LASKER, District Judge:

          On June 7, 1971, an Allegheny Airlines flight crashed in fog while approaching New Haven Airport. Nancy Feldman, a passenger, died, in the crash. Allegheny conceded liability, and the parties submitted the issue of damages to Judge Blumenfeld of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.[1] The airline appeals[2] from Judge Blumenfeld's judgment awarding $444,056. to Reid Laurence Feldman, as administrator of the estate of his late wife.

          Determination of damages in this diversity wrongful death action is governed by Connecticut law, specifically Conn.Gen.Stats. § 52-555, which measures recovery by the loss to the decedent of the value of her life rather than by the value of the estate she would have left had she lived a full life. Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349, 1351 (2d Cir. 1974); Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 669-671, 136 A.2d 918, 924 (1957). In accordance with Connecticut law, the judgment represented the sum of (1) the value of Mrs. Feldman's lost earning capacity and (2) the destruction of her capacity to enjoy life's non-remunerative activities, less (3) deductions for her necessary personal living expenses. No award was made for conscious pain and suffering before Mrs. Feldman's death because the evidence on this point was too speculative, nor did the award include pre-judgment interest.

          Damages in a wrongful death action must of necessity represent a crude monetary forecast of how the decedent's life would have evolved. Prior to stating his specific findings, the district judge noted, and we agree, that "[t]he whole problem of assessing damages for wrongful death . . . defies any precise mathematical computation," citing Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., supra, 144 Conn. at 675, 136 A.2d at 927 (382 F.Supp. at 1282).

          It is clear from Judge Blumenfeld's remarkably detailed and precise analysis that he nevertheless made a prodigious effort to reduce the intangible elements of an award to measurable quantities. It is with reluctance, therefore, that we conclude that his determination of loss of earnings and personal living expenses must be remanded.

I. Damages for Destruction of Earning Capacity.

          Nancy Feldman was 25 years old at the time of her death. From 1968 until shortly before the plane crash, she lived and worked in New Haven while her husband studied at Yale Law School. On Mr. Feldman's graduation from law school in the spring of 1971 the Feldmans moved to Washington, D. C., where they intended to settle. At the time of her death, Mrs. Feldman had neither accepted nor formally applied for employment in Washington, although she had been accepted by George Washington Law School for admission in the Fall of 1971 and had made inquiries about the availability of employment.

          A key objection of appellant Allegheny runs to Judge Blumenfeld's calculation of the discount rate at 1½% in determining the present value of Mrs. Feldman's lost earning capacity on the grounds that the court has no right to take inflation into account in any way in its assessment of damages. The district court decided that the appropriate rate of discount would be the "price of capital," such to be "obtained by adjusting interest 387*387 rates on `risk-free' investments so as to exclude the additional interest demanded by the investment market as compensation for investors' assumption of the risk of inflation." 382 F.Supp. at 1293.

          In calculating the discount rate, the appellee's expert, relied on by the district court, used an average earnings of 4.14% (from mutual savings bank investments) as representative of a prudent, non-sophisticated investment and subtracted 2.87% as the average yearly inflation rate revealed in the Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index over an 18-year period, yielding a 1.27% difference which was rounded up to 1.5%. Judge Blumenfeld corroborated this "inflation-adjusted discount rate" of 1.5% by calculating the real yields of investments since 1940 in federal government securities (with inflation factored out) from the 1974 Economic Report of the President, a source referred to by appellant Allegheny's expert. The district court made this calculation according to its view of Connecticut's law and policies on the subject of inflation accounting in wrongful death damages.

          We agree with the district court's interpretation of Connecticut law as leaving open the question how inflation may be accounted for in such damages.[3] We believe that Judge Blumenfeld, a long-time Connecticut lawyer and district court judge for 14 years, appropriately hypothesized the Connecticut Supreme Court's favorable reaction to a discount rate adjustment, since Connecticut, unlike most jurisdictions, reduces what would otherwise be inflated judgments for wrongful death injuries by requiring deduction of income taxes payable on future earnings. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., supra, 144 Conn. at 673, 136 A.2d at 926.

          The district court was fully aware that in a way it was being speculative in what it was doing, as every trier of fact is required to some extent to be whenever it engages in calculating future earnings and a lump sum discount rate. 382 F.Supp. at 1291-92. As a matter of federal law we do not necessarily vouchsafe either the principle of making an "inflation adjustment" in setting a discount rate[4] or the means by which it was done in this instance. Yet we note that consideration of inflation has historically been approved in a number of state courts. See, e. g., Halloran v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 276, 115 A. 143, 144 (1921) and cases cited in Judge Blumenfeld's opinion, 382 F.Supp. at 1290. As a matter of federal law, at least one circuit has approved jury consideration of the impact of inflation and even reversed for charging that it should not consider "future increases or decreases in the purchasing power of money." Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969). Our own Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 489 F.2d 1349, affirmed a $369,400. judgment on a jury verdict for the estate of another victim of the very same crash here involved; while the point was not discussed specifically in the opinion it is interesting that Judge Blumenfeld's charge to the jury referred to the plaintiff's expert's testimony on a 1.5% discount rate and the underlying rationale therefor, a reference duly attacked on 388*388 appeal by Allegheny. Commentators have supported an accounting for inflation in damage awards, see Econometrics and Damages, 44 Wash.L.Rev. 351, 360-61 (1969); Comment, 6 U.S.F.L.Rev. 311 (1972). It has even been suggested that a trial court may be in error in failing to account fully for inflation in wrongful death damages in a non-diversity case. See Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866, 868 (9th Cir. 1974).[5] As Judge Friendly himself said in McWeeney v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960):

"There are few who do not regard some degree of continuing inflation as here to stay and would be willing to translate their own earning power into a fixed annuity, and it is scarcely to be expected that the average personal injury plaintiff will have the acumen to find investments that are proof against both inflation and depression — a task formidable for the most expert investor." (Footnote omitted.)

          Within the latitude afforded by the Connecticut decisions, note 3 supra, and with the support in the historical and other economic evidence before him that Judge Blumenfeld had, we cannot fault him for computing the discount rate by offsetting the anticipated rate of earnings from investment of the lump sum to be awarded, by an inflation factor.

          In computing the value of Mrs. Feldman's lost earning capacity, the trial judge found that Mrs. Feldman's professional earnings in her first year of employment would have been $15,040. and that with the exception of eight years during which she intended to raise a family and to work only part time, she would have continued in full employment for forty years until she retired at age 65. The judge further found that during the period in which she would be principally occupied in raising her family, Mrs. Feldman would have remained sufficiently in contact with her profession to maintain, but not increase, her earning ability. Pointing out that under Connecticut law damages are to be based on "the loss of earning capacity, not future earnings per se . . ." (382 F.Supp. at 1282) (emphasis in original), the judge concluded that when a person such as Mrs. Feldman, who possesses significant earning capacity, chooses to forego remunerative employment in order to raise a family, she manifestly values child rearing as highly as work in her chosen profession and her loss of the opportunity to engage in child rearing "may thus fairly be measured by reference to the earning capacity possessed by the decedent" (382 F.Supp. at 1283). Applying this rationale, the trial judge made an award for the eight year period of $17,044. per year, the salary which he computed Mrs. Feldman would have reached in the year preceding the first child-bearing year, but did not increase the amount during the period.

          We believe the trial judge erred in automatically valuing Mrs. Feldman's loss for the child-bearing period at the level of her salary. As Judge Blumenfeld's opinion points out, the Connecticut cases distinguish clearly between loss of earning capacity and loss of capacity to carry on life's non-remunerative activities. As we read Connecticut law, where a decedent suffers both kinds of loss for the same period each must be valued independently in relation to the elements particular to it.

          The court in Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., supra, equated "earning capacity" with "the capacity to carry on the particular activity of earning money." 144 Conn. at 671, 136 A.2d at 925. Here the evidence established, and the trial court found, that Mrs. Feldman would have worked only part-time while raising a family. In the circumstances, we believe that under the Connecticut rule the plaintiff is entitled to recover "loss of earnings" for the child raising years only to the extent that the court finds that Mrs. Feldman would actually have 389*389 worked during those years. For example, if the court finds that she would have worked 25% of the time during that period, the plaintiff would properly be credited only with 25% of her salary for each of the eight years.

          This conclusion is consistent with the other leading authority in Connecticut. In Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946), an award for "loss of future earnings" was denied in respect of a decedent who had been employed as a housekeeper, but who at the time of her death was a housewife with no intention of seeking outside employment. The court held that any award for wrongful death in such a case should be based not on the decedent's loss of earning capacity, but rather on her "loss of the enjoyment of life's activities." 132 Conn. at 470, 45 A.2d at 793. Consistently with the holding in Chase, we conclude that any award in relation to the portion of the child-raising period during which Mrs. Feldman would not have been working must be predicated on her "loss of the enjoyment of life's activities" rather than on loss of earnings, and on remand the district judge should reevaluate the elements accordingly.

          We recognize that thus computed the total award for Mrs. Feldman's child-raising years may be similar to that already made, but conclude that the conceptual framework we have described is required by Connecticut's distinctive law of damages.

II. Deductions for Decedent's Necessary Personal Living Expenses.

          Where the decedent had been subject to the expense of self-maintenance, Connecticut case law provides for the deduction of "personal living expenses" from damages otherwise recoverable for the loss of earning capacity. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., supra, 144 Conn. at 674, 136 A.2d at 926. Judge Blumenfeld properly held that although a husband under Connecticut law has a duty to support his spouse, (see, e. g., Conn.Gen.Stats. §§ 46-10; 53-304), that duty does not exempt an income-earning wife from an obligation to apportion a part of her income for her own support. The Floyd court defined the term "personal living expenses" as:

". . . those personal expenses which, under the standard of living followed by a given decedent, it would have been reasonably necessary for him to incur in order to keep himself in such a condition of health and well-being that he could maintain his capacity to enjoy life's activities, including the capacity to earn money." 144 Conn. at 675, 136 A.2d at 926-927.

          The trial judge concluded that, under Connecticut law, deductions for Mrs. Feldman's personal living expenses should include the cost, at a level commensurate with her standard of living, of food, shelter, clothing and health care. The judge fixed such costs in Washington, D. C. for the year following her death at $2,750., increasing that figure by 3% per year to the age of retirement. After retirement, living expenses were deducted at the rate of $5,000. annually. These figures were discounted annually by 1.5% to reduce the deduction to present value. Although the process by which the trial judge determined the level of Mrs. Feldman's living expenses was proper, we believe that he substantially underestimated the actual costs of food, shelter, clothing and health care.

          On direct examination, Mr. Feldman testified that his wife's personal living expenses in New Haven had been approximately $2,120. per year. On cross-examination, this figure was shown to have been unduly conservative with regard to clothing and food, and the trial judge rounded the amount to $2,200. He found that the Feldmans' cost of living would have increased after they moved to Washington, where living expenses were higher and their social and economic status would have changed from that of students to that of young professionals. Accordingly, the judge adjusted the $2,200. figure upward by 25% for the 390*390 first year Mrs. Feldman would have resided in Washington, and by 3% annually until she would have reached the age of sixty-five and retired. Personal living expenses for that year were calculated to be $6,675, but during the years of retirement deductions were lowered to $5,000., a level which the trial judge felt was consistent with a high standard of living but also reflected the fact that the cessation of work often produces a reduction in personal expenditures.

          We recognize the perils involved in an appellate court dealing de novo with factual matters. We would not venture to do so in this case if we did not feel we have the right to take judicial notice of the facts of life, including the cost of living for those in the position of the Feldmans in such metropolitan areas as Washington, D. C. We reluctantly conclude that the trial judge was in error in computing living expenses at $2,750. for the year after Mrs. Feldman's death, and building on that base for later years.

          Without attempting to specify what the results of such a computation should be, we believe that it would fall more nearly in the area of $4,000., including approximately $25. per week for food, $125. per month for rent, $1,000. annually for clothing and $400. annually for health care. For one year the difference between the trial judge's figure of $2,750. and the suggested figure of $4,000. may be considered de minimis in relation to the total award. However, projected over the 52 years of Mrs. Feldman's life expectancy, and at an annual increase of 3%, the difference is sufficiently large to require us to remand the matter for further determination by the trial judge.

          We have considered the other points raised by Allegheny and find them to be without merit.

          The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge (concurring dubitante):

          This case is another example of a federal court's being compelled by the Congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction to determine a novel and important question of state law on which state decisions do not shed even a glimmer of light.[1] The question here, how far awards of damages for disabling personal injury or for death shall attempt to make allowance for future inflation, is of great concern to the states since awards like that made here will further escalate the heavily mounting burden of liability insurance costs. The state decisions and the federal cases endeavoring to ascertain state law are in a stage of uncertainty and flux. So too are the decisions with respect to federal law. Compare Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 414 F.2d 305 (6 Cir. 1969), with Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6 Cir. 1974). In a case of federal law, the Fifth Circuit recently granted en banc consideration and by a vote of twelve to three expressly disapproved a district court's effort, in computing lost future earnings, to take account of possible inflationary trends over a period of several decades on the ground that "the influence on future damages of possible inflation or deflation is too speculative a matter for judicial determination." Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236, 241 (5 Cir. 1975) (en banc), petition for certiorari filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684.

          Both plaintiff's expert and the court allowed for inflation not by building cost-of-living increases into future earnings but by applying a rate of only 1.5% in discounting to present value estimated 391*391 lost future earnings and other recoverable values calculated in 1971 dollars. The district court derived this 1.5% figure by comparing rates of return on a number of "risk-free" securities issued by the federal government (plaintiff's expert examined other types of "riskfree" fixed income investments and reached similar conclusions) since 1940 with rates of inflation during the same period as reflected by annual changes in the Consumer Price Index. The court subtracted the latter from the former on the theory that the latter amounted to that portion of the return representing what investors have historically demanded as protection against inflation. The difference varied from year to year, but the court determined that 1.5% was a representative figure for the period. This was deemed to be "that part of the annual yield which constitutes payment for the use of capital" or "real yield" — presumably the rate of return which investors would be willing to accept in an inflation-free economy; while the rate of inflation might rise and fall, investors could be expected to demand about 1.5% return on safe investments in addition to protection against expected inflation. The court recognized that other courts have been reluctant to take explicit account of the effects of future inflation (see 510 F.2d at 236 n.1) but stated that its approach in fact was "a means to avoid undue speculation" with respect to future inflation and even suggested that when, as in this case, the effects of future inflation have been expressly excluded in the calculation of the amount to be discounted, the "appropriate rate of discount" must necessarily be adjusted so that "the additional interest demanded by the investment market as compensation for investors' assumption of the risk of inflation" is excluded. The distinction drawn between this method and the one more commonly used — adjusting the amount to be discounted so as to include a sum reflecting assumptions about future inflation — apparently given some weight by the majority — is more apparent than real. Plaintiff's expert acknowledged that "another approach" or "alternative calculation" for this problem would be to increase estimated lost future compensation and living expenses to take account of the effects of future inflation and not reduce the rate of return used for discounting by any amount reflecting inflation. The outcome of the calculation under either approach would be very nearly identical. Indeed, at one point counsel for plaintiff asked his expert to calculate the present value in 1971 dollars of the deceased's lost earnings based upon the "speculative" assumption of an inflation rate of 4.5% and a rate of return of 6%. This approach would have reduced the recovery by less than $2,000 out of approximately a quarter of a million dollars.

          In any event, plaintiff's expert came up with a $253,424 present value of Mrs. Feldman's projected earnings. Using higher starting and ending salary figures and a different percentage deduction for income taxes, the judge arrived at an initial sum of $499,953 to which he added $100,000, admittedly drawn from the atmosphere, "for the destruction of the decedent's capacity to enjoy life's activities", an element recognized as appropriate for consideration by Connecticut law, and from which he subtracted $155,897 as the discounted sum of personal living expenses, yielding a total recovery of $444,056. On the judge's computations, Mrs. Feldman, who had been earning $10,000 a year at the time of her death in 1971, would be earning $33,757 in 1971 dollars in 2011 as a "legislative analyst" for the National League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors (NLC/USCM), when she would have attained the age of 65. However, as counsel for Allegheny points out, without dispute from counsel for Mr. Feldman and apparently based upon the testimony of plaintiff's expert about an alternative method of calculation discussed above, a calculation deducting 4.5% for inflation from a 6% interest rate assumed to be attainable on an investment free from risks other than inflation implicitly carries 392*392 the prediction that Mrs. Feldman, and also all federal employees in the GS 16-7 category (which Mrs. Feldman hypothetically would reach after 40 years under the scheme for predicting merit pay increases adopted by the court), would in fact be earning $122,823 in the year 2011. Similar calculations based upon maintaining the 1.5% differential could yield even more striking results, which are largely veiled by the court's approach. One point that immediately occurs is why, if Mrs. Feldman's salary would rise to such a figure, income tax, deductible from damages under Connecticut law, should be computed at only 25%, a rate which the court found would achieve "substantial justice." It is common knowledge that one effect of inflation is that the same progressive rates of income tax take an ever larger bite out of real income, and it is unlikely in the last degree that, in an era of increasing budgets, due in considerable part to inflation, Congress would make the accommodation needed to prevent this.

          Save for this important point not urged by Allegheny and the two corrections made by the majority, I have no reason to question the meticulous calculations of the able district judge. Indeed one could argue that, at a time when the national goal is simply to bring back the golden age of single rather than double digit inflation, without too much question what the single digit should be, the entire interest return on otherwise riskfree investments, today probably in excess of 6%, represents compensation against the risk of inflation; in other words, investors in fixed income securities are willing, for the time being, to forego any return if they can keep the real amount of their investment intact. Indeed, insofar as the return is subject to income tax, they are not even achieving that. Yet common sense suggests that investors will not tolerate such a situation indefinitely.

          I doubt whether judges, or anyone else, can peer so far into the future; the district court's computations suffer from what Mr. Justice Holmes, in another context, called "[t]he dangers of a delusive exactness," Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342, 42 S.Ct. 124, 133, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921) (dissenting opinion). Instead of recognizing the plethora of uncertainties as the Fifth Circuit has done, see Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., supra, 510 F.2d at 236, compare Frankel v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 1331, 1346 (E.D.Pa. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3 Cir. 1972), the court below endeavored to construct an iron-clad guaranty against the unknown and unknowable future effects of inflation. The estate of a young woman without dependents is hardly an outstanding candidate for a forty-year protection against inflation not enjoyed at all by millions of Americans who depend on pensions or investment income and not fully enjoyed by millions more whose salaries have in no wise kept pace with inflation.

          The court necessarily assumed not only continued inflation, which unhappily seems likely in some degree, but continued responsiveness to it by equivalent wage increases. Yet we have seen in recent months that employers, particularly municipalities, simply cannot maintain these. Thousands of New York City's employees have been dismissed and the rest are being subjected to a wage freeze. Other important cities may not be far behind in having to resort to similar measures. Under such conditions can we be sure that NLC/USCM would continue to grant automatic cost-of-living pay increases for 40 years, as the court assumed? Perhaps so, since the main business of NLC/USCM is seeking to obtain federal funds for cities, which surely is a boom industry if any there be; but perhaps not.

          I would also question the likelihood — indeed, the certainty as found by the court — that, despite her ability, determination and apparent good health, Mrs. Feldman would have worked full time for forty years until attaining age 65, except for the eight years she was expected to devote to the bearing and early rearing of two children. Apart from 393*393 the danger of disabling illness, temporary or permanent, there would be many attractions to which the wife of a successful lawyer might yield: devoting herself to various types of community service, badly needed but unpaid, or to political activity; accompanying her husband on business trips — often these days to far-off foreign countries; making pleasure trips for periods and at times of the year inconsistent with the demands of her job; perhaps, as the years went on, simply taking time off for reflection and enjoyment. Granted that in an increasing number of professional households both spouses work full time until retirement age, in more they do not. Surely some discount can and should be applied to the recovery for these reasons.

          My guess is also that, even if inflation should be taken into account, neither a Connecticut nor a federal jury would have made an award as large as was made here. I say this despite the $369,400 jury verdict for another death arising out of the same crash which we sustained in Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 489 F.2d 1349, where we did not expressly discuss the inflation question. Even though the existence of dependents is legally irrelevant under the Connecticut survival statute, a jury would hardly have ignored that, whereas Perry was survived by a dependent wife and five children ranging from 6 to 14 years in age, Mrs. Feldman had no dependents. More significant to me is that in Perry's case the jury awarded only $369,400 as against the $535,000 estimate of Mrs. Perry's expert for economic loss alone; here the judge was more generous in important respects than plaintiff's expert.

          However, I am loathe to require a busy federal judge to spend still more time on this diversity case, especially when I do not know what instructions to give him about Connecticut law. Some of the questions I have raised are not open for exploitation by the defendant since its own expert made his calculations on the basis that Mrs. Feldman would work until age 65. Although intuition tells me that the Supreme Court of Connecticut would not sustain the award made here, I cannot prove it. I therefore go along with the majority, although with the gravest doubts. I do this on the basis that, as far as I am concerned, the decision will not constitute a precedent on the inflation problem in a case arising under federal law. Judgments like Mr. Feldman's and Mrs. Perry's also inevitably raise serious policy questions with respect to damages in airline accident cases beyond those here considered, but these are for Congress and not for the courts.

          [*] Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

          [1] Judge Blumenfeld's detailed opinion is reported at 382 F.Supp. 1271.

          [2] Mr. Feldman filed a cross-appeal to enable him to argue that, if this court were inclined to adopt some of Allegheny's contentions, "there are other damage elements, not recognized by the District Court which would offset any reduction in the award and thus justify a judgment of $444,056." We disagree that Judge Blumenfeld failed to recognize any appropriate element of damages.

          [3] Connecticut law requires discounting the lump sum representing loss of earning capacity (Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946)), less income taxes that would be paid (Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957)). In Quednau v. Langrish, 144 Conn. 706, 714, 137 A.2d 544, 549 (1957), the court reserved judgment whether a case "could arise in which it would be proper to charge the jury that they should take into consideration the depreciated value of the dollar in assessing damages." The Connecticut courts' position thus does not pose the bar to explicit consideration of an inflation factor by the fact-finder which the Nebraska court's position did in Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1975).

          [4] We refer specifically to the situation as here where inflation is not taken into account in calculating the amount of damages from most earning capacity.

          [5] But see Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc, 12-3 on issue of inflation), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (June 24, 1975).

          [1] In recent years we have had many cases in which we have been obliged largely to improvise state law. See, e. g., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2 Cir. 1973); East Hampton Dewitt Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 1234 (2 Cir. 1973); Modave v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 501 F.2d 1065 (2 Cir. 1974). Despite the sincere respect that I have for Judge Blumenfeld and his long years of experience as a Connecticut practitioner and federal district judge, I do not believe that he, or anyone else, can make any reliable prediction what the Supreme Court of Connecticut would do with the exceedingly difficult question here discussed.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

          Defendant CB & I Constructors, Inc., ("CB & I") negligently caused a June 2002 wildfire that burned roughly 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest in Southern California. The United States brought a civil action against CB & I to recover damages for harm caused by the fire. CB & I does not contest its liability or the jury's award of roughly $7.6 million in fire suppression, emergency mitigation, and resource protection costs. It challenges only the jury's additional award of $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages.

          830*830 The district court denied CB & I's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial or remittitur, concluding that under California law the government could recover damages for all of the harm caused by the fire, including intangible harm to the environment. The court held that the government provided sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages, and that the resulting award was not grossly excessive. We affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

          The Angeles National Forest covers roughly 650,000 acres in the San Gabriel Mountains, just north of metropolitan Los Angeles. It was set aside for watershed protection and public use in 1892 as the first federal forest reserve in California. See ANTHONY GODFREY, THE EVER-CHANGING VIEW: A HISTORY OF NATIONAL FORESTS IN CALIFORNIA 38 (2005). The U.S. Forest Service administers the forest "for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 528. It is part of a National Forest System "dedicated to the long-term benefit for present and future generations." Id. § 1609(a).

          The Angeles National Forest is an important environmental and recreational resource for Southern Californians, representing about 70 percent of all open space in Los Angeles County. It is also a refuge for native plants and animals, including several threatened and endangered species. San Francisquito Canyon, a chaparral and sage scrub ecosystem surrounded by high ridges in the northwestern part of the National Forest, contains known populations of several species protected under the Endangered Species Act, including the Bald Eagle, California Condor, Southwest Willow Fly-catcher, and California Red-Legged Frog. The Red-Legged Frog was once widespread throughout the region, but now has only three known populations in Southern California. The largest of the three populations is in San Francisquito Canyon, where the frog remains "extremely vulnerable" to local extinction.

          In April 2002, a county water district hired Merco Construction Engineers, Inc., ("Merco") to build four water storage tanks for a housing project in the city of Santa Clarita. Merco subcontracted with CB & I to construct two of the steel tanks. The site was on private land, next to a brush-covered hillside about a half mile from the National Forest. As the general contractor, Merco maintained a superintendent at the construction site for part of the work day. CB & I encouraged its employees to work quickly by offering them a financial bonus if they completed the tanks in fewer hours than initially projected.

          On June 5, 2002, the air temperature at the work site exceeded 100 degrees. A crew from CB & I worked through the heat to perform tasks that posed known fire hazards. Neither CB & I nor Merco had taken several recommended fire prevention precautions, such as clearing brush 100 feet from the tanks, regularly watering dry vegetation, or keeping a fire watch on the ground while the crew worked on the roof.

          At about 2:40 p.m., a CB & I employee was on the roof of the tank operating an electric grinder. The grinder cuts and smooths metal with a high-speed rotating abrasive disc that sends out a trail of sparks and hot metal slag. The employee was directing the sparks away from his coworkers and off the edge of the tank toward the dry brush. He saw that the sparks ignited a fire, but by the time the 831*831 crew descended from the roof the fire was out of control.

          As the fire spread, it burned about 2,000 acres of private and county-owned property. It quickly reached the National Forest where it burned another 18,000 acres, or more than 28 square miles. Federal, state, and county firefighters fought the fire for nearly a week before they contained it on June 11. The government incurred roughly $6.6 million in fire suppression costs. The fire became known as the Copper Fire.

          The CB & I welding crew returned to work the day after starting the fire. Company employees eventually received a bonus for completing the water tanks in fewer hours than originally projected.

          Within the National Forest, some of the greatest fire damage occurred in San Francisquito Canyon. The fire burned "pretty much all" of the native chaparral and sage scrub vegetation in the Canyon, opening the door to invasive, nonnative plants that increase the risk of future fires. For example, the Copper Fire spread an infestation of Arundo donax — a highly invasive giant reed that grows as fast as eighteen inches per day, outcompetes native vegetation, and clogs waterways. The fire also created a serious flood hazard by destroying vegetation that normally intercepts the flow of rainwater and allows for filtration of the water into the soil. Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 307, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (discussing a July 1977 forest fire and resulting February 1978 flood in the Angeles National Forest). The Copper Fire increased the rates of sedimentation in the Canyon watershed by up to three times its normal amount. Much of San Francisquito Creek filled in with ash and dead trees.

          The U.S. Forest Service assembled a Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation ("BAER") team of specialists to coordinate immediate erosion control measures after the fire. The team included a hydrologist, soil scientist, botanist, biologist, and archeologist. Based on the team's recommendations, the Forest Service installed drainage on forest roads and built a large, 30,000 cubic-yard catchment basin to trap mudflow from denuded hillsides. The total cost of BAER work was about $530,000. The government also estimated about $515,000 in anticipated resource protection costs, such as manually removing Arundo donax from about 40 burned acres and surveying and reestablishing boundary markers damaged by the fire.

          In September 2002, as part of the BAER process, the Forest Service closed public access to areas where the National Forest most needed to recover. The Forest Service prohibited all users in these areas for one year, and horseback riders, bicycles, and off-road vehicles for two. Vegetation had regrown by roughly 40% when the closures ended in September 2004. However, researchers estimated it would take as long as 20 to 25 years for the National Forest to recover from the fire.

          The fire and subsequent floods destroyed more than 90% of the California Red-Legged Frog habitat in the National Forest. In 2002, before the fire, about 350 to 500 adult California Red-Legged Frogs lived along San Francisquito Creek. By 2009, researchers saw only about 30 to 50 frogs. Researchers expressed concern that the small size of the remaining population would result in a lack of genetic diversity, making the population more susceptible to diseases and other threats.

          The Copper Fire also caused extreme damage to the Hazel Dell Mining Camp, an abandoned graphite mine in the National 832*832 Forest with historically significant cabins and artifacts from the early twentieth century. The fire consumed all of the camp's wooden structures and contents and collapsed two horizontal mining tunnels. It left the vegetation at the site "moonscaped" and "burned beyond recognition." Damage from the fire reduced the site's historical value and integrity to the point where the camp was no longer eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.

B. Procedural Background

          In June 2008, the United States filed a civil action against CB & I and Merco to recover tort damages resulting from the Copper Fire. During a five-day jury trial in September 2009, the government presented evidence of monetary costs for its fire suppression, BAER, and resource protection efforts. The government also called expert witnesses who testified about environmental harm to scenic views, recreational use, soil stability, water quality, plant life, wildlife habitat, the Red-Legged Frog population, and the mining camp. However, the government did not elicit testimony that put a dollar amount on the environmental harm. It maintained that the environmental damages are "not susceptible to empirical calculation" because they are "measured by their value to the public and for posterity."

          In its closing argument, the government described the intangible environmental harm as "a category of damage that you, the jury, are going to decide based on your assessment of the evidence." The government asked the jury, "What is ... the fact that the Hazel Dell Mining Camp isn't there anymore worth? What is it worth that the [California Red-Legged F]rog has been compromised and the gene pool polluted? What is it worth that the grasses have been changed and other aspects of the Angeles National Forest have been changed?" The government suggested two possible ways the jury could calculate an award for the intangible environmental damages: first, by applying a "multiplier" to the hard damages; or second, by determining a "price per acre" for the 18,000 acres of burned National Forest land.

          The district court instructed the jury, "The United States does not have to prove the exact amount of damages that will provide reasonable compensation for the harm. However, you must not speculate or guess in awarding damages." The court also instructed the jury not to include any punitive damages "for the purpose of punishing or making an example of the defendant."

          The jury returned a special verdict finding CB & I and Merco liable for negligence and trespass by fire, allocating 65% of the fault to CB & I and 35% to Merco. It awarded roughly $7.6 million for fire suppression, BAER, and resource protection costs in the amounts requested by the government. The jury also awarded the government an additional $28.8 million for intangible environmental damages, or $1,600 per acre of burned National Forest land.

          Merco had settled with the government for $2.1 million just before the jury returned its verdict. In November 2009, the district court entered a judgment against CB & I, offsetting its damages liability based on the Merco settlement. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 1431.2, the court held CB & I jointly and severally liable for the $7.6 million in economic damages, but only severally liable for its share of the $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages. CB & I's 65% share of the environmental damages award was $18.72 million.

          In December 2009, CB & I renewed an earlier motion for judgment as a matter of 833*833 law. The company did not challenge its liability, or the jury's award of $7.6 million in economic damages. Rather, CB & I argued that the intangible environmental damages were not compensable. The company also moved for a new trial or remittitur, arguing that the $28.8 million award was excessive.

          In January 2010, the district court denied both motions. It wrote:

          In burning 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest, the Copper Fire harmed lands held in trust for this and future generations. The Government should be able to recover damages for all of the damages caused by the fire, including the intangible environmental damages, and the trial provided sufficient evidence for the jurors to quantify that harm.

          CB & I timely appealed. Energy utilities that operate transmission lines in California forests, and tree companies that trim or remove trees for the utilities, filed amicus briefs supporting CB & I on appeal (collectively "Amici").

II. Standard of Review

          We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Marketing FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir.2008), and its legal conclusion about the availability of certain types of damages, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.1998). We review a jury's damage award for substantial evidence. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial and remittitur for abuse of discretion. DSPT Int'l., Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.2010).

III. Discussion

          On appeal, CB & I makes three primary arguments challenging its share of the $28.8 million jury award for intangible environmental damages. First, CB & I argues that intangible noneconomic damages are not compensable in tort suits alleging harm to property. Second, it contends that the government did not produce sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages in a rational way. Finally, CB & I argues that the jury award was grossly excessive. We take the three arguments in turn.

A. Compensability of Intangible Environmental Damages

          State law governs the federal government's recovery of damages for harm caused by fires in National Forests. See United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 917, 920 (9th Cir.1980).

          California's general tort statute provides that the proper measure of damages "is the amount which will compensate [the plaintiff] for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not." Cal. Civ.Code § 3333. "There is no fixed rule for the measure of tort damages under Civil Code section 3333. The measure that most appropriately compensates the injured party for the loss sustained should be adopted." Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 88 Cal.App.4th 439, 446-47, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 (2001). "What is apparent from the[] cases is the flexibility employed in the approach to measuring damages and the broad scope of alternative theories applied to fit the particular circumstances of a case." Id. at 447, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 856; see also 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 1727 (10th ed. 2005) ("The different kinds of real property and varying types of injury make it unwise to establish a fixed rule 834*834 governing damages, and consequently a number of alternative theories are applied.").

          California also has a specific statutory provision governing liability for negligently set fires. It provides:

          Any person who personally or through another wilfully, negligently, or in violation of law, sets fire to, allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled or attended by him to escape to, the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, is liable to the owner of such property for any damages to the property caused by the fire.

          Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13007. Based on the provision's "broad language" and "history of liberal construction," a California Court of Appeal held that section 13007 places "no restrictions on the type of property damage that is compensable." McKay v. California, 8 Cal.App.4th 937, 940, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 (1992). California courts have "neither deviated from nor limited the reach of" the provision, and generally treat it as an "addition[] to rather than deduction[] from plaintiffs' general protections against negligent harm." Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379, 1381, 1384 n. 5 (9th Cir.1995).

          Landowners in California may recover damages for all the harm, including environmental injuries, caused by negligently set fires. In People v. Southern Pacific Co., 139 Cal.App.3d 627, 188 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1983), the court recognized that a private landowner was entitled to both the fair market value of destroyed timber as well as the cost of restoring the property through reforestation. Id. at 635, 188 Cal.Rptr. 913. The court reasoned that the fire damaged plaintiff's property "not only through destruction of trees used for timber, but through damage to the soil.... These are separate injuries." Id.; see also McKay, 8 Cal.App.4th at 939-40, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 771 (permitting recovery of lost agricultural profits, as well as diminution in value of a burned 25-acre farm).

          More recently, a California Court of Appeal upheld a negligence award of more than $3 million against CB & I for damage that the Copper Fire caused to a private, 34-acre ranch near Santa Clarita. Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 179 Cal.App.4th 442, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (2009). The fire destroyed about 100 oak trees on the property, damaged several structures, and was a substantial factor in subsequent mudslides that gouged a 200-foot-long gully across a pasture. Id. at 448-49, 102 Cal. Rptr.3d 32. The Court of Appeal affirmed an award of more than $2.6 million in restoration costs — including roughly $1.5 million for erosion and flood control, streambed reconstruction, and removing silt and sand from a pasture — even though these damages "substantially exceeded" the market value of the property before the fire. Id. at 454, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 32. The court also upheld an additional $750,000 in damages for harm to trees on the property. Id. at 459-61, 102 Cal. Rptr.3d 32.

          Federal courts have allowed the government to recover environmental damages for negligently set forest fires on protected public land in California. In Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.1929), we affirmed a damages award against a negligent lumber company for harm caused to merchantable timber in the National Forest as well as to young growth, which "while it had no market value, had a value to its owner." Id. at 644. We explained that the measure of damages for the merchantable timber was the market value of the trees, but that the measure of damages for young growth in the National Forest, which could not be sold, was "the damage actually sustained, that is to say, what was required to make 835*835 the government whole." Id. We held that this amount "might properly include the cost of restoring the land to the condition in which it was before the fire." Id.

          In a case arising out of an August 2000 fire in the Plumas and Lassen National Forests, a district court in the Eastern District of California held that under California law the federal government was "entitled to full compensation for all of its damages." United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1143 (E.D.Cal.2008) (emphasis in original). The court noted that many of the tort cases cited by the defendant railroad company had "little or no relevance" to a case, as here, in which the defendant "burned thousands of acres of protected government forest lands for which no real estate market value exists." Id. The court held that "to `fully' compensate plaintiff for defendant's negligent conduct," the government "may seek damages for injuries other than to the timber, including harm to the soil,... and destruction of wildlife, habitat, recreation use, views, etc." Id. at 1150.

          CB & I and Amici argue that the government may not recover intangible environmental damages because non-economic damages are not recoverable in negligence suits regarding harm to real property. However, CB & I and Amici err by relying on cases that merely limit damages for emotional distress or suffering. See, e.g., Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal.4th 543, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 886, 981 P.2d 978, 985 (1999) ("No California case has allowed recovery for emotional distress arising solely out of [negligent] property damage." (internal quotation marks omitted)). They point to no case holding that noneconomic damages, as a general category, are precluded in suits alleging harm to property. California law plainly contemplates that noneconomic damages are compensable in such suits. See Cal. Civ.Code § 1431.2(a) ("In any action for ... property damage,... the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several...."); accord DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 593, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140, 145 (1992) ("Section 1431.2 declares plainly and clearly that in tort suits for ... property damage ... each defendant shall be liable only for those non-economic damages directly attributable to his or her own percentage of fault." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). In fact, CB & I and Amici acknowledge that at least some noneconomic damages, such as annoyance and discomfort, are recoverable in trespass cases under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal.2d 265, 288 P.2d 507, 511 (1955); Kelly, 179 Cal.App.4th at 456-59, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (reversing a $543,000 annoyance and discomfort award because the plaintiff property owner merely stored personal property on the trespassed land at the time of the fire).

          The government never sought emotional distress damages in the case. Rather, the intangible environmental damages sought by the government are a type of property damage caused by the fire. See McKay, 8 Cal.App.4th at 940, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 (holding that California law places "no restrictions on the type of property damage that is compensable" for negligently set forest fires). The district court observed that the government simply made an "instructive" analogy between valuing environmental harm and other forms of noneconomic damages. Cf. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? — Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 478-79 (1972) (analogizing valuation of environmental harm to tort damages for pain and suffering); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse 836*836 Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 937-44 (1994) (same). Environmental harm shares characteristics with other noneconomic damages in that they are "subjective, non-monetary losses." Cal. Civ.Code § 1431.2(b)(2); see also Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462-63 (D.C.Cir.1989) ("From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural resources have values that are not fully captured by the market system."). However, as the district court noted, "[t]hat the Government has analogized its evidentiary burden in seeking intangible environmental damages to the burden of a plaintiff seeking damages for emotional distress does not mean that the Government is impermissibly seeking damages for emotional distress. It is not."

          For similar reasons, CB & I and Amici's argument that the government lacks the ability to experience emotional distress is misplaced. See, e.g., Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal.2d 461, 72 Cal.Rptr. 344, 446 P.2d 152, 156 (1968) ("Plaintiff Templeton, a corporation, does not seriously urge that it, a corporate entity, can sustain mental suffering."). Here, the government did not seek damages for emotional distress or mental suffering. It sought damages for intangible environmental harms caused by the fire. Moreover, CB & I and Amici's attempt to analogize the federal government to a corporate entity is mistaken. The United States is not a corporation. In the public lands context, the federal government is more akin to a trustee that holds natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations. See United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342, 8 S.Ct. 1083, 32 L.Ed. 121 (1888) ("The public domain is held by the government as part of its trust. The government is charged with the duty, and clothed with the power, to protect it from trespass and unlawful appropriation...."). As the district court observed, the Copper Fire harmed 18,000 acres of federal forest land "held in trust for this and future generations."

          CB & I relies on a Canadian Supreme Court case to argue that intangible environmental damages are not recoverable for a negligently set forest fire. In British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products, Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74 (Can.), a logging company negligently burned approximately 3,700 acres of government-owned forest in British Columbia. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2. The Crown filed suit to recover fire suppression costs, lost revenue from commercial timber, and the value of protected non-harvestable trees. Id. at ¶ 3. For the non-harvestable trees in environmentally sensitive areas, the Crown sought to recover both their commercial value as well as a 20% premium for harm to the environment. Id. at ¶ 131. The court was skeptical of an analogy between environmental harm and other types of noneconomic damages. See id. at ¶ 151 ("[P]rinciples governing non-pecuniary loss ... do not fit easily with renewable forest resources."). But the court ultimately rejected the requested 20% premium because the Crown had pled its case as a landowner with "a fairly narrow commercial focus" and had not produced evidence of environmental harm. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 83, 134, 141. The court expressly left unresolved the question whether the common law allowed the Crown to seek compensation on behalf of the public for environmental damage to public lands. Id. at ¶¶ 81-82, 119, 155. Even if we were willing to treat Canadian common law as instructive on an issue of California statutory law, we note that, by contrast to the Crown in Canadian Forest Products, the government here pled environmental damages from the outset and produced substantial evidence of the environmental harm caused by the fire.

          837*837 In sum, we see nothing in California law that prevents the federal government from recovering intangible, non-economic environmental damages for a negligently set fire. California embraces broad theories of tort liability that enable plaintiffs to recover full compensation for all the harms that they suffer. Under California law, the government may recover intangible environmental damages because anything less would not compensate the public for all of the harm caused by the fire. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13007 (anyone who sets fire to "the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, is liable to the owner of such property for any damages to the property caused by the fire" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we agree with the district court in this case that the government "should be able to recover damages for all of the damages caused by the fire, including the intangible environmental damages."

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

          CB & I next argues that the government did not produce sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages. Where, as here, property has no commercial or market equivalent, "its value, or plaintiff's damages, must be ascertained in some other rational way, and from such elements as are attainable." Willard v. Valley Gas & Fuel Co., 171 Cal. 9, 151 P. 286, 289 (1915) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Showalter v. W. Pac. R.R., 16 Cal.2d 460, 106 P.2d 895, 898-99 (1940).

          As the district court observed, a "rational way" of ascertaining damages "does not require mathematical precision." In Zvolanek v. Bodger Seeds, Ltd., 5 Cal.App.2d 106, 42 P.2d 92 (1935), plaintiff's experimental, non-marketable varieties of sweet peas were damaged in flooding caused by defendant's negligence. Id. at 107-08, 42 P.2d 92. Citing Willard, the court held that the elements available to support a rational damages award may include "the difficulty and expense to which plaintiff was put in acquiring the property, the nature and character of the use to which it was put by him, and the like." Id. at 109, 42 P.2d 92. "All these elements being shown, the value is to be determined by the court or jury by the exercise of a sound discretion." Id.

          The district court acknowledged that the government in this case did not "elicit any testimony that put a dollar amount on the intangible environmental damages." However, the court noted that the government "produced evidence regarding the extent of damage to the Angeles National Forest, including testimony regarding the 18,000 acres of burned federal land that was not usable by the public as a result of the fire.... The jury also heard testimony concerning the extensive destruction and harm to animal habitats, soils, and plant life. This testimony included the harm caused by the fire to the endangered California red-legged frog and the destruction of the historic Hazel Dell mining camp."

          The government presented the jury with five days of evidence specifying the nature and extent of the damage caused by the Copper Fire. It called three expert witnesses who testified in detail about the fire's impacts. Lisa Northrop, the resource and planning officer in the Angeles National Forest, described the damage to San Francisquito Canyon including erosion and sedimentation, invasive species, and lost recreational use. Dr. Robert Fisher, a research ecologist with the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS"), provided a first-hand account of harm to the California Red-Legged Frog population and habitat. 838*838 Darrell Vance, an archeologist with the National Forest, testified at length about the destruction of the Hazel Dell Mining Camp. Through these experts, the government also introduced several reports as evidence of environmental harm, including a burned area report prepared by the BAER team; a botany report describing effects to Nevin's barberry, an endangered flowering shrub; a hydrology report about flood and sedimentation; a USGS report regarding the California Red-Legged Frog and federally threatened unarmored three-spine stickleback freshwater fish; and an archeological report about the mining camp.

          We agree with the district court that the "trial provided sufficient evidence for the jurors to quantify the[intangible environmental] harm." Evidence about the "nature and character" of the damaged National Forest environment provided a rational way for the jury to calculate the award. Zvolanek, 5 Cal.App.2d at 109, 42 P.2d 92. Such evidence having been shown, the jury could determine the intangible environmental damages award in "the exercise of a sound discretion." Id. That the government's environmental damages are "largely intangible" and "`not readily subject to precise calculation'" does not make them any less real. Moylan v. Dykes, 181 Cal.App.3d 561, 574, 226 Cal.Rptr. 673 (1986) (quoting Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329, 1338 (1979)). The amount of such damages is "`necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact.'" Id. (quoting Greater Westchester, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d at 1338).

          CB & I argues that the government did not present evidence about the monetary cost of restoring the burned acreage or the value of lost recreational use after the fire. See, e.g., Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC, 153 Cal.App.4th 583, 600, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 (2007) (finding "no record evidence" to support the jury's award of restoration costs); Chaparkas v. Webb, 178 Cal.App.2d 257, 261-62, 2 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1960) ("While compensation for loss of use may be an item of damages, proof of value of the use lost must be established."). CB & I and Amici compare this case to Union Pacific, where the government produced evidence that placed a monetary figure on the environmental damages, such as reforestation plans that estimated costs of between $24 and $33 million and expert testimony that calculated the damage to wildlife habitat and public enjoyment of the forest at another $13 million. Union Pacific, 565 F.Supp.2d at 1150-52. However, as the court noted in Union Pacific, "the case law is clear that there is not one particular method for ascertaining plaintiff's damages." Id. at 1145.

          In Robinson v. United States, 175 F.Supp.2d 1215 (E.D.Cal.2001), plaintiffs sued the government, alleging that it negligently allowed a prescribed fire to escape onto their private land and burn their homes. Id. at 1217-18. They sought to recover damages for items of personal property with important sentimental value, such as a wedding dress, little league trophies, and school art projects. Id. at 1219. The government argued that evidence of the items' sentimental value was not a rational method of valuation. Id. at 1232. The court agreed and held that "Plaintiffs must provide a rational basis for determining their value. The sentimental or subjective value placed on such items is not permitted." Id. at 1233; see also McMahon v. Craig, 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1519, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (2009) ("damages cannot be based on sentimental value" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 911)). Citing Willard, the court suggested that a 839*839 rational method might include the "nature and character" of the property. Robinson, 175 F.Supp.2d at 1232 (citing Willard, 151 P. at 290 (Sloss, J., concurring)). Here, the government did not rely on the sentimental value that specific plaintiffs placed on damaged forest lands. Rather, the government produced substantial evidence detailing the nature and character of the environmental harm caused by the fire, and allowed the jury to determine the value to the public as a whole.

          Based on the testimony and reports describing the fire's extensive damage to the National Forest — including impacts to public use; harm to animal habitats, soils, plant life, and the California Red-Legged Frog; and the destruction of the historic mining camp — we agree with the district court that sufficient evidence supported the jury's award of intangible environmental damages. See Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1012.

C. Excessiveness of the Award

          Finally, CB & I argues that it is entitled to a new trial or remittitur because the jury's award of $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages was grossly excessive. We "afford substantial deference to a jury's finding of the appropriate amount of damages." Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must uphold the jury's award "[u]nless the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation or guesswork." Id.

          CB & I premises its excessiveness argument on the government's suggestion during closing argument that the jury could determine the amount of intangible environmental damages by applying a "multiplier of two or three" to the hard economic damages. Amici note that multipliers are traditionally reserved for punitive, rather than compensatory, damages. See, e.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 605, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, 235 P.3d 171, 176 (2010) ("Penalties provide for recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as double or treble damages." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court specifically instructed the jury that punitive damages were not authorized in this case.

          CB & I conceded at oral argument on appeal that the jury likely determined the amount of intangible environmental damages based on a "price per acre" of burned National Forest land, which was the government's other suggested method for calculating damages. The price-per-acre method results in a round number: $28.8 million divided by 18,000 acres equals $1,600 per acre. By contrast, a multiplier method would have required a very unlikely multiplier. If the jury had applied a multiplier to the $7,637,035.68 in "hard" economic damages, to reach the total of $28.8 million it would have had to use a multiplier of 3.77109669.

          Given the scope of the environmental harm caused by the Copper Fire, we agree with the district court that the jury's damage award of $1,600 per acre was not grossly excessive or against the clear weight of the evidence. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying CB & I's motion for a new trial or remittitur.

Conclusion

          CB & I negligently sparked a forest fire that burned roughly 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest. Under California law, the government was entitled to full compensation for all the harms caused by the fire, including intangible environment harm. The government produced substantial evidence for the jury to determine 840*840 the amount of environmental damages, and the resulting award of $1,600 per acre was not grossly excessive.

AFFIRMED.

POSNER, Circuit Judge.

          The plaintiffs brought this diversity suit governed by Illinois law against affiliated entities (which the parties treat as a single entity, as shall we) that own and operate the "Motel 6" chain of hotels and motels. One of these hotels (now a "Red Roof Inn," though still owned by the defendant) is in downtown Chicago. The plaintiffs, a brother and sister, were guests there and were bitten by bedbugs, which are making a comeback in the U.S. as a consequence of more conservative use of pesticides. Kirsten Scharnberg, "You'll Be Itching to Read This: Bedbugs Are Making a Comeback: Blame World Travelers and a Ban on Certain Pesticides," Chi. Tribune, Sept. 28, 2003, p. 1; Mary Otto, "Bloodthirsty Pests Make Comeback: Bug Infestations Raising Welts, Ire," Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 674*674 2003, p. B2. The plaintiffs claim that in allowing guests to be attacked by bedbugs in a motel that charges upwards of $100 a day for a room and would not like to be mistaken for a flophouse, the defendant was guilty of "willful and wanton conduct" and thus under Illinois law is liable for punitive as well as compensatory damages. Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill.2d 109, 234 Ill.Dec. 455, 703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (1998); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978); Barton v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 325 Ill.App.3d 1005, 258 Ill.Dec. 844, 757 N.E.2d 533, 554 (2001). The jury agreed and awarded each plaintiff $186,000 in punitive damages though only $5,000 in compensatory damages. The defendant appeals, complaining primarily about the punitive-damages award. It also complains about some of the judge's evidentiary rulings, but these complaints are frivolous and require no discussion. The plaintiffs cross-appeal, complaining about the dismissal of a count of the complaint in which they alleged a violation of an Illinois consumer protection law. But they do not seek any additional damages, and so, provided we sustain the jury's verdict, we need not address the cross-appeal.

          The defendant argues that at worst it is guilty of simple negligence, and if this is right the plaintiffs were not entitled by Illinois law to any award of punitive damages. It also complains that the award was excessive — indeed that any award in excess of $20,000 to each plaintiff would deprive the defendant of its property without due process of law. The first complaint has no possible merit, as the evidence of gross negligence, indeed of recklessness in the strong sense of an unjustifiable failure to avoid a known risk, see Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 161 Ill.2d 267, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402, 405-09 (1994) (plurality opinion); Landers v. School Dist. No. 203, O'Fallon, 66 Ill. App.3d 78, 22 Ill.Dec. 837, 383 N.E.2d 645, 647-48 (1978); Vigortone AG Products, Inc. v. PM AG Products, Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.2002) (Illinois law); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-70 (D.C.Cir.1996), was amply shown. In 1998, EcoLab, the extermination service that the motel used, discovered bedbugs in several rooms in the motel and recommended that it be hired to spray every room, for which it would charge the motel only $500; the motel refused. The next year, bedbugs were again discovered in a room but EcoLab was asked to spray just that room. The motel tried to negotiate "a building sweep [by EcoLab] free of charge," but, not surprisingly, the negotiation failed. By the spring of 2000, the motel's manager "started noticing that there were refunds being given by my desk clerks and reports coming back from the guests that there were ticks in the rooms and bugs in the rooms that were biting." She looked in some of the rooms and discovered bedbugs. The defendant asks us to disregard her testimony as that of a disgruntled ex-employee, but of course her credibility was for the jury, not the defendant, to determine.

          Further incidents of guests being bitten by insects and demanding and receiving refunds led the manager to recommend to her superior in the company that the motel be closed while every room was sprayed, but this was refused. This superior, a district manager, was a management-level employee of the defendant, and his knowledge of the risk and failure to take effective steps either to eliminate it or to warn the motel's guests are imputed to his employer for purposes of determining whether the employer should be liable for punitive damages. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 675*675 509, 512 (1975); Barton v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., supra, 258 Ill.Dec. 844, 757 N.E.2d at 556 n. 11; Kennan v. Checker Taxi Co., 250 Ill. App.3d 155, 189 Ill.Dec. 891, 620 N.E.2d 1208, 1212-14 (1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C (1958). The employer's liability for compensatory damages is of course automatic on the basis of the principle of respondeat superior, since the district manager was acting within the scope of his employment.

          The infestation continued and began to reach farcical proportions, as when a guest, after complaining of having been bitten repeatedly by insects while asleep in his room in the hotel, was moved to another room only to discover insects there; and within 18 minutes of being moved to a third room he discovered insects in that room as well and had to be moved still again. (Odd that at that point he didn't flee the motel.) By July, the motel's management was acknowledging to EcoLab that there was a "major problem with bed bugs" and that all that was being done about it was "chasing them from room to room." Desk clerks were instructed to call the "bedbugs" "ticks," apparently on the theory that customers would be less alarmed, though in fact ticks are more dangerous than bedbugs because they spread Lyme Disease and Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Rooms that the motel had placed on "Do not rent, bugs in room" status nevertheless were rented.

          It was in November that the plaintiffs checked into the motel. They were given Room 504, even though the motel had classified the room as "DO NOT RENT UNTIL TREATED," and it had not been treated. Indeed, that night 190 of the hotel's 191 rooms were occupied, even though a number of them had been placed on the same don't-rent status as Room 504. One of the defendant's motions in limine that the judge denied was to exclude evidence concerning all other rooms — a good example of the frivolous character of the motions and of the defendant's pertinacious defense of them on appeal.

          Although bedbug bites are not as serious as the bites of some other insects, they are painful and unsightly. Motel 6 could not have rented any rooms at the prices it charged had it informed guests that the risk of being bitten by bedbugs was appreciable. Its failure either to warn guests or to take effective measures to eliminate the bedbugs amounted to fraud and probably to battery as well (compare Campbell v. A.C. Equipment Services Corp., 242 Ill.App.3d 707, 182 Ill.Dec. 876, 610 N.E.2d 745, 748-49 (1993); see Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 18, comment c and e), as in the famous case of Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (1955), appeal after remand, 49 Wash.2d 499, 304 P.2d 681 (1956), which held that the defendant would be guilty of battery if he knew with substantial certainty that when he moved a chair the plaintiff would try to sit down where the chair had been and would land on the floor instead. See also Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303, 1873 WL 12016 (1873). There was, in short, sufficient evidence of "willful and wanton conduct" within the meaning that the Illinois courts assign to the term to permit an award of punitive damages in this case.

          But in what amount? In arguing that $20,000 was the maximum amount of punitive damages that a jury could constitutionally have awarded each plaintiff, the defendant points to the U.S. Supreme Court's recent statement that "few awards [of punitive damages] exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." State Farm Mutual 676*676 Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1524, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). The Court went on to suggest that "four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety." Id., citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). Hence the defendant's proposed ceiling in this case of $20,000, four times the compensatory damages awarded to each plaintiff. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages determined by the jury was, in contrast, 37.2 to 1.

          The Supreme Court did not, however, lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio rule — it said merely that "there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio," State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra, 123 S.Ct. at 1524 — and it would be unreasonable to do so. We must consider why punitive damages are awarded and why the Court has decided that due process requires that such awards be limited. The second question is easier to answer than the first. The term "punitive damages" implies punishment, and a standard principle of penal theory is that "the punishment should fit the crime" in the sense of being proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's action, though the principle is modified when the probability of detection is very low (a familiar example is the heavy fines for littering) or the crime is potentially lucrative (as in the case of trafficking in illegal drugs). Hence, with these qualifications, which in fact will figure in our analysis of this case, punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's actions.

          Another penal precept is that a defendant should have reasonable notice of the sanction for unlawful acts, so that he can make a rational determination of how to act; and so there have to be reasonably clear standards for determining the amount of punitive damages for particular wrongs.

          And a third precept, the core of the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, and more broadly of the principle of the rule of law, is that sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than on the status of the defendant; a person is punished for what he does, not for who he is, even if the who is a huge corporation.

          What follows from these principles, however, is that punitive damages should be admeasured by standards or rules rather than in a completely ad hoc manner, and this does not tell us what the maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages should be in a particular case. To determine that, we have to consider why punitive damages are awarded in the first place. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1996).

          England's common law courts first confirmed their authority to award punitive damages in the eighteenth century, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., "Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1982), at a time when the institutional structure of criminal law enforcement was primitive and it made sense to leave certain minor crimes to be dealt with by the civil law. And still today one function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures on an overloaded system of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor crimes. An example is deliberately spitting in a person's face, a criminal assault but because minor readily deterrable by the levying of what amounts to a civil fine through a suit for damages for the tort of battery. Compensatory damages 677*677 would not do the trick in such a case, and this for three reasons: because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that inflict largely dignitary harms; because in the spitting case they would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue, and he might decide instead to respond with violence — and an age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury — and because to limit the plaintiff to compensatory damages would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity provided that he was willing to pay, and again there would be a danger that his act would incite a breach of the peace by his victim.

          When punitive damages are sought for billion-dollar oil spills and other huge economic injuries, the considerations that we have just canvassed fade. As the Court emphasized in Campbell, the fact that the plaintiffs in that case had been awarded very substantial compensatory damages — $1 million for a dispute over insurance coverage — greatly reduced the need for giving them a huge award of punitive damages ($145 million) as well in order to provide an effective remedy. Our case is closer to the spitting case. The defendant's behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was emotional. And the defendant may well have profited from its misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was able to keep renting rooms. Refunds were frequent but may have cost less than the cost of closing the hotel for a thorough fumigation. The hotel's attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks, which some guests might ignorantly have thought less unhealthful, may have postponed the instituting of litigation to rectify the hotel's misconduct. The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the additional purpose of limiting the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is "caught" only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.

          Finally, if the total stakes in the case were capped at $50,000 (2 × [$5,000 + $20,000]), the plaintiffs might well have had difficulty financing this lawsuit. It is here that the defendant's aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion becomes relevant. A defendant's wealth is not a sufficient basis for awarding punitive damages. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra, 123 S.Ct. at 1525; BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at 591, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (concurring opinion); Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 508-09 (7th Cir.1992). That would be discriminatory and would violate the rule of law, as we explained earlier, by making punishment depend on status rather than conduct. Where wealth in the sense of resources enters is in enabling the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense against suits such as this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee.

          In other words, the defendant is investing in developing a reputation intended to deter plaintiffs. It is difficult otherwise to explain the great stubborness with which it has defended this case, making a host of frivolous evidentiary arguments despite the very modest stakes even when the punitive damages awarded by the jury are included.

          As a detail (the parties having made nothing of the point), we note that "net 678*678 worth" is not the correct measure of a corporation's resources. It is an accounting artifact that reflects the allocation of ownership between equity and debt claimants. A firm financed largely by equity investors has a large "net worth" (= the value of the equity claims), while the identical firm financed largely by debt may have only a small net worth because accountants treat debt as a liability.

          All things considered, we cannot say that the award of punitive damages was excessive, albeit the precise number chosen by the jury was arbitrary. It is probably not a coincidence that $5,000 + $186,000 = $191,000/191 = $1,000: i.e., $1,000 per room in the hotel. But as there are no punitive-damages guidelines, corresponding to the federal and state sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be arbitrary. (Which is perhaps why the plaintiffs' lawyer did not suggest a number to the jury.) The judicial function is to police a range, not a point. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at 582-83, 116 S.Ct. 1589; TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (plurality opinion).

          But it would have been helpful had the parties presented evidence concerning the regulatory or criminal penalties to which the defendant exposed itself by deliberately exposing its customers to a substantial risk of being bitten by bedbugs. That is an inquiry recommended by the Supreme Court. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra, 123 S.Ct. at 1520, 1526; BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at 583-85, 116 S.Ct. 1589. But we do not think its omission invalidates the award. We can take judicial notice that deliberate exposure of hotel guests to the health risks created by insect infestations exposes the hotel's owner to sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate are comparable in severity to the punitive damage award in this case.

          "A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful." 720 ILCS 5/12-5(a). This is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year's imprisonment or a fine of $2,500, or both. 720 ILCS 5/12-5(b); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(a)(1), 5/5-9-1(a)(2). (For the application of the reckless-conduct criminal statute to corporate officials, see Illinois v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 126 Ill.2d 356, 128 Ill.Dec. 517, 534 N.E.2d 962, 963 (1989).) Of course a corporation cannot be sent to prison, and $2,500 is obviously much less than the $186,000 awarded to each plaintiff in this case as punitive damages. But this is just the beginning. Other guests of the hotel were endangered besides these two plaintiffs. And, what is much more important, a Chicago hotel that permits unsanitary conditions to exist is subject to revocation of its license, without which it cannot operate. Chi. Munic. Code §§ 4-4-280, X-XXX-XXX, 050, 060, 110. We are sure that the defendant would prefer to pay the punitive damages assessed in this case than to lose its license.

AFFIRMED.

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

          We address once again the measure of punishment, by means of punitive damages, a State may impose upon a defendant in a civil case. The question is whether, in the circumstances we shall recount, an award of $145 million in punitive damages, where full compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

I

          In 1981, Curtis Campbell (Campbell) was driving with his wife, Inez Preece Campbell, in Cache County, Utah. He decided to pass six vans traveling ahead of them on a two-lane highway. Todd Ospital was driving a small car approaching from the opposite direction. To avoid a head-on collision with Campbell, who by then was driving on the wrong side of the highway and toward oncoming traffic, Ospital swerved onto the shoulder, lost control of his automobile, and collided 413*413 with a vehicle driven by Robert G. Slusher. Ospital was killed, and Slusher was rendered permanently disabled. The Campbells escaped unscathed.

          In the ensuing wrongful death and tort action, Campbell insisted he was not at fault. Early investigations did support differing conclusions as to who caused the accident, but "a consensus was reached early on by the investigators and witnesses that Mr. Campbell's unsafe pass had indeed caused the crash." 65 P. 3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001). Campbell's insurance company, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), nonetheless decided to contest liability and declined offers by Slusher and Ospital's estate (Ospital) to settle the claims for the policy limit of $50,000 ($25,000 per claimant). State Farm also ignored the advice of one of its own investigators and took the case to trial, assuring the Campbells that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel." Id., at 1142. To the contrary, a jury determined that Campbell was 100 percent at fault, and a judgment was returned for $185,849, far more than the amount offered in settlement.

          At first State Farm refused to cover the $135,849 in excess liability. Its counsel made this clear to the Campbells: "`You may want to put for sale signs on your property to get things moving.'" Ibid. Nor was State Farm willing to post a supersedeas bond to allow Campbell to appeal the judgment against him. Campbell obtained his own counsel to appeal the verdict. During the pendency of the appeal, in late 1984, Slusher, Ospital, and the Campbells reached an agreement whereby Slusher and Ospital agreed not to seek satisfaction of their claims against the Campbells. In exchange the Campbells agreed to pursue a bad-faith action against State Farm and to be represented by Slusher's and Ospital's attorneys. The Campbells also agreed that Slusher and Ospital would have a right to play a part in all major decisions concerning 414*414 the bad-faith action. No settlement could be concluded without Slusher's and Ospital's approval, and Slusher and Ospital would receive 90 percent of any verdict against State Farm.

          In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court denied Campbell's appeal in the wrongful-death and tort actions. Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P. 2d 437. State Farm then paid the entire judgment, including the amounts in excess of the policy limits. The Campbells nonetheless filed a complaint against State Farm alleging bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court initially granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment because State Farm had paid the excess verdict, but that ruling was reversed on appeal. 840 P. 2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). On remand State Farm moved in limine to exclude evidence of alleged conduct that occurred in unrelated cases outside of Utah, but the trial court denied the motion. At State Farm's request the trial court bifurcated the trial into two phases conducted before different juries. In the first phase the jury determined that State Farm's decision not to settle was unreasonable because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess verdict.

          Before the second phase of the action against State Farm we decided BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559 (1996), and refused to sustain a $2 million punitive damages award which accompanied a verdict of only $4,000 in compensatory damages. Based on that decision, State Farm again moved for the exclusion of evidence of dissimilar out-of-state conduct. App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a-172a. The trial court denied State Farm's motion. Id., at 189a.

          The second phase addressed State Farm's liability for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The Utah Supreme Court aptly characterized this phase of the trial:

"State Farm argued during phase II that its decision to take the case to trial was an `honest mistake' that did 415*415 not warrant punitive damages. In contrast, the Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims company wide. This scheme was referred to as State Farm's `Performance, Planning and Review,' or PP & R, policy. To prove the existence of this scheme, the trial court allowed the Campbells to introduce extensive expert testimony regarding fraudulent practices by State Farm in its nation-wide operations. Although State Farm moved prior to phase II of the trial for the exclusion of such evidence and continued to object to it at trial, the trial court ruled that such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages." 65 P. 3d, at 1143.

          Evidence pertaining to the PP&R policy concerned State Farm's business practices for over 20 years in numerous States. Most of these practices bore no relation to third-party automobile insurance claims, the type of claim underlying the Campbells' complaint against the company. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. Both parties appealed.

          The Utah Supreme Court sought to apply the three guideposts we identified in Gore, supra, at 574-575, and it reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award. Relying in large part on the extensive evidence concerning the PP&R policy, the court concluded State Farm's conduct was reprehensible. The court also relied upon State Farm's "massive wealth" and on testimony indicating that "State Farm's actions, because of their clandestine nature, will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability," 65 P. 3d, at 1153, and concluded that the ratio 416*416 between punitive and compensatory damages was not unwarranted. Finally, the court noted that the punitive damages award was not excessive when compared to various civil and criminal penalties State Farm could have faced, including $10,000 for each act of fraud, the suspension of its license to conduct business in Utah, the disgorgement of profits, and imprisonment. Id., at 1154-1155. We granted certiorari. 535 U. S. 1111 (2002).

II

          We recognized in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424 (2001), that in our judicial system compensatory and punitive damages, although usually awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different purposes. Id., at 432. Compensatory damages "are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct." Ibid. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, pp. 453-454 (1979)). By contrast, punitive damages serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution. Cooper Industries, supra, at 432; see also Gore, supra, at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition"); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 19 (1991) ("[P]unitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence").

          While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. Cooper Industries, supra; Gore, supra, at 559; Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U. S. 415 (1994); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443 (1993); Haslip, supra. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. Cooper Industries, supra, at 433; Gore, 517 U. S., at 562; see also id., at 587 (BREYER, J., concurring) ("This constitutional concern, itself 417*417 harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary coercion"). The reason is that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose." Id., at 574; Cooper Industries, supra, at 433 ("Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion"). To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property. Haslip, supra, at 42 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category").

          Although these awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding. This increases our concerns over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered. We have admonished that "[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences." Honda Motor, supra, at 432; see also Haslip, supra, at 59 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Due Process Clause 418*418 does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process — of the law in general — is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or whim"). Our concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is presented, as we shall discuss, with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. Vague instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid "passion or prejudice," App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a-109a, do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory.

          In light of these concerns, in Gore, supra, we instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to consider three guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id., at 575. We reiterated the importance of these three guideposts in Cooper Industries and mandated appellate courts to conduct de novo review of a trial court's application of them to the jury's award. 532 U. S. 424. Exacting appellate review ensures that an award of punitive damages is based upon an "`application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice.'" Id., at 436 (quoting Gore, supra, at 587 (BREYER, J., concurring)).

III

          Under the principles outlined in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, this case is neither close nor difficult. It was error to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages award. We address each guidepost of Gore in some detail.

419*419 A

          "[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." Gore, 517 U. S., at 575. We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Id., at 576-577. The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect. It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence. Id., at 575.

          Applying these factors in the instant case, we must acknowledge that State Farm's handling of the claims against the Campbells merits no praise. The trial court found that State Farm's employees altered the company's records to make Campbell appear less culpable. State Farm disregarded the overwhelming likelihood of liability and the near-certain probability that, by taking the case to trial, a judgment in excess of the policy limits would be awarded. State Farm amplified the harm by at first assuring the Campbells their assets would be safe from any verdict and by later telling them, postjudgment, to put a for-sale sign on their house. While we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest punishment for this 420*420 reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further.

          This case, instead, was used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country. The Utah Supreme Court's opinion makes explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the Campbells. 65 P. 3d, at 1143 ("[T]he Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims company wide"). This was, as well, an explicit rationale of the trial court's decision in approving the award, though reduced from $145 million to $25 million. App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a ("[T]he Campbells demonstrated, through the testimony of State Farm employees who had worked outside of Utah, and through expert testimony, that this pattern of claims adjustment under the PP&R program was not a local anomaly, but was a consistent, nationwide feature of State Farm's business operations, orchestrated from the highest levels of corporate management").

          The Campbells contend that State Farm has only itself to blame for the reliance upon dissimilar and out-of-state conduct evidence. The record does not support this contention. From their opening statements onward the Campbells framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its nationwide activities. App. 208 ("You're going to hear evidence that even the insurance commission in Utah and around the country are unwilling or inept at protecting people against abuses"); id., at 242 ("[T]his is a very important case.... [I]t transcends the Campbell file. It involves a nationwide practice. And you, here, are going to be evaluating and assessing, and hopefully requiring State Farm to stand accountable for what it's doing across the country, which is the purpose of punitive damages"). This was a position 421*421 maintained throughout the litigation. In opposing State Farm's motion to exclude such evidence under Gore, the Campbells' counsel convinced the trial court that there was no limitation on the scope of evidence that could be considered under our precedents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a ("As I read the case [Gore], I was struck with the fact that a clear message in the case ... seems to be that courts in punitive damages cases should receive more evidence, not less. And that the court seems to be inviting an even broader area of evidence than the current rulings of the court would indicate"); id., at 189a (trial court ruling).

          A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred. Gore, supra, at 572; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State"); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State ... without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in question and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound"); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States"). Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction. Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need 422*422 to apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 821-822 (1985).

          Here, the Campbells do not dispute that much of the out-of-state conduct was lawful where it occurred. They argue, however, that such evidence was not the primary basis for the punitive damages award and was relevant to the extent it demonstrated, in a general sense, State Farm's motive against its insured. Brief for Respondents 46-47 ("[E]ven if the practices described by State Farm were not malum in se or malum prohibitum, they became relevant to punitive damages to the extent they were used as tools to implement State Farm's wrongful PP&R policy"). This argument misses the mark. Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. A jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred. Gore, 517 U. S., at 572-573 (noting that a State "does not have the power ... to punish [a defendant] for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on [the State] or its residents"). A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction. Id., at 569 ("[T]he States need not, and in fact do not, provide such protection in a uniform manner").

          For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts erred in relying upon this and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells' harm. A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. 423*423 A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Supreme Court did that here. 65 P. 3d, at 1149 ("Even if the harm to the Campbells can be appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial court's assessment of the situation is on target: `The harm is minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate'"). Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains. Gore, supra, at 593 (BREYER, J., concurring) ("Larger damages might also `double count' by including in the punitive damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover").

          The same reasons lead us to conclude the Utah Supreme Court's decision cannot be justified on the grounds that State Farm was a recidivist. Although "[o]ur holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance," Gore, supra, at 577, in the context of civil actions courts must ensure the conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions. TXO, 509 U. S., at 462, n. 28 (noting that courts should look to "`the existence and frequency of similar past conduct'" (quoting Haslip, 499 U. S., at 21-22)).

          The Campbells have identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them. Nor does our review of the Utah courts' decisions convince us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the Campbells. Although evidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive damages, the Utah court erred here because evidence pertaining to claims 424*424 that had nothing to do with a third-party lawsuit was introduced at length. Other evidence concerning reprehensibility was even more tangential. For example, the Utah Supreme Court criticized State Farm's investigation into the personal life of one of its employees and, in a broader approach, the manner in which State Farm's policies corrupted its employees. 65 P. 3d, at 1148, 1150. The Campbells attempt to justify the courts' reliance upon this unrelated testimony on the theory that each dollar of profit made by underpaying a third-party claimant is the same as a dollar made by underpaying a first-party one. Brief for Respondents 45; see also 65 P. 3d, at 1150 ("State Farm's continuing illicit practice created market disadvantages for other honest insurance companies because these practices increased profits. As plaintiffs' expert witnesses established, such wrongfully obtained competitive advantages have the potential to pressure other companies to adopt similar fraudulent tactics, or to force them out of business. Thus, such actions cause distortions throughout the insurance market and ultimately hurt all consumers"). For the reasons already stated, this argument is unconvincing. The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year period. In this case, because the Campbells have shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis.

B

          Turning to the second Gore guidepost, we have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. 517 U. S., at 582 ("[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive 425*425 award"); TXO, supra, at 458. We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. 499 U. S., at 23-24. We cited that 4-to-1 ratio again in Gore. 517 U. S., at 581. The Court further referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish. Id., at 581, and n. 33. While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, id., at 582, or, in this case, of 145 to 1.

          Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages." Ibid.; see also ibid. (positing that a higher ratio might be necessary where "the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine"). The converse is also true, however. When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.

          426*426 In sum, courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered. In the context of this case, we have no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio. The compensatory award in this case was substantial; the Campbells were awarded $1 million for a year and a half of emotional distress. This was complete compensation. The harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not from some physical assault or trauma; there were no physical injuries; and State Farm paid the excess verdict before the complaint was filed, so the Campbells suffered only minor economic injuries for the 18-month period in which State Farm refused to resolve the claim against them. The compensatory damages for the injury suffered here, moreover, likely were based on a component which was duplicated in the punitive award. Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role of punitive damages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages, however, already contain this punitive element. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c, p. 466 (1977) ("In many cases in which compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant's act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both").

          The Utah Supreme Court sought to justify the massive award by pointing to State Farm's purported failure to report a prior $100 million punitive damages award in Texas to its corporate headquarters; the fact that State Farm's policies have affected numerous Utah consumers; the fact that State Farm will only be punished in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability; and State Farm's enormous wealth. 65 P. 3d, at 1153. Since the Supreme 427*427 Court of Utah discussed the Texas award when applying the ratio guidepost, we discuss it here. The Texas award, however, should have been analyzed in the context of the reprehensibility guidepost only. The failure of the company to report the Texas award is out-of-state conduct that, if the conduct were similar, might have had some bearing on the degree of reprehensibility, subject to the limitations we have described. Here, it was dissimilar, and of such marginal relevance that it should have been accorded little or no weight. The award was rendered in a first-party lawsuit; no judgment was entered in the case; and it was later settled for a fraction of the verdict. With respect to the Utah Supreme Court's second justification, the Campbells' inability to direct us to testimony demonstrating harm to the people of Utah (other than those directly involved in this case) indicates that the adverse effect on the State's general population was in fact minor.

          The remaining premises for the Utah Supreme Court's decision bear no relation to the award's reasonableness or proportionality to the harm. They are, rather, arguments that seek to defend a departure from well-established constraints on punitive damages. While States enjoy considerable discretion in deducing when punitive damages are warranted, each award must comport with the principles set forth in Gore. Here the argument that State Farm will be punished in only the rare case, coupled with reference to its assets (which, of course, are what other insured parties in Utah and other States must rely upon for payment of claims) had little to do with the actual harm sustained by the Campbells. The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U. S., at 585 ("The fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of its business"); see also id., at 591 (BREYER, J., concurring) ("[Wealth] provides an open-ended basis for 428*428 inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy.... That does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that this factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as `reprehensibility,' to constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant's conduct"). The principles set forth in Gore must be implemented with care, to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality.

C

          The third guidepost in Gore is the disparity between the punitive damages award and the "civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id., at 575. We note that, in the past, we have also looked to criminal penalties that could be imposed. Id., at 583; Haslip, 499 U. S., at 23. The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action. When used to determine the dollar amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility. Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof. Punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award.

          Here, we need not dwell long on this guidepost. The most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud, 65 P. 3d, at 1154, an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award. The Supreme Court of Utah speculated about the loss of State Farm's business license, the disgorgement of profits, and possible imprisonment, but here again its references were to the broad fraudulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct. This analysis was insufficient to justify the award.

429*429 IV

          An application of the Gore guideposts to the facts of this case, especially in light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive element), likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages. The punitive award of $145 million, therefore, was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant. The proper calculation of punitive damages under the principles we have discussed should be resolved, in the first instance, by the Utah courts.

          The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

          It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.

          I adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 598-599 (1996), that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against "excessive" or "`unreasonable'" awards of punitive damages. I am also of the view that the punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW v. Gore is insusceptible of principled application; accordingly, I do not feel justified in giving the case stare decisis effect. See id., at 599. I would affirm the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court.

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

          I would affirm the judgment below because "I continue to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards." Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424, 443 (2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (citing BMW of North America, 430*430 Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (SCALIA, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.

          Not long ago, this Court was hesitant to impose a federal check on state-court judgments awarding punitive damages. In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257 (1989), the Court held that neither the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment nor federal common law circumscribed awards of punitive damages in civil cases between private parties. Id., at 262-276, 277-280. Two years later, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991), the Court observed that "unlimited jury [or judicial] discretion ... in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities," id., at 18; the Due Process Clause, the Court suggested, would attend to those sensibilities and guard against unreasonable awards, id., at 17-24. Nevertheless, the Court upheld a punitive damages award in Haslip "more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, ... more than 200 times [the plaintiff's] out-of-pocket expenses," and "much in excess of the fine that could be imposed." Id., at 23. And in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443 (1993), the Court affirmed a state-court award "526 times greater than the actual damages awarded by the jury." Id., at 453;[1] cf. Browning-Ferris, 492 U. S., at 262 (ratio of punitive to compensatory damages over 100 to 1).

          It was not until 1996, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, that the Court, for the first time, invalidated a state-court punitive damages assessment as unreasonably 431*431 large. See id., at 599 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). If our activity in this domain is now "well established," see ante, at 416, 427, it takes place on ground not long held.

          In Gore, I stated why I resisted the Court's foray into punitive damages "territory traditionally within the States' domain." 517 U. S., at 612 (dissenting opinion). I adhere to those views, and note again that, unlike federal habeas corpus review of state-court convictions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, the Court "work[s] at this business [of checking state courts] alone," unaided by the participation of federal district courts and courts of appeals. 517 U. S., at 613. It was once recognized that "the laws of the particular State must suffice [to superintend punitive damages awards] until judges or legislators authorized to do so initiate system-wide change." Haslip, 499 U. S., at 42 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). I would adhere to that traditional view.

I

          The large size of the award upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in this case indicates why damages-capping legislation may be altogether fitting and proper. Neither the amount of the award nor the trial record, however, justifies this Court's substitution of its judgment for that of Utah's competent decisionmakers. In this regard, I count it significant that, on the key criterion "reprehensibility," there is a good deal more to the story than the Court's abbreviated account tells.

          Ample evidence allowed the jury to find that State Farm's treatment of the Campbells typified its "Performance, Planning and Review" (PP&R) program; implemented by top management in 1979, the program had "the explicit objective of using the claims-adjustment process as a profit center." App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a. "[T]he Campbells presented considerable evidence," the trial court noted, documenting "that the PP&R program ... has functioned, and continues to function, as an unlawful scheme ... to deny benefits owed consumers by paying out less than fair value in order to meet 432*432 preset, arbitrary payout targets designed to enhance corporate profits." Id., at 118a-119a. That policy, the trial court observed, was encompassing in scope; it "applied equally to the handling of both third-party and first-party claims." Id., at 119a. But cf. ante, at 423-424, 427 (suggesting that State Farm's handling of first-party claims has "nothing to do with a third-party lawsuit").

          Evidence the jury could credit demonstrated that the PP&R program regularly and adversely affected Utah residents. Ray Summers, "the adjuster who handled the Campbell case and who was a State Farm employee in Utah for almost twenty years," described several methods used by State Farm to deny claimants fair benefits, for example, "falsifying or withholding of evidence in claim files." App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a. A common tactic, Summers recounted, was to "unjustly attac[k] the character, reputation and credibility of a claimant and mak[e] notations to that effect in the claim file to create prejudice in the event the claim ever came before a jury." Id., at 130a (internal quotation marks omitted). State Farm manager Bob Noxon, Summers testified, resorted to a tactic of this order in the Campbell case when he "instruct[ed] Summers to write in the file that Todd Ospital (who was killed in the accident) was speeding because he was on his way to see a pregnant girlfriend." Ibid. In truth, "[t]here was no pregnant girlfriend." Ibid. Expert testimony noted by the trial court described these tactics as "completely improper." Ibid.

          The trial court also noted the testimony of two Utah State Farm employees, Felix Jensen and Samantha Bird, both of whom recalled "intolerable" and "recurrent" pressure to reduce payouts below fair value. Id., at 119a (internal quotation marks omitted). When Jensen complained to top managers, he was told to "get out of the kitchen" if he could not take the heat; Bird was told she should be "more of a team player." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). At times, Bird said, she "was forced to commit dishonest acts 433*433 and to knowingly underpay claims." Id., at 120a. Eventually, Bird quit. Ibid. Utah managers superior to Bird, the evidence indicated, were improperly influenced by the PP&R program to encourage insurance underpayments. For example, several documents evaluating the performance of managers Noxon and Brown "contained explicit preset average payout goals." Ibid.

          Regarding liability for verdicts in excess of policy limits, the trial court referred to a State Farm document titled the "Excess Liability Handbook"; written before the Campbell accident, the handbook instructed adjusters to pad files with "self-serving" documents, and to leave critical items out of files, for example, evaluations of the insured's exposure. Id., at 127a-128a (internal quotation marks omitted). Divisional superintendent Bill Brown used the handbook to train Utah employees. Id., at 134a. While overseeing the Campbell case, Brown ordered adjuster Summers to change the portions of his report indicating that Mr. Campbell was likely at fault and that the settlement cost was correspondingly high. Id., at 3a. The Campbells' case, according to expert testimony the trial court recited, "was a classic example of State Farm's application of the improper practices taught in the Excess Liability Handbook." Id., at 128a.

          The trial court further determined that the jury could find State Farm's policy "deliberately crafted" to prey on consumers who would be unlikely to defend themselves. Id., at 122a. In this regard, the trial court noted the testimony of several former State Farm employees affirming that they were trained to target "the weakest of the herd" — "the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who are least knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to trickery or deceit, or who have little money and hence have no real alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to settle a claim at much less than fair value." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

          434*434 The Campbells themselves could be placed within the "weakest of the herd" category. The couple appeared economically vulnerable and emotionally fragile. App. 3360a-3361a (Order Denying State Farm's Motion for Judgment NOV and New Trial Regarding Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). At the time of State Farm's wrongful conduct, "Mr. Campbell had residuary effects from a stroke and Parkinson's disease." Id., at 3360a.

          To further insulate itself from liability, trial evidence indicated, State Farm made "systematic" efforts to destroy internal company documents that might reveal its scheme, App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a, efforts that directly affected the Campbells, id., at 124a. For example, State Farm had "a special historical department that contained a copy of all past manuals on claim-handling practices and the dates on which each section of each manual was changed." Ibid. Yet in discovery proceedings, State Farm failed to produce any claim-handling practice manuals for the years relevant to the Campbells' bad-faith case. Id., at 124a-125a.

          State Farm's inability to produce the manuals, it appeared from the evidence, was not accidental. Documents retained by former State Farm employee Samantha Bird, as well as Bird's testimony, showed that while the Campbells' case was pending, Janet Cammack, "an in-house attorney sent by top State Farm management, conducted a meeting ... in Utah during which she instructed Utah claims management to search their offices and destroy a wide range of material of the sort that had proved damaging in bad-faith litigation in the past — in particular, old claim-handling manuals, memos, claim school notes, procedure guides and other similar documents." Id., at 125a. "These orders were followed even though at least one meeting participant, Paul Short, was personally aware that these kinds of materials had been requested by the Campbells in this very case." Ibid.

          Consistent with Bird's testimony, State Farm admitted that it destroyed every single copy of claim-handling manuals 435*435 on file in its historical department as of 1988, even though these documents could have been preserved at minimal expense. Ibid. Fortuitously, the Campbells obtained a copy of the 1979 PP&R manual by subpoena from a former employee. Id., at 132a. Although that manual has been requested in other cases, State Farm has never itself produced the document. Ibid.

          "As a final, related tactic," the trial court stated, the jury could reasonably find that "in recent years State Farm has gone to extraordinary lengths to stop damaging documents from being created in the first place." Id., at 126a. State Farm kept no records at all on excess verdicts in third-party cases, or on bad-faith claims or attendant verdicts. Ibid. State Farm alleged "that it has no record of its punitive damage payments, even though such payments must be reported to the [Internal Revenue Service] and in some states may not be used to justify rate increases." Ibid. Regional Vice President Buck Moskalski testified that "he would not report a punitive damage verdict in [the Campbells'] case to higher management, as such reporting was not set out as part of State Farm's management practices." Ibid.

          State Farm's "wrongful profit and evasion schemes," the trial court underscored, were directly relevant to the Campbells' case, id., at 132a:

"The record fully supports the conclusion that the bad-faith claim handling that exposed the Campbells to an excess verdict in 1983, and resulted in severe damages to them, was a product of the unlawful profit scheme that had been put in place by top management at State Farm years earlier. The Campbells presented substantial evidence showing how State Farm's improper insistence on claims-handling employees' reducing their claim payouts ... regardless of the merits of each claim, manifested itself ... in the Utah claims operations during the period when the decisions were made not to offer to settle the Campbell case for the $50,000 policy limits— 436*436 indeed, not to make any offer to settle at a lower amount. This evidence established that high-level manager Bill Brown was under heavy pressure from the PP&R scheme to control indemnity payouts during the time period in question. In particular, when Brown declined to pay the excess verdict against Curtis Campbell, or even post a bond, he had a special need to keep his year-end numbers down, since the State Farm incentive scheme meant that keeping those numbers down was important to helping Brown get a much-desired transfer to Colorado.... There was ample evidence that the concepts taught in the Excess Liability Handbook, including the dishonest alteration and manipulation of claim files and the policy against posting any supersedeas bond for the full amount of an excess verdict, were dutifully carried out in this case.... There was ample basis for the jury to find that everything that had happened to the Campbells—when State Farm repeatedly refused in bad-faith to settle for the $50,000 policy limits and went to trial, and then failed to pay the `excess' verdict, or at least post a bond, after trial — was a direct application of State Farm's overall profit scheme, operating through Brown and others." Id., at 133a-134a.

          State Farm's "policies and practices," the trial evidence thus bore out, were "responsible for the injuries suffered by the Campbells," and the means used to implement those policies could be found "callous, clandestine, fraudulent, and dishonest." Id., at 136a; see id., at 113a (finding "ample evidence" that State Farm's reprehensible corporate policies were responsible for injuring "many other Utah consumers during the past two decades"). The Utah Supreme Court, relying on the trial court's record-based recitations, understandably characterized State Farm's behavior as "egregious and malicious." Id., at 18a.

437*437 II

          The Court dismisses the evidence describing and documenting State Farm's PP&R policy and practices as essentially irrelevant, bearing "no relation to the Campbells' harm." Ante, at 422; see ante, at 424 ("conduct that harmed [the Campbells] is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis"). It is hardly apparent why that should be so. What is infirm about the Campbells' theory that their experience with State Farm exemplifies and reflects an overarching underpayment scheme, one that caused "repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them," ante, at 423? The Court's silence on that score is revealing: Once one recognizes that the Campbells did show "conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them," ante, at 424, it becomes impossible to shrink the reprehensibility analysis to this sole case, or to maintain, at odds with the determination of the trial court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a, that "the adverse effect on the State's general population was in fact minor," ante, at 427.

          Evidence of out-of-state conduct, the Court acknowledges, may be "probative [even if the conduct is lawful in the State where it occurred] when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious...." Ante, at 422; cf. ante, at 419 (reiterating this Court's instruction that trial courts assess whether "the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident"). "Other acts" evidence concerning practices both in and out of State was introduced in this case to show just such "deliberateness" and "culpability." The evidence was admissible, the trial court ruled: (1) to document State Farm's "reprehensible" PP&R program; and (2) to "rebut [State Farm's] assertion that [its] actions toward the Campbells were inadvertent errors or mistakes in judgment." App. 3329a (Order Denying Various Motions of State Farm to Exclude Plaintiffs' Evidence). Viewed in this light, there surely was "a nexus" between much of the "other 438*438 acts" evidence and "the specific harm suffered by [the Campbells]." Ante, at 422.

III

          When the Court first ventured to override state-court punitive damages awards, it did so moderately. The Court recalled that "[i]n our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any particular case." Gore, 517 U. S., at 568. Today's decision exhibits no such respect and restraint. No longer content to accord state-court judgments "a strong presumption of validity," TXO, 509 U. S., at 457, the Court announces that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." Ante, at 425.[2] Moreover, the Court adds, when compensatory damages are substantial, doubling those damages "can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee." Ibid.; see ante, at 429 ("facts of this case ... likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages"). In a legislative scheme or a state high court's design to cap punitive damages, the handiwork in setting single-digit and 1-to-1 benchmarks could hardly be questioned; in a judicial decree imposed on the States by this Court under the banner of substantive due process, the numerical controls today's decision installs seem to me boldly out of order.

* * *

          I remain of the view that this Court has no warrant to reform state law governing awards of punitive damages. 439*439 Gore, 517 U. S., at 607 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Even if I were prepared to accept the flexible guides prescribed in Gore, I would not join the Court's swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching orders. For the reasons stated, I would leave the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court undisturbed.

          [*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alliance of American Insurers et al. by Mark F. Horning, Charles G. Cole, and Bennett Evan Cooper; for the American Council of Life Insurers by William F. Sheehan and Victoria E. Fimea; for the American Tort Reform Association by Roy T. Englert, Jr., and Alan E. Untereiner; for the Business Roundtable by Malcolm E. Wheeler; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Andrew L. Frey, Andrew H. Schapiro, Evan M. Tager, and Robin S. Conrad; for Common Good by Philip K. Howard, Robert A. Long, Jr., and Keith A. Noreika; for the Defense Research Institute by Patrick Lysaught; for Ford Motor Co. by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Miguel A. Estrada, John M. Thomas, and Michael J. O'Reilly; for the Health Insurance Association of America et al. by Robert N. Weiner and Nancy L. Perkins; for the International Mass Retail Association et al. by Daniel H. Bromberg, Robert J. Verdisco, David F. Zoll, and Donald D. Evans; for the National Association of Manufacturers by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, Richard D. Bernstein, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the National Conference of Insurance Legislators by Patrick Lynch; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Victor E. Schwartz and Leah Lorber; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Arvin Maskin, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; and for A. Mitchell Polinsky et al. by Dan M. Kahan.

          Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Minnesota et al. by Mike Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, and Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the California Consumer Health Care Council, Inc., by Eugene R. Anderson and Daniel Healy; for Certain Leading Social Scientists et al. by Paul M. Simmons and William M. Shernoff; and for Keith N. Hylton by Garry B. Bryant.

          Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Abbott Laboratories et al. by Walter Dellinger; for DeKalb Genetics Corp. by Seth P. Waxman and David W. Ogden; and for the Truck Insurance Exchange et al. by Ellis J. Horvitz, S. Thomas Todd, and Mary-Christine Sungaila.

          [1] By switching the focus from the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages to the potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant succeeded in its illicit scheme, the Court could describe the relevant ratio in TXO as 10 to 1. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 581, and n. 34 (1996).

          [2] TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 462, n. 8 (1993), noted that "[u]nder well-settled law," a defendant's "wrongdoing in other parts of the country" and its "impressive net worth" are factors "typically considered in assessing punitive damages." It remains to be seen whether, or the extent to which, today's decision will unsettle that law.