Affirmed by published opinion. Judge DUNCAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge WYNN and Judge FLOYD joined.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Karen B. Balas appeals the district court’s denial of relief on her claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), as well as wrongful discharge, assault, and battery, brought under Virginia law, against Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (“Huntington Ingalls”), the successor to her former employer, Northrop Grumman Corporation.1 On appeal, Balas argues that the district court erred in construing the scope of her charge of discrimination, denying her leave to amend her complaint, and granting summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on her claims of retaliatory discharge, assault, and battery. For the reasons ably articulated by the district court, we affirm.

I.

A.

According to Balas, Huntington Ingalls “subject[ed] her to an ongoing sexually hostile work environment that included unwanted requests from her supervisor for sex, numerous sexual comments, sexually explicit posters knowingly being allowed in [her] workplace, employees massaging one another, sexually offensive pictures, and unwanted touching....” J.A. 7. Her complaint centers on the actions of her supervisor, Brad Price, who, she alleges, “frequently and repeatedly commented to [her] about how much he liked her attire and physical appearance”; “referred to [her] as a ‘good woman’ “frequently and repeatedly entered [her] small work space and her personal space”; and “frequently talked about his sex life to [her].” J.A. 7-8. According to Balas’s complaint, “[i]n or around April 2009, Mr. Price solicited sex from [her].” J.A. 8.

In August 2009, Balas wore a pair of ripped jeans to work. Price, apparently in response to a complaint, sent her home to change into more appropriate work attire. Balas alleges that men dressed in similarly ripped jeans were not asked to change. She alleges that upon returning to work, she complained to Price that his request for her to change clothes was discriminatory.

In January 2010, Price hugged Balas. Balas alleges that Price “trapped [her] in her work space and willfully, wantonly and forcibly put his arms around [her,] hugging her against her will.” J.A. 11-12. It is undisputed, however, that this hug occurred after Balas had given Price a gift of Christmas cookies for his family, and that immediately prior to the hug, Price had thanked her for the cookies and told her, “You never cease to amaze me.” J.A. 145.

*405Balas alleges that she repeatedly complained of gender discrimination and a hostile work environment. She asserts that because of these complaints, she was repeatedly denied promotions.

On February 17, 2010, Balas was fired for falsifying her February 11, 2010 time records. Another female employee was fired the same day for the same infraction. It is undisputed that Balas did not properly account for taking off over an hour of time. Price alerted Cindi Wolfe, his human resources representative, and Roger Lowman, the department manager, of the time-keeping infraction. The three of them undertook an investigation of the incident. Lowman, who was never made aware of Balas’s alleged complaint to Price about the jeans incident, was solely responsible for the decision to fire Balas.

B.

On July 19, 2010, Balas submitted an intake questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). She attached to her questionnaire a letter laying out her complaints in greater detail, including being denied opportunities for promotions, a “personal vendetta” Wolfe held against her, and the circumstances of the jeans incident. J.A. 182-84. The EEOC prepared a charge on her behalf, alleging sex discrimination and retaliatory termination, which Balas signed on July 26, 2010. The only specific occurrences referenced in the charge were her termination and the jeans incident. The EEOC charge listed February 17, 2010 — the date of her termination — -as the “earliest” and “latest” date of discrimination. The “continuing action” box on the charge was left blank.

On October 2, 2010, Balas sent a second letter to the EEOC providing further details related to Price and the alleged sexual harassment. Later that month, the EEOC prepared an amended charge, which included the allegation that Price inappropriately hugged her in January 2010. The hug was the only additional fact alleged in the amended charge. The earliest date of discrimination section was left blank, but, again, the “continuing action” box was not checked.

The EEOC dismissed Balas’s charge and issued her right to sue letter on February 25, 2011. She subsequently filed suit in the district court pro se. In her complaint, Balas alleged Title VII claims for failure to promote, retaliatory termination, and hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. She also alleged state law claims for wrongful discharge, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Huntington Ingalls filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted in part. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider allegations in Balas’s Title VII claim that were not included in her EEOC charge. In determining the scope of that charge, the court declined to consider Ba-las’s intake questionnaire or letters to the EEOC. The court concluded that Balas only properly alleged discriminatory or retaliatory termination and harassment by her supervisor. It went on, however, to dismiss her harassment claim.

In her complaint, Balas alleged that Huntington Ingalls wrongfully discharged her by terminating her in order to silence her opposition to discrimination and harassment in the workplace, in violation of what she asserted is the public policy articulated in the Virginia Human Rights Act (“VHRA”), Va.Code § 2.1-714 et seq. Balas sought to amend her complaint to include other sources of public policy in support of her claim. The district court determined that Balas’s proposed amendments would be futile because the complaint, even if amended, *406would not sufficiently state a claim for wrongful discharge. The court thus denied Balas leave to amend her complaint and dismissed her wrongful discharge claim.

The court found that Balas had stated a claim of retaliatory termination under Title VII and denied Huntington Ingalls’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to that claim. In considering the merits of Balas’s retaliatory termination claim on summary judgment, the court concluded that Balas sufficiently alleged that she had engaged in a protected activity in complaining to Price about discrimination and that Huntington Ingalls took an adverse employment action against her by firing her. It determined, however, that she failed to present more than merely color-able evidence of a causal link between the two events, and granted summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls.

The court also determined that Balas had stated claims for assault and battery. Upon considering the merits of those claims, however, it concluded that Price’s hug could not amount to either a battery or an assault, and granted summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls.

Balas now appeals the district court’s dismissal of the majority of her Title VII claims on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, its denial of leave to amend her complaint, and its grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on her retaliatory termination, assault, and battery claims.2

II.

Balas first argues that the district court erred by considering only her EEOC charge — and not the intake questionnaire and letters she sent to the EEOC — in evaluating her Title VII claims. She also argues that she should have been granted leave to amend her complaint to include additional sources of public policy upon which to base her wrongful discharge claim.

Balas further challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls. With respect to her Title VII retaliatory discharge claim, she argues that a reasonable person could find a connection between her alleged complaints to Price regarding sexual harassment and discrimination and Lowman’s decision to fire her. She also argues that she presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Price committed the torts of assault and battery.

We address each of these arguments in turn.

A.

We first take up Balas’s argument that the district court erred in considering only her amended EEOC charge, and not the contents of her intake questionnaire or the two letters she submitted to the EEOC. The import of her argument derives from the fact that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims for which a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir.2009). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc).

1.

An employee seeking redress for discrimination cannot file suit until she has exhausted the administrative process. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The requirement of filing a charge with the EEOC against *407the party sued serves two principal purposes: “ ‘First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the [Civil Rights] Act’s primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law.’ ” Dickey v. Greene, 710 F.2d 1003, 1005 (4th Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds, 729 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir.1969)). The filing of an administrative charge, therefore, “is not simply a formality to be rushed through so that an individual can quickly file his subsequent lawsuit.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir.2005). Rather, the charge itself serves a vital function in the process of remedying an unlawful employment practice.

An employee complaining of illegal discrimination must first contact the EEOC and present it with information supporting the allegations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6. After receiving an employee’s intake questionnaire and any other information the employee has provided, the EEOC typically assists the employee with filing a charge. This assistance often includes drafting a charge — as it did here — and then asking the employee to sign it. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, The Charge Handling Process, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ employees/process.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).

The EEOC sends a notice and copy of the charge to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14. This notice gives the employer the chance to voluntarily conduct its own investigation and attempt to resolve any discriminatory actions internally. See Chacko, 429 F.3d at 510. Concurrently, the EEOC investigates the charge.

The filing of a charge also “initiates agency-monitored settlement, the primary way that claims of discrimination are resolved.” Id. This procedure “reflects a congressional intent to use administrative conciliation as the primary means of handling claims, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes.” Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir.2000). Prior to making any determination as to the merit of a charge, the EEOC may encourage and facilitate settlement between the parties. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20.

If the EEOC finds “reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24. If the EEOC cannot reach a voluntary settlement with the employer, the agency may file a lawsuit or issue a Notice-of-Right-to-Sue to the employee. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.27-28. If the EEOC does not make a reasonable cause determination or the employee requests a right to sue, the agency may issue one, thus allowing the employee to file suit. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.

2.

In any subsequent lawsuit alleging unlawful employment practices under Title VII, a federal court may only consider those allegations included in the EEOC charge. See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir.1996) (“The allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally operate to limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.”). If the plaintiffs Title VII claims “ ‘exceed the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are procedurally barred.’ ” Chacko, 429 F.3d at *408506 (quoting Dennis v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir.1995)).

In determining what claims a plaintiff properly alleged before the EEOC, we may look only to the charge filed with that agency. We have noted that “it would be objectively illogical to view a private letter from a complaining party to the EEOC as constructively amending a formal charge, given that one of the purposes of requiring a party to file charges with the EEOC is to put the charged party on notice of the claims raised against it.” Sloop v. Mem’l Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir.1999). Sloop’s reasoning applies here, despite Balas’s contentions to the contrary. Balas argues that her letters, written before formal charges were filed, should be treated differently. We disagree. Given that Balas’s employer was never apprised of the contents of her letters (nor could she expect it to have been), the point at which they were written makes no difference for the goals of putting her employer on notice or encouraging conciliation.

While we recognize that EEOC charges often are not completed by lawyers and as such “ ‘must be construed with utmost liberality,’ ” Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir.1988) (quoting Kaplan v. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Emps., 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.1975)), we are not at liberty to read into administrative charges allegations they do not contain. Instead, persons alleging discrimination have a different form of recourse if they determine that their initial charge does not read as they intended: they may, as Balas did, file an amended charge with the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).3 The intake questionnaire and the letters Balas submitted to the EEOC cannot be read as part of her formal discrimination charge without contravening the purposes of Title YU.

Balas also argues that she should not be penalized for the EEOC’s “negligence” in failing to send a copy of her intake questionnaire and letters to the EEOC to her employer.4 However, she points to no authority — and we find none— requiring the EEOC to undertake such an action or providing the EEOC with the discretion to do so.5 We decline to impose such an obligation upon the EEOC.

*409Any Title VII claims based on allegations included only in Balas’s intake questionnaire and letters are therefore outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The district court properly declined to consider those allegations not included in Balas’s EEOC charge.

B.

We next consider the district court’s denial of leave for Balas to amend her complaint. Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “ ‘[L]eave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.’ ” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir.1986)). The court determined that Balas’s proposed amendments would be futile. We review the denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. HCMF Corp. v. Allen, 238 F.3d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir.2001).

Virginia generally adheres to the common law doctrine of at-will employment. Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915, 916-17 (1987). However, an at-will employee may bring a tor-tious wrongful discharge claim if her termination violates a state public policy as expressed in a statute. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985). The Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently characterized this exception as “narrow.” City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 220, 523 S.E.2d 239, 245 (2000). That court has recognized a “discharge ... based on [an] employee’s refusal to engage in a criminal act” as a basis for a wrongful discharge action. Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2002).

Balas contends that she was discharged for refusing to engage in illegal activity and sought to amend her complaint to reference additional crimes she declined to commit. Specifically, she would have amended her complaint to allege that her discharge followed from her refusal to commit three crimes under Virginia law: (1) fornication, see Va.Code § 18.2-344; (2) lewd and lascivious behavior, see Va.Code § 18.2-345; and (3) sexual assault, see Va. Code § 18.2-61. We consider each in turn.

In support of her argument regarding the first of these policies, Balas cites Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 523 S.E.2d 246 (2000). There, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful discharge based on Virginia statutes proscribing fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior. However, as the district court correctly determined here, Mitchem’s application of Virginia Code § 18.2-344, prohibiting fornication, was abrogated by Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 607 S.E.2d 367 (2005), making Balas’s proposed amendment futile. In Martin, the Virginia Supreme Court struck down § 18.2-344 as unconstitutional, “because by subjecting certain private sexual conduct between two consenting adults to criminal penalties it infringes on the rights of adults to ‘engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.’ ” 607 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003)).

Amending her complaint to reference Virginia’s public policy against lewd and lascivious behavior would likewise be futile. Virginia Code § 18.2-345, which makes it illegal to “lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit” and to engage in “open and gross lewdness and *410lasciviousness,” does not apply to the facts Balas alleges in her complaint. Price never proposed cohabitation, and the hug Balas complains of did not even begin to approach the sort of “open and gross lewdness” § 18.2-345 prohibits. See Everett v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 325, 200 S.E.2d 564 (1973).6

Balas’s final proposed amendment would be even farther from the mark. She would amend her complaint to allege that she was wrongfully discharged for not consenting to engage in the crime of sexual assault. Her proposed argument is untenable, as it is legally impossible to consent to sexual assault. Lack of consent is an element of the crime of sexual assault, so consensual sexual activity simply cannot constitute sexual assault. Va.Code § 18.2-61. Therefore, as a matter of law, “had [Balas] consented to having [Price] touch her, there would have been no crime.” Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 253. Any complaint of wrongful discharge on this basis would be unavailing.

Because the district court correctly determined that amending her complaint would be futile, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Balas leave to do so.

C.

Next, we turn to Balas’s Title VII claim of retaliatory discharge. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Castillo v. Emergency Med. Assocs., 372 F.3d 643, 646 (4th Cir.2004). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Balas, the non-moving party. Id.

“In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) that there was a causal link between the two events.” EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405-06 (4th Cir.2005). Balas’s alleged complaint of discrimination to Price regarding the jeans incident was a protected activity, and her termination from the company was an adverse employment action. For a successful Title VII claim, Balas must show a causal connection between these two incidents.

Balas does not dispute that Lowman, the manager responsible for firing her, was not aware of her complaint to Price regarding the jeans incident. However, Ba-las argues that Price’s involvement in the investigation that led to her termination constitutes evidence that he directly influenced that decision.

Title VII does not “limit the discrimination inquiry to the actions or statements of formal decisionmakers for the employer.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir.2004). However, we have refused to endorse a construction of Title VII that would treat a “subordinate who has no supervisory or disciplinary authority and who does not make the final or formal employment decision [as] a decisionmaker simply because he had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or because he has played a role, even a significant *411one, in the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 291. For Balas’s retaliatory termination claim to succeed, she must demonstrate that Price “possessed such authority as to be viewed as the one principally responsible for the decision.” Id. It is fatal to her claim that she presents no evidence to that effect.

Because Lowman did not know of the protected activity, and because Price, who allegedly influenced him, was not principally responsible for the decision to terminate Balas’s employment, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on the retaliatory discharge claim.

D.

Finally, we turn to the district court’s summary adjudication of Balas’s assault and battery claims. Again, we review the court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Castillo, 372 F.3d at 646.

Battery is “an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified.” Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2003). Assault entails “an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)). “Although these two torts ‘go together like ham and eggs,’ the difference between them is ‘that between physical contact and the mere apprehension of it. One may exist without the other.’ ” Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 10 at 46).

1.

For contact to rise to the level of battery, it must be “offensive,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18, and “done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,” Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242, 244 (1924). “A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19. As Balas concedes, the quality of the act’s offensiveness is judged by an objective standard, not by whether the plaintiff found the act offensive. Id. at § 18.7

Balas argues that whether she consented to the hug is a question of fact appropriate for a jury, although she does not dispute that she never told Price to stop or that the hug was unwelcome. To the contrary, rather than objecting to the hug itself, she testified that it was the manner of the hug that made her uncomfortable: “the way [Price] swooped [her] up at [her] waist, or the way he grabbed [her] was what felt offensive.” J.A. 128.

Even if the hug was not consented to, it was “excused” or “justified,” and a reasonable person could not find it objectively offensive. See Koffman, 574 S.E.2d at 261. To constitute battery, the challenged contact must be “unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 cmt. a. Balas had just given Price a gift of Christmas cookies. Immediately before hugging Balas, Price thanked her and told her that she never ceased to amaze him. Given the circumstances surrounding the hug, we determine that Balas raises no genuine question of material fact as to whether the hug was objectively offensive.

*4122.

For conduct to constitute assault, it must be intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension of that contact. Koffman, 574 S.E.2d at 261. The conduct must also cause an objectively reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery. Id. Balas presented no evidence that the hug was harmful or offensive, or that Price intended the hug to involve any contact beyond the hug itself or intended to make Balas think that it would. The circumstances indicate that the requisite intent was absent, and any apprehension of an imminent battery Balas might have felt was not objectively reasonable.

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the assault and battery claims.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is before the Court after briefing and oral argument on Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Anthony Marcantonio (“Plaintiff’) filed this diversity action against former teammates on the University of Virginia (“UVA”) men’s swim team for several torts under Virginia law.1 Generally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to assorted forms of hazing, threats, verbal abuse, intimidation, and unwanted touching or limitations on his physical movement. The crux of the Complaint is the purported “hazing” of new swim team members by upperclassmen that took place one evening at an off-campus residence known as the “Swim House.” Plaintiff also contends that, as part of Defendants’ effort to cover up their alleged misdeeds, they retaliated against him such that he no longer continued swimming for UVA and left the school.

There are five defendants, all of whom have filed a motion to dismiss: Kyle Dud-zinski; Luke Papendick; Charles Rommel; David Ingraham; and Jacob Pearce. The Complaint alleges ten counts, all against each Defendant, for assault, battery, false imprisonment, hazing, tortious interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, common law and statutory conspiracy, and negligence. For the reasons discussed below, the motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss merely tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). A court need not “accept the legal conclusions drawn from the *623facts” or “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.2000). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, with all allegations in the complaint taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiffs favor. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2005). Rule 12(b)(6) does “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

FACTS AS ALLEGED

Plaintiffs Background and Matriculation to UVA

Plaintiff Anthony Marcantonio graduated high school in 2013 as an honor student. Compl. ¶ 11. During his high school days, he excelled in competitive swimming, devoting many morning, evenings, and weekends to practice and eventually developing a national reputation in the amateur swimming community - due to his exploits. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. Consequently, several universities recruited him for their respective swim teams, and Plaintiff welcomed the opportunity to attend a top-flight academic institution with a swimming team he hoped could springboard him into the world of professional or Olympic swimming. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16.

The University of Virginia, Plaintiff believed, presented such an opportunity. UVA’s swimming coach impressed Plaintiff, who was particularly enamored with the supportive environment surrounding the team. Compl. ¶ 17. The “anti-hazing” policy in UVA’s Student Handbook — which forbade “any action ... by members of a student organization towards [another] member[ ] ... designed to or producing] mental or physical harassment, discomfort, or ridicule” — also appealed to Plaintiff, as did the provision of the UVA Standards of Conduct prohibiting hazing and “physical assault.” Compl. ¶ 18. These aspects, as well as the University’s stellar reputation generally and in academics specifically, led Plaintiff to matriculate to UVA in August 2014 to study and to swim.2 Compl. ¶¶ 19-20, 22.

Emails from “Mr. Mean”

After Plaintiff arrived on Grounds, Defendants Dudzinski and Papendick — up-perclass members of the swim team— called a meeting of the first-year swimmers and informed them that “team bonding” would take place during a so-called “welcome week.” Compl. ¶ 23. Shortly thereafter, on the evening of August 26, 2014, Plaintiff received an email from the aptly-named “Mr. Mean,” in actuality an email account persona created by Defendants Dudzinski, Papendick, Romniel, Ingraham, and Pearce. The email— “jointly] authored]” by “defendants”— was addressed to “[d]earrest [sic] shitcuts” (i.e., the first-year swimmers) who Mr. Mean was “fucking embarrassed” to welcome to ÚVA on account of their b.eing “gender-neutral dick sucks” (whatever that means). Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26(xliii). Mr. Mean emphasized that “what I say, goes,” announced that the first event of Welcome Week would commence the next day, and instructed the first-year swimmers to arrive at the appointed time at 1100 Wert-land Street, Charlottesville, Virginia. Id. True to his moniker, Mr. Mean closed by *624warning the first-years that (1) if they arrived even one second early or late, he would sodomize their future fiancées in front of them, and (2) if they “tell a soul” about the Swim House rendezvous, they would be sodomized with a “dry ice dildo we have packed away,” so they better “keep [their] FUCKING MOUTHS SHUT.” Compl. ¶ 24 (emphasis added). The next day (but prior to the appointed arrival time), Mr. Mean sent another profane, but much shorter, email to the first-year swimmers moving the appointed meeting time. Id.

Plaintiff was “unsure” whether the emails were a joke or whether he should be “concerned or fearful” due to them. Compl. ¶ 25. But he “did not want to appear squeamish” to his teammates, so he arrived at the appointed time to 1100 Wertland Street, known as the “Swim House” because upperclass swimmers lived there. Id. What happened next, Plaintiff alleges, “was instigated by the defendants who were the organizers [of] and who participated” in the events at the Swim House. Compl. ¶ 26.

Events at the Swim House

When Plaintiff arrived, the Swim House’s interior was dark except for a strobe light, and “heavy-metal, satanic music” blared. Compl. ¶ 26(i). Once inside, Plaintiff saw another first-year who appeared frightened. Compl. ¶ 26(h). An upperclassman instructed him to sit down and to remove his tie and “anything else he didn’t want to get wet.” Compl. ¶ 26(iii). Defendant Rommel entered the room and yelled at Plaintiff, and Defendant Dudzin-ski appeared, asking the first-years if they were scared. Compl. ¶¶ 26(iv)-(v). Defendant Ingraham instructed the first-years to say “pussy,” and then “defendants” placed buckets on the first-years’ heads. Compl. ¶ 26(vii). “Defendants” taunted and insulted them. Compl. ¶ 26(vni). Plaintiff began to fear for his safety. Compl. ¶ 26(ix). “[Defendants” then removed the buckets, instructing the first-years to assemble in a line and placing them accordingly. Compl. ¶26^). Defendants Dudzin-ski and Ingraham came “menacingly close” to Plaintiff “with sudden and threatening movements and grunts” during this time. Compl. ¶ 26(xi).

“Defendants” then blindfolded the first-years, including Plaintiff, with dirty ties and cummerbunds and screamed at them to perform an “Elephant Walk” (ie., to reach between their legs to grab the genitals of the person behind them). Compl. ¶¶ 26(xii)-(xiii). This Elephant Walk procession ambled into a dark bathroom, where Plaintiff “felt closed in” and became disoriented and “more concerned.” Compl. ¶ 26(xv). Once inside, Defendant Pearce yelled that the first-years “had one hour” and slammed the door. Compl. ¶ 26(xvi). The first-years turned on the bathroom lights, which revealed several containers of alcohol and other liquids; all methods of pouring out the containers (the sink, toilet, windows, and shower drain) were blocked or duct-taped shut. Compl. ¶ 26(xvii). “Defendants” screamed at the first-years to turn off the lights and unidentified individuals yelled at them to drink all the liquids immediately, lest they “get the dry-ice dildo” treatment for pouring any out. Compl. ¶ 26(xviii). One first-year complained of an injury caused by Defendant Rommel when shards of a glass he shattered on the floor ricocheted into the first-year’s eye. Compl. ¶ 26(xix).

For roughly the next hour, “defendants” periodically opened the bathroom door to demand an empty bottle as proof of consumption. Compl. ¶ 26(xxi). “All first-years who drank the alcohol became intoxicated.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxii). Defendants Rommel and Pearce opened the door to shout in obscenities before slamming it closed. *625Compl. ¶ 26(xxiii). “Defendants” also threw in a questionnaire and a flashlight, and occasionally “a bucket of water would be thrown in.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxv). The bathroom became hot and humid because its radiator was turned on. Compl. ¶ 26(xxvi). “[Defendants” again opened the door, this time ordering the first-years to fill out a questionnaire including both benign identification questions {e.g., name, hometown, birthdate) and offensive/intrusive ones (e.g., favorite sexual position, how “many girls on the women’s team have you hooked up with”). Compl. ¶ 26(xxvii). Similar offensive questioning occurred by “[d]efendants” from outside the bathroom, including by Defendant Ingraham of Plaintiff, who fabricated answers and “felt humiliated and ashamed.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxviii).

Eventually, “defendants” removed the first-years from the bathroom and “made” them face a corner blindfolded. Compl. ¶ 26(xxix). Plaintiff became “more fearful,” believing that “defendants ... had become drunk and had lost all self-control.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxxi). Defendants again interrogated the first-years; Defendant Rommel badgered Plaintiff and instructed him that his name was “Anthony Fucking Weiner.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxxv). Meanwhile, “defendants were or were causing others to pour an unknown liquid over his head.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxxvi). Rommel asked Plaintiff for the most offensive term for a black person he could think of and, after Plaintiff responded, his blindfold was removed to reveal an African-American in front of him. Compl. ¶ 26(xxxvi). Defendant Rommel responded with jeering jubilation. Id. Plaintiff became “delirious and could no longer think clearly.” Compl. ¶ 26(xxxviii).

Defendants led the first-years to the back of the Swim House. Compl. ¶ 26(xliii). Plaintiff had previously insisted he did not drink alcohol and therefore was “forced” to drink a gallon of milk and four glasses of prune juice. Compl. ¶ 26(xliv). As a result, he vomited on the back porch while “defendants” taunted him. Id. Defendant Pearce produced a bucket of live goldfish, and “defendants” instructed each first-year to name and then eat them. Compl. ¶ 26(xlv). “[Fjearing for his safety,” Plaintiff complied, and “defendants” made him prove that he had chewed his goldfish rather than swallowed it whole. Id. Plaintiff then received another goldfish to name and to hold in a plastic cup. Compl. ¶ 26(xlvii). But the cup was knocked from Plaintiffs hand, and “defendants” “tried to stomp” the second goldfish to death while yelling at Plaintiff he must try to save it. Id. Alas, the goldfish suffered fatal injuries. Compl. ¶ 26(xlviii).

Finally, the first-years were given dirty ■ ties and cummerbunds, instructed that they must wear them for the rest of Welcome Week, and ordered to complete a scavenger list that required the performance of theft, in violation of UVA’s Honor Code. Compl. ¶ 26(xlix). After five hours, the Swim House soiree concluded in the early morning of August 28, 2014. Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff worried that Defendants “had the power to deprive him of his ability to swim for UVA.” Id.

Additional Events and Fallout

■ In the afternoon of August 28th, Mr. Mean sent another email to Plaintiff and his fellow first-years, this one instructing them — in both profane and insulting language — to save seats at UVA’s amphithea-tre for an event the next day. Compl. ¶ 80. Plaintiff “felt compelled to comply out of fear” and thus camped out overnight. Compl. ¶ 31.

“[Djefendants” instructed Plaintiff that if he was asked about his teammate’s eye injury caused by Defendant Rommel breaking glass, he was to lie. Compl. ¶ 32. Defendant Ingraham interrupted a meeting between Plaintiff and an academic ad-*626visor to insist that Plaintiff remove his mandatory tie, for fear that the UVA swim coach would suspect hazing. Compl. ¶ 34.

On September 6, 2014, UVA’s swim coach learned of potential hazing problems in the program. Compl. ¶ 36. He questioned all the first-years about the issue, including Plaintiff, who confirmed the events at the Swim House. Id. Plaintiff also described the affair to an administrator at UVA two days later. Id. Defendants — after learning Plaintiff had disclosed the events at the Swim House— “ostracized and threatened” Plaintiff, who was instructed by his coach to practice apart from his teammates out of concern for his safety. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 39. Plaintiff had to exit the pool whenever his teammates arrived to practice because UVA’s swim coach said he “could not guarantee[ ]” Plaintiffs safety. Compl. ¶ 37. This altered schedule affected Plaintiffs training regimen and, ultimately, he “left the school.” Compl. ¶¶ 38-40.

ANALYSIS

I. General Allegations Against “Defendants” and the Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A common argument made by all Defendants is that the Complaint does not at times specifically identify which defendant (or any defendant) took certain actions, and thus fails to state a claim. This is a valid concern, as the Complaint — whether strategically or out of necessity — contains many vague or ambiguous allegations. There are at least three manifestations of this issue. First, the. Complaint often lumps together all “Defendants” without regard for which defendant actually did what. For instance, unspecified “defendants” are alleged to have “put buckets on” Plaintiffs head, taunted and insulted him, placed him in a line, and blindfolded him. Compl. ¶¶ 26(vii), (viii), (x), (xii). Second, the Complaint uses passive voice and omits the identity of the actor (e.g., first-years “were forced” to remain in the bathroom; Plaintiff “was again forced” to sit, “was pushed and shoved back” into his seat, and “was then made to stand up again”). Id. ¶¶ 26(xxi), (xxxii), (xxxvii)(xxxviii). Third, some allegations assert that “upperclassmen” took certain actions (such as telling Plaintiff to sit down and ordering him to memorize trivia answers, id. ¶¶ 26(iii), (xlvi)), an ambiguous term that could encompass Defendants, non-Defendant upperclassmen, or a mix of the two groups.

Although citing and generally discussing Twombly and Iqbal, the parties have not identified authorities specifically addressing the above pleading practices. In the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere, courts have interpreted Twombly and Iqbal to mean that generic or general allegations about the conduct of “defendants,” without more, fail to state a claim. E.g., Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir.2008) (use of “collective term ’Defendants’ ” not proper pleading practice); Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir.2008) (“conclusory allegations that simply name the ’Defendants’ generically” fail to state claim); Raub v. Bowen, 960 F.Supp.2d 602, 616 (E.D.Va.2013) (concluding “vagaries” in “ambiguous” false imprisonment count asserted against “one or more Defendants” warranted dismissal); Boykin Anchor Co. v. AT & T Corp., No. 5:10-CV-591-FL, 2011 WL 1456388, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2011) (holding “plaintiff cannot rely on bare allegations relating to the conduct of ’all defendants’”); Maisha v. Univ. of N. Carolina, No. 1:12-CV-371, 2013 WL 1232947, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (dismissing claims where complaint “was often vague as to who took what action” and made “no specific allegations” against certain defendants); Baca v. Callahan, No. *627CV-10-885-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 2757251, at *1 (D.Ariz. July 12, 2010) (dismissing complaint against ten defendants that did “little to clarify each Defendant’s role in the underlying transaction”); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 661 (4th Cir.2012) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Nevertheless, with the exception of Defendant Papendick, the Complaint does supplement its generic or ambiguous references with several specific allegations against Defendants by name. Accordingly, the claims against them will be analyzed further based on the parties’ substantive legal arguments.

As for Defendant Papendick, all but the common law conspiracy claim (Count VII) and punitive damages claim (Count IX) against him do not warrant further consideration insofar as they relate to his own personal actions. As Plaintiff admits (dkt. no. 47 at 16 n.5) and unlike with the other Defendants, there are only two substantive allegations against Defendant Papendick by name: he informed the first-year swimmers about Welcome Week, and he was co-creator of the “Mr. Mean” persona. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24. While these facts might support conspiracy and punitive damages claims, the other claims against him fall short based on the aforementioned authorities.3 Butler v. Bank of Am., N.A., 690 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir.2012) (holding that general allegations against all defendants did not state claim against particular defendant who was specifically referenced only twice in the complaint). The Complaint even lacks any specific allegation that Defendant Papendick was actually present at the Swim House on the night in question, or that he participated in the alleged “cover up” and retaliation against Plaintiff.4 Accordingly, but for the common law conspiracy and punitive damages counts, all claims against Defendant Papendick will be dismissed to the extent they allege that Papendick himself directly committed them.5

II. Count-by-COunt Analysis

1. Assault

Assault under Virginia law is “an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.” Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 16, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va.2003). To the extent this claim is based upon the Mr. Mean emails, it falls short. Given the intangible nature of email and the temporal gap between when the emails were received and when Plaintiff arrived at the Swim House, the immediacy required for assault is lacking. Indeed, shouting profanities and threats even in close physical proximity does not constitute assault. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 442, 449, 546 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Va.Ct.App.2001) (threatening a “blood bath” within inches of police officers was not assault). Plaintiffs own authority also acknowledges “[t]here can *628be no assault if the defendant is too far away to commit a battery.” Goforth v. Office Max, 48 Va. Cir. 463, 1999 WL 33722384, at *6 (Norfolk Cir.Ct.1999).

There is, however, more to the Complaint that the Mr. Mean emails. Defendants Rommel, Pearce, and Ingraham assert that the facts are insufficient to show an assault. But Rommel frequently screamed, yelled, and slammed doors at Plaintiff and others. Compl. ¶¶ 26(iv), (xxiii), (xxiv). He also shattered a glass bottle on the ground at the Swim House, causing shards to fly into another individual’s eye.6 Compl. t26(xix). Paragraph 26(xi) alleges that Defendants Ingraham and Dudzinski approached Plaintiff and made sudden and threatening movements towards him, which constitutes assault. Defendant Pearce repeatedly slammed shut a door near Plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 26(xvi), (xxiii). And all of these facts are supplemented by other general allegations against all Defendants, such as throwing buckets of water at Plaintiff, pouring liquid on him, and threatening sodomy in a “menacing way.” Compl. ¶¶ 26(xxv), (xxxvi), 42. Consequently, the Court will not dismiss the assault count against Defendants other than Pa-pendick.

2. Battery

“The tort of battery is an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified.” King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 312 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that reasonable jury could have found compliance with request by supervisor/sheriff for a kiss was not consent). Paragraph 45 of the Complaint summarizes the battery claim. It is based on Defendants placing a garbage can on Plaintiffs head, forcibly blindfolding him, leading him around while blindfolded, forcing him to ingest milk and prune juice, and pouring liquids on his head while blindfolded.

Defendant Dudzinski argues that Plaintiff consented to the alleged touching. He points out that Plaintiff arrived at the Swim House due to his own desire to fit in. Compl. ¶ 25. Nor is there any indication, Dudzinski notes, that Plaintiff objected to the Swim House happenings or at any time tried to leave. Dudzinski argues that Plaintiffs supposed “voluntary participation” in the activity was tantamount to consent. But this argument falters when confronted with the Complaint’s allegations that Plaintiff “was delirious and could no longer think clearly,” “was afraid for his life,” “felt compelled to comply out of fear,” and “felt captive and not free to leave.” “If consent is coerced or obtained by fraud, the touching is unlawful.” Gnadt v. Commonwealth., 27 Va.App. 148, 151, 497 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1998); see King, 594 F.3d at 312.7

Lack of consent vis-a-vis battery is an element Plaintiff must prove. In “the ease of battery, the plaintiffs burden is to show that the defendant intended to and did cause either harm or ‘offense,’ a burden that ordinarily requires the plaintiff to *629show that the defendant’s touching was not apparently consented to.” Dan B. Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 34 (2d ed.). Yet the Supreme Court of Virginia has reversed a demurrer dismissing a battery claim where the precise scope of the consent was at issue, ie., where plaintiffifoot-ball player affirmatively alleged he had not consented to being tackled by his adult coach and had no prior notice that such tackling would occur. Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 17, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va.2003).

Construing the facts and inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs arrival at the Swim House establishes as a matter of law that he consented to all the subsequent touching. Even if his appearance manifested consent to some activities, the scope of that consent is clearly at issue. Further, to the extent his continued presence at the Swim House was consent in a colloquial sense, numerous allegations (see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 26 (ix), (xxxi), 31) show it was coerced and thus not legal consent under Gnadt and King.8

3. False Imprisonment

“False imprisonment is the restraint of one’s liberty without any sufficient legal excuse.” Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 724, 708 S.E.2d 884, 890 (Va.2011); Parker v. Austin, 105 F.Supp.3d 592, 604-05 (W.D.Va.2015). “If a person is under a reasonable apprehension that force will be used unless he willingly submits, and he does submit to the extent that he is denied freedom of action, this, in legal contemplation, constitutes false imprisonment.” Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 51, 147 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Va.1966); Zaklit v. Global Linguist Solutions, LLC, 53 F.Supp.3d 835, 846 (E.D.Va.2014) (denying motion to dismiss where defendants threatened plaintiffs with arrest for attempting to leave confined area).

Only Defendant Rommel provides extended argument on this Count, although Pearce and Ingraham adopt Rommel’s position by reference. In addition to arguing the facts are insufficient, Rommel asserts that the “Complaint sets out no real reason that Plaintiff believed he could not leave, and certainly no reason attributable to Rommel.” But the Complaint does allege — in addition to many, more general allegations that constitute false imprisonment by Defendants — that Defendant Rommel “slammed the door shut” of the bathroom that Plaintiff was in and which had all other methods of escape closed off. Compl. ¶¶ 26(xvii), (xviii), (xxiii). Plaintiff also rightly responds to Rommel’s argument by citing Zaklit for the proposition that submission in the face of a reasonable apprehension of force suffices for imprisonment. Whether based on Zaklit, the fact that Plaintiff was shut in the bathroom, or any of the other allegations suggesting that Plaintiff felt he could not freely leave the Swim House on account of Defendants’ actions, the Complaint states a claim for false imprisonment.

4. Hazing

In Virginia, it is “unlawful to haze so as to cause bodily injury, any student at any school, college, or university.” Va. Code § 18.2-56. Hazing means:

*630to recklessly or intentionally endanger the health or safety of a student or students or to inflict bodily injury on a student or students in connection .with or for the purpose of initiation, admission into or affiliation with or as a condition for continued membership in a club, organization, association, fraternity, sorority, or student body regardless of whether the student or students so endangered or injured participated voluntarily in the relevant activity.

Id. Hazing is a criminal misdemeanor, but “[a]ny person receiving bodily injury by hazing shall have a right to sue, civilly, the person or persons guilty thereof.” Id. (emphasis added).9 Only two cases to date cite the statute, neither of which is illustrative here. Guerrero v. Deane, 750 F.Supp.2d 631, 658 (E.D.Va.2010) aff'd sub nom. Guerrero v. Moore, 442 Fed.Appx. 57 (4th Cir.2011), cites the statute when discussing battery. Givens v. O’Quinn, 121 Fed.Appx. 984 (4th Cir.2005), involved an assault on plaintiff by two co-workers with the Department of Corrections and merely referenced the definition in an inapplicable context.

Defendants’ central argument— made most comprehensively by Defendant Pearce — is that Plaintiff did not suffer any “bodily injury.”10 Although that term is undefined in the statute, it is used elsewhere in the Virginia Code as part of the malicious wounding law. Va. Code § 18.2-51. The parties agree that the Court should look to caselaw interpreting the term in that context.

Defendant Pearce contends that any emotional trauma, fear, humiliation, or disorientation Plaintiff felt did not constitute bodily injury, and the Court agrees. He further asserts that vomiting — which Plaintiff endured after being forced by Defendants to drink copious amounts of milk and prune juice — is merely a bodily “reaction,” not a bodily injury. Despite its initial appeal, this view is incorrect.

Courts give “bodily injury” its “everyday, ordinary meaning,” including “’any detriment hurt, loss, impairment’ that could fairly be considered an injury to the human body.” English v. Virginia, 58 Va.App. 711, 718-19, 715 S.E.2d 391, 395 (Va. Ct.App.2011). The “victim need not experience any observable wounds, cuts, or breaking of the skin,” nor “offer proof of broken bones or bruises.” Id. at 719, 715 S.E.2d at 395. “Bodily injury comprehends, it would seem, any bodily hurt whatsoever.” Id. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added). Simply put, vomiting certainly en*631tails bodily hurt. Chilton v. Commonwealth, No. 1531-13-3, 2014 WL 6428394 (Va.Ct.App. Nov. 18, 2014), is also illustrative. There, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed a strangulation conviction for lack of “bodily injury.”

[The victim] neither sought nor required medical attention, displayed no evidence of visible bruising or cuts, suffered no residual effects following the altercation, did not take or require medication, and did not testify to suffering any type of pain or stiffness at the time of the altercation.

Id. at *4 (emphasis added). This conclusion comports with the statement in English that suffering contemporaneous bodily pain or hurt constitutes bodily injury. Read liberally, then, one can infer from the Complaint that Plaintiff “suffered pain” and thus sustained bodily injury when he vomited.11

5. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

This tort requires showing “(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.” Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985). Plaintiffs conception of this claim appears to be: he had a contract to attend and swim at UVA; after he discussed the events at the Swim House with his coach, his teammates viewed him as a “rat”; his coach become concerned for his safety and had him practice apart from the team (al-though he remained on the team), and; eventually, Plaintiff left UVA (and by necessity the swim team). See Compl. ¶¶ 36-40; dkt. no. 47 at 10-12. Defendants contest the first, third, and fourth elements. The Court agrees that Count V has multiple shortcomings. The personal tort claims involved here are not a proper contractually-based business tort.

a. Contract or business expectancy

Defendant Dudzinski argues that Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a contract or its terms. In response, Plaintiff claims “he had a contract to attend UVA, swim on its Varsity swim team, and study.”

As a threshold matter, courts in Virginia are hesitant to find that the sorts of documents on which the Complaint relies— student handbooks, university policies, and codes of conduct — create a contract. Doe v. Washington & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *11 (W.D.Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (compiling cases); see Dodge v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Woman’s Coll., 276 Va. 1, 6, 661 S.E.2d 801, 803 (Va.2008) (holding various documents from university did not include contractual promise that it would not become co-educational). Additionally, the “terms of the contract must be clear, definite, and explicit,” Dodge, 276 Va. at 5, 661 S.E.2d at 803, and, as Defendants Dudzinski and Pearce point out, the Complaint alleged only in conclusory terms that Plaintiff had a contract with UVA to “come to UVA to study and to swim on its Varsity swim team.” Compl. ¶¶ 20, 40. There is no explication of the length of the contract, its substantive content or terms, or when it was terminated. In short, a contract and its terms have not been adequately pled.

*632At oral argument, Plaintiff stated that his business expectancy was that of becoming a professional swimmer, which would be aided by attended a “swimming school.” This theory was in neither the Complaint (which summarily alleged in Paragraphs 20, 40, and 54 a contract with UVA) nor Plaintiffs brief (which proclaimed the same). Moreover, the hope of becoming a professional athlete is too attenuated and too vague to serve as a basis for the first element, much less causation,

b. Intentional interference causing breach

Defendant Dudzinski challenges causation, observing that “there are no allegations that allow one to infer how the defendants’ actions caused or induced plaintiff to be unable to continue to study and swim at UVa” or “identifying which party to the contract — UVa or [Plaintiff] — may have actually breached the contract, or which provision(s) may have been breached.” As the Complaint alleges at Paragraph 40, Plaintiff “left the school,” not that UVA breached any alleged contract due to any actions by Defendants. In Defendant Rommel’s words, “[njothing in the Complaint indicates that [UVA] barred [Plaintiff] from swimming or competing;” rather, Plaintiff “chose to leave the UVA Swim Team.” Because “a plaintiff cannot interfere with [his] own contract,” CVLR Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne, 977 F.Supp.2d 598, 603 (W.D.Va.2013) (citing Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 427, 362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (Va.1987)), this element fails as well. Even assuming one could reasonably infer from the Complaint that UVA breached the hypothetical contract, attributing the cause of that breach to Defendants is not supported by the Complaint. At most, Defendants merely subjected Plaintiff to social hostility and ostracism because they thought he was a “rat”; there is no indication that Defendants conveyed that view to UVA’s coach, or that they otherwise tried to convince anyone with the power to remove Plaintiff from the team or school to do so. Indeed, it was Plaintiffs parents, not Defendants, who told the coach that Defendants viewed Plaintiff as a rat. Compl. ¶ 37.

c. Resulting damage

Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ contention that the Complaint lacks allegations about how or to what degree he suffered damages. (Compare dkt. no. 35 at 9 and dkt. no. 39 at 11 with dkt. no. 47 at 10-12). The Complaint, in Paragraph 55, contains only a recital that “Plaintiff has suffered damages” from the conduct at issue.

6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) are: “[1] the wrongdoer’s conduct is intentional or reckless; [2] the conduct is outrageous and intolerable; [3] the alleged wrongful conduct and emotional distress are causally connected; and, [4] the distress is severe.” Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 26, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Va.1991). IIED claims are disfavored in Virginia. Supervalu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 370, 666 S.E.2d 335, 343 (Va.2008); Williams v. Agency, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 409, 414 (E.D.Va.2014); Nelson v. Green, 965 F.Supp.2d 732, 752 (W.D.Va.2013). The Court assumes without deciding that the first three elements are satisfied. The fourth element is not met here.

In Russo, plaintiffs allegations that she suffered stress, nervousness, and sleeplessness did not qualify as severe distress. 241 Va. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163; see Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 205, 624 S.E.2d 24, 34 (Va.2006) (allegations of “nightmares, difficulty sleeping, extreme loss of self-esteem and depression,” and *633subsequent counseling did not state claim); Dixon v. Denny’s, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 792, 796 (E.D.Va.1996) (feeling “fearful and degraded” and suffering “headaches and vomiting” does not satisfy fourth element). The Complaint alleges Plaintiff suffered only the types of distress — e.g., fear, disorientation, shame, humiliation, deliriousness — that fail as a matter of law. Defendants Pearce, Dudzinski, and Papendick provided extensive argument on this issue. Plaintiffs brief — while recounting the factual allegations at great length — lacks any argument on the “severity” element, asserting only that there was “emotional distress [that] was severe.” Thus, the Court has not found any cases contrary to the authorities provided by Defendants showing that, a fortiori, the allegations here fail. As Defendant Dudzinski’s reply (dkt. no. 56 at 3) summarizes, “Plaintiff does not — and, indeed, cannot — point to allegations in the Complaint of even the barest symptoms of emotional distress.” The IIED claim must be dismissed.12

7. Punitive Damages13

Count VII is for punitive damages, which are “awarded only in cases of the most egregious conduct.” Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 407, 368 S.E.2d 268, 283 (Va.1988). “A claim for punitive damages at common law in a personal injury action must be supported by factual allegations sufficient to establish that the defendant’s conduct was willful or wanton.” Woods v. Mendez, 265 Va. 68, 76, 574 S.E.2d 263, 268 (Va.2003). Such damages “are allowable only where there is misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others” Condo. Servs., Inc. v. First Owners’ Ass’n of FoHy Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 579, 709 S.E.2d 163,174 (Va.2011). The Court finds that the facts alleged would be sufficient to infer actual malice by Defendants toward Plaintiff, or that they consciously disregarded his rights.14

*6348. Common Law Conspiracy

“Under Virginia law, the elements of a common law civil conspiracy are (i) an agreement between two or more persons (ii) to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means, which (iii) results in damage to plaintiff’ through an overt action done pursuant to the agreement. William v. AES Corp., 28 F.Supp.3d 553, 574 (E.D.Va.2014); Skillstorm, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys., LLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 610, 618 (E.D.Va.2009). There must also be an underlying tort committed. William, 28 F.Supp.3d at 574. Defendants — particularly Defendant Rommel — argue that there are insufficient facts to support an agreement or unity of purpose. Specifically, it is claimed that the Complaint contains “con-clusory allegations” of mere “parallel conduct.” (Dkt. no. 43 at 10-13). To the contrary, the Complaint does provide enough factual material on this issue.

The Complaint specifically alleges that all Defendants, by name, conspired together to draft and send the Mr. Mean emails regarding Welcome Week. The content of those emails is then recounted in detail. Not coincidentally, Defendants Dud-zinski and Papendick earlier mentioned to Plaintiff and the other first-years that Welcome Week would take place. And when Plaintiff arrived at the Swim House for Welcome Week as instructed by Mr. Mean, Defendants behaved in a manner one would expect from the creators of that crass persona, even making unique threats — e.g., the “dry-ice dildo” treatment — contained in the emails that would only have been known to its authors. All of this shows that, as alleged, Defendants worked together to send the Mr. Mean emails, knew their content and plan, and orchestrated and directly participated in the Swim House ritual. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that Defendants “were the organizers” of the Swim House event who “instigated” a slew of allegedly tor-tious activity, described in detail. Compl. ¶ 26. And the events inside the Swim House were not “spontaneous, parallel action” caused by partygoers who “got out of hand,” as Rommel claims. Rather, it took significant time, effort, and planning for Defendants to, among other things, procure buckets to place on the first-years’ heads; obtain large containers of alcohol and other liquids to be consumed; duct-tape shut or block all exits or drains of the bathroom in which Defendants would falsely imprison Plaintiff; draft detailed and embarrassing questionnaires; compile a scavenger hunt list; and purchase goldfish ignominiously condemned to death-by-mastication. Compl. ¶¶ 26(vii), (xvii), (xxv)(xxvii), (xlv)-(xlvi), (xlvii); see Dante Alighieri, Inferno, canto XXXIV: All told, the facts alleged are sufficient to establish a common law civil conspiracy.

9. Statutory Conspiracy under Va. Code §§ 18.2-499 & -500

By statute, “two or more persons who combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of ... willfully and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever” are jointly and severally guilty of a misdemeanor. Va. Code § 18.2-499(A)(i). “Any person ... injured in his reputation, trade, business or profession by reason of [such] a violation of § 18.2-499” has a private right of action for treble damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. Va. Code § 18.2-500.

■ “Despite its broad language, it is well-settled that this statute applies only to injuries ‘to business and property interests, not to personal or employment interests.’” Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 321 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting An*635drews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 (Va.2003)) (dismissing tort claim “cloaked” as a business conspiracy).

In an unbroken line of federal district cases, ... the federal district courts in Virginia have consistently held that a right of action is afforded [under these statutes] only when malicious conduct is directed at one’s business, not one’s person, and that the statute focuses upon conduct directed at property, i.e., one’s business and applies only to conspiracies resulting in business-related damages.

Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259 (4th Cir.1985) (emphasis in original, internal quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted); see Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc., 149 F.Supp.2d 246, 267 (W.D.Va.2001) (“In order to state a claim under Section 18.2-499, courts have held that the conspiracy must be one to injure the plaintiff ’in his business.’”).

Perhaps for this reason, federal district courts in Virginia have required that a conspiracy under this statute be pled, like fraud, with particularity (which has not been done here). E.g., Schlegel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 505 F.Supp.2d 321, 329 (W.D.Va.2007) (quoting Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F.Supp.2d 700, 706 (E.D.Va.2004)). Courts have reduced the elements of this claim to “(1) concerted action between two or more people; (2) legal malice towards Plaintiffs business; and (3) that the conspiratorial actions caused Plaintiffs business damages.” Jaggars v. Sandy Spring Bank, No. 6:14-CV-00015, 2015 WL 1648556, at *2 (W.D.Va. Apr. 14, 2015) (quoting Rogers v. Deane, 992 F.Supp.2d 621, 635 (E.D.Va.) aff'd, 594 Fed.Appx. 768 (4th Cir.2014)); see Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 108 F.3d 522, 526 (4th Cir.1997).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions injured him in “his business and property” by causing the “destruction of [his] valuable swim contract with UVA.” Compl. ¶ 69. But Plaintiff fails to respond to Defendants’ arguments that this allegation is legally insufficient.15' Defendant Dudzinski (and to a lesser extent Rommel) rely on Shirvinski and Warner, supra, in urging that Plaintiffs claim involves merely a personal interest, not a business 'one. The Complaint bears this out: Besides the conspiracy counts, Plaintiffs claims and the underlying conduct sound in torts of personal injury, not business harm. In Shirvinski, the Fourth Circuit observed that “because injury to personal reputation ordinarily causes damage to one’s business or profession, nearly every defamation action would fall within the statute’s ambit if we permitted such claims to proceed.” 673 F.3d at 321. But “Virginia’s business conspiracy statute was not designed to provide treble damages for defamation suits cloaked as conspiracy claims.” Id. Similarly, nor was it designed to provide treble damages for the personal injury torts alleged here.

Dudzinski also contends that “an athletic financial aid agreement is not a business or property interest” under the statute. Cases widely hold that college athletic scholarships and participation in collegiate athletics are not cognizable property interests. 16 E.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. *636Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.Supp.2d 660, 680-81 (W.D.Va.2009) (compiling cases holding that participation in collegiate athletics is a privilege, not a property right, and finding no support in Virginia to the contrary) aff'd, 639 F.3d 91, 109 (4th Cir.2011); Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1984) (rejecting assertion that scholarship provided a contractual property interest in playing hockey).17 And as discussed regarding the tortious interference with contract claim, the Complaint lacks the necessary details about the alleged interest harmed (ie., the purported UVA contract, its terms, and when it was terminated) and suffers from a failure of causation.

Finally, Defendant Pearce builds on his co-Defendants’ positions by arguing that Plaintiffs so-called “swim contract with UVA” was, at most, a future business interest that is not cognizable under the statute. Warner, 149 F.Supp.2d at 267-68 (compiling cases and holding that “unspecified future business endeavor” is not sufficient). For instance, Plaintiff alleges he “was going to use his college training as a basis for swimming professionally or even try to compete in the Olympics,” so his school choice would “greatly impact those possible professional pursuits” and “determine if he would- swim professionally after he graduated.” Compl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). This also comports with Plaintiffs description at oral argument of his tortious interference claim, which he asserted was built upon attending a “swimming school” to springboard him into the professional ranks. To the extent, then, that Plaintiffs alleged business interest is not simply his “swim contract” with UVA but the hope of becoming a professional athlete, it is a future business interest that is not cognizable.

10. Negligence

Defendant Rommel seeks dismissal of the negligence count. His sole argument is the assertion that the Complaint provides no facts showing he “violated some common law duty as to Plaintiff so as to constitute negligence.” This passing mention of Count X is insufficient to place the issue before the Court, and in any event the Complaint contains ample facts to state a negligence claim.

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend

At the end of his response brief, Plaintiff appended a request for leave to amend his *637Complaint if any count is dismissed. Plaintiff cites the “federal rule policy” of deciding eases on the merits and allowing “at least one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears.” Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir.1999). Defendants oppose this request, with Defendant Dudzinski doing the heavy lifting. He argues that leave to amend should not be granted on Counts II (battery), V (tortuous interference with contract), VI (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and IX (statutory conspiracy) on the grounds of futility.

Ordinarily, Rule 15(a)(2) would permit amendment upon “the court’s leave,” which should freely be given “when justice so requires.” However, the Court’s pretrial order of July 29, 2015 provides that any such motion must be filed within 45 days from that date “[ejxcept for good cause shown.” (Dkt. no. 14 ¶ 24). That deadline expired over three months ago, on September 14, 2015.

When a motion to amend the complaint is filed “after the deadline set by the scheduling order for amending pleadings, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) applies [not Rule 15(a)(2) ]. Under Rule 16(b) a motion to amend a complaint filed after a scheduling order deadline shall be granted only upon a showing of ’good cause.’” Montgomery v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Md., 182 Fed.Appx. 156, 162 (4th Cir.2006); see Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir.2008); Wooton v. CL, LLC, 504 Fed.Appx. 220, 223 (4th Cir.2013). “Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard emphasizes the diligence of the party seeking amendment.” RFT Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Powell, 607 Fed.Appx. 238, 242 (4th Cir.2015).

Because Plaintiff has filed neither (1) a proposed amended complaint which the Court could assess for futility nor (2) a formal motion attempting to make the required showing under Rule 16(b), leave to amend will not be given as a matter of course. The Court will not speculate whether a hypothetical amended complaint would be futile, or'whether the good cause standard is met. The former point is especially salient given that some of Plaintiffs claims have been found to rest on faulty legal grounds and not mere pleading defects. Regardless, without prejudging the matter should Plaintiff subsequently submit a formal motion and proposed amended complaint, the instant request for leave to amend will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs request for leave to amend will be denied without prejudice to his right to seek amendment through a formal motion and proposed amended complaint. An appropriate order will issue. The Clerk is requested to circulate a copy of this opinion to all counsel of record.