3 Chapter 2: The Basic Ideals of an Individualistic Law of Contracts and Their Erosion 3 Chapter 2: The Basic Ideals of an Individualistic Law of Contracts and Their Erosion

3.1 Chapter 2: The Basic Ideals of an Individualistic Law of Contracts and Their Erosion Introduction 3.1 Chapter 2: The Basic Ideals of an Individualistic Law of Contracts and Their Erosion Introduction

This chapter is designed to give the reader an overview of many of the main doctrines of classical contract law. As we have said, classical theory was distinguished by the emphasis it placed on individual freedom both in the creation and the design of contractual relationships. Two fundamental principles underlie freedom of contract: (1) There can be no contracts by compulsion, i.e., one cannot be forced into a contract against one's will, and (2) the parties to a contract are free to give it whatever content they wish.

Within the classical law itself there was always a counter-principle favoring social control, which should not be overlooked. The consideration requirement came to be used by courts to police certain types of contracts. Although courts were reluctant to look into the adequacy of consideration, cases like Davis & Co. v. Morgan, infra p. 77, show how counter-principles could be devised to do just that. Manipulation of narrowly drawn rules of mistake could also result in a relaxing of the principle of self-reliance (compare Wood v. Boynton, infra p. 84, with Sherwood v. Walker, infra p. 887). But these are exceptions, and the dominant liberal ethic of individualism can be seen working with undiminished vigor in the doctrine of caveat emptor, as illustrated by Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, infra p. 93, and in the nineteenth-century judicial attitude toward fraud and nondisclosure, exemplified by Laidlaw v. Organ, infra p. 89.

In some instances only the techniques used for social control of private contract-making have changed. In other cases, the fundamental ideals of liberal individualism have come under attack. The Notes following the cases provide a glimpse at the modern trend away from freedom of contract.

3.2 Hurley v. Eddingfield 3.2 Hurley v. Eddingfield

Supreme Court of Indiana.

HURLEY v. EDDINGFIELD

156 Ind. 416 (1901)

BAKER, J.

The appellant sued appellee for $10,000 damages for wrongfully causing the death of his intestate. The court sustained appellee's demurrer to the complaint, and this ruling is assigned as error.

The material facts alleged may be summarized thus: At and for years before decedent's death appellee was a practicing physician at Mace, in Montgomery county, duly licensed under the laws of the state. He held himself out to the public as a general practitioner of medicine. He had been decedent's family physician. Decedent became dangerously ill, and sent for appellee. The messenger informed appellee of decedent's violent sickness, tendered him his fee for his services, and stated to him that no other physician was procurable in time, and that decedent relied on him for attention. No other physician was procurable in time to be of any use, and decedent did rely on appellee for medical assistance. Without any reason whatever, appellee refused to render aid to decedent. No other patients were requiring appellee's immediate service, and he could have gone to the relief of decedent if he had been willing to do so. Death ensued, without decedent's fault, and wholly from appellee's wrongful act.

The alleged wrongful act was appellee's refusal to enter into a contract of employment. Counsel do not contend that, before the enactment of the law regulating the practice of medicine, physicians were bound to render professional service to every one who applied. Whart. Neg. § 731. The act regulating the practice of medicine provides for a board of examiners, standards of qualification,
examinations, licenses to those found qualified, and penalties for practicing without license. Acts 1897, p. 255; Acts 1899, p. 247. The act is a preventive, not a compulsive, measure. In obtaining the state's license (permission) to practice medicine, the state does not require, and the licensee does not engage, that he will practice at all or on other terms than he may choose to accept. Counsel's
analogies, drawn from the obligations to the public on the part of innkeepers, common carriers, and the like, are beside the mark.

Judgment affirmed.

3.3 Notes - Hurley v. Eddingfield 3.3 Notes - Hurley v. Eddingfield

NOTE

1. The principle set forth in the opinion has retained its vitality over the years. L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976); Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977); 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, §14, p. 159. But it is also generally recognized that

when a physician or surgeon takes charge of a case and is employed to attend a patient, unless the terms of employment otherwise limit the service, or notice be given that he will not undertake, or cannot afford, the subsequent treatment, his employment, as well as the relation of physician and patient, continues until ended by the mutual consent of the parties, or revoked by the dismissal of the physician or surgeon, or until his services are no longer needed. And he must exercise, at his peril, reasonable care and judgment in determining when his attendance may properly and safely be discontinued.

Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 413, 127 S.E. 356, 359 (1925). Whether a physician-patient relationship exists is a question of fact. Compare Lyons v. Grether, supra, and Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, supra. Paradoxically, a physician who is summoned by a bystander to render services to an unconscious person injured in a road accident is entitled to compensation from the estate, even if the patient dies without ever regaining consciousness. Cotnam v. Wisdom, infra p. 163.

Does the Hurley case still reflect our moral sentiments? More than a hundred years ago Bentham argued for imposing a duty to aid backed up by criminal sanctions.

Every man is bound to assist those who have need of assistance if he can do it without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience. This obligation is stronger, in proportion as the danger is the greater for the one and the trouble of preserving him the less for the other. . . . [T]he crime would be greater if he refrained from acting not simply from idleness, but from malice or some pecuniary interest.

J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 Works 164 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). See Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247 (1980). Is the recent suggestion that social goods should be distributed according to their "internal goal" (in the case of physicians’' services, the prevention and cure of physical suffering) helpful in deciding the doctor's case? See B. Williams, The Idea of Equality, in 2 Philosophy, Politics and Society 121-122 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962). Should a doctor bear the costs of the desired allocation just because he happens to have the requisite skill? "[I]s he less entitled to pursue hisown goals, within the special circumstances of practicing medicine, than anybody else?" R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 234 (1974). Should society be able to compel a physician to render aid, on the grounds that its licensing statutes give the physician the benefit of an artificial monopoly? See generally A. Kronman & R Posner, The Economics of Contract Law 264-265 (1979).

Assume that a court, inspired by a concern for distributive justice, decides to impose liability on the doctor. How should liability be confined to prevent runaway social engineering? Would a rule be workable that imposed a duty to give aid, unless the physician had a legitimate reason for refusing? Should a statute be passed that imposes on a physician the duty to give aid in an emergency? Should such a statute be passed only in a jurisdiction that has a good Samaritan law? For examples of good Samaritan laws, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §2144 (West 1959), §2725.5 (West 1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-557b (1983). On the duty to aid imposed by admiralty law, see G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §8-4 (2d ed. 1975). See 1964 Wis. L. Rev. 494; 51 Calif. L. Rev. 816 (1963).

2. In the modern urban setting, the hospital emergency ward has relieved the individual physician from many of the burdens of rendering individual emergency care. Should a hospital with an emergency ward be held liable for refusing to treat an emergency patient? Some courts, though not all, have so held. See the policy discussion in Mercy Medical Center of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 206 N.E.2d 198, 200-201 (1973). See also Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1455 (1968); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 841 (1971).

On the constitutional and public policy aspects of a private hospital's refusal to allow its facilities to be used for elective abortions, see Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Assn., 71 N.J. 478, 366 A2d 641 (1976); Annot., 42 AL.R. Fed. 463, 526 et seq. (1979). Receipt by a private hospital of federal funding may also have an effect on its freedom to deny members of the public use of its facilities, even if they are unable to pay. See Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§291 et seq.; Annot., 11 AL.R. Fed. 683 (1972) (discussing whether there is a private right of action under the Hill-Burton Act).

3. In recent years, freedom of contract has been severely limited in an effort to prevent discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodation. Could a private physician/dentist today refuse to treat a patient because of race? See Rice v. Rinaldo, 67 Ohio Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657 (1951). On legislation controlling discrimination in the credit market, see p. 603 infra. Discussion on the pertinent legislation and case law in other fields lies outside the scope of this casebook.

4. Consult Wyman, The Inherent Limitation of the Public Service Duty to Particular Classes, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 339 (1910); Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 586 (1943). For the attitude of the common law with regard to the duty to render aid in an emergency, see Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217 (1908); 52 Colum. L. Rev. 631 (1952). For the compensation of the rescuer, see Dawson, The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 1073 (1961).

3.4 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. 3.4 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.

GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. v. CREAM OF WHEAT CO., 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915). Lacombe, J.; “We had supposed that it was elementary law that a trader could buy from whom he pleased and sell to whom he pleased, and that his selection of seller and buyer was wholly his own concern. 'It is a part of a man's civil rights that he be at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice.' Cooley on Torts, p. 278. See, also, our own opinion in Greater New York Film Co. v. Biograph Co., 2013 Fed. 39, 121 C.C.A. 375.

"Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might reject the offer of a proposing buyer, for any reason that appealed to him; it might be because he did not like the other's business methods, or because he had some personal difference with him, political, racial, or social. That was purely his own affair, with which nobody else had any concern. Neither the Sherman Act, nor any decision of the Supreme Court construing the same, nor the Clayton Act, has changed the law in this particular. We have not yet reached the stage where the selection of a trader's customers is made for him by the government."

3.5 United States v. Colgate Co. 3.5 United States v. Colgate Co.

UNITED STATES v. COLGATE & CO., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919): "The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in trade and commerce—in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. 'The trader or manufacturer, on the other hand, carries on an entirely private business, and can sell to whom he pleases.' United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 320. 'A retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so because he thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his trade.'"

3.6 Notes - United States v. Colgate Co. 3.6 Notes - United States v. Colgate Co.

1. As the excerpts from the two preceding cases dealing with the validity of resale price-maintenance agreements show, a system committed to liberty of trade and competition requires close scrutiny of contract as an instrument of commercial and industrial organization. Freedom of contract cannot be used as a means to bring about unreasonable restraint of trade. Small wonder that freedom of contract has been subjected to extensive limitation through the antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman[1] and, Clayton Acts.[2] These statutes, enacted to protect the competitive framework of the market, deal with horizontal restraints of trade (e.g., cartels aimed at price fixing or market allocation), as well as vertical integration (the combination of various phases of the production and distribution process before the goods reach the ultimate consumer). To be sure, integration by contract (both backwards and forwards), restricting the freedom of the distributor by means of resale price setting, tie-ins,[3] the allocation of territories, and other exclusive arrangements, is not the only means of integration. But contract integration has one advantage over ownership integration that is of particular importance; it enhances flexibility and thereby affords protection against the movement of the business cycle.[4]

Since antitrust laws are exceedingly vague, they amount in effect to a legislative command to the judiciary to develop a common law of antitrust; as a result, in the antitrust field judicial lawmaking has become of paramount importance. Excellent illustrations are furnished by the excerpts from the Cream of Wheat and Colgate cases (whose implications are still felt today, though less broadly and more remotely than before).[5]

Both cases deal with one aspect of freedom of contract; the refusal to deal. Given unlimited scope, the refusal to deal is a means of controlling the distribution process and of enforcing resale price-maintenance agreements. The law has not gone so far as to take away the privilege of a single trader to deal with whom he pleases, but it"has expanded its control over what may be termed "joint action." Even here the protection accorded to the injured party is still imperfect under present antitrust laws.[6] A single trader, on the other hand, is free to deal with whom he pleases, absent any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. And it would seem that he is free to announce in advance (unilaterally) the conditions under which he will refuse to deal with those who fail to abide by his wishes and thus, for example, is free to terminate a recalcitrant dealer who is unwilling to accede to a scheme in restraint of trade. So long as he acts unilaterally, he is safe, but once he enlists the help of others in the scheme of distribution, his privilege is forfeited; see, for example, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

This book is not the place to deal with the economics of vertical integration or to evaluate the relevant statute and case law. It must be sufficient to sketch a few highlights and to point out that the field is a highly controversial one. Congress and the courts have vacillated when dealing with the legitimacy of vertical integration. This is not surprising since the relevant antitrust statutes reflect different and somewhat inconsistent legislative purposes and, as a result, internal tensions exist within the antitrust structure. To make matters worse, a tension also exists between the "per se" and "rule of reason" yardsticks employed to determine the existence of an antitrust violation. A rule of reason standard requires the court to assay the economic consequences of business behavior and to ban only behavior that is "unreasonable" in purpose or effect. The application of this standard necessitates a comprehensive and costly economic analysis, a task for which courts may be most ill-suited (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 (1949)). Therefore, a catalogue of per se offenses has emerged. Within this category the courts are relieved of the necessity of a comprehensive economic analysis, since "the practice facially appears to be one that would almost always tend to restrict competition .... " (Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)). Unfortunately, "there is often no bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence certifies a presumption of anticompetitive effect. For example, while the Court has spoken of a per se rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis." See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2 v. Hyde, - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 155 (1984). Inquiry into market conditions is also necessary to determine the pro- or anti-competitive effects of exclusive dealings.

As early as 1911, the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of resale price maintenance in the celebrated case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Court treated the scheme as an illegal restraint on alienation on the grounds that the seller sought to maintain prices after he had parted with the article. The scheme was declared illegal per se, and thus the public was given the benefit of price competition in the market subsequent to the first sale. Congress stepped in to overturn the decision, making resale price maintenance legal, but subsequent legislation restored the per se rule of the Dr. Miles case. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801.

Non-price restraints are treated differently. With regard to these there is a growing tendency to advocate a hands-off policy on the grounds of efficiency. This attitude is reflected in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1971). Although the Court explicitly said that it was not changing the per se rule in vertical price fixing, there has been an increasing tendency in the legal literature to question whether price and territory restraints can logically be treated differently under the per se rule. See, e.g., Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 936 (1979), and the amicus brief of the Department of Justice in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) (where the Court in that case sidestepped the issue). See further Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949 (1970); Williamson, SessingVertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953 (1979); United States Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, Jan. 23, 1985. The testimony of L. A. Sullivan before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary is highly critical, 16 Antitrust Law and Economics Review 11 (1984); see further L. A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Ch. 5 (1977) and Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market Restraints, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1985) (critical); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1013 (1985). See further Chapter 4, Section 4 on dealer franchises.

2. A statutory approach to the refusal-to-deal problem has been suggested by Vernon Mund in a report prepared for the Senate Small Business Committee (Sen. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)). The report proposed legislation "requiring producers of standard products who hold themselves out as dealing with the public, and who control a substantial percentage of the output in their area of practical shipment, to sell to all comers offering to meet the terms of sale" (pp. 92, 102). His proposal was not unlike a section of the original Clayton Bill which passed the House in 1914 but was deleted by the Senate Committee before the passage of the Act. The excised section imposed a duty upon owners and transporters of hydroelectric energy, coal, oil, gas, and other minerals to sell to all responsible persons (H. R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. S 3 (1914)). The Senate felt such a statute "would practically compel owners of the products named to sell to anyone or else decline to do so at the peril of incurring heavy penalties, [and] would project us into a field of legislation at once untried, complicated, and dangerous" (S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914)).

3. The economic plight of workers laid off by plant shutdowns and relocations is not a new problem, but until recently it has been regarded as an unavoidable consequence of the market system. Traditionally, a belief in the mobility of both capital and labor supported the view that employers should be free to close or relocate when an operation became unprofitable due to obsolescence, increased transportation costs, or for other reasons. Over the last decades, however, the plight of workers, along with their families and communities, has become a matter of increasing national concern, and the traditional wisdom of leaving the problem of dislocation to free market decisionmaking has become problematical. It is not surprising that we observe a tendency, in recent years, to bring the problem of dislocation to courts and legislatures.

As yet, efforts to prevent shutdowns through the application of labor law, antitrust legislation, and the common law have for the most part been unsuccessful. In particular, attempts to expand the duty imposed by labor legislation to bargain in good faith to include a duty on the part of management to bargain with the employees' representative about plant-closing decisions have come to naught: an employer, it has been held, has an almost absolute right to terminate the business for economic reasons. First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).

Common law principles have proven equally unhelpful from the worker's point of view. For example, one federal court quite recently refused to make a contract out of assurances by local managers and public relations experts that the plant would remain open if the joint efforts of management and the union were successful in making the plant profitable. Accepting the management's accounting procedures, the court found that this "condition precedent" had not been met. Also unsuccessful was the argument, advanced in the same case, for the imposition of a duty to sell the plant to community interests, based on a "new concept of community property." Attempts to get financing apparently failed, thus foreclosing the possibility left open by the court that the workers might pursue an antitrust remedy based on the contention that management was anxious to prevent the emergence of a competitor. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). (See further Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983).)

While the court in the United Steel Workers case could not have reached any other result under traditional doctrine, the decision has led the author of a recent article to advocate the extension of contract principles in recognition of the social dimension of contract law. Freedom of contract, he argues, "in the utopian vision requires a social order in which people possess the practical ability to connect with each other to find meaning in their lives through common endeavor, a freedom that denies the life and death power of distant corporate managers over workers and their town." The analysis and reform of contract law, this author asserts, should be the next step on the agenda of critical legal theory. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 829, at 857 et seq. (1983). Feinman is associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, a somewhat amorphous group of legal scholars and law reformers that is broadly concerned with the relationship between legal rules and institutions and the prerequisites for a "more humane, egalitarian and Studies, democratic society." Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 Yale L.J. 460 (1984). Some members of the group have been influenced by legal realism and others by contemporary social theory (especially the work of those in the Neo-Marxist “Frankfurt School”). On the movement, see The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Symposium in 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1-674 (1984); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1982).

Despite these setbacks, there are continuing efforts to persuade plant owners to sell, and even to impose upon them a duty to sell to unions or to other community interests, plants regarded as obsolete. These efforts have so far succeeded only with regard to the transfer of ownership of the Wireton steel mill. See the recent article in the New York Times of Jan. 30, 1985, at 7, entitled "Pittsburgh Area Rallies to Save Blast Furnace."

Efforts to obtain help by legislation on the federal level have as yet yielded no positive results, although a substantial number of bills have been introduced. On the state level, similar efforts have also been largely unsuccessful. Only in three states, Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, have legislatures acted favorably. See Barton, Common Law and Its Substitutes: The Allocation of Social Problems to Alternative Decisional Institutions, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 518, 525-526 (1985). See in general Aarons, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 941 (1983); MacNeil, Plant Closings and Workers' Rights, 14 Ottawa L. Rev. 122 (1982).

[1] 26 Stat. 209 (1890).

[2] 38 Stat. 731 (1914).

[3] They are made illegal under the Clayton Act. Clayton Act §3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 15 U .S.C. 14 (1958); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). For a criticism of the treatment of tie-ins, see Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957); see pp. 61-63 infra.

[4] For the most eloquent defense see of the Sherman Act, see Black, J., in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958):

The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits, "Every contract, combination. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." Although this prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have construed it as a precluding only those contracts or combinations which “unreasonably” restrain competition. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31.

 

[5] For an early analysis of the Cream of Wheat case, see Slichter, The Cream of Wheat Case, 31 Pol. Sci. Q. 392 (1916). On the erosion of the Colgate doctrine, see in general Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 258; Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 684-695 (1961). But see P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law (1978); Fulda, Individual Refuasals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 590 (1965); L. Sullivan, Antitrust §139 (1977). See also the discussion of franchising in Chapter 4, Section 4.

[6] Nelson radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 83-91, 115-116 (1959); Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute, 39 Tex. L. Rev. 717, 731, 747-751 (1961).

3.7 Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc., v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. 3.7 Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc., v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc.

205 Misc. 982 (1954)

Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc., Plaintiff,
v.
Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Orange County.

June 1, 1954.

 

Van De Water & Van De Water for defendant.

Murray M. Segal for plaintiff.

[983] EAGER, J.

This is a motion to dismiss the complaint herein upon the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The action is by a merchant, who alleges he conducts two retail stores in the city of Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and is brought against a publisher of a Poughkeepsie daily newspaper. The complaint alleges that the newspaper published by the defendant is the only general daily newspaper in Poughkeepsie and is known as the "Poughkeepsie New Yorker," and that, by reason of its large circulation and high reputation, it is "the dominant advertising medium in the entire area of its publication." It is further alleged that the defendant refuses, because of the persuasion and coercion of local merchants in competition with plaintiff, to publish advertising of the plaintiff in the defendant's newspaper and that, as a result, the plaintiff's business has been seriously reduced and such refusal has caused and will continue to cause irreparable damage to plaintiff's business. Further alleging that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, injunctive relief is demanded, namely, judgment directing the defendant to accept and publish plaintiff's advertising on payment of the usual charges of the defendant.

To dispose of the motion, the court must decide whether a newspaper publisher may be required to publish proper advertising matter upon the tender of the usual charge therefor or whether such publisher is free to contract and deal with whom he pleases. There are no New York decisions in point. The holding of courts in other States is summarized in a note in volume 87 of American Law Reports at page 979 as follows: — "With the exception of one case, Uhlman v. Sherman (1919) 22 Ohio N. P. N. S. 225, 31 Ohio Dec. N. P. 54 * * *, it has been uniformly held in the few cases which have considered the question that the business of publishing a newspaper is a strictly private enterprise, as distinguished from a business affected with a public interest, and that its publisher is under no legal obligation to sell advertising to all who may apply for it."

The plaintiff contends that this court should reject the majority view and adopt the reasoning laid down by the Ohio decision [984] of Uhlman v. Sherman (supra). It was there held that the newspaper business was clothed with a public interest and that a corporation owning and publishing a newspaper was in the class of a quasi-public corporation bound to treat all advertisers fairly and without discrimination. It was further there specifically held that a newspaper publisher, having advertising space to sell, had no right to discriminate against a local merchant, who, in his application for advertising, complies with the law and all reasonable rules of the publisher, and tenders the regular and ordinary fee charged therefor by the paper. Courts in other States have, however, expressly refused to follow this Ohio decision. (See Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 247 N. W. 813 [Iowa], 87 A. L. R. 975; Matter of Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254, 256, and Friedenberg v. Times Pub. Co., 170 La. 3.)

This court has also reached the conclusion that the rationale of said Ohio decision is not to be followed in this State in that it is contrary to general and fundamental doctrine laid down in our decisional law. For instance, we find decisions here, though not in point, in which it has been generally held that the publication and distribution of newspapers is a private business and that newspaper publishers lawfully conducting their business have the right to determine the policy they will pursue therein and the persons with whom they will deal. (Lepler v. Palmer, 150 Misc. 546; Collins v. American News Co., 34 Misc. 260, 263, affd. 68 App. Div. 639.) And it is said to be "the well-settled law of this State that the refusal to maintain trade relations with any individual is an inherent right which every person may exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reasons whatever, and it is immaterial whether such refusal is based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice or malice. It is a part of the liberty of action which the Constitutions, State and Federal, guarantee to the citizen." (Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 App. Div. 443, 451-452, affd. 195 N.Y. 565.) There are limitations to this inherent right, but such limitations must be found either in firmly established common-law principles or in statutory regulations enacted pursuant to the police power for the public good. It has been ably pointed out that there was no rule at common law, similar to the rules applicable to common carriers and inns, whereby a newspaper was forbidden to discriminate between customers. (See Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, supra.) And there are no pertinent statutory regulations in this State. It may be [985] that the Legislature has the right to reasonably regulate the newspaper advertising business but the fact that it has not seen fit to do so does not confer power upon the courts to impose rules for the conduct of such business.

This court holds, therefore, that, in this State, the newspaper business is in the nature of a private enterprise and that, in the absence of valid statutory regulation to the contrary, the publishers of a newspaper have the general right either to publish or reject a commercial advertisement tendered to them. Their reasons for rejecting a proposed advertisement are immaterial, assuming, of course, there are absent factual allegations connecting them with a duly pleaded fraudulent conspiracy or with furthering an unlawful monopoly. There are no such allegations in this case.

The complaint is dismissed. Submit order on notice.

3.8 Notes - Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. 3.8 Notes - Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc.

NOTE

Consult Developments in the Law, Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 925-932 (1964); J. J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961), discussed in 3 B.C. Ind. & Com L. Rev. 522 (1962); Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704, 18 A.L.R.3d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). For the impact of the antitrust laws, see further Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). On first amendment problems and the different treatment of electronic and print media, consult Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? (1974); Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1973). See also Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).

3.9 Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co. 3.9 Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co.

518 P.2d 1201 (1974)
95 Idaho 739

CONTINENTAL FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHANDLER SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11019.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
February 4, 1974.
Rehearing Denied March 7, 1974.

[1203] Robert S. Campbell, Jr., of Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss, Campbell & Cowley, Salt Lake City, Utah and Harold Q. Noack, Jr., Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Frank E. Chalfant, Jr., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

[1202] BAKES, Justice.

Continental Forest Products, Inc., the plaintiff-respondent, is an Oregon corporate lumber broker. As plaintiff, it instituted this action against Chandler Supply Company, also a corporation, the defendant-appellant, seeking recovery of $10,231.45, plus interest, for two carloads of plywood allegedly sold defendant in the summer of 1969. Following trial without a jury, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as Continental), and entered judgment in conformity with its findings and conclusions. The defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as Chandler) appeals from this judgment and from the order of the trial court denying its objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of the court.

The appellant Chandler is a wholesale lumber distributor at Boise and has done business, both buying and selling of lumber products, with a company known as North America Millwork, Inc., of Tacoma, Washington. On June 26, 1969, Larry Williams, an employee of Chandler, phoned North America Millwork, Inc., for quotations on plywood prices, advising North America it was in the market for a carload of 1/2 inch plywood and a carload of 5/8 inch plywood. Williams spoke with Ed Barker, an employee of North America, giving him the necessary data. Later on the same day, Barker advised Williams of the quoted prices for plywood, and Williams ordered the two carloads of plywood from North America Millwork, giving Barker the Chandler purchase order numbers 3246 and 3247.

On the same day, Williams prepared two separate Chandler purchase orders covering the two carloads of plywood fixing the delivery date as two weeks or sooner, f.o.b. mill, with the quoted prices. These two purchase orders, one numbered 3246 and the other numbered 3247, were mailed by Chandler to North America Millwork on the same day.

This was Chandler's first order for plywood from North America Millwork, although it had transacted a considerable volume of other lumber business with North America Millwork between December, 1968, and July, 1969. In prior transactions when Chandler had purchased from North America, North America had sent its own written acknowledgments of Chandler's purchase orders placed with it and later had submitted invoices upon shipments being made. In this instance, North America neither confirmed nor rejected the June 26, 1969, Chandler purchase orders by written acknowledgment nor did it send its invoices to Chandler.

However, on July 2, 1969, Chandler received two acknowledgments of the orders for plywood from Continental, both dated June 27, 1969, one for a carload of 1/2 inch plywood, and the other for a carload of 5/8 inch plywood. The specifications, prices and terms for the plywood as recited in the acknowledgments were substantially the same as the orders placed by Chandler with North America on June 26. The acknowledgments also referred to the Chandler purchase orders 3246 and 3247 which had been sent to North America Millwork. It is not entirely clear how Continental received Chandler's orders sent to North America. Apparently Ed Barker left his employment with North America and commenced brokering for Continental and gave the orders to Continental.

On July 7, 1969, the Monday following the Fourth of July holiday, Earl Chandler, the president of appellant company, in his [1204] own handwriting, wrote on each duplicate copy of the acknowledgments of orders received from Continental, "Purchased from North America Millwork. Earl Chandler 7-7-69" and directed that they be mailed to Continental. Earl Chandler testified that in writing this notation he assumed that Continental was making the shipments for North America. Mrs. Hebein, Earl Chandler's secretary, testified that she mailed these copies of the acknowledgments of orders, addressed to Continental, by regular mail. Witnesses for Continental testified that even though they searched through their files for these copies of the acknowledgments, they could not be found. Chandler kept copies of these acknowledgments with his handwritten note on them, and they were introduced into evidence.

Chandler received the first carload of plywood on July 24, 1969, and received an invoice from Continental for this carload. The second carload of plywood arrived August 6, 1969, and the invoice from Continental arrived on August 15. Chandler took delivery of both of these carloads, and at no time offered to return the plywood.

The terms of the orders provided for a 2% discount if paid for within five days after arrival of the invoice. On August 11, 1969, Chandler made a check for $3,636.36 payable to both Continental and North America Millwork and returned it to North America Millwork in payment of these two carloads of plywood. In calculating the amount of the payment, Chandler first deducted the 2% discount for the two carloads of plywood and also deducted a $6,212.95 trade debt owing from North America to Chandler.[1]

North America returned Chandler's check and denied that Chandler owed it money for the shipment of plywood. Chandler sent the payment to North America a second time, but it was again returned. Through a series of letters and telephone calls Chandler attempted to induce North America to accept payment. During this time, Ed Barker (who was then acting as an independent lumber broker, having left employment with North America on June 30, 1969), sent a letter to Williams (employee of Chandler) indicating that Continental was the actual supplier of the plywood. Chandler's attempt to pay North America failed, and Chandler refused to tender payment to Continental without deducting North America's trade debt.

Not having received payment for the two carloads, Continental brought this action for the quoted price of the plywood plus interest. Continental subsequently filed its supplemental complaint alleging a second claim against Chandler on the theory of unjust enrichment on the part of Chandler and seeking as damages $10,231.45.

Appellant Chandler answered the complaint and supplemental complaint, denying that it owed Continental any money or that Continental had sold it any goods. Chandler alleged that it had a contract only with North America to whom it had tendered payment. Following trial to the court on the issues framed by the pleadings, the trial court rendered its memorandum opinion in favor of Continental. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 52, Chandler moved for reconsideration of the memorandum opinion and proposed findings, which motion the court denied. Thereafter findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment for $11,559.93 were entered, to which appellant objected. The district court denied these objections, and this appeal was taken.

Appellant first assigned as error the trial court's failure to find that Continental's [1205] claim was subject to Chandler's right of set off against North America.

In the trial court's memorandum opinion, rendered on May 26, 1971, the court discussed the relationship between Continental and Chandler and found that "the very least we have was an implied agreement or quasi contract."

Basically the courts have recognized three types of contractual arrangements. Restatement of Contracts, § 5, comment a, at p. 7 (1932); 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 562 at p. 283 (1960). First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 316, 267 P.2d 730 (1954). Secondly, there is the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 408 P.2d 810 (1965). The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract. However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 277 P.2d 554 (1929); 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 561, at p. 276 (1960). It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust enrichment, implied in law contract or restitution. In discussing a quasi contract or an action founded on unjust enrichment, the California Supreme Court stated in Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959):

"The promise is purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to circumvent rigid common-law pleading. It was invoked not to deny a remedy, but to create one 'for the purpose of bringing about justice without reference to the intention of the parties.' 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 9; . . ." 336 P.2d at 538.

Similarly, in Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 (1948), the court stated at p. 367:

"This brings us to the question as to an implied or quasi-contract pleaded in the second cause of action. Black's Law Dictionary defines it thus:

'A quasi-contract is what was formerly known as the contract implied in law; it has no reference to the intentions or expressions of the parties. The obligation is imposed despite and frequently in frustration of their intention.'" 196 P.2d at 367.

See also, Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 164, 470 P.2d 91 (1970), and 1 Williston on Contracts (3d Ed.), § 3A at p. 13 (1957).

In this case it is clear that there is neither an express nor an implied in fact contract since there was an express rejection by Chandler of any intention to enter into a contract with Continental as evidenced by the notation made on the acknowledgments and Chandler's subsequent attempts to pay North America Millwork for the carloads of plywood. However, we agree with the trial court that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the third type of contract, implied in law or quasi contract, exists obligating Chandler to pay for the materials which he received. However, the problem which arises is determining the amount of recovery to which Continental is entitled.

As the essence of a contract implied in law lies in the fact that the defendant has received a benefit which it would be inequitable for him to retain, it necessarily follows that the measure of recovery in a quasi-contractual action is not the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of the enrichment which, as between the two parties it would be unjust for one party to retain. Hixon v. Allphin, supra; 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, at p. 946 (1973); Meehan v. Cheltenham, 410 Pa. 446 189 A.2d [1206] 593 (1963); Farmers National Bank of Bloomsburg v. Albertson, 203 Pa.Super. 205, 199 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1964). In the instant case we feel that the enrichment which Chandler "unjustly received" was the value of the plywood shipped less the trade set off which Chandler had against North America Millwork and which he would have been entitled to take had the transaction been completed the way Chandler had intended and attempted to complete it. Chandler had a right to deal exclusively with North America and use his trade set off as part of the purchase price. Chandler should not be deprived of this set off in view of the way that Continental became involved in this transaction.

The foregoing conclusions necessarily follow as a matter of law from the salient facts found in the record. Those facts are that Chandler had placed the orders initially with North America Millwork, knowing that he had a trade set off; that the North America Millwork employee Ed Barker left his employment with North America Millwork and apparently took the Chandler orders with him, and that the orders subsequently wound up in the Continental organization; that Continental, without notifying Chandler that Barker had terminated his employment with North America and was now brokering for Continental, mailed its acknowledgments of the two orders which Chandler had placed with North America Millwork, referring to them by Chandler purchase order numbers which were sent to North America Millwork; that Chandler wrote on those acknowledgments that he had purchased the plywood from North America Millwork and mailed the acknowledgments back to Continental; and that Chandler attempted to make payment for the plywood to North America Millwork. If any party was responsible for the situation present in this case, it was Continental. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it would appear that Barker breached the fiduciary duty which he owed to his employer North America Millwork by taking the Chandler purchase orders to Continental. Continental then, wittingly or unwittingly, took advantage of that breach of a fiduciary relationship and filled the orders, apparently without inquiry concerning the status of North America Millwork, the existence of a trade debt, the situation behind Barker's taking the purchase orders to Continental, or notifying Chandler that it was attempting to take over the North America transactions. Under these circumstances we feel that it would not be unjust to require Chandler to pay only that amount which he would have had to pay to North America had the transaction gone the way Chandler had intended and attempted to have it go.

Since the resolution of the quasi-contractual issue is dispositive in this case it is unnecessary to become embroiled in a discussion of the presumption of receipt of a letter duly mailed versus the weight to be given to testimony on non-receipt, as did the trial court in deciding the case and as did the parties on appeal.

Judgment should be entered for Continental against Chandler in the amount of the principal claim less the amount of the North America Millwork trade debt which Chandler had. The matter should be remanded to the trial court to make the necessary computations including adjustments for interest on account.

Judgment reversed and remanded. Costs awarded to appellant.

DONALDSON and McQUADE, JJ., concur; SHEPARD, C.J., concurs in result.

McFADDEN, Justice (dissenting).

It is my conclusion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which after determining that Chandler was obligated to pay for the plywood it received, then proceeds to grant an offset to Chandler for an alleged debt owed to it by North America Millwork.

[1207] The basic reason for this dissent is that the majority opinion in effect grants to Chandler an offset for a trade debt allegedly due Chandler from North America, who is neither a party to this action, nor in privity with Continental. Stringent requirements are established for a court to recognize an offset. See, Brown v. Porter, 42 Idaho 295, 245 P. 398 (1926), which considered the provisions governing the right to a setoff, C.S. §§ 6694-6697 (I.C. §§ 5-612 to 5-615). See I.R.C.P. 13(a) and 13(b). In Petersen v. Lyders, 139 Cal. App. 303, 33 P.2d 1030, 1031 (1934), cert. den. 294 U.S. 716, 55 S.Ct. 514, 79 L.Ed. 1249, reh. den. 294 U.S. 734, 55 S.Ct. 635, 79 L.Ed. 1262, the Supreme Court of California considered statutes governing the right to setoff which were identical to Idaho's:

"It is elementary that a set-off may not be invoked unless the parties and the debts are mutual and that the doctrine of mutuality requires that the debts be due to and from the same persons in the same capacity."

Later in Advance Ind. Fin. Co. v. Western Equities, Inc., 173 Cal. App.2d 420, 343 P.2d 408 (1959), the California Supreme Court again emphasized the necessity of mutuality in setoff cases in the following language:

"A counterclaim or a setoff is defined as a cause of action in favor of the defendant on which he might have sued the plaintiff in a separate action and, in the case of a counterclaim, might have obtained affirmative relief * * *. A claim based on an equitable right may be set up as a counterclaim against a claim based on a legal right. While the doctrine of setoff, as distinguished from statutory counterclaim, is eminently an equitable one, the equitable right is founded on the idea that mutual existing indebtedness, arising out of contracts between parties to the record, creates payment of both demands so far as they equal each other. The two demands must be mutual." (Citations omitted.) 343 P.2d at 412.

See also, Cruzan v. Franklin Stores Corp., 72 N.M. 42, 380 P.2d 190 (N.M. 1963); Sarkeys v. Marlow, 205 Okl. 15, 235 P.2d 676 (1951); A.S. & R. Co. v. Swisshelm Gold Silver Co., 63 Ariz. 204, 160 P.2d 757 (Ariz. 1945).

In this case there is no record of mutuality. The alleged debt is owing from North America to Chandler, Continental has not been shown to have been connected with North America by agency, contract, or assignment, and the trial court did not find any such relationship between Continental and North America.

The majority opinion reaches its final conclusion on the basis that Chandler was going to be unjustly enriched if it was allowed to retain the plywood shipped by Continental without paying somebody. By some process the opinion places fault on the part of Continental, and then states "Under these circumstances we feel that it would not be unjust to require Chandler to pay only that amount which he would have had to pay to North America had the transaction gone the way Chandler had intended and attempted to have it go." This conclusion is then followed by a refusal of the majority opinion to consider what in my opinion is one of the crucial points of the case, i.e., whether Continental ever received the copies of the acknowledgment of orders on which Earl Chandler had written "Purchased from North America Millwork. Earl Chandler 7-7-69."

The majority opinion in faulting Continental for its activities in effect holds the trial court erred when it specifically found "the return acknowledgment with the notation by Mr. Earl Chandler was not received by Continental Forest Products." At trial both parties contested this issue and appellant assigned the issue as an error on appeal. In such cases, when there is testimony by the addressee denying receipt of the mailed instrument, an issue of fact is presented for resolution by the trier [1208] of facts. American Surety Co. v. Blake, 54 Idaho 1, 27 P.2d 972 (1933); IX Wigmore (3d ed.) § 2519; Bell, Handbook of Evidence (1972), p. 239. The trial court sat as a trier of the facts and its function was to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. A conflict in the evidence as to the receipt of the acknowledgments was presented, and in light of competent, substantial, although conflicting evidence, the trial court's findings in this regard should have been considered and upheld. Ivie v. Peck, 94 Idaho 625, 495 P.2d 1110 (1972).

There are numerous other points wherein I disagree with the majority opinion, particularly in regard to what it claims the trial court found. Extended discussion of these would be futile in a dissent and would unduly lengthen it.

[1] During the summer of 1969 North America Millwork began experiencing financial difficulties. Eventually, in December, 1969, North America Millwork made a common law assignment of assets to its creditors in an effort to liquidate its trade obligations. Through a letter of July 17, 1969, North America Millwork advised Chandler of its financial problems. At this time there was a balance due from North America to Chandler on other transactions in the amount of $6,212.95.

3.10 Notes - Continental Forest Products v. Chandler Supply Co. 3.10 Notes - Continental Forest Products v. Chandler Supply Co.

NOTE

1. Compare Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28 (1877), infra p. 1504. For more on Boston Ice Co., see the notes following that case, and also Costigan, The Doctrine of Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 7 Colurn. L. Rev. 32 (1907).

2. The Boston Ice Co. case was cited with mild approval by Cardozo in Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 211 N.Y. 68, 105 N.E. 88 (1914), a suit by an undisclosed principal-buyer against the seller for breach of warranty. For the treatment of the undisclosed principal, see the following case.

3.11 Watteau v. Fenwick 3.11 Watteau v. Fenwick

1 Q.B. 346

WATTEAU
v.
FENWICK.

[346] Principal and Agent—Liability of Principal—Undisclosed Principal—Unauthorized Acts of Agent.

The defendants, a firm of brewers, who were the owners of the business of a beerhouse, appointed a manager of the business; the licence was always taken out in the name of the manager, whose name also appeared over the door. By the agreement between the defendants and their manager, the latter was forbidden to purchase certain articles for the purpose of the business, which were to be supplied by the defendants; but the manager, in contravention of his instructions, ordered such articles from the plaintiff for use in the business; the plaintiff supplied the goods and gave credit for them to the manager only. Subsequently, upon discovering that the defendants were the real owners of the business, the plaintiff sued them for the value of the goods:—

Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action, for the defendants, as the real principals, were liable for all acts of their agent which were within the authority usually conferred upon an agent of his particular character, although he had never been held out by the defendants as their agent, and although the authority actually given to him by them had been exceeded.

APPEAL from the decision of the county court judge of Middlesborough.

From the evidence it appeared that one Humble had carried on business at a beerhouse called the Victoria Hotel, at Stockton-on-Tees, which business he had transferred to the defendants, a firm of brewers, some years before the present action. After the transfer of the business, Humble remained as defendants' manager; but the licence was always taken out in Humble's name, and his name was painted over the door. Under the terms of the agreement made between Humble and the defendants, the former had no authority to buy any goods for the business except bottled ales and mineral waters; all other goods required were to be supplied by the defendants themselves. The action was brought to recover the price of goods delivered at the Victoria Hotel over some years, for which it was admitted that the plaintiff gave credit to Humble only: they consisted of cigars, bovril, and other articles. The learned judge allowed the claim for the cigars and bovril only, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for £22 12s. 6d. The defendants appealed.

[347] 1892. Nov. 19. Finlay, Q.C. (Scott Fox, with him), for the defendants. The decision of the county court judge was wrong. The liability of a principal for the acts of his agent, done contrary to his secret instructions, depends upon his holding him out as his agent—that is, upon the agent being clothed with an apparent authority to act for his principal. Where, therefore, a man carries on business in his own name through a manager, he holds out his own credit, and would be liable for goods supplied even where the manager exceeded his authority. But where, as in the present case, there is no holding out by the principal, but the business is carried on in the agent's name and the goods are supplied on his credit, a person wishing to go behind the agent and make the principal liable must shew an agency in fact.

[LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. Cannot you, in such a case, sue the undisclosed principal on discovering him?]

Only where the act done by the agent is within the scope of his agency; not where there has been an excess of authority. Where anyone has been held out by the principal as his agent, there is a contract with the principal by estoppel, however much the agent may have exceeded his authority; where there has been no holding out, proof must be given of an agency in fact in order to make the principal liable.

Boydell Houghton, for the plaintiff. The defendants are liable in the present action. They are in fact undisclosed principals, who instead of carrying on the business in their own names employed a manager to carry it on for them, and clothed him with authority to do what was necessary to carry on the business. The case depends upon the same principles as Edmunds v. Bushell[1], where the manager of a business which was carried on in his own name with the addition "and Co."  accepted a bill of exchange, notwithstanding a stipulation in the agreement with his principal that he should not accept bills; and the Court held that the principal was liable to an indorsee who took the bill without any knowledge of the relations between the principal and agent. In that case there was no holding out of the manager as an agent; it was the simple case of an agent being allowed to act as the ostensible principal without any [348] disclosure to the world of there being anyone behind him. Here the defendants have so conducted themselves as to enable their agent to hold himself out to the world as the proprietor of their business, and they are clearly undisclosed principals: Ramazotti v. Bowring[1] All that the plaintiff has to do, therefore, in order to charge the principals, is to shew that the goods supplied were such as were ordinarily used in the business—that is to say, that they were within the reasonable scope of the agent's authority.

[He also cited Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson.[2]]

Finlay, Q.C., in reply, cited Summers v. Solomon.[3]

Cur. adv. vult.

Dec. 12. LORD COLERIDGE, C.J. The judgment which I am about to read has been written by my brother Wills, and I entirely concur in, it.

WILLS, J. The plaintiff sues the defendants for the price of cigars supplied to the Victoria Hotel, Stockton-upon-Tees. The house was kept, not by the defendants, but by a person named Humble, whose name was over the door. The plaintiff gave credit to Humble, and to him alone, and had never heard of the defendants. The business, however, was really the defendants', and they had put Humble into it to manage it for them, and had forbidden him to buy cigars on credit. The cigars, however, were such as would usually be supplied to and dealt in at such an establishment. The learned county court judge held that the defendants were liable. I am of opinion that he was right.

There seems to be less of direct authority on the subject than one would expect. But I think that the Lord Chief Justice during the argument laid down the correct principle, viz., once it is established that the defendant was the real principal, the ordinary doctrine as to principal and agent applies—that the principal is liable for all the acts of the agent which are within the authority usually confided to an agent of that [349] character, notwithstanding limitations, as between the principal and the agent, put upon that authority. It is said that it is only so where there has been a holding out of authority—which cannot be said of a case where the person supplying the goods knew nothing of the existence of a principal. But I do not think so. Otherwise, in every case of undisclosed principal, or at least in every case where the fact of there being a principal was undisclosed, the secret limitation of authority would prevail and defeat the action of the person dealing with the agent and then discovering that he was an agent and had a principal.

But in the case of a dormant partner it is clear law that no limitation of authority as between the dormant and active partner will avail the dormant partner as to things within the ordinary authority of a partner. The law of partnership is, on such a question, nothing but a branch of the general law of principal and agent, and it appears to me to be undisputed and conclusive on the point now under discussion.

The principle laid down by the Lord Chief Justice, and acted upon by the learned county court judge, appears to be identical with that enunciated in the judgments of Cockburn, C.J., and Mellor, J., in Edmunds v. Bushell[1], the circumstances of which case, though not identical with those of the present, come very near to them. There was no holding out, as the plaintiff knew nothing of the defendant. I appreciate the distinction drawn by Mr. Finlay in his argument, but the principle laid down in the judgments referred to, if correct, abundantly covers the present case. I cannot find that any doubt has ever been expressed that it is correct, and I think it is right, and that very mischievous consequences would often result if that principle were not upheld.

In my opinion this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for plaintiff: Belfrage & Co., for Bainbridge & Barnley, Middlesborough.

Solicitors for defendants: Johnson, Weatherall, & Sturt, for Marshall, Sunderland.

----------

[1] Law Rep. 1 Q.B. 97.

----------

[1] 7 C.B. (N.S.) 851.

[2] 4 C. P. D. 204; 5 C. P. D. 109.

[3] 7 E. & B. 879.

3.12 Notes - Watteau v. Fenwick 3.12 Notes - Watteau v. Fenwick

NOTE

For a criticism of the undisclosed principal doctrine, see Ames, Undisclosed Principal — Rights and Liabilities, 18 Yale L.J. 443 (1909); Pollock, 3 L.Q. Rev. 358, 359 (1887):

The plain truth ought never to be forgotten that the whole law as to the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal is inconsistent with the elementary doctrines of the law of contract. The right of one person to sue another on a contract not really made with the person suing is unknown to every other legal system except that of England and America. It rests originally on a sort of common law equity, and originates in the feeling that a principal who had got the advantage of a purchase ought to pay for it if the agent to whom the seller really trusted was not able to do so. Whether it was not from the first a mistake to suppose that the rights of a principal must of necessity be correlative to his liabilities is a question of some speculative interest. It is still more doubtful whether it be not inadvisable to extend by a process of judicial logic analogous rights which ought rather to be lessened than increased.

For a defense, see W. Seavey, Studies in Agency 87 (1949); Muller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed Principal, 16 Modern L. Rev. 299 (1953), and see also his Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency, 18 Modern L. Rev. 33 (1955). See, in general, S. Stoljar, The Law of Agency, ch. 10 (1961).

3.13 Noble v. Williams 3.13 Noble v. Williams

150 Ky. 439

Noble, et al.
v.
Williams, et al.

(Decided November 1, 1912.)
Appeal from Breathitt Circuit Court.

Schools land School Districts—Voluntary Payment of Rent of Schoolhouse and Furnishing of Supplies by Teacher.—A teacher of a common school who voluntarily pays rent for the schoolhouse and furnishes fuel and supplies necessary to the conduct of the school, cannot recover the amount so expended in an action against the school board. In contracting and paying these obligations the teacher was a volunteer. If the board made it impossible to conduct the school by failing to furnish a place to conduct it, the teacher had a right of action upon his contract. He had no right to voluntarily pay an obligation which was not his.

G. W. FLEENOR for appellants.

CHESTER BACH for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE WINN—Affirming.

According to the allegations of the petition the appellants, the plaintiffs, were hired to teach the public school in Jackson, Kentucky, for the fall term of 1908. The school board failed to pay rent for the schoolhouse, to buy the coal, to furnish the seats, crayons, blackboards, and the like, incident and necessary to the conduct of the school. Plaintiffs allege that they, in order to conduct the school, were obliged to and did pay the rent and buy the supplies. They allege no request by the school board that they should do so, nor any promise by the board to reimburse them. They sought to recover nevertheless, against the appellee board for these expenditures. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to their petition, and they appeal.

The circuit court was right. The teachers, in contracting and paying these obligations, were volunteers. No man entirely of his own volition can make another his debtor. The school board could have been required by mandamus, at the suit of any proper party, to furnish a place for the conduct of the school. The teachers had no right to supply it themselves, and then recover the rent. They had their teaching contract; and if the board made it impossible for them to teach by failing to furnish a place for conducting the school, they had their right of action on their contract, subject to the customary principles involved in such cases. They adopted neither of these courses, but instead voluntarily paid an obligation which was not theirs.

Judgment affirmed.

3.14 Notes - Noble v. Williams 3.14 Notes - Noble v. Williams

NOTE

Contrast Sommers v. Putnam Board of Education, infra p. 168. For a case denying recovery in restitution to a concerned citizen who made payment on a contract for a piano in order to "save it for the school," see Grand Isle v. McGowan, 88 Vt. 140, 92 A. 6 (1914).

3.15 Davis & Co v. Morgan 3.15 Davis & Co v. Morgan

43 S.E. 732
117 Ga. 504

DAVIS & CO.
v.
MORGAN.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
March 19, 1903.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT—ALTERATION-CONSIDERATION—ENFORCEMENT.

1. Where a contract of employment is made for one year at a stipulated salary per month, an agreement during the term to receive less or to pay more than the contract price is void, unless supported by some change in place, hours, character of employment, or other consideration.

2. Protection to person and property is the duty of the state, and in pursuance thereof laws are made to protect property and award damages for breach of contract, but courts cannot enforce promises binding on the conscience, except in those cases where some pecuniary damage flows from the breach, or where, in addi tion to the moral obligation, the promise is also supported by a legal consideration.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Mcintosh County; P. E. Seabrook, Judge.

Action by A. M. Morgan against C. H. Davis & Co. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

Osborne & Lawrence, for plaintiffs in error.

Gignilliatt & Stubbs, for defendant in error.

LAMAR, J. Davis & Co. employed Morgan for one year at $40 per month. After the contract had been in force for some time, Morgan received an offer of $65 per month from a company in Florida, and mentioned the fact to Davis, saying that of course be would not go without consent Davis insists that he then said, if Morgan would stay out the balance of the term, and work satisfactorily, he would give him $120 at the end of the year. Morgan says that Davis stated, "I will add $10 a month from the time you began, and owe you $120 when your time is up." Davis & Co. discharged Morgan two or three weeks before the end of the term, because the latter had gone to Florida for several days without their consent. Morgan insists that he told Davis that he was going, and the latter made no objection. He claimed that he was discharged without proper cause, and brought suit for the extra compensation promised. The jury found a verdict in his favor, and, the court having refused to grant a new trial, Davis & Co. excepted.

If the promise contemplated that Davis & Co. were to pay Morgan $10 per month for that part of the year which had already passed, and as to which there had been a settlement, it was manifestly nudum pactum; for a past transaction, the obligation of which has been fully satisfied, will not sustain a new promise. Gay v. Mott, 43 Ga. 254. And the result is practically the same whether Morgan or Davis was correct in the statement of the conversation. Both proved a promise to give more than was due, and to pay extra for what one was already legally bound to perform. The employer, therefore, received no consideration for his promise to give the additional money at the end of the year. Morgan had agreed to work for 12 months at the price promised, and if during the term he had agreed to receive less, the employer would still have been liable to pay him the full $40 per month. On the other hand, the employer could not be forced to pay more than the contract price. He got no more services that he had already contracted to receive, and according to an almost unbroken line of decisions the agreement to give more than was due was a nudum pactum, and void, as having no considertion to support the promise. The case is something like that of Bush v. Rawlins, 89 Ga. 117, 14 S. E. 886, where the landlord agreed to give [43 S.E. 733] the tenant certain property if he would pay his rent promptly; and it was held that such a promise was a gratuity, and void, as without consideration to support it. And see Tatum v. Morgan, 108 Ga. 336, 33 S. E. 940 (2); Civ. Code 1895, § 3735. It is also within the principle of Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Campbell, 317, where Lord Ellenborough held that an agreement to pay seamen extra for what they were bound by their articles to do was void. And so in Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260, a similar ruling was made in a case where a master agreed to give more wages if the seamen would not abandon the ship. See, also, Ayres v. C. R. I. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa. 478, 3 N. W. 522. There are cases holding that a new promise is binding where one of the parties to a contract refuses to perform, and, to save a loss, the innocent party agrees to pay more than the original contract price, if the actor will perform as originally agreed. Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N. W. 284, 41 Am. Rep. 723. But even if that line of cases should not be disregarded as tending to encourage a breach of contract, they do not affect the rights of Morgan here, because he does not bring himself within their ruling. Had there been a rescission or formal cancellation (Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 402) of the old contract by mutual consent, and if a new contract with new terms had been made; or if there had been any change in the hours, services, or character of work, or other consideration to support the promise to pay the increased wages it would have been enforceable. But, as It was, Morgan proved that Davis promised to pay more for the performance of the old contract than he had originally agreed. Such a promise was not binding.

It was argued that the moral obligation would support the promise here, and undoubtedly there are cases in which such consideration has been held to be sufficient. For example, that arising from the duty of a father to support his bastard child. Har-groves v. Freeman, 12 Ga. 342. At one time Lord Mansfield was quoted as having said that all promises deliberately made should be held binding, but Lord Denman, in Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Adol. & E. 438, attempts to show that this was either a misquotation, or that, if such a doctrine could have been deduced from whatever he said, the court had refused to follow it in Littlefield v. Shee, 2 Barn. & Ad. 811. The cases holding in conformity with Lord Mansfield's supposed statement, while set out in Hargrove v. Freeman, supra, are not adopted as law, because the court finally held that the principle to be adduced from the general current of authorities is that, for a moral obligation to constitute a sufficient consideration to support an express promise, it must be founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration, though respectable authority can be adduced on the "other side." In an agreement by one partner to pay the other for extra work (Gray v. Hamil, 82 Ga. 375, 10 S. E. 205, 6 L. R. A. 72); in the promise by a landlord to refund to tenant's money paid by them for worthless fertilizer (Parrott v. Johnson, 61 Ga. 475); and in the agreement by a brother to account to a sister for her interest as an heir at law in land which he had improperly induced the father to convey (Brown v. Latham, 92 Ga. 280, 18 S. E. 421)—the court recognized that there was a moral obligation to support the promise, but in each of the cases there was something very close akin to a legal obligation or to a trust. In Pittman v. Elder, 76 Ga. 371, it was shown that an agreement to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or discharged in bankruptcy, was not supported by what was formerly called a "moral obligation," but by the antecedent obligation; the new promise to pay amounting simply to a waiver of the statute or of the discharge. Civ. Code 1895, § 3658, defines a good consideration to be such as is founded on natural duty and affection or "on a strong moral obligation." In the light of the authorities, however, the strong moral obligation here referred to seems to be one supported either by some antecedent legal obligation, though unenforceable at the time, or by some present equitable duty. The section, however, does not relate to the moral obligation which inheres in every promise. Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 416, 27 S. E. 736. While all courts recognize the obligation arising from any undertaking, they are, from the necessity of the case, forced to hold that naked promises must depend for their performance solely upon the will of the promisor, and not upon the tribunals which are organized to perform the "duty of government to protect person and property," and in pursuance thereof to award money damages for breaches of contracts. Civ. Code 1895, § 5009. But they cannot enforce promises binding on the conscience, except in those cases where some pecuniary damage flows from the breach, or where, in addition to the moral obligation, the promise is also supported by a consideration. When one receives a naked promise, and such promise is broken, he is no worse off than he was. He gave nothing for it, he has lost nothing by it, and on its breach he has suffered no damage cognizable by courts. No benefit accrued to him who made the promise, nor did any injury flow to him who received it. Such promises are not made within the scope of transactions intended to confer rights enforceable at law. They are lightly made, dictated by generosity, curtesy, or impulse, often by ruinous prodigality. To enforce them by a judgment in favor of those who gave nothing therefor would often bring such imperfect obligations into competition with the absolute duties to wife and children, or into competition with debts for property actually received, and make the law an instrument by which a man could be forced to be generous before he was just. Both [43 S.E. 734] under the civil and the common law, courts were prohibited from enforcing contracts without consideration, and relegated the performance of such promises solely to those who made them.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concurring, except LUMPKIN, P. J., absent on account of sickness.

3.16 Notes - Davis & Co. v. Morgan 3.16 Notes - Davis & Co. v. Morgan

NOTE

In evaluating the decision of Davis & Co. v. Morgan, two questions should be asked. Did both parties regard the defendant's promise as gratuitous? And even assuming that the parties understood the promise for additional compensation to be gratuitous, are the policy reasons advanced by the court self-evidently sound, absent fraud, duress, or other forms of unconscionability? See Chapter 4, Section 5. See further U.C.C. §2-209, discussed infra p. 667. Do not overlook Comment 2, which subjects modifications to the test of good faith, U.C.C. §§1-203, 2-103. When is a promise gratuitous?

For a discussion of the consideration doctrine, see pp. 279 et seq. infra. Contrast Davis & Co. with Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., which follows.

3.17 Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch 3.17 Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch

231 N.Y. 196

Louis SCHWARTZREICH, Respondent,
v.
BAUMAN-BASCH, INCORPORATED, Appellant.

Contract — trial — where record shows question of fact it is error for trial justice to set aside verdict and dismiss complaint — contract may be set aside by parties and new one made at one and the same time — charge.

1. Where, in an action to recover on a contract for services, defended on the ground that there was no consideration for the contract as the plaintiff was already bound under a prior agreement to do the same work for the same period for a lesser salary, the record shows that a [197] question of fact was presented and that the evidence most favorable for the plaintiff would sustain a finding that the first contract was destroyed, canceled or abrogated by the consent of both parties, it was error for the trial justice to set aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and dismiss the complaint and a reversal of such ruling was proper.

2. A contract of employment may be set aside or terminated by the parties to it and a new one made or substituted in its place and it is competent to end the one and make the other at the same time.

3. A charge, by the trial justice, therefore, to the effect that if the jury find that the old contract was, prior to or at the time of the execution of the new contract, "cancelled and revoked by the parties by their mutual consent then it is your duty to find that there was a consideration for the making of the contract in suit" and "the test question is whether by word or by act, either prior to or at the time of the signing" of the new contract "these parties mutually agreed that the old contract from that instant should be null and void," is correct and a reinstatement of the verdict was proper.

Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 188 App. Div. 960, affirmed.

(Submitted April 27, 1921; decided May 10, 1921.)

APPEAL, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 28, 1919, affirming a determination of the Appellate Term, which reversed a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon an order of the trial justice in the City Court of the city of New York setting aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and directing a dismissal of the complaint and reinstated said verdict.

Louis Boehm and Samuel Zeiger for appellant. Not only was there lacking evidence of a cancellation of the first contract for $90 before the second contract for $100 was agreed upon, but it affirmatively appears from plaintiff's own testimony that such cancellation was not even mentioned. (Disker v. Herten, 73 App. Div. 453; 175 N. Y. 480; Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209; Pratt v. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 21 N. Y. 305; Belmar Contracting Co. v. State, 185 N. Y. Supp. 734.) A promise to do that which one is already legally obligated to do does not furnish a consideration sufficient to support a [198] contract. (Teele v. Mayer, 173 App. Div. 869; Weed v. Spears, 193 N. Y. 289; Carpenter v. Taylor, 164 N. Y. 171; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392.) Both sides having offered all their proof, and both plaintiff and defendant having testified as to what took place when the second contract was signed, and the contract itself being plain and unambiguous, a question of law was presented for the decision of the trial court, and its dismissal of the complaint on the merits was proper. (Carpenter v. Taylor, 164 N. Y. 171.)

I. Maurice Wormser and I. Gainsburg for respondent. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the merits. There was, at the very least, a clean-cut issue of fact for the jury, whether the $90 contract was canceled and rescinded by the parties, and a new $100 contract made. (Harris v. Carter, 3 El. & Bl. 559; Hart v. Lawman, 39 Barb. 410; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330; Spier v. Hyde, 78 App. Div. 151, 159; Bailey v. Elm City Lumber Co., 167 App. Div. 42, 45; Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 338; Wood v. Knight, 35 App. Div. 21; International Cont. Co. v. Lamont, 15.5 U. S. 303; Am. Ex. Nat. Bank v. Smith, 61 Misc. Rep. 49; 113 N. Y. Supp. 236; Galway v. Prignano, 134 N. Y. Supp. 571.)

CRANE, J. On the 31st day of August, 1917, the plaintiff entered into the following employment agreement with the defendant:

"BAUMAN-BASCH, INC., 

"Coats & Wraps,

"31-33 East 32nd Street,

"New York

"Agreement entered into this 31st day of August, 1917, by and between Bauman-Basch, Inc., a domestic corporation, party of the first part, and Louis Schwartzreich, of the Borough of Bronx, City of New York, party of the second part, Witnesseth:

[199] "The party of the first part does hereby employ the party of the second part, and the party of the second part agrees to enter the services of the party of the first part as a designer of coats and wraps.

"The employment herein shall commence on the 22nd day of November, 1917, and shall continue for twelve months thereafter. The party of the second part shall receive a salary of Ninety ($90.00) per week, payable weekly.

"The party of the second part shall devote his entire time and attention to the business of the party of the first part, and shall use his best energies and endeavors in the furtherance of its business.

"In witness whereof, the party of the first part has caused its seal to be affixed hereto and these presents to be signed, and the party of the second part has here- unto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written.

"BAUMAN-BASCH, INC.

 S. BAUMAN

"LOUIS SCHWARTZREICH.

"In the presence of:"

In October the plaintiff was offered more money by another concern. Mr. Bauman, an officer of the Bauman-Basch, Inc., says that in that month he heard that the plaintiff was going to leave and thereupon had with him the following conversation.

"A. I called him in the office, and I asked him, 'Is that true that you want to leave us?' and he said 'Yes,' and I said, 'Mr. Schwartzreich, how can you do that; you are under contract with us?' He said, 'Somebody offered me more money.' * * * I said, 'How much do they offer you?' He said, 'They offered him $115 a week.' * * * I said, 'I cannot get a designer now, and, in view of the fact that I have to send my sample line out on the road, I will give you a hundred dollars a week rather than to let you go.' He said, 'If you will give me $100, I will stay.'"

[200] Thereupon Mr. Bauman dictated to his stenographer a new contract, dated October 17, 1917, in the exact words of the first contract and running for the same period, the salary being $100 a week, which contract was duly executed by the parties and witnessed. Duplicate originals were kept by the plaintiff and defendant.

Simultaneously with the signing of this new contract, the plaintiff's copy of the old contract was either given to or left with Mr. Bauman. He testifies that the plaintiff gave him the paper but that he did not take it from him. The signatures to the old contract plaintiff tore off at the time according to Mr. Bauman.

The plaintiff's version as to the execution of the new contract is as follows:

"A. I told Mr. Bauman that I have an offer from Scheer & Mayer of $110 a week, and I said to him, 'Do you advise me as a friendly matter — will you advise me as a friendly matter what to do; you see I have a contract with you, and I should not accept the offer of $110 a week, and I ask you, as a matter of friendship, do you advise me to take it or not.' At the minute he did not say anything, but the day afterwards he came to me in and he said, 'I will give you $100 a week, and I want you to stay with me.' I said, 'All right, I will accept it; it is very nice of you that you do that, and I appreciate it very much.'"

The plaintiff says that on the 17th of October when the new contract was signed, he gave his copy of the old contract back to Mr. Bauman, who said: "You do not want this contract any more because the new one takes its place."

The plaintiff remained in the defendant's employ until the following December when he was discharged. He brought this action under the contract of October 17th for his damages.

The defense, insisted upon through all the courts, is that there was no consideration for the new contract as [201] the plaintiff was already bound under his agreement of August 31, 1917, to do the same work for the same period at $90 a week.

The trial justice submitted to the jury the question whether there was a cancellation of the old contract and charged as follows:

"If you find that the $90 contract was prior to or at the time of the execution of the $100 contract cancelled and revoked by the parties by their mutual consent, then it is your duty to find that there was a consideration for the making of the contract in suit, viz., the $100 contract and, in that event, the plaintiff would be entitled to your verdict for such damages as you may find resulted proximately, naturally and necessarily in consequence of the plaintiff's discharge prior to the termination of the contract period of which I shall speak later on."

Defendant's counsel thereupon excepted to that portion of the charge in which the court permitted the jury to find that the prior contract may have been canceled simultaneously with the execution of the other agreement. Again the court said:

"The test question is whether by word or by act, either prior to or at the time of the signing of the $100 contract, these parties mutually agreed that the old contract from that instant should be null and void."

The jury having rendered a verdict for the plaintiff the trial justice set it aside and dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence that the first contract was canceled to warrant the jury's findings.

The above quotations from the record show that a question of fact was presented and that the evidence most favorable for the plaintiff would sustain a finding that the first contract was destroyed, canceled or abrogated by the consent of both parties.

The Appellate Term was right in reversing this ruling. Instead of granting a new trial, however, it reinstated [202] the verdict of the jury and the judgment for the plaintiff. The question remains, therefore, whether the charge of the court, as above given, was a correct statement of the law or whether on all the evidence in the plaintiff's favor a cause of action was made out.

Can a contract of employment be set aside or terminated by the parties to it and a new one made or substituted in its place? If so, is it competent to end the one and make the other at the same time?

It has been repeatedly held that a promise made to induce a party to do that which he is already bound by contract to perform is without consideration. But the cases in t'his state, while enforcing this rule, also recognize that a contract may be canceled by mutual consent and a new one made. Thus Vanderbilt v. Schreyer (91 N. Y. 392, 402) held that it was no consideration for a guaranty that a party promise to do only that which he was before legally bound to perform. This court stated, however:

"It would doubtless be competent for parties to cancel an existing contract and make a new one to complete the same work at a different rate of compensation, but it seems that it would be essential to its validity that there should be a valid cancellation of the original contract. Such was the case of Lattimore v. Harsen (14 Johns. 330)."

In Cosgray v. New England Piano Co. (10 App. Div. 351, 353) it was decided that where the plaintiff had bound himself to work for a year at $30 a week, there was no consideration for a promise thereafter made by the defendant that he should notwithstanding receive $1,800 a year. Here it will be noticed there was no termination of the first agreement which gave occasion for BARTLETT, J., to say in the opinion:

"The case might be different if the parties had, by word of mouth, agreed wholly to abrogate and do away with a pre-existing written contract in regard to service [203] and compensation, and had substituted for it another agreement."

Any change in an existing contract, such as a modification of the rate of compensation, or a supplemental agreement, must have a new consideration to support it. In such a case the contract is continued, not ended. Where, however, an existing contract is terminated by consent of both parties and a new one executed in its place and stead, we have a different situation and the mutual promises are again a consideration. Very little difference may appear in a mere change of compensation in an existing and continuing contract and a termination of one contract and the making of a new one for the same time and work, but at an increased compensation. There is, however, a marked difference in principle. Where the new contract gives any new privilege or advantage to the promisee, a consideration has been recognized, though in the main it is the same contract. (Triangle Waist Co., Inc., v. Todd, 223 N. Y. 27.)

If this which we are now holding were not the rule, parties having once made a contract would be prevented from changing it no malter how willing and desirous they might be to do so, unless the terms conferred an additional benefit to the promisee.

All concede that an agreement may be rescinded by mutual consent and a new agreement made thereafter on any terms to which the parties may assent. Prof. Williston in his work on Contracts says (Vol. 1, § 130a): "A rescission followed shortly afterwards by a new agreement in regard to the same subject-matter would create the legal obligations provided in the subsequent agreement."

The same effect follows in our judgment from a new contract entered into at the same time the old one is destroyed and rescinded by mutual consent. The determining factor is the rescission by consent. Provided this is the expressed and acted upon intention, the time [204] of the rescission, whether a moment before or at the same time as the making of the new contract, is unimportant. The decisions are numerous and divergent where one of the parties to a contract refuses to perform unless paid an additional amount. Some states hold the new promise to pay the demand binding though there be no rescission. It is said that the new promise is given to secure performance in place of an action for damages for not performing (Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway Co., 207 Mass. 184), or that the new contract is evidence of the rescission of the old one and it is the same as if no previous contract had been made (Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282; Connelly v. Devoe, 37 Conn. 570; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489), or that unforeseen difficulties and hardships modify the rule (King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 482), or that the new contract is an attempt to mitigate the damages which may flow from the breach of the first. (Endriss v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 49 Mich. 279.) (See Anson's Law of Contract [Huffcut's Amer. Ed.], p. 114, sec. 138.) To like effect are Blodgett v. Foster (120 Mich. 392); Scanlon v. Northwood (147 Mich. 139); Evans v. Oregon & Washington R. R. Co. (58 Wash. 429); Main Street & A. P. R. R. Co. v. Los Angeles Traction Co. (129 Cal. 301).

The contrary has been held in such cases as Carpenter v. Taylor (164 N. Y. 171); Price v. Press Publishing Co. (117 App. Div. 854); Davis & Company v. Morgan (117 Ga. 504); Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico (117 Fed. Rep. 99); Conover v. Stillwell (34 N. J. L. 54, 57); Erny v. Sauer (234 Penn. St. 330). In none of these cases, however, was there a full and complete rescission of the old contract and it is this with which we are dealing in this case. Rescission is not presumed; it is expressed; the old contract is not continued with modifications; it is ended and a new one made.

The efforts of the courts to give a legal reason for holding good a promise to pay an additional compensation [205] for the fulfillment of a pre-existing contract is commented upon in note upon Abbott v. Doane (163 Mass. 433) in 34 L. R. A. 33, 39, and the result reached is stated as follows: "The almost universal rule is that without any express rescission of the old contract, the promise is made simply for additional compensation, making the new promise a mere nudum pactum." As before stated, in this case we have an express rescission and a new contract.

There is no reason that we can see why the parties to a contract may not come together and agree to cancel and rescind an existing contract, making a new one in its place. We are also of the opinion that reason and authority support the conclusion that both transactions can take place at the same time.

For the reasons here stated, the charge of the trial court was correct, and the judgments of the Appellate Division and the Appellate Term should be affirmed, with costs.

HISCOCK, Ch. J., HOGAN, CARDOZO, MCLAUGHLIN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur; CHASE, J., dissents.

Judgments affirmed.

3.18 Notes - Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc. 3.18 Notes - Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc.

NOTE

1. For the decision of the lower court, see A. Corbin, Cases on the Law of Contracts 294 (3d ed. 1947). For a general discussion, see Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 514 et seq.; 1A Corbin §186; N.Y. Law Revision Commission, Report Recommendations and Studies 172 et seq. (1936); DeKoven, Modification of a Contract in New York: Criteria for Enforcement, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1967).

2. Posner, in Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. Leg. Stud., 411, 424 (1977), defends the principal case on the following grounds:

Because the higher price [offered by a third party] is a genuine opportunity cost of continued compliance with the contract, the promisor should be allowed to terminate subject only to his obligation to make good the promisee's loss from the breach, and hence he should be allowed to negotiate with the promisee over a modification that will compensate the promisor for the lost opportunity.

Do you agree with this interpretation? Has Posner overlooked the fact that the defendant Bauman-Basch may have been a victim of compulsion, despite the promisee's ostentatious civility? Even if there was an interval between "tearing up" the old contract and making the new one, isn't the issue of compulsion the central one in the case? See Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1942). Consult Restatement Second §74, Comment b; U.C.C. §2-209, Comment 2.

3.19 Wood v. Boynton 3.19 Wood v. Boynton

64 Wis. 265

WOOD, Appellant,
vs.
BOYNTON and another, Respondents.

September 26 — October 13, 1885.

SALE OF CHATTELS. (1) Rescission. (2) Disparity between price and value: Evidence of fraud.

1. In the absence of fraud or a mistake as to the identity of the thing sold, the vendor cannot rescind the sale and maintain an action of replevin.

2. Where the value of the thing sold was open to the investigation of both parties, and both supposed at the time that the price paid was a fair one, no disparity, however great, between such price and the real value, is to be received in an action at law as evidence of fraud.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.

The case is stated in the opinion.

For the appellants there was a brief by Johnson, Rietbrock & Halsey, and oral argument by Mr. Johnson: 1. The gross disparity between the price paid for the diamond and its admitted value was evidence of fraud, and should have been submitted to the jury in connection with the other facts of the case. Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. 134, 150; Eyre v. Potter, 15 id. 42, 60; Byers v. Surget, 19 id. 303, 311; Kerr on F. & M. (2 Eng. ed.), 169, (Am. ed. 186); Risch v. Von Lillienthal, 34 Wis. 258; Kuelkamp v. Hidding, 31 id. 511; Wright v. Wilson, 2 Terg. 294; Barnet v. Spratts Adm'r, 4 Ired. Eq. 171; Deaderick v. Watkins, 8 Humph. 520; Morriso v. Philliber, 30 Mo. 145; Hardeman v. Burge, 10 Yerg. 202; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. 651.

2. There was a mutual, vital mistake as to the kind or species of thing sold, and this justifies a rescission. The case is precisely like the cases of " sales by description." In all such cases the courts have held that where the article varied from the description in hind (not quality), the consideration failed and the contract of sale could be rescinded, even though there was neither fraud nor warranty. Burchard v. Moore, 3 El. & Bl. 683; Westropp v. Solomon, 8 C. B. 345; Story on Sales, sec. 148; Paton v. Duncan, 3 Carr. & P. 336; 2 Schouler on Pers. Prop. 621; Benjamin on Sales, sec. 600, and note (P). See, also, 2 Schouler on Pers. Prop. 204; Benjamin on Sales, sec. 77; Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio St. 300; Bannerman v. White, 10 C. B. (N. S.), 844; S. C. 31 L. J. C. P. 28; Josling v. Kingsford, 32 id. 94; Azemar v. Casella, L. B. 2 C. P. 431, 677; 36 L. J. C. P. 124; Morse v. Brackett, 98 Mass. 205.

N.S. Murphey, for the respondents:

A mutual mistake as to the quantity or quality of the thing sold is no ground for a rescission of the contract. The mistake must concern the subject matter of the contract; and care must be taken to distinguish between the subject matter and collateral facts, such as quantity, quality, etc. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. sees. 141-151; Barr v. Gibson, 3 Mees. & W. 390; Kerr on F. & M. (Am. ed. 1871), 399, 409, 432; Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 414; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 274; Okill v. Whittaker, 1 DeG. & Sm. 83; Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed. Rep. 365; Morris Canal Co. v. Emmett, 9 Paige, 168; Durham v. Legard, 34 Beav. 611; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. of L. App. Cas. 149; Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr. 126; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees. & W. 399; Leake on Cont. 169; Hawkins v. Jackson, 2 Macn. & G. 372; Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 5 Beav. 287; Hill v. Bush, 19 Ark. 522. And the fraud or mistake must be of such a nature that the plaintiff could not, with reasonable diligence, acquire knowledge thereof when put on inquiry. Trigg v. Reed, 5 Humph. 529; Kerr on F. & M. 407; Hill v. Bush, 19 Ark. 522; Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story C. C. 172; Warner v. Daniels, 1 Woodb. & M. 90; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Severence v. Whittier, 24 Me. 120. A contract for the sale of a thing, the extent or value of which is understood to be unknown to both parties, or which is from its nature or character doubtful or uncertain, is valid and binding. Mortimer v. Capper, 1 Bro. C. C. 156; Ridgway v. Sneyd, Kay, 627; Frank v. Frank, 1 Ch. Cas. 84; Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. Wms. 182; Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 24; Croome v. Zediard, 2 Mylne & K. 251; Sullivan v. Jacob, 1 Molloy, 472; Baxendale v. Seale, 19 Beav. 601. Or, if the subject matter be an uncertain thing and the chance be known to both parties, neither can have relief because the reality has turned out to be different from what he anticipated. Monro v. Taylor, 3 Macn. & G. 718. The parties in this case were dealing at arms length, and the means of information and knowledge were open to both alike. Kerr on F. & M. 408, 414; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178; Kintsing v. McElrath, 5 Pa. St. 469; Blydenburgh v. Welsh, Baldw. 331; Bronson v. Wiman, 8 N. Y. 187; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 274; Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. C. C. 420; Turner v. Harvey, Jacob, 178; Stettheimer v. Killip, 75 N. Y. 282.

TAYLOR, J. This action was brought in the circuit court for Milwaukee county to recover the possession of an uncut diamond of the alleged value of $1,000. The case was tried in the circuit court and, after hearing all the evidence in the case, the learned circuit judge directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff excepted to such instruction, and, after a verdict was rendered for the defendants, moved for a new trial upon the minutes of the judge. The motion was denied, and the plaintiff duly excepted, and, after judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, appealed to this court.

The defendants are partners in the jewelry business. On the trial it appeared that on and before the 28th of December, 1883, the plaintiff was the owner of and in the possession of a small stone of the nature and value of which she was ignorant; that on that day she sold it to one of the defendants for the sum of one dollar. Afterwards it was ascertained that the stone was a rough diamond, and of the value of about $700. After learning this fact the plaintiff tendered the defendants the one dollar, and ten cents as interest, and demanded a return of the stone to her. The defendants refused to deliver it, and therefore she commenced this action.

The plaintiff testified to the circumstances attending the sale of the stone to Mr. Samuel B. Boynton, as follows:

"The first time Boynton saw that stone he was talking about buying the topaz, or whatever it is, in September or October. I went into his store to get a little pin mended, and I had it in a small box, — the pin, — a small ear-ring; . . . this stone, and a broken sleeve-button were in the box. Mr. Boynton turned to give me a check for my pin. I thought I would ask him what the stone was, and I took it out of the box and asked him to please tell me what that was. He took it in his hand and seemed some time looking at it. I told him I had been told it was a topaz, and he said it might be. He says, 'I would buy this; would you sell it?' I told him I did not know but what I would. What would it be worth? And he said he did not know; he would give me a dollar and keep it as a specimen, and I told him I would not sell it; and it was certainly pretty to look at. He asked me where I found it, and I told him in Eagle. He asked about how far out, and I said right in the village, and I went out. Afterwards, and about the 28th of December, I needed money pretty badly, and thought every dollar would help, and I took it back to Mr. Boynton and told him I had brought back the topaz, and he says, 'Well, yes; what did I offer you for it?' and 1 says, 'One dollar;' and he stepped to the change drawer and gave me the dollar, and I went out."

In another part of her testimony she says:

"Before I sold the stone I had no knowledge whatever that it was a diamond. I told him that I had been advised that it was probably a topaz, and he said probably it was. The stone was about the size of a canary bird's egg, nearly the shape of an egg, — worn pointed at one end; it was nearly straw color, — a little darker."

She also testified that before this action was commenced she tendered the defendants $1.10, and demanded the return of the stone, which they refused. This is substantially all the evidence of what took place at and before the sale to the defendants, as testified to by the plaintiff herself. She produced no other witness on that point.

The evidence on the part of the defendant is not very different from the version given by the plaintiff, and certainly is not more favorable to the plaintiff. Mr. Samuel B. Boynton, the defendant to whom the stone was sold, testified that at the time he bought this stone, he had never seen an uncut diamond; had seen cut diamonds, but they are quite different from the uncut ones; "he had no idea this was a diamond, and it never entered his brain at the time." Considerable evidence was given as to what took place after the sale and purchase, but that evidence has very little if any bearing upon the main point in the case.

This evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff sold the stone in question to the defendants, and delivered it to them in December, 1883, for a consideration of one dollar. The title to the stone passed by the sale and delivery to the defendants. How has that title been divested and again vested in the plaintiff? The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the title became vested in the plaintiff by the tender to the Boyntons of the purchase money, with interest, and a demand of a return of the stone to her. Unless such tender and demand revested the title in the appellant, she cannot maintain her action.

The only question in the case is whether there was anything in the sale which entitled the vendor (the appellant) to rescind the sale and so revest the title in her. The only reasons we know of for rescinding a sale and revesting the title in the vendor so that he may maintain an action at law for the recovery of the possession against his vendee are (1) that the vendee was guilty of some fraud in procuring a sale to be made to him; (2) that there was a mistake made by the vendor in delivering an article which was not the article sold, — a mistake in fact as to the identity of the thing sold with the thing delivered upon the sale. This last is not in realty a rescission of the sale made, as the thing delivered was not the thing sold, and no title ever passed to the vendee by such delivery.

In this case, upon the plaintiff's own evidence, there can be no just ground for alleging that she was induced to make the sale she did by any fraud or unfair dealings on the part of Mr. Boynton. Both were entirely ignorant at the time of the character of the stone and of its intrinsic value. Mr. Boynton was not an expert in uncut diamonds, and had made no examination of the stone, except to take it in his hand and look at it before he made the offer of one dollar, which was refused at the time, and afterwards accepted without any comment or further examination made by Mr. Boynton. The appellant had the stone in her possession for a long time, and it appears from her own statement that she had made some inquiry as to its nature and qualities. If she chose to sell it without further investigation as to its intrinsic value to a person who was guilty of no fraud or unfairness which induced her to sell it for a small sum, she cannot repudiate the sale because it is afterwards ascertained that she made a bad bargain. Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co. L. K 2 Q. B. 580.

There is no pretense of any mistake as to the identity of the thing sold. It was produced by the plaintiff and exhibited to the vendee before the sale was made, and the thing sold was delivered to the vendee when the purchase price was paid. Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co. L. R. 2 Q. B. 587; Street v. Blay, 2 Barn. & Adol. 456; Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El. & Bl. 849; Gurney v. Womersley, 4 El. & Bl. 133; Ship's Case, 2 De G., J. & S. 544. Suppose the appellant had produced the stone, and said she had been told that it was a diamond, and she believed it was, but had no knowledge herself as to its character or value, and Mr. Boynton had given her $500 for it, could he have rescinded the sale if it had turned out to be a topaz or any other stone of very small value? Could Mr. Boynton have rescinded the sale on the ground of mistake? Clearly not, nor could he rescind it on the ground that there had been a breach of warranty, because there was no warranty, nor could he rescind it on the ground of fraud, unless he could show that she falsely declared that she had been told it was a diamond, or, if she had been so told, still she knew it was not a diamond. See Street v. Blay, supra.

It is urged, with a good deal of earnestness, on the part of the counsel for the appellant that, because it has turned out that the stone was immensely more valuable than the parties at the time of the sale supposed it was, such fact alone is a ground for the rescission of the sale, and that fact was evidence of fraud on the part of the vendee. Whether inadequacy of price is to be received as evidence of fraud, even in a suit in equity to avoid a sale, depends upon the facts known to the parties at the time the sale is made.

When this sale was made the value of the thing sold was open to the investigation of both parties, neither knew its intrinsic value, and, so far as the evidence in this case shows, both supposed that the price paid was adequate. How can fraud be predicated upon such a sale, even though after-investigation showed that the intrinsic value of the thing sold was hundreds of times greater than the price paid ? It certainly shows no such fraud as would authorize the vendor to rescind the contract and bring an action at law to recover the possession of the thing sold. Whether that fact would have any influence in an action in equity to avoid the sale we need not consider. See Stettheimer v. Killip, 75 N. T. 287; Etting v. Bank of U.S. 11 Wheat. 59.

We can find nothing in the evidence from which it could be justly inferred that Mr, Boynton, at the time he offered the plaintiff one dollar for the stone, had any knowledge of the real value of the stone, or that he entertained even a belief that the stone was a diamond. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was a suppression of knowledge on the part of the defendant as to the value of the stone which a court of equity might seize upon to avoid the sale. The following cases show that, in the absence of fraud or warranty, the value of the property sold, as compared with the price paid, is no ground for a rescission of a sale. Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99; Lambert v. Heath, 15 Mees. & W. 487; Bryant v. Pemler, 45 Vt. 487; Kuelkamp v. Hidding, 31 Wis. 503, 511.

However unfortunate the plaintiff may have been in selling this valuable stone for a mere nominal sum, she has failed entirely to make out a case either of fraud or mistake in the sale such as will entitle her to a rescission of such sale so as to recover the property sold in an action at law.

By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

3.20 Notes - Wood v. Boynton 3.20 Notes - Wood v. Boynton

NOTE

1. "'Pure' contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and persons. It does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought and sold. . . . Contract law is abstraction — what is left in the law relating to agreement when particularities of person and subject-matter are removed." L. Friedman, Contract Law in America 20 (1965).

2. The new Restatement seems to take the position that the risk of mistake was properly placed on Mrs. Wood. See Restatement Second §§151, 154, Illus. 3 and Reporter's note thereto. See also Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1293 (1967).

3. How should a court decide on whom to place the risk, in the absence of an express allocation by the contracting parties? Kronman says that the risk should be placed on the better information-gatherer in order to reduce "the transaction costs of the contracting process." Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978). Was Wood or Boynton the better information gatherer? Consult Ohio Co. v. Rosmeier, 32 Ohio App. 2d 116, 288 N.E.2d 326 (1972); Thomas v. Caldwell, 27 Utah 2d 423, 497 P.2d 31 (1972). Restatement Second §154(c).

A different view is expressed in 2 G. Palmer, Restitution §12.17, p. 666 (1978): "While the court denied restitution to the seller, it seems likely that such relief would now be granted because of manifest enrichment of the buyer." Was defendant in the principal case "unjustly enriched," or was his enrichment "just" because Mrs. Wood assumed the risk that the stone was more valuable than the two parties had originally thought?

Should "unjust enrichment" be the principal criterion for setting aside a contract based on mistake? Is this idea more helpful than the distinction drawn by the Wood court between the identity of the subject matter and its intrinsic value? See Comment a to §154 of Restatement Second, describing distinctions of the latter sort as "artificial and specious." See also 2 G. Palmer, Restitution §12.17, p. 666 (1978), who notes that courts inclined to grant relief often say that the mistake is one of identity, while those not so inclined usually consider the mistake to be of a less fundamental nature. For an illustration of this process, see Sherwood v. Walker, infra p. 887, and compare Backus v. Maclaury, 278 A.D. 504, 106 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1951).

4. Suppose Mr. Boynton had permitted Mrs. Wood to keep the stone until January 2, and before handing it over, she discovered its value. In a suit by the jeweller against her, same result? Consult Sherwood v. Walker, infra p. 887.

Suppose plaintiff had entered the store and offered the stone for $1.00 without haggling and the defendant, ignorant of the value of the stone, had accepted the offer, or suppose both parties had regarded the stone as a very pretty piece of glass and agreed on a sales price of $.25. Can the plaintiff now rescind?

Under the doctrine of laesio enormis, supposedly developed by late Roman law and quite influential during the Middle Ages, a seller could rescind a contract for the sale of land, if the price received was less than one-half of the reasonable price; the buyer, however, could validate the contract by agreeing to pay the full price. See p. 555 infra for more on the doctrine.

3.21 Sherwood v. Walker 3.21 Sherwood v. Walker

For a report of the case, see p. 887 infra.

3.22 Notes - Sherwood v. Walker 3.22 Notes - Sherwood v. Walker

NOTE

Consult 13 Williston §§1569, 1570, 1570A (1970); 1 W. H. Page, The Law of Contracts §§379, 384 (1920); 2 J. N. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §927 (4th ed. 1918); Thayer, Unilateral Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for the Avoidance of Legal Transactions, in Harvard Legal Essays 467, 480, 494 (R. Pound ed. 1934).

Do not overlook the fact that the ultimate decision as to whether there was a mutual mistake was left to the jury.

If the statement of facts given by the dissenting judge is correct, and the plaintiff prospective buyer did not share the defendant seller's belief concerning the sterility of the cow, was the plaintiff under a duty to warn the defendant that the defendant might be mistaken?

Suppose the plaintiff was not a gentleman farmer but a butcher who really bought the cow for its meat value. What result?

3.23 Laidlaw v. Organ 3.23 Laidlaw v. Organ

15 U.S. 178
4 L.Ed. 214
2 Wheat. 178

LAIDLAW et al.
v.
ORGAN.

March 15, 1817.

ERROR to the district court for the Louisiana district.

The defendant in error filed his petition, or libel, in the court below, stating, that on the 18th day of February, 1815, he purchased of the plaintiffs in error one hundred and eleven hogsheads of tobacco, as appeared by the copy of a bill of parcels annexed, and that the same were delivered to him by the said Laidlaw & Co., and that he was in the lawful and quiet possession of the said tobacco, when, on the 20th day of the said month, the said Laidlaw & Co., by force, and of their own wrong, took possession of the same, and unlawfully withheld the same from the petitioner, notwithstanding he was at all times, and still was, ready to do and perform all things on his part stipulated to be done and performed in relation to said purchase, and had actually tendered to the said Laidlaw & Co. bills of exchange for the amount of the purchase money, agreeably to the said contract; to his damage, &c. Wherefore the petition prayed that the said Laidlaw & Co. might be cited to appear and answer to his plaint, and that judgment might be rendered against them for his damages, &c. And inasmuch as the petitioner did verily believe that the said one hundred and eleven hogsheads of tobacco would be removed, concealed, or disposed of by the said Laidlaw & Co., he prayed that a writ of sequestration might issue, and that the same might be sequestered in the hands of the marshal, to abide the judgment of the court, and that the said one hundred and eleven hogsheads of tobacco might be finally adjudged to the petitioner, together with his damages, &c., and costs of suit, and that the petitioner might have such other and farther relief as to the court should seem meet, &c.

The bill of parcels referred to in the petition was in the following words and figures, to wit:

"Mr. Organ Bo't of Peter Laidlaw & Co. 111 hhds. Tobacco, weighing 120,715 pounds n't. fr. $7,544.69.

"New-Orleans, 18th February, 1815."

On the 21st of February, 1815, a citation to the said Laidlaw & Co. was issued, and a writ of sequestration, by order of the court, to the marshal, commanding him to sequester 111 hogsheads of tobacco in their possession, and the same so sequestered to take into his (the marshal's) possession, and safely keep, until the farther order of the court; which was duly executed by the marshal. And on the 2d of March, 1815, counsel having been heard in the case, it was ordered, that the petitioner enter into a bond or stipulation, with sufficient sureties in the sum of 1,000 dollars, to the said Laidlaw & Co., to indemnify them for the damages which they might sustain in consequence of prosecuting the writ of sequestration granted in the case.[a] 

On the 22d of March, 1815, the plaintiffs in error filed their answer, stating that they had no property in the said tobacco claimed by the said petitioner or ownership whatever in the same, nor had they at any time previous to the bringing of said suit; but disclaimed all right, title, interest, and claim, to the said tobacco, the subject of the suit. And on the same day, Messrs. Boorman & Johnston filed their bill of interpleader or intervention, stating that the petitioner having brought his suit, and filed his petition, claiming of the said Laidlaw & Co. 111 hogsheads of tobacco, for which he had obtained a writ of sequestration, when, in truth, the said tobacco belonged to the said Boorman & Johnston, and was not the property of the said Laidlaw & Co., and praying that they, the said Boorman & Johnston, might be admitted to defend their right, title, and claim, to the said tobacco, against the claim and pretensions of the petitioner, the justice of whose claim, under the sale as stated in his petition, was wholly denied, and that the said tobacco might be restored to them, &c.

On the 20th of April, 1815, the cause was tried by a jury, who returned the following verdict, to wit: "The jury find for the plaintiff, for the tobacco named in the petition, without damages, payable as per contract." Whereupon the court rendered judgment "that the plaintiff recover of the said defendants the said 111 hogsheads of tobacco, mentioned in the plaintiff's petition, and sequestered in this suit, with his costs of suit to be taxed; and ordered, that the marshal deliver the said tobacco to the said plaintiff, and that he have execution for his costs aforesaid, upon the said plaintiff's depositing in this court his bills of exchange for the amount of the purchase money endorsed, &c., for the use of the defendants, agreeably to the verdict of the jury."

On the 29th of April, 1815, the plaintiffs in error filed the following bill of exceptions, to wit:

"Be it remembered, that on the 20th day of April, in the year of our Lord, 1815, the above cause came on for trial before a jury duly sworn and empannelled, the said Peter Laidlaw & Co. having filed a disclaimer, and Boorman and Johnston of the city of New-York, having filed their claim. And now the said Hector M. Organ having closed his testimony, the said claimants, by their counsel, offered Francis Girault, one of the above firm of Peter Laidlaw & Co., as their witness; whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff objected to his being sworn, on the ground of his incompetency. The claimants proved that Peter Laidlaw & Co., before named, were, at the date of the transaction which gave rise to the above suit, commission merchants, and were then known in the city of New-Orleans as such, and that it is invariably the course of trade in said city for commission merchants to make purchases and sales in their own names for the use of their employers; upon which the claimants again urged the propriety of suffering the said Francis Girault to be sworn, it appearing in evidence that the contract was made by Organ, the plaintiff, with said Girault, one of the said firm of Peter Laidlaw & Co. in their own name, and there being evidence that factors and commission merchants do business on their own account as well as for others, and there being no evidence that the plaintiff, at the time of the contract, had any knowledge of the existence of any other interest in the said tobacco, except that of the defendants, Peter Laidlaw & Co. The court sustained the objection, and rejected the said witness. To which decision of the court the counsel for the claimants aforesaid begged leave to except, and prayed that this bill of exceptions might be signed and allowed. And it appearing in evidence in the said cause, that on the night of the 18th of February, 1815, Messrs. Livingston, White, and Shepherd bought from the British fleet the news that a treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent by the American and British commissioners, contained in a letter from Lord Bathurst to the Lord Mayor of London, published in the British newspapers, and that Mr. White caused the same to be made public in a handbill on Sunday morning, 8 o'clock, the 19th of February, 1815, and that the brother of Mr. Shepherd, one of these gentlemen, and who was interested in one-third of the profits of the purchase set forth in said plaintiff's petition, had, on Sunday morning, the 19th of February, 1815, communicated said news to the plaintiff; that the said plaintiff, on receiving said news, called on Francis Girault, (with whom he had been bargaining for the tobacco mentioned in the petition, the evening previous,) said Francis Girault being one of the said house of trade of Peter Laidlaw & Co., soon after sunrise on the morning of Sunday, the 19th of February, 1815, before he had heard said news. Said Girault asked if there was any news which was calculated to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased; and that the said purchase was then and there made, and the bill of parcels annexed to the plaintiff's petition delivered to the plaintiff between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of that day; and that in consequence of said news the value of said article had risen from 30 to 50 per cent. There being no evidence that the plaintiff had asserted or suggested any thing to the said Girault, calculated to impose upon him with respect to said news, and to induce him to think or believe that it did not exist; and it appearing that [15 U.S. 184] the said Girault, when applied to, on the next day, Monday, the 20th of February, 1815, on behalf of the plaintiff, for an invoice of said tobacco, did not then object to the said sale, but promised to deliver the invoice to the said plaintiff in the course of the forenoon of that day; the court charged the jury to find for the plaintiff. Wherefore, that justice, by due course of law, may be done in this case, the counsel of said defendants, for them, and on their behalf, prays the court that this bill of exceptions be filed, allowed, and certified as the law directs.

(Signed,) DOMINICK A. HALL,

District Judge.

New-Orleans, this 3d day of May, 1815."

On the 29th of April, 1815, a writ of error was allowed to this court, and on the 3d of May, 1815, the defendant in error deposited in the court below, for the use of the plaintiffs in error, the bills of exchange mentioned in the pleadings, according to the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court thereon, which bills were thereupon taken out of court by the plaintiffs in error.

Feb. 20th.

Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, for the plaintiffs in error. 1. The first question is, whether the sale, under the circumstances of the case, was a valid sale; whether fraud, which vitiates every contract, must be proved by the communication of positive misinformation, or by withholding information when asked. Suppression of material circumstances within the knowledge of the vendee, and not accessible [15 U.S. 185] to the vendor, is equivalent to fraud, and vitiates the contract.[b] Pothier, in discussing this subject, adopts the distinction of the forum of conscience, and the forum of law; but he admits that fides est servanda.[c] The parties treated on an unequal footing, as the one [15 U.S. 186] party had received intelligence of the peace of Gbent, at the time of the contract, and the other had not. [15 U.S. 187] This news was unexpected, even much more at New-Orleans, the recent scene of the [15 U.S. 188] most sanguinary operations of the war. In answer to the question, whether there was any news calcu [15 U.S. 189] lated to enhance the price of the article, the vendee was silent. This reserve, when such a question was [15 U.S. 190] asked, was equivalent to a false answer, and as much calculated to deceive as the communication of the most fabulous intelligence. Though the plaintiff's in error, after they heard the news of peace, still went on, in ignorance or their legal rights, to complete the contract, equity will protect them.

[15 U.S. 191] 2. Mr. Girault was improperly rejected as a witness, because he and his partner had disclaimed, and Messrs. Boorman & Johnston, the real owners of the tobacco, had intervened and taken the place of the original defendants. Girault was not obliged to disclose his character of agent, and, as such, he was an admissible witness.[d] The tendency of the modern decisions to let objections go to the credibility, and not to the competency of witnesses, ought to be encouraged as an improvement in the jurisprudence on this subject. Besides, the proceedings are essentially in rem, according to the course of the civil law, and that consideration is conclusive as to the admissibility of the witness. 3. The court below had no right to charge the jury absolutely to find for the plaintiff. It was a mixed question of fact and law, which ought to have been left to the jury to decide. 4. There is error in the judgment of the court, in decreeing a deposit of the bills of exchange by the vendee for the tobacco, no such agreement being proved.

Mr. Key contra, 1. Though there be no testimony in the record to show a contract for payment in bills of exchange, still the court may infer that such was the contract from the petition of the plaintiff below, supported as it is by his oath, and uncontradicted, as to this fact, by the defendant's answer.

[15 U.S. 192] The decree was for a specific performance, and the vendors took the bills out of court. 2. The judge's charge was right, there being no evidence of fraud. The vendee's silence was not legal evidence of fraud, and, therefore, there was no conflict of testimony on this point: it was exclusively a question of law; the law was with the plaintiff; and, consequently, the court did right to instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff. 3. Mr. Girault was an inadmissible witness. He and his partners were general merchants as well as factors. They sold in their own names, and might call the article their own or the property of their principals, as it suited them. But they were parties to the suit, and the intervention of their principals did not abate the suit as to them.[e]

[15 U.S. 193] On every ground, therefore, Mr. Girault was an inadmissible witness. 4. The only real question in the cause is, whether the sale was invalid because the vendee did not communicate information which he received precisely as the vendor might have got it had he been equally diligent or equally fortunate? And, surely, on this question there can be no doubt. Even if the vendor had been entitled to the disclosure, he waived it by not insisting on an answer to his question; and the silence of the vendee might as well have been interpreted into an affirmative as a negative answer. But, on principle, he was not bound to disclose. Even admitting that his conduct was unlawful, in foro conscientiae, does that prove that it was so in the civil forum? Human laws are imperfect in this respect, and the sphere of morality is more extensive than the limits of civil jurisdiction. The maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept into the law, if the province of ethics had been co-extensive with it. There was, in the present case, no circumvention or manoeuvre practised by the vendee, unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by superior diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a romantic equality that is contended for on the other side. Parties never can be precisely equal in knowledge, either of facts or of the [15 U.S. 194] inferences from such facts, and both must concur in order to satisfy the rule contended for. The absence of all authority in England and the United States, both great commercial countries, speaks volumes against the reasonableness and practicability of such a rule.

Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, in reply. Though the record may not show that any thing tending to mislead by positive assertion was said by the vendee, in answer to the question proposed by Mr. Girault, yet it is a case of manoeuvre; of mental reservation; of circumvention. The information was monopolized by the messengers from the British fleet, and not imparted to the public at large until it was too late for the vendor to save himself. The rule of law and of ethics is the same. It is not a romantic, but a practical and legal rule of equality and good faith that is proposed to be applied. The answer of Boorman & Johnston denies the whole of the petition, and consequently denies that payment was to be in bills of exchange; and their taking the bills out of court, ought not to prejudice them. There is nothing in the record to show that the vendors were general merchants, and they disclosed their principals when they came to plead. The judge undertook to decide from the testimony, that there was no fraud; in so doing he invaded the province of the jury; he should have left it to the jury, expressing his opinion merely.

[15 U.S. 195] Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor? The court is of opinion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or do any thing tending to impose upon the other. The court thinks that the absolute instruction of the judge was erroneous, and that the question, whether any imposition was practised by the vendee upon the vendor ought to have been submitted to the jury. For these reasons the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court of Louisiana, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.

Venire de novo awarded.

[a] Sequestration, in the practice of the civil law, is a process to take judicial custody of the res or persona in controversv to abide the event of the suit. It may be applied to real or personal property, the right to which is litigated between the parties, or even to persons, as to a married woman, in a cause of divorce, in order to preserve her from ill treatment on the part of her husband, or to a minor in order to secure him from ill treatment by his parents.Clerke's Prax. Tit. 43. Pothier, de la Proc edure Civile, Partie I, Chap. 3. art. 2. § 1. Code Napoleon, Liv. 3. tit. 11. Des Depots et du Sequestre, art. 1961. Digest of the Civil laws of Louisiana, 419. The sequestration may be demanded, either in the original petition, or in the progress of the cause at any time before it is set down for hearing by a petition from the party demanding it, with notice to the opposite party, on which the judge, after hearing counsel, pronounces his interlocutory sentence or decree. This sentence is to be provisionally executed notwithstanding an appeal. The sequestration is usually ordered, in possessory actions, where the preliminary proofs of the parties appear to be nearly balanced; where an inheritance consisting of personal effects of great value is in controversy; where there is ground to apprehend that the parties may resort to personal violence in contesting the enjoyment of the mesne profits; in actions of partition, where the property in litigation cannot be quietly enjoyed by the respective owners; and sometimes in cases where the suit is likely to be of long duration. Pothier, Ib. and § 2.

[b] 1 Comyn on Contr.38. and the authorities there cited.

[c] Pothier, De Vente, Nos. 233 to 241. He considers this question under the four following heads. 1st. Whether good faith obliges the vendor, at least in foro conscientiae, not only to refrain from practising any deception, but also from using any mental reservation? 2d. What reservation binds the party in the civil forum, and to what obligations? 3d. Whether the vendor is bound, at least in foro conscientiae, not to conceal any circumstances, even extrinsic, which the vendee has an interest in knowing? 4th. Whether the vendor may, in foro conscientiae, sometimes sell at a price above the true value of the article. As Pothier's discussion throws great light on this subject, a translation of this part of his admirable treatise may not be unacceptable to the reader.

"ARTICLE I. 233. Although, in many transactions of civil society, the rules of good faith only require us to refrain from falsehood, and permit us to conceal from others that which they have an interest in knowing if we have an equal interest in concealing it from them; yet, in interested contracts, among which is the contract of sale, good faith not only forbids the assertion of falsehood, but also all reservation concerning that which the person with whom we contract has an interest in knowing, touching the thing which is the object of the contract.

"The reason is that equity and justice, in these contracts, consists in equality. It is evident that any reservation, by one of the contracting parties, concerning any circumstance which the other has an interest in knowing, touching the object of the contract, is fatal to this equality: for the moment the one acquires a knowledge of this object superior to the other, he has an advantage over the other in contracting; he knows better what he is doing than the other; and, consequently, equality is no longer found in the contract.

"In applying these principles to the contract of sale, it follows that the vendor is obliged to disclose every circumstance within his knowledge touching the thing which the vendee has an interest in knowing, and that he sins against that good faith which ought to reign in this contract, if he conceals any such circumstance from him.

"This is what Florentinus teaches in the law 43. § 2. Dig. De contr. empt. Dolum malum a se abesse proestare venditor debet, qui non tantum in eo est qui fallendi causd obscur e loquitur, sed etiam qui insidiose, obscure dissimulat.

"234. According to these principles the vendor is obliged not to conceal any of the defects of the article sold, which are within his knowledge, although these defects may not be such as fall within an implied warranty, but even such defects as the vendee would have no right to complain of, if the vendor who had not disclosed them was ignorant of their existence. Cum ex XII. tabulis, says Cicero, (Lib 3. de Off.) satis esset cautum ea praestare quae essent lingu a nuncuipata; a jurisconsultis, etiam reticencioe poena constituta, quidquid enim inest proedio vitii id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, proestare oportere. The vendor, in this case, is held in id quanti (emptoris) intererit scisse. Dig. l. 4. De act. empt. and this reservation may sometimes authorize a rescinding of the contract. 1. 11, § 5. Dig. de tit.

"235. This rule ought to be applied, although the vendor, who has concealed the defects in the thing sold, has not sold it for more than its value with these defects. The reason is that he who sells me a thing has no right to require that I should pay the highest price for it, unless I consent to buy it for that price; he has no right to require of me a higher price than that which I voluntarily give, and he ought not to practise any artifice to induce me to consent to buy it at a higher price than I should have been willing to give had I known the defects which he had maliciously concealed.

"236. Good faith obliges the vendor, not only not to conceal any of the intrinsic vices of the thing sold, but generally not to dissemble any circumstance concerning it which might induce the vendee not to buy, or not to buy at so high a price. For example, the vendee may have his action against the vendor if the latter has concealed the existence of a bad neighbourhood to a real estate sold by him, which might have prevented the vendee from purchasing had he known it: Si quis in vendendo proedio confinem celaverit, quem emptor si audisset, empturus non esset. Dig. L. 15. § 8. De contr. empt.

"237. These principles of the Roman jurisconsults, are more accurate and more conformable to justice than the decision of St. Thomas, which permits the vendor to conceal the vices of the thing sold, except in two cases, 1. If the vice be of a nature to cause the vendee some injury; and 2. If the vendor availed himself of his reservation in order to sell the thing at a higher price than it was worth. This decision appears to me to be unjust, since, as the vendor is perfectly at liberty to sell or not to sell, he ought to leave the vendee perfectly at liberty to buy or not to buy, even for a fair price, if that price does not suit the buyer: it is, therefore, unjust to lay a snare for this liberty which the vendee ought to enjoy, by concealing from him the vice of the thing, in order to induce him to buy that which he would not have been willing to buy for the price at which it is sold to him, had he known its defects.

"ARTICLE II. 238. Although it is with respect to the civil forum that the Roman jurisconsults have established the principles which we have stated, touching the obligation of the vendor not to conceal from the vendee any circumstance relative to the thing sold, and although they ought to be exactly followed, in foro conscientioe, yet they are little observed in our tribunals, and the vendee is not easily listened to who complains of the concealment of some vice in the thing sold, unless it be such a defect as falls within the doctrine of implied warranty. The interest of commerce not permitting parties to set aside their contracts with too much facility, they must impute it to their own fault in not having better informed themselves of the defects in the commodities they have purchased.

"239. There are, nevertheless, certain reservations touching the thing sold which have been thought worthy of the attention of the law, and which are obligatory on the vendor in the civil forum; as for instance, when the vendor knows that the thing which he sells does not belong to him, or that it does not irrevocably belong to him, or that it is subject to certain incumbrances, and conceals these facts from the vendee," &c.

"ARTICLE III. 241. Cicero, in the third book of his Offices, has treated this question in the case of a corn-merchant, who being arrived at Rhodes, in a time of scarcity, before a great number of other vessels loaded with corn, exposes his own for sale: Cicero proposes the question whether this merchant is obliged to inform the buyers that there are a great number of other vessels on their voyage, and near the port? He states, upon this question, the sentiments of two stoic philosophers, Diogenes and Antipater; Diogenes thought that the merchant might lawfully withhold the knowledge which he had of the vessels on the point of arriving, and sell his corn at the current price: Antipater, his disciple, whose decision Cicero appears to adopt, thought, on the contrary, that this dissimulation was contrary to good faith. The reason on which he grounds this opinion is that the concord which ought to exist among men, the affection which we ought to bear to each other, cannot permit us to prefer our private interest to the interest of our neighbour, from whence it follows that, though we may conceal some things from prudence, we cannot conceal, for the sake of profit, facts which those with whom we contract have an interest in knowing. Hoc celandi genus, says he, non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui; non justi, non viri boni: vertuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri.

"This question only concerns the forum of conscience; for there can be no doubt that in the civil forum, the demand of a vendee cannot be listened to who complains that the vendor has not disclosed to him all the extrinsic circumstances relative to the thing sold, whatever interest the vendee might have in knowing them. The decision of Cicero is somewhat difficult to maintain even in the forum of conscience. The greater part of the writers on natural law have considered it as unreasonable.

"These writers are of opinion, that the good faith which ought to govern the contract of sale, only requires that the vendor should represent the thing sold as it is, without dissimulating its defects, and not to sell it above the price which it bears at the time of the contract; that he commits no injustice in selling it at this price, although he knows that the price must soon fall; that he is not obliged to disclose to the vendee a knowledge which he may have of the circumstances that may produce a depression of the price; the vendee having no more right to demand that the vendor should impart this knowledge than that he should give away his property; that if he should do it, it would be merely an act of benevolence, which we are not obliged to exercise except towards those who are in distress, which was not the case with the Rhodians, who were only in want of corn, but were not in want of money to buy it. The profit which the merchant makes in selling it for the price it is worth today, although he is conscious the price will fall to-morrow, is not iniquitous; it is a just recompense for his diligence in reaching the market first, and for the risk which he ran of losing upon his commodities if any accident had prevented his arriving so soon. It is no more forbidden to sell at the current price, without disclosing the circumstances which may cause it to fall, than it is to buy without communicating those which may cause it to rise. And Joseph was never accused of injustice for profiting of the knowledge which he alone had of the years of famine to buy the fifth part of the corn of the Egyptians without warning them of the years of famine that were to follow.

"Notwithstanding these reasons and authorities, I should have some difficulty, in the forum of conscience, in excusing the injustice of a profit which the vendor might derive from concealing a fact which would cause a fall in the price of the commodity, when that fall must be very considerable, and must certainly arrive in a very short period of time, such as that which the merchant knew of the near approach of a fleet to Rhodes laden with corn. In the contract of sale, as well as in other mutually beneficial contracts, equity requires that what the one party gives should be the equivalent of what he receives, and that neither party should wish to profit at the expense of the other. But in the case of the merchant, who, by dissembling the knowledge which he has of this fact, sells his corn at one hundred livres the cask, the market price of the day, can he, without illusion, persuade himself that the article which, in two days, will be worth no more than twenty livres, is the equivalent of one hundred livres which he receives? You will say that it is sufficient if at the time it be worth the price of one hundred livres for which he sells it. I answer, that a thing, which has a present and momentary value of one hundred livres, but which he certainly knows will be reduced in two days to the value of twenty, cannot be seriously regarded by him as truly the equivalent of the money which he receives, and which must always be worth one hundred. Does not his conduct imply, that he wishes, by his reservation, to profit and enrich himself at the expense of the buyers, to induce them to purchase a commodity by which he is certain they must lose in two days four fifths of the original cost?"

The merchant will smile at the rigid morality of this deservedly celebrated writer, who proceeds, in a fourth article, to consider whether the vendor may, in foro conscientia, sometimes sell at a price above the true value of the commodity. After laying down some general rules on this subject, he remarks, that "they are not adopted in the civil forum, where a vendee is not ordinarily admitted to complain that he has purchased dearer than the true value, it being for the interest of commerce that parties should not be allowed to set aside their contracts with too much facility." No. 242. In a subsequent part of his treatise he states what are the nature of the frauds that may be committed by the vendee, which he resolves into two classes. 1st. The first consists of any misrepresentation or circumvention which the vendee may employ in order to induce the vendor to sell, or to sell at a less price. 2d. Where the vendee conceals from the vendor the knowledge which he may have, touching the thing sold, and which the vendor may not possess. The former species of fraud, if sufficiently proved, he considers will invalidate the contract even in the civil forum. But the latter he deems only obligatory in foro conscientiae, both because unduly restricting the freedom of commerce, and because the vendor ought to know best the qualities of the articles he sells, and if he does not, it is his own fault. Nos. 294-298. In the fifth part, chap. 2., he considers the subject of the action which is given by the Code, l. 4. tit. 44. De rescind. vend., to the vendor for rescinding the contract on account of enormous lesion, or gross inadequacy of price, which, however, does not extend to merchandise, or other personal property, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to trouble the reader by extending this note to a greater length.

[d] Dixon v. Cooper, 3 Wils. 40. 1 Atk. 248. Benjamin v. Porteus, 2 H. Bl. 590. Mackay v. Rhinelander et al., 1 Johns. Cas. 408. Jones v. Hake, 2 Johns Cas. 60. Burlingame v. Dyer, Johns. Rep. 189.

[e] Intervention is a proceeding by which a third person petitions to be received as a party in a cause, either with the plaintiff or the defendant, and to prosecute the suit jointly with the party whose interests may be connected with his own. It may take place either before or after the cause is at issue, and set down for hearing; either in the court below, or upon appeal. But it cannot operate to retard the adjudication of the principal cause; which may either be determined separately, or the whole controversy may be decided by one and the same judgment.Clerke's Prax. tit. 38, 39. Pothier, De la Procedure Civile, Partie 1, chap. 2, art. 3. § 3. Code de Proc edure Civile, Partie 1. Liv. 2. tit. 16. De l'Intervention, art. 339, 340. It may take place where the goods of one person are attached as the property or for the debt of another. Clerke's Prax. Ib. In actions of warranty, Pothier, Ib. Partie 1. chap. 2. art. 2. § 2. Code de Procedure Civile, 1 ere Partie Liv. 2. tit. 9. Des Exceptions Dilatoires, art. 183. So also in a suit for separation of property between husband and wife, the creditors of the husband may intervene for the preservation of their rights. Ib. 2 Partie. Liv. 1. tit. 8. Des Separations de Biens, art. 871.

Interest in the subject matter of the suit is a fatal objection to the competency of a witness by the civil law; (Pothier, Id. Partie 2. chap. 3. art. 4. § 3.;) but according to the above authorities, Mr. Girault appears to have been an inadmissible witness, because still a party to the cause notwithstanding the intervention of his principals.

3.24 Notes - Laidlaw v. Organ 3.24 Notes - Laidlaw v. Organ

NOTE

1. 12 Williston §1497; 2 Kent, Commentaries 485 (12th ed. 1873); Smith v. Hughes, L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 (1871); Bell v. Lever Brothers, [1932] A.C. 161, 227, infra p. 896.

How would the case be decided today? Consult Restatement Second §161, Comment d. Did the defendant not act in an exceedingly unbusinesslike fashion in disregarding the plaintiff's silence?

2. For an analysis contemporary to the decision, see G. Verplanck, Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts (1826). Verplanck, an outspoken critic of the just price theory, would have required disclosure of "material facts concerning the terms or the subject of the contract, which necessarily and of course enter into all calculations of price among those whose demand and supply, and estimation of value, fix the market price of similar things." According to Verplanck, the concealment of such facts is unfair and a breach of confidence. On the issue of unfairness, compare the following passage from Keeton, Fraud — Concealment and NonDisclosure, 15 Texas L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (1936):

[T]he case of Laidlaw v. Organ has received a storm of criticism, but it seems that the buyer in that case acted in the way in which buyers generally would be expected to act. If those facts were given to a normal person, as an abstract question, he would probably say that the buyer's conduct was unethical; on the other hand, if the same individual were given the opportunity that the buyer had in Laidlaw v. Organ, he would do precisely the same thing. In this connection it would seem that the conception of negligence as the care of the ordinary prudent man would be of benefit. It has been said that the standard man in his conduct on the question of negligence evaluates interests in accordance with the sentiment of the community. Why not employ the standard man in this connection? This would be, not the ordinary man's views as to the ethical quality of the silence, but what the man of ordinary moral sensibilities would have done; would he have disclosed the information or would he have remained silent? This is not the same as saying that when a person is negligent he cannot recover, because the circumstances may be such that however negligent the uninformed person might be, the ordinary ethical man would disclose the information. Of course, the opportunity which the uninformed person might have to ascertain the fact not disclosed is a factor of importance since a person would seem to be entitled to reap some benefit if he is more diligent and careful or has a wider experience. Society requires or should require of a person a judgment on moral questions which represents the sentiment of the community, and the fictitious standard man is set up with that judgment. Under this standard, it would seem that the question in a particular case as to whether the non-disclosure under the circumstances would be fraudulent, would be a mixed question of law and fact.

Dean Keeton's article contains a most valuable discussion of factors to be considered in determining the extent of the duty to disclose. According to Dean Prosser, "the law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it." Handbook of the Law of Torts 698 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser's book contains an interesting policy discussion regarding the different treatment accorded the injured party by contract and tort law (at 698). See further Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1953).

3. Kronman, in Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978), offers another approach to the problem. According to Kronman, "allocative efficiency is promoted by getting information of changed circumstances to the market as quickly as possible." The information in question, however, does not arrive of its own accord; individuals supply it. To promote efficiency, judicial rules should encourage the gathering and provision of information. This requires that deliberate search be rewarded, or at least compensated as a cost. The casual acquisition of information, on the other hand, need not be protected, as a disclosure requirement for casually-acquired information would have little or no effect on the production of socially useful information. One may have doubts, of course, about the ability of courts to discriminate between the deliberate and chance acquisition of information. Kronman feels that the courts should make a blanket rule for different classes of cases, depending on "whether the kind of information involved is (on the whole) more likely to be generated by chance or by deliberate searching" (at 17-18). Using this analysis, how should a case like Laidlaw be decided?

3.25 Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank 3.25 Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank

311 Mass. 677

NEIL W. SWINTON
vs.
WHITINSVILLE SAVINGS BANK.

Middlesex County.
March 4, 1942 - June 22, 1942.

Present: FIELD, C.J., DONAHUE, QUA, & RONAN, JJ.

A buyer of a dwelling house cannot maintain an action of tort against the seller in which he relies solely upon the facts that the seller, knowing the building to be infested with termites and the internal destruction they were creating therein, failed to reveal their presence to him.

Characterization in a declaration of conduct of the defendant as false and fraudulent was ineffective, on demurrer, if not supported by allegations of fact respecting such conduct.

TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated November 10, 1941.

A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by Swift, J. The plaintiff appealed.

J. E. Hannigan, (E. M. McMahon with him,) for the plaintiff.

A. V. Harper, for the defendant.

QUA, J. The declaration alleges that on or about September 12, 1938, the defendant sold the plaintiff a house in Newton to be occupied by the plaintiff and his family as a dwelling; that at the time of the sale the house "was infested with termites, an insect that is most dangerous and destructive to buildings"; that the defendant knew the house was so infested; that the plaintiff could not readily observe this condition upon inspection; that, "knowing the internal destruction that these insects were creating in said house," the defendant falsely and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff its true condition; that the plaintiff at the time of his purchase had no knowledge of the termites, exercised due care thereafter, and learned of them about August 30, 1940; and that, because of the destruction that was being done and the dangerous condition that was being created by the termites, the plaintiff was put to great expense for repairs and for the installation of termite control in order to prevent the loss and destruction of said house.

There is no allegation of any false statement or representation, or of the uttering of a half truth which may be tantamount to a falsehood. There is no intimation that the defendant by any means prevented the plaintiff from acquiring information as to the condition of the house. There is nothing to show any fiduciary relation between the parties, or that the plaintiff stood in a position of confidence toward or dependence upon the defendant. So far as appears the parties made a business deal at arm's length. The charge is concealment and nothing more; and it is concealment in the simple sense of mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any peculiar duty to speak. The characterization of the concealment as false and fraudulent of course adds nothing in the absence of further allegations of fact. Province Securities Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co. 269 Mass. 75, 92.

If this defendant is liable on this declaration every seller is liable who fails to disclose any nonapparent defect known to him in the subject of the sale which materially reduces its value and which the buyer fails to discover. Similarly it would seem that every buyer would be liable who fails to disclose any nonapparent virtue known to him in the subject of the purchase which materially enhances its value and of which the seller is ignorant. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358. The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this. That the particular case here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense is scarcely to be denied. Probably the reason is to be found in the facts that the infestation of buildings by termites has not been common in Massachusetts and constitutes a concealed risk against which buyers are off their guard. But the law cannot provide special rules for termites and can hardly attempt to determine liability according to the varying probabilities of the existence and discovery of different possible defects in the subjects of trade. The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated and followed by this court in Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 52, 53, Potts v. Chapin, 133 Mass. 276, Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N.E. 705, Phinney v. Friedman, 224 Mass. 531, 533, 113 N.E. 285, Windram Manuf. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co. 239 Mass. 123, 126, 131 N.E. 454, Wellington v. Rugg, 243 Mass. 30, 35, 36, 136 N.E. 831, and Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 561, 165 N.E. 873. It is adopted in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, § 551. See Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.) §§ 1497, 1498, 1499.

The order sustaining the demurrer is affirmed, and judgment is to be entered for the defendant. Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co. 303 Mass. 53, 55-63, 20 N.E.2d 465.

So ordered.

3.26 Notes - Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank 3.26 Notes - Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank

NOTE

The case represents a striking example of the caveat emptor principle: let the purchaser take care of his own interest. This principle found its most powerful expression in nineteenth century sales law. A seller, for instance, was not responsible for any defects of the chattel sold, absent fraud or express warranty of quality.

. . . The common law does not oblige a seller to disclose all that he knows which lessens the value of the property he would sell. He may be silent, and be safe; but if he be more than silent, if by acts, and certainly if by words, he leads the buyer astray, inducing him to suppose that he buys with warranty, or otherwise preventing his examination or inquiry, this becomes a fraud of which the law will take cognizance. The distinction and it is grounded upon the apparent necessity of leaving seems to be, — men to take some care of themselves in their business transactions, — the seller may let the buyer cheat himself ad libitum, but must not actively assist him in cheating himself.[8]

The principle was regarded as eminently fair since the buyer could protect himself by an express warranty of quality. Its opposite, namely the rule that every sales contract implies a warranty of quality, we were told, would cause an immense amount of litigation and would accord protection to a buyer against "the consequences of his own neglect of duty."[9]

However powerful the sentiments in favor of caveat emptor, the emergence of so-called implied warranties became inevitable with the advent of mass production of goods which were no longer there to be seen and traded face to face by neighbors: sales law had to make sure that goods bought were of fair merchantable quality and even fit for the buyer's "particular purpose," provided the seller at the time of contracting had "reason to know" the purpose for which the goods were required and the buyer was relying on the seller's "skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods."[10] As a result of this development, the doctrine of caveat emptor, a New Jersey court has asserted, "is very nearly abolished" so far as personal property is concerned. Levy v. C. Young Construction Co., 46 NT Super. 293, 296, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (App. Div. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958).

The rule set forth in the Swinton case has been rejected by many jurisdictions. Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 40, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972). In both Obde and Cohen, the courts based their decisions not on an implied warranty but on the assertion that it is a fraud for a seller to fail to disclose a known defect that cannot be discovered by means of a reasonable examination, whether or not the buyer asked specific questions regarding the possibility of its existence. See Restatement of Torts Second §551, Comment on clause (e); Restatement Second §161, Illus. 5. In Hughes v. Strusser, 68 Wash. 2d 707, 415 P.2d 89 (1966), the Supreme Court of Washington declared that a seller could not be held liable for a defect unknown to him. Recently, however, warranties have been implied in the sale of residential housing when the seller is a builder, or is in the business of selling real estate, other than as a broker. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 25 A.L.R.3d 372 (Tex. 1968); Uniform Land Transactions Act §2-309. Federal and state legislation, requiring extensive disclosure, has also been enacted to regulate the sale of subdivided property. See, e.g., Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§170 et seq. (1968); Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. In the field of real estate leases, especially those involving residential apartments, many courts and legislatures have imposed on landlords an implied warranty of habitability. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act §2-104.

For more on the warranty of habitability, and the issue of its disclaimability, see Fair v. Negley, infra p. 1257, and the Note following that case.

[8] 1 Parsons on Contracts 486 (3d ed. 1857).

[9] Id. at 485.

[10] This is the language used in U.C.C. §2-315. For the gradual evolution of warranties of quality, see Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 697 (1936.); Id., On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pt. 2), 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341 (1937); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117 (1943). On the warranty of merchantability, see U.C.C. §2-314.

3.27 Blair v. National Security Insurance Co. 3.27 Blair v. National Security Insurance Co.

BLAIR v. NATIONAL SECURITY INSURANCE CO., 126 F. 2d 955 (3d Cir. 1942), Clark, J.: ". . . It may be some reflection of the business ethics fostered by a system of individual competition that the parties to a contract are permitted to deal at arm's length. I can buy my neighbor's land for a song, although I know and he doesn't that it is oil bearing. That isn't dishonest, it is 'smart business' and the just rewind of my superior individualism. In some instances the law, at any rate, gagged a bit; if competitive conditions do not prevail, for instance, as in cases of fiduciary relationships or if the rule discourages competition altogether."

3.28 Notes - Blair v. National Security Insurance Co. 3.28 Notes - Blair v. National Security Insurance Co.

NOTE

For the duty to disclose material facts in so-called good faith contracts (e.g., insurance and suretyship contracts) and confidential fiduciary relations, see 5 Williston §1499 (Rev. ed. 1937) (giving instances where silence may be fraudulent). See further A.B.C. Packard, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960); J. Dawson, W. Harvey, & S. Henderson, Cases and Comment on Contracts 175-176 (4th ed. 1982); Jackson v. Seymour, infra p. 569. See further Letch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 1 Ont. Rep. 469, 492-493 (1969).

For the duty to correct an assertion that later turns out to be inaccurate, see Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928) (serious health deterioration after application for life insurance).

3.29 Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 3.29 Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

STERNAMAN v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO., 170 N.Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763 (1902), Vann, J.: "The power to contract is not unlimited. While, as a general rule, there is the utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions are placed upon the right by legislation, by public policy, and by the nature of things. Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation of law or of public policy. They cannot in the same instrument agree that a thing exists, and that it does not exist, or provided that one is the agent of the other, and at the same time, and with reference to the same subject, that there is no relation of agency between them. They cannot bind themselves by agreeing that a loan in fact void for usury is not usurious, or that a copartnership which actually exists between them does not exist. They cannot by agreement change the laws of nature or of logic, or create relations, physical, legal, or moral, which cannot be created. In other words, they cannot accomplish the impossible by contract."

3.30 Notes - Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 3.30 Notes - Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

NOTE

Restatement Second, unlike its predecessor,[11] does not characterize certain bargains as illegal, but speaks instead of a promise or term as being unenforceable on grounds of public policy. "A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or if the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms." Restatement Second §178. Subsections 2 and 3 list various general considerations of public policy to be weighed in favor of and against enforcement in particular cases.

To be sure, it has occasionally been said by English courts that they are no longer free to enlarge the heads of public policy.[12] But the existing heads are sufficiently vague to leave room for judicial discretion. To mention only a few illustrations: contracts in restraint of trade, usurious and unconscionable bargains, contracts adversely affecting the administration of justice, bargains in violation of public or fiduciary duty or to defraud or injure third parties have all been denied enforcement for reasons of public policy.

Public policy has a positive as well as a negative meaning. In one sense, every legal doctrine is the expression of public policy; it is at the basis of all legal development.[13] In another sense, public policy is invoked as a limiting factor, enabling courts to strike down bargains regarded as inimical to the common good. The two sides of public policy are illustrated by a paradox: considerations of public policy have led to the demand that liberty of contract be respected; on the other hand, liberty of contract has had to be limited in the interest of its own preservation, and this, too, has been done in the name of public policy.[14]

Public policy is not a static but a dynamic concept. It varies with the needs of society and is used to adjust the legal system to its current needs. To complicate matters still further, in the name of public policy conflicting social demands have frequently been pressed upon a court. Small wonder that courts in the past, aware of the emotive nature of the term, have often been reluctant to invoke it or to rationalize results in terms of public policy. It is, an English judge informs us, "a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you will never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail."[15] But today it is no longer true to say with Holmes that considerations of public policy are those "which judges most rarely mention and always with an apology" (The Common Law 35 (1881)). Still, it should not be forgotten that courts often apply notions of public policy under the guise of other doctrines. The consideration doctrine, for instance, has been used to filter out transactions that courts are agreed should remain unenforceable. On the other hand, the same concept has responded to changing notions of public policy favoring expansion of promissory liability and this has meant a loosening of the doctrine of consideration.

Attempts to work out the effect of illegality have caused considerable difficulties. Generally speaking, courts have taken the attitude that no legal remedy is available to either party to an illegal bargain. The parties are left where they find themselves. This attitude has found its classic expression in a famous statement of Lord Mansfield in the case of Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowper 341 (1775):

. . . The principle of public policy is this: Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon this ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, potior est conditio defendentis.

But considerations of fairness and of common sense have required the courts to graft e-xceptions upon this general rule. They have protected, for instance, a party who is justifiably ignorant of the facts which led to illegality or of minor statutory regulations involving illegality. See Restatement Second §180. See also Restatement Second §§181-184. See, in general, Winfield, Public Policy in English Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1928); Gellhorn, Contract and Public Policy, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 679 (1935); R. Wright, Public Policy in Legal Essays and Addresses 66 (1939); D. Lloyd, Public Policy (1953); 6A Corbin, Part VIII.

[11] Restatement First §512.

[12] Janson v. Drifontein Consolidated Mines. Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484, 491.

[13] Holmes, The Common Law 35, 36 (1881):

Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions. but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.

[14] Williams, Language and the Law. 62 L.Q. Rev. 387, 399 (1946).

[15] Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).

3.31 School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett 3.31 School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett

27 N.J.L. 513

THE SUPERINTENDENT AND TRUSTEES OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF TRENTON
vs.
IRA BENNETT and AARON CARLISLE.

1. If a person contract with the owner of a lot to build, erect and complete a building on a certain lot, and by reason of a latent defect in the soil, the building falls down before it is completed, the loss falls upon the contractor.

2. Where a contract is made to build and complete a building and find materials for a certain entire price, payable in installments as the work progresses, the contract is entire; and if the building, either by fault of the builder or by inevitable accident, is destroyed before completion, the owner may recover back the installments he has paid.

3. If specifications require a cellar to be a certain depth, it is not a trade phrase which fixes the depth of the foundation walls; it is the duty of the builder to place the walls deep enough to get a sufficient foundation.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought against Bennett and Carlisle, as guarantors for Evernham and Hill. In the fall of 1856, the plaintiffs made a contract with Evernham and Hill to build and complete a school-house, and find all materials therefor, according to specifications annexed to the contract; the building to be located on a lot owned by the plaintiffs, and designated in the contract. Bennett and Carlisle guaranteed the fulfillment of this contract on the part of Evernham and Hill. When the building was partially erected, it was blown down by a gale of wind. The contractors rebuilt it, and when nearly completed, the house again fell down, and the contractors, alleging that the second fall was occasioned by latent defects in the soil, refused to rebuild it.

The contract price was $2610, of which $2200 was to be paid in installments, as follows: $300 when the first floor of joists was on; $300 when the second floor of joists was on; $1000 when the building was enclosed; $400 when the plastering was done; $200 when the building was completed, except the rough-casting, and the balance to be paid when the whole was finished. When the building fell down the second time, installments to the amount of $1600 had been paid to the contractors. To recover the damages which the plaintiffs had sustained by reason of the non-fulfillment of the contract on the part of the contractors, this suit was brought against the guarantors.

The cause was tried at the Mercer Circuit, at April Term, 1858. On the trial, the plaintiffs, having proved the amount paid to the contractors, and that they had failed to complete the building according to contract, rested their case.

The defendants then opened their case, and offered to prove that the plaintiffs procured the plan and specifications for the building to be made under the advice of builders or architects employed by them, and purchased the lot, of land whereon the building was to be erected, and designated the particular location of the building, and the precise elevation of said building and its first floor, and that the contractors and defendants were not consulted about either the plan, specifications, lot purchased, particular location, or elevation; that the plaintiffs advertised for proposals to erect said building according to said plan and specifications, and that the contractors were the lowest bidders therefor, and proceeded to erect said building, and did erect the same in strict accordance with said specifications, and that as each portion of the building was completed, the completion of which was a condition precedent to the payment of an installment of the contract price, such completion was reported to the plaintiffs by the plaintiffs' agents; that all the work of the said contractors was done in strict accordance with the plans and specifications, in a workmanlike manner and of proper materials, and that they exercised all proper care over said building while in course of erection; that after the second floor of joists was laid on said building, and the installment due therefor was paid, a violent gale of wind arose suddenly, without any of the usual premonitory signs of a storm, and prostrated the said building; that the said contractors thereupon again proceeded to, and did erect said building of proper materials, and in a good workmanlike manner, in strict accordance with the said plans and specifications, until said building was enclosed, and the plastering nearly completed; that as each portion of said building was so again completed, its completion was reported to the plaintiffs by their agents, and the installment of one thousand dollars was paid; that when the building was thus enclosed, and nearly plastered, it fell, solely on account of the soil on which it stood having become soft and miry, and unable to support the weight of said building; that at the time the foundation walls were laid, the said soil appeared to be in all respects suitable for the support of such building that said soil was at that time so hard as to be penetrated with difficulty by the pick-ax, and that its defects were latent; that said soil became soft and miry in the spring of the year, either by reason of the rising of the springs, or from other natural causes wholly beyond the control of said contractors; that by the uniform custom of the trade, the phrase "with a cellar under the building to be eight feet deep," is a trade phrase, meaning that the height of the foundation wall is to be of the depth of the cellar, measuring from the bottom of the cellar to the joists of the first floor.

The counsel of the plaintiffs moved to overrule said evidence so offered by said defendants, upon the ground that if all the facts offered to be proved were proved, they would constitute no legal defence to said action. The court overruled said defence, and, under the direction of the court, a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs for the amount of the installment paid the contractors, with interest, subject to the opinion of the court; and to the end that it might be decided whether the said verdict was properly rendered, it was directed that the case be certified to the Supreme Court, for its opinion upon the following points:

1. Were all or either of the facts offered to be proved on the part of the defendants competent evidence; if proved, would they constitute a valid legal defence to the action of said plaintiffs?

2. Should the damage occasioned by the destruction of the part of said building first erected, by the aforesaid gale of wind, be borne by the plaintiffs or the defendants?

Argued at February Term, 1859, before the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices OGDEN, VEEDENBURGH, and WHELPLEY.

Gummere and W. L. Dayton, for defendants.

E. W. Scudder and Dutcher, for plaintiffs.

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

WHELPLEY, J. This case presents the naked question whether, where a builder has agreed, by a contract under seal, with the owner of a lot of land "to build, erect, and complete a building upon the lot for a certain entire price, but payable in arbitrary installments, fixed without regard to the value of the work done, and the house before its completion falls down, solely by reason of a latent defect in the soil, and not on account of faulty construction, the loss falls upon the builder or the owner of the land."

The case comes before the court, upon a certificate from the Mercer Circuit, for the advisory opinion of this court.

The covenant of Evernham and Hill was to build, erect, and complete the school-house upon the lot in question for the sum of $2610; the whole price was to be paid for the whole building; the division of that sum into installments, payable at certain stages of the work, was not intended to sever the entirety of the contract, and make the payment of the installments payments for such parts of the work as might be done when they were payable: this division was made, not to apportion the price to the different parts of the work, but to suit the wants of the contractor, and aid' him in the completion of the work; the consideration of the covenant to complete the building was the whole price, and not the mere balance that might remain after the payment of the installments: it cannot be pretended that the contractor, after payment of a part of the installments, might refuse to go on and complete the building, and yet retain that part of the price he had received. Haslack v, Mayers, 2 Dutcher 284.

No rule of law is more firmly established by a long train of decisions than this, that where a party, by his own contract, creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because lie might have provided against it by his contract; therefore, if a lessee covenant to repair a house, though it be burned by lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet he is bound to repair it. Paradine v. Jayne, Alleyn 26; Walton v. Waterhouse, 2 Wm. Saunders 422, a, note 2; Brecknock Company v. Pritchard, 6 Term Rep. 750. This case was an action upon a covenant to build a bridge, and keep it in repair: the defendant pleaded that the bridge was carried away by the act of God, by a great and extraordinary flood, although well built and in good repair. The plea was held bad on demurrer.

To the same effect are Bullock v. Dommit, 6 Term Rep. 650; Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238; Dyer 33, a. And there is no relief in equity. Gates v. Green, 4 Paige 355; Holtzapffell v. Baker, 18 Ves. 115. Chancellor Walworth, in Gates v. Green, in denying relief in equity against a covenant to pay rent after the destruction of the demised premises, admits the rule to be against natural law, and not to be found in the law of other countries where the civil law prevails; yet says it is firmly established, notwithstanding the struggles of some of the early English Chancellors against it.

In Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, it was held by Nelson, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, that the defendant was not excused from performing his covenant to perfect, in England, a patent granted in this country, so as to insure to the plaintiff the exclusive right of vending the patented article in the Canadas, because the power of granting such an exclusive privilege appertained not to the mother country, but to the provinces, and was never granted, except to subjects of Great Britain and residents of the provinces.; and the plaintiff and defendant were both American citizens.

The court said, if the covenant be within the range of possibility, however absurd or improbable the idea of execution may be, it will be upheld, as where one covenants it shall rain to-morrow, or that the pope shall be at Westminster on a certain day. To bring the case within the rule of dispensation, it must appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means be accomplished; for if it be only improbable, or out of the power of the obligor, it is not deemed in law impossible. 3 Comyn's Dig. 93. If a party enter into an absolute contract, without any qualification or exception, and receives from the party with whom he contracts the consideration of such engagement, he must abide by the contract, and either do the act or pay the damages; his liability arises from his own direct and positive undertaking.

In Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray 282, where a workman had agreed to repair a building for an entire sum, and after the owner had moved in, it was burned up before the repairs were completed, it was held, that where one per- son agrees to expend labor upon a specific subject, the property of another, as to shoe his horse, or slate his dwelling-house, if the horse dies, or the dwelling-house is destroyed by fire, before the work is done, the performance of the contract becomes impossible, and with the principal perishes the incident. The case was clearly distinguished from the ordinary contract of one to erect a building upon the lands of another, performing the labor and supplying the materials therefor; where, if before the building is completed or accepted, it is destroyed by fire or other casualty, the loss falls upon the builder, he must rebuild. The thing may be done, and he has contracted to do it. 19 Pick 275, Nichols v. Adams; Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala. 123; 2 Parsons on Con. 184; 1 Chit, on Con. 568.

No matter how harsh and apparently unjust in its operation the rule may occasionally be, it cannot be denied that it has its foundations in good sense and inflexible honesty. He that agrees to do an act should do it, unless absolutely impossible. He should provide against contingencies in his contract. Where one of two innocent persons must sustain a loss, the law casts it upon him who has agreed to sustain it, or rather the law leaves it where the agreement of the parties has put it; the law will not insert, for the benefit of one of the parties, by construction, an exception which the parties have not, either by design or neglect, inserted in their engagement. If a party, for a sufficient consideration, agrees to erect and complete a building upon a particular spot, and find all the materials, and do all the labor, he must erect and complete it, because he has agreed so to do. No matter what the expense, he must provide such a substruction as will sustain the building upon that spot, until it is complete and delivered to the owner. If he agrees to erect a house upon a spot where it cannot be done without driving piles, he must drive them, because he has agreed to do everything necessary to erect and complete the building. If the difficulties are apparent on the surface, he must overcome them. If they are not, but become apparent by excavation or the sinking of the building, the rule is the same. He must overcome them, and erect the building, simply because he has agreed to do so—to do everything necessary for that purpose.

The cases make no distinction between accidents that could be foreseen when the contract was entered into, and those that could not have been foreseen. Between accidents by the fault of the contractor, and those where he is without fault, they all rest upon the simple principle—such is the agreement, clear and unqualified, and it must be performed, no matter what the cost, if performance be not absolutely impossible.

The case of a bailment of an article—locatio operis faciendi—is not analogous to the case before the court; there, if the article intrusted to the workman is lost without his fault, the owner sustains the loss; not because he is the owner, but because the contract of bailment is well defined by the law; there is no express agreement to return the article to the owner in a finished state; but the agreement is an implied agreement, a duty imposed by the law upon a bailee, because the chattel has been bailed to him, to use his best endeavors to protect the bailment from injury. Parsons states the obligation of the workman to be, to do the work in a proper manner, to employ the materials furnished in the right way. These obligations grow out of the act of bailment; they are its legal consequences, and the law declares them to be so, not because the parties have actually so stipulated, but because they are equitable and fair; and in the absence of express agreement such will be implied.

The case of Menetone v. Athawes, 3 Burr. 1592, was relied upon by defendants' counsel to show that when the failure to perform the contract was not the fault of the contractor, he can recover. It was the bailment of a ship, to be repaired vehicle in the shipwrights' dock, for the use of which the owner paid £5. The vessel was burned when the repairs were nearly completed; the action was for these repairs. It was like the case of Lord v. Wheeler, before cited. The right to recover was put upon the ground that the plaintiff was not answerable for the accident, which happened with- out his default, unless there had been a special undertaking; that this liability did not grow out of the law of bailments.

The cases of Trippe v. Armitage, 4 Mees. & Wels. 689; Woods v. Russell, 5 B. & Aid. 942; Clarks v. Spence, 4 Ad. & Ellis 448, have no application; they are all cases arising under the bankrupt laws, involving the question when, under the circumstances of each case, the property in an incomplete chattel in process of manufacture passed out of the bankrupt, so as not to belong to his assignees. They are inapplicable, because the rights of the parties to this suit do not turn upon the question whether the property in an incomplete building is in the owner of the land or the builder, or whether the owner would derive a partial benefit from partial performance, but upon what was the express contract between the parties. The question upon whom the loss is to fall, occasioned by an inevitable accident, is not to be settled by determining what is equitable, what is right, or by the application of the maxim, res peril domino, or by any nice philosophical disquisitions whether the owner or the builder shall bear the loss. These considerations—this maxim—have their full application in cases where the rights of the parties have not been fixed by contract, but are to be settled by the law upon facts of the case; where resort is to be had to an implied contract, to a legal obligation raised by the law out of the natural equities of the case, in the absence of an express agreement.

Neither the destruction of the incomplete building by a sudden tornado, nor its falling by reason of a latent softness of the soil which rendered the foundation insecure, necessarily prevented the performance of the contract to build, erect, and complete this building for the specified price; it can still be done, for aught that was opened to the jury as a defence, and overruled by the court.

The whole defence was properly overruled, because it did not show the performance of the covenant impossible, or any lawful excuse for non-performance of the contract.

I am also of opinion that the damage occasioned by the destruction of the building by the gale of wind must be borne by the defendants, for the reasons before given, and that the Circuit Court be advised accordingly.

CITED in Brown v. Fitch, 4 Vr. 422; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard, 8 Vr. 483; Coles v. Celluloid Manufacturing Co., 10 Vr. 327; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 8.

3.32 Notes - School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett 3.32 Notes - School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett

NOTE

Could defendant have protected himself by an appropriate clause? Draft such a clause. Contrast Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494 (1874); Kurland v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 112, 59 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1967). See further the Notes on pp. 936-937 infra, and compare Butterfield v. Byron, reprinted infra p. 937.

If, as some economic theorists contend, the central issue in cases like Bennett is which of the parties is the more efficient risk-bearer, how should a judge go about making such a determination? Does it help to ask who is the cheaper insurer, or who is in the best position to prevent the occurrence of the feared event (or at least reduce its likelihood)? See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 74-79 (1977); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility Analysis, 6 J. Legal and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Stud. 83 (1977). Is it perhaps simpler to establish a rule of law, however arbitrary or harsh, that fixes the risk of an unforeseen occurrence (whether or not preventable) so that the parties will know in advance who should purchase insurance? See G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 77-79 (1974). Is this view of the matter inconsistent with the economic approach?

3.33 O. W. Holmes, The Common Law 3.33 O. W. Holmes, The Common Law

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881): ". . . The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfilment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses."

3.34 Notes - O. W. Holmes, The Common Law 3.34 Notes - O. W. Holmes, The Common Law

NOTE

One of the stated objectives of Holmes' approach was the advantage of "freeing the subject from the superfluous theory that a contract is a qualified subjection of one will to another, a kind of limited slavery" (The Common Law 300). But, as Cohen correctly observed, the theory fails to attain this objective, "[f]or the paying of damages does not flow from the promisor's willingness, but is the effect of the law's lending its machinery to the promisee." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. 1. Rev. 553, 583 (1933). Holmes' view reflects his skepticism with regard to the distinction between "primary rights and duties and consequences or sanctioning rights." 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters 20 (M. Howe ed. 1941). On the need for distinguishing between primary and secondary legal rights, see 1A Corbin §182 (1963); J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence 124 legal (G. Williams 11th ed. 1957); Pollock, in 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters 80, 2 id. at 201. See further Cook, The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, in 5 Lectures on Legal Topics 337, 346 (Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1928). For Holmes' analysis of contract as a device of risk distribution, see Chapter 9, Section 1. Consult further, in addition to the Cohen article, Buckland, The Nature of Contractual Obligation, 8 Camb. L.J. 247 (1944); W. W. Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence 96 (1945); 2 M. Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 233 (1963).

In a fairly recent English case, the question was raised whether an executor was under a duty to repudiate a contract if paying damages instead of performing would be beneficial to the estate. The argument was put thus: "there is nothing immoral in breaking a contract, and if an executor can benefit the estate by committing an actionable wrong and paying damages therefore, so that the person wronged really suffered nothing in the end, it is his duty to do so." This doctrine was rejected by the Privy Council in Ahmed Angullia Bin Hadjee Mohamed Salleh Angullia v. Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd., [1938] A.C. 624, 107 L.J.P.C. 71. In the case the executor, instead of breaking the contract entered into by the deceased with a building contractor, had permitted the latter to complete the contract and had performed himself. The question, therefore, in Hohfeldian language, was whether the executor, who unquestionably had a power vis-a-vis the building contractor to change a primary obligation into a secondary one by breaking the contract, was under a duty vis-a-vis the estate to exercise the power. The court, though recognizing that the executor is under a duty to the estate to come to a friendly arrangement with the other contracting party beneficial to' the estate should the opportunity present itself, correctly decided that he is under no duty to commit a wrongful act, i.e., a breach of contract. The decision in favor of the executor makes eminent good sense, otherwise his duties would be far too onerous, 55 L.Q. Rev. 1 (1939). On the distinction between rights and duties on the one hand and powers and liabilities on the other, see W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1923); Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163 (1919); Cook, supra, at 346-351; J. Stone, Legal Systems and Lawyers' Reasonings 137 (1964). For the so-called right to break a contract, see further Chapter 10, Section 2. For an economist's reinterpretation of the Holmesian view, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 88 et seq. (1977). For a strong defense of the usefulness of specific performance, see Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271 (1979).

3.35 Hadley v. Baxendale 3.35 Hadley v. Baxendale

IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER

     
    23 February 1854

Before:

Alderson, B.
____________________

Between:
  HADLEY & ANOR  
  -v-  
  BAXENDALE & ORS  
____________________

 

The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at the time of the making by the defendants of the promises hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and occupiers of the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and were possessed of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked the said mills, and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into meal, and dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs were desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill, and had ordered the same of certain persons trading under the name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who had contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs; but before they could complete the said new shaft it was necessary that the said broken shaft should be forwarded to their works at Greenwich, in order that the said new shaft might be made so as to fit the other parts of the said engine which were not injured, and so that it might be substituted for the said broken shaft; and the plaintiffs were desirous of sending the said broken shaft to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the purpose aforesaid; and the defendants, before and at the time of the making of the said promises, were common carriers of business of common carriers, under the name of "Pickford & Co."; and the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, delivered to them as such carriers the said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants as such carriers from Gloucester to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there to be delivered for the plaintiffs on the second day after the day of such delivery, for reward to the defendants; and in consideration thereof the defendants then promised the plaintiffs to convey the said broken shaft from Gloucester to Greenwich, and there on the said second day to deliver the same to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the plaintiffs. And although such second day elapsed before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants did not nor would deliver the said broken shaft at Greenwich on the said second day, but wholly neglected and refused so to do for the space of seven days after the said shaft was so delivered to them as aforesaid.

The second count stated, that, the defendants being such carriers as aforesaid, the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, caused to be delivered to them as such carriers the said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants from Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there to be delivered by the defendants for the plaintiffs, within a reasonable time in that behalf, for reward to the defendants; and in consideration of the premises in this count mentioned, the defendants promised the plaintiffs to use due and proper care and diligence in and about the carrying and conveying the said broken shaft from Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there delivering the same for the plaintiffs in a reasonable time then following for the carriage, conveyance, and delivery of the said broken shaft as aforesaid; and although such reasonable time elapsed long before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants did not nor would use due or proper care or diligence in or about the carrying or conveying or delivering the said broken shaft as aforesaid, within such reasonable time as aforesaid, but wholly neglected and refused so to do; and by reason of the carelessness, negligence, and improper conduct of the defendants, the said broken shaft was not delivered for the plaintiffs to the said W. Joyce & Co., or at Greenwich, until the expiration of a long and unreasonable time after the defendants received the same as aforesaid, and after the time when the same should have been delivered for the plaintiffs; and by reason of the several premises, the completing of the said new shaft was delayed for five days, and the plaintiffs were prevented form working their said steam-mills, and from cleaning corn, and grinding the same into meal, and dressing the meal into flour, sharps, or bran, and from carrying on their said business as millers and mealmen for the space of five days beyond the time that they otherwise would have been prevented from so doing, and they thereby were unable to supply many of their customers with flour, sharps, and bran during that period, and were obliged to buy flour to supply some of their other customers, and lost the mans and opportunity of selling flour, sharps, and bran, and were deprived of gains and profits which otherwise would have accrued to them, and were unable to employ their workmen, to whom they were compelled to pay wages during that period, and were otherwise injured, and the plaintiffs claim 300l.

The defendants pleaded non assumpserunt to the first count; and to the second payment of 25l. into Court in satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claim under that count. The plaintiffs entered a nolle prosequi as to the first count; and as to the second plea, they replied that the sum paid into the Court was not enough to satisfy the plaintiffs' claim in respect thereof; upon which replication issue was joined.

At the trial before Crompton, J., at the last Gloucester Assizes, it appeared that the plaintiffs carried on an extensive business as millers at Gloucester; and that, on the 11th of May, their mill was stopped by a breakage of the crank shaft by which the mill was worked. The steam-engine was manufactured by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the engineers, at Greenwich, and it became necessary to send the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Greenwich. The fracture was discovered on the 12th, and on the 13ththe plaintiffs sent one of their servants to the office of the defendants, who are the well-known carriers trading under the name of Pickford & Co., for the purpose of having the shaft carried to Greenwich. The plaintiffs' servant told the clerk that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent immediately; and in answer to the inquiry when the shaft would be taken, the answer was, that if it was sent up by twelve o'clock an day, it would be delivered at Greenwich on the following day. On the following day the shaft was taken by the defendants, before noon, for the purpose of being conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of 2l. 4s. was paid for its carriage for the whole distance; at the same time the defendants' clerk was told that a special entry, if required, should e made to hasten its delivery. The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was delayed by some neglect; and the consequence was, that the plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft for several days after they would otherwise have done, and the working of their mill was thereby delayed, and they thereby lost the profits they would otherwise have received.

On the part of the defendants, it was objected that these damages were too remote, and that the defendants were not liable with respect to them. The learned Judge left the case generally to the jury, who found a verdict with 25l. damages beyond the amount paid into Court.

Whateley, in last Michaelmas Term, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.

Keating and Dowdeswell (Feb. 1) shewed cause. The plaintiffs are entitled to the amount awarded by the jury as damages. These damages are not too remote, for they are not only the natural and necessary consequence of the defendants' default, but they are the only loss which the plaintiffs have actually sustained. The principle upon which damages are assessed is founded upon that of rendering compensation to the injured party. The important subject is ably treated in Sedgwick on the Measure of Damages. And this particular branch of it is discussed in the third chapter, where, after pointing out the distinction between the civil and the French law, he says (page 64), "It is sometimes said, in regard to contracts, that the defendant shall be held liable for those damages only which both parties may fairly be supposed to have at the time contemplated as likely to result from the nature of the agreement, and this appears to be the rule adopted by the writers upon the civil law." In a subsequent passage he says, "In cases of fraud the civil law made a broad distinction" (page 66); and he adds, that "in such cases the debtor was liable for all consequences." It is difficult, however, to see what the ground of such principle is, and how the ingredient of fraud can affect the question. For instance, if the defendants had maliciously and fraudulently kept the shaft, it is not easy to see why they should have been liable for these damages, if they are not to be held so where the delay is occasioned by their negligence only. In speaking of the rule respecting the breach of a contract to transport goods to a particular place, and in actions brought on agreements for the sale and delivery of chattels, the learned author lays it down, that, "In the former case, the difference in value between the price at the point where the goods are and the place where they were to be delivered, is taken as the measure of damages, which, in fact, amounts to an allowance of profits; and in the latter case, a similar result is had by the application of the rule, which gives the vendee the benefit of the rise of the market price" (page 80). The several cases, English as well as American, are there collected and reviewed. If that rule is to be adopted, there was ample evidence in the present case of the defendants' knowledge of such a state of things as would necessarily result in the damage the plaintiffs suffered through the defendants' default. The authorities are in the plaintiffs' favour upon the general ground. In Nurse v. Barns (1 Sir T. Raym. 77) which was an action for breach of an agreement for the letting of certain iron mills, the plaintiff was held entitled to a sum of 500l., awarded by reason of loss of stock laid in, although he had only paid 10l. by way of consideration. InBorradaile v. Brunton (8 Taunt. 535, 2 B. Moo. 582), which was an action for the breach of the warranty of a chain cable that it should last two years as a substitute for a rope cable of sixteen inches, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover for the loss of the anchor, which was occasioned by the breaking of the cable within the specified time. These extreme cases, and the difficulty which consequently exists in the estimation of the true amount of damages, supports the view for which the plaintiffs contend, that the question is properly for the decision of a jury, and therefore that this matter could not properly have been withdrawn from their consideration. In Ingram v. Lawson (6 Bing. N.C. 212) the true principle was acted upon. That was an action for a libel upon the plaintiff, who was the owner and master of a ship, which he advertised to take passengers to the East Indies; and the libel imputed that the vessel was not seaworthy, and that Jews had purchased her to take out convicts. The Court held, that evidence shewing that the plaintiff's profits after the publication of the libel were 1500l below the usual average, was admissible, to enable the jury to form an opinion as to the nature of the plaintiff's business, and of his general rate of profit. Here, also, the plaintiffs have not sustained any loss beyond that which was submitted to the jury. Bodley v. Reynolds (8 Q. B. 779) and Kettle v. Hunt (Bull. N. P. 77) are similar in principle. In the latter, it was held that the loss of the benefit of trade, which a man suffers by the detention of his tools, is recoverable as special damage. The loss they had sustained during the time they were so deprived of their shaft, or until they could have obtained a new one. In Black v. Baxendale (1 Exch. 410), by reason of the defendant's omission to deliver the goods within a reasonable time at Bedford, the plaintiff's agent, who had been sent there to meet the goods, was put to certain additional expenses, and this Court held that such expenses might be given by the jury as damages. In Brandt v. Bowlby (2 B. & Ald. 932), which was an action of assumpsit against the defendants, as owners of a certain vessel, for not delivering a cargo of wheat shipped to the plaintiffs, the cargo reached the port of destination was held to be the true rule of damages." As between the parties in this cause," said Parke, J., "the plaintiffs are entitled to be put in the same situation as they would have been in, if the cargo had been delivered to their order at the time when it was delivered to the wrong party; and the sum it would have fetched at the time is the amount of the loss sustained by the non-performance of the defendants' contract." The recent decision of this Court, in Waters v. Towers (8 Ex. 401), seems to be strongly in the plaintiffs' favour. The defendants there had agreed to fit up the plaintiffs' mill within a reasonable time, but had not completed their contract within such time; and it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, by way of damages, the loss of profit upon a contract they had entered into with third parties, and which they were unable to fulfil by reason of the defendants' breach of contract. There was ample evidence that the defendants knew the purpose for which this shaft was sent, and that the result of its nondelivery in due time would be the stoppage of the mill; for the defendants' agent, at their place of business, was told that the mill was then stopped, that the shaft must be delivered immediately, and that if a special entry was necessary and natural result of their wrongful act. They also cited Ward v. Smith (11 Price, 19); and Parke, B., referred to Levy v. Langridge (4 M. & W. 337).

Whateley, Willes, and Phipson, in support of the rule (Feb. 2). It has been contended, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the damages found by the jury are a matter fit for their consideration; but still the question remains, in what way ought the jury to have been directed? It has been also urged, that, in awarding damages, the law gives compensation to the injured individual. But it is clear that complete compensation is not to be awarded; for instance, the non-payment of a bill of exchange might lead to the utter ruin of the holder, and yet such damage could not be considered as necessarily resulting from the breach of contract, so as to entitle the party aggrieved to recover in respect of it. Take the case of the breach of a contract to supply a rick-cloth, whereby and in consequence of bad weather the hay, being unprotected, is spoiled, that damage could not be recoverable. Many similar cases might be added. The true principle to be deduced form the authorities upon this subject is that which is embodied in the maxim: "In jure non remota cause sed proxima spectatur." Sedgwick says (page 38), "In regard to the quantum of damages, instead of adhering to the term compensation, it would be far more accurate to say, in the language of Domat, which we have cited above, 'that the object is discriminate between that portion of the loss which must be borne by the offending party and that which must be borne by the sufferer'. The law in fact aims not at the satisfaction but at a division of the loss." And the learned author also cites the following passage from Broom's Legal Maxims: "Every defendant," says Mr. Broom, "against whom an action is brought experiences some injury or inconvenience beyond what the costs will compensate him for."[1] Again, at page 78, after referring to the case of Flureau v. Thornhill (2 W. Blac. 1078), he says, "Both the English and American Courts have generally adhered to this denial of profits as any part of the damages to be compensated and that whether in cases of contract or of tort. So, in a case of illegal capture, Mr. Justice Story rejected the item of profits on the voyage, and held this general language: 'Independent, however, of all authority, I am satisfied upon principle, that an allowance of damages upon the basis of a calculation of profits is inadmissible. The rule would be in the highest degree unfavourable to the interests of the community. The subject would be involved in utter uncertainty. The calculation would proceed upon contingencies, and would require acknowledge of foreign markets to an exactness, in point of time and value, which would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles; much would depend upon the length of the voyage, and the season of arrival, much upon the vigilance and activity of the master, and much upon the momentary demand. After all, it would be a calculation upon conjectures, and not upon facts; such a rule therefore has been rejected by Courts of law in ordinary cases, and instead of deciding upon the gains or losses of parties in particular cases, a uniform interest has been applied as the measure of damages for the detention of property." There is much force in that admirably constructed passage. We ought to pay all due homage in this country to the decisions of the American Courts upon this important subject, to which they appear to have given much careful consideration. The damages here are too remote. Several of the cases which were principally relied upon by the plaintiffs are distinguishable. In Waters v. Towers (1 Exch. 401) there was a special contract to do the work in a particular time, and the damage occasioned by the non-completion of the contract was that to which the plaintiffs were held to be entitled. In Borradale v. Brunton (8 Taunt. 535) there was a direct engagement that the cable should hold the anchor. So, in the case of taking away a workman's tools, the natural and necessary consequence is the loss of employment: Bodley v. Reynolds (8 Q. B. 779). The following cases may be referred to as decisions upon the principle within which the defendants contend that the present case falls: Jones v. Gooday (8 M. & W. 146), Walton v. Fothergill (7 Car. & P. 392), Boyce v. Bayliffe (1 Camp. 58) and Archer v. Williams (2. C. & K. 26). The rule, therefore, that the immediate cause is to be regarded in considering the loss, is applicable here. There was no special contract between these parties. A carrier has a certain duty cast upon him by law, and that duty is not to be enlarged to an indefinite extent in the absence of a special contract, or of fraud or malice. The maxim "dolus circuitu non purgatur", does not apply. The question as to how far liability may be affected by reason of malice forming one of the elements to be taken into consideration, was treated of by the Court of Queen's Bench in Lumley v. Gye (2 E. & B. 216). Here the declaration is founded upon the defendants' duty as common carriers, and indeed there is no pretence for saying that they entered into a special contract to bear all the consequences of the non-delivery of the article in question. They were merely bound to carry it safely, and to deliver it within a reasonable time. The duty of the clerk, who was in attendance at the defendants' office, was to enter the article, and to take the amount of the carriage; but a mere notice to him, such as was here given, could not make the defendants, as carriers, liable as upon a special contract. Such matters, therefore, must be rejected from the consideration of the question. If carriers are to be liable in such a case as this, the exercise of a sound judgment would not suffice, but they ought to be gifted also with a spirit of prophecy. "I have always understood," said Patterson, J., in Kelly v. Partington (5 B. & Ad. 651), "that the special damage must be the natural result of the thing done." That sentence presents the true test. The Court of Queen's Bench acted upon that rule in Foxall v. Barnett (2 E. & B. 928). This therefore is a question of law, and the jury ought to have been told that these damages were too remote; and that, in the absence of the proof of any other damage, the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages only: Tindall v. Bell (11 M. & W. 232). Siordet v. Hall (4 Bing. 607) and De Vaux v. Salvador (4 A. & E. 420) are instances of cases where the Courts appear to have gone into the opposite extremes: in the one case of unduly favouring the carrier, in the other of holding them liable for results which would appear too remote. If the defendants should be held responsible for the damages awarded by the jury, they would be in a better position if they confined their business to the conveyance of gold. They cannot be responsible for results which, at the time the goods are delivered for carriage, and beyond all human foresight. Suppose a manufacturer were to contract with a coal merchant or min owner for the delivery of a boat load of coals, no intimation being given that the coals were required for immediate use, the vendor in that case would not be liable for the stoppage of the vendee's business for want of the article which he had failed to deliver: for the vendor has no knowledge that the goods are not to go to the vendee's general stock. Where the contracting party is shewn to be acquainted with all the consequences that must of necessity follow from a breach on his part of the contract, it may be reasonable to say that he takes the risk of such consequences. If, as between vendor and vendee, this species of liability has no existence, a fortiori, the carrier is not to be burthened with it. In cases of personal injury to passengers, the damage to which the sufferer has been held entitled is the direct and immediate consequence of the wrongful act.

Cur. adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court was now delivered by

ALDERSON, B. We think that there ought to be a new trial in this case; but, in so doing, we deem it to be expedient and necessary to state explicitly the rule which the Judge, at the next trial, ought, in our opinion, to direct the jury to be governed by when they estimate the damages.

It is. Indeed, of the last importance that we should do this; for, if the jury are left without any definite rule to guide them, it will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead to the greatest injustice. The Courts have done this on several occasions; and in Blake v. Midland Railway Company (18 Q. B. 93), the Court granted a new trial on this very ground, that the rule had not been definitely laid down to the jury by the learned Judge at Nisi Prius.

"There are certain establishing rules", this Court says, in Alder v. Keighley (15 M. & W. 117), "according to which the jury ought to find". And the Court, in that case, adds: "and here there is a clear rule, that the amount which would have been received if the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if the contract is broken."

Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this:-- Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.  For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract. It is said, that other cases such as breaches of contract in the nonpayment of money, or in the not making a good title of land, are to be treated as exceptions from this, and as governed by a conventional rule. But as, in such cases, both parties must be supposed to be cognizant of that well-known rule, these cases may, we think, be more properly classed under the rule above enunciated as to cases under known special circumstances, because there both parties may reasonably be presumed to contemplate the estimation of the amount of damages according to the conventional rule. Now, in the present case, if we are to apply the principles above laid down, we find that the only circumstances here communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants at the time of the contract was made, were, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiffs were the millers of the mill.

But how do these circumstances shew reasonably that the profits of the mill must be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carrier to the third person? Suppose the plaintiffs had another shaft in their possession put up or putting up at the time, and that they only wished to send back the broken shaft to the engineer who made it; it is clear that this would be quite consistent with the above circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the delivery would have no effect upon the intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again, suppose that, at the time of the delivery to the carrier, the machinery of the mill had been in other respects defective, then, also, the same results would follow. Here it is true that the shaft was actually sent back to serve as a model for the new one, and that the want of a new one was the only cause of the stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of profits really arose from not sending down the new shaft in proper time, and that this arose from the delay in delivering the broken one to serve as a model. But it is obvious that, in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these special circumstances were here never communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It follows therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. The Judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury that upon the facts then before them they ought not to take the loss of profits into consideration at all in estimating the damages. There must therefore be a new trial in this case.

Rule absolute.

3.36 Notes - Hadley v. Baxendale 3.36 Notes - Hadley v. Baxendale

NOTE

"[A]s the contract is by mutual consent, the parties themselves expressly or by implication, fix the rule by which damages are to be measured." Holmes, J., in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903), infra p. 1144.

The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale

. . . by subjecting all contract claims to a test of foreseeability by the contract breaker of the loss at the time of the making of the contract, diminishes the risk of business enterprise, and the result harmonized well with the free-trade economic philosophy of the Victorian era during which our law of contracts became systematized.

C. T. McCormick, Law of Damages 566-567 (1935). For an excellent discussion of the rules in Hadley v. Baxendale, consult The Heron II and Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries, pp. 1157 and 1164 infra.

The scope of damage for breach of contract is much narrower than the "proximate consequence" rule which prevails in actions to recover for a tort. If we may assume that the defaulting promisor is usually all entrepreneur, a businessman who has undertaken a risky enterprise, the law here manifests a policy to encourage the entrepreneur by reducing the extent of his risk below that amount of damage which, it might be plausibly argued, the promisee has actually been caused to suffer.

Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 335, 342 (1924). For a further discussion of the measure of damages in tort and contract, see 5 Corbin §101 9. See, in general, Chapter 10. In Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 249 (1975), Professor Danzig offers some fascinating insights into the circumstances surrounding the case and suggests a variety of reasons for the rule, some turning on contemporary deficiencies in the substantive law and others on administrative needs of the judiciary. He further points out that however sensible the rule was for business enterprises in nineteenth-century Eng1and, "a survey of the most recent American cases brings home the fact that as the economy has become more diverse and complex, the rule has become less viable." Id. at 280. An extract from the Danzig article is reproduced infra p. 1140.

Despite criticism of the rule, Restatement Second §365 carries it forward, as does U.C.C. §2-715(2)(a), albeit in a modified form.