12 Chapter 11: Third Party Beneficiaries 12 Chapter 11: Third Party Beneficiaries

12.1 Introductory Note 12.1 Introductory Note

12.1.1 Introductory Note 12.1.1 Introductory Note

In preceding chapters the focus of attention has been on the two-party relationship. In this chapter on so-called Third Party Beneficiaries and in the following chapter on Assignment we shall consider the more complicated situation that results when C joins, or attempts to join, in the game along with those veteran warriors A and B.

The cast of characters need not, of course, remain frozen at three. Consider, for example, the contractual arrangements that cluster around the typical building contract. Landowner (A) enters into a contract with a construction company (B) under which B is to put a structure (house, factory, office building, airport) on A's land. The A-B contract requires B to furnish, for A's protection, a bond under which a surety company (C) guarantees that, if B defaults, C will complete the contract (performance bond) or pay all claims of laborers and materialmen against B (payment bond) or both. (If A is the United States, a federal statute known as the Miller Act[1] requires that all general contractors furnish both payment and performance bonds.) The general or prime contractor typically requires his subcontractors to furnish the same types of bonds running in the general contractor's favor — so that there may be several layers or levels of surety bonds arranged in hierarchical order below the prime contract. In form, the surety's payment bond may be described as a promise by C (surety company) to A (landowner) that the claims of D1, D2, D3, etc. (laborers, materialmen, subcontractors) against B (construction company) will be paid. (If they were not paid, many of the claimants might be in a position, under applicable state law, to go against A directly and to acquire so-called mechanics' liens against his property.) In order to protect itself against possible liability on its bond, C (surety company) will require B (construction company) to assign to it moneys to be earned under the contract — the assignment to C to take effect on B's default under the A-B contract. If the construction project is a large one, B will have to get outside financing. Usually it will borrow the money it needs from a bank (E). As security for the loan the bank will require that B assign to it all moneys to be earned in the course of performance of the A-B contract. (B's assignments to surety company and bank are of course in conflict with each other, since both assignments cover the same fund.)

The foregoing description of the relationships generated by the ordinary construction contract has been drastically oversimplified. Enough has been said, however, so that the student will not be surprised to learn that, for more than a hundred years past, state and federal courts have had to devote an inordinate amount of their time to disentangling the rights, duties and priorities of A, B, C, D, and E. Nor is there any present indication that the judges will ever produce a general agreement as to what those rights, duties, and priorities are. Business practice in the construction industry changes; the practices of banks and surety companies change; new statutes, state or federal, are passed that arguably may have, by accident or design, a bearing on some aspect of the complex. It is always possible to argue — it always is argued — that something has happened this year to cast doubt on last year's precedents. And so the dreary game drags on.[2]

For present purposes, we may restrict ourselves to the triangular or A-B-C relationship, which is already difficult enough without the additional presence of D and E.

The suggestion that C can acquire rights in a contract between A and B to which C is not a party is one that has always, when first put forward in some context, aroused judicial suspicion or hostility. The idea that a contract between A and B is a private link between them, and between them alone, is one that dies hard. A and B, we say, are in "privity" with each other; C is not in "privity" with them or with their contract; lacking "privity," C can acquire no rights (or duties) under the A-B contract. That, at all events, is a recurrent judicial reaction when a novel type of claim on behalf of C is put forward: what "privity" is or why the lack of it should be fatal is never inquired into. We may take the word "privity" as a sort of mystical absolute. To lack privity is to have failed to achieve the requisite state of contractual grace.

The history of the common law over the past several hundred years nevertheless reveals a succession of instances in which C has prevailed - however grudgingly his rights may have been recognized as an initial matter. Often, however, C's position has been vindicated by an appeal to the principles of agency or trust law, and his rights under the A-B agreement have therefore not appeared to be contractual at all. And even where C's rights have been upheld on contractual grounds, they have typically been explained not by general principles of promissory liability hut by the specialized rules belonging to one or another of the satellite systems thrown off by the common law of contracts in the course of its historical development.

The assumed unity of contract law has in fact always masked a centrifugal tendency. The law of sales and the law of labor agreements, to take two examples, both have (or once had) their roots in contract; sales law has long since become, and labor law is clearly in process of becoming, independent of the general law of contract. This centrifugal tendency has been particularly marked in what we may generically describe as the area of third party claims. Many types of triangular or A-B-C relationships have so completely won their independence that for generations or centuries no lawyer has thought of them as being a part of general contract law. This is true, for example, of the law of suretyship and the law of negotiable instruments. The fact that they split off from contract at an early date may reflect the deep-rooted difficulty that our contract theory has always had with third party claims. It seems to have been easier to establish a whole new body of law — and call it, say, suretyship — than to work out a general theory of contractual obligation under which A could transfer property to B for C's benefit.

The doctrine of third party beneficiaries starts from the idea that C can have rights under a contract to which he is not himself a party even though he has none of the special legal attributes that have long been recognized as a basis of third party claims. To this extent, the doctrine may be viewed as a generalization of what has been, until quite recently, an exceptional principle limited to certain specialized and largely independent branches of contract Law. The recency of this development, and the resistance the doctrine has encountered in many jurisdictions — English courts still refuse to recognize any general principle establishing the rights of contract beneficiaries — attest to the influence that the idea of privity still exercises on our legal imagination. (It may be that recognition of the rights of beneficiaries as a matter of contract law was a belated acknowledgment of the fact that such rights had long been upheld under the noncontractual principles of trust or agency theory. A not uncommon theme in the opinions written in the early third party beneficiary cases was that C should be allowed to sue on the contract made between A and B because C's situation was essentially "like" that of the beneficiary of a trust. If C prevailed as a beneficiary when A and B had used language of trust, why should he not equally prevail when A and B had sought to achieve the same result but had used contract language instead? The contract beneficiary soon went on to argue, often successfully, that he should prevail even when the trust analogy failed — even when there was nothing remotely like a trust res anywhere in sight. And it may be that the success of the contract beneficiary's argument has contributed, in turn, to the expansion of the concept of fiduciary obligation that has been a notable feature of trust law in this century. A common law development not infrequently stimulates a process of reciprocal cross-fertilization.)

Established in our American law of contracts by the wonderfully obscure case of Lawrence v. Fox (1859), the doctrine of third party beneficiaries has followed a meandering course and been a subject of intense controversy (in Massachusetts, for example, the doctrine was not finally approved until 1979).[3] On the whole, however, the tendency of the third party beneficiary idea has been, in the words of a New York judge, "progressive, not retrograde,"[4] and in recent years the doctrine has been put to such expansive use that today one must wonder whether it has any limits at all. Efforts to impose limits on the doctrine have of course been made (by judges and restaters), but the third party beneficiary, loose in our law of contracts now for more than a century, appears to have gained an almost irresistible momentum.

The triumph of the third party beneficiary idea may be looked on as still another instance of the progressive liberalization or erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth-century theory of contractual obligation. That such a process has been going on throughout this century is so clear as to be beyond argument. The movement on all fronts has been in the direction of expanding the range and the quantum of obligation and liability. We have seen the development of theories of quasi-contractual liability, of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and culpa in contrahendo, of the perhaps revolutionary idea that the law imposes on the parties to a contract an affirmative duty to act in good. faith. During the same period the sanctions for breach of contract have been notably expanded. Recovery of "special" or "consequential" damages has become routinely available in situations in which the recovery would have been as routinely denied seventy-five years ago. The once "exceptional" remedy of specific performance is rapidly becoming the order of the day. On the other hand the party who has failed to perform his contractual duty but who, in the light of the circumstances, is nevertheless felt to be without fault has been protected by a notable expansion of theories of excuse, such as the overlapping ideas of mistake and frustration. To the nineteenth-century legal mind the propositions that no man was his brother's keeper, that the race was to the swift, and that the devil should take the hindmost seemed not only obvious but morally right. The most striking feature of nineteenth-century contract theory is the narrow scope of social duty it implicitly assumed. In our own century we have witnessed what it does not seem too fanciful to describe as a socialization of our theory of contract. The progressive expansion of the range of non-parties allowed to sue as contract beneficiaries as well as of the situations in which they have been allowed to sue is one of the entries to be made in this ledger.

[1] 40 U.S.C.A. §§270a-270e (West 1965 & Supp. 1985).

[2] For more on this problem, see p. 1364 infra, and the Note following that case.

[3] Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Serv., Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979).

[4] Kellogg, P.J., quoted in Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918), infra p. 1356.

12.2 The Origins: Cross-Currents of Doctrine 12.2 The Origins: Cross-Currents of Doctrine

12.2.1 Lawrence v. Fox 12.2.1 Lawrence v. Fox

20 N.Y. 268

Lawrence
v.
Fox

Court of Appeals of New York 
December Term, 1859

 OPINION OF THE COURT

Appeal from the Superior Court of the city of Buffalo. On the trial before Mr. Justice Masten, it appeared by the evidence of a bystander, that one Holly, in November, 1857, at the request of the defendant, loaned and advanced to him $300, stating at the time that he owed that sum to the plaintiff for money borrowed of him, and had agreed to pay it to him the then next day; that the defendant in consideration thereof, at the time of receiving the money, promised to pay it to the plaintiff the then next day. Upon this state of facts the defendant moved for a nonsuit, upon three several grounds; viz.: That there was no proof tending to show that Holly was indebted to the plaintiff; that the agreement by the defendant with holly to pay the plaintiff was void for want of consideration, and that there was no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. The court overruled the motion, and the counsel for the defendant excepted. The cause was then submitted to the jury, and they found a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the loan and interest, $344.66, upon which judgment was entered; from which the defendant appealed to the Superior Court, at general term, where the judgment was affirmed, and the defendant appealed to this court. The cause was submitted on printed arguments.

[269] H. GRAY, J.

The first objection raised on the trial amounts to this: That the evidence of the person present, who heard the declarations of Holly giving directions as to the payment of the money he was then advancing to the defendant, was mere hearsay and therefore not competent. Had the plaintiff sued Holly for this sum of money no objection to the competency of this evidence would have been thought of; and if the defendant had performed his promise by paying the sum loaned to him to the plaintiff, and Holly had afterwards sued him for its recovery, and this evidence had been offered by the defendant, it would doubtless have been received without an objection from any source. All the defendant had the right to [270] demand in this case was evidence which, as between Holly and the plaintiff, was competent to establish the relation between them of debtor and creditor. For that purpose the evidence was clearly competent; it covered the whole ground and warranted the verdict of the jury. But it is claimed that notwithstanding this promise was established by competent evidence, it was void for the want of consideration. It is now more than a quarter of a century since it was settled by the Supreme Court of this State—in an able and pains-taking opinion by the late Chief Justice SAVAGE, in which the authorities were fully examined and carefully analysed—that a promise in all material respects like the one under consideration was valid; and the judgment of that court was unanimously affirmed by the Court for the Correction of Errors. (Farley v. Cleaveland, 4 Cow., 432; same case in error, 9 id., 639.) In that case one Moon owed Farley and sold to Cleaveland a quantity of hay, in consideration of which Cleaveland promised to pay Moon's debt to Farley; and the decision in favor of Farley's right to recover was placed upon the ground that the hay received by Cleaveland from Moon was a valid consideration for Cleaveland's promise to pay Farley, and that the subsisting liability of Moon to pay Farley was no objection to the recovery. The fact that the money advanced by Holly to the defendant was a loan to him for a day, and that it thereby became the property of the defendant, seemed to impress the defendant's counsel with the idea that because the defendant's promise was not a trust fund placed by the plaintiff in the defendant's hands, out of which he was to realize money as from the sale of a chattel or the collection of a debt, the promise although made for the benefit of the plaintiff could not enure to his benefit. The hay which Cleaveland delivered to Moon was not to be paid to Farley, but the debt incurred by Cleaveland for the purchase of the hay, like the debt incurred by the defendant for money borrowed, was what was to be paid. That case has been often referred to by the courts of this State, and has never been doubted as sound authority for the principle upheld by it. (Barker v. Buklin, 2 Denio, 45; Hudson Canal [271] Company v. The Westchester Bank, 4 id., 97.) It puts to rest the objection that the defendant's promise was void for want of consideration. The report of that case shows that the promise was not only made to Moon but to the plaintiff Farley. In this case the promise was made to Holly and not expressly to the plaintiff; and this difference between the two cases presents the question, raised by the defendant's objection, as to the want of privity between the plaintiff and defendant. As early as 1806 it was announced by the Supreme Court of this State, upon what was then regarded as the settled law of England, "That where one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person, that third person may maintain an action upon it." Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden (1 John. R., 140), has often been re-asserted by our courts and never departed from. The case of Seaman v. White has occasionally been referred to (but not by the courts) not only as having some bearing upon the question now under consideration, but as involving in doubt the soundness of the proposition stated in Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden. In that case one Hill, on the 17th of August, 1835, made his note and procured it to be indorsed by Seaman and discounted by the Phoenix Bank. Before the note matured and while it was owned by the Phoenix Bank, Hill placed in the hands of the defendant, Whitney, his draft accepted by a third party, which the defendant indorsed, and on the 7th of October, 1835, got discounted and placed the avails in the hands of an agent with which to take up Hill's note; the note became due, Whitney withdrew the avails of the draft from the hands of his agent and appropriated it to a debt due him from Hill, and Seaman paid the note indorsed by him and brought his suit against Whitney. Upon this state of facts appearing, it was held that Seaman could not recover: first, for the reason that no promise had been made by Whitney to pay, and second, if a promise could be implied from the facts that Hill's accepted draft, with which to raise the means to pay; the note, had been placed by Hill in the hands of Whitney, the promise would not be to Seaman, but to the Phoenix Bank who then owned the note; although, in the course of [272] the opinion of the court, it was stated that, in all cases the principle of which was sought to be applied to that case, the fund had been appropriated by an express undertaking of the defendant with the creditor. But before concluding the opinion of the court in this case, the learned judge who delivered it conceded that an undertaking to pay the creditor may be implied from an arrangement to that effect between the defendant and the debtor. This question was subsequently, and in a case quite recent, again the subject of consideration by the Supreme Court, when it was held, that in declaring upon a promise, made to the debtor by a third party to pay the creditor of the debtor, founded upon a consideration advanced by the debtor, it was unnecessary to aver a promise to the creditor; for the reason that upon proof of a promise made to the debtor to pay the creditor, a promise to the creditor would be implied. And in support of this proposition, in no respect distinguishable from the one now under consideration, the case of Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, with many intermediate cases in our courts, were cited, in which the doctrine of that case was not only approved but affirmed. (The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company v. The Westchester County Bank, 4 Denio, 97.) The same principle is adjudged in several cases in Massachusetts. I will refer to but few of them. (Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass., 400; Hall v. Marston, Id., 575; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush., 337, 340.) In Hall v. Marston the court say: "It seems to have been well settled that if A promises B for a valuable consideration to pay C, the latter may maintain assumpsit for the money;" and in Brewer v. Dyer, the recovery was upheld, as the court said, "upon the principle of law long recognized and clearly established, that when one person, for a valuable consideration, engages with another, by a simple contract, to do some act for the benefit of a third, the latter, who would enjoy the benefit of the act, may maintain an action for the breach of such engagement; that it does not rest upon the ground of any actual or supposed relationship between the parties as some of the earlier cases would seem to indicate, but upon the broader and more satisfactory basis, that the law operating on the act [273] of the parties creates the duty, establishes a privity, and implies the promise and obligation on which the action is founded." There is a more recent case decided by the same court, to which the defendant has referred and claims that it at least impairs the force of the former cases as authority. It is the case of Mellen v. Whipple (1 Gray, 317). In that case one Rollins made his note for $500, payable to Ellis and Mayo, or order, and to secure its payment mortgaged to the payees a certain lot of ground, and then sold and conveyed the mortgaged premises to the defendant, by deed in which it was stated that the "granted premises were subject to a mortgage for $500, which mortgage, with the note for which it was given, the said Whipple is to assume and cancel." The deed thus made was accepted by Whipple, the mortgage was afterwards duly assigned, and the note indorsed by Ellis and Mayo to the plaintiff's intestate. After Whipple received the deed he paid to the mortgagees and their assigns the interest upon the mortgage and note for a time, and upon refusing to continue his payments was sued by the plaintiff as administratrix of the assignee of the mortgage and note. The court held that the stipulation in the deed that Whipple should pay the mortgage and note was a matter exclusively between the two parties to the deed; that the sale by Rollins of the equity of redemption did not lessen the plaintiff's security, and that as nothing had been put into the defendant's hands for the purpose of meeting the plaintiff's claim on Rollins, there was no consideration to support an express promise, much less an implied one, that Whipple should pay Mellen the amount of the note. This is all that was decided in that case, and the substance of the reasons assigned for the decision; and whether the case was rightly disposed of or not, it has not in its facts any analogy to the case before us, nor do the reasons assigned for the decision bear in any degree upon the question we are now considering. But it is urged that because the defendant was not in any sense a trustee of the property of Holly for the benefit of the plaintiff, the law will not imply a promise. I agree that many of the cases where a promise was implied were cases of trusts, [274] created for the benefit of the promiser. The case of Felton v. Dickinson (10 Mass., 189, 190), and others that might be cited, are of that class; but concede them all to have been cases of trusts, and it proves nothing against the application of the rule to this case. The duty of the trustee to pay the cestuis que trust, according to the terms of the trust, implies his promise to the latter to do so. In this case the defendant, upon ample consideration received from Holly, promised Holly to pay his debt to the plaintiff; the consideration received and the promise to Holly made it as plainly his duty to pay the plaintiff as if the money had been remitted to him for that purpose, and as well implied a promise to do so as if he had been made a trustee of property to be converted into cash with which to pay. The fact that a breach of the duty imposed in the one case may be visited, and justly, with more serious consequences than in the other, by no means disproves the payment to be a duty in both. The principle illustrated by the example so frequently quoted (which concisely states the case in hand) "that a promise made to one for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it is made may bring an action for its breach," has been applied to trust cases, not because it was exclusively applicable to those cases, but because it was a principle of law, and as such applicable to those cases. It was also insisted that Holly could have discharged the defendant from his promise, though it was intended by both parties for the benefit of the plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this suit for the recovery of a demand over which he had no control. It is enough that the plaintiff did not release the defendant from his promise, and whether he could or not is a question not now necessarily involved; but if it was, I think it would be found difficult to maintain the right of Holly to discharge a judgment recovered by the plaintiff upon confession or otherwise, for the breach of the defendant's promise; and if he could not, how could he discharge the suit before judgment, or the promise before suit, made as it was for the plaintiff's benefit and in accordance with legal presumption accepted by him (Berley v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577-584, et seq.), until his dissent was [275] shown. The cases cited, and especially that of Farley v. Cleaveland, establish the validity of a parol promise; it stands then upon the footing of a written one. Suppose the defendant had given his note in which, for value received of Holly, he had promised to pay the plaintiff and the plaintiff had accepted the promise, retaining Holly's liability. Very clearly Holly could not have discharged that promise, be the right to release the defendant as it may. No one can doubt that he owes the sum of money demanded of him, or that in accordance with his promise it was his duty to have paid it to the plaintiff; nor can it be doubted that whatever may be the diversity of opinion elsewhere, the adjudications in this State, from a very early period, approved by experience, have established the defendant's liability; if, therefore, it could be shown that a more strict and technically accurate application of the rules applied, would lead to a different result (which I by no means concede), the effort should not be made in the face of manifest justice.

The judgment should be affirmed.

JOHNSON, Ch. J., DENIO, SELDEN, ALLEN and STRONG, Js., concurred. JOHNSON, Ch. J., and DENIO, J., were of opinion that the promise was to be regarded as made to the plaintiff through the medium of his agent, whose action he could ratify when it came to his knowledge, though taken without his being privy thereto.

COMSTOCK, J.  (Dissenting.)

The plaintiff had nothing to do with the promise on which he brought this action. It was not made to him, nor did the consideration proceed from him. If he can maintain the suit, it is because an anomaly has found its way into the law on this subject. In general, there must be privity of contract. The party who sues upon a promise must be the promisee, or he must have some legal interest in the undertaking. In this case, it is plain that Holly, who loaned the money to the defendant, and to whom the promise in question was made, could at any time have claimed that it should be performed to himself personally. He had lent the [276] money to the defendant, and at the same time directed the latter to pay the sum to the plaintiff. This direction he could countermand, and if he had done so, manifestly the defendant's promise to pay according to the direction would have ceased to exist. The plaintiff would receive a benefit by a complete execution of the arrangement, but the arrangement itself was between other parties, and was under their exclusive control. If the defendant had paid the money to Holly, his debt would have been discharged thereby. So Holly might have released the demand or assigned it to another person, or the parties might have annulled the promise now in question, and designated some other creditor of Holly as the party to whom the money should be paid. It has never been claimed, that in a case thus situated, the right of a third person to sue upon the promise rested on any sound principle of law. We are to inquire whether the rule has been so established by positive authority.

The cases which have sometimes been supposed to have a bearing on this question, are quite numerous. In some of them, the dicta of judges, delivered upon very slight consideration, have been referred to as the decisions of the courts. Thus, in Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden (1 John., 140), the court is reported as saying, "We are of opinion, that where one person makes a promise to another, for the benefit of a third person, that third person may maintain an action on such promise." This remark was made on the authority of Dalton v. Poole (Vent., 318, 332), decided in England nearly two hundred years ago. It was, however, but a mere remark, as the case was determined against the plaintiff on another ground. Yet this decision has often been referred to as authority for similar observations in later cases.

In another class of cases, which have been sometimes supposed to favor the doctrine, the promise was made to the person who brought the suit, while the consideration proceeded from another; the question considered being, whether the promise was void by the statute of frauds. Thus, in Gold v. Phillips (10 Johns., 412), one Wood was indebted to the [277] plaintiffs for services as attorneys and counsel, and he conveyed a farm to the defendants, who, as part of the consideration, were to pay that debt. Accordingly, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs, informing them that an arrangement had been made by which they were to pay the demand. The defence was, that the promise was void within the statute, because, although in writing, it did not express the consideration. But the action was sustained, on the ground that the undertaking was original and not collateral. So in the case of Farley v. Cleaveland (4 Cow., 432; 9 id., 639), the facts proved or offered to be proved were, that the plaintiff held a note against one Moon; that Moon sold hay to the defendant, who in consideration of that sale promised the plaintiff by parol to pay the note. The only question was, whether the statute of frauds applied to the case. It was held by the Supreme Court, and afterwards by the Court of Errors, that it did not. Such is also precisely the doctrine of Ellwood v. Monk (5 Wend., 235), where it was held, that a plea of the statute of frauds, to a count upon a promise of the defendant to the plaintiff, to pay the latter a debt owing to him by another person, the promise being founded on a sale of property to the defendant by the other person, was bad.

The cases mentioned, and others of a like character, were referred to by Mr. Justice JEWETT, in Barker v. Bucklin (2 Denio, 45). In that case, the learned justice considered at some length the question now before us. The authorities referred to were mainly those which I have cited, and others, upon the statute of frauds. The case decided nothing on the present subject, because it was determined against the plaintiff on a ground not involved in this discussion. The doctrine was certainly advanced which the plaintiff now contends for, but among all the decisions which were cited, I do not think there is one standing directly upon it. The case of Arnold v. Lyman (17 Mass., 400), might perhaps be regarded as an exception to this remark, if a different interpretation had not been given to that decision in the Supreme Court of the same State where it was pronounced. In the recent case of Mellen, Ad[278] ministratrix, v. Whipple (1 Gray, 317), that decision is understood as belonging to a class where the defendant has in his hands a trust fund, which was the foundation of the duty or promise in which the suit is brought.

The cases in which some trust was involved are also frequently referred to as authority for the doctrine now in question, but they do not sustain it. If A delivers money or property to B, which the latter accepts upon a trust for the benefit of C, the latter can enforce the trust by an appropriate action for that purpose. (Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577.) If the trust be of money, I think the beneficiary may assent to it and bring the action for money had and received to his use. If it be of something else than money, the trustee must account for it according to the terms of the trust, and upon principles of equity. There is some authority even for saying that an express promise founded on the possession of a trust fund may be enforced by an action at law in the name of the beneficiary, although it was made to the creator of the trust. Thus, in Comyn's Digest (Action on the case upon Assumpsit, B. 15), it is laid down that if a man promise a pig of lead to A, and his executor give lead to make a pig to B, who assumes to deliver it to A, an assumpsit lies by A against him. The case of The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company v. The Westchester County Bank (4 Denio, 97), involved a trust because the defendants had received from a third party a bill of exchange under an agreement that they would endeavor to collect it, and would pay over the proceeds when collected to the plaintiffs. A fund received under such an agreement does not belong to the person who receives it. He must account for it specifically; and perhaps there is no gross violation of principle in permitting the equitable owner of it to sue upon an express promise to pay it over. Having a specific interest in the thing, the undertaking to account for it may be regarded as in some sense made with him through the author of the trust. But further than this we cannot go without violating plain rules of law. In the case before us there was nothing in the nature of a trust or agency. The defendant borrowed the money of Holly and [279] received it as his own. The plaintiff had no right in the fund, legal or equitable. The promise to repay the money created an obligation in favor of the lender to whom it was made and not in favor of any one else.

I have referred to the dictum in Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden (1 Johns., 140), as favoring the doctrine contended for. It was the earliest in this State, and was founded, as already observed, on the old English case of Dutton v. Poole, in Ventris. That case has always been referred to as the ultimate authority whenever the rule in question has been mentioned, and it deserves, therefore, some further notice. The father of the plaintiff's wife being seized of certain lands, which afterwards on his death descended to the defendant, and being about to cut £1,000 worth of timber to raise a portion for his daughter, the defendant promised the father, in consideration of his forbearing to cut the timber, that he would pay the said daughter the £1,000. After verdict for the plaintiff, upon the issue of non- assumpsit, it was urged in arrest of judgment, that the father ought to have brought the action, and not the husband and wife. It was held, after much discussion, that the action would lie. The court said, "It might be another case if the money had been to have been paid to a stranger; but there is such a manner of relation between the father and the child, and it is a kind of debt to the child to be provided for, that the plaintiff is plainly concerned." We need not criticise the reason given for this decision. It is enough for the present purpose, that the case is no authority for the general doctrine, to sustain which it has been so frequently cited. It belongs to a class of cases somewhat peculiar and anomalous, in which promises have been made to a parent or person standing in a near relationship to the person for whose benefit it was made, and in which, on account of that relationship, the beneficiary has been allowed to maintain the action. Regarded as standing on any other ground, they have long since ceased to be the law in England. Thus, in Crow v. Rogers (1 Strange, 592), one Hardy was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of £70, and upon a discourse between Hardy and the defendant, it was [280] agreed that the defendant should pay that debt in consideration of a house, to be conveyed by Hardy to him. The plaintiff brought the action on that promise, and Dutton v. Poole was cited in support of it. But it was held that the action would not lie, because the plaintiff was a stranger to the transaction. Again, in Price v. Easton (4 Barn. & Adolph., 433), one William Price was indebted to the plaintiff in £13. The declaration averred a promise of the defendant to pay the debt, in consideration that William Price would work for him, and leave the wages in his hands; and that Price did work accordingly, and earned a large sum of money, which he left in the defendant's hands. After verdict for the plaintiff, a motion was made in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration. Dutton v. Poole, and other cases of that class, were cited in opposition to the motion, but the judgment was arrested. Lord DENMAN said, "I think the declaration cannot be supported, as it does not show any consideration for the promise moving from the plaintiff to the defendant." LITTLEDALE, J., said, "No privity is shown between the plaintiff and the defendant. The case is precisely like Crow v. Rogers, and must be governed by it." TAUNTON, J., said, "It is consistent with all the matter alleged in the declaration, that the plaintiff may have been entirely ignorant of the arrangement between William Price and the defendant." PATTERSON, J., observed, "It is clear that the allegations do not show a right of action in the plaintiff. There is no promise to the plaintiff alleged." The same doctrine is recognized in Lilly v. Hays (5 Ad. & Ellis, 548), and such is now the settled rule in England, although at an early day there was some obscurity arising out of the case of Dutton v. Poole, and others of that peculiar class.

The question was also involved in some confusion by the earlier cases in Massachusetts. Indeed, the Supreme Court of that State seem at one time to have made a nearer approach to the doctrine on which this action must rest, than the courts of this State have ever done. (10 Mass., 287; 17 id., 400.) But in the recent case of Mellen, Administratrix, v. Whipple [281] (1 Gray, 317), the subject was carefully reviewed and the doctrine utterly overthrown. One Rollin was indebted to the plaintiff's testator, and had secured the debt by a mortgage on his land. He then conveyed the equity of redemption to the defendant, by a deed which contained a clause declaring that the defendant was to assume and pay the mortgage. It was conceded that the acceptance of the deed with such a clause in it was equivalent to an express promise to pay the mortgage debt; and the question was, whether the mortgagee or his representative could sue on that undertaking. It was held that the suit could not be maintained; and in the course of a very careful and discriminating opinion by Judge METCALF, it was shown that the cases which had been supposed to favor the action belonged to exceptional classes, none of which embraced the pure and simple case of an attempt by one person to enforce a promise made to another, from whom the consideration wholly proceeded. I am of that opinion.

The judgment of the court below should therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted.

GROVER, J., also dissented. Judgment affirmed.

12.2.2 Notes - Lawrence v. Fox 12.2.2 Notes - Lawrence v. Fox

 

1. In Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854), discussed in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Lawrence v. Fox, Metcalf, J., suggested that most of the cases in which third parties had been allowed to sue on contracts to which they were not parties fell into two classes:

 1. . . . [C]ases . . . in which A has put money or property into B's hands as a fund from which A's creditors are to be paid, and B has promised, either expressly, or by implication from his acceptance of the money or property without objection to the terms on which it was delivered to him, to pay such creditors. In such cases, the creditors have maintained actions against the holder of the fund. . . .

2. Cases where promises have been made to a father or uncle, for the benefit of a child or nephew, form a second class, in which the person for whose benefit the promise was made has maintained an action for the breach of it. The nearness of the relation between the promisee and him for whose benefit the promise was made, has been sometimes assigned as a reason for these decisions. And though different opinions, both as to the correctness of the decisions, and as to this reason for them, have often been expressed by English judges, yet the decisions themselves have never been overruled, but are still regarded as settled law. Dutton v. Pool[e], 1 Vent. 318, is a familiarly known case of this kind, in which the defendant promised a father, who was about to fell timber for the purpose of raising a portion for his daughter, that if he would forbear to fell it, the defendant would pay the daughter £1,000. The daughter maintained an action on this promise. Several like decisions had been previously made. Rookwood's case, Cro. Eliz. 164. Oldham v. Bateman, 1 Rol. Ab. 31. Provender v. Wood, Hetl. 30. Thomas's case, Style, 461. Bell v. Chaplain, Hardr. 321. These cases support the decision of this court in Felton v. Dickinson, JO Mass. 287.

67 Mass. (l Gray) at 322-323.

Judge Metcalf also referred without disapproval to Brewer v. Dyer, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 337 (1851), in which a lessor had been allowed to sue a sublessee who had promised the original lessee to pay the rent and taxes. The cases in which third party suits had been allowed were, he said, exceptions to the general rule and the classes of third parties who should be allowed to bring them should not be expanded. Held, in Mellen v. Whipple, that a mortgagee could not sue the purchaser of the mortgagor's equity of redemption who had promised the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt. (On "equities of redemption," see Note 1 following the next principal case, Vrooman v. Turner.)

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts finally rejected the rule of Mellen v. Whipple in Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc. 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). Choate, Hall & Stewart, a law firm, had done extensive legal work for its client, a former director of the defendant corporation. The law firm sued to recover legal fees which it claimed the defendant, in a contract with its former director, had agreed to pay. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that Massachusetts law did not give standing to third party beneficiaries. In reversing the trial court, Kaplan, ]., noted that "this court has in fact frequently recognized the right of suit of creditor beneficiaries . . . but it has been in the form of 'exceptions' to . . . the supposed general prohibitory rule of the Mellen case." Judge Kaplan characterized the court's endorsement of the doctrine of third party beneficiaries in the Choate, Hall case as "a long anticipated but relatively minor change in the law of the Commonwealth."

The Massachusetts court's long resistance to third party beneficiaries may be some indication of its instinctive feeling for logical consistency, expressed elsewhere in the same court's rejection of the anticipatory breach idea (compare Daniels v. Newton, supra p. 1270).

2. Judge Metcalf might have confined the classes of third party beneficiaries even more narrowly than he did in Mellen v. Whipple if he had been as well up on English case law as Comstock, J., dissenting in Lawrence v. Fox. For the overruling in later cases of Dutton v. Poole, on which Metcalf relied, see Comstock's opinion. Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433, 110 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B. 1833), is sometimes taken as the definitive rejection in English law of third party beneficiary doctrine. The rule that beneficiaries cannot sue on contracts to which they are not parties has come to be referred to in England as the rule of Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393, 121 Eng. Rep. 762, 30 L.J.Q.B. 265, 4 L.T. 468, [1861-1873] All KR. 369 (Q.B. 1861). (According to the Chicago Note cited at the end of this Note, the case is reported with "considerable variation" in the several collections of reports.) It has, however, long been a commonplace (at least in American legal writing) to point out that English courts, while rejecting the beneficiary doctrine, have achieved results quite like those reached in this country by a somewhat tortured manipulation of trust theory. See 4 Corbin, ch. 46, which first appeared as an article in 46 L.Q. Rev. 12 (1930). It has been said that, after Professor Corbin's article appeared, the English courts were, at least for a while, somewhat more reluctant than they had been to protect contract beneficiaries by calling them trust beneficiaries.

The current state of English law on third party beneficiaries was inconclusively reexamined in Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58. The facts were that Peter Beswick had entered into an agreement with his nephew under which Peter turned his small trucking business over to the nephew who promised, among other things, that in the event of Peter's death he would pay Peter's widow an annuity. Peter having died, the nephew, after making one payment on the annuity, refused to make any more payments. Mrs. Beswick brought an action to compel payment of the annuity, claiming that she was entitled to a decree of specific performance either on the ground that she was the beneficiary of the contract between her late husband and the defendant or on the ground that, as executrix under her late husband's will, she could bring the action for the estate. The ultimate disposition of the case in the House of Lords was that she could bring the action in her capacity as executrix, so that it was unnecessary to decide whether, apart from that happy circumstance, she could have brought it in her individual capacity as a beneficiary. However, in the Court of Appeal, [1966] Ch. 538, [1966J 3 All KR. 1, Lord Denning, M.R., had chosen to make the case a vehicle for reexamination of English third party beneficiary doctrine. Lord Denning, who had long been known as an advocate of the doctrine, wrote an elaborate opinion in which he argued that Dutton v. Poole had never in fact been overruled and that, both at common law and in equity, suits by beneficiaries were recognized in England. Even if that were not so, he went on, a provision in the Law of Property Act, 1925, had, perhaps by inadvertence, authorized suits by contract beneficiaries. On appeal to the House of Lords counsel for Mrs. Beswick abandoned the argument that English law recognized actions by beneficiaries, which seems rather hard on Lord Denning, and were duly congratulated for that wise decision in several of the opinions delivered in the House. Counsel did argue the point based on the Law of Property Act, 1925; all the opinions in the House of Lords were devoted, in large part, to demonstrating that the 1925 Act had had no such effect, intended or unintended. There was, thus, little discussion of the arguments advanced by Lord Denning, beyond rather casual statements that his historical reconstruction of English law had not so much as a leg to stand on. That is not to say that the members of the House of Lords considered the third party beneficiary idea noxious or evil. Lord Reid, for example, noted that in 1937 a "strong" Law Revision Committee had recommended the enactment of a statute providing that: "Where a contract by its express terms purports to confer a benefit directly on a third party it shall be enforceable by the third party in his own name. . . . " Nothing was ever done in Parliament about the Law Revision Committee's recommendation. In his Beswick opinion, Lord Reid commented: "If one had to contemplate a further long period of Parliamentary procrastination, this House might find it necessary to deal with this matter; but if legislation is probable at an early-date, I would not deal with it in a case where that is not essential." His reference to the probability of an early legislative solution was to the work of the Law Commission which is currently engaged in the ambitious task of preparing a codification of the English law of obligations and had announced that the third party beneficiary problem was among the items which it proposed to consider (see the Editorial Note to the report of the Beswick case in the Court of Appeal, [1966] 3 All KR. 1, 2).

In deciding to dispose of the case by holding that Mrs. Beswick could sue as executrix, the learned Lords had to hurdle the difficulty that it was far from apparent how the estate (as distinguished from Mrs. Beswick, personally) had been damaged by the nephew's failure to pay the annuity. The difficulty was hurdled in a manner that can only command an awed Transatlantic respect. It must be, however, a matter for jurisprudential regret that the faithless nephew had not been named executor of Peter Beswick's estate instead of Mrs. Beswick.

The history of the matter is traced and the Beswick case analyzed in an excellent Note, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in England, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 544 (1968).

Continuing dissatisfaction with the English law on third party beneficiaries was again voiced in Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction UK Ltd., [1980] 1 All KR. 571. Lord Scarman, recalling Lord Reid's reference to "Parliamentary procrastination," commented: "the Committee reported in 1937; Beswick v. Beswick was decided in 1967. It is now 1979; but nothing has been done. If the opportunity arises, I hope the House will reconsider Tweddle v. Atkinson and the other cases which stand guard over this unjust rule."

3. In National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878), it appeared that the Masonic Hall Association had issued bonds. The Grand Lodge adopted a resolution that the Lodge would assume the payment of the bonds issued by the Association on condition that the Association issue its stock to the Lodge in the amount of the bonds whose payment was assumed. The Bank, a bondholder, brought action against the Lodge to compel the payment of bond coupons. It did not appear that the Association had accepted the offer made by the Lodge or that stock of the Association had ever been issued to the Lodge. At trial the jury. was directed to enter a verdict in favor of the Lodge. This disposition of the case was affirmed in the Supreme Court. Justice Strong commented on the third party beneficiary doctrine in the following passage:

We do not propose to enter at large upon a consideration of the inquiry how far privity of contract between a plaintiff and defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action of assumpsit. The subject has been much debated, and the decisions are not all reconcilable. No doubt the general rule is that such a privity must exist. But there are confessedly many exceptions to it. One of them, and by far the most frequent one, is the case where, under a contract between two persons, assets have come to the promisor's hands or under his control which in equity belong to a third person. In such a case it is held that the third person may sue in his own name. But then the suit is founded rather on the implied undertaking the law raises from the possession of the assets, than on the express promise. Another exception is where the plaintiff is the beneficiary solely interested in the promise, as where one person contracts with another to pay money or deliver some valuable thing to a third. But where a debt already exists from one person to another, a promise by a third person to pay such debt being primarily for the benefit of the original debtor, and to relieve him from liability to pay it (there being no novation), he has a right of action against the promisor for his own indemnity; and if the original creditor can also sue, the promisor would be liable to two separate actions, and therefore the rule is that the original creditor cannot sue. His case is not an exception from the general rule that privity of contract is required. There are some other exceptions recognized, but they are unimportant now. The plaintiff's case is within none of them.

Id. at 124-125.

4. In a brilliant article on the evolution of third party beneficiary doctrine, Professor Waters throws some additional light on the curious facts in Lawrence v. Fox (footnotes have been omitted):

The mystery of Lawrence v. Fox is why Lawrence chose the tortuous route of suing Fox, with whom he had not dealt, rather than sue Holly, who was, it appears, his debtor. . . . From the records of the case, we learn that "Holly" was in fact one Hawley, referred to in the complaint as Samuel Hawley. The Buffalo census of 1855 lists no Samuel Hawley, but of the eighteen Hawleys who are listed, only one appears to have had sufficient means to have been involved in a three hundred dollar cash transaction. He was Merwin Spencer Hawley, a prominent merchant. In 1856, Hawley was President of the Buffalo Board of Trade, an organization with which Fox, at some point, was also connected. It is admittedly possible that the Hawley who dealt with Fox, and who was allegedly indebted to Lawrence, was another Hawley from out of town, or out of state. That would explain his absence from the census and from the courtroom. But there are indications of other reasons why Lawrence may have avoided suing Hawley, even If he was affluent and available. Those reasons — which I shall deal with shortly — taken together with the fact that Merwin Hawley was a wealthy Buffalonian who moved in the same social circles as Arthur Fox make it more likely that he is the Hawley of Lawrence v. Fox. The assumption that Hawley was affluent and available in Buffalo when Lawrence sued Fox does nothing, however, to solve the mystery of why Lawrence chose not to sue him. The solution to that mystery lies in the nature of Lawrence's transaction with Hawley, of which Hawley's dealings with Fox on the next day are highly suggestive.

 In 1854, when the transaction took place, three hundred dollars was a very large amount of money. Even among successful entrepreneurs, a loan the size of Hawley’s to Fox, to be repaid a day later, must have been out of the ordinary. At trial in the Superior Court in Buffalo, Fox's attorney, Jared Torrance, shed some light On the nature of that transaction. The only witness in the case was William Riley, by whom Lawrence's attorney, Edward Chapin, had proved that Hawley paid three hundred dollars to Fox; that Hawley told Fox that he, Hawley, owed that amount to Lawrence; and that Fox promised Hawley that he would repay that amount to Lawrence. On cross-examination, Torrance elicited four facts: that Lawrence was not present when Hawley made the loan to Fox; that the deal took place at Mr. Purdy Merritt's on Washington Street; that there were "two or three persons present . . . doing nothing but standing near them"; and that Hawley counted out the money as he handed it to Fox.

The first fact, that Lawrence was not present, formed the basis of Fox's privity defense. This defense makes sense only in an action based on contract, a point to which we shall return. For now, it is the other three facts — the location, the bystanders, and the cash being counted out — that are noteworthy, for they suggest the milieu in which the transaction took place, and help to explain its character.

William Riley, the witness, was a horse dealer. He did his business near the canal, the life line of Buffalo's then-thriving commerce. Not many steps away was Mr. Purdy Merritt's establishment, where the transaction took place; Merritt was also a horse dealer. Torrance's cross-examination presented a more complete picture: two well-to-do merchants in a horse dealer's establishment down by the canal; a large amount of cash changing hands;. and several other people present, loitering. Of these facts, not the least significant was the location:

 Canal Street was more than a street. It was the name of a district, a small and sinful neighborhood. . . . As late as the 1800's, there were ninety-three saloons there, among which were sprinkled fifteen other dives known as concert halls plus sundry establishments designed to separate the Slicker from his money as swiftly as possible, painlessly by preference, but painfully if necessary. . . . It must have been an eternal mystery to the clergy and the good people of the town why the Lord never wiped out this nineteenth century example of Sodom and Gamorrah with a storm or a great wave from Lake Erie.

 In his cross-examination of Riley, Attorney Torrance had gone as far as he could go to set the scene for what he then sought to prove directly, also by William Riley: that Hawley lent the money to Fox for Fox to gamble with it, and that this unlawful purpose was known to Hawley.

Trial Judge Joseph Masten did not, however, permit Riley to testify to the alleged link with gambling. Attorney Chapin, for Lawrence, successfully objected on two grounds, neither of which bears upon the probable truth or untruth of the evidence that Riley was prepared to give. As to that question, the facts that Torrance had already elicited do suggest a setting in which gambling could have been taking place. But there is one more fact, this one uncontroverted, that is entirely consistent with the allegation of a connection with gambling and is difficult to explain otherwise. The fact — the central mystery of this case — is that Lawrence chose to sue not his debtor, Hawley, but his debtor's debtor, Fox. If, as seems to be the fact, Hawley was a person of considerable wealth in Buffalo, and if, as alleged, he owed three hundred dollars to Lawrence, then Lawrence must have had compelling reason to neglect the obvious action — suing Hawley — in favor of the much more difficult task of seeking recovery from Fox. A gambling debt would have presented just such a reason. If Hawley's debt to Lawrence from the day before, in the round sumn of three hundred dollars, was itself the outcome of gambling and thus unenforceable at law, Lawrence was well advised to look for someone other than Hawley to sue. Furthermore, if we look to the law of gamblers rather than the law of commerce, it is clear that Fox, and not Hawley, was both the villain and the obvious person to pursue.

Commercial transactions were not then and are not now structured in such a way as to leave a creditor with no better means of recovery than to sue his debtor's debtor. The series of events described in Lawrence v. Fox makes no commercial sense. Had Hawley's dealings with Fox conformed to the norms of commercial behavior, Hawley would have requested a negotiable instrument either made out to Lawrence, or to be endorsed in his favor, in return for his loan to Fox. And had Lawrence's dealings with Hawley been of a kind condoned and upheld by the law of the land, then Lawrence would surely have sued Hawley, and not Fox. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was no theory of recovery in the law of contract by which Lawrence could collect from Fox.

 Waters, The Property In the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1123-1127 (1985).

 

12.2.3 Vrooman v. Turner 12.2.3 Vrooman v. Turner

69 N.Y. 280 (Ct. App. 1877)

 CHARLES W. VROOMAN, Guardian, etc., Respondent,
v.
HARRIET B. TURNER, Impleaded, etc., Appellant.

[280] A grantee of mortgaged premises whose conveyance recites that the land is conveyed subject to the mortgage, and that the grantee assumes and agrees to pay the same as part of the consideration, is not liable for a deficiency arising upon a foreclosure and sale, in case the grantor was not personally liable, legally or equitably, for the payment of the mortgage.[1]

A mere stranger cannot claim the benefit of a contract between other parties; to entitle a third person to such a benefit there must be either a new consideration or some prior right or claim against one of the contracting parties, by which he has a legal interest in the performance of the agreement.[2]

The cases similar to Lawrence v. Fox (20 N.Y., 268), holding that a promise to one for the benefit of a third person may avail to give an action to the latter against the promissor, collated and distinguished.

Vrooman v. Turner (8 Hun, 78), reversed in part.

(Argued April 2, 1877; decided April 10, 1877.)

APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee. (Reported below, 8 Hun, 78.)

This was an action to foreclose a mortgage.

The mortgage was executed in August, 1873, by defendant Evans, who then owned the mortgaged premises. He conveyed the same to one Mitchell, and through various mesne conveyances the title came to one Sanborn. In none of these conveyances did the grantee assume to pay the mortgage. Sanborn conveyed the same to defendant Harriet [281] B. Turner, by deed which contained a clause stating that the conveyance was subject to the mortgage, "which mortgage the party hereto of the second part hereby covenarts and agrees to pay off and discharge, the same forming part of the consideration thereof."

The referee found that said grantee, by so assuming payment of the mortgage, became personally liable therefor, and directed judgment against her for any deficiency. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Edward T. Bartlett, for the appellant. The appellant's covenant with Sanborn to assume the mortgage in suit did not constitute a cause of action. (King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N.Y., 74; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 id., 233; Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 J. R., 140; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow., 432; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Den., 45; D. & H. Canal Co. v. West. Co. Bank, 4 id., 97; Hall v. Robbins, 6 Barb., 33; Barker v. Bradley, 42 N.Y., 316; Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 id., 581; Glen v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co., 56 id., 379; Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 id., 179; Coster v. Mayor, etc., 43 id., 410; Dingledein v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 37 id., 575; Van Schaick v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 38 id., 346; Secor v. Lord, 3 Keyes, 525.) The appellant, being a married woman, is not bound by the covenant in the deed from Sanborn to her. (Chamberlain v. Parker, 45 N.Y., 569; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 id., 35; White v. McNett, 33 id., 371; Yale v. Dederer, 22 id., 450; Corn Ex. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 id., 613.)

N. H. Clement, for the respondent. The appellant was liable on her covenant. (Thorpe v. Keokuk Goal Co., 48 N.Y., 253; Coster v. Mayor, etc., 43 id., 411; Secor v. Lord, 3 Keyes, 525; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y., 268; Burr v. Beers, 24 id., 178; Dingledein v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 37 id., 575; Van Schaick v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 38 id., 346; Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 id., 179; Barker v. Bradley, 42 id., 322; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 id., 233.) The fact of the [282] appellant being a married woman did not relieve her from liability on her covenant. (Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N.Y., 425; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 id., 35; Maxon v. Scott, 55 id., 247.)

ALLEN, J. The precise question presented by the appeal in this action has been twice before the courts of this State, and received the same solution in each. It first arose in King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465, decided in 1843. There the grantor of an equity of redemption in mortgaged premises, neither legally nor equitably interested in the payment of the bond and mortgage except so far as the same were a charge upon his interest in the lands, conveyed the lands subject to the mortgage, and the conveyance recited that the grantees therein assumed the mortgage, and were to pay off the same as a part of the consideration of such conveyance, and it was held that as the grantor in that conveyance was not personally liable to the holder of the mortgage to pay the same, the grantees were not liable to the holder of such mortgage for the deficiency upon a foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. It was conceded by the chancellor that if the grantor had been personally liable to the holder of the mortgage for the payment of the mortgage debt, the holder of such mortgage would have been entitled in equity to the benefit of the agreement recited in such conveyance, to pay off the mortgage and to a decree over against the grantees for the deficiency. This would have been in accordance with a well established rule in equity, which gives to the creditor the right of subrogation to and the benefit of any security held by a surety for the re-enforcement of the principal debt, and in the case supposed, and by force of the agreement recited in the conveyance, the grantee would have become the principal debtor, and the grantor would be a quasi surety for the payment of the mortgage debt. (Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige, 446; Curtis v. Tyler, id., 432; Burr v. Beers, 24 N.Y., 178.)

King v. Whitely was followed, and the same rule applied [283] by an undivided court in Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N.Y., 74, and the same case was cited with approval in Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N.Y., 233.

The clause in the conveyance in Trotter v. Hughes was not in terms precisely like that in King v. Whitely, or in the grant under consideration. The undertaking by the grantees to pay the mortgage debt as recited, was not in express terms, or as explicit as in the other conveyances. But the recital was, I think, sufficient to justify the inference of a promise to pay the debt, and so it must have been regarded by the court. The case was not distinguished by the court in any of its circumstances from King v. Whitely, but was supposed to be on all fours with and governed by it. Had the grantor in that case been personally bound for the payment of the debt, I am of the opinion that an action would have been sustained against the grantee upon a promise implied from the terms of the grant accepted by him to pay it, and indemnify the grantor. It must have been so regarded by this court, otherwise no question would have been made upon it, and the court would not have so seriously and ably fortified and applied the doctrine of King v. Whitely. A single suggestion that there was no undertaking by the grantee and no personal liability for the payment of the debt assumed by him, would have disposed of the claim to charge him for the deficiency upon the sale of the mortgaged premises. The rule which exempts the grantee of mortgaged premises subject to a mortgage, the payment of which is assumed in consideration of the conveyance as between him and his grantor, from liability to the holder of the mortgage when the grantee is not bound in law or equity for the payment of the mortgage, is founded in reason and principle, and is not inconsistent with that class of cases in which it has been held that a promise to one for the benefit of a third party may avail to give an action directly to the latter against the promissor, of which Lawrence v. Fox (20 N.Y., 268), is a prominent example. To give a third party who may derive a benefit from the performance of the [284] promise, an action, there must be, first, an intent by the promissee to secure some benefit to the third party, and second, some privity between the two, the promissee and the party to be benefited, and some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter which would give him a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise, or an equivalent from him personally.

It is true there need be no privity between the promissor and the party claiming the benefit of the undertaking, neither is it necessary that the latter should be privy to the consideration of the promise, but it does not follow that a mere volunteer can avail himself of it. A legal obligation or duty of the promissee to him, will so connect him with the transaction as to be a substitute for any privity with the promissor, or the consideration of the promise, the obligation of the promissee furnishing an evidence of the intent of the latter to benefit him, and creating a privity by substitution with the promissor. A mere stranger cannot intervene, and claim by action the benefit of a contract between other parties. There must be either a new consideration or some prior right or claim against one of the contracting parties, by which he has a legal interest in the performance of the agreement.

It is said in Garnsey v. Rodgers (47 N.Y. 233), that it is not every promise made by one person to another from the performance of which a third person would derive a benefit that gives a right of action to such third person, he being privy neither to the contract nor the consideration. In the language of Judge RAPALLO, "to entitle him to an action, the contract must have been made for his benefit. He must be the party intended to be benefited." See, also, Turk v. Ridge (41 N.Y., 201), and Merrill v. Green (55 id, 270), in which, under similar agreements third parties sought to maintain an action upon engagements by the performance of which they would be benefited, but to which they were not parties, and failed. The courts are not inclined to extend the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to cases not clearly within [285] the principle of that decision. Judges have differed as to the principle upon which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest, but in every case in which an action has been sustained there has been a debt or duty owing by the promissee to the party claiming to sue upon the promise. Whether the decisions rest upon the doctrine of agency, the promissee being regarded as the agent for the third party, who, by bringing his action adopts his acts, or upon the doctrine of a trust, he promissor being regarded as having received money or other thing for the third party, is not material. In either case there must be a legal right, founded upon some obligation of the promissee, in the third party, to adopt and claim the promise as made for his benefit.

In Lawrence v. Fox a prominent question was made in limine, whether the debt from Halley to the plaintiff was sufficiently proved by the confession of Halley made at the time of the loan of the money to the defendant. It was assumed that if there was no debt proved the action would anot lie, and the declaration of Halley the debtor was held sufficient evidence of the debt. GRAY, J., said: "All the defendant had the right to demand in this case was evidence which as between Halley and the plaintiff was competent to establish the relation between them of debtor and creditor." In Burr v. Beers, (24 N.Y., 178), and Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., (48 N.Y., 253), the grantor of the defendant was personally liable to pay the mortgage to the plaintiff, and the cases were therefore clearly within the principle of Lawrence v. Fox, Halsey v. Reed, and Curtis v. Tyler, supra. See also per BOSWORTH, J., Doolittle v. Naylor, (2 Bos., 225); and Ford v. David (1 Bos., 569). It is claimed that King v. Whitely and the cases following it were overruled by Lawrence v. Fox. But it is very clear that it was not the intention to overrule them, and that the cases are not inconsistent. The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, although questioned and criticised, was not first adopted in this state by the decision of that case. It was expressly adjudged as early as 1825, in Farley v. Cleveland, (4 Cow., 432), affirmed in the court [286] for the correction of errors in 1827, per totam curiam, and reported in 9 Cow., 639. The chancellor was not ignorant of these decisions when he decided King v. Whitely, nor was Judge DENIO and his associates unaware of them when Trotter v. Hughes was decided, and Judge GRAY in Lawrence v. Fox says the case of Farley v. Cleveland had never been doubted.

The court below erred in giving judgment against the appellant for the deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged premises, and so much of the judgment as directs her to pay the same must be reversed with costs.

All concur, except EARL, J., dissenting.

Judgment accordingly.

[1] Cashman v. Henry, 75 N.Y. 106; Thayer v. Marsh, id. 342; Pardee v. Treat, 82 id. 388; Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 id. 35; Carter v. Holahan, 92 id. 504; Matter of Wilbur v. Warren, 104 id. 198; Biddel v. Brizzolara, 64 Cal. 362. Not followed, Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 547; Birke v. Abbott, 103 Iad. 6.

[2] Wheat v. Rice, 97 N.Y. 302; Litchfield v. Flint, 104 id. 550; Meech v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 210; Davis v. Clinton Water Wks. Co., 54 Iowa, 62; Wright v. Briggs, 99 Ind. 566; Stuart v. Worden, 42 Mich. 161; Ferries v. Carson Water Co., 16 Nev. 47; Brewster v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 550.

12.2.4 Notes - Vrooman v. Turner 12.2.4 Notes - Vrooman v. Turner

NOTE

1. Mortgagees, Mortgagors, Purchasers, and the Equity of Redemption. In the mortgage transaction, property (real or personal) is transferred as security for a loan. If the loan is repaid according to the terms of the loan agreement, the security transfer may be said to lapse: the borrower-mortgagor, on repayment, regains whatever interest he had in the mortgaged property before he mortgaged it. If the borrower defaults on his payments, the mortgagee may look to the mortgaged property for satisfaction of the debt. In most states today the typical procedure is for the mortgagee to take possession of the property, sell it and apply the proceeds of sale, after deduction of his expenses, to the debt. If the property has been sold for more than enough to cover the debt and expenses, the surplus is remitted to the mortgagor (or to the holders of junior security interests in the property or to the mortgagor's trustee in bankruptcy or other representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings). If the proceeds of the sale do not cover the expenses and pay the debt in full, the mortgagor (or his insolvent estate) is liable for the deficiency. (For an account of the historical development of the mortgagee's rights against the security after default, see 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property §43.2 (1965).)

During the period while the loan is outstanding, the mortgage transaction creates what may be called a divided interest in the mortgaged property. It is no longer fully the mortgagor's: he stands to lose it entirely if he does not make payments on the loan as they become due. It is not yet the mortgagee's: he cannot sell it until there has been a default under the loan agreement. The mortgagor's interest is called his "equity of redemption." That term, which came into use during the seventeenth century, reflects a great deal of history. The early land mortgage was, in form, a conveyance of the land to the mortgagee, to become absolute on the mortgagor's default. The seventeenth-century equity courts, however, allowed the mortgagor, on tender of the debt even long after default, to "redeem" the land from the mortgagee. Hence, equity of redemption.

Either the mortgagee or the mortgagor may elect to sell his interest in the mortgaged property before the loan has been repaid. In this discussion we shall not be concerned with the mortgagee's sale of his interest, although it may avoid confusion to point out that the mortgagee's sale of his security interest is always ancillary to an assignment of the debt secured and has nothing to do with a sale of the property after default. It should also be kept in mind that the borrower-mortgagor, by selling the property, does not escape liability on the debt. If he sells the property without authority from the mortgagee, the sale may be a default under the loan agreement; however, whether he sells with or without authority, he remains liable to pay the debt.

In this country there is a universal requirement that the mortgagee must file or record his mortgage with a public official as a condition of protection against third parties. If the mortgage has not been properly filed, a purchaser of the mortgaged property from the mortgagor, who is himself without notice of the mortgage, will take the property free of the mortgage. In such a case the mortgagee has lost his security interest in the property and is left with his money claim against the borrower-mortgagor under the loan agreement. However, if the mortgage has been properly filed and if the mortgagee has not authorized the mortgagor to sell the property free of the mortgage, the purchaser will take subject to the mortgage. That is to say, his purchase will not cut off the mortgagee's interest in the property; he acquires only the mortgagor's interest. Such a transaction is often referred to, as it was in the opinion in Vrooman v. Turner, as a purchase or sale of the mortgagor's equity of redemption. In the balance of our discussion we shall assume that the purchaser (or grantee) from the mortgagor acquires only the mortgagor's interest or equity. We shall also assume that the mortgage security is land. (Theoretically the Vrooman v. Turner situation could arise where the mortgage covered personal property, but it is in the highest degree unlikely that the situation would ever come up except in the context of a land mortgage).

Let us assume that A owns land which is subject to a mortgage securing a debt of $10,000. The debt has ten years to run before it is to be fully repaid. B wants to buy the land and A is willing to sell. They agree that the land is worth $20,000. How are they to carry out the transaction?

The simplest way is to payoff the mortgage debt before or at the time of the sale. A pays the mortgagee $10,000, discharges the mortgage and sells the land to B for $20,000. Or B pays $10,000 to the mortgagee and $10,000 to A and in that way acquires the land free of A's mortgage. B may now borrow $10,000 and mortgage the land as security, but the new B mortgage has nothing to do with the old A mortgage. No doubt today the overwhelming number of land transactions of this kind are carried out by paying off A's mortgage first and letting B find his own financing.

Another way is for B to buy A's interest (or equity) subject to the mortgage. This seems to have been more common in the past than it is today but this way of carrying out the transaction has by no means disappeared. If interest rates have risen since A executed his mortgage, it is obviously to B's interest to take over A's mortgage at the lower rate. If interest rates have fallen, the mortgagee would prefer to keep the mortgage alive and refuse to be paid off; whether or not he can rightfully refuse prepayment depends on the terms of the mortgage and loan agreement. For these reasons, or for no reason, transactions continue to appear in which B buys A's equity subject to the existing mortgage. We have already noted that A continues liable for the debt although he no longer owns the land. We may now turn to the relationship between B, the new owner of the land (or A's equity in it), and the mortgagee.

It was long ago accepted as a matter of legal doctrine that there was a difference between a transaction in which B, as part of his purchase of A's equity, assumed the mortgage debt (i.e., promised A that he would pay the debt) and one in which B did not assume the debt. In the latter case he was oddly described as a "non-assuming grantee." We shall presently return to the "assuming grantee" but it is first necessary to inquire into the situation of the grantee who did not assume.

What happens if, after equity has been sold to B (a non-assuming grantee), there is a default in the payment on the mortgage debt? Clearly (as we tend to say when dealing with obscure matters) the mortgagee can either sue A on the debt or he can foreclose the mortgage on the land in B's hands (i.e., have the land sold). Thus B stands to lose the land unless the mortgage payments are kept up (that is what we meant by saying that he bought the land, or A's equity, "subject to" the mortgage). But, as between B and A, which of them was supposed to pay? The answer to that question is that, in all probability, B was supposed to pay. It is theoretically possible to imagine an agreement between A and B under which A sold his equity to B and agreed to go on making the mortgage payments himself. In such a case, reverting to our hypothetical case of the land worth $20,000 subject to a mortgage debt of$10,000, B would presumably have paid A $20,000 for the land and trusted A to go on paying the mortgagee until the debt was discharged. In the real world B, whether or not he assumed the debt, did not pay A $20,000 and hope for the best; he paid him $10,000 and took over the mortgage payments himself. (From which, as the astute reader will have deduced, it must follow that, if the mortgagee on default collects the $10,000 from A instead of foreclosing the mortgage by having the land sold, then A will succeed to the mortgagee's interest and can himself foreclose the mortgage against B. The cases so hold. If they did not so hold, B would end up by acquiring land valued at $20,000 for which he had paid only $10,000.)

Thus the non-assuming grantee will lose the land if there is a default in paying down the mortgage debt and furthermore has, in connection with his purchase of the mortgagor's equity, almost certainly taken over payment of the debt himself. What then is the difference between a purchase of the equity by a grantee who assumes the debt and a purchase by a grantee who does not assume? The difference lies in the grantee's liability for a deficiency judgment if, on a foreclosure sale, the land sells for less than the amount of the debt. A, the original mortgagor, always remains liable for any deficiency. If he sells his equity to a grantee who assumes the debt, the grantee is also liable for the deficiency. If the mortgagee collects the deficiency from A in the first instance, A can recover over from the grantee on his assumption. If the grantee does not assume the debt, he will lose the land unless he keeps up the payments but he will not become liable for the deficiency. Thus, it might be said, the non-assuming grantee limits his liability to the amount of his investment in the land. If he concludes at any time that the land is not worth the additional amount he will have to pay to discharge the mortgage, he can stop paying and let the land go, thus cutting his loss.

In a period of rising land values, there is (factually) no difference between the situation of the assuming grantee and that of the non-assuming grantee. Presumably the land will always be worth more than the mortgage debt so that, if it is sold on foreclosure, there will be no resulting claim for a deficiency. It will always be to the grantee's interest to pay the mortgage debt, whether or not he has assumed it, .and acquire the undivided ownership of the land. If land values fall during the term of the mortgage, the ultimate liability for a deficiency judgement shifts from the mortgagor to the grantee who assumes the debt; it remains with the mortgagor if the grantee does not assume.

It is a fair guess that mortgagors and grantees who engage in such transactions are frequently unaware of the difference between a sale of the equity with an assumption and a sale without an  assumption. Whether the grantee assumes or does not assume may be the result of accident rather than a result consciously bargained for. Non-professionals who are not lawyers are in the highest degree unlikely to understand what is at stake. It would be comforting to think that all lawyers who have been admitted to practice have the distinction between asssuming grantees and non-assuming grantees at their fingertips. If that were true, however, there would not be nearly as many cases as there are, and always have been, in which both the sale contract and the deed leave shrouded in doubt the question whether the grantee did or did not assume the debt.

2. Assuming Grantees, Mortgages, and Third Party Beneficiary Doctrine. In the situation in which A mortgages his land and later conveys his equity of redemption to B who assumes the mortgage debt, most courts have allowed the mortgagee to proceed directly against B for a deficiency judgment. Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854), which is discussed in the Note following Lawrence v. Fox, supra p. 1333, as well as in the opinions delivered in that case, was exceptional in denying the mortgagee's direct action. Naturally, even the Massachusetts court would have concluded that if the mortgagee recovered a deficiency judgment against the original mortgagor, the mortgagor could recover the amount from the assuming grantee. Most courts saw no reason to require the successive suits and allowed the mortgagee to recover the deficiency from the assuming grantee in the course of his action to foreclose the mortgage.

It is not so clear that the courts which allowed the direct action thought of it in terms of third party beneficiary doctrine. Thus, in a series of New York cases that antedated Lawrence v. Fox, the mortgagee's right to proceed directly against the assuming grantee was grounded on suretyship law, the third party beneficiary cases being dismissed as irrelevant. In Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige 446,451 (N.Y. Ct. Chancery 1842), the Chancellor explained the result in this way:

It is not necessary to inquire whether the holder of the bond and mortgage could have maintained an action at law against Halsey upon this promise, within the principle of the decisions in the case of Starkey v. Mill, (Style's Rep. 296,) Dutton v. Poole, (2 Levintz, 210,) and of Schermerhorn v. Venderheyden, (1 John. Rep. 139.) For whatever may have been their right at law, there is no doubt that in equity the assignees of the bond and mortgage would have the right to a decree against Halsey or his personal representatives for the deficiency, upon a foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises, if the proceeds of the sale should be found insufficient to pay the debt and costs. For it is a well settled principle of this court that the creditor is entitled to the benefit of the collateral obligations for the payment of the debt which any person standing in the situation of surety for others has received for his indemnity and to discharge him from such payment.

Indeed in Lawrence v. Fox itself the New York cases on mortgagee vs. assuming grantee were not mentioned in either the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion, both of which not only dealt at length with the New York precedents but also wrestled with Mellen v. Whipple in which the Massachusetts court put its refusal to allow the mortgagee's action squarely on the ground that the third party beneficiary doctrine was an exceptional and, on the whole, doubtful novelty that should be confined within narrow limits.

3. The Situation in Vrooman v. Turner. What distinguishes cases like Vrooman v. Turner from the situation just discussed is that there have been two or more conveyances of the equity of redemption, that an intermediate grantee did not assume the mortgage debt and that the purchaser from the non-assuming grantee did assume it. Since a non-assuming grantee is not himself liable for a deficiency judgment, there is no rational explanation for his requiring the purchaser of the equity from him to assume the debt. However, as we have suggested earlier: (1) it is frequently unclear, as a factual matter, whether a grantee has or has not assumed the debt; (2) in any particular transaction neither the parties nor their lawyers may understand the esoterics of assumption vs. non-assumption. Thus one explanation. is that the non-assuming grantee requires the purchaser from him to assume the debt simply in order to be on the safe side; the alternative explanation is that nobody understood what was going on so that the assumption following a break in the chain is merely accidental.

In Vrooman v. Turner the court refers to two pre-Lawrence v. Fox cases in which a break in the chain of assumptions had been held fatal. In King v. Whiteley, 10 Paige 465 (N.Y. Ct. Chancery 1843), it was held that the mortgagee could not recover a deficiency from the grantee who assumed after the break. In Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N.Y. 74 (1854), it was held that the original mortgagor could not recover either. In those cases the decisions were based on suretyship law in the light of Halsey v. Reid, discussed in the preceding section of this Note. In Vrooman v. Turner the court, in the light of Lawrence v. Fox, dealt with the question as one of third party beneficiary law. Does the conceptual shift from suretyship language to contract beneficiary language seem to you to make any difference?

Cases like Vrooman v. Turner have reappeared in litigation during each period when land values have fallen and deficiency judgments have become important (most notably, of course, during the 1930s). No judicial consensus has ever emerged, but the tendency today seems to be in favor of allowing the mortgagee to sue. For example, in Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460,261 S.E.2d 334 (1979), the Supreme Court of Georgia.held, on facts similar to those in Vrooman v. Turner, that a remote grantee who agreed to pay a mortgage not owed by his grantor was personally liable to the mortgagee. The Restatement Second, focusing on the intentions of the contracting parties, clearly rejects the rule of Vrooman v. Turner. See §304, Illustration 2 and §310, Illustration 2. In Schneider v. Ferrigno, 110 Conn. 86, 147 A. 303 (1929), Maltbie, J., put the case against Vrooman v. Turner as follows:

. . . The basic question presented is, can the holder of a mortgage make liable one who, upon acquiring title to the premises, has assumed and agreed to pay that mortgage, despite the fact that in the chain of title from the original maker of the mortgage some owner of the equity of redemption has not assumed and agreed to pay it. Where such situations have come before the courts in the absence of statutory provision different conclusions have been reached. Those which deny a right of recovery advance various reasons. Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure, Vol. 1 (4th Ed.) 5246, states that such a conclusion is based upon the fact that there is no consideration for the assumption, but that can hardly be so; the agreement to assume is but one term in the contract by which the lands are acquired and if that contract as a whole is supported by a valuable consideration it cannot be said that anyone term lacks such support. 2 Williston on Contracts, §386, suggests as the basis for the conclusion, that where the grantor of the equity of redemption was not himself liable by reason of an assumption of the mortgage and hence had no interest in the assumption of it by his grantee, the only intelligent object which can be attributed to him is to guard against a supposed or possible liability on his part, and he cannot be assumed to have intended to confer a benefit upon the holder of the mortgage; but it is difficult to see why, if his object is assumed to be to protect himself against a possible liability, his mental attitude is any different than it would be, had he sought to protect himself against a definite liability fixed by his own agreement to pay the mortgage. The cases which deny liability, such as the leading case of Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 285, do not seem fully to recognize the extent and force of the rule which permits a third party beneficiary to sue upon a contract as it has now been developed. The controlling test now is, was there any intent to confer a right of action upon the third party. Amer. Law Inst. Restatement, Contracts, §§133, 135; Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293. If the grantor of the equity of redemption who has not assumed the mortgage has no obiect to protect himself, an intent to confer a right to sue upon the holder of the mortgage would be the most natural motive to assign to him in requiring his grantee to agree to pay it.

4. The Suretyship Analogy. In Vrooman v. Turner, Allen, J., remarks that the relationship of a grantor to his assuming grantee is like that of a "quasi surety" to a principal debtor. The same analogy is repeated in hundreds of other opinions. The thought is that the grantor, if he is forced to pay a deficiency claim, has a right to be reimbursed by the grantee just as a surety who pays the creditor has a right to be reimbursed by the principal debtor. Under suretyship law a surety is discharged if the creditor, without the surety's consent, enters into an agreement with the principal debtor to extend the time of payment. Another suretyship rule discharges the surety, at least to the extent of his loss, if the creditor holds collateral security which he could have applied to the debt and which has depreciated in value during the period of the creditor's forbearance to collect the debt. The theory of these, and other, suretyship defenses is that the creditor should not deal with the principal debtor without the surety's consent in any way that increases the risk assumed by the surety. Does it seem to you that a mortgagor who has sold his equity of redemption should be discharged from his liability for a deficiency claim if the mortgagee gives the present holder of the equity further time within which to pay? Or at all events discharged in the amount by which the value of the land has decreased during the period of forbearance? And should it make any difference whether the mortgagor's grantee did or did not assume the debt? See Kazunas v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 554,4 N.E.2d 118 (1936), in which the court concluded that the mortgagee's extension of time to a non-assuming grantee discharged the original mortgagors.

12.2.5 Seaver v. Ransom 12.2.5 Seaver v. Ransom

224 N.Y. 223
MARION E. SEAVER, Respondent,

v.
MATT C. RANSOM et al., as Executors of SAMUEL A. BEMAN, Deceased, Appellants.
Court of Appeals of New York

[234]

(Argued June 12, 1918; decided October 1, 1918.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered January 7, 1918, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court at a Trial Term, a jury having been waived.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

Frederick H. Bryant for appellants. Plaintiff cannot recover in an action at law. In order to give a third party, who may derive benefit from the performance of a promise, an action there must be: An intent by the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party; some privity between the two, the promisee and the party to be benefited, or some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter, which would give plaintiff a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise, or an equivalent from the promisee personally. (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233; Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498; Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219; Townsend v. Rackham, 143 N. Y. 516; French v. Vix, 143 N. Y. 90; Embler v. Hartford Steam Boiler Co., 158 N. Y. 431; Borland v. Welch, 162 N. Y. 104; Rigney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 217 N. Y. 31; Wait v. Wilson, 86 App. Div. 485; Lockwood v. Smith, 143 N. Y. Supp. 480; Coleman v. Hiler, 85 Hun. 547.) Specific performance cannot be decreed. (Phalen v. U.S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178.) There is no trust, express, implied or secret. (Matter of O'Hara, 95 N. Y. 403: Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282; Hamlin v. [235] Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39; Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N. Y. 454; Ide v. Brown, 178 N. Y. 26; Bull v. Bull, 31 Hun, 69; Crippen v. Crippen, 53 Hun, 233; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555.)

John P. Kellas for respondent. The agreement between Mrs. Beman and her husband at the time of the execution of her will was valid and can be enforced in this action. (Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282; Matter of O'Hara, 95 N. Y. 403; Crippen v. Crippen, 53 Hun, 232; Bull v. Bull, 31 Hun, 69; Burr v. Burr, 24 N. Y. 178; Clark v. Howard, 150 N. Y. 232; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555; McClellan v. Grant, 83 App. Div. 599; Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 135 App. Div. 457.)

POUND, J. Judge Beman and his wife were advanced in years. Mrs. Beman was about to die. She had a small estate consisting of a house and lot in Malone and little else. Judge Beman drew his wife's will according to her instructions. It gave $1,000 to plaintiff, $500 to one sister, plaintiff's mother, and $100 each to another sister and her son, the use of the house to her husband for life, remainder to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. She named her husband as residuary legatee and executor. Plaintiff was her niece, thirty-four years old, in ill health, sometimes a member of the Beman household. When the will was read to Mrs. Beman she said that it was not as she wanted it; she wanted to leave the house to plaintiff. She had no other objection to the will, but her strength was waning and although the judge offered to write another will for her, she said she was afraid she would not hold out long enough to enable her to sign it. So the judge said if she would sign the will he would leave plaintiff enough in his will to make up the difference. He [236] avouched the promise by his uplifted hand with all solemnity and his wife then executed the will. When he came to die it was found that his will made no provision for the plaintiff.

This action was brought and plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court on the theory that Beman had obtained property from his wife and induced her to execute the will in the form prepared by him by his promise to give plaintiff $6,000, the value of the house, and that thereby equity impressed his property with a trust in favor of plaintiff. Where a legatee promises the testator that he will use property given him by the will for a particular purpose, a trust arises. (O'Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403; Trustees of Amherst College v. Bitch, 151 N. Y. 282; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555.) Beman received nothing under his wife's will but the use of the house in Malone for life. Equity compels the application of property thus obtained to the purpose of the testator, but equity cannot so impress a trust except on property obtained by the promise. Beman was bound by his promise, but no property was bound by it; no trust in plaintiff's favor can be spelled out.

An action on the contract for damages or to make the executors trustees for performance stands on different ground. (Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N. Y. 290, 294, 295.) The Appellate Division properly passed to the consideration of the question whether the judgment could stand upon the promise made to the wife, upon a valid consideration, for the sole benefit of plaintiff. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by a return to the general doctrine laid down in the great case of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268) which has since been limited as herein indicated. 

Contracts for the benefit of third persons have been the prolific source of judicial and academic discussion. (Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, [237] 15 Harvard Law Review, 767; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 Yale Law Review, 1008.) The general rule, both in law and equity (Phalen v. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 186), was that privity between a plaintiff and a defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action on the contract. The consideration must be furnished by the party to whom the promise was made. The contract cannot be enforced against the third party and, therefore, it cannot be enforced by him. On the other hand, the right of the beneficiary to sue on a contract made expressly for his benefit has been fully recognized in many American jurisdictions, either by judicial decision or by legislation, and is said to be "the prevailing rule in this country." (Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143; Lehow v. Simonton, 3 Col. 346.) It has been said that "the establishment of this doctrine has been gradual, and is a victory of practical utility over theory, of equity over technical subtlety." (Brantly on Contracts [2d ed.], p. 253.) The reasons for this view are that it is just and practical to permit the person for whose benefit the contract is made to enforce it against one whose duty it is to pay. Other jurisdictions still adhere to the present English rule (7 Halsbury's Laws of England, 342, 343; Jenks' Digest of English Civil Law, § 229) that a contract cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party. (Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37; but see, also, Forbes v. Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570; Gardner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492.) In New York the right of the beneficiary to sue on contracts made for his benefit is not clearly or simply defined. It is at present confined, first, to cases where there is a pecuniary obligation running from the promisee to the beneficiary; "a legal right founded upon some obligation of the promisee in the third party to adopt and claim the promise as made for his benefit." (Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432; Lawrence v. Fox, supra; [238] Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233; Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280; Lorillardv. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498; Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219; Townsend v. Rackham, 143 N. Y. 516; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 161 N. Y. 554.) Secondly, to cases where the contract is made for the benefit of the wife (Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109; Bouton v. Welch, 170 N. Y. 554), affianced wife (De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431), or child (Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 193; Matter of Kidd, 188 N. Y. 274) of a party to the contract. The close relationship cases go back to the early King's Bench case (1677), long since repudiated in England, of Button v. Poole (2 Lev. 210; s. c, 1 Ventris, 318, 332). (Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 139.) The natural and moral duty of the husband or parent to provide for the future of wife or child sustains the action on the contract made for their benefit. "This is the farthest the cases in this state have gone," says CULLEN, J., in the marriage settlement case of Borland v. Welch (162 N. Y. 104, 110).

The right of the third party is also upheld in, thirdly, the public contract cases (Little v. Banks, 85 N. Y. 258; Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330; Smyth v. City of New York, 203 N. Y. 106; Farnsworth v. Boro Oil & Gas Co., 216 N. Y. 40, 48; Rigney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 217 N. Y. 31; Matter of International Ry. Co. v. Rann, 224 N. Y. 83; cf. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220) where the municipality seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their benefit and, fourthly, the cases where, at the request of a party to the contract, the promise runs directly to the beneficiary although he does not furnish the consideration. (Rector, etc., v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583; F. N. Bank of Sing Sing v. Chalmers, 144 N. Y. 432, 439; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 127 App. Div. 871, 875.) It may be safely said that a general rule sustaining recovery at the suit of the [239] third party would include but few classes of cases not included in these groups, either categorically or in principle.

The desire of the childless aunt to make provision for a beloved and favorite niece differs imperceptibly in law or in equity from the moral duty of the parent to make testamentary provision for a child. The contract was made for the plaintiff's benefit. She alone is substantially damaged by its breach. The representatives of the wife's estate have no interest in enforcing it specifically. It is said in Buchanan v. Tilden that the common law imposes moral and legal obligations upon the husband and the parent not measured by the necessaries of life. It was, however, the love and affection or the moral sense of the husband and the parent that imposed such obligations in the cases cited rather than any common-law duty of husband and parent to wife and child. If plaintiff had been a child of Mrs. Beman, legal obligation would have required no testamentary provision for her, yet the child could have enforced a covenant in her favor identical with the covenant of Judge Beman in this case. (De Cicco v. Schweizer, supra.) The constraining power of conscience is not regulated by the degree of relationship alone. The dependent or faithful niece may have a stronger claim than the affluent or unworthy son. No sensible theory of moral obligation denies arbitrarily to the former what would be conceded to the latter. We might consistently either refuse or allow the claim of both, but I cannot reconcile a decision in favor of the wife in Buchanan v. Tilden based on the moral obligations arising out of near relationship with a decision against the niece here on the ground that the relationship is too remote for equity's ken. No controlling authority depends upon so absolute a rule. In Sullivan v. Sullivan (supra) the grandniece lost in a litigation with the aunt's estate founded on a certificate of deposit payable to the aunt "or in case of her death to her niece," but [240] what was said in that case of the relations of plaintiff's intestate and defendant does not control here, any more than what was said in Durnherr v. Rau (supra) on the relation of husband and wife, and the inadequacy of mere moral duty, as distinguished from legal or equitable obligation, controlled the decision in Buchanan v. Tilden. Borland v. Welch (supra) deals only with the rights of volunteers under a marriage settlement not made for the benefit of collaterals.

KELLOGG, P. J., writing for the court below well said: "The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox is progressive, not retrograde. The course of the late decisions is to enlarge, not to limit the effect of that case." The court in that leading case attempted to adopt the general doctrine that any third person, for whose direct benefit a contract was intended, could sue on it. The head note thus states the rule. FINCH, J., in Gifford v. Corrigan (117 N. Y. 257, 262) says that the case rests upon that broad proposition; EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J., in Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co. (183 N. Y. 330, 337) calls it "the general principle;" but Vrooman v. Turner (supra) confined its application to the facts on which it was decided. " In every case in which an action has been sustained," says ALLEN, J., "there has been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the party claiming to sue upon the promise." (69 N. Y. 285.) As late as Townsend v. Rackham (143 N. Y. 516, 523) we find PECKHAM, J., saying that "to maintain the action by the third person there must be this liability to him on the part of the promisee." Buchanan v. Tilden went further than any case since Lawrence v. Fox in a desire to do justice rather than to apply with technical accuracy strict rules calling for a legal or equitable obligation. In Embler v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. (158 N. Y. 431) it may at least be said that a majority of the court did not avail themselves of the opportunity to concur with the [241] views expressed by GRAY, J.,— who wrote the dissenting opinion in Buchanan v. Tilden,— to the effect that an employee could not maintain an action on an insurance policy issued to the employer, which covered injuries to employees.

In Wright v. Glen Telephone Co. (48 Misc. Rep. 192, 195) the learned presiding justice who wrote the opinion in this case said, at Trial Term: "The right of a third person to recover upon a contract made by other parties for his benefit must rest upon the peculiar circumstances of each case rather than upon the law of some other case." "The case at bar is decided upon its peculiar facts." (EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J., in Buchanan v. Tilden.) But, on principle, a sound conclusion may be reached. If Mrs. Beman had left her husband the house on condition that he pay the plaintiff $6,000 and he had accepted the devise, he would have become personally liable to pay the legacy and plaintiff could have recovered in an action at law against him, whatever the value of the house. (Gridley v. Gridley, 24 N. Y. 130; Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136, 143; Dinan v. Coneys, 143 N. Y. 544, 547; Blackmore v. White, [1899] 1 Q. B. 293, 304.) That would be because the testatrix had in substance bequeathed the promise to plaintiff and not because close relationship or moral obligation sustained the contract. The distinction between an implied promise to a testator for the benefit of a third party to pay a legacy and an unqualified promise on a valuable consideration to make provision for the third party by will is discernible but not obvious. The tendency of American authority is to sustain the gift in all such cases and to permit the donee-beneficiary to recover on the contract. (Matter of Edmundson's Estate, [1918, Pa.] 103 Atl. Rep. 277.) The equities are with the plaintiff and they may be enforced in this action, whether it be regarded as an [242] action for damages or an action for specific performance to convert the defendants into trustees for plaintiff's benefit under the agreement.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

HOGAN, CARDOZO and CRANE, JJ., concur; HISCOCK, Ch. J., COLLIN and ANDREWS, JJ., dissent.

Judgment affirmed.

12.2.6 Notes - Seaver v. Ransom 12.2.6 Notes - Seaver v. Ransom

Note

1. In his Seaver v. Ransom opinion, Pound, J., suggests that De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917), had extended the range of New York third party beneficiary doctrine. The De Cicco case is re-printed supra p. 494. Do you read the opinion of Cardozo, J., in De Cicco as saying that Blanche Schweizer could have brought an action as third party beneficiary on the contract between her father and Count Gulinelli?

2. Does it seem to you that Seaver v. Ransom in effect overrules Vrooman v. Turner, supra p. 1346? If so, what test does Seaver establish for determining which classes of beneficiaries are entitled to sue?

12.3 The Search for Doctrinal Clarity 12.3 The Search for Doctrinal Clarity

12.3.1 The Search for Doctrinal Clarity Introduction 12.3.1 The Search for Doctrinal Clarity Introduction

Section 3. The Search for Doctrinal Clarity

The erratic historical development of the third party beneficiary idea has left us with a considerable number of triangular groupings: trustor-trustee-beneficiary; principal-agent-third party; creditor-debtor-surety; promisor-promisee-third party. The relationship among these various categories has never been entirely clear; as a result, even after the "progressive" doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox had won wide acceptance, the exact nature and scope of the rights enjoyed by a third party beneficiary remained uncertain. One important, and unresolved, issue concerned the significance of the relationship between promisee and beneficiary: Judge Gray's opinion in Lawrence v. Fox seemed to imply that Lawrence's recovery was dependent upon his standing in a particular relationship to Holly — that of creditor to debtor — suggesting, perhaps, that if things had been otherwise Lawrence might have lost his lawsuit. Sixty years later, in Seaver v. Ransom, the same court emphasized the special relationship between niece (third party) and aunt (promisee), carefully avoiding an explicit endorsement of what the headnote to Lawrence v. Fox had exuberantly declared to be the "general doctrine" of that case that "any third person, for whose direct benefit a contract was intended, could sue on it" (emphasis added). All of this left the reach of the doctrine in doubt; by 1918 no one could dispute that contract beneficiaries had certain established legal rights, at least in New York and a few other progressive jurisdictions, but the class of beneficiaries entitled to protection remained almost as undefined as it had been in 1859.

The Restatement First of Contracts devoted an entire Chapter (Chapter 6, §§3-147) to the subject of third party rights. Chapter 6 was almost certainly the handiwork of Arthur Corbin, a tireless proselytizer for the rights of third party beneficiaries. (Corbin wrote six articles on the subject and probably did more than any court to win acceptance for the doctrine.) See Waters, The Property In the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1148-1172 (1985). The nomenclature that the Restaters adopted to describe the rights of contract beneficiaries has been widely employed in subsequent opinions and, on first appearance, seems a useful aid in reducing to a semblance of order the doctrinal chaos reviewed in the preceding section.

The Restatement First's treatment of third party beneficiaries begins with a distinction among what are termed "donee," "creditor," and "incidental" beneficiaries. Subsections (1) and (2) of §133 provide:

(1) Where performance of-a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is. . .

(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise or all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary;

(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds;

(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exists.

(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (1a) is a gift promise. Such a promise as is described in Subsection (1b) is a promise to discharge the promisee's duty.

Section 147 provides that: "An incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the promisor or the promisee." Thus, under the Restatement First's categorization, a beneficiary must be able to qualify either as a "donee beneficiary" or a "creditor beneficiary" in order to be entitled to bring an action. The term "incidental beneficiary" is used to describe would-be beneficiaries who do not qualify. In the Comment to §133 the Restaters give the following illustrations of such would-be or non-qualifying beneficiaries:

 9. B promises A for sufficient consideration to pay whatever debts A may incur in a certain undertaking. A incurs in the undertaking debts to C, D and E. If, on a fair interpretation of B's promise, the amount of the debts is to be paid by B to C, D and E, they are creditor beneficiaries; if the money is to be paid to A in order that he may be provided with money to pay C, D and E, they are at most incidental beneficiaries.

11. B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A's land. C's adjoining land would be enhanced in value by the performance of the contract. C is an incidental beneficiary.

12. B contracts with A to buy A a new Gordon automobile. The Gordon Company is an incidental beneficiary. Though the contract cannot be performed without the payment of money to the Gordon Company, the payment is not intended as a gift nor is the payment a discharge of a real or supposed obligation of the promisee to the beneficiary.

 The Comment to S147 adds a fourth illustration;

 A, an owner of land, enters into a contract with B, a contractor, by which B contracts to erect a building containing certain vats. C contracts with B to build the vats according to the specifications in the contract. The vats are installed in the building, but, owing to defective construction, leak and cause harm to A C is under no duty to A who is only an incidental beneficiary of the contract between Band C, since C's performance is not given or received in discharge of B's duty to A

 In the Restatement Second, the topic of contract beneficiaries is addressed in Chapter 14 (§§302-315). The Introductory Note to Chapter 14 states that the terms "donee" and "creditor" beneficiary have been avoided because they "carry overtones of obsolete doctrinal difficulties."Instead, the Restaters have chosen to build their discussion of third party rights on a distinction between what are termed "intended" and "incidental" beneficiaries. Section 302 reads as follows:

 (1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance if the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either

 (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or

 (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.

 (2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

As under the Restatement First "[a]n incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the promisor or the promisee"(§315).

Does this shift in terminology seem to you significant? Helpful? How would the cases in the preceding section have been decided under the two Restatements? It is clear enough that the plaintiff in Lawrence v. Fox 'was a "creditor" beneficiary and the niece in Seaver v. Ransom a "done" beneficiary. But how about the mortgagee in the situation illustrated by Vrooman v. Turner? Can he even be described as an "intended" beneficiary? Under the approach adopted in the Restatement Second, C has rights under the A-B contract only if that is the intention of "the parties."Does this mean that A and B must both have such an intention, or is it sufficient that B (the promisee) intend to confer rights on C? Significantly, Comment d to §302 states that "if the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary." This is clearly meant to protect the reliance interest of the beneficiary and suggests that neither A nor B need have an actual intention to benefit C in order for C to have rights under their contract as a third party beneficiary. In a case of this sort, what would the extent of C's rights be? See Restatement Second §90(1) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person . . . ") (emphasis added).

As you read the following materials, consider whether the Restatement First's emphasis on the promisee-beneficiary relationship or the Restatement Second's general requirement of intent seems more consistent with the case law, and whether either is desirable.

12.3.2 Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. Continental Casualty Company 12.3.2 Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. Continental Casualty Company

219 F.2d 645 (1955)

SOCONY-VACUUM OIL COMPANY, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 156, Docket 23179.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued January 13, 1955.
Decided February 7, 1955.

[646] Edmunds, Austin & Wick, Burlington, Vt., for plaintiff-appellant.

Fletcher B. Joslin, Theriault & Joslin, Montpelier, Vt. (Andrew Eckel, New York City, Donald B. Knight, Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and FRANK and HINCKS, Circuit Judges.

HINCKS, Circuit Judge.

The Bennett-Stewart Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the prime contractor) was awarded a contract by the United States Government to construct a radar station at St. Albans, Vermont, and gave the "performance bond" and the "payment bond" required by the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270a, 270b.[1] The prime contractor entered into a subcontract with R. F. Carpenter, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the subcontractor) for road and parking area construction work around the radar station. Obviously having in mind its liabilities under the Miller Act to the subcontractor's materialmen, the prime contractor required the subcontractor to furnish a surety bond. The subcontractor, accordingly, provided a surety bond whereby it, as principal, and the defendant surety company, as surety, obligated themselves to the prime contractor in the penal sum of $162,000. This bond, which was made a part of the complaint, was conditioned as follows:

"Whereas, the above bounden Principal has entered into a certain written contract with the above named Obligee, dated the 8th day of May, 1950, for the construction of Roads, Parking Areas, etc., at St. Albans, Vermont.

Which contract is hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully and to the same extent as if copied at length herein.

Now Therefore, The Condition of The Above Obligation Is Such, That if the above bounden Principal shall pay all labor and material obligations and shall well and truly keep, do and perform, each and every, all and singular, the matters and things in said contract set forth and specified to be by the said Principal kept, done and performed at the time and [647] in the manner in said contract specified, and shall pay over, make good and reimburse to the above named Obligee, all loss and damage which said Obligee may sustain by reason of failure or default on the part of said Principal, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise to be and remain in full force and effect."

The plaintiff herein was a materialman of the subcontractor which, having failed within the time limitations of the proviso in Section 2 of the Miller Act, 40 U.S. C.A. § 270b(a), to perfect its rights against the surety on the prime contractor's payment bond, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont to recover for material furnished by it to the subcontractor for use in the performance of the subcontract and hence a part of the material provided in the prosecution of the main contract. The basis of jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship and no jurisdictional problem is presented.

In the court below the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had no right in the bond because the bond was for the benefit of the prime contractor only and not third parties, and that the plaintiff by failing to pursue its rights against the prime contractor under the Miller Act had injured the defendant. This motion was granted, 122 F.Supp. 621, on the ground that the bond was given only for the benefit of the prime contractor, and not for the protection of the plaintiff as a materialman. From the ensuing judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The record shows that the defendant Casualty Company was an Illinois corporation, that its principal — the subcontractor — was a Vermont corporation, and that the prime contractor was a Massachusetts corporation, and that the subcontract was one to be performed in Vermont. There is nothing in the record to show that the parties to the bond contemplated or agreed that it was to be interpreted or governed by the law of any particular state. Accordingly, we think the problem presented should be determined by the law of Vermont. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188.

However, there seems to be neither statute nor judicial precedent in Vermont bearing on the problem. And the problem presented has been variously decided in various jurisdictions. Confronted with this dilemma our task is not to surmise which line of judicial precedent a Vermont court would follow if presented with the case, but rather, by looking to the same sources which a Vermont court would presumably consult and by weighing the comparative reasoning of learned authors and conflicting judicial decisions for their intrinsic soundness, to define the pertinent law which when thus ascertained is presumably the law of Vermont even though as yet unannounced by a Vermont Court. See Moore, Commentary on the United States Judicial Code, pp. 338-340.

Professor Corbin in his work on law of contracts, 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sections 798-804, has this to say: "* * * the third party has an enforcible right if the surety promises in the bond, either in express words or by reasonable implication, to pay money to him. If there is such a promissory expression as this, there need be no discussion of 'intention to benefit'. We need not speculate for whose benefit the contract was made, or wonder whether the promisee was buying the promise for his own selfish interest or for philanthropic purposes. It is a much simpler question: Did the surety promise to pay money to the plaintiff?" See also Corbin, "Contractor's Surety Bonds," 38 Yale Law Journal 1. This doctrine, we think, has the support of the great weight of authority. A long line of cases cited to such doctrine in 77 A.L.R. 53 amplifies the cases which Professor Corbin particularly cites.

It is true that in the bond here sued on the only expressly promissory words are those whereby the surety acknowledges itself bound to the prime contractor, as obligee, in the penal sum of $162,000. But since the bond is stated to be on condition that the principal — here the [648] subcontractor — "shall pay all labor and material obligations," the words of the condition are the full equivalent of words of direct promise.[2]

We are unable to recognize either the validity or the relevance of the conclusion of the trial judge that the bond was given only for the benefit of the prime contractor and not for the protection of materialmen. Doubtless the prime contractor in requiring a bond of its subcontractor sought protection against his own liability to materialmen of the subcontractor. But this he obtained through a bond requiring the payment of the materialmen. Obviously it was contemplated that performance under the bond would benefit not only the prime contractor who would thereby be exonerated from liability to the materialmen thus paid but also the materialmen of the subcontractor who were thereby to be paid.

But this aside, we think it was wholly irrelevant for the trial judge to speculate as to the motives of the parties of the bond. The scope of the bond, like any written contract, must be determined not by the unexpressed motive of the parties but rather by the ordinary meaning of the words which they used. By this simple test, the defendant here was plainly obligated to pay "material obligations" such as that sued on here.

The situation is affected not at all by the fact that the plaintiff failed to perfect its rights under the Miller Act against the prime contractor and its surety. The bond now sought to reach was not one required under that Act and the rights to which it gave rise are not qualified by the Act or conditioned upon the timely pursuit of remedies under that Act. The rights under this bond must be determined by its language interpreted as of the date it was given. At that time, of course, it was not known whether all or some of the materialmen would fail or decline to press their rights under the Miller Act.

Moreover, the bond was conditioned not only on the payment of "material obligations" but also on reimbursement to the obligee of "all loss and damage which said obligee may sustain by reason of failure or default on the part of said Principal." This latter branch of the condition was broad enough to protect the prime contractor against claims of materialmen which through timely prosecution had actually caused loss to the prime contractor or his surety. The branch of the condition calling for payment of material obligations without limitation to those which might be timely prosecuted under the Miller Act imports an intent that all were to be included within the obligation of the bond.

The judge below relied on the case of Spokane Merchants' Ass'n v. Pacific Surety Co., 1915, 86 Wash. 489, 150 P. 1054, and in support of his ruling the plaintiff-appellee cites the recent case of McGrath v. American Surety Company of New York, 307 N.Y. 552, 122 N.E.2d [649] 906. The McGrath decision was predicated on prior decisions of that court, viz.: Eastern Steel Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 227 N.Y. 586, 125 N.E. 917; Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 90 Hun 74, 35 N.Y.S. 453, affirmed on opinion below, 156 N.Y. 702, 51 N.E. 1089, and Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472. But these three cases which the court cited in the McGrath opinion were all cases relating to bonds in which a prime contractor was the principal and the state or a municipality was the obligee: in each, the bond given was one required by statute or ordinance. Consequently none involved the rights of materialmen against the surety of a subcontractor under a private bond. Certainly these cases are not apposite to the case before us: considerations of public policy affecting the scope of statutory bonds are absent when it comes to determine the scope of a private bond. Notwithstanding, we find, at least in the Fosmire and Buffalo Cement cases, dicta which we think support our holding here as to the plaintiff's right under a private bond.

We do not blink the fact that the McGrath case, as far as appears from the facts stated in the opinion, is legally indistinguishable from that now before us. True, in McGrath the subcontractor furnished both a payment bond and a performance bond whereas here a single bond is involved which is conditioned both for payment of "material obligations" and for performance of the subcontract. But this, we think, is a difference without legal significance. But both the Spokane and the McGrath cases and others of similar purport we think out of line with the great weight of authority referred to above. With deference, we suggest that it is unfortunate doctrine to modify the scope of a plainly stated written obligation in a private bond by the supposed motive of the obligee, as these cases seem to do. Such doctrine leads to unnecessary and undesirable uncertainty in business relationships. It means that one within the orbit of a private bond cannot rely upon a plainly stated obligation: instead he must search for the undisclosed motive of the parties and take that as the measure of his rights.

In cases such as these involving a private bond not required by statute, even if — contrary to our view — there be need to search for the motive which led to the taking of a bond, we find a lack of rational basis for an analysis which goes no further than to recognize intent to provide protection to the obligee against actually accrued liability under some statute such as the Miller Act. To say that the object of the bond was only to protect the obligee against liabilities imposed upon him by the Miller Act overlooks the fact that the bond was not required by that Act and calls for the payment of "all labor and material obligations" without express limitation to liabilities of the obligee under the Miller Act. In our view, the object of the bond was to accomplish the payment of these obligations and by such payment to provide protection to the obligee. If the obligee sought indemnity only or if it wished to exclude third parties from benefit under a surety bond, the natural presumption is that it would not have required a surety's payment bond. But here the prime contractor required a payment bond and paid the premium for a payment bond, at least indirectly under the terms of the subcontract whereby the subcontractor made the direct payment. And the defendant in return for the premium, furnished a payment bond. It follows that the surety should not be allowed to avoid the obligation which it was paid to assume by suggesting that as things turned out the obligee did not need all the protection which was bargained and paid for. Were we to hold otherwise, we should in effect, by substituting a mere contract for indemnity for the bond which was made, be presenting the defendant surety company with an unearned windfall.

Since we find it necessary to remand, it seems advisable to say that we find no merit in the defendant's assertion, by way of defense, that is was injured by [650] the plaintiff's failure to pursue its right against the prime contractor under the Miller Act. If the plaintiff, when it furnished material, had a right against the prime contractor and his surety and also, as we hold, a right against the subcontractor and the defendant as its surety, we know of no principle of law which required the plaintiff first to exhaust its remedy against the prime contractor and its surety.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] The Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 270a provides:

"(a) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States is awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to the United States the following bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of the contract to such person, who is hereinafter designated as 'contractor':

"(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer awarding such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the protection of the United States.

"(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract for the use of each such person."

Section 270b provides:

"(a) Every person who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished under section 270a of this title and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the last of the labor was done or performed by him or material was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him: Provided, however, That any person having direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship express or implied with the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall have a right of action upon the said payment bond upon giving written notice to said contractor within ninety days from the date on which such person did or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the material for which such claim is made, stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the material was furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done or performed."

[2] 4 Corbin on Contracts, pages 177-178.

"Words of 'condition' are not words of 'promise' in form; but in this class of cases it is sound policy to interpret the words liberally in favor of the third parties. In a majority of states, it is already done; and without question the surety's rate of compensation for carrying the risk is sufficiently adjusted to the law. The compensated surety has become an institution that is well suited to carry the risk of the principal contractor's default, whereas individual laborers and materialmen are frequently very ill prepared to carry the risk. The legislatures have recognized this fact, and in the case of public contracts have required surety bonds to protect the third parties. While this has not been done in the case of private construction, and while the courts should not on their own motion put such a provision into a private surety bond, they may well interpret a bond that is expressly conditioned on the payment of laborers and materialmen as being a promise to pay them and made for their benefit. The words reasonably permit it, and social policy approves it. The court need not strain the words of the bond, as has sometimes been done, to hold that the third persons were not intended as beneficiaries thereof, even though the promisee may have been thinking chiefly of himself when he paid for the bond."

12.3.3 Notes - Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. 12.3.3 Notes - Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.

NOTE

1. In his Opinion in the Socony-Vacuum case, Judge Hincks concluded that McGrath v. American Surety Co., 307 N.Y. 552,122 N.E.2d 906 (1954), was "legally indistinguishable" from the case at bar, but evidently was not impressed by the reasoning of the New York court in McGrath.

Shortly after the Second Circuit's Socony-Vacuum decision had been handed down, the New York Court of Appeals decided Daniel-Morris Co., Inc. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 308 N.Y. 464, 126 N.E.2d 750 (1955). The general contractor on a housing project, which was, apparently, privately financed, had required his subcontractors to furnish both performance and payment bonds. Plaintiff had furnished materials to a subcontractor and, remaining unpaid, brought an action against the surety company on the payment bond. Without overruling McGrath, the Court held for plaintiff. Dye, J., wrote:

. . . The underlying contract, as we have pointed out, required the furnishing of work and materials "free of the lien of any third party" and indemnity for nonperformance. To meet this underlying obligation two separate and distinct bonds were given. Suit by this plaintiff to enforce the payment bond is an entirely different situation than that existing where the obligations of the surety are combined in a single payment-performance bond. In such a situation a materialman may not maintain a separate suit as a third-party beneficiary because the primary or dominant purpose of the combined bond is regarded as "performance" which should not be dissipated or defeated by the neglect of the subcontractor to meet his obligation (Fosmire v. National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44).

Here we are not confronted with the problem of ascertaining the dominant purpose of a bond having a twofold function, but simply whether the primary, paramount purpose of this bond — payment of materialmen — may be enforced by a materialman. On this record it is clear that he may. This introduces no new principle — a materialman is allowed to sue as a third-party beneficiary whenever "the primary purpose of [the] bond but . . . also [its] paramount purpose" is to benefit creditors (d. McClare v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 371, 377). The language of the within bond specifically provides that the materials furnished are to be "free of the lien of any third party." When this is read in conjunction with the underlying contract, the inference is irresistible that the parties intended to benefit unpaid materialmen. The intention to benefit is pointed up by the fact that the separate performance bond given to the prime contractor afforded it protection for noncompletion of the work, which necessarily included the contingencies within the indemnification of the payment bond. The materialman, on the other hand, had no recourse against the performance bond.

The intention to benefit the materialmen must not be confused with the motive of the parties in entering into the bond. Big-W's demand for indemnification, as pointed out in the opinion below, "supplies the motive in [1371] securing the undertaking rather than the intent as to who shall be benefited." Once the right is created the law furnishes a remedy irrespective of the motivation of the parties (Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268; 2 Williston on Contracts, §§372-402; Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds, 38 Yale L.J. 1).

McGrath v. American Sur. Co. (283 App. Div. 693, 698, revd. 307 N.Y. 552) is not authority to the contrary. There it clearly appeared that the bond sought to be enforced was not intended to supersede or supplement the right of action given materialmen under the Miller Act (U.S. Code, tit. 40, §§270a, 270b; cf. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 219 F.2d 645 [U.S. Court of Appeals, 2d Cir.]).

Id. at 468-469, 126 N.E.2d at 752-753.

2. A Note in 41 Cornell L.Q. 482 (1956) reviews the New York cases and concludes that the court reached a proper result in both the McGrath and Daniel-Morris cases, albeit on faulty reasoning. The author remarks that the "vexing problem" of the materialman's right to sue on the contractor's surety bond "has already caused an immense amount of unnecessary litigation, and court decisions, many hamstrung by outworn dogma, leave the law in this area conflicting and uncertain." The author proposes that the "intent-to-benefit" test be discarded and suggests that "a test eliminating ambiguity and furnishing a sound basis would be: Was it a distinct objective of the exact performance specified in the condition of the bond that the surety assumes a direct obligation to materialmen." This test, the author concludes, would result in payment to materialmen, but without possible confusion with claims of incidental beneficiaries. Do you agree?

3. In the principal case and the other cases referred to in this Note the surety company writes its bond on account of its principal, the subcontractor, undertaking in favor of the general contractor (obligee of the bond) that the subcontractor's debts for labor and materials will be paid. In contract terminology, the surety company is the promisor and the general contractor is the promisee. The plaintiff has furnished materials (or labor) to the subcontractor. Under the definitions in Restatement First §133, is the plaintiff (in states that allow him to recover) a creditor beneficiary or a donee beneficiary? For contradictory answers to the question see 4 Corbin §802; 2 Williston §372.

12.3.4 Lucas v. Hamm 12.3.4 Lucas v. Hamm

15 Cal.Rptr. 821
56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685

Robert LUCAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
L. S. HAMM, Defendant and Respondent.

S. F. 20269.
Supreme Court of California, In Bank.
Sept. 5, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1961.

[15 Cal.Rptr. 822] [364 P.2d 686] [56 Cal.2d 586] Reginald G. Hearn, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Philip H. Angell, Scott Elder, Robert M. Adams, Jr., Angell, Adams, Gochnauer & Elder and B. E. Kragen, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, who are some of the beneficiaries under the will of Eugene H. Emmick, deceased, brought this action for damages against defendant L. S. Hamm, an attorney at law who had been engaged by the testator to prepare the will. They have appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after an order sustaining a general demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend.

The allegations of the first and second causes of action are summarized as follows: Defendant agreed with the testator, for a consideration, to prepare a will and condicils thereto for him by which plaintiffs were to be designated as beneficiaries of a trust provided for by paragraph Eighth of the will and were to receive 15% of the residue as specified in that paragraph. Defendant, in violation of instructions and in breach of his contract, negligently prepared testamentary instruments containing phraseology that was invalid by virtue of section 715.2 and former sections 715.1 and 716 of the Civil Code relating to restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities.[1] Paragraph Eighth of these instruments [15 Cal.Rptr. 823] [364 P.2d 687] [56 Cal.2d 587] "transmitted" the residual estate in trust and provided that the "trust shall cease and terminate at 12 o'clock noon on a day five years after the date upon which the order distributing the trust property to the trustee is made by the Court having jurisdiction over thr probation of this will." After the death of the testator the instruments were admitted to probate. Subsequently defendant, as draftsman of the instruments and as counsel of record for the executors, advised plaintiffs in writing that the residual trust provision was invalid and that plaintiffs would be deprived of the entire amount to which they would have been entitled if the provision had been valid unless they made a settlement with the blood relatives of the testator under which plaintiffs would receive a lesser amount than that provided for them by the testator. As the direct and proximate result of the negligence of defendant and his breach of contract in preparing the testamentary instruments and the written advice referred to above, plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a settlement under which they received a share of the estate amounting to $75,000 less than the sum which they would have received pursuant to testamentary instruments drafted in accordance with the directions of the testator.

(The third cause of action will be discussed separarately because it concerns matters not involved in the first two counts.)

[56 Cal.2d 588] It was held in Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900, 31 L.R.A. 862, that an attorney who made a mistake in drafting a will was not liable for negligence or breach of contract to a person named in the will who was deprived of benefits as a result of the error. The court stated that an attorney is liable to his client alone with respect to actions based on negligence in the conduct of his professional duties, and it was reasoned that there could be no recovery for mere negligence where there was no privity by contract or otherwise between the defendant and the person injured. 110 Cal. at pages 342-343, 42 P. 900. The court further concluded that there could be no recovery on the theory of a contract for the benefit of a third person, because the contract with the attorney was not expressly for the plaintiff's benefit and the testatrix only remotely intended the plaintiff to be benefited as a result of the contract. 110 Cal. at pages 346-347, 42 P. 900. For the reasons hereinafter stated the case is overruled.

The reasoning underlying the denial of tort liability in the Buckley case, i. e., the stringent privity test, was rejected in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-650, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358, where we held that a notary public who, although not authorized to practice law, prepared a will but negligently failed to direct proper attestation was liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who was damaged because of the invalidity of the instrument. It was pointed out that since 1895, when Buckley was decided, the rule that in the absence of privity there was no liability for negligence committed in the performance of a contract had been greatly liberalized. 49 Cal.2d at page 649, 320 P.2d 16. In restating the rule it was said that the determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm. 49 Cal.2d at page 650, 320 P.2d 16. The same general principle must be applied in determining whether a beneficiary [15 Cal.Rptr. 824] [364 P.2d 688] is entitled to bring an action for negligence in the drafting of a will when the instrument is drafted by an attorney rather than by a person not authorized to practice law.

Many of the factors which led to the conclusion that the notary public involved in Biakanja was liable are equally [56 Cal.2d 589] applicable here. As in Biakanja, one of the main purposes which the transaction between defendant and the testator intended to accomplish was to provide for the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to plaintiffs in the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable; it became certain, upon the death of the testator without change of the will, that plaintiffs would have received the intended benefits but for the asserted negligence of defendant; and if persons such as plaintiffs are not permitted to recover for the loss resulting from negligence of the draftsman, no one would be able to do so, and the policy of prevent future harm would be impaired.

Since defendant was authorized to practice the profession of an attorney, we must consider an additional factor not present in Biakanja, namely, whether the recognition of liability to beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn by attorneys would impose an undue burden on the profession. Although in some situations liability could be large and unpredictable in amount, this is also true of an attorney's liability to his client. We are of the view that the extension of his liability to beneficiaries injured by a negligently drawn will does not place an undue burden on the profession, particularly when we take into consideration that a contrary conclusion would cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the loss. The fact that the notary public involved in Biakanja was guilty of unauthorized practice of the law was only a minor factor in determining that he was liable, and the absence of the factor in the present case does not justify reaching a different result.

It follows that the lack of privity between plaintiffs and defendant does not preclude plaintiffs from maintaining an action in tort against defendant.

Neither do we agree with the holding in Buckley that beneficiaries damaged by an error in the drafting of a will cannot recover from the draftsman on the theory that they are third-party beneficiaries of the contract between him and the testator.[2] Obviously the main purpose of a contract [56 Cal.2d 590] for the drafting of a will is to accomplish the future transfer of the estate of the testator to the beneficiaries named in the will, and therefore it seems improper to hold, as was done in Buckley, that the testator intended only "remotely" to benefit those persons. It is true that under a contract for the benefit of a third person performance is usually to be rendered directly to the beneficiary, but this is not necessarily the case. (See Rest., Contracts, § 133, com. d; 2 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed.1959) 829.) For example, where a life insurance policy lapsed because a bank failed to perform its agreement to pay the premiums out of the insured's bank account, it was held that after the insured's death the beneficiaries could recover against the bank as third-party beneficiaries. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 945 et seq. Persons who had agreed to procure liability insurance for the protection of the promisees but did not do so were also held liable to injured persons who would have been covered by the insurance, the courts stating that all persons who might be injured were third-party beneficiaries of the contracts to procure insurance. [15 Cal.Rptr. 825] [364 P.2d 689] Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Merc., Inc., 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 296 et seq., 325 P.2d 193; James Stewart & Co. v. Law, 149 Tex. 392, 233 S.W.2d 558, 561-562, 22 A.L.R.2d 639. Since, in a situation like those presented here and in the Buckley case, the main purpose of the testator in making his agreement with the attorney is to benefit the persons named in his will and this intent can be effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney, only by giving the beneficiaries a right of action, we should recognize, as a matter of policy, that they are entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries. See 2 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed. 1959) pp. 843-844; 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) pp. 8, 20.

Section 1559 of the Civil Code, which provides for enforcement by a third person of a contract made "expressly" for his benefit, does not preclude this result. The effect of the section is to exclude enforcement by persons who are only incidentally or remotely benefited. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 244, 73 P.2d 1163; cf. 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) pp. 23-24. As we have seen, a contract for the drafting of a will unmistakably shows the intent of the testator to benefit the persons to be named in the will, and the attorney must necessarily understand this.

Defendant relies on language in Smith v. Anglo- [56 Cal.2d 591] California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 P. 898, and Fruitvale Canning Co. v. Cotton, 115 Cal.App.2d 622, 625, 252 P.2d 953, that to permit a third person to bring an action on a contract there must be "an intent clearly manifested by the promisor" to secure some benefit to the third person. This language, which was not necessary to the decision in either of the cases, is unfortunate. Insofar as intent to benefit a third person is important in determining his right to bring an action under a contract, it is sufficient that the promisor must have understood that the promisee had such intent. (Cf. Rest., Contracts, § 133, subds. 1(a) and 1(b); 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) pp. 16-18; 2 Williston on Contracts (3rd ed. 1959) pp. 836-839). No specific manifestation by the promisor of an intent to benefit the third person is required. The language relied on by defendant is disapproved to the extent that it is inconsistent with these views.

We conclude that intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testamentary rights because of failure of the attorney who drew the will to properly fulfill his obligations under his contract with the testator may recover as third-party beneficiaries.

However, an attorney is not liable either to his client or to a beneficiary under a will for errors of the kind alleged in the first and second causes of action.

The general rule with respect to the liability of an attorney for failure to properly perform his duties to his client is that the attorney, by accepting employment to give legal advice or to render other legal services, impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake. Estate of Kruger, 130 Cal. 621, 626, 63 P. 31; Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal.App.2d 1, 7, 200 P.2d 7; Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal.App. 677, 684, 283 P. 871; see Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence (1959) 12 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 755, 762-765; 5 Am.Jur. 336. The attorney is not liable for efery mistake he may make in his practice; he is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. See Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 786, 171 P. 961; Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198, 25 L.Ed. 621; [56 Cal.2d 592] 5 Am.Jur. 335; 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 143, p. 980. These principles are equally applicable whether the plaintiff's claim is based on tort or breach of contract.

[364 P.2d 690] [15 Cal.Rptr. 826] The complaint, as we have seen, alleges that defendant drafted the will in such a manner that the trust was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities and restraints on alienation. These closely akin subjects have long perplexed the courts and the bar. Professor Gray, a leading authority in the field, stated:

"There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps it is because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are most familiar. * * * A long list might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with regard to its questions made by eminent men, blunders which they themselves have been sometimes the first to acknowledge; and there are few lawyers of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who have not at some time either fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least shuddered to think how narrowly they have escaped it."

Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) p. xi; see also Leach, Perpetuities Legislation (1954) 67 Harv.L.Rev. 1349 (describing the rule as a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare" and a "dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of the bar"). Of the California law on perpetuities and restraints it has been said that few, if any, areas of the law have been fraught with more confusion or concealed more traps for the unwary draftsman; that members of the bar, probate courts, and title insurance companies make errors in these matters; that the code provisions adopted in 1872 created a situation worse than if the matter had been left to the common law, and that the legislation adopted in 1951 (under which the will involved here was drawn), despite the best of intentions, added rurther complexities. (See 38 Cal.Jur.2d 443; Coil, Perpetuities and Restraints; A Needed Reform (1955) 30 State Bar J. 87, 88-90.)

In view of the state of the law relating to perpetutities and restraints on alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by defendant in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that defendant failed to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise. The provision of the will quoted in the complaint, namely, that the trust was to terminate five years after the order of the probate court distributing the property to the trustee, could cause the trust to be [56 Cal.2d 593] invalid only because of the remote possibility that the order of distribution would be delayed for a period longer than a life in being at the creation of the interest plus 16 years (the 21-year statutory period less the five years specified in the will). Although it has been held that a possibility of this type could result in invalidity of a bequest (Estate of Johnston, 47 Cal.2d 265, 269-270, 303 P.2d 1; Estate of Campbell, 28 Cal.App.2d 102, 103 et seq., 82 P.2d 22), the possible occurrence of such a delay was so remote and unlikely that an attorney of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might well have "fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary" and failed to recognize the danger. We need not decide whether the trust provision of the will was actually invalid or whether, as defendant asserts, the complaint fails to allege facts necessary to enable such a determination,[3] because we have concluded that in any event an error of the type relied on by plaintiffs does not show negligence or breach of constract on the part of defendant. It is apparent that plaintiffs have not stated and cannot state causes of action with respect to the first two counts, and the trial court did not [15 Cal.Rptr. 827] [364 P.2d 691] abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend as to these counts.

The third cause of action contains additional allegations as follows: After admission of the will and codicils to probate, Harold Houghton Emmick, Walton Russell Emmick, Clelta Inez Spelman, and Retha Newell, hereinafter called the contestants, instituted a will contest. The executors, defendant, and the contestants tentatively reached a settlement agreement, subject to court approval, under which $10,000 would be paid to the contestants from the assets of the estate in return for which each contestant would sign an "appropriate release." Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties in that he caused to be executed on behalf of the estate and those interested therein, including plaintiffs, releases which did not precluded the contrestants from a subsequent attack upon the validity of the testamentary instruments. After complete execution of the releases and their transmittal to escrow but before approval of the compromise [56 Cal.2d 594] by the court, defendant was advised by competent counsel that the residual clause of the will and codicils was invalid as a violation of the rule against perpetuities and that as a consequence the phraseology of the releases was inadequate to protect the estate and persons interested therein, and defendant was requested by competent counsel to modify the releases and insert appropriate language suggested by counsel under which the contestants would release the estate and persons interested in it from any claims of whatsoever kind or nature. Defendant refused to do so and also refused to call the court's attention to the recommendations. As a consequence of the failure to direct the matter to the attention of the court, the order approving the compromise was made on the assumption that the releases would give adequate protection. The sum of $10,000 was paid to the contestants from the assets of the estate, and the releases were filed in the proceedings. Subsequently the contestants joined in a legal attack upon the validity of the residual clause of the will and codicils and by virtue of the invalidity of the clause participated in the settlement referred to above concerning paragraph Eighth of the will. If the releases had been prepared in accord with good legal practice they would have precluded such participation, with the result that plaintiffs would have received an additional sum of $15,000 from the estate.

This cause of action, unlike the first two, does not concern defendant's conduct as attorney for the testator, but, rather, asserted negligence by him when acting as attorney for the executors with respect to the execution of releases in the settlement of a will contest based on lack of testamentary capacity. It is undisputed that the releases were adequate to preclude any further litigation of that contest, but plaintiffs assert that defendant had a duty to obtain releases which, in addition, would waive all other claims of the contestants against the estate and prevent them from subsequently attacking the validity of the trust provisions.

There are no allegations that the contestants, either at the time of the negotiations for the settlement or at the time of the signing of the releases, were willing to waive their rights to make other attacks upon the will after the settlement of that contest. In the absence of additional allegations we must assume that the agreed sum of $10,000 was intended solely for the settlement of the contest and the ground on which it was based, i. e., lack of testamentary capacity, and it would ordinarily be expected that the contestants would have demanded [56 Cal.2d 595] an additional sum for a more extensive waiver terminating their rights to attack the validity of the various provisions of the will. The written releases, of course, were required to conform to the settlement agreement. Under these circumstances it could well be argued that the attorneys for the contestants would have been derelict in their duty to their clients if they had approved broader releases. At most, under the allegations, defendant had a duty to request [15 Cal.Rptr. 828] [364 P.2d 692] that the contestants sign broader releases, but there is no allegation that he failed to ask them to do so. The third count does not state a cause of action for negligence.

Although defendant pointed out in both the trial court and this court that there is no allegation that he could have secured releases different from the ones given, plaintiffs make no claim that they can amend their complaint so as to cure the deficiency, and we cannot properly hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.

The judgment is affirmed.

TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, McCOMB, PETERS, WHITE and DOOLING, JJ., concur.

[1] Former section 715.1 of the Civil Code, as it read at the times involved here, provided:

"The absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a period longer than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of suspension must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence of thir deaths is likely to be unreasonaly difficult to obtain."

Section 715.2 reads as follows:

"No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of vesting must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain. It is intended by the enactment of this section to make effective in this State the American common-law rule against perpetuities."

Former section 716, as it read at the times involved here, provided:

"Every future interest is void in its creation which, by any posssibility, may suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than in prescribed in this chapter. Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute interest in possession can be conveyed. The period of time during which an interest is destructible pursuant to the uncontrolled volition and for the exclusive personal benefit of the person having such a power of destruction is not to be included in determining the existence of a suspension of the absolute power of alienation or the permissible period for the vesting of an interest within the rule against perpetuities."

[2] It has been recognized in other jurisdictions that the client may recover in a contract action for failure of the attorney to carry out his agreement. (See 5 Am.Jur. 331; 49 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1219-1221; Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (1954) pp. 438, 422.) This is in accord with the general rule stated in Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R.2d 883, that where a case sounds in both tort and contract, the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between the two actions.

[3] Defendant asserts that a provision of a will like the one quoted in the complaint could not cause a trust to be invalid unless it also appeared that there were contingent interests which could not vest within the statutory time or that the trust could not be terminated by the beneficiaries acting together within the statutory period. See Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752, 759-760, 190 P. 17; Estate of Heberle, 155 Cal. 723, 726-727, 102 P. 935; Rest., Trusts, Second, § 337.

12.3.5 Notes - Lucas v. Hamm 12.3.5 Notes - Lucas v. Hamm

NOTE

1. In Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969), the California Supreme Court had an opportunity to reconsider the rationale of the Lucas case. Heyer, like Lucas, was an action by the intended beneficiaries of a will against the attorney who had, it was alleged, negligently drafted the will with the result that the plaintiffs did not receive part of the bequest they had been meant to receive. Writing for the court in bank, Judge Tobriner had this to say:

In the earlier case of Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358, we had held that a notary public who negligently failed to direct proper attestation of a will became liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who suffered damage because of the invalidity of the instrument. In that case, the defendant argued that the absence of privity deprives a plaintiff of a remedy for negligence committed in the performance of a contract. In rejecting this contention we pointed out that the inflexible privity requirement for such a tort recovery has been virtually abandoned in California. . . .

Applying the Biakanja criteria to the facts of Lucas, the court found that attorneys incur a duty in favor of certain third persons, namely, intended testamentary beneficiaries. In proceeding to discuss the contractual remedy of such persons as the plaintiffs in Lucas, we concluded that "as a matter of policy, . . . they are entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries." (56 Cal. 2d at p. 590, 15 Cal. Rptr. at p. 825, 364 P.2d at p. 689.) The presence of the Biakanja criteria in a contractual setting led us to sustain not only the availability of a tort remedy but of a third-party beneficiary contractual remedy as well. This latter theory of recovery, however, is conceptually superfluous since the crux of the action must lie in tort in any case; there can be no recovery without negligence. . . .

When an attorney undertakes to fulfill the testamentary instructions of his client, he realistically and in fact assumes a relationship not only with the client but also with the client's intended beneficiaries. The attorney's actions and omissions will affect the success of the client's testamentary scheme; and thus the possibility of thwarting the testator's wishes immediately becomes foreseeable. Equally foreseeable is the possibility of injury to an intended beneficiary. In some ways, the beneficiary's interests loom greater than those of the client. After the latter's death, a failure in his testamentary scheme works no practical effect except to deprive his intended beneficiaries of the intended bequests. Indeed, the executor of an estate has no standing to bring an action for the amount of the bequest against an attorney who negligently prepared the estate plan, since in the normal case the estate is not injured by such negligence except to the extent of the fees paid; only the beneficiaries suffer the real loss. We recognize in Lucas that unless the beneficiary could recover against the attorney in such a case, no one could do so and the social policy of preventing future harm would be frustrated.

The duty thus recognized in Lucas stems from the attorney's undertaking to perform legal services for the client but reaches out to protect the intended beneficiary. We impose this duty because of the relationship between the attorney and the intended beneficiary; public policy requires that the attorney exercise his position of trust and superior knowledge responsibly so as not to affect adversely persons whose rights and interests are certain and foreseeable. . . .

Id. at 226-229, 449 P.2d at 163-165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 227-229. Judge Tobriner concluded that the plaintiff's complaint stated "a cause of action in tort under the doctrine of Lucas." Would you view Heyer as an affirmation or repudiation of the contract beneficiary theory advanced in the Lucas case? Does it make any difference whether we treat the plaintiff's claim in Lucas as one that sounds in tort or contract?

2. In Lucas v. Hamm, the court held that the attorney was not liable because he had not been negligent. Thus its discussion of the attorney's theoretical liability if he had been negligent may be dismissed as dictum, albeit a peculiarly insistent kind of dictum. The court's approach suggests interesting possibilities in the case of lawyers who give opinions on, for example, the validity of municipal or corporate bond issues or the enforceability of security arrangements. In this connection, consider the case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139 (1931). In Ultramares, the New York Court of Appeals was asked to determine the liability of a public accountant to a third party who had made loans to an insolvent company in reliance on a balance sheet prepared and certified by the accountant which showed that the borrowing enterprise was solvent. The action in Ultramares was in tort, with one count that alleged merely negligent misrepresentation and a second count that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the accountant was not liable to the third party on the negligence count but remanded the case for further proceedings on the fraud count. In the course of his discussion of the negligence count Cardozo, C.J., compared the contract and tort cases on third party liability:

The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical discussion (Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 433; Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, pp. 150, 151; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 Harv. 1. Rev. 733; Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harv. 1. Rev. 184; Green, Judge and Jury, chapter Deceit, p. 280; 16 Va. Law Rev. 749). In the field of the law of contract there has been a gradual widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N.Y. 268), until today the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left without a remedy (Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 238). Even in that field, however, the remedy is narrower where the beneficiaries of the promise are indeterminate or general. Something more must then appear than an intention that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite extension. The promise must be such as to "bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost" (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164; [1378] American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §145). In the field of the law of torts a manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture of a chattel in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, §262). A force or instrument of harm having been launched with potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence, the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it within bounds (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., supra, at p. 168). Even so, the question is still open whether the potentialities of danger that will charge with liability are confined to harm to the person, or include injury to property (Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton B.-P. Mfg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293, 296; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, supra). In either view, however, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in words.

Three cases in this court are said by the plaintiff to have committed us to the doctrine that words, written or oral, if negligently published with the expectation that the reader or listener will transmit them to another, will lay a basis for liability though privity be lacking. These are Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N.Y. 236); International Products Co. v. Erie RR. Co. (244 N.Y. 331), and Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank (253 N.Y. 369).

In Glanzer v. Shepard the seller of beans requested the defendants, public weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer with a copy. This the defendants did. Their return, which was made out in duplicate, one copy to the seller and the other to the buyer, recites that it  was made by order of the former for the use of the latter. The buyer paid the seller on the faith of the certificate which turned out to be erroneous. We held that the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer for the moneys overpaid. Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case where the transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction," as certain and immediate and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a telegraph company, contracting with the sender of a message, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage of the person expected to receive it (Wolfskehl v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 Hun, 542; DeRuth v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 1 Daly, 547; Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 N.Y. 403, 410). The intimacy of the resulting nexus is attested by the fact that after stating the case in terms of legal duty, we went on to point out that viewing it as a phase or extension of Lawrence v. Fox (supra), or Seaver v. Ransom (supra), we could reach the same result by stating it in terms of contract (cf. Economy Building & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N.J.L. 27; Young v. Lohr, 118 Iowa, 624; Murphy v. Fidelity, Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77). The bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not completely one with it. Not so in the case at hand. No one would be likely to urge that there was a contractual relation, or even one approaching it, at the root of any duty that was owing from the defendants now before us to the indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the Stern company in reliance on the audit. In a word, the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may charge with liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will charge with liability for negligence.

Id. at 180-183, 174 N.E. at 445-446. Does Lucas v. Hamm reject the approach adopted in Ultramares or are the two cases distinguishable and reconcilable?

3. Cases like Lucas v. Hamm, Heyer v. Flaig, and Ultramares are characterized by a recurrent interplay between contract and tort theory. Another area in which the uneasy alliance between contract and tort makes its appearance is that of a manufacturer's liability to remote consumers or users of a defective product. In recent years a great many courts have adopted a rule, sometimes referred to as one of "strict liability," under which the manufacturer may be held liable even though it was not in "privity" of contract with the injured plaintiff and even though it was not chargeable with negligence in the manufacture of the goods. The California Court announced such a rule in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and reaffirmed it in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145,45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). The New York Court of Appeals followed suit in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (held that the administratrix of a passenger killed in an airplane crash could recover on a theory of implied warranty from the manufacturer of the airplane). For excellent discussions of these developments, see R. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 1-67 (1980); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985).

Could it plausibly be argued that the "strict liability" products cases, which abolish the manufacturer's defenses based on theories of privity and negligence, foreshadow a further expansion of the range of interests protected by third party beneficiary doctrine? In the context of the New York case law, is not the Goldberg case (1963) ultimately inconsistent with the Ultramares case (1931)?

 4. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code reads as follows:

Third Party Beneficiaries. Warranties Express or Implied

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

In the California version of the Uniform Commercial Code, §2-318 was deleted, apparently on the theory that the California case law (e.g., the 1963 Greenman case referred to above) had already gone beyond the position taken in §2-318.

5. In his opinion in Lucas v. Hamm, Chief Justice Gibson refers to a California statutory provision (Civil Code §1559) on third party beneficiaries. For the text oft he statute, see Note 2, infra p. 1427.

12.3.6 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, of International Longshoremen's Assn. 12.3.6 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, of International Longshoremen's Assn.

204 F.2d 495 (1953)

ISBRANDTSEN CO., Inc.
v.
LOCAL 1291 OF INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N.

No. 10896.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued April 7, 1953.
Decided May 7, 1953.

Samuel B. Fortenbaugh, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa. (Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young, Philadelphia, Pa., Hunt, Hill & Betts, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Abraham E. Freedman, Philadelphia, Pa. (Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARIS, GOODRICH and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.

GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This case involves a suit on a contract by one not a party to it. Action was brought in the district court, and that court, upon motion by the defendant, dismissed the case under rule 12(b), F.R.C.P. 28 U.S.C.[1] We proceed, as did the district court, on the assumption that all statements of fact alleged are true.

[496] Here are the facts. Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., was the time charterer of a ship called the "Nyco." Isbrandtsen in turn chartered the ship to the Scott Paper Company for the purpose of transporting pulp from Nova Scotia to Philadelphia. Under the terms of the charter Scott Paper Company was to load and unload the vessel. Scott in turn hired Lavino Shipping Company to do the unloading. When the vessel got to its destination the employees of Lavino started to unload it, and during the unloading stopped work contrary to the provisions of the contract which their union had made with their employer. More needs to be said about that contract. The parties to it were the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, of which Lavino Shipping Company was a member, "as collective bargaining agent for those of its members who employ longshoremen", and Local 1291 of the International Longshoremen's Association. The contract provided among other things that there was to be no work stoppage pending arbitration of disputes which might arise. Isbrandtsen, alleging that the delay in unloading the ship caused it damage, sued under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.[2] Alternatively it claimed, there being diversity of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional amount, to be able to recover as a matter of common law.

Local 1291 has made the point that the provision of the Labor Management Relations Act gives no right to sue to anyone except employer and employee. The statute does not, however, so state. It says:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).

All the statute talks about is a suit for violation of the contract; it does not say who may or who may not sue. The legislative history cited by the appellee is certainly inconclusive with regard to the rights of those not signatory to the contract, and a point of view contrary to appellee's argument seems to be indicated by the decision in Marranzano v. Riggs National Bank, 1950, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 184 F.2d 349.[3] We need not decide this point, however.

We may assume that § 301(a) does not impose any limitations upon the persons who may sue. Our question then becomes, is Isbrandtsen to be included as one who may sue for damages suffered by breach of this contract?

It may aid in understanding the problem if it is kept in mind just how far away Isbrandtsen stands from the actual parties to the contract. Signatories were, as said above, Philadelphia Marine Trade Association and Local 1291. Lavino Shipping Company is a member of that Association. Scott made its contract for unloading the vessel with Lavino. Scott in turn chartered this vessel from Isbrandtsen. Isbrandtsen is, then, three steps away from the contracting party.

The question of determining what rights one who is not a party to a contract has in its performance is one which is not free from difficulty. As Professor Williston points out, the first recognition of such rights was in the cases now called the donee beneficiary type.[4] Here the courts protected the interest of the person for whose benefit the performance was intended to prevent a failure of justice. [497] The party to the contract would have no action for its breach except for nominal damages since he was not the one who suffered by the promisor's default. If the beneficiary could not sue there could be no adequate recovery even though the breach was established. The next extension was made, with hesitancy on the part of some courts, to the creditor beneficiary situation. "[T]hrough this travail," in Mr. Williston's words, "the common law has given birth to a distinct, new principle of law which takes its own place in the family of legal principles, and gives not only to a donee beneficiary, but also to a creditor beneficiary, the right to enforce directly the promise from which he derives his interest."[5]

So we have the classification of donee beneficiary, creditor beneficiary and incidental beneficiary, a classification discussed in the works of both Williston and Corbin and used in the Restatement. As Mr. Corbin says, the description of the term "incidental beneficiary" to describe one "whose relation to the contracting parties is such that the courts will not recognize any legal right in him" is not particularly helpful "for the problem of the courts is to determine what kinds of claimants asserting themselves to be beneficiaries have rights and what kinds have not."[6]

Corbin goes on to describe what constitutes a creditor beneficiary and what constitutes a donee beneficiary.[7] He says:

"If in buying the promise the promisee expresses an intent that some third party shall receive either the security of the executory promise or the benefit of performance as a gift, that party is a donee of either the contract right or of the promised performance or both. If, on the other hand, the promisee's expressed intent is that some third party shall receive the performance in satisfaction and discharge of some actual or supposed duty or liability of the promisee, the third party is a creditor beneficiary. All others who may in some way be benefited by performance have no rights and are called incidental beneficiaries."[8]

We see no possibility that Isbrandtsen can be a creditor beneficiary of this labor union. The labor union was a complete stranger to Isbrandtsen so far as this transaction is concerned. Neither owed the other anything. And, therefore, there was no obligation on the part of either to do anything to or for the other.[9] Nor do we see any possibility of making out of this situation a donee beneficiary relationship. This is not like a contract where a father buys an insurance policy to build up an estate for his son.[10] It was a labor contract made between this association and a union. The contract recited that the association was acting on behalf of its members who employ longshoremen. Lavino is one of those members. But it does not appear that either Scott or Isbrandtsen was a member, and there is no allegation that either one employed longshoremen.

There is considerable language in the Restatement and in the cases and decisions about "intent" and "accompanying circumstances."[11] From that the argument is made to us that the court should not have [498] dismissed under Rule 12 but should have heard the plaintiff upon an attempt to make a showing of the supposed intention of the parties with regard to persons to benefit by this contract.[12]

But we think that the whole setting of this fact situation as described in the complaint and exhibits is one which completely negatives a gift transaction under any possible interpretation of that term. The contract between the association and the labor union was a usual type of collective bargaining agreement. The contract between Isbrandtsen and Scott was a charter party in the ordinary form made upon stated money consideration. We do not have before us a copy of the contract between Scott and Lavino, but the complaint describes it as an agreement whereby Lavino promised Scott to discharge a cargo of wood pulp from the vessel. We cannot think that Lavino was making a gift to Scott or that Scott was making a gift to Isbrandtsen. In other words, all the transactions were usual business transactions in which parties were agreeing to do things for and pay money to each other.

We do not think, therefore, that in view of this business setting any statement by the marine association that it intended its agreement with the labor union to benefit all the world who might be helped by the faithful performance of the contract would give these remote parties rights against one who broke it.[13] It may well be that Isbrandtsen suffered a loss of use of its boat because a strike stopped the unloading of the Nyco. It also may be that the people who had cargo to ship on the next voyage lost a market by the delay. And it may be that the people who did not get the goods on the next voyage, on time, lost a profitable bargain on that account. But neither in contract nor in tort have duties been extended very far beyond the immediate parties to the facts out of which a cause of action is said to arise. If one induces another to break a contract with a third person that third person has a tort claim against the one who procured the breach. But while Lumley could sue Gye for inducing Miss Wagner not to sing for Lumley as she had promised, no one would, we think, allow an action for breach of contract on the part of all the disappointed opera goers who did not hear Miss Wagner, even though the ultimate effect of performance by Miss Wagner would have been to send them home with the pleased feeling of having heard something beautiful.[14]

The question was thoughtfully considered by the district judge. He concluded that Isbrandtsen was but "an incidental beneficiary" and in this conclusion he was right. Isbrandtsen is too far away from this contract to be included either as a donee or a creditor beneficiary and it must be one or the other in order to sue for breach of an agreement to which it was not a party.

It may be an arguable question whether the underlying law here will be found in federal decisions, assuming that plaintiff bases his claim upon a federal statute and [499] comes within federal authority under the commerce power, or whether it is a question of Pennsylvania law by virtue of diversity of citizenship since the agreement and its breach took place in that state. That question need not be resolved. We think that Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company v. Flint, 1927, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290, shows clearly that there could be no recovery under federal authority, and the same thing is true under the Pennsylvania decisions.[15]

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

[1] The district court's opinion is reported in 107 F.Supp. 72.

[2] 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).

[3] But cf. MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., D.C.S.D. Cal., 1949, 84 F.Supp. 676, affirmed on other grounds, 9 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 170, certiorari denied 1950, 340 U.S. 828, 71 S. Ct. 65, 95 L.Ed. 608, rehearing denied 340 U.S. 885, 71 S.Ct. 194, 95 L.Ed. 643; Schatte v. International Alliance, etc., D.C.S.D.Cal.1949, 84 F.Supp. 669, affirmed on other grounds, 9 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 158, certiorari denied, 1950, 340 U. S. 827, 71 S.Ct. 64, 95 L.Ed. 608, rehearing denied 340 U.S. 885, 71 S.Ct. 194, 95 L.Ed. 643.

[4] 2 Williston on Contracts, § 357 (Rev. ed. 1936).

[5] Ibid. See also id. at § 361; 4 Corbin on Contracts 2-4, 28-31, 34-38 (1951).

[6] 4 Corbin on Contracts, § 779C (1951).

[7] The discussion of Corbin is in accord with the statements which appear in the Restatement of Contracts, §§ 133-147, and in 2 Williston on Contracts, §§ 356-361 (Rev. ed. 1936). Corbin's language is quoted because it is the most recent statement on the subject by an established authority.

[8] 4 Corbin on Contracts 41 (1951).

[9] For a discussion of this sort of contract see Corbin, op. cit. supra, § 779D. See also Restatement, Contracts, § 133 (1) (b), § 147.

[10] As in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 1952, 370 Pa. 513, 88 A.2d 710.

[11] M. E. Smith & Co. v. Wilson, 8 Cir., 1925, 9 F.2d 51; In re Gubelman, 2 Cir., 1926, 13 F.2d 730, 48 A.L.R. 1037; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., supra note 10; Brill v. Brill, 1925, 282 Pa. 276, 127 A. 840; Note, 81 A.L.R. 1271. Williston, Corbin, and the Restatement make a distinction between donee and creditor beneficiaries in this regard; "intent to benefit" should be an operative factor only in the case of donee beneficiaries. Restatement, Contracts, § 133; Williston, op. cit. supra, § 356A; Corbin, op. cit. supra, §§ 776-777.

[12] Plaintiff relies on this Court's liberal interpretation of when a complaint states a cause of action. See, e.g., Continental Collieries v. Shober, 3 Cir., 1942, 130 F. 2d 631; Frederick Hart & Co. v. Record-graph Corp., 3 Cir., 1948, 169 F.2d 580.

[13] We are reinforced in this conclusion by the fact that the contract does not mention, or even allude to, any third party. While a third party need not be ascertained when the contract is made in order to acquire a right thereunder, Restatement, Contracts, § 139, we have found no case in which a right has been held to exist in a third party whose existence is not referred to in the contract. Cf. United States v. Huff, 5 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 720, 1 A.L.R.2d 854. It is the intention of the promisee which is said to govern, but there is no authority known to us which carries this principle to the extent of holding liable a promisor whose contemplation of a third party does not appear from the contract. See Williston, op. cit. supra, at p. 1045; Corbin, op. cit. supra, at p. 18. See note 15, infra.

[14] Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 (1853). In general, see Restatement, Torts, § 766 et seq.; Prosser on Torts, 972-1013 (1941 ed.).

[15] If anything, the current rule in Pennsylvania appears to be stricter, as shown in Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 1950, 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828, where the present Chief Justice of Pennsylvania's Supreme Court denied recovery by an alleged third party beneficiary because the contract did not disclose that both the parties thereto intended to confer a right on him. At the very least the opinion supports the proposition that the promisor must have contemplated the existence of a third party before he can be held liable to him.

12.3.7 Notes - Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Local 1291 of International Longshoremen’s Assn. 12.3.7 Notes - Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Local 1291 of International Longshoremen’s Assn.

NOTE

1. Reconsider the Restatement First's definitions of "donee" and "creditor" beneficiaries, supra p. 1362. In the principal case Judge Goodrich seems to have assumed that the crucial issue was the relationship between Isbrandtsen and Local 1291. Should he not have focused, instead, on the relationship between Isbrandtsen and Lavino? Would that make a difference? Suppose the action had been brought by Scott Paper Co. instead of by Isbrandtsen?

2. Other courts have been more sympathetic to claims put forward by third parties who allege that they have been injured by A's breach of his contract with B. Thus in Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959), it appeared that both Visintine and the Railroad had been awarded contracts with the State of Ohio in connection with the elimination of a grade crossing. The work to be done by Visintine apparently depended on the prior completion by the Railroad of its part of the project. Visintine brought an action against the Railroad, with counts both in contract and in tort for negligence, to recover loss allegedly caused by the Railroad's improper performance of its contract with the State. The Railroad demurred to both the contract count and the tort count. The court's conclusion, in a per curiam opinion, was as follows:

Taken altogether, we believe the allegations of the petition are sufficient, as against demurrer, to qualify plaintiff as a beneficiary under the contracts between the defendants and the state of Ohio, particularly in view of the fact that the state is immune from suit for any alleged violations of the duties it assumed under its contract with plaintiff.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the sustaining of the demurrer to the tort cause of action. Tort is based on a duty owed by one party to another. The duty owed here by the defendants was to the state of Ohio, not to the plaintiff. The duty arising out of contract upon  which plaintiff may rely in its first cause of action was that owed to it by the state. If defendants  are liable to plaintiff it is due to a breach of the contracts they made with the state of Ohio and not to the violation of any duty owed directly to the plaintiff upon which a tort action may be based.

12.4 Government Contracts and Citizen Beneficiaries 12.4 Government Contracts and Citizen Beneficiaries

12.4.1 Government Contracts and Citizen Beneficiaries Introduction 12.4.1 Government Contracts and Citizen Beneficiaries Introduction

Governments —local, state and federal — make an untold number of contracts every day, most (if not all) of which are meant to benefit the citizens for whose welfare governments are generally thought to be responsible. When a private landowner contracts to build a new hotel on his property, the owner of the restaurant next door may be benefited; but the benefit, no matter how large, is unintended — it is no part of the landowner's purpose to confer a benefit on his neighbor and we have little difficulty classifying the restaurant owner as an "incidental" beneficiary in the terminology of the Restatements. Government contracts are different: when it makes a contract to purchase sewage treatment services or to provide financing for a housing development, the government is exchanging its resources for something, or the promise of something, that is meant to benefit its citizens. The citizens who will use the sewage system and who will live in the housing development are, in the most obvious sense, "intended" beneficiaries of the government contracts made on their behalf. But if we permitted all of the intended beneficiaries of every such agreement to enforce its terms, the promisor would become contractually obligated to a limitless number of third parties. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to permit such a broadening of contractual responsibility unless, in Cardozo's words, the benefit conferred on the public by the contract is "primary and immediate in such a sense and to such a degree as to bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost."

The Restatement First reflected a similar uneasiness about government contracts. Section 145 provided that "a promisor bound to the United States or to a state or municipality" has no contractual obligations to the public unless "an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall compensate members of the public" for injuries resulting from the breach of his contract. Restatement Second §313(2) asserts, somewhat more cautiously, that a promisor who contracts with the government is not contractually liable to the public for consequential damages unless

(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or

(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.

Despite such scholarly hesitation, the courts have in recent years shown an increased (though by no means universal) willingness to use the "progressive" third party beneficiary idea as a vehicle for expanding the legal rights of citizens in what Professor Charles Reich has called the "new property" — the diverse and all — embracing field of government benefits on which each of us increasingly depends. The following materials, which cover a period of more than fifty years, provide some milestones to measure our progress (or decline) in this regard, and illustrate the role that the third party beneficiary idea has played in the re-emergence of a status-based law of obligations.

12.4.2 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 12.4.2 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.

H.R. Moch Company, Inc., Appellant,
v.
Rensselaer Water Company, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York
Submitted December 9, 1927
Decided January 10, 1928

247 NY 160

CITE TITLE AS: Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co.

[*163] OPINION OF THE COURT

CARDOZO, Ch. J.

The defendant, a water works company under the laws of this State, made a contract with the city of Rensselaer for the supply of water during a term of years. Water was to be furnished to the city for sewer flushing and street sprinkling; for service to schools and public buildings; and for service at fire hydrants, the latter service at the rate of $42.50 a year for each hydrant. Water was to be furnished to private takers within the city at their homes and factories and other industries at reasonable rates, not exceeding a stated schedule. While this contract was in force, a building caught fire. The flames, spreading to the plaintiff's warehouse near by, destroyed it and its contents. The defendant according to the complaint was promptly notified of the fire, "but omitted and neglected after such notice, to supply or furnish sufficient or adequate quantity of water, with adequate pressure to stay, suppress or extinguish the fire before it reached the warehouse of the plaintiff, although the pressure and supply which the defendant was equipped to supply and furnish, and had agreed by said contract to supply and furnish, was adequate and sufficient to prevent the spread of the fire to and the destruction of the plaintiff's warehouse and its contents." By reason of the failure of the defendant to "fulfill the provisions of the contract between it and the city of Rensselaer," the plaintiff is said to have suffered damage, for which judgment is demanded. A motion, in the nature of a demurrer, to dismiss the complaint, was denied at Special Term. The Appellate Division reversed by a divided court.

Liability in the plaintiff's argument is placed on one or other of three grounds. The complaint, we are told, is to be viewed as stating: (1) A cause of action for breach of contract within Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268); (2) a cause of action for a common-law tort, within Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Company (217 N. Y. 382); or (3) a cause of action for the breach of a statutory duty. These several grounds of liability will be considered in succession. [*164]

(1) We think the action is not maintainable as one for breach of contract.

No legal duty rests upon a city to supply its inhabitants with protection against fire (Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46). That being so, a member of the public may not maintain an action under Lawrence v. Fox against one contracting with the city to furnish water at the hydrants, unless an intention appears that the promisor is to be answerable to individual members of the public as well as to the city for any loss ensuing from the failure to fulfill the promise. No such intention is discernible here. On the contrary, the contract is significantly divided into two branches: one a promise to the city for the benefit of the city in its corporate capacity, in which branch is included the service at the hydrants; and the other a promise to the city for the benefit of private takers, in which branch is included the service at their homes and factories. In a broad sense it is true that every city contract, not improvident or wasteful, is for the benefit of the public. More than this, however, must be shown to give a right of action to a member of the public not formally a party. The benefit, as it is sometimes said, must be one that is not merely incidental and secondary (cf. Fosmire v. Nat. Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44). It must be primary and immediate in such a sense and to such a degree as to bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost. The field of obligation would be expanded beyond reasonable limits if less than this were to be demanded as a condition of liability. A promisor undertakes to supply fuel for heating a public building. He is not liable for breach of contract to a visitor who finds the building without fuel, and thus contracts a cold. The list of illustrations can be indefinitely extended. The carrier of the mails under contract with the government is not answerable to the merchant who has lost the benefit of a bargain through [*165] negligent delay. The householder is without a remedy against manufacturers of hose and engines, though prompt performance of their contracts would have stayed the ravages of fire. "The law does not spread its protection so far" (Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303).

So with the case at hand. By the vast preponderance of authority, a contract between a city and a water company to furnish water at the city hydrants has in view a benefit to the public that is incidental rather than immediate, an assumption of duty to the city and not to its inhabitants. Such is the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States (German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220). Such has been the ruling in this State (Wainwright v. Queens County Water Co., 78 Hun, 146; Smith v. Great South Bay Water Co., 82 App. Div. 427), though the question is still open in this court. Such with few exceptions has been the ruling in other jurisdictions (Williston, Contracts, § 373, and cases there cited; Dillon, Municipal Corporations [5th ed.]., § 1340). The diligence of counsel has brought together decisions to that effect from twenty-six States. Typical examples are Alabama (Ellis v. Birmingham Water Co., 187 Ala. 552); California (Nichaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Water Co., 159 Cal. 305); Georgia (Holloway v. Macon G. & W. Co., 132 Ga. 387); Connecticut (Nickerson v. Bridgeport H. Co., 46 Conn. 24); Kansas (Mott v. Cherryvale W. & M. Co., 48 Kan. 12); Maine (Hone v. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217); New Jersey (Hall v. Passaic Water Co., 83 N. J. L. 771), and Ohio (Blunk v. Dennison Water Co., 71 Ohio St. 250). Only a few States have held otherwise (Page, Contracts, § 2401). An intention to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public is seen to be the more improbable when we recall the crushing burden that the obligation would impose (cf. Hone v. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217, at 232). The consequences invited would bear [*166] no reasonable proportion to those attached by law to defaults not greatly different. A wrongdoer who by negligence sets fire to a building is liable in damages to the owner where the fire has its origin, but not to other owners who are injured when it spreads. The rule in our State is settled to that effect, whether wisely or unwisely (Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618; Rose v. Penn. R. R. Co., 236 N. Y. 568; Moore v. Van Beuren & N. Y. Bill Posting Co., 240 N. Y. 673; cf. Bird v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47). If the plaintiff is to prevail, one who negligently omits to supply sufficient pressure to extinguish a fire started by another, assumes an obligation to pay the ensuing damage, though the whole city is laid low. A promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward.

The cases that have applied the rule of Lawrence v. Fox to contracts made by a city for the benefit of the public are not at war with this conclusion. Through them all there runs as a unifying principle the presence of an intention to compensate the individual members of the public in the event of a default. For example, in Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co. (183 N. Y. 330) the contract with the city fixed a schedule of rates to be supplied not to public buildings but to private takers at their homes. In Matter of International Railway Co. v. Rann (224 N. Y. 83, 85) the contract was by street railroads to carry passengers for a stated fare. In Smyth v. City of N. Y. (203 N. Y. 106) and Rigney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (217 N. Y. 31) covenants were made by contractors upon public works, not merely to indemnify the city, but to assume its liabilities. These and like cases come within the third group stated in the comprehensive opinion in Seaver v. Ransom (224 N. Y. 233, 238). The municipality was contracting in behalf of its inhabitants by covenants intended to be enforced by any of them severally as occasion should arise. [*167]

(2) We think the action is not maintainable as one for a common-law tort.

"It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all" (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 239; Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., Inc., 245 N. Y. 256, 258). The plaintiff would bring its case within the orbit of that principle. The hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though liability would fail if it had never been applied at all. A time-honored formula often phrases the distinction as one between misfeasance and non-feasance. Incomplete the formula is, and so at times misleading. Given a relation involving in its existence a duty of care irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well from acts of omission as of commission in the fulfillment of the duty thus recognized by law (Pollock, Torts [12th ed.], p. 555; Kelley v. Met. Ry. Co., 1895, 1 Q. B. 944). What we need to know is not so much the conduct to be avoided when the relation and its attendant duty are established as existing. What we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation. It is here that the formula, however incomplete, has its value and significance. If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward (Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, p. 87). So the surgeon who operates without pay, is liable though his negligence is in the omission to sterilize his instruments (cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, supra); the engineer, though his fault is in the failure to shut off steam (Kelley v. Met. Ry. Co., supra; cf. Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Shoe Co., 71 N. H. 522, 529, 533); the maker of automobiles, at the suit of some one other than the buyer, though his negligence is merely in inadequate inspection (MacPherson [*168] v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382). The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good (cf. Fowler v. Athens Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219, 222). The plaintiff would have us hold that the defendant, when once it entered upon the performance of its contract with the city, was brought into such a relation with every one who might potentially be benefited through the supply of water at the hydrants as to give to negligent performance, without reasonable notice of a refusal to continue, the quality of a tort. There is a suggestion of this thought in Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher (200 U. S. 57), but the dictum was rejected in a later case decided by the same court (German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220) when an opportunity was at hand to turn it into law. We are satisfied that liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely extended by this enlargement of the zone of duty. The dealer in coal who is to supply fuel for a shop must then answer to the customers if fuel is lacking. The manufacturer of goods, who enters upon the performance of his contract, must answer, in that view, not only to the buyer, but to those who to his knowledge are looking to the buyer for their own sources of supply. Every one making a promise having the quality of a contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked together. Again we may say in the words of the Supreme Court of the United States, "The law does not spread its protection so far" (Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, supra; cf. Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191; Dale v. Grant, 34 N. J. L. 142; [*169] Conn. Ins. Co. v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265; Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. 290). We do not need to determine now what remedy, if any, there might be if the defendant had withheld the water or reduced the pressure with a malicious intent to do injury to the plaintiff or another. We put aside also the problem that would arise if there had been reckless and wanton indifference to consequences measured and foreseen. Difficulties would be present even then, but they need not now perplex us. What we are dealing with at this time is a mere negligent omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements. The failure in such circumstances to furnish an adequate supply of water is at most the denial of a benefit. It is not the commission of a wrong.

(3) We think the action is not maintainable as one for the breach of a statutory duty.

The defendant, a public service corporation, is subject to the provisions of the Transportation Corporations Act. The duty imposed upon it by that act is in substance to furnish water, upon demand by the inhabitants, at reasonable rates, through suitable connections at office, factory or dwelling, and to furnish water at like rates through hydrants or in public buildings upon demand by the city, all according to its capacity (Transportation Corporations Law [[Cons. Laws, ch. 63], § 81; Staten Island Water Supply Co., v. City of N. Y., 144 App. Div. 318; People ex rel. City of N. Y. v. Queens Co. Water Co., 232 N. Y. 277; People ex rel. Arthur v. Huntington Water Works Co., 208 App. Div. 807, 808). We find nothing in these requirements to enlarge the zone of liability where an inhabitant of the city suffers indirect or incidental damage through deficient pressure at the hydrants. The breach of duty in any case is to the one to whom service is denied at the time and at the place where service to such one is due. The denial, though wrongful, is unavailing without more to give a cause of action to another. We may find a helpful analogy in the law of common carriers. [*170] A railroad company is under a duty to supply reasonable facilities for carriage at reasonable rates. It is liable, generally speaking, for breach of a duty imposed by law if it refuses to accept merchandise tendered by a shipper. The fact that its duty is of this character does not make it liable to some one else who may be counting upon the prompt delivery of the merchandise to save him from loss in going forward with his work. If the defendant may not be held for a tort at common law, we find no adequate reason for a holding that it may be held under the statute.

The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

POUND, CRANE, ANDREWS, LEHMAN and KELLOGG, JJ., concur; O'BRIEN, J., not sitting.

Judgment affirmed, etc.

12.4.3 Notes - H. R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 12.4.3 Notes - H. R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co.

NOTE

1. As municipalities have increasingly taken over the business of supplying public services to their residents, cases like the principal case have of course gradually disappeared from the reports. See, however, Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d B75 (1964), a fire-loss case in which it was held that the complaint stated a good cause of action against the Water Company. With respect to Cardozo's opinion in the Moch case, Musmanno, J., commented that "at this point Homer nodded." (414 Pa. at 214.) For nearly a hundred years, however, there was a great deal of litigation of this' type. In most situations the municipal residents were, more often than not, allowed to sue as third party beneficiaries of the contracts. In most states, however, the actions against privately owned water companies, typically for fire loss, were not allowed, either on contract or tort theory. Corbin suggests that the result in the water company cases may have been in part "accidental" in that "the earlier water cases were brought during a period of temporary reaction against the rule in Lawrence v. Fox," as illustrated by Vrooman v. Turner, supra p. 1346. (4 Corbin §§805, 806, 827.)

2. Another possible explanation of the judicial reluctance to allow actions against water companies for fire loss might be the universality of fire insurance covering residential and business property. However, the fact that the property owner is insured is not necessarily the end of the matter. It could be argued (though few courts have accepted this view) that the prudent property owner should be entitled to collect both his insurance and his damages. Or, alternatively, that the fire insurance company, after paying the loss, should be subrogated to the insured's right to collect damages from the water company. On the question of the insurer's subrogation to the insured's rights, in contract or in tort, against third parties, see 2 Harper & James, Torts §§25.19-25.23 (1974); 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property §42.7.1 (1965).

12.4.4 Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc. 12.4.4 Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc.

113 Cal.Rptr. 585
11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841

Ignacio MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SOCOMA COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29985.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
May 1, 1974.

[11 Cal.3d 397] [113 Cal.Rptr. 586] [521 P.2d 842] Richard N. Fisher, Frank G. Ker and Brent N. Rushforth, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Savitch, Earl P. Willens, Richard D. Bronner, Los Angeles, Caditz & Grant and M. Alfred Karlsen, Beverly Hills, for defendants and respondents.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs brought this class action on behalf of themselves and other disadvantaged unemployed persons, alleging that [113 Cal.Rptr. 587] [521 P.2d 843] defendants failed to perform contracts with the United States government under which defendants agreed to provide job training and at least one year of employment to certain numbers of such persons. Plaintiffs claim that they and the other such persons are third party beneficiaries of the contracts and as such are entitled to damages for defendants' nonperformance. General demurrers to the complaint were sustained without leave to amend, apparently on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as third party beneficiaries. Dismissals were entered as to the demurring defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

We affirm the judgments of dismissal. As will appear, the contracts nowhere state that either the government or defendants are to be liable to persons such as plaintiffs for damages resulting from the defendants' nonperformance. The benefits to be derived from defendants' performance were clearly intended not as gifts from the government to such persons but as a means of executing the public purposes stated in the contracts and [11 Cal.3d 398] in the underlying legislation. accordingly, plaintiffs were only incidental beneficiaries and as such have no right of recovery.

The complaint names as defendants Socoma Companies, Inc. ("Socoma"), Lady Fair Kitchens, Incorporated ("Lady Fair"), Monarch Electronics International, Inc. ("Monarch"), and eleven individuals of whom three are alleged officers or directors of Socoma, four of Lady Fair, and four of Monarch. Lady Fair and the individual defendants associated with it, a Utah corporation and Utah residents respectively, did not appear in the trial court and are not parties to this appeal.

The complaint alleges that under 1967 amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (81 Stat. 688-690, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-2768, repealed by 86 Stat. 703 (1972)) "the United States Congress instituted Special Impact Programs with the intent to benefit the residents of certain neighborhoods having especially large concentrations of low income persons and suffering from dependency, chronic unemployment and rising tensions." Funds to administer these programs were appropriated to the United States Department of Labor. The department subsequently designated the East Los Angeles neighborhood as a "Special Impact area' and made federal funds available for contracts with local private industry for the benefit of the "hard-core unemployed residents" of East Los Angeles.

On January 17, 1969, the corporate defendants allegedly entered into contracts with the Secretary of Labor, acting on behalf of the Manpower Administration, United States Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as the "Government"). Each such defendant entered into a separate contract and all three contracts are made a part of the complaint as exhibits. Under each contract the contracting defendant agreed to lease space in the then vacant Lincoln Heights jail building owned by the City of Los Angeles, to invest at least $5,000,000 in renovating the leasehold and establishing a facility for the manufacture of certain articles, to train and employ in such facility for at least 12 months, at minimum wage rates, a specified number of East Los Angeles residents certified as disadvantaged by the Government, and to provide such employees with opportunities for promotion into available supervisorial-managerial positions and with options to purchase stock in their employer corporation. Each contract provided for the lease of different space in the building and for the manufacture of a different kind of product. As consideration, the Government agreed to pay each defendant a stated amount in installments. Socoma was to hire 650 persons and receive $950,000; Lady Fair was to hire 550 persons and receive $999,000; and Monarch was to hire 400 persons and receive $800,000. The hiring of these persons was to be completed by January 17, 1970.

[11 Cal.3d 399] Plaintiffs were allegedly members of a class of no more than 2,017 East Los Angeles residents who were certified as disadvantaged and were qualified for employment [113 Cal.Rptr. 588] [521 P.2d 844] under the contracts. Although the Government paid $712,500 of the contractual consideration to Socoma, $299,700 to Lady Fair, and $240,000 to Monarch, all of these defendants failed to perform under their respective contracts, except that Socoma provided 186 jobs of which 139 were wrongfully terminated, and Lady Fair provided 90 jobs, of which all were wrongfully terminated.

The complaint contains 11 causes of action. The second, fourth, and sixth causes of action seek damages of $3,607,500 against Socoma, $3,052,500 against Lady Fair, and $2,220,000 against Monarch, calculated on the basis of 12 months' wages at minimum rates and $1,000 for loss of training for each of the jobs the defendant contracted to provide. The third and fifth causes of action seek similar damages for the 139 persons whose jobs were terminated by Socoma and the 90 persons whose jobs were terminated by Lady Fair. The first, seventh, and eighth causes of action seek to impose joint liability on Socoma, Lady Fair, and Monarch as joint venturers, alleging that they negotiated the contracts through a common representative and entered into a joint lease of the Lincoln Heights jail building. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action seek to impose the liability of the corporate defendants upon their officers and directors named as individual defendants, alleging that the latter undercapitalized their respective corporations and used the same as their Alter egos.[1]

Each cause of action alleges that the "express purpose of the (Government) in entering into (each) contract was to benefit (the) certified disadvantaged hard-core unemployed residents of East Los Angeles (for whom defendants promised to provide training and jobs) and none other, and those residents are thus the express third party beneficiaries of (each) contract."

The general demurrers admitted the truth of all the material factual allegations of the complaint, regardless of any possible difficulty in proving them (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216), but did not admit allegations which constitute conclusions of law (Faulkner v. Cal. Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal.2d 317, 329, 253 P.2d 659) or which are contrary to matters of which we must take judicial notice (Chavez v. Times-Mirror Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 20, 23, 195 P. 666). (See Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1970) [11 Cal.3d 400] Pleading, §§ 328, 800.) When a complaint is based on a written contract which it sets out in full, a general demurrer to the complaint admits not only the contents of the instrument but also an pleaded meaning to which the instrument is reasonably susceptible. (Coast Bank v. Minderhout (1964) 61 Cal.2d 311, 315, 38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265.) Moreover, where, as here, the general demurrer is to an Original complaint and is sustained without leave to amend, "the issues presented are whether the complaint states a cause of action, and if not, whether there is a reasonable possibility that it could be amended to do so." (MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 542, 343 P.2d 36, 38; see 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 845.) Thus, we must determine whether the pleaded written contracts support plaintiffs' claim either on their face or under any interpretation to which the contracts are reasonably susceptible and which is pleaded in the complaint or could be pleaded by proper amendment. This determination must be made in light of applicable federal statutes and other matters we must judicially notice. (Evic.Code, §§ 451, 459, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs contend they are third party beneficiaries under Civil Code section 1559, which provides: "A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." This section excludes enforcement of a contract by persons [113 Cal.Rptr. 589] [521 P.2d 845] who are only incidentally or remotely benefited by it. (Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 590, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 824, 364 P.2d 685, 688.) American law generally classifies persons having enforceable rights under contracts to which they are not parties as either creditor beneficiaries or donee beneficiaries. (Rest., Contracts, §§ 133, subds. (1), (2), 135, 136, 147; 2 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1959) § 356; 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) § 774; see Rest.2d Contracts (Tentative Drafts 1973) § 133, coms. b, c.) California decisions follow this classification. (Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Construction Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 747, 752, 22 Cal.Rptr. 540; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 500.)

A person cannot be a creditor beneficiary unless the promisor's performance of the contract will discharge some form of legal duty owed to the beneficiary by the promisee. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 232, 244, 73 P.2d 1163; Rest., Contracts, § 133, subd. (1)(b).) Clearly the Government (the promisee) at no time bore and legal duty toward plaintiffs to provide the benefits set forth in the contracts and plaintiffs do not claim to be creditor beneficiaries.

A person is a donee beneficiary only if the promisee's contractual intent is either to make a gift to him or to confer on him a right against [11 Cal.3d 401] the promisor. (Rest., Contracts, § 133, subd. (1)(a).) If the promisee intends to make a gift, the donee beneficiary can recover if such donative intent must have been understood by the promisor from the nature of the contract and the circumstances accompanying its execution. (Lucas v. Hamm, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 590-591, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685.) This rule does not aid plaintiffs, however, because, as will be seen, no intention to make a gift can be imputed to the Government as promisee.

Unquestionably plaintiffs were among those whom the Government intended to benefit through defendants' performance of the contracts which recite that they are executed pursuant to a statute and a presidential directive calling for programs to furnish disadvantaged persons with training and employment opportunities. However, the fact that a Government program for social betterment confers benefits upon individuals who are not required to render contractual consideration in return does not necessarily imply that the benefits are intended as gifts. Congress' power to spend money in aid of the general welfare (U.S.Const., art. I, § 8) authorizes federal programs to alleviate national unemployment. (Helvering v. Davis (1937) 301 U.S. 619, 640-645, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307.) The benefits of such programs are provided not simply as gifts to the recipients but as a means of accomplishing a larger public purpose. The furtherance of the public purpose is in the nature of consideration to the Government, displacing any governmental intent to furnish the benefits as gifts. (See County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281, 106 P.2d 11; Allied Architects v. Payne (1923) 192 Cal. 431, 438-439, 221 P. 209.)

Even though a person is not the intended recipient of a gift, he may nevertheless be "a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise . . . is . . . to Confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary." (Rest., Contracts, § 133, subd. (1)(a) (italics supplied); Gourmet Lane, Inc. v. Keller (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 701, 705, 35 Cal.Rptr. 398.) The Government may, of course, deliberately implement a public purpose by including provisions in its contracts which expressly confer on a specified class of third persons a direct right to benefits, or damages in lieu of benefits, against the private contractor. But a governmental intent to confer such a direct right cannot be inferred simply from the fact that the third persons were intended to enjoy the benefits. The Restatement of Contracts makes this clear in dealing specifically with contractual promises to the Government to render services to mem [113 Cal.Rptr. 590] bers [521 P.2d 846] of the public:

"A promisor [11 Cal.3d 402] bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by contract to do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of the public, Is subject to no duty under the contract to such members to give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless, . . . An intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding its formation, That the promisor shall compensate members of the public for such injurious consequences. . . ." (Rest., Contracts, § 145 (italics supplied);[2] see City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 121, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216.)

The present contracts manifest no intent that the defendants pay damages to compensate plaintiffs or other members of the public for their nonperformance. To the contrary, the contracts' provisions for retaining the Government's control over determination of contractual disputes and for limiting defendants' financial risks indicate a governmental purpose to exclude the direct rights against defendants claimed here.

Each contract provides that any dispute of fact arising thereunder is to be determined by written decision of the Government's contracting officer, subject to an appeal to the Secretary of Labor, whose decision shall be final unless determined by a competent court to have been fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, in bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. These administrative decisions may include determinations of related questions of law although such determinations are not made final. The efficiency and uniformity of interpretation fostered by these administrative procedures would tend to be undermined if litigation such as the present action, to which the Government is a stranger, were permitted to proceed on the merits.

In addition to the provisions on resolving disputes each contract contains a "liquidated damages" provision obligating the contractor to refund all amounts received from the Government, with interest, in the event of failure to acquire and equip the specified manufacturing facility, and, for each employment opportunity it fails to provide, to refund a stated dollar amount equivalent to the total contract compensation divided by the number [11 Cal.3d 403] of jobs agreed to be provided. This liquidated damages provision limits liability for the breaches alleged by plaintiffs to the refunding of amounts received and indicates an absence of any contractual intent to impose liability directly in favor of plaintiffs, or, as claimed in the complaint, to impose liability for the value of the promised performance. To allow plaintiffs' claim would nullify the limited liability for which defendants bargained and which the Government may well have held out as an inducement in negotiating the contracts.[3]

[113 Cal.Rptr. 591] [521 P.2d 847] It is this absence of any manifestation of intent that defendants should pay compensation for breach to persons in the position of plaintiffs that distinguishes this case from Shell v. Schmidt (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 272 P.2d 82, relied on by plaintiffs. The defendant in Shell was a building contractor who had entered into an agreement with the federal government under which he received priorities for building materials and agreed in return to use the materials to build homes with required specifications for sale to war veterans at or below ceiling prices. Plaintiffs were 12 veterans, each of whom had purchased a home that failed to comply with the agreed specifications. They were held entitled to recover directly from the defendant contractor as third party beneficiaries of his agreement with the government. The legislation under which the agreement was made included a provision empowering the government to obtain payment of monetary compensation by the contractor to the veteran purchasers for deficiencies resulting from failure to comply with specifications. Thus, there was "an intention . . . manifested in the contract . . . that the promisor shall compensate members of the public for such injurious consequences (of nonperformance)."[4]

[11 Cal.3d 404] Plaintiffs contend that section 145 of the Restatement of Contracts, previously quoted, does not preclude their recovery because it applies only to promises made to a governmental entity "to do an act or render a service to . . . the public," and, plaintiffs assert they and the class they represent are identified persons set apart from "the public." Even if this contention were correct it would not follow that plaintiffs have standing as third party beneficiaries under the Restatement. The quoted provision of section 145 "is a special application of the principles stated in §§ 133(1a), 135 (on donee beneficiaries)" (Rest., Contracts, § 145, com. a), delineating certain circumstances which preclude government contractors' liability to third parties. Section 145 itself does not purport to confer standing to sue on persons who do not otherwise qualify under basic third party beneficiary principles. [5] As pointed out above, plaintiffs are not donee beneficiaries [113 Cal.Rptr. 592] [521 P.2d 848] under those basic principles because it does not appear from the terms and circumstances of the contract that the Government intended to make a gift to plaintiffs or to confer on them a legal right against the defendants.

Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, section 145 of the Restatement of Contracts does preclude their recovery because the services which the contracts required the defendants to perform Were to be rendered to "members of the public" within the meaning of that section. Each contract recites it is made under the "Special Impact Programs" part of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and pursuant to a presidential directive [11 Cal.3d 405] for a test program of cooperation between the federal government and private industry in an effort to provide training and jobs for thousands of the hard-core unemployed or under-employed.[6] The congressional declaration of purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act as a whole points up the public nature of its benefits on a national scale. Congress declared that the purpose of the act was to "strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in furtherance of (the) policy" of "opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity" so that the "United States can achieve its full economic and social potential as a nation." (42 U.S.C. § 2701.)[7]

In providing for special impact programs, Congress declared that such programs were directed to the solution of critical problems existing in particular neighborhoods having especially large concentration of low income persons, and that the programs were intended to be of sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable impact in such neighborhoods in arresting [11 Cal.3d 406] tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment, and rising community tensions. (42 U.S.C. former § 2763.)[8] Thus the contracts here [113 Cal.Rptr. 593] [521 P.2d 849] were designed not to benefit individuals as such but to utilize the training and employment of disadvantaged persons as a means of improving the East Los Angeles neighborhood. Moreover, the means by which the contracts were intended to accomplish this community improvement were not confined to provision of the particular benefits on which plaintiffs base their claim to damages—one year's employment at minimum wages plus $1,000 worth of training to be provided to each of 650 persons by one defendant, 400 by another, and 550 by another. Rather the objective was to be achieved by establishing permanent industries in which local residents would be permanently employed and would have opportunities to become supervisors, managers and part owners. The required minimum capital investment of $5,000,000 by each defendant and the defendants' 22-year lease of the former Lincoln Heights jail building for conversion into an industrial facility also indicates the broad, long-range objective of the program. Presumably, as the planned enterprises prospered, the quantity and quality of employment and economic opportunity that they provided would increase and would benefit not only employees but also their families, other local enterprises and the government itself through reduction of law enforcement of welfare costs.

The fact that plaintiffs were in a position to benefit more directly than certain other members of the public from performance of the contract does not alter their status as incidental beneficiaries. (See Rest., Contracts, § 145, illus. 1: C, a member of the public cannot recover for injury from B's failure to perform a contract with the United States to carry mail over a certain route.)[9] For example, in City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216, the agreement between the federal government and the city for improvement of the airport could be considered to be of greater benefit to air carriers using the airport than to many other members of the public. Nevertheless, Western, as an air carrier, was but an incidental, not an express, beneficiary of the agreement and therefore had no standing to enforce the contractual prohibition against [11 Cal.3d 407] discrimination in the airport's availability for public use. The court explains the distinction as follows:

"None of the documents under consideration confers on Western the rights of a third-party beneficiary. The various contracts and assurances created benefits and detriments as between only two parties—the United States and the City. Nothing in them shows any intent of the contracting parties to confer any benefit directly and expressly upon air carriers such as the defendant. It is true that air carriers, including Western, may be Incidentally benefited by City's assurances in respect to nondiscriminatory treatment at the airport. They may also be incidentally benefited by the fact that, through federal aid, a public airport is improved with longer runways, brighter beacons, or larger loading ramps, or by the fact a new public airport is provided for a community without one. The various documents and agreements were part of a federal aid program directed to the promoting of a national transportation system. Provisions in such agreements, including the nondiscrimination clauses, were intended to advance such federal aims and not for the benefit of those who might be affected by the sponsor's failure to perform." (204 Cal.App.2d at p. 120, 22 Cal.Rptr. at p. 225.)

For the reasons above stated we hold that plaintiffs and the class they represent have no standing as third party beneficiaries to recover the damages sought in the complaint under either California law or the general contract principles which [113 Cal.Rptr. 594] [521 P.2d 850] federal law applies to government contracts.[10]

The judgments of dismissal are affirmed.

McCOMB, SULLIVAN, and CLARK, JJ., concur.

BURKE, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent. The certified hard-core unemployed of East Los Angeles were the express, not incidental, beneficiaries of the contracts in question and, therefore, have standing to enforce those contracts.

[11 Cal.3d 408] As the majority point out, we must reverse the order sustaining the demurrer in this case if we determine the written contracts incorporated into the complaint support plaintiffs' claim either on their face or under any interpretation to which the contracts are reasonably susceptible (maj. opn., p. 588). Furthermore, at this stage of the proceedings, the question of plaintiffs' ability to prove these allegations does not concern us, for plaintiffs need only plead facts showing they may be entitled to some relief. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216.)

Civil Code section 1559 provides that "A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." The general principles applicable to such contracts are set forth in Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 290-291, 272 P.2d 82, 89, as follows:

"(A) third party beneficiary may maintain an action directly on such a contract. (Citation.) The promise in such a situation is treated as having been made directly to the third party. (Citation.) It is no objection to an action by the third party that the contracting party (here the government) could also sue upon the contract for the same breach. (Citation.) Of course, the beneficiary must be more than incidentally benefited by the contract. An incidental beneficiary cannot successfully maintain an action. (Citation.) Whether the beneficiary is or is not an incidental one, or a beneficiary for whose express benefit the contract was entered into, is a question of construction. (Citation.) It is not required that the third party beneficiary be specifically named as a beneficiary. All that section 1559 requires is that the contract be 'made expressly for the benefit of a third person,' and 'expressly' simply means 'in an express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly.' (Citation.) ( ) Where the contract is for the benefit of a class any members or member of the intended class may enforce it. (Citation.) The fact that the government is one of the contracting parties does not change the rule." (Italics added.)

Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case I conclude that plaintiffs are express beneficiaries of the contracts between defendants and the government and are therefore entitled to enforce the contracts.

The majority contend that the congressional purpose in enacting the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (including the subsequent amendments thereto creating the Special Impact Program), and the government's purpose in executing the instant contracts with defendants pursuant to the Act, [113 Cal.Rptr. 595] [521 P.2d 851] was to benefit only the general public and particularly the local neighborhoods where these programs were to be implemented. Although members[11 Cal.3d 409] of plaintiffs' class "were among those whom the Government intended to benefit. . . ," (maj. opn., p. 589) the benefits accruing to plaintiffs' class, according to the majority, were merely "means of executing the public purposes stated in the contracts and in the underlying legislation." (P. 587, italics added.)

The majority err in the above conclusion because the congressional purpose was to benefit Both the communities in which the impact programs are established And the individual impoverished persons in such communities.[11] The benefits from the instant contracts were to accrue directly to the members of plaintiffs' class, as a reading of the contracts clearly demonstrates.[12] These direct benefits to members of plaintiffs' class were not merely the "means of executing the public purposes," as the majority contend (p. 589, italics added), but were the Ends in themselves and one of the public purposes to which the legislation and subsequent contracts were addressed. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that "the contracts here were designed Not to benefit individuals as such but to utilize the training and employment of disadvantaged persons as a Means of improving the East Los Angeles neighborhood." (Pp. 592, 593, italics added.)

The intent of the contracts themselves is expressed in their preambles:

"WHEREAS, the Secretary of Labor is authorized . . . to enter into contracts to provide for Special Impact Programs . . . directed to the solution of the critical problems existing in particular communities and neighborhoods within urban areas of the Nation having especially large concentrations of low-income persons and ( ) WHEREAS, the President of the United States on October 2, 1967, launched a major test program to mobilize the resources of private industry and the Federal Government To help find jobs and provide training for thousands of the Nation's hardcore[11 Cal.3d 410] unemployed, or underemployed, by inviting private industry throughout the country to join with the agencies and departments of the Federal Government in assuming responsibility For providing training and work opportunities for such seriously disadvantaged persons. ( ) NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the aforesaid statutory authority, and the directive of the President, the parties hereto, in consideration of the mutual promises herein expressed, agree as follows:. . . ." (Italics added.) By these provisions, the contracting parties clearly state as one of their purposes their intent to find jobs for the hard-core unemployed.

In accord with this expressed intent, the substantive provisions of the contracts confer a direct benefit upon the class seeking to enforce them. The contracts call for the hiring of stated numbers of hard-core unemployed from the East Los Angeles Special Impact Area for a period of at least one year at a starting minimum wage of $2.00 per hour for the first 90 days and [113 Cal.Rptr. 596] [521 P.2d 852] a minimum wage of $2.25 per hour thereafter, or for the prevailing wage for the area, whichever is higher. In addition to requiring appropriate job training for such employees, the contracts also require "That the Contractor will arrange for the orderly promotion of persons so employed into available supervisory-managerial and other positions, and will arrange for all contract employees to obtain a total ownership interest not exceeding thirty (30) percent in the Contractor through an appropriate stock purchase plan. . . ." The scope of the stock purchase plans is detailed in each of the contracts.

In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 590, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, we noted that one of the usual characteristics of a third party beneficiary contract is that performance is to be rendered directly to the beneficiary. The direct benefits to accrue to the beneficiaries as enumerated above renders inescapable the conclusion that these are third party beneficiary contracts.

Although the contracts may also benefit particular communities and neighborhoods, this fact does not preclude the maintenance of the action by plaintiffs as intended beneficiaries of the contracts. It is not necessary under Civil Code section 1559, Supra, that a contract be exclusively for the benefit of a third party to give him a right to enforce its provisions. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 247, 73 P.2d 1163; Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount, 216 Cal.App.2d 433, 437, 31 Cal.Rptr. 174.) And, as will be discussed more fully, Infra, nor does the existence of a liquidated damages clause running in favor of the government defeat plaintiffs' right to recover under the contract; the fact that the government may also being an action for the same breach does not [11 Cal.3d 411] bar the third party beneficiary from enforcing his rights. (Shell v. Schmidt, Supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82.) All that is necessary is that the third party show he is a member of a class for whose benefit the contract was made. (Shell v. Schmidt, Supra; Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount, Supra.) Thus, plaintiffs have standing to bring an action for the breach of defendants' contracts with the government.

The majority, relying on Restatement of Contracts section 145, and City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216, conend that in the context of government contracts the intent to confer upon a third party a right of action against the promisor must be express; that intent "cannot be inferred simply from the fact that the third persons were intended to enjoy the benefits. . . ." (P. 589.) The majority insist that "The fact that plaintiffs were in a position to benefit more directly than certain other members of the public from performance of the contract does not alter their status as incidental beneficiaries." (P. 593.) The majority conclude (p. 592) that "section 145 of the Restatement of Contracts does preclude (plaintiffs') recovery because the services which the contracts required the defendants to perform Were to be rendered to "members of the public" within the meaning of that section." (Italics added by majority.)

The majority's reliance on Restatement of Contracts section 145, and City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., Supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216, is misplaced. An analysis of section 145 of the Restatement (which also forms a part of the basis for the rule of Western Air lines) indicates that its provisions are not applicable to the case at hand. Section 145 provides in pertinent part that

"A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by contract to do an act or render a service To some or all of the members of the public, is subject to no duty under the contract to Such members to give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless, (a) an intention is manifested in the light of the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall Compensate members of the public for such injurious consequences. . . ." (Italics added.)

[113 Cal.Rptr. 597] [521 P.2d 853] The express language of this provision indicates that it applies only to a promise to do an act or render a service to "some or all of the members of the public." The section deals solely with the promisor's duty to give compensation to "such" members of the public. The type of government contract to which section 145 applies is therefore distinguishable from the contracts in the instant case. Here, the contracts specify a particular class [11 Cal.3d 412] of persons who are to receive a direct benefit. The beneficiaries of these contracts are to receive the promised performance because of their membership in a particularly defined and limited class and not simply because they are members of the public in general. Defendants are not bound to "do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of the public"; thus, by its own terms, section 145 of the Restatement is not applicable.

In addition, as indicated by comment (a) to section 145 of the Restatement, that section is merely a special application of the principles stated in Restatement section 133 which provides in part that

"Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is, . . . (a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary. . . ."[13] Section 135 of the Restatement makes such a contract enforceable by the donee beneficiary.[14]

The language of section 133, standing alone, could reasonably suggest that members of the general public are "donee beneficiaries" under any contract whose purpose is to confer a "gift" upon them. Section 145 qualifies this broad language and treats the general public merely as incidental, not direct, beneficiaries under contracts made for the general public benefit, unless the contract manifests a clear intent to compensate such members of the public in the event of a breach. Section 145 does not, however, entirely preclude application of the "donee beneficiary" concept to every government contract. Whenever, as in the instant case, such a contract expresses an intent to benefit directly a particular person or ascertainable [11 Cal.3d 413] class of persons, section 145 is, by its terms, inapplicable and the contract may be enforced by the beneficiaries pursuant to the general provisions of section 133. Thus, I would conclude that section 145 is consistent with the holding of Shell v. Schmidt, Supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 272 P.2d 82, and the City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., Supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216.[15]

[113 Cal.Rptr. 598] [521 P.2d 854] In City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., Supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216, defendant airline was held to be merely an incidental beneficiary of contracts providing that an airport "will operate . . . for the use and benefit Of the public, on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination." (P. 118, 22 Cal.Rptr. p. 224, italics added.) Nothing in the various contracts and assurances involved in the case "shows any intent of the contracting parties to confer any benefit directly and expressly upon air carriers such as the defendant." (P. 120, 22 Cal.Rptr. p. 225.) The court stated that "To recover as a third party beneficiary, one must show that the contract in question was made expressly for his benefit. (Citations.)" (P. 120, 22 Cal.Rptr. p. 225.)

The rationale for the Western Air Lines rule is set out in Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173, 180, 75 P. 773, 775 (quoting from an earlier case) as follows, "The bar to such a recovery in each case is that The contract was not for the protection of any particular property or [11 Cal.3d 414] person, but was for the general benefit of all the property and persons within the municipal limits, and was entered into by the town as a public agency, solely for that purpose, and in the exercise of its power to furnish such general protection." (Italics added.)

Since in Western Air Lines the government contract at issue was not made expressly for the benefit of defendant but instead to benefit the general public, that case was correctly decided under Restatement of Contracts section 145. However, an interpretation to which the contracts in the instant case "are reasonably susceptible and which is pleaded in the complaint or could be pleaded by proper amendment" (maj. opn., p. 588), in light of the legislative intent and the language of the contracts themselves, is that they were made expressly for the benefit of a particular class of persons, namely the class consisting of the certified hard-core unemployed of East Los Angeles.

Western Air Lines holds that a member of the general public cannot recover under a contract made for the public benefit unless there appears an intent in the contract that the promisor shall compensate the public for injuries caused by the promisor's performance or failure to perform. (204 Cal.App.2d at pp. 120-121, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216.) That case does not stand for the proposition that an Express beneficiary, or a class of express beneficiaries, may not enforce the contract unless it expressly declares that the parties so intended. On the contrary, under the rules set forth in Shell v. Schmidt, Supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 290-291, 272 P.2d 82, so long as the contract Expressly declares an intent to benefit a [113 Cal.Rptr. 599] [521 P.2d 855] particular individual or class of persons, such persons may enforce their rights under the contract notwithstanding the absence of a provision for damages for such beneficiaries in the event of breach. Therefore, the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those of Western Air Lines and, furthermore, Restatement of Contracts section 145 is not applicable.

The majority contend that the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses in each of the contracts limits defendants' financial risks and was intended to preclude the assertion of third party claims. (P. 590.) Yet, these clauses simply provide for various refunds of monies advanced by the government in the event of a default. These so-called "liquidated damages" clauses nowhere purport to limit damages to the specified refunds. Nothing in the contracts limits the right of the government or, more importantly, plaintiffs' class, to seek additional relief. As I noted above, the fact that the government could also sue for breach of the contracts does not affect the rights of third party beneficiaries. (Shell v. Schmidt, Supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82.)

[11 Cal.3d 415] The majority also rely on the fact that, "The present contracts manifest no intent that the defendants pay damages to compensate plaintiffs or other members of the public for their nonperformance." (P. 590.) Therefore, it assertedly follows that giving plaintiffs the right to monetary benefits in lieu of performance would give to plaintiffs and the class they represent benefits never contemplated nor intended under the contracts. This argument disregards both the fact that the class was to receive a direct monetary benefit under the contracts in the form of wages, and that under well settled contract law, an aggrieved party is entitled to be compensated for all the detriment proximately caused by a breach of contract (Civ.Code, § 3300).

A contract of employment ordinarily confers upon the employee the expectation that he will obtain the work bargained for. The measure of damages for the breach of such a contract, however, is not the award of the job, but is the amount of salary the employee would have earned for the agreed upon period of service less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned, or with reasonable effort might have earned, from other employment. (Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal.3d 176, 181, 89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689.) Thus, the fact that plaintiffs' class has been promised only jobs and job training does not prevent them from recovering an amount of money which will compensate them for the loss of such jobs and training, i.e., the damages proximately caused by defendants' breach. (Civ.Code, § 3300, Supra.)

It is my conclusion, therefore, that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. I would order the trial court to determine the propriety of plaintiffs' class action prior to proceeding upon the merits of the complaint.

TOBRINER and MOSK, JJ., concur.

[1] The fourth, fifth, and tenth causes of action, being directed solely against nonappearing defendants, to wit, Lady Fair and its officers and directors, are not before us on this appeal.

[2] The corresponding language in the Tentative Drafts of the Restatement Second of Contracts (1973), section 145, is:

"(A) promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public Is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from performance or failure to perform unless . . . the terms of the promise provide for such liability. . . ."

The language omitted in this quotation and the quotation in the accompanying text relates to the creditor beneficiary situation in which the government itself would be liable for nonperformance of the contract. As noted earlier, plaintiffs do not claim to be creditor beneficiaries.

[3] Comment A of a section 145 of the Tentative Drafts of the Restatement Second of Contracts points out that these factors—retention of administrative control and limitation of contractor's liability—make third party suits against the contractor inappropriate:

"Government contracts often benefit the public, but individual members of the public are treated as incidental beneficiaries unless a different intention is manifested. In case of doubt, a promise to do an act for or render a service to the public does not have the effect of a promise to pay consequential damages to individual members of the public unless the conditions of Subsection (2)(b) (including governmental inability to the claimant) are met. Among factors which may make inappropriate a direct action against the promisor are Arrangements for governmental control over the litigation and settlement of claims, the likelihood of impairment of service or of excessive financial burden, and the availability of alternatives such as insurance." (Italics supplied.)

[4] In contrast to Shell, supra, is City & County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216. There, Western Air Lines claimed to be a third party beneficiary of agreements between the federal government and the City and County of San Francisco under which the city received federal funds for the development of its airport subject to a written condition that the airport "be available for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination." Western Air Lines asserted that it had been charged for its use of the airport at a higher rate than some other air carriers in violation of the contractual condition, and therefore was entitled to recover the excess charges from the city. One of the reasons given by the court on appeal for rejecting this contention was the absence of any provision or indication of intent in the agreements between the government and the city to compensate third parties for noncompliance. The court said:

"The granting agreement in each instance entitles the (federal) administrator to recover all grant payments made where there has been any misrepresentation or omission of a material fact by the sponsor (i.e., the city). We find no other provision for [113 Cal.Rptr. 599] recovery of funds by the administrator and none whatsoever permitting recovery of money or excess rates by a private party. Indeed the language of the granting agreement itself appears to us to point up that it is simply and entirely a financial arrangement between two parties. As the agreement states, it constitutes 'the obligations and rights of the United States and the Sponsor with respect to the accomplishment of the Project. . . ." (204 Cal.App.2d at p. 120, 22 Cal.Rptr. at p. 225.)

[5] The same is true of the Tentative Draft of section 145 of the Restatement Second of Contracts which declares that the general rules on third party beneficiaries "apply to contracts with a government or governmental agency except to the extent that application would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach" and that "(i)n particular" the limitations of section 145, including those set forth in footnote 2, supra, apply to a government contractor's liability to a member of the public for nonperformance of a service to the public.

[6] The contracts recite:

"WHEREAS, the Secretary of Labor is authorized by delegation from the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, dated June 17, 1968, approved by the President of the United States on June 27, 1968 (33 F.R. 9850, July 9, 1968), to enter into contracts to provide for Special Impact Programs, pursuant to Title ID of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act, directed to the solution of the critical problems existing in particular communities and neighborhoods within urban areas of the Nation having especially large concentrations of low-income persons; and

"WHEREAS, the President of the United States on October 2, 1967, launched a major test program to mobilize the resources of private industry and the Federal Government to help find jobs and provide training for thousands of the Nation's hard-core unemployed, or under-employed, by inviting private industry throughout the country to join with the agencies and departments of the Federal Government in assuming responsibility for providing training and work opportunities for such seriously disadvantaged persons.

"NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the aforesaid statutory authority, and the directive of the President, the parties hereto, in consideration of the mutual promises herein expressed, agree as follows: . . ."

[7] Section 2701 declares:

"Although the economic well-being and prosperity of the United States have progressed to a level surpassing any achieved in world history, and although these benefits are widely shared throughout the Nation, poverty continues to be the lot of a substantial number of our people. The United States can achieve its full economic and social potential as a nation only if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of our society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity. It is the purpose of this chapter to strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in furtherance of that policy.

"It is the sense of the Congress that it is highly desirable to employ the resources of the private sector of the economy of the United States in all such efforts to further the policy of this chapter."

[8] Former section 2763 provided:

"The purpose of this part is to establish special programs which (1) are directed to the solution of the critical problems existing in particular communities or neighborhoods (defined without regard to political or other subdivisions or boundaries) within those urban areas having especially large concentrations of low-in-come persons, and within those rural areas having substantial out-migration to eligible urban areas, and (2) are of sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable impact in such communities and neighborhoods in arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment, and rising community tensions."

[9] This illustration is repeated in Tentative Drafts, Restatement Second of Contracts, section 145, illustration 1.

[10] In the absence of controlling provisions in the federal Constitution, statutes or regulations, the United States government's rights and obligations under its contracts are ordinarily construed according to general contract law rather than the law of any particular state. (Priebe & Sons v. United States (1947) 332 U.S. 407, 411, 68 S.Ct. 123, 92 L.Ed. 32; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838.) In disputes between private parties over conflicting claims stemming from United States government contracts, the applicability of federal law to particular issues is generally held to depend on the degree to which the outcome will affect the government's interests. (Bank of America v. Parnell (1956) 352 U.S. 29, 77 S.Ct. 119, 1 L.Ed.2d 93; United States v. Taylor (5th Cir. 1964) 333 F.2d 633, 638; American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (9th Cir. 1961) 292 F.2d 640, 643.) In view of our holding it is unnecessary for us to decide whether or to what extent federal law applies in the present case.

[11] Evidence of Congress' purpose to aid the Individual impoverished persons in such communities can be gleaned from 42 U.S.C.A. § 2701, wherein Congress declared that if our country is to achieve its full potential, "every individual" must be given "the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity." Congress implemented this general policy of assisting our impoverished citizens in various ways, including the Special Impact Program involved in this case. Yet, contrary to the majority, nothing indicates that Congress' Exclusive purpose in doing so was to assist the neighborhoods and communities in which these persons live. It seems clear that Congress intended Both the communities and the individuals to be direct beneficiaries of the program. It is incorrect to label one as an intended Direct beneficiary and the other as merely Incidental.

[12] In the contracts, the defendants agreed to provide training and jobs to a specified class of persons, whom plaintiffs represent. The government's express intent, therefore, was to confer a benefit, namely training and jobs, upon an ascertainable identifiable class and not simply the general public itself.

[13] Comment (c) to section 133 of the Restatement of Contracts states in part that "By gift is meant primarily some performance or right which is not paid for by the recipient and which is apparently designed to benefit him." Thus, section 133 states essentially the same rule as that enunciated in Shell v. Schmidt, Supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 279, 290-291, 272 P.2d 82. Section 133 has been followed by the California courts. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., Supra, 10 Cal.2d 232, 244, 73 P.2d 1163; Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Construction Co., 204 Cal.App.2d 747, 752, 22 Cal.Rptr. 540.)

[14] Section 135 of the Restatement of Contracts, Supra, provides:

"Except as stated in § 140 (giving the promisor the protection against the third party beneficiary of any defenses he has against the promisee), (a) a gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the promisor to the donee beneficiary to perform the promise; and the duty can be enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own benefit; (b) a gift promise also creates a duty of the promisor to the promisee to render the promised performance to the donee beneficiary."

[15] The tentative draft of section 145 in Restatement 2d, Contracts (The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Contracts, Tentative Draft No. 3 (April 18, 1967), p. 76), also supports the conclusion that this provision of the Restatement does not bar plaintiffs' action. The tentative draft states:

"In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach." (Italics added.)

Comment A to the draft of section 145 explains the rationale for the section in part as follows:

"Subsection (2) applies to a particular class of contracts the classification of beneficiaries in § 133. Government contracts often benefit the public, But individual members of the public are treated as incidental beneficiaries unless a different intention is manifested." (Italics added.)

Comment C to the tentative draft of section 145 states further that "Government contractors sometimes make explicit promises to pay damages to third persons, and such promises are enforced. If there is no explicit promise, and no government liability, The question whether a particular claimant is an intended beneficiary is one of interpretation, depending on all the circumstances of the contract." (Italics added.) Thus, under the tentative draft, section 145 is not an outright prohibition of the enforcement of government contracts by third parties absent the enumerated conditions. Comment C makes it clear that the question as to a particular claimant is one of interpretation, and that, where, as here, the contract manifests an intent to benefit a particular third party, liability is properly imposed upon the promisee in favor of such third party.

12.4.5 Notes - Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc. 12.4.5 Notes - Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc.

NOTE

1. The material covered by the Tentative Draft of §145 of the Restatement Second, discussed by the court in its opinion, is now contained in Restatement Second §§302 and 313.

2. In Zigas v. Superior Court of Calif., 120 Cal. App. 3d 827, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1981), a group of tenants living in a building that had been financed with a federally insured mortgage brought an action against their landlords, seeking damages for an alleged breach of a provision in their landlord's financing agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Among other things, the agreement forbade the charging of rents in excess of those set out in a HUD-approved schedule. The plaintiffs claimed their landlords, in violation of this provision, had collected excessive rents of more than two million dollars. The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs had no right to enforce the provisions of a contract between their landlords and the federal government. On appeal, it was held that the tenants did indeed have a cause of action, under the law of California, as third party beneficiaries. After a lengthy examination of the relevant precedents (in particular, Martinez v. Socoma and Shell v. Schmidt), Justice Feinberg summarized the court's reasons for upholding the plaintiffs' right to sue:

1. In Martinez, the contract between the government and Socoma provided that if Socoma breached the agreement, Socoma would refund to the government that which the government had paid Socoma pursuant to the contract between them. Thus, it is clear in Martinez that it was the government that was out of pocket as a consequence of the breach and should be reimbursed therefor, not the people to be trained and given jobs. In the case at bench, as in Shell, the government suffered no loss as a consequence of the breach, it was the renter here and the veteran purchaser in Shell that suffered the direct pecuniary loss.

2. Unlike Martinez, too, in the case at bench, no governmental administrative procedure was provided for the resolution of disputes arising under the agreement. Thus, to permit this litigation would in no way affect the "efficiency and uniformity of interpretation fostered by these administrative procedures." (Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc., supra, 11 Cal. 3d at p. 402, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585,521 P.2d 841.) On the contrary, as we earlier noted, lawsuits such as this promote the federal interest by inducing compliance with HUD agreements.

3. In Martinez, the court held that "To allow plaintiffs' claim would nullify the limited liability for which defendants bargained and which the Government may well have held out as an inducement in negotiating the contracts." (At p. 403, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 521 P.2d 841, fn. omitted.) Here, there is no "limited liability." As we shall point out, real parties are liable under the agreement, without limitation, for breach of the agreement.

4. Further, in Martinez, the contracts "were designed not to benefit individuals as such but to utilize the training and employment of disadvantaged persons as a means of improving the East Los Angeles neighborhood." (At p. 406, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 521 P.2d 841.) Moreover, the training and employment programs were but one aspect of a "broad, long-range objective" (id.) contemplated by the agreement and designed to benefit not only those to be trained and employed but also "other local enterprises and the government itself through reduction of law enforcement and welfare costs." (Id.)

Here, on the other hand, as in Shell, the purpose of the Legislature and of the contract between real parties and HUD is narrow and specific: to provide moderate rental housing for families with children; in Shell, to provide moderate priced homes for veterans.

5. Finally, we believe the agreement itself manifests an intent to make tenants direct beneficiaries, not incidental beneficiaries, of [the landlords'] promise to charge no more than the HUD approved rent schedule.

Section 4(a) and 4(c) of the agreement, providing that there can be no increase in rental fees, over the approved rent schedule, without the prior approval in writing of HUD, were obviously designed to protect the tenant against arbitrary increases in rents, precisely that which is alleged to have occurred here. Certainly, it was not intended to benefit the Government as a guarantor of the mortgage. . . .

Id. at 837-839, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 811-812.

Justice Feinberg noted in conclusion that

it would be unconscionable if a builder could secure the benefits of a government guaranteed loan upon his promise to charge no more than a schedule of rents he had agreed to and then find there is no remedy by which the builder can be forced to disgorge rents he had collected in excess of his agreement simply because the Government had failed to act.

Id. at 841, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 813.

Do you think the California cases are reconcilable, as Justice Feinberg suggests? In attempting to resolve the issues posed by cases like Martinez and Zigas, is the terminology proposed by the two Restatements an aid, or a source of mischief?

3. In the Moch case, the water company made a contract with the city to supply water at the city's hydrants. In Zigas, the landlord-mortgagors made a promise to the federal government to abide by the terms of HUD's rent schedule. In the latter case, however, there was also a contractual relation between promisor and beneficiary (though, apparently, not one that by its own terms required the landlords to observe the rent restrictions imposed by HUD). Does this help to explain or justify the different outcome in the two cases? Was there a contractual relation between promisor and beneficiary in Martinez? Does the existence of such a relation necessarily mean that the beneficiary is a creditor beneficiary or even an intended beneficiary? Traditionally, third party beneficiary doctrine has evaluated the rights of the beneficiary on the basis of his relation to the promisee; Moch and Zigas suggest, however, that the beneficiary's relation to the promisor may be of equal importance.

4. The Supreme Court of Delaware put the doctrine of third party beneficiaries to unusual use in Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974). Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, was incarcerated in a Delaware state prison under a contract between the federal and state government according to which the federal government was to pay for the maintenance and support of federal offenders placed in the state's institutions. In return, the state agreed, among other things, to assume responsibility for the safety of the federal inmates. After being attacked by a fellow prisoner, plaintiff sued the state for damages in both contract and tort. The tort claim was barred by sovereign immunity, but the contract claim was permitted. The court, after finding that the state had waived sovereign immunity as to claims arising from the contract, argued: "while there may be semantic concerns about calling a prisoner a 'creditor' or 'beneficiary' (or both) of a Federal-State incarceration contract, the point is that plaintiff was the very subject of the agreement between the governments." Would you describe plaintiff as an intended beneficiary of the contracting parties? If so, what damages would you award for Delaware's violation of its contract with the federal government? In distinguishing Zigas from Martinez, Justice Feinberg partly relied on the fact that the federal job training program at issue in the latter case included "an administrative procedure . . . for the resolution of disputes." Blair presents a similar question: If the inmates have no standing to sue on the contract, will its policy be enforced?

12.4.6 Holbrook v. Pitt 12.4.6 Holbrook v. Pitt

643 F.2d 1261

Doris HOLBROOK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Henry C. PITT, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 80-1006.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued May 28, 1980.
Decided March 2, 1981.
Rehearing Denied July 2, 1981.

[1264] Lawrence G. Albrecht, James A. Grambling, Jr., Legal Action of Wisconsin Inc., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.

William C. Calahan, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for third-party defendant-appellee.

Before BAUER, Circuit Judge, KILKENNY, Senior Circuit Judge,[*] and CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by tenants of certain housing projects in Wisconsin who are beneficiaries of housing assistance payments made by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") under its housing assistance program for existing multifamily projects benefiting from HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgages. This program was established pursuant [1265] to Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (as amended by § 201(a) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976) ("Section 8"). Under this program, HUD executes contracts with project owners to make rental payments on behalf of eligible low-income tenants (the "Contracts"). Appellants contend they are entitled to these rent subsidies within a reasonable time after the effective date of the Contracts between HUD and the various project owners. The tenants also argue that the rent subsidies should be made retroactive to the effective dates of the respective Contracts. Appellants further claim that HUD's procedures for making rental assistance payments violate the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of HUD (the "Secretary"), who was the third-party defendant, finding that the tenants had no claim under the Contracts since no provisions of the Contracts were breached. The district court also found that the tenants' interest in receiving housing assistance payments was only a "subjective expectancy" which was not entitled to due process protection. We hold that the Contracts were breached and that the tenants can recover retroactive benefits as third-party beneficiaries; we also find that tenants in existing HUD-insured projects assisted under Section 8 are generally entitled to housing assistance benefits within a reasonable time after the effective date of the applicable Section 8 Contract. We further determine that appellants have a legitimate claim of entitlement to housing assistance payments as of the effective dates of the Contracts. We therefore reverse and remand.

The Case

This litigation began as a small claims action in Milwaukee County Court in July 1977, to recover housing assistance payments allegedly due to plaintiff Doris Holbrook from defendant Henry Pitt, the owner of Main Street Gardens, the housing project in which Holbrook lived. Pitt subsequently filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary, alleging a breach of duty to inform Pitt of his Section 8 Contract obligations. HUD removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

After the district court granted Holbrook's motion to amend her complaint, the original complaint was redesignated as Count I. In Count II, Holbrook then asserted a class claim for declaratory judgment and damages on behalf of the class of tenants in multifamily projects in Wisconsin who had been certified for Section 8 assistance payments by the owners of their dwelling units.[1] Count II was based on the theory that the members of the tenant class were third-party beneficiaries of the Contracts executed between HUD and the owners of the projects in question, and that the class was thereby entitled to Section 8 benefits retroactive to the effective dates of the Contracts, payable within a reasonable time after the dates of execution.

In Count III, the plaintiff class alleged that they were denied retroactive assistance payments in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2] The tenants argued that they had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the receipt of Section 8 benefits as of the date of Contract execution and that the provision of such benefits must commence not later than thirty days after [1266] the execution date. To enforce these rights, plaintiffs requested, inter alia, that HUD be ordered to provide a meaningful opportunity for all class members to challenge HUD's procedures regarding administration of the Contracts.

After extensive discovery, the parties, on a joint statement of uncontested facts, filed cross motions for summary judgment. While these motions were pending, Pitt certified Holbrook for the claimed retroactive housing assistance payments. HUD then tendered full payment to Holbrook.

The district court found that, because of the payment to Holbrook, Count I had become moot. As to Count II, the district court held that, even assuming that plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, they were bound by the terms of the Section 8 Contracts, which HUD had not breached. With respect to Count III, the court found that plaintiffs possessed only an "inchoate property interest" in the receipt of housing assistance payments, which was merely a "subjective expectancy" not entitled to due process protection. HUD's motion for summary judgment was therefore granted.[3]

Plaintiff Holbrook lived with her four minor children in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in Main Street Gardens, a housing development owned by Henry Pitt. On June 10, 1976, HUD and Pitt executed a Section 8 Contract under which housing assistance payments were to be paid to Pitt's eligible tenants, including Holbrook. Under the Contract, HUD committed funds to make housing assistance payments on behalf of eligible tenants as of June 1976. Funds were not disbursed under the Contract, however, until Pitt certified to HUD the names of the eligible tenants and the amount of subsidy to which each was entitled.[4]

Despite prodding by Holbrook and HUD, a Section 8 application, and eligibility and certification forms were not mailed by Pitt to residents of Main Street Gardens until November 16, 1976. Holbrook and other eligible families at Main Street Gardens were then certified and received Section 8 payments beginning December 1976. But, at the time of certification, no retroactive payments were made, as were authorized and for which funds had been set aside.[5]

The Section 8 Program

The federal policy of providing decent, safe and sanitary housing for all families, [1267] first articulated in the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), has inspired numerous programs designed to increase the availability of housing for lower income families.[6] The Section 8 lower income housing assistance program, which was enacted as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 20, 31, 42, 49 U.S.C.), is one of the most ambitious of these efforts.[7] This program was enacted for the dual purposes "of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1976). Section 8 was designed to achieve these goals by providing rent subsidies to lower income families living in housing owned primarily by private developers. All tenants whose incomes do not exceed 80 percent of the median income for their area are eligible for Section 8 assistance.[8]

In implementing Section 8, HUD has created several distinct subprograms, which are set forth in the regulations found at 24 C.F.R. § 880 et seq. (1980). Defined according to the characteristics of the housing to be subsidized, there are separate subprograms governing Section 8 assistance payments for, inter alia, newly constructed housing, 24 C.F.R. § 880 (1980), substantially rehabilitated housing, 24 C.F.R. § 881 (1980), existing housing, 24 C.F.R. § 882 (1980), and housing developed under public housing agency programs, 24 C.F.R. § 883 (1980).

Appellants reside in projects with HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgages. Main [1268] Street Gardens, for example, where Holbrook resides, received the benefit of mortgage interest payments under Section 236 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976).[9]

The regulations applicable to the making of housing assistance payments on behalf of tenants in projects subject to HUD-insured mortgages are found at 24 C.F.R. § 886 (1980). These regulations, together with HUD's program instruction handbook,[10] establish the policies and procedures pursuant to which HUD makes housing assistance payments for projects with HUD-insured mortgages. The heart of this Section 8 subprogram is the Contract between HUD and the owner, which governs the relationship between the contracting parties and defines the rights and duties of the owner with respect to the administration of the Section 8 subprogram.

Prior to execution of a Contract, the owner must submit information regarding the gross income, number of household members under age 18 and rent-to-income ratio for each resident household, present vacancies and any rental increases currently being processed by HUD. At the time a Contract is executed, HUD commits funds to that project. The dollar amount of HUD's maximum commitment of funds is set at 75 percent of the current HUD-approved rents for the units expected to receive Section 8 subsidies. These units include the units occupied by families whose gross incomes and rent payments would appear to make them eligible for Section 8 assistance as well as the units that were vacant when the owner applied for a Contract. This calculation of the maximum contract commitment can include a proposed rent increase if HUD anticipates its approval.

Pursuant to paragraph 1.9c of the model Contract,[11] the owner is responsible for determining and verifying the eligibility of families, processing necessary application and verification forms, selecting families who will receive Section 8 assistance,[12] and computing the amount of housing assistance payments to be made on their behalf, a process denominated as "certification."[13] Upon the completion of certification of eligible [1269] families by the owner, HUD makes housing assistance payments to owners on behalf of tenants in accordance with the provisions of the Contract.[14]

HUD also maintains a project account "to assure that housing assistance payments will be increased on a timely basis to cover (HUD-approved) increases in Contract rents or decreases in Family Incomes." 24 C.F.R. § 886.108(c) (1980). According to HUD's regulations, this project account is established and maintained "out of amounts by which the maximum annual Contract commitment per year exceeds amounts paid under the Contract for any year." 24 C.F.R. § 886.108(c)(1) (1980). It appears from the record, however, that HUD actually deposits the entire amount of the maximum contract commitment in a segregated account at the time the Contract is executed.

Although HUD imposes no duty on owners to submit certifications at any specified time,[15] HUD regulations allow housing assistance payments to be made as of the effective date of the Contract and funds are committed by HUD to provide for payments from that date. 24 C.F.R. § 886.108 (1980). HUD, however, has refused to make housing assistance payments on behalf of tenants for the period between the effective date of the Contract and the month in which tenants are certified by the project owner, unless the owner provides for proper certification (termed "retroactive certification") for the intervening months.

After the effective date of a Contract, but before the initiation of housing assistance payments, HUD provides no administrative process for determining a tenant's eligibility to receive housing assistance payments. Nor does an administrative procedure exist whereby an eligible (whether certified or uncertified) family may, in appropriate circumstances, challenge either a project owner's initial delay in certifying eligible tenants for payments or an owner's unwillingness or refusal to certify tenants for payments retroactive to the Contract date.

Discussion

1. Tenants' Third-Party Beneficiary Claim

In Count II, the tenant class asserted their rights as third-party beneficiaries of the Contracts executed between HUD and the owners. The tenants sought prompt implementation of the Contracts as well as the receipt of retroactive benefits. The district court declined to rule on the third-party beneficiary issue but found that, in any event, the Contracts had not been breached since HUD had no contractual duty to pay benefits from the effective dates of the Contracts. Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. 990, 994 (E.D.Wis.1979).

Plaintiffs' approach in this case seems to have made analysis of their claims for retroactive benefits unnecessarily difficult. They argue that HUD has improperly administered the Section 8 program by totally delegating certification responsibilities to [1270] the owners. While this argument may have merit in the context of a claim that HUD has failed to meet its Section 8 obligations, it is only obliquely related to plaintiffs' claim that HUD has breached the Contracts before us.

In her original action, Holbrook had named Pitt, the owner of her building, as defendant. Pitt was dismissed from this action when he certified Holbrook for retroactive benefits and those benefits were paid to Holbrook by HUD. The other Wisconsin project owners who had executed Contracts with HUD were not named as defendants, however, when plaintiff subsequently asserted her class claim. Yet, since the Contracts place the obligation to certify tenants on the owners, it is not HUD but the owners who have most clearly breached the duty to properly certify the tenants. Despite this discrepancy, however, we have concluded that tenants can recover retroactive benefits because HUD breached its obligation to properly administer the Contracts by accepting non-retroactive certifications from the owners.

Under settled principles of federal common law,[16] a third party may have enforceable rights under a contract if the contract was made for his direct benefit. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428, 79 S.Ct. 445, 448, 3 L.Ed.2d 413 (1959); Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1979); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1248-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 1977); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1339 (2d Cir. 1974); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 1972); Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1971); Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 2116, 18 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1967). If the agreement was not intended to benefit the third party, however, he is viewed as an "incidental" beneficiary, having no legally cognizable rights under the contract.[17] German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 33 [1271] S.Ct. 32, 57 L.Ed. 195 (1912); Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d at 1208; 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 776 at 18-19 (1951); Restatement of Contracts, § 133 at 151-52 (1932).

To determine whether plaintiffs have enforceable rights under the Contracts we must analyze the purposes underlying their formation. Plaintiffs maintain that HUD executed the Contracts in order to provide rental assistance to low income families. HUD, however, claims that plaintiffs are only incidental beneficiaries of the Contracts, since the primary purpose of the Section 8 program, and the Contracts entered into pursuant thereto, was to benefit financially troubled HUD-insured projects. We reject this argument, as it is contradicted by the language of Section 8, relevant legislative history, HUD's implementing regulations and interpretations and the terms of the Contracts.[18] HUD's position displays an astonishing lack of perspective about government social welfare programs. If the tenants are not the primary beneficiaries of a program designed to provide housing assistance payments to low income families, the legitimacy of the multi-billion dollar Section 8 program is placed in grave doubt.

Congress did not establish the Section 8 housing assistance program merely to limit claims on HUD's insurance fund that might be occasioned by assignments or foreclosures of HUD-insured mortgages. Congress authorized Section 8 payments "(f)or the purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1976).

Section 8 is designed to provide rent subsidies to needy families. If Congress had intended to design Section 8 primarily to assist financially troubled projects (rather than low-income families), it would have provided that Contracts would be awarded and funding structured in accordance with the financial condition of the housing projects.[19] Instead, it provided that Section 8 funds should be allocated according to the [1272] financial needs of the tenants. The statute does not establish a preference for projects that may soon be in default on HUD-insured mortgages, but it does provide that 30 percent of the families assisted by Section 8 funds must be "very low-income families," 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(7) (1976), which are defined as "those families whose incomes do not exceed 50 per centum of the median income for the area." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(2) (1976).[20]

HUD has also recognized that the function of the Section 8 subprogram we are considering is to assist low income families in securing decent, safe and sanitary housing. Thus, HUD's introduction to the regulations that established this subprogram provides:

The purpose of this program is to assist families presently in occupancy in a HUD-insured or HUD-assisted project to more easily carry their rental burden.

42 Fed.Reg. 5602 (Jan. 28, 1977).

HUD's regulations further demonstrate that the Section 8 program is designed primarily to benefit low-income families. Under the regulations, a Contract may be executed only after a project owner establishes that a significant number of existing or potential tenants are "eligible for and in need of Section 8 assistance." 24 C.F.R. § 886.107(d) (1980). And, when a Contract is executed, HUD calculates and budgets funds not on the basis of the financial needs of the project's management but on the estimated rental assistance needs of eligible tenants.

The Contract terms also demonstrate that the tenants are intended beneficiaries of the Contracts. Paragraph 1.3(b)(1) provides, in part:

The Government hereby agrees to make housing assistance payments on behalf of Families for the Contract Units, to enable such Families to lease Decent, Safe, and Sanitary housing pursuant to Section 8 of the Act.

Numerous other Contract provisions make it clear that the Contracts were executed primarily for the tenants' benefit. Paragraph 1.7, for example, requires the owners to "maintain and operate the Contract unit and related facilities so as to provide Decent, Safe and Sanitary housing." See also paragraph 1.9(a) (requiring affirmative action in owner's marketing of units and selection of families); paragraph 1.9(b) (restricting owner's discretion regarding the collection and refunding of utility and security deposits); paragraph 1.10 (restricting owner's right to evict tenants).

HUD, of course, perceives that the Section 8 program also serves to minimize claims on its insurance fund. The creation of a separate Section 8 subprogram exclusively for projects with HUD-insured mortgages is compelling evidence of this perception. It is also apparent from the introduction to HUD's Handbook, which reads:

The Section 8 set-aside program for existing multifamily projects benefiting from HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgages . . . is designed to accomplish two goals: (1) reduce the claims on HUD's insurance funds by stabilizing the finances of projects intended for low and moderate income residents by avoiding project mortgage assignments or, in projects with assigned mortgages, by preventing foreclosure and (2) assure the continued availability of units in these existing multifamily projects to the lower income families for whom they were intended by reducing to affordable levels the rent obligation of assisted families.[21]

We do not decide whether it is proper for HUD, in allocating Section 8 funds, [1273] to give priority to projects with serious financial problems.[22] We believe, however, that this preference does not contradict the fact that the Contracts before us are intended primarily to benefit needy tenants. Plaintiffs have enforceable rights since the Contracts were intended to provide them with rental assistance. Subsidiary purposes, such as HUD's interest in minimizing claims on its insurance funds, do not defeat plaintiffs' status as protected beneficiaries. See King v. National Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1975); Avco Delta Corp. v. United States, 484 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974); Beck v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 870, 871 (7th Cir. 1947).[23]

Having concluded that plaintiffs have enforceable rights under the Contracts, we must determine whether the Contracts have been breached. The district court held that HUD did not violate any provision of the Contracts, since "it is the owner who is given the responsibility to effect certifications of eligibility, and there is no contract provision requiring HUD to make assistance payments until the necessary certifications (including retroactive certifications) are performed." Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. at 993.[24] Because they are somewhat distinct, we will consider first the question whether HUD breached the Contracts because the tenants were not promptly certified, and second, the question whether HUD breached the Contracts because the tenants were not retroactively certified.

The district court refused to imply a Contract term that would require the [1274] owners to certify tenants within a reasonable time after execution of the Contract. We believe it is appropriate to imply such a term, since the purpose of the Contracts to provide housing assistance to lower income families would otherwise be frustrated. We agree with the district court, however, that HUD did not breach the Contracts with respect to the timing of certification.

The district court relied on paragraph 1.9(c) (Eligibility, Selection and Admission of Families), supra note 14, and on paragraph 1.11(a) (Reduction of Number of Contract Units for Failure to Lease to Eligible Families), supra note 16, of the Contracts in deciding that there was no contractual duty to certify tenants promptly. Paragraph 1.9(c), however, merely allocates the certification function to the owner. It does not address the form which certifications are to take, the date by which certifications are to be performed or the period of time certifications are intended to cover. Although paragraph 1.9(c) is silent on the question of time of performance, it is reasonably inferrable from the purpose of the Contract that the owner is obligated to perform his certification responsibilities within a reasonable time.[25]

We are similarly unpersuaded that paragraph 1.11(a) is intended to be the sole contract limitation on the timing of certification. Paragraph 1.11(a)'s penalty provision would not be triggered until one year after the effective date of the Contract. It is inconceivable, however, that the parties intended to allow a full year for implementation (while housing assistance payments built up in project accounts) of a shelter program designed to provide economic relief for poor tenants. Paragraph 1.11(a) merely establishes one remedy which HUD may resort to in the event that a project owner fails to keep Contract units leased or available for leasing by eligible families. It does not purport to govern the date by which owners must perform certification.

Since all the tenants in the class designated in Count II have been certified, it is not necessary to determine what would be a reasonable time to perform certification under the circumstances of this case. Cf. A. M. R. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Postal Savings Association, 567 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1978). In any event, although we have implied a Contract term requiring prompt certification, we believe that the owners, and not HUD, breached this implied term, since HUD had no mechanism (in the Contracts before us) to force the owners promptly to certify tenants.[26]

With respect to retroactive certification, the district court held that plaintiffs could not recover retroactive benefits because HUD was not "required, by the terms of the contract or otherwise, to pay retroactive benefits." Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. at 994. The court also refused to imply from the Contract that retroactive certification was required, finding again that paragraph 1.9(c) set "the terms and conditions of performance." Id. Yet we believe that paragraph 1.9(c) must be interpreted quite differently than the district court suggests. Paragraph 1.9(c) provides only that the owner is "responsible for . . . computation of the amount of housing assistance payments on behalf of each selected Family." It does not set forth the period for which housing assistance payments are to be requested [1275] or paid. It certainly does not suggest that the obligation to compute housing assistance payments includes the right to arbitrarily deny to tenants benefits from the date of Contract execution. The very use of the word "computation" connotes the application of a formula to numbers, not the exercise of discretion either arbitrary or informed.

We believe it is necessary to interpret the language of paragraph 1.9(c) to mean that retroactive certification is required. First, "computation" is a mathematical process presumably involving, inter alia, the multiplication of the amount of rental subsidy to which a particular tenant is entitled by the number of months the subsidy is due; the Contract language in no way suggests that the number of months is a matter of discretion. Rather, that number must be the number of months the tenant has lived in the project since the Contract governing Section 8 payments was executed (and funds were set aside). Second, unless the language is construed to require retroactive payment, the primary purpose of the Contracts to provide housing assistance to low income families would be frustrated. HUD has not offered any justification for its policy of accepting certifications that do not provide for retroactive benefits covering all relevant months, and we can perceive no circumstances that would justify such a policy.[27]

HUD's calculation of the dollar amount of financial assistance it sets aside in a project account is based on the estimated monthly rental assistance needs of specific tenants beginning with the month in which the Contract is executed. HUD, therefore, has committed funds to pay housing assistance payments from the first day of the Contract period.[28]

Although the owners may exercise limited discretion with regard to the selection [1276] of those families that are to receive benefits,[29] the owners' obligation to "compute" the amount of housing assistance payments is entirely ministerial. No reason has been suggested for allowing the owners to determine whether tenants will or will not receive retroactive benefits.[30] Therefore, by accepting deficient computations from the owners, we believe HUD breached its obligation to properly administer the Contracts, see 24 C.F.R. § 886.120(a) (1980), and its coordinate responsibility to third-party beneficiaries to fulfill the purposes of the Contracts, i. e., to provide full assistance benefits to certified families. Appellants can therefore recover retroactive benefits from HUD as third-party beneficiaries of the Contracts.

2. Tenants' Due Process Claim

The class of tenants designated in Count III of the complaint includes only those tenants "who were certified or who will be certified pursuant to the contracts for housing assistance payments but who did not or will not receive the benefit of housing assistance payments as of the effective date of the contracts."[31] The narrow question before us, therefore, is whether the due process clause requires HUD to establish procedures to provide already certified tenants with notice and opportunity to be heard concerning the provision of retroactive benefits.[32]

The existence and scope of appellants' due process rights depend on the resolution of three issues. First, there must be governmental [1277] action sufficient to invoke the guarantees of the fifth amendment. This requirement has clearly been met here. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th Cir. 1973). Second, the asserted interest must be shown to be a "liberty" or a "property" interest to which there is a claim of entitlement under the due process clause. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-83, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600-01, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Third, assuming an entitlement is established, what process is due? Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See generally Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration, 558 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1977).

In determining whether appellants have a constitutionally protected property interest, we are guided by the well-known discussion in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972):

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.

Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.

It is clear in the present case that appellants have established a legitimate claim of entitlement[33] The tenants' interest in retroactive benefits rises above a subjective expectancy or a "unilateral expectation," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, since, as concluded above, certified tenants have legally enforceable rights as beneficiaries under the Contracts to receive retroactive benefits.[34]

In similar circumstances, the United States Supreme Court held in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), that a teacher at a state college would have a [1278] protectable interest in continued employment if he could demonstrate that his tenure claim was based upon an implied term in his employment contract. Here we have, in effect, implied a Contract term requiring retroactive certification. Tenants therefore have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.[35]

Courts have held in a variety of circumstances that certified tenants in Section 8 programs have protectable property interests under the due process clause. For example, Ferguson v. Metropolitan Development & Housing Agency, 485 F.Supp. 517 (M.D.Tenn.1980) and Watkins v. Mobile Housing Board, No. 79-0067-P (S.D.Ala. May 14, 1979) (order on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief), both held that tenants have due process rights in connection with the termination of their certificates of family participation in the Section 8 subprogram for existing housing.[36] See also Brezina v. Dowdall, 472 F.Supp. 82 (N.D.Ill.1979). And, in Ressler v. Landrieu, No. A77-228C (D.Alas. March 6, 1980), the court extended due process protection to prospective applicants for Section 8 payments who were not yet certified, but who met the Section 8 eligibility criteria, despite the fact that project owners exercise limited discretion with respect to the selection of tenants to be certified. See note 12, supra.

The district court's analysis in the present case is inapposite because it is based on the assumption that appellants were claiming due process protection for tenants who had not yet been certified.[37] The class designated in Count III, however, is limited to those tenants who have already been certified and, probably in addition, those who will be certified in the future under existing Contracts.[38] But see note 31, supra. Thus, tenants are included in the class denominated in Count III only after they have been certified. We therefore do not express any opinion on the district court's holding that [1279] non-certified tenants do not have a legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause. But see Ressler v. Landrieu, No. A77-228C (D.Alas. March 6, 1980).

The district court relied on Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d at 494-96, in support of the proposition that neither Congress nor HUD has "manifested an intention 'to create a governmental obligation' to tenants who have not been certified as eligible to receive section 8 benefits." Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. at 995.

The claim of entitlement rejected by Judge Hufstedler in Geneva Towers and by this court in Harlib v. Lynn, 511 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1975), involved a rent increase in a housing project subsidized under Section 221(d)(3), which created an assistance program similar to the Section 8 program. In determining that Section 221(d)(3) did not create an entitlement to a certain rent level, Judge Hufstedler emphasized that Congress did not "gear rent levels to the budgets of individual tenants" but, instead, authorized the Secretary to set rent levels based upon several factors. She also noted that Section 221(d)(3) was not enacted as a direct financial assistance program for tenants and that the program was directed more "to benefiting the class of low and middle income housing consumers than it (was) to benefiting any specific tenants." Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 497.

But this analysis, which also underlies Harlib, supports rather than contradicts the existence of a legitimate claim of entitlement in the instant case. Here the rent subsidies are fashioned to fit the budgets of individual tenants. Section 8 was designed to benefit specific tenants by providing them with monthly rental subsidies meeting their particularized needs. Once a family is selected to receive Section 8 assistance, the only factors that determine the level of assistance the family is to receive are the monthly rental charge for the unit and the family's financial circumstances. Thus, in contrast to the Section 221(d)(3) program, award of Section 8 benefits is geared to the rental assistance needs of particular tenants.[39]

The existence of owner discretion in the certification process does not suggest a different conclusion. Although the owner may have limited discretion with regard to the initial selection of tenants who are to be subsidized under the Contracts, see note 12, supra, the owner may properly exercise no discretion with regard to retroactive certification, see pages 1274-76, supra. Indeed, it is the apparent decision by HUD to give owners the unreviewable right to decide whether a certified tenant will receive retroactive benefits that offends the concepts of fairness and nonarbitrariness which are at the heart of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.

3. What Process is Due?

Since appellants have a legitimate claim of entitlement to retroactive housing [1280] assistance payments, we must remand to the district court to determine what process may be due. Due process does not have a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Instead, it is a flexible concept that requires such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). As the Supreme Court has emphasized:

The function of the legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2107 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

To determine what process is appropriate, the countervailing interests of appellants and HUD must be balanced.[40]

(I)dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).[41]

The hardship upon tenants here consists in their being deprived, in their necessitous circumstances, of housing assistance benefits for periods as long as seven months. In this regard, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341, 96 S.Ct. at 905 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 539, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975)).

On the other hand, the fiscal and administrative burdens of elaborate procedural requirements could become relatively onerous in comparison with the private interests sought to be benefited. In this case, however, the burden of providing procedural safeguards regarding the provision of retroactive payments to already certified tenants would appear to be insubstantial. We note that HUD has already provided notice, hearing and appeal procedures for applicants under Section 8 subprograms that involve public housing authorities. See, e. g., 24 C.F.R. § 881.603(b)(3) (1980) (substantially rehabilitated housing). See also Ressler v. Landrieu, No. A77-228 (D.Alas. November 21, 1980) (requiring HUD to establish tenant selection standards, waiting lists, and notice, hearing and review procedures with regard to the selection of tenants to be certified under the Section 8 subprogram for projects with HUD-insured mortgages).

It is a sine qua non that all tenants receive prompt notification of their right to receive such payments retroactively. See [1281] Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). Due process would also seem to require that the tenants receive a written statement setting forth the reasons for any denial of retroactive benefits and the opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of HUD's reasons. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); T. A. Moynahan Properties, Inc. v. Lancaster Village Cooperative, Inc., 496 F.2d 1114, 1118 (7th Cir. 1974); Brezina v. Dowdall, 472 F.Supp. 82, 85 (N.D.Ill.1979). In addition, appellants must receive some sort of hearing before retroactive benefits are finally denied, since the "fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. at 901 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 1564. On remand, the district court should determine the precise contours of the requirements of procedural due process in the context of this case, giving whatever regard is appropriate to the contract remedy we have provided to presently certified tenants.[42]

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

[*] The Honorable John F. Kilkenny, Senior Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, is sitting by designation.

[1] The class certified in Count II includes all families in Wisconsin who resided in certain dwelling units when Section 8 Contracts were executed between HUD and the owners of these dwelling units and who were certified for housing assistance payments pursuant to these Contracts, but who did not receive the benefit of payments as of the effective dates of the Contracts.

[2] The class certified in Count III includes all families in Wisconsin who resided or will reside in dwelling units when Section 8 Contracts were executed or will be executed between HUD and the owner of these dwelling units and who were certified or will be certified pursuant to these Contracts for housing assistance payments, but who did not or will not receive the benefit of such payments as of the effective dates of the Contracts.

[3] After the instant appeal was filed, plaintiffs orally moved (on the basis of Pitt's certification of Holbrook and tender of full payment of claimed retroactive payments) to dismiss defendant Pitt from the appeal, and this motion was granted.

[4] At the time the Contract between HUD and Pitt was executed, Holbrook paid $182.03 per month in rent; she also paid for electric service. Her total housing costs allegedly consumed nearly 50 percent of her monthly income. Under the Section 8 program she was entitled to subsidies from HUD that would limit her housing costs to 25 percent of her monthly income.

[5] With respect to the Contracts executed between 1976 and 1979 between HUD and the forty-nine multifamily project owners in Wisconsin, HUD made housing assistance payments on behalf of 1,736 certified families, who are members of the class certified in Count II. Of these, 336 families (19.3 percent) waited longer than ninety days after the effective dates of their respective Contracts to be certified and to receive initial housing assistance payments, including Holbrook and twelve other families at Main Street Gardens. An additional 188 families (10.8 percent) waited sixty days to receive payments and 772 families (44.5 percent) waited less than thirty days. The record is unclear concerning the delay in initial payments for the remaining 440 certified families (25.4 percent).

Implementation of Contracts at the following projects illustrates the inconsistent manner in which HUD initiated housing assistance payments on behalf of certified families:

(a) At West View Apartments:

i. the effective date of the Contract was December 1, 1976;

ii. the initial claim for housing assistance payments was submitted by the owner to HUD on November 23, 1976;

iii. HUD made housing assistance payments effective December 1976.

(b) At Watertown East I:

i. the effective date of the Contract was December 13, 1977;

ii. the initial claim for housing assistance payments was submitted by the owners on June 9, 1978;

iii. HUD made housing assistance payments effective June 1978; no retroactive payments to cover the period from December to June were made since none were requested by the project owner.

(c) At Meadow Village:

i. the effective date of the Contract was October 21, 1977;

ii. the initial claim for housing assistance payments was submitted by the owner on June 20, 1978;

iii. HUD made retroactive housing assistance payments to cover the period from October to June since the tenants here were certified for retroactive benefits by the project owner.

[6] These programs include, inter alia, the Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.), the Housing Act of 1961, Pub.L. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.), the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 38, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.), the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476, (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 20, 31, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.).

Many of these programs were enacted because of the perceived failure of existing legislation to provide decent housing for lower income families. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, for example, which set ambitious goals for the preservation of existing housing as well as the creation of additional housing through construction and rehabilitation, included the congressional finding that the supply of housing was not increasing rapidly enough to realize "the goal of [1281] a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family." 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1976).

[7] Congress has described the Section 8 program as "the Nation's major tool for assisting the construction of lower income housing." S.Rep. No. 94-749, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1885, 1887. See also S.Rep.No. 93-693, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4273 et seq.

[8] Under the Section 8 program, the monthly rent an owner may charge is generally limited to 110 percent of the fair market rental of the units. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). Eligible families are required to pay not more than 25 percent of their income for rent (or 15 percent in the case of certain tenants). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) (1976). The difference between the amount payable by eligible families and the total rental amount due to the owner is the amount subsidized by HUD in the form of housing assistance payments. Owners do not receive an increase in rental income as the result of Section 8 Contracts. Rather, the rent payable by each certified tenant is apportioned between the tenant and HUD based on both the tenant's income and family size.

Pursuant to § 202 of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979) was amended to increase the tenant's share of the rent to a maximum of 30 percent of income. However, tenants currently in occupancy are exempt from this increase.

[9] 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(a) (1976) sets forth the purpose of the Section 236 program:

For the purpose of reducing rentals for lower income families, the Secretary is authorized to make, and to contract to make, periodic interest reduction payments on behalf of the owner of a rental housing project designed for occupancy by lower income families, which shall be accomplished through payments to mortgagees holding mortgages meeting the special requirements specified in this section.

Tenants residing in Section 236 developments are required to pay, as rent, the greater of either one-fourth of their monthly income, as defined, or a "basic rental charge determined on the basis of operating the project with (the Section 236 mortgage interest subsidies)." 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(f)(1) (1976).

For 20 percent of the units in projects assisted by Section 236 after August 22, 1974, HUD is authorized to make "additional assistance payments to the project owner on behalf of tenants whose incomes are too low for them to afford the basic rentals . . . with 25 per centum of their income." 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(f)(2) (1976).

[10] HUD, Section 8 Additional Assistance Program for Projects with HUD-Insured or HUD-Held Mortgages (1976) ("Handbook").

[11] It appears that the model Contract, which is included in the Handbook as an appendix, was used as the actual Contract for every agreement, to which this case has application, between HUD and the owners under the Section 8 HUD-insured mortgage subprogram.

[12] This responsibility would only arise if, at the time certification occurs, the number of units occupied by eligible tenants is greater than the number of units authorized to be assisted under the Contract.

[13] Paragraph 1.9(c) of the Contract, which contains the basic provision pertaining to certification of eligible tenants, reads as follows:

1.9 Leasing of Units

c. Eligibility, Selection and Admission of Families.

(1) The Owner shall be responsible for determination of eligibility of applicants, selection of families from among those determined to be eligible, and computation of the amount of housing assistance payments on behalf of each selected Family in accordance with schedules and criteria established by the Government.

[14] Contracts may be executed for an initial period of up to five years, renewable for successive five year terms by agreement between the owner and HUD. The total Contract term cannot exceed fifteen years. 24 C.F.R. § 886.111 (1980).

[15] Paragraph 1.11(a) of the Contract provides as follows:

1.11 Reduction of Number of Contract Units for Failure to lease to Eligible Families

a. After First Year of Contract.

If at any time, beginning six months after the effective date of this Contract, the Owner fails for a continuous period of six months to have at least 80 percent of the Contract Units leased or available for leasing by Families, the Government may on 30 days notice reduce the number of Contract Units to not less than the number of units under lease or available for leasing by Families, plus 10 percent of such number if the number is 10 or more, rounded to the next higher number.

This provision is an incentive to project owners to lease Contract units to eligible lower income families. There is no other express requirement for owners, detailed in the Contract, concerning either certification of eligible families within any specific time period or retroactive certification to the Contract date.

[16] Federal common law applies to plaintiffs' third-party beneficiary claims since a federal agency is a party to the action and since the outcome of this case will directly affect substantial financial obligations of the United States. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943). Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977), does not suggest a contrary result. The Court in Miree held that state and not federal common law applied to third-party beneficiary claims arising out of a contract between the Federal Aviation Administration and DeKalb County. Central to the Court's holding, however, was the fact that the United States, although a party to the contract, was not named as a defendant in the breach of contract claim. Therefore, in sharp contrast with the case before us, only the rights of private litigants were at issue, and resolution of the dispute would have had "no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury." Id. at 29, 97 S.Ct. at 2493.

We note, however, that our result as to the third-party beneficiary claim would be the same if analyzed under Wisconsin law. See Mercado v. Mitchell, 83 Wis.2d 17, 264 N.W.2d 532 (1978); Schell v. Knickelbein, 77 Wis.2d 344, 252 N.W.2d 921 (1977); In re Bratt, 257 Wis. 447, 43 N.W.2d 817 (1950).

[17] Consistent with the scheme set forth in the Restatement of Contracts § 133 (1932), most court decisions have recognized three classes of third-party beneficiaries donee, creditor and incidental with different rules governing the rights of each class. It has been suggested, for example, that a contracting party's "intent to benefit" a third party is relevant if the third party is viewed as a donee beneficiary, but not if the third party is viewed as a creditor beneficiary. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 497 n.11 (3d Cir. 1953).

We decline to follow this approach, since it fails to focus on the central interpretative question involved in third-party beneficiary problems: did the contracting parties intend that the third party benefit from the contract? We prefer the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968), which divides beneficiaries into two classes intended and incidental. Section 133 provides:

(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either

(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or

(b) the promisee manifests an intention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.

(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

We also decline to adopt the Restatement's position to the extent it may suggest that only the intentions of the "promisee" (the party through whom the beneficiary claims) and not the "promisor" (the party obligated to render performance that benefits the third party) are relevant to a determination of the third-party beneficiary's rights. Contracts are the product of shared intentions, and a promisor should be bound only by those objectively manifested intentions of the promisee to which the promisor has implicitly or explicitly assented. It is improper to neglect the reasonable expectations of the promisor, since the burden of the agreement to the promisor, and therefore the consideration he will require, may vary according to the number of parties who have enforceable rights under the contract. See generally Jones, Legal Protection of Third Party Beneficiaries: On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 Cinn.L.Rev. 313 (1977).

[18] We believe the legislative history and purpose of the Section 8 program may properly be used to interpret the parties' intentions. It is evident from the terms of the Contract that HUD, in executing the Contract, is acting to fulfill the objectives of the Section 8 program. The Contract itself is entitled "Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program" and Part I of the Contract expressly states that the "contract is entered into pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937." Cf. Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 1972); Feir v. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc., 459 F.Supp. 841, 848 n.3 (D.Conn.1978).

[19] It is instructive to compare Section 8 with Section 201 of the Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1a (Supp. III 1979), which was designed to assist financially troubled multifamily projects. Eligibility under Section 201 does turn on the likelihood that assistance will "restore or maintain the financial soundness of the project," 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1a(d)(1) (Supp. I 1978), and the level of Section 201 assistance is based on the project's financial circumstances, not the tenants' incomes and rental assistance needs. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(f) (Supp. III 1979).

[20] The only priority for acceptance of Contract applications set forth in the statute is geared toward realizing the Section 8 program's second express purpose of promoting economically integrated housing. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(5) (1976), the Secretary "may give preference to applications for assistance involving not more than 20 per centum of the dwelling units in a project."

[21] Handbook, supra note 10 at 1. In similar fashion, a HUD-prepared model letter sent to owners of HUD-insured projects provides:

This is to advise you that Section 8 project commitments are available for those projects with HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgages . . . which are likely to benefit most substantially from Section 8 assistance. Commitments will be made based upon HUD's approval of a project owner's request for participation in the program.

The Section 8 program is designed to assist lower-income residents by bringing their rents down to a level that they can afford, and to provide financial stability to housing projects which serve the needs of lower-income families by increasing the market for their units. Section 8 assistance can also help by assuring that needed rent increases can be implemented without forcing out those families needing such units. The Section 8 contract can cover up to 100 percent of the units and ties the subsidy to the project, not the individual residents. The eligible families and individuals in these projects will pay between 15 percent and 25 percent of income for rent. The difference between the tenant's share and the HUD-approved rent for the unit occupied will represent the amount of the assistance payment for that family or individual.

Handbook, supra note 10 at Appendix 3.

[22] We note in this regard that the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee's Report on the Housing Authorization Act of 1976 disapproved of HUD's efforts to direct Section 8 funds toward financially troubled FHA-insured projects:

The Committee recognized the merits of HUD's plan to help these projects, but disagreed with HUD's use of Section 8 funds for this purpose because it detracts from the basic intent of Congress that such funds be used to provide additional housing units for low and moderate income families.

S.Rep.No.94-749, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 1896 (emphasis supplied).

[23] We believe that the status of appellants as third-party beneficiaries is not defeated by the fact that they are not specifically named in the Contracts, since they are identified at the time performance is due, i. e., when certification occurs. See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Safer v. Perper, 569 F.2d 87, 92 (D.C.Cir.1977); Avco Delta Corp. v. United States, 484 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974); United States v. California State Automobile Ass'n, 385 F.Supp. 669, 672 (E.D.Cal.1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1976); Bethune v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 376 F.Supp. 1074 (W.D.Mo.1972); 4 A. Corbin, supra, § 781 at 70.

[24] We agree with the district court that the tenants, as third-party beneficiaries, are bound by the terms and conditions of the Contracts. See Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. at 993. See also Trans-Bay Engineers and Builders, Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370, 378 (1976); Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1973).

[25] It is appropriate for courts to supply contract terms requiring performance within a reasonable time where such terms are necessary to fulfill the purposes of the contract. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 54-55, 67 S.Ct. 982, 989-990, 91 L.Ed. 1328 (1947); Boyd Construction Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 477 F.2d 34, 35 (5th Cir. 1973); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 447 F.Supp. 108, 114 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 595 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1978).

[26] Once owners did submit certifications, however, HUD was liable for the failure to provide retroactive benefits to tenants, since the owner should no longer have had any meaningful discretion with regard to the computation of the amount of the payments to be made on behalf of the tenants. As discussed below, we believe HUD improperly allowed owners to exclude retroactive benefits from their computations.

[27] The district court apparently concluded that the tenants were bound by the failure of their project owners to submit retroactive certifications to HUD. But we think the binding effect of the owners' nonfeasance must be drastically tempered by the economic realities of the transactions. The owners have no economic stake in retroactive certification (except to the extent which the record does not disclose that accumulated financial burdens might force tenants sooner or later to default in rent payments). Indeed, the benefit of retroactive certification is almost entirely to the tenants. Thus, there is no direct financial incentive to owners to perform certifications in a way which will be advantageous to tenants. We think the purpose of the Contracts to assist tenants, who may be paying as much as 50 percent of their income for shelter expenses, ought not to be frustrated by the owners' failure to perform financially profitless acts. To accord weight, in this regard, to the owners' discretion is to convert the statutory scheme into a game of chance.

[28] By segregating funds exclusively to pay rent subsidies on behalf of particular tenants, HUD has created an identifiable res to which the tenants have a claim in the nature of the equitable lien imposed in Bennett Construction Co. v. Allen Gardens, Inc., 433 F.Supp. 825 (W.D.Mo.1977).

Bennett Construction involved the rights of a general contractor a third-party beneficiary to enforce the terms of a construction loan agreement between HUD as assignee of a mortgage and a mortgagor project owner in default. The general contractor had completed construction and was owed certain undisbursed loan proceeds. Bennett Construction is like the instant case in that the mortgagor through whom the general contractor claimed was assertedly not entitled to performance in two respects: (1) it had not gone to final closing of the construction loan and (2) it was in default. These defects are analogous to the failure of the project owners in the instant case to certify tenants retroactively. Bennett Construction is, however, unlike the instant case in that the general contractor there was a creditor third-party beneficiary, and failure to impress the undisbursed loan proceeds with an equitable lien would have resulted in the unjust enrichment of HUD. "Unjust enrichment" is only at issue here to the extent that HUD might be said to be "enriched" by the opportunity to retain set-aside funds and to the extent that it is "unjust" to deny retroactive benefits to tenants who may have reasonably relied on receiving them.

In any case, Bennett Construction and the instant case are similar in that (1) there is an identifiable res (in Bennett Construction the undisbursed loan proceeds and here the set-aside funds) and (2) HUD in both cases is the "guiding spirit" and the dominant force. In Bennett Construction, the mortgagor owner was the "creature of HUD", 433 F.Supp. at 835. Here the project owners have (or should have) no meaningful discretion regarding the decision to pay retroactive benefits. Based on these similarities we think there are persuasive reasons for regarding the funds set aside by HUD as impressed with a lien dictated by the policy of the Section 8 program in favor of the tenants from the execution dates of the Contracts. It is unjust to deny tenants the funds set aside specifically for their benefit solely because of the capricious decisions of their project owners not to make their certifications retroactive.

[29] See note 12, supra.

[30] Indeed, the question of retroactive certification often becomes important only if the owner breaches his obligation to promptly certify tenants. As the record in this case demonstrates, it is often possible for owners to certify tenants by the effective dates of their Contracts. See note 5, supra. In such cases, an owner would have the opportunity to choose whether tenants are to receive retroactive benefits only if he failed to promptly certify the tenants in the first instance. It is unreasonable to assume that the parties intended for the owner to have such a choice when the choice exists only because of the owner's initial breach of his contractual obligation of prompt certification.

[31] The class designated in Count III would appear to include Wisconsin tenants who will be certified in the future under existing Contracts. In their brief on appeal, however, appellants assert that "all class members claiming entitlements to housing assistance payments as of the effective dates of the respective Section 8 Contracts have already been certified and received benefits under the contracts." Appellant's brief at 30 (emphasis supplied).

On remand, the district court should determine whether due process protection should be extended to tenants certified in the future or whether appellants have waived such a claim.

[32] In their amended complaint, appellants also requested declaratory and injunctive relief under the due process clause ordering the Secretary to amend the Contracts to require certification of tenants and initiation of benefits within thirty days. This relief was denied by the district court.

On appeal, appellants no longer seek this relief because of HUD's representation that it does not intend to execute any additional Contracts in Wisconsin. We therefore express no opinion on the merits of these claims.

We also note that our decision to provide appellants with due process protection regarding the decision to award retroactive benefits is largely superfluous, since we have decided that tenants have enforceable rights to retroactive benefits as beneficiaries under the Contracts. It would certainly be inappropriate for us to engage in unnecessary constitutional adjudication. See Ruslan Shipping Corp. v. Coscol Petroleum Corp., 635 F.2d 648 at 650 (7th Cir. 1980).

We reach the due process claims, however, since appellants may want to invoke their due process rights if HUD does not promptly tender the full amount of retroactive benefits. Even if HUD does tender these benefits to existing tenants, tenants certified in the future under existing Contracts may be entitled to due process protection, since their rights as beneficiaries will not have been reduced to judgment at the time they are certified. But see note 31, supra.

[33] In response to the need for insuring that government programs are not administered in an arbitrary or irrational fashion, courts have extended due process protections to a wide variety of governmentally conferred benefits. See, e. g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (parole application); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1967) (application for bar admission); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978) (social security benefits); Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (chauffeur's license application); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing application).

As court decisions have extended the notion of protected rights under the due process clause beyond traditional concepts of "liberty" and "property," however, it is often difficult to discern the boundaries of due process protection. Compare Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974), with Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 494 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) and Harlib v. Lynn, 511 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1975).

[34] Indeed, HUD does not dispute that certified tenants have a legitimate claim of entitlement. Its brief on appeal states:

In this case, a property interest did not arise until the owners certified plaintiffs as being eligible to participate in the Section 8 program. Prior to certification plaintiffs had merely an inchoate property interest. Only after certification by the owner did a property interest become choate. Therefore, plaintiffs' subjective expectancy is not constitutionally protected by the due process clause.

Thus, at most HUD challenges only the scope or magnitude of entitlement of certified tenants (i. e., whether the entitlement extends to retroactive benefits).

[35] At a minimum, the nature of the appellants' entitlement claim must be deemed to be that of applicants for retroactive benefits. Applicants who have met the objective eligibility criteria of a wide variety of governmental programs have been held to be entitled to protection under the due process clause. See, e. g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (parole applicant); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1967) (bar applicant); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 1348, 64 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980) (general assistance applicants); Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal employment applicant); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978) (general assistance applicants); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978) (social security applicants); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (general assistance applicants); Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (chauffeur's license applicants); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045, 92 S.Ct. 1309, 31 L.Ed.2d 588 (1972) (AFDC applicants); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing applicants); Meyer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357, 361-62 (N.D.Ill.1979) (general assistance applicants); Davis v. United States, 415 F.Supp. 1086 (D.Kan.1976) (worker's compensation applicant); Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F.Supp. 1179 (E.D.Wis.1973) (general relief applicant); Neddo v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 335 F.Supp. 1397 (E.D.Wis.1971) (public housing applicant); Custom v. Trainor, 74 F.R.D. 409 (N.D.Ill.1977) (general assistance applicants).

[36] Although Ferguson and Watkins involved termination of certificates of family participation in a Section 8 subprogram, a similar analysis applies to the denial of housing assistance payments in the first instance. In Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978), this court concluded that "denials (of benefits) do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations."

[37] The district court stated:

HUD argues that a property interest in Section 8 benefits does not arise until the owner certifies a family as eligible to receive such benefits. Prior to certification, HUD contends that the plaintiffs have an inchoate property interest, which is merely a subjective expectancy not entitled to any due process protection. I agree.

Holbrook v. Pitt, 479 F.Supp. at 994.

[38] Future tenants obviously have a legitimate claim of entitlement only with respect to benefits for the months during which they rented units.

[39] Judge Hufstedler determined that a governmentally conferred benefit constitutes a constitutionally cognizable claim of entitlement if the initial receipt or the termination of the benefit is conditioned on the "existence of a controvertible and controverted fact." Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 495. This requirement "serves the practical side of due process, since a hearing and notice would be 'pointless' if there were no such facts to resolve." Uneeda Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Association, 640 F.2d 30, at 41 (7th Cir. 1980).

In the present case, it is clear that appellants have an entitlement claim under Judge Hufstedler's definition. Since they are certified, their eligibility to receive Section 8 benefits has been established, and their owners have selected them specifically as the tenants who are to receive payments under the Contracts. Also, by the terms of the Contracts, HUD has already committed sufficient funds to provide assistance payments to the tenants from the effective dates of the Contracts. The tenants' receipt of retroactive benefits is therefore conditioned solely upon the owners' certification of the tenants for retroactive benefits (and we have held, in effect, that this retroactive certification cannot properly be withheld). The single factual determination that may be required, therefore, is whether, during the period for which the retroactive benefits would be paid, the tenants' incomes exceeded the maximum income limits set forth in the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(4), 1437f(f)(1) (1976), and in the regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 886.102, 886.109, and 886.117 (1980).

[40] See, e. g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978); Winston v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198, 209 (7th Cir. 1978); Klein v. Mathews, 430 F.Supp. 1005, 1008 (D.N.J.1977).

[41] Accord, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); Winston v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1978).

[42] On remand, the district court may also decide to fashion due process protection for tenants who will be certified in the future. See note 31, supra.

12.4.7 Notes - Holbrook v. Pitt 12.4.7 Notes - Holbrook v. Pitt

NOTE

1. Over twenty years ago, Professor Charles Reich wrote:

One of the most important developments in the United States during the past decade has been the emergence of government as a major source of wealth. Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in revenue and power, and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and licenses. Government has always had this function. But while in early times it was minor, today's distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale.

The valuables dispensed by government take many forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth — forms which are held as private property. Social insurance substitutes for savings; a government contract replaces a businessman's customers and goodwill. The wealth of more and more Americans depends upon a relationship to government. Increasingly, Americans live on government largess — allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject to conditions which express "the public interest."

The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 733 (1964).

Professor Reich defined the main features of this emerging system of government largess, which he termed a "new feudalism," as follows:

(1) Increasingly we turn over wealth and rights to government, which reallocates and redistributes them in the many forms of largess; (2) there is a merging of public and private, in which lines of private ownership are blurred; (3) the administration of the system has given rise to special laws and special tribunals, outside the ordinary structure of government; (4) the right to possess and use government largess is bound up with the recipient's legal status; status is both the basis for receiving largess and a consequence of receiving it; hence the new wealth is not readily transferable; (5) individuals hold the wealth conditionally rather than absolutely; the conditions are usually obligations owed to the government or to the public, and may include the obligation of loyalty to the government; the obligations may be changed or increased at the will of the state; (6) for breach of condition the wealth may be forfeited or escheated back to the government; (7) the sovereign power is shared with large private interests; (8) the object of the whole system is to enforce "the public interest" — the interest of the state or society or the lord paramount by means of the distribution and use of wealth in such a way as to create and maintain dependence. . . .

Id. at 770.

To protect individuals from an "all-pervasive system of regulation and control," Professor Reich urged that "those forms of largess which are closely linked to status . . . be deemed to be held as of right." Only in this way, he argued, would it be possible to create "a zone of privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor private power can push. . . ." (Id. at 785.) In a memorable conclusion, he declared, "[j]ust as the Homestead Act was a deliberate effort to foster individual values at an earlier time, so we must try to build an economic basis for liberty today — a Homestead Act for rootless twentieth century man. We must create a new property." Id. at 787.

Does the expansive use of the third party beneficiary idea, in cases like Holbrook, belong to the general movement that Professor Reich describes? To what extent has the idea retained its contractual character in the process of its expansion?

3. Social contract theorists seek to explain the obligations of citizenship in contractual terms. Not all of them, however, view the relation between citizen and state as itself a contractual one. Hobbes, for example, vigorously denied this could ever be the case. According to Hobbes, the covenant that establishes the commonwealth is one made by each citizen with each other; the sovereign himself is not a party to the contract but is merely the agreed-upon agent or bystander to whom each of the citizens promises to relinquish his private right of self-protection (together, presumably, with whatever instruments of violence he happens to possess). The sovereign is, in other words, a third party beneficiary of the contract the citizens make with one another. One rather disturbing consequence of this view which Hobbes did not flinch to draw — is that the sovereign, being a contract beneficiary, may enforce the contractual obligations of the citizens, but, since he is a non-party, owes them no such duties in return:

Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the soveraigne; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.

Leviathan, ch. 18 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946).

12.4.8 Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1192-1199 (1985) 12.4.8 Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1192-1199 (1985)

WATERS, THE PROPERTY IN THE PROMISE: A STUDY OF THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY RULE, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1192-1199 (1985) (footnotes have been omitted): "During the past twenty years or so, the federal courts have recognized and developed a theory of constitutionally protected property that was first fully articulated by Charles Reich in his influential 1964 article, 'The New Property.' This 'new property' consists of governmentally created rights, typically the right to the tangible and intangible benefits of social welfare programs. Reich argued that such new property rights should be afforded procedural safeguards. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court embraced the new property concept, according procedural due process protection to certain statutory entitlements.

"In the twenty years since Reich's article was published, much ink has been spilled in discussing the contours of the new property, but there seems to be general agreement among commentators about one thing: it has developed in an overtly teleological fashion. In this analysis, the first question a court asks, in one way or another, is whether the claimed right merits constitutional protection. If the court concludes that it does, it will articulate the right, as a means to this end — for the sake of the remedy, if you will — as a constitutionally protected property right.

"'New property' plainly has more to do with the broad set of values thought to be pertinent to constitutional adjudication than with the common law definition of property, particularly where intangible benefits are involved. This claim is borne out by the fact that when the Court has limited its recognition of 'new property,' it has done so by moving away from a broadly equitable property notion — a property right that is recognized because it ought to be — toward the more traditional common law property idea.

"Constitutionally protected rights to intangible property, many of which are not 'property rights' within the common law meaning of that term, are by now well established. Those that concern us here are the 'new property' rights created by the government for the benefit of particular groups — specifically, what have come to be called statutory entitlements. Where such rights are protected as 'property,' it is the statute that creates the property and the due process clause that protects it. Examples of statutory entitlements that have passed muster in the Supreme Court are welfare benefits, old-age benefits, federal civil service employment, and social security benefits.

". . . The origin of the rule that enables third party beneficiaries to secure compliance with federal statutes lies in quasi-contract, specifically, in the old common count for 'money had and received for and to the use of the plaintiff.' Yet this action was not precisely a property claim. A plaintiff stating a claim for money had and received did not, for example, have to identify specific funds, but the defendant's right to act other than as trustee of the money would defeat the claim. The courts permitted all manner of 'tracing' when the money held had been mingled with other funds and identification of the specific property had become impossible. In holding that an action for money had and received is not defeated by 'incidental legal relationships' that arise when the money is passed from bank account to bank account, a modern English court described the claim as one 'of substance, founded in equity, which fastens upon the conscience of the recipient.' Professor Scott has explained the outcome in cases of this kind in terms of the plaintiff's having 'an equitable interest in the mingled fund.' On this analysis, what is involved is a kind of 'equitable property,' as distinct from the common law notion of property.

"The doctrinal innovation involved in Lawrence v. Fox was the substitution of the promise to pay money for the equitable property in the money itself. The rule of Lawrence v. Fox made the defendant a 'constructive trustee' of the benefit of the promise, extending the potential of the action considerably. So long as the promise remained a promise to pay money, this legal sleight of hand did not matter very much. But once courts developed a generalized right of 'intended beneficiaries' to enforce promises of all kinds, this type of 'equitable property' was enlarged enormously.

"This analysis of the role now being played by the third party beneficiary rule is supported not only by the history of the rule, but also by the nature of the rights it secures. Rights acquired by third party beneficiaries under contracts that are a part of statutory schemes of distribution and protection have a great deal in common with the kinds of rights the Supreme Court has held to be protected property under the due process clauses. This similarity is especially obvious with respect to intangible, 'new property' rights, which are not encompassed by traditional legal concepts of property.

"Setting aside for a moment the notion that the third party's right, thus created, is a 'contract right,' the right may be thought of in terms of its restitutionary, quasi-contractual origins. Quasi-contractual rights were dependent on the fiction of a promise 'implied by law' from the facts of the case facts such as the receipt of money by the defendant for and to the use of the plaintiff. If a federal agency pays a subsidy to a provider of low-income housing to be credited toward the rent of an identified tenant, the tenant could maintain an action for money had and received, were it available, against the recipient of the funds if they were not so applied and could certainly recover as an intended beneficiary of the contract under which funds were paid. Thus, where money earmarked for the plaintiff's use or credit is the object of the claim, the grievance is virtually identical to that involved in Lawrence v. Fox.

"The same analysis applies where an apartment house owner charges rents in excess of the maximum permitted under its mortgage agreement with the federal government, and the tenants sue for a refund. The plaintiffs' claim is rather straightforward: 'We want our money back!' But the response of the law can be rather sophisticated, offering several formally distinct avenues to the same remedy. That which most accurately describes the grievance is the action for money had and received, which is as straightforward and as primitive as the claim itself. But this simple tool from yesteryear has been mislaid in the process of doctrinal development; an action 'on the promise' or another 'on the statute' must be made to do the job.

"Turning from the particular case of money paid to the credit of an identified beneficiary to cases of federal funding contracts generally, we move away from something very much like the 'old property' idea toward something that more closely resembles the 'new property.' Indeed, that so many modern third party beneficiary cases are class actions — status-based actions that straddle the divide between public and private law by making a nominally private law claim on behalf of a class created by statute — emphasizes the similarity between these cases and those involving statutory entitlements considered property for due process purposes. . . .

"The third party beneficiary's right, then, is better understood, and more precisely classified, as a restitutionary right to intangible property — the benefit of a promise than as a contract action. This characterization is not limited to those cases in which the benefits being sought happen to resemble intangible benefits that have been constitutionally protected as property, but those cases do illustrate one point particularly well: there is sometimes a marked similarity between the kinds of rights constitutionally protected as property and those secured by the third party beneficiary rule that derives historically from a private law notion of equitable property. Given that both notions of property developed teleologically, one to protect due process values as they affect groups of citizens, the other for the more limited purpose of achieving 'justice as between man and man' in the form of restitution, it is not surprising that each should now address the same contemporary social concern over intangible property rights."

12.5 The Problem of Defenses, Modifications, and Rescission 12.5 The Problem of Defenses, Modifications, and Rescission

12.5.1 The Problem of Defenses, Modifications, and Rescission Introduction 12.5.1 The Problem of Defenses, Modifications, and Rescission Introduction

In the preceding sections we have considered principally the question whether the plaintiff is within one of the recognized classes of third party beneficiaries or whether he is, in Restatement terminology, merely an incidental beneficiary not entitled to sue on the A-B contract. The great bulk of third party beneficiary litigation has focused on this question of identification or categorization. Neither in the cases nor in the learned commentary has there been much discussion of the status of the plaintiff, once it has been conceded that he is entitled to sue as a contract beneficiary.

In Lawrence v. Fox, supra p. 1333, Fox promised Holly to pay Holly's debt to Lawrence. The consideration for Fox's promise was a loan made by Holly to Fox, which, under the Holly-Fox agreement, was to be discharged by Fox's payment to Lawrence. Assume that, in Lawrence's action against Fox, Fox pleads:

1. Failure of consideration between Holly and Lawrence — that is, Holly, the original debtor, had a defense which would have been good against Lawrence if Lawrence had sued Holly.

2. Failure of consideration between Holly and Fox — that is, Holly had not made the loan to Fox which was the consideration for Fox's promise to pay Lawrence.

3. Rescission of the Holly-Fox agreement — that is, Holly and Fox agreed that Fox should repay the money loaned directly to Holly and that he should not pay Lawrence (or that Fox should pay some other creditor of Holly instead of Lawrence).

It is a matter of interest that the opinions delivered in Lawrence v. Fox did in fact discuss two of the three hypothetical pleas which we have attributed to Fox. For the ensuing hundred years there was little or no discussion in the cases of either the freedom of promisor and promisee to modify or rescind their contract without the beneficiary's consent or of the availability to the promisor, when he is sued by the beneficiary, of defenses based on (a) the transaction between promisee and beneficiary or (b) the transaction between promisor and promisee. It is true that cases holding that the beneficiary could not sue at all, because he was not in privity of contract with the promisee, may have masked decisions based on the availability of defenses. (See, e.g., National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878), digested in the Note following Lawrence v. Fox, supra p. 1333, which could be analyzed as a case involving failure of consideration between promisor and promisee.)

It is a fair guess that the focus of beneficiary litigation will presently shift to questions of the type just discussed. There will, no doubt, continue to be fringe cases of the traditional type, as illustrated by the Isbrandtsen case, supra p. 1380. But the third party beneficiary doctrine is recognized almost everywhere in this country and there is today fairly widespread agreement on the classes of beneficiaries who are within the doctrine. That being so, it may be anticipated that in the future the courts will be less concerned with the metaphysics of privity and purpose and more concerned with the by no means simple problem of the effectiveness of defenses, modifications and rescissions against the beneficiary.

In this section we turn therefore to the bits and pieces of law that are available in cases and Restatement.

12.5.2 Ford v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York 12.5.2 Ford v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York

283 Ill. App. 325

Scott Ford, Appellee,
v.
The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant.

Gen. No. 8,996.

Appeal by defendant from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. LOREN E. MURPHY, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1935. Reversed and judgment entered here. Opinion filed January 17, 1936.

FREDERICK L. ALLEN, WINSTON, STRAWN & SHAW, of Chicago, and MILLER, ELLIOTT & WESTERVELT, of Peoria, for appellant; GEORGE T. EVANS, of Chicago, and EUGENE R. JOHNSON, of Peoria, of counsel.

R. D. ROBINSON, of Galesburg, for appellee; PHILLIP BENJAMIN ROBINSON, of counsel.

[326] MR. JUSTICE WOLFE delivered the opinion of the court.

In an action of assumpsit the plaintiff secured a verdict and judgment against the defendant for $2,149.33 which the evidence shows was the cash surrender value of a policy of insurance issued by the defendant on the life of the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff's wife is named the beneficiary. The declaration of one count is based on the surrender clause of the policy. As one of its defenses, the defendant interposed the plea of the statute of limitations. The other pleas of the defendant raise the issue as to whether the plaintiff had the legal right to surrender the policy and collect its cash surrender value without the consent of the beneficiary. It is conceded that the beneficiary has not consented to the surrender of the policy to the defendant. If the plaintiff did not have the right to surrender the policy and collect the cash surrender value, without the consent of the beneficiary, no right of action has ever accrued in favor of the plaintiff for the surrender value of the policy. If this court holds that the statute of limitations has run against the action of the plaintiff, it must have necessarily decided that his right of action accrued without the consent of the beneficiary to so surrender the policy. Whether the statute of limitations is applicable depends in any event upon a determination of the question presented by the pleas going to the merits of the plaintiff's claim. This was a question of law, dependent upon the construction of the policy, which was presented to the trial court by appropriate motions at the close of all the evidence.

The application for the policy was signed by the plaintiff on August 24, 1896, at Galesburg, Illinois, where the plaintiff lived. The policy is dated September 3, 1896, and it was delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff at Galesburg. The defendant is incorporated under the laws of the State of New York [327] where applications for life insurance policies are passed upon and issued by the defendant. The application for the policy contains the following provision:

"This application made to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York is the basis and a part of a proposed Contract of Insurance, subject to the Charter of the Company and the laws of the State of New York."

By this stipulation, the proposed contract of insurance became consummated and completed upon the issuance of the policy, and the plaintiff and the defendant mutually agreed that the contract should be a New York contract and construed according to the laws of that State. Subject to limitations hereafter stated, the statutory provisions of the State of New York and the decisions of the highest court of that State as to the construction of such a contract and of the statutes of New York must therefore be accepted as conclusive upon the parties. Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 402, 44 L.Ed. 1124, and Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill. App. 395. The above stipulation is subject to limitations or conditions among which may be mentioned, that the laws of the State of New York must give way if they are in conflict with express and valid terms of the policy; further, the stipulation does not avoid statutory provisions of the State of Illinois, governing life insurance contracts, enacted for the protection of its citizens. (Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 48 L.Ed. 788; Albro v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 119 Fed. 629, certiorari denied 194 U.S. 633; State Life Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 166 Ala. 192, 52 So. 344; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 Atl. 385; Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U.S. 389, 44 L.Ed. 1116, affirming 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519, 71 Am. St. Rep. 628.)

The policy on its face recites as follows:

"Annual Premium for 20 years, $71.60. In consideration on the application for this policy, which is hereby made a [328] part of this contract, The Mutual  Life Insurance Company of New York promises to pay at its Home Office in the City of New York, unto Caroline Ford wife of Scott Ford of Galesburg in the County of Knox State of Illinois, her executors, administrators or assigns, Two Thousand Dollars, upon acceptance of satisfactory proofs at its Rome Office of the death of the said Scott Ford during the continuance of this policy, upon the following condition; and subject to the provisions, requirements and benefits stated on the back of this policy, which are hereby referred to and made a part hereof."

The condition mentioned is that,

"The annual premium of Seventy-one Dollars and Sixty Cents, shall be paid in advance on the delivery of this policy, and thereafter to the Company, at its Home Office in the City of New York, on the Third day of September in every year during the continuance of this contract, until premiums for Twenty full years shall have been duly paid to said Company."

The benefits referred to on the face of the policy and stated on the back thereof, which are material for consideration, are as follows:

"Surrender—This policy may be surrendered to the Company at the end of the first period of twenty years, and the full reserve computed by the American Table of Mortality, and four per cent interest, and the surplus as defined above, will be paid therefor in cash."

As before stated, the full reserve of the policy computed by the American Table of Mortality, and four per cent interest, and the surplus as defined by the policy, is the amount of the verdict, $2,149.33.

Premiums called for by the policy for 20 years after the date it was issued have been duly paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff has had possession of the policy from the time it was issued to him by the defendant. The contract of insurance does not contain any provisions either permitting or prohibiting [329] the plaintiff from changing the beneficiary named in the policy, or surrendering the policy, either with or without the consent of the beneficiary. It is silent on those subjects. No statutory provision of the State of New York was introduced in evidence which permitted the insured in a life insurance policy to change the beneficiary thereof without the consent of the beneficiary, or to surrender the policy without the consent of the beneficiary. There are no statutory provisions in this State either permitting, or prohibiting, the insured of a life insurance policy to change the beneficiary thereof, or surrender the policy, without the consent of the beneficiary.

The evidence shows that on June 7, 1924, the beneficiary of the policy, Caroline Ford, assigned all her right, title and interest in the policy to "Caroline Ford, wife of insured, if living, if not, to Eloise Ford, birth November 12, 1897, and Pauline Ford, birth May 8, 1902 daughters of Caroline Ford, or the survivor, or the estate of the last survivor." The legality of the assignment is not involved in this case. The beneficiary and her two said daughters are living and none of them has consented to a change of beneficiary or surrender of the policy. They are not parties to this action, and do not reside in this State.

The beneficiary, the wife of the insured, had a vested right in the policy when the contract of insurance took effect. There are no terms or provisions of the policy inconsistent with this rule of law. Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N.Y. 143, 6 N.E. 267; Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Ill. 573; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 212 Ill. 125; Garner v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 110 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E. 130, 1 L.R.A. 256, 37 C.J. 577; Couch's Cyc. of Ins. Law 821. Since the beneficiary had a vested interest in the policy, the plaintiff did not have the right to surrender the policy and collect its surrender value, although the policy was in the pos [330] session of the plaintiff and he had paid the premiums thereon. Fuchs v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 164 N.Y.S. 105; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ireland (Tex.), 17 S.W. 617, 14 L.R.A. 278; Joyce on Insurance (1897) Vol. 11, sec. 1651; Condon v. New York Ins. Co., 183 Iowa 658, 166 N.W. 452, 19 L.R.A. 649, 654.

The motion of the defendant for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence in the case should have been sustained by the trial court.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and judgment rendered in this court for the defendant.

Reversed and judgment entered here.

12.5.3 Copeland v. Beard 12.5.3 Copeland v. Beard

115 So. 389, 217 Ala. 216 - 1928
MARVIN COPELAND
v.
B.V. BEARD.
(6 Div. 986.)

[216] Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 26, 1928.

[217] Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Suit by Mrs. B. V. Beard against Marvin Copeland. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (115 So. 385), and defendant petitions for certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Writ granted. Judgment reversed, and case remanded.

T. B. Ward and J. M. Ward, both of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

Where a party bas made a contract with another, whereby he assumes and agrees to pay the debt of said person to some stranger or third person, such contract may be rescinded at any time before such third person or stranger accepts the contract or asserts his rights thereunder. Clark & Co. v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819; Georgia Home Ins. Co. V. Boykins, 137 Ala. 350, 34 So. 1012; Pugh Stone Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ala. 167, 19 So. 370; Carver V. Eads, 65 Ala. 190; 21 A. L. R. 462, note. Promisor may interpose, as against promisee's creditor, for whose benefit the contract was made, any defense available as between himself and the promisee, where the creditor beneficiary has not aeted in good faith upon the promise so as to alter his position. Clark & Co. v. Nelson, supra.

H. A. & D. K. ,Tones, of Tuscaloosa, for appellee.

Brief did not reach the Reporter.

BOULDIN, J. Taking the facts from the findings of the Court of Appeals, the essential question here for review on certiorari may be briefly stated thus: Where a debtor sells and conveys real and personal property, upon consideration in part that the purchaser shall assume and pay specified debts of the vendor, and, on the same day, before the creditors for whose benefit the promise is made have assented thereto, the purchaser resells and conveys the property upon consideration in part that the subpurchaser shall assume and pay the same indebtedness, and the original vendor debtor thereupon releases the original purchaser from his promise to pay, can such creditor thereafter maintain an action of assumpsit against the original purchaser?

In Clark v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819, this court, after a review of the authorities, approved the general statement of the doctrine in cases of rescission by Mr. Williston:

"The creditor's right is purely derivative, and, if the debtor no longer has a right of action against the promisor, the creditor can have none." 1 Williston on Contracts, § 397.

After quoting from our own cases, it was said:

"We think, therefore, this court is definitely committed to the doctrine that the promisor may interpose any defense that was permissible as between himself and the original debtor, including, of course, mutual rescission of the contract so long as the creditor had not acted in good faith upon the promise so as to alter his [218] position." Clark v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, 112 So. 821.

The Court of Appeals takes the view that the case at bar is to be differentiated from the Nelson Case, saying (115 So. 385):

"The recent case of Clark & Co. v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819, is based upon the rescission of the contract, before acceptance by the debtor, thereby placing the parties in statu quo. There is a vast difference between a rescission, where the property transferred as the consideration for the agreement to pay a creditor is reconveyed to the contracting debtor and a subsequent agreement to release a purchaser of the debtor's property who had agreed to pay a creditor in consideration of property transferred to him without a reconveyance of the property."

Is the distinction thus declared sound in principle?

The transaction between the debtor, his vendee, and the subvendee, whereby the latter purchased the property, assumed the obligation to pay creditors, and the debtor released the original promisor, was, as between them, a novation. It was supported by a valuable consideration, as in other cases of novation. All right of action in the promisee, the debtor, as against his promisor, the vendee, was released. Whether such release may be aptly called a rescission of the promise to pay creditors seems unimportant. As between the immediate parties to the transaction it had the same effect

When a debtor contracts with another, for a valuable consideration, to assume and pay his debt, the creditor has an election to accept or reject the new party as his debtor. He may ignore the offer and proceed to enforce all his remedies against the original debtor. Henry v. Murphy, 54 Ala. 246.

An election requires knowledge of the facts. So a suit against the original debtor without notice that another has assumed to pay it does not constitute an election to reject the agreement. Young v. Hawkins, 74 Ala. 370. An action against the promisor assuming to pay the debt is a sufficient acceptance—an election to affirm the contract made for the creditor's benefit. Carver v. Eads, 65 Ala. 191.

There is difference of view as to the status of the parties after acceptance of the agreement by the creditor. Some authorities hold that upon election to accept the benefits of the contract, he releases the original debtor. These cases proceed on idea that the contract made between the debtor and the assuming party, while binding between themselves, is, as to the creditor, an offer of novation. Several of our earlier cases quite clearly proceed on this view. The Nelson Case, in course of discussion, recognizes these decisions.

The other view is that by the contract wherein the debtor sells property in consideration that the purchaser assumes the payment of debt, the latter becomes, as between the immediate parties, the principal and the debtor a quasi surety, and the creditor, upon acceptance of the arrangement, may sue either or both. The latter view is distinctly held in People's Savings Bank v. Jordan, 200 Ala. 500, 76 So. 442; Tyson v. Austill, 168 Ala. 525, 53 So. 263; Moore v. First Nat. Bank of Florence, 139 Ala. 595, 60S6 36 So. 777.

This is the prevailing doctrine in other jurisdictions. 1 Williston on Contracts, § 393. While our cases involved directly conveyances by a mortgagor, the purchaser assuming the mortgage debt, no sound distinction exists between them and the instant case.

The question is here involved only incidentally in defining when the rights of the creditor to sue the promisor becomes fixed, and not subject to rescission or release. It is said the promisor and promisee may rescind at any time before the creditor alters his position. If bringing suit against the promisor releases the original debtor, this would clearly alter the creditor's position for the worse, if a right of rescission still exists. If such action does not release the original debtor, then the inquiry is, When is the creditor's position so altered that his rights become fixed and beyond the power of the original parties to rescind or release?

We now adopt the doctrine that by acceptance of the promise made for his benefit, and action thereon, the creditor does not release the original debtor, unless so stipulated in the contract and made known to the creditor.

Both parties invite the creditor to accept· the contract. The debtor has the benefit of the promise for his protection in case he is still required to pay. The creditor being thus invited to avail himself of the contract, we think no fair intendment can be indulged that he shall thereby take the hazard of losing his debt, if the promise so recommended proves unavailing.

Coming then to the question of when the creditor's right of action against the promisor becomes fixed, we think it properly determinable on the basic law of contracts. So long as the contract to assume is between the debtor and his promisor only, the creditor is not a party thereto.  He can become so only by his consent. At the same time, the contract, in the nature of it, is an open offer to the creditor. His assent while the offer is open is all that is required. When the minds of all parties consent to the same thing at the same time, and such consent is communicated between them, the contract is complete.

Consent in such case may be proven in the same manner as in other contracts. The consideration for the promise passing between promisor and promisee is also consideration for the completed contract between all [219] parties. The tripartite contract being consummated, it cannot be rescinded without the consent of all. It follows that the creditor's assent to the contract, made known to the promisor, who is expected to pay, is the only change of position required. But the assent must be to a promise in force at tile time the right of contract is the right to rescind or modify.

The principle of the Nelson Case, supra, is applicable to the present case. The same doctrine that the creditor must have assented while the promise remained in force is recognized in Farrell v. Anderson, 211 Ala. 239, 100 So. 205, and Moore v. First Nat. Bank of Florence, 139 Ala. 595, 606, 36 So. 777.

The case of Biddle v. Pugh, 59 N. J. Eq. 480, 45 A. 626, involved the right of the mortgagee to hold the vendee of a mortgagor after a sale to a subvendee. Successive vendees had, as between themselves and their immediate grantors, assumed the payment of the mortgage debt. It was declared that the mortgagee's "right is subject to such action as the mortgagor and purchaser may have taken to modify or rescind the contract."The first purchaser was held still bound because the mortgagor had never released him from his obligation. See, also, note 21 A. L. R. 462 et seq.

The Court of Appeals appears to hold the status quo as to ownership of the property must be restored. The ownership of the property is of no concern to the creditor except as it may affect his power to collect his debt. This turns upon an issue of fraud vel non in the transaction, as defined in the law of fraudulent conveyances. All participants in a fraud may be held to account in a proper form of action.

No such question is presented here. So far as appears, the original debtor and the subvendee, whose promise is still open to the plaintiff creditor, are solvent, able, and ready to pay the, demand. It is a case of election to sue the vendee, who, before any acceptance of his promise, conveyed the property to another, who assumed the payment of plaintiff's demand, and after the promise had released defendant from the obligation.

Writ of certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.

All the Justices concur.

12.5.4 Note on The Restatement of Contracts and the Problem of Rescission 12.5.4 Note on The Restatement of Contracts and the Problem of Rescission

Under the Restatement First, the power of A and B to rescind their contract; depriving C of his rights as a beneficiary, depended upon whether C was a "donee" or "creditor" of the promisee; this was, in fact, the most important consequence of the distinction between these two types of beneficiaries. Sections 142 and 143 read as follows:

§142. Variation of the Duty to a Donee Beneficiary by Agreement of Promisor and Promisee

Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the promisor to the donee beneficiary cannot be released by the promisee or affected by any agreement between the promisee and the promisor, but if the promisee receives consideration for an attempted release or discharge of the promisor's duty, the donee beneficiary can assert a right to the consideration so received, and on doing so loses his right against the promisor.

§143. Variation of the Promisor's Duty to a Creditor Beneficiary by Agreement of Promisor and Promisee

A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,

(a)  the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise or otherwise materially change his position in reliance thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation, and

(b) the promisee's action is not a fraud on creditors.

Under §142, it would seem, a donee beneficiary's rights "vest" immediately; unless the promisor and promisee have in their contract reserved the right to do so, they cannot, once the promise to the donee has been made, thereafter rescind or modify it without the donee's consent. On the other hand, as against a creditor beneficiary, promisor and promisee remain free to rescind or vary their agreement until the creditor has taken the type of action described in §143(a).

The Restatement's disparate treatment of creditor and donee beneficiaries was explained, and the distinction itself vigorously criticized, in Page, The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. Rev. 141 (1937). After an elaborate review of the authorities, Professor Page concluded (at 183-184; footnotes have been omitted):

It seems that neither the rule of section 142 of the Restatement nor the rule of section 143 is taken from the common law as it exists in states which recognize the right of C as a contract right against A. While these states differ among themselves as to the stage of the transaction at which the right of A and B to terminate or to modify the contract by mutual agreement, without the consent of C, ends, they agree in the main that the stage of the transaction, wherever it may end, is the same whether C has a claim against B or whether he does not have a claim against B; and they agree that no advantage is to be given to C in the situation in which he does not have a claim against B, as compared to the situation in which he has a claim against B.

The rule of section 143, which applies where C has a claim against B, bears a strong resemblance to the rule which is laid down by the courts which deny that C has a contract right against A and which hold that C's right, if any, is by way of subrogation to B's right against A. Both under the holdings of these courts, and under section 143, A and B may terminate or modify the contract by mutual agreement up to the time that C brings suit against A or changes his position materially in reliance upon the contract, unless B's discharge of A would operate as a fraud against C.

The rule of section 142, which applies where C has no claim against B, bears a strong resemblance to the rule which the courts apply in cases of life insurance (not benefit certificates); a rule which originated in statute, and which is applied by courts, many of which say that C's right under the policy is either a gift or a trust, and not a contractual right against the insurance company.

Sections 142 and 143 of the Restatement, when taken together, are thus contrary to the common law rule as applied by the courts which treat the transactions in question as contracts; and they seem to be borrowed from cases in which the courts did not recognize as contracts the transactions with reference to which they laid down these rules.

The position of contracts to render performance to a third person would seem to be so clearly established in the United States (except in a few of the Eastern States) that the rights which arise should be determined by principles of contract law; and not by principles of gift, trust, and subrogation.

The Restatement Second adopts the position urged by Professor Page, asserting that "[t]he weight of authority is opposed to a distinction between donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries with respect to the power of promisor and promisee to vary [their agreement)" (Reporter's Note to §311). Instead, the draftsmen of the Restatement Second have chosen to emphasize the elements of reliance and assent in formulating a rule that applies to all intended beneficiaries. Section 311 (Variation of a Duty to a Beneficiary) provides:

(1) Discharge or modification of a duty to an intended beneficiary by conduct of the promisee or by a subsequent agreement between promisor and promisee is ineffective if a term of the promise creating the duty so provides.

(2) In the absence of such a term, the promisor and promisee retain power to discharge or modify the duty by subsequent agreement.

(3) Such a power terminates when the beneficiary, before he receives notification of the discharge or modification, materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee.

(4) If the promisee receives consideration for an attempted discharge or modification of the promisor's duty which is ineffective against the beneficiary, the beneficiary can assert a right to the consideration so received. The promisor's duty is discharged to the extent of the amount received by the beneficiary.

12.5.5 Notes - Note on The Restatement of Contracts and the Problem of Rescission 12.5.5 Notes - Note on The Restatement of Contracts and the Problem of Rescission

NOTE

1. Does the Restatement Second's treatment of the rescission problem seem to you, on the whole, an improvement over the approach adopted in §§142 and 143 of the Restatement First? Does it seem to you to be, in all situations, sound policy to provide that promisor and promisee can no longer modify or rescind their agreement once the beneficiary has materially changed his position in reliance thereon? By the same token, are there cases in which it is appropriate that the beneficiary's rights vest even though he has neither given his' assent to nor relied on the contract (which, let us assume, is silent on this issue)?

2. A legislative approach to the problem of rescission and modification, different from (and considerably simpler than) that of either Restatement, is illustrated by §1559 of the California Civil Code: "A contract made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." Section 1559 was originally enacted in 1872.

3. In McCulloch v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534, (D. Minn., 1943), Nordbye, J. commented:

While it must be recognized that [§142 of the] Restatement assumes to lay down the broad rule that a third party donee beneficiary contract cannot be rescinded without the donee's consent, this rule is not followed by the majority of the courts. 2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 396; 13 C.J. 602; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §390; note 53, A.L.R. 178. The only condition laid down by the majority of the courts with reference to the rescission of a donee beneficiary contract is that there must be an absence of reliance on the contract by the third party beneficiary. . . .

The main arguments advanced in favor of the rule (set out in §142] are that a beneficiary in a life insurance policy cannot be changed without the consent of the existing beneficiary, and that, where there is a gift, it cannot be revoked without the donee's consent. But it will be seen that neither of these situations is analogous to the donee's rights under a third party beneficiary contract. First, it may be observed that insurance law is peculiar to itself. There has grown up in that field principles of law which are not applicable elsewhere. Public policy and the relationship between the parties largely have influenced the rule with reference to the change of beneficiaries in a life insurance contract. Therein, because of the peculiarity of the law, a beneficiary has a vested interest in absence of the right to change beneficiaries. Nor is the rule regarding revocation of gifts helpful or persuasive in determining the rule as to rescission of a third party beneficiary contract. Where the gift is executed, the donee accepts the gift from the donor and usually possession then rests in the donee. There is the element of delivery and the element of reliance by the donee on that which was done.

53 F. Supp. at 539.

12.5.6 ROUSE v. UNITED STATES 12.5.6 ROUSE v. UNITED STATES

215 F.2d 872 (1954)

ROUSE
v.
UNITED STATES

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

October 7, 1954.

Action by United States, which had taken assignment of F.H.A. note which was in default, to recover from purchaser who had bought house from maker to note. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Burnita Shelton Matthews, J., struck purchaser's defenses and granted summary judgment for plaintiff and purchaser appealed. The Court of Appeals, Edgerton, Circuit Judge, Held that where vendor paid for heating plant in house with note, guaranteed by F.H.A., and sold house to purchaser, who promised to assume liability for heating plant cost, purchaser could set up defense of vendor's fraudulent misrepresentation of condition of heating plant.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions.

Before Edgerton, Bazelon, and Washington, Circuit Judges.

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

Bessie Winston gave Associated Contractors, Inc., her promissory note for $1,008.37, payable in monthly installments of $28.01, for a heating plant in her house. The Federal Housing Administration guaranteed the note and the payee endorsed it for value to the lending bank, the Union Trust Company.

Winston sold the house to Rouse. In the contract of sale Rouse agreed to assume debts secured by deeds of trust and also "to assume payment of $850 for heating plant payable $28 per Mo." Nothing was said about the note.

Winston defaulted on her note. The United States paid the bank, took an assignment of the note, demanded payment from Rouse, and sued him for $850 and interest.

Rouse alleged as defenses (1) that Winston fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the heating plant and (2) that Associated Contractors did not install it satisfactorily. The District Court struck these defenses and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant Rouse appeals.

Since Rouse did not sign the note he is not liable on it. D.C. Code 1951, §28-119; N.I.L. Sec. 18. He is not liable to the United States at all unless his contract with Winston makes him so. The contract says the parties to it are not "bound by any terms, conditions, statements, warranties or representations, oral or written not contained in it. But this means only that the written contract contains the entire agreement. It does not mean that fraud cannot be set up as a defense to a suit on the contract. Rouse's promise to "assume payment of $850 for heating plant" made him liable to Associated Contractors, Inc., only if and so far as it made him liable to Winston; one who promises to make a payment to the promisee's creditor can assert against the creditor any defense that the promisor could assert against the promisee. Accordingly Rouse, if he had been sued by the corporation, would have been entitled to show fraud on the part of Winston. He is equally entitled to do so in this suit by an assignee of the corporation's claim. It follows that the court erred in striking the first defense. We do not consider whether Winston's alleged fraud, if shown, would be a complete or only a partial defense to this suit, since that question has not arisen and may not arise.

We think the court was right in striking the second defense.

If the promisor's agreement is to be interpreted as a promise to discharge whatever liability the promisee is under, the promisor must certainly be allowed to show that the promisee was under no enforceable liability . . . . On the other hand, if the promise means that the promisor agrees to pay a sum of money to A, to whom the promisee says he is indebted, it is immaterial whether the promisee is actually indebted to that amount or at all. . . . Where the promise is to pay a specific debt. . . this interpretation will generally be the true one. [17]

 

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to reinstate the first defense.

Reversed and remanded.

 

[17] 2 Williston, Contracts §399 (Rev: Ed. 1936).

12.5.7 Notes - ROUSE v. UNITED STATES 12.5.7 Notes - ROUSE v. UNITED STATES

1. On the status of assuming grantees, and the distinction between assuming grantees and non-assuming grantees, see the Note following Vrooman v. Turner, supra p. 1346. It does not appear that the heating plant in the principal case was sold subject to a security interest (e.g., a conditional sale or chattel mortgage); the F.H.A. guaranty no doubt made such an arrangement unnecessary. In the absence of a security arrangement covering the heating plant, Rouse would not have been liable for the unpaid balance of the purchase price if he had not assumed the debt. Presumably he paid Winston less for the house than he would have done if he had not agreed to take over the monthly payments for the heating plant.

2. Winston's Liability on the Note: Disregard for the moment the sale to Rouse and assume that Winston still owned the house. When she bought the heating plant from Associated Contractors she executed a note for the purchase price. If the seller, having kept the note itself (or having been required to take the note up after default) sued Winston, she could interpose her defense of faulty installation. Such defenses as failure of consideration, breach of warranty, and the like are always available between the original parties to the underlying transaction. There is no way in which Associated Contractors can set up the transaction so that it can sue Winston free of such defenses.

Associated Contractors financed the sale by selling Winston's note to Union Trust Company. Let us assume that the note was negotiable and that Union Trust Company qualified as a holder in due course. (On negotiable instruments and the holder in due course concept, see the Note following Muller v. Pondir, infra p. 1444.) Normally, one who is the holder in due course of an instrument takes it free of all defenses of the sort involved in the Rouse case (failure of consideration and what is usually termed fraud "in the inducement"). If the Trust Company, as a holder in due course, held Winston's note free of her defenses against Associated Contractors, she would be liable for the full amount of the note; having paid the Trust Company, however, she could then sue Associated Contractors to recover damages for the faulty installation or breach of warranty. That is, the seller never escapes liability to the buyer for his default, even though the buyer may have become obligated to a financing institution to pay the full price without regard to the default.

Today, however, it is extremely unlikely that Winston could become obligated in this way. Some states flatly forbid the use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions like the one between Winston and Associated Contractors (with the result that the Trust Company could not become a holder in due course of her note in the first place); other states have, by statute or judicial decision, made the defenses of a consumer-purchaser available against anyone who subsequently acquires a negotiable instrument issued in a consumer transaction (making the Trust Company's holder in due status worthless as a practical matter). For statutes illustrating these two approaches, see Wis. Stat. Ann. 422.406 (1974) and Mo. Ann. Stat. §408.405 (Vernon 1979). A leading case on the subject is Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).

When the note went into default, the United States, under the F.H.A. guaranty, was required to pay off Union Trust Company. As part of that transaction it acquired Winston's note from the Trust Company and succeeded to whatever rights the Trust Company had in the note. If the United States had sued Winston on the note, the situation would have been the same as that described in the preceding paragraph.

 3. Rouse's Liability: Rouse was not liable on Winston's note because he was not a party to it (i.e., he had never signed it in any capacity). This, as the court says, is a standard rule of negotiable instruments law. Nor was he a party to the contract of sale between Winston and Associated Contractors. His liability thus is predicated on his assumption of the debt in his purchase of the house from Winston.

Rouse's first defense was that Winston had fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the heating plant and the court held that this defense, if established, was good against the United States. In third party beneficiary terminology, Rouse was the promisor and Winston was the promisee. Rouse's argument, with which the court agreed, was that the promisor, when sued by the beneficiary, could interpose the defense of fraud (or, presumably, failure of consideration) between himself and the promisee. It seems clear that if the United States had elected to collect from Winston, and Winston, having paid, had sued Rouse, the defense of Winston's fraud would have been available to Rouse. Does it necessarily follow that it should also be available against the United States? If it were held that the defense was not available to Rouse against the United States, what further remedies would Rouse have?

Rouse's second defense was faulty installation of the heating system by Associated Contractors — that is, failure of consideration or breach of warranty between the promisee (Winston) and the seller. The court held that this defense was not available to Rouse. Thus, if he fails to establish the fraudulent misrepresentation defense, he will have to pay the full amount of the unpaid purchase price even if the heating system had been improperly installed and was worthless. Did the court say that the United States, in its action against Rouse, was in the same position that Associated Contractors would have been in if they had sued Rouse after taking up the note from the United States? Or that the defense was not available against the United States but would have been available against Associated Contractors? If Rouse paid the United States, could he then bring an action for breach of warranty against the Contractors? Or could Winston bring such an action after Rouse had paid? It does seem necessary, does it not, to find a solution that will make Associated Contractors liable to someone if it has breached its contract with Winston.

4. In the last paragraph of his opinion, Judge Edgerton quoted from Williston on Contracts. Williston proposed a distinction between cases in which the promisor should, and cases in which he should not, be able to use the promisee's defenses against the beneficiary. Did the court in the Rouse case misapply Williston's distinction?

5. Reconsider the discussion of Lawrence v. Fox in the Introductory Note to this section. If Holly had a defense against Lawrence, should Fox be able to plead it? What would Williston say? If you conclude that Holly's defense would not be available to Fox, would it follow that Winston's defense would not be available to Rouse if he were sued by Associated Contractors?

12.5.8 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp. 12.5.8 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.

361 U.S. 459
80 S.Ct. 489
4 L.Ed.2d 442

John L. LEWIS, Henry G. Schmidt and Josephine Roche, as Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund, Petitioners,
v.
BENEDICT COAL CORPORATION. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and United Mine Workers of America, District 28, Petitioner,
v.
BENEDICT COAL CORPORATION.

Nos. 18 and 19.
Argued Oct. 21, 1959.
Decided Feb. 23, 1960.

[361 U.S. 460] Mr. Russell R. Kramer, Knoxville, Tenn., for petitioners Lewis and others.

Mr. M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va., for petitioners United Mine Workers.

Mr. Robert T. Winston, Jr., Norton, Va., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, a collective bargaining agreement between coal operators and the United Mine Workers of America, provides for a union welfare fund meeting the requirements of § 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act.[1] The [461] fund is the "United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950." Each signatory coal operator agreed to pay into the fund a royalty of 30¢, later increased to 40¢, for each ton of coal produced for use or for sale.

Benedict Coal Corporation, the respondent in both No. 18 and No. 19, is a signatory coal operator. From [462] March 5, 1950, through July 1953, Benedict produced coal upon which the amount of royalty was calculated to be $177,762.92. Benedict paid $101,258.68 of this amount but withheld $76,504.24. The petitioners in No, 18, who are the trustees of the fund, brought this action to recover that balance in the District Court for the eastern District of Tennessee.[2] Benedict's main defense was that the performance of the duty to pay royalty to the trustees, regarding them as third-party beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agreement, was excused when the promisee contracting party, the union and its District 28—who are the petitioners in No. 19 and who will be referred to as the union violated the agreement by strikes and stoppages of work. Benedict also cross-claimed against the union for damages sustained from the strikes and stoppages. By its answer to the cross-claim, the union denied that its conduct violated the agreement.

The jury, using a verdict form provided by the trial judge, found that the trustees were entitled to recover the full amount of the unpaid royalty but that Benedict was entitled to a setoff of $81,017.68; the jury also gave a verdict to Benedict for that sum on its cross-claim against the union. In a single entry, two judgments were entered on this verdict. One was a judgment in favor of Benedict on its cross-claim on which immediate execution was ordered, but with direction that the sum collected from the union be paid into the registry of the court. The other was a judgment in favor of the trustees for the unpaid balance of the royalty. However, effect was given to Benedict's defense in the trustees' suit by refusing immediate execution, and interest, on the trustees' judgment and ordering instead that that judgment be [463] satisfied only out of the proceeds collected by Benedict on its judgment and paid into the registry of the court.[3]

The union and the trustees prosecuted separate appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The union alleged that the District Court erred in holding that the strikes and stoppages violated the collective bargaining agreement, contending that, properly construed, the agreement did not forbid the strikes and stoppages; in the alternative, the union urged that the damages awarded were excessive. The trustees alleged as error, primarily, the refusal of the trial court to allow them immediate and unconditional execution, and interest, on their judgment against Benedict.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court except as to the amount of damages awarded to Benedict [464] on its cross-claim, which the court adjudged was excessive. The court held that, under the evidence, Benedict's damages would not equal the amount of the trustees' judgment of $76,504.26. The case was remanded for a redetermination of Benedict's damages, with instructions that "(t)he judgment in favor of the Trustees will then be amended by the district court to allow execution and interest on that part of the said judgment which is in excess of the set-off in favor of Benedict as so redetermined." 6 Cir., 259 F.2d 346, 355. This left unaffected so much of the District Court's order as predicated the trustees' recovery, to the extent of the amount of Benedict's judgment as finally determined, upon Benedict's recovery of that judgment. The trustees and the union filed separate petitions for certiorari. We granted the trustee's petition, No. 18, and also the union's petition, No. 19, except that we limited the latter grant to the question whether the strikes and stoppages complained of by Benedict violated the collective bargaining agreement. 359 U.S. 905, 79 S.Ct. 580, 581, 3 L.Ed.2d 570.

In No. 19, the Court is equally divided. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, so far as it sustains the holding of the District Court that the union violated the collective bargaining agreement, is therefore affirmed.

We turn to the question presented in No. 18, whether the lower courts were correct in holding in effect that Benedict might assert the union's breaches as a defense to the trustees' suit, for to the extent Benedict (the promisor) does not collect from the union (the promisee) the union's liability is set off against Benedict's liability to the third-party beneficiary. The answer to that question requires, we think, our consideration of the nature of the interests of the union, the company, and the trustees in the fund under the collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement creating the fund include the express provision that "this [465] Fund is an irrevocable trust created pursuant to Section 302(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947." Another provision specifies that the purposes of the fund shall be all purposes "provided for or permitted in Section 302(c)."[4] In this way the agreement plainly declares what the statute requires, namely, that the fund shall be used "for the sole and exclusive benefit" of the employees, their families and dependents. Thus, the fund is in no way an asset or property of the union.

Benedict does not, however, base its claim of setoff on any contention that the royalty was owing to the union and might because of this be applied to the payment of its damages. Benedict's position is that in an amount equal to the amount of the damages sustained from the union's breaches, no fund property came into existence under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This depends upon whether the agreement is to be construed as making performance by the union of its promises a condition precedent to Benedict's promise to pay royalty to the trustees. Benedict argues that the contracting parties expressed this meaning in an article at the close of the agreement—"This Agreement is an integrated instrument and its respective provisions are interdependent"—and in the provision in another article that the no-strike clauses are "part of the consideration of this contract." However, the specific provisions of the article creating the fund provide: (1) "During the life of this (collective bargaining) Agreement, there shall be paid into such Fund by each operator signatory * * * (a royalty) on each ton of coal produced for use or for sale." (2) The operator is required to make payment "on the 10th day of each * * * calendar month covering the production of all coal for use or sale during the preceding month." (3) "This obligation of each Operator signatory [466] hereto, which is several and not joint, to so pay such sums shall be a direct and continuing obligation of said Operator during the life of this Agreement * * *." (4) "Title to all the moneys paid into and or due and owing said Fund shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the Trustees of the Fund * * *."[5] (Emphasis added.) These provisions, rather than the stipulations of general application, are controlling. Their clear import is that the parties meant that the duty to pay royalty should arise on the production of coal independent of the union's performance. Indeed, Benedict's conduct was not consistent with the interpretation which it is now urging. Benedict continued despite the breaches to perform all of its several promises under the contract, including the promise to pay royalty, paying over $100,000 on coal produced during the period in dispute and withholding only the portion in suit.

But our conclusion that the union's performance of its promises is not a condition precedent to Benedict's duty to pay royalty does not fully answer the question we are to decide. For it may reasonably be argued that the damages sustained by Benedict may nevertheless affect the amount of the trustees' recovery. Professor Corbin, while acknowledging that "No case of the sort has been discovered,"[6] states: "It may perhaps be regarded as just to make the right of the beneficiary not only subject to the conditions precedent but also subject (as in the case of an assignee) to counter-claims against the promisee—at least if they arise out of a breach by the promisee of [467] his duties created by the very same contract on which the beneficiary sues."[7] Using terms like "counterclaim" or "setoff" in a third-party beneficiary context may be confusing. In a two-party contract situation, when a promisor's duty to perform is absolute, the promisee's breaches will not excuse performance of that duty; the promisor has an independent claim against the promisee in damages. Formerly the promisor was required to bring a separate action to recover his damages. Under modern practice, when the promises are to pay money, or are reducible to a money amount, the promisor, when sued by the promisee, offsets the damages which he has sustained against the amount he owes, and usually obtains a judgment for any excess.[8]

However, a third-party beneficiary has made no promises and therefore has breached no duty to the promisor. Accordingly, to hold, as the lower courts in this case did, that a promisor may "set off" the damages caused by the promisee's breach is actually to read the contract, which is the measure of the third party's rights, as so providing. In other words, although the promisor's duty to perform has become fixed by the occurrence of applicable conditions precedent, the parties may be taken to have agreed that the extent of the promisor's duty to the third party will be affected by the promisee's breach of contract. When it is said that "it may be just" to make the third party subject to the counterclaim, what must be meant is that a court should infer an intention of the promisor and promisee that the third party's rights be so limited.

This may be a desirable rule of construction to apply to third-party beneficiary contract where the promisor's interest in or connection with the third party, in [468] contrast with the promisee's, begins with the promise and ends with its performance. Of course, in entering into such a contract, the promisor may be held to have given up some defense against the third party's claim to performance of the promise, for example, the right to defeat that claim by rescinding the contract at any time he and the promisee agree. Nevertheless it may be fair to assume that had the parties anticipated the possibility of a breach by the promisee they would have provided that the promisor might protect himself by such means as would be available against the promisee under a two-party contract.[9] This suggestion has not been crystallized into a rule of construction. Our problem is whether we should infer such an intention in this contract because there may be reasons making it appropriate to do so in the generality of third-party beneficiary contracts.

This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a typical third-party beneficiary contract. The promisor's interest in the third party here goes far beyond the mere performance of its promise to that third party, i.e., beyond the payment of royalty. It is a commonplace of modern industrial relations for employers to provide security for employees and their families to enable them to meet problems arising from unemployment, illness, old age or death. While employers in may other industries assume this burden directly, this welfare fund was jointly created by the coal industry and the union for that purpose. Not only has Benedict entered into a longterm relationship with the union in this regard, but in compliance with § 302(c)(5)(B) it has assumed equal responsibility with the union for the management of the fund. In a very real sense Benedict's interest in the soundness of the fund and its management is in no way [469] less than that of the promisee union. This of itself cautions against reliance upon language which does not explicitly provide that the parties contracted to protect Benedict by allowing the company to set off its damages against its royalty obligation.

Moreover, unlike the usual third-party beneficiary contract, this is an industry-wide agreement involving many promisors. If Benedict and other coal operators having damage claims against the union for its breaches may curtail royalty payments, the burden will fall in the first instance upon the employees and their families across the country. Ultimately this might result in pressures upon the other coal operators to increase their royalty payments to maintain the planned schedule of benefits. The application of the suggested rule of construction to this contract would require us to assume that the other coal operators who are parties to the agreement were willing to risk the threat of diminution of the fund in order to protect those of their number who might have become involved in local labor difficulties.

Furthermore, Benedict promised in the collective bargaining agreement to pay a specified scale of wages to the employees. It would not be contended that Benedict might recoup its damages by decreasing these wages. This could be rationalized by saying that the covenant to pay wages is included in separate contracts of hire entered into with each employee. The royalty payments are really another form of compensation to the employees,[10] and as such the obligation to pay royalty might be thought to be incorporated into the individual employment contracts. This is not to say that the same treatment should necessarily be accorded to royalty payments as is accorded to wages, but the similarity militates against the inference [470] that the parties intended that the trustees' claim be subject to offset.

Finally a consideration which is not present in the case of other third-party beneficiary contracts is the impact of the national labor policy. Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(b), provides that "(a)ny money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." At the least, this evidences a congressional intention that the union as an entity, like a corporation, should in the absence of agreement be the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it.[11] Although this policy was prompted by a solicitude for the union members, because they might have little opportunity to prevent the union from committing actionable wrongs,[12] it seems to us to apply with even greater force to protecting the interests of beneficiaries of the welfare fund, many of whom may be retired, or may be dependents, and therefore without any direct voice in the conduct of union affairs. Thus the national labor policy becomes an important consideration in determining whether the same inferences which might be drawn as to other third-party agreements should be drawn here.

Section 301 authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. In the discharge of this function, having appropriate regard for the several considerations we have discussed, including the national labor policy, we hold that the parties to a collective bar [471] gaining agreement must express their meaning in unequivocal words before they can be said to have agreed that the union's breaches of its promises should give rise to a defense against the duty assumed by an employer to contribute to a welfare fund meeting the requirements of § 302(c)(5). We are unable to find such words in the general provisions already mentioned—"This Agreement is an integrated instrument and its respective provisions are interdependent," and "The contracting parties agree that (the no-strike clauses are) * * * part of the consideration of this contract"—or elsewhere in the agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore modified to provide that the District Court shall amend the judgment in favor of the trustees to allow immediate and unconditional execution, and interest, on the full amount of the trustees' judgment for $76,504.26 against Benedict.

It is so ordered.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals modified.

Mr. Justice STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

This litigation arose out of an agreement entered into on March 5, 1950, between coal operators, including respondent, and United Mine Workers. It was the outcome of collective bargaining between the parties to fix the terms of industrial relations, wages and other conditions of employment, between the coal operators and their employees as represented by the union. It is an elaborate document of twenty pages, formulating the rights and obligations of the union on the one side and the rights and obligations of the operators on the other. Part of the agreement called for the establishment of a welfare and retirement fund for the benefit of employees and their families. This obligated the respondent, as one [472] of the operators bound by the agreement, to pay the Fund a fixed amount per ton of coal that it produced during the period in controversy. The narrow question before the Court is whether the respondent operator may withhold from the amount it is obligated, as a matter of arithmetic, to pay into the Fund, the amount of assessable damage owing it from the union in discharge of the union's liability for violation of its obligation under the agreement.

The suit was by the Trustees of the Fund, who claimed the payment in full of the scheduled amounts to be paid into the Fund. This liability is conceded, subject however to deduction for the amount owing from the union to Benedict on the basis of judicially determined liability. The Court of Appeals sustained the right of respondent to set off against its obligation to pay the defined amount into the Fund the amount arising out of liability by the union for breach of the union's obligation under the same agreement.

A considered reading of the Court's opinion compels the conclusion that if the agreement, which it is the Court's duty to construe, were "a typical third-party beneficiary contract," the respondent would not have to pay over the full amount payable to the Fund but could withhold the amount which is owing it for breach of the union's undertaking. The Court holds that this is not such a contract, although the agreement was not merely a single document with obviously interrelated sections, but specifically provided, "This agreement is an integrated instrument and its respective provisions are interdependent and shall be effective from and after March 5, 1950." The Court justifies rejecting what is assumed to be applicable to "a typical third-party beneficiary contract," partly by devising a policy distilled from two provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, §§ 301(b) and 302(c)(5), and partly by its assumptions about the community of interest [473] between the employer and the trust fund in the assertedly special context of labor relations.

I have no doubt that legislation may be a source for reasoning in court-made law. But when legislation is thus drawn upon there should be a close relation between the terms of an enactment and what the courts deduce therefrom as a direction for adjudication. I find none such here. The two provisions drawn upon do not afford the radiations attributed to them. The relevant language of § 301(b) of the Taft-Hartly Act provides that "Any money judgment against a labor organization * * * shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." The text deals expressly only with the enforcement of a money judgment rendered against a labor organization. No such judgment is involved in this case. The undoubted concern of Congress behind this provision was to avoid the liability of union members solely by virtue of their union membership, a liability notoriously imposed by the laws of several of the States in 1947 and vividly remembered by labor unions by reason of the Danbury Hatters' case in federal courts. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 1908, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488; Lawlor v. Loewe, 1915, 235 U.S. 522, 35 S.Ct. 170, 59 L.Ed. 341; Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 2 Cir., 1916, 236 F. 444, L.R.A. 1917B, 938.[1] The intent and scope of § 301(b) were accurately described in the Senate Report on what became the Taft-Hartley Act as affording members of a union "all the advantages of limited liability without incorporation of the union." S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16.

[474] Nor does any emanation from § 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act negate what would otherwise dictate the right of setoff setoff, be it remembered, not a condition on Benedict's duty to pay into the Fund—of what is owing to Benedict for breach of the contract by the union under the same contract by which Benedict promised the union to pay into the Fund for its mined coal. The function of § 302(c)(5) is to define the conditions set by Congress for permitted industrial welfare funds. It was not an implied qualification of just principles relevant to the enforcement of contracts generally. Only the other day the Court stated the purpose of the Congress in enacting § 302(c)(5):

"Congress believed that if welfare funds were established which did not define with specificity the benefits payable thereunder, a substantial danger existed that such funds might be employed to perpetuate control of union officers, for political purposes, or even for personal gain. See 92 Cong.Rec. 4892—4894, 4899, 5181, 5345—5346; S.Rep. No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52; 93 Cong.Rec. 4678, 4746—4747. To remove these dangers, specific standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be established only for purposes which Congress considered proper and expended only for the purposes for which they were established." Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426, 79 S.Ct. 864, 868, 3 L.Ed.2d 915.

Congress was concerned with abuses by union officers, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 76 S.Ct. 400, 100 L.Ed. 335. It gave not a thought to withdrawing the enforcement of an agreement such as the one before us from rules relevant to the fair administration of justice.

The Court quotes one of the twin leading authorities on the law of contracts: "It may perhaps, be regarded as [475] just to make the right of the beneficiary not only subject to the conditions precedent but also subject (as in the case of an assignee) to counter-claims against the promisee—at least if they arise out of a breach by the promisee of his duties created by the very same contract on which the beneficiary sues." 4 Corbin, Contracts, § 819. As I understand it, apart from the effects attributed to §§ 301(b) and 302(c)(5), the Court rejects this "just" view as simply not applicable to this kind of a collective bargaining agreement. But the rule stated by Professor Corbin is not a technical rule narrowly limited to particular kinds of contracts. It reflects the broader generalization that under a civilized system of law all just presuppositions of an agreement are to be deemed part of it, and that courts, whose duty it is to determine the legal consequences of agreements, should attribute to an agreement such just presuppositions.

Underlying the Court's view is the assumption that the law of contracts is a rigorously closed system applicable to a limited class of arrangements between parties acting at arm's length, and that collective bargaining agreements are a very special class of voluntary agreements to which the general law pertaining to the construction and enforcement of contracts is not relevant. As a matter of fact, the governing rules pertaining to contracts recognize the diversity of situations in relation to which contracts are made and duly allow for these variant factors in construing and enforcing contracts. And so, of course, in construing agreements for the reciprocal rights and obligations of employers and employees, account must be taken of the many implications relevant to construing a document that governs industrial relations. There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness and justice that are as relevant to the law's attitude in the enforce [476] ment of collective bargaining agreements as they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard to the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this furnishes in construing collective bargaining agreements.

One of the most experienced students of labor law has warned against the dangers of such an approach:

"The ease with which one can show that collective bargaining agreements have characteristics which preclude the application of some of the familiar principles of contracts and agency creates the danger that those who are knowledgeable about collective bargaining will demand that we discard all the precepts of contract law and create a new law of collective bargaining agreements. I have already expressed the view that the courts would ignore the plea but surely it is unwise even if they would sustain it. Many legal rules have hardened into conceptual doctrines which lawyers invoke with little thought for the underlying reasons, but the doctrines themselves represent an accumulation of tested wisdom, they are bottomed upon notions of fairness and sound public policy, and it would be a foolish waste to climb the ladder all over again just because the suggested principles were developed in other contexts and some of them are demonstrably inapposite. * * *" Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, in Collective Bargaining and the Law (Univ. of Mich. Law School), pp. 121—122.

Judges will do well to heed this admonition. Their experience makes them much more sure-footed in applying principles pertinent to the enforcement of contracts than they are likely to be in discerning the needs of wise industrial relations.

I would affirm the judgment.

----------

[1] Section 302(c)(5) is as follows:

"The provisions of this section (making it unlawful for the employer to deliver and a representative of the employees to receive anything of value) shall not be applicable * * * with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative

for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities." Act of June 23, 1947, § 302, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (5).

[2] The article creating the fund provides that "Title to all the moneys paid into and or due and owing said Fund shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the Trustees of the Fund * * *."

[3] The District Court's entry reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Thereupon this action came on to be heard on a former day before the Court and a verdict was rendered by the jury in favor of Benedict Coal Corporation in the sum of $81,017.68 and in favor of John L. Lewis, Charles A. Owen and Josephine Roche (trustees of the fund) in the sum of $76,504.26, the verdict containing an offset provision.

"In accordance with the Court's interpretation of the offset provision in the jury's verdict and as a means of carrying out the intended effect of the verdict, it is ordered that the Benedict Coal Corporation have and recover the sum of $81,017.68 from United Mine Workers of America and United Mine Workers of America District 29, for which execution may issue.

"It is further ordered that said sum of $81,017.68 be paid into the registry of the Court to be disbursed by the clerk in accordance with instructions appearing below.

"It is further ordered that said Trustees, in accordance with the verdict rendered in their favor, have and recover of Benedict Coal Corporation the sum of $76,504.26, said recovery to be had in the manner following: From the aforesaid $81,017.68 ordered paid into the registry of the Court, that the sum of $76,504.26 be paid to said Trustees. That the difference between $76,504.26 and $81,017.68 be paid to Benedict Coal Corporation."

[4] See note 1, supra.

[5] In an earlier agreement the last clause read "moneys paid into said Fund" and was amended to read "moneys paid into and or due and owing said Fund" (emphasis added) after the decision in Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., D.C., 86 F.Supp. 354, appeal dismissed, 8 Cir., 181 F.2d 1011, holding, among other things, that under the agreement, no trust arose as to royalty not paid into the fund.

[6] But cf. Fulmer v. Goldfarb, 171 Tenn. 218, 101 S.W.2d 1108; Depuy v. Loomis, 74 Pa.Super. 497.

[7] 4 Corbin, Contracts, § 819.

[8] See 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 709. Cf. 3 Williston, Contracts, § 883 (Rev. ed. 1936). Compare Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183, 6 L.Ed. 595, Withers v. Greene, 9 How. 213, 13 L.Ed. 109.

[9] To some degree the third-party beneficiary may be thought of as being "substituted" for the promisee. See Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N.Y. 30, 35.

[10] See 93 Cong.Rec. 4746—4747. See also S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (supplemental views).

[11] See 93 Cong.Rec. 5014; id., at 3839. Cf. Hearings before House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8, H.R. 725, H.R. 880, H.R. 1095, and H.R. 1096, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 135—136.

[12] See 93 Cong.Rec. 6283.

----------

[1] The result of this litigation was a judgment for $250,000 against the goods and estate of over 150 named defendants and attachment was issued against them.

12.5.9 Notes - Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp. 12.5.9 Notes - Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.

NOTE

1. The decision in the Lewis case was, of course, based partly on provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and partly on theories of public policy which the Court found persuasive with respect to collective bargaining agreements but which it might not have found equally persuasive with respect to the "typical" or "usual" third party beneficiary contract. However, if, for the sake of the argument, we take Justice Brennan's opinion as a contribution to private contract law, the decision is that the promisor (Benedict) when sued by the beneficiary (the trustees) may not interpose as a defense the promisee's (union's) breach of the promisor-promisee contract. The promisor must pay the beneficiary and bring a separate action against the promisee to recover damages for the breach. Do you think that is necessarily an unsound rule or do you prefer the approach suggested in the quotation from Corbin? Would what we may call the Brennan rule lead to a sensible result if applied (with respect to the fraudulent misrepresentation defense) in the Rouse case, supra p. 1428? Are there some types of cases in which the promisee's breach should be a defense to the promisor when sued by the beneficiary and other types in which Justice Brennan's solution might be preferable?

2. The applicability of general contract principles to collective bargaining agreements is admirably discussed in Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L.J. 525 (1969). Professor Summers comments that "the legal rules governing everyday commercial contracts can contribute little but mischief when applied to collective agreements, but the basic principles of contract . . . can make valuable contributions to the law of collective agreements." 78 Yale L.J. at 527 . . Professor Summers discusses the contract third party beneficiary rules in the context of collective agreements at 538 et seq.

3. In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Eisenberg, 294 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1961), Aetna had issued a Furriers' Customers Basic Policy to Eisenberg, the owner of a fur store who stored furs for his customers. Under the policy Eisenberg was authorized to issue "Storage Receipts" to his customers which stated that the furs in storage were insured up to a stated amount under the Aetna policy. Eisenberg was required to make monthly reports to Aetna of the stated value of the furs for which he had issued Storage Receipts and to pay monthly premiums based on that value. After a fire had destroyed furs covered by such Storage Receipts, it was discovered that Eisenberg in his monthly reports had consistently and grossly undervalued the furs in storage; by reason of the undervaluation he had, of course, paid lower premiums to Aetna than he would have had to pay if he had declared their actual value. The holders of Storage Receipts brought actions directly against Aetna. Aetna defended on the ground of Eisenberg's breach of his duty to Aetna in filing the false monthly reports. The court held that the holders of Storage Receipts were third party beneficiaries of Eisenberg's policy with Aetna and that Aetna was "estopped" to defend on the ground that Eisenberg (promisee) had breached his contract with Aetna (promisor). The court stressed the fact that Aetna had accepted Eisenberg's reports without making an independent check of whether the reports were true or false. Do you think the case would have been decided the same way if Eisenberg had failed to pay any premium for the month in which the fire took place?

In its discussion of the "estoppel" point the court, in a string citation, referred to the Rouse case, supra p. 1428, as one in which the plaintiff had not made the argument that the defendant (promisor) was estopped. Do you think that the United States, in the Rouse case, could have successfully argued that Rouse was estopped to raise the defense of Winston's fraudulent misrepresentation? Would the estoppel theory have been helpful to Justice Brennan as an alternative explanation of the Supreme Court's decision in the Lewis case? If you agree that Aetna should have been held liable to the holders of the Storage Receipts, can you suggest any theory, other than that of estoppel, to justify the result?

4. The Restatement Second deals with the question of availability of defenses against a beneficiary in §309:

Defenses Against the Beneficiary

(1) A promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless a contract is formed between the promisor and the promisee; and if a contract is voidable or unenforceable at the time of its formation the right of any beneficiary is subject to the infirmity.

(2) If a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impracticability, public policy, nonoccurrence of a condition, or present or prospective failure of performance, the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.

(3) Except as stated in Subsections (1) and (2) and in §311 or as provided by the contract, the right of any beneficiary against the promisor is not subject to the promisor's claims or defenses against the promisee or to the promisee's claims or defenses against the beneficiary.

(4) A beneficiary's right against the promisor is subject to any claim or defense arising from his own conduct or agreement.

Under the approach of the Restatement Second, how would you decide the Rouse case? The Lewis case? The Eisenberg case? The hypothetical variants on Lawrence v. Fox suggested in the Introductory Note to this section?