*49Mr. Justice Sutherland

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases were argued together and submitted for decision as one case.

The petitioners, hereinafter referred to as defendants, are negroes charged with the crime of rape, committed upon the persons of two white girls. The crime is said to have been committed on March 25, 1931. The indictment was returned in a state Court of first instance on March 31, and the record recites that on the same day the defendants were arraigned and entered pleas otf not guilty. There is a further recital to the effect that upon the arraignment they were represented by counsel. But no counsel had been employed, and aside from a statement made by the trial judge several days later during a colloquy immediately preceding the trial, the record does not disclose when, or under what circumstances, an appointment of counsel was made, or who was appointed. . During the colloquy referred to, the trial judge, in response to a question, said that he had appointed all the members of the bar for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and then of course anticipated that the members of the bar would continue to help the defendants if no counsel appeared. Upon the argument here both sides accepted that as a correct statement of the facts concerning the matter.

There was a severance upon the request of the state, and the defendants were tried in three several groups, as indicated above. As each of the three cases was called for trial, each defendant was arraigned, and, having the *50indictment read to him, entered a plea of. not guilty. Whether the original arraignment and pleas were regarded as ineffective is not shown. Each of the three trials was completed within a single day. Under the Alabama statute the punishment for rape is to be fixed by the jury, and in its discretion may be from ten years imprisonment to death. The juries found defendants guilty and imposed the death penalty upon all. The trial court overruled motions for new trials and sentenced the defendants in accordance with the verdicts. The judgments were affirmed by the state supreme court. Chief Justice Anderson thought the defendants had not been accorded a fair trial and strongly dissented. 224 Ala. 524; id. 531; id. 540; 141 So. 215, 195, 201.

In this court the judgments are assailed upon the grounds that the defendants, and each of them, were denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, in contravention of the Fourteenth' Amendment, specifically as follows: (1) they were not given a fair, impartial and deliberate trial; (2) they were denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of. consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial; and (3) they were tried before juries from which qualified members of their own race were systematically excluded. These questions were properly raised and saved in the courts below.

The only one of the assignments which we shall consider is the second, hr respect of the denial of counsel; and it becomes unnecessary to discuss the facts of the case or the circumstances surrounding the prosecution except in so far as they reflect light upon that question.

The record shows that on the day when the offense is said to have been committed, these defendants, together with a number of other negroes, were upon a freight train on its way through Alabama. On the same train were seven white boys and the two white girls. A fight took *51place between the negroes and the white boys, in the course of which the white boys, with the exception of one named Gilley, were thrown off the train. A message was sent ahead, reporting the fight and asking that every negro be gotten off the train. The participants in the fight, and' the two girls, were in an open gondola car. The two girls testified that each of them was assaulted by six different negroes in turn, and they identified the seven defendants as having been among the number. None of the white boys was called to testify, with the exception of Gilley, who was called in rebuttal.

Before the train reached Scottsboro, Alabama, a sheriff’s posse seized the defendants and two other negroes. Both girls and the negroes then were taken to Scottsboro, the county seat. Word of their coming and of the alleged assault had preceded them, and they were met at Scottsboro by a large crowd. It does not sufficiently appear that the defendants were seriously threatened with, or that they were actually in danger of, mob violence; but it does appear that the attitude of the community was one of great hostility. The sheriff thought it necessary to call for the militia to assist in safeguarding the prisoners. Chief Justice Anderson pointed out in his opinion that every step taken from the arrest and arraignment to the sentence was accompanied by the military. Soldiers took the defendants to Gadsden for safekeeping, brought them back to Scottsboro for arraignment, returned them to Gadsden for safekeeping while awaiting trial, escorted them to Scottsboro for trial a few days later, and guarded the court house and grounds at every stage of the proceedings. It is perfectly apparent that the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment. During the entire time, the defendants were closely confined or were under military guard. The record does not disclose their ages, except that one of them was nineteen; but the *52record clearly indicates that most, if not all, of them were youthful, and they are constantly referred to as “ the boys.” They were ignorant and illiterate. All of them were residents of other states, where alone members of their families or friends resided.

However guilty defendants, upon due inquiry, might prove to have been, they were, until convicted, presumed to be innocent. It was the duty of the court having their cases in charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial. With any error of the state court involving alleged contravention of the state statutes or constitution we, of course, have nothing to do. The sole inquiry which we are permitted to make is whether the federal Constitution was contravened (Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 434; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316); and as to that, we confine ourselves, as already suggested, to the inquiry whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

First. The record shows that immediately upon the rer turn of the indictment defendants were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Apparently they were not asked whether they had, or were able to employ, counsel, or wished to have counsel appointed; or whether they had friends or relatives who might assist in that regard if communicated with. That it would not have been an idle ceremony to have given the defendants reasonable opportunity to communicate with their families and endeavor to obtain counsel is demonstrated by the fact that, very soon after conviction, able counsel appeared in their behalf. This was pointed out by Chief Justice Anderson in the course of his dissenting opinion. “They were nonresidents,” he said, “ and had little time or opportunity to get in touch with their families and friends who were scattered throughout two other states, and time has dem*53onstrated that they could or would have been represented by able counsel had a better opportunity been given by a reasonable delay in the trial of the cases, judging from the number and activity of counsel that appeared immediately or shortly after their conviction.” 224 Ala., at pp. 554-555; 141 So. 201.

It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Not only was that not done here, but such designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective' and substantial aid in that regard. This will be amply demonstrated by a brief review of the record.

April 6, six days after indictment, the trials began. When the first case was called, the court inquired whether the parties were ready for trial. The state’s attorney replied that he was ready to proceed. No one answered for the defendants or appeared to represent or defend them. Mr. Roddy, a Tennessee lawyer not a member of the local bar, addressed the court, saying that he had not been employed, but that people who were interested had spoken to him about the case. He was asked by the court whether he intended to appear for the defendants, and answered that he would like to appear along with counsel that the court might appoint. The record then proceeds:

“ The Court: If you appear for these defendants, then I will not appoint counsel; if local counsel are willing to appear and assist .you under the circumstances all right, but I will not appoint them.

“ Mr. Roddy: Your Honor has appointed counsel, is that correct?

“ The Court: I appointed all the members of the bar for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and then of course I anticipated them to continue to help them if- no counsel appears.

*54“ Mr. Roddy: Then I don’t appear then as counsel but I do want to stay in and not be ruled out in this case.

“ The Court: Of course I would not do that—

“Mr. Roddy: I just appear here through the courtesy of Your Honor.

“The Court: Of course I give you that right; . . .”

And then, apparently addressing all the lawyers present, the court inquired:

“ . . . well are you all willing to assist?

“Mr. Moody: Your Honor appointed us ,all and we have been proceeding along every line we know about it under Your Honor’s appointment.

“ The Court: The only thing I am trying to do is, if counsel appears for these defendants I don’t want to impose on you all, but if you feel like counsel from Chattanooga—

“ Mr. Moody: I see his situation of course and I have not run out of anything yet. Of course, if Your Honor purposes to .appoint us, Mr. Parks, I am willing to go on with it. Most of the bar have been down and conferred with these defendants in this case; they did not know what else to do.

“ The Court: The thing, I did not want to impose on the members of the bar if counsel unqualifiedly appears; if you all feel like Mr. Roddy is only interested in a limited way to assist, then I don’t care to appoint—

“Mr. Parks: Your Honor, I don’t feel like you ought to impose on any member of the local bar if the defendants are represented by counsel.

“The Court: That is what I was trying to ascertain, Mr. Parks.

“Mr. Parks: Of course if they have counsel, I don’t see the necessity of the Court appointing anybody; if they haven’t counsel,, of course I think it is up to the Court to appoint counsel to represent them.

*55“ The Court: Lthink you are right about it Mr. Parks and that is the reason I was trying to get an expression from Mr. Roddy.

“ Mr. Roddy: I think Mr. Parks is entirely right about it, if I was paid down here and employed, it would be a different thing, but I have not prepared this case for trial and have only been called into it by people who are interested in these boys from Chattanooga. Now, they have not given me an opportunity to prepare the case and I am not familiar with the procedure in Alabama, but I merely came down here as a friend of the people who are interested and not as paid counsel, and certainly I haven’t any money to pay them and nobody I am interested in had me to come down here has put up any fund of money to come down here and pay counsel. If they should do it I would be glad to turn it over — a counsel but I am merely here at the solicitation of people who have become interested in this case without any payment of fee and without any preparation for trial and I think the boys would be better off if I step entirely out of the case according to my way of looking at it and according to my lack of preparation of it and not being familiar with the procedure in Alabama, . . .”

Mr. Roddy later observed:

“ If there is anything I can do to be of help to them, I will be glad to do it; I am interested to that extent.

“The Court: Well gentlemen, if Mr. Roddy only appears as assistant that way, I think it is proper that I appoint members of this bar to represent them, I expect that is right. If Mr. Roddy will appear, I wouldn’t of course, I would not appoint anybody. I don’t see, Mr. Roddy, how I can make a qualified appointment or a limited appointment. Of course, I don’t mean to cut off your assistance in any way — Well gentlemen, I think you understand it.

*56“ Mr. Moody: I am willing to go ahead and help Mr. Roddy in anything I can do about it, under the circumstances.

“The Court: All right, all the lawyers that will; of course I would not require a lawyer to appear if—

“Mr. Moody: I am willing to do that for him as a member of the bar; I will go ahead and help do anything I can do.

“ The Court: All right.”

And in this casual fashion the matter of counsel in a capital case was disposed of.

It thus will be seen that until the very morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to represent the defendants. Prior to that time, the trial judge had “ appointed all the members of the bar ” for the limited “ purpose of arraigning the defendants.” Whether they would represent the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of the court. Such a designation, even if made for all purp'oses, would, in our opinion, have fallen far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of counsel. How many lawyers were members of the bar does not appear; but, in the very nature of things, whether many or few, they would not, thus collectively named, have been given that clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that-individual sense of duty which should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a selected member of the bar, specifically named and assigned.

That this action of the trial judge in respect of appointment of counsel was little more than an expansive gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligation upon any one, is borne out by the fact that prior to the calling of the case for trial on April 6, a leading member of the local ■ bar accepted employment on the side of the prosecution *57and actively participated in the trial. It is true that he said that before doing so he had understood Mr. Roddy would be employed as counsel for the defendants. This the lawyer in question, of his own accord, frankly stated to the court; and no doubt he acted with the utmost good faith. Probably other members of the bar had a like understanding. In any event, the circumstance lends emphasis to the conclusion that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as a,t the trial itself. People ex rel. Burgess v. Risley, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 67; Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76; 125 N. E. 773.

Nor do we think the situation was helped by what occurred on the morning of the trial. At that time, as' appears from the colloquy printed above, Mr. Roddy stated to the court that he did not appear as counsel, but that he would like to appear along with counsel that the court might appoint; that he had not been given an opportunity to prepare the case; that he was not familiar with the procedure in Alabama, but merely came down as a friend of the people who were interested; that he thought the boys would be better off if he should step entirely out of the case. Mr. Moody, a member of the local bar, expressed a willingness to help Mr. Roddy in anything he could do under the circumstances. To this the court responded, “All right, all the lawyers that will; of course I would not require a lawyer to appear if — .” And Mr. Moody continued, “ I am willing to do that for him as a member of the bar;-1 will go ahead and help do any thing I can do.” With this dubious understanding, the trials immediately proceeded. The defendants, young, igno*58rant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, were thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.

It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given. Defendants were immediately hurried to trial. Chief Justice Anderson, after disclaiming any intention to criticize harshly counsel who attempted to represent defendants at the trials, said: “ . . .' the record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active ...” Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities. This conclusion finds ample support in the reasoning of an overwhelming array of state decisions, among which we cite the following: Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 464; 141 S. E. 196; Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777; 79 S. E. 1128; McArver v. State, 114 Ga. 514; 40 S. E. 779; Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235, 246; 157 N. E. 1; Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76; 125 N. E. 773; Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 83; 7 S. W. (2d) 823; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 800; 287 S. W. 17; State v. Collins, 104 La. 629; 29 So. 180; State v. Pool, 50 La. Ann. 449; 23 So. 503; People ex rel. Burgess v. Risley, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 67; State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Cr. 94; 130 Pac. 962; Commonwealth v. O’Keefe, 298 Pa. 169; *59148 Atl. 73; Shaffer v. Territory, 14 Ariz. 329, 333; 127 Pac. 746.

It is true that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of our criminal law is one of the grave evils of our time. Continuances are frequently granted for unnecessarily long periods of time, and delays incident to the disposition of motions for new trial and hearings upon appeal have come in many cases to be a.distinct reproach to the administration of justice. The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in reaching that result a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense. To do that is not to proceed promptly in the calm spirit of regulated justice but to go forward with the haste of the mob.

As the court said in Commonwealth v. O’Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 173; 148 Atl. 73:

“ It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the Tatter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case.

“A prompt and vigorous administration of the criminal law is commendable and we have no desire to clog the wheels of justice. What we here decide is that to force a defendant, charged with a serious misdemeanor, to trial within five hours of his arrest, is not due process of law, regardless of the merits of the case.”

Compare Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 778; 79 S. E. 1128.

Second. The Constitution of Alabama provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel; and a state statute requires the court in a capital case, where the defendant *60is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. The state supreme court held that these provisions had not been infringed, and with that holding w.e are powerless to interfere. The question, however, which it is our duty, and within our power, to decide, is whether the denial of the assistance of counsel contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

If recognition of the right of a defendant charged with a felony to have the aid of counsel depended upon the existence of a similar right at common law' as it existed in England when our Constitution was adopted, there would be great difficulty in maintaining it as necessary to due process. Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions -which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel. After the revolution of 1688, the rule was abolished as to treason, but was otherwise steadily adhered to until 1836, when by act of Parliament the full right was granted in respect of felonies generally. 1 Cooley’s Const. Lim., 8th ed., 698, et seq., and notes.

An affirmation of the right to the aid of counsel in petty offenses, and its denial in the case of crimes of the gravest character, where such aid is most needed, is so outrageous and so obviously a perversion of all sense of proportion that the rule was constantly, vigorously and sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and lawyers. As early as 1758, Blackstone, although recognizing that the rule was settled at common law, denounced it as not in keeping with the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners'by the English law. “For upon what face of reason,” he says, “ can that assistance be denied *61to save the life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass? ” 4 Blackstone 355. One of the grounds upon which Lord Coke defended the rule was that in felonies the court itself was counsel for the prisoner. 1 Cooley’s Const. Lim., supra. But how can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.

. The rule was rejected by the colonies. Before the adoption of the federal Constitution, the Constitution of Maryland had declared “ That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel; . . (Art. XIX, Constitution of 1776). The Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780 (Part the First, Art. XII), the Constitution of New Hampshire, adopted in 1784 (Parti, Art. XV), the Constitution of New York of 1777 (Art. XXXIV), and the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 (Art. IX), had also declared to the same effect. And in the case of Pennsylvania, as early as 1701, the Penn Charter (Art. V) declared that “ all Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors ”; and there was also a provision in the Pennsylvania statute of May 31, 1718 (Dallas, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1700-1781, Vol. 1, p. 134), that in capital cases learned counsel should be assigned to the prisoners.

In Delaware, the Constitution of 1776 (Art. 25), adopted the common law of England, but expressly excepted such parts as were repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in the Declaration of Rights; and the Declaration of Rights, which was adopted on September *6211, 1776, provided (Art. 14), “That in all Prosecutions for criminal Offences, every Man hath a Right ... to be allowed Counsel, . . .” In addition, Penn’s Charter, already referred to, was applicable in Delaware. The original Constitution of New Jersey of 1776 (Art. XVI) contained a provision like that of the Penn Charter, to the effect that all criminals should be admitted to the same privileges of counsel as their prosecutors. The original Constitution of North Carolina (1776) did not contain the guarantee, but c. 116, § 85, Sess. Laws, N. Car., 1777 (N. Car. Rev. Laws, 1715-1796, Vol. 1, 316), provided “. . . That every person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to council in all matters which may be necessary for his defence, as well to facts as to law; . . .” Similarly, in South Carolina the original Constitution of 1776 did not contain .the provision as to counsel, but it was provided as early as 1731 (Act of August 20, 1731, § XLIII, Grimke, S. Gar. Pub. Laws, 1682-1790, p. 130) that every person charged with treason, murder, felony, or other capital offense, should be admitted to make full defense by counsel learned -in the law. In Virginia there was no constitutional provision on the subject, but as early as August, 1734 (c. VII, .§ Ill, Laws of Va., 8th Geo. II, Hening’s Stat. at Large, Vol. 4, p. 404), there was an act declaring that in all trials for capital offenses the prisoner, upon his petition to the court, should be allowed counsel.

The original Constitution of Connecticut (Art. I, § 9) contained a provision that “ In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to be heard by himself and by counsel”; but this constitution was not adopted until 1818. However, it appears that the English common law rule had been rejected in practice long prior to 1796. See Zephaniah Swift’s “A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut,” printed at Windham by John *63Byrne, 1795-1796, Vol. II, Blc. 5, “ Of Crimes and Punishments,” c. XXIY, “ Of Trials,” pp. 398-399.*

The original Constitution of Georgia (1777) did not contain a guarantee in respect of counsel, but the Constitution of 1798 (Art. Ill, § 8) provided that “ ... no person shall be debarred from advocating or defending his cause before any court or tribunal, either by himself or counsel, or both.” What the practice was prior to 1798 we are unable to discover. The first constitution adopted by Rhode Island was in 1842, and this constitution contained the usual guarantee in respect of the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. As early as 1798 it was provided by statute, in the very language of the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, that “ In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence; *64...” An Act Declaratory of certain Rights of the People of this State, § 6, Rev. Pub. Laws, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1798. Furthermore, while the statute itself is not available, it is recorded as a matter of history that in 1668 or 1669 the colonial assembly enacted that any person who was indicted might employ an attorney to plead in his behalf. 1 Arnold, History of Rhode Island, 336.

It thus appears that in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all *65criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious crimes; and this court seems to have been of the opinion that this was true in all the colonies. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 386, Mr. Justice Brown, writing for the court, said:

“ The earlier practice of the common law, which denied the benefit of witnesses to a person accused of felony, had been abolished by statute, though so far as it deprived him of the assistance of counsel and compulsory process for the attendance of his witnesses, it had not been changed in England. But to the credit of her American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive a doctrine had never obtained a foothold there.”

One test which has been applied to determine whether due process of law has been accorded in given instances is to ascertain what were the settled usages and modes of proceeding under the common and statute law of England before the Declaration of Independence, subject, however, to the qualification that they be shown not to have been unsuited to the civil and political conditions of our ancestors by having been followed in this country after it became a nation. Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 85. Compare Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 276-277; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 100-101. Plainly, as appears from the foregoing, this test, as thus qualified, has not been met in the present case.

We do not overlook the case of Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, where this court determined that due process of law does not require an indictment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to prosecution by a state for murder. In support of that conclusion the court (pp. 534-535) referred to the fact that the Fifth Amendment, in addition to containing the due process of law clause, pro*66vides in explicit terms that “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, . . .”, and said that since no part of this important amendment could be regarded as superfluous, the obvious inference is that in the sense of the Constitution due process of law was not intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case; and that the same phrase, employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the action of the states, was to be interpreted as having been used in the same sense and with no greater extent; and that if it had been the purpose of that Amendment to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in the states, it would have embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, an express declaration to that effect.

The Sixth Amendment, in terms, provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the. right “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” In the face of the reasoning of the Hurtado case, if it stood alone, it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that the right to counsel, being thus specifically granted by the Sixth Amendment, was also within the intendment of the due process of law clause. But the Hurtado case does not stand alone. In the later case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241, this court held that a judgment of a state court, even though authorized by statute, by which private property was taken for public use without just compensation, was in violation of the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This holding was followed in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 277; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 524; and San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 754.

*67Likewise, this court has considered that freedom of speech and of the press are rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although in the First Amendment, Congress is prohibited in specific terms from abridging the right. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707.

These later cases establish that notwithstanding the sweeping character of the language in the Hurtado case, the rule laid down is not without exceptions. The rule is an aid to construction, and in some instances may be conclusive; but it must yield to more compelling considerations whenever such considerations exist. The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those “ fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions ” (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316), is obviously one of those compelling considerations which must prevail in determining whether it is embraced within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although it be specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution. Evidently this court, in the later cases enumerated, regarded the rights there under consideration as of this fundamental character. That some such distinction must be observed is foreshadowed in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99, where Mr. Justice Moody, speaking for the court, said that “ . . . it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226. If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in *68the conception of due process of law.” While the question has never been categorically determined by this court, a consideration of the nature of the right and a review of the expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.

It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. The words of Webster, so often quoted, that by “ the law of the land ” is intended “ a law which hears before it condemns,” have been repeated in varying forms of expression in a multitude of decisions. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389, the necessity of due notice and an opportunity of being heard is described as among the “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.” And Mr. Justice Field, in an earlier case, Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368-369, said that the rule that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court was as old as the law, and it meant that he must be cited to appear and afforded an opportunity to be heard. “ Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is justly administered.” Citations to the same effect might be indefinitely multiplied, but there is no occasion for doing so.

What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right *69to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.

The decisions all point to that conclusion. In Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 537, it was held that where a contempt was not in open court, due process of law required charges and a reasonable opportunity to defend or explain. The court added, “ We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, ...” In numerous other cases the court, in determining that due process was accorded, has frequently stressed the fact that the defendant had the aid of counsel. See, for example, Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 129; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 344; Kelley v. Oregon, 273 U. S. 589, 591. In Ex parte Hidekuni Iwata, 219 Fed. 610, 611, the federal dis*70trict judge enumerated among the elements necessary to due process of law in a deportation case the opportunity at some stage of the hearing to secure and have the advice and assistance of counsel. In Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, also a deportation case, the district judge held that under the particular circumstances of the case the prisoner, having seasonably made demand, was entitled to confer with and have the aid of counsel. Pointing to the fact that the right to counsel as secured by the Sixth Amendment relates only to criminal prosecutions, the judge said, “ . . . but it is equally true that that provision was inserted in the Constitution because the assistance of counsel was recognized as essential to any fair trial of a case against a prisoner.” In Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404, 418, a case involving the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court said, by way of illustration, that if the state should deprive a person of the benefit of counsel, it would not be due process of law. Judge Cooley refers to the right of a person accused of crime to have counsel as perhaps his most important privilege, and after discussing the development of the English law upon that subject, says:' “ With us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defense by counsel.” 1 Cooley’s Const. Lim., 8th ed., 700. The same author, as appears from a chapter which he added to his edition of Story on the Constitution, regarded the right of the accused to the presence, advice and assistance of counsel as necessarily included in due process of law. 2 Story on the Constitution, 4th ed., § 1949, p. 668. The state decisions which refer to the matter, invariably recognize the right to the aid of counsel as fundamental in character. E. g., People v. Napthaly, 105 Cal. 641, 644; 39 Pac. 29; Cutts v. State, 54 Fla. 21, 23; 45 So. 491; Martin v. State, 51 Ga. 567, 568; Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 464; 141 S. E. 196; State v. Moore, 61 Kan. 732, 734; 60 Pac. 748; *71State v. Ferris, 16 La. Ann. 424; State v. Simpson, 38 La. Ann. 23, 24; State v. Briggs, 58 W. Va. 291, 292; 52 S. E. 218.

In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion — the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives — we think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.

But passing that, and assuming their inability, even if opportunity had been given, to employ counsel, as the trial court evidently did assume, we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, “that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which *72no member of the Union may disregard.” Holden v. Hardy, supra. In a case such as this, whatever may be the rule in other cases, the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel. Compare Carpenter & Sprague v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274; Dane County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 586. Hendryx v. State, 130 Ind. 265, 268-269; 29 N. E. 1131; Cutts v. State, 54 Ma. 21, 23; 45 So. 491; People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 344; 19 Pac. 161; Delk v. State, 99 Ga. 667, 669-670; 26 S. E. 752.

In Hendryx v. State, supra, there was no statute authorizing the assignment of an attorney to defend an indigent person accused of crime, but the court held that such an assignment was necessary to accomplish the ends of public justice, and that the court possessed the inherent power to make it. “Where a prisoner,” the court said (p. 269), “ without legal knowledge, is confined in jail, absent from his friends, without the aid of legal advice or the means of investigating the charge against him, it is impossible to conceive of a fair trial where he is compelled to conduct his cause in court, without the aid of counsel. . . . Such a trial is not far removed from an ex parte proceeding.”

Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner charged with a capital offense, who is deaf and dumb, illiterate and feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, with the whole power of the state arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for the state without assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death. Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little short of judicial murder, it cannot be doubted would be a gross violation of the guarantee of due process of law; and we venture to think that no appellate court, state or federal, would hesitate so to decide. See Stephenson v. State, 4 Ohio App. 128; Williams v. State, 163 Ark. 623, *73628; 260 S. W. 721; Grogan v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 484, 485; 1 S. W. (2d) 779; Mullen v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 218, 230; 230 Pac. 285; Williams v. Commonwealth, (Ky.), 110 S. W. 339, 340. The duty of the trial court to appoint counsel under such circumstances is clear, as it is clear under circumstances such as are disclosed by the record here; and its power to do so, even in the absence of a statute, can not be questioned. Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an appointment. See Cooley, Const. Lim., supra, 700 and note.

The United States by statute and every state in the Union by express provision of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that right.

The judgments must be reversed and the causes remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Judgments reversed.

Mr. Justice Butler,

dissenting.

The Court, putting aside — they are utterly without merit — all other claims that the constitutional rights of petitioners were infringed, grounds its opinion and judgment upon a single assertion of fact. It is that petitioners “were denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation ,and opportunity of preparation for trial.” If that is true, they were denied due process *74of law and are entitled to have the judgments against them reversed.

But no such denial is shown by the record.

Nine defendants including Patterson were accused in one indictment, and he was also separately indicted. Instead of trying them en masse, the State gave four trials and so lessened the danger of mistake and injustice that inevitably attends an attempt in a single trial to ascertain the guilt or innocence of many accused. Weems and Norris were tried first. Patterson was tried next on the separate indictment. Then five were tried. These eight were found guilty. The other defendant, Roy Wright, was tried last and not convicted. The convicted defendants took the three cases to the state supreme court where the judgment as to Williams was reversed and those against the seven petitioners were affirmed.

There were three painstaking opinions, a different justice writing for the court in each case. 224 Ala. 524, 531, 540; 141 So. 215, 195, 201. Many of the numerous questions decided were raised at the trial and reflect upon defendants’ counsel much credit for zeal and diligence on behalf of their clients. Seven justices heard the cases. The chief justice, alone dissenting, did not find any contention for the. accused sufficient in itself to warrant a reversal but alluded to a number of considerations which he deemed sufficient when taken together to warrant the conclusion that the defendants did not have a fair trial. The court said (p. 553): “ We think it a bit inaccurate to say Mr. Roddy appeared only as amicus curiae. [This refers to a remark in the dissenting opinion.] He expressly announced he was there from the beginning at the instance of friends of the accused; but not being paid counsel asked to appear not as employed counsel, but to aid local counsel appointed by the court, and was permitted so to appear. The defendants were represented as shown by the record and pursuant to appointment of the *75court by Hon. Milo Moody, an able member of the local bar of long and successful experience in the trial of criminal as well as civil cases. We do not regard the representation of the accused by counsel as pro forma. A very rigorous and rigid cross-examination was made of the state’s witnesses,- the alleged victims of rape, especially in the cases first tried. A reading of the records discloses why experienced counsel would not travel over all the same ground in each case.”

The informality disclosed by the colloquy between court and counsel, which is quoted in the opinion of this Court and so heavily leaned on, is not entitled to any weight. It must be inferred from the record that Mr. Roddy at all times was in touch with the defendants and the people who procured him to act for them. Mr. Moody and others of the local bar also acted for defendants at the time of the first arraignment and, as appears from the part of the record that is quoted in the opinion, thereafter proceeded in the discharge of their duty, including conferences with the defendants. There is not the slightest ground to suppose that Roddy or Moody were by fear or in any manner restrained from full performance of their duties. Indeed, it clearly appears that the State, by proper and adequate show of its purpose and power to preserve order, furnished adequate protection to them and the defendants.

When the first case was called for trial, defendants’ attorneys had already prepared, and then submitted, a motion for change of venue together with supporting papers. They were ready to and did at once introduce testimony of witnesses to sustain that demand. They had procured and were ready to offer evidence to show that the defendants Roy Wright and Eugene Williams- were under age. The record shows that the State’s evidence was ample to warrant a conviction. And three defendants each, while asserting his own innocence, testified that he *76saw others accused commit the crime charged. When regard is had to these and other disclosures that may have been and probably were made by petitioners to Roddy and Moody before the trial, it would be difficult to think of anything that counsel erroneously did or omitted for their defense.

If there had been any lack of opportunity for preparation, trial counsel would have applied to the court for postponement. No such application was made. There was no suggestion, at the trial or in the motion for a new trial which they made, that Mr. Roddy or Mr. Moody was denied such opportunity or that they were not in fact fully prepared. The amended motion for new trial, by counsel who succeeded them, contains the first suggestion that defendants were denied counsel or opportunity to prepare for trial. But neither Mr. Roddy nor Mr.' Moody has given any support to that claim. Their silence requires a finding that the claim is groundless, for if it had any merit they would be bound to support it. And no one has come to suggest any lack of zeal or good faith on their part.

If correct, the ruling that the failure of the trial court to give petitioners time and opportunity to secure counsel was denial of due process is enough, and with this the opinion should end. But the Court goes on to declare that “ the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” This is an extension of federal authority into a field hitherto occupied exclusively by the several States. Nothing before the Court calls for a consideration of the point. It was not suggested below, and petitioners do not ask for its 'decision here. The Court, without being called upon to consider it, adjudges without a hearing an important constitutional question concerning criminal procedure in state courts.

*77It is a wise rule, firmly established by a long course of decisions here, that constitutional questions — even when properly raised and argued — are to be decided only when necessary for a determination of the rights of the parties in controversy before it. Thus, in the Charles River Bridge case, 11 Pet. 420, the Court said (p. 553): “ Many other questions, of the deepest importance, have been raised and elaborately discussed in the argument. It is not necessary, for the decision of this case, to express our opinion upon them; and the Court deem it proper to avoid volunteering an opinion on any question involving the construction of the constitution where the case itself does not bring the question directly before them, and make it their duty to decide upon it.” And see Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 103, et seq. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 490. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 279. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 544.

The record wholly fails to reveal that petitioners have been deprived of any right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and I am of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds concurs in this opinion.

Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, together with Anthony Horton and Louis Kaplan, were found guilty upon an indictment charging them with a conspiracy to defraud the United States, under § 37 of the Criminal Code (R. S. § 5440; 18 U. S. C. § 88).1 Judgment was entered on the verdict and Glasser, Kretske and Kaplan were sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 14 months. Roth was ordered to pay a fine of $500, and Horton was placed on probation. On appeal the convictions of Glasser, Kretske and Roth were affirmed.2 We brought the case here because of the important constitutional issues involved. 313 U. S. 551.

Glasser was the assistant United States attorney in charge of liquor cases in the Northern District of Illinois from about March 1935 to April 1939. Kretske was an assistant United States attorney in the same district from October 1934 until April 1937. He assisted Glasser in the prosecution of liquor cases. After his resignation he entered private practice in Chicago. Roth was an attorney in private practice. Kaplan was an automobile dealer reputed to be engaged in the illicit alcohol traffic around Chicago. Horton was a professional bondsman.

The indictment was originally in two counts, but only the second survives here, as the Government elected to *64proceed on that count alone at the close of its case. That count, after alleging that during certain periods Glasser and Kretske were assistant United States attorneys for the Northern District of Illinois, employed to prosecute all delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, and more particularly violations of the federal internal revenue laws relating to liquor, charged in substance that the defendants conspired to “defraud the United States of and concerning its governmental function to be honestly, faithfully and dutifully represented in the courts of the United States” in such matters “free from corruption, improper influence, dishonesty, or fraud.” The means by which the conspiracy was to be accomplished was alleged to be by the defendants’ soliciting certain persons charged, or about to be charged, with violating the laws of the United States, to promise or cause to be promised certain sums to be paid or pledged to the defendants, to be used to corrupt and influence the defendants Glasser and Kretske, and the defendant Glasser alone, in the performance of their and his official duties.

All the defendants filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground (a) that the grand jury was illegally constituted because women were excluded therefrom and (b) that the indictment was not properly returned in open court. Glasser, Kretske and Roth also filed demurrers to the indictment. The motion to quash and the demurrers were overruled, and petitioners here renew their objections.

On July 1,1939, two Acts of the State of Illinois providing for women jurors became effective.3 Section 275 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. § 411) provides in substance that jurors in a federal court are to have the qualifications of jurors in the highest court of the State. Petitioners *65contend that the grand jury, composed entirely of men, and summoned on August 25, 1939, was illegally constituted because, at the time it was drawn, Illinois law required state jury lists to contain the names of women. However, in 17 of the 18 counties comprising the Northern District of Illinois the county boards could wait until September, 1939, to include women on their jury lists.4 Of course, for women to serve as federal jurors in Illinois it is not necessary that their names appear on a county list, but we are of opinion that, in view of the short time elapsing between the effective date of the Illinois Acts and the summoning of the grand jury, it was not error to omit the names of women from federal jury lists, where it was not shown that women’s names had yet appeared on the state jury lists.

The record here adequately disposes of petitioners’ contention that there is no showing that the indictment was returned ‘in open court by the grand jury. It contains a placitum in regular form which recites the convening of a regular term of the District Court for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois, “on the first Monday of September [1939] (it being the twenty-ninth day of September the indictment was filed),” and discloses the presence of the judges of that court, the marshal and the clerk. The indictment bears the notation: “A true bill, George A. Hancock, Foreman”, and the endorsement: “Filed in open court this 29th day of Sept., *66A. D. 1939, Hoyt King, Clerk.” Immediately following the indictment in the record is the motion-slip discharging the September grand jury, dated September 29, 1939, initialled by Judge Wilkerson and containing: “The Grand Jury return 4 Indictments in open Court. Added 10/30/39.” The presence of this notation in the record is meaningless unless the indictment in this case is one of the four mentioned. The addition was obviously made to clarify the indorsement of the clerk so as to show clearly the return by the grand jury and thus avert the technical argument here advanced. While a formal nunc pro tunc order would have been the more correct procedure, especially since a new term of court had begun, we do not think that this informal clarification of the record amounts to such error as requires reversal. Cf. Breese v. United States, 226 U. S. 1.

The demurrers to the indictment were properly overruled. The indictment is sufficiently definite to inform petitioners of the charges against them. It shows “certainty, to a common intent.” Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 447. The particularity of time, place, circumstances, causes, etc., in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of a conspiracy, for which petitioners contend, is not essential to an indictment. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539. Such specificity of detail falls rather within the scope of a bill of particulars, which petitioners requested and received.

The indictment charges that the United States was defrauded by depriving it of its lawful governmental functions by dishonest means; it is settled that this is a “defrauding” within the meaning of § 37 of the Criminal Code. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182.

It is unnecessary to explore the merits of the argument that the indictment is defective on the ground that it *67charges a conspiracy to commit a substantive offense requiring concerted action, namely, bribery, because, “The indictment does not charge as a substantive offense the giving or receiving of bribes; nor does it charge a conspiracy to give or accept bribes. It charges a conspiracy to . . . defraud the United States, the scheme of resorting to bribery being averred only to be a way of consummating the conspiracy and which, like the use of a gun to effect a conspiracy to murder, is purely ancillary to the substantive offense.” United States v. Manton, 107 F. 2d 834, 839.

Petitioners Glasser and Roth claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Kretske makes no such argument but merely contends that the Government’s testimony was largely that of accomplices “to emphasize the inescapable conclusion that the evidence against petitioner (Kretske) was of a borderline character.” Since we are of opinion that a new trial must be ordered as to Glasser, we do not at this time feel that it is proper to comment on the sufficiency of the evidence against Glasser.

Admittedly, the case against Glasser is not a strong one. The Government frankly concedes that the case with respect to Glasser “depends in large part . . . upon a development and collocation of circumstances tending to sustain the inferences necessary to support the verdict.” This is significant in relation to Glasser’s contention that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel contrary to the Sixth Amendment. In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be jealously preserved for the benefit of the accused, but especially is this true where the scales of justice may be delicately poised between guilt and innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances would not be ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since there is a real chance that it might have provided the slight impetus which swung the scales toward guilt.

*68On November 1, 1939, George Callaghan entered the appearance of himself and Glasser as attorneys for Glasser. On January 29, 1940, William Scott Stewart entered his appearance as associate counsel for Glasser. “Harrington & McDonnell” had entered an appearance for Kretske. On February 5, 1940, the day set for trial, Harrington asked for a continuance. The motion was overruled and McDonnell was appointed Kretske’s attorney. On February 6, McDonnell informed the court that Kretske did not wish to be represented by him. The court then asked if Stewart could act as Kretske’s attorney. The following discussion then took place:

“Mr. Stewart: May I make this statement about that, judge? We were talking about it — we were all trying to get along together. I filed an affidavit, or I did on the behalf of Mr. Glasser pointing out some little inconsistency in the defense, and the main part of it is this: There will be conversations here where Mr. Glasser wasn’t present, where people have seen Mr. Kretske and they have talked about, that they gave money to take care of Glasser, that is not binding on Mr. Glasser, and there is a divergency there, and Mr. Glasser feels that if I would represent Mr. Kretske the jury would get an idea that they are together, and all the evidence—

“The Court: How would it be if I appointed you as attorney for Kretske?

“Mr. Stewart: That would be for your Honor to decide.

“The Court: I know you are looking out for every possible legitimate defense there is. Now, if the jury understood that while you were retained by Mr. Glasser the Court appointed you at this late hour to represent Kretske, what would be the effect of the jury on that?

“Mr. Stewart: Your Honor could judge that as well as I could.

*69“The Court: I think it would be favorable to the defendant Kretske.

“Mr. Glasser: I think it would be too, if he had Mr. Stewart. That’s the reason. I got Mr. Stewart, but if a defendant who has a lawyer representing him is allowed to enter an objection, I would like to enter my objection. I would like to have my own lawyer representing me.

“The Court: Mr. McDonnell, you will have to stay in it until Mr. Kretske gets another lawyer, if he isn’t satisfied with you.

“(To Mr. Kretske) Mr. Kretske, if you are not satisfied with Mr. McDonnell, you will have to hire another lawyer. We will proceed with the selection of the jury now.”

A colloquy then ensued between the court, McDonnell and Kretske when the following occurred:

“Mr. Kretske: I can end this. I just spoke to Mr. Stewart and he said if your Honor wishes to appoint him I think we can accept the appointment.

“Mr. Stewart: As long as the Court knows the situation. I think there is something to the fact that the jury knows we can’t control that.

“Mr. McDonnell: Then the order is vacated?

“The Court: The order appointing Mr. McDonnell is vacated and Mr. Stewart is appointed attorney for Mr. Kretske.”

Glasser remained silent. Stewart thereafter represented Glasser and Kretske throughout the trial and was the most active of the array of defense counsel.

The guarantees of the Bill of Rights are the protecting bulwarks against the reach of arbitrary power. Among those guarantees is the right granted by the Sixth Amendment to an accused in a criminal proceeding in a federal court “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” “This is one of the safeguards deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty,” and a *70federal court cannot constitutionally deprive an accused, whose life or liberty is at stake, of the assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462, 463. Even as we have held that the right to the assistance of counsel is so fundamental that the denial by a state court of a reasonable time to allow the selection of counsel of one’s own choosing, and the failure of that court to make an effective appointment of counsel, may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, so are we clear that the “assistance of counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel means less than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired.

To preserve the protection of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, we indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S. 389; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292. Glasser never affirmatively waived the objection which he initially advanced when the trial court suggested the appointment of Stewart. We are told that, since Glasser was an experienced attorney, he tacitly acquiesced in Stewart’s appointment because he failed to renew vigorously his objection at the instant the appointment was made. The fact that Glasser is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the protection of the Sixth Amendment. His professional experience may be a factor in determining whether he actually waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464. But it is by no means conclusive.

*71Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. Speaking of the obligation of the trial court to preserve the right to jury trial for an accused, Mr. Justice Sutherland said that such duty “is not to be discharged as a matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.” Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 312-313. The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel.' “This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465.

No such concern on the part of the trial court for the basic rights of Glasser is disclosed by the record before us. The possibility of the inconsistent interests of Glasser and Kretske was brought home to the court, but instead of jealously guarding Glasser’s rights, the court may fairly be said to be responsible for creating a situation which resulted in the impairment of those rights. For the manner in which the parties accepted the appointment indicates that they thought they were acceding to the wishes of the court. Kretske said the appointment could be accepted “if your Honor wishes to appoint him [Stewart],” and Stewart immediately replied: “As long as the Court knows the situation. I think there is something in the fact that the jury knows we can’t control that.” The court made no effort to reascertain Glasser’s attitude or *72wishes. Under these circumstances, to hold that Glasser freely, albeit tacitly, acquiesced in the appointment of Stewart is to do violence to reality and to condone a dangerous laxity on the part of the trial court in the discharge of its duty to preserve the fundamental rights of an accused.

Glasser urges that the court’s appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske embarrassed and inhibited Stewart’s conduct of his defense, in that it prevented Stewart from adequately safeguarding Glasser’s right to have incompetent evidence excluded and from fully cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution.

One Brantman, an accountant known to Kretske and recommended professionally by him to a client, testified that he gave Kretske $3000 on behalf of one Abosketes. He further testified that he did not know Glasser. Stewart secured a postponement of cross-examination for “In view of the fact that your Honor appointed me for Mr. Kretske, I am not prepared to cross-examine.”

Abosketes took the stand immediately after Brantman and testified that Brantman told him that he was about to be indicted and offered to “fix” the case with someone in the Federal Building for $5000. About the time of this meeting, Glasser and investigator Bailey were questioning one Brown, who had been convicted for operating a still, to determine whether Abosketes was connected with that still. Abosketes referred frequently to Glasser in his testimony and indicated that Glasser and Brantman were linked together. Thus he testified that Brantman told him “They have got the goods on you, Mr. Glasser has got it out of Brown.” When questioned as to his knowledge of Brantman’s connections, Abosketes replied: “There was more than a fix, if indictment was stopped. He [Brantman] knows Mr. Glasser and that was all there was to it.” And, later: “He had connections to stop things like that, he had connections in the Federal Build*73ing.” And, again: “I could not be sure that this man [Brantman] was not putting a shake on me and be honest about it. I could not go over and ask Mr. Glasser if Mr. Brantman was able to fix him. I thought Brantman could, though. I was kind of hoping he could. If I did not think he could, I would not have given him the money.”

Brantman was re-called three days later. Stewart declined cross-examination. That this decision was influenced by a desire to protect Kretske can reasonably be inferred from the colloquy between the court and Stewart before sentence was imposed. At that time Stewart told the court that, lest his failure to cross-examine Brantman reflect on Kretske, the reason for his forbearance was that he feared that Brantman would tell worse lies. But, especially after the intervening testimony of Abosketes, a thorough cross-examination was indicated in Glasser’s interest to fully develop Brantman’s lack of reference to, or knowledge of Glasser. Stewart’s failure to undertake such a cross-examination luminates the cross-purposes under which he was laboring.

Glasser also argues that certain testimony, inadmissible as to him, was allowed without objection by Stewart on his behalf because of Stewart’s desire to avoid prejudice to Kretske. The testimony complained of is that of Elmer Swanson, Frank Hodorowicz, Edward Dewes, and Stanley Wasielewski as to statements made by Kretske, not in the presence of Glasser, and heard by them which implicated Glasser. Glasser has red hair, and the statements made by Kretske were that he would have to see “Red,” or send the money over to the “red-head,” etc., in connection with “fixing” cases.5

Glasser contends that such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay as to him and that Stewart forewent *74this obvious objection lest an objection on behalf of Glasser alone leave with the jury the impression that the testimony was true as to Kretske. The Government attacks this argument as unsound, and, relying on the doctrine that the declarations of one conspirator in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy made to a third party are admissible against his co-conspirators, Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, contends that the declarations of Kretske were admissible against Glasser and hence no prejudice could arise from Stewart’s failure to object. However, such declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. Minner v. United States, 57 F. 2d 506; and see Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426. *75Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.

Glasser urges that, independently of the statements complained of, there is no proof connecting him with the conspiracy. Clearly the statements were damaging. Other evidence tending to connect Glasser with the conspiracy is rather meagre by comparison. Frank Hodorowiez testified that Glasser apologized to him after his indictment because he, Glasser, could do nothing for Hodorowiez. Hodorowiez also testified that he sent a case of whiskey to Glasser for Christmas, 1937. Victor Raubunas testified that he saw Glasser, Kretske and Kaplan meet on three occasions. An alcohol agent, Dowd, testified that Glasser expelled him from the court-room during the trial of a libel case in which Roth represented the successful claimant. Glasser released Raubunas and one Joppek, who were picked up on different occasions for suspected liquor violations, without extensive questioning. Whether testimony such as this was sufficient to establish the participation of Glasser in the conspiracy we need not decide. That is beside the point. The important fact is that no objection was offered by Stewart on Glasser’s behalf to the statements complained of, and this despite the fact that, when the court broached the possibility of Stewart’s appointment, Stewart told the court that statements of this nature were not binding on Glasser. That this is indicative of Stewart’s struggle to serve two masters cannot seriously be doubted.

There is yet another consideration. Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an accused should be respected. Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing another party may conceivably impair counsel’s effectiveness.

To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court’s appointment of *76Stewart as counsel for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 116; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535; Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 292. And see McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342, 347. Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first client, when the possibility of that divergence is brought home to the court. In conspiracy eases, where the liberal rules of evidence and the wide latitude accorded the prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate unfairly against an individual defendant, it is especially important that he be given the benefit of the undivided assistance of his counsel without the court’s becoming a party to encumbering that assistance. Here the court was advised of the possibility that conflicting interests might arise which would diminish Stewart’s usefulness to Glasser. Nevertheless Stewart was appointed as Kretske’s counsel. Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that Stewart’s representation of Glasser was not as effective as it might have been if the appointment had not been made. We hold that the court thereby denied Glasser his right to have the effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This error requires that the verdict be set aside and a new trial ordered as to Glasser.

But this error does not require that the convictions of the other petitioners be set aside. To secure a new trial they must show that the denial of Glasser’s constitutional rights prejudiced them in some manner, for where error *77as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that a new trial be granted him, the rights of his co-defendants to a new trial depend upon whether that error prejudiced them. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150; Rossi v. United States, 278 F. 349; Belfi v. United States, 259 F. 822; Browne v. United States, 145 F. 1; Dufour v. United States, 37 App. D. C. 497. Kretske does not contend that he was prejudiced by the appointment, and we are clear from the record that no prejudice is disclosed as to him. Roth argues the point, but he was represented throughout the case by his own attorney. We fail to see that the denial of Glasser’s right to have the assistance of counsel affected Roth.

Turning now to the contentions of Kretske and Roth, we are clear that substantial evidence supports the verdict against both. As noted before, Kretske does not raise the point other than to mention that the testimony against him was largely that of accomplices and unsavory characters. The short answer to this is that the credibility of a witness is a question for the jury.

The evidence against Roth discloses the following salient facts. Elmer Swanson, Clem Dowiat and Anthony Hodorowiez were arrested in connection with a still on Stony Island Avenue. Frank Hodorowiez, the head of the Hodorowiez crowd, arranged a meeting with Kretske at his hardware store to “take care” of the case. Horton was present and Kretske told the group that there “was a lot of heat” on the case but that it could be arranged so that nobody “would go to jail” for $1200, part of which “Red” was to get. A down payment of $500 was made. When a lawyer was sought, Kretske referred the prospective defendants to Roth. He represented them at the hearing before the Commissioner, which was continued at the request of Glasser. After an indictment was returned, Roth appeared for trial to find that the case had *78been stricken from the docket with leave to reinstate it. The defendants were never brought to trial. None of the Hodorowiczes or their associates paid Roth for his services. Roth testified that he received his fee from Kretske.

In June 1938, Glasser secured two indictments, one against Frank, Mike, and Peter Hodorowicz and Clem Dowiat, and the other against Frank and Peter Hodorowicz and Dowiat, for the sale of illicit alcohol. Frank paid Kretske $250 after the indictments. Kretske later told him that nothing could be done, as investigator Bailey was pressing Glasser. Frank then went to see Roth, who with Kretske went to see Glasser. Roth later told Frank that nothing could be done and suggested that he get an attorney and prepare to defend himself. Roth’s explanation of this was that he went to Glasser to learn the latter’s attitude toward clemency for Frank, and that he suggested the retention of two lawyers, one to defend Frank, and the other to represent the remaining defendants. Frank dispensed with Roth’s services and was represented at the trial by one Hess. Frank paid Roth $50, but this was in connection with substituting some securities on his bond.

Edward Dewes had been associated with the defendant Kaplan in a still at Spring Grove. That case was twice presented to a grand jury by Glasser but withdrawn on each occasion. Two days before it was presented a third time, the defendant Horton told Dewes that Kretske wished to see him. Dewes went to Kretske’s office and paid him $100 so that he would not be indicted. Dewes was no-billed in that case. Dewes was also involved in a still on the farm of one Beisner. It was raided and several were arrested. Dewes, Victor Raubunas and Edward Farber asked Horton to “fix” that case, but when his price was thought too high, Farber, who had known Kretske for some time, took Dewes and Raubunas to Kretske’s *79office. Kretske offered to take care of the case for $1200. Raubunas paid $300 and they were told they would need no lawyer at the preliminary hearing. Eventually Raubunas, Dewes and Beisner were indicted. Dewes thereafter paid Kretske $275 to “fix” his case. Kretske referred the matter to Roth, who represented Dewes throughout his trial. Dewes testified that he neither retained,nor paid Roth.

Paul Svec, an associate of one Yarrio, was arrested in 1937 for a liquor violation. Horton arranged his bond. In Svee’s presence Horton .picked up Kretske and Yarrio. They told Svec not to worry. He was thereafter indicted and convicted. While at liberty pending an appeal, he was again arrested. This time hé called Glasser, and according to the latter, offered him money. The following morning Glasser interrogated Svec in the hearing of a secreted agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and secured admissions that Svec had never paid Glasser money or received any promises from him, and that the call had been at the instigation of the arresting investigators. Svec testified that Roth told him that he “stood up o. k.” under Glasser’s questioning. Svec was discharged at the Commissioner’s hearing.

Glasser prosecuted Leo Vitale for the operation of a still. He was convicted and received a sentence of one hour in the custody of the marshal. Vitale’s wife, Rose, was the claimant in a subsequent libel action against a car allegedly used to transport illicit liquor. The case was referred to Roth by Kretske. Roth informed the court that Vitale was “o. k.” and that the car was not used for illegal purposes. As was the custom, the case was .tried on the agent’s report. It was dismissed. Investigator Dowd later informed Glasser that he had heard that Vitale had boasted that “he got out of this for nine hundred dollars.”

In April 1938, Edward and William Wroblewski were indicted in the Northern District of Indiana, They en*80gaged Roth as their counsel. They did not remember how they met Roth. When asked by the court if anyone recommended Roth to him, Edward answered: “No, sir, I don't remember whether it was a rumor about his name.” According to Alexander Campbell, an assistant United States attorney in that district, Roth appeared in his office in September 1938 and asked if the Wroblewskis had been indicted. Campbell replied that he did not know off-hand but would check the files. Roth then asked, if the files showed no indictment, whether some arrangement could be made so that no indictment would be returned. He offered Campbell $500 or $1000. When Campbell refused, Roth said: “Well, that is the way we handle cases in Chicago sometimes.” The Wroblewskis were convicted. Subsequently, Roth asked Campbell to use his influence to stop the investigation in Chicago by Bailey which resulted in the instant case.

It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. United States v. Manton, 107 F. 2d 834, 839, and cases cited. Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a “development and a collocation of circumstances.” United States v. Manton, supra. We are clear that, from the circumstances outlined above, the jury could infer the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of Roth in it. Roth's statements to Campbell in the Wroblewski matter, his suggestion to Frank Hodorowicz that he should get a lawyer and prepare to defend himself when the case could not be “fixed,” the fact that he received no fees from the Hodorowiczes with the exception of $50 in connection with Frank’s bond, Dewes’ testimony that he neither retained nor paid Roth, Roth’s commendation of Svec’s bearing under Glasser’s *81interrogation, all furnish the necessary support for the jury’s verdict.

The objections of Kretske and Roth with regard to the admission of certain evidence are without merit. The reports of investigators of the Alcohol Tax Unit on stills at Western Avenue and at Spring Grove, operated by the defendant Kaplan and his associates, were admitted as Government exhibits 81A and 113. Each contained statements taken from prospective witnesses by the investigators, and each gave a description of the prospective defendants. Kaplan was referred to as of Jewish descent, a bootlegger by reputation, and mention was made of the arrest of Kaplan and Edward Dewes in connection with the killing of one Pinna. At the time each report was admitted the trial judge informed the jury that it was admitted only against Glasser and continued: “At some further stage of the proceedings I may advise you with reference to its competency as to the other defendants, but for the time being it will be admissible only against the defendant Glasser.” The record before us contains no indication that the jury was later informed that the exhibits were evidence against the defendants other than Glasser. The claim of Kretske and Roth, that the admission of these reports was prejudicial to Kaplan and that they are entitled to take advantage of that error, ignores the fact that they were admitted against Glasser alone.

No reversible error was committed by overruling objections to the testimony of Alexander Campbell with relation to his dealings with Roth. Trial judges have a measure of discretion in allowing testimony which discloses the purpose, knowledge, or design of a particular person. Butler v. United States, 53 F. 2d 800; Simpkins v. United States, 78 F. 2d 594, 598. We do not think the bounds of that discretion were exceeded here. The statements of Roth were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but they *82did tend to connect Roth with it by explaining his state of mind.

The judge conducting a jury trial in a federal court is “not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct.” Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 469. Upon him rests the responsibility of striving for that atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding. Petitioners contend that the trial judge made remarks prejudicial to them, committed acts of advocacy, questioned them in a hostile manner, unduly limited cross-examination, and in general failed to maintain an impartial attitude. Various incidents in support of those contentions are brought to our attention.

The court did interrogate several witnesses, but in the main such interrogation was within its power to elicit the truth by an examination of the witnesses. United States v. Gross, 103 F. 2d 11; United States v. Breen, 96 F. 2d 782. In asking Anthony Hodorowicz whether there had been a full disclosure of his connection with the Stony Island still when he appeared before Judge Woodward, the court obviously was under a misapprehension of the nature of the appearance. It was simply for the purpose of arraignment, and of course no testimony was offered. Much is made of this, but at the time no one attempted to explain to the court the nature of the appearance. Stewart later brought out on cross-examination that it was only an arraignment and that there was no necessity for testimony on that day.

After the testimony of Abosketes, the court read into the record the fact that Abosketes was indicted in Wisconsin in 1936 and 1938, and that he pleaded guilty to one indictment and that the other was dismissed. It is, of course, improper for a judge to assume the role of a witness, but we cannot here conclude that prejudicial error *83resulted. Abosketes had briefly referred to his troubles in Wisconsin in his testimony.

The alleged undue limitation of cross-examination merits scant attention. The extent of such examination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687. We find no abuse of that discretion.

Perhaps the court did not attain at all times that thoroughgoing impartiality which is the ideal, but our examination of the record as a whole leads to the conclusion that the substantial rights of the petitioners were not affected. The trial was long and the incidents relied on by petitioners few. We must guard against the magnification on appeal of instances which were of little importance in their setting. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 240; Goldstein v. United States, 63 F. 2d 609; United States v. Warren, 120 F. 2d 211.

Separate consideration of the numerous instances of alleged prejudicial misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney would unduly extend this opinion. Suffice it to say, that after due consideration we conclude that no one instance, nor the combination of them all, constitutes reversible error.

All the petitioners contend that they were denied an impartial trial because of the alleged exclusion from the petit jury panel of all women not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. In support of their motions for a new trial, Glasser and'Roth filed affidavits which are the basis of petitioners’ present contentions. Kretske did not file an affidavit, but he urges the point here.

Glasser swore on information and belief that all the names of women placed in the box from which the panel was drawn were taken from a list furnished the clerk of the court by the Illinois League of Women Voters, and pre*84pared exclusively from its membership, that the women on that list had attended “jury classes whose lecturers presented the views of the prosecution,” and that women not members of the League, but otherwise qualified, were systematically excluded, by reason of which affiant “did not have a trial by a jury free from bias, prejudice, and prior instructions, and as a result thereof the jury was disqualified and this affiant’s rights were prejudiced in that he was deprived of a trial by jury guaranteed to him by the laws and the constitution of the United States of America, and particularly the 5th and 6th amendment, all of which he offers to prove.” The source of Glasser’s information was stated to be a then current article, “Women and the Law,” in the American Bar Association Journal for April 1940 (Yol. 26, No. 4). Roth’s affidavit merely gave Glasser as his source of information and made no offer of proof. The court overruled the motions for a new trial. The record discloses that the jury was composed of six men and six women.

Since it was first recognized in Magna Carta, trial by jury has been a prized shield against oppression, but, while proclaiming trial by jury as “the glory of the English law,” Blackstone was careful to note that it was but a “privilege.” Commentaries, Book 3, p. 379. Our Constitution transforms that privilege into a right in criminal proceedings in a federal court. This was recognized by Justice Story: “When our more immediate ancestors removed to America, they brought this great privilege [trial by jury in criminal cases] with them, as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced round and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power. It is now incorporated into all our State constitutions as a fundamental right, and the Constitution of the United States would have been justly obnoxious to the most conclusive *85objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it on the most solemn terms.” 2 Story, Const. § 1779.

Lest the right of trial by jury be nullified by the improper constitution of juries, the notion of what a proper jury is has become inextricably intertwined with the idea of jury trial. When the original Constitution provided only that “The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,” 6 the people and their representatives, leaving nothing to chance, were quick to implement that guarantee by the adoption of the Sixth Amendment which provides that the jury must be impartial.

For the mechanics of trial by jury we revert to the common law as it existed in this country and in England when the Constitution was adopted. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276. But even as jury trial, which was a privilege at common law, has become a right with us, so also, whatever limitations were inherent in the historical common law concept of the jury as a body of one’s peers do not prevail in this country. Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. For “It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130.

Jurors in a federal court are to have the qualifications of those in the highest court of the State, and they are to be selected by the clerk of the court and a jury commissioner. §§ 275, 276 Jud. Code; 28 U. S. C. §§ 411, 412. This duty of selection may not be delegated. United States v. Murphy, 224 F. 554; In re Petition For Special Grand Jury, 50 F. 2d 973. And, its exercise must always *86accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a “body truly representative of the community,” and not the organ of any special group or class. If that requirement is observed, the officials charged with choosing federal jurors may exercise some discretion to the end that competent jurors may be called. But they must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community. Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. Steps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.

The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial. No matter how high-principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such a method of selection are the more real when the members of those organizations, from training or otherwise, acquire a bias in favor of the prosecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addition, it is also openly partisan. If such practices are to be countenanced, the hard-won right of trial by jury becomes a thing of doubtful value, lacking one of the essential characteristics that have made it a cherished feature of our institutions.

*87So, if the picture in this case actually is as alleged in Glasser’s affidavit, we would be compelled to set aside the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial as a clear abuse of discretion, and order a new trial for all the petitioners. But from the record before us we must conclude that petitioners’ showing is insufficient. The Government did not controvert the affidavits by counter-affidavits or formal denial, and it does not appear from the record that any argument was heard on them. From this, petitioners argue that the allegations of the affidavits are to be taken as true for the purpose of the motion. However, this is not a case where the prosecution has impliedly, Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, or actually, Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613, stipulated that affidavits in support of a motion alleging the improper constitution of a jury may be accepted as proof. In the absence of such a stipulation, it is incumbent on the moving party to introduce, or to offer, distinct evidence in support of the motion; the formal affidavit alone, even though uncontroverted, is not enough. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519; cf. Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U. S. 426. Glasser, in his affidavit, offered to prove the allegations contained therein, but the record is barren of any actual tender of proof on his part. Furthermore, there is no indication that the court refused to entertain such an offer, if it were in fact made. Roth did not even make an offer of proof in his affidavit, and Kretske did not file one. While it is error to refuse to hear evidence offered in support of allegations that a jury was improperly constituted, Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, there is, and, on the state of this record, can be, no assertion that such error was here committed. The failure of petitioners to prove their contention is fatal.

We conclude that the conviction of Glasser must be set aside and the cause as to him remanded to the District *88Court for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois for a new trial. The convictions of petitioners Kretske and Roth are in all respects upheld.

No\ SO, reversed.

Nos. SI and 82, affirmed.

Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter:

The Chief Justice

and I are of opinion that the conviction of Glasser, as well as that of his co-defendants, should stand.

It is a commonplace in the administration of criminal justice that the actualities of a long trial are too often given a meretricious appearance on appeal; the perspective of the living trial is lost in the search for error in a dead record. To set aside the conviction of Glasser (a lawyer who served as an Assistant United States Attorney for more than four years) after a trial lasting longer than a month, on the ground that he was denied the basic constitutional right “to have the assistance of counsel for his defence,” is to give fresh point to this regrettably familiar phenomenon. For Glasser himself made no such claim at any of the critical occasions throughout the proceedings. Neither when the judge appointed Stewart to act as counsel for both Kretske and Glasser, nor at any time during the long trial, nor in his motions to set aside the verdict and to arrest judgment, nor in his plea to the court before sentence was passed, nor in setting forth his grounds for appeal, did Glasser assert, or manifest in any way a belief, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Not until twenty weeks after Stewart had become counsel for the co-defendant Kretske, and fifteen weeks after the trial had ended, did Glasser discover that he had been *89deprived of his constitutional rights. This was obviously a lawyer’s afterthought. It does not promote respect for the Bill of Rights to turn such an afterthought into an imaginary injury that is reflected nowhere in the contemporaneous record of the trial, and make it the basis for reversal.

The guarantees of the Bill of Rights are not abstractions. Whether their safeguards of liberty and dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends upon the particular circumstances. The fact that Glasser is an attorney, of course, does not mean that he is not entitled to the protection which is afforded all persons by the Sixth Amendment. But the fact that he is an attorney with special experience in criminal cases, and not a helpless illiterate, may be — as we believe it to be here — extremely relevant in determining whether he was denied such protection.

In this light, what does the record show? Before the trial got under way the trial judge was presented with a problem created by the inability of one of Kretske’s lawyers to try the case in his behalf. Kretske was dissatisfied with his other lawyer, who professed to be unfamiliar with the many details of the case. Upon Kretske’s motion for a continuance, the judge was faced with the difficulty of avoiding either delay of the trial or an undesirable severance as to Kretske. All the defendants, including Glasser, and their counsel were present in court. The judge asked whether Stewart, who had been retained by Glasser, would be prepared to act also for Kretske. The record gives no possible ground for any inference other than that this suggestion came from the judge as a fair and disinterested proposal to solve a not unfamiliar trial problem. It is not, and indeed could not be, contended that the judge’s suggestion, addressed to the consideration of the defendants, was not wholly proper. And so, *90when Stewart raised the question of a possible conflict of interest, and Glasser himself objected, saying “I would like to have my own lawyer representing me/’ the judge neither remonstrated nor argued. He promptly dropped his suggestion and directed Kretske’s other lawyer, who ,was present but with whom Kretske was dissatisfied, to stay in the case until Kretske could hire someone to his satisfaction. The footnote sets forth the full text of this episode.1

There ensued a long discussion relating to the representation of Kretske. During this discussion the judge never *91again adverted to his original suggestion that Stewart also represent Kretske. Kretske interrupted, and there then occurred in Glasser’s presence what is now made the basis for reversal:

“Mr. Kretske: I can end this. I just spoke to Mr. Stewart and he said if yoür Honor wishes to appoint him I think we can accept the appointment.

“Mr. Stewart: As long as the Court knows the situation. I think there is something to the fact that the jury knows we can’t control that.

“Mr. McDonnell: Then the order is vacated?

“The Court: The order appointing Mr. McDonnell is vacated and Mr. Stewart is appointed attorney for Mr. Kretske.”

It is clear, therefore, that this arrangement was voluntarily assumed by the parties, and was not pressed upon them by the judge. Glasser, who was present, raised no objection and made no comment.

The requirement that timely objections be made to prejudicial rulings of a trial judge often has the semblance of traps for the unwary and uninformed. But Glasser was neither unwary nor uninformed. His experience in the prosecution of criminal cases makes his silence here most significant. Nor was this the last opportunity he had to indicate that embarrassment was being caused him by Stewart’s representation of Kretske, let alone that he deemed it a denial of his constitutional rights. If he were laboring under a handicap, he would have made it known at the times when he felt it most — during the long course of the trial, in his motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, in his extended plea to the court before sentence was passed, and finally when, on April 26, 1940, over his own signature he gave twenty grounds for appeal but did not mention this one. The long period of uninterrupted silence concerning his after-discovered injury negatives its existence. We find it difficult to know what acquies*92cence in a judge’s ruling could be, if this record does not show it.2

A fair reading of the record thus precludes the inference that the judge forced upon Glasser a situation which hobbled him in his defense. To be sure, he did say at first that he would like his lawyer to represent him alone. But he plainly acquiesced in the arrangement which, after consultation at the defense table, was proposed to the trial judge and which the judge accepted. A conspiracy trial presents complicated questions of strategy for the defense. There are advantages and disadvantages in having separate counsel for each defendant or a single counsel for more than one. Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack. These considerations could not have escaped a lawyer of Glasser’s experience. His thorough acquiescence in the proceedings cannot be reconciled with a denial of his constitutional rights.

A belated showing that Glasser was actually prejudiced by the judge’s action is now attempted. This has two aspects: (1) Stewart’s failure to cross-examine the witness Brantman, and (2) his failure to make objections on behalf of Glasser to the admission of certain evidence.

*93(1) The Brantman episode evaporates upon examination. His only testimony relating to Glasser was that he did not know him. This was brought out fully and distinctly on direct examination.3 That it had been amply established, Glasser himself recognized in his address to the court before sentence. It is difficult to understand how cross-examination would have been of any further benefit to Glasser. In any event, the record shows that Stewart abstained from cross-examining Brantman not because he felt himself inhibited by any conflict of interest but because, as he told the judge after verdict, he thought that on cross-examination Brantman “would be telling worse lies.”

(2) It is said that Stewart’s failure to object, on behalf of Glasser, to certain evidence in itself proves that Stewart felt himself restricted — wholly regardless of the admissibility of such evidence. No evidence inadmissible against Glasser is avouched. Indeed we are told that it is “beside the point” that the evidence is admissible. Can it be that a lawyer who fails to make frivolous objections to admissible evidence is thereby denying his client the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel?

Mr. Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was indicted for robbery in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Maryland. Due to lack of funds, *457he was unable to employ counsel, and so informed the judge at his arraignment. He requested that counsel be appointed for him. The j udge advised him that this would not be done, as it was not the practice in Carroll County to appoint counsel for indigent defendants, save in prosecutions for murder and rape.

Without waiving his asserted right to counsel, the petitioner pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried without a jury. At his request witnesses were summoned in his behalf. He cross-examined the State’s witnesses and examined his own. The latter gave testimony tending to establish an alibi. Although afforded the opportunity, he did not take the witness stand. The judge found him guilty and imposed .a sentence of eight years.

While serving his sentence, the petitioner filed with a judge of the Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been deprived of the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The writ issued, the cause was heard, his contention was rejected, and he was remanded to the custody of the prison warden.

Some months later, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to Hon. Carroll T. Bond, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, setting up the same grounds for the prisoner’s release as the former petition. The respondent answered, a hearing was afforded, at which an agreed statement of facts was offered by counsel for the parties, the evidence taken at the petitioner’s trial was incorporated in the record, and the cause was argued. Judge Bond granted the writ but, for reasons set forth in an opinion, denied the relief prayed and remanded the petitioner to the respondent’s custody.

The petitioner applied to this court for certiorari directed to Judge Bond. The writ was issued on account of the importance of the jurisdictional questions involved *458and conflicting decisions1 upon the constitutional question presented. In awarding the writ, we requested counsel to discuss the jurisdiction of this court, “particularly (1) whether the decision below is that of a court within the meaning of § 2372 of the Judicial Code, and (2) whether state remedies, either by appeal or by application to other judges or any other state court, have been exhausted.”

1. Sec. 237 of the Judicial Code declares this court competent to review, upon certiorari, “any cause wherein a final judgment . . . has been rendered ... by the highest court” of a State “in which a decision could be had” on a federal question. Was Judge Bond’s judgment that of a court within the meaning of the statute? ■ Answer must be made in the light of the applicable law of Maryland.

Art. 4, § 6 of the State Constitution provides: “All Judges shall by virtue of their offices be Conservators of the Peace throughout the State; . . .” Sec. 1 of Art. 42 of the Public General Laws of Maryland (Flack’s 1939 Edition) invests the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge thereof, the Circuit Courts for the respective counties, and the several judges thereof, the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the Court of Common Pleas of that city, the Circuit Court and Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Court, and the judges of the said courts, out of court, and the Judge of the Court of Appeals from the City of Baltimore, with power to grant writs of habeas corpus and to exercise jurisdiction in all matters pertaining thereto.

*459Although it is settled that the grant to the Court of Appeals of the power to issue the writ is unconstitutional and void,3 and although the statute does not confer on individual judges of the Court of Appeals the power to issue a writ and proceed thereon, nevertheless, those judges, as conservators of the peace, have the power under the quoted section of the Constitution. 4 In any event, Judge Bond is the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the judge of that court from the City of Baltimore and, as such, is empowered to act.

Sections 2 to 6, inclusive, 9 to 12 inclusive, and 17 of the statute prescribe the procedure governing the issue of the writ, its service, the return, and the hearing. No question is made but that Judge Bond complied with these provisions. It is, therefore, apparent that in all respects he acted in a judicial capacity and that, in his proper person, he was a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction, upon pleadings and proofs, to hear and to adjudicate the issue of the legality of the petitioner’s detention. If Judge Bond had been sitting in term time as a member of a court, clothed with power to act as one of the members of that court, his judgment would be that of a court within the scope of § 237. Doubt that his judgment in the present instance is such arises out of our decision in McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 685, where we refused to review the denial of a discharge by a judge of an inferior court of Ohio who issued the writ and heard the case at chambers. It appeared that the petitioner had addressed his petition to a judge of the Circuit Court instead of the court itself; and that, for this reason, the order of the judge was not reviewable by the Supreme Court of Ohio as it would have been had the writ been addressed *460to the Circuit Court though heard by a single judge. The petitioner had not exhausted his state remedy since, though he could have obtained a decision by the highest court of the State, he had avoided doing so, and then sought to come to this court directly from the order of the Circuit Judge on the theory that that judge’s order was the final order of the highest court of the State which could decide his case. In a later decision, we referred to this and other cognate cases as deciding that appeals do not lie to this court from orders by judges at chambers,5 but the fundamental reason for denying our jurisdiction was that the appellant had not exhausted state remedies.

In view of what has been said of the power of Judge Bond as a judicial tribunal to hear and finally decide the cause, and of the judicial quality of his action we are of opinion that his judgment was that of a court within the intendment of § 237.

2. Did the judgment entered comply with the requirement of § 237 that it must be a final judgment rendered by the highest court in which a decision could be had? Again answer must be made in the light of the applicable law of Maryland. The judgment was final in the sense that an order of'a Maryland judge in a habeas corpus case, whatever the court to which he belongs, is not reviewable by any other court of Maryland except in specific instances named in statutes which are here inapplicable.6 It is true that the order was not final, and the petitioner has not exhausted state remedies in the sense that in Maryland, as in England, in many of the States, and in the federal courts, a prisoner may apply succes*461sively to one judge after another and to one court after another without exhausting his right.7 We think this circumstance does not deny to the judgment in a given case the quality of finality requisite to this court’s jurisdiction. Although the judgment is final in the sense that it is not subject to review by any other court of the State, we may, in our discretion, refuse the writ when there is a higher court of the State to which another petition for the relief sought could be addressed,8 but this is not such a case. To hold that, since successive applications to courts and judges of Maryland may be made as of right, the judgment in any case is not final, would be to deny all recourse to this court in such cases.

Since Judge Bond’s order was a final disposition by the highest court of Maryland in which a judgment could be had of the issue joined on the instant petition we have jurisdiction to review it.

3. Was the petitioner’s conviction and sentence a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of the court’s refusal to appoint counsel at his request?

The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials in federal courts.9 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, *462as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment,10 although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.11 Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth. The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.12 In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.

The petitioner, in this instance, asks us, in effect, to apply a rule in the enforcement of the due process clause. He says the rule to be deduced from our former decisions is that, in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State. Expressions in the *463opinions of this court lend color to the argument,13 but, as the petitioner admits, none of our decisions squarely adjudicates the question now presented.

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, ignorant and friendless negro youths, strangers in the community, without friends or means to obtain counsel, were hurried to trial for a capital offense without effective appointment of counsel on whom the burden of preparation and trial would rest, and without adequate opportunity to consult even the counsel casually appointed to represent them. This occurred in a State whose statute law required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted for the offense charged. Thus the trial was conducted in disregard of every principle of fairness and in disregard of that which was declared by the lav/ of the State a requisite of a fair trial. This court held the resulting convictions were without due process of law. It said that, in the light of all the facts, the failure of the trial court to afford the defendants reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process. The court stated further that “under the circumstances . . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process,” but added: “Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that, in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign *464counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law, . . .”

Likewise, in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, the state law required the appointment of counsel. The claim which we felt required examination, as in the Powell case, was that the purported compliance with this requirement amounted to mere lip service. Scrutiny of the record disclosed that counsel had been appointed and the defendant had been afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense with the aid of counsel. We, therefore, overruled the contention that due process had been denied.

In Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, the petition for habeas corpus alleged a failure to appoint counsel but averred other facts which, if established, would prove that the trial was a mere sham and pretense, offensive to the concept of due process. There also, state law required the appointment of counsel for one on trial for the offense involved.

Those cases, which are the petitioner’s chief reliance, do not rule this. The question we are now to decide is whether due process of law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of counsel in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness? The answer to the question may be found in the common understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-American system of law. By the Sixth Amendment the people ordained that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused should “enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” We have construed the provision to require appointment of counsel in all cases where a defendant is unable to procure the services of an attorney, and where the right has not been intentionally and *465competently waived.14 Though, as we have noted, the Amendment lays down no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Relevant data on the subject are afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date. These constitute the most authoritative sources for ascertaining the considered judgment of the citizens of the States upon the question.

The Constitutions of the thirteen original States, as they were at the time of federal union, exhibit great diversity in respect of the right to have counsel in criminal cases. Rhode Island had no constitutional provision on the subject until 1843, North Carolina and South Carolina had none until 1868. Virginia has never had any. Maryland, in 1776, and New York, in 1777, adopted provisions to the effect that a defendant accused of crime should be “allowed” counsel. A constitutional mandate that the accused should have a right to be heard by himself and by his counsel was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776, New Hampshire in 1774, by Delaware in 1782, and by Connecticut in 1818. In 1780 Massachusetts ordained that the defendant should have the right to be heard by himself or his counsel at his election. In 1798 Georgia provided that the accused might be heard by himself or counsel, or both. In 1776 New Jersey guaranteed the accused the same privileges of witnesses and counsel as their prosecutors “are or shall be entitled to.”

*466The substance of these provisions of colonial and early-state constitutions is explained by the contemporary common law. Originally, in England, a prisoner was not permitted to be heard by counsel upon the general issue of not guilty on any indictment for treason or felony.15 The practice of English judges, however, was to permit counsel to advise with a defendant as to the conduct of his case and to represent him in collateral matters and as respects questions of law arising upon the trial.16 In 1695 the rule was relaxed by statute17 to the extent of permitting one accused of treason the privilege of being heard by counsel. The rule forbidding the participation of counsel stood, however, as to indictments for felony, until 1836, when a statute accorded the right to defend by counsel against summary convictions and charges of felony.18 In misdemeanor cases and, after 1695, in prosecutions for treason, the rule was that the defense must be conducted either by the defendant in person or by counsel, but that both might not participate in the trial.19

In the light of this common law practice, it is evident that the constitutional provisions to the effect that a defendant should be “allowed” counsel or should have a right “to be heard by himself and his counsel,” or that he might be heard by “either or both,” at his election, were intended to do away with the rules which denied representation, in whole or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions, but were not aimed to compel the State to provide counsel for a defendant. At the least, such a construction by State courts and legislators can not be said to lack reasonable basis.

*467The statutes in force in the thirteen original States at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights are also illuminating. It is of interest that the matter of appointment of counsel for defendants, if dealt with at all, was dealt with by statute rather than by constitutional provision. The contemporary legislation exhibits great diversity of policy.20

The constitutions of all the States, presently in force, save that of Virginia, contain provisions with respect to the assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Those of nine *468States21 may be said to embody a guarantee textually the same as that of the Sixth Amendment, or of like import. In the fundamental law of most States, however, the language used indicates only that a defendant is not to be denied the privilege of representation by counsel of his choice.22

In three States, the guarantee, whether or not in the exact phraseology of the Sixth Amendment, has been held to require appointment in all cases where the defendant *469is unable to procure counsel.23 In six, the provisions (one of which is like the Sixth Amendment) have been held not to require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.24 In eight, provisions, one of which is the same as that of the Sixth Amendment, have evidently not been viewed as requiring such appointment, since the courts have enforced statutes making appointment discretionary, or obligatory only in prosecutions for capital offenses or felonies.25

In twelve States, it seems to be understood that the constitutional provision does not require appointment of *470counsel, since statutes of greater or less antiquity call for such appointment only in capital cases or cases of felony or other grave crime,26 or refer the matter to the discretion of the court.27 In eighteen States the statutes now require the court to appoint in all cases where defendants are unable to procure counsel.28 But this has not always been *471the statutory requirement in some of those States.29 And it seems to have been assumed by many legislatures that the matter was one for regulation from time to time as deemed necessary, since laws requiring appointment in all cases have been modified to require it only in the case of certain offenses.30

This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative policy. In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case. Every court has power, if it deems *472proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.

The practice of the courts of Maryland gives point to the principle that the States should not be straight-jacketed in this respect, by a construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Bond’s opinion states, and counsel at the bar confirmed the fact, that in Maryland the usual practice is for the defendant to waive a trial by jury. This the petitioner did in the present case. Such trials, as Judge Bond remarks, are much more informal than jury trials and it is obvious that the judge can much better control the course of the trial and is in a better position to see impartial justice done than when the formalities of a jury trial are involved.31

In this case there was no question of the commission of a robbery. The State’s case consisted of evidence identifying the petitioner as the perpetrator. The defense was an alibi. Petitioner called and examined witnesses to prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense. The simple issue was the veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the defendant. As Judge Bond says, the accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that narrow issue. He had once before been in a criminal court, pleaded guilty to larceny and served a sentence and was not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure. It is quite clear that in Maryland, if the situation had been otherwise and it had appeared that the petitioner was, for any reason, at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack *473of counsel, a refusal to appoint would have resulted in the reversal of a judgment of conviction. Only recently the Court of Appeals has reversed a conviction because it was convinced on the whole record that an accused, tried without counsel, had been handicapped by the lack of representation.32

To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the States in this matter would be to impose upon them, as Judge Bond points out, a requirement without distinction between criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction. As he says: “Charges of small crimes tried before justices of the, peace and capital charges tried in the higher courts would equally require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it would be argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it.” And, indeed, it was said by petitioner’s counsel both below and in this court, that as the Fourteenth Amendment extends the protection of due process to property as well as to life and liberty, if we hold with the petitioner, logic would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.

As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.

The judgment is

Affirmed,

[Over]

*474Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy concur.

To hold that the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in this case does not require us to say that “no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” This case can be determined by a resolution of a narrower question: whether in view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his trial and conviction, this petitioner was denied the procedural protection which is his right under the Federal Constitution. I think he was.

The petitioner, a farm hand, out of a job and on relief, was indicted in a Maryland state court on a charge of robbery. He was too poor to hire a lawyer. He so informed the court and requested that counsel be appointed to defend him. His request was denied. Put to trial without a lawyer, he conducted his own defense, was found guilty, and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The court below found that the petitioner had “at least an ordinary amount of intelligence.” It is clear from his examination of witnesses that he was a man of little education.

If this case had come to us from a federal court, it is clear we should have to reverse it, because the Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel in criminal cases inviolable by the Federal Government. I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the states.1 But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never been accepted by a majority of this Court *475and is not accepted today. A statement of the grounds supporting it is, therefore, unnecessary at this time. I believe, however, that, under the prevailing view of due process, as reflected in the opinion just announced, a view which gives this Court such vast supervisory powers that-I am not prepared to accept it without grave doubts, the judgment below should be reversed.

This Court has ju^t declared that due process of law is denied if a trial is conducted in such manner that it is “shocking to the universal sense of justice” or “offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.” On another occasion, this Court has recognized that whatever is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “essential to the substance of a hearing” is within the procedural protection afforded by the constitutional guaranty of due process. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 327.

The right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is “fundamental.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 70; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243-244. It is guarded from invasion by the Sixth Amendment, adopted to raise an effective barrier against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of liberty by the Federal Government. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462.

An historical evaluation of the right to a full hearing in criminal cases, and the dangers of denying it, were set out in the Powell case, where this Court said: “What . . . does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the person asserting the right . . . Even the in*476telligent and educated layman . , . lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel in every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." Powell v. Alabama, supra, 68-69. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 462-463.

A practice cannot be reconciled with “common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,” which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant’s case was adequately presented. No one questions that due process requires a hearing before conviction and sentence for the serious crime of robbery. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said, in 1859, “ . . . would it not be a little like mockery to secure to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a fair and full trial of the matters with which he was charged, and yet say to him when on trial, that he must employ his own counsel, who could alone render these guaranties of any real permanent value to him. . . . Why this great solicitude to secure him a fair trial if he cannot have the benefit of counsel?” Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274, 276-277.

Denial to the poor of the request for counsel in proceedings based on charges of serious crime has long been regarded as shocking to the “universal sense of justice” throughout this country. In 1854, for example, the Supreme Court of Indiana said: “It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid. No Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear *477such a trial. The defence of the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere, which will be at once conceded as essential to the accused, to the Court, and to the public.” Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13,18. And most of the other States have shown their agreement by constitutional provisions, statutes, or established practice judicially approved, which assure that no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty.2 Any other practice seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under the law.

Appendix

I. States which require that indigent defendants in non-capital as well as capital criminal cases be provided with counsel on request:

A. By Statute. Arizona: Revised Statutes of Arizona Territory, 1901, Penal Code, Pt. II, Title VII, § 858; Arizona Code Ann. 1939, Vol. Ill, § 44-904. Arkansas: Compiled Laws, Arkansas Territory, 1835, Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 37; Pope’s Digest, 1937, Vol. I, c. 43, § 3877. California: California Penal Code of 1872, § 987; Deering’s Penal Code, 1937, § 987. Idaho: Territorial Criminal Practice Act, 1864, § 267; Idaho Code, 1932, §§ 19-1412, 19-1413. Illinois: Rev. Stat. 1874, Criminal Code, § 422; Jones’s 111. Stat. Ann. 1936, § 37.707. *478Cf. Laws, 1933, 430-431. See also, Vise v. County of Hamilton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857). Iowa: Territorial Laws, 1839, Courts, § 64; Iowa Code, 1939, § 13773. Kansas: See Compilation published in 1856 as S. Doc. No. 23, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 520 (c. 129, Art. V, §4). Laws, 1941, c. 291. Louisiana: Act of May 4, 1805, of the Territory of Orleans, § 35; Dart’s Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 1932, Title XIII, Art. 143. Minnesota: Minnesota General Laws, 1869, c. LXXII, § 1; Mason’s Minnesota Statutes, 1927, §§ 9957, 10667. Missouri: Digest of Laws of Missouri Territory, 1818, Crimes and Misdemeanours, § 35; Rev. Stat. 1939, § 4003. Montana: Montana Territory Criminal Practice Act of 1872, § 196 (Laws of Montana, Codified Stat. 1871-1872,220); Revised Code, 1935, § 11886. Nebraska: General Statutes, 1873, c. 58, § 437; Compiled Stat. 1929, § 29-1803. Nevada: Act of November 26, 1861 (Compiled Laws, 1861-1873, Vol. I, 477, 493); Compiled Laws, 1929, Vol. 5, § 10883. New Hampshire: Laws, 1907, c. 136; Laws, 1937, c. 22. New Jersey: Act of March 6, 1795, §2; New Jersey Stat. § 2.190-3. New York: Code of Criminal Procedure, § 308 (enacted in 1881, still in force). See People v. Supervisors of Albany County, 28 How. Pr. 22, 24 (1864). North Dakota: Dakota Territory Code of Procedure, 1863, § 249 (Rev. Codes, 1877, Criminal Procedure, 875); Compiled Laws, 1913, Vol. II, §§ 8965, 10721. Ohio: Act of February 26, 1816, § 14 (Chase, Statutes of Ohio, 1788-1833, Vol. II, 982); Throckmorton’s Ohio Code Ann. 1940, Vol. II, § 13439-2. Oklahoma: Oklahoma Territorial Stat. 1890, c. 70, § 10; Stat. Ann. 1941 Supp., Title 22, § 464. Oregon: Act of October 19, 1864 (General Laws, 1845-1864, c. 37, § 381; Laws 1937, c. 406 (Compiled Laws Ann., Vol. Ill, § 26-804). South Dakota: Dakota Territory Code of Procedure, 1863, § 249 (Rev. Codes, 1877, Criminal Procedure 875); Code of 1939, Vol. II, § 34.1901. Tennessee: Code of 1857-1858, §§ 5205, 5206; Code of 1938, *479§§ 11733, 11734. Utah: Laws of Territory of Utah, 1878, Criminal Procedure, § 181; Rev. Stat. 1933, § 105-22-12. Washington: Statutes of Territory of Washington, 1854, Criminal Practice Act, § 89; Remington’s Revised Statutes, 1932, Yol. IV, §§ 2095, 2305. Wyoming: Laws of Wyoming Territory, 1869, Criminal Procedure, § 98; Rev. Stat. 1931, § 33-501.

B. By judicial decision or established practice judicially approved. Connecticut: For an account of early practice in Connecticut, see Zephaniah Swift “A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut,” Vol. II, 392: “The chief justice then, before the prisoner is called upon to plead, asks the prisoner if he desires counsel, which if requested, is always granted, as a matter of course. On his naming counsel, the court will appoint or assign them. If from any cause, the prisoner decline to request or name counsel, and a trial is had, especially in the case of minors, the court will assign proper counsel. When counsel are assigned, the court will enquire of them, whether they have advised with the prisoner, so that he is ready to plead, and if not, will allow them proper time for that purpose. But it is usually the case that the prisoner has previously employed and consulted counsel, and of course is prepared to plead.” See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, footnote, 63-64. See also, Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1930, §§ 2267, 6476. Florida: Cutts v. State, 54 Fla, 21, 23, 45 So. 491 (1907). See Compiled General Laws, 1927, § 8375 (capital crimes). Indiana: Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854). See also Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 497-498, 29 N. E. 2d 405 (1940); State v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N. E. 2d 129, 131 (1941). Michigan: People v. Crandell, 270 Mich. 124, 127, 258 N. W. 224 (1935). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Richards, 111 Pa. Super. 124, 169 A. 464 (1933). See Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 49, 59, 24 A. 2d 1. Virginia: Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 521-525, 6 S. E. 2d 670 (1940). *480West Virginia: State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 692-693, 47 S. E. 166 (1904). Wisconsin: Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). See Stat. 1941, § 357.26.

C. By constitutional provision. Georgia: Constitution of 1865, Art. 1, Par. 8. See Martin v. Georgia, 51 Ga. 567, 568 (1874). Kentucky: Kentucky Constitution, § 11. See Fugate v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 663, 665, 72 S. W. 2d 47 (1934).

II. States which are without constitutional provision, statutes, or judicial decisions clearly establishing this requirement:

Colorado: General Laws, 1877, §§ 913-916; Colorado Stat. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, c. 48, §§ 502, 505, as amended by Laws of 1937, 498, § 1. See Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507, 517, 289 P. 1081. Delaware: See 6 Laws of Delaware 741; 7 id. 410; Rev. Code, 1935, §§ 4306, 4310. Maine: See Rev. Stat. 1857, 713; Rev. Stat. 1930, c. 146, §14. Massachusetts: See McDonalds. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 327, 53 N. E. 874 (1899). New Mexico. North Carolina. Rhode Island: See State v. Hudson, 55 R. I. 141, 179 A. 130 (1935); General Laws, 1938, c. 625, § 62. South Carolina: See State v. Jones, 172 S. C. 129, 130, 173 S. E. 77 (1934); Code, 1932, Vol. I, § 980. Vermont.

III. States in which dicta of judicial opinions are in harmony with the decision by the court below in this case:

Alabama: Gilchrist v. State, 234 Ala. 73, 74, 173 So. 651. Mississippi: Reed v. State, 143 Miss. 686, 689, 109 So. 715.

IV. States in which the requirement of counsel for indigent defendants in non-capital cases has been affirmatively rejected:

Maryland: See, however, Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A. 2d 676. Texas: Gilley v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. 548, 26 S. W. 2d 1070. But cf. Brady v. State, 122 Tex. Cr. 275, 278, 54 S. W. 2d 513.

*479Mr. Justice Goldberg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, .the refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 342, and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation.

On the night of January 19, 1960, petitioner’s brother-in-law was fatally shot. In the early hours of the next morning, at 2:30 a. m., petitioner was arrested without a warrant and interrogated. Petitioner made no statement to the police and was released at 5 that afternoon pursuant to a state court writ of habeas corpus obtained by Mr. Warren Wolfson, a lawyer who had been retained by petitioner.

On January 30, Benedict DiGerlando, who was then in police custody and who was later indicted for the murder along with petitioner, told the police that petitioner had fired the fatal shots. Between 8 and 9 that evening, petitioner and his sister, the widow of the deceased, were arrested and taken to police headquarters. En route to the police station, the police “had handcuffed the defendant behind his back,” and “one of the arresting officers told defendant that DiGerlando had named him as the one who shot” the deceased. Petitioner testified, without contradiction, that the “detectives said they had us pretty well, up pretty tight, and we might as well admit to this crime,” and that he replied, “I am sorry but I would like to have advice from my lawyer.” A police officer testified that although petitioner was not formally charged “he was in custody” and “couldn’t walk out the door.”

*480Shortly after petitioner reached police headquarters, his retained lawyer arrived. The lawyer described the ensuing events in the following terms:

“On that day I received a phone call [from “the mother of another defendant”] and pursuant to that phone call I went to the Detective Bureau at 11th and State. The first person I talked to was the Sergeant on duty at the Bureau Desk, Sergeant Pidgeon. I asked Sergeant Pidgeon for permission to speak to my client, Danny Escobedo. . . . Sergeant Pidgeon made a call to the Bureau lockup and informed me that the boy had been taken from the lockup to the Homicide Bureau. This was between 9:30 and 10:00 in the evening. Before I went anywhere, he called the Homicide Bureau and told them there was an attorney waiting to see Escobedo. He told me I could not see him. Then I went upstairs to the Homicide Bureau. There were several Homicide Detectives around and I talked to them. I identified myself as Escobedo’s attorney and asked permission to see him. They said I could not. . . . The police officer told me to see Chief Flynn who was on duty. I identified myself to Chief Flynn and asked permission to see my client. He said I could not. . . . I think it was approximately 11:00 o’clock. He said I couldn’t' see him because they hadn’t completed questioning. . . . [F]or a second or two I spotted him in an office in the Homicide Bureau. The door was open and I could see through the office. ... I waved to him and. he waved back and then the door was closed, by one of the officers at Homicide.1 There were four or five officers milling *481around the Homicide Detail that night. As to whether I talked to Captain Flynn any later that day, I waited around for another hour or two and went back again and renewed by [sic] request to see my client. He again told me I could not. . . . I filed an oficial complaint with Commissioner Phelan of the Chicago Police Department. I had a conversation with every police officer I could find. I was told at Homicide that I couldn’t see him and I would have to get a writ of habeas corpus. I left the Homicide Bureau and from the Detective Bureau at 11th and State at approximately 1:00 A. M. [Sunday morning] I had no opportunity to talk to my client that night. I quoted to Captain Flynn the Section of the Criminal Code which allows an attorney the right to see his client.” 2

Petitioner testified that during the course of the interrogation he repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer and that the police said that his lawyer “didn’t want to see” him. The testimony of the police officers confirmed these accounts in substantial detail.

Notwithstanding repeated requests by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the entire interrogation. At one point, as previously noted, petitioner and his attorney came into each other’s view for a few moments but the attorney was quickly ushered away. Petitioner testified “that he heard a detective telling the attorney the latter would not be allowed to talk to [him] ‘until they *482were done’ ” and that he heard the attorney being refused permission to remain in the adjoining room. A police officer testified that he had told the lawyer that he could not see petitioner until “we were through interrogating” him.

There is testimony by the police that during the interrogation, petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police, “was handcuffed” 3 in a standing position and that he “was nervous, he had circles under his eyes and he was upset” and was “agitated” because “he had not slept well in over a week.”

It is undisputed that during the course of the interrogation Officer Montejano, who “grew up” in petitioner’s neighborhood, who knew his family, and who uses “Spanish language in [his] police work,” conferred alone with petitioner “for about a quarter of an hour. . . .” Petitioner testified that the officer said to him “in Spanish that my sister and I could go home if I pinned it on Benedict DiGerlando,” that “he would see to it that we would go home and be held only as witnesses, if anything, if we had made a statement against DiGerlando . . . , that we would be able to go home that night.” Petitioner testified that he made the statement in issue because of this assurance. Officer Montejano denied offering any such assurance.

A police officer testified that during the interrogation the following occurred:

“I informed him of what DiGerlando told me and when I did, he told me that DiGerlando was [lying] and I said, ‘Would you care to tell DiGer-lando that?’ and he said, ‘Yes, I will.’ So, I *483brought . . . Escobedo in and he confronted DiGer-lando and he told him that he was lying and said, 'I didn’t shoot Manuel, you did it.’ ”

In this way, petitioner, for the first time, admitted to some knowledge of the crime. After that he made additional statements further implicating himself in the murder plot. At this point an Assistant State’s Attorney, Theodore J. Cooper, was summoned “to take” a statement. Mr. Cooper, an experienced lawyer who was assigned to the Homicide Division to take “statements from some defendants and some prisoners that they had in custody,” “took” petitioner’s statement by asking carefully framed questions apparently designed to assure the admissibility into evidence of the resulting answers. Mr. Cooper testified that he did not advise petitioner of his constitutional rights, and it is undisputed that no one during the course of the interrogation so advised him.

Petitioner moved both before and during trial to suppress the incriminating statement, but the motions were denied. Petitioner was convicted of murder and he appealed the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Illinois, in its original opinion of February 1, 1963, held the statement inadmissible and reversed the conviction. The court said:

“[I]t seems manifest to us, from the undisputed evidence and the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of his statement and shortly prior thereto, that the defendant understood he would be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be granted an immunity from prosecution.”

Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528.

The State petitioned for, and the court granted, rehearing. The court then affirmed the conviction. It said: “[T]he *484officer denied making the promise and the trier of fact believed him. We find no reason for disturbing the trial court’s finding that the confession was voluntary.” 4 28 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46, 190 N. E. 2d 825, 827. The court also held, on the authority of this Court’s decisions in Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, that the confession was admissible even though “it was obtained after he had requested the assistance of counsel, which request was denied.” 28 Ill. 2d, at 46, 190 N. E. 2d, at 827. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether the petitioner’s statement was constitutionally admissible at his trial. 375 U. S. 902. We conclude, for the reasons stated below, that it was not and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction.

In Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, this Court observed that “a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less . . . might deny a defendant 'effective representation by counsel at the only stage when *485legal aid and advice would help him.’ ” Id., at 204, quoting Douglas, J., concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 326.

The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of “an unsolved crime.” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to “get him” to confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so. At the time of. his arrest and throughout the course of the interrogation, the police told petitioner that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the fatal shots. Without informing him of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the police urged him to make a statement.5 As this Court observed many years ago:

“It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression would not also have nat*486urally arisen, that by denying there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.” Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562.

Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of “mere” complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing of the fatal shots. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N. E. 2d 825. The “guiding hand of counsel” was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69. This was the “stage when legal aid and advice” were most critical to petitioner. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204. It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, and the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59. What happened at this interrogation could certainly “affect the whole trial,” Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 54, since rights “may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.” Ibid. It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the ¿uthorities had secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder.

The New York Court of Appeals, whose decisions this Court cited with approval in Massiah, 377 U. S. 201, at 205, has recently recognized that, under circumstances such as those here, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment. In People v. Donovan, 13 N. Y. 2d 148, 193 N. E. 2d 628, that court, in an opinion by Judge Fuld, held that a “confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention [prior to indictment], after his attorney had requested and been denied access *487to him” could not be used against him in a criminal trial.6 Id., at 151, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629. The court observed that it “would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from him by the police.” Id., at 152, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629.7

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, we held that every person accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial.8 The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the “right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.” In re Groban, 352 U. S. *488330, 344 (Black, J., dissenting).9 “One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can’t escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.’ ” Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-518.

It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior to indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police will diminish significantly, because most confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment,10 and “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This argument, of course, cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a “stage when legal aid and advice” are surely needed. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204; Hamilton v. Alabama, supra; White v. Maryland, supra. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Note, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964).

We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement *489which comes to depend on the “confession” will, in the long run, be less reliable11 and more subject to abuses12 than a system, which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. As Dean Wigmore so wisely said:

“[A]ny system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,— that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege was not recognized.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 309. (Emphasis in original.)

*490This Court also has recognized that “history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence . . . .” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519.

We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights.13 If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.14

We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the sus*491pect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 342, and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.

Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, does not compel a contrary result. In that case the Court merely rejected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that “every state denial of a request to contact counsel [is] an infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the case.” Id., at 440. (Emphasis in original.) In its place, the following rule was announced:

“[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits, . . . but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. . . .’ The latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the case.” 357 U. S., at 439-440. (Emphasis added.)

The Court, applying “these principles” to “the sum total of the circumstances [there] during the time petitioner was without counsel,” id., at 440, concluded that he had not been fundamentally prejudiced by the denial of his request for counsel. Among the critical circumstances which distinguish that case from this one are that the petitioner there, but not here, was explicitly advised by the police of his constitutional right to remain silent and *492not to “say anything” in response to the questions, id., at 437, and that petitioner there, but not here, was a well-educated man who had studied criminal law while attending law school for a year. The Court’s opinion in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, decided the same day, merely said that the “contention that petitioner had a constitutional right to confer with counsel is disposed of by Crooker v. California . . . That case adds nothing, therefore, to Crooker. In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling.15

Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate “an unsolved crime,” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring), by gathering information from witnesses and by other “proper investigative efforts.” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519. We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession— our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis of Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, *493decided by this Court only six years ago. Like my Brother White, post, p. 495, I think the rule announced today is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

I think this case is directly controlled by Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, and I would therefore affirm the judgment.

Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, is not in point here. In that case a federal grand jury had indicted Massiah. He had retained a lawyer and entered a formal plea of not guilty. Under our system of federal justice an indictment and arraignment are followed by a trial, at which the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the assistance of counsel.* But Massiah was released on bail, and thereafter agents of the Federal Government deliberately elicited incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. We held that the use of these statements against him at his trial denied him the basic protections of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. Putting to one side the fact that the case now before us is not a federal case, the vital fact remains that this case does not involve the deliberate interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings against him. The Court disregards this basic differenbe between the present case and Massiah’s, with the bland assertion that “that fact should make no difference.” Ante, p. 485.

It is “that fact,” I submit, which makes all the difference. Under our system of criminal justice the institution of formal, meaningful judicial proceedings, by way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the *494point at which a criminal investigation has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced. It is at this point that the constitutional guarantees attach which pertain to a criminal trial. Among those guarantees are the right to a speedy trial, the right of confrontation, and the right to trial by jury. Another is the guarantee of the assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59.

The confession which the Court today holds inadmissible was a voluntary one. It was given during the course of a perfectly legitimate police investigation of an unsolved murder. The Court says that what happened during this investigation “affected” the trial. I had always supposed that the whole purpose of a police investigation of a murder was to “affect” the trial of the murderer, and that it would be only an incompetent, unsuccessful, or corrupt investigation which would not do so. The Court further says that the Illinois police officers did not advise the petitioner of his “constitutional rights” before he confessed to the murder. This Court has never held that the Constitution requires the police to give any “advice” under circumstances such as these.

Supported by no stronger authority than its own rhetoric, the Court today converts a routine police investigation of an unsolved murder into a distorted analogue of a judicial trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts historically applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so, I think the Court perverts those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital interests of society in preserving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police investigation.

Like my Brother ClaRK, I cannot escape the logic of my Brother White’s conclusions as to the extraordinary implications which emanate from the Court’s opinion in *495this case, and I share their views as to the untold and highly unfortunate impact today’s decision may have upon the fair administration of criminal justice. I can only hope we have completely misunderstood what the Court has said.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart join,

dissenting.

In Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, the Court held that as of the date of the indictment the prosecution is disentitled to secure admissions from the accused. The Court now moves that date back to the time when the prosecution begins to “focus” on the accused. Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own counsel, cf. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, or has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation. Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506. At the very least the Court holds that once the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has waived his right to counsel. The decision is thus another major step in the direction of the goal which the Court seemingly has in mind — to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not. It does of course put us one step “ahead” of the English judges who have had the good sense to leave the matter a discretionary one with the trial court.* I reject this step and *496the invitation to go farther which the Court has now issued.

By abandoning the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of confessions, the Court seems driven by the notion that it is uncivilized law enforcement to use an accused’s own admissions against him at his trial. It attempts to find a home for this new and nebulous rule of due process by attaching it to the right to counsel guaranteed in the federal system by the Sixth Amendment and binding upon the States by virtue of the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra. The right to counsel now not only entitles the accused to counsel’s advice and aid in preparing for trial but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation once the accused has become a suspect. From that very moment apparently his right to counsel attaches, a rule wholly unworkable and impossible to administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side. I would not abandon the Court’s prior cases defining with some care and analysis the circumstances requiring the presence or aid of counsel and substitute the amorphous and wholly unworkable principle that counsel is constitutionally required whenever he would or could be helpful. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59; Gideon v. *497Wainwright, supra. These cases dealt with the requirement of counsel at proceedings in which definable rights could be won or lost, not with stages where probative evidence might be obtained. Under this new approach one might just as well argue that a potential defendant is constitutionally entitled to a lawyer before, not after, he commits a crime, since it is then that crucial incriminating evidence is put within the reach of the Government by the would-be accused. Until now there simply has been no right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution to be free from the use at trial of a voluntary admission made prior to indictment.

It is incongruous to assume that the provision for counsel in the Sixth Amendment was meant to amend or supersede the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment, which is now applicable to the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. That amendment addresses itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions of an accused and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements. Neither the Framers, the constitutional language, a century of decisions of this Court nor Professor Wigmore provides an iota of support for the idea that an accused has an absolute constitutional right not to answer even in the absence of compulsion — the constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making voluntary disclosures.

Today’s decision cannot be squared with other provisions of the Constitution which, in my view, define the system of criminal justice this Court is empowered to administer. The Fourth Amendment permits upon probable cause even compulsory searches of the suspect and his possessions and the use of the fruits of the search at trial, all in the absence of counsel. The Fifth Amendment and state constitutional provisions authorize, indeed require, inquisitorial grand jury proceedings at which a potential defendant, in the absence of counsel, *498is shielded against no more than compulsory incrimination. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F. 2d 566, 578 (C. A. 1st Cir.); United States v. Benjamin, 120 F. 2d 521, 522 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, 115 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 (D. C. M. D. Pa.). A grand jury witness, who may be a suspect, is interrogated and his answers, at least until today, are admissible in evidence at trial. And these provisions have been thought of as constitutional safeguards to persons suspected of an offense. Furthermore, until now, the Constitution has permitted the accused to be fingerprinted and to be identified in a line-up or in the courtroom itself.

The Court chooses to ignore these matters and to rely on the virtues and morality of a system of criminal law enforcement which does not depend on the “confession.” No such judgment is to be found in the Constitution. It might be appropriate for a legislature to provide that a suspect should not be consulted during a criminal investigation ; that an accused should never be called before a grand jury to answer, even if he wants to, what may well be incriminating questions; and that no person, whether he be a suspect, guilty criminal or innocent bystander, should be put to the ordeal of responding to orderly non-compulsory inquiry by the State. But this is not the system our Constitution requires. The only “inquisitions” the Constitution forbids are those which compel incrimination. Escobedo’s statements were not compelled and the Court does not hold that they were.

This new American judges’ rule, which is to be applied in both federal and state courts, is perhaps thought to be a necessary safeguard against the possibility of extorted confessions. To this extent it reflects a deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers everywhere, unsupported by relevant data or current material based upon our own *499experience. Obviously law enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today’s decision shows that even judges can do, but I have somewhat more faith than the Court evidently has in the ability and desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts to discern and correct such violations of the law.

The Court may be concerned with a narrower matter: the unknowing defendant who responds to police questioning because he mistakenly believes that he must and that his admissions will not be used against him. But this worry hardly calls for the broadside the Court has now fired. The failure to inform an accused that he need not answer and that his answers may be used against him is very relevant indeed to whether the disclosures are compelled. Cases in this Court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional rights. If an accused is told he must answer and does not know better, it would be very doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against him. When the accused has not been informed of his rights at all the Court characteristically and properly looks very closely at the surrounding circumstances. See Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560. I would continue to do so. But in this case Danny Escobedo knew full well that he did not have to answer and knew full well that his lawyer had advised him not to answer.

I do not suggest for a moment that law enforcement will be destroyed by the rule announced today. The need for peace and order is too insistent for that. But it will be crippled and its task made a great deal more difficult, all in my opinion, for unsound, unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of the provisions of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice Fortas

delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona affirming the *4dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P. 2d 760 (1965). The petition sought the release of Gerald Francis Gault, appellants’ 15-year-old son, who had been committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School by the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed dismissal of the writ against various arguments which included an attack upon the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code because of its alleged denial of procedural due process rights to juveniles charged with being “delinquents.” The court agreed that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law is applicable in such proceedings. It held that Arizona’s Juvenile Code is to be read as “impliedly” implementing the “due process concept.” It then proceeded to identify and describe “the particular elements which constitute due process in a juvenile hearing.” It concluded that the proceedings ending in commitment of Gerald Gault did not offend those requirements. We do not agree, and we reverse. We begin with a statement of the facts.

I.

On Monday, June 8, 1964, at about 10 a. m., Gerald Francis Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County. Gerald was then still subject to a six months’ probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964, as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady’s purse. The police action on June 8 was taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs. Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers made lewd or indecent remarks. It will suffice for purposes of this opinion to say that the remarks or questions put to her were of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety.

*5At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children’s Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at about 6 o’clock, Gerald was not there. Gerald’s older brother was sent to look for him at the trailer home of the Lewis family. He apparently learned then that Gerald was in custody. He so informed his mother. The two of them went to the Detention Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault “why Jerry was there” and said that a hearing would be held in Juvenile Court at 3 o’clock the following day, June 9.

Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day, June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults. Indeed, none of them saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964. The petition was entirely formal. It made no reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It recited only that “said minor is under the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the protection of this Honorable Court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor.” It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding “the care and custody of said minor.” Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the petition.

On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald’s father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. Our information about the proceed*6ings and the subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge,1 Mr. and Mrs. Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding conducted two months later. From this, it appears that at the June 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone call. There was conflict as to what he said. His mother recalled that Gerald said he only dialed Mrs. Cook’s number and handed the telephone to his friend, Ronald. Officer Flagg recalled that Gerald had admitted making the lewd remarks. Judge McGhee testified that Gerald “admitted making one of these [lewd] statements.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he would “think about it.” Gerald was taken back to the Detention Home. He was not sent to his own home with his parents. On June 11 or 12, after having been detained since June 8, Gerald was released and driven home.2 There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he was released. At 5 p. m. on the day of Gerald’s release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows:

“Mrs. Gault:

“Judge McGHEE has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 A. M. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald’s delinquency

“/s/Flagg”

*7At the appointed time on Monday, June 15, Gerald, his father and mother, Ronald Lewis and his father, and Officers Flagg and Henderson were present before Judge McGhee. Witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding differed in their recollections of Gerald’s testimony at the June 15 hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Gault recalled that Gerald again testified that he had only dialed the number and that the other boy had made the remarks. Officer Flagg agreed that at this hearing Gerald did not admit -making the lewd remarks.3 But Judge McGhee recalled that “there was some admission again of some of the lewd statements. He — he didn’t admit any of the more serious lewd statements.”4 Again, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. Mrs. Gault asked that Mrs. Cook be present “so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone.” The Juvenile Judge said “she didn’t have to be present at that hearing.” The judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or communicate with her at any time. Probation Officer Flagg had talked to her once — over the telephone on June 9.

At this June 15 hearing a “referral report” made by the probation officers was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This listed the charge as “Lewd Phone Calls.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner dis*8charged by due process of law.” An order to that effect was entered. It recites that “after a full hearing and due deliberation the Court finds that said minor is a delinquent child, and that said minor is of the age of 15 years.”

No appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and referred by it to the Superior Court for hearing.

At the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, Judge McGhee was vigorously cross-examined as to the basis for his actions. He testified that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on probation. He was asked “under what section of . . . the code you found the boy delinquent?”

His answer is set forth in the margin.5 In substance, he concluded that Gerald came within ARS § 8-201-6 (a), which specifies that a “delinquent child” includes one “who has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof.” The law which Gerald was found to have violated is ARS § 13-377. This section of the Arizona Criminal Code provides that a person who “in the presence or hearing of any woman or child . . . uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would *9apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. The judge also testified that he acted under ARS § 8-201-6 (d) which includes in the definition of a “delinquent child” one who, as the judge phrased it, is “habitually involved in immoral matters.”6

Asked about the basis for his conclusion that Gerald was “habitually involved in immoral matters,” the judge testified, somewhat vaguely, that two years earlier, on July 2, 1962, a “referral” was made concerning Gerald, “where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it.” The judge said there was “no hearing,” and “no accusation” relating to this incident, “because of lack of material foundation.” But it seems to have remained in his mind as a relevant factor. The judge also testified that Gerald had admitted making other nuisance phone calls in the past which, as the judge recalled the boy’s testimony, were “silly calls, or funny calls, or something like that.”

The Superior Court dismissed the writ, and appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. That court stated that it considered appellants’ assignments of error as urging (1) that the Juvenile Code, ARS § 8-201 to § 8-239, is unconstitutional because it does not require that parents and children be apprised of the specific charges, does not require proper notice of a hearing, and does not provide for an appeal; and (2) that the proceed*10ings and order relating to Gerald constituted a denial of due process of law because of the absence of adequate notice of the charge and the hearing; failure to notify appellants of certain constitutional rights including the rights to counsel and to confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination; the use of unsworn hearsay testimony; and the failure to make a record of the proceedings. Appellants further asserted that it was error for the Juvenile Court to remove Gerald from the custody of his parents without a showing and finding of their unsuitability, and alleged a miscellany of other errors under state law.

The Supreme Court handed down an elaborate and wide-ranging opinion affirming dismissal of the writ and stating the court’s conclusions as to the issues raised by appellants and other aspects of the juvenile process. In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this Court, appellants do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied:

1. Notice of the charges;

2. Right to counsel;

3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;

4. Privilege against self-incrimination ;

5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and

6. Right to appellate review.

We shall not consider other issues which were passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. We emphasize *11that we indicate no opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to such other issues does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal Constitution.7

*12II.

The Supreme Court of Arizona held that due process of law is requisite to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a court reaches the conclusion that a juvenile has been at fault, has engaged in conduct prohibited by law, or has otherwise misbehaved with the consequence that he is committed to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed. This conclusion is in accord with the decisions of a number of courts under both federal and state constitutions.8

This Court has not heretofore decided the precise question. In Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541 (1966), we considered the requirements for a valid waiver of the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia so that a juvenile could be tried in the adult criminal court of the District. Although our decision turned upon the language of the statute, we emphasized the necessity that “the basic requirements of due process and fairness” be satisfied in such proceedings.9 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948), involved the admissibility, in a state criminal court of general jurisdiction, of a confession by a 15-year-old boy. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to *13prohibit the use of the coerced confession. Mr. Justice Douglas said, “Neither naan nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.” 10 To the same effect is Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 (1962). Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.

We do not in this opinion consider -the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile “delinquents.” For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dis-positional process. See note 48, infra. We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a “delinquent” as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution. As to these proceedings, there appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play.11 The problem is to ascertain *14the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.

From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated — indeed insisted upon— between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. In addition to the specific problems involved in the present case, for example, it has been held that the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury.12 It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.13

The history and theory underlying this development are well-known, but a recapitulation is necessary for purposes of this opinion. The Juvenile Court movement began in this country at the end of the last century. From the juvenile court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.14 The con-*15stitutionaUty of Juvenile Court laws has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.15

The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was “guilty” or “innocent,” but “What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.” 16 The child — essentially good, as they saw it — was to be made “to feel that he is the object of [the state’s] care and solicitude,” 17 not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was *16to be “treated” and “rehabilitated” and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be “clinical” rather than punitive.

These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae.18 The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child.19 But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders.20 In these old days, *17the state was not deemed to have authority to- accord them fewer procedural rights than adults.

The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right “not to liberty but to custody.” He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions — that is, if the child is “delinquent” — the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the “custody” to which the child is entitled.21 On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as “civil” not “criminal” and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.22

Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is — to say the least — debatable. And in practice, as we remarked in the Kent case, supra, the results have *18not been entirely satisfactory.23 Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: “The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts . . . .”24 The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have fre*19quently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: “Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process.” 25

Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate *20or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.26 As Mr. Justice *21Frankfurter has said: “The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”27 But in addition, the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data. “Procedure is to law what ‘scientific method’ is to science.” 28

It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process.29 But it is important, we think, that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings *22as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. This Commission’s Report states:

“In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously. In 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice before.” Id., at 773.

Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which we have referred {supra, n. 26), could not lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion.30 Further, we are *23told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a “criminal.” The juvenile offender is now classed as a “delinquent.” There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, *24however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term “criminal” applied to adults.31 It is also emphasized that in practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment.32 There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions.

Beyond this, it is frequently said that juveniles are protected by the process from disclosure of their devia-tional behavior. As the Supreme Court of Arizona phrased it in the present case, the summary procedures of Juvenile Courts are sometimes defended by a statement that it is the law’s policy “to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.” This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than reality. Disclosure of court records is discretionary with the judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory restrictions almost invariably apply only to the court records, and even as to those the evidence is that many courts routinely furnish information to the FBI and the military, and on request to government agencies and even to private employers.33 Of more importance are police records. In most States the police keep a complete file of juvenile “police contacts” and have complete discretion as to disclosure of *25juvenile records. Police departments receive requests for information from the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service agencies, and most of them generally comply.34 Private employers word their application forms to produce information concerning juvenile arrests and court proceedings, and in some jurisdictions information concerning juvenile police contacts is furnished private employers as well as government agencies.35

In any event, there is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision for the confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles. It is interesting to note, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court used the confidentiality argument as a justification for the type of notice which is here attacked as inadequate for due process purposes. The parents were given merely general notice that their child was charged with “delinquency.” No facts were specified. The Arizona court held, however, as we shall discuss, that in addition to this general “notice,” the child and his parents fnust be advised “of the facts involved in the case” no later than the initial hearing by the judge. Obviously, this does not “bury” the word about the child’s transgressions. It merely defers the time of disclosure to a point when it is of limited use to the child or his parents in preparing his defense or explanation.

Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception *26of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help “to save him from a downward career.” 36 Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness — -in short, the essentials of due process — may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. For example, in a recent study, the sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell observe that when the procedural laxness of the “parens patriae” attitude is followed by stern disciplining, the contrast may have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that he has been deceived or enticed. They conclude as follows: “Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.” 37 Of course, it is not suggested that juvenile court judges should fail appropriately to take account, in their demeanor and conduct, of the emotional and psychological attitude of the juveniles with whom they *27are confronted. While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite, nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the disposition of the delinquent child.

Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence — and of limited practical meaning— that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a “receiving home” or an “industrial school” for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes “a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . . . .” 38 Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and “delinquents” confined with him for anything from waywardness 39 to rape and homicide.

In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and *28the exercise of care implied in the phrase “due process.” Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it — was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected? 40 Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions.41 Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us, except for some conversation with Gerald about his school work and his “wanting to go to . . . Grand Canyon with his father,” the points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be in*29volved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute.42 The essential difference between Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald’s case. The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18.

If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings.43 For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six years. If he had been over 18 and had committed an offense to which such a sentence might apply, he would have been entitled to substantial rights under the Constitution of the United States as well as under Arizona’s laws and constitution. The United States Constitution would guarantee him rights and protections with respect to arrest, search and seizure, and pretrial interrogation. It would assure him of specific notice of the charges and adequate time to decide his course of action and to prepare his defense. He would be entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by counsel, and, at least if a felony were involved, the State would be required to provide counsel if his parents were unable to afford it. If the court acted on the basis of his confession, careful procedures would be required to assure its volun-tariness. If the case went to trial, confrontation and opportunity for cross-examination would be guaranteed. So wide a gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere *30verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than cliché can provide. As Wheeler and Cottrell have put it, “The rhetoric of the juvenile court movement has developed without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of court and institutional routines.” 44

In Kent v. United States, supra, we stated that the Juvenile Court Judge’s exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not unlimited. We said that “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.”45 With respect to the waiver by the Juvenile Court to the adult court of jurisdiction over an offense committed by a youth, we said that “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.”46 We announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that while “We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” 47 We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of “delinquency,” as a requirement *31which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution.48

We now turn to the specific issues which are presented to us in the present case.

III.

Notice of Charges.

Appellants allege that the Arizona Juvenile Code is unconstitutional or alternatively that the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were constitutionally defective because of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. No notice was given to Gerald’s parents when he was taken into custody on Monday, June 8. On that night, when Mrs. Gault went to the Detention Home, she was orally informed that there would be a hearing the next afternoon and was told the reason why Gerald was in custody. The only written notice Gerald’s parents received at any time was a note on plain paper from Officer Flagg delivered on Thursday or Friday, June 11 or 12, to the effect that the judge had set Monday, June 15, “for further Hearings on Gerald’s delinquency.”

A “petition” was filed with the court on June 9 by Officer Flagg, reciting only that he was informed and believed that “said minor is a delinquent minor and that it is necessary that some order be made by the Honorable Court for said minor’s welfare.” The applicable Arizona *32statute provides for a petition to be filed in Juvenile Court, alleging in general terms that the child is “neglected, dependent or delinquent.” The statute explicitly states that such a general allegation is sufficient, “without alleging the facts.” 49 There is no requirement that the petition be served and it was not served upon, given to, or shown to Gerald or his parents.50

The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected appellants’ claim that due process was denied because of inadequate notice. It stated that “Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge against Gerald from the day he was taken to the detention home.” The court also pointed out that the Gaults appeared at the two hearings “without objection.” The court held that because “the policy of the juvenile law is to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past,” advance notice of the specific charges or basis for taking the juvenile into custody and for the hearing is not necessary. It held that the appropriate rule is that “the infant and his parent or guardian will receive a petition only reciting a conclusion of delinquency.[51] But no later than the initial hearing by the judge, they must be advised of the facts involved in the *33case. If the charges are denied, they must be given a reasonable period of time to prepare.”

We cannot agree with the court’s conclusion that adequate notice was given in this case. Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must “set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” 52 It is obvious, as we have discussed above, that no purpose of shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for hearing is served by the procedure approved by the court below. The “initial hearing” in the present case was a hearing on the merits. Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described— that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.53 It does *34not allow a hearing to bo held in which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet. Nor, in the circumstances of this case, can it reasonably be said that the requirement of notice was waived.54

IV.

Right to Counsel.

Appellants charge that the Juvenile Court proceedings were fatally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their right to counsel, and proceeded with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in the absence of counsel for the child and his parents or an express waiver of the right thereto. The Supreme Court of Arizona pointed out that “[t]here is disagreement [among the various jurisdictions] as to whether the court must advise the infant *35that he has a right to counsel.” 55 It noted its own decision in Arizona State Dept. of Public Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P. 2d 298 (1956), to the effect “that the parents of an infant in a juvenile proceeding cannot be denied representation by counsel of their choosing.” (Emphasis added.) It referred to a provision of the Juvenile Code which it characterized as requiring “that the probation officer shall look after the interests of neglected, delinquent and dependent children,” including representing their interests in court.56 The court argued that “The parent and the probation officer may be relied upon to protect the infant’s interests.” Accordingly it rejected the proposition that “due process requires that an infant have a right to counsel.” It said that juvenile courts have the discretion, but not the duty, to allow such representation; it referred specifically to the situation in which the Juvenile Court discerns conflict between the child and his parents as an instance in which this discretion might be exercised. We do not agree. Proba*36tion officers, in the Arizona scheme, are also arresting officers. They initiate proceedings and file petitions which they verify, as here, alleging the delinquency of the child; and they testify, as here, against the child. And here the probation officer was also superintendent of the Detention Home. The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the judge represent the child. There is no material difference in this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort here involved. In adult proceedings, this contention has been foreclosed by decisions of this Court.57 A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be “delinquent” and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,58 to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” 59 Just as in Kent v. United States, supra, at 561-562, we indicated our agreement with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the assistance of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it is equally essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of incarceration *37in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.60

During the last decade, court decisions,61 experts,62 and legislatures63 have demonstrated increasing recognition of this view. In at least one-third of the States, statutes *38now provide for the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, notice of the right, or assignment of counsel, or a combination of these. In other States, court rules have similar provisions.64

The President’s Crime Commission has recently recommended that in order to assure “procedural justice for the child,” it is necessary that “Counsel... be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent.” 65 As stated by the authoritative “Standards *39for Juvenile and Family Courts,” published by the Children’s Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:

“As a component part of a fair hearing required by due process guaranteed under the 14th amendment, notice of the right to counsel should be required at all hearings and counsel provided upon request when the family is financially unable to employ counsel.” Standards, p. 57.

*40This statement was “reviewed” by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges at its 1965 Convention and they “found no fault” with it.66 The New York Family Court Act contains the following statement:

“This act declares that minors have a right to the assistance of counsel of their own choosing or of law guardians1[67] in neglect proceedings under article three and in proceedings to determine juvenile delinquency and whether a person is in need of supervision under article seven. This declaration is based on a finding that counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition.” 68

The Act provides that “At the commencement of any hearing” under the delinquency article of the statute, the juvenile and his parent shall be advised of the juvenile’s *41“right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or his parent ... or by a law guardian assigned by the court . . . .”69 The California Act (1961) also requires appointment of counsel.70

We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.

At the habeas corpus proceeding,- Mrs. Gault testified that she knew that she could have appeared with counsel *42at the juvenile hearing. This knowledge is not a waiver of the right to counsel which she and her juvenile son had, as we have defined it. They had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether they did or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to employ counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the potential commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they chose waiver. Mrs. Gault’s knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment” of a fully known right.71

Y.

Confrontation, Self-Incrimination, Cross-Examination .

Appellants urge that the writ of habeas corpus should have been granted because of the denial of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the Juvenile Court hearings, and because the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed. The Juvenile Court Judge testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he had proceeded on the basis of Gerald’s admissions at the two hearings. Appellants attack this on the ground that the admissions were obtained in disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination.72 If the confession is disregarded, appellants argue that the delinquency conclusion, since it was fundamentally based on a finding that Gerald had made lewd remarks during the phone call to Mrs. Cook, is fatally defective for failure to accord the rights of confrontation and cross-examination which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the *43Federal Constitution guarantees in state proceedings generally.73

Our first question, then, is whether Gerald’s admission was improperly obtained and relied on as the basis of decision, in conflict with the Federal Constitution. For this purpose, it is necessary briefly to recall the relevant facts.

Mrs. Cook, the complainant, and the recipient of the alleged telephone call, was not called as a witness. Gerald’s mother asked the Juvenile Court Judge why Mrs. Cook was not present and the judge replied that “she didn’t have to be present.” So far as appears, Mrs. Cook was spoken to only once, by Officer Flagg, and this was by telephone. The judge did not speak with her on any occasion. Gerald had been questioned by the probation officer after having been taken into custody. The exact circumstances of this questioning do not appear but any admissions Gerald may have made at this time do not appear in the record.74 Gerald was also questioned by the Juvenile Court Judge at each of the two hearings. The judge testified in the habeas corpus proceeding that Gerald admitted making “some of the lewd statements . . . [but not] any of the more serious lewd statements.” There was conflict and uncertainty among the witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding — the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault, and the probation officer — as to what Gerald did or did not admit.

We shall assume that Gerald made admissions of the sort described by the Juvenile Court Judge, as quoted above. Neither Gerald nor his parents were advised that *44he did not have to testify or make a statement, or that an incriminating statement might result in his commitment as a “delinquent.”

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected appellants’ contention that Gerald had a right to be advised that he need not incriminate himself. It said: “We think the necessary flexibility for individualized treatment will be enhanced by a rule which does not require the judge to advise the infant of a privilege against self-incrimination.”

In reviewing this conclusion of Arizona’s Supreme Court, we emphasize again that we are here concerned only with a proceeding to determine whether a minor is a “delinquent” and which may result in commitment to a state institution. Specifically, the question is whether, in such a proceeding, an admission by the juvenile may be used against him in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent. In light of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), we must also consider whether, if the privilege against self-incrimination is available, it can effectively be waived unless counsel is present or the right to counsel has been waived.

It has long been recognized that the eliciting and use of confessions or admissions require careful scrutiny. Dean Wigmore states:

“The ground of distrust of confessions made in certain situations is, in a rough and indefinite way, judicial experience. There has been no careful collection of statistics of untrue confessions, nor has any great number of instances been even loosely reported . . . but enough have been verified to fortify the conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct, that under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or peculiar *45temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives between which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk that may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some worse alternative associated with silence.

“The principle, then, upon which a confession may be excluded is that it is, under certain conditions, testimonially untrustworthy .... [T]he essential feature is that the principle of exclusion is a testimonial one, analogous to the other principles which exclude narrations as untrustworthy .. ..” 75

This Court has emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, where this Court reversed the conviction of a 15-year-old boy for murder, Mr. Justice Douglas said:

“What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child — an easy victim of the law — is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might stand the ordeal from midnight *46to 5 a. m. But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him. No friend stood at the side of this 15-year-old boy as the police, working in relays, questioned him hour after hour, from midnight until dawn. No lawyer stood guard to make sure that the police went so far and no farther, to see to it that they stopped short of the point where he became the victim of coercion. No counsel or friend was called during the critical hours of questioning.” 76

In Haley, as we have discussed, the boy was convicted in an adult court, and not a juvenile court. In notable decisions, the New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of New Jersey have recently considered decisions of Juvenile Courts in which boys have been adjudged “delinquent” on the basis of confessions obtained in circumstances comparable to those in Haley. In both instances, the State contended before its highest tribunal that constitutional requirements governing inculpatory statements applicable in adult courts do not apply to juvenile proceedings. In each case, the State’s contention was rejected, and the juvenile court’s determination of delinquency was set aside on the grounds of inadmissibility of the confession. In the Matters of Gregory W. and Gerald S., 19 N. Y. 2d 55, 224 N. E. 2d 102 (1966) (opinion by Keating, J.), and In the Interests of Carlo and Stasilowicz, 48 N. J. 224, 225 A. 2d 110 (1966) (opinion by Proctor, J.).

*47The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and — in a philosophical sense— insists upon the equality of the individual and the state.77 In other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.78'

It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. As Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 94 (1964):

“The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ... it protects any dis*48closures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." 79 (Emphasis added.)

With respect to juveniles, both common observation and expert opinion emphasize that the “distrust of confessions made in certain situations” to which Dean Wig-more referred in the passage quoted supra, at 44-45, is imperative in the case of children from an early age through adolescence. In New York, for example, the recently enacted Family Court Act provides that the juvenile and his parents must be advised at the start of the hearing of his right to remain silent.80 The New York statute also provides that the police must attempt to communicate with the juvenile’s parents before questioning him,81 and that absent “special circumstances” a confession may not be obtained from a child prior to notifying his parents or relatives and releasing the child either to them or to the Family Court.82 In In the Matters of Gregory W. and Gerald S., referred to above, the New York Court of Appeals held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies in juvenile delinquency cases and requires the exclusion of involuntary confessions, and that People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 *49(1932), holding the contrary, had been specifically overruled by statute.

The authoritative “Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts” concludes that, “Whether or not transfer to the criminal court is a possibility, certain procedures should always be followed. Before being interviewed [by the police], the child and his parents should be informed of his right to have legal counsel present and to refuse to answer questions or be fingerprinted [83] if he should so decide.” 84

Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued that juvenile proceedings are “civil” and not “criminal,” and therefore the privilege should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, is that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” However, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be inculpatory.85

It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to “criminal” involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine “delinquency,” which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as “criminal” for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold *50otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the “civil” label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over half of the States, there is not even assurance that the juvenile will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult “criminals.” In those States juveniles may be placed in or transferred to adult penal institutions86 after having been found “delinquent” by a juvenile court. For this purpose, at least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one’s will, whether it is called “criminal” or “civil.” And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be “compelled” to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty — a- command which this Court has broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind’s battle for freedom.87

In addition, apart from the equivalence for this purpose of exposure to commitment as a juvenile, delinquent and exposure to imprisonment as an adult offender, the fact of the matter is that there is little or no assurance in Arizona, as in most if not all of the States, that a juvenile apprehended and interrogated by the police or even by the Juvenile Court itself will remain outside of the reach of adult courts as a consequence of the offense for which he has been taken into custody. In Arizona, as in other States, provision is made for Juvenile Courts to relinquish *51or waive jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal courts.88 In the present case, when Gerald Gault was interrogated concerning violation of a section of the Arizona Criminal Code, it could not be certain that the Juvenile Court Judge would decide to “suspend” criminal prosecution in court for adults by proceeding to an adjudication in Juvenile Court.89

It is also urged, as the Supreme Court of Arizona here asserted, that the juvenile and presumably his parents should not be advised of the juvenile’s right to silence because confession is good for the child as the commencement of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, and he should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and confidence toward the officials of the juvenile process. This proposition has been subjected to widespread challenge on the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities of the handling of juvenile offenders.

In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in “individualized treatment,” as the court below put it, and that compelling the child to answer questions, without - warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or any other good purpose. In light of the observations of Wheeler and Cottrell,90 and others, it seems probable that where children are induced to confess by “paternal” urgings on the part of officials and the confession is then fol*52lowed by disciplinary action, the child’s reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse — the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and that despite his confession, he is being punished.91

Further, authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of “confessions” by children. This Court’s observations in Haley v. Ohio are set forth above. The recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals referred to above, In the Matters of Gregory W. and Gerald S., deals with a dramatic and, it is to be hoped, extreme example. Two 12-year-old Negro boys were taken into custody for the brutal assault and rape of two aged domestics, one of whom died as the result of the attack. One of the boys was schizophrenic and had been locked in the security ward of a mental institution at the time of the attacks. By a process that may best be described as bizarre, his confession was obtained by the police. A psychiatrist testified that the boy would admit “whatever he thought' was expected so that he could get out of the immediate situation.” The other 12-year-old also “confessed.” Both confessions were in specific detail, albeit they contained various inconsistencies. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Keating, J., concluded that the confessions were products of the will of the police instead- of the boys. The confessions were therefore held involuntary and the order of the Appellate -Division affirming the order of the Family Court adjudging the defendants to be juvenile delinquents was reversed.

A similar and equally instructive case has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In the Interests of Carlo and Stasilowics, supra. The body of a 10-year-old girl was found. She had been strangled. Neighborhood boys who knew the girl were questioned. *53The two appellants, aged 13 and 15, confessed to the police, with vivid detail and some inconsistencies. At the Juvenile Court hearing, both denied any complicity in the killing. They testified that their confessions were the product of fear and fatigue due to extensive police grilling. The Juvenile Court Judge found that the confessions were voluntary and admissible. On appeal, in an extensive opinion by Proctor, J., the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. It rejected the State’s argument that the constitutional safeguard of voluntariness governing the use of confessions does not apply in proceedings before the Juvenile Court. It pointed out that under New Jersey court rules, juveniles under the age of 16 accused of committing a homicide are tried in a proceeding which “has all of the appurtenances of a criminal trial,” including participation by the county prosecutor, and requirements that the juvenile be provided with counsel, that a stenographic record be made, etc. It also pointed out that under New Jersey law, the confinement of the boys after reaching age 21 could be extended until they had served the maximum sentence which could have been imposed on an adult for such a homicide, here found to be second-degree murder carrying up to 30 years’ imprisonment.92 The court concluded that the confessions were involuntary, stressing that the boys, contrary to statute, were placed in the police station and there interrogated;93 that the parents of both boys were not allowed to see them while they *54were being interrogated;94 that inconsistencies appeared among the various statements of the boys and with the objective evidence of the crime; and that there were protracted periods of questioning. The court noted the State’s contention that both boys were advised of their constitutional rights before they made their statements, but it held that this should not be given “significant weight in our determination of voluntariness.” 95 Accordingly, the judgment of the Juvenile Court was reversed.

In a recent case before the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, Judge Ketcham rejected the proffer of evidence as to oral statements made at police headquarters by four juveniles who had been taken into custody for alleged involvement in an assault and attempted robbery. In the Matter of Four Youths, Nos. 28-776-J, 28-778-J, 28-783-J, 28-859-J, Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, April 7, 1961. The court explicitly stated that it did not rest its decision on a showing that *55the statements were involuntary, but because they were untrustworthy. Judge Ketchamsaid:

“Simply stated, the Court's decision in this ease rests upon the considered opinion — after nearly four busy years on the Juvenile Court bench during which the testimony of thousands of such juveniles has been heard — that the statements of adolescents under 18 years of age who are arrested and charged with violations of law are frequently untrustworthy and often distort the truth.”

We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique — but not in principle — depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.96

*56The “confession” of Gerald Gault was first obtained by Officer Flagg, out of the presence of Gerald’s parents, without counsel and without advising him of his right to silence, as far as appears. The judgment of the Juvenile ■ Court was stated by the judge to be based on Gerald’s admissions in court. Neither “admission” was reduced to writing, and, to say the least, the process by which the “admissions” were obtained and received must be characterized as lacking the certainty and order which are required of proceedings of such formidable consequences.97 Apart from the “admissions,” there was nothing upon which a judgment or finding might be based. There was no sworn testimony. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not present. The Arizona Supreme Court held that “sworn testimony must be required of all witnesses including police officers, probation officers and others who are part of or officially related to the juvenile court structure.” We hold that this is not enough. No reason is suggested or appears for a different rule in respect of sworn testimony in juvenile courts than in adult tribunals. Absent a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination were essential for a finding of “delinquency” and an order committing Gerald to a state institution for a maximum of six years.

The recommendations in the Children’s Bureau’s “Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts” are in general accord with our conclusions. They state that testimony should be under oath and that only competent, material and relevant evidence under rules applicable *57to civil cases should be admitted in evidence.98 The New York Family Court Act contains a similar provision.99

As we said in Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554 (1966), with respect to waiver proceedings, “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony . . . We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.

VI.

Appellate Review and Transcript of Proceedings.

Appellants urge that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because, as construed by its Supreme Court, “there is no right of appeal *58from a juvenile court order . . . .” The court held that there is no right to a transcript because there is no right to appeal and because the proceedings are confidential and any record must be destroyed after a prescribed period of time.100 Whether a transcript or other recording is made, it held, is a matter for the discretion of the juvenile court.

This Court has not held that a State is required by the Federal Constitution “to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.” 101 In view of the fact that we must reverse the Supreme Court of Arizona’s affirmance of the dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus for other reasons, we need not rule on this question in the present case or upon the failure to provide a transcript or recording of the hearings — or, indeed, the failure of the Juvenile Judge to state the grounds for his conclusion. Cf. Kent v. United States, supra, at 561, where we said, in the context of a decision of the jhvenile court waiving jurisdiction to the adult court, which by local law, was permissible: “. . . it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor.” As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the juvenile court’s conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him.102

*59For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Me. Justice Black,

concurring.

The juvenile court laws of Arizona and other States, as the Court points out, are the result of plans promoted by humane and forward-looking people to provide a system of courts, procedures, and sanctions deemed to be less harmful and more lenient to children than to adults. For this reason such state laws generally provide less formal and less public methods for the trial of children. In line with this policy, both courts and legislators have shrunk back from labeling these laws as “criminal” and have preferred to call them “civil.” This, in part, was to prevent the full application to juvenile court cases of the Bill of Rights safeguards, including notice as provided in the Sixth Amendment,1 the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth,2 the right against self-*60incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth,3 and the right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth.4 The Court here holds, however, that these four Bill of Rights safeguards apply to protect a juvenile accused in a juvenile court on a charge under which he can be imprisoned for a term of years. This holding strikes a well-nigh fatal blow to much that is unique about the juvenile courts in the Nation. For this reason, there is much to be said for the position of my Brother Stewart that we should not pass on all these issues until they are more squarely presented. But since the majority of the Court chooses to decide all of these questions, I must either do the same or leave my views unexpressed on the important issues determined. In these circumstances, I feel impelled to express my views.

The juvenile court planners envisaged a system that would practically immunize juveniles from “punishment” for “crimes” in an effort to save them from youthful indiscretions and stigmas due to criminal charges or convictions. I agree with the Court, however, that this exalted ideal has failed of achievement since the beginning of the system. Indeed, the state laws from the first one on contained provisions, written in emphatic terms, for arresting and charging juveniles with violations of state criminal laws, as well as for taking juveniles by force of law away from their parents and turning them over to different individuals or groups or for confinement within some state school or institution for a number of years. The latter occurred in this case. Young Gault was arrested and detained on a charge of violating an Arizona penal law by using vile and offensive language to a lady on the telephone. If an adult, he *61could only have been fined or imprisoned for two months for his conduct. As a juvenile, however, he was put through a more or less secret, informal hearing by the court, after which he was ordered, or, more realistically, “sentenced,” to confinement in Arizona’s Industrial School until he reaches 21 years of age. Thus, in a juvenile system designed to lighten or avoid punishment for criminality, he was ordered by the State to six years’ confinement in what is in all but name a penitentiary or jail.

Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly this would be true of an adult defendant, and it would be a plain denial of equal protection of the laws — an invidious discrimination — to hold that others subject to heavier punishments could, because they are children, be denied these same constitutional safeguards. I consequently agree with the Court that the Arizona law as applied here denied to the parents and their son the right of notice, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and right to confront the witnesses against young Gault. Appellants are entitled to these rights, not because “fairness, impartiality and orderliness — in short, the essentials of due process” — require them and not because they are “the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process,” but because they are specifically and unequivocally granted by provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments which the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States.

A few words should be added because of the opinion of my Brother Harlan who rests his concurrence and *62dissent on the Due Process Clause alone. He reads that clause alone as allowing this Court “to determine what forms of procedural protection are necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juvenile proceedings” “in a fashion consistent with the 'traditions and conscience of our people.’ ” Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 166. He believes that the Due Process Clause gives this Court the power, upon weighing a “compelling public interest,” to impose on the States only those specific constitutional rights which the Court deems “imperative” and “necessary” to comport with the Court’s notions of “fundamental fairness.”

I cannot subscribe to any such interpretation of the Due Process Clause. Nothing in its words or its history permits it, and “fair distillations of relevant judicial history” are no substitute for the words and history of the clause itself. The phrase “due process of law” has through the years evolved as the successor in purpose and meaning to the words “law of the land” in Magna Charta which more plainly intended to call for a trial according to the existing law of the land in effect at the time an alleged offense had been committed. That provision in Magna Charta was designed to prevent defendants from being tried according to criminal laws or proclamations specifically promulgated to fit particular cases or to attach new consequences to old conduct. Nothing done since Magna Charta can be pointed to as intimating that the Due Process Clause gives courts power to fashion laws in order to meet new conditions, to fit the “decencies” of changed conditions, or to keep their consciences from being shocked by legislation, state or federal.

And, of course, the existence of such awesome judicial power cannot be buttressed or created by relying on the word “procedural.” Whether labeled as “procedural” or “substantive,” the Bill of Rights safeguards, far from *63being mere “tools with which” other unspecified “rights could be fully vindicated,” are the very vitals of a sound constitutional legal system designed to protect and safeguard the most cherished liberties of a free people. These safeguards were written into our Constitution not by judges but by Constitution makers. Freedom in this Nation will be far less secure the very moment that it is decided that judges can determine which of these safeguards “should” or “should not be imposed” according to their notions of what constitutional provisions are consistent with the “traditions and conscience of our people.” Judges with such power, even though they profess to “proceed with restraint,” will be above the Constitution, with power to write it, not merely to interpret it, which I believe to be the only power constitutionally committed to judges.

There is one ominous sentence, if not more, in my Brother Harlan’s opinion which bodes ill, in my judgment, both for legislative programs and constitutional commands. Speaking of procedural safeguards in the Bill of Rights, he says:

“These factors in combination suggest that legislatures may properly expect only a cautious deference for their procedural judgments, but that, conversely, courts must exercise their special responsibility for procedural guarantees with care to permit ample scope for achieving the purposes of legislative programs. ... [T]he court should necessarily proceed with restraint.”

It is to be noted here that this case concerns Bill of Rights Amendments; that the “procedure” power my Brother Harlan claims for the Court here relates solely to Bill of Rights safeguards; and that he is here claiming for the Court a supreme power to fashion new Bill of Rights safeguards according to the Court’s notions of *64what fits tradition and conscience. I do not believe that the Constitution vests any such power in judges, either in the Due Process Clause or anywhere else. Consequently, I do not vote to invalidate this Arizona law on the ground that it is “unfair” but solely on the ground that it violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 412 (Goldberg, J., concurring). It is enough for me that the Arizona law as here applied collides head-on with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in the four respects mentioned. The only relevance to me of the Due Process Clause is that it would, of course, violate due process or the “law of the land” to enforce a law that collides with the Bill of Rights.

Mr. Justice White,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion except for Part V. I also agree that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings. I do not, however, find an adequate basis in the record for determining whether that privilege was violated in this case. The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being “compelled” in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself. Compulsion is essential to a violation. It may be that when a judge, armed with the authority he has or which people think he has, asks questions of a party or a witness in an adjudicatory hearing, that person, especially if a minor, would feel compelled to answer, absent a warning to the contrary or similar information from some other source. The difficulty is that the record made at the habeas corpus hearing, which is the only information we have concerning the proceedings in the juvenile court, does not directly inform us whether Gerald Gault or his parents were told of Gerald’s right to remain silent; nor does it reveal whether the parties *65were aware of the privilege from some other source, just as they were already aware that they had the right to have the help of counsel and to have witnesses on their behalf. The petition for habeas corpus did not raise the Fifth Amendment issue nor did any of the witnesses focus on it.

I have previously recorded my views with respect to what I have deemed unsound applications of the Fifth Amendment. See, for example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 526, and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 33, dissenting opinions. These views, of course, have not prevailed. But I do hope that the Court will proceed with some care in extending the privilege, with all its vigor, to proceedings in juvenile court, particularly the nonadjudicatory stages of those proceedings.

In any event, I would not reach the Fifth Amendment issue here. I think the Court is clearly ill-advised to review this case on the basis of Miranda v. Arizona, since the adjudication of delinquency took place in 1964, long before the Miranda decision. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719. Under these circumstances, this case is a poor vehicle for resolving a difficult problem. Moreover, no prejudice to appellants is at stake in this regard. The judgment below must be reversed on other grounds and in the event further proceedings are to be had, Gerald Gault will have counsel available to advise him.

For somewhat similar reasons, I would not reach the questions of confrontation and cross-examination which are also dealt with in Part V of the opinion.

Me. Justice Hablan,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Each of the 50 States has created a system of juvenile or family courts, in which distinctive rules are employed and special consequences imposed. The jurisdiction of *66these courts commonly extends both to cases which the States have withdrawn from the ordinary processes of criminal justice, and to cases which involve acts that, if performed by an adult, would not be penalized as criminal. Such courts are denominated civil, not criminal, and are characteristically said not to administer criminal penalties. One consequence of these systems, at least as Arizona construes its own, is that certain of the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Constitution are withheld from juveniles. This case brings before this Court for the first time the question of what limitations the Constitution places upon the operation of such tribunals.1 For reasons which follow, I have concluded that the Court has gone too far in some respects, and fallen short in others, in assessing the procedural requirements demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.

I.

I must first acknowledge that I am unable to determine with any certainty by what standards the Court decides that Arizona’s juvenile courts do not satisfy the obligations of due process. The Court’s premise, itself the product of reasoning which is not described, is that the “constitutional and theoretical basis” of state systems of juvenile and family courts is “debatable”; it buttresses these doubts by marshaling a body of opinion which suggests that the accomplishments of these courts have often fallen short of expectations.2 The Court does not *67indicate at what points or for what purposes Such views, held either by it or by other observers, might be pertinent to the present issues. Its failure to provide any discernible standard for the measurement of due process in relation to juvenile proceedings unfortunately might be understood to mean that the Court is concerned principally with the wisdom of having such courts at all.

If this is the source of the Court’s dissatisfaction, I cannot share it. I should have supposed that the constitutionality of juvenile courts was beyond proper question under the standards now employed to assess the substantive validity of state legislation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It can scarcely be doubted that it is within the State’s competence to adopt measures reasonably calculated to meet more effectively the persistent problems of juvenile delinquency; as the opinion for the Court makes abundantly plain, these are among the most vexing and ominous of the concerns which now face communities throughout the country.

The proper issue here is, however, not whether the State may constitutionally treat juvenile offenders through a system of specialized courts, but whether the proceedings in Arizona’s juvenile courts include procedural guarantees which satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Among the first premises of our constitutional system is the obligation to conduct any proceeding in which an individual may be deprived of liberty or property in a fashion consistent with the “traditions and conscience of our people.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105. The importance of these procedural guarantees is doubly intensified here. First, many of the problems with which Arizona is concerned *68are among those traditionally confined to the processes of criminal justice; their disposition necessarily affects in the most direct and substantial manner the liberty of individual citizens. Quite obviously, systems of specialized penal justice might permit erosion, or even evasion, of the limitations placed by the Constitution upon state criminal proceedings. Second, we must recognize that the character and consequences of many juvenile court proceedings have in fact closely resembled those of ordinary criminal trials. Nothing before us suggests that juvenile courts were intended as a device to escape constitutional constraints, but I entirely agree with the Court that we are nonetheless obliged to examine with circumspection the procedural guarantees the State has provided.

The central issue here, and the principal one upon which I am divided from the Court, is the method by which the procedural requirements of due process should be measured. It must at the outset be emphasized that the protections necessary here cannot be determined by resort to any classification of juvenile proceedings either as criminal or as civil, whether made by the State or by this Court. Both formulae are simply too imprecise to permit reasoned analysis of these difficult constitutional issues. The Court should instead measure the requirements of due process by reference both to the problems which confront the State and to the actual character of the procedural system which the State has created. The Court has for such purposes chiefly examined three connected sources: first, the “settled usages and modes of proceeding,” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277; second, the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,” Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316; and third, the character and requirements of the circumstances presented in each situation. FCC v. WJR, 337 U. S. 265, 277; Yakus v. *69United States, 321 U. S. 414. See, further, my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, and compare my opinion concurring in the result in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 408. Each of these factors is relevant to the issues here, but it is the last which demands particular examination.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that determination of the constitutionally required procedural safeguards in any situation requires recognition both of the “interests affected” and of the “circumstances involved.” FCC v. WJR, supra, at 277. In particular, a “compelling public interest” must, under our cases, be taken fully into account in assessing the validity under the due process clauses of state or federal legislation and its application. See, e. g., Yakus v. United States, supra, at 442; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 520; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 279. Such interests would never warrant arbitrariness or the diminution of any specifically assured constitutional right, Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426, but they are an essential element of the context through which the legislation and proceedings under it must be read and evaluated.

No more evidence of the importance of the public interests at stake here is required than that furnished by the opinion of the Court; it indicates that “some 601,000 children under 18, or 2% of all children between 10 and 17, came before juvenile courts” in 1965, and that “about one-fifth of all arrests for serious crimes” in 1965 were of juveniles. The Court adds that the- rate of juvenile crime is steadily rising. All this, as the Court suggests, indicates the importance of these due process issues, but it mirrors no less vividly that state authorities are confronted by formidable and immediate problems involving the most fundamental social values. The state legislatures have determined that the most hopeful solution for *70these problems is to be found in specialized courts, organized under their own rules and imposing distinctive consequences. The terms and limitations of these systems are not identical, nor are the procedural arrangements which they include, but the States are uniform in their insistence that the ordinary processes of criminal justice are inappropriate, and that relatively informal proceedings, dedicated to premises and purposes only imperfectly reflected in the criminal law, are instead necessary.

It is well settled that the Court must give the widest deference to legislative judgments that concern the character and urgency of the problems with which the State is confronted. Legislatures are, as this Court has often acknowledged, the “main guardian” of the public interest, and, within their constitutional competence, their understanding of that interest must be accepted as “well-nigh” conclusive. Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32. This principle does not, however, reach all the questions essential to the resolution of this case. The legislative judgments at issue here embrace assessments of the necessity and wisdom of procedural guarantees; these are questions which the Constitution has entrusted at least in part to courts, and upon which courts have been understood to possess particular competence. The fundamental issue here is, therefore, in what measure and fashion the Court must defer to legislative determinations which encompass constitutional issues of procedural protection.

It suffices for present purposes to summarize the factors which I believe to be pertinent. It must first be emphasized that the deference given to legislators upon substantive issues must realistically extend in part to ancillary procedural questions. Procedure at once reflects and creates substantive rights, and every effort of courts since the beginnings of the common law to separate the two has proved essentially futile. The distinction between them is particularly inadequate here, where the *71legislature’s substantive preferences directly and unavoidably require judgments about procedural issues. The procedural framework is here a principal element of the substantive legislative system; meaningful deference to the latter must include a portion of deference to the former. The substantive-procedural dichotomy is, nonetheless, an indispensable tool of analysis, for it stems from fundamental limitations upon judicial authority under the Constitution. Its premise is ultimately that courts may not substitute for the judgments of legislators their own understanding of the public welfare, but must instead concern themselves with the validity under the Constitution of the methods which the legislature has selected. See, e. g., McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246-247. The Constitution has in this manner created for courts and legislators areas of primary responsibility which are essentially congruent to their areas of special competence. Courts are thus obliged both by constitutional command and by their distinctive functions to bear particular responsibility for the measurement of procedural due process. These factors in combination suggest that legislatures may properly expect only a cautious deference for their procedural judgments, but that, conversely, courts must exercise their special responsibility for procedural guarantees with care to permit ample scope for achieving the purposes of legislative programs. Plainly, courts can exercise such care only if they have in each case first studied thoroughly the objectives and implementation of the program at stake; if, upon completion of those studies, the effect of extensive procedural restrictions upon valid legislative purposes cannot be assessed with reasonable certainty, the court should necessarily proceed with restraint.

The foregoing considerations, which I believe to be fair distillations of relevant judicial history, suggest *72three criteria by which the procedural requirements of due process should be measured here: first, no more restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to assure the proceedings’ fundamental fairness; second, the restrictions which are imposed should be those which preserve, so far as possible, the essential elements of the State’s purpose; and finally, restrictions should be chosen which will later permit the orderly selection of any additional protections which may ultimately prove necessary. In this way, the Court may guarantee the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and yet permit the State to continue development of an effective response to the problems of juvenile crime.

II.

Measured by these criteria, only three procedural requirements should, in my opinion, now be deemed required of state juvenile courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: first, timely notice must be provided to parents and children of the nature and terms of any juvenile court proceeding in which a determination affecting their rights or interests may be made; second, unequivocal and timely notice must be given that counsel may appear in any such proceeding in behalf of the child and its parents, and that in cases in which the child may be confined in an institution, counsel may, in circumstances of indigency, be appointed for them; and third, the court must maintain a written record, or its equivalent, adequate to permit effective review on appeal or in collateral proceedings. These requirements would guarantee to juveniles the tools with which their rights could be fully vindicated, and yet permit the States to pursue without unnecessary hindrance the purposes which they believe imperative in this field. Further, their imposition now would later *73permit more intelligent assessment of the necessity under the Fourteenth Amendment of additional requirements, by creating suitable records from which the character and deficiencies of juvenile proceedings could be accurately judged. I turn to consider each of these three requirements.

The Court has consistently made plain that adequate and timely notice is the fulcrum of due process, whatever the purposes of the proceeding. See, e. g., Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 409; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 424. Notice is ordinarily the prerequisite to effective assertion of any constitutional or other rights; without it, vindication of those rights must be essentially fortuitous. So fundamental a protection can neither be spared here nor left to the “favor or grace” of state authorities. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 138; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, supra, at 425.

Provision of counsel and of a record, like adequate notice, would permit the juvenile to assert very much more effectively his rights and defenses, both in the juvenile proceedings and upon direct or collateral review. The Court has frequently emphasized their importance in proceedings in which an individual may be deprived of his liberty, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; this reasoning must include with special force those who are commonly inexperienced and immature. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45. The facts of this case illustrate poignantly the difficulties of review without either an adequate record or the participation of counsel in the proceeding’s initial stages. At the same time, these requirements should not cause any substantial modification in the character of juvenile court proceedings: counsel, although now present in only a small percentage of juvenile cases, have apparently already appeared without *74incident in virtually all juvenile courts;3 and the maintenance of a record should not appreciably alter the conduct of these proceedings.

The question remains whether certain additional requirements, among them the privilege against self-incrimination, confrontation, and cross-examination, must now, as the Court holds, also be imposed. I share in part the views expressed in my Brother White’s concurring opinion, but believe that there are other, and more deep-seated, reasons to defer, at least for the present, the imposition of such requirements.

Initially, I must vouchsafe that I cannot determine with certainty the reasoning by which the Court concludes that these further requirements are now imperative. The Court begins from the premise, to which it gives force at several points, that juvenile courts need not satisfy “all of the requirements of a criminal trial.” It therefore scarcely suffices to explain the selection of these particular procedural requirements for the Court to declare that juvenile court proceedings are essentially criminal, and thereupon to recall that these are requisites for a criminal trial. Nor does the Court’s voucher of “authoritative opinion,” which consists of four extraordinary juvenile cases, contribute materially to the solution of these issues. The Court has, even under its own premises, asked the wrong questions: the problem here is to determine what forms of procedural protection are necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juvenile proceedings, and not which of the procedures now employed in criminal trials should be transplanted intact to proceedings in these specialized courts.

*75In my view, the Court should approach this question in terms of the criteria, described above, which emerge from the history of due process adjudication. Measured by them, there are compelling reasons at least to defer imposition of these additional requirements. First, quite unlike notice, counsel, and a record, these requirements might radically alter the character of juvenile court proceedings. The evidence from which the Court reasons that they would not is inconclusive,4 and other available evidence suggests that they very likely would.5 At the least, it is plain that these additional requirements would contribute materially to the creation in these proceedings of the atmosphere of an ordinary criminal trial, and would, even if they do no more, thereby largely frustrate a central purpose of these specialized courts. Further, these are restrictions intended to conform to the demands of an intensely adversary system of criminal justice; the broad purposes which they represent might be served in juvenile courts with equal effectiveness by procedural devices more consistent with the premises of proceedings *76in those courts. As the Court apparently acknowledges, the hazards of self-accusation, for example, might be avoided in juvenile proceedings without the imposition of all the requirements and limitations which surround the privilege against self-incrimination. The guarantee of adequate notice, counsel, and a record would create conditions in which suitable alternative procedures could be devised; but, unfortunately, the Court’s haste to impose restrictions taken intact from criminal procedure may well seriously hamper the development of such alternatives. Surely this illustrates that prudence and the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment alike require that the Court should now impose no more procedural restrictions than are imperative to assure fundamental fairness, and that the States should instead be permitted additional opportunities to develop without unnecessary hindrance their systems of juvenile courts.

I find confirmation for these views in two ancillary considerations. First, it is clear that an uncertain, but very substantial number of the cases brought to juvenile courts involve children who are not in any sense guilty of criminal misconduct. Many of these children have simply the misfortune to be in some manner distressed; others have engaged in conduct, such as truancy, which is plainly not criminal.6 Efforts are now being made to develop effective, and entirely noneriminal, methods of treatment for these children.7 In such cases, the state authorities *77are in the most literal sense acting in loco parentis; they are, by any standard, concerned with the child’s protection, and not with his punishment. I do not question that the methods employed in such cases must be consistent with the constitutional obligation to act in accordance with due process, but certainly the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand that they be constricted by the procedural guarantees devised for ordinary criminal prosecutions. Cf. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270. It must be remembered that the various classifications of juvenile court proceedings are, as the vagaries of the available statistics illustrate, often arbitrary or ambiguous; it would therefore be imprudent, at the least, to build upon these classifications rigid systems of procedural requirements which would be applicable, or not, in accordance with the descriptive label given to the particular proceeding. It is better, it seems to me, to begin by now requiring the essential elements of fundamental fairness in juvenile courts, whatever the label given by the State to the proceeding; in this way the Court could avoid imposing unnecessarily rigid restrictions, and yet escape dependence upon classifications which may often prove to be illusory. Further, the provision of notice, counsel, and a record would permit orderly efforts to determine later whether more satisfactory classifications can be devised, and if they can, whether additional procedural requirements are necessary for them under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Second, it should not be forgotten that juvenile crime and juvenile courts are both now under earnest study throughout the country. I very much fear that this Court, by imposing these rigid procedural requirements, may inadvertently have served to discourage these efforts to find more satisfactory solutions for the problems of juvenile crime, and may thus now hamper enlightened development of the systems of juvenile courts. It is *78appropriate to recall that the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel the law to remain passive in the midst of change; to demand otherwise denies “every quality of the law but its age.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 529.

III.

Finally, I turn to assess the validity of this juvenile court proceeding under the criteria discussed in this opinion. Measured by them, the judgment below must, in my opinion, fall. Gerald Gault and his parents were not provided adequate notice of the terms and purposes of the proceedings in which he was adjudged delinquent; they were not advised of their rights to be represented by counsel; and no record in any form was maintained of the proceedings. It follows, for the reasons given in this opinion, that Gerald Gault was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

Mb. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

The Court today uses an obscure Arizona case as a vehicle to impose upon thousands of juvenile courts throughout the Nation restrictions that the Constitution made applicable to adversary criminal trials.1 I believe the Court’s decision is wholly unsound as a matter of constitutional law, and sadly unwise as a matter of judicial policy.

Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neg*79lected child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.

In the last 70 years many dedicated men and women have devoted their professional lives to the enlightened task of bringing us out of the dark world of Charles Dickens in meeting our responsibilities to the child in our society. The result has been the creation in this century of a system of juvenile and family courts in each of the 50 States. There can be no denying that in many areas the performance of these agencies has fallen disappointingly short of the hopes and dreams of the courageous pioneers who first conceived them. For a variety of reasons, the reality has sometimes not even approached the ideal, and much remains to be accomplished in the administration of public juvenile and family agencies — in personnel, in planning, in financing, perhaps in the formulation of wholly new approaches.

I possess neither the specialized experience nor the expert knowledge to predict with any certainty where may lie the brightest hope for progress in dealing with the serious problems of juvenile delinquency. But I am certain that the answer does not lie in the Court’s opinion in this case, which serves to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution.

The inflexible restrictions that the Constitution so wisely made applicable to adversary criminal trials have no inevitable place in the proceedings of those public social agencies known as juvenile or family courts. And to impose the Court’s long catalog of requirements upon juvenile proceedings in every aréa of the country is to invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth century. In that era there were no juvenile proceedings, and a *80child was tried in a conventional criminal court with all the trappings of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that a 12-year-old boy named James Guild was tried in New Jersey for killing Catharine Beakes. A jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death by hanging. The sentence was executed. It was all very constitutional.2

A State in all its dealings must, of course, accord every person due process of law. And due process may require that some of the same restrictions which the Constitution has placed upon criminal trials must be imposed upon juvenile proceedings. For example, I suppose that all would agree that a brutally coerced confession could not constitutionally be considered in a juvenile court hearing. But it surely does not follow that the testimonial privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in all juvenile proceedings.3 Similarly, due process clearly *81requires timely notice of the purpose and scope of any proceedings affecting the relationship of parent and child. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545. But it certainly does not follow that notice of a juvenile hearing must be framed with all the technical niceties of a criminal indictment. See Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749.

In any event, there is no reason to deal with issues such as these in the present case. The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the parents of Gerald Gault “knew of their right to counsel, to subpoena and cross examine witnesses, of the right to confront the witnesses against Gerald and the possible consequences of a finding of delinquency.” 99 Ariz. 181, 185, 407 P. 2d 760, 763. It further found that “Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge against Gerald from the day he was taken to the detention home.” 99 Ariz., at 193, 407 P. 2d, at 768. And, as Mr. Justice White correctly points out, pp. 64-65, ante, no issue of compulsory self-incrimination is presented by this case.

I would dismiss the appeal.

Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that an accused person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id., at 484-485. In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), we reiterated that “Edwards established a bright-line rule to safeguard pre-existing rights,” id., at 646: “once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him.” Id., at 641.

The question presented by these two cases is whether the same rule applies to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment. In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained — and the Sixth Amendment violated— because the defendants had “requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations.” 421 Mich. 39, 67-68, 365 N. W. 2d 56, 69 (1984). We agree with that holding.

H-{

The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Respondent Bladel was convicted of the murder of three railroad employees at the Amtrak Station in Jackson, Michigan, on Decem*627ber 31, 1978. Bladel, a disgruntled former employee, was arrested on January 1, 1979, and, after being questioned on two occasions, was released on January 3. He was arrested again on March 22, 1979, and agreed to talk to the police that evening without counsel. On the following morning, Friday, March 23, 1979, Bladel was arraigned. He requested that counsel be appointed for him because he was indigent. The detective in charge of the Bladel investigation was present at the arraignment. A notice of appointment was promptly mailed to a law firm, but the law firm did not receive it until Tuesday, March 27. In the interim, on March 26, 1979, two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail and obtained a confession from him. Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights.1 Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him.

The trial court overruled Bladel’s objection to the admissibility of all four statements. On appeal from his conviction and sentence, Bladel challenged only the postarraignment confession. The Michigan Court of Appeals first rejected that challenge and affirmed the conviction, 106 Mich. App. 397, 308 N. W. 2d 230 (1981), but, after reconsideration in the light of a recent decision by the State Supreme Court, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. 118 Mich. App. 498, 325 N. W. 2d 421 (1982). The Michigan Supreme Court then granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and considered the case with respondent Jackson’s appeal of his conviction. 421 Mich. 39, 365 N. W. 2d 56 (1984).

*628Respondent Jackson was convicted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. He was one of four participants in a wife’s plan to have her husband killed on July 12, 1979. Arrested on an unrelated charge on July 30, 1979, he made a series of six statements in response to police questioning prior to his arraignment at 4:30 p.m. on August 1. During the arraignment, Jackson requested that counsel be appointed for him. The police involved in his investigation were present at the arraignment. On the following morning, before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel, two police officers obtained another statement from Jackson to “confirm” that he was the person who had shot the victim. As was true of the six prearraignment statements, the questioning was preceded by advice of his Miranda rights and Jackson’s agreement to proceed without counsel being present.

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the seventh statement was properly received in evidence. 114 Mich. App. 649, 319 N. W. 2d 613 (1982). It distinguished Edwards on the ground that Jackson’s request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment whereas Edwards’ request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police. Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson’s conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that the postarraignment statements in both cases should have been suppressed. Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the court concluded that the Edwards rule “applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . . The police cannot simply ignore a defendant’s unequivocal request for counsel.” 421 Mich., at 66-67, 365 N. W. 2d, at 68-69 *629(footnote omitted). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1124 (1985), and we now affirm.2

II

The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations. The existence of that right is clear. It has two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards, 451 U. S., at 482; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 470 (1966). The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations. The arraignment signals “the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings” and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, 187, 188 (1984);3 there*630after, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent “critical stages” at which the Sixth Amendment applies. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The question in these cases is whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations.

In Edwards, the request for counsel was made to the police during custodial interrogation, and the basis for the Court’s holding was the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted the relevance of various Sixth Amendment precedents, 451 U. S., at 484, n. 8, but found it unnecessary to rely on the possible applicability of the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 480, n. 7. In these cases, the request for counsel was made to a judge during arraignment, and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel.4 The State argues that the Edwards rule should not apply to these circumstances because there are legal differences in the basis for the claims; because there are *631factual differences in the contexts of the claims; and because respondents signed valid waivers of their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations. We consider these contentions in turn.

The State contends that differences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments compel the conclusion that the Edwards rule should not apply to a Sixth Amendment claim. Edwards flows from the Fifth Amendment’s right to counsel at custodial interrogations, the State argues; its relevance to the Sixth Amendment’s provision of the assistance of counsel is far less clear, and thus the Edwards principle for assessing waivers is unnecessary and inappropriate.

In our opinion, however, the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before. The State’s argument misapprehends the nature of the pretrial protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Gouveia, we explained the significance of the formal accusation, and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:

“[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings ‘is far from a mere formalism.’ Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S., at 689. It is only at that time ‘that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecuto-rial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’” 467 U. S., at 189.

*632As a result, the “Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S., at 176. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation.

Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made — and a person who had previously been just a “suspect” has become an “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment— the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation. Thus, the surreptitious employment of a cellmate, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), or the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties, see Maine v. Moulton, supra; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), may violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the same methods of investigation might have been permissible before arraignment or indictment.5 Far from undermining the Edwards rule, the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these circumstances.

The State also relies on the factual differences between a request for counsel during custodial interrogation and a request for counsel at an arraignment. The State maintains that respondents may not have actually intended their re*633quest for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning by the police. This argument, however, must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights. Almost a half century ago, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), a case involving an alleged waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court explained that we should “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id., at 464. For that reason, it is the State that has the burden of establishing a valid waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 404. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant’s request for counsel — we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer’s services at every critical stage of the prosecution.6 We thus reject the State’s suggestion that respondents’ requests for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings.7

*634The State points to another factual difference: the police may not know of the defendant’s request for attorney at the arraignment. That claimed distinction is similarly unavailing. In the cases at bar, in which the officers in charge of the investigations of respondents were present at the arraignments, the argument is particularly unconvincing. More generally, however, Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State’s knowledge from one state actor to another. For the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation between the State and the individual.8 One set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants’ unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor (the court).

The State also argues that, because of these factual differences, the application of Edwards in a Sixth Amendment context will generate confusion. However, we have frequently emphasized that one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, “bright-line” quality. See, e. g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S., at 646; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1054, n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We do not agree that applying the rule when the accused requests counsel at an arraignment, rather than in the police station, somehow diminishes that clarity. To the extent that there may have been any doubts about interpreting a request *635for counsel at an arraignment, or about the police responsibility to know of and respond to such a request, our opinion today resolves them.

Finally, the State maintains that each of the respondents made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a postarraignment confession after again being advised of his constitutional rights. In Edwards, however, we rejected the notion that, after a suspect’s request for counsel, advice of rights and acquiescence in police-initiated questioning could establish a valid waiver. 451 U. S., at 484. We find no warrant for a different view under a Sixth Amendment analysis. Indeed, our rejection of the comparable argument in Edwards was based, in part, on our review of earlier Sixth Amendment cases.9 Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.10

*636r — H l-H

Edwards is grounded in the understanding that “the assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event,” 451 U. S., at 485, and that “additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel.” Id., at 484. We conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment. We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.

Although the Edwards decision itself rested on the Fifth Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial interrogation, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly perceived that the reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases. The judgments are accordingly affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in the judgment.

I concurred only in the judgment in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1981), and in doing so I observed:

“The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but as with all ‘good’ things they can be carried too far.”

The urge for “bright-line” rules readily applicable to a host of varying situations would likely relieve this Court some*637what from more than a doubling of the Court’s work in recent decades, but this urge seems to be leading the Court to an absolutist, mechanical treatment of the subject. At times, it seems, the judicial mind is in conflict with what behavioral— and theological — specialists have long recognized as a natural human urge of people to confess wrongdoing. See, e. g., T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959).

We must, of course, protect persons in custody from coercion, but step by step we have carried this concept well beyond sound, common-sense boundaries. The Court’s treátment of this subject is an example of the infirmity of trying to perform the rulemaking function on a case-by-case basis, ignoring the reality that the criminal cases coming to this Court, far from typical, are the “hard” cases. This invokes the ancient axiom that hard cases can make bad law.

Stare decisis calls for my following the rule of Edwards in this context, but plainly the subject calls for reexamination. Increasingly, to borrow from Justice Cardozo, more and more “criminal[s]... go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926).

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

The Court’s decision today rests on the following deceptively simple line of reasoning: Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), created a bright-line rule to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights; Sixth Amendment rights are even more important than Fifth Amendment rights; therefore, we must also apply the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment. The Court prefers this neat syllogism to an effort to discuss or answer the only relevant question: Does the Edwards rule make sense in the context of the Sixth Amendment? I think it does not, and I therefore dissent from the Court’s unjustified extension of the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment.

*638My disagreement with the Court stems from our differing understandings of Edwards. In Edwards, this Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, “a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” 451 U. S., at 484. This “prophylactic rule,” see Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 644, 645 (1984), was deemed necessary to prevent the police from effectively “overriding” a defendant’s assertion of his Miranda rights by “badgering” him into waiving those rights. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (Edwards rule “designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers”).1 In short, as we explained in later cases, “Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it ‘created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.’” Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 644, n. 4, quoting Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 54 (1973); see also Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 61 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (describing “prophylactic purpose” of Edwards rule).

What the Court today either forgets or chooses to ignore is that the “constitutional guarantee” referred to in Solem v. Stumes is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. This prohibition, of course, is also the constitutional underpinning for the set of prophylactic rules announced in Miranda itself. See Moran v. Burbine, ante, at 424-425; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304-305, 306, *639and n. 1 (1985).2 Edwards, like Miranda, imposes on the police a bright-line standard of conduct intended to help ensure that confessions obtained through custodial interrogation will not be “coerced” or “involuntary.” Seen in this proper light, Edwards provides nothing more than a second layer of protection, in addition to those rights conferred by Miranda, for a defendant who might otherwise be compelled by the police to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The dispositive question in the instant cases, and the question the Court should address in its opinion, is whether the same kind of prophylactic rule is needed to protect a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The answer to this question, it seems to me, is clearly “no.” The Court does not even suggest that the police commonly deny defendants their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nor, I suspect, would such a claim likely be borne out by empirical evidence. Thus, the justification for the prophylactic rules this Court created in Miranda and Edwards, namely, the perceived widespread problem that the police were violating, and would probably continue to violate, the Fifth Amendment rights of defendants during the course of custodial interrogations, see Miranda, supra, at 445-458,3 is conspicu*640ously absent in the Sixth Amendment context. To put it simply, the prophylactic rule set forth in Edwards makes no sense at all except when linked to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.

Not only does the Court today cut the Edwards rule loose from its analytical moorings, it does so in a manner that graphically reveals the illogic of the Court’s position. The Court phrases the question presented in these cases as whether the Edwards rule applies “to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment.” Ante, at 626 (emphasis added). And the Court ultimately limits its holding to those situations where the police “initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel.” Ante, at 636 (emphasis added).

In other words, the Court most assuredly does not hold that the Edwards per se rule prohibiting all police-initiated interrogations applies from the moment the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, with or without a request for counsel by the defendant. Such a holding would represent, after all, a shockingly dramatic restructuring of the balance this Court has traditionally struck between the rights of the defendant and those of the larger society. Applying the Edwards rule to situations in which a defendant has not made an explicit request for counsel would also render completely nugatory the extensive discussion of “waiver” in such prior Sixth Amendment cases as Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 401-406 (1977). See also id., at 410 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The critical factual issue is whether there had been a voluntary waiver”); id., at 417 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (“[I]t is very clear that Williams had made a valid *641waiver of his . . . Sixth Amendment right to counsel); id., at 430, n. 1 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (“It does not matter whether the right not to make statements in the absence of counsel stems from Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In either case the question is one of waiver”).4

This leaves the Court, however, in an analytical straitjacket. The problem with the limitation the Court places on the Sixth Amendment version of the Edwards rule is that, unlike a defendant’s “right to counsel” under Miranda, which does not arise until affirmatively invoked by the defendant during custodial interrogation, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend at all' on whether the defendant has requested counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 404; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513 (1962). The Court acknowledges as much in footnote six of its opinion, where it stresses that “we do not, of course, suggest that *642the right to counsel turns on ... a request [for counsel].” Ante, at 633, n. 6.

The Court provides no satisfactory explanation for its decision to extend the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment, yet limit that rule to those defendants foresighted enough, or just plain lucky enough, to have made an explicit request for counsel which we have always understood to be completely unnecessary for Sixth Amendment purposes. The Court attempts to justify its emphasis on the otherwise legally insignificant request for counsel by stating that “we construe the defendant’s request for counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.” Ibid. This statement sounds reasonable, but it is flatly inconsistent with the remainder of the Court’s opinion, in which the Court holds that there can be no waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel after a request for counsel has been made. See ante, at 635-636, n. 10. It is obvious that, for the Court, the defendant’s request for counsel is not merely an “extremely important fact”; rather, it is the only fact that counts.

The truth is that there is no satisfactory explanation for the position the Court adopts in these cases. The glaring inconsistencies in the Court’s opinion arise precisely because the Court lacks a coherent, analytically sound basis for its decision. The prophylactic rule of Edwards, designed from its inception to protect a defendant’s right under the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself, simply does not meaningfully apply to the Sixth Amendment. I would hold that Edwards has no application outside the context of the Fifth Amendment, and would therefore reverse the judgment of the court below.

Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider in this case the scope and continued viability of the rule announced by this Court in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), forbidding police to initiate interroga*781tion of a criminal defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.

I

Petitioner Jesse Montejo was arrested on September 6, 2002, in connection with the robbery and murder of Lewis Ferrari, who had been found dead in his own home one day earlier. Suspicion quickly focused on Jerry Moore, a disgruntled former employee of Ferrari’s dry cleaning business. Police sought to question Montejo, who was a known associate of Moore.

Montejo waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and was interrogated at the sheriff’s office by police detectives through the late afternoon and evening of September 6 and the early morning of September 7. During the interrogation, Montejo repeatedly changed his account of the crime, at first claiming that he had only driven Moore to the victim’s home, and ultimately admitting that he had shot and killed Ferrari in the course of a botched burglary. These police interrogations were videotaped.

On September 10, Montejo was brought before a judge for what is known in Louisiana as a “72-hour hearing” — a preliminary hearing required under state law.1 Although the proceedings were not transcribed, the minute record indicates what transpired: “The defendant being charged with First Degree Murder, Court ordered N[o] Bond set in this matter. Further, Court ordered the Office of Indigent Defender be appointed to represent the defendant.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a.

Later that same day, two police detectives visited Montejo back at the prison and requested that he accompany them on an excursion to locate the murder weapon (which Montejo *782had earlier indicated he had thrown into a lake). After some back-and-forth, the substance of which remains in dispute, Montejo was again read his Miranda rights and agreed to go along; during the excursion, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow. Only upon their return did Montejo finally meet his court-appointed attorney, who was quite upset that the detectives had interrogated his client in his absence.

At trial, the letter of apology was admitted over defense objection. The jury convicted Montejo of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. 06-1807 (1/16/08), 974 So. 2d 1238 (2008). As relevant here, the court rejected Monte jo’s argument that under the rule of Jackson, supra, the letter should have been suppressed. 974 So. 2d, at 1261. Jackson held that “if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” 475 U. S., at 636.

Citing a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Montoya v. Collins, 955 F. 2d 279 (1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the prophylactic protection of Jackson is not triggered unless and until the defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 974 So. 2d, at 1260-1261, and n. 68. Because Montejo simply stood mute at his 72-hour hearing while the judge ordered the appointment of counsel, he had made no such request or assertion. So the proper inquiry, the court ruled, was only whether he had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to have counsel present during the interaction with the police. Id., at 1261. And because Montejo had been read his Miranda rights and agreed to waive them, *783the Court answered that question in the affirmative, 974 So. 2d, at 1262, and upheld the conviction.

We granted certiorari. 554 U. S. 944 (2008).

II

Montejo and his amici raise a number of pragmatic objections to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Jackson. We agree that the approach taken below would lead either to an unworkable standard, or to arbitrary and anomalous distinctions between defendants in different States. Neither would be acceptable.

Under the rule adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, a criminal defendant must request counsel, or otherwise “assert” his Sixth Amendment right at the preliminary hearing, before the Jackson protections are triggered. If he does so, the police may not initiate further interrogation in the absence of counsel. But if the court on its own appoints counsel, with the defendant taking no affirmative action to invoke his right to counsel, then police are free to initiate further interrogations provided that they first obtain an otherwise valid waiver by the defendant of his right to have counsel present.

This rule would apply well enough in States that require the indigent defendant formally to request counsel before any appointment is made, which usually occurs after the court has informed him that he will receive counsel if he asks for it. That is how the system works in Michigan, for example, Mich. Ct. Rule 6.005(A) (2009), whose scheme produced the factual background for this Court’s decision in Michigan v. Jackson. Jackson, like all other represented indigent defendants in the State, had requested counsel in accordance with the applicable state law.

But many States follow other practices. In some two dozen, the appointment of counsel is automatic upon a finding of indigency, e. g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-4503(c) (2007); and in *784a number of others, appointment can be made either upon the defendant’s request or sua sponte by the court, e. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 4602(a) (2003). See App. to Brief for National Legal Aid & Defender Assn, et al. as Amici Curiae la-21a. Nothing in our Jackson opinion indicates whether we were then aware that not all States require that a defendant affirmatively request counsel before one is appointed; and of course we had no occasion there to decide how the rule we announced would apply to these other States.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s answer to that unresolved question is troublesome. The central distinction it draws— between defendants who “assert” their right to counsel and those who do not — is exceedingly hazy when applied to States that appoint counsel absent request from the defendant. How to categorize a defendant who merely asks, prior to appointment, whether he will be appointed counsel? Or who inquires, after the fact, whether he has been? What treatment for one who thanks the court after the appointment is made? And if the court asks a defendant whether he would object to appointment, will a quick shake of his head count as an assertion of his right?

To the extent that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s rule also permits a defendant to trigger Jackson through the “acceptance” of counsel, that notion is even more mysterious: How does one affirmatively accept counsel appointed by court order? An indigent defendant has no right to choose his counsel, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 151 (2006), so it is hard to imagine what his “acceptance” would look like, beyond the passive silence that Monte jo exhibited.

In practice, judicial application of the Louisiana rule in States that do not require a defendant to make a request for counsel could take either of two paths. Courts might ask on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant has somehow invoked his right to counsel, looking to his conduct at the preliminary hearing — his statements and gestures — and the to*785tality of the circumstances. Or, courts might simply determine as a categorical matter that defendants in these States — over half of those in the Union — simply have no opportunity to assert their right to counsel at the hearing and are therefore out of luck.

Neither approach is desirable. The former would be particularly impractical in light of the fact that, as amici describe, preliminary hearings are often rushed, and are frequently not recorded or transcribed. Brief for National Legal Aid & Defender Assn, et al. 25-30. The sheer volume of indigent defendants, see id., at 29, would render the monitoring of each particular defendant’s reaction to the appointment of counsel almost impossible. And sometimes the defendant is not even present. E. g., La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 230.1(A) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing court to appoint counsel if defendant is “unable to appear”). Police who did not attend the hearing would have no way to know whether they could approach a particular defendant; and for a court to adjudicate that question ex post would be a fact-intensive and burdensome task, even if monitoring were possible and transcription available. Because “clarity of. .. command” and “certainty of. . . application” are crucial in rules that govern law enforcement, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, 151 (1990), this would be an unfortunate way to proceed. See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 425-426 (1986).

The second possible course fares no better, for it would achieve clarity and certainty only at the expense of introducing arbitrary distinctions: Defendants in States that automatically appoint counsel would have no opportunity to invoke their rights and trigger Jackson, while those in other States, effectively instructed by the court to request counsel, would be lucky winners. That sort of hollow formalism is out of place in a doctrine that purports to serve as a practical safeguard for defendants’ rights.

*786III

But if the Louisiana Supreme Court’s application of Jackson is unsound as a practical matter, then Montejo’s solution is untenable as a theoretical and doctrinal matter. Under his approach, once a defendant is represented by counsel, police may not initiate any further interrogation. Such a rule would be entirely untethered from the original rationale of Jackson.

A

It is worth emphasizing first what is not in dispute or at stake here. Under our precedents, once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 227-228 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57 (1932). Interrogation by the State is such a stage. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 204-205 (1964); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 274 (1980).

Our precedents also place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285,292, n. 4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 352-353 (1990). And when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment:

“As a general matter ... an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda *787. . . has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.” Patterson, supra, at 296.

The only question raised by this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances. 475 U. S., at 630, 633. We created such a presumption in Jackson by analogy to a similar prophylactic rule established to protect the Fifth Amendment-based Miranda right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), decided that once “an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation ... [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available,” unless he initiates the contact. Id., at 484-485.

The Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,” Harvey, supra, at 350. It does this by presuming his postassertion statements to be involuntary, “even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 177 (1991). This prophylactic rule thus “protects] a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U. S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Jackson represented a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.” Cobb, supra, at 175. The Jackson Court decided that a request for counsel at an arraignment should be treated as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution,” 475 U. S., at 633, despite doubt that defendants “actually inten[d] their request for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning,” id., at 632-*788633, because doubts must be “resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim,” id., at 633. Citing Edwards, the Court held that any subsequent waiver would thus be “insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogation.” 475 U. S., at 635. In other words, we presume such waivers involuntary “based on the supposition that suspects who assert their right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily” in subsequent interactions with police. Harvey, supra, at 350.

In his dissent, Justice Stevens presents us with a revisionist view of Jackson. The defendants' request for counsel, he contends, was important only because it proved that counsel had been appointed. Such a non sequitur (nowhere alluded to in the case) hardly needs rebuttal. Proceeding from this fanciful premise, he claims that the decision actually established “a rule designed to safeguard a defendant's right to rely on the assistance of counsel,” post, at 807 (hereinafter dissent), not one “designed to prevent police badgering,” ibid. To safeguard the right to assistance of counsel from what? From a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant himself? Unless the dissent seeks to prevent a defendant altogether from waiving his Sixth Amendment rights, i. e., to “imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution,” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 280 (1942) — a view with zero support in reason, history, or case law — the answer must be: from police pressure, i. e., badgering. The antibadgering rationale is the only way to make sense of Jackson’s repeated citations of Edwards, and the only way to reconcile the opinion with our waiver jurisprudence.2

*789B

With this understanding of what Jackson stands for and whence it came, it should be clear that Montejo’s interpretation of that decision — that no represented defendant can ever be approached by the State and asked to consent to interrogation — is off the mark. When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary. There is no “initial election” to exercise the right, Patterson, 487 U. S., at 291, that must be preserved through a prophylactic rule against later waivers. No reason exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel present. And no reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring. Edwards and Jackson are meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about their rights, but a defendant who never asked for counsel has not yet made up his mind in the first instance.

The dissent’s argument to the contrary rests on a flawed a fortiori: “If a defendant is entitled to protection from police-initiated interrogation under the Sixth Amendment when he merely requests a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to such protection when he has secured a lawyer.” Post, at 804. The question in Jackson, however, was not whether respondents were entitled to counsel (they unquestionably were), but “whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel,” 475 U. S., at 630; and even if it is reasonable to presume from a defendant's request for counsel that any subsequent waiver of the right was coerced, no such *790presumption can seriously be entertained when a lawyer was merely “secured” on the defendant’s behalf, by the State itself, as a matter of course. Of course, reading the dissent’s analysis, one would have no idea that Montejo executed any waiver at all.

In practice, Montejo’s rule would prevent police-initiated interrogation entirely once the Sixth Amendment right attaches, at least in those States that appoint counsel promptly without request from the defendant. As the dissent in Jackson pointed out, with no expressed disagreement from the majority, the opinion “most assuredly [did] not hold that the Edwards per se rule prohibiting all police-initiated interrogations applies from the moment the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, with or without a request for counsel by the defendant.” 475 U. S., at 640 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). That would have constituted a “shockingly dramatic restructuring of the balance this Court has traditionally struck between the rights of the defendant and those of the larger society.” Ibid.

Montejo’s rule appears to have its theoretical roots in codes of legal ethics, not the Sixth Amendment. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (which nearly all States have adopted into law in whole or in part) mandate that “a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of [a] representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.” Model Rule 4.2 (2008). But the Constitution does not codify the ABA’s Model Rules, and does not make investigating police officers lawyers. Montejo’s proposed rule is both broader and narrower than the Model Rule. Broader, because Montejo would apply it to all agents of the State, including the detectives who interrogated him, while the ethical rule governs only lawyers. And narrower, because he agrees that if a defendant initiates contact with the police, they may talk *791freely — whereas a lawyer could be sanctioned for interviewing a represented party even if that party “initiates” the communication and consents to the interview. Model Rule 4.2, Comment 3.

Monte jo contends that our decisions support his interpretation of the Jackson rule. We think not. Many of the eases he cites concern the substantive scope of the Sixth Amendment — e. g., whether a particular interaction with the State constitutes a “critical” stage at which counsel is entitled to be present — not the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); Henry, 447 U. S. 264; Massiah, 377 U. S. 201; see also Moran, 475 U. S. 412. Since everyone agrees that absent a valid waiver, Monte jo was entitled to a lawyer during the interrogation, those cases do not advance his argument.

Montejo also points to descriptions of the Jackson holding in two later cases. In one, we noted that “analysis of the waiver issue changes” once a defendant “obtains or even requests counsel.” Harvey, 494 U. S., at 352. But elsewhere in the same opinion, we explained that Jackson applies “after a defendant requests assistance of counsel,” 494 U. S., at 349; “when a suspect charged with a crime requests counsel outside the' context of interrogation,” id., at 350; and to “suspects who assert their right to counsel,” ibid. The accuracy of the “obtains” language is thus questionable. Anyway, since Harvey held that evidence obtained in violation of the Jackson rule could be admitted to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony, 494 U. S., at 346, the Court’s varying descriptions of when the rule was violated were dicta. The dictum from the other decision, Patterson, supra, at 290, n. 3, is no more probative.3

*792The upshot is that even on Jackson’s own terms, it would be completely unjustified to presume that a defendant’s consent to police-initiated interrogation was involuntary or coerced simply because he had previously been appointed a lawyer.

IV

So on the one hand, requiring an initial “invocation” of the right to counsel in order to trigger the Jackson presumption is consistent with the theory of that decision, but (as Montejo and his amici argue, see Part II, swpra) would be unworkable in more than half the States of the Union. On the other hand, eliminating the invocation requirement would render the rule easy to apply but depart fundamentally from the Jackson rationale.

We do not think that stare decisis requires us to expand significantly the holding of a prior decision — fundamentally revising its theoretical basis in the process — in order to cure its practical deficiencies. To the contrary, the fact that a decision has proved “unworkable” is a traditional ground for overruling it. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). Accordingly, we called for supplemental briefing addressed to the question whether Michigan v. Jackson should be overruled.

Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, *793and of course whether the decision was well reasoned. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 234-235 (2009). The first two cut in favor of abandoning Jackson: The opinion is only two decades old, and eliminating it would not upset expectations. Any criminal defendant learned enough to order his affairs based on the rule announced in Jackson would also be perfectly capable of interacting with the police on his own. Of course it is likely true that police and prosecutors have been trained to comply with Jackson, see generally Supplemental Brief for Larry D. Thompson et al. as Amici Curiae, but that is hardly a basis for retaining it as a constitutional requirement. If a State wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with represented defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may continue to do so.4

Which brings us to the strength of Jackson’s reasoning. When this Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant “reasoning” is the weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs. “The value of any prophylactic rule ... must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but also on the basis of what is lost.” Minnick, 498 U. S., at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting). We think that the marginal benefits of Jackson (viz., the number of confessions obtained coercively that are suppressed by its bright-line rule and would otherwise have been admitted) are dwarfed by its substantial costs (viz., hindering “society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law,” Moran, supra, at 426).

*794What does the Jackson rule actually achieve by way of preventing unconstitutional conduct? Recall that the purpose of the rule is to preclude the State from badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights. See Harvey, 494 U. S., at 350; see also McNeil, 501 U. S., at 177. The effect of this badgering might be to coerce a waiver, which would render the subsequent interrogation a violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Massiah, 377 U. S., at 204. Even though involuntary waivers are invalid even apart from Jackson, see Patterson, 487 U. S., at 292, n. 4, mistakes are of course possible when courts conduct case-by-case voluntariness review. A bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson ensures that no fruits of interrogations made possible by badgering-induced involuntary waivers are ever erroneously admitted at trial.

But without Jackson, how many would be? The answer is few if any. The principal reason is that the Court has already taken substantial other, overlapping measures toward the same end. Under Miranda's prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right. 384 U. S., at 474. Under Edwards' prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a defendant “has invoked his right to have counsel present,” interrogation must stop. 451 U. S., at 484. And under Minnick’s prophylactic protection of the Edwards right, no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present, “whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” 498 U. S., at 153.

These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of eases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but *795“badgering” by later requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of “a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence” before his arraignment, Cobb, 532 U. S., at 175 (Kennedy, J., concurring), it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when Sixth Amendment rights have attached. And if so, then Jackson is simply superfluous.

It is true, as Montejo points out in his supplemental brief, that the doctrine established by Miranda and Edwards is designed to protect Fifth Amendment, not Sixth Amendment, rights. But that is irrelevant. What matters is that these cases, like Jackson, protect the right to have counsel during custodial interrogation — which right happens to be guaranteed (once the adversary judicial process has begun) by two sources of law. Since the right under both sources is waived using the same procedure, Patterson, supra, at 296, doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver.

Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards regime is narrower than Jackson in one respect: The former applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. If the defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of interactions between the defendant and the State (like pretrial lineups). However, those uncovered situations are the least likely to pose a risk of coerced waivers. When a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative interactions with the State do not involve the “inherently compelling pressures,” Miranda, supra, at 467, that one might reasonably fear could lead to involuntary waivers.

Jackson was policy driven, and if that policy is being adequately served through other means, there is no reason to *796retain its rule. Miranda and the cases that elaborate upon it already guarantee not simply noncoercion in the traditional sense, but what Justice Harlan referred to as “voluntariness with a vengeance,” 384 U. S., at 505 (dissenting opinion). There is no need to take Jackson’s further step of requiring voluntariness on stilts.

On the other side of the equation are the costs of adding the bright-line Jackson rule on top of Edwards and other extant protections. The principal cost of applying any exclusionary rule “is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go free . . . .” Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135, 141 (2009). Jackson not only “operates to invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights but waived them nonetheless,” Cobb, supra, at 174-175 (Kennedy, J., concurring), but also deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions. The “ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good.” McNeil, supra, at 181. Without these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished. These are not negligible costs, and in our view the Jackson Court gave them too short shrift.5

Notwithstanding this calculus, Montejo and his amici urge the retention of Jackson. Their principal objection to its elimination is that the Edwards regime which remains will not provide an administrable rule. But this Court has praised Edwards precisely because it provides “‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession,” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 682 (1988). Our cases *797make clear which sorts of statements trigger its protections, see Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 459 (1994), and once triggered, the rule operates as a bright line. Monte jo expresses concern that courts will have to determine whether statements made at preliminary hearings constitute Edwards invocations — thus implicating all the practical problems of the Louisiana rule we discussed above, see Part II, supra. That concern is misguided. “We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’. . . .” McNeil, 501 U. S., at 182, n. 3. What matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation — not what happened at any preliminary hearing.

In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not “pay its way,” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 907-908, n. 6 (1984). Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled.

Y

Although our holding means that the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly rejected Montejo’s claim under Jackson, we think that Monte jo should be given an opportunity to contend that his letter of apology should still have been suppressed under the rule of Edwards. If Monte jo made a clear assertion of the right to counsel when the officers approached him about accompanying them on the excursion for the murder weapon, then no interrogation should have taken place unless Monte jo initiated it. Davis, supra, at 459. Even if Montejo subsequently agreed to waive his rights, that waiver would have been invalid had it followed an “unequivocal election of the right,” Cobb, 532 U. S., at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

*798Montejo understandably did not pursue an Edwards objection, because Jackson served as the Sixth Amendment analogy to Edwards and offered broader protections. Our decision today, overruling Jackson, changes the legal landscape and does so in part based on the protections already provided by Edwards. Thus we think that a remand is appropriate so that Montejo can pursue this alternative avenue for relief. Montejo may also seek on remand to press any claim he might have that his Sixth Amendment waiver was not knowing and voluntary, e. g., his argument that the waiver was invalid because it was based on misrepresentations by police as to whether he had been appointed a lawyer, cf. Moran, 475 U. S., at 428-429. These matters have heightened importance in light of our opinion today.

We do not venture to resolve these issues ourselves, not only because we are a court of final review, “not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005), but also because the relevant facts remain unclear. Montejo and the police gave inconsistent testimony about exactly what took place on the afternoon of September 10, 2002, and the Louisiana Supreme Court did not make an explicit credibility determination. Moreover, Monte jo’s testimony came not at the suppression hearing, but rather only at trial, and we are unsure whether under state law that testimony came too late to affect the propriety of the admission of the evidence. These matters are best left for resolution on remand.

We do reject, however, the dissent’s revisionist legal analysis of the “knowing and voluntary” issue. Post, at 810-814. In determining whether a Sixth Amendment waiver was knowing and voluntary, there is no reason categorically to distinguish an unrepresented defendant from a represented one. It is equally true for each that, as we held in Patterson, the Miranda warnings adequately inform him “of his right to have counsel present during the questioning,” and make him “aware of the consequences of a decision by him *799to waive his Sixth Amendment rights,” 487 U. S., at 293. Somewhat surprisingly for an opinion that extols the virtues of stare decisis, the dissent complains that our “treatment of the waiver question rests entirely on the dubious decision in Patterson,” post, at 812. The Court in Patterson did not consider the result dubious, nor does the Court today.

* * *

This case is an exemplar of Justice Jackson’s oft quoted warning that this Court “is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.” Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 181 (1943) (opinion concurring in result). We today remove Michigan v. Jackson’s fourth story of prophylaxis.

The judgment of. the Louisiana Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.

Earlier this Term, in Arizona v. Gant, ante, p. 332, the Court overruled New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), even though that case had been on the books for 28 years, had not been undermined by subsequent decisions, had been recently reaffirmed and extended, had proved to be eminently workable (indeed, had been adopted for precisely that reason), and had engendered substantial law enforcement reliance. See Gant, ante, at 358 (Alito, J., dissenting). The Court took this step even though we were not asked to overrule Belton, and this new rule is almost certain to lead to a host of problems. See Gant, ante, at 363-365 (Alito, J., dissenting); Megginson v. United States, post, p. 1230; Grooms v. United States, post, p. 1231 (same).

*800Justice Scalia,

who cast the deciding vote to overrule Belton, dismissed stare decisis concerns with the following observation: “[I]t seems to me ample reason that the precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous ... results.” Gant, ante, at 353 (concurring opinion). This narrow view of stare decisis provides the only principle on which the decision in Gant can be justified.

In light of Gant, the discussion of stare decisis in Justice Stevens’ dissent* is surprising. His dissent in the case at hand criticizes the Court for “[a]cting on its own” in reconsidering Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986). Post, at 804 (hereinafter dissent). But the same was true in Gant, and in this case, the Court gave the parties and interested amici the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs on the issue, a step not taken in Gant.

The dissent faults the Court for “cast[ing] aside the reliance interests of law enforcement,” post, at 809, but in Gant, there were real and important law enforcement interests at stake, see ante, at 358-360 (Alito, J., dissenting). Even the Court conceded that the Belton rule had “been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers ha[d] relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years.” Ante, at 349. And whatever else might be said about Belton, it surely provided a bright-line rule.

A month ago, none of this counted for much, but today the dissent writes:

“Jackson’s bright-line rule has provided law enforcement officers with clear guidance, allowed prosecutors to quickly and easily assess whether confessions will be admissible in court, and assisted judges in determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated by police interrogation.” Post, at 808.

*801It is striking that precisely the same points were true in Gant:

“[Belton’s] bright-line rule ha[d] provided law enforcement officers with clear guidance, allowed prosecutors to quickly and easily assess whether [evidence obtained in a vehicle search] w[ould] be admissible in court, and assisted judges in determining whether a defendant’s [Fourth] Amendment rights ha[d] been violated by police interrogation.” Post, at 808.

The dissent, finally, invokes Jackson’s antiquity, stating that “the 23-year existence of a simple bright-line rule” should weigh in favor of its retention. Post, at 810. But in Gant, the Court had no compunction about casting aside a 28-year-old bright-line rule. I can only assume that the dissent thinks that our constitutional precedents are like certain wines, which are most treasured when they are neither too young nor too old, and that Jackson, supra, at 23, is in its prime, whereas Belton, supra, at 28, had turned brownish and vinegary.

I agree with the dissent that stare decisis should promote “ ‘the evenhanded ... development of legal principles,’ ” post, at 807 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827-828 (1991)). The treatment of stare decisis in Gant fully supports the decision in the present case.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, and with whom Justice Breyer joins except for footnote 5, dissenting.

Today the Court properly concludes that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s parsimonious reading of our decision in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), is indefensible. Yet the Court does not reverse. Rather, on its own initiative and without any evidence that the longstanding Sixth Amendment protections established in Jackson have caused any harm to the workings of the criminal justice system, the *802Court rejects Jackson outright on the ground that it is “untenable as a theoretical and doctrinal matter.” Ante, at 786. That conclusion rests on a misinterpretation of Jackson’s rationale and a gross undervaluation of the rule of stare decisis. The police interrogation in this case clearly violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

I

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The right to counsel attaches during “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings,” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U. S. 191, 198 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it guarantees the assistance of counsel not only during in-court proceedings but during all critical stages, including postarraignment interviews with law enforcement officers, see Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 290 (1988).

In Jackson, this Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment bars police from interrogating defendants who have requested the appointment of counsel at arraignment. Applying the presumption that such a request constitutes an invocation of the right to counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution,” 475 U. S., at 633, we held that “a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment” cannot be subject to uncounseled interrogation unless he initiates “exchanges or conversations with the police,” id., at 626.

In this case, petitioner Jesse Montejo contends that police violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by interrogating him following his “72-hour hearing” outside the presence of, and without prior notice to, his lawyer. Brief for Petitioner 7. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Montejo’s claim. Relying on the fact that the defendants in Jackson had “requested” counsel at arraignment, the state court held that Jackson’s protections did not apply to Mon*803tejo because his counsel was appointed automatically; Montejo had not explicitly requested counsel or affirmatively accepted the counsel appointed to represent him before he submitted to police interrogation. 06-1807, pp. 28-29 (1/16/ 08), 974 So. 2d 1238, 1261.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, if allowed to stand, “would lead either to an unworkable standard, or to arbitrary and anomalous distinctions between defendants in different States,” ante, at 783. Neither option is tolerable, and neither is compelled by Jackson itself.

Our decision in Jackson involved two consolidated cases, both arising in the State of Michigan. Under Michigan law in effect at that time, when a defendant appeared for arraignment the court was required to inform him that counsel would be provided if he was financially needy and he requested representation. Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 785.4(1) (1976). It was undisputed that the Jackson defendants made such a “request” at their arraignment: one by completing an affidavit of indigency, and the other by responding affirmatively to a question posed to him by the court. See App. in Michigan v. Jackson, O. T. 1984, No. 84-1531, p. 168; App. in Michigan v. Bladel, O. T. 1984, No. 84-1539, pp. 3a-4a. In neither case, however, was it clear that counsel had actually been appointed at the arraignment. Thus, the defendants’ requests for counsel were significant as a matter of state law because they served as evidence that the appointment of counsel had been effectuated even in the absence of proof that defense counsel had actual notice of the appointments.

Unlike Michigan, Louisiana does not require a defendant to make a request in order to receive court-appointed counsel. Consequently, there is no reason to place constitutional significance on the fact that Montejo neither voiced a request for counsel nor affirmatively embraced that appointment post hoc. Certainly our decision in Jackson did not mandate such an odd rule. See ante, at 784 (acknowledging that we *804had no occasion to decide in Jackson how its rule would apply in States that do not make appointment of counsel contingent on affirmative request). If a defendant is entitled to protection from police-initiated interrogation under the Sixth Amendment when he merely requests a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to such protection when he has secured a lawyer. Indeed, we have already recognized as much. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 352 (1990) (acknowledging that “once a defendant obtains or even requests counsel,” Jackson alters the waiver analysis); Patterson, 487 U. S., at 290, n. 3 (noting “as a matter of some significance” to the constitutional analysis that defendant had “not retained, or accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned by authorities” (emphasis added)).1 Once an attorney-client relationship has been established through the appointment or retention of counsel, as a matter of federal law the method by which the relationship was created is irrelevant: The existence of a valid attorney-client relationship provides a defendant with the full constitutional protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment.

II

Today the Court correctly concludes that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding is “troublesome,” ante, at 784, “impractical,” ante, at 785, and “unsound,” ante, at 786. Instead of reversing the decision of the state court by simply answering the question on which we granted certiorari in a unanimous opinion, however, the majority has decided to change the law. Acting on its own initiative, the majority overrules Jackson to correct a “theoretical and doctrinal” *805problem of its own imagining, see ante, at 786. A more careful reading of Jackson and the Sixth Amendment cases upon which it relied reveals that the rule announced in Jackson protects a fundamental right that the Court now dishonors.

The majority’s decision to overrule Jackson rests on its assumption that Jackson’s protective rule was intended to “prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about their rights,” ante, at 789; see also ante, at 794, just as the rule adopted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), was designed to prevent police from coercing unindicted suspects into revoking their requests for counsel at interrogation. Operating on that limited understanding of the purpose behind Jackson’s protective rule, the Court concludes that Jackson provides no safeguard not already secured by this Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) (requiring defendants to be admonished of their right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation); Edwards, 451 U. S. 477 (prohibiting police-initiated interrogation following defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel).

The majority’s analysis flagrantly misrepresents Jackson’s underlying rationale and the constitutional interests the decision sought to protect. While it is true that the rule adopted in Jackson was patterned after the rule in Edwards, 451 U. S., at 484-485, the Jackson opinion does not even mention the antibadgering considerations that provide the basis for the Court's decision today. Instead, Jackson relied primarily on cases discussing the broad protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel — not its Fifth Amendment counterpart. Jackson emphasized that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to “ ‘protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary,’” 475 U. S., at 631 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, 189 (1984)), by giving him “ ‘the right to rely on counsel as a “medium” between him[self] and the State,’ ” 475 U. S., at 632 *806(quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 176 (1985)). Underscoring that the commencement of criminal proceedings is a decisive event that transforms a suspect into an accused within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, we concluded that arraigned defendants are entitled to “at least as much protection” during interrogation as the Fifth Amendment affords unindicted suspects. See, e. g., 475 U. S., at 632 (“[T]he difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these circumstances” (emphasis added)). Thus, although the rules adopted in Edwards and Jackson are similar, Jackson did not rely on the reasoning of Edwards but remained firmly rooted in the unique protections afforded to the attorney-client relationship by the Sixth Amendment.2

Once Jackson is placed in its proper Sixth Amendment context, the majority’s justifications for overruling the decision crumble. Ordinarily, this Court is hesitant to disturb past precedent and will do so only when a rule has proven “outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately *807vulnerable to serious reconsideration.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 266 (1986). While stare decisis is not “an inexorable command,” we adhere to it as “the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827-828 (1991).

Paying lipservice to the rule of stare decisis, the majority acknowledges that the Court must consider many factors before taking the dramatic step of overruling a past decision. See ante, at 792-793. Specifically, the majority focuses on four considerations: the reasoning of the decision, the workability of the rule, the reliance interests at stake, and the antiquity of the precedent. The Court exaggerates the considerations favoring reversal, however, and gives short shrift to the valid considerations favoring retention of the Jackson rule.

First, and most central to the Court’s decision to overrule Jackson, is its assertion that Jackson’s “‘reasoning’”— which the Court defines as “the weighing of the [protective] rule’s benefits against its costs,” ante, at 793 — does not justify continued application of the rule it created. The balancing test the Court performs, however, depends entirely on its misunderstanding of Jackson as a rule designed to prevent police badgering, rather than a rule designed to safeguard a defendant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel.3

*808Next, in order to reach the conclusion that the Jackson rule is unworkable, the Court reframes the relevant inquiry, asking not whether the Jackson rule as applied for the past quarter century has proved easily administrable, but instead whether the Louisiana Supreme Court’s cramped interpretation of that rule is practically workable. The answer to that question, of course, is no. When framed more broadly, however, the evidence is overwhelming that Jackson’s simple, bright-line rule has done more to advance effective law enforcement than to undermine it.

In a supplemental brief submitted by lawyers and judges with extensive experience in law enforcement and prosecution, amici Larry D. Thompson et al. argue persuasively that Jackson’s bright-line rule has provided law enforcement officers with clear guidance, allowed prosecutors to quickly and easily assess whether confessions will be admissible in court, and assisted judges in determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated by police interrogation. See generally Thompson Supplemental Brief 6. While amici acknowledge that “Jackson reduces opportunities to interrogate defendants” and “may require exclusion of evidence that could support a criminal conviction,” they maintain that “it is a rare case where this rule lets a guilty defendant go free.” Ibid. Notably, these representations are not contradicted by the State of Louisiana or other amici, including the United States. See United States Brief 12 (conceding that the Jackson rule has not “resulted in the suppression of significant numbers of statements in federal prosecutions in the past”).4 In short, there is substantial *809evidence suggesting that Jackson’s rule is not only workable, but also desirable from the perspective of law enforcement.

Turning to the reliance interests at stake in the case, the Court rejects the interests of criminal defendants with the flippant observation that any who are knowledgeable enough to rely on Jackson are too savvy to need its protections, and casts aside the reliance interests of law enforcement on the ground that police and prosecutors remain free to employ the Jackson rule if it suits them. See ante, at 793. Again as a result of its mistaken understanding of the purpose behind Jackson’s protective rule, the Court fails to identify the real reliance interest at issue in this case: the public’s interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be reasonably relied upon as a medium between the accused and the power of the State. That interest lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee, and is surely worthy of greater consideration than it is given by today’s decision.

Finally, although the Court acknowledges that “antiquity” is a factor that counsels in favor of retaining precedent, it *810concludes that the fact Jackson is “only two decades old” cuts “in favor of abandoning” the rule it established. Ante, at 792-793. I would have thought that the 23-year existence of a simple bright-line rule would be a factor that cuts in the other direction.

Despite the fact that the rule established in Jackson remains relevant, well grounded in constitutional precedent, and easily administrabie, the Court today rejects it sua sponte. Such a decision can only diminish the public’s confidence in the reliability and fairness of our system of justice.5

Ill

Even if Jackson had never been decided, it would be clear that Monte jo’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Today’s decision eliminates the rule that “any waiver of Sixth Amendment rights given in a discussion initiated by police is presumed invalid” once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel. Harvey, 494 U. S., at 349 (citing Jackson, 475 U. S., at 636). Nevertheless, under the undisputed facts of this case, there is no sound basis for concluding that Monte jo made a knowing and valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before acquiescing in police interrogation fol*811lowing his 72-hour hearing. Because police questioned Montejo without notice to, and outside the presence of, his lawyer, the interrogation violated Monte jo’s right to counsel even under pre-Jackson precedent.

Our pre-Jackson case law makes clear that “the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.” Moulton, 474 U. S., at 176. The Sixth Amendment entitles indicted defendants to have counsel notified of and present during critical confrontations with the State throughout the pretrial process. Given the realities of modern criminal prosecution, the critical proceedings at which counsel’s assistance is required more and more often occur outside the courtroom in pretrial proceedings “where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.” United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224 (1967).

In Wade, for instance, we held that because a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, a defendant and his counsel are constitutionally entitled to notice of the impending lineup. Accordingly, counsel’s presence is a “requisite to conduct of the lineup, absent an intelligent waiver.” Id., at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same reasoning applies to police decisions to interrogate represented defendants. For if the Sixth Amendment entitles an accused to such robust protection during a lineup, surely it entitles him to such protection during a custodial interrogation, when the stakes are as high or higher. Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]hat use is a defendant’s right to effective counsel at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he confesses?”).

*812The Court avoids confronting the serious Sixth Amendment concerns raised by the police interrogation in this case by assuming that Montejo validly waived his Sixth Amendment rights before submitting to interrogation.6 It does so by summarily concluding that “doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver,” ante, at 795; thus, because Montejo was given Miranda warnings prior to interrogation, his waiver was presumptively valid. Ironically, while the Court faults Jackson for blurring the line between this Court’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it commits the same error by assuming that the Miranda warnings given in this case, designed purely to safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, were somehow adequate to protect Montejo’s more robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The majority’s cursory treatment of the waiver question rests entirely on the dubious decision in Patterson, in which we addressed whether, by providing Miranda warnings, police had adequately advised an indicted but unrepresented defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The majority held that “[a]s a general matter... an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed ... in Miranda, .. . has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights.” 487 U. S., at 296. The Court recognized, however, that “because the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the attorney-client relationship . . . extends beyond Mi*813randa’s protection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, ... there will be cases where a waiver which would be valid under Miranda will not suffice for Sixth Amendment purposes.” Id., at 297, n. 9. This is such a case.

As I observed in Patterson, the conclusion that Miranda warnings ordinarily provide a sufficient basis for a knowing waiver of the right to counsel rests on the questionable assumption that those warnings make clear to defendants the assistance a lawyer can render during postindictment interrogation. See 487 U. S., at 307 (dissenting opinion). Because Miranda warnings do not hint at the ways in which a lawyer might assist her elient during conversations with the police, I remain convinced that the warnings prescribed in Miranda,7 while sufficient to apprise a defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, are inadequate to inform an unrepresented, indicted defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to have a lawyer present at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. The inadequacy of those warnings is even more obvious in the case of a represented defendant. While it can be argued that informing an indicted but unrepresented defendant of his right to counsel at least alerts him to the fact that he is entitled to obtain something he does not already possess, providing that same warning to a defendant who has already secured counsel is more likely to confound than enlighten.8 By glibly assuming that the Mi*814randa warnings given in this case were sufficient to ensure Montejo’s waiver was both knowing and voluntary, the Court conveniently avoids any comment on the actual advice Montejo received, which did not adequately inform him of his relevant Sixth Amendment rights or alert him to the possible consequences of waiving those rights.

A defendant’s decision to forgo counsel’s assistance and speak openly with police is a momentous one. Given the high stakes of making such a choice and the potential value of counsel’s advice and mediation at that critical stage of the criminal proceedings, it is imperative that a defendant possess “a foil awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 421 (1986), before his waiver is deemed valid. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U. S. 77, 81 (2004); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Because the administration of Miranda warnings was insufficient to ensure Montejo understood the Sixth Amendment right he was being asked to surrender, the record in this case provides no basis for concluding that Montejo validly waived his right to counsel, even in the absence of Jackson’s enhanced protections.

IV

The Court’s decision to overrule Jackson is unwarranted. Not only does it rest on a flawed doctrinal premise, but the dubious benefits it hopes to achieve are far outweighed by the damage it does to the rule of law and the integrity of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, even apart *815from the protections afforded by Jackson, the police interrogation in this case violated Jesse Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Breyer,

dissenting.

I join Justice Stevens’ dissent except for footnote 5. Although the principles of stare decisis are not inflexible, I believe they bind the Court here. I reached a similar conclusion in Arizona v. Gant, ante, at 354-355 (dissenting opinion), and in several other recent cases. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 923-929 (2007) (same); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 865-866 (2007) (same); Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 534-536 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 219-220 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 190-191 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 675-679 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).