The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lockett, J.:

A worker was killed on his return trip home from work. The worker’s surviving spouse and minor children claimed death benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied their claim, finding that the worker had abandoned his employment and therefore the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his *274employment. On review, the Workers Compensation Board (the Board) reversed the ALJ, finding that the worker’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The employer appealed. The case was transferred to this court from the Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).

Donald L. Kindel was employed by Ferco Rental, Inc. (Ferco). On October 11,1991, Kindel was transported in a company pickup truck from his home in Salina, Kansas, to a construction job site in Sabetha, Kansas. James Graham, Kindel’s supervisor, was the driver of the truck. The company truck had been checked out to Graham to transport Kindel and other employees to and from the job site.

On the way to Sabetha, Graham and Kindel passed a former employee of Ferco. Kindel held up a note inviting the former coworker to join them at the Outer Limits, a “striptease” bar adjacent to Interstate 70 on the west side of Topeka. At approximately 3:30 p.m., after completing the day’s work at the job site in Sabetha, Graham and Kindel proceeded back toward Salina. On the way, the two men stopped at the Outer Limits for approximately four hours, where they became inebriated.

Graham suffers from amnesia and cannot recall any of the events occurring after they stopped at the Outer Limits. Graham testified, however, that it was Kindel’s idea to stop at the Outer Limits; that Kindel made the arrangements to meet the former co-worker at the Outer Limits after work that day; and that if Kindel would have wanted to proceed straight home, Graham would have done so.

At approximately 8:50 p.m., the Kansas Highway Patrol received a call of a motor vehicle accident on Interstate 70 near mile marker 337. When Trooper McCool arrived at the accident scene, he observed the Ferco truck overturned and lying in the south ditch of the westbound lane near an entrance to a rest area. Graham, who was driving, and Kindel had been partially ejected out of the truck’s windshield. Kindel was deceased. Subsequent tests determined that Graham and Kindel had blood alcohol levels of .225 and .26, respectively.

Prior to the accident, Graham and Kindel were aware that Ferco had a policy that, except to obtain food or fuel, company vehicles *275were to be used only to go directly from the shop to the job site. Company vehicles were not to be used for personal pleasure or business. Ferco had a comprehensive drug and alcohol policy in place at the time of the accident which, among other things, prohibited workers from using the company equipment while under the influence of alcohol. Employees were not authorized to use a company vehicle to stop at a bar to consume alcohol. Kindel signed off on this policy on December 8, 1990. The employer asserted that when the employees stopped at the bar, authorization to use the company vehicle ceased and any further use of the company vehicle was not part of their employment.

At the time of the accident on October 11, 1991, Graham possessed a valid Kansas driver s license. Ferco was aware of Graham’s propensity for drinking and driving. Graham had been charged with DUI some six days prior to this incident and had a previous conviction for which he had had his driver’s license suspended. Graham understood that he was prohibited from drinking while using company equipment. Graham testified that the reason for stopping at the Outer Limits was to pursue pleasure and to have a good time. He said it was his understanding that when he pulled up at the Outer Limits, his work was over for the day.

Kindel’s surviving spouse and minor children filed a workers compensation claim, seeking death benefits pursuant to K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-510b. The ALJ found

“that the deviation was so substantial and there is not a causal connection between the deviation and the purpose of employment, nor a causal nexus between the resulting accident and death as to say that the claimant had ever returned to the scope of his employment. . . . The subsequent death, therefore, did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.”

The ALJ made no findings as to whether Kindel’s death resulted substantially from his intoxication. The claimants appealed.

After reviewing the record, the Board reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Kindel’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Board acknowledged case law from other jurisdictions supporting the ALJ’s decision, but found case law supporting a finding of compensability to be more persuasive. The Board first noted that Kindel’s trip to and from Sabetha, absent *276the detour, would have been considered a part of his employment. The Board stated that even if it assumed that the deviation from employment increased the risk of injury, the injury and resulting death resulted from the combined personal and work-related risks. The Board concluded that, under Kansas law, the increased risk attributable to the deviation did not, by itself, bar recovery. The Board observed:

“The [Kansas Workers Compensation] Act is to be liberally construed to bring both employees and employers within the coverage of the act. K.S.A. 44-501(g). The fact that claimant had been drinking and even the type of bar may be emotionally charged factors. This is especially so in this case where respondent had a clear policy against drinking while driving company vehicles. Nevertheless, the activities of claimant during the deviation from employment do not have any real relevance to whether the accident which occurred after claimant returned to the route home in the company vehicle occurred in the course of employment. Had claimant and his supervisor stopped for the evening, spent the night at a motel and returned the. next morning, an accident on the route home would likely have been considered compensable. The only difference here is the nature of the activity during the deviation from employment.

“The Appeals Board does not consider the nature of the activity, i.e., the drinking at a topless bar, to be determinative. The Kansas Workers Compensation Act is generally a no fault system. With the exception of certain specific defenses, e.g., refusal to use a safety guard or injury caused by the' claimant’s intoxication, the fault of the claimant is not relevant to compensability. Second, the specific factor, i.e., drinking, is already addressed by statute. See K.S.A. 44-501(d). The statute specifies the circumstances where intoxication acts to bar recovery. It would be [an] inappropriate expansion of that statute if claimant’s drinking were the sole factor taking the injury out of the scope of employment.

“When reduced to the essential relevant facts, this case is not materially different from any other where a claimant deviates from his employment but has returned at the time of the accident. The Appeals Board therefore finds that claimant’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment.”

The Board reversed the decision of the ALJ and remanded the case for a determination of the appropriate benefits. The employer appealed.

The employer contends that when Graham and Kindel stopped at the Outer Limits, they abandoned their employment and the subsequent accident which caused the worker’s death is not compensable. The claimants assert that Kindel’s activity during the deviation is irrelevant because he was not killed during the deviation. *277The claimants argue there is substantial competent evidence to support the finding of the Board that Kindel’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Standard of Review

K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-556(a), defining the standard of review of the district court under the pre-Board system, states that “[s]uch review shall be upon questions of law and fact.” Review of the Board’s decision is now by the appellate courts in accordance with the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 etseq. See L. 1995, ch. 1, § 3.

Under K.S.A. 77-621, appellate review is explicitly limited to questions of law. That statute states, in relevant part:

“(c) The court shall grant relief only if it determines any one or more of the following:

“(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

“(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole . . . ; or

“(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.”

Arising out of and in the Course of Employment

Although K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-508(f), a codification of the longstanding “going and coming” rule, provides that injuries occurring while traveling to and from employment are generally not compensable, there is an exception which applies when travel upon the public roadways is an integral or necessary part of the employment. See Blair v. Shaw, 171 Kan. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951); Messenger v. Sage Drilling Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 435, 437, 680 P.2d 556, rev. denied 235 Kan. 1042 (1984). Because Kindel and other Ferco employees were expected to live out of town during the work weeks, and transportation to and from the remote site was in a company vehicle driven by a supervisor, this case falls within the exception to the general rule.

In any employment to which workers compensation laws apply, an employer is liable to pay compensation to an employee where *278the employee incurs personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-501(a). Whether an accident arises out of and in the course of the worker’s employment depends upon the facts peculiar to the particular case.

The two phrases arising “out of” and “in the course of” employment, as used in our Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., have separate and distinct meanings; they are conjunctive, and each condition must exist before compensation is allowable. The phrase “out of” employment points to the cause or origin of the accident and requires some causal connection between the accidental injury and the employment.- An injury arises “out of” employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Thus, an injury arises “out of” employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations, and incidents of the employment. The phrase “in the course of” employment relates to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred and means the injury happened while the worker was at work in the employer’s service. Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 236 Kan. 190, 198-99, 689 P.2d 837 (1984); Newman v. Bennett, 212 Kan. 562, 512 P.2d 497 (1973).

Both the ALJ and the Board acknowledge the separate considerations inherent in the determination whether the death arose “out of” and “in the course of” employment. The ALJ concluded that the length of time Kindel spent at the Outer Limits and his substantial consumption of alcohol removed his subsequent activity from arising “in the course of” his employment, notwithstanding the fact he was on his homeward route at the time of the accident. The Board, on the other hand, determined that Kindel’s injury and death resulted from combined risks attributable to his personal deviation and his employment, and held that the increased risk factor attributable to the deviation should not bar recovery. The point of disagreement between the ALJ and Board is whether the deviation was so substantial as to permanently remove the worker from the course of his employment, even though he later continued *279his homeward route. The parties cite various cases for support of their respective positions.

Two Kansas cases address a somewhat similar situation and determined whether the worker had abandoned his employer s business. They are Angleton v. Starkan, Inc., 250 Kan. 711, 828 P.2d 933 (1992), and Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 103 P.2d 837 (1940). In Angleton, the widow and surviving children filed workers compensation claims against the employer following Angletoris death. Angleton, who was employed as a truck driver for Starkan, was hauling a load of cattle when a pair of hijackers began following him in another truck. By conversation over the citizens band radio, one of the hijackers persuaded Angleton to pull off the highway to smoke marijuana. Angleton stopped his truck and got into the hijackers’ truck. While Angleton was smoking a marijuana cigarette, one of the hijackers shot and killed him. An ALJ denied all claimants’ requests for compensation for failure to prove that Angletoris death arose out of and in the course of his employment. On review, the assistant director found that Angletoris fatal injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded compensation to the surviving minor children and funeral expenses, but denied compensation to Angletoris widow on the basis she had failed to file her claim in a timely manner. The widow petitioned the district court for review of the assistant director’s order. The district court affirmed. The widow appealed.

On appeal, the employer argued that Angletoris death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment because Angleton was smoking marijuana in another vehicle at the time of his death. The Angleton court first determined that absent the alleged marijuana episode, the accident occurred in the course of Angletoris employment. The court noted that at the time of his death, Angle-ton was en route to deliver his load of cattle to a feedlot on the route designated by his employer and that at the time Angleton pulled off the highway, he was driving his load in fulfillment of his employment obligations. The court further observed that Angleton was killed because he was responsible for the Starkan truck and cattle and his employment for Starkan transporting valuable cargo *280exposed him to an increased risk of injury of being robbed while on the highway. 250 Kan. at 718.

The Angleton court then examined whether the alleged use of marijuana changed the district court’s conclusion that the accident resulting in Angleton’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The district court had noted that the only testimony that Angleton pulled off the highway to smoke marijuana was the testimony by one of the hijackers and found that testimony to be inherently unreliable. The Angleton court pointed out that on appeal it was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. It noted that if the district court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence, an appellate court is bound by those findings. The court noted that on appeal its jurisdiction was limited to review of questions of law, citing Craig v. Electrolux Corporation, 212 Kan. 75, 77, 510 P.2d 138 (1973); and Jones v. City of Dodge City, 194 Kan. 777, 779, 402 P.2d 108 (1965). The Angleton court noted that the courts, district and appellate, are to liberally construe the workers compensation statutes “ ‘to effect legislative intent and award compensation to the worker where it is reasonably possible to do so.’ ” 250 Kan. at 716 (quoting Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. 638, 643, 750 P.2d 1000 [1988]). The Angleton court determined that the record supported the district court’s finding that the hijacker’s testimony was unreliable and held that the testimony was not sufficient or rehable to support a finding that the worker’s conduct constituted a deviation from his employment. The court found that Angleton’s death arose in the course of and out of his employment. 250 Kan. at 720.

In Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, the claimant was a traveling salesman who lived in Salina. Woodring was sent by his employer to meet a client in Enterprise, Kansas, to further the employer’s business. Prior to arriving at Enterprise, the claimant went to Minneapolis, Kansas, and picked up three friends who made the journey to Enterprise with him. When the worker arrived at Enterprise, he discovered the man he was supposed to meet was in Abilene. The claimant made no further attempts to contact the client, and instead proceeded to a local drink*281ing establishment with his friends for “an hour or so” where he imbibed intoxicating liquor. Thereafter, while driving recklessly on his return journey to Salina, claimant was injured when his car overturned.

The compensation commissioner found that the claimant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and entered an award of compensation on behalf of the claimant. The employer appealed to the district court. The district court reached the opposite conclusion, finding that because the claimant had abandoned his employer’s business, the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Claimant appealed.

The Woodring court noted that it had little concern of the disputed questions of fact in ordinary lawsuits and none whatsoever in workers compensation cases except to ascertain whether the record contained any evidence which on any theory of credence or want of credence would justify the trial court’s finding or conclusion of fact. The court stated that its responsibility was to determine questions of law.

The Woodring court then observed that where a business errand is the purpose of a worker’s journey, the social incident of taking a few guests along for the pleasure of their company would not affect the worker’s right to compensation for an injury sustained in the performance of that errand. The Woodring court noted that an intruding question was whether a worker, engaged in the employer’s service, could be permitted to recover compensation for an injury sustained while operating an automobile on the public highway under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of a Kansas statute which made such an act a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. It found that because the district court'had determined the business errand was finished or abandoned and that the worker had set about the pursuit of his own pleasure or indulgence, there was no theory of law or of justice which would impose on the employer the obligation to pay compensation for any injury sustained by the worker under such circumstances. 152 Kan. at 418.

The claimants rely heavily on Angleton and Rainear v. Rainear, 63 N.J. 276, 307 A.2d 72 (1973), for support of a finding of com*282pensability in this case. The claimants seek to distinguish Woodring, noting that Kindel was a passenger being driven home by his supervisor in a company vehicle and that the supervisor was required to return his employers vehicle. The employer fails to address the Angleton precedent, but contends that the rationale of Woodring should be applied to this case. It is important to note that in Angleton and Woodring there were allegations that the worker was violating the law. Here, although Kindel was intoxicated, the fact he drank was not a violation of the law nor was he violating a law, at the time he was killed.

In support of their arguments, both parties cite numerous cases from outside of Kansas. The most favorable case for the employer is Calloway v. Workmen’s Comp., 165 W. Va. 432, 268 S.E.2d 132 (1980). In Calloway, the West Virginia Supreme Court found the claimant salesman’s activity of drinking and tavern-hopping from midaftemoon until 11 p.m. amounted to an abandonment of any business purpose such that the injuries he received in an accident shortly thereafter while being transported home were not compensable. The Calloway court acknowledged that workers compensation laws generally recognize that an employee is entitled to compensation for an injury received while travelling on behalf of his employer’s business. 165 W. Va. at 434. The court noted that where an employee deviates from the employer’s business, the employee may be denied compensation if the injury occurs during the deviation and that once the employee ceases the deviation and returns to the employer’s business, a subsequent injury is ordinarily compensable. The court then observed:

“In the case of a major deviation from the business purpose, most courts will bar compensation recovery on the theory that the deviation is so substantial that the employee must be deemed to have abandoned any business purpose and consequently cannot recover for injuries received, even though he has ceased the deviation and is returning to the business route or purpose. [Citations omitted.]

“The key is how the terms ‘major’ and ‘deviation’ are defined, and often courts do not address this point. It is apparent that a deviation can be determined only after the nature of the employment and the scope of the business trip are known. This involves an analysis of the employment relationship, the purpose of the trip, the employer’s rules or instructions relating to the trip, as well as past practices, *283in order to determine the reasonableness of the employee’s conduct as it relates to the employer’s business.

“A deviation generally consists of a personal or nonbusiness-related activity. The longer the deviation exits in time or the greater it varies from the normal business route or in purpose from the normal business objectives, the more likely that it will be characterized as major.” 165 W. Va. at 435-36.

The Calloway court then reviewed a number of cases in which various courts have characterized an employee’s deviations to be sufficiently major to deny compensation. 165 W. Va. at 436-39. The Calloway court concluded:

“In the present case, there is no dispute that the claimant was initially traveling on behalf of his employer in an attempt to solicit new business in the Logan County area. However, even under the facts liberally construed in his behalf, he had completed any company business in the midaftemoon when he and his fellow employee began to frequent taverns. The continuation of this activity until 11:00 p.m. was a major deviation, not only in time but also in its nature. It can only be viewed as an abandonment of any business purpose.” 165 W. Va. at 439-40.

The most favorable case for the claimants is Rainear v. Rainear, 63 N.J. 276. In Rainear, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that where an automobile accident had occurred while the decedent was on his way home from work along a proper and permissible route, decedent’s 10-hour stop at a restaurant and bar to eat and drink did not amount to such a departure from the decedent’s reasonable sphere of employment as to bar a compensation award. In that case, the decedent’s travel expenses were being paid by his employer. There was nothing in the record to confirm that drinking caused the accident. 63 N.J. at 279. The Rainear court reviewed a number of cases awarding compensation to employees injured following a deviation. The court stated:

“There is nothing in the compensation law which fixes an arbitrary limit to the number of hours of deviation which may be terminated with travel coverage resumed. Thus if the decedent ate dinner at [the restaurant and bar] en route home and stayed there simply watching television for hours before continuing on his intended travel home, there clearly would be no rational basis for failing to apply the broad remedial principles embraced in [other New Jersey workers compensation cases]. While the fact that he also did some drinking there may have influenced the Appellate Division’s negative result, the drinking really has no legal bearing here since there was no proof that the accident or death resulted from intoxication.” 63 N.J. at 286-87.

*284A deviation from the employer’s work generally consists of a personal or nonbusiness-related activity. The longer the deviation exists in time or the greater it varies from the normal business route or in purpose from the normal business objectives, the more likely that the deviation will be characterized as major. In the case of a major deviation from the business purpose, most courts will bar compensation recovery on the theory that the deviation is so substantial that the employee must be deemed to have abandoned any business purpose and consequently cannot recover for injuries received, even though he or she has ceased the deviation and is returning to the business route or purpose.

Is there substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding of compensability, i.e., that Kindel’s death arose in the course of his employment? The employer provided transportation. Kindel was a passenger and not the driver. He was being transported home after completion of his duties. Despite approximately four hours at the Outer Limits, the distance of the deviation was less, than one quarter of a mile. Kindel was killed after resuming the route home. Under the facts, even though the worker was intoxicated, as a passenger in his employer’s vehicle, he was not committing a violation of Kansas law. Kindel was killed while engaging in an activity contemplated by his employer while traveling on a public interstate highway. The fact he had been drinking has no legal bearing on the present compensation determination since there was no proof that the accident or Kindel’s death resulted from Kindel’s intoxication.

The workers compensation statutes are to be liberally construed to effect legislative intent and award compensation where it is reasonably possible to do so. Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. 638, 643, 750 P.2d 1000 (1988). We note that the workers compensation law does not fix an arbitrary limit on the number of hours of deviation, which may be terminated with travel coverage resumed. Whether there was a deviation, and if that deviation had terminated, is a question of fact to be determined by the administrative law judge or the Workers Compensation Board. Under our standard of review, we find that the Board did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously and there is substantial evidence to sup*285port the Board’s conclusion that the fatal injury occurred in the course of Kindel’s employment.

Did Death Result Substantially From Intoxication?

K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-501(d) provides:

“If it is proved that the injury to the employee results . . . substantially from the employee’s intoxication, any compensation in respect to that injury shall be disallowed.’’

Employer contends that Kindel’s intoxication was a substantially causative factor in bringing about his death. Employer’s argument can be summarized as follows: (1) Kindel had a blood alcohol concentration of .26; (2) Kindel would have been substantially impaired and incapable of acting in a manner in which an ordinarily prudent person would act; (3) under Kansas law, a passenger who has knowledge of a danger, and circumstances are such that an ordinary person would speak out or take other positive action to avoid injury, has the legal duty to take the action an ordinary prudent person would take under the circumstances (see Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, Syl. ¶ 5, 707 P.2d 1063 [1985]); (4) had Kindel exercised the degree of care required of him, he would have stayed out of the vehicle; and (5) because Kindel got into the vehicle after stopping at the Outer Limits, he was killed. The employer concludes that under these circumstances Kindel’s death substantially resulted from his own intoxication, thereby barring a workers compensation claim for death benefits. Claimants respond that Graham, not Kindel, was driving the employer’s truck at the time of the accident and Kindel’s intoxication did not cause the accident or his death.

To defeat a workers compensation claim based on the worker’s intoxication, an employer must prove not only that the worker was intoxicated, but also that such intoxication was the substantial cause of the injury. The presumption of intoxication provided for under the Kansas criminal statute is inapplicable in workers compensation cases. Evidence of the blood alcohol concentration of a workers compensation claimant is relevant to the issue of the cause of the accident in which the claimant is injured but does not give rise to a presumption of intoxication. Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. *286638, Syl. ¶¶ 4, 5. For an in-depth discussion of intoxication as it relates to workers compensation, see 1A Larsons Workmen’s Compensation Law § 34 (1995).

The ALJ did not address the issue of intoxication. On appeal, the Board noted that Graham was driving, not Kindel, and that K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 44-501(d) expressly requires that the intoxication of the claimant be shown as the cause of the injury before compensation is disallowed. The Board noted that it was the driver’s intoxication, not the worker’s, that caused the fatal accident. The Board concluded it would require “speculation beyond the reasonable inferences from the evidence” to conclude that Kindel’s own intoxication was a substantial cause of the accident

To this court, the employer asserts that Kansas courts have recognized that a passenger owes a duty to exercise that care which a reasonably careful person would use for his or her own protection under the existing circumstances. See McGlothin v. Wiles, 207 Kan. 718, Syl. ¶ 1, 487 P.2d 533 (1971). Under tort law, a passenger can only be liable for negligence in two situations: (1) where there was a failure to use due care for his or her own safety as a passenger in the automobile and (2) under a joint enterprise or when the passenger and driver had a special relationship which created some duty where the negligence of the driver would be imputed to the passenger. Akins v. Hamblin, 237 Kan. 742, Syl. ¶ 2, 703 P.2d 771 (1985).

Common-law defenses to tort theories of negligence do not apply to workers compensation claims. K.S.A. 44-545 provides that it shall be a defense for an employer

“in all cases where said employee has elected not to come within the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act . . . : (a) That the employee either expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of the hazard complained of; (b) that the injury or death was caused in whole or in part by the want of due care of a fellow servant; or (c) that said employee was guiliy of contributory negligence: Provided, That none of these defenses shall be available where the injury was caused.by the willful negligence of such employer, or of any managing officer or of managing agent of said employer.”

Because Kindel was covered by workers compensation, these defenses are not available to the employer; therefore, Kindel had no common-law duty as a passenger.

*287In addition, the employer failed to prove that Kindel’s intoxication was a substantial cause of the injury. The testimony of Trooper McCool was that the alcohol level of the driver was a substantial cause of the accident. Neither the ALJ nor the Board concluded that the accident substantially resulted from Kindel’s intoxication. The fact that Kindel was a passenger, and not the driver, defeats the employer’s claim. The Board properly found that the employer’s attempt to prove Kindel’s intoxication caused the accident requires “speculation beyond the reasonable inferences from the evidence.” In essence,the employer asks this court to make a factual finding in the absence of any such finding by the Board. Because our review is limited to questions of law, we are required to decline this request.

Failure to Follow Safety Policies

The employer asserts that Kindel’s claim should be denied because he was violating known and established safety policies by consuming alcohol and utilizing company equipment while under the influence of alcohol. The claimants respond that the employer’s argument improperly centers on the nature of the activity involved in the deviation and asserts that analysis has no application to the facts of this case.

The employer first asserted this argument before the ALJ. The ALJ, in his factual findings, noted that “[t]he respondent/employer, Ferco Rental, had a strict alcohol and drug policy . . . . There is little dispute that Mr. Graham and Mr. Kindel were aware of the alcohol/drug policy.” No further mention is made of Ferco’s company policies in the text of the ALJ’s opinion. The Board, in its opinion, states:

“The fact that claimant had been drinking and even the type of bar may be emotionally charged factors. This is especially so in this case where respondent had a clear policy against drinking while driving company vehicles. Nevertheless, the activities of claimant during the deviation from employment do not have any real relevance to whether the accident which occurred after claimant returned to the route home in the company vehicle occurred in the course of employment.”

The employer fails to point out what particular provisions of the statutes were violated. In addition, the employer cites K.S.A. 1991 *288Supp. 44-501(d) as authority, but fails to specify why that statute disallows compensation. The case law and authority that are cited by the employer are directed to whether an injury can properly be said to arise “in the course of” employment, as opposed to whether a violation of company policy bars compensation. See Hoover v. Ehrsam Co., 218 Kan. 662, 544 P.2d 1366 (1976); 1A Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law §§ 31.00, 31.12 (1995). The employer has failed to show that compensation should have been disallowed under 44-501(d).

Affirmed.

Gibson, J.

Defendant Rentavision, Inc. appeals a decision of the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry awarding workers’ compensation benefits to claimant Brian Clodgo. Rentavision argues the Commissioner erred in awarding compensation for an injury sustained while claimant and another employee were engaged in horseplay. We reverse.

On July 22, 1995, claimant was working as manager of Rentavision’s store in Brattleboro. During a lull between customers, claimant began firing staples with a staple gun at a co-worker, who was sitting on a couch watching television. The co-worker first protested, but then, after claimant had fired twenty or thirty staples at him, fired three staples back at claimant. As claimant ducked, the third staple hit him in the eye.

Claimant eventually reported the injury and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Rentavision contested the award, arguing that claimant was engaged in noncompensable horseplay at *550the time of the injury. Following a hearing in March 1996, the Commissioner awarded permanent partial disability and vocational rehabilitation benefits, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed.

This Court’s review is limited to questions of law the Commissioner has certified. 21 V.S.A. § 672; Goodwin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 123 Vt. 161, 162, 184 A.2d 220, 221 (1962). Although the Court defers to the Commissioner’s interpretation of Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act, we will not affirm an interpretation that is unjust or unreasonable. See Bedini v. Frost, 165 Vt. 167, 169, 678 A.2d 893, 894 (1996). We look to the whole statute, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law to determine whether the Commissioner’s interpretation conflicts with the Legislature’s intent. Spears v. Town of Enosburg, 153 Vt. 259, 262, 571 A.2d 604, 605-06 (1989).

Compensable injuries under Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act are those received “by accident arising out of and in the course of . . . employment.” 21 V.S.A. § 618. Although only work-related injuries are compensable, we recognize that “even [employees] of maturer years [will] indulge in a moment’s diversion from work to joke with or play a prank upon a fellow [employee].” Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 711 (N.Y. 1920). For such a horseplay-related injury to be compensated, however, claimant must show that it both (1) arose out of the employment, and (2) occurred in the course of the employment. 21 V.S.A. § 618; Miller v. International Business Machs. Corp., 161 Vt. 213, 214, 637 A.2d 1072, 1072-73 (1993). A nonparticipant injured by the horseplay of others will nearly always be able to meet this test, see 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 23.61, at 5-199 (1997); cf. Myott v. Vermont Plywood, Inc., 110 Vt. 131, 134-35, 2 A.2d 204, 206 (1938) (nonparticipant compensated for injury), while a participant may or may not recover. See 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 23.20, at 5-182 to 5-183.

In setting forth the applicable standard, the Commissioner stated that nothing short of specific intent to injure falls outside the scope of the Act. This overly broad statement was borrowed, however, from a case analyzing the exclusive-remedy aspects of workers’ compensation law, made in the context where an employee attempts to prove specific intent by the employer to injure the employee. See Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, *551927 (1980). Whether a horseplay participant is entitled to recover usually hinges on whether the injury occurred in the course of employment, which, in turn, depends on the extent of the employee’s deviation from work duties. See 2 Larson & Larson, supra, §§ 23.20, 23.61, at 5-183, 5-198 to 5-201; cf. Sekora v. Industrial Comm’n, 556 N.E.2d 285, 288-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (claimant riding all-terrain cycle without authorization was substantial deviation from work duties and thus outside course of employment); Petrie v. General Motors Corp., 466 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. Ct. App.) (claimant’s actions leading to electrocution found to be substantial deviation from work duties), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1991).

•The question certified for review is whether claimant’s horseplay bars him from recovery for the resulting injury under Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Rentavision contends the Commissioner misapplied the law in concluding that claimant’s horseplay-related injury was compensable. We agree. An injury arises out of employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he or she was injured. Miller, 161 Vt. at 214, 637 A.2d at 1073; Shaw v. Dutton Berry Farm, 160 Vt. 594, 599, 632 A.2d 18, 20 (1993). Thus, claimant must show that “but for” the employment and his position at work, the injury would not have happened. Shaw, 160 Vt. at 599, 632 A.2d at 20 (adopting positional-risk doctrine).*

Although the accident here would not have happened but for claimant’s participation in the horseplay and therefore was not exclusively linked to his employment, it also was not a purely personal risk that would have occurred regardless of his location and activity on that day. He was injured during work hours with a staple gun provided for use on the job, and thus the findings support a causal connection between claimant’s work conditions and the injury adequate to conclude that the accident arose out of his employment. See 1 Larson & Larson, supra, §§ 7.00-7.30, at 3-14 to 3-16 (when risk is neither distinctly related to employment nor distinctly personal to claimant, trend is to hold employer liable if conditions of employment put claimant in position to be injuréd by neutral risk).

*552Nonetheless, claimant must also show that the injury occurred in the course of the employment. An accident occurs in the course of employment when it was within the period of time the employee was on duty at a place where the employee was reasonably expected to be while fulfilling the duties of the employment contract. Miller, 161 Vt. at 215, 637 A.2d at 1073. Thus, while some horseplay among employees during work hours can be expected and is not an automatic bar to compensation, the key inquiry is whether the employee deviated too far from his or her duties. See Jean Fluet, Inc. v. Harrison, 652 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

The Commissioner must therefore consider (1) the extent and seriousness of the deviation; (2) the completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether the activity was commingled with performance of a work duty or was a complete abandonment of duty); (3) the extent to which the activity had become an accepted part of the employment; and (4) the extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some horseplay. See 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 23.00, at 5-178; Petrie, 466 N.W.2d at 716. The Commissioner found that although shooting staples was common among employees, such activity was not considered acceptable behavior by Rentavision. She made no finding concerning whether Rentavision knew that staple-shooting occurred at work, but did find that claimant made material misrepresentations of fact designed to avoid an inference of horseplay or inappropriate behavior in order that he might obtain workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant makes no showing that shooting staples at fellow employees was an accepted part of claimant’s employment or furthered Rentavision’s interests. Cf. Kenney v. Rockingham Sch. Dist., 123 Vt. 344, 347-48, 190 A.2d 702, 704 (1963) (holding that injury arose out of and in the course of employment where claimant teacher sustained injury while voluntarily enrolled in course to improve teaching skills).

The facts show that the accident was unrelated to any legitimate use of the staplers at the time, indicating there was no commingling of the horseplay with work duties. The Commissioner focused on the slack time inherent in claimant’s job, but this factor alone is not dispositive. Although some horseplay was reasonably to be expected during idle periods between customers, the obvious dangerousness of shooting staples at fellow employees and the absence of connection between duties as a salesperson and the horseplay events indicates the accident occurred during a substantial *553deviation from work duties. Therefore, we reverse the Commissioner’s award.

Reversed.

Morse, J.,

dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The Court reverses a decision of the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry awarding workers’ compensation benefits for an injury sustained while claimant was engaged in “horseplay” with another employee. The basic criteria of analysis utilized by the Commissioner are not disputed by the Court. Rather, the Court disagrees with the Commissioner’s application of the law to the facts, holding that the horseplay constituted a substantial deviation from the course of employment and therefore was not compensable.

Under settled standards of review, the Court has stepped out of its proper role. The Court is not to second-guess the Commissioner’s conclusions. The Court’s duty, rather, is to affirm the judgment if the facts fairly and reasonably support it. See Kenney v. Rockingham Sch. Dist., 123 Vt. 344, 348, 190 A.2d 702, 705 (1963). Where reasonable minds might honestly disagree about whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment, we must defer to the judgment of the Commissioner. See id.

As noted, the Court does not take issue with the general legal standard adopted and applied by the Commissioner. Under that standard, when a claimant’s injury occurs in the course of horseplay and the claimant was an active participant, the claimant must not have “substantially deviated” from the work if the injury is to be considered sustained in the course of employment. See 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 23.20, at 5-183 (1997). The criteria used in making this determination are as follows: (1) the extent and seriousness of the deviation; (2) the completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty); (3) the extent to which the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the employment; and (4) the extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some such horseplay. Id. § 23.00, at 5-178.

With respect to the extent and seriousness of the deviation, as well as its completeness, the Commissioner found that claimant and his fellow employee had completed virtually all the work that needed to be done in the absence of customers and that business was very slow that day When the injury occurred, claimant and his fellow employee were in a period of enforced idleness while they waited for customers. They were not actively pursuing any specific tasks and were passing *554the time as required by their jobs. As Larson points out, when there is a lull in work, there are no duties to abandon. During such periods, the deviation can be more substantial than at other times when an employee may be actively pursuing a task directly related to employment. Id. § 23.65, at 5-219, 5-226 to 5-227. The Commissioner could thus reasonably conclude that the horseplay in this case did not constitute an abandonment of duties or even a serious deviation from the demands of work at that time of day.

Regarding the extent to which such horseplay had become an accepted activity, the Commissioner found that it had been a commonplace occurrence at the store. Although the executive assistant to defendant’s president testified that claimant’s horseplay was not considered acceptable behavior, he acknowledged that an employee would not be fired for engaging in such activity. The Commissioner thus reasonably concluded that the horseplay as engaged in by claimant, while not condoned by the employer, was a tacit part of employment. See Jean Fluet, Inc. v. Harrison, 652 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that activity of “nail tossing,” though not expressly tolerated, was sufficiently commonplace to be impliedly tolerated); Industrial Comm’r v. McCarthy, 68 N.E.2d 434, 435-36 (N.Y. 1946) (finding that particular horseplay engaged in by waiters was more or less customary and had become part and parcel of employment).

Finally, the Commissioner could reasonably conclude that work in a retail establishment might be expected to include such horseplay. The Commissioner characterized the claimant and his fellow employee as “suffering through a very slow day in a retail establishment,” having quoted Larson as noting that “idleness breeds mischief, so that if idleness is a fixture of the employment, its handmaiden mischief is also.” (Quoting 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 23.65, at 5-219.) Retail work necessitates passing time if there are no customers demanding attention. “Employers, whose work require[s] that men wait upon the job for work conditions, ought not to be heard to say that an accident, occurring out of the very conditions presented by the required waiting, is not compensatory.” Gillmore v. Ring Constr. Co., 61 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933). The Commissioner’s determination that the nature of the business lent itself to the horseplay in question was fairly and reasonably supported by the facts.

In sum, the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard to the facts, and the evidence fairly and reasonably supports the Commis*555sioner’s conclusion, a conclusion that, I might add, is a reasonable one given the policy of the law to help alleviate the consequences of injury in the workplace. It is not our prerogative to reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because we would have reached a different conclusion. We must, in these circumstances, defer to the judgment of the administrative agency charged with the initial decision-making responsibility. See Kenney, 123 Vt. at 348, 190 A.2d at 704-05. Therefore, I would affirm the Commissioner’s award of compensation.

HODGES, Justice.

¶ 1 Odyssey/Americare of OMahoma (Employer) and its insurer seek vacation of a Court of Civil Appeals opinion in this matter which sustained an order of the Workers’ Compensation Court awarding benefits to Cheryl Worden (Claimant). The trial tribunal found that Claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. This Court finds that there was not competent evidence to support that determination.

¶ 2 Claimant was a field nurse for Employer. She lived approximately twenty miles away from Employer’s office. She went to Employer’s office about once a week. *311Otherwise, she worked out of her home scheduling appointments with patients and traveling to visit them. At trial, the parties submitted a stipulation that Claimant was Employer’s employee covered under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Claimant testified that as she was walking to her car to go to a patient appointment, she slipped on wet grass in her yard and fell injuring her foot and ankle. The grass was wet from rain. But for the patient appointment, she would not have left the house.

¶3 The trial tribunal originally denied the claim, finding that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. According to the court, “the claimant’s injuries were as a result of a risk which was purely personal to the claimant and not as a result of a hazardous risk associated with the claimant’s employment.”

¶ 4 Claimant submitted the finding to the three-judge review panel of the Workers’ Compensation Court. The panel held that the finding was contrary to law and against the clear weight of the evidence. On remand, the trial tribunal awarded Claimant disability and continuing medical benefits. Employer appealed that order. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the order and this Court granted certiorari review.

¶ 5 Oklahoma law requires that an employer pay compensation only for “accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, without regard to fault....” Okla.Stat. tit. 85, § 11 (1991). The term “in the course of employment” relates to the time, place, or circumstances under which the injury is sustained. Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 653 P.2d 201, 202 (Okla.1982). The term “arise out of employment” contemplates the causal connection between the injury and the risks incident to employment. American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 903 P.2d 288, 291 (Okla.1995). The two requirements are distinct and are not synonymous. Id. Only the “arise out of’ requirement is at issue in this matter. The parties agree that Claimant was in the course of her employment at the time of injury.

¶6 There are three categories of injury-causing risk an employee may encounter while in the course of employment: risks solely connected with employment, which are compensable; personal risks, which are not compensable; and neutral risks, such as weather risks, which are neither distinctly connected with employment nor purely personal. See 1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 7.30 (1997). Whether a neutral risk that causes an injury is employment-related or personal is a question of fact to be decided in each case. See Burns, 903 P.2d at 291. That determination will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any competent evidence to support it. Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 684 P.2d 548, 549 (Okla.1984).

¶ 7 Nationwide, there have been five lines of interpretation of the “arising out of’ requirement. 1 Larson supra at § 6. The “peculiar risk” doctrine required the claimant “to show that the source of the harm was in its nature peculiar to his occupation.” Id. at § 6.20. At. one time the peculiar risk doctrine was the dominant test in American Workers’ Compensation jurisprudence but it was gradually replaced by the “increased risk” doctrine.

¶ 8 The “increased risk” test “differs from the peculiar-risk test in that the distinctiveness of the employment risk can be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not peculiar to the employment.” Id. The rule is often stated as a determination of whether the claimant’s employment exposed the worker to more risk than that to which the general public was exposed.

¶ 9 An easier test for a claimant to meet is that of “actual risk”. “Under this doctrine, a substantial number of courts are saying, in effect, “We do not care whether the risk was also common to the public, if in fact it was a risk of this employment.’ ” Id. at § 6.40.

¶10 A number of courts now apply the “positional risk” doctrine. It states that “[á]n injury arises out of employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions on the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured.” Id. at § 6.50.

*312¶ 11 A rarely used line of interpretation is that of “proximate cause”. This test demands “that the harms be foreseeable as a hazard of this kind of employment, and that the chain of causation be not broken by any independent intervening cause, such as an act of God.” Id. at § 6.60. This line of authority is “encountered occasionally in opinions and old texts.” Id.

¶ 12 Prior to the 1986 amendments to Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act, Oklahoma cases relied primarily on the increased risk doctrine to determine whether a risk arose out of a worker’s employment. However, the peculiar risk and positional risk tests had also been applied. See, e.g., Halliburton Services v. Alexander, 647 P.2d 958, 961 (Okla.1976) (“where accidental injury results from risk factor peculiar to task performed, it arises out of employ-ment_”); Fox v. National Carrier, 709 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Okla.1985) (but for claimant’s employment as truck driver he would not have been exposed to risk of choking on food at restaurant). But in 1986, the Oklahoma Legislature amended section 3(7) of title 85 to require that “only injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal but one that is reasonably connected with the conditions of employment shall be deemed to arise out of employment.” The Legislature also repealed the provision which required an employer to produce “substantial evidence” to overcome a presumption that' an injury was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Okla. State tit. 85, § 27 (1981) (repealed). The presumption and its corresponding burdens of production and persuasion were abolished.

¶ 13 These statutory changes to the analysis of the “arise out of’ requirement were explained in American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 903 P.2d 288 (1995). In Burns, a worker visiting Oklahoma City on a business trip for his employer was murdered in his hotel room by a unknown assailant with unknown motive. This Court explained that a claimant now has the burden of establishing the causal connection between injury and employment. Id. at 291. “To establish injury or death as attributable to an employment-related risk, the operative force of a hazard, other than that which affects the public in general, must be identified.” Id. at 293. This Court specifically held that the positional risk test is now “unavailable for proving an injury’s causal nexus to employment.” Id. at 291. Burn’s widow faded to establish that her husband’s death arose out of his employment rather than from the ever-present risk of crime faced by the general public.

¶ 14 Despite the holding in Bums, the Court of Civil Appeals in this matter held that “because the risk responsible was clearly presented by the requirements of her employment, it does not matter whether the risk of injury to her was no greater than the risk to the general public.” Thus, it applied essentially the positional risk test rejected in the 1986 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act as explained in Bums.

¶ 15 The Court of Civil Appeals read two post-Bwm.s cases as controlling this controversy, Darco Transportation v. Dulen, 922 P.2d at 591 and Stroud Municipal Hospital v. Mooney, 933 P.2d 872 (Okla.1996). It noted that in each case compensation was allowed for traffic collision injuries even though the employee was exposed to the same street risk faced by the general motoring public. That is true, but for reasons that are not present in the instant claim.

¶ 16 In Darco, a cross-country truck driver was injured when the tractor-trailer rig he was driving was struck by a train at a crossing where the warning equipment had malfunctioned. The test this Court applied was the.same increased risk test that had been applied in Bums. However, the accident risk the truck driver encounter in Darco arose out of his employment “[bjecause the perils of this servant’s travel for his master [were] eo-extensive with the risks of employment” Darco, 922 P.2d at 596. Thus, for that truck driver the risk of traffic accident arose from the very nature of his employment.

¶ 17 The Court of Civil Appeals also read Stroud Municipal Hospital v. Mooney, 933 P.2d at 872, as modifying the rule in Bums. Mooney involved an exception to the “general rule that an injury sustained while going to or from an employer’s premises is not one arising out of and in the course of employ*313ment.” Id. at 874. There, the special mission exception applied because the employee was instructed to return immediately from his lunch break at home to the emergency room of his employer’s hospital in order for him to perform emergency blood work. The employee was injured in an automobile accident while he was attempting to comply with his employer’s instruction. This Court concluded that “[o]n this record it could be found that Claimant’s return trip was ‘outside regular working hours’ and within the ‘special mission’ exception.” Id. at 875. Thus, when the employee’s special mission was “to promptly drive to the emergency room for an emergency,” id., the traffic risk became a risk of his employment.

¶ 18 In this matter, there are no facts to indicate that Claimant was on a special mission outside regular working hours for her employer. In fact, the record demonstrated that she was within her regular working hours performing her usual tasks. Mooney’s special mission exception was not asserted by Claimant nor does it apply to these facts.

¶ 19 Neither Da/rco nor Mooney abrogate or modify the increased risk test required by the Workers’ Compensation Act and described in Bums. Neither case controls resolution of the claim now before this Court.

¶20 This case is controlled by the increased risk test for the arising out of element of coverage provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act at section 3(7)(a) of title 85. The question is whether Claimant’s employment subjected her to a risk that exceeded the ordinary hazards to which the general public is exposed. It did not.

¶ 21 Claimant encountered the neutral risk of wet and therefore slippery grass due to rain. Her employment exposed her to no more risk of injury from wet grass than that encountered by any member of the general public. No evidence was presented linking the risk to her employment. Although Claimant was undeniably in the course of her employment1 at the time of her injury, the injury did not arise from her employment. The trial tribunal’s initial order denying coverage was correct. The order allowing compensation was error.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT WITH INSTRUCTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR EMPLOYER.

¶ 22 HODGES, SIMMS, HARGRAVE, OPALA and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur.

¶ 23 KAUGER, C.J., and WATT, J., concur in result.

¶ 24 SUMMERS, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, J., dissent.

RUCKER, Justice.

Case Summary

This case presents the question of when and to what extent an injury resulting from an unexplained accident occurring in the workplace is compensable under Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act. We conclude that an unexplained accident represents a "neutral risk" and that the "positional-risk" doctrine applies. Under which, an injury is compensable if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the condition or obligation of the employment put the employee in the position at the time of injury.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1983 Phyllis Milledge began working as a housekeeper at a nursing home known as "The Oaks, A Living Center." On October 21, 1994, she arrived at work shortly before 7 am. to begin her usual shift and parked her car in the nursing home parking lot. After closing the door upon exiting the car Milledge twisted her ankle. She proceeded to her job and completed the majority of her shift but the pain in her ankle prevented Milledge from finishing her duties. Leaving work early, Mil-ledge went to the emergency room of a local hospital where x-rays revealed a sprained ankle. However, her ankle still bothered her a week after the injury. Among other things she suffered swelling in her right leg, and her right foot was severely discolored. In addition, a large blister had developed on her ankle, which her husband lanced on two occasions. Mil-ledge returned to the hospital on November 6, 1994, where she was treated with antibiotics. On November 14, 1994, after surgical procedures failed to control the infection that had developed, Milledge's right leg was amputated below the knee. Subsequently, she was fitted with a prosthesis.

When The Oaks' worker's compensation insurance carrier denied her claim for benefits on March 3, 1995, Milledge filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim before the Worker's Compensation Board. On July 21, 1999, a hearing was conducted before a single-member hearing officer who denied the claim concluding in part:

The record shows [Milledge's] injury may have occurred in the course of her employment, but fails to show any causal connection between her ankle sprain and her work duties for [The Oaks]. Thus, [Milledge's] injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment *929with [The Oaks] for the purposes of the [Indiana Worker's Compensation] Act.

Appellant's App. at 9. In a vote of five to two, the Full Board adopted the single hearing officer's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. See Milledge v. The Oaks, 764 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the decision of the Worker's Compensation Board and remand this cause for further proceedings.

Discussion

The Worker's Compensation Act authorizes the payment of compensation to employees for "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." Ind.Code § 22-83-2-2(a). An injury "arises out of" employment when a causal nexus exists between the injury sustained and the duties or services performed by the injured employee. Outlaw v. Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc., 742 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Roush, 706 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. An accident occurs "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is fulfilling the duties of employment or while engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Outlaw, 742 N.E.2d at 530; Tanglewood Trace v. Long, 715 N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Both requirements must be met before compensation is awarded, and neither alone is sufficient. Conway v. Sch. City of East Chicago, 734 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. The person who seeks Worker's Compensation benefits bears the burden of proving both elements. Id.

There is no question that the injury Milledge sustained in this case occurred in the course of her employment. She sprained her ankle on the parking lot of her employer while arriving for work at her regularly scheduled time. See, e.g., Lawhead v. Brown, 653 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (employee entitled to compensation where injury occurred immediately after employee "elocked-out" but while present on employer-controlled parking lot); Ward v. Tillman, 179 Ind.App. 626, 386 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (1979) ("[Liliability of employers has been extended beyond the immediate job site.... Accidents resulting from the ingress-egress of employees to a plant within workmen's compensation coverage [are] an employment-related risk."). Rather, the question is whether Milledge's injury arose out of her employment. Highlighting the Board's finding that the parking lot was "clean, dry, level and clear of debris" the Court of Appeals concluded the injury Mil-ledge sustained did not arise out of her employment. Milledge, 764 N.E.2d at 234. This was so because the facts of this case lacked the requisite causal connection between the injury and the employment. Id.

Commenting on the causal connection necessary to show that an accidental injury arises out of employment, this Court has said "[the] nexus is established when a reasonably prudent person considers the injury to be born out of a risk incidental to the employment, or when the facts indicate a connection between the injury and the cireumstances under which the employment occurs." Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 389 (Ind.1999); see also Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc. v. Dacus, 505 N.E.2d 101, 102-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ("[A] connection is established when the accident arises out of a risk which a reasonably prudent person might comprehend as incidental to the work. It is not necessary that the injury should have been expected or foreseen."), trans. denied.

*930The "risk[s} incidental to employment" fall into three categories: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment, (2) risks personal to the claimant, and (8) risks of neither distinctly employment nor distinctly personal in character. Roush, 706 N.E.2d at 1114; see also 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law 4-1 (2002). Risks that fall within categories numbered one and three are generally covered under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. However risks personal to the claimant, those "caused by a pre-existing illness or condition unrelated to employment," are not compensable. Kovatch v. A.M. Gen., 679 N.E.2d 940, 943 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied.

Risks in category number one are those we intuitively think of as work connected. As Professor Larson explains, this category includes: "[all the things that can go wrong around a modern factory, mill, mine, transportation system, or construction project ... and constitute the bulk of what not only the public but perhaps also the original drafters of compensation acts had in mind as their proper concern." Larson, supra, § 4.01, at 4-l1-4-2. See, e.g., Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind.2002) (electrician severely burned while measuring the voltage in a circuit breaker at a factory); Mid-West Box Co. v. Hazzard, 195 Ind. 608, 146 N.E. 420, 420-21 (1925) (employee's finger severed while operating machinery); Turner v. Richmond Power & Light Co., 756 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (employee electrocuted when excavating a sewer line after co-worker hit a buried power line), trans. denied. The underlying theme uniting these cases is that the injury sustained by the claimant was the result of conditions inherent in the work environment. In this case there was nothing inherent in The Oaks' parking lot that either caused or contributed to Mil-ledge's injury. As such her injury was not born out of a risk categorized as distinctly associated with employment.

As for category number two, the record does not show that Milledge's injury to her ankle was the result of a pre-existing illness or condition. To the contrary, although the Board made no finding on this point, uncontroverted evidence of record reveals that prior to the accident of October 21, 1994, Milledge experienced no problems with her right leg in general or to her ankle in particular. R. at 21, 82-33. The record also shows, that although Mil-ledge suffered from diabetes for thirty years, at the time of the accident she was taking medication for her diabetes and she reported having no trouble with the illness; additionally, she noted that diabetes had never prevented her from fulfilling her job responsibilities. R. at 18, 24. In this case Milledge simply has no explanation of what caused her to twist her ankle; nor does the record give any indication of causation. The facts here are thus analogous to those cases involving injuries suffered by an employee as the result of an "unexplained" fall. As the Court of Appeals has observed:

Workplace falls can result from either an employment, personal or neutral risk, or from a combination thereof. Some falls clearly result from risks personal to the employee; that is, they are caused by a pre-existing illness or condition, unrelated to employment. As a general matter, these "idiopathic" falls are not compensable. In contrast, some falls are "unexplained" in that there is no indication of causation. Most jurisdictions compensate such falls, classifying them as neutral risks.

Kovatch, 679 N.E.2d at 943 (citations omitted).*931 1

Courts have taken three approaches in addressing the "arising out of" element in unexplained fall cases. One approach requires the worker to rule out idiopathic causes for the fall. If the worker carries that burden, then an inference arises that the fall arose out of employment. Using this approach the Oregon Supreme Court has applied a "work-comnection" test to determine whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment. Phil 4. Livesley Co. v. Russ, 296 Or. 25, 672 P.2d 337, 339, 340 (1983). The "work-connection" test focuses on whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is sufficient for the injury to be compensable. Id. at 839. If the "in the course of" element is fully met, then it will satisfy the "arising out of" element, provided the employee rules ' out idiopathic causes. Id. at 342. See also Waller v. Mayfield, 37 Ohio St.3d 118, 524 N.E.2d 458, 464-65 (1988) ("Where the course of employment test is fully met, where cause-in-fact cannot be directly established, and where the claimant has met his burden of eliminating idiopathic causes, we interpret the Workers' Compensation Act to allow the inference that the unexplained fall arose out of employment."). Although this is an attractive approach, it nonetheless places the employee in the position of attempting to prove a negative. This is not a burden we believe the employee should have to bear. See, e.g., Town of Montezuma v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 108, 116 n. 9 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("To require the Downs to affirmatively prove that the pipeline was not inspected would require them to prove a negative, something which we refuse to do."), trans. denied; Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1218 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (describing as "impossible" the "burden of proving a negative fact"). We therefore decline to adopt this view.

A second approach leaves the burden on the employee to show a causal connection between the injury and the employment. This is the most difficult burden to meet when an injury occurs without explanation. And although it is especially well suited for injuries that result from risks distinctly associated with employment, as discussed in more detail below, it is problematic for risks that are neither distinctly employment related nor distinctly personal in character. This is essentially the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case.

A third approach involves applying the "positional risk test" also referred to as the "positional risk doctrine." See Smith v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 754 N.E.2d 18, 26 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (observing that under Indiana law "the positional risk doe-trine is generally applied to neutral risks"), trans. denied; accord K-Mart Corp. v. Novak, 521 N.E.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. Under this doctrine "(aln injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured." Larson, supra, § 8.05, at 8-6. This but for reasoning is the foundation of the positional risk doctrine, under which if the "in the course of" employment element is met, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the injury "arises out of" employment. Although similar to the "work connection" test mentioned above, here the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the injury was actually the result of a cause personal to the claimant.

*932The positional risk doctrine is generally applied in those instances where injuries result from risks that are categorized as neutral. See, e.g., Logsdon v. ISCO Co., 260 Neb. 624, 618 N.W.2d 667, 673-74, 675 (2000) (noting that Nebraska applies the positional risk doctrine when faced with a neutral risk such as an unexplained fall and under the doctrine a claimant is not required to rule out idiopathic causes, but where there is at least some evidence of a possibility of a personal or idiopathic factor contributing to the fall, the fall is not properly categorized as a purely unexplained fall); Cartwright v. Onondaga News Agency, 283 A.D.2d 837, 728 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (explaining that an unexplained fall that occurs in the course of employment is presumed to arise out of employment in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary).

We acknowledge, as has the Court of Appeals, that neutral risks present risk of loss problems. See Milledge, 764 N.E.2d at 235 (citing K-Mart, 521 N.E.2d at 1349 n. 1). This is so because the risk does not fall clearly upon the employer or the employee. Id. Responding to the question of who should bear this risk, Professor Larson observes:

[The usual answer in the past has been to leave this loss on the employee, on the theory that he or she must meet the burden of proof of establishing affirmatively a clear causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the occurrence of the injury. More recently, some courts have reasoned in the following vein: Either the employer or the employee must bear the loss; to show connection with the employment, there is at least the fact that the injury occurred while the employee was working; to show connection with the employee there is nothing; therefore, although the work connection is slender, it is at least stronger than any connection with the claimant's personal life. .

Larson, supra, § 4.08, at 4-8.

We believe the positional risk doe-trine is the appropriate analytical tool for resolving questions concerning injuries that result from neutral risks. It has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions that have spoken on the subject2 And it is consistent with the underlying purpose of *933the Worker's Compensation Act: to provide compensation to workers suffering from work-related injuries without meeting the liability requirements of tort law. Worker's compensation is for the benefit of the employee, and the Act should "be liberally construed ... so as not to negate the Act's humane purposes." Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973).

In this case the injury to Milledge's ankle is without explanation. It is thus classified as a neutral risk in that the cause of the injury is neither personal to Milledge nor distinctly associated with her employment. The injury would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of her employment placed Milledge in the parking lot where she was injured. In turn, The Oaks has not carried its burden of demonstrating that this unexplained accident, which precipitated the ankle injury, was the result of idiopathic causes. Milledge is thus entitled to compensation under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act.

This does not however end our analysis. Milledge sought worker's compensation not for her ankle injury alone, but also, and primarily, for the disability arising from the injury including the surgery that led to the amputation of her leg. Whether Milledge was entitled to such compensation was fiercely contested before the single-member hearing officer3 However, determining that Milledge failed to show any causal connection between her ankle injury and her employment, neither the hearing officer nor the full Board ever reached the question of whether Milledge's infection and subsequent amputation were causally connected to her ankle injury. Therefore this cause is remanded to the Board for consideration of this issue.

Conclusion

We conclude that an injury resulting from an unexplained accident falls *934under the category of a neutral risk, one neither distinctly personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. We conclude also that in the case of a neutral risk, the positional risk doctrine applies. As applied in this case, Milledge would not have been at the place where she injured her ankle injury but for the duties of her employment. Consequently, a presumption arises that her injury "arose out of" employment. Because The Oaks presented no evidence that the injury was the result of idiopathic causes, it has not rebutted this presumption. On this issue, we reverse the judgment of the Worker's Compensation Board. However, issues still remain as to whether Milledge's other medical problems including the amputation of her leg were causally connected to the ankle injury. Accordingly, on this issue we remand this cause to Worker's Compensation Board for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.