WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

After two decades of employment with her county government, Dorothy Goelzer was fired from her job. Her supervisor informed her of the termination decision two weeks before she was scheduled to begin two months of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). This leave did not mark the first time Goelzer was away from work on FMLA leave, as Goelzer had taken a significant amount of authorized FMLA leave during the four preceding years to deal with her own health issues and those of her mother and husband. After she lost her job, Goelzer brought this suit and alleged that her employer had interfered with her right to reinstatement under the FMLA and had retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave. The defendants contend that her supervisor simply decided to hire another person with a larger skill set. The district court agreed with the defendants and granted summary judgment against Goelzer. We, however, conclude that Goelzer has marshaled enough evidence for this case to reach a trier of fact, including comments suggesting her supervisor’s dissatisfaction with her use of FMLA leave, her positive performance reviews, and the timing of her termination. Therefore, we reverse the entry of summary judgment against her.

I. BACKGROUND

Sheboygan County, Wisconsin hired Dor'othy Goelzer in 1986 to serve as a Clerk Typist in its office of the Register of Deeds. Two years later, Goelzer applied for the position of Administrative Assistant to the County Board Chairperson and received the job. Goelzer’s boss worked *990part-time and was only present intermittently in the office.

In 1997, the County Board enacted an ordinance that created a full-time Administrative Coordinator position. The Board hired a new Administrative Coordinator the next year, and Goelzer’s position was converted to that of Administrative Assistant to the County Administrative Coordinator. The Board hired Adam Payne as its Administrative Coordinator in January 1999. Goelzer became the administrative assistant to Payne, who unlike her previous boss was in the office full-time, and Goelzer also assisted the County Board Chairperson.

Payne consistently gave Goelzer good performance reviews. For the 2000 year, Payne rated Goelzer with an overall performance score of 3.8 on a scale of zero to five, and Goelzer received a merit pay increase of 1.5%. Payne commented in that year’s performance evaluation that Goelzer was “rarely absent,” and he gave her a 4.0 in the “attendance” category. Payne gave her a 4.0 for attendance the following year and noted she “is rarely absent (36 hours of sick leave in 2001).” Goelzer received an overall rating of 3.72 in that evaluation and again received a merit increase.

Goelzer began to have significant health issues in 2002. She had eye surgery in July and took approximately a month of FMLA leave during her surgery and recovery. She also had multiple doctors’ appointments in the months before and after her surgery. All in all, she used 312.50 hours of sick leave in 2002, the equivalent of nearly eight forty-hour weeks. Payne wrote in Goelzer’s 2002 performance evaluation that, “[t]hough Dorothy has had an excellent record in'the past, (36 hours of sick leave in 2001), she utilized 312 hours or 39 days of sick leave in 2002.”

Goelzer continued to have health problems in 2003. She had another eye surgery that year and took two weeks of FMLA leave as a result. She also had many doctors’ appointments throughout the year. Goelzer took time off on thirty-two different days during 2003 for her health issues and used a total of 176.50 hours of leave. Payne commented on Goelzer’s use of sick leave again in that year’s performance evaluation, stating: “Dorothy utilized 176.50 hours or 22 days of sick leave in 2003.” He gave her an overall rating of 3.36, with a 3.5 in the attendance category. He did not award her a merit pay increase. Goelzer disagreed with some of the reasons Payne gave for not awarding her a merit increase, and she wrote Payne a memorandum detailing her position. Payne responded on February 5, 2004 in a memorandum to Goelzer that said in part:

On page 3 of 4, you have denoted goals you believe to have accomplished. As we discussed during your performance review and I have noted in your annual performance review, your perspective is different than mine.

I am very pleased that you understand the importance of having a user-friendly filing system in place. As you mentioned, you were out of the office having eye surgery in 2002 and 2003. In fact, the past two years, use of sick leave and vacation combined, you were out of the office 113 days. As the only support person in the office, this has presented challenges in the functionality and duties associated with the office.

Goelzer used 94 hours of sick leave in 2004. She received a merit increase of 1.5% after her 2004 evaluation. The next year, Goelzer’s health was stable, but her mother’s health was not. Goelzer took FMLA leave on nine days in 2004 for appointments related to her mother or husband, and her 2005 FMLA applications included requests for intermittent leave to *991care for her mother. Goelzer received a 1.25% merit increase after 2005. Goelzer stated in an affidavit that when she asked why she did not receive a higher merit pay increase, Payne responded that she had missed a lot of time at work due to appointments with her mother.

Goelzer learned in 2006 that she would need foot surgery that year. On May 10, 2006, Goelzer submitted an FMLA leave request for time away from work from September 22, 2006 to November 20, 2006 for her foot surgery and recovery. At Payne’s request, Goelzer provided a medical certification for the foot surgery to Human Resources Director Michael Collard on June 1, 2006. Collard wrote directly to Goelzer’s doctor five days later and asked whether Goelzer could return to light duty office work before November 19, 2006, and if so, when. Goelzer’s doctor responded that she would be totally disabled and unable to work during that time period. The County eventually approved Goelzer’s FMLA leave request on August 8.

On August 15, 2006, the Sheboygan County Board passed an ordinance that converted the position of County Administrative Coordinator to that of County Administrator. The Board also appointed Payne to serve as County Administrator. With this change, Payne now had the power under Wisconsin Statute § 59.18(3) to discharge Goelzer on his own, a power he did not previously have. Within the next ten days, Payne told Collard that he wanted to meet to discuss options for terminating Goelzer’s employment. In preparation for the August 25, 2006 meeting, Collard prepared notes related to options, with a list that included “term outright, just need to change,” “eliminate position,” “Change T/O — reshuffle—create new position not qualified for,” “Raise expectations & evaluate,” and “Retaliation for FMLA?”.

On September 8, 2006, two weeks before Goelzer was to commence FMLA leave for her foot surgery, Payne discharged Goelzer with an effective date of November 30, 2006. (Payne placed Goelzer on paid leave until November 30, 2006 so that she would receive the FMLA leave that had been previously approved.) At the time, Goelzer had used 67 hours of leave in 2006 and was scheduled to take an additional 328 hours related to her foot surgery. Goelzer’s discharge document stated:

Under Section 59.18(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes, and Section II N of the County Administrator’s job description, the County Administrator has the right to appoint an administrative secretary of his own choosing. The County Administrator has decided to appoint an Administrative Assistant other than the current incumbent in that position, Dorothy Goelzer. Goelzer’s employment with the County must therefore be terminated. This action is not based on any infraction committed by Goelzer, and should not be considered a disciplinary action.

Payne did not immediately replace Goelzer. Instead, he first utilized an unpaid college intern. On January 16, 2007, the County Board enacted an ordinance that eliminated Goelzer’s former position and replaced it with the position of “Assistant to the Administrator.” It also increased the pay grade for the role from Grade 6 to Grade 8. Payne hired Kay Lorenz as the Assistant to the Administrator on March 19, 2007.

Goelzer filed this lawsuit in federal court alleging that the County and Payne violated the FMLA when they did not restore her to her position after her FMLA leave and instead fired her, and that they discriminated against her in violation of the FMLA when they did so. She also brought a breach of contract claim alleging that her discharge breached her contractu*992al rights under Sheboygan County’s Policies and Procedures Manual. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Goelzer’s claims. Goelzer appeals, raising only the FMLA determination.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and we view all facts and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The FMLA allows an eligible employee with a serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform her position to take twelve workweeks of leave during each twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). An employee may also utilize this leave to care for certain immediate relatives, including a parent or spouse, with a serious health condition. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Under the FMLA, an employee on leave is entitled to the right to be restored to the same or an equivalent position that she had before she took qualifying leave. Id. § 2614(a)(l)-(2). An employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” any FMLA rights. Id. § 2615(a)(1).

In addition, the FMLA affords protection to employees who are retaliated against because they exercise rights protected by the Act. Lewis v. Sch. Dist. # 70, 523 F.3d 730, 741 (7th Cir.2008). Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” The Act also makes it unlawful to “discharge” or “discriminate” against a person for taking part in proceedings or inquiries under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b). We have construed these provisions as stating a cause of action for retaliation. See, e.g., Lewis, 523 F.3d at 741; Kauffman v. Federal Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir.2005).

Goelzer argues on appeal that she can establish both interference and retaliation under 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(1) and 2615(a)(2), respectively. The defendants state in their response brief that they “take issue” with Goelzer’s assertion that her complaint included claims for both interference and retaliation. They state that they understood Goelzer’s complaint to assert that they discriminated against her for having exercised her FMLA rights, which appears to be a statement that they only read her complaint to allege retaliation.

Goelzer’s Amended Complaint stated in relevant part:

16. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1), Dorothy was entitled to be restored to her position with Sheboygan County or an equivalent position with Sheboygan County after her return from medical leave.

21. By the above-described intentional conduct, Sheboygan County and Payne violated the FMLA by discriminating against Dorothy for exercising her FMLA rights and by refusing to return her to her position or an equivalent position following her leave.

*993Paragraph 16 explicitly cites to 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1), the statutory provision for FMLA interference claims, and the allegation in the paragraph mirrors that provision’s language. Paragraph 21, on the other hand, uses the language of the FMLA retaliation provision. See 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). So to the extent the defendants are arguing that Goelzer waived an interference or retaliation cause of action by failing to raise either in the complaint, we disagree. We also note that the district court addressed both interference and retaliation in its summary judgment ruling. We now turn to Goelzer’s argument that the entry of summary judgment against her should be reversed on both theories.

A. FMLA Interference

We first address Goelzer’s interference argument. The plaintiff carries the burden of proving an FMLA interference claim. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir.2008). To establish such a claim, an employee must show that: (1) she was eligible for the FMLA’s protections; (2) her employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave; and (5) her employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. Burnett, 472 F.3d at 477. There is no dispute regarding the first four requirements; it is clear that the FMLA allowed Goelzer to take the leave that she did. The only issue is whether the defendants fired her to prevent her from exercising her right to reinstatement to her position. See Simpson v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Will County, 559 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Firing an employee to prevent her from exercising her right to return to her prior position can certainly interfere with that employee’s FMLA rights.”).

An employee’s right to reinstatement is not absolute. The FMLA allows an employer to refuse to restore an employee to the “former position when restoration would confer a ‘right, benefit, or position of employment’ that the employee would not have been entitled to if the employee had never left the workplace.” Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wisc., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir.2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (“An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee has been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period.”). In other words, an employee is not entitled to return to her former position if she would have been fired regardless of whether she took the leave. See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir.2008).

The question at this stage of the proceedings, then, is whether a jury could find that the defendants did not reinstate Goelzer because she exercised her right to take FMLA leave. See Kohls, 259 F.3d at 805; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”). Payne and the County maintain that the answer is “no,” as their position is that Goelzer’s employment would have been terminated regardless of whether she took FMLA leave. They maintain that after Payne received a promotion to County Administrator, he simply exercised his new authority to replace Goelzer on his own with a person of his choosing. They stress that before his promotion, Payne would have needed the approval of the County through its Executive Committee before he could terminate Goelzer’s employment. *994With the promotion to County Administrator, however, Payne could now make the termination decision on his own. See Wis. Stat. § 59.18(3). And three weeks after he assumed his new role, Payne notified Goelzer she was losing her job, a decision he says had nothing to do with Goelzer’s use of FMLA leave.

Michael Collard, the County’s Human Resources Director, supports Payne’s account. Collard asserts that Payne had expressed frustration for some time that Goelzer was not performing the tasks Payne had envisioned for her, and Collard also says that Payne had expressed a desire for an assistant with a greater skill set. In addition, although Payne did not immediately replace Goelzer and instead first utilized a college intern, Payne maintains that in the longer term he wanted the position to be enhanced to allow him to assign more sophisticated tasks beyond those that he says Goelzer could handle.

The defendants’ account provides one possible explanation for the termination decision, and a jury might well choose to believe it. But there is another possibility as well. Goelzer contends that she lost her job because Payne and the County were not happy that she had exercised her right to take FMLA leave. Indeed, she used 312 hours of FMLA leave in 2002, 176 hours in 2003, 94 hours in 2004, at least 70 hours in 2005, and she was on track to use nearly 400 hours in 2006. Again, there is no dispute that the FMLA authorized Goelzer to take all of this leave. Even though the leave was authorized, we conclude that the evidence Goelzer introduced in response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment could lead a jury to find that she was denied reinstatement not because Payne simply wanted a different assistant, but because she had exercised her right to take leave under the FMLA.

A jury might be swayed by comments Payne made that could suggest frustration with Goelzer’s use of FMLA leave. In her 2002 performance evaluation, for instance, Payne explicitly contrasted Goelzer’s use of FMLA leave with her past “excellent” attendance, saying, “[tjhough Dorothy has had an excellent attendance record in the past, (36 hours of sick leave in 2001), she utilized 312 hours or 39 days of sick leave in 2002.” Payne gave her a 3.5 rating in the “attendance” category in 2002. He noted her use of sick leave in the following year’s performance evaluation as well, stating “Dorothy utilized 176 hours of 22 days of sick leave in 2003,” and he gave her an overall rating of 3.36 that year but did not award a merit increase. Notably too, when Goelzer asked Payne in 2006 why she did not receive a higher merit increase based on her 2005 performance, she says that Payne responded that she had missed too much time from work to attend to appointments with her mother.

A jury might also look to the memorandum Payne wrote in 2004 in response to Goelzer’s view that she should have received a merit increase, where he said in part: “you were out of the office having eye surgery in 2002 and 2003. In fact, the past two years, use of sick leave and vacation combined, you were out of the office 113 days. As the only support person in the office, this has presented challenges in the functionality and duties associated with the office.” A jury might view this memorandum as evidence that Goelzer lost her job because she exercised her right to take FMLA leave, as it might Payne’s comments in an evaluation he wrote in January 2006: “On occasion, I have been concerned with office and phone coverage. Dorothy had numerous appointments the past year and needs to be more cognitive of the time she is away from her desk or corresponding with others on non-related work activities.” The defendants do not *995dispute that the FMLA protected Goelzer’s attendance at these appointments, and a jury could look to those comments as indication that Payne was not pleased Goelzer had been absent for many FMLAcovered appointments, even though she was permitted to take them by the Act and an employer is not to interfere with that right.

Moreover, although Payne now maintains he had concerns about Goelzer’s skill set and performance, he consistently gave her favorable performance reviews. He says now that her satisfactory performance ratings reflect his “lowered expectations” of her abilities, but the performance ratings themselves do not speak of lowered expectations, and a jury would not be compelled to credit this explanation. In fact, just over seven months before Payne told Goelzer she was being terminated, he had conducted Goelzer’s annual performance review and concluded that her performance met or exceeded expectations in all areas.

A factfinder might also consider that, if Payne had serious problems with Goelzer’s performance, he could have asked the County Board to terminate Goelzer’s employment before he received the promotion, yet he did not do so. In addition, although Payne asserts that he wanted an assistant with a larger skill set, there are no documents evidencing a plan to restructure the assistant position before Goelzer’s termination. And, of course, Payne told Goelzer that she was losing her job two weeks before she was scheduled to take two months of FMLA leave. See Kohls, 259 F.3d at 806. In short, we are left with two competing accounts, either of which a jury could believe. So summary judgment is not appropriate, and we reverse its grant.

B. FMLA Retaliation

Goelzer also contends her FMLA retaliation theory should proceed to trial. The FMLA provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge or in any manner discriminate against” any employee for opposing any practice the FMLA makes unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). The difference between a retaliation and interference theory is that the first “requires proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent while [an interference theory] requires only proof that the employer denied the employee his or her entitlements under the Act.” Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 884; see also King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.1999). To succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff does not need to prove that “retaliation was the only reason for her termination; she may establish an FMLA retaliation claim by ‘showing that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s decision”.’ Lewis, 523 F.3d at 741-42 (quoting Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005)).

A plaintiff may proceed under the direct or indirect methods of proof when attempting to establish an FMLA retaliation claim. Burnett, 472 F.3d at 481. Under the direct method, the only method Goelzer employs, a plaintiff must present evidence that her employer took a materially adverse action against her because of her protected activity. Id. If the plaintiffs evidence is contradicted, the case must proceed to trial unless the employer presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse action against the plaintiff even if it did not have a retaliatory motive. Id. (citing Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002)). That is, the plaintiff survives summary judgment by “ ‘creating a triable issue of whether the adverse em*996ployment action of which she complains had a discriminatory motivation.’ ” Lewis, 523 F.3d at 741 (quoting Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir.2005)).

Payne and the County maintain that a jury could not conclude that they intentionally discriminated against Goelzer for using FMLA leave. In addition to the evidence to which she pointed in support of her interference claim, Goelzer also directs our attention to Human Resources Director Collard’s inquiry to Goelzer’s physician that asked “[w]hether Ms. Goelzer would be physically able to work light duty in an office environment prior to November 19, 2006, and if so, when would be an appropriate time that we would expect her to return.” As Goelzer points out, 29 C.F.R. § 825.307 provides that “[i]f an employee submits a complete and sufficient certification signed by the health care provider, the employer may not request additional information from the health care provider.” Goelzer submitted a complete and signed certification, so at the time Collard contacted Goelzer’s physician without her permission, that contact likely violated the FMLA. See Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 698 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2009). (The regulation has since been amended to add that “the employer may contact the health care provider for purposes of clarification and authentication of the medical certification ... after the employer has given the employee an opportunity to cure any deficiencies.... ” 29 C.F.R. § 825.307 (effective January 16, 2009); see Smith, 560 F.3d at 698 n. 4). Goelzer does not assert an independent claim for relief based on any violation of this regulation, nor does the FMLA provide one unless the violation interfered with or restrained an employee’s rights under the statute. See Smith, 560 F.3d at 698 n. 4. Instead, Goelzer asserts that Collard’s inquiry to her doctor supports her claim that the defendants had retaliated against her for using her FMLA leave.

Even if Collard’s inquiry is put to the side, there is enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that the defendants fired Goelzer because she had utilized FMLA leave and not because Payne wanted to hire a new person with more skills. For example, Goelzer had received positive performance reviews, and none suggest on their face that they were the result of any “lowered expectations” from Payne. Payne denies that he made any oral derogatory comments regarding Goelzer’s FMLA use, but that is for the jury to decide, and in any event the jury might view his written comments on Goelzer’s performance evaluations regarding her use of FMLA leave as evidence that her use of FMLA leave motivated the termination decision. Payne also communicated the termination decision after he knew Goelzer planned to be out for two months on FMLA leave, and she had utilized a significant amount of FMLA leave in the years preceding the decision. Although the defendants disclaim any causal connection between Goelzer’s requests for and use of FMLA leave and her firing, we conclude that a jury could find otherwise. As is the case with her interference theory, cf. Burnett, 472 F.3d at 482 (noting similarities of FMLA interference and retaliation analyses in case before it), then, summary judgment is not appropriate on her retaliation action, and we reverse its grant in the defendants’ favor.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is Reversed.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

The defendants, the Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor and the Sag Harbor Police Department (collectively the “Village” or the “defendants”), move pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment in their favor in this pregnancy discrimination action brought by the plaintiff Laura R. Lehmuller (“Lehmuller” or the “plaintiff”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); the New York State Human *1089Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 296-a; the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of her First Amendment right to petition the government for redress.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have discriminated against her because of her gender, her pregnancy, and her physical disability. In addition, Lehmuller claims that the Village took retaliatory action against her in response to her discrimination claim filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which she contends is her protected right to petition the government for a redress of grievances under the First Amendment.

Presently before the Court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

A. The Parties

The plaintiff Laura R. Lehmuller is a resident of New York State and is a female and full-time police officer who has been employed by the defendants since 1988. The defendants are the Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor, a municipality located in Suffolk County, and the Sag Harbor Village Police Department. The Police Department currently consists of ten officers and Chief Joseph J. Ialacci.

B. Duties as a Village Police Officer

Generally, all police officers within the Police Department are required to work rotating shifts and to perform all duties associated with police work. Patrol duty requires, among other things, that officers patrol the Village both on foot and in a police vehicle, respond to hazardous and medical calls, and perform routine after-hours door cheeks of commercial businesses. Patrol duty may require an officer to travel at high speeds in a police vehicle, to break up “bar fights” and domestic disputes, and to render assistance to the mentally infirm.

In addition, Village police officers are required to carry weapons, wear bullet proof vests and gun belts that contain two sets of handcuffs, a radio, mace, and extra bullets.

C.The Police Department’s Disability Policy

Since Chief Ialacci joined the Police Department in 1986, the Department has followed an unwritten policy whereby officers who become disabled due to illness or off-duty injury are required to use their sick leave, holidays, vacation days, or compensatory time for the period that they are unable to perform their normal patrol duties. Officers injured in the line of duty who are unable to conduct their patrol duties, but who can perform routine clerical tasks, are required to report for duty at headquarters as their physical condition permits. This policy purportedly stems from New York General Municipal Law § 207-c that mandates that officers injured in the line of duty receive full pay whether they work or not. According to the defendants, the policy is designed to insure that officers perform whatever work they can in exchange for their continued pay.

When the plaintiff was hired as the first and only woman police officer, the Village had no established policy regarding light-duty for pregnant officers. When Lehmuller announced her pregnancy and as a result, requested light-duty, Chief Ialacci referred the matter to the Mayor and Board of Trustees of the Village (the “Board”). Upon consideration of the light-duty policy, the Mayor and the Board decided that the Village would treat pregnancy as it did other non-job related injuries. Therefore, the plaintiff would be required to use her sick leave, holidays, vacation days, or compensatory time for the period that she would be unable to perform her normal patrol duties as a result of her pregnancy.

II. The Complaint

On October 22, 1993, Lehmuller filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that the Village discriminated against her because of her pregnancy in violation of Title VII, as a result of the denial of her request for light duty work. On April 6, 1995, the EEOC issued to the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter.

*1090The plaintiff continued to perform her usual job responsibilities until November 27, 1993, when she fell and sustained an on-the-job back injury while on patrol. Lehmuller reported the accident and was taken to the Southampton Hospital emergency room where she received limited treatment due to her pregnant condition. Subsequently, Leh-muller’s personal orthopedic physician instructed her not to return to work. Lehmul-ler filed a workers’ compensation claim and, on December 6, 1993, the Village prepared an “Employer’s Report of Work-Related Accident/Occupational Disease.”

On December 15, 1993, Chief Ialacci mailed a certified letter to Lehmuller asking that she submit to an examination by Dr. Reese at Suffolk County Headquarters to evaluate her back injury. Lehmuller complied with the Chiefs request. Dr. Reese concluded, contrary to Lehmuller’s personal doctor, that Lehmuller could perform light-duty work. The plaintiff was notified of the decision and subsequently returned to work on or about January 17, 1994. She was assigned to “Headquarters-schedule” light-duty with responsibilities that consisted of taking walk-in window complaints and assisting with clerical work as a result of her on-the-job injury.

Lehmuller continued to work until she gave birth to her son on April 21, 1994 and used her holiday, sick, vacation, and personal time to remain at home until September 15, 1994 when she returned to work.

Lehmuller filed this lawsuit alleging that the Village discriminated against her because of her pregnancy in violation of both Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In addition, the plaintiff claims discrimination because of her back-injury disability in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Finally, the plaintiff maintains that the defendants deprived her of her federal right to free speech based on the alleged retaliation against her for filing the EEOC claim. Specifically, Lehmuller contends that the Village unlawfully required a second examination of her back injury that resulted in her return to work contrary to her own doctor’s advice. Further, Lehmuller asserts that her EEOC claim is a protected right to petition the government for redress under the First Amendment and, therefore, the Village’s alleged retaliatory actions violated her constitutional right.

III. Discussion

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

A court may grant summary judgment “only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, presents no genuine issue of material fact,” Cable Science Corp. v. Rochdale Village, Inc., 920 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir.1990), and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (summary judgment standard). The court must, however, resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.1995); Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.1990); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987).

According to the Second Circuit “[s]um-mary judgment is a tool to winnow out from the trial calendar those cases whose facts predestine them to result in a directed verdict.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. The Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351, 355 (2d Cir.1993). Once a party moves for summary judgment, to avoid the granting of the motion, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir.1989). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see Vann v. New York City, 72 F.3d 1040, 1048 (2d Cir.1995).

Mere conclusory allegations, speculation or conjecture will not, however, avail a party resisting, summary judgment. See Western *1091 World, 922 F.2d at 121. If there is evidence in the record as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See United Nat’l, 988 F.2d at 354-55; Rattner v. Netbum, 930 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir.1991). Finally, the court is charged with the function of “issue finding,” not “issue resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994).

It is within this framework that the Court addresses the grounds for the present motions for summary judgment.

B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2 of Title VII provides that:

(a) [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice

(1) to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, or sex....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, § 2000e(k), which provides that discrimination:

on the basis of sex inelude[s] ... [discrimination] “on the basis of pregnancy” ... [and] a woman affected by pregnancy shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in § 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Two types of discrimination are actionable under Title VII: (1) “disparate treatment”, and (2) “disparate impact.” See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (acknowledging both claims as actionable). Disparate treatment occurs where an employer “treats some people less favorably than others” because of their sex, or where a facially neutral policy is merely a pretext for intentional employment See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2530, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982). discrimination.

Disparate impact claims, on the other hand, “involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. at 1854; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A). Lehmuller alleges that the Village has discriminated against her under both theories.

1. Lehmuller’s discrimination claims

A. Disparate Treatment

The Second Circuit recently reiterated the standards applicable in pregnancy discrimination cases in Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.1995) (setting forth the standard in reduction in force cases). In a pregnancy discrimination case, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie ease by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 64. To prove a prima facie ease, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she satisfactorily performed her job duties; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and, (4) in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a “legitimate, clear, specific and non-discriminatory reason for discharging the employee.” Id. If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must prove that the reason proffered was pretextual and that intentional discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment decision. Id., citing, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-17, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

Applying these standards, the only real issues presented in this Title VII claim is whether the denial of a light duty assignment for her pregnancy occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, and, if so, whether the plaintiff offered any evidence that the reasons advanced by the defendants for her termination were *1092pretextual. There is no question that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; she was a pregnant woman. Moreover, the defendants have not disputed that Lehmuller was qualified for her job or that she suffered an adverse employment decision, namely she was denied light duty. Rather, the parties focus on the fourth element of the prima facie case.

In support of its motion, the Village contends that the Police Department’s treatment of the plaintiff was not discriminatory because the law does not require the defendant to create a different job description to meet the plaintiffs changed requirements based on her pregnancy. The Village maintains that where a pregnant employee is treated the same as a non-pregnant employee, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie ease of a violation of Title VII. Thus, the defendants contend that they did not act in a discriminatory fashion when they denied Lehmuller a light duty work assignment.

In response to these contentions, the plaintiff alleges that although the Village’s disability policy appears to be facially neutral, it was applied to her in an intentionally discriminatory manner. In support of her position, Lehmuller compares the denial of her light-duty request to the light duty assignment of a male officer who was not injured in the line of duty. According to Lehmuller, the plaintiff asserts that the male officer was assigned to light duty when that officer was arrested and charged with, among other things, menacing and driving while intoxicated. The plaintiff argues that this constitutes proof that the Village’s policy is not applied equally to pregnant and non-pregnant officers. On the other hand, the Village contends that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for that assignment, namely that of public safety.

In the Court’s view, Lehmuller’s allegations constitute evidence that the Village’s policy was merely a pretext for discrimination and creates an issue of material fact sufficient to withstand the defendant’s summary judgment motion. In addition, material issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the part of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Village’s motion and Lehmuller’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim are both denied on the basis that material issues of fact are present.

B. Disparate Impact

To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact on the basis of pregnancy, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) the defendant engaged in a specific employment practice that had an adverse impact on pregnant employees; and

(2) there is a causal link between the challenged employment practice and the adverse impact.

See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2788-89, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988).

Lehmuller has shown that the Village adopted a light-duty policy that has an adverse impact on pregnant officers and, therefore, has established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a “business necessity” for the policy. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. at 1854.

The Village contends that light-duty was offered to those officers injured on the job only because New York General Municipal Law § 207-c requires it to continue to pay those officers whether they work or not. The Village claims that the policy was imposed to enable the taxpayers to receive some benefit from the salary it pays to an officer injured in the line of duty. Thus, the Village considers that its policy is the result of business necessity.

Despite the Village’s claim, however, it is undisputed that the record reveals that an officer not injured in the line of duty was assigned to light-duty. This discrepancy in the Village’s application of its policy presents a genuine issue of material fact, that is, whether the Village truly had a business necessity for its policy. Therefore, the defendants’ motion and the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs disparate impact claim are both *1093denied on the ground that material issues of fact are present.

C. New York State Human Rights Law

Section 296 1-a of the N.Y. Executive Law (New York State Human Rights law) provides that:

“[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: [fjor an employer [t]o discriminate against any person in his pursuit of such programs or to discriminate against such person in the terms, conditions or privileges of such programs because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age, disability or marital status.”

N.Y.Exec.Law at § 296(l)(a). Because the New York courts rely on a Title VII analysis to determine claims brought under New York Executive Law § 296(1)(a) (New York State Human Rights Law), see, e.g., Reed v. AW. Lawrence & Co., 96 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir.1996), the same material issues of fact are presented by the plaintiffs New York Human Rights Law claim and, therefore, both the motion for summary judgment by the Village and the cross-motion for summary judgment by Lehmuller with respect to the state discrimination claim are similarly denied.

D. Americans With Disabilities Act

The Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides that:

[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to ... [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

The plaintiff alleges two grounds for her claim that the Village discriminated against her in violation of the ADA. First, Lehmul-ler states that her pregnancy was a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and, as a result, the Village was required to make reasonable accommodations to enable her to perform her duties. Second, Lehmuller claims that her on-the-job back injury was a disability within the meaning of the ADA and that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate that condition.

1. Pregnancy as a “Disability”

Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, the term “disability” means; (A) a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. The Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) states that “conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are ... not impairments.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1995).

Courts have generally held that pregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the ADA. See, e.g., Johnson v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 934 F.Supp 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (noting that neither an employee’s pregnancy nor its complications were a disability under the ADA); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F.Supp 465, 473 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that pregnancy is not an impairment or disorder under the ADA because pregnancy is a natural consequence of reproduction and it will not be considered an impairment unless it exceeds normal ranges).

Lehmuller concedes that pregnancy is not per se a disability under the ADA. However, she argues that conditions relating to pregnancy are covered by the ADA. While this may be accurate, Lehmuller admits that she did not have any such condition that could be considered a disability. Further, the plaintiffs reliance on eases such as Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F.Supp. 797 (N.D.Ill.1996) and Chapsky v. Baxter v. Mueuller Din, 1995 WL 103299, *3 (N.D.Ill.1995) is misplaced. In these cases, the courts held that infertility could be considered a disability because the plaintiffs were substantially impaired in reproduction, a major life activity. A normal pregnancy however, does not impair any major life activity; it is merely the natural consequence of reproduction. See Gudenkauf, 922 F.Supp. at 473. It follows that, absent any medical conditions related to pregnancy that impairs a major life activity, pregnancy is not a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Johnson, 934 F.Supp. at 627.

*1094Because the coverage of ADA does not extend to normal pregnancies, in this Court’s view the plaintiffs ADA claim for disability discrimination in connection with her pregnancy must fail. The Court’s finding that a normal pregnancy is not a disability within the meaning of the ADA renders moot the further questions of (1) whether the defendant was required to accommodate the plaintiffs pregnancy and (2) whether the plaintiff was required to exhaust all of her administrative remedies prior to proceeding in this Court.

Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs ADA claim based on pregnancy is granted and the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

2. Disability as a Result of the Orv-the-Job Injury

The plaintiff also alleges that the Village discriminated against her because of a disability that resulted from an on-the-job injury she sustained in a fall while on patrol. In particular, Lehmuller claims that the Village had a duty to make reasonable accommodations for her back injury and that it failed to do so.

The defendants counter that the Village made all necessary reasonable accommodations. More importantly, the defendants argue that even if the Court were to find that all of the plaintiffs allegations are true, Leh-muller is barred from proceeding in this Court because she faded to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

Claimants under the ADA must follow the same procedures as those imposed by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117. A claimant under the ADA must first file a claim with the EEOC before a suit may be brought. Id.; see generally Luna v. Walgreens, 888 F.Supp. 87 (N.D.Ill.1995). In the present case, it is undisputed that Lehmuller did not file a claim with the EEOC for her back-injury disability. The plaintiff has failed to follow the procedures established under the ADA and Title VII and is, therefore, barred from bringing a suit on this ground. As a result of her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies in relation to her back injury, this portion of her ADA claim must also fail. Accordingly, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing each of the plaintiffs ADA claims is granted and the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

E. 12 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment

Section 1988 of the United States Code provides private individuals with a right of action where:

[a] person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States to ... the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

To sustain a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged test. She must show that: (1) she was deprived of a federal right by the defendant and, (2) the defendant acted under color of state law. Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Counties of Warren & Washington Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1996): see also, Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 778 (2d Cir.1991).

The plaintiff claims that she was deprived of her federal right to petition the government for redress when the defendants, acting under color of state law, retaliated against her for filing an EEOC claim on October 22, 1993. Lehmuller maintains that in order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff does not have to prove that she engaged in “speech” addressing matters of “public concern.” According to the plaintiff, she only needs to prove that she petitioned a governmental authority about her own particular concerns in order to improve her own situation and that retaliatory conduct then ensued.

On the other hand, the Village contends that the plaintiffs proposition that she does not have to meet the “public concern” test *1095set forth in the seminal case of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), is not the state of the law in the Second Circuit. The defendants argue that the right to petition the government is subject to the Connick test because it is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression and is governed by the same principles as other First Amendment claims.

Because the defendants maintain that the right to petition the government must follow the same analysis as other First Amendment claims, the Village relies on Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1689-90, for the proposition that speech must address matters of “public concern” for it to be protected. It is the defendants’ position that Lehmuller’s filing of the EEOC claim was a purely personal matter and was, therefore, not protected speech. The Court agrees.

The right to petition the government for redress of grievances, which is ‘an assurance of a particular freedom of expression,’ McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2789, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 is “ ‘subject to the same constitutional analysis’ as the right to free speech.” White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 185, 126 L.Ed.2d 144 (1993) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1532 n. 11, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)); see Ezekwo v. New York Health & Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct 657, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991). Thus, right-to-petition claims are also governed by the interest-balancing principles articulated in Connick. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 498 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 1476, 108 L.Ed.2d 613 (1990).

The First Amendment protects speech that involves matters of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1690, 1693-94 (1983); see Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992). Whether speech is constitutionally protected, namely of public concern, is one of law for the court to decide. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1691 n. 7.

The Second Circuit has ruled that an EEOC complaint based on race and sex discrimination is not a matter of public concern, and therefore, is not protected speech under the First Amendment. See Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 778. Lehmuller’s EEOC charge is personal in nature and relates solely to her employment situation. It is not speech of “public concern” and, thus, is not protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs Section 1983 claim is granted and the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

IV. Conclusion

After reviewing the papers submitted by both parties, hearing oral argument, and for the reasons set forth in the record, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion and the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 with regard to the Title VII claim are denied; it is further

ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion and the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 with regard to the New York Exec. Law § 296-a (New York State Human Rights) claim are denied; it is further

ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 dismissing plaintiffs claim arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act is granted. The plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is granted. The plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment with regard to this claim is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that re*275quires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy.

HH

California s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp. 1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits discrimination in employment and housing. In September 1978, California amended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Cal. Labor Code Ann. §1420.35, 1978 Cal. Stats., ch. 1321, §1, pp. 4320-4322 (West Supp. 1979), now codified at Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).1 Subdivision (b)(2) — the provision at issue here — is the only portion of the statute that applies to employers subject to Title VII. See *276§ 12945(e).2 It requires these employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA,3 has construed § 12945(b)(2) to require California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer must make a reasonable, good-faith effort to place the employee in a substantially similar job.4 The statute does not compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employees. Accordingly, the only benefit pregnant workers actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to reinstatement.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment *277discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII.5 In response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.6

*278rH l-H

Petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Association (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan association based in Los A.ngeles; it is an employer covered by both Title VII and §l2IÍ45(b)(2)^ Cal Fed has a facially neutral leave policy that permits" employees who have completed three months of service to take unpaid leaves of absence for a variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Although it is Cal Fed’s policy to try to provide an employee taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning, Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an employee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is not available.

Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist for several years. In January 1982, she took a pregnancy disability leave. When she was able to return to work in April of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was informed that her job had been filled and that there were no receptionist or similar positions available. Garland filed a complaint with respondent Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on her behalf.7' Respondent" charged Cal Fed with violating § 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA.' 'Prior to .the scheduled hearing before respondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the California Chamber of Commerce,8 brought this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. *279They sought a declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with and pre-empted by Title VII and an injunction against enforcement of the section.9 The District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. 33 EPD ¶ 34,227, p. 32781, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984). Citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669 (1983),10 the court stated that “California employers who comply with state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits under Title VII brought by temporarily disabled males who do not receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by pregnancy . . . .” 34 FEP Cases, at 568. On this basis, the District Court held that “California state law and the policies of interpretation and enforcement. . . which require preferential treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions are pre-empted by Title VII and are null, void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.” Ibid. 11

*280The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 758 F. 2d 390 (1985). It held that “the district court’s conclusion that section 12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense, misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA.” Id., at 393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading of Newport News, the Court of Appeals found that the PDA does not “demand that state law be blind to pregnancy’s existence.” 758 F. 2d, at 395. The court held that in enacting the PDA Congress intended “to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above which they may not rise. ” Id., at 396. Because it found that the California statute furthers the goal of equal employment opportunity for women, the Court of Appeals concluded: “Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII.” Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1049 (1986), and we now affirm.

III

A

In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978). Federal law may supersede state law in several different ways. First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms. E. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Second, congressional in*281tent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress “left no room” for supplementary state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Neither of these bases for pre-emption exists in this case. Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent categorically to pre-empt state law or to “occupy the field” of employment discrimination law. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-7 and2000h-4.

As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict occurs either because “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or because the state law stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and. objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn., Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 478 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 156 (1982). Nevertheless, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981).

This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in this case. In two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, §§708 and 1104, Congress has indicated that state laws will be pre-empted only if they actually conflict with federal law. Section 708 of Title VII provides:

“Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment *282practice under this title.” 78 Stat. 262, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-7.

Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil Rights Act, establishes the following standard for preemption:

“Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.” 78 Stat. 268, 42 U. S. C. §2000h-4.

Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title VII; these two sections provide a “reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority” to regulate employment practice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra, at 505.

Sections 708 and 1104 severely limit Title VII’s preemptive effect. Instead of pre-empting state fair employment laws, § 708 “‘simply left them where they were before the enactment of title VIL’ ” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 103, n. 24 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v. Connecticut Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (Conn. 1978), affirmance order, 603 F. 2d 214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1031 (1980)). Similarly, § 1104 was intended primarily to “assert the intention of Congress to preserve existing civil rights laws.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2788 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Meader). See also H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 (1963) (additional views of Rep. Meader).12 The narrow scope of pre*283emption available under §§708 and 1104 reflects the importance Congress attached to state antidiscrimination laws in achieving Title VII’s goal of equal employment opportunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 101-102; Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468-469, 472, 477 (1982); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63-65 (1980).13 The legislative history of the PDA also supports a narrow interpretation of these provisions,14 as does our opinion in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra. 15

In order to decide whether the California statute requires or permits employers to violate Title VII, as amended by the PDA, or is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, we *284must determine whether the PDA prohibits the States from requiring employers to provide reinstatement to pregnant workers, regardless of their, policy for disabled workers generally.

B

Petitioners argue that the language of the federal statute itself unambiguously rejects California’s “special treatment” approach to pregnancy discrimination, thus rendering any resort to the legislative history unnecessary. They contend that the second clause of the PDA forbids an employer to treat pregnant employees any differently than other disabled employees. Because “Tt]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’” of the pre-emption inquiry, Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S., at 504 (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)), however, we must examine the PDA’s language against the background of its legislative history and historical context. As to the language of the PDA, “[i]t is a ‘familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.’” Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892)). See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940).

It is well established that the PDA was passed in reaction to this Court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). “When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S., at 678. By adding pregnancy to the definition of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the first clause of the PDA reflects Congress’ disapproval of the reasoning in Gilbert. Newport News, supra, at 678-679, and *285n. 17 (citing legislative history). Rather than imposing a limitation on the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied. Cf. 462 U. S., at 678, n. 14 (“The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the application of the general principle to women employees”); see also id., at 688 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).16 Accordingly, subject to certain limitations,17 we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Congress intended the PDA to be “a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above which they may not rise.” 758 F. 2d, at 396.

The context in which Congress considered the issue of pregnancy discrimination supports this view of the PDA. Congress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insurance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977).18 The Reports, debates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Congress *286intended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to end discrimination against pregnant workers.19 In contrast to the thorough account of discrimination against pregnant workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of preferential treatment of pregnancy,20 beyond acknowledgments of the existence of state statutes providing for such preferential treatment. See infra, at 287. Opposition to the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability-benefit plans and the application of the bill to abortion,21 not from those who favored special accommodation of pregnancy.

In support of their argument that the PDA prohibits employment practices that favor pregnant women, petitioners and several amici cite statements in the legislative history to the effect that the PDA does not require employers to extend any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees. For example, the House Report explained that the proposed legislation “does not re*287quire employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner. . . . H. R. 6075 in no way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist.”22 We do not interpret these references to support petitioners’ construction of the statute. On the contrary, if Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed only its intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had intended to prohibit such treatment.

We also find it significant that Congress was aware of state laws similar to California’s but apparently did not consider them inconsistent with the PDA. In the debates and Reports on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged the existence of state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.23 Two of the States mentioned then required employers to provide reasonable leave to pregnant workers.24 After citing these state laws, *288Congress failed to evince the requisite “clear and manifest purpose” to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190, 206 (1983). To the contrary, both the House and Senate Reports suggest that these laws would continue to have effect under the PDA.25

Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and California’s pregnancy disability leave statute share a common goal. The purpose of Title VII is “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 429-430 (1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 75, n. 7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). Rather than limiting existing Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends *289them to cover pregnancy.26 As Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Act, stated: “The entire thrust. . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life. ” 123 Cong. Rec. 29658 (1977).

Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, § 12945(b)(2) ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability.27 California’s approach is consistent with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted in enacting the PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), a Title VI decision, Justice Brennan stated:

“[DJiscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a social context and, therefore, unavoidably tákes its meaning from the desired end products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due consideration of the uniqueness of the ‘disadvantaged’ individuals. A realistic understanding of conditions found in today’s labor environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies.” 429 U. S., at 159 (footnote omitted).

By “taking pregnancy into account,” California’s pregnancy disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs.

*290We emphasize the limited nature of the benefits § 12945 (b)(2) provides. The statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Accordingly, unlike the protective labor legislation prevalent earlier in this century,28 § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers. A statute based on such stereotypical assumptions would, of course, be inconsistent with Title VIPs goal of equal employment opportunity. See, e. g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 709 (1978); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).

C

Moreover, even if we agreed with petitioners’ construction of the PDA, we would nonetheless reject their argument that the California statute requires employers to violate Title VII.29 Section 12945(b)(2) does not prevent employers from *291complying with both the federal law (as petitioners construe it) and the state law. This is not a case where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S., at 142-143, or where there is an “inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation.” Id., at 143.30 Section 12945(b)(2) does not compel California employers to treat pregnant workers better than other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits that employers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant workers. Employers are free to give comparable benefits to other disabled employees, thereby treating “women affected by pregnancy” no better than “other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Indeed, at oral argument, petitioners conceded that compliance with both statutes “is theoretically possible.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.

Petitioners argue that “extension” of the state statute to cover other employees would be inappropriate in the absence of a clear indication that this is what the California Legislature intended. They cite cases in which this Court has declined to rewrite underinclusive state statutes found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393, n. 13 (1979). This argument is beside the point. Extension is a remedial option to be exercised by a court once a statute is *292found to be invalid.31 See, e. g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 89 (1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J'., concurring in result)).

IV

Thus, petitioners’ facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2) fails. The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by the PDA, because it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute, nor does it require the doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII.32

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) does not exist in a vacuum. As Justice White recognizes in his dissent, Congress did not intend to “put pregnancy in a class by itself within Title VII,” and the enactment of the PDA “did not mark a departure from Title VII principles.” Post, at 298-299. But this realization does not lead me to support Justice White’s position; rather, I believe that the PDA’s posture as part of Title VII compels rejection of his argument that the PDA mandates complete neutrality and forbids all beneficial treatment of pregnancy.1

*293In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), the Court rejected the argument that Title VII prohibits all preferential treatment of the disadvantaged classes that the statute was enacted to protect. The plain words of Title VII, which would have led to a contrary result, were read in the context of the statute’s enactment and its purposes.2 In this case as well, the language of the Act seems to mandate treating preg*294nant employees the same as other employees. I cannot, however, ignore the fact that the PDA is a definitional section of Title VIPs prohibition against gender-based discrimination. Had Weber interpreted Title VII as requiring neutrality, I would agree with Justice White that the PDA should be interpreted that way as well. But since the Court in Weber interpreted Title VII to draw a distinction between discrimination against members of the protected class and special preference in favor of members of that class, I do not accept the proposition that the PDA requires absolute neutrality.

I therefore conclude that Justice Marshall’s view, which holds that the PDA allows some preferential treatment of pregnancy, is more consistent with our interpretation of Title VII than Justice White’s view is. This is not to say, however, that all preferential treatment of pregnancy is automatically beyond the scope of the PDA.3 Rather, as with other parts of Title VII, preferential treatment of the disadvantaged class is only permissible so long as it is consistent with “accomplish[ing] the goal that Congress designed Title VII to'achieve.” Weber, supra, at 204.4 That goal has been *295characterized as seeking “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of. . . employees over other employees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 429-430 (1971).

It is clear to me, as it is to the Court,5 and was to the Court of Appeals,6 that the California statute meets this test. Thus, I agree that a California employer would not violate the PDA were it to comply with California’s statute without affording the same protection to men suffering somewhat similar disabilities.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in the judgment.

The only provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 whose effect on pre-emption need be considered in the present case is §708 of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-7. Although both that section and § 1104, 42 U. S. C. §2000h-4, are described by the majority as pre-emption provisions, they are more precisely antipre-emption provisions, prescribing that nothing in Title VII (in the case of § 708) and nothing in the entire Civil Rights Act (in the case of § 1104) shall be deemed to preempt state law unless certain conditions are met. The exceptions set forth in the general § 1104 ban on pre-emption (“inconsisten[cy] with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof”) are somewhat broader than the single exception set forth in the Title VII § 708 ban. Because the Pregnancy Disability Act (PDA) is part of Title VII, the more expansive prohibition of pre-emption particularly applicable to that Title applies. If that precludes pre-emption of Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980), it is unnecessary to inquire whether § 1104 would do so.

Section 708 narrows the pre-emptive scope of the PDA so that it pre-empts only laws which “purpor[t] to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employ*296ment practice” under the Title. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-7. Thus, whether or not the PDA prohibits discriminatorily favorable disability treatment for pregnant women, § 12945(b)(2) of the California Code cannot be pre-empted, since it does not remotely purport to require or permit any refusal to accord federally mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated. No more is needed to decide this case.

The majority not only ignores the clear antipre-emptive effect of § 708, but, even proceeding on the basis of its more generalized pre-emption analysis, decides more than is necessary. Its reasoning is essentially as follows: It is consistent with the requirements and purposes of the PDA for a State to require special treatment for pregnancy disability (Part III-B); and besides, the state law here at issue does not require special treatment for pregnancy disability (Part III-C). By parity of analysis, we can decide any issue, so long as the facts before us either do or do not present it. There are proper occasions for alternative holdings, where one of the alternatives does not eliminate the jurisdictional predicate for the other — though even in that situation the practice is more appropriate for lower courts than for this Court, whose first arrow runs no risk of being later adjudged to have missed its mark. But where, as here, it is entirely clear that an issue of law is not presented by the facts of the case, it is beyond our jurisdiction to reach it.

I am fully aware that it is more convenient for the employers of California and the California Legislature to have us interpret the PDA prematurely. It has never been suggested, however, that the constitutional prohibition upon our rendering of advisory opinions is a doctrine of convenience. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground that § 12945(b)(2) of the California Code does not purport to require or permit any act that would be an unlawful employment practice under any conceivable interpretation of the PDA, and therefore, by virtue of § 708, cannot be pre-empted.

*297Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join, dissenting.

I disagree with the Court that Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) is not pre-empted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 92 Stat. 2076, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k), and § 708 of Title VII. Section 703(a) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a), forbids discrimination in the terms of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The PDA gave added meaning to discrimination on the basis of sex:

“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in § 703(a) of this Title] include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .” §'2000e(k).

The second clause quoted above could not be clearer: it mandates that pregnant employees “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes” as nonpregnant employees similarly situated with respect to their ability or inability to work. This language leaves no room for preferential treatment of pregnant workers. The majority would avoid its plain meaning by misapplying our interpretation of the clause in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 678, n. 14 (1983). Ante, at 285. The second clause addresses only female employees and was not directly implicated in Newport News because the pregnant persons at issue in that case were spouses of male employees. We therefore stated in Newport News that the second clause had only explanatory or illustrative significance. We did not indicate in any way, however, that the *298second clause does not mean exactly what it says in a situation where it is directly implicated.

Contrary to the mandate of the PDA, California law requires every employer to have a disability leave policy for pregnancy even if it has none for any other disability. An employer complies with California law if it has a leave policy for pregnancy but denies it for every other disability. On its face, § 12945(b)(2) is in square conflict with the PDA and is therefore pre-empted. Because the California law permits employers to single out pregnancy for preferential treatment and therefore to violate Title VII, it is not saved by §708 which limits pre-emption of state laws to those that require or permit an employer to commit an unfair employment practice.1

The majority nevertheless would save the California law on two grounds. First, it holds that the PDA does not require disability from pregnancy to be treated the same as other disabilities; instead, it forbids less favorable, but permits more favorable, benefits for pregnancy disability. The express command of the PDA is unambiguously to the contrary, and the legislative history casts no doubt on that mandate.

The legislative materials reveal Congress’ plain intent not to put pregnancy in a class by itself within Title VII, as the majority does with its “floor . . . not a ceiling” approach. Ante, at 285. The Senate Report clearly stated:

“By defining sex discrimination to include discrimination against pregnant women, the bill rejects the view that employers may treat pregnancy and its incidents as sui generis, without regard to its functional comparability to other conditions. Under this bill, the treatment of *299pregnant women in covered employment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees; and when they are not able to work for medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other benefits, as other workers who are disabled from working.”2

The House Report similarly stressed that the legislation did not mark a departure from Title VII principles:

“It must be emphasized that this legislation, operating as part of Title VII, prohibits only discriminatory treatment. Therefore, it does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. H. R. 6075 in no way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist. The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.”3

*300The majority correctly reports that Congress focused on discrimination against, rather than preferential treatment of, pregnant workers. There is only one direct reference in the legislative history to preferential treatment. Senator Brooke stated during the Senate debate: “I would emphasize most strongly that S. 995 in no way provides special disability benefits for working women. They have not demanded, nor asked, for such benefits. They have asked only to be treated with fairness, to be accorded the same employment rights as men.”4 Given the evidence before Congress of the widespread discrimination against pregnant workers, it is probable that most Members of Congress did not seriously consider the possibility that someone would want to afford preferential treatment to pregnant workers. The parties and their amici argued vigorously to this Court the policy implications of preferential treatment of pregnant workers. In favor of preferential treatment it was urged with conviction that preferential treatment merely enables women, like men, to have children without losing their jobs. In opposition to preferential treatment it was urged with equal conviction that preferential treatment represents a resurgence of the 19th-century protective legislation which perpetuated sex-role stereotypes and which impeded women in their efforts to take their rightful place in the workplace. See, e. g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 421-423 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). It is not the place of this Court, however, to resolve this policy dispute. Our task is to interpret Congress’ intent in enacting the PDA. Congress’ silence in its consideration of the PDA with respect to preferential treatment of pregnant workers cannot fairly be interpreted to abrogate the plain statements in the legislative history, not to mention the language of the statute, that equality of treatment was to be the guiding principle of the PDA.

*301Congress’ acknowledgment of state antidiscrimination laws does not support a contrary inference. Ante, at 287-288. The most extensive discussion of state laws governing pregnancy discrimination is found in the House Report.5 It was reported that six States, Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and Montana, and the District of Columbia specifically included pregnancy in their fair employment practices laws. In 12 additional States, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin, the prohibition on sex discrimination in the state fair employment practices law had been interpreted, either by a state court or the state enforcement agency, to require equal treatment of pregnant workers. Finally, five States, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, had included pregnancy in their temporary disability laws under which private employers are required to provide partial wage replacement for temporary disabilities. The Report noted, however, that whereas California, New Jersey, and New York covered complications from pregnancy on the same basis as other disabilities, California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island set maximum limits on the coverage required for disability associated with normal childbirth. The Report did not in any way set apart the Connecticut and Montana statutes, on which the majority relies, from the other state statutes. The House Report gave no indication that these statutes required anything more than equal treatment. Indeed, the state statutes were considered, not in the context of pre-emption, but in the context of a discussion of health insurance costs. The House Report expressly stated: “The significance of this State coverage” is that “many employers are already under a State law obligation to provide benefits to pregnant disabled workers. Passage of the bill thus has little or no economic impact on such employers.”6

*302Nor does anything in the legislative history from the Senate side indicate that it carefully considered the state statutes, including those of Connecticut and Montana, and expressly endorsed their provisions. The Senate Report noted that “25 States presently interpret their own fair employment practices laws to prohibit sex discrimination based on pregnancy and childbirth,” and Senator Williams presented during the Senate debate a list of States which required coverage for pregnancy and pregnancy-related disabilities, but there was no analysis of their provisions.7 The majority seems to interpret Senator Javits’ acknowledgment that several state legislatures, including New York, his own State, had mandated certain benefits for pregnant employees as an unqualified endorsement of those state statutes. Ante, at 287, n. 23. Later, however, when pressed by Senator Hatch about the fact that the New York statute limited the required coverage of disability caused by pregnancy to eight weeks, Senator Javits had no hesitation in expressing his disagreement with the New York statute.8 Passing reference to state statutes without express recognition of their content and without express endorsement is insufficient in my view to override the PDA’s clear equal-treatment mandate, expressed both in the statute and its legislative history.

The Court’s second, and equally strange, ground is that even if the PDA does prohibit special benefits for pregnant women, an employer may still comply with both the California law and the PDA: it can adopt the specified leave policies for pregnancy and at the same time afford similar benefits for all other disabilities. This is untenable. California surely had no intent to require employers to provide general disability leave benefits. It intended to prefer pregnancy and went no further. Extension of these benefits to the entire work force would be a dramatic increase in the scope of the state *303law and would impose a significantly greater burden on California employers. That is the province of the California Legislature. See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393, n. 13 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 210, n. 24 (1976). Nor can § 12945(b)(2) be saved by applying Title VII in tandem with it, such that employers would be required to afford reinstatement rights to pregnant workers as a matter of state law but would be required to afford the same rights to all other workers as a matter of federal law. The text of the PDA does not speak to this question but it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not intend for the PDA to impose such burdens on employers. As recognized by the majority, opposition to the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans. Ante, at 286. The House Report acknowledged these concerns and explained that the bill “in no way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist.”9 The Senate Report gave a similar assurance.10 In addition, legislator after legislator stated during the floor debates that the PDA would not require an employer to institute a disability benefits program if it did not already have one in effect.11 Congress intended employers to be free to *304provide any level of disability benefits they wished — or none at all — as long as pregnancy was not a factor in allocating such benefits. The conjunction of § 12945(b)(2) and the PDA requires California employers to implement new minimum disability leave programs. Reading the state and federal statutes together in this fashion yields a result which Congress expressly disavowed.

In sum, preferential treatment of pregnant workers is prohibited by Title VII, as amended by the PDA. Section 12945(b)(2) of the California Government Code, which extends preferential benefits for pregnancy, is therefore pre-empted. It is not saved by § 708 because it purports to authorize employers to commit an unfair employment practice forbidden by Title VII.12