4 Defining The Objective: Remedies, Appeals, Enforcement of Judgments 4 Defining The Objective: Remedies, Appeals, Enforcement of Judgments

4.1 Defining the Objective Wordcloud 4.1 Defining the Objective Wordcloud

4.2 Introduction 4.2 Introduction

    The first rule of warfare is: "Define the objective." If you can't say what you hope to achieve, and can't show how that goal can be achieved, engaging in active conflict is foolish.

     The same holds true for litigation. Both plaintiffs and defendants need to understand the desired outcome and how litigation strategies help bring it about. There is no point in going to court if litigating cannot produce the desired objective. Even on the defense side, where litigation was not desired, understanding your own achievable objectives and your opponent's apparent objectives are critical steps in charting a strategy.

     That is why we start at what others might consider the end - remedies and appeals. Only by understanding the end game of litigation can a wise strategy be charted through the rest of the process.

     Remedies examine the relief that a court can order. Not all desired objectives can be obtained through litigation. Some situations are beyond anyone's power to reverse. For example, if someone has been grievously injured in a car accident, the court cannot enter an order that restores the person to health.  In other cases, it's conceivable that the situation can be reversed, but it is not the kind of thing that lies within the power of a court. For example, a court cannot restore respect between the parties, or replace a failed business relationship with a new one better suited to current market conditions. In still other cases, the relief sought might be a kind that some courts in some countries would award, such as ordering a state government to comply with the law, but not be one that lies within the powers granted to courts in other jurisdictions.

     Courts are also limited in terms of against whom they can award that relief.  In some cases, as we will shortly study, the party sought to be brought before the court is beyond the territorial reach of the court. In other cases, the party that might be sued might enjoy immunity - for example, in the United States foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from civil lawsuits except those involving real property because of international law. In other cases, prudential or constitutional doctrines might prevent the order of an injunction against an Executive Branch official. These limitations will vary depending upon the nature of the judicial system, the location of the judicial system, and choices made in litigation such as the cause of action pursued.

      We will examine shortly the kinds of remedies that are allowed in the US system, although time prevents us from going into depth into all possible remedies (once upon a time, Remedies was a common and sometimes required stand alone course in law schools).

     Appeals also play into assessing strategy. You may often find yourself in a situation where a key legal issue - say, personal jurisdiction - is unclear at the outset of litigation. US judges, and especially US federal judges, are generally technically proficient, honest, and hard-working, but they are not perfect. They may wrongly decide that critical legal issue against your client, or the issue may be so close that an equally intelligent and hard-working appellate court might decide it differently. To understand what that means you need to understand at the outset what is involved in getting that wrong decision reversed by a higher court. If an issue is close and reversal can only be obtained after a long and costly process of litigation before the appeal can even be filed, the value and cost of litigating the issue rather than negotiating might look different.

     Before we move on, it is worth noting that not every lawsuit is filed with an eye just to the remedies a court can order. In many cases, litigation or the threat of litigation is used to make the other side pay attention and bargain seriously. In other cases litigation or the threat of litigation is used as a tool to push people, such as government officials, to act in accord with the legal responsibilities before the court requires them to do so. In some cases, filing a lawsuit serves as a signal to third parties that the issue matters. In some cases, and this is an abusive and unethical practice, litigation and threats of litigation are used to intimidate and burden a less well-resourced opponent in hopes that they will bend to the will of the party filing suit. In all of those situations, as we will see later, the lawsuit has to have a  good faith basis and the judicial remedy has to be a legitimate goal.

4.3 Remedies - What Are You Asking For 4.3 Remedies - What Are You Asking For

4.3.1 Overview of Remedies 4.3.1 Overview of Remedies

      Remedies in US courts are influenced by the traditional split between the common law (remember the writs that evolved into modern causes of actions, and the rise of stare decisis) and the courts of equity (remember going to the King's Chancellor to seek relief when the common law could not provide justice). In common law courts, the remedy typically was money damages. In equity, the remedies were more varied, and specifically did not include money damages (remember, if the relief of damages offered by a common law court was sufficient, the courts of equity were not open to any claim). In general, the relief offered by the courts of equity involves an order to do or to not do something. This can range from handing over property (including money - but don't lose the thread here) to stopping actions that are challenged as being illegal.

     While the history of the common law courts and the equity courts influence modern remedies, the situation today can be a bit more complicated. In the federal courts and in most state courts, law and equity have been merged, so that the same court and the same judge will hear both common law and equitable claims in the same action. While some remedies are clearly only common law (e.g., money damages) and others are clearly only equitable (e.g., injunctions), others are less clearly separated. Whether a declaratory judgment arises in equity or the common law, for example, can get more complicated than we are going to want to deal with. In the context of equity and the common law having been merged, courts sometimes have little inclination to be fussy about clarifying such issues.

     In the American system, there are four kinds of relief a court most often will order. The court can award monetary damages. For example, if the plaintiff is injured in an automobile accident, while the court cannot restore health the court can order a losing defendant to give money to the plaintiff in compensation for the injuries suffered. A court can award coercive remedies, such as injunctions or temporary restraining orders. For example, if an industrial plant has been held to be operating in violation of environmental laws, the court can order the owners of the plant to stop those activities that lead to the illegal emissions. The court can order restitution. For example, if the defendant is found to have illegally taken property from the plaintiff, the defendant can be ordered to restore the property, along with any benefits that accrued to the defendant because of its wrongful possession of the property. Finally, a court can give a declaratory judgment. Declaratory remedies establish the rights or legal relations between the parties, so long as there is an actual, live controversy involving those rights, even if the dispute is not appropriate for damages, coercive relief, or restitution.

     In general, remedies are defined by the law that creates the right, whether that law is common law, statutory, or from the Constitution. For most common law remedies, such as torts and contracts, the normal remedy is money damages. The court will determine if a right has been violated, and if it finds that one has, calculate the level of money damages. The remedy of damages also is sometimes known as a "legal remedy" so as to distinguish it from an equitable remedy.

     As you will see in your substantive courses, calculating the correct level of money damages can be a complex undertaking. If someone has been physically injured, should they collect non-economic damages such as pain and suffering? If so, are there settings where a limit should be placed on such non-economic damages? (In some US states, caps have been put on non-economic damages in settings such as medical malpractice). In contracts, if a contract is breached should the damages be limited to the lost profits on the contract or the money paid under the contract, or should more extensive "consequential damages" be awarded if the breach led to follow-on injuries beyond the scope of the contract itself? 

     In some cases, the legal or monetary damages will be linked to the "after the fact" regulatory role of litigation we talked about earlier. For example, in antitrust cases, the court will treble (multiply by three) the level of actual damages to get at a damage award. This is believed to add to the deterrent impact of the antitrust laws. In other cases, particularly egregious conduct can lead to additional "punitive damages," in which damages are increased as a kind of additional fine, but payable to the plaintiff. In some areas, such as copyright infringement, damages will be allowed for violation of a registered copyright in certain circumstances without a requirement that actual damages be proven; these kinds of damages are called "statutory damages." In still other cases, attorneys' fees - which under the "American Rule" are normally born by the litigant and not shifted, even if the litigant wins - can be awarded from the losing side, once again in support of regulatory interests.

     We won't dig into those sorts of issues in this course, but you will encounter them in other courses. Even more importantly, because the law bearing on remedies can vary from state to state, you will need to do specific research into the scope of available legal remedies early in the litigation process, whether you are a plaintiff or a defendant.

     As we will see just a bit later, a monetary damage award can be enforced in courts other than the court where the trial was held. The Full Faith and Credit clause of the US Constitution, which appears in Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution, provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." For present purposes, that means that valid judgments of the courts of one state can be enforced in any other US jurisdiction. This makes damage awards portable within the US to a location where a defendant has assets. As we will also see later, the story with regard to importing foreign judgments or exporting US judgments to other countries is quite a bit less clear.

     Other remedies arose from the courts of equity. Most importantly, the remedies employed by a court of equity did not include money damages (although money could be ordered to change hands).

     Coercive remedies include injunctions and specific performance. Under an injunction, a party is ordered to take a certain action so as to comply with the law - for example, to desegregate segregated schools, or to eliminate conditions in state prisons that violate the Constitution. Injunctions also apply to private litigants as well - an individual might be ordered to no longer trespass by using the property of a neighbor for a driveway or a company may be ordered to stop releasing pollutants into the environment. Specific performance arises in the realm of contracts. For example, if you have contracted to purchase the famous Water Bottle of Shenzhen but the seller decides not to perform the contract, you might prefer the famed water bottle to money damages, and specific performance is a way for a court to compel compliance with the contract.

     Restitutionary remedies involve situations where the litigant wants to be restored to the position it deserves to be in. Examples would include the restoration of property to its rightful owner. If, for example, your roommate has stolen your collection of signed photographs of C-Pop stars, an order of restitution would return those to you. If your neighbor has 'borrowed' your prize pig and received funds for allowing it to appear in a pig food advertisement, a restitutionary remedy might require the disgorgement of that payment to you. The measurement of restitutionary remedies is typically the defendant's gains rather than the plaintiff's losses - even if no harm was caused to you by the absence of your pig for a day, the restitutionary measure is the funds the defendant wrongly obtained.

     Declaratory remedies involve the establishment of legal rights but not the award of damages (although a demand for declaratory relief will sometimes accompany a claim for damages). In the US federal courts, there must be a live case or controversy, so declaratory relief cannot produce just an advisory "maybe someday" opinion, but must be tied to a live situation. 

     In most but not quite all situations, the attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing a claim are not part of the damages awarded. In many national jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, it is normal under the "English Rule" for a court to require the losing party to pay at least some substantial part of the winnings party’s attorneys fees, although these often are not at all the actual fees incurred. In the United States, on the other hand, the normal “American Rule” is that each party bears its own attorneys’ fees. The ‘costs’ of litigation normally are awarded, but in practice these tend to be relatively minor compared to attorneys’ fees. The reasoning for this in the United States is that to do otherwise would make litigants of limited resources reluctant to pursue even valid claims because of the downside risk of paying attorneys' fees that might exceed their ability to pay. The reasoning against this is that defendants who have been found to have violated no one's rights will nonetheless be required to pay sometimes substantial attorneys' fees out of their own pocket.  Even in the United States, some statutes provide for an award of attorney’s fees to the winning party. Most often, this happens in connection with a statute that serves an important regulatory purpose, such as those protecting the civil rights of individuals. Attorneys' fees can also be awarded when the lawsuit is found to be frivolous and without a good basis. In addition, contracts can provide that for any dispute arising from the contract the winning party shall be awarded its attorneys’ fees.

     In modern practice, it is common for alternative or multiple remedies to be sought for the same breach. For example, if a company is polluting the environment, the plaintiff might seek both monetary damages for injuries already suffered and an injunction preventing the company from pollution in the future. In a contrast case, a party might seek restitution of money paid or, in the alternative, a damage remedy equal to the money paid.

4.3.2 Equitable Remedies 4.3.2 Equitable Remedies

4.3.2.1 Introduction to Equitable Remedies: Preliminary Injunctions and TROs 4.3.2.1 Introduction to Equitable Remedies: Preliminary Injunctions and TROs

     Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders are a special kind of equitable relief, and a kind of equitable relief that often is encountered in US courts. In both cases the goal is to offer temporary relief that preserves the position of the parties until trial can be held. Of these, the Temporary Restraining Order often comes first. A Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is sought in order to freeze a situation in place before changes occur that cannot be undone. A TRO can be granted in an emergency ex parte hearing (a hearing where the other side is not even present) but generally last only until a more complete hearing can be held. A TRO might be put in place to stop a contractor from tearing down a historic building before a hearing is held on whether the destruction is lawful, for example, or to require an alleged abuser to not come near his or her alleged victim. In many cases, TRO proceedings lead directly to a hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should be granted.

     Preliminary injunctions are, as the name suggests, granted preliminarily before a full trial is heard on whether a permanent injunction should be granted. Again, as with a TRO, the issue is preserving the situation until there is a full trial. In reality, and unlike a TRO, in many cases the preliminary injunction can remain in place for a long time. (Note that in injunction and TRO settings, which are equitable in nature, there is no jury).

     The following case deals with a request for a preliminary injunction. The Court sets forth the four requirements for the granting of a temporary injunction as: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." In addition, as is true for all equitable remedies, the moving party must show that there is no adequate remedy at law.

     As you read this case think of how the equitable procedural tradition deals with situations not readily addressed by common law damage remedies. Also note how the equitable traditions of balancing and discretion are built into the court's approach.

4.3.2.2 FRCP 65 - Injunctions and Restraining Orders 4.3.2.2 FRCP 65 - Injunctions and Restraining Orders

(a) Preliminary Injunction.

     (1) Notice. The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.

     (2) Consolidating the Hearing with the Trial on the Merits. Before or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing. Even when consolidation is not ordered, evidence that is received on the motion and that would be admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at trial. But the court must preserve any party’s right to a jury trial.

(b) Temporary Restraining Order.

     (1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

          (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

          (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

     (2) Contents; Expiration. Every temporary restraining order issued without notice must state the date and hour it was issued; describe the injury and state why it is irreparable; state why the order was issued without notice; and be promptly filed in the clerk’s office and entered in the record. The order expires at the time after entry—not to exceed 14 days—that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension. The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.

     (3) Expediting the Preliminary-Injunction Hearing. If the order is issued without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction must be set for hearing at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character. At the hearing, the party who obtained the order must proceed with the motion; if the party does not, the court must dissolve the order.

     (4) Motion to Dissolve. On 2 days’ notice to the party who obtained the order without notice—or on shorter notice set by the court—the adverse party may appear and move to dissolve or modify the order. The court must then hear and decide the motion as promptly as justice requires.

(c) Security. The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. The United States, its officers, and its agencies are not required to give security.

(d) Contents and Scope of Every Injunction and Restraining Order.

     (1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must:

          (A) state the reasons why it issued;

          (B) state its terms specifically; and

          (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.

     (2) Persons Bound. The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise:

          (A) the parties;

          (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and

          (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).

(e) Other Laws Not Modified. These rules do not modify the following:

     (1) any federal statute relating to temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and employee;

     (2) 28 U.S.C. §2361, which relates to preliminary injunctions in actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader; or

     (3) 28 U.S.C. §2284, which relates to actions that must be heard and decided by a three-judge district court.

     (f) Copyright Impoundment. This rule applies to copyright-impoundment proceedings.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 23, 2001, eff. Dec. 1, 2001; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/

4.3.2.3 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 4.3.2.3 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, et al. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.

No. 07-1239.

Argued October 8, 2008

Decided November 12, 2008

*10Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion *11concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part I, post, p. 34. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 43.

Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nelson, Anthony A. Yang, Andrew C. Mergen, Michael R. Eitel, Luther L. Hajek, Allen M. Brdbender, Daniel J. DelVOrto, Thomas N. Ledvina, J. Page Turney, Jane C. Luxton, Mary Beth Ward, Joel La Bissonniere, and Edward A. Boling.

Richard B. Kendall argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent environmentalists were Robert N. Klieger, Gregory A. Fayer, Joel R. Reynolds, Cara A. Horowitz, and Stephen Zak Smith.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, filed a brief for respondent California Coastal Commission. With him on the brief were Jarme Jordan Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, Solicitor General, and Gordon Burns, Deputy Solicitor General.*

*

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Navy League of the United States — Honolulu Council et al. by Robert H. Thomas, Mark M. Murakami, Theodore G. Meeker, and Michael A. Lilly; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper and Steven Geoffrey Gieseler; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Andrew G. McBride, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Ecological Society of America by Peter E. Perkowski; for California Assembly Member Julia Brownley et al. by Stephen B. Kinnaird, Peter H. Weiner, Paul W. Cane, Jr., and Sean D. Unger; and for Michael C. Small et al. by Mr. Small, pro se, Jonathan D. Varat, and Edward P. Lazarus.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the California Forestry Association et al. by Thomas R. Dundquist, J. Michael Klise, Michele Dias, William R. Murray, Douglas T. Nelson, Duane J. Desiderio, and Thomas J. Ward; and for Defenders of Wildlife et al. by Eric R. Glitzenstein.

*12Chief Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 57 (J. Richardson comp. 1897). So said George Washington in his first Annual Address to Congress, 218 years ago. One of the most important ways the Navy prepares for war is through integrated training exercises at sea. These exercises include training in the use of modern sonar to detect and track enemy submarines, something the Navy has done for the past 40 years. The plaintiffs, respondents here, complained that the Navy’s sonar-training program harmed marine mammals, and that the Navy should have prepared an environmental impact statement before commencing its latest round of training exercises. The Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction imposing restrictions on the Navy’s sonar training, even though that court acknowledged that “the record contains no evidence that marine mammals have been harmed” by the Navy’s exercises. 518 F. 3d 658, 696 (CA9 2008).

The Court of Appeals was wrong, and its decision is reversed.

I

The Navy deploys its forces in “strike groups,” which are groups of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft centered around either an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship. App. to Pet. for Cert. 316a-317a (Pet. App.). Seamless coordination among strike-group assets is critical. Before deploying a strike group, the Navy requires extensive integrated training in analysis and prioritization of threats, execution of military missions, and maintenance of force protection. App. 110-111.

Antisubmarine warfare is currently the Pacific Fleet’s top war-fighting priority. Pet. App. 270a-271a. Modern diesel-electric submarines pose a significant threat to Navy vessels because they can operate almost silently, making them ex*13tremely difficult to detect and track. Potential adversaries of the United States possess at least 300 of these submarines. App. 571.

The most effective technology for identifying submerged diesel-electric submarines within their torpedo range is active sonar, which involves emitting pulses of sound underwater and then receiving the acoustic waves that echo off the target. Pet. App. 266a-267a, 274a. Active sonar is a particularly useful tool because it provides both the bearing and the distance of target submarines; it is also sensitive enough to allow the Navy to track enemy submarines that are quieter than the surrounding marine environment.1 This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” (MFA) sonar, which transmits sound waves at frequencies between 1 kHz and 10 kHz.

Not surprisingly, MFA sonar is a complex technology, and sonar operators must undergo extensive training to become proficient in its use. Sonar reception can be affected by countless different factors, including the time of day, water density, salinity, currents, weather conditions, and the contours of the sea floor. Id., at 278a-279a. When working as part of a strike group, sonar operators must be able to coordinate with other Navy ships and planes while avoiding interference. The Navy conducts regular training exercises under realistic conditions to ensure that sonar operators are thoroughly skilled in its use in a variety of situations.

The waters off the coast of southern California (SOCAL) are an ideal location for conducting integrated training exercises, as this is the only area on the west coast that is relatively close to land, air, and sea bases, as well as amphibious *14landing areas. App. 141-142. At issue in this case are the Composite Training Unit Exercises and the Joint Tactical Force Exercises, in which individual naval units (ships, submarines, and aircraft) train together as members of a strike group. A strike group cannot be certified for deployment until it has successfully completed the integrated training exercises, including a demonstration of its ability to operate under simulated hostile conditions. Id., at 564-565. In light of the threat posed by enemy submarines, all strike groups must demonstrate proficiency in antisubmarine warfare. Accordingly, the SOCAL exercises include extensive training in detecting, tracking, and neutralizing enemy submarines. The use of MFA sonar during these exercises is “mission-critical,” given that MFA sonar is the only proven method of identifying submerged diesel-electric submarines operating on battery power. Id., at 568-571.

Sharing the waters in the SOCAL operating area are at least 37 species of marine mammals, including dolphins, whales, and sea lions. The parties strongly dispute the extent to which the Navy’s training activities will harm those animals or disrupt their behavioral patterns. The Navy emphasizes that it has used MFA sonar during training exercises in SOCAL for 40 years, without a single documented sonar-related injury to any marine mammal. The Navy asserts that, at most, MFA sonar may cause temporary hearing loss or brief disruptions of marine mammals’ behavioral patterns.

The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Jean-Michael Cousteau (an environmental enthusiast and filmmaker), and several other groups devoted to the protection of marine mammals and ocean habitats. They contend that MFA sonar can cause much more serious injuries to marine mammals than the Navy acknowledges, including permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness, and major behavioral disruptions. According to the plaintiffs, several mass strandings of marine mammals (outside of SOCAL) *15have been “associated” with the use of active sonar. They argue that certain species of marine mammals — such as beaked whales — are uniquely susceptible to injury from active sonar; these injuries would not necessarily be detected by the Navy, given that beaked whales are “very deep divers” that spend little time at the surface.

II

The procedural history of this case is rather complicated. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 86 Stat. 1027, generally prohibits any individual from “taking” a marine mammal, defined as harassing, hunting, capturing, or killing it. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1362(13), 1372(a). The Secretary of Defense may “exempt any action or category of actions” from the MMPA if such actions are “necessary for national defense.” § 1371(f)(1). In January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense — acting for the Secretary — granted the Navy a 2-year exemption from the MMPA for the training exercises at issue in this case. Pet. App. 219a-220a. The exemption was conditioned on the Navy adopting several mitigation procedures, including: (1) training lookouts and officers to watch for marine mammals; (2) requiring at least five lookouts with binoculars on each vessel to watch for anomalies on the water surface (including marine mammals); (3) requiring aircraft and sonar operators to report detected marine mammals in the vicinity of the training exercises; (4) requiring reduction of active sonar transmission levels by 6 dB if a marine mammal is detected within 1,000 yards of the bow of the vessel, or by 10 dB if detected within 500 yards; (5) requiring complete shutdown of active sonar transmission if a marine mammal is detected within 200 yards of the vessel; (6) requiring active sonar to be operated at the “lowest practicable level”; and (7) adopting coordination and reporting procedures. Id., at 222a-230a.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, requires federal agencies “to the fullest extent *16possible” to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “every . . . major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (2000 ed.). An agency is not required to prepare a full EIS if it determines — based on a shorter environmental assessment (EA) — that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the environment. 40 CFR §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2007).

In February 2007, the Navy issued an EA concluding that the 14 SOCAL training exercises scheduled through January 2009 would not have a significant impact on the environment. App. 226-227. The EA divided potential injury to marine mammals into two categories: Level A harassment, defined as the potential destruction or loss of biological tissue (1 e., physical injury), and Level B harassment, defined as temporary injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as migration, feeding, surfacing, and breeding. Id., at 160-161.

The Navy’s computer models predicted that the SOCAL training exercises would cause only eight Level A harassments of common dolphins each year, and that even these injuries could be avoided through the Navy’s voluntary mitigation measures, given that dolphins travel in large pods easily located by Navy lookouts. Id., at 176-177, 183. The EA also predicted 274 Level B harassments of beaked whales per year, none of which would result in permanent injury. Id., at 185-186. Beaked whales spend little time at the surface, so the precise effect of active sonar on these mammals is unclear. Erring on the side of caution, the Navy classified all projected harassments of beaked whales as Level A. Id., at 186, 223. In light of its conclusion that the SOCAL training exercises would not have a significant impact on the environment, the Navy determined that it was unnecessary to prepare a full EIS. See 40 CFR § 1508.13.

Shortly after the Navy released its EA, the plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Navy’s SOCAL training exercises violated *17NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).2 The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and prohibited the Navy from using MFA sonar during its remaining training exercises. The court held that plaintiffs had “demonstrated a probability of success” on their claims under NEPA and the CZMA. Pet. App. 207a, 215a. The court also determined that equitable relief was appropriate because, under Ninth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs had established at least a “ ‘possibility’ ” of irreparable harm to the environment. Id., at 217a. Based on scientific studies, declarations from experts, and other evidence in the record, the District Court concluded that there was in fact a “near certainty” of irreparable injury to the environment, and that this injury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy. Id., at 217a-218a.

The Navy filed an emergency appeal, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 502 F. 3d 859, 865 (2007). After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate. The appellate court concluded, however, that a blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar in SOCAL was overbroad, and remanded the case to the District Court “to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 508 F. 3d 885, 887 (2007).

On remand, the District Court entered a new preliminary injunction allowing the Navy to use MFA sonar only as long as it implemented the following mitigation measures (in addition to the measures the Navy had adopted pursuant to its MMPA exemption): (1) imposing a 12 nautical mile “exclusion *18zone” from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3) restricting the use of “helicopter-dipping” sonar; (4) limiting the use of MFA sonar in geographic “choke points”; (5) shutting down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) powering down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface ducting conditions, in which sound travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences in adjacent layers of water. 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118-1121 (CD Cal. 2008). The Navy filed a notice of appeal, challenging only the last two restrictions.

The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch. The President, pursuant to 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(1)(B), granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA. Section 1456(c)(1)(B) permits such exemptions if the activity in question is “in the paramount interest of the United States.” The President determined that continuation of the exercises as limited by the Navy was “essential to national security.” Pet. App. 232a. He concluded that compliance with the District Court’s injunction would “undermine the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary to ensure the combat effectiveness of... strike groups.” Ibid.

Simultaneously, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) authorized the Navy to implement “alternative arrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of “emergency circumstances.” See 40 CFR § 1506.11.3 The CEQ determined that alternative arrangements were appropriate because the District Court’s injunction “create[s] a significant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be *19able to train and be certified as fully mission capable.” Pet. App. 238a. Under the alternative arrangements, the Navy would be permitted to conduct its training exercises under the mitigation procedures adopted in conjunction with the exemption from the MMPA. The CEQ also imposed additional notice, research, and reporting requirements.

In light of these actions, the Navy then moved to vacate the District Court’s injunction with respect to the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the restrictions on training in surface ducting conditions. The District Court refused to do so, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (2008), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that there was a serious question regarding whether the CEQ’s interpretation of the “emergency circumstances” regulation was lawful. Specifically, the court questioned whether there was a true “emergency” in this case, given that the Navy has been on notice of its obligation to comply with NEPA from the moment it first planned the SOCAL training exercises. 518 F. 3d, at 681. The Court of Appeals concluded that the preliminary injunction was entirely predictable in light of the parties’ litigation history. Ibid. The court also held that plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on their claim that the Navy was required to prepare a full EIS for the SOCAL training exercises. Id., at 693. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s holding that the Navy’s EA — which resulted in a finding of no significant environmental impact — was “cursory, unsupported by cited evidence, or unconvincing.” Ibid.4

The Court of Appeals further determined that plaintiffs had carried their burden of establishing a “possibility” of irreparable injury. Even under the Navy’s own figures, the court concluded, the training exercises would cause 564 physical injuries to marine mammals, as well as 170,000 disturb*20anees of marine mammals’ behavior. Id., at 696. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the balance of hardships and consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that the negative impact on the Navy’s training exercises was “speculative,” since the Navy has never before operated under the procedures required by the District Court. Id., at 698-699. In particular, the court determined that: (1) The 2,200-yard shutdown zone imposed by the District Court was unlikely to affect the Navy’s operations, because the Navy often shuts down its MFA sonar systems during the course of training exercises; and (2) the power-down requirement during significant surface ducting conditions was not unreasonable because such conditions are rare, and the Navy has previously certified strike groups that had not trained under such conditions. Id., at 699-702. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the District Court’s preliminary injunction struck a proper balance between the competing interests at stake.

We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 916 (2008), and now reverse and vacate the injunction.

Ill

A

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674, 689-690 (2008); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311-312 (1982).

The District Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their NEPA claim. The Navy strongly disputes this determination, arguing that plaintiffs’ likelihood of success is low because the CEQ reasonably concluded that “emergency *21circumstances” justified alternative arrangements to NEPA compliance. 40 CFR § 1506.11. Plaintiffs’briefs before this Court barely discuss the ground relied upon by the lower courts — that the plain meaning of “emergency circumstances” does not encompass a court order that was “entirely predictable” in light of the parties’ litigation history. 518 F. 3d, at 681. Instead, plaintiffs contend that the CEQ’s actions violated the separation of powers by readjudicating a factual issue already decided by an Article III court. Moreover, they assert that the CEQ’s interpretations of NEPA are not entitled to deference because the CEQ has not been given statutory authority to conduct adjudications.

The District Court and the Ninth Circuit also held that when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a. “possibility” of irreparable harm. Id., at 696-697; 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118 (quoting Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F. 3d 891, 906 (CA9 2007); Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 442 F. 3d 1147,1159 (CA9 2006)). The lower courts held that plaintiffs had met this standard because the scientific studies, declarations, and other evidence in the record established to “a near certainty” that the Navy’s training exercises would cause irreparable harm to the environment. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118.

The Navy challenges these holdings, arguing that plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury— not just a possibility — in order to obtain preliminary relief. On the facts of this case, the Navy contends that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are too speculative to give rise to irreparable injury, given that ever since the Navy’s training program began 40 years ago, there has been no documented case of sonar-related injury to marine mammals in SOCAL. And even if MFA sonar does cause a limited number of injuries to individual marine mammals, the Navy asserts that plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of species-level harm that *22would adversely affect their scientific, recreational, and ecological interests. For their part, plaintiffs assert that they would prevail under any formulation of the irreparable injury standard, because the District Court found that they had established a “near certainty” of irreparable harm.

We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” standard is too lenient. Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 103 (1983); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U. S. 423, 441 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 502 (1974); see also 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.1, p. 139 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (applicant must demonstrate that in the absence of a preliminary injunction, “the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered”); id., at 154-155 (“[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury”). Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam).

It is not clear that articulating the incorrect standard affected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of irreparable harm. Although the court referred to the “possibility” standard, and cited Circuit precedent along the same lines, it affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs had established a “ ‘near certainty’ ” of irreparable harm. 518 F. 3d, at 696-697. At the same time, however, the nature of the District Court’s conclusion is itself unclear. The District Court originally found irreparable harm from sonar-training exercises generally. But by the time of the District Court’s final decision, the Navy challenged only two of six restrictions *23imposed by the court. See supra, at 17-19. The District Court did not reconsider the likelihood of irreparable harm in light of the four restrictions not challenged by the Navy. This failure is significant in light of the District Court’s own statement that the 12 nautical mile exclusion zone from the coastline — one of the unchallenged mitigation restrictions— “would bar the use of MFA sonar in a significant portion of important marine mammal habitat.” 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119.

We also find it pertinent that this is not a case in which the defendant is conducting a new type of activity with completely unknown effects on the environment. When the Government conducts an activity, “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 350 (1989). Instead, NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to “ensur[e] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.” Id., at 349. Part of the harm NEPA attempts to prevent in requiring an EIS is that, without one, there may be little if any information about prospective environmental harms and potential mitigating measures. Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin — or substantially restrict — training exercises that have been taking place in SOCAL for the last 40 years. And the latest series of exercises were not approved until after the defendant took a “hard look at environmental consequences,” id., at 350 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976); internal quotation marks omitted), as evidenced by the issuance of a detailed, 293-page EA.

As explained in the next section, even if plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. A proper consideration of these factors alone requires denial of the requested injunctive relief. For the same reason, we *24do not address the lower courts’ holding that plaintiffs have also established a likelihood of success on the merits.

B

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Munaf, 553 U. S., at 689-690. In each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., at 542. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 312; see also Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941). In this case, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises, and the injunction’s consequent adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.

This case involves “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force,” which are “essentially professional military judgments.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973). We “give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986). As the Court emphasized just last Term, “neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 797 (2008).

Here, the record contains declarations from some of the Navy’s most senior officers, all of whom underscored the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training to counter this threat. Admiral Gary *25Roughead — the Chief of Naval Operations — stated that during training exercises:

“It is important to stress the ship crews in all dimensions of warfare simultaneously. If one of these training elements were impacted — for example, if effective sonar training were not possible — the training value of the other elements would also be degraded . . . .” Pet. App. 342a.

Captain Martin May — the Third Fleet’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Readiness — emphasized that the use of MFA sonar is “mission-critical.” App. 570-571. He described the ability to operate MFA sonar as a “highly perishable skill” that must be repeatedly practiced under realistic conditions. Id., at 577. During training exercises, MFA sonar operators learn how to avoid sound-reducing “clutter” from ocean floor topography and environmental conditions; they also learn how to avoid interference and how to coordinate their efforts with other sonar operators in the strike group. Id., at 574. Several Navy officers emphasized that realistic training cannot be accomplished under the two challenged restrictions imposed by the District Court — the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the requirement that the Navy power down its sonar systems during significant surface ducting conditions. See, e. g., Pet. App. 333a (powering down in presence of surface ducting “unreasonably prevent[s] realistic training”); id., at 356a (shutdown zone would “result in a significant, adverse impact to realistic training”). We accept these officers’ assertions that the use of MFA sonar under realistic conditions during training exercises is of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation.

These interests must be weighed against the possible harm to the ecological, scientific, and recreational interests that are legitimately before this Court. Plaintiffs have submitted declarations asserting that they take whale watching trips, observe marine mammals underwater, conduct scien*26tifie research on marine mammals, and photograph these animals in their natural habitats. Plaintiffs contend that the Navy’s use of MFA sonar will injure marine mammals or alter their behavioral patterns, impairing plaintiffs’ ability to study and observe the animals.

While we do not question the seriousness of these interests, we conclude that the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest in this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy. For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and observe. In contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet. Active sonar is the only reliable technology for detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines, and the President— the Commander in Chief — has determined that training with active sonar is “essential to national security.” Id., at 232a.

The public interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions plainly outweighs the interests advanced by the plaintiffs. Of course, military interests do not always trump other considerations, and we have not held that they do. In this case, however, the proper determination of where the public interest lies does not strike us as a close question.

C

Despite the importance of assessing the balance of equities and the public interest in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the District Court addressed these considerations in only a cursory fashion. The court’s entire discussion of these factors consisted of one (albeit lengthy) sentence: “The Court is also satisfied that the balance of hardships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur if prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation *27measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for a limited period.” Id., at 217a-218a. As the prior Ninth Circuit panel in this case put it, in staying the District Court’s original preliminary injunction, “[t]he district court did not give serious consideration to the public interest factor.” 502 F. 3d, at 863. The District Court’s order on remand did nothing to cure this defect, but simply repeated nearly verbatim the same sentence from its previous order. Compare 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118, with Pet. App. 217a-218a. The subsequent Ninth Circuit panel framed its opinion as reviewing the District Court’s exercise of discretion, 518 F. 3d, at 697-699, but that discretion was barely exercised here.

The Court of Appeals held that the balance of equities and the public interest favored the plaintiffs, largely based on its view that the preliminary injunction would not in fact impose a significant burden on. the Navy’s ability to conduct its training exercises and certify its strike groups. Id., at 698-699. The court deemed the Navy’s concerns about the preliminary injunction “speculative” because the Navy had not operated under similar procedures before. Ibid. But this is almost always the case when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to alter a defendant’s conduct. The lower courts failed properly to defer to .senior Navy officers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s SOCAL training exercises. See Wright & Miller §2948.2, at 167-168 (“The policy against the imposition of judicial restraints prior to an adjudication of the merits becomes more significant when there is reason to believe that the decree will be burdensome”).

The preliminary injunction requires the Navy to shut down its MFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because sightings of marine mammals *28during training exercises are relatively rare. But regardless of the frequency of marine mammal sightings, the injunction will greatly increase the size of the shutdown zone. Pursuant to its exemption from the MMPA, the Navy agreed to reduce the power of its MFA sonar at 1,000 yards and 500 yards, and to completely turn off the system at 200 yards. Pet. App. 222a-230a. The District Court’s injunction does not include a graduated power-down, instead requiring a total shutdown of MFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. There is an exponential relationship between radius length and surface area (Area = % r2). Increasing the radius of the shutdown zone from 200 to 2,200 yards would accordingly expand the surface area of the shutdown zone by a factor of over 100 (from 125,664 square yards to 15,205,308 square yards).

The lower courts did not give sufficient weight to the views of several top Navy officers, who emphasized that because training scenarios can take several days to develop, each additional shutdown can result in the loss of several days’ worth of training. Id., at 344a. Limiting the number of sonar shutdowns is particularly important during the Joint Tactical Force Exercises, which usually last for less than two weeks. Ibid. Rear Admiral John Bird explained that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would cause operational commanders to “lose awareness of the tactical situation through the constant stopping and starting of MFA [sonar].” Id., at 332a; see also id., at 356a (“It may take days to get to the pivotal attack in antisubmarine warfare, but only minutes to confound the results upon which certification is based”). Even if there is a low likelihood of a marine mammal sighting, the preliminary injunction would clearly increase the number of disruptive sonar shutdowns the Navy is forced to perform during its SOCAL training exercises.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because the Navy had shut down MFA sonar 27 times during its eight *29prior training exercises in SOCAL; in several of these cases, the Navy turned off its sonar when marine mammals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self-imposed 200-yard shutdown zone. 518 F. 3d, at 700, n. 65. Vice Admiral Samuel Locklear III — the Commander of the Navy’s Third Fleet— stated that any shutdowns beyond the 200-yard zone were voluntary avoidance measures that likely took place at tactically insignificant times; the Ninth Circuit discounted this explanation as not supported by the record. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals ignored key portions of Vice Admiral Locklear’s declaration, in which he stated unequivocally that commanding officers “would not shut down sonar until legally required to do so if in contact with a submarine.” Pet. App. 354a-355a. Similarly, if a commanding officer is in contact with a target submarine, “the CO will be expected to continue to use active sonar unless another ship or helicopter can gain contact or if regulatory reasons dictate otherwise.” Id., at 355a. The record supports the Navy’s contention that its shutdowns of MFA sonar during prior training exercises only occurred during tactically insignificant times; those voluntary shutdowns do not justify the District Court’s imposition of a mandatory 2,200-yard shutdown zone.

Lastly, the Ninth Circuit stated that a 2,200-yard shutdown zone was feasible because the Navy had previously adopted a 2,000-meter zone for low-frequency active (LFA) sonar. The Court of Appeals failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that LFA sonar is used for long-range detection of enemy submarines, and thus its use and shutdown involve tactical considerations quite different from those associated with MFA sonar. See App. 508 (noting that equating MFA sonar with LFA sonar “is completely misleading and is like comparing 20 degrees Fahrenheit to 20 degrees Celsius”).

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Navy’s training exercises would not be significantly affected by the requirement that it power down MFA sonar by 6 dB during *30significant surface ducting conditions. Again, we think the Ninth Circuit understated the burden this requirement would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises.

Surface ducting is a phenomenon in which relatively little sound energy penetrates beyond a narrow layer near the surface of the water. When surface ducting occurs, active sonar becomes more useful near the surface but less useful at greater depths. Pet. App. 299a-300a. Diesel-electric submariners are trained to take advantage of these distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. Id., at 333a.

The Ninth Circuit determined that the power-down requirement during surface ducting conditions was unlikely to affect certification of the Navy’s strike groups because surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and the Navy has previously certified strike groups that did not train under such conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701-702. This reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting is both rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy to be able to train under these conditions when they occur. Rear Admiral Bird explained that the 6 dB power-down requirement makes the training less valuable because it “exposes [sonar operators] to unrealistically lower levels of mutual interference caused by multiple sonar systems operating together by the ships within the Strike Group.” Pet. App. 281a (footnote and some capitalization omitted). Although a 6 dB reduction may not seem terribly significant, decibels are measured on a logarithmic scale, so a 6 dB decrease in power equates to a 75% reduction. Id., at 284a-285a.

The District Court acknowledged that “ ‘the imposition of these mitigation measures will require the Navy to alter and adapt the way it conducts antisubmarine warfare training — a substantial challenge. Nevertheless, evidence presented to the Court reflects that the Navy has employed mitigation measures in the past, without sacrificing training *31objectives.’ ” 527 F. Supp. 2d, at 1238. Apparently no good deed goes unpunished. The fact that the Navy has taken measures in the past to address concerns about marine mammals — or, for that matter, has elected not to challenge four additional restrictions imposed by the District Court in this case, see supra, at 17-19 — hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictions pose no threat to preparedness for war.

The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by stating that “the Navy may return to the district court to request relief on an emergency basis” if the preliminary injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train and certify sufficient naval forces to provide for the national defense.” 518 F. 3d, at 703. This is cold comfort to the Navy. The Navy contends that the injunction will hinder efforts to train sonar operators under realistic conditions, ultimately leaving strike groups more vulnerable to enemy submarines. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we do not think the Navy is required to wait until the injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train ... sufficient naval forces to provide for the national defense” before seeking its dissolution. By then it may be too late.

IV

As noted above, we do not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims. While we have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, see Munaf, 553 U. S., at 691-692, doing so is not necessary here. In addition, reaching the merits is complicated by the fact that the lower courts addressed only one of several issues raised, and plaintiffs have largely chosen not to defend the decision below on that ground.5

*32At the same time, what we have said makes clear that it would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction, after final decision on the merits, along the same lines as the preliminary injunction. An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 313 (“[A] federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law”).

The factors examined above — the balance of equities and consideration of the public interest — are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or permanent. See Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., at 546, n. 12 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success”). Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such *33training in a manner credibly alleged to pose a serious threat to national security. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the training has been going on for 40 years with no documented episode of harm to a marine mammal. A court concluding that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS has many remedial tools at its disposal, including declaratory relief or an injunction tailored to the preparation of an EIS rather than the Navy’s training in the interim. See, e. g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction”). In the meantime, we see no basis for jeopardizing national security, as the present injunction does. Plaintiffs confirmed at oral argument that the preliminary injunction was “the whole ball game,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, and our analysis of the propriety of preliminary relief is applicable to any permanent injunction as well.

* Hi

President Theodore Roosevelt explained that “the only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all the conditions which would have to be met if war existed.” President’s Annual Message, 42 Cong. Rec. 81 (1907). We do not discount the importance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals. Those interests, however, are plainly outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines. The District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200-yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power down its MPA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the preliminary injunction is vacated to the extent it has been challenged by the Navy.

It is so ordered.

1

In contrast, passive sonar “listens” for sound waves but does not introduce sound into the water. Passive sonar is not effective for tracking diesel-electric submarines because those vessels can operate almost silently. Passive sonar also has a more limited range than active sonar, and cannot identify the exact location of an enemy submarine. Pet. App. 266a-271a.

2

The CZMA states that federal agencies taking actions “that affec[t] any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone” shall carry out these activities “in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.” 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(1)(A).

3

That provision states in full: ‘Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.”

4

The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success was limited to their NEPA claims. The court did not discuss claims under the CZMA or ESA.

5

The bulk of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is devoted to the merits. For the reasons stated, we find the injunctive relief granted in this case an abuse of discretion, even if plaintiffs are correct on the underlying merits. As to the injunction, the dissent barely mentions the Navy’s in*32terests. Post, at 53. We find that those interests, and the documented risks to national security, clearly outweigh the harm on the other side of the balance.

We agree with much of Justice Breyer's analysis, post, at 36-41 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), but disagree with his conclusion that the modified conditions imposed by the stay order should remain in force until the Navy completes its EIS, post, at 42-43. The Court is reviewing the District Court’s imposition of the preliminary injunction; once we conclude, as Justice Breyer does, post, at 41, that the preliminary injunction should be vacated, the stay order is no longer pertinent. A stay is a useful tool for managing the impact of injunctive relief pending further appeal, but once the Court resolves the merits of the appeal, the stay ceases to be relevant. See 518 F. 3d 704, 706 (CA9 2008) (“[T]he partial stay... shall remain in effect until final disposition by the Supreme Court”). Unexamined conditions imposed by the stay order are certainly no basis for what would be in effect the entry of a new preliminary injunction by this Court.

*34Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Stevens joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

As of December 2006, the United States Navy planned to engage in a series of 14 antisubmarine warfare training exercises off the southern California coast. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and others (NRDC) brought this case in Federal District Court claiming that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires the Navy to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) (assessing the impact of the exercises on marine mammals) prior to its engaging in the exercise's. As the case reaches us, the District Court has found that the NRDC will likely prevail on its demand for an EIS; the Navy has agreed to prepare an EIS; the District Court has forbidden the Navy to proceed with the exercises unless it adopts six mitigating measures; and the Navy has agreed to adopt all but two of those measures.

The controversy between the parties now concerns the two measures that the Navy is unwilling to adopt. The first concerns the “shutdown zone,” a circle with a ship at the center within which the Navy must try to spot marine mammals and shut down its sonar if one is found. The controverted condition would enlarge the radius of that circle from about one-tenth of a mile (200 yards) to one and one-quarter miles (2,200 yards). The second, concerns special ocean conditions called “surface ducting conditions.” The controverted condition would require the Navy, when it encounters any such condition, to diminish the sonar’s power by 75%. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court order that contained these two conditions. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (CA9 2008).

I

We must now decide whether the District Court was legally correct in forbidding the training exercises unless the Navy implemented the two controverted conditions. In *35doing so, I assume, like the Court, that the NRDC will prevail on its demand for an EIS. (Indeed, the Navy is in the process of preparing one.) And, I would ask whether, in imposing these conditions, the District Court properly “balance[d the] harms.” See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987).

Respondents’ (the plaintiffs) argument favoring the District Court injunction is a strong one. As Justice Ginsburg well points out, see post, at 47-48 (dissenting opinion), the very point of NEPA’s insistence upon the writing of an EIS is to force an agency “carefully” to “consider ... detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts,” while “giv[ing] the public the assurance that the agency ‘has indeed considered- environmental concerns in its decision-making process.’” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 349 (1989). NEPA seeks to assure that when Government officials consider taking action that may affect the environment, they do so fully aware of the relevant environmental considerations. An EIS does not force them to make any particular decision, but it does lead them to take environmental considerations into account when they decide whether, or how, to act. Id., at 354. Thus, when a decision to which EIS obligations attach is made without the informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, much of the harm that NEPA seeks to prevent has already taken place. In this case, for example, the absence of an injunction means that the Navy will proceed with its exercises in the absence of the fuller consideration of environmental effects that an EIS is intended to bring. The absence of an injunction thereby threatens to cause the very environmental harm that a full preaction EIS might have led the Navy to avoid (say, by adopting the two additional mitigation measures that the NRDC proposes). Consequently, if the exercises are to continue, conditions designed to mitigate interim environmental harm may well be appropriate.

*36On the other hand, several features of this case lead me to conclude that the record, as now before us, lacks adequate support for an injunction imposing the two controverted requirements. First, the evidence of need for the two special conditions is weak or uncertain. The record does show that the exercises as the Navy originally proposed them could harm marine mammals. The District Court found (based on the Navy’s study of the matter) that the exercises might cause 466 instances of Level A harm and 170,000 instances of Level B harm. App. to Pet. for Cert. 196a-197a. (The environmental assessment actually predicted 564 instances of Level A harm. See App. 223-224.) The study defines Level A injury as “any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild” through “destruction or loss of biological tissue,” whether “slight to severe.” Id., at 160. It defines Level B harm as “ ‘any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal... by causing disruption of natural behavioral patterns including, but not limited to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering to a point where such behaviors are abandoned or significantly altered’ ” and describes it as a “short term” and “temporary” “disturbance.” Id., at 161, 175.

The raw numbers seem large. But the parties argue about the extent to which they mean likely harm. The Navy says the classifications and estimates err on the side of caution. (When in doubt about the amount of harm to a mammal, the study assumed the harm would qualify as Level A harassment. Id., at 200.) The Navy also points out that, by definition, mammals recover from Level B injuries, often very quickly. It notes that, despite 40 years of naval exercises off the southern California coast, no injured marine mammal has ever been found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 274a-275a. (It adds that dolphins often swim alongside the ships. Id., at 290a, 346a.) At the same time, plaintiffs point to instances where whales have been found stranded. They add *37that scientific studies have found a connection between those beachings and the Navy’s use of sonar, see, e. g., App. 600-602, and the Navy has acknowledged one stranding where “U. S. Navy mid-frequency sonar has been identified as the most plausible contributory source to the stranding event,” id., at 168.

Given the uncertainty the figures create in respect to the harm caused by the Navy’s original training plans, it would seem important to have before us at least some estimate of the harm likely avoided by the Navy’s decision not to contest here four of the six mitigating conditions that the District Court ordered. Without such evidence, it is difficult to assess the relevant harm — that is, the environmental harm likely caused by the Navy’s exercises with the four uncontested mitigation-measures (but without the two contested mitigation measures) in place.

Second, the Navy has filed multiple affidavits from Navy officials explaining in detail the seriousness of the harm that the delay associated with completion of this EIS (approximately one year) would create in respect to the Navy’s ability to maintain an adequate national defense. See generally App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a-357a. Taken by themselves, those affidavits make a strong case for the proposition that insistence upon the two additional mitigating conditions would seriously interfere with necessary defense training.

The affidavits explain the importance of training in antisubmarine warfare, id., at 263a; the need to use active sonar to detect enemy submarines, id., at 266a-267a, App. 566; the complexity of a training exercise involving sonar, App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the need for realistic conditions when training exercises take place, id., at 299a-300a, App. 566; the “cascading” negative “effect” that delay in one important aspect of a set of coordinated training exercises has upon the Navy’s ability “to provide combat ready forces,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the cost and disruption that would accompany the adoption of the two additional mitigating conditions that *38the NRDC seeks, ibid.; the Navy’s resulting inability adequately to train personnel, id., at 278a; the effectiveness of the mammal-protecting measures that the Navy has taken in the past, id., at 285a-298a; and the reasonable likelihood that the mitigating conditions to which it has agreed will prove adequate, id., at 296a.

Third, and particularly important in my view, the District Court did not explain why it rejected the Navy’s affidavit-supported contentions. In its first opinion enjoining the use of sonar, the District Court simply stated:

“The Court is ... satisfied that the balance of hardships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur if prevented from using [mid-frequency active (MFA)] sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for a limited period.” Id., at 217a-218a.

Following remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court simply repeated, word for word, this same statement. It said:

“The Court is ... satisfied that the balance of hardships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur (or the public interest would suffer) if Defendants were prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for a limited period.” 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (CD Cal. 2008).

With respect to the imposition of the 2,200-yard shutdown zone, the District Court noted evidence of the harm that MFA sonar poses to marine mammals, and then concluded that “[t]he Court therefore is persuaded that while the 2200 yard shutdown requirement may protect marine mammals *39from the harshest of sonar-related consequences, it represents a minimal imposition [on] the Navy’s training exercises.” Id., at 1119. The District Court did not there explain the basis for that conclusion. With respect to the imposition of the surface ducting condition, the District Court said nothing about the Navy’s interests at all. Id., at 1120-1121.

While a district court is often free simply to state its conclusion in summary fashion, in this instance neither that conclusion, nor anything else I have found in the District Court’s opinion, answers the Navy’s documented claims that the two extra conditions the District Court imposed will, in effect, seriously interfere with its ability to carry out necessary training exercises.

The first condition requires the Navy to reduce the power of its sonar equipment by 75% when the ship encounters a condition called “surface ducting” that occurs when the presence of layers of water of different temperature make it unusually difficult for sonar operators to determine whether a diesel submarine is hiding below. Rear Admiral John Bird, an expert in submarine warfare, made clear that the 75% power-reduction requirement was equivalent to forbidding any related training. App. to Pet. for Cert. 297a. But he says in paragraph 52 of his declaration: “Training in surface ducting conditions is critical to effective training because sonar operators need to learn how sonar transmissions are altered due to surface ducting and how submarines may take advantage of them.” Id., at 299a-300a. The District Court, as far as I can tell, did not even acknowledge in its opinion the Navy’s asserted interest in being able to train under these conditions. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1120-1121.

The second condition requires the Navy to expand the sonar “shutdown” area surrounding a ship (i e., turn off the sonar if a mammal is spotted in the area) from a circle with a radius of about one-tenth of a mile to a circle with a radius of about one mile and a quarter. Both sides agree that this *40requirement will lead to more shutdowns. Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, states in paragraph 12 of his declaration that this expanded zone requirement “will result in increased interruptions to training exercises, . . . vastly increasing] the risk of negating training effectiveness, preventing strike group certification, and disrupting carefully orchestrated deployment plans to meet world-wide operational commitments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 344a. Again, I can find nothing in the District Court’s opinion that specifically explains why this is not so. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119-1120.

Fourth, the Court of Appeals sought, through its own thorough examination of the record, to supply the missing explanations. But those explanations are not sufficient. In respect to the surface ducting conditions, the Court of Appeals rejected the Navy’s contentions on the ground that those conditions are “rar[e],” and the Navy has certified trainings that did not involve any encounter with those conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701-702. I am not certain, however, why the rarity of the condition supports the District Court’s conclusion. Rarity argues as strongly for training when the condition is encountered as it argues for the contrary.

In respect to the expansion of the “shutdown” area, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) the Navy in earlier exercises had shut down its sonar when marine mammals were sited within about one-half a mile, (2) the Navy has used a larger shutdown area when engaged in exercises with lower frequency sonar equipment, and (3) foreign navies have used larger shutdown areas. Id., at 699-701, and nn. 63, 67. But the Navy’s affidavits state that (1) earlier shutdowns when marine mammals were spotted at farther distances “likely occurred during tactically insignificant times,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 356a, (2) ships with low frequency sonar (unlike the sonar here at issue) have equipment that makes it easier to monitor the larger area, particularly by significantly reducing the number of monitoring personnel necessarily involved, and (3) foreign navy experience is not relevant given the *41potentially different military demands upon those navies, App. 508-509.

Finally, the Court of Appeals, mirroring a similar District Court suggestion in the language I have quoted, says that “the exercises in southern California are only a subset of the Navy’s training activities involving active sonar.” 518 F. 3d, at 702. It adds that the Navy’s study “shows the Navy is still able to conduct its exercises in alternative locations, in reduced number, or through simulation.” Ibid., n. 69. The Court of Appeals, however, also concluded that the study “provides reasonably detailed justifications for why the Southern California Operating Area is uniquely suited to these exercises, and demonstrates that the Navy would suffer a certain hardship if the considered alternatives were employed instead.” Ibid.

Fifth, when the Court of Appeals first heard this case following the District Court’s imposition of a broad, absolute injunction, it held that any injunction must be crafted so that the Navy could continue its training exercises. Noting that the Navy had, in the past, been able to use mitigation measures to “reduce the harmful effects of its active sonar,” it “vacate[d] the stay and remand[ed] this matter to the district court to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 508 F. 3d 885, 887 (CA9 2007) (emphasis added). For the reasons just stated, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has explained why we should reject the Navy’s assertions that it cannot effectively conduct its training exercises under the mitigation conditions imposed by the District Court.

I would thus vacate the preliminary injunction imposed by the District Court to the extent it has been challenged by the Navy. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has adequately explained its conclusion that the balance of the equities tips in favor of plaintiffs. Nor do those parts of the record to which the parties have pointed supply the missing explanation.

*42II

Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals held when it first considered this case, the Navy’s past use of mitigation conditions makes clear that the Navy can effectively train under some mitigation conditions. In the ordinary course, I would remand so the District Court could, pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ direction, set forth mitigation conditions that will protect the marine wildlife while also enabling the Navy to carry out its exercises. But, at this point, the Navy has informed us that this set of exercises will be complete by January, at the latest, and an EIS will likely be complete at that point, as well. Thus, by the time the District Court would have an opportunity to impose new conditions, the case could very well be moot.

In February of this year, the Court of Appeals stayed the injunction imposed by the District Court — but only pending this Court’s resolution of the case. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[i]n light of the short time before the Navy is to commence its next exercise, the importance of the Navy’s mission to provide for the national defense and the representation by the Chief of Naval Operations that the district court’s preliminary injunction in its current form will ‘unacceptably risk’ effective training and strike group certification and thereby interfere with his statutory responsibility ... to ‘organiz[e], train[], and equip[] the Navy,’” interim relief was appropriate, and the court then modified the two mitigation conditions at issue. 518 F. 3d 704, 705 (CA9 2008).

With respect to the 2,200-yard shutdown zone, it required the Navy to suspend its use of the sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards, except when sonar is being used at a “critical point in the exercise,” in which case the amount by which the Navy must power down is proportional to the mammal’s proximity to the sonar. Id., at 705-706 (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to surface ducting, the Navy is only required to shut down sonar alto*43gether when a marine mammal is detected within 500 meters and the amount by which it is otherwise required to power down is again proportional to the mammal’s proximity to the sonar source. Ibid. The court believed these conditions would permit the Navy to go forward with its imminently planned exercises while at the same time minimizing the harm to marine wildlife.

In my view, the modified conditions imposed by the Court of Appeals in its February stay order reflect the best equitable conditions that can be created in the short time available before the exercises are complete and the EIS is ready. The Navy has been training under these conditions since February, so allowing them to remain in place will, in effect, maintain what has become the status quo. Therefore, I would modify the Court of Appeals’ February 29, 2008, order so that the provisional conditions it contains remain in place until the Navy’s completion of an acceptable EIS.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting.

The central question in this action under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was whether the Navy must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). The Navy does not challenge its obligation to do so, and it represents that the EIS will be complete in January 2009 — one month after the instant exercises conclude. If the Navy had completed the EIS before taking action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public could have benefited from the environmental analysis — and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without interruption. Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus thwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve. To justify its course, the Navy sought dispensation not from Congress, but from an executive council that lacks authority to countermand or revise NEPA’s requirements. I would hold that, in imposing manageable measures to mitigate harm until completion of the *44EIS, the District Court conscientiously balanced the equities and did not abuse its discretion.

I

In December 2006, the Navy announced its intent to prepare an EIS to address the potential environmental effects of its naval readiness activities in the Southern California (SOCAL) Range Complex. See 71 Fed. Reg. 76639 (2006). These readiness activities include expansion and intensification of naval training, as well as research, development, and testing of various systems and weapons. Id., at 76639, 76640. The EIS process is underway, and the Navy represents that it will be complete in January 2009. Brief for Petitioners 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

In February 2007, seeking to commence training before completion of the EIS, the Navy prepared an environmental assessment (EA) for the 14 exercises it planned to undertake in the interim. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 235a.1 On February 12, the Navy concluded the EA with a finding of no significant impact. App. 225-226. The same day, the Navy commenced its training exercises. Id., at 227 (“The Proposed Action is hereby implemented.”).

On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Navy’s alleged violations of NEPA and other environmental statutes. As relevant here, the District Court determined that NRDC was likely to succeed on its NEPA claim and that equitable principles warranted preliminary relief. On August 7, 2007, the court *45enjoined the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar during the 11 remaining exercises at issue.

On August 31, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending disposition of the Navy’s appeal, and the Navy proceeded with two more exercises. In a November 13 order, the Court of Appeals vacated the stay, stating that NRDC had shown “a strong likelihood of success on the merits” and that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate. 508 F. 3d 885, 886 (2007). The Court of Appeals remanded, however, instructing the District Court to provide mitigation measures under which the Navy could conduct its remaining exercises.

On remand, the District Court received briefing from both parties. In addition, the court “toured the USS Milius at the naval base in San Diego, California, to improve its understanding of the Navy’s sonar training procedures and the feasibility of the parties’ proposed mitigation measures. Counsel for both [parties] were present.” 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1112 (2008). On January 3, 2008, the District Court entered a modified preliminary injunction imposing six mitigation measures. The court revised the modified injunction slightly on January 10 in response to filings by the Navy, and four days later, denied the Navy’s application for a stay pending appeal.

On the following day, January 15, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an advisory body within the Executive Office of the President, responded to the Navy’s request for “alternative arrangements” for NEPA compliance. App. to Pet. for Cert. 233a. The “arrangements” CEQ set out purported to permit the Navy to continue its training without timely environmental review. Id., at 241a-247a. The Navy accepted the arrangements on the same day. App. 228.

The Navy then filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals requesting immediate vacatur of the District Court’s modified injunction. CEQ’s action, the Navy urged, *46eliminated the injunction’s legal foundation. In the alternative, the Navy sought a stay of two aspects of the injunction pending its appeal: the 2,200-yard mandatory shutdown zone and the power-down requirement in significant surface ducting conditions, see ante, at 17-18 (opinion of the Court). While targeting in its stay application only two of the six measures imposed by the District Court, the Navy explicitly reserved the right to challenge on appeal each of the six mitigation measures. Responding to the Navy’s emergency motion, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to allow the District Court to determine in the first instance the effect of the intervening executive action. Pending its own consideration of the Navy’s motion, the District Court stayed the injunction, and the Navy conducted its sixth exercise.

On February 4, after briefing and oral argument, the District Court denied the Navy’s motion. The Navy appealed, reiterating its position that CEQ’s action eliminated all justification for the injunction. The Navy also argued that vacatur of the entire injunction was required irrespective of CEQ’s action, in part because the “conditions imposed, in particular the 2,200 yard mandatory shutdown zone and the six decibel (75%) power-down in significant surface ducting conditions, severely degrade the Navy’s training.” Brief for Appellants in No. 08-55054 (CA9), p. 15. In the February 29 decision now under review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (2008). The Navy has continued training in the meantime and plans to complete its final exercise in December 2008.

As the procedural history indicates, the courts below determined that an EIS was required for the 14 exercises. The Navy does not challenge that decision in this Court. Instead, the Navy defends its failure to complete an EIS before launching the exercises based upon CEQ’s “alternative arrangements” — arrangements the Navy sought and obtained in order to overcome the lower courts’ rulings. As *47explained below, the Navy’s actions undermined NEPA and took an extraordinary course.

II

NEPA “promotes its sweeping commitment” to environmental integrity “by focusing Government and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360, 371 (1989). “By so focusing agency attention, NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct.” Ibid.

The EIS is NEPA’s core requirement. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757 (2004). This Court has characterized the requirement as “action-forcing.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Environmental concerns must be “integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking” and “interwoven into the fabric of agency planning.” Id., at 350-351. In addition to discussing potential consequences, an EIS must describe potential mitigation measures and alternatives to the proposed course of action. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 351-352 (1989) (citing 40 CFR §§ 1508.25(b), 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1505.2(c) (1987)). The EIS requirement “ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.” 490 U. S., at 349.

“Publication of an EIS . . . also serves a larger informational role.” Ibid. It demonstrates that an agency has indeed considered environmental concerns, and “perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard for public comment.” Ibid. At the same time, it affords other affected governmental bodies “notice of the expected consequences and the opportunity to plan and implement corrective measures in a timely manner.” Id., at 350.

*48In light of these objectives, the timing of an EIS is critical. CEQ regulations instruct agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values.” 40 CFR § 1501.2 (1987). An EIS must be prepared “early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.” Andrus, 442 U. S., at 351-352, n. 3 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 55995 (1978) (codified in 40 CFR § 1502.5 (1979))).

The Navy’s publication of its EIS in this case, scheduled to occur after the 14 exercises are completed, defeats NEPA’s informational and participatory purposes. The Navy’s inverted timing, it bears emphasis, is the very reason why the District Court had to confront the question of mitigation measures at all. Had the Navy prepared a legally sufficient EIS before beginning the SOCAL exercises, NEPA would have functioned as its drafters intended: The EIS process and associated public input might have convinced the Navy voluntarily to adopt mitigation measures, but NEPA itself would not have impeded the Navy’s exercises. See Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 756, 769, n. 2 (noting that NEPA does not mandate particular results, but rather establishes procedural requirements with a “focus on improving agency decisionmaking”).

The Navy had other options. Most importantly, it could have requested assistance from Congress. The Government has sometimes obtained congressional authorization to proceed with planned activities without fulfilling NEPA’s requirements. See, e.g., Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 106-398, §317, 114 Stat. 1654A-57 (exempting the military from preparing a programmatic EIS for low-level flight training); 42 U. S. C. § 10141(c) (2000 ed.) (exempting the Environmental Protection Agency from preparing an EIS for the development of criteria for handling spent nuclear fuel and high-*49level radioactive waste); 43 U. S. C. § 1652(d) (exempting construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline from further NEPA compliance).

Rather than resorting to Congress, the Navy “sought relief from the Executive Branch.” Ante, at 18 (opinion of the Court). On January 10, 2008, the Navy asked CEQ, adviser to the President, to approve alternative arrangements for NEPA compliance pursuant to 40 CFR §1506.11 (1987). App. to Pet. for Cert. 233a; see ante, at 18, n. 3. The next day, the Navy submitted supplementary material to CEQ, including the Navy’s EA and after-action reports, the District Court’s orders, and two analyses by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). App. to Pet. for Cert. 237a-238a. Neither the Navy nor CEQ notified NRDC, and CEQ did not request or consider any of the materials underlying the District Court orders it addressed.

Four days later, on January 15, the Chairman of CEQ issued a letter to the Secretary of the Navy. Repeating the Navy’s submissions with little independent analysis, the letter stated that the District Court’s orders posed risks to the Navy’s training exercises. See id., at 238a (“You have explained that the training restrictions set forth in the . . . injunctive orders prevent the Navy from providing Strike Groups with adequate proficiency training and create a substantial risk of precluding certification of the Strike Groups as combat ready.”).

The letter continued:

“Discussions between our staffs, your letter and supporting documents, and the classified declaration and briefings I have received, have clearly determined that the Navy cannot ensure the necessary training to certify strike groups for deployment under the terms of the injunctive orders. Based on the record supporting your request . . . CEQ has concluded that the Navy must be able to conduct the [exercises] ... in a timeframe that does not provide sufficient .time to complete an EIS. *50Therefore, emergency circumstances are present for the nine exercises and alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA under CEQ regulation 40 C. F. R. § 1506.11 are warranted.” Id., at 240a.

The alternative arrangements CEQ set forth do not vindicate NEPA’s objectives. The arrangements provide for “public participation measures,” which require the Navy to provide notices of the alternative arrangements. Id., at 241a, 242a. The notices must “seek input on the process for reviewing post-exercise assessments” and “include an offer to meet jointly with Navy representatives . . . and CEQ to discuss the alternative arrangements.” Id., at 242a-243a. The alternative arrangements also describe the Navy’s existing research and mitigation efforts. Id., at 243a-247a.

CEQ’s hasty decision on a one-sided record is no substitute for the District Court’s considered judgment based on a two-sided record.2 More fundamentally, even an exemplary CEQ review could not have effected the short circuit the Navy sought. CEQ lacks authority to absolve an agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS. NEPA established CEQ to assist and advise the President on environmental policy, 42 U. S. C. § 4342, and a 1977 Executive Order charged CEQ with issuing regulations to federal agencies for implementation of NEPA’s procedural provisions, Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 123 (1977 Comp.). This Court has recognized that CEQ’s regulations are entitled to “substantial deference,” Robertson, 490 U. S., at 355, and 40 CFR § 1506.11 indicates that CEQ may play an important consultative role in emergency circumstances, but we have never suggested that CEQ could eliminate the statute’s command. If the *51Navy sought to avoid its NEPA obligations, its remedy lay in the Legislative Branch. The Navy’s alternative course— rapid, self-serving resort to an office in the White House — is surely not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.” 42U.S.C. §4332.3

Ill

A

Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction. “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944)). Consistent with equity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants uniformly show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury before awarding equitable relief. Instead, courts have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a “sliding scale,” sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very high. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3, p. 195 (2d ed. 1995). This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.

Equity’s flexibility is important in the NEPA context. Because an EIS is the tool for uncovering environmental harm, environmental plaintiffs may often rely more heavily on their probability of success than the likelihood of harm. The Court is correct that relief is not warranted “simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury.” Ante, *52at 22 (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, §2948.1, at 155). “However, the injury need not have been inflicted when application is made or be certain to occur; a strong threat of irreparable injury before trial is an adequate basis.” Wright & Miller, supra, §2948.1, at 155-156 (footnote omitted). I agree with the District Court that NRDC made the required showing here.

B

The Navy’s own EA predicted substantial and irreparable harm to marine mammals. Sonar is linked to mass standings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around the brain and ears, acute spongiotic changes in the central nervous system, and lesions in vital organs. E. g., App. 600-602; id., at 360-362, 478-479. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the EA predicts that the Navy’s “use of MFA sonar in the SOCAL exercises will result in 564 instances of physical injury including permanent hearing loss (Level A harassment) and nearly 170,000 behavioral disturbances (Level B harassment), more than 8,000 of which would also involve temporary hearing loss.” 518 F. 3d, at 696; see App. 223-224. Within those totals,

“the EA predicts 436 Level A harassments of Cuvier’s beaked whales. According to [the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)], as few as 1,121 . . . may exist in California, Oregon and Washington combined. Likewise, the EA predicts 1,092 Level B harassments of bottlenose dolphins, of which only 5,271 may exist in the California Coastal and Offshore stocks.” 518 F. 3d, at 691-692.

The majority acknowledges the lower courts’ findings, ante, at 19, but also states that the EA predicted “only eight Level A harassments of common dolphins each year” and “274 Level B harassments of beaked whales per year, none of which would result in permanent injury,” ante, at 16. Those numbers do not fully capture the EA’s predictions.

*53The EA classified the harassments of beaked whales as Level A, not Level B. The EA does indeed state that “modeling predicts non-injurious Level B exposures.” App. 185. But, as the majority correctly notes, ante, at 16, the EA also states that “all beaked whale exposures are counted as Level A,” App. 185. The EA counted the predicted exposures as Level A “[b]y Navy policy developed in conjunction with NMFS.” Id., at 200. The record reflects “the known sensitivity of these species to tactical sonar,” id., at 365 (NO A A letter), and as the majority acknowledges, beaked whales are difficult to study, ante, at 16. Further, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “the EA . . . maintained that the methodology used was based on the ‘best available science.’” 518 F. 3d, at 669.4

In my view, this likely harm — 170,000 behavioral disturbances, including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss; and 564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries to a beaked whale population numbering only 1,121 — cannot be lightly dismissed, even in the face of an alleged risk to the effectiveness of the Navy’s 14 training exercises. There is no doubt that the training exercises serve critical interests. But those interests do not authorize the Navy to violate a statutory command, especially when recourse to the Legislature remains open. “Of course, military interests do not always trump other considerations, and we have not held that they do.” Ante, at 26.

In light of the likely, substantial harm to the environment, NRDC’s almost inevitable success on the merits of its claim *54that NEPA required the Navy to prepare an EIS, the history of this litigation, and the public interest, I cannot agree that the mitigation measures the District Court imposed signal an abuse of discretion. Cf. Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i. e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.”).

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

1

An EA is used “for determining whether to prepare” an EIS. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757 (2004) (quoting 40 CFR § 1508.9(a) (2003)); see ante, at 15-16 (opinion of the Court). By definition, an EA alone does not satisfy an agency’s obligation under NEPA if the effects of a proposed action require preparation of a full EIS.

2

The District Court may well have given too spare an explanation for the balance of hardships in issuing its injunction of August 7, 2007. The court cured any error in this regard, however, when it closely examined each mitigation measure in issuing the modified injunction of January 3, 2008. The Court of Appeals, too, conducted a detailed analysis of the record.

3

On the same day that CEQ issued its letter, the President granted the Navy an exemption from the requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) pursuant to 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2006 ed.). That exemption, expressly authorized by the CZMA, does not affect NRDC’s NEPA claim.

4

The majority reasons that the environmental harm deserves less weight because the training exercises “have been taking place in SOCAL for the last 40 years,” such that “this is not a ease in which the defendant is conducting a new type of activity with completely unknown effects on the environment.” Ante, at 23. But the EA explains that the proposed action is not a continuation of the “status quo training.” App. 128. Instead, the EA is based on the Navy’s proposal to employ a “surge” training strategy, ibid., in which the commander “would have the option to conduct two concurrent major range events,” id., at 124.

4.3.2.4 Notes on Winter v. NRDC 4.3.2.4 Notes on Winter v. NRDC

     1) What standard of law is applied in Winter to determine whether an injunction is proper?

     2) What facts did the Supreme Court find relevant to that standard?

     3) Can you explain how the Supreme Court analysis differs from the trial court and the court of appeals?

     4) What aspects of injunctive relief and equity practice does Justice Ginsberg stress in the excerpt from her dissent that is given here?

     5) Take note of the parties here. While those directly injured are the whales, the whales are not parties. The case was brought by an environmental public interest organization, litigating on behalf of the public interest. 

     6) What does this case tell you about the divided and distributed nature of power in the US government under the Constitiution? Put differently, how does it happen that a panel of civilian justices end up passing judgment on whether an important military exercise can proceed as planned? Note the power that the courts have over the executive branch of the federal government, even when sensitive military exercises are involved. While it is fair to say that the Supreme Court is highly deferential to the military's interest, it's also clear that the Court - and the military - take it for granted that the Court does have the power to stop the military from taking actions it considers important.

     7) Thinking back to our discussion about the western legal tradition and the importance of legal rules, ask yourself how the statute and the traditions of equity channel the Court's analysis. Is the Court free to simply substitute its judgment as to whether the exercises are desirable for that of the Navy, even under Justice Ginsberg's approach? From where does the power come for the Court to decide whether these exercises should be allowed to go forward?

 

4.3.3 Provisional Remedies - The Concept of Opportunity To Be Heard 4.3.3 Provisional Remedies - The Concept of Opportunity To Be Heard

4.3.3.1 Rule 64 – Seizing a Person or Property 4.3.3.1 Rule 64 – Seizing a Person or Property

(a) Remedies Under State Law—In General. At the commencement of and throughout an action, every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment. But a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.

(b) Specific Kinds of Remedies. The remedies available under this rule include the following—however designated and regardless of whether state procedure requires an independent action:

  •      arrest;
  •      attachment;
  •      garnishment;
  •      replevin;
  •      sequestration; and
  •      other corresponding or equivalent remedies.

4.3.3.2 Opportunity to be Heard 4.3.3.2 Opportunity to be Heard

     In some cases the attachment of property can come at the beginning of a case. In in rem and quasi-in-rem cases (more on this coming soon), the attachment of property establishes jurisdiction over the property. In in personam cases (more on this coming soon), property is sometimes attached at the outset so that a winning plaintiff can find assets in the jurisdiction to satisfy a judgment. Attaching property can have costs for the person whose property is attached. It may matter that the property cannot be moved, sold, or mortgaged. At the same time, it also can matter for the claimant. Property that is not secured may not be available for exercise of the judgment if no provisional remedy has held it in place

     This issue can arise when a creditor claims that a debtor has failed to pay as required. The legal structure of these kinds of claims can vary - in some cases, the lender retains title to an item that is being sold on installment payments; in other cases, title has passed to the buyer but the creditor retains a claim to reclaim the property if the debt is not paid. The issue can arise with garnishment of wages (where a creditor asks an employer to withhold a portion of an employee's paycheck to pay down the claimed debt). It can also arise when a tort claim is filed and the plaintiff wants to be sure that assets exist to satisfy a judgment.

     Procedures can vary for these kinds of provisional relief. There might be some kind of adversary hearing before the attachment is allowed. Alternatively, the person seeking the remedy might post a bond, or sign a sworn affidavit asserting their claim to the property. The attachment might proceed without any review at all, or, even if there is no contested hearing, it might be reviewed and acted upon by a judge before taking effect. In some cases, even when a seizure can take place with no hearing, the local rules call for a prompt post seizure hearing so the seizure can be contested quickly.

     The issue also arises when someone is a recipient of government benefits. In many cases, such benefits are the only support the individual has, and arbitrary deprivation of those rights without effective review by a government bureaucrat can be devastating. At the same time, the issue arises as to whether government administration can function efficiently if every government action is subject to an adversarial proceeding. When is it proper to take away or cancel benefits without first having some kind of notice and hearing?

     Federal Rule 64 provides the rule that applies to this. As you will see, Rule 64 is effectively a pass through provision - state law applies unless there is a federal statute that takes precedence.

     There also is a Constitutional dimension, and that is the concern of the cases that follow. The Constitutiona requires that property not be taken without "due process of law," and that raises the question as to what kind of process is due before property can be attached under a provisional remedy.

     In the years leading up to the cases that follow, the Supreme Court faced this issue relatively often. 

     In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the case involved wage garnishment before any judgment was issued. The employee whose wages were garnished had no opportunity under the statute to be heard before the garnishment took effect. In finding that the procedure violated due process, the Court noted the great importance of receiving expected wages for working families. A concurrence by Justin Harlan suggested that establishing "at least the probable validity of the underlying claim" should occur before the deprivation of property.

     In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the case involved replevin (taking back) of property without any hearing first, and even allowed the creditor to enter the home of the debtor to reclaim the property. The creditor was required to file a security bond, but the writ to reclaim the property could be granted by a clerk with no involvement by a judge. The Court held this procedure violated due process: 

We do not question the power of a State to seize goods before a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those creditors have tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing. The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation—not adjudication. Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however, it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test.

        407 U.S. at 96–97

     Some took Fuentes to mean that a prior hearing was required in all but exceptional circumstances. The Court soon seemed to back away from such a requirement, however, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1975), in which a Lousiana statute allowed attachment of property without a prior hearing but with judicial (not clerk) authorization and with an adversarial hearing available promptly  after the attachment took place. The Court found this met Due Process requirements. The same year, though, the Court invalidated a Georgia garnishment statute that allowed the writ to be issued without a hearing on conclusory allegations and without provisions for an immediate hearing. North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).

     The Court earlier reached the issue with regard to government benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This case involved welfare benefits without which the recipient had no means of support. The Court held that welfare benefits were a kind of property deserving Due Process protection. Given the importance of the benefits to the individuals receiving them, the Court held that the recipients were entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits. Otherwise, the Court found, "termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." 397 U.S. at 335. 

     Goldberg v. Kelly was a controversial decision. Some felt it provided much-needed protections to those dependent on government benefits so as to protect them from arbitrary bureaucrats. Others felt it encrusted bureaucratic decisions with an adversarial litigation process that was both resource intensive and unsuited to the task. Beyond that, the Court had experienced rather frequent involvement in deciding on a case by case basis whether benefits could be terminated or assets seized without a hearing, which to some degree conflicted with the Court's role of making broadly applicable law. 

     After a transitional period in which the Court (which was also undergoing significant changes in personnel) and lower courts struggled with where to go with the kind of rights recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court addressed the issue again in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The case involved a claim for benefits under Social Security. Social Security is a social insurance program operated by the federal government. Funded by payroll contributions from workers, it provides benefits to senior citizens of retirement age but also, among other things, provides benefits to workers who have become disabled and can no longer work. In Mathews, the claim was brought on behalf of a social security recipient whose benefits had been terminated upon an administrative finding that he no longer suffered from a disability that would prevent him from working. The recipient claimed that he was entitled to a hearing before benefits were cut off.

       The Court announced a test to be applied in future cases:

These decisions underscore the truism that “‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

     The Mathews v. Eldridge decision represented a resolution of the Court's position on the issue where governmental benefits were involved. One thing to note is that the Mathews v. Eldridge involves a balancing test that is highly dependent upon specific facts, and the Supreme Court generally grants certiorari in cases to announce rules of general application rather than to rebalance individual, fact-bound decisions. The net is that the burden on the Court to chart the way through this kind of issue was much reduced by the kind of test it announced in Mathews v. Eldridge. Thinking back to the distinction between rules, standards, principles, and catalogs, how would you characterize the Mathews v. Eldridge test?

     The issue did come up again in a setting where the deprivation was given effect by governmental action but on behalf of a private litigant. We turn now to that case.

4.3.3.3 Connecticut v. Doehr 4.3.3.3 Connecticut v. Doehr

501 U.S. 1 (1991)

CONNECTICUT ET AL.
v.
DOEHR.

No. 90-143.

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued January 7, 1991.
Decided June 6, 1991.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[4] Henry S. Cohn, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General, Arnold B. Feigin and Carolyn K. Querijero, Assistant Attorneys General, and Andrew M. Calamari.

Joanne S. Faulkner argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Brian Wolfman and Alan B. Morrison.[1]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and III of which are the opinion of the Court.[2]

This case requires us to determine whether a state statute that authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, and without a requirement that the person seeking the attachment post a bond, satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that, as applied to this case, it does not.

[5] I

On March 15, 1988, petitioner John F. DiGiovanni submitted an application to the Connecticut Superior Court for an attachment in the amount of $75,000 on respondent Brian K. Doehr's home in Meriden, Connecticut. DiGiovanni took this step in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr in the same court. The suit did not involve Doehr's real estate, nor did DiGiovanni have any pre-existing interest either in Doehr's home or any of his other property.

Connecticut law authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without affording prior notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing to the individual whose property is subject to the attachment. The State's prejudgment remedy statute provides, in relevant part:

"The court or a judge of the court may allow the prejudgment remedy to be issued by an attorney without hearing as provided in sections 52-278c and 52-278d upon verification by oath of the plaintiff or of some competent affiant, that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claims and (1) that the prejudgment remedy requested is for an attachment of real property . . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e (1991).[3]

[6] The statute does not require the plaintiff to post a bond to insure the payment of damages that the defendant may suffer should the attachment prove wrongfully issued or the claim prove unsuccessful.

As required, DiGiovanni submitted an affidavit in support of his application. In five one-sentence paragraphs, DiGiovanni stated that the facts set forth in his previously submitted complaint were true; that "I was willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted by the defendant, Brian K. Doehr"; that "[s]aid assault and battery broke my left wrist and further caused an ecchymosis to my right eye, as well as other injuries"; and that "I have further expended sums of money [7] for medical care and treatment." App. 24A. The affidavit concluded with the statement, "In my opinion, the foregoing facts are sufficient to show that there is probable cause that judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff." Ibid.

On the strength of these submissions the Superior Court Judge, by an order dated March 17, found "probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim" and ordered the attachment on Doehr's home "to the value of $75,000." The sheriff attached the property four days later, on March 21. Only after this did Doehr receive notice of the attachment. He also had yet to be served with the complaint, which is ordinarily necessary for an action to commence in Connecticut. Young v. Margiotta, 136 Conn. 429, 433, 71 A. 2d 924, 926 (1950). As the statute further required, the attachment notice informed Doehr that he had the right to a hearing: (1) to claim that no probable cause existed to sustain the claim; (2) to request that the attachment be vacated, modified, or dismissed or that a bond be substituted; or (3) to claim that some portion of the property was exempt from execution. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(b) (1991).

Rather than pursue these options, Doehr filed suit against DiGiovanni in Federal District Court, claiming that § 52-278e (a)(1) was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[4] The District Court upheld the statute and granted summary judgment in favor of DiGiovanni. Pinsky v. Duncan, 716 F. Supp. 58 (Conn. 1989). On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F. 2d 852 (1990).[5] Judge Pratt, who wrote the opinion [8] for the court, concluded that the Connecticut statute violated due process in permitting ex parte attachment absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. "The rule to be derived from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U. S. 337 (1969), and its progeny, therefore, is not that postattachment hearings are generally acceptable provided that plaintiff files a factual affidavit and that a judicial officer supervises the process, but that a prior hearing may be postponed where exceptional circumstances justify such a delay, and where sufficient additional safeguards are present." Id., at 855. This conclusion was deemed to be consistent with our decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974), because the absence of a preattachment hearing was approved in that case based on the presence of extraordinary circumstances.

A further reason to invalidate the statute, the court ruled, was the highly factual nature of the issues in this case. In Mitchell, there were "uncomplicated matters that len[t] themselves to documentary proof" and "[t]he nature of the issues at stake minimize[d] the risk that the writ [would] be wrongfully issued by a judge." Id., at 609-610. Similarly, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 343-344 (1976), where an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termination of disability benefits, the determination of disability was "sharply focused and easily documented." Judge Pratt observed that in contrast the present case involved the fact-specific event of a fist fight and the issue of assault. He doubted that the judge could reliably determine probable cause when presented with only the plaintiff's version of the altercation. "Because the risk of a wrongful attachment is considerable under these circumstances, we conclude that dispensing with notice and opportunity for a hearing until after the attachment, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, violates the requirements of due process." 898 F. 2d, at 856. Judge Pratt went on to conclude that in his view, the statute was also constitutionally infirm for its failure [9] to require the plaintiff to post a bond for the protection of the defendant in the event the attachment was ultimately found to have been improvident.

Judge Mahoney was also of the opinion that the statutory provision for attaching real property in civil actions, without a prior hearing and in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, was unconstitutional. He disagreed with Judge Pratt's opinion that a bond was constitutionally required. Judge Newman dissented from the holding that a hearing prior to attachment was constitutionally required and, like Judge Mahoney, disagreed with Judge Pratt on the necessity for a bond.

The dissent's conclusion accorded with the views of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which had previously upheld § 52-278e(b) in Fermont Division, Dynamics Corp. of America v. Smith, 178 Conn. 393, 423 A. 2d 80 (1979). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of authority. 498 U. S. 809 (1990).

II

With this case we return to the question of what process must be afforded by a state statute enabling an individual to enlist the aid of the State to deprive another of his or her property by means of the prejudgment attachment or similar procedure. Our cases reflect the numerous variations this type of remedy can entail. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U. S. 337 (1969), the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that permitted a creditor to effect prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice and prior hearing to the wage earner. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), the Court likewise found a due process violation in state replevin provisions that permitted vendors to have goods seized through an ex parte application to a court clerk and the posting of a bond. Conversely, the Court upheld a Louisiana ex parte procedure allowing a lienholder to have disputed goods sequestered in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., supra. Mitchell, however, carefully noted that Fuentes was [10] decided against "a factual and legal background sufficiently different . . . that it does not require the invalidation of the Louisiana sequestration statute." Id., at 615. Those differences included Louisiana's provision of an immediate postdeprivation hearing along with the option of damages; the requirement that a judge rather than a clerk determine that there is a clear showing of entitlement to the writ; the necessity for a detailed affidavit; and an emphasis on the lienholder's interest in preventing waste or alienation of the encumbered property. Id., at 615-618. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975), the Court again invalidated an ex parte garnishment statute that not only failed to provide for notice and prior hearing but also failed to require a bond, a detailed affidavit setting out the claim, the determination of a neutral magistrate, or a prompt postdeprivation hearing. Id., at 606-608.

These cases "underscore the truism that `"[d]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961)). In Mathews, we drew upon our prejudgment remedy decisions to determine what process is due when the government itself seeks to effect a deprivation on its own initiative. 424 U. S., at 334. That analysis resulted in the now familiar threefold inquiry requiring consideration of "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards"; and lastly "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id., at 335.

Here the inquiry is similar, but the focus is different. Prejudgment remedy statutes ordinarily apply to disputes between private parties rather than between an individual and [11] the government. Such enactments are designed to enable one of the parties to "make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials," and they undoubtedly involve state action "substantial enough to implicate the Due Process Clause." Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 486 (1988). Nonetheless, any burden that increasing procedural safeguards entails primarily affects not the government, but the party seeking control of the other's property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, at 99-101 (WHITE, J., dissenting). For this type of case, therefore, the relevant inquiry requires, as in Mathews, first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and third, in contrast to Mathews, principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections.

We now consider the Mathews factors in determining the adequacy of the procedures before us, first with regard to the safeguards of notice and a prior hearing, and then in relation to the protection of a bond.

III

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the property interests that attachment affects are significant. For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. Nor does Connecticut deny that any of these consequences occurs.

[12] Instead, the State correctly points out that these effects do not amount to a complete, physical, or permanent deprivation of real property; their impact is less than the perhaps temporary total deprivation of household goods or wages. See Sniadach, supra, at 340; Mitchell, 416 U. S., at 613. But the Court has never held that only such extreme deprivations trigger due process concern. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 74 (1917). To the contrary, our cases show that even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. Without doubt, state procedures for creating and enforcing attachments, as with liens, "are subject to the strictures of due process." Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 85 (1988) (citing Mitchell, supra, at 604; Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276, 281 (1905)).[6]

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the risk of erroneous deprivation that the State permits here is substantial. By definition, attachment statutes premise a deprivation of property on one ultimate factual contingency—the award of damages to the plaintiff which the defendant may not be able to satisfy. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 104-105 (1921); R. Thompson & J. Sebert, Remedies: Damages, Equity and Restitution § 5.01 (1983). For attachments [13] before judgment, Connecticut mandates that this determination be made by means of a procedural inquiry that asks whether "there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a) (1991). The statute elsewhere defines the validity of the claim in terms of the likelihood "that judgment will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278c(a)(2) (1991); Ledgebrook Condominium Assn. v. Lusk Corp., 172 Conn. 577, 584, 376 A. 2d 60, 63-64 (1977). What probable cause means in this context, however, remains obscure. The State initially took the position, as did the dissent below, that the statute requires a plaintiff to show the objective likelihood of the suit's success. Brief for Petitioners 12; Pinsky, 898 F. 2d, at 861-862 (Newman, J., dissenting). Doehr, citing ambiguous state cases, reads the provision as requiring no more than that a plaintiff demonstrate a subjective good-faith belief that the suit will succeed. Brief for Respondent 25-26. Ledgebrook Condominium Assn., supra, at 584, 376 A. 2d, at 63-64; Anderson v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App. 85, 88, 561 A. 2d 948, 949 (1989). At oral argument, the State shifted its position to argue that the statute requires something akin to the plaintiff stating a claim with sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.

We need not resolve this confusion since the statute presents too great a risk of erroneous deprivation under any of these interpretations. If the statute demands inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint, or, still less, the plaintiff's good-faith belief that the complaint is sufficient, requirement of a complaint and a factual affidavit would permit a court to make these minimal determinations. But neither inquiry adequately reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation. Permitting a court to authorize attachment merely because the plaintiff believes the defendant is liable, or because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid complaint, would permit the deprivation of the defendant's property when the claim would fail to convince a jury, when it rested on factual allegations [14] that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defendant would dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The potential for unwarranted attachment in these situations is self-evident and too great to satisfy the requirements of due process absent any countervailing consideration.

Even if the provision requires the plaintiff to demonstrate, and the judge to find, probable cause to believe that judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the risk of error was substantial in this case. As the record shows, and as the State concedes, only a skeletal affidavit need be, and was, filed. The State urges that the reviewing judge normally reviews the complaint as well, but concedes that the complaint may also be conclusory. It is self-evident that the judge could make no realistic assessment concerning the likelihood of an action's success based upon these one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory submissions. And as the Court of Appeals said, in a case like this involving an alleged assault, even a detailed affidavit would give only the plaintiff's version of the confrontation. Unlike determining the existence of a debt or delinquent payments, the issue does not concern "ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof." Mitchell, 416 U. S., at 609. The likelihood of error that results illustrates that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights . . . . [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 170-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

What safeguards the State does afford do not adequately reduce this risk. Connecticut points out that the statute also provides an "expeditiou[s]" postattachment adversary hearing, [15] § 52-278e(c);[7] notice for such a hearing, § 52-278e(b); judicial review of an adverse decision, § 52-2781(a); and a double damages action if the original suit is commenced without probable cause, § 52-568(a)(1). Similar considerations were present in Mitchell, where we upheld Louisiana's sequestration statute despite the lack of predeprivation notice and hearing. But in Mitchell, the plaintiff had a vendor's lien to protect, the risk of error was minimal because the likelihood of recovery involved uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documentary proof, 416 U. S., at 609-610, and the plaintiff was required to put up a bond. None of these factors diminishing the need for a predeprivation hearing is present in this case. It is true that a later hearing might negate the presence of probable cause, but this would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented. "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause." Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 86.

[16] Finally, we conclude that the interests in favor of an ex parte attachment, particularly the interests of the plaintiff, are too minimal to supply such a consideration here. The plaintiff had no existing interest in Doehr's real estate when he sought the attachment. His only interest in attaching the property was to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy his judgment if he prevailed on the merits of his action. Yet there was no allegation that Doehr was about to transfer or encumber his real estate or take any other action during the pendency of the action that would render his real estate unavailable to satisfy a judgment. Our cases have recognized such a properly supported claim would be an exigent circumstance permitting postponing any notice or hearing until after the attachment is effected. See Mitchell, supra, at 609; Fuentes, supra, at 90-92; Sniadach, 395 U. S., at 339. Absent such allegations, however, the plaintiff's interest in attaching the property does not justify the burdening of Doehr's ownership rights without a hearing to determine the likelihood of recovery.

No interest the government may have affects the analysis. The State's substantive interest in protecting any rights of the plaintiff cannot be any more weighty than those rights themselves. Here the plaintiff's interest is de minimis. Moreover, the State cannot seriously plead additional financial or administrative burdens involving predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an immediate postdeprivation hearing. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-278e(b) and (c) (1991); Fermont, 178 Conn., at 397-398, 423 A. 2d, at 83.

Historical and contemporary practices support our analysis. Prejudgment attachment is a remedy unknown at common law. Instead, "it traces its origin to the Custom of London, under which a creditor might attach money or goods of the defendant either in the plaintiff's own hands or in the custody of a third person, by proceedings in the mayor's court or in the sheriff's court." Ownbey, 256 U. S., at 104. Generally speaking, attachment measures in both England and this [17] country had several limitations that reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation which Connecticut permits. Although attachments ordinarily did not require prior notice or a hearing, they were usually authorized only where the defendant had taken or threatened to take some action that would place the satisfaction of the plaintiff's potential award in jeopardy. See C. Drake, Law of Suits by Attachment, §§ 40-82 (1866) (hereinafter Drake); 1 R. Shinn, Attachment and Garnishment § 86 (1896) (hereinafter Shinn). Attachments, moreover, were generally confined to claims by creditors. Drake §§ 9-10; Shinn § 12. As we and the Court of Appeals have noted, disputes between debtors and creditors more readily lend themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits. Tort actions, like the assault and battery claim at issue here, do not. See Mitchell, supra, at 609-610. Finally, as we will discuss below, attachment statutes historically required that the plaintiff post a bond. Drake §§ 114-183; Shinn § 153.

Connecticut's statute appears even more suspect in light of current practice. A survey of state attachment provisions reveals that nearly every State requires either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstance, or both, before permitting an attachment to take place. See Appendix to this opinion. Twenty-seven States, as well as the District of Columbia, permit attachments only when some extraordinary circumstance is present. In such cases, preattachment hearings are not required but postattachment hearings are provided. Ten States permit attachment without the presence of such factors but require prewrit hearings unless one of those factors is shown. Six States limit attachments to extraordinary circumstance cases, but the writ will not issue prior to a hearing unless there is a showing of some even more compelling condition.[8] Three States always require a [18] preattachment hearing. Only Washington, Connecticut, and Rhode Island authorize attachments without a prior hearing in situations that do not involve any purportedly heightened threat to the plaintiff's interests. Even those States permit ex parte deprivations only in certain types of cases: Rhode Island does so only when the claim is equitable; Connecticut and Washington do so only when real estate is to be attached, and even Washington requires a bond. Conversely, the States for the most part no longer confine attachments to creditor claims. This development, however, only increases the importance of the other limitations.

We do not mean to imply that any given exigency requirement protects an attachment from constitutional attack. Nor do we suggest that the statutory measures we have surveyed are necessarily free of due process problems or other constitutional infirmities in general. We do believe, however, that the procedures of almost all the States confirm our view that the Connecticut provision before us, by failing to provide a preattachment hearing without at least requiring a showing of some exigent circumstance, clearly falls short of the demands of due process.

IV

A

Although a majority of the Court does not reach the issue, JUSTICES MARSHALL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and I deem it appropriate to consider whether due process also requires the plaintiff to post a bond or other security in addition to requiring a hearing or showing of some exigency.[9]

[19] As noted, the impairments to property rights that attachments effect merit due process protection. Several consequences can be severe, such as the default of a homeowner's mortgage. In the present context, it need only be added that we have repeatedly recognized the utility of a bond in protecting property rights affected by the mistaken award of prejudgment remedies. Di-Chem, 419 U. S., at 610, 611 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 619 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 416 U. S., at 606, n. 8.

Without a bond, at the time of attachment, the danger that these property rights may be wrongfully deprived remains unacceptably high even with such safegnards as a hearing or exigency requirement. The need for a bond is especially apparent where extraordinary circumstances justify an attachment with no more than the plaintiff's ex parte assertion of a claim. We have already discussed how due process tolerates, and the States generally permit, the otherwise impermissible chance of erroneously depriving the defendant in such situations in light of the heightened interest of the plaintiff. Until a postattachment hearing, however, a defendant has no protection against damages sustained where no extraordinary circumstance in fact existed or the plaintiff's likelihood of recovery was nil. Such protection is what a bond can supply. Both the Court and its individual Members have repeatedly found the requirement of a bond to play an essential role in reducing what would have been too great a degree of risk in precisely this type of circumstance. Mitchell, [20] supra, at 610, 619; Di-Chem, 419 U. S., at 613 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 619 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 101 (WHITE, J., dissenting).

But the need for a bond does not end here. A defendant's property rights remain at undue risk even when there has been an adversarial hearing to determine the plaintiff's likelihood of recovery. At best, a court's initial assessment of each party's case cannot produce more than an educated prediction as to who will win. This is especially true when, as here, the nature of the claim makes any accurate prediction elusive. See Mitchell, supra, at 609-610. In consequence, even a full hearing under a proper probable-cause standard would not prevent many defendants from having title to their homes impaired during the pendency of suits that never result in the contingency that ultimately justifies such impairment, namely, an award to the plaintiff. Attachment measures currently on the books reflect this concern. All but a handful of States require a plaintiff's bond despite also affording a hearing either before, or (for the vast majority, only under extraordinary circumstances) soon after, an attachment takes place. See Appendix to this opinion. Bonds have been a similarly common feature of other prejudgment remedy procedures that we have considered, whether or not these procedures also included a hearing. See Ownbey, 256 U. S., at 101-102, n. 1; Fuentes, supra, at 73, n. 6, 75-76, n. 7, 81-82; Mitchell, supra, at 606, and n. 6; DiChem, supra, at 602-603, n. 1, 608.

The State stresses its double damages remedy for suits that are commenced without probable cause. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-568(a)(1).[10] This remedy, however, fails to make [21] up for the lack of a bond. As an initial matter, the meaning of "probable cause" in this provision is no more clear here than it was in the attachment provision itself. Should the term mean the plaintiff's good faith or the facial adequacy of the complaint, the remedy is clearly insufficient. A defendant who was deprived where there was little or no likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain a judgment could nonetheless recover only by proving some type of fraud or malice or by showing that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim. Problems persist even if the plaintiff's ultimate failure permits recovery. At best a defendant must await a decision on the merits of the plaintiff's complaint, even assuming that a § 52-568(a)(1) action may be brought as a counterclaim. Hydro Air of Connecticut, Inc. v. Versa Technologies, Inc., 99 F. R. D. 111, 113 (Conn. 1983). Settlement, under Connecticut law, precludes seeking the damages remedy, a fact that encourages the use of attachments as a tactical device to pressure an opponent to capitulate. Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 464 A. 2d 52 (1983). An attorney's advice that there is probable cause to commence an action constitutes a complete defense, even if the advice was unsound or erroneous. Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 361, 407 A. 2d 982, 987 (1978). Finally, there is no guarantee that the original plaintiff will have adequate assets to satisfy an award that the defendant may win.

Nor is there any appreciable interest against a bond requirement. Section 52-278e(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to show exigent circumstances nor any pre-existing interest in the property facing attachment. A party must show more than the mere existence of a claim before subjecting an opponent to prejudgment proceedings that carry a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. See Mitchell, supra, at 604-609; Fuentes, supra, at 90-92; Sniadach, 395 U. S., at 339.

[22] B

Our foregoing discussion compels the four of us to consider whether a bond excuses the need for a hearing or other safeguards altogether. If a bond is needed to augment the protections afforded by preattachment and postattachment hearings, it arguably follows that a bond renders these safeguards unnecessary. That conclusion is unconvincing, however, for it ignores certain harms that bonds could not undo but that hearings would prevent. The law concerning attachments has rarely, if ever, required defendants to suffer an encumbered title until the case is concluded without any prior opportunity to show that the attachment was unwarranted. Our cases have repeatedly emphasized the importance of providing a prompt postdeprivation hearing at the very least. Mitchell, 416 U. S., at 606; Di-Chem, 419 U. S., at 606-607. Every State but one, moreover, expressly requires a preattachment or postattachment hearing to determine the propriety of an attachment.

The necessity for at least a prompt postattachment hearing is self-evident because the right to be compensated at the end of the case, if the plaintiff loses, for all provable injuries caused by the attachment is inadequate to redress the harm inflicted, harm that could have been avoided had an early hearing been held. An individual with an immediate need or opportunity to sell a property can neither do so, nor otherwise satisfy that need or recreate the opportunity. The same applies to a parent in need of a home equity loan for a child's education, an entrepreneur seeking to start a business on the strength of an otherwise strong credit rating, or simply a homeowner who might face the disruption of having a mortgage placed in technical default. The extent of these harms, moreover, grows with the length of the suit. Here, oral argument indicated that civil suits in Connecticut commonly take up to four to seven years for completion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. Many state attachment statutes require [23] that the amount of a bond be anywhere from the equivalent to twice the amount the plaintiff seeks. See, e. g., Utah Rule of Civ. Proc. 64C(b). These amounts bear no relation to the harm the defendant might suffer even assuming that money damages can make up for the foregoing disruptions. It should be clear, however, that such an assumption is fundamentally flawed. Reliance on a bond does not sufficiently account for the harms that flow from an erroneous attachment to excuse a State from reducing that risk by means of a timely hearing.

If a bond cannot serve to dispense with a hearing immediately after attachment, neither is it sufficient basis for not providing a preattachment hearing in the absence of exigent circumstances even if in any event a hearing would be provided a few days later. The reasons are the same: a wrongful attachment can inflict injury that will not fully be redressed by recovery on the bond after a prompt postattachment hearing determines that the attachment was invalid.

Once more, history and contemporary practices support our conclusion. Historically, attachments would not issue without a showing of extraordinary circumstances even though a plaintiff bond was almost invariably required in addition. Drake §§ 4, 114; Shinn §§ 86, 153. Likewise, all but eight States currently require the posting of a bond. Out of this 42-State majority, all but one requires a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigency, or both, and all but one expressly require a postattachment hearing when an attachment has been issued ex parte. See Appendix to this opinion. This testimony underscores the point that neither a hearing nor an extraordinary circumstance limitation eliminates the need for a bond, no more than a bond allows waiver of these other protections. To reconcile the interests of the defendant and the plaintiff accurately, due process generally requires all of the above.

[24] V

Because Connecticut's prejudgment remedy provision, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), violates the requirements of due process by authorizing prejudgment attachment without prior notice or a hearing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Prejudgment Attachment Statutes

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                    Attachment                  Preattach.       Only in Exigent   Preattach.                  Hrg. Required       Circs.;        Hrg. Even in                 Unless Exigent     No Preattach.    Most Exigent    Bond       Postattach.                    Circs.          Hrg. Required       Circs.      Required   Hrg. Required-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Alabama                                   X                            X            XAlaska               Preattachment hrg. always required.               XArizona              X                                                 X            XArkansas                                  X                            X            XCalifornia           X                                                 X            XColorado                                  X                            X            XConnecticut          X (or unless attachment of real estate)                        XDelaware                                  X                            X            XDC                                        X                            X            XFlorida                                   X                            X            XGeorgia                                   X                            X            XHawaii               Preattachment hrg. always required.               X            XIdaho                X                                                 X            XIllinois                                  X                            X            XIndiana                                   X                            X            XIowa                                      X                            X            XKansas                                    X                            X            XKentucky                                                 X             XLouisiana                                 X                            X            X
 [25] Maine                X                                                              XMaryland                                  X                            X            XMassachusetts        X                                                 X/O1         XMichigan                                  X                                         XMinnesota                                                X             X            XMississippi                               X                            X            XMissouri                                  X                            X            XMontana                                   X                            X            XNebraska                                  X                            X            XNevada               X                                                 X            XNew Hampshire        X                                                              XNew Jersey           X                                                 X/O          XNew Mexico                                X                            X            XNew York                                  X                            X            XNorth Carolina                            X                            X            XNorth Dakota                              X                            X            XOhio                                                     X             X            XOklahoma             X                                                 X            XOregon               Preattachment hrg. always required.               XPennsylvania         Rescinded in light of 530 F. 2d 1123 (CA3 1976).Rhode Island         X (but not if equitable claim)                    X/OSouth Carolina                            X                            X            XSouth Dakota                              X                            X            XTennessee                                 X                            X            X2Texas                                                    X             X            XUtah                                                     X             X            XVermont              X                                                              X1. An "X/O" in the "Bond Required" column indicates that a bond may berequired at the discretion of the court.2. The court may, under certain circumstances, quash the attachment atthe defendant's request without a hearing.
 [26] Virginia                                  X                            X            XWashington                                               X             X3      X                                          (except for real estate on a contract claim)West Virginia                             X                            X            XWisconsin                                 X                            X            XWyoming                                                  X             X            X-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. A bond is required except in situations in which the plaintiff seeks toattach the real property of a defendant who, after diligent efforts, cannotbe served.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Connecticut attachment statute, "as applied to this case," ante, at 4, fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III of its opinion. Unfortunately, the remainder of the opinion does not confine itself to the facts of this case, but enters upon a lengthy disquisition as to what combination of safeguards are required to satisfy due process in hypothetical cases not before the Court. I therefore do not join Part IV.

As the Court's opinion points out, the Connecticut statute allows attachment not merely for a creditor's claim, but for a tort claim of assault and battery; it affords no opportunity for a predeprivation hearing; it contains no requirement that there be "exigent circumstances," such as an effort on the part of the defendant to conceal assets; no bond is required from the plaintiff; and the property attached is one in which the plaintiff has no pre-existing interest. The Court's opinion [27] is, in my view, ultimately correct when it bases its holding of unconstitutionality of the Connecticut statute as applied here on our cases of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974), and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975). But I do not believe that the result follows so inexorably as the Court's opinion suggests. All of the cited cases dealt with personalty—bank deposits or chattels —and each involved the physical seizure of the property itself, so that the defendant was deprived of its use. These cases, which represented something of a revolution in the jurisprudence of procedural due process, placed substantial limits on the methods by which creditors could obtain a lien on the assets of a debtor prior to judgment. But in all of them the debtor was deprived of the use and possession of the property. In the present case, on the other hand, Connecticut's prejudgment attachment on real property statute, which secures an incipient lien for the plaintiff, does not deprive the defendant of the use or possession of the property.

The Court's opinion therefore breaks new ground, and I would point out, more emphatically than the Court does, the limits of today's holding. In Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (Ariz. 1973), the District Court held that the filing of a mechanics' lien did not cause the deprivation of a significant property interest of the owner. We summarily affirmed that decision. 417 U. S. 901 (1974). Other courts have read this summary affirmance to mean that the mere imposition of a lien on real property, which does not disturb the owner's use or enjoyment of the property, is not a deprivation of property calling for procedural due process safeguards. I agree with the Court, however, that upon analysis the deprivation here is a significant one, even though the owner remains in undisturbed possession. "For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise [28] alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause." Ante, at 11. Given the elaborate system of title records relating to real property which prevails in all of our States, a lienor need not obtain possession or use of real property belonging to a debtor in order to significantly impair its value to him.

But in Spielman-Fond, Inc., supra, there was, as the Court points out, ante, at 12, n. 4, an alternative basis available to this Court for affirmance of that decision. Arizona recognized a pre-existing lien in favor of unpaid mechanics and materialmen who had contributed labor or supplies which were incorporated in improvements to real property. The existence of such a lien upon the very property ultimately posted or noticed distinguishes those cases from the present one, where the plaintiff had no pre-existing interest in the real property which he sought to attach. Materialman's and mechanic's lien statutes award an interest in real property to workers who have contributed their labor, and to suppliers who have furnished material, for the improvement of the real property. Since neither the labor nor the material can be reclaimed once it has become a part of the realty, this is the only method by which workmen or small businessmen who have contributed to the improvement of the property may be given a remedy against a property owner who has defaulted on his promise to pay for the labor and the materials. To require any sort of a contested court hearing or bond before the notice of lien takes effect would largely defeat the purpose of these statutes.

Petitioners in their brief rely in part on our summary affirmance in Bartlett v. Williams, 464 U. S. 801 (1983). That case involved a lis pendens, in which the question presented to this Court was whether such a procedure could be valid when the only protection afforded to the owner of land affected by the lis pendens was a postsequestration hearing. [29] A notice of lis pendens is a well-established, traditional remedy whereby a plaintiff (usually a judgment creditor) who brings an action to enforce an interest in property to which the defendant has title gives notice of the pendency of such action to third parties; the notice causes the interest which he establishes, if successful, to relate back to the date of the filing of the lis pendens. The filing of such notice will have an effect upon the defendant's ability to alienate the property, or to obtain additional security on the basis of title to the property, but the effect of the lis pendens is simply to give notice to the world of the remedy being sought in the lawsuit itself. The lis pendens itself creates no additional right in the property on the part of the plaintiff, but simply allows third parties to know that a lawsuit is pending in which the plaintiff is seeking to establish such a right. Here, too, the fact that the plaintiff already claims an interest in the property which he seeks to enforce by a lawsuit distinguishes this class of cases from the Connecticut attachment employed in the present case.

Today's holding is a significant development in the law; the only cases dealing with real property cited in the Court's opinion, Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 85 (1988), and Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276, 281 (1905), arose out of lien foreclosure sales in which the question was whether the owner was entitled to proper notice. The change is dramatically reflected when we compare today's decision with the almost casual statement of Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court in Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 31 (1928):

"[N]othing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit."

The only protection accorded to the debtor in that case was the right to contest his liability in a postdeprivation proceeding.

[30] It is both unwise and unnecessary, I believe, for the plurality to proceed, as it does in Part IV, from its decision of the case before it to discuss abstract and hypothetical situations not before it. This is especially so where we are dealing with the Due Process Clause which, as the Court recognizes, "`"unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"'" ante, at 10. And it is even more true in a case involving constitutional limits on the methods by which the States may transfer or create interests in real property; in other areas of the law, dicta may do little damage, but those who insure titles or write title opinions often do not enjoy the luxury of distinguishing detween dicta and holding.

The two elements of due process with which the Court concerns itself in Part IV—the requirements of a bond and of "exigent circumstances" — prove to be upon analysis so vague that the discussion is not only unnecessary, but not particularly useful. Unless one knows what the terms and conditions of a bond are to be, the requirement of a "bond" in the abstract means little. The amount to be secured by the bond and the conditions of the bond are left unaddressed —is there to be liability on the part of a plaintiff if he is ultimately unsuccessful in the underlying lawsuit, or is it instead to be conditioned on some sort of good-faith test? The "exigent circumstances" referred to by the Court are admittedly equally vague; nonresidency appears to be enough in some States, an attempt to conceal assets is required in others, an effort to flee the jurisdiction in still others. We should await concrete cases which present questions involving bonds and exigent circumstances before we attempt to decide when and if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires them as prerequisites for a lawful attachment.

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Since the manner of attachment here was not a recognized procedure at common law, cf. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. [31] Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 24 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), I agree that its validity under the Due Process Clause should be determined by applying the test we set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); and I agree that it fails that test. I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion, and concur in the judgment of the Court.

[1] Allan B. Taylor, James J. Tancredi, and Kirk D. Tavtigian, Jr., filed a brief for the Connecticut Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

[2] THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER join Parts I, II, and III of this opinion, and JUSTICE SCALIA joins Parts I and III.

[3]The complete text of § 52-278e reads:

"Allowance of prejudgment remedy without hearing. Notice to defendant. Subsequent hearing and order. Attachment of real property of municipal officers. (a) The court or a judge of the court may allow the prejudgment remedy to be issued by an attorney without hearing as provided in sections 52-278c and 52-278d upon verification by oath of the plaintiff or of some competent affiant, that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim and (1) that the prejudgment remedy requested is for an attachment of real property; or (2) that there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant (A) neither resides in nor maintains an office or place of business in this state and is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction over his person by the court, or (B) has hidden or will hide himself so that process cannot be served on him or (C) is about to remove himself or his property from this state or (D) is about to fraudulently dispose of or has fraudulently disposed of any of his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors or (E) has fraudulently hidden or withheld money, property or effects which should be liable to the satisfaction of his debts or (F) has stated he is insolvent or has stated he is unable to pay his debts as they mature.

"(b) If a prejudgment remedy is granted pursuant to this section, the plaintiff shall include in the process served on the defendant the following notice prepared by the plaintiff: YOU HAVE RIGHTS SPECIFIED IN THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES, INCLUDING CHAPTER 903a, WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO EXERCISE CONCERNING THIS PREJUDGMENT REMEDY. THESE RIGHTS INCLUDE: (1) THE RIGHT TO A HEARING TO OBJECT TO THE PREJUDGMENT REMEDY FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUSTAIN THE CLAIM; (2) THE RIGHT TO A HEARING TO REQUEST THAT THE PREJUDGMENT REMEDY BE MODIFIED, VACATED OR DISMISSED OR THAT A BOND BE SUBSTITUTED; AND (3) THE RIGHT TO A HEARING AS TO ANY PORTION OF THE PROPERTY ATTACHED WHICH YOU CLAIM IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.

"(c) The defendant appearing in such action may move to dissolve or modify the prejudgment remedy granted pursuant to this section in which event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion expeditiously. If the court determines at such hearing requested by the defendant that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim, then the prejudgment remedy granted shall remain in effect. If the court determines there is no such probable cause, the prejudgment remedy shall be dissolved. An order shall be issued by the court setting forth the action it has taken."

[4] Three other plaintiffs joined Doehr, challenging § 52-278e(a)(1) out of separate instances of attachment by different defendants. These other plaintiffs and defendants did not participate in the Court of Appeals and are no longer parties in this case.

[5] The Court of Appeals invited Connecticut to intervene pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) after oral argument. The State elected to intervene in the appeal and has fully participated in the proceedings before this Court.

[6] Our summary affirmance in Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 417 U. S. 901 (1974), does not control. In Spielman-Fond, the District Court held that the filing of a mechanic's lien did not amount to the taking of a significant property interest. 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (Ariz. 1973) (three-judge court) (per curiam). A summary disposition does not enjoy the full precedential value of a case argued on the merits and disposed of by a written opinion. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). The facts of Spielman-Fond presented an alternative basis for affirmance in any event. Unlike the case before us, the mechanic's lien statute in Spielman-Fond required the creditor to have a pre-existing interest in the property at issue. 379 F. Supp., at 997. As we explain below, a heightened plaintiff interest in certain circumstances can provide a ground for upholding procedures that are otherwise suspect. Infra, at 15.

[7] The parties vigorously dispute whether a defendant can in fact receive a prompt hearing. Doehr contends that the State's rules of practice prevent the filing of any motion—including a motion for the mandated postattachment hearing—until the return date on the complaint, which in this case was 30 days after service. Connecticut Practice Book § 114 (1988). Under state law at least 12 days must elapse between service on the defendant and the return date. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-46 (1991). The State counters that the postattachment hearing is available upon request. See Fermont Division, Dynamics Corp. of America v. Smith, 178 Conn. 393, 397-398, 423 A. 2d 80, 83 (1979) ("Most important, the statute affords to the defendant whose property has been attached the opportunity to obtain an immediate postseizure hearing at which the prejudgment remedy will be dissolved unless the moving party proves probable cause to sustain the validity of his claim"). We assume, without deciding, that the hearing is prompt. Even on this assumption, the State's procedures fail to provide adequate safeguards against the erroneous deprivation of the property interest at stake.

[8] One State, Pennsylvania, has not had an attachment statute or rule since the decision in Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of New York City, 530 F. 2d 1123 (CA3 1976).

[9] Ordinarily we will not address a contention advanced by a respondent that would enlarge his or her rights under a judgment, without the respondent filing a cross-petition for certiorari. E. g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 119, n. 14 (1985). Here the Court of Appeals rejected Doehr's argument that § 52-278e(a)(1) violates due process in failing to mandate a preattachment bond. Nonetheless, this case involves considerations that in the past have prompted us "to consider the question highlighted by respondent." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 435-436, n. 23 (1984). First, as our cases have shown, the notice and hearing question and the bond question are intertwined and can fairly be considered facets of the same general issue. Thus, "[w]ithout undue strain, the position taken by respondent before this Court . . . might be characterized as an argument in support of the judgment below" insofar as a discussion of notice and a hearing cannot be divorced from consideration of a bond. Ibid. Second, this aspect of prejudgment attachment "plainly warrants our attention, and with regard to which the lower courts are in need of guidance." Ibid. Third, "and perhaps most importantly, both parties have briefed and argued the question." Ibid.

[10]Section 52-568(a)(1) provides:

"Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name, or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages."

4.3.3.4 Notes on Opportunity to Be Heard 4.3.3.4 Notes on Opportunity to Be Heard

     1. In Matthews v. Eldridge the government argued that disability benefits, unlike welfare benefits, do not automatically involve financial need. While this might be true logically, in many cases disability benefits are all that stand between the recipient and destitution. In the early 2000s, an attorney in Kentucky named Eric Conn ran a fraudulent operation that sought social security benefits on behalf of disabled workers, many of them coal miners or other physical laborers. Unbeknownst to the clients, Conn had made a dishonest deal with an administrative judge in the Social Security administration so that all of his clients would be approved for benefits, whether or not they would automatically qualify. Many, probably most, and perhaps even all, would have qualified for benefits under an honest process, but that would have meant more work for Conn. When the dishonest scheme came to light, with more than $550 million in benefits awarded to Conn clients, the Social Security administration, without hearings, canceled benefits to all Conn clients. The financial shock was so great that several committed suicide. Four years after benefits were canceled, litigation was ongoing as to both the individual cases and the process. 

     2. Can you state the Matthews v. Eldridge test? The Doehr test? Do you understand the difference?

4.3.4 Questions on Remedies 4.3.4 Questions on Remedies

     Sammy Seller promised to deliver one million blue widgets to Bernice Buyer, and took a $1,000,000 deposit. The widgets were never delivered. Buyer wishes to sue. If possible, she would still like the widgets to be delivered as she has customers for them. Alternatively, she feels she suffered damages above and beyond the deposit because of the non-delivery and would like to recover those damages. Last but not least, she wants at a minimum to recover her deposit. Please discuss which remedies are appropriate.

     Pamela Plaintiff was injured in a car accident by Denise Driver. These damages, all agree, are $1,000,000. Everyone also agrees that Driver was completely at fault. Plaintiff brings a lawsuit against Driver and asks the court to enter an injunction requiring Driver to pay her $1,000,000. What are Plaintiff's chances of success?

     A court finds that a plaintiff will be irreparably damaged if an injunction is not issued but nonetheless finds that such an injunction would be against the public interest. Should an injunction be issued?

     Donna Driver is the owner of a brand new $400,000 Maserati automobile, her only real financial asset. She is being sued by Ima Injured, who claims that Driver hit her with her old automobile, causing substantial damage in excess of $500,000. While Driver fled the scene, traffic cameras recorded the whole incident, and she has already been criminally convicted of driving recklessly and leaving the scene of the accident. Injured wishes to attach Driver's Maserati so she will have something to collect against if she wins her lawsuit. Driver claims any attachment would be unconstitutional. Please analyze.

4.4 Enforcement of Judgments 4.4 Enforcement of Judgments

4.4.1 Overview: Enforcement of Domestic Judgments, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, and Enforcement of US Judgments Abroad 4.4.1 Overview: Enforcement of Domestic Judgments, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, and Enforcement of US Judgments Abroad

     Within the United States, the bottom line for enforcement of judgments is quite clear: valid judgments obtained in one US court can be enforced nationwide. State to state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

      At the federal level, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 provides statutory authority for registration of judgments for enforcement in other US district courts. A copy of the judgment is presented in the other district, which then enforces it as if it had been obtained locally.

     In practice, the process for ‘domesticating’ state judgments and registering federal judgments can be somewhat technical and state domestication procedures will vary state by state. For our present purposes, which are to have you think about a case in the way someone litigating a matter will think about it, those technicalities are not terribly important. It is sufficient that you know that if the defendant (your client or your opponent) has attachable assets that can be located in the United States, as a general rule it will be likely that the prevailing party in a US-based lawsuit can attach and collect those US assets to satisfy the judgment.

     That said, please take note that some assets are not attachable to satisfy a court judgment - in some states, someone's home cannot be attached, even if it is a $100 million mansion, and government annuities such as Social Security payments may also be unreachable. Things like bankruptcy and competing claims from other creditors can also complicate things. Last but not least, some litigants do their best to make assets hard to find, using devices such as offshore bank accounts. All of these kinds of issues have to be taken into account when entering into litigation. This is one reason that many plaintiff's side attorneys like to sue big companies that have plenty of visible assets.

     We will spend more time covering some aspects of what makes a judgment valid. If the court never had personal jurisdiction over the party, or if proper notice was not given, the judgment will not be valid and will be subject to attack that it is not enforceable. Similarly, if the judgment was procured due to fraud, the judgment can be attacked. 

     To be enforceable, a judgment has to be final and conclusive. Oddly, that an appeal is pending is not by itself a bar to enforcement of a final judgment of a trial court. The process to avoid enforcement in that setting is for the party that filed the appeal (“the appellant”) to seek a stay of enforcement.

     Enforcing Foreign Judgments

     The issue becomes more complicated when a party seeks to enforce a foreign judgment in a US court or to take a US judgment overseas for enforcement by a foreign tribunal. There is no international treaty comparable to the New York Convention on arbitration that governs foreign enforcement of judgments. Some countries have bilateral treaties; others as a matter of ‘comity’ enforce judgments reciprocally.

     For the US, the situation is complicated because of the US federal system of governance. There are, for starters, state courts and federal courts, and the systems operate significantly independently.  

     At a federal level, no statute addresses enforcement of foreign judgments.

     The Supreme Court's leading statement on enforcing a foreign country money judgment came in the case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 133 (1895). As a matter of common law, the Court held:

No sovereign is bound . . . to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another State; and if execution be sought . . . the tribunal in which the suit is brought, [is free] to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. The general comity, utility, and convenience of nations have, however, established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries.

You might be wondering what is meant by the term 'comity.' The Court gave a definition:

‘Comity’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

     Although Hilton v. Guyot has been influential, it turns out that for reasons that we won’t go into now, most requests to enforce a federal judgment are governed by state law, not federal law. States are free to set their own standards for enforcing, or rejecting, foreign judgments.

     At this point we need to discuss a concept called "soft law," which will be an important concept for you to master in your time at STL. Particularly for transnational lawyers, soft law can be of paramount importance. Soft law refers to "measures which are not legally binding but which nevertheless have practical and even legal effects." Francis Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques', Modern Law Review, 56, 1, January 1993, pp 19-54. In some cases, soft law can morph into hard law or be adopted as hard law. Examples can range from unratified international treaties with which parties nonetheless voluntarily comply to declarations of principle.

     There are two types of soft law that have mattered in the context of enforcing foreign judgments in the United States. One is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 1962, and its later version, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 2005. Neither version of the UFMJRA is hard law, but rather a codification proposed by experts to bring consistency to state laws. At present, almost all US states have adopted one or the other, with the adoption, of course, having the effect of hard law in the state where that version of the UFMJRA was adopted by the state government. Some states applying the UFMJRA require 'reciprocity,' which means they look to whether the foreign state issuing the judgment would enforce a judgment from their courts. Others do not require reciprocity.

     The other type of soft law that has bearing here is "Restatements" of the law which are produced by the American Law Institute. These seek to reflect the law as applied, or perhaps more accurately as the drafters of these Restatements think it is correctly applied. The two that matter here are the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the new Restatement of the Law (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Courts will often look to the Restatement for guidance in states where the UFMRJA has not been enacted or for situations not reached by the UFMJRA. Some judges will apply a section of the Restatement in deciding a case, which makes that section - subject to the rules on what constitutes a holding that we discussed earlier - hard law as applied in that jurisdiction if it meets the requirements of stare decisis. You might encounter other Restatements in courses such as Torts, Contracts, or Property.

     All of these paths to enforcement require a valid foreign judgment. To some degree, this tracks some of the requirements that apply even under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Beyond that, the quality and fairness of the foreign judicial system might be examined.,

     Again, for our present purposes, state courts and federal courts applying state law will follow the enactment of the UFMJRA that applies in their state, sometimes looking to one or the other of the Restatements for guidance if the application is unclear or if the UFMJRA does not reach the situation. The bottom line is that a foreign judgment, especially a foreign money judgment, may well be enforceable in the US, but you will have to look at the relevant state law. This law can be complicated, and can deal with issues beyond where we are now, such as whether the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction where the assets are located. The takeaway is "it depends."

     One aspect of the US state-by-state system is that there is no national standard for recognizing foreign judgments. As we noted, there also is no federal statute governing the recognition of foreign judgments. There is also no generally applicable foreign treaty. In 2019, the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Judgments Convention”) was concluded. While the text of the convention has been written, and while it would be binding at a federal level if ratified, not enough countries have ratified it for it to be binding law (last checked, only six countries had, a number that includes the United States but not China). While bilateral and multilateral (usually regional) treaties for judgment enforcement do exist, and such treaties are also binding at a national level, no such treaty exists between the United States and China. Both countries are subject to many bilateral treaties with other countries but the scope of such treaties is beyond what we can cover.

      That can prove confusing to other jurisdictions looking to apply the doctrines of comity and reciprocity. A look at federal law will show no overall treaty and no federal statute and therefore, for those who do not understand the US system, no apparent path to reciprocity other than judicial comity. For those not versed in the US system it can be hard to see that the proper reciprocity analysis looks to the states, as it is state law that most often governs in this setting in the US, and most states do rather generously enforce foreign judgments following state statute and state common law. A foreign court might conclude that there is no reciprocity whereas, in fact, a judgment from the foreign jurisdiction might be enforced in the US due to state law.

     Chinese Recognition of US Judgments. 

     The degree to which China recognizes US judgments, and the legal analysis to be applied, is a topic to be covered in a course with a scholar of Chinese law. Nonetheless, you may be curious.

     One recent article put it this way:

Some critics argue that China has adopted one of the most restrictive reciprocity systems for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments in the world. Although Chinese Civil Procedure Law (CPL) provides that foreign judgments can be recognized and enforced according to reciprocity if no treaty is applicable, Chinese courts tend to reject judgment recognition and enforcement (JRE) for lack of reciprocity. However, 2016 and 2017 delivered unprecedented development for reciprocal JRE in China: two commercial monetary judgments, rendered in Singapore and the United States, respectively, were recognized and enforced according to reciprocity. Nevertheless, this development should not be overestimated because of its prospective institutional, doctrinal, and practical challenges.

Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Enforcing Foreign Monetary Judgments in China: Breakthroughs, Challenges, and Solutions in the Context of "One Belt One Road, 51 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 105, 106 (2019)

See also, William S. Dodge & Wenliang Zhang, Reciprocity in China-US Judgments Recognition,  53 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1541 (2020)

     To the extent you are curious, the Chinese case recognizing a US judgment was  Liu Li v. Tao Li et al., Yue Wuhan Zhong Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No. 00026 (Hubei Interm. People's Ct. 2015).

     At present, China seems to have somewhat more than 30 reciprocal agreements, but its largest trading partners are not among the countries with such treaties. That is not to say that the bilateral treaties are not significant.  For more background, see King Fung Tsang, Chinese Bilateral Judgment Enforcement Treaties, 40 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2017).

     The bottom line is this: if you are litigating in the US, do not count on a US judgment being enforced in China. Note, however, that this is a complex area of the law subject to change.

4.4.2 Global Materials Technologies, Inc., v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co. Ltd. et al 4.4.2 Global Materials Technologies, Inc., v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co. Ltd. et al

     This case recognizes and applies a Chinese judgment in US litigation. While the circumstances are somewhat unusual in that the US company resisting enforcement had started the litigation in China, it provides an example of how a competent court applies a statute relating to enforcement of foreign judgments.

Global Material Technologies, Inc., Plaintiff,
v.
Dazheng Metal Fibre Co. Ltd., Dazheng Metal Fibre Co. Ltd. d/b/a Chuanguping a/k/a Tru Group, and Dong Jue Min, Defendants.
No. 12 CV 1851
|
Signed May 1, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Manish S. Shah, United States District Judge
     Global Material Technologies makes and sells metallic-wool products. Beginning in the 1990s, GMT began to obtain a large portion of its metallic fibers from Dahzeng Metal Fibre Co. (DNZ), a Chinese company. The two companies were initially on good terms and maintained a close business relationship. Eventually, however, the relationship disintegrated, and the parties became embroiled in a series of lawsuits in the United States and abroad.
     GMT first sued DNZ in China for breach of contract. Two days later, GMT sued DNZ, as well as DNZ’s president and one of its supposed affiliates, in the Middle District of Tennessee. In the Tennessee litigation, GMT claimed that the defendants had, among other things, stolen GMT’s trade secrets and violated the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The in the interim, the Chinese trial court rendered its judgment on GMT’s claims (and DNZ’s counterclaims) in China. The Chinese court ordered both parties to pay damages, though GMT was ordered to pay more than DNZ. Each party appealed, but the trial court’s ruling was largely affirmed by the Chinese intermediate court.
     In the present suit, defendants filed counterclaims seeking recognition and enforcement of the Chinese judgment. Defendants also asserted (in answer to GMT’s current complaint) that both of GMT’s remaining claims are barred by res judicata. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which GMT opposes. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
I. Legal Standard
     A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if there are no material issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .
II. Facts
A. GMT’s Business Relationship with DNZ
     GMT is an Illinois-based company that manufactures metallic-wool products. DNZ, a Chinese company based in Zhuhai, China, supplied GMT with steel fibers from 1996 to 2010. For a time, the two companies maintained a close business relationship: GMT’s president attended meetings by DNZ’s board of directors, and GMT maintained a 25% ownership interest in DNZ. Annual transactions between the two companies at one time exceeded one million dollars. But the relationship eventually soured, and the two parties (who no longer do business together, became entangled in multiple lawsuits.
B. GMT’s Suit in China
      On February 26, 2011, GMT sued DNZ in the Zhuhai People’s Court of Guangdong Province, China. In its Chinese complaint, GMT brought against DNZ a series of contract-based claims, alleging that DNZ had violated the parties’ agreement by shipping to GMT (or its customers) products suffering from severe quality issues, products that otherwise did not conform to GMT’s specific purchase orders, and products that GMT simply had not ordered at all.
 
1. The Parties’ Claims in China
     According to GMT, in June 2008 DNZ began to send steel-wool shipments that contained rusted fibers. The problematic shipments stemmed from the same invoice (No. RJCT0), see id. at 9, and triggered a series of back-and-forth communications between the two companies, resulting, said GMT, in DNZ’s agreement to: (1) pay the cost of sorting the rusty fibers from the usable ones; (2) accept the return of the rusted product; and (3) reimburse GMT for the shipment of said product back to DNZ (and all other related costs or expenses), see id. GMT did inspect all 752,000 pounds or so of the RJCT0 shipments, identified and separated out 268,568 pounds supposedly damaged by rust, and returned the latter (at GMT’s own expense) to DNZ in China. But DNZ never refunded GMT for the returned product, and never reimbursed GMT for any of its sorting- or shipping-related costs.
     Meanwhile, claimed GMT, DNZ had begun to disregard GMT’s purchase orders completely, shipping to GMT large quantities of products that did not meet GMT’s specifications (and about which customers had started to complain). An inspection by GMT revealed that, of the 13,170 pounds sent to GMT under invoice No. 1192011—whose shipments spanned from April to October 2008—only 1,975 of them (approximately 15%) actually met GMT’s requirements. Similar issues resurfaced in July 2010, when GMT discovered more non-conforming goods in shipments related to a different invoice (No. 1172011). One month later, one of GMT’s customers found rust in yet another of DNZ’s shipments (invoice No. 1172011–2). According to GMT, DNZ admitted the presence of rust in the latter shipment, and admitted the non-conformity of certain goods (as to invoice No. 1172011), but refused to reimburse GMT for any of the products or to accept their return.
     GMT sued DNZ in China, requesting compensatory damages for DNZ’s alleged breaches of contract, as well as an injunction requiring DNZ to accept the return of the faulty or non-conforming goods still in GMT’s possession. DNZ, for its part, denied any wrongdoing and alleged that GMT had fabricated the “quality” issues as a scheme to avoid paying DNZ for its shipments. See Civil Judgment of The People’s Court of Jinwan District, Zhuhai City, Guangdong Province, The People’s Republic of China (as translated), [172–3] at 29. According to DNZ, it was GMT—not DNZ—who had breached the parties’ contract: first by amassing over nine hundred thousand dollars’ worth of unpaid balances, and next by failing for several years to purchase quantities at or above the agreed annual minimum. DNZ filed corresponding counterclaims, requesting that GMT be ordered to pay: (1) its outstanding balance of $996,503.77; (2) 15% of the value of all purchase-quantity deficiencies (as allegedly required by the contract); and (3) various related damages.
2. The Trial Court’s Judgment
     On September 8, 2011, the Chinese court of first instance (for simplicity, the “trial court”) held a public hearing before a three-judge panel. Both parties were represented by counsel. The court considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, and issued its ruling on March 9, 2012.
     After determining that Chinese law applied to the parties’ breach-of-contract claims, the trial court granted in part and denied in part GMT’s request for damages for the allegedly-rusty product shipments in invoice No. RJCT0. The court first concluded that GMT had not met its burden of proof as far as demonstrating that the products were in fact rusted, since: (1) the e-mail messages in which DNZ had allegedly admitted to the existence of the rust did not actually show any such admission; (2) a customs inspection by Chinese officials (performed when GMT returned, by DNZ’s agreement, the supposedly faulty goods) failed to show that there was any rust; and (3) GMT submitted no independent proof of rust, such as testing or inspection results from a third party. But GMT was not entirely out of luck, as DNZ had agreed to accept the return of the RJCT0 products–indeed, DNZ had taken back the supposedly-rusty goods, and had managed to resell them to another buyer. The court determined that DNZ therefore should refund GMT for that batch of product (valued at $154,494), and should reimburse GMT for the cost of shipping those goods back to DNZ (an additional $52,475). But because there was no actual proof of rust, the court ruled that DNZ was not liable for any other costs incurred by GMT in inspecting, sorting, or repackaging those shipments.
     As to GMT’s claims concerning shipments under other invoices (Nos. 1192011, 1172011, and 1172011–2, as discussed above), the trial court again rejected GMT’s argument that there had been any quality issues with those shipments. Once again, GMT’s evidence failed to show any admission by DNZ that such issues in fact existed, and without any third-party test results demonstrating that there was indeed a problem, GMT had not met its burden of proof. The court was similarly unpersuaded by GMT’s contention that DNZ was liable for shipping goods that did not conform exactly to GMT’s purchase orders. DNZ was off the hook for that one, said the court, because GMT had in the past accepted extra-order goods from DNZ. Moreover, the parties had agreed to a maximum quantity of goods to be delivered by DNZ each year, and DNZ’s total shipments to GMT were far below this upper limit.
     Turning to DNZ’s counterclaims (which sought payment of GMT’s allegedly outstanding balance of $996,503, as well as 15% of the value of GMT’s supposed purchase-quantity shortfalls), the trial court again found in DNZ’s favor. The court first determined that DNZ had proven that it had, as claimed, shipped goods to GMT totaling $12,097,677.34 in value. Since the contract called for delivery of purchased goods on an “FOB” basis, DNZ, as the seller, was responsible for addressing export-related requirements. In order to clear the goods for export, DNZ would have had to file with the Chinese customs office a myriad of documents, including contracts, invoices, or other papers identifying the type, quantity, and price (unit and total) of the goods to be shipped. The customs office would verify this information–which, if the goods were cleared for export, would also appear on the customs-declaration form issued by that office. Several copies of the form are typically made, of which one may be used to file a claim for an export-tax rebate.
     In the case before the Chinese trial court, DNZ submitted as proof of its shipments to GMT (and of the value thereof) copies of GMT’s official customs-declaration forms as issued by the Chinese customs bureau, as well as invoices used by DNZ to claim export-tax rebates. The tax invoices included not only the quantity and price of the exported goods (which matched the figures shown on the customs declarations), but the relevant contract number and name of the “consignee” (i.e., buyer): GMT. Thus, said the court, the tax invoices proved that GMT was the recipient of the exported goods declared in the customs forms, and the one set of forms corroborated the other in proving that DNZ had indeed shipped to GMT goods in the amount (and value) DNZ had claimed. Since those documents indicated that DNZ had supplied to GMT goods totaling $12,097,677.34 in value, GMT was liable for that amount–that is, to the extent it could not prove that it had already paid for what it had received. But the court found that GMT did not know, and could not prove, how much it had already paid.
      As evidence that GMT had paid most of the twelve-million-dollar balance, GMT pointed to foreign-exchange collection forms (“Form for Collection, Verification and Settlement of Export Proceeds in Foreign Exchange”) submitted by DNZ. Some of those forms proved payment, said GMT, because the word “settled” appeared on those documents. But the trial court was unpersuaded by this evidence because, according to DNZ, the “settlement” notations reflected not GMT’s proper payment, but a strategy by DNZ to avoid paying additional taxes in light of GMT’s delinquency. If foreign-exchange payments were not collected within a certain period of time, exported goods would be taxed as though they had been sold domestically (i.e., at a higher rate). To avoid the additional tax burden, DNZ claimed that it applied other payments to the otherwise-unsettled transactions with GMT, such that the overdue payments in question were still, in fact, outstanding. In light of DNZ’s explanation, and without any evidence from GMT that it had already paid for the twelve million dollars’ worth of goods it had received, the court found that GMT was liable to DNZ for any outstanding balance. As DNZ admitted that GMT had already paid $11,101,173.57 toward the relevant shipments, the court held that GMT was liable only for the remainder ($966,503.77).
      But with GMT’s delay in payment came additional losses for DNZ. Lost interest on the payments, for one, as well as losses related to fluctuations in the exchange rate between U.S. and Chinese currencies. Additional taxes were imposed on some of the sales, too (since, as discussed above, delays in collecting foreign payments can and did result in exported goods being taxed at the higher domestic rate). Because these losses were caused by GMT’s delay, the court found GMT liable for these additional damages, as well.
      As for DNZ’s second counterclaim—that GMT should be liable for 15% of the value of any purchase-quantity shortfalls—the court found for GMT. The trial court determined that over the course of the parties’ business relationship, GMT had often failed to order the minimum annual quantities as set forth in the contract, but DNZ had nonetheless continued to supply goods under that agreement, without objection. Thus, the court concluded, it could be inferred from the parties’ behavior that they had tacitly agreed to modify the terms of the contract. GMT, as a result, was not liable for “insufficient” purchasing.
3. The Appeal in China
     The judgment of the Chinese trial court was entered on March 9, 2012. Each party filed an appeal with the Intermediate People’s Court of Zhuhai City. Among other things, GMT was unhappy with the ruling that it must pay $966,503.77 in outstanding balances (and related damages), and asked the intermediate court to vacate certain portions of the lower court’s order. DNZ was dissatisfied with the part of the order denying damages for GMT’s alleged purchase-order shortfalls, and asked on appeal that that decision be set aside.
     The court of appeals agreed in large part with the trial court, affirming the majority of the latter’s conclusions. The intermediate court did make one adjustment, however. In the proceeding below, the trial court had held GMT liable for damages related to the approximate $966,500 in payments delinquent under the contract. These related damages included lost interest and damages from variations in the currency-exchange rate. On appeal, GMT argued that even if it were liable for such damages (though it claimed it was not), the trial court had calculated them incorrectly. Whereas the parties’ contract called for GMT’s payment within 90 days of any bill of lading, the lower court had relied on DNZ’s list of overdue payments, and some of those payment periods were listed as being fewer than 90 days. (In defense of its original submissions—and of the trial court’s calculations as based on those submissions–DNZ argued that the “pay by” requirement had been orally altered by the parties, first to 60 days, then to 45.
     The court of appeals concluded that GMT was liable for the related damages, but agreed that they had been calculated incorrectly. The parties’ written agreement had provided that all payments should be made within 90 days; and although DNZ argued that the written contract had been modified by oral agreement, the intermediate court rejected this argument because DNZ had offered no proof in support. The lower court’s reliance on DNZ’s representations of shorter payment periods was therefore improper, and an adjustment down required.
C. GMT’s Lawsuit in the United States
     On February 28, 2011 (two days after GMT filed its claim in China), GMT sued DNZ in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Also named as defendants in the United States action were Tru Group, an alleged subsidiary of DNZ, and Dong Jue Min, DNZ’s president. On defendants’ motion, the action was transferred from Tennessee to the Northern District of Illinois.
     In its U.S. complaint, GMT again included allegations that DNZ had shipped to GMT rusted products, products suffering from other (unspecified) quality problems, and products that failed to conform to GMT’s purchase orders and requirements. But GMT also alleged other actions by DNZ concerning the use of GMT’s confidential information. The two companies, GMT alleged, originally had a close working relationship, and when times were good, GMT shared with DNZ (through DNZ’s directors and shareholders, including Dong Jue Min) a great deal about the former’s business approach–among other things, its pricing strategies, customer list, customer-specific product specifications, and internal operating procedures. GMT admitted that it had supplied this information voluntarily, but with the explicit understanding that DNZ would neither communicate the information to third parties nor use it to GMT’s detriment. But, according to GMT, that is precisely what DNZ did. GMT claimed that through its subsidiary, Tru Group (and possibly other such companies), DNZ contacted GMT’s current and prospective customers, and offered them a pricing scheme derived from GMT’s own confidential pricing structure.
     GMT brought as part of its domestic action four claims against defendants DNZ, Tru Group, and Dong Jue Min: (1) intentional interference with business relations; (2) violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) violation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The interference and conspiracy claims were dismissed in a ruling by Judge Dow. The trade-secrets and CISG claims remain pending.
     Defendants filed two counterclaims, seeking recognition of the Chinese judgment (as entered by the intermediate court in Zhuhai) under the Illinois Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, and enforcement of that judgment in the United States. In their answer to GMT’s complaint, defendants also asserted that both of GMT’s remaining claims are precluded by res judicata. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to their counterclaims, as well as to their affirmative defense of claim preclusion.
III. Analysis
A. Judicial Notice of the Chinese Judgment
     District courts may take judicial notice of a foreign judgment.[Professor's note: What does 'judicial notice' mean? Be prepared to explain. Remember, Black's Law Dictionary holds the answer.]The significance of a foreign judgment, however, depends on its meaning; thus, an accurate translation is also required. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”). Attached to defendants’ counterclaims here were original-language copies of several documents related to the proceedings in China—the complaint, the judgments of the Chinese trial and appellate courts, and the intermediate court’s acceptance of appeal—and English translations of the same. Although GMT initially contested the authenticity of the translations, defendants later filed re-translations to which GMT does not object. I therefore take judicial notice of the Chinese proceedings and judgment, as related in the revised translations.
B. Recognition and Enforcement of the Chinese Judgment
     Defendants seek recognition and enforcement of the Chinese intermediate court’s judgment under the Illinois Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The Recognition Act permits, as its title implies, recognition of a judgment rendered by a “foreign country,"where the judgment: (1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money; and (2) is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of that foreign country. It is the burden of the party seeking recognition–here, defendants–to establish that the Act applies. If entitled to recognition, the foreign-country judgment is conclusive between the parties to the same extent as would be a judgment rendered by another state entitled to full faith and credit, and it is enforceable to the same extent as would be a judgment rendered in Illinois. A request for recognition may be raised as a counterclaim in a pending suit, as defendants have done here.
     In the Chinese action, the trial court both granted and denied recovery by the litigants of various sums of money. DNZ was ordered to reimburse GMT for certain expenditures (related to the RJCT0 shipments), while GMT was ordered to pay some $966,000 in outstanding balances, as well as related damages. So the first requirement for recognition is satisfied. The second requirement for recognition—that the foreign judgment be final and enforceable under the laws of the foreign country—is also met. GMT agrees that the judgment of the Chinese intermediate court is final and enforceable in China, as it cannot be appealed there. Thus, the Chinese judgment is presumptively entitled to recognition under the Act.
     The Recognition Act provides that a foreign judgment meeting the above two criteria “shall” be recognized unless: (1) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction (personal or subject-matter), or (2) the foreign judicial system under which the judgment was rendered does not generally provide impartial tribunals or “procedures compatible with the requirements of due process." As used in the Act, “compatible with due process” means “fundamentally fair” or adhering to principles of basic fairness. See Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden,233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir.2000) (citations omitted); see also id. (distinguishing the “international concept of due process” from its American counterpart). If either element is present, the domestic court cannot recognize the foreign judgment. If, however, neither of these elements is present, the domestic court must recognize the foreign judgment unless it is shown that the specific proceeding at issue was otherwise problematic for one or more reasons as set forth in the Act–for example, the proceeding was incompatible with due process (i.e., it was fundamentally unfair), the judgment, or cause of action on which it was based, was repugnant to United States public policy or the public policy of Illinois, or the judgment was rendered “in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court” as to that judgment. If any such reason is shown, the court may in its discretion decline to recognize the judgment; but non-recognition is not compelled. See id. at 5/12–664(c) (stating that the court “need not” recognize the foreign-country judgment). It is the burden of the party opposing recognition—here, GMT—to show that a ground for non-recognition exists.
      GMT has not raised any issues that would compel non-recognition of the Chinese judgment in this case. GMT admits in its answer to DNZ’s counterclaim that the Chinese court had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. And GMT does not allege that the Chinese judicial system as a whole is biased and incompatible with principles of basic fairness. Non-recognition, therefore, is not mandatory. The court may nonetheless decline to recognize the foreign judgment (under Section 664(c)) if GMT can show that the particular proceeding at issue was problematic. This is the argument on which GMT hangs its hat: the Chinese judgment should not be recognized, says GMT, because the foreign proceedings in this instance were not fair or impartial, and the rendering court’s integrity in this case was suspect. GMT contends that the fairness (or not) of the Chinese proceedings is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on the pleadings, so judgment cannot be awarded to DNZ at this stage of the litigation. The determination of whether a particular proceeding was fair does involve certain considerations that are best treated as factual matters. I do not address any such factual issues here.
      At bottom, what GMT seeks is an examination by a United States court of how exactly the Chinese court approached GMT’s lawsuit abroad—and whether, with respect to certain aspects of that approach, the proceedings were fair enough to GMT. This kind of “retail” inspection is generally disfavored, as it frustrates the very purpose of the Recognition Act: to provide “a streamlined, expeditious method for collecting money judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions.” Ashenden,233 F.3d at 477; see also id. (“The process of collecting a judgment is not meant to require a second lawsuit ...". A retail approach is especially inappropriate where, as here, the party now opposing recognition is the same party who filed suit abroad—and the same party who, had they won in the foreign proceeding, would have tried to enforce that judgment in the United States. Recall, too, that GMT did not come away from the proceedings in China empty-handed. GMT won in the Chinese trial court a judgment for more than $200,000. And, besides affirming that judgment, the court of appeals modified DNZ’s judgment against GMT—in GMT’s favor. This is not a situation in which the prior proceeding was so obviously biased or unfair that a dissection of the kind sought by GMT is warranted. The Recognition Act is based on the principle of international comity, which reflects a general respect for the decisions of foreign judiciaries. It was not meant as a tool for gaining second chances at a (more) favorable judgment. Thus, the focus in this instance ought not to rest on the details of the individual proceeding in China, and nor does the statute require such parsing. The focus, rather, should be on the procedures afforded by the Chinese judicial system as a whole.
      But as noted above, GMT has not alleged that the Chinese judicial system in general provides biased courts or unfair procedures. Indeed, that GMT would have tried to enforce a more favorable Chinese judgment, had it obtained one, merely confirms that GMT has no creditable objection to how judicial proceedings are usually conducted in China. Even if GMT had pleaded systemic defects, whether a particular judicial system is fundamentally biased or unfair is not a question of fact; it is a question “about the law of a foreign nation”—and so, in answering this question, the district court may consult “any relevant material or source.” Although given an opportunity to do so, and although it is GMT’s burden to identify any grounds for non-recognition, GMT has not provided any materials suggesting that the Chinese judicial system is problematic in such a way as to preclude recognition of (that is, to mandate non-recognition of) the foreign judgment in this case.
     Accordingly, the judgment of the Chinese intermediate court is enforceable under the Recognition Act. Defendants’ motion for recognition and enforcement of the judgment of the Chinese intermediate court is therefore granted.
C. Claim Preclusion
* * * Omitted * * *
IV. Conclusion
      For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted insofar as defendants seek recognition and enforcement of the judgment rendered by the Chinese intermediate court. The CISG claim is precluded. The motion is denied as to preclusion of GMT’s trade-secrets claim.

4.4.3 Review of Enforcement of Judgments 4.4.3 Review of Enforcement of Judgments

     The Full Faith and Credit Clause is an important aspect of the US Constitutional system. By providing that judgments of one state court system can be enforced nationwide, it has played a significant role in binding the states into one political and governmental union.

     For our purposes, and following procedures that are beyond the scope of what we have time to cover, it means that judgments of sufficient quality granted by any US court can be enforced nationwide. If the defendant does not have assets sufficient to cover the judgment in the forum state, but does have assets in another state, the judgment may be taken to where resources exist sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

     Foreign judgments are much more complicated. First, enforcement of foreign judgments most frequently is a matter of state law. Foreign scholars and courts who deny comity to the US because there is no federal statute or rule for enforcing foreign judgments may not understand the nature of the US federal system at the level any STL graduate will be expected to understand that system. The fact is, most foreign money judgments have a good chance of being enforced in the US.

     We saw an example of an enforcement of a foreign judgment by a federal court applying state law. What law did the court apply? What was the source of the law that the state legislature passed and the court followed? What facts do you think were essential to the court's holding? For example, here the party objecting to the enforcement of the foreign judgment had itself initiated litigation in the foreign forum. Is that an essential element of the court's holding or merely an interesting but unessential fact?

     As you go into practice, remember that enforcement of judgments can be forum specific. For domestic, US judgments the procedures for technically domesticating a judgment vary by location and must be followed. For foreign judgments, the text or the application of the state law may also vary.

     One final thing to note is that the court distinguished between different concepts of due process. As you will learn both in this course and others, Due Process under the US Constitution is a well-developed and complex doctrine. The court refers, however, to a less technical sense of due process – basically, that in some sense the proceeding is fundamentally fair, even if the process is quite different from the US process. Could comity be applied if US Courts insisted that foreign courts receiving it conform to aspects of US Due Process that are exceptional, such as jury trials?

4.4.4 Questions on Enforcement of Judgments 4.4.4 Questions on Enforcement of Judgments

     Assume that Buyer wins a $5,000,000 judgment in state court in Mississippi. Seller has no assets in Mississippi but owns land and manufacturing facilities worth $20,000,000 in Florida. What are Buyer's options?

     Barry Buyer obtains a judgment in an overseas jurisdiction against Sammy Seller. He seeks to enforce this judgment in a state court in the United States. Discuss which soft law might be relevant.  

4.5 Appeals and Review 4.5 Appeals and Review

4.5.1 Overview of Appellate Process 4.5.1 Overview of Appellate Process

    US Federal judges are very good, but they are not perfect. Appeals and the other methods of obtaining review allow litigants to seek correction of mistaken decisions. There are also close cases where two different results are reasonable, and an appellate court might choose a different result than the trial court. 

     Having some sort of appellate process serves multiple functions. It allows the correction of errors in the individual case. It provides a mechanism to make sure that courts across a systemact with uniformity. In a common law system, it allows for the creation and announcement of rules of law. It allows higher courts to provide guidance, even aside from binding law, to lower courts and litigants.

     An appellate court has certain actions it can take. These are to vacate, to reverse, to remand, and to affirm. When a court vacates an opinion, the opinion below has no further effect. A remand sends the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. For example, when a case is vacated, it can be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding of the appellate court. This might happen if the lower court applied the wrong legal rule but the appellate court still wants the lower court to parse the facts and make a new determination. A reversal simply changes who wins - the winner below becomes the loser, and the loser the winner. An affirmance simply confirms at the appellate level the result below. In some cases, with multiple claims and parties, the court can affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand, all on parts of the same case. As you read the cases in this and other courses pay attention to exactly what the court does.

     As we go through this chapter, take note of the various vehicles for how review might be had. Understand both the statutory basis for the vehicle, and understand its role and limitations.

     We start with the basic default way to get review, which is to pursue an appeal subject to the rule of finality.

4.5.2 The Final Judgment Rule (And Built in Twists on the Rule) 4.5.2 The Final Judgment Rule (And Built in Twists on the Rule)

     As noted, we start with the rule of finality, which is incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We then look at a couple of twists on finality. There are situations where there is a kind of finality, but not the total end of the case that you might be thinking of. 

     We will then proceed to other statutory grants of authority to grant review, and then turn to an alternative to appeal that can allow the issues to be raised to an appellate court in certain narrow circumstances.

4.5.2.1 The Classic Rule of Finality 4.5.2.1 The Classic Rule of Finality

     We look first at the classic requirement of finality.

4.5.2.1.1 28 U.S.C. § 1291 - Final decisions of district courts 4.5.2.1.1 28 U.S.C. § 1291 - Final decisions of district courts

     The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.

4.5.2.1.2 The Final Judgment Rule 4.5.2.1.2 The Final Judgment Rule

     Federal courts, as we will spend much time learning in the second half of this course, are courts of limited jurisdiction. That means that they can only hear and decide those cases that fall within the Constitutional grant of authority and where there is a statutory pathway for review.

     28 U.S.C. § 1291 creates appellate jurisdiction for all "final decisions" of a district court. This statutory provision is not the only statute creating appellate jurisdiction, but it is the main one through which most federal appeals arise.

     What does the statute mean by final decision? Is a final decision any decision by the trial court where the trial court indicates that it has made up its mind and will not reconsider? Not at all. 

A ‘final decision’ for purposes of appeal under Judicial Code is one which ends litigation upon the merits and leaves nothing for court to do but execute the judgment.  Catlin v. US, 324 US 229 (1945)

      Imagine that a motion has been made to dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction. A decision to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction will end the lawsuit, leaving nothing for the trial court to do. Such a decision will be a final judgment. What if the court denies the motion, and finds that there is personal jurisdiction? Even if this decision represents the final word the trial court is going to say on this particular issue, the litigation will continue. There will be much for the trial court to do before there is any judgment to be executed. Such a decision is not a final decision for purposes of Section 1291.

      This approach vests much power in the trial judge in the federal system, as many decisions will be effectively immune from review until, at least, the end of the trial phase. This reflects a high level of confidence in the capability of the federal judiciary.

      At the same time, since many cases settle in light of such rulings as the case goes on, this rule means that in many cases there will never be a good chance for appellate review. Parties might decide that litigating the case to final judgment just to be able to bring an appeal of a legal ruling by the trial court represents a poor investment. Litigants considering litigation or who have been brought into litigation need to keep this reality in mind as they consider their strategic options. Being right, and having the trial judge be wrong (and they sometimes are), does not mean as a practical matter that it will be sensible or cost-effective to get the judge's error to an appellate court.

      As we go forward, note the various devices and doctrines that respond to this concern. Also note that states can and do have their own rules - the New York state rules included below, for example, are here as an illustration that state procedure might choose a very different solution.

4.5.2.1.3 A Different Approach - New York State Appellate Procedure 4.5.2.1.3 A Different Approach - New York State Appellate Procedure

     From a systems design approach, the final judgment rule is not inevitable and comes with certain costs. By deferring review in the normal case until all trial level matters are complete, an incorrect decision on a key issue can lead to much wasted effort when the case effectively has to start again after the appeal. Given that many legal issues are capable of debate such that the correct resolution is not always obvious, this is not just a hypothetical problem. At a more practical level, since most US cases are resolved by settlement, the negotiating range for the settlement can be distorted by the incorrect decision; moreover, the lack of a final appealable judgment after settlement means that the disputed issue may never get to an appellate court for resolution.

     Reprinted below is the text of section 5701 of the New York Civil Practice Law and  Rules, the New York state-law equivalent of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1292.  Unlike its federal counterpart, New York law allows parties litigating in its state courts system to appeal most orders—whether final or interlocutory—to the state's Appellate Division (the intermediate appellate court).

    As you read through it, ask yourself what difference might this make strategically?  For example, how might a case or negotiations to resolve it by settlement proceed differently if a contestable decision that the court has jurisdiction to hear the case can be appealed immediately?

§ 5701. Appeals to appellate division from supreme and county courts.

      (a) Appeals as of right.  An appeal may be taken to the appellate division as of right in an action, originating in the supreme court or a county court:

           1. from any final or interlocutory judgment except one entered subsequent to an order of the appellate division which disposes of all the issues in the action; or

           2. from an order not specified in subdivision (b), where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it:

                (i) grants, refuses, continues or modifies a provisional remedy; or

                (ii) settles, grants or refuses an application to resettle a transcript or statement on appeal; or

                (iii) grants or refuses a new trial; except where specific questions of fact arising upon the issues in an action triable by the court have been tried by a jury, pursuant to an order for that purpose, and the order grants or refuses a new trial upon the merits; or

                (iv) involves some part of the merits; or

                (v) affects a substantial right; or

                (vi) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken; or

                (vii) determines a statutory provision of the state to be unconstitutional, and the determination appears from the reasons given for the decision or is necessarily implied in the decision; or

                (viii) grants a motion for leave to reargue made pursuant to subdivision (d) of rule 2221 or determines a motion for leave to renew made pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule 2221; or

          3. from an order, where the motion it decided was made upon notice, refusing to vacate or modify a prior order, if the prior order would have been appealable as of right under paragraph two had it decided a motion made upon notice.

     (b) Orders not appealable as of right.  An order is not appealable to the appellate division as of right where it:

          1. is made in a proceeding against a body or officer pursuant to article 78; or

          2. requires or refuses to require a more definite statement in a pleading; or

          3. orders or refuses to order that scandalous or prejudicial matter be stricken from a pleading.

     (c) Appeals by permission.  An appeal may be taken to the appellate division from any order which is not appealable as of right in an action originating in the supreme court or a county court by permission of the judge who made the order granted before application to a justice of the appellate division; or by permission of a justice of the appellate division in the department to which the appeal could be taken, upon refusal by the judge who made the order or upon direct application.

     The New York approach also raises system design issues and has costs. Most immediately, access to piecemeal appeals creates a risk that a case might be delayed while those appeals proceed, delaying the resolution of the case. Given the old adage that justice delayed is justice denied, the systems cost of that approach can be substantial.

      As this is a course in federal procedure, we will focus on the federal rules. There will be times, however, when your clients may have a choice between proceeding in federal court or state court. In that situation, be aware that while many states follow the federal approach in designing their litigation system none are required to and not all choose to. Be aware of the possibility of different rules between state courts and federal courts, and be prepared to think through whether any difference might give your client an advantage or a disadvantage as the litigation proceeds.

4.5.2.1.4 Review of "No Twists" Final Judgment 4.5.2.1.4 Review of "No Twists" Final Judgment

To make sure you understand the final judgment rule, think through the following situations. Ask yourself if an immediate appeal by be had pursuant to  § 1291. Just to make sure you understand that not all systems are the same as the federal system, ask yourself what rule would be applied under the New York statute.

1) A defendant files a motion to dismiss the case arguing that an important constitutional right will be violated if the case goes forward. The judge denies the motion

2) A defendant files a motion to dismiss the case. The judge grants the motion, and an order dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice is ordered.

 

4.5.2.2 Rule 54(b) and Cases Involving Multiple Claims 4.5.2.2 Rule 54(b) and Cases Involving Multiple Claims

     What happens when a case involves more than one party or more than one claim? A judge's decision might end the litigation on one claim or with regard to one party, but the case goes on. This was not the case in the common law, where there was one claim per writ. Rule 54(b) responds to that situation, providing a pathway for review of such final but partial decisions.

4.5.2.2.1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b) 4.5.2.2.1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b)

(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

4.5.2.2.2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey 4.5.2.2.2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey

SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. v. MACKEY et al.

No. 34.

Argued February 28, 1956.

Decided June 11, 1956.

*428Walter J. Rockier argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

Edward I. Rothschild argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief for Mackey, respondent, was John Paul Stevens.

Mr. Justice Burton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This action, presenting multiple claims for relief, was brought by Mackey and another in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in 1953. The court expressly directed that judgment be entered for the defendant, Sears, Roebuck & Co., on two, but less than all, of the claims presented. It also expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay in making the entry. After Mackey’s notice of appeal from that judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Sears, Roebuck & Co. moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals upheld its jurisdiction and denied the *429motion, relying upon 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1946. 218 F. 2d 295. Because of the importance of the issue in determining appellate jurisdiction and because of a conflict of judicial views on the subject,1 we granted certiorari. 348 U. S. 970. For the reasons hereafter stated, we sustain the Court of Appeals and its appellate jurisdiction.

Although we are here concerned with the present ap-pealability of the judgment of the District Court and not with its merits, we must examine the claims stated in the complaint so as to consider adequately the issue of appealability.

The complaint contains six counts. We disregard the fifth because it has been abandoned and the sixth because it duplicates others. The claims stated in Counts I and II are material and have been dismissed without leave to amend. The claim contained in Count III and that in amended Count IV are at issue on the answers filed by Sears, Roebuck & Co. The appeal before us is from a *430judgment striking out Counts I and II without disturbing Counts III and IV, and the question presented is whether such a judgment is presently appealable when the District Court, pursuant to amended Rule 54 (b), has made “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay” and has given “an express direction for the entry of judgment.”

In Count I, Mackey, a citizen of Illinois, and Time Saver Tools, Inc., an Illinois corporation owned by Mackey, are the original plaintiffs and the respondents here. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a New York corporation doing business in Illinois, is the original defendant and the petitioner here. Mackey charges Sears with conduct violating the Sherman Antitrust Act in a manner prejudicial to three of Mackey’s commercial ventures causing him $190,000 damages, for which he seeks $570,000 as treble damages. His first charge is unlawful destruction by Sears, since 1949, of the market for nursery lamps manufactured by General Metalcraft Company, a corporation wholly owned by Mackey. Mackey claims that this caused him a loss of $150,000. His second charge is unlawful interference by Sears, in 1952, with Mackey’s contract to sell, on commission, certain tools and other products of the Vascoloy-Ramet Corporation, causing Mackey to lose $15,000. His third charge is unlawful destruction by Sears, in 1952, of the market for a new type of carbide-tipped lathe bit and for other articles manufactured by Time Saver Tools, Inc., resulting in a loss to Mackey of $25,000. Mackey combines such charges with allegations that Sears has used its great size to monopolize commerce and restrain competition in these fields. He asks for damages and equitable relief.

In Count II, Mackey claims federal jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship. He incorporates the allegations of Count I as to the Metalcraft transactions and asks for $250,000 damages for Sears’ wilful destruc*431tion of the business of Metalcraft, plus $50,000 for Mackey’s loss on obligations guaranteed by him.

In Count III, Mackey seeks $75,000 in a common-law proceeding against Sears for unlawfully inducing a breach of his Yascoloy commission contract.

In Count IV, Time Saver seeks $200,000 in a common-law proceeding against Sears for unlawfully destroying Time Saver’s business by unfair competition and patent infringement.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain Mackey’s appeal from the District Court’s judgment depends upon 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which provides that “The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

If Mackey’s complaint had contained only Count I, there is no doubt that a judgment striking out that count and thus dismissing, in its entirety, the claim there stated would be both a final and an appealable decision within the meaning of § 1291. Similarly, if his complaint had contained Counts I, II, III and IV, there is no doubt that a judgment striking out all four would be a final and appealable decision under § 1291. The controversy before us arises solely because, in this multiple claims action, the District Court has dismissed the claims stated in Counts I and II, but has left unadjudicated those stated in Counts III and IV.2

Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1939, such a situation was generally regarded as leaving the appellate court without jurisdiction- of an attempted appeal. It was thought that, although the judgment was a final decision on the respective claims in Counts I and II, it obviously was not a final decision of *432the whole case, and there was no authority for treating anything less than the whole case as a judicial unit for purposes of appeal.3 This construction of the judicial unit was developed from the common law which had dealt with litigation generally less complicated than much of that of today.4

With the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there came an increased opportunity for the liberal joinder of claims in multiple claims actions. This, in turn, demonstrated a need for relaxing the restrictions upon what should be treated as a judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Sound judicial administration did not require relaxation of the standard of finality in the disposition of the individual adjudicated claims for the purpose of their appealability. It did, however, demonstrate that, at least in multiple claims actions, some final decisions, on less than all of the claims, should be appealable without waiting for a final decision on all of the claims. Largely to *433meet this need, in 1939, Rule 54 (b) was promulgated in its original form through joint action of Congress and this Court.5 It read as follows:

“(b) Judgment at Various Stages. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is so entered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.”

It gave limited relief. The courts interpreted it as not relaxing the requirement of a “final decision” on each individual claim as the basis for an appeal, but as author*434izing a limited relaxation of the former general practice that, in multiple claims actions, all the claims had to be finally decided before an appeal could be entertained from a final decision upon any of them.6 Thus, original Rule 54 (b) modified the single judicial unit theory but left unimpaired the statutory concept of finality prescribed by § 1291. However, it was soon found to be inherently difficult to determine by any automatic standard of unity which of several multiple claims were sufficiently separable from others to qualify for this relaxation of the unitary principle in favor of their appealability. The result was that the jurisdictional time for taking an appeal from a final decision on less than all of the claims in a multiple claims action in some instances expired earlier than was foreseen by the losing party. It thus became prudent to take immediate appeals in all cases of doubtful appealability and the volume of appellate proceedings was undesirably increased.

Largely to overcome this difficulty, Rule 54 (b) was amended, in 1946, to take effect in 1948.7 Since then it has read as follows:

“(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination *435that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In this form, it does not relax the finality required of each decision, as an individual claim, to render it appeal-able, but it does provide a practical means of permitting an appeal to be taken from one or more final decisions on individual claims, in multiple claims actions, without waiting for final decisions to be rendered on all the claims in the case. The amended rule does not apply to a single claim action nor to a multiple claims action in which all of the claims have been finally decided. It is limited expressly to multiple claims actions in which “one or more but less than all” of the multiple claims have been finally decided and are found otherwise to be ready for appeal.

To meet the demonstrated need for flexibility, the District Court is used as a “dispatcher.” It is permitted to determine, in the first instance, the appropriate time when each “final decision” upon “one or more but less than all” of the claims in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. This arrangement already has lent welcome certainty to the appellate procedure. Its “negative effect” has met with uniform approval. The effect so referred to is the rule’s specific requirement that for “one or more but less than all” multiple claims to become appealable, the District Court must make both “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay” and “an express direction for the entry of judgment.” A party adversely affected by a final decision thus knows that *436his time for appeal will not run against him until this certification has been made.8

In the instant case, the District Court made this certification, but Sears, Roebuck & Co. nevertheless moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. The grounds for such a motion ordinarily might be (1) that the judgment of the District Court was not a decision upon a “claim for relief,” (2) that the decision was not a “final decision” in the sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action, or (3) that the District Court abused its discretion in certifying the order.

In the case before us, there is no doubt that each of the claims dismissed is a “claim for relief” within the meaning of Rule 54 (b), or that their dismissal constitutes a “final decision” on individual claims. Also, it cannot well be argued that the claims stated in Counts I and II are so inherently inseparable from, or closely related to, those stated in Counts III and IV that the District Court has abused its discretion in certifying that there exists no just reason for delay. They certainly can be decided independently of each other.

Petitioner contends that amended Rule 54 (b) attempts to make an unauthorized extension of § 1291. We disagree. It could readily be argued here that the claims stated in Counts I and II are sufficiently independent of those stated in Counts III and IV to satisfy the requirements of Rule 54 (b) even in its original form. If that were so, the decision dismissing them would also be appealable under the amended rule. It is nowhere contended today that a decision that would have been appealable under the original rule is not also appealable under the amended rule, provided the District Court makes the required certification.

*437While it thus might be possible to hold that in this case the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under original Rule 54 (b), there at least would be room for argument on the issue of whether the decided claims were separate and independent from those still pending in the District Court.9 Thus the instant case affords an excellent illustration of the value of the amended rule which was designed to overcome that difficulty. Assuming that the requirements of the original rule are not met in this case, we nevertheless are enabled to recognize the present appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under the amended rule. The District Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, treat as “final” that which is not “final” within the meaning of § 1291. But the District Court may, by the exercise of its discretion in the interest of sound judicial administration, release for appeal final decisions upon one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple claims actions. The timing of such a release is, with good reason, vested by the rule primarily in the discretion of the District Court as the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay. With equally good reason, any abuse of that discretion remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

Rule 54 (b), in its original form, thus may be said to have modified the single judicial unit practice which had been developed by court decisions. The validity of that rule is no longer questioned. In fact, it was applied by this Court in Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U. S. 283, without its validity being questioned.

*438Rule 54 (b), in its amended form, is a comparable exercise of the rulemaking authority of this Court. It does not supersede any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction. It scrupulously recognizes the statutory requirement of a “final decision” under § 1291 as a basic requirement for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. It merely administers that requirement in a practical manner in multiple claims actions and does so by rule instead of by judicial decision. By its negative effect, it operates to restrict in a valid manner the number of appeals in multiple claims actions.

We reach a like conclusion as to the validity of the amended rule where the District Court acts affirmatively and thus assists in properly timing the release of final decisions in multiple claims actions. The amended rule adapts the single judicial unit theory so that it better meets the current needs of judicial administration. Just as Rule 54 (b), in its original form, resulted in the release of some decisions on claims in multiple claims actions before they otherwise would have been released,10 so amended Rule 54 (b) now makes possible the release of more of such decisions subject to judicial supervision. The amended rule preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals in many cases more effectively than did the original rule.11

Accordingly, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is sustained,12 and its judgment denying the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction is

Affirmed.

1

For decisions directly or impliedly sustaining the validity of amended Rule 54 (b), as applied in the instant case, see Rieser v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 224 F. 2d 198 (C. A. 2d Cir.), and cases cited at 203, n. 7; United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc., 221 F. 2d 213 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Clarksville v. United States, 198 F. 2d 238 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lea & Febiger, 195 F. 2d 853 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F. 2d 267 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F. 2d 422 (C. A. 2d Cir.), concr. op. of Judge Clark, at 424-430; Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F. 2d 169 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953) 220-230, and Note, 62 Yale L. J. 263.

Contra: See Rieser v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra, concr. op. of Judge Frank, at 205-208; Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, supra, concr. op. of Judge Hastie, at 277-282; Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., supra, concr. op. of Judge Frank, at 176-181; Flegenheimer v. General Mills, Inc., 191 F. 2d 237 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See also, Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 249, 209 F. 2d 802.

2

Sears also contends that the Court of Appeals misconstrued amended Rule 54 (b). See Flegenheimer v. General Mills, Inc., supra. The meaning of that rule is considered hereafter.

3

At common law, a writ of error did not lie to review a judgment that failed to adjudicate every cause of action asserted in the controversy. See Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How. 552; United States v. Girault, 11 How. 22; Metcalfe’s Case, 11 Co. Rep. 38a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193. The rule generally followed in the federal courts was that, in a case involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, a judgment was not appealable if it disposed of some, but less than all, of the claims presented. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364; Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 F. 946 (C. A. 2d Cir.). In eases involving multiple parties where the alleged liability was joint, a judgment was not appealable unless it terminated the action as to all the defendants. See Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U. S. 262. But if, in a multiple party case, a judgment finally disposed of a claim that was recognized to be separate and distinct from the others, that judgment, under some circumstances, was appealable. See Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F. 2d 334 (C. A. 2d Cir.).

4

The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals, with exceptions not directly pertinent here, is still largely restricted to the review of cases appealed under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. But see Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541; 28 U. S. C. §§ 1292, 1651.

5

The Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is derived from the Enabling Act, now appearing as 28 U. S. C. § 2072. It authorizes this Court to promulgate rules governing “the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States ... in civil actions.” It provides that such rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right . . . .” And, by reason of Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, it has been held repeatedly that only Congress may define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1; Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176; and Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 82. “Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.” 28 U. S. C. § 2072.

6

See Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., supra, at 174.

7

“. . . situations arose where district courts made a piecemeal disposition of an action and entered what the parties thought amounted to a judgment, although a trial remained to be had on other claims similar or identical with those disposed of. In the interim the parties did not know their ultimate rights, and accordingly took an appeal, thus putting the finality of the partial judgment in question.” Report of Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 70-71 (June 1946).

8

For favorable comment on this aspect of the rule, see Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 338 U. S. 507, 511-512.

9

In the instant case, the claim dismissed by striking out Count I is based on the Sherman Act, while Counts III and IV do not rely on, or even refer to, that Act. They are largely predicated on common-law rights. The basis of liability in Count I is independent of that on which the claims in Counts III and IV depend. But the claim in Count I does rest in part on some of the facts that are involved in Counts III and IV. The claim stated in Count II is clearly independent of those in Counts III and IV.

10

See Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. 2d 83 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cited in Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U. S. 283.

11

See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323.

12

Mackey also argues that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (1). In view of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that contention.

*439Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins,

concurring in No. 34 and dissenting in No. 76.

The result in these two litigations of course has significance for the parties. That is, however, of relative insignificance compared to the directions which judges in the district courts and courts of appeals will draw from the Court’s opinions. For me, what is said has not a little kinship with the pronouncements of the Delphic oracle.

The opinion in Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., post, p. 445, declares that 28 U. S. C. § 1291 remains unimpaired, but surely that section does not remain what it was before these opinions were written. Rule 54 (b) is apparently the transforming cause. The Court could have said that Rule 54 (b), promulgated under congressional authority and having the force of statute, has qualified 28 U. S. C. § 1291. It does not say so. The Court could have said that it rejects the reasoning of the decisions in which this Court for over a century has interpreted § 1291 as expressing a hostility toward piecemeal appeals. It does not say so. The Court could have said that Rule 54 (b)’s requirement of a certificate from a district judge means that the district judges alone determine the content of finality. The Court does not say that either.

The Court does indicate that what has been the core of the doctrine of finality as applied to multiple claims litigation — that only that part of a litigation which is separate from, and independent of, the remainder of the litigation can be appealed before the completion of the entire litigation — is no longer to be applied as a standard, or at least as an exclusive standard, for deciding what is final for purposes of § 1291. The Court does not, however, indicate what standards the district courts and the courts of appeals are now to apply in determining when a decision is final. It leaves this problem in the first *440instance to the district courts, subject to review by the courts of appeals for an abuse of discretion. In other instances where a district court’s ruling can be upset only for an abuse of its discretion, the scope of review is necessarily narrow. Here, in regard to the present problem, what is to come under review is a newly modified requirement of finality. But the requirement continues to be based upon a statute, viz., 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and that statute defines and constricts the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Therefore the issue of compliance with this congressional command would, I should suppose, cast upon the courts of appeals a duty of independent judgment broader than is implied by the usual flavor of the phrase “abuse of discretion.”

For me, the propositions emerging from analysis of the relationship of Rule 54 (b) to 28 U. S. C. § 1291 are clear.

1. 28 U. S. C. § 1291 is left intact by Rule 54 (b). It could not be otherwise with due regard for the congressional policy embodied in that section and in view of what the Advisory Committee on the Rules said in its Note to amended Rule 54 (b):

“The historic rule in the federal courts has always prohibited piecemeal disposal of litigation and permitted appeals only from final judgments except in those special instances covered by statute. . . . Rule 54 (b) was originally adopted in view of the wide scope and possible content of the newly created ‘civil action’ in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case. It was not designed to overturn the settled federal rule stated above ....
“. . . After extended consideration, it [the Committee] concluded that a retention of the older fed*441eral rule was desirable, and that this rule needed only the exercise of a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case to provide a simple, definite, workable rule. This is afforded by amended Rule 54 (b). It re-establishes an ancient policy with clarity and precision. . . .” Report of Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 70-72.

2. 28 U. S. C. § 1291 is not a technical rule in a game. It expresses not only a deeply rooted but a wisely sanctioned principle against piecemeal appeals governing litigation in the federal courts. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323; Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127. The great importance of this characteristic feature of the federal judicial system — its importance in administering justice — is made luminously manifest by considering the evils where, as in New York, piecemeal reviews are allowed.

3. While the principle against piecemeal appeals has been compendiously and therefore, at times, loosely phrased as implying that the whole of a litigation, no matter what its nature, must be completed before any appeal is allowed, see Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 370, the underlying rationale of the principle has been respected when not susceptible of this mechanical way of putting it. What have been called exceptions are not exceptions at all in the sense of inroads on the principle. They have not qualified the core, that is, that there should be no premature, intermediate appeal.

Thus the Court has permitted appeal before completion of the whole litigation when failure to do so would preclude any effective review or would result in irreparable injury. See Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545-547; Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U. S. 684, 688-689. A *442second situation in which the Court has found that an appeal before termination of the entire litigation did not conflict with the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals is that in which a party to the completed portion of the litigation has no interest in the rest of the proceedings and to make him await their outcome would merely cause unfairness. See Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 699; United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 413-414.

4. The expansion by the Federal Rules of the allowable content of a proceeding and the range of a litigation inevitably enlarged the occasions for severing one aspect or portion of a litigation from what remains under the traditional test of a “final decision.” On the basis of prior cases, we held that it was not a departure from the policy against piecemeal appeals to permit an appeal with respect to that part of a multiple claims litigation based on a set of facts separate and independent from the facts on which the remainder of the litigation was based. Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U. S. 283. The Note of the Advisory Committee, quoted supra, demonstrates that the amended Rule 54 (b) was designed in accordance with the historic policy against premature appeal and with the decisions of this Court allowing appeal from a “judgment of a distinctly separate claim.” What the Rule did introduce, however, was a discretionary power in the district judge to control appealability by preventing a party from even attempting to appeal a severable part of a litigation unless the district judge has expressly certified that there is no just reason for delay and has expressly directed entry of judgment on that phase of the litigation. This provision was directed to the kind of difficulty encountered in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507, in ascertaining whether the district judge is in fact finished with a separable part of the litigation.

*443The Court casually disregards this long history of § 1291 and the bearing of Rule 54 (b) to it by rejecting the separate-and-independent test as the basis for determining the finality of a part of a multiple claims litigation. The Court says that its decision “does not impair the statutory concept of finality embraced in § 1291.” The Court may not do so in words, for it pays lip-service to § 1291. But that section’s function as a brake against piecemeal appeals in future multiple claims litigation is greatly impaired. Encouragement is abundantly given to parties to seek such appeals.

The principles which this Court has heretofore enunciated over a long course of decisions under § 1291 furnish ready guides for deciding the appealability of the certified parts of the litigation in the two cases now before the Court. Count II in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, p. 427, is appealable since the transactions and occurrences involved in it do not involve any of those embraced in Counts III and IV. Count I involves at least two transactions which are also the subject matter of Counts III and IV, but is appealable under § 1292 (1) as an interlocutory order denying an injunction. In Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., post, p. 445, the counterclaim, even if not compulsory, is based in substantial part on the transactions involved in the main litigation and hence not appealable.

5. Of course, as the Court’s opinion appears to recognize, that crucial principle of the doctrine of finality that the court of appeals has no jurisdiction unless there is a “final decision” cannot be left to the district court. It is one thing for a district court to determine whether it is or is not through with a portion of a litigation. It is quite another thing for it to determine whether the requirements of § 1291 are satisfied so as to give jurisdiction to the court of appeals. A district court can no more confer *444jurisdiction on a court of appeals outside the limits of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 than a state supreme court can confer jurisdiction on this Court beyond the bounds of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. In a particular litigation the opinion of the district judge may properly be deemed a valuable guide. But flexibility would be a strange name for authority in the district court to command the court of appeals to exercise jurisdiction.

6. In summary, then, the Court rightly states, even if it does not hold, that § 1291 is unimpaired by Rule 54 (b). Section 1291 is what a long course of decision has construed it to be. The unifying principle of decisions for over a century is observance of hostility in the federal judicial system to piecemeal appellate review (with a few strictly defined exceptions not here relevant, see 28 U. S. C. § 1292) of one litigation, no matter how many phases or parts there may be to a single judicial proceeding, so long as no part has become separated from, and independent of, the others. This rooted principle against piecemeal appeals of an organic whole — the core of § 1291 — is not left unimpaired when its enforcement is committed without guidance to the individualized notions about finality of some two hundred and fifty district judges, themselves accountable to the discordant views of eleven essentially independent courts of appeals. Allowing such leeway to the district courts and courts of appeals is not flexibility but anarchy.

4.5.2.2.3 Notes on Rule 54(b) 4.5.2.2.3 Notes on Rule 54(b)

     1.  Rule 54(b) is not an exception to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rather, it is an implementation of § 1291 in the context of the federal rules, which unlike some traditional practices allow the aggregation of multiple claims and multiple parties in the same lawsuit. It still requires a final judgment for that part of the lawsuit to which it applies.

     2. Consider a lawsuit between one plaintiff and one defendant but involving two claims. At summary judgment, the court dismisses count one and pursuant to Rule 54(b) enters the required certification that there is no just cause for delay. The court carefully considers dismissing count two, but decides to deny the motion for summary judgment. In that context, the plaintiff may appeal the dismissal of count one yet the defendant may not appeal the dismissal of count two. Why? Could the court make an appeal on count two possible if, pursuant only to 54(b), it said that there was no just cause for delay and purported to enter the certification?  Is there a final judgment with regard to count two? Same analysis if it is a two defendant lawsuit and the court dismisses the claims against defendant one but does not dismiss the claims against defendant two. Assuming entry of the appropriate certifications under Rule 54(b), who is allowed to bring an appeal?

3. Note the potential interaction of Rule 54(b) and the statutory deadline for filing an appeal. If a party fails to file an appeal after the court enters final judgment, the statutory deadline for an appeal may pass - and probably will pass - before the rest of the lawsuit is resolved. 

 

4.5.2.3 The 'Cohen' or Collateral Order Doctrine 4.5.2.3 The 'Cohen' or Collateral Order Doctrine

     Cohen is another implementation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in certain special and limited circumstances. As you read the case, focus on what kinds of situations might fall under the rule applied in this case.

4.5.2.3.1 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 4.5.2.3.1 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

337 U.S. 541 (1949)

COHEN, EXECUTRIX, ET AL.
v.
BENEFICIAL INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORP. ET AL.

No. 442.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 18, 1949.
Decided June 20, 1949.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.[1]

[542] Charles Hershenstein and Philip B. Kurland argued the cause for petitioners in No. 442 and respondents in [543] No. 512. With them on the brief were Edward J. O'Mara, Samuel Dreskin and David F. Cohen.

John M. Harlan argued the cause for the Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., respondent in No. 442 and petitioner in No. 512. With him on the brief were Charles Danzig and Walter Pond.

Briefs of amici curiae in support of petitioners in No. 442 and respondents in No. 512 were filed by Julius Levy for Weinberger; and by Lewis M. Dabney, Jr.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The ultimate question here is whether a federal court, having jurisdiction of a stockholder's derivative action only because the parties are of diverse citizenship, must apply a statute of the forum state which makes the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense and entitles the corporation to require security for their payment.

Petitioners' decedent, as plaintiff, brought in the United States District Court for New Jersey an action in the right of the Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, a Delaware corporation doing business in New Jersey. The defendants were the corporation and certain of its managers and directors. The complaint alleged generally that since 1929 the individual defendants engaged in a continuing and successful conspiracy to enrich themselves at the expense of the corporation. Specific charges of mismanagement and fraud extended over a period of eighteen years and the assets allegedly wasted or diverted thereby were said to exceed $100,000,000. The stockholder had demanded that the corporation institute proceedings for its recovery but, by their control of the corporation, the individual defendants prevented it from doing so. This stockholder, therefore, sought to assert [544] the right of the corporation. One of 16,000 stockholders, he owned 100 of its more than two million shares, so that his holdings, together with 150 shares held by the intervenor, approximated 0. 0125% of the outstanding stock and had a market value that had never exceeded $9,000.

The action was brought in 1943, and various proceedings had been taken therein when, in 1945, New Jersey enacted the statute which is here involved.[2] Its general effect is to make a plaintiff having so small an interest liable for the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees of [545] the defense if he fails to make good his complaint and to entitle the corporation to indemnity before the case can be prosecuted. These conditions are made applicable to pending actions. The corporate defendant therefore moved to require security, pointed to its by-laws by which it might be required to indemnify the individual defendants, and averred that a bond of $125,000 would be appropriate.

The District Court was of the opinion that the state enactment is not applicable to such an action when pending in a federal court, 7 F.R.D. 352. The Court of Appeals was of a contrary opinion and reversed, 170 F.2d 44, and we granted certiorari. 336 U.S. 917.

APPEALABILITY.

At the threshold we are met with the question whether the District Court's order refusing to apply the statute was an appealable one. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides, as did its predecessors, for appeal only "from all final decisions of the district courts," except when direct appeal to this Court is provided. Section 1292 allows appeals also from certain interlocutory orders, decrees and judgments, not material to this case except as they indicate the purpose to allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties. It is obvious that, if Congress had allowed appeals only from those final judgments which terminate an action, this order would not be appealable.

[546] The effect of the statute is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete. Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal. But the District Court's action upon this application was concluded and closed and its decision final in that sense before the appeal was taken.

Nor does the statute permit appeals, even from fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge. The purpose is to combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results. But this order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment. When that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably. We conclude that the matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case.

This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical construction. Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 1 Pet. 567, 569; United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328.

We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient [547] of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it. But we do not mean that every order fixing security is subject to appeal. Here it is the right to security that presents a serious and unsettled question. If the right were admitted or clear and the order involved only an exercise of discretion as to the amount of security, a matter the statute makes subject to reconsideration from time to time, appealability would present a different question.

Since this order may be reviewed on appeal, the petition in No. 512, whereby the corporation asserts the right to compel security by mandamus, is dismissed.

CONSTITUTIONALITY.

Petitioners deny the validity of the statute under the Federal Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution. The latter question is ultimately for the state courts, and since they have made no contrary determination, we shall presume in the circumstances of this case that the statute conforms with the state constitution.

Federal constitutional questions we must consider, because a federal court would not give effect, in either a diversity or nondiversity case, to a state statute that violates the Constitution of the United States.

The background of stockholder litigation with which this statute deals requires no more than general notice. As business enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorporation, management became vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling other people's money. The vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to be drawn to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered holders of small interests. The director was not subject to an effective accountability. That created strong temptation for managers to profit personally at expense of their trust. The business code became all too tolerant of such practices. Corporate laws [548] were lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders, in face of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust.

Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to bring civil action at law against faithless directors and managers. Equity, however, allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand in his own. It required him first to demand that the corporation vindicate its own rights, but when, as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrongs also were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and adjudge the corporation's cause through its stockholder with the corporation as a defendant, albeit a rather nominal one. This remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there would be little practical check on such abuses.

Unfortunately, the remedy itself provided opportunity for abuse, which was not neglected. Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon their nuisance value. They were bought off by secret settlements in which any wrongs to the general body of share owners were compounded by the suing stockholder, who was mollified by payments from corporate assets. These litigations were aptly characterized in professional slang as "strike suits." And it was said that these suits were more commonly brought by small and irresponsible than by large stockholders, because the former put less to risk and a small interest was more often within the capacity and readiness of management to compromise than a large one.

We need not determine the measure of these abuses or the evils they produced on the one hand or prevented [549] and redressed on the other. The Legislature of New Jersey, like that of other states,[3] considered them sufficient to warrant some remedial measures.

The very nature of the stockholder's derivative action makes it one in the regulation of which the legislature of a state has wide powers. Whatever theory one may hold as to the nature of the corporate entity, it remains a wholly artificial creation whose internal relations between management and stockholders are dependent upon state law and may be subject to most complete and penetrating regulation, either by public authority or by some form of stockholder action. Directors and managers, if not technically trustees, occupy positions of a fiduciary nature, and nothing in the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from imposing on them the strictest measure of responsibility, liability and accountability, either as a condition of assuming office or as a consequence of holding it.

Likewise, a stockholder who brings suit on a cause of action derived from the corporation assumes a position, not technically as a trustee perhaps, but one of a fiduciary character. He sues, not for himself alone, but as representative of a class comprising all who are similarly situated. The interests of all in the redress of the wrongs are taken into his hands, dependent upon his diligence, wisdom and integrity. And while the stockholders have chosen the corporate director or manager, they have no such election as to a plaintiff who steps forward to represent them. He is a self-chosen representative and a volunteer champion. The Federal Constitution does not oblige the state to place its litigating and adjudicating processes at the disposal of such a [550] representative, at least without imposing standards of responsibility, liability and accountability which it considers will protect the interests he elects himself to represent. It is not without significance that this Court has found it necessary long ago in the Equity Rules[4] and now in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[5] to impose procedural regulations of the class action not applicable to any other. We conclude that the state has plenary power over this type of litigation.

In considering specific objections to the way in which the state has exercised its power in this particular statute, it should be unnecessary to say that we are concerned only with objections which go to constitutionality. The wisdom and the policy of this and similar statutes are involved in controversies amply debated in legal literature[6] but not for us to judge, and hence not for us to remark upon. The Federal Constitution does not invalidate state legislation because it fails to embody the [551] highest wisdom or provide the best conceivable remedies. Nor can legislation be set aside by courts because of the fact, if it be such, that it has been sponsored and promoted by those who advantage from it.[7] In dealing with such difficult and controversial subjects, only experience will verify or disclose weaknesses and defects of any policy and teach lessons which may be applied by amendment. Within the area of constitutionality, the states should not be restrained from devising experiments, even those we might think dubious, in the effort to preserve the maximum good which equity sought in creating the derivative stockholder's action and at the same time to eliminate as much as possible its defects and evils.

It is said that this statute transgresses the Due Process Clause by being "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable"; the Equal Protection Clause by singling out small stockholders to burden most heavily; that it violates the Contract Clause; and that its application to pending litigation renders it unconstitutionally retroactive.

The contention that this statute violates the Contract Clause of the Constitution is one in which we see not the slightest merit. Plaintiff's suit is entertained by equity largely because he had no contract rights on which to base an action at law, and hence none which is impaired by this legislation.

In considering whether the statute offends the Due Process Clause we can judge it only by its own terms, for it has had no interpretation or application as yet. It imposes liability and requires security for "the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be incurred" (emphasis supplied) by the corporation and by other parties defendant. The amount of security is subject to increase if the progress of the litigation reveals [552] that it is inadequate, or to decrease if it is proved to be excessive. A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigations in its courts. No type of litigation is more susceptible of regulation than that of a fiduciary nature. And it cannot seriously be said that a state makes such unreasonable use of its power as to violate the Constitution when it provides liability and security for payment of reasonable expenses if a litigation of this character is adjudged to be unsustainable. It is urged that such a requirement will foreclose resort by most stockholders to the only available judicial remedy for the protection of their rights. Of course, to require security for the payment of any kind of costs, or the necessity for bearing any kind of expense of litigation, has a deterring effect. But we deal with power, not wisdom; and we think, notwithstanding this tendency, it is within the power of a state to close its courts to this type of litigation if the condition of reasonable security is not met.

The contention that the statute denies equal protection of the laws is based upon the fact that it enables a stockholder who owns 5% of a corporation's outstanding shares, or $50,000 in market value, to proceed without either security or liability and imposes both upon those who elect to proceed with a smaller interest. We do not think the state is forbidden to use the amount of one's financial interest, which measures his individual injury from the misconduct to be redressed, as some measure of the good faith and responsibility of one who seeks at his own election to act as custodian of the interests of all stockholders, and as an indication that he volunteers for the large burdens of the litigation from a real sense of grievance and is not putting forward a claim to capitalize personally on its harassment value. These may not be the best ways of precluding "strike lawsuits," but we are unable to say that a classification for these purposes, [553] based upon the percentage or market value of the stock alleged to be injured by the wrongs, is an unconstitutional one. Where any classification is based on a percentage or an amount, it is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. It is difficult to say of many lines drawn by legislation that they give those just above and those just below the line a perfectly equal protection. A taxpayer with $10,000.01 of income does not think it is equality to tax him at a different rate than one who has $9,999.99, or to require returns from one just above and not from one just below a certain figure. It is difficult to say that a stockholder who has 49.99% of a company's stock should be unable to elect any representative to its Board of Directors while one who owns 50.01% may name the entire Board. If there is power, as we think there is, to draw a line based on considerations of proportion of amount, it is a rare case, of which this is not one, that a constitutional objection may be made to the particular point which the legislature has chosen.

The contention also is made that the provision which applies this statute to actions pending upon its enactment, in which no final judgment has been entered, renders it void under the Due Process Clause for retroactivity. While by its terms the statute applies to pending cases, it does not provide the manner of application; nor do the New Jersey courts appear to have settled what its effect is to be. Its terms do not appear to require an interpretation that it creates new liability against the plaintiff for expenses incurred by the defense previous to its enactment. The statute would admit of a construction that plaintiff's liability begins only from the time when the Act was passed or perhaps when the corporation's application for security is granted and that security for expenses and counsel fees which "may be incurred" does not include those which have been incurred [554] before one or the other of these periods. We would not, for the purpose of considering constitutionality, construe the statute in absence of a state decision as imposing liability for events before its enactment. On this basis its alleged retroactivity amounts only to a stay of further proceedings unless and until security is furnished for expense incurred in the future, and does not extend either to destruction of an existing cause of action or to creation of a new liability for past events.

The mere fact that a statute applies to a civil action retrospectively does not render it unconstitutional. Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173, 180; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. L. & N.R. Co., 258 U.S. 13; Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304. Looking upon the statute as we have indicated, its retroactive effect, if any, is certainly less drastic and prejudicial than that held not to be unconstitutional in these decisions. We do not find in the bare statute any such retroactive effect as renders it unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, and of course we express no opinion as to the effect of an application other than we have indicated.

It is also contended that this statute may not be applied in this case because the cause of action derives from a Delaware corporation and hence Delaware law governs it. But it is the plaintiff who has brought the case in New Jersey. The trial will very likely involve questions of conflict of laws as to which the law of New Jersey will apply, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, and perhaps questions of full faith and credit. These are not before us now. A plaintiff cannot avail himself of the New Jersey forum and at the same time escape the terms on which it is made available, if the law is applicable to a federal court sitting in that State, which we later consider.

We conclude, therefore, that, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, New Jersey's security statute is [555] a valid law of that State and the question remains as to whether it must be applied by federal courts in that State to suits brought therein on diversity grounds.

APPLICABILITY IN FEDERAL COURT.

The Rules of Decision Act, in effect since the First Congress of the United States and now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652, provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." This Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64, held that judicial decisions are laws of the states within its meaning. But Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny have wrought a more far-reaching change in the relation of state and federal courts and the application of state law in the latter whereby in diversity cases the federal court administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own conduct of business. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99. The only substantial argument that this New Jersey statute is not applicable here is that its provisions are mere rules of procedure rather than rules of substantive law.

Even if we were to agree that the New Jersey statute is procedural, it would not determine that it is not applicable. Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not merely a regulation of procedure. With it or without it the main action takes the same course. However, it creates a new liability where none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative action liable for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other defendants, if he does not make good his claims. Such liability is not usual and it goes beyond payment of what we know as "costs." If all [556] the Act did was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But this new liability would be without meaning and value in many cases if it resulted in nothing but a judgment for expenses at or after the end of the case. Therefore, a procedure is prescribed by which the liability is insured by entitling the corporate defendant to a bond of indemnity before the outlay is incurred. We do not think a statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device.

It is urged, however, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure No. 23 deals with plaintiff's right to maintain such an action in federal court and that therefore the subject is recognized as procedural and the federal rule alone prevails. Rule 23 requires the stockholder's complaint to be verified by oath and to show that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law. In other words, the federal court will not permit itself to be used to litigate a purchased grievance or become a party to speculation in wrongs done to corporations. It also requires a showing that an action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction and to set forth the facts showing that the plaintiff has endeavored to obtain his remedy through the corporation itself. It further provides that the class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court, with notice to the members of the class. These provisions neither create nor exempt from liabilities, but require complete disclosure to the court and notice to the parties in interest. None conflict with the statute in question and all may be observed by a federal court, even if not applicable in state court.

We see no reason why the policy stated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, should not apply.

[557] We hold that the New Jersey statute applies in federal courts and that the District Court erred in declining to fix the amount of indemnity reasonably to be exacted as a condition of further prosecution of the suit.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs, dissenting in part.

The cause of action on which this suit is brought is a derivative one. Though it belongs to the corporation, the stockholders are entitled under state law to enforce it. The measure of the cause of action is the claim which the corporation has against the alleged wrongdoers. This New Jersey statute does not add one iota to nor subtract one iota from that cause of action. It merely prescribes the method by which stockholders may enforce it. Each state has numerous regulations governing the institution of suits in its courts. They may favor the litigation or they may affect it adversely. But they do not fall under the principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, unless they define, qualify or delimit the cause of action or otherwise relate to it.

This New Jersey statute, like statutes governing security for costs, regulates only the procedure for instituting a particular cause of action and hence need not be applied in this diversity suit in the federal court. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines that procedure for the federal courts.

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.

I am in accord with the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in this case. I also agree with the dissenting views of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON in No. 465, Woods v. [558] Interstate Realty Co., ante, p. 538, decided today. And I have noted my dissent in No. 522, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., ante, p. 530, also decided today.

Without undertaking to discuss each case in detail, I think the three decisions taken together demonstrate the extreme extent to which the Court is going in submitting the control of diversity litigation in the federal courts to the states rather than to Congress, where it properly belongs. This is done in the guise of applying the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. But in my opinion it was never the purpose of that decision to put such matters as those involved here outside the power of Congress to regulate and to confer that authority exclusively upon the states.

What is being applied is a gloss on the Erie rule, not the rule itself. That case held that federal courts in diversity cases must apply state law, decisional as well as statutory, in determining matters of substantive law, in particular and apart from procedural limitations upon its assertion — whether a cause of action exists. I accept that view generally and insofar as it involves a wise rule of administration for the federal courts, though I have grave doubt that it has any solid constitutional foundation.

But the Erie case made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases a federal court is "merely another court of the state in which it sits." and hence that in every situation in which the doors of state courts are closed to a suitor, so must be also those of the federal courts. Not only is this not true when the state bar is raised by a purely procedural obstacle. There is sound historical reason for believing that one of the purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy when, for at least some reasons of state policy, none would be available in the state courts. It is the gloss which has [559] been put upon the Erie ruling by later decisions, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, which in my opinion is being applied to extend the Erie ruling far beyond its original purpose or intent and, in my judgment, with consequences and implications seriously impairing Congress' power, within its proper sphere of action, to control this type of litigation in the federal courts.

The accepted dichotomy is the familiar "procedural-substantive" one. This of course is a subject of endless discussion, which hardly needs to be repeated here. Suffice it to say that actually in many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible. But, even so, this fact cannot dispense with the necessity of making a distinction. For, as the matter stands, it is Congress which has the power to govern the procedure of the federal courts in diversity cases, and the states which have that power over matters clearly substantive in nature. Judges therefore cannot escape making the division. And they must make it where the two constituent elements are Siamese twins as well as where they are not twins or even blood brothers. The real question is not whether the separation shall be made, but how it shall be made: whether mechanically by reference to whether the state courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consideration of the policies which close them and their relation to accommodating the policy of the Erie rule with Congress' power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits.

It is in these close cases, this borderland area, that I think we are going too far. It is one thing to decide that Pennsylvania does or does not create a cause of action in tort for injuries inflicted by specified conduct and to have that determination govern the outcome of [560] a diversity suit in Pennsylvania or New York.[8] It is another, in my view, to require a bond for costs or for payment of the opposing party's expenses and attorney's fees in the event the claimant is unsuccessful. Whether or not the latter is conceived as creating a new substantive right, it is too close to controlling the incidents of the litigation rather than its outcome to be identified with the former. It is a matter which in my opinion lies within Congress' control for diversity cases, not one for state control or to be governed by the fact that the state shuts the doors of its courts unless the state requirements concerning such incidents of litigation are complied with.

In my view Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, derived from the former Equity Rules and now having the sanction of Congress, is valid and governs in the Cohen case. If, however, the State of New Jersey has the power to govern federal diversity suits within its [561] borders as to all matters having a substantive tinge or aspect, then it may be questioned whether, in the event of conflict with some local policy, a federal court sitting in that state could give effect to the Rule's requirement that the complaint aver "that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. . . ." For in any strict and abstract sense that provision would seem to be as much a "substantive" one as the New Jersey requirements for bond, etc. And, if so, then it would seem highly doubtful, on any automatic or mechanical application of the substantive-procedural dichotomy, that either Congress or this Court could create such a limitation on diversity litigation, since as a substantive matter this would be for the states to control. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed., 1948) 3493-3506.

For myself I have no doubt of the validity of Rule 23 or of the power of Congress to enact such a rule, even though it has a substantive aspect. Notwithstanding that aspect, the rule is too closely related to procedural and other matters affecting litigation in the federal courts for me to conceive of its invalidity. So also in the present cases I think the state regulations, though each may be regarded as having a substantive aspect, are too closely related to the modes and methods of conducting litigation in the federal courts to be capable of displacing Congress' power of regulation in those respects or the federal courts' power to hear and determine the respective controversies.

Accordingly I would reverse the judgments in the Cohen and Ragan cases and affirm that in the Woods case.

[1] Together with No. 512, Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, United States District Judge, et al., also on certiorari to the same Court.

[2]Chapter 131, New Jersey Laws of 1945, provides in pertinent part as follows:

"1. In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation having a total par value or stated capital value of less than five per centum (5%) of the aggregate par value or stated capital value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation's stock of every class . . . unless the shares or voting trust certificates held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled, at any stage of the proceeding before final judgment, to require the complainant or complainants to give security for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which it may become subject pursuant to law, its certificate of incorporation, its by-laws or under equitable principles, to which the corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such security may thereafter, from time to time, be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.

"2. In any action, suit or proceeding brought or maintained in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation, it must be made to appear that the complainant was a shareholder or the holder of a voting trust certificate at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or voting trust certificate thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law.

"3. This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all such actions, suits or proceedings now pending in which no final judgment has been entered, and to all future actions, suits and proceedings."

[3] See New York General Corporation Law. § 61-b; 12 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1322; Laws of Maryland, 1945, c. 989; Wisconsin Stat. § 180.13 (1945).

[4] Old Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix; Equity Rule 27, 226 U.S. 649, 656.

[5] Rule 23 (b).

[6] See Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 Col. L.R. 574; Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits, 43 id. 301; Koessler, The Stockholder's Suit; A Comparative View, 46 id. 238; Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 id. 1; Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 Mich. L.R. 1125; P.E. Jackson, Reorganization of the Corporate Concept And the Effect of Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law, A5 Am. Bankr. Rev. 323; Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 Cornell L.Q. 431; House, Stockholders' Suits And the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 377; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 California L.R. 123; Zlinkoff. The American Investor And the Constitutionality of Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law, 54 Yale L.J. 352. See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L.R. 1305.

[7] Daniel v. Family Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220.

[8] It may be noted that the disposition of the local law problem apparently presented in Erie was not consistent, either here or on remand, with the current view that a federal district court is required to treat a diversity case exactly as would a state court of the state in which the district court is sitting: The Erie case arose out of an alleged Pennsylvania tort, and this Court stated that the court of appeals had erred when it "declined to decide the issue of state law," 304 U.S. at 80 — i.e., "the Pennsylvania law." Ibid. But the Erie case was initiated by Tompkins, "a citizen of Pennsylvania . . . in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State." 304 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as Erie is now construed, the issue on remand should have been what law a New York state court would have applied to the Pennsylvania tort. But the sole issue determined on remand was the applicable Pennsylvania law, without mention of the probable attitude of the New York courts. Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 98 F.2d 49. It was not until after Justice Brandeis had retired that this Court held that federal district courts were required to follow local conflict of laws doctrine in the resolution of diversity cases. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487.

4.5.2.3.2 Note on Collateral Order Doctrine 4.5.2.3.2 Note on Collateral Order Doctrine

     As often happens in the common law process, the body of cases following a decision tells us to what extent a case will have a broad impact. Cohen has not been overruled, but in a number of settings where the Cohen rule might seem to apply the Supreme Court has refused to apply the doctrine. See, e.g.Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (Order to disqualify a party's attorney not subject to immediate appeal); Van Cauwenberghe v. Chasser, 486 U.S. 517 (1988) (claim that foreign defendant who had been extradited to U.S. was immune from civil service could wait until the end of the case); Lauro Lines S.L.R. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (holding that a defendant's argument that a case should have been filed in Italy instead of the United States in accordance with a contract would be reviewable only at the end of the case); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (holding that immediate review was not available from an order rejecting a party's claim to immunity from a suit under a private settlement agreement); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999) (Imposition of sanctions for discovery violations on an attorney who no longer represented the client in an ongoing matter could not be appealed while the case was not final); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2005) (Judgment bar arising from the prior case could not be appealed under Cohen).  But seeShoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2037, 2042-42 Fn. 1 (2022) (Holding that the appellate courts had jurisdiction under Cohen to review district court order requiring a state inmate to be transported from prison for medical testing in support of a habeas corpus claim.)

     On the other hand, criminal contempt of court, arising from a situation where a party has refused to obey a court order, has led to some cases where an interlocutory appeal under the Cohen collateral order doctrine is permitted because the issue is both important and distinct from the merits of the underlying case.  See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971).

     In some unique circumstances, the Court has gone even further to allow an appeal.  For instance, in the unusual historical circumstances that arose during the Watergate scandal, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 - 92 (1974), the Court held that an appeal of an order requiring the President of the United States to produce certain tape recordings was appealable even though the President had not refused to comply and thus had not been held in contempt.  According to the Court, "[t]o require a President of the United States to place himself in a posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling would be unseemly and would present an unnecessary occasion for constitutional confrontation between two branches of government."

 

4.5.3 Discretionary Appeals Under 28 USC 1292 (a) and (b) 4.5.3 Discretionary Appeals Under 28 USC 1292 (a) and (b)

    In this section, we see that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not the only statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction,  28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) and (b) provide a different path to getting appellate review, a path that does not require a final judgment but that also has requirements of its own. Put differently, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 is a different grant of appellate authority. Please pay attention to when and how 28 U.S.C. § 1292 applies even when there is no final judgment.

4.5.3.1 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) and (b) 4.5.3.1 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) and (b)

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;

(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property;

(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.

(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

4.5.3.2 Appeals Related to Injunctive Relief Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1292 4.5.3.2 Appeals Related to Injunctive Relief Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1292

     Under § 1292(a), there is a right to an immediate appeal, without leave of court, when the trial court enters or denies an injunction. Injunctions are not, strictly speaking, final judgments. The work of the court is ongoing after an injunction has been entered. In some cases - in, for example, the order regarding the Alabama prisons referenced in the short Adversarial Legalism excerpt on TWEN, the court proceeded to spend many years effectively managing the Alabama state prison system through injunctive relief.

     So why are immediate appeals of decisions related to injunctive relief allowed even though there may not be a final order? First, note that § 1292 is a separate grant of appellate authority from the final judgment rule implemented in § 1291, so we are not looking at a situation where we are trying to characterize an injunction as final. Rather, the question is one of policy - why is there an exception to the final judgment rule in this statute?

     Think about what it means when an injunction is ordered or a court refuses to grant one but allows the litigation to continue on damage claims. The court has heard the evidence, considered the law, weighed the equities, and announced the kind of relief that will or will not be granted. Even though the case is not technically final, it seems an appropriate time for appellate supervision. Certainly, holding off the appellate review until the case is completely final will, in many cases, effectively prevent ever having effective appellate supervision.

     That said, this provision is far from self-executing. First, what qualifies as an "interlocutory order . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions" under the statute? You may be interested to learn that temporary restraining orders, despite being a kind of coercive relief, normally do not qualify. It turns out to be quite complex determining what kinds of orders qualify. One leading civil procedure treatise addresses what counts as an injunction under the statute this way:

If an affirmative definition of a § 1292(a)(1) “injunction” must be attempted, it would embrace orders that are directed to a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect “some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint” in more than temporary fashion.

§ 3922 - Orders Not Constituting Injunctions, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright & Miller)

     Another issue is whether the time to appeal is triggered by the entry or denial of an injunction. Remember that under FRCP 54(b) the entry of final judgment along with the certification of no just cause for delay puts the burden on the losing party to bring an appeal within the statutory deadline or lose the chance to appeal. Under § 1292(a), in contrast, appeals are permissive but not mandatory - the losing party can wait and appeal later.

4.5.3.3 Discretionary Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) 4.5.3.3 Discretionary Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b)

     28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as you may have noted when you read it earlier, allows interlocutory appeals when the trial judge allows such an appeal to be made. The trial judge is limited in his discretion. The statute provides:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

     In the Chinese Drywall Litigation, using 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the trial judge allowed appeal of his decision that personal jurisdiction existed. One of the major issues in the Chinese Drywall Litigation was whether the court had personal jurisdiction over the Chinese defendants - that is, whether the court had the power to require the Chinese defendants to appear and defend themselves in a foreign country. A decision that personal jurisdiction exists is not a final judgment. The litigation continues and is ongoing, and under the final judgment rule alone no review can be had until the case has been concluded. That conclusion might be years and millions of dollars in attorneys fees away.

     In the Chinese Drywall Litigation the Chinese defendants sought an interlocutory appeal of the personal jurisdiction issue under § 1292(b).

     Below is the court's discussion of the issue in one of the consolidated cases (2012 WL 4928869):

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS. Standard of Review

This Court has the discretion to certify its Order and Reasons for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995) (“Congress thus chose to confer on district courts first line discretion to allow interlocutory appeals.”). Pursuant to Section 1292(b), this Court may certify an order for appeal where: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) a substantial ground for difference of opinion concerning the ruling exists; and (3) an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).Here, the Court finds, and the parties do not dispute, that its Order and Reasons denying challenges to its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Taishan involves a controlling question of law. Similarly, the Court finds that an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation by eliminating the possibility of a meaningless trial. As to the disputed second element, the Court finds that a substantial ground exists for difference of opinion concerning the propriety of the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Taishan. Although the Court in its Order and Reasons has considered and addressed the arguments Taishan now raises, the Court agrees that Taishan's position is not insubstantial. Accordingly, because the Court finds that its Order and Reasons of September 4, 2012, Record Document 15755, involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and because the Court further finds that an immediate appeal from that Order and Reasons may materially advance the ultimate termination of this MDL, the Court certifies its Order and Reasons for immediate appeal pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, Section1292(b).

The Court also finds that a stay of the proceedings against Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. and Tai‘an TaishanPlasterboard Co., Ltd. pending the appeal is appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the following motions are GRANTED:

(1) Motion Pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Certify the Court's Order & Reasons for Interlocutory Appeal and Stay Further Proceedings Pending the Appeal filed solely on behalf of Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. (R. Doc. 15812); and (2) Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Certify the Court's Order & Reasons for Interlocutory Appeal and Stay Further Proceedings Pending the Appeal filed on behalf of Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. and Tai‘an Taishan Plasterboard Co. Ltd. (R. Doc. 15813).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all proceedings against Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. (“TG”) and Tai‘an Taishan Plasterboard Co., Ltd. (“TTP”) be and are hereby STAYED during the pendency of this appeal and until further ordered by the Court.

     You can see that § 1292 (b) allowed an appeal in the Chinese Drywall Litigation to be held near the beginning of the case rather than at the end because the case fit the requirements of the statute.

     § 1292(b), like § 1292(a), is an exception to the final judgment rule set forth in § 1291. It is a different grant of appellate jurisdiction that in the specific circumstances set out in the rule does not require a final judgment.

     That is not to say that § 1292(b) allows unconstrained discretion by the trial judge. First, there has to be an order - the court cannot simply refer an issue up for advisory guidance. Second, the trial judge has to find three factors present: 1) a controlling question of law on which 2) there are grounds for a substantial difference of opinion, and 3) the resolution of which will expedite efficient handling of the case. Absent those statutory criteria, it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). Note also that the court of appeals can refuse to hear the appeal. Under § 1291, the court of appeals does not have this choice - the party is entitled to have a resolution of the appeal. Under § 1292(b), by way of contrast, both the district court and the court of appeals have discretion.

     Think of § 1292(b) as a kind of safety valve. In most cases, the final judgment rule allows a case to proceed without interruptions or delay. In a small subset of cases, that can lead to unwanted problems in managing the litigation. In some of those cases, § 1292(b) allows a way around the problems by allowing an interlocutory appeal if the conditions are met and if both the trial judge and the court of appeals agree on all the circumstances that it is an appropriate case for interlocutory review.

     Note, as we shall shortly see, that the form of certification matters. The trial court has to be clear whether it is allowing a case to go up under Rule 54(b) or under § 1292(b).

4.5.3.4 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel 4.5.3.4 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel

We include this case as a review of the ways in which appeals may be had under §1291 and §1292.

424 U.S. 737 (1976)

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
v.
WETZEL ET AL.

No. 74-1245.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 19, 1976.
Decided March 23, 1976.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

[738] Kalvin M. Grove argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lawrence M. Cohen, Jeffrey S. Goldman, and Robert A. Penney.

Howard A. Specter argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.[1]

[739] MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in which they asserted that petitioner's employee insurance benefits and maternity leave regulations discriminated against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). The District Court ruled in favor of respondents on the issue of petitioner's liability under that Act, and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court held that it had jurisdiction of petitioner's appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and proceeded to affirm on the merits the judgment of the District Court. We [740] granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), and heard argument on the merits. Though neither party has questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal, we are obligated to do so on our own motion if a question thereto exists. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884). Because we conclude that the District Court's order was not appealable to the Court of Appeals, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss petitioner's appeal from the order of the District Court.

Respondents' complaint, after alleging jurisdiction and facts deemed pertinent to their claim, prayed for a judgment against petitioner embodying the following relief:

"(a) requiring that defendant establish non-discriminatory hiring, payment, opportunity, and promotional plans and programs;
"(b) enjoining the continuance by defendant of the illegal acts and practices alleged herein;
"(c) requiring that defendant pay over to plaintiffs and to the members of the class the damages sustained by plaintiffs and the members of the class by reason of defendant's illegal acts and practices, including adjusted backpay, with interest, and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and exemplary damages;
"(d) requiring that defendant pay to plaintiffs and to the members of the class the costs of this suit and a reasonable attorneys' fee, with interest; and
"(e) such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate." App. 19.

After extensive discovery, respondents moved for partial summary judgment only as to the issue of liability. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (c). The District Court on January 9, 1974, finding no issues of material fact in dispute, [741] entered an order to the effect that petitioner's pregnancy-related policies violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also ruled that Liberty Mutual's hiring and promotion policies violated Title VII.[2] Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the District Court. Its order of February 20, 1974, denying the motion for reconsideration, contains the following concluding language:

"In its Order the court stated it would enjoin the continuance of practices which the court found to be in violation of Title VII. The Plaintiffs were invited to submit the form of the injunction order and the Defendant has filed Notice of Appeal and asked for stay of any injunctive order. Under these circumstances the court will withhold the issuance of the injunctive order and amend the Order previously issued under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), as follows:
"And now this 20th day of February, 1974, it is directed that final judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs that Defendant's policy of requiring female employees to return to work within three months of delivery of a child or be terminated is in violation of the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; that Defendant's policy of denying disability income protection plan benefits to female employees for disabilities related to pregnancies or childbirth are [sic] in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that it is expressly directed that Judgment be entered for the [742] Plaintiffs upon these claims of Plaintiffs' Complaint; there being no just reason for delay." 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1164.

It is obvious from the District Court's order that respondents, although having received a favorable ruling on the issue of petitioner's liability to them, received none of the relief which they expressly prayed for in the portion of their complaint set forth above. They requested an injunction, but did not get one; they requested damages, but were not awarded any; they requested attorneys' fees, but received none.

Counsel for respondents when questioned during oral argument in this Court suggested that at least the District Court's order of February 20 amounted to a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2201. Had respondents sought only a declaratory judgment, and no other form of relief, we would of course have a different case. But even if we accept respondents' contention that the District Court's order was a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability, it nonetheless left unresolved respondents' requests for an injunction, for compensatory and exemplary damages, and for attorneys' fees. It finally disposed of none of respondents' prayers for relief.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals apparently took the view that because the District Court made the recital required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b) that final judgment be entered on the issue of liability, and that there was no just reason for delay, the orders thereby became appealable as a final decision pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We cannot agree with this application of the Rule and statute in question.

Rule 54 (b)[3] "does not apply to a single claim [743] action . . . . It is limited expressly to multiple claims actions in which `one or more but less than all' of the multiple claims have been finally decided and are found otherwise to be ready for appeal." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427, 435 (1956).[4] Here, however, respondents set forth but a single claim: that petitioner's employee insurance benefits and maternity leave regulations discriminated against its women employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They prayed for several different types of relief in the event that they sustained the allegations of their complaint, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (a) (3), but their complaint advanced a single legal theory which was applied to only one set of facts.[5] Thus, despite the fact that the District Court undoubtedly made the findings required [744] under the Rule, had it been applicable, those findings do not in a case such as this make the order appealable pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See Mackey, supra, at 437-438.

We turn to consider whether the District Court's order might have been appealed by petitioner to the Court of Appeals under any other theory. The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54 (b), constitutes a grant of partial summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's liability. Such judgments are by their terms interlocutory, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (c), and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to be "final" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See, e. g., Borges v. Art Steel Co., 243 F. 2d 350 (CA2 1957); Leonidakis v. International Telecoin Corp., 208 F. 2d 934 (CA2 1953); Tye v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 173 F. 2d 317 (CA3 1949); Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 136 F. 2d 654 (CA3 1943). Thus the only possible authorization for an appeal from the District Court's order would be pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1292.

If the District Court had granted injunctive relief but had not ruled on respondents' other requests for relief, this interlocutory order would have been appealable under § 1292 (a) (1).[6] But, as noted above, the court did not issue an injunction. It might be argued that the order of the District Court, insofar as it failed to include the injunctive relief requested by respondents, is an interlocutory [745] order refusing an injunction within the meaning of § 1292 (a) (1). But even if this would have allowed respondents to then obtain review in the Court of Appeals, there was no denial of any injunction sought by petitioner and it could not avail itself of that grant of jurisdiction.

Nor was this order appealable pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b).[7] Although the District Court's findings made with a view to satisfying Rule 54 (b) might be viewed as substantial compliance with the certification requirement of that section, there is no showing in this record that petitioner made application to the Court of Appeals within the 10 days therein specified. And that court's holding that its jurisdiction was pursuant to § 1291 makes it clear that it thought itself obliged to consider on the merits petitioner's appeal. There can be no assurance that had the other requirements of § 1292 (b) been complied with, the Court of Appeals would have exercised its discretion to entertain the interlocutory appeal.

Were we to sustain the procedure followed here, we would condone a practice whereby a district court in virtually any case before it might render an interlocutory decision on the question of liability of the defendant, [746] and the defendant would thereupon be permitted to appeal to the court of appeals without satisfying any of the requirements that Congress carefully set forth. We believe that Congress, in enacting present §§ 1291 and 1292 of Title 28, has been well aware of the dangers of an overly rigid insistence upon a "final decision" for appeal in every case, and has in those sections made ample provision for appeal of orders which are not "final" so as to alleviate any possible hardship. We would twist the fabric of the statute more than it will bear if we were to agree that the District Court's order of February 20, 1974, was appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petitioner's appeal.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Gordon Dean Booth, Jr., for Alaska Airlines, Inc., et al.; by Edward Silver, Larry M. Lavinsky, Sara S. Portnoy, and Kenneth L. Kimble for the American Life Insurance Assn. et al.; by William Martin and Paul C. Blume for the American Mutual Insurance Alliance et al.; by Thompson Powers for the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; by Simon H. Rifkind, Frazer F. Hilder, and Edmond J. Dilworth, Jr., for General Motors Corp.; by Richard D. Godown for the National Association of Manufacturers; by Lloyd Sutter for Owens-Illinois, Inc., et al.; and by John G. Wayman and Scott F. Zimmermanfor Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Brian K. Landsberg, Walter W. Barnett, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States et al.; by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Rouse and Terry Jean Seligmann, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al.; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ruzicho and Earl M. Manz, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by Henry Spitz and Paul Hartman for the New York State Division of Human Rights; by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Melvin L. Wulf, and David Rubin for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, Stephen I. Schlossberg, and John Fillion for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Diane Serafin Blank and Nancy E. Stanley for Blank Goodman Kelly Rone & Stanley; by Wendy W. Williams, Rhonda Copelon, Sylvia Roberts, Marilyn Hall Patel, Judith Lonnquist, Gladys Kessler, and Peter Hart Weiner for the Center for Constitutional Rights et al.; and by Mary K. O'Melveny, Jonathan W. Lubell, H. Howard Ostrin, and Charles V. Koons for the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO.

[2] The portion of the District Court's order concerning petitioner's hiring and promotion policies was separately appealed to a different panel of the Court of Appeals. The judgment rendered by the Third Circuit upon that appeal is not before us in this case. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F. 2d 239, cert. denied, 421 U. S. 1011 (1975).

[3] "Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties. "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."

[4] Following Mackey, the Rule was amended to insure that orders finally disposing of some but not all of the parties could be appealed pursuant to its provisions. That provision is not implicated in this case, however, to which Mackey's exposition of the Rule remains fully accurate.

[5] We need not here attempt any definitive resolution of the meaning of what constitutes a claim for relief within the meaning of the Rules. See 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶¶ 54.24, 54.33 (2d ed. 1975). It is sufficient to recognize that a complaint asserting only one legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a single claim for relief.

[6] 

"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

"(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."

[7] "When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."

4.5.3.5 Questions On Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel 4.5.3.5 Questions On Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel

      Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel provides a good review of the appellate issues we have covered to date. If you understand what the Court is doing here and why it is compelled to reach the result it does, you are well on your way to understanding the core principles of appellate jurisdiction.

     Make sure you understand the following:

  • Why was appeal not available under the final judgment rule of  § 1291?
    • Put differently, what did not happen here that would have had to happen to make such an appeal available?
  • Why was appeal not available under Rule 54(b)?
    • Put differently, what did not happen here that would have had to happen to make such an appeal available?
  • Why was appeal not available under § 1292 (a) (1)?
    • Put differently, what did not happen here that would have had to happen to make such an appeal available?
  • Why was appeal not available under § 1292 (b)?
    • Put differently, what did not happen here that would have had to happen to make such an appeal available?
  • Why could the Court not exercise some form of discretion and allow the appeal to go forward?

     We now move on to another path, that while not an appeal, allows appellate courts to review the actions of lower courts.

 

4.5.4 Mandamus (AKA Writ of Prohibition) 4.5.4 Mandamus (AKA Writ of Prohibition)

4.5.4.1 Overview of Mandamus 4.5.4.1 Overview of Mandamus

     Mandamus serves a supervisory rather than a purely appellate function. In short, it is a vehicle that can be used to require a government official - not just judges - to act in accordance with their legal duties. In the judicial setting, it sometimes is used as a way to get lower court decisions before a higher court but winning a mandamus claim is far from easy.

     Mandamus started as one of the 'prerogative writs' employed by the king's justices to supervise governmental officials. The prerogative writs include mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, quo warranto, and prohibition. Habeas corpus, as you may recall, can be used to challenge wrongful imprisonment. Certiorari is the writ by which the US Supreme Court calls for the record from the lower court so as to review a case. Quo warranto is used to challenge the right of an official to hold office. Mandamus and prohibition both deal with compelling government officials to act (mandamus) or not act (prohibition) in ways consistent with their duties. Today, as a practical matter, in federal court mandamus covers the same ground as prohibition.

     Courts are quick to declare that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and not one that is easily granted. That said, in areas that do not lend themselves to normal appeals, the parties may turn to mandamus in an effort to get the attention of an appellate court. It can be used, for example, in the case of discovery orders that parties feel are excessive or not sufficient, so as to make justice impossible, in the case of a jury trial being granted or denied, in the cases of judges who refuse to disqualify themselves in light of an asserted conflict, or in cases where a stay has been sought and denied. You will note when we get to personal jurisdiction that some of those cases arise from state courts where writs of prohibition or mandamus may be more freely granted.

     The following case illustrates mandamus in action in an unusual setting.

4.5.4.2 Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia 4.5.4.2 Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia

CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.

No. 03-475.

Argued April 27, 2004 —

Decided June 24, 2004

*372Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Katsas and Coffin, and Mark B. Stern, Michael S. Raab, and Douglas Hallward-Driemeier.

Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for respondent Sierra Club. With him on the brief were Scott Nelson, David Bookbinder, Patrick Gallagher, Alex Levinson, and Sanjay Narayan. Paul J. Orfanedes argued the cause for respondent Judicial Watch, Inc. With him on the brief was James F. Peterson. *

Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered discovery orders directing the Vice President and other senior officials in the Executive Branch to produce information about a task force established to give advice and make policy recommendations to the President. This case requires us to consider the circumstances under which a court of appeals may exercise its power to issue a writ of mandamus to modify or dissolve the orders when, by virtue of their overbreadth, enforcement might interfere with the *373officials in the discharge of their duties and impinge upon the President’s constitutional prerogatives.

I

A few days after assuming office, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG or Group). The Group was directed to “develo[p]... a national energy policy designed to help the private sector, and government at all levels, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future.” App. 156-157. The President assigned a number of agency heads and assistants — all employees of the Federal Government — to serve as members of the committee. He authorized the Vice President, as chairman of the Group, to invite “other officers of the Federal Government” to participate “as appropriate.” Id., at 157. Five months later, the NEPDG issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations.

Following publication of the report, respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club filed these separate actions, which were later consolidated in the District Court. Respondents alleged the NEPDG had failed to comply with the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA or Act), 5 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 1.

FACA was enacted to monitor the “numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups [that] have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government,” § 2(a), and to prevent the “wasteful expenditure of public funds” that may result from their proliferation, Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 453 (1989). Subject to specific exemptions, FACA imposes a variety of open-meeting and disclosure requirements on groups that meet the definition of an “advisory committee.” As relevant here, an “advisory committee” means

*374“any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof. . . , which is—
“(B) established or utilized by the President,... except that [the definition] excludes (i) any committee that is composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, officers , or employees of the Federal Government. .. .” 5 U. S. C. App. §3(2), p. 2.

Respondents do not dispute the President appointed only Federal Government officials to the NEPDG. They agree that the NEPDG, as established by the President in his memorandum, was “composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal Government.” Ibid. The complaint alleges, however, that “non-federal employees,” including “private lobbyists,” “regularly attended and fully participated in non-public meetings.” App. 21 (Judicial Watch Complaint ¶ 25). Relying on Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F. 2d 898 (CADC 1993) (AAPS), respondents contend that the regular participation of the non-Government individuals made them de facto members of the committee. According to the complaint, their “involvement and role are functionally indistinguishable from those of the other [formal] members.” Id., at 915. As a result, respondents argue, the NEPDG cannot benefit from the Act’s exemption under subsection B and is subject to FACA’s requirements.

Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, the Government officials who served on the committee, and the alleged de facto members were named as defendants. The suit seeks declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to produce all materials allegedly subject to FACA’s requirements.

All defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The court acknowledged FACA does not create a private cause of action. On this basis, it dismissed respondents’ claims against *375the non-Government defendants. Because the NEPDG had been dissolved, it could not be sued as a defendant; and the claims against it were dismissed as well. The District Court held, however, that FACA’s substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and other Government participants on the NEPDG under the Mandamus Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706. The District Court recognized the disclosure duty must be clear and nondiscretionary for mandamus to issue, and there must be, among other things, “final agency actions” for the APA to apply. According to the District Court, it was premature to decide these questions. It held only that respondents had alleged sufficient facts to keep the Vice President and the other defendants in the case. .

The District Court deferred ruling on the Government’s contention that to disregard the exemption and apply FACA to the NEPDG would violate principles of separation of powers and interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of the President and the Vice President. Instead, the court allowed respondents to conduct a “tightly-reined” discovery to ascertain the NEPDG’s structure and membership, and thus to determine whether the de facto membership doctrine applies. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002). While acknowledging that discovery itself might raise serious constitutional questions, the District Court explained that the Government could assert executive privilege to protect sensitive materials from disclosure. In the District Court’s view, these “issues of executive privilege will be much more limited in scope than the broad constitutional challenge raised by the government.” Id., at 55. The District Court adopted this approach in an attempt to avoid constitutional questions, noting that if, after discovery, respondents have no evidentiary support for the allegations about the regular participation by lobbyists and industry executives on the NEPDG, the *376Government can prevail on statutory grounds. Furthermore, the District Court explained, even were it appropriate to address constitutional issues, some factual development is necessary to determine the extent of the alleged intrusion into the Executive’s constitutional authority. The court denied in part the motion to dismiss and ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan.

In due course the District Court approved respondents’ discovery plan, entered a series of orders allowing discovery to proceed, see CADC App. 238, 263, 364 (reproducing orders entered on Sept. 9, Oct. 17, and Nov. 1, 2002), and denied the Government’s motion for certification under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) with, respect to the discovery orders. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals to vacate the discovery orders, to direct the District Court to rule on the basis of the administrative record, and to dismiss the Vice President from the suit. The Vice President also filed a notice of appeal from the same orders. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the Vice President’s attempted interlocutory appeal. In re Cheney, 334 F. 3d 1096 (CADC 2003). With respect to mandamus, the majority declined to issue the writ on the ground that alternative avenues of relief remained available. Citing United States v. Nixon, supra, the majority held that petitioners, to guard against intrusion into the President’s prerogatives, must first assert privilege. Under its reading of Nixon, moreover, privilege claims must be made “‘with particularity.’” 334 F. 3d, at 1104. In the majority’s view, if the District Court sustains the privilege, petitioners will be able to obtain all the relief they seek. If the District Court rejects the claim of executive privilege and creates “an imminent risk of disclosure of allegedly protected presidential communications,” “mandamus might well be appropriate to avoid letting ‘the *377cat... out of the bag.’ ” Id., at 1104-1105. “But so long as the separation of powers conflict that petitioners anticipate remains hypothetical,” the panel held, “we have no authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.” Id., at 1105. The majority acknowledged the scope of respondents’ requests is overly broad, because it seeks far more than the “limited items” to which respondents would be entitled if “the district court ultimately determines that the NEPDG is subject to FACA.” Id., at 1105-1106; id., at 1106 (“The requests to produce also go well beyond FACA’s requirements”); ibid. (“[Respondents’] discovery also goes well beyond what they need to prove”). It nonetheless agreed with the District Court that petitioners “ ‘shall bear the burden’ ” of invoking executive privilege and filing objections to the discovery orders with “‘detailed precision.’” Id., at 1105 (quoting Aug. 2, 2002, Order).

For similar reasons, the majority rejected the Vice President’s interlocutory appeal. In United States v. Nixon, the Court held that the President could appeal an interlocutory subpoena order without having “to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review.” 418 U. S., at 691. The majority, however, found the case inapplicable because Vice President Cheney, unlike then-President Nixon, had not yet asserted privilege. In the majority’s view, the Vice President was not forced to choose between disclosure and suffering contempt for failure to obey a court order. The majority held that to require the Vice President to assert privilege does not create the unnecessary confrontation between two branches of Government described in Nixon.

Judge Randolph filed a dissenting opinion. In his view A APS’ de facto membership doctrine is mistaken, and the Constitution bars its application to the NEPDG. Allowing discovery to determine the applicability of the defacto membership doctrine, he concluded, is inappropriate. He would *378have issued the writ of mandamus directing dismissal of the complaints. 334 F. 3d, at 1119.

We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 1088 (2003). We now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the ease for further proceedings to reconsider the Government’s mandamus petition.

II

As a preliminary matter, we address respondents’ argument that the Government’s petition fór a writ of mandamus was jurisdictionally out of time or, alternatively, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. According to respondents, because the Government’s basic argument was one of discovery immunity — that is, it need not invoke executive privilege or make particular objections to the discovery requests — the mandamus petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals within 60 days after the District Court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss. Sée Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered”). On this theory, the last day for making any filing to the Court of Appeals was September 9, 2002. The Government, however, did not file the mandamus petition and the notice of appeal until November 7, four months after the District Court issued the order that, under respondents’ view, commenced the time for appeal.

As even respondents acknowledge, however, Rule 4(a), by its plain terms, applies only to the filing of a notice of appeal. Brief for Respondent Sierra Club 23. Rule 4(a) is inapplicable to the Government’s mandamus petition under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Because we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings for the court to consider whether a writ of mandamus should have issued, we need not decide whether the Vice President also could have appealed the District Court’s or*379ders under Nixon and the collateral order doctrine. We express no opinion on whether the Vice President’s notice of appeal was timely filed.

Respondents’ argument that the mandamus petition was barred by laches does not withstand scrutiny. Laches might bar a petition for a writ of mandamus if the petitioner “slept upon his rights . . . , and especially if the delay has been prejudicial to the [other party], or to the rights of other persons,” Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 355 (1883). Here, the flurry of activity following the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss overcomes respondents’ argument that the Government neglected to assert its rights. The Government filed, among other papers, a motion for a protective order on September 3; a motion to stay pending appeal on October 21; and a motion for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) on October 23. Even were we to agree that the baseline for measuring the timeliness of the Government’s mandamus petition was the District Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, the Government’s active litigation posture was far from the neglect or delay that would make the application of laches appropriate.

We do not accept, furthermore, respondents’ argument that laches should apply because the motions filed by the Government following the District Court’s denial of its motion to dismiss amounted to little more than dilatory tactics to “delay and obstruct the proceedings.” Brief for Respondent Sierra Club 23. In light of the drastic nature of mandamus and our precedents holding that mandamus may not issue so long as alternative avenues of relief remain available, the Government cannot be faulted for attempting to resolve the dispute through less drastic means. The law does not put litigants in the impossible position of having to exhaust alternative remedies before petitioning for mandamus, on the one hand, and having to file the mandamus petition at the earliest possible moment to avoid laches, on the *380other. The petition was properly before the Court of Appeals for its consideration.

Ill

We now come to the central issue in the case — whether the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude it “ha[d] no authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus,” 334 F. 3d, at 1105, on the ground that the Government could protect its rights by asserting executive privilege in the District Court.

The common-law writ of mandamus against a lower court is codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a): “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” This is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259-260 (1947). “The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine [the court against which mandamus is sought] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed juris-’ diction.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 26 (1943). Although courts have not “confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of ‘jurisdiction,’ ” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 95 (1967), “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power,’ ” ibid., or a “clear abuse of discretion,” Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U. S. 379, 383 (1953), “will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy,” Will, 389 U. S., at 95.

As the writ is one of “the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,” id., at 107, three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal, 426 U. S. 394, 403 (1976). First, “the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” ibid. — a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a *381substitute for the regular appeals process, Fahey, supra, at 260. Second, the petitioner must satisfy “‘the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.’”” Kerr, supra, at 403 (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 384). Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Kerr, supra, at 403 (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112, n. 8 (1964)). These hurdles, however demanding, are not insuperable. This Court has issued the writ to restrain a lower court when its actions would threaten the separation of powers by “embarrassing] the executive arm of the Government,” Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 588 (1943), or result in the “intrusion by the federal judiciary on a delicate area of federal-state relations,” Will, supra, at 95 (citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9 (1926)).

Were the Vice President not a party in the case, the argument that the Court of Appeals should have entertained an action in mandamus, notwithstanding the District Court’s denial of the motion for certification, might present different considerations. Here, however, the Vice President and his comembers on the NEPDG are the subjects of the discovery orders. The mandamus petition alleges that the orders threaten “substantial intrusions on the process by which those in closest operational proximity to the President advise the President.” App. 343. These facts and allegations remove this case from the category of ordinary discovery orders where interlocutory appellate review is unavailable, through mandamus or otherwise. It is well established that “a President’s communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ‘ordinary individual.’” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 715. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a trial judge, recognized the unique position of the Executive Branch when he stated that “[i]n no case ... would a court be required to *382proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14, 694) (CC Va. 1807). See also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 698-699 (1997) (“We have, in short, long recognized the ‘unique position in the constitutional scheme’ that [the Office of the President] occupies” (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749 (1982))); 520 U. S., at 710-724 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). As United States v. Nixon explained, these principles do not mean that the “President is above the law.” 418 U. S., at 715. Rather, they simply acknowledge that the public interest requires that a coequal, branch of Government “afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice,” ibid., and give recognition to the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties.

These separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the Vice President. Accepted mandamus standards are broad enough to allow a court of appeals to prevent a lower court from interfering with a coequal branch’s ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. See Ex parte Peru, supra, at 587 (recognizing jurisdiction to issue the writ because “the action of the political arm of the Government taken within its appropriate sphere [must] be promptly recognized, and . . . delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation [must] be avoided by prompt termination of the proceedings in the district court”); see also Clinton v. Jones, supra, at 701 (“We have recognized that ‘[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties’ ” (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 757 (1996))).

*383IV

The Court of Appeals dismissed these separation-of-powers concerns. Relying on United States v. Nixon, it held that even though respondents’ discovery requests are overbroad and “go well beyond FACA’s requirements,” the Vice President and his former colleagues on the NEPDG “ ‘shall bear the burden’ ” of invoking privilege with narrow specificity and objecting to the discovery requests with “ ‘detailed precision.’ ” 334 F. 3d, at 1105-1106. In its view, this result was required by Nixon’s rejection of an “absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” 418 U. S., at 706. If Nixon refused to recognize broad claims of confidentiality where the President had asserted executive privilege, the majority reasoned, Nixon must have rejected, a fortiori, petitioners’ claim of discovery immunity where the privilege has not even been invoked. According to the majority, because the Executive Branch can invoke executive privilege to maintain the separation of powers, mandamus relief is premature.

This analysis, however, overlooks fundamental differences in the two cases. Nixon cannot bear the weight the Court of Appeals puts upon it. First, unlike this case, which concerns respondents’ requests for information for use in a civil suit, Nixon involves the proper balance between the Executive’s interest in the confidentiality of its communications and the “constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding.” Id., at 713. The Court’s decision was explicit that it was “not... concerned with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation .... We address only the conflict between the President’s assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.” Id., at 712, n. 19.

*384The distinction Nixon drew between criminal and civil proceedings is not just a matter of formalism. As the Court explained, the need for information in the criminal context is much weightier because “our historic[al] commitment to the rule of law... is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that ‘the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’ ” Id., at 708-709 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935)). In light of the “fundamental”. and “comprehensive” need for “every man’s evidence” in the criminal justice system, 418 U. S., at 709, 710, not only must the Executive Branch first assert privilege to resist disclosure, but privilege claims that shield information from a grand jury proceeding or a criminal trial are not to be “expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth,” id., at 710. The need for information for use in civil cases, while far from negligible, does not share the urgency or significance of the criminal subpoena requests in Nixon. As Nixon recognized, the right to production of relevant evidence in civil proceedings does not have the same “constitutional dimensions.” Id., at 711.

The Court also observed in Nixon that a “primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch [is] to do justice in criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 707. Withholding materials from a tribunal in an ongoing criminal case when the information is necessary to the court in carrying out its tasks “conflict[s] with the function of the courts under Art. III.” Ibid. Such an impairment of the “essential functions of [another] branch,” ibid., is impermissible. Withholding the information in this case, however, does not hamper another branch’s ability to perform its “essential functions” in quite the same way. Ibid. The District Court ordered discovery here, not to remedy known statutory violations, but to ascertain whether FACA’s disclosure requirements even apply to the NEPDG in the first place. Even if FACA embodies important congressional objectives, the only consequence from re*385spondents’ inability to obtain the discovery they seek is that it would be more difficult for private complainants to vindicate Congress’ policy objectives under FACA. And even if, for argument’s sake, the reasoning in Judge Randolph’s dissenting opinion in the end is rejected and FACA’s statutory objectives would be to some extent frustrated, it does not follow that a court’s Article III authority or Congress’ central Article I powers would be impaired. The situation here cannot, in fairness, be compared to Nixon, where a court’s ability to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to resolve cases and controversies within its jurisdiction hinges on the availability of certain indispensable information.

A party’s need for information is only one facet of the problem. An important factor weighing in the opposite direction is the burden imposed by the discovery orders. This is not a routine discovery dispute. The discovery requests are directed to the Vice President and other senior Government officials who served on the NEPDG to give advice and make recommendations to the President. The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives. As we have already noted, special considerations control when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated. This Court has held, on more than one occasion, that “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive ... is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery,” Clinton, 520 U. S., at 707, and that the Executive’s “constitutional responsibilities and status [are] factors counseling judicial deference and restraint” in the conduct of litigation against it, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753. Respondents’ reliance on cases that do not involve senior members of the Executive Branch, see, e. g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 426 U. S. 394 (1976), is altogether misplaced.

*386Even when compared against United States v. Nixon’s criminal subpoenas, which did involve the President, the civil discovery here militates against respondents’ position. The observation in Nixon that production of confidential information would not disrupt the functioning of the Executive Branch cannot be applied in a mechanistic fashion to civil litigation. In the criminal justice system, there are various constraints, albeit imperfect, to filter out insubstantial legal claims. The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is made by a publicly accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations and under an ethical obligation, not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to serve the cause of justice. The rigors of the penal system are alsp mitigated by the responsible exercise of prosecuto-rial discretion. In contrast, there are no analogous checks in the civil discovery process here. Although under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, sanctions are available, and private attorneys also owe an obligation of candor to the judicial tribunal, these safeguards have proved insufficient to discourage the filing of meritless claims against the Executive Branch. “In view of the visibility of” the Offices of the President and the Vice President and “the effect of [their] actions on countless people,” they are “easily identifiable target[s] for suits for civil damages.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 753.

Finally, the narrow subpoena orders in United States v. Nixon stand on an altogether different footing from the overly broad discovery requests approved by the District Court in this case. The criminal subpoenas in Nixon were required to satisfy exacting standards of “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity.” 418 U. S., at 700 (interpreting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17(c)). They were “not intended to provide a means of discovery.” 418 U. S., at 698. The burden of showing these standards were met, moreover, fell on the party requesting the information. Id., at 699 (“[I]n order to require production prior to trial, the moving party *387must show [that the applicable standards are met]”). In Nixon, the Court addressed the issue of executive privilege only after having satisfied itself that the special prosecutor had surmounted these demanding requirements. Id., at 698 (“If we sustained this [Rule 17(c)] challenge, there would be no occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material”). The very specificity of the subpoena requests serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President.

In contrast to Nixon's subpoena orders that “precisely identified” and “specific[ally] . . . enumerated” the relevant materials, id., at 688, and n. 5, the discovery requests here, as the panel majority acknowledged, ask for everything under the sky:

“1. All documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees of the Task Force.
“2. All documents establishing or referring to any Sub-Group.
“3. All documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees of any Sub-Group.
“4. All documents identifying or referring to any other persons participating in the preparation of the Report or in the activities of the Task Force or any Sub-Group.
“5. All documents concerning any communication relating to the activities of the Task Force, the activities of any Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report....
“6. All documents concerning any communication relating to the activities of the Task Force, the activities of Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report between any person .. . and [a list of agencies].” App. 220-221.

The preceding excerpt from respondents’ “First Request for Production of Documents,” id., at 215 (emphasis added), *388is only the beginning. Respondents’ “First Set of Interrogatories” are similarly unbounded in scope. Id., at 224. Givén the breadth of the discovery requests in this case compared to the narrow subpoena orders in United States v. Nixon, our precedent provides no support for the proposition that the Executive Branch “shall bear the burden” of invoking executive privilege with sufficient specificity and of making particularized objections. 334 F. 3d, at 1105. To be sure, Nixon held that the President cannot, through the assertion of a “broad [and] undifferentiated” need for confidentiality and the invocation of an “absolute, unqualified” executive privilege, withhold information in the face of subpoena orders. 418 U. S., at 706, 707. It did so, however, only after the party requesting the information — the special prosecutor — had satisfied his burden of showing the propriety of the requests. Here, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the discovery requests are anything but appropriate. They provide respondents all the disclosure to which they would be entitled in the event they prevail on the merits, and much more besides. In these circumstances, Nixon does not require -the Executive Branch to bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line by line. Our precedents suggest just the opposite. See, e. g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681 (1997); id., at 705 (holding that the Judiciary may direct “appropriate process” to the Executive); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753.

The Government, however, did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way. Its arguments were ignored. See App. 167, 181-183 (arguing “this case can be resolved far short of the wide-ranging inquiries plaintiffs have proposed” and suggesting alternatives to “limi[t]” discovery); id., at 232 (“Defendants object to the scope of plaintiffs’ discovery requests and to the undue burden imposed by them. The scope of plaintiffs’ requests is broader than that reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence”); id., at 232, n. 10 (“We state *389our general objections here for purposes of clarity for the record and to preclude any later argument that, by not including them here, those general objections have been waived”). In addition, the Government objected to the burden that would arise from the District Court’s insistence that the Vice President winnow the discovery orders by asserting specific claims of privilege and making more particular objections. Id., at 201 (Tr. of Status Hearing (Aug. 2, 2002)) (noting “concerns with disrupting the effective functioning of the presidency and the vice-presidency”); id., at-274 (“[C]ompliance with the order of the court imposes a burden on the Office of the Vice President. That is a real burden. If we had completed and done everything that Your Honor has asked us to do today that burden would be gone, but it would have been realized”). These arguments, too, were rejected. See id., at 327, 329 (Nov. 1, 2002, Order) (noting that the court had, “on numerous occasions,” rejected the Government’s assertion “that court orders requiring [it] to respond in any fashion to [the] discovery requests creates an ‘unconstitutional burden’ on the Executive Branch”).

Contrary to the District Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ conclusions, Nixon does not leave them the sole option of inviting the Executive Branch to invoke executive privilege while remaining otherwise powerless to modify a party’s overly broad discovery requests. Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power “not to be lightly invoked.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 7 (1953). Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive’s claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These “occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two *390branches” .should be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, supra, at 692.

In recognition of these concerns, there is sound precedent in the District of Columbia itself for district courts to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, when they are asked to enforce against the Executive Branch unnecessarily broad subpoenas. In United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (1989), defendant Poindexter, on trial for criminal charges, sought to have the District Court enforce subpoena orders against President Reagan to obtain allegedly exculpatory materials. The Executive considered the subpoenas “unreasonable and oppressive.” Id., at 1503. Rejecting defendant’s argument that the Executive must first assert executive privilege to narrow the subpoenas, the District Court agreed with the President that “it is undesirable as a matter of constitutional and public policy to compel a President to make his decision on privilege with respect to a large array of documents.” Ibid. The court decided to narrow, on its own, the scope of the subpoenas to allow the Executive “to consider whether to invoke executive privilege with respect to ... a possibly smaller number of documents following the narrowing of the subpoenas.” Id., at 1504. This is but one example of the choices available to the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case.

As we discussed at the outset, under principles of mandamus jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals may exercise its power to issue the writ only upon a finding of “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power,’ ” Will, 389 U. S., at 95, or a “clear abuse of discretion,” Bankers Life, 346 U. S., at 383. As this case implicates the separation of powers, the Court of Appeals must also ask, as part of this inquiry, whether the District Court’s actions constituted an unwarranted impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. This is especially so here because the District Court’s analysis of whether mandamus relief is appropriate should itself be constrained *391by principles similar to those we have outlined, supra, at 380-382, that limit the Court of Appeals’ use of the remedy. The panel majority, however, failed to ask this question. Instead, it labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Government’s separation-of-powers objections.

V

In the absence of overriding concerns of the sort discussed in Schlagenhauf, 379 U. S., at 111 (discussing, among other things, the need to avoid “piecemeal litigation” and to settle important issues of first impression in areas where this Court bears special responsibility), we decline petitioners’ invitation to direct the Court of Appeals to issue the writ against the District Court. Moreover, this is not a case where, after having considered the issues, the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by failing to issue the writ. Instead, the Court of Appeals, relying on its mistaken reading of United States v. Nixon, prematurely terminated its inquiry after the Government refused to assert privilege and did so without even reaching the weighty separation-of-powers objections raised in the case, much less exercised its discretion to determine whether “the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Supra, at 381. Because the issuance of the writ is a matter vested in the discretion of the court to which the petition is made, and because this Court is not presented with an original writ of mandamus, see, e. g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S., at 586, we leave to the Court of Appeals to address the parties’ arguments with respect to the challenge to AAPS and the discovery orders. Other matters bearing on whether the writ of mandamus should issue should also be addressed, in the first instance, by the Court of Appeals after considering any additional briefs and arguments as it deems appropriate. We note only that all courts should be mindful of the burdens imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings. Special consider*392ations applicable to the President and the Vice President suggest that the courts should be sensitive to requests by the Government for interlocutory appeals to reexamine, for example, whether the statute embodies the defacto membership doctrine.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring.

Broad discovery should be encouraged when it serves the salutary purpose of facilitating the prompt and fair resolution of concrete disputes. In the normal case, it is entirely appropriate to require the responding party to make particularized objections to discovery requests. In some circumstances, however, the requesting party should be required to assume a heavy burden of persuasion before any discovery is allowed. Two interrelated considerations support taking that approach in this case: the nature of the remedy respondents requested from the District Court, and the nature of the statute they sought to enforce.

As relevant here, respondents, Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club, sought a writ of mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1361. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available to “a plaintiff only if... the defendant owes him a clear nondis-cretionary duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 616 (1984). Thus, to persuade the District Court that they were entitled to mandamus relief, respondents had to establish that petitioners had a nondiscretionary duty to comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq., p. 1, and in particular with FACA’s requirement that “records related to the advisory committee’s work be made public” — the only requirement still enforceable if, as respondent Sierra Club concedes, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) no longer exists. See Ju*393dicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 42 (DC 2002). Relying on the Court of Appeals’ novel de facto member doctrine, ante, at 374, respondents sought to make that showing by obtaining the very records to which they will be entitled if they win their lawsuit. In other words, respondents sought to obtain, through discovery, information about the NEPDG’s work in order to establish their entitlement to the same information.

Thus, granting broad discovery in this case effectively prejudged the merits of respondents’ claim for mandamus relief — an outcome entirely inconsistent with the extraordinary nature of the writ. Under these circumstances, instead of requiring petitioners to object to particular discovery requests, the District Court should have required respondents to demonstrate that particular requests would tend to establish their theory of the case.* I therefore think it would have been appropriate .for the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court’s discovery order. I nevertheless join the Court’s opinion and judgment because, as the architect of the de facto member doctrine, the Court of Appeals is the appropriate forum to direct future proceedings in the case.

Justice Thomas,

with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that “[t]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal, 426 U. S. 394, 402 (1976). In framing our review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Court recognizes this hurdle, observing that “the petitioner must satisfy ‘the burden of showing *394that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.’ ” Ante, at 381 (quoting Kerr, supra, at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted)). But in reaching its disposition, the Court barely mentions the fact that respondents, Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club, face precisely the same burden to obtain relief from the District Court. The proper question presented to the Court of Appeals was not only whether it is clear and indisputable that petitioners have a right to an order “ 'vacating] the discovery orders issued by the district court, directing] the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and directing] that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.’” 334 F. 3d 1096, 1101 (CADC 2003) (quoting Emergency Pet. for Writ of Mandamus in In re Cheney, in No. 02-5354 (CADC)). The question with which the Court of Appeals was faced also necessarily had to account for the fact that respondents sought mandamus relief in the District Court. Because they proceeded by mandamus, respondents had to demonstrate in the District Court a clear and indisputable right to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) materials. If respondents’ right to the materials was not clear and indisputable, then petitioners’ right to relief in the Court of Appeals was clear.

One need look no further than the District Court’s opinion to conclude respondents’ right to relief in the District Court was unclear and hence that mandamus would be unavailable. Indeed, the District Court acknowledged this Court’s recognition “that applying FACA to meetings among Presidential advisors 'presentís] formidable constitutional difficulties.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 47 (DC 2002) (quoting Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 466 (1989)).

Putting aside the serious constitutional questions raised by respondents’ challenge, the District Court could not even *395determine whether FACA applies to the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) as a statutory matter. 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54-55 (noting the possibility that, after discovery, petitioners might prevail on summary judgment on statutory grounds). I acknowledge that under the Court of Appeals’ de facto member doctrine, see Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F. 2d 898, 915 (CADC 1993), a district court is authorized to undertake broad discovery to determine whether FACA’s Government employees exception, 5 U. S. C. App. § 3(2)(C)(i), p. 2, applies. But, application of the de facto member doctrine to authorize broad discovery into the inner workings of the NEPDG has the same potential to offend the Constitution’s separation of powers as the actual application of FACA to the NEPDG itself. 334 F. 3d, at 1114-1115 (Randolph, J., dissenting). Thus, the existence of this doctrine cannot support the District Court’s actions here. If respondents must conduct wide-ranging discovery in order to prove that they have any right to relief — much less that they have a clear and indisputable right to relief — mandamus is unwarranted, and the writ should not issue.

Although the District Court might later conclude that FACA applies to the NEPDG as a statutory matter and that such application is constitutional, the mere fact that the District Court might rule in respondents’ favor cannot establish the clear right to relief necessary for mandamus. Otherwise, the writ of mandamus could turn into a freestanding cause of action for plaintiffs seeking to enforce virtually any statute, even those that provide no such private remedy.

Because the District Court clearly, exceeded its authority in this case, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with instruction to issue the writ.*

*396Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting.

The Government, in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and on brief to this Court, urged that this case should be resolved without any discovery. See App. 188-184, 339; Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief 18. In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, this Court remands for consideration whether mandamus is appropriate due to the overbreadth of the District Court’s discovery orders. See ante, at 372-37.3, 387-390. But, as the Court of Appeals observed, it appeared that the Government “never asked the district court to narrow discovery.” In re Cheney, 334 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (CADC 2003) (emphasis in original). Given the Government’s decision to resist all discovery, mandamus relief based on the exorbitance of the discovery orders is at least “premature,” id., at 1104. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the writ,1 and allow the District Court, in the first instance, to pursue its expressed intention “tightly [to] rei[n] [in] discovery,” 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002), should the Government so request.

I

A

The discovery at issue here was sought in a civil action filed by respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sierra Club. *397To gain information concerning the membership and operations of an energy-policy task force, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), respondents filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq., p. 1; respondents named among the defendants the Vice President and senior Executive Branch officials. See App. 16-40, 139-154; ante, at 373-374. After granting in part and denying in part the Government’s motions to dismiss, see 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, the District Court approved respondents’ extensive discovery plan, which included detailed and far-ranging interrogatories and sweeping requests for production of documents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; App. 215-230. In a later order, the District Court directed the Government to “produce non-privileged documents and a privilege log.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.

The discovery plan drawn by Judicial Watch and Sierra Club was indeed “unbounded in scope.” Ante, at 388; accord 334 F. 3d, at 1106. Initial approval of that plan by the District Court, however, was not given in stunning disregard of separation-of-powers concerns. Cf. ante, at 387-391. In the order itself, the District Court invited “detailed and precise objections]” to any of the discovery requests, and instructed the Government to “identify and explain ... invocations of privilege with particularity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. To avoid duplication, the District Court provided that the Government could identify “documents or information [responsive to the discovery requests] that [it] ha[d] already released to [Judicial Watch or the Sierra Club] in different fora.” Ibid2 Anticipating further proceedings concerning discovery, the District Court suggested that the Government could “submit [any privileged documents] under seal for the court’s consideration,” or that “the court [could] appoint the equivalent of a Special Master, maybe a retired judge,” to review allegedly privileged documents. App. 247.

*398The Government did not file specific objections; nor did it supply particulars to support assertions of privilege. Instead, the Government urged the District Court to rule that Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club could have no discovery at all. See id., at 192 (“the government] position is that... no discovery is appropriate”); id., at 205 (same); 334 E 3d, at 1106 (“As far as we can tell, petitioners never asked the district court to narrow discovery to those matters [respondents] need to support their allegation that FACA applies to the NEPDG.” (emphasis in original)). In the Government’s view, “the resolution of the case ha[d] to flow from the administrative record” sans discovery. App. 192. Without taking up the District Court’s suggestion of that court’s readiness to rein in discovery, see 219 F. Supp. 2d, at 54, the Government, on behalf of the Vice President, moved, unsuccessfully, for a protective order and for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). See 334 F. 3d, at 1100; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a (District Court denial of protective order); 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (DC 2002) (District Court denial of § 1292(b) certification).3 At the District Court’s hearing on the Government’s motion for a stay pending interlocutory appeal, the Government argued that “the injury is submitting to discovery in the absence of a compelling showing of need by the [respondents].” App. 316; see 230 F. Supp. 2d 12 (DC 2002) (District Court order denying stay).

Despite the absence from this “flurry of activity,” ante, at 379, of any Government motion contesting the terms of the discovery plan or proposing a scaled-down substitute plan, see 334 F. 3d, at 1106, this Court states that the Government *399“did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way,” ante, at 388. In support of this statement, the Court points to the Government’s objections to the proposed discovery plan, its response to the interrogatories and production requests, and its contention that discovery would be unduly burdensome. See ante, at 388-389; App. 166-184, 201, 231-234, 274.

True, the Government disputed the definition of the term “meeting” in respondents’ interrogatories, and stated, in passing, that “discovery should be [both] limited to written interrogatories” and “limited in scope to the issue of membership.” Id., at 179, 181, 233.4 But as the Court of Appeals noted, the Government mentioned “excessive discovery” in support of .its plea to be shielded from any discovery. 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The Government argument that “the burden of doing a document production is an unconstitutional burden,” App. 274, was similarly anchored. The Government so urged at a District Court hearing in which its underlying “position [was] that it’s not going to produce anything,” id., at 249.5

*400The Government’s bottom line was firmly and consistently that “review, limited to the administrative record, should frame the resolution of this case.” Id., at 181; accord id., at 179, 233. That administrative record would “consist of the Presidential Memorandum establishing NEPDG, NEPDG’s public report, and the Office of the Vice President’s response to . . . Judicial Watch’s request for permission to attend NEPDG meetings”; it would not include anything respondents could gain through discovery. Id., at 183. Indeed, the Government acknowledged before the District Court that its litigation strategy involved opposition to the discovery plan as a whole in lieu of focused objections. See id., at 205 (Government stated: “We did not choose to offer written objections to [the discovery plan]....”).

Further sounding the Government’s leitmotif, in a hearing on the proposed discovery plan, the District Court stated that the Government “didn’t file objections” to rein in discovery “because [in the Government’s view] no discovery is appropriate.” Id., at 192; id., at 205 (same). Without endeavoring to correct any misunderstanding on the District Court’s part, the Government underscored its resistance to any and all discovery. Id., at 192-194; id., at 201 (asserting that respondents are “not entitled to discovery to supplement [the administrative record]”). And in its motion for a protective order, the Government similarly declared its unqualified opposition to discovery. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order and for Reconsideration, C. A. Nos. 01-1530 (EGS), 02-631 (EGS), p. 21 (D. D. C., Sept. 3, 2002) (“[Petitioners] respectfully request that the Court enter a protective order relieving them of any obligation to respond to [respondents’] discovery [requests].” (emphasis added)); see 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (same).6

*401The District Court, in short, “ignored” no concrete pleas to “narrow” discovery. But see ante, at 388-390. That court did, however, voice its concern about the Government’s failure to heed the court’s instructions:

“I told the government, if you have precise constitutional objections, let me know what they are so I can determine whether or not this [discovery] plan is appropriate, and ... you said, well, it’s unconstitutional, without elaborating. You said, because Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery plan has not been approved by the court, the Defendants are not submitting specific objections to Plaintiffs’ proposed request____My rule was, if you have objections, let me know what the objections are, and you chose not to do so.” App. 205.

B

Denied § 1292(b) certification by the District Court, the Government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals. See id., at 339-365. In its mandamus petition, the Government asked the appellate court to “vacate the discovery orders issued by the district court, direct the court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record and such supplemental affidavits as it may require, and direct that the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant.” Id., at 364-365. In support of those requests, the Government again argued that the case should be adjudicated without discovery: “The Constitution and principles of comity preclude discovery of the President or Vice President, especially without a demonstration of compelling and focused countervailing interest.” Id., at 360.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the discovery plan presented by respondents and approved by the District *402Court “goes well beyond what [respondents] need.” 334 F. 3d, at 1106. The appellate court nevertheless denied the mandamus petition, concluding that the Government’s separation-of-powers concern “remained] hypothetical.” Id., at 1105. Far from ordering immediate “disclosure of communications between senior executive branch officials and those with information relevant to advice that was being formulated for the President,” the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court had directed the Government initially to produce only “non-privileged documents and a privilege log.” Id., at 1104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.7

The Court of Appeals stressed that the District Court could accommodate separation-of-powers concerns short of denying all discovery or compelling the invocation of executive privilege. See 334 F. 3d, at 1105-1106. Principally, the Court of Appeals stated, discovery could be narrowed, should the Government so move, to encompass only “whether non-federal officials participated [in NEPDG], and if so, to what extent.” Id., at 1106. The Government could identify relevant materials produced in other litigation, thus avoiding undue reproduction. Id., at 1105; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; supra, at 397. If, after appropriate narrowing, the discovery allowed still impels “the Vice President.'.. to claim privilege,” the District Court could “entertain [those] privilege claims” and “review allegedly privileged documents in camera.” 334 F. 3d, at 1107. Mindful of “the judiciary’s responsibility to police the separation of powers in litigation involving the executive,” the Court of Appeals *403expressed confidence that the District Court would “respond to petitioners’ concern and narrow discovery to ensure that [respondents] obtain no more than they need to prove their case.” Id., at 1106.

II

“This Court repeatedly has observed that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 289 (1988) (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 426 U. S. 394, 402 (1976)); see ante, at 380-381 (same). As the Court reiterates, “the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.” Kerr, 426 U. S., at 403 (citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 26 (1943)); ante, at 380-381.

Throughout this litigation, the Government has declined to move for reduction of the District Court’s discovery order to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See supra, at 398-402. The Court now remands this case so the Court of Appeals can consider whether a mandamus writ should issue ordering the District Court to “explore other avenues, . short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege,” and, in particular, to “narrow, on its own, the scope of [discovery].” Ante, at 390. Nothing in the District Court’s orders or the Court of Appeals’ opinion, however, suggests that either of those courts would refuse reasonably to accommodate separation-of-powers concerns. See supra, at 397, 398, 401-402, and this page. When parties seeking a mandamus writ decline to avail themselves of opportunities to obtain relief from the District Court, a writ of mandamus ordering the same relief — i. e., here, reined-in discovery — is surely a doubtful proposition.

The District Court, moreover, did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative. Although the Court cites United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (DC 1989), as “sound precedent” for district-court narrowing of *404discovery, see ante, at 390, the target of the subpoena in that case, former President Reagan, unlike petitioners in this case, affirmatively requested such narrowing, 727 F. Supp., at 1503. A district court is not subject to criticism if it awaits a party’s motion before tightening the scope of discovery; certainly, that court makes no “clear and indisputable” error in adhering to the principle of party initiation, Kerr, 426 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).8

*405Review by mandamus at this stage of the proceedings would be at least comprehensible as a means to test the Government’s position that no discovery is appropriate in this litigation. See Brief for Petitioners 45 (“[P]etitioners’ separation-of-powers arguments are . . . in the nature of a claim of immunity from discovery.”). But in remanding for consideration of discovery-tailoring measures, the Court apparently rejects that no-discovery position. Otherwise, a remand based on the overbreadth of the discovery requests would make no sense. Nothing in the record, however, intimates lower court refusal to reduce discovery. Indeed, the appeals court has already suggested tailored discovery that would avoid “effectively prejudging] the merits of respondents’ claim,” ante, at 393 (Stevens, J., concurring). See 334 F. 3d, at 1106 (respondents “need only documents referring to the involvement of non-federal officials”). See also ante, at 393, n. (Stevens, J., concurring) (“A few interrogatories or depositions might have determined ... whether any non-Government employees voted on NEPDG recommendations or drafted portions of the committee’s report”). In accord with the Court of Appeals, I am “confident that [were it moved to do so] the district court here [would] protect petitioners’ legitimate interests and keep discovery within appropriate limits.” 334 F. 3d, at 1107.9 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

4.5.4.3 Mandamus Reviewed 4.5.4.3 Mandamus Reviewed

In Cheney, the Court makes clear that mandamus is an extraordinary but not altogether unavailable remedy:

Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259—260. While the conditions for obtaining it may be demanding, they are not insuperable.

     The party seeking mandamus must meet three requirements:

  • The party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires
  • The petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.
  • The issuing courts, in the exercise of its discretion, must additionally satisfy itself that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

     In Cheney, that the defendant was the vice president bore on what was appropriate under the circumstances.

     One reason a court might entertain a mandamus claim involves its supervisory responsibility. If the lower courts frequently face an issue that is important but not readily susceptible to appellate review - such as whether special masters should be appointed to handle matters under the court's supervision - the need to provide guidance and supervision to lower courts will bear on what is appropriate under the circumstances.

4.5.5 Standard of Review, Timing, and Other Issues 4.5.5 Standard of Review, Timing, and Other Issues

4.5.5.1 Standard of Review 4.5.5.1 Standard of Review

     Once an appeal is possible, how is it handled in the appellate court? Put differently, what is the split of work and authority between the trial judge, the jury (if one is used), and the appellate court?

     First, the court of appeals normally is to supposed to consider only those issues that have been presented to the trial court for decision. It is up to the trial lawyer to put into the record objections to legal standards used, to the admission of evidence, or to other aspects of the trial. There are some exceptions - if the trial court's mistake was so clear as to be 'plain error,' a point can be considered without a trial objection, and appellate courts also have broad latitude with regard to applying correct legal standards.

     For those matters the appellate court does consider, what is the standard? That depends on the nature of the issue.

     For legal issues, the standard is de novo, or "from the beginning." In terms of what legal rule should be applied, the appellate court will substitute its opinion for that of the trial court.

     For factual issues, the appellate courts show great deference, even when the factfinder is a trial judge and not a jury. The standard here is 'clear error' - that is, if “on the entire evidence [the appellate court] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Pullman-Standard v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.12 (1982)). As a practical matter, it is a usually losing proposition to try to get trial verdicts reversed on factual error grounds. Trial judges and juries have a better opportunity to observe witnesses and place isolated statements in a larger context, and as a systems design matter the appellate courts do not want to get involved.

     For mixed questions of fact and law, the answer is more mixed. Imagine a situation where everyone agrees the fact is that the defendant was driving while distracted by the music on his sound system, and all agree on the legal standard for negligence. Is it negligent to drive while distracted by music? Some courts say that if the facts are truly undisputed the review should be de novo; other courts admit to applying a sliding scale based on how fact-intensive the issue is.

     In many situations, the standard for trial courts is an "abuse of discretion standard." An example would be whether a trial judge should certify an issue for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). Again, as with review of facts, as a practical matter judges rarely are overturned for matters where an abuse of discretion standard applies.

     Another issue is when the appeal must be taken. As the following case indicates, there's little discretion.

 

 

4.5.5.2 Bowles v. Russell 4.5.5.2 Bowles v. Russell

BOWLES v. RUSSELL, WARDEN

No. 06-5306.

Argued March 26, 2007

Decided June 14, 2007

*206Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scaua, Kennedy, and Auto, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 215.

Paul Mancino, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul Mancino III and Brett Mancino.

, William P. Marshall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Marc Dann, Attorney General of Ohio, Elise W. Porter, Acting Solicitor General, and Stephen P. Carney, Robert J. Krummen, and Elizabeth T. Scavo, Deputy Solicitors..

Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Eric D. Miller, Douglas N. Letter, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr.*

Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, a District Court purported to extend a party’s time for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed by statute. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the statutory period but within the period allowed by the District Court’s order. We have long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s untimely notice — even *207though filed in reliance upon a District Court’s order— deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction.

I

In 1999, an Ohio jury convicted petitioner Keith Bowles of murder for his involvement in the beating death of Ollie Gipson. The jury sentenced Bowles to 15-years-to-life imprisonment. Bowles unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

Bowles then filed a federal habeas corpus application on September 5, 2002. On September 9, 2003, the District Court denied Bowles habeas relief. After the entry of final judgment, Bowles had 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. §2107(a). He failed to do so. On December 12, 2003, Bowles moved to reopen the period during which he could file his notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), which allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days from the day the district court grants the order to reopen, provided certain conditions are met. See § 2107(c).

On February 10, 2004, the District Court granted Bowles’ motion. But rather than extending the time period by 14 days, as Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c) allow, the District Court inexplicably gave Bowles 17 days — until February 27 — to file his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his notice on February 26 — within the 17 days allowed by the District Court’s order, but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c).

On appeal, respondent Russell argued that Bowles’ notice was untimely and that the Court of Appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the ease. The Court of Appeals agreed. It first recognized that this Court has consistently held the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” 432 F. 3d 668, 673 (CA6 2005) (citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978)). The court also noted that Courts of Ap*208peals have uniformly held that Rule 4(a)(6)’s 180-day period for filing a motion to reopen is also mandatory and not susceptible to equitable modification. 432 F. 3d, at 673 (collecting eases). Concluding that “the fourteen-day period in Rule 4(a)(6) should be treated as strictly as the 180-day period in that same Rule,” id., at 676, the Court of Appeals held that it was without jurisdiction. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1092 (2006), and now affirm.

II

According to 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a), parties must file notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment being appealed. District courts have limited authority to grant an extension of the 30-day time period. Relevant to this case, if certain conditions are met, district courts have the statutory authority to grant motions to reopen the time for filing an appeal for 14 additional days. § 2107(c). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure carries §2107 into practice. In accord with § 2107(c), Rule 4(a)(6) describes the district court’s authority to reopen and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal after the lapse of the usual 30 days:

“(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal.
“The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied:
“(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry, whichever is earlier;
“(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice from the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and
*209“(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.” (Emphasis added.)1

It is undisputed that the District Court’s order in this case purported to reopen the filing period for more than 14 days. Thus, the question before us is whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed outside the 14-day window allowed by § 2107(c) but within the longer period granted by the District Court.

A

This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted);2 accord, Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 247 (1998); Tor*210res v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 314-315 (1988); Browder, 434 U. S., at 264. Indeed, even prior to the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, this Court regarded statutory limitations on the timing of appeals as limitations on its own jurisdiction. See Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S. 567, 568 (1883) (“[T]he writ of error in this case was not brought within the time limited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction”); United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113 (1848) (“[A]s this appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction”). Reflecting the consistency of this Court’s holdings, the courts of appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction. See, e. g., Atkins v. Medical Dept. of Augusta Cty. Jail, No. 06-7792, 2007 WL 1048810 (CA4, Apr. 4, 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3901, p. 6 (2d ed. 1992) (“The rule is well settled that failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals”). In fact, the author of today’s dissent recently reiterated that “[t]he accepted fact is that some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, see, e.g., . . . §2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil cases must be filed ‘within thirty days after the entry of such judgment’).” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 160, n. 6 (2003) (majority opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., inter alios).

Although several of our recent decisions have undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into question our longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional. Indeed, those decisions have also recognized the jurisdictional significance of the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute. In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), we held that failure to comply with the time *211requirement in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 did not affect a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Critical to our analysis was the fact that “[n]o statute . . . specifies a time limit for filing a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge.” 540 U. S., at 448. Rather, the filing deadlines in the Bankruptcy Rules are “ ‘procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business’” that are “‘not jurisdictional.’” Id., at 454 (quoting Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970)). Because “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” 540 U. S., at 452 (citing U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1), it was improper for courts to use “the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court,” 540 U. S., at 454. See also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). As a point of contrast, we noted that §2107 contains the type of statutory time constraints that would limit a court’s jurisdiction. 540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8.3 Nor do Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 (2006), or Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401 (2004), aid petitioner. In Arbaugh, the statutory limitation was an employee-numerosity requirement, not a time limit. 546 U. S., at 505. Scarborough, which addressed the availability of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerned “a mode of relief . . . ancillary to the judgment of a court” that already had plenary jurisdiction. 541 U. S., at 413.

This Court’s treatment of its certiorari jurisdiction also demonstrates the jurisdictional distinction between court-*212promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress. According to our Rules, a petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. See this Court’s Rule 13.1. That 90-day period applies to both civil and criminal cases. But the 90-day period for civil cases derives from both this Court’s Rule 13.1 and 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). We have repeatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil cases is jurisdictional. See, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 90 (1994). Indeed, this Court’s Rule 13.2 cites § 2101(c) in directing the Clerk not to file any petition “that is jurisdictionally out of time.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, we have treated the rule-based time limit for criminal cases differently, stating that it may be waived because “[t]he procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion ....” Schacht, supra, at 64.4

Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense. Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear *213cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. See Curry, 6 How., at 113. Put another way, the notion of “‘subject-matter’” jurisdiction obviously extends to “ ‘classes of cases ... falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority,’” Eberhart, supra, at 16 (quoting Kontrick, supra, at 455), but it is no less “jurisdictional” when Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate “class of cases” after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.

The resolution of this ease follows naturally from this reasoning. Like the initial 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, the limit on how long a district court may reopen that period is set forth in a statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c). Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in § 2107(c), that limitation is more than a simple “claim-processing rule.” As we have long held, when an “appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Curry, supra, at 113. Bowles’ failure to file his notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles’ error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with the statute’s time limitations. See Arbaugh, supra, at 513-514.

B

Bowles contends that we should excuse his untimely filing because he satisfies the “unique circumstances” doctrine, which has its roots in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per curiam). There, pursuant to then-Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a District Court entertained a timely motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. The District Court found the moving party had established a showing of “excusable neglect,” as required by the Rule, and *214granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the finding of excusable neglect and, accordingly, held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the extension. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 303 F. 2d 609, 611-612 (CA7 1962). This Court reversed, noting “the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge’s finding of ‘excusable neglect.’ ” 371 U. S., at 217.

Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the “unique circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate. Given that this Court has applied Harris Truck Lines only once in the last half century, Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964) (per curiam), several courts have rightly questioned its continuing validity. See, e. g., Panhorst v. United States, 241 F. 3d 367, 371 (CA4 2001) (doubting “the continued viability of the unique circumstances doctrine”). See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 282 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our later cases ... effectively repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach . . . ”); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U. S. 169, 170 (1989) (referring to “the so-called ‘unique circumstances’ exception” to the timely appeal requirement). We see no compelling reason to resurrect the doctrine from its 40-year slumber. Accordingly, we reject Bowles’ reliance on the doctrine, and we overrule Harris Truck Lines and Thompson to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.

C

If rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits. Even narrow rules to this effect would give rise to litigation testing their reach and would no doubt detract from the clarity'of the rule. However, congressionally authorized rule-*215making would likely lead to less litigation than court-created exceptions without authorization. And in all events, for the reasons discussed above, we lack present authority to make the exception petitioner seeks.

Ill

The Court of Appeals correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Bowles’ appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The District Court told petitioner Keith Bowles that his notice of appeal was due on February 27, 2004. He filed a notice of appeal on February 26, only to be told that he was too late because his deadline had actually been February 24. It is intolerable for the judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical justification for condoning this bait and switch. I respectfully dissent.

I

“ ‘Jurisdiction,’ ” we have warned several times in the last decade, “ ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC 1996)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (quoting Steel Co.); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 510 (2006) (same); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. 457, 467 (2007) (same). This variety of meaning has insidiously tempted courts, this one included, to engage in “less than meticulous,” Kontrick, supra, at 454, sometimes even “profligate . . . use of the term,” Arbaugh, supra, at 510.

In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our language, and until today we have been avoiding the errone*216ous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from indiscriminate use of the ambiguous word. Thus, although we used to call the sort of time limit at issue here “mandatory and jurisdictional,” United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960), we have recently and repeatedly corrected that designation as a misuse of the “jurisdiction” label, Arbaugh, supra, at 510 (citing Robinson as an example of improper use of the term “jurisdiction”); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 17-18 (2005) (per curiam) (same); Kontrick, supra, at 454 (same).

But one would never guess this from reading the Court's opinion in this case, which suddenly restores Robinson’s indiscriminate use of the “mandatory and jurisdictional” label to good law in the face of three unanimous repudiations of Robinson’s error. See ante, at 209. This is puzzling, the more so because our recent (and, I repeat, unanimous) efforts to confine jurisdictional rulings to jurisdiction proper were obviously sound, and the majority makes no attempt to show they were not.1 1

The stakes are high in treating time limits as jurisdictional. While a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is enforceable at the insistence of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion. But if a limit is taken to be jurisdictional, waiver becomes impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant (unless the statute so provides), and sua sponte consideration in the *217courts of appeals mandatory, see Arbaugh, supra, at 514.2 As the Court recognizes, ante, at 210-211, this is no way to regard time limits set out in a court rule rather than a statute, see Kontrick, supra, at 452 (“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”). But neither is jurisdictional treatment automatic when a time limit is statutory, as it is in this case. Generally speaking, limits on the reach of federal statutes, even nontemporal ones, are only jurisdictional if Congress says so: “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. Thus, we have held “that time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are not properly typed “jurisdictional,” ’ ” id., at 510 (quoting Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004)), absent some jurisdictional designation by Congress. Congress put no jurisdictional tag on the time limit here.3

*218The doctrinal underpinning of this recently repeated view was set out in Kontrick: “the label ‘jurisdictional’ [is appropriate] not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” 540 U. S., at 455. A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claim-processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal courts may hear, and so it falls outside the class of limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise.4 **4

The time limit at issue here, far from defining the set of cases that may be adjudicated, is much more like a statute of limitations, which provides an affirmative defense, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), and is not jurisdictional, Day v. *219McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205 (2006). Statutes of limitations may thus be waived, id., at 207-208, or excused by rules, such as equitable tolling, that alleviate hardship and unfairness, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990).

Consistent with the traditional view of statutes of limitations, and the carefully limited concept of jurisdiction explained in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and Kontrick, an exception to the time limit in 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c) should be available when there is a good justification for one, for reasons we recognized years ago. In Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam), we found that “unique circumstances” excused failures to comply with the time limit. In fact, much like this case, Harris and Thompson involved District Court errors that misled litigants into believing they had more time to file notices of appeal than a statute actually provided. Thus, even back when we thoughtlessly called time limits jurisdictional, we did not actually treat them as beyond exemption to the point of shrugging at the inequity of penalizing a party for relying on what a federal judge had said to him. Since we did not dishonor reasonable reliance on a judge's official word back in the days when we uncritically had a jurisdictional reason to be unfair, it is unsupportable to dishonor it now, after repeatedly disavowing any such jurisdictional justification that would apply to the 14-day time limit of § 2107(c).

The majority avoids clashing with Harris and Thompson by overruling them on the ground of their “slumber,” ante, at 214, and inconsistency with a time-limit-as-jurisdictional rule.5 But eliminating those precedents underscores what *220has become the principal question of this case: why does to-day’s majority refuse to come to terms with the steady stream of unanimous statements from this Court in the past four years, culminating in Arbaugh’s summary a year ago? The majority begs this question by refusing to confront what we have said: “in recent decisions, we have clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are not properly typed “jurisdictional.” ’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 510 (quoting Scarborough, 541 U. S., at 414). This statement of the Court, and those preceding it for which it stands as a summation, cannot be dismissed as “some dicta,” ante, at 209, n. 2, and cannot be ignored on the ground that some of them were made in cases where the challenged restriction was not a time limit, see ante, at 211. By its refusal to come to grips with our considered statements of law the majority leaves the Court incoherent.

In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a District Court Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one may depend on the recent, repeated, and unanimous statements of all participating Justices of this Court. Yet more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the Court, along with two of our cases,6 are jettisoned in a ruling for which the leading justification is stare decisis, see ante, at 209 (“This Court has long held ... ”).

II

We have the authority to recognize an equitable exception to the 14-day limit, and we should do that here, as it certainly seems reasonable to rely on an order from a federal judge.7 *221Bowles, though, does not have to convince us as a matter of first impression that his reliance was justified, for we only have to look as far as Thompson to know that he ought to prevail. There, the would-be appellant, Thompson, had filed post-trial motions 12 days after the District Court’s final order. Although the rules said they should have been filed within 10, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(b) and 59(b) (1964 ed.), the trial court nonetheless had “specifically declared that the ‘motion for a new trial’ was made ‘in ample time.’ ” Thompson, supra, at 885. Thompson relied on that statement in filing a notice of appeal within 60 days of the denial of the post-trial motions but not within 60 days of entry of the original judgment. Only timely post-trial motions affected the 60-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal, Rule 73(a) (1964 ed.), so the Court of Appeals held the appeal untimely. We vacated because Thompson “relied on the statement of the District Court and filed the appeal within the assumedly new deadline but beyond the old deadline.” 375 U. S., at 387.

Thompson should control. In that ease, and this one, the untimely filing of a notice of appeal resulted from reliance on an error by a District Court, an error that caused no evident prejudice to the other party. Actually, there is one difference between Thompson and this case: Thompson filed his post-trial motions late, and the District Court was mistaken when it said they were timely; here, the District Court made the error out of the blue, not on top of any mistake by Bowles, who then filed his notice of appeal by the specific date the District Court had declared timely. If anything, this distinction ought to work in Bowles’s favor. Why should we have rewarded Thompson, who introduced the error, but now punish Bowles, who merely trusted the District Court’s statement?8

*222Under Thompson, it would be no answer to say that Bowles’s trust was unreasonable because the 14-day limit was clear and counsel should have checked the judge’s arithmetic. The 10-day limit on post-trial motions was no less pellucid in Thompson, which came out the other way. And what is more, counsel here could not have uncovered the court’s error simply by counting off the days on a calendar. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) allows a party to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of “the date when [the district court’s] order to reopen is entered.” See also 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c)(2) (allowing reopening for “14 days from the date of entry”). The District Court’s order was dated February 10,2004, which reveals the date the judge signed it but not necessarily the date on which the order was entered. Bowles’s lawyer therefore could not tell from reading the order, which he received by mail, whether it was entered the day it was signed. Nor is the possibility of delayed entry merely theoretical: the District Court’s original judgment in this case, dated July 10, 2003, was not entered until July 28. See App. 11 (District Court docket). According to Bowles’s lawyer, electronic access to the docket was unavailable at the time, so to learn when the order was actually entered he would have had to call or go to the courthouse and check. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56-57. Surely this is more than equity demands, and unless every statement by a federal court is to be tagged with the warning “Beware of the Judge,” Bowles’s *223lawyer had no obligation to go behind the terms of the order he received.

I have to admit that Bowles’s counsel probably did not think the order might have been entered on a different day from the day it was signed. He probably just trusted that the date given was correct, and there was nothing unreasonable in so trusting. The other side let the order pass without objection, either not caring enough to make a fuss or not even noticing the discrepancy; the mistake of a few days was probably not enough to ring the alarm bell to send either lawyer to his copy of the Federal Rules and then off to the courthouse to check the docket.9 This would be a different case if the year were wrong on the District Court’s order, or if opposing counsel had flagged the error. But on the actual facts, it was reasonable to rely on a facially plausible date provided by a federal judge.

I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the merits.

4.5.5.3 Notes On Standard of Review, Timing, and Other Issues 4.5.5.3 Notes On Standard of Review, Timing, and Other Issues

     1. The term 'jurisdictional' by its terms deals with the power of a court to act. Bowles applies a strict version of this concept but nonetheless suggests that courts have, on occasion, found more elasticity in the concept than one might expect. In the Bowles case the result was certainly harsh. Based on your reading of the case, what would be required to give courts some flexibility to deal with such situations? As a matter of system design, would it be better to allow some flexibility?

     2. Another system design matter involves the allocation of roles and power between the trial court and the appellate court. As a general rule, the standard of review rules favor appellate courts when it comes to making and interpreting law, and trial courts when it comes to determining facts or making any of the many discretionary decisions inherent in managing pretrial processes and trials. Do you think this makes sense?

4.5.6 Review and Recap of Judicial Review 4.5.6 Review and Recap of Judicial Review

4.5.6.1 Review of Judicial Review 4.5.6.1 Review of Judicial Review

     How do trial court decisions get reviewed by higher courts? We've seen several methods, and it will be helpful to you to keep them organized analytically.

     First, in the US system federal courts generally need affirmative grants of jurisdiction. The Constitution and then a statute needs to give them the authority to hear a case.

     The first such grant for appellate jurisdiction that we saw was 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This section provides appellate review when a trial court has made a 'final decision.' You will recall that a final decision is one where, in effect, things have come to end - the court has nothing left to do. It's not just any of the many decisions that judges will make in the course of handling litigation, but the big, concluding, final decision that resolves the claim. In the ordinary case, where the final decision involves all the claims in the case, the loser (and sometimes both sides are losers on different issues) can go straight to the Court of Appeals with her appeal, with no permission required from the trial court.

     There are two wrinkles to § 1291, but neither one is an exception to the rule of finality. In both cases, there is a kind of finality, and the grant of appellate jurisdiction still flows from §  1291.

     First, FRCP Rule 54(b) deals with those situations where a case has many claims and many parties, which was not the case under some of the common law rules of procedure in effect when preceding versions of what is now § 1291 first took effect. Rule 54(b) addresses this situation by making the trial judge a gatekeeper or a dispatcher. When a final decision is reached on part of a case - that is, if relief is granted to one party on one or more claims, or one party is dismissed, or one claim is dismissed - but other parts of the case continue, those parts where a final decision has been reached can be addressed under Rule 54(b). Imagine a situation where a plaintiff has brought both a contract claim and a fraud claim involving the same set of facts. The trial court dismisses the fraud claim, but allows the contract claim to continue toward trial. Because the dismissal of the fraud claim is a final decision under the meaning of § 1291, the judge can certify that there is no just reason for delay and the plaintiff can (and must if they ever want to take an appeal, because the time to appeal starts running) go straight to the appellate court. Because the judge's decision on the contract claim is not a final decision - the case is not over, but continues - Rule 54(b) does not allow for certification of that issue, and there is no option under Rule 54(b) to get an appeal on that issue.

     The second wrinkle is the Cohen collateral judgment rule. Under this doctrine, which interprets finality practically, certain side issues are treated as final. An immediate appeal on just that issue is allowed. Again, Cohen is clearly situated under § 1291.

     We next turn to 28 U.S.C. §  1292. When we get to § 1292, we are not talking variations on the final judgment rule, but true exceptions - situations where no kind of final judgment is required.

     The first part of § 1292 that we deal with is § 1292 (a). This statute involves injunctions. Injunctions are not final in the sense required under § 1291 because typically the court will retain jurisdiction and supervise the actions of the parties. Nonetheless, at the time the request for an injunction (or other forms of equitable relief) on the merits of the case has been decided, the court has effectively made its decision - the facts have been weighed, the law has been considered, and the court has decided what it will do. In this context, § 1292 reflects a policy choice that even without finality actions such as granting, modifying, or denying an injunction on the merits are actions that warrant immediate appellate review.

     Also under § 1292 we have § 1292(b). Again, this represents an exception to finality, and in this case the grant of interlocutory appeals provides a kind of safety valve so immediate appeals can be taken in those somewhat rare situations where waiting for the end of the case would make managing the litigation more difficult for the judge and deciding how to resolve the dispute more difficult for the parties. The decision we read in the Chinese Dry Wall case represents a casebook example of a good application of this gateway to appeal. In that case the decision on personal jurisdiction would be outcome determinative if decided differently, and there were two reasonable sides to this complex issue. Knowing that the issue was finally decided allowed the judge presiding over the multidistrict litigation security in proceeding to merits discovery and resolution over literally thousands of cases, and also allowed the defendants to better calculate the benefits of settlement since they now knew that a free exit thanks to personal jurisdiction was not going to be in the cards. The § 1292 approach requires the judge first to determine that the situation meets the three qualifying categories - if it does not, there is no discretion to allow a § 1292(b) appeal. Even when it does, then both the trial court and the appellate court have discretion with regard to whether the appeal goes forward.

     The final way of getting a judge's decision to a higher court that was looked at was the so-called 'extraordinary writ' of mandamus. In understanding mandamus (which means "We command" in the language of Latin) it's important to understand that the writ does not exist, unlike appeals, for the principal purpose of reviewing legal decisions. Rather, it is broader than that. It exists to require that government officials, including but not limited to judges, act in lawful ways. Through mandamus, the court commands government officials to do their duty. It has been used, for example, to command a body charged with accrediting schools to accredit a university according to the lawful criteria, rather than blocking accreditation because they disagreed with religious requirements the school imposed on faculty.

     In the context of the courts, mandamus overlaps with a separate doctrine that bears on appellate courts, which the power and duty of appellate courts to supervise those courts underneath them. It's the job of a state supreme court, for example, to address lower court judges who are acting in ways that exceed the authority granted to them, and this duty exists apart from the normal appellate process.

     The language of mandamus opinions in all courts makes clear that mandamus is to be granted only in rare circumstances, and that indeed seems to be the practice in the federal courts. If you reread the language in the Cheney you will note the general language establishing the extraordinary nature of the writ as well as the demanding three part test, which requires far more than error in the court below. While mandamus was granted in Cheney, that was an unusual outcome, and depended in large part on the need to avoid conflict between the executive and judicial branches of the federal government.

     The takeaway for those exposed to US federal litigation (and remember that state courts might have different appellate rules, which may be one reason to prefer or not prefer being in state court), is that the default rule where you get an appeal as of right requires that the case be over, done and dusted, final, with nothing left to do at the trial level except execute the judgment. The wrinkles on and exceptions to § 1291 are things you need to understand and be able to apply as you consider your strategic options, but overall you don't want to confuse the existence of a doctrine such as collateral issue appeals with a likelihood that such an appeal is likely. Knowing the actual odds and the various wrinkles and exceptions will involve up-to-date research in the relevant jurisdiction at the time.

     Here is a takeaway problem to help you appreciate why understanding the process of appellate review of trial decisions matters. Imagine a situation where your client has been sued in the United States. The issue of personal jurisdiction appears close (we will get to the why of that issue can be close later in the course). If the court holds personal jurisdiction does not exist, you will be dismissed from the lawsuit (for simplicity, we will assume that for one reason or another they cannot sue you anywhere else at this time). If the court holds that personal jurisdiction does exist, and refuses to certify the decision under § 1292, it is a long road to finality and other options are very limited. Imagine the suit is for $50 million. Imagine your US counsel expects costs of briefing the motion to dismiss to be $500,000, estimates the cost of bringing an appeal on that issue to also be $500,000, estimates costs through the end of discovery if it continues at $10,000,000, and estimates another $5,000,000 for trial and post-trial work. Imagine that your US counsel has investigated the trial judge, and has found that this judge tends to have a very expansive view of personal jurisdiction and not liking to be be reversed very, very rarely certifies cases for appeal under § 1292(b). Your US counsel gives you only a 5 percent chance of winning the motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction, but a 95 percent chance of prevailing on the issue on appeal. Your US counsel gives you a 50 percent chance of winning on the merits if the case goes all the way to trial. The opposing party offers to settle for $12 million now but indicates the number will go up if they win on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The situation is such that the decision whether to settle can be a purely mathematical decision (for example, no worries about legal precedent or encouraging other plaintiffs to bring copycat suits). The American rule on fees applies. How would you approach this settlement offer under the US system? How would you approach this settlement offer under a system where an immediate appeal could be taken from the trial court decision?

4.6 Review - Defining the Objective 4.6 Review - Defining the Objective

     Any sensible litigation must begin with understanding what outcomes are possible and likely. Whether you are defending or bringing a claim, you can make no sound decisions without a firm handle on this.

     This section should have taught you that simply having (or being exposed to) a valid legal claim is only the start of the process. Before that means anything, you must know:

  • What remedies can the court award if you prevail? If those remedies do not meet your needs, litigation may not be the best path.
  • Can those remedies be enforced? Will the defending party be subject to the court's injunctive relief or, if the claim is for damages, can it be enforced where the defendant has assets? As you will quickly learn in some of your other classes, there is little point in pursuing a 'judgment proof' target. A party may have deep pockets with plenty of money in them, but if a judgment cannot be enforced where those assets are it means little.
  • What are the procedural costs of getting to where you can obtain that recovery? We use the appeals process to illustrate that having a winning claim, or a winning appeal, is not at all the same as having a claim or appeal that you can afford to pursue. 

     In any system, such concerns should inform the decision about whether litigation should be pursued or whether some other method of resolving the conflict should be pursued. In the US system, where few cases go to trial and many are resolved by settlement, these kinds of issues inform settlement negotiations just as much as pure liability calculations.