5 Federal Criminal Law 5 Federal Criminal Law

5.1 Basic Principles: knowledge v. strict liability 5.1 Basic Principles: knowledge v. strict liability

United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)

 

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a prosecution begun by two informations, consolidated for trial, charging Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., and Dotterweich, its president and general manager, with violations of the Act of Congress of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. §§301-392, known as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The Company, a jobber in drugs, purchased them from their manufacturers and shipped them, repacked under its own label, in interstate commerce. . . . The informations were based on §301 of that Act (21 U.S.C. §331), paragraph (a) of which prohibits “The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.” “Any person” violating this provision is, by paragraph (a) of §303 (21 U.S.C. §333), made “guilty of a misdemeanor.” Three counts went to the jury — two, for shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, and a third, for so shipping an adulterated drug. The jury disagreed as to the corporation and found Dotterweich guilty on all three counts. . . . The Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed the conviction on the ground that only the corporation was the “person” subject to prosecution. . . .

. . . The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was an exertion by Congress of its power to keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce. By the Act of 1938, Congress extended the range of its control over illicit and noxious articles and stiffened the penalties for disobedience. The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government. . . . The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct — awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250. And so it is clear that shipments like those now in issue are “punished by the statute if the article is misbranded [or adulterated], and that the article may be misbranded [or adulterated] without any conscious fraud at all. It was natural enough to throw this risk on shippers with regard to the identity of their wares. . . .” United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497-98.

The statute makes “any person” who violates §301(a) guilty of a “misdemeanor.” It specifically defines “person” to include “corporation.” §201(e). But the only way in which a corporation can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf. And the historic conception of a “misdemeanor” makes all those responsible for it equally guilty. . . . If, then, Dotterweich is not subject to the Act, it must be solely on the ground that individuals are immune when the “person” who violates §301(a) is a corporation, although from the point of view of action the individuals are the corporation. . . . To hold that the Act of 1938 freed all individuals, except when proprietors, from the culpability under which the earlier legislation had placed them is to defeat the very object of the new Act. Nothing is clearer than that the later legislation was designed to enlarge and stiffen the penal net and not to narrow and loosen it. This purpose was unequivocally avowed by the two committees which reported the bills to the Congress. The House Committee reported that the Act “seeks to set up effective provisions against abuses of consumer welfare growing out of inadequacies in the Food and Drugs Act. . . .” (H. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., at 1.) And the Senate Committee explicitly pointed out that the new legislation “must not weaken the existing laws,” but on the contrary “it must strengthen and extend that law’s protection of the consumer.” (S. Rep. No. 152, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1.) . . .

. . . Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.

It would be too treacherous to define or even to indicate by way of illustration the class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation. To attempt a formula embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons may responsibly contribute in furthering a transaction forbidden by an Act of Congress, to wit, to send illicit goods across state lines, would be mischievous futility. In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted. Our system of criminal justice necessarily depends on “conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers,” Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378, even when the consequences are far more drastic than they are under the provision of law before us. See United States v. Balint, supra (involving a maximum sentence of five years). For present purpose it suffices to say that . . . the District Court properly left the question of the responsibility of Dotterweich for the shipment to the jury, and there was sufficient evidence to support its verdict. . . .

Mr. Justice MURPHY, dissenting.

. . . There is no evidence in this case of any personal guilt on the part of the respondent. There is no proof or claim that he ever knew of the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in question, much less that he actively participated in their introduction. Guilt is imputed to the respondent solely on the basis of his authority and responsibility as president and general manager of the corporation.

It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a citizen who, like the respondent, has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing. It may be proper to charge him with responsibility to the corporation and the stockholders for negligence and mismanagement. But in the absence of clear statutory authorization it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to rest liability on an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he had no personal knowledge. Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous. . . .

. . . To erect standards of responsibility is a difficult legislative task and the opinion of this Court admits that it is “too treacherous” and a “mischievous futility” for us to engage in such pursuits. But the only alternative is a blind resort to “the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries.” Yet that situation is precisely what our constitutional system sought to avoid. . . . The legislative power to restrain the liberty and to imperil the good reputation of citizens must not rest upon the variable attitudes and opinions of those charged with the duties of interpreting and enforcing the mandates of the law. I therefore cannot approve the decision of the Court in this case.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS, Mr. Justice REED, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE join in this dissent.

 

United States v. Balint United States v. Balint

United States v. Balint

United States Supreme Court

258 U.S. 250 (1922)

 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the court.

Defendants in error were indicted for a violation of the Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, 38 Stat. 785. The indictment charged them with unlawfully selling to another a certain amount of a derivative of opium and a certain amount of a derivative of coca leaves, not in pursuance of any written order on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, contrary to the provisions of § 2 of the act. The defendants demurrer to the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge that they had sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such. The statute does not make such knowledge an element of the offense. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. The correctness of this ruling is the question before us.

While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it, there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. It has been objected that punishment of a person for an act in violation of law when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an absence of due process of law. But that objection is considered and overruled in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69, 70 [1910], in which it was held that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public policy provide "that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Many instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se. So, too, in the collection of taxes, the importance to the public of their collection leads the legislature to impose on the taxpayer the burden of finding out the facts upon which his liability to pay depends and meeting it at the peril of punishment. Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.

The question before us, therefore, is one of the construction of the statute and of inference of the intent of Congress. The Narcotic Act has been held by this court to be a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of poisonous and demoralizing drugs.

Section 2 of the Narcotic Act, 38 Stat. 786, we give in part in the margin.[1] It is very evident from a reading of  it that the emphasis of the section is in securing a close supervision of the business of dealing in these dangerous drugs by the taxing officers of the Government and that it merely uses a criminal penalty to secure recorded evidence of the disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and restraining the traffic. Its manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him. Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed to this conclusion. We think the demurrer to the indictment should have been overruled.

Judgment reversed.

[1]

Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Every person who shall accept any such order, and in pursuance thereof shall sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs, shall preserve such order for a period of two years in such a way as to be readily accessible to inspection by any officer, agent, or employee of the Treasury Department duly authorized for that purpose, and the State, Territorial, District, municipal, and insular officials named in section five of this Act. Every person who shall give an order as herein provided to any other person for any of the aforesaid drugs shall, at or before the time of giving such order, make or cause to be made a duplicate thereof on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and in case of the acceptance of such order, shall preserve such duplicate for said period of two years in such a way as to be readily accessible to inspection by the officers, agents, employees, and officials hereinbefore mentioned.

Morissette v. United States Morissette v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States
Morissette v. United States
342 U.S. 246
96 L. Ed. 2d 288
72 S. Ct. 240
1952 U.S. LEXIS 2714, SCDB 1951-028
No. 12
1952-01-07

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This would have remained a profoundly insignificant case to all except its immediate parties had it not been so tried and submitted to the jury as to raise questions both fundamental and far-reaching in federal criminal law, for which reason we granted certiorari.

On a large tract of uninhabited and untilled land in a wooded and sparsely populated area of Michigan, the Government established a practice bombing range over which the Air Force dropped simulated bombs at ground targets. These bombs consisted of a metal cylinder about forty inches long and eight inches across, filled with sand and enough black powder to cause a smoke puff by which the strike could be located. At various places about the range, signs read "Danger -- Keep Out -- Bombing Range." Nevertheless, the range was known as good deer country, and was extensively hunted.

Spent bomb casings were cleared from the targets and thrown into piles "so that they will be out of the way." They were not sacked or piled in any order, but were dumped in heaps, some of which had been accumulating for four years or upwards, were exposed to the weather and rusting away.

Morissette, in December of 1948, went hunting in this area but did not get a deer. He thought to meet expenses of the trip by salvaging some of these casings. He loaded three tons of them on his truck and took them to a nearby farm, where they were flattened by driving a tractor over them. After expending this labor and trucking them to market in Flint, he realized $84.

Morissette, by occupation, is a fruit stand operator in summer and a trucker and scrap iron collector in winter. An honorably discharged veteran of World War II, he enjoys a good name among his neighbors and has had no blemish on his record more disreputable than a conviction for reckless driving.

The loading, crushing and transporting of these casings were all in broad daylight, in full view of passers-by, without the slightest effort at concealment. When an investigation was started, Morissette voluntarily, promptly and candidly told the whole story to the authorities, saying that he had no intention of stealing. but thought the property was abandoned, unwanted and considered of no value to the Government. He was indicted, however, on the charge that he "did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly steal and convert" property of the United States of the value of $84, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, which provides that "whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts" government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment. [Footnote 1]. Morissette was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two months or to pay a fine of $200. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting.

On his trial, Morissette, as he had at all times told investigating officers, testified that, from appearances, he believed the casings were cast-off and abandoned, that he did not intend to steal the property, and took it with no wrongful or criminal intent. The trial court, however, was unimpressed, and ruled: "[H]e took it because he thought it was abandoned and he knew he was on government property. . . . That is no defense. . . . I don't think anybody can have the defense they thought the property was abandoned on another man's piece of property." The court stated: "I will not permit you to show this man thought it was abandoned. . . . I hold in this case that there is no question of abandoned property." The court refused to submit or to allow counsel to argue to the jury whether Morissette acted with innocent intention. It charged: "And I instruct you that if you believe the testimony of the government in this case, he intended to take it. . . . He had no right to take this property. . . . [A]nd it is no defense to claim that it was abandoned because it was on private property. . . . And I instruct you to this effect: that if this young man took this property (and he says he did), without any permission (he says he did), that was on the property of the United States Government (he says it was), that it was of the value of one cent or more (and evidently it was), that he is guilty of the offense charged here. If you believe the government, he is guilty. . . . The question on intent is whether or not he intended to take the property. He says he did. Therefore, if you believe either side, he is guilty." Petitioner's counsel contended, "But the taking must have been with a felonious intent." The court ruled, however: "That is presumed by his own act."

The Court of Appeals suggested that "greater restraint in expression should have been exercised," but affirmed the conviction because, "As we have interpreted the statute, appellant was guilty of its violation beyond a shadow of doubt, as evidenced even by his own admissions." Its construction of the statute is that it creates several separate and distinct offenses, one being knowing conversion of government property. The court ruled that this particular offense requires no element of criminal intent. This conclusion was thought to be required by the failure of Congress to express such a requisite and this Court's decisions in United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280, and United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250.

I

In those cases, this Court did construe mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent as dispensing with it. If they be deemed precedents for principles of construction generally applicable to federal penal statutes, they authorize this conviction. Indeed, such adoption of the literal reasoning announced in those cases would do this and more -- it would sweep out of all federal crimes, except when expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind. We think a resume of their historical background is convincing that an effect has been ascribed to them more comprehensive than was contemplated and one inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.

The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious will." Common law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same principle, although a few exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be recognized.

Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle, but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element. However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "willfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability. By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common law crimes.

However, the Balint and Behrman offenses belong to a category of another character, with very different antecedents and origins. The crimes there involved depend on no mental element, but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions. This, while not expressed by the Court, is made clear from examination of a century-old but accelerating tendency, discernible both here and in England, to call into existence new duties and crimes which disregard any ingredient of intent. The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare.

While many of these duties are sanctioned by a more strict civil liability, lawmakers, whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regulations more effective by invoking criminal sanctions to be applied by the familiar technique of criminal prosecutions and convictions. This has confronted the courts with a multitude of prosecutions, based on statutes or administrative regulations, for what have been aptly called "public welfare offenses." These cases do not fit neatly into any of such accepted classifications of common law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property, or public morals. Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property, but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does not grave damage to an offender's reputation. Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime. This has not, however, been without expressions of misgiving.

The pilot of the movement in this country appears to be a holding that a tavernkeeper could be convicted for selling liquor to an habitual drunkard even if he did not know the buyer to be such. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849). Later came Massachusetts holdings that convictions for selling adulterated milk in violation of statutes forbidding such sales require no allegation or proof that defendant knew of the adulteration. Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489 (1864); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 10 Allen 199 (1865); Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 264 (1865). Departures from the common law tradition, mainly of these general classes, were reviewed and their rationale appraised by Chief Justice Cooley, as follows:

"I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent, but this is not by any means a universal rule. . . . Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them, the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible."

People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 579, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (1884).

After the turn of the Century, a new use for crimes without intent appeared when New York enacted numerous and novel regulations of tenement houses, sanctioned by money penalties. Landlords contended that a guilty intent was essential to establish a violation. Judge Cardozo wrote the answer:

"The defendant asks us to test the meaning of this statute by standards applicable to statutes that govern infamous crimes. The analogy, however, is deceptive. The element of conscious wrongdoing, the guilty mind accompanying the guilty act, is associated with the concept of crimes that are punished as infamous. . . . Even there, it is not an invariable element. . . . But, in the prosecution of minor offenses, there is a wider range of practice and of power. Prosecutions for petty penalties have always constituted in our law a class by themselves. . . . That is true though the prosecution is criminal in form."

Tenement House Department of City of New York v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168, 109 N.E. 88, 90 (1915).

Soon, employers advanced the same contention as to violations of regulations prescribed by a new labor law. Judge Cardozo, again for the court, pointed out, as a basis for penalizing violations whether intentional or not, that they were punishable only by fine "moderate in amount", but cautiously added that, in sustaining the power so to fine unintended violations "we are not to be understood as sustaining to a like length the power to imprison. We leave that question open." People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 1918, 225 N.Y. 25, 32-33, 121 N.E. 474, 476, 477.

Thus, for diverse but reconcilable reasons, state courts converged on the same result, discontinuing inquiry into intent in a limited class of offenses against such statutory regulations.

Before long, similar questions growing out of federal legislation reached this Court. Its judgments were in harmony with this consensus of state judicial opinion, the existence of which may have led the Court to overlook the need for full exposition of their rationale in the context of federal law. In overruling a contention that there can be no conviction on an indictment which makes no charge of criminal intent but alleges only making of a sale of a narcotic forbidden by law, Chief Justice Taft, wrote:

"While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not, in terms, include it . . . , there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. . . ."

United States v. Balint, supra, 258 U. S. 251-252.

He referred, however, to

"regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment, rather than the punishment of the crimes, as in cases of mala in se,"

and drew his citation of supporting authority chiefly from state court cases dealing with regulatory offenses. Id. at 258 U. S. 252.

On the same day, the Court determined that an offense under the Narcotic Drug Act does not require intent, saying,

"If the offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent."

United States v. Behrman, supra, at 258 U. S. 288.

Of course, the purpose of every statute would be "obstructed" by requiring a finding of intent, if we assume that it had a purpose to convict without it. Therefore, the obstruction rationale does not help us to learn the purpose of the omission by Congress. And since no federal crime can exist except by force of statute, the reasoning of the Behrman opinion, if read literally, would work far-reaching changes in the composition of all federal crimes. Had such a result been contemplated, it could hardly have escaped mention by a Court which numbered among its members one especially interested and informed concerning the importance of intent in common law crimes. This might be the more expected since the Behrman holding did call forth his dissent, in which Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis joined, omitting any such mention.

It was not until recently that the Court took occasion more explicitly to relate abandonment of the ingredient of intent not merely with considerations of expediency in obtaining convictions, nor with the malum prohibitumclassification of the crime, but with the peculiar nature and quality of the offense. We referred to " . . . a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation", and continued,

"such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct -- awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."

But we warned: "Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 320 U. S. 280-281, 320 U. S. 284

Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static. The conclusion reached in the Balint and Behrman cases has our approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied. A quite different question here is whether we will expand the doctrine of crimes without intent to include those charged here.

Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents were among the earliest offenses known to the law that existed before legislation; they are invasions of rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is ". . . as bad a word as you can give to man or thing." State courts of last resort, on whom fall the heaviest burden of interpreting criminal law in this country, have consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses. If any state has deviated, the exception has neither been called to our attention nor disclosed by our research.

Congress, therefore, omitted any express prescription of criminal intent from the enactment before us in the light of an unbroken course of judicial decision in all constituent states of the Union holding intent inherent in this class of offense, even when not expressed in a statute. Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except the Act. Because the offenses before this Court in the Balint and Behrmancases were of this latter class, we cannot accept them as authority for eliminating intent from offenses incorporated from the common law. Nor do exhaustive studies of state court cases disclose any well considered decisions applying the doctrine of crime without intent to such enacted common law offenses, although a few deviations are notable as illustrative of the danger inherent in the Government's contentions here.

The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common law crimes on judicial initiative.

The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute. And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.

We hold that mere omission from § 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.

II

It is suggested, however, that the history and purposes of § 641 imply something more affirmative as to elimination of intent from at least one of the offenses charged under it in this case. The argument does not contest that criminal intent is retained in the offenses of embezzlement, stealing and purloining, as incorporated into this section. But it is urged that Congress joined with those, as a new, separate and distinct offense, knowingly to convert government property, under circumstances which imply that it is an offense in which the mental element of intent is not necessary.

Congress has been alert to what often is a decisive function of some mental element in crime. It has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as "intentional," "willful," "knowing," "fraudulent" or "malicious," will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act, or increase the degree of the offense or its punishment. Also, it has at times required a specific intent or purpose which will require some specialized knowledge or design for some evil beyond the common law intent to do injury. The law under some circumstances recognizes good faith or blameless intent as a defense, partial defense, or as an element to be considered in mitigation of punishment. And treason -- the one crime deemed grave enough for definition in our Constitution itself -- requires not only the duly witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy but also the mental element of disloyalty or adherence to the enemy. In view of the care that has been bestowed upon the subject, it is significant that we have not found, nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law.

The section with which we are here concerned was enacted in 1948, as a consolidation of four former sections of Title 18, as adopted in 1940, which, in turn, were derived from two sections of the Revised Statutes. The pertinent legislative and judicial history of these antecedents, as well as of § 641, is footnoted. We find no other purpose in the 1948 reenactment than to collect from scattered sources crimes so kindred as to belong in one category. Not one of these had been interpreted to be a crime without intention, and no purpose to differentiate between them in the matter of intent is disclosed.

No inference that some were and some were not crimes of intention can be drawn from any difference in classification or punishment. Not one fits the congressional classification of the petty offense; each is, at its least, a misdemeanor, and if the amount involved is one hundred or more dollars each is a felony. If one crime without intent has been smuggled into a section whose dominant offenses do require intent, it was put in ill-fitting and compromising company. The Government apparently did not believe that conversion stood so alone when it drew this one-count indictment to charge that Morissette "did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly steal and convert to his own use."

Congress, by the language of this section, has been at pains to incriminate only "knowing" conversions. But, at common law, there are unwitting acts which constitute conversions. In the civil tort, except for recovery of exemplary damages, the defendant's knowledge, intent, motive, mistake, and good faith are generally irrelevant. If one takes property which turns out to belong to another, his innocent intent will not shield him from making restitution or indemnity, for his well meaning may not be allowed to deprive another of his own.

Had the statute applied to conversions without qualification, it would have made crimes of all unwitting, inadvertent and unintended conversions. Knowledge, of course, is not identical with intent, and may not have been the most apt words of limitation. But knowing conversion requires more than knowledge that defendant was taking the property into his possession. He must have had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion. In the case before us, whether the mental element that Congress required be spoken of as knowledge or as intent, would not seem to alter its bearing on guilt, for it is not apparent how Morissette could have knowingly or intentionally converted property that he did not know could be converted, as would be the case if it was, in fact, abandoned, or if he truly believed it to be abandoned and unwanted property.

It is said, and at first blush the claim has plausibility, that, if we construe the statute to require a mental element as part of criminal conversion, it becomes a meaningless duplication of the offense of stealing, and that conversion can be given meaning only by interpreting it to disregard intention. But here again a broader view of the evolution of these crimes throws a different light on the legislation.

It is not surprising if there is considerable overlapping in the embezzlement, stealing, purloining, and knowing conversion grouped in this statute. What has concerned codifiers of the larceny-type offense is that gaps or crevices have separated particular crimes of this general class, and guilty men have escaped through the breaches. The books contain a surfeit of cases drawing fine distinctions between slightly different circumstances under which one may obtain wrongful advantages from another's property. The codifiers wanted to reach all such instances. Probably every stealing is a conversion, but certainly not every knowing conversion is a stealing. "To steal means to take away from one in lawful possession without right with the intention to keep wrongfully." (Italics added.) Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 364, 171 N.E. 569, 571. Conversion, however, may be consummated without any intent to keep and without any wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the converter was entirely lawful. Conversion may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's custody for limited use. Money rightfully taken into one's custody may be converted without any intent to keep or embezzle it merely by commingling it with the custodian's own, if he was under a duty to keep it separate and intact. It is not difficult to think of intentional and knowing abuses and unauthorized uses of government property that might be knowing conversions but which could not be reached as embezzlement, stealing or purloining. Knowing conversion adds significantly to the range of protection of government property without interpreting it to punish unwitting conversions.

The purpose which we here attribute to Congress parallels that of codifiers of common law in England and in the States, and demonstrates that the serious problem in drafting such a statute is to avoid gaps and loopholes between offenses. It is significant that the English and State codifiers have tried to cover the same type of conduct that we are suggesting as the purpose of Congress here, without, however, departing from the common law tradition that these are crimes of intendment.

We find no grounds for inferring any affirmative instruction from Congress to eliminate intent from any offense with which this defendant was charged.

III

As we read the record, this case was tried on the theory that, even if criminal intent were essential, its presence (a) should be decided by the court (b) as a presumption of law, apparently conclusive, (c) predicated upon the isolated act of taking, rather than upon all of the circumstances. In each of these respects we believe the trial court was in error.

Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. State court authorities cited to the effect that intent is relevant in larcenous crimes are equally emphatic and uniform that it is a jury issue. The settled practice and its reason are well stated by Judge Andrews in People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270, 11 L.R.A. 807:

"It is alike the general rule of law and the dictate of natural justice that, to constitute guilt, there must be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention. Under our system (unless in exceptional cases), both must be found by the jury to justify a conviction for crime. However clear the proof may be, or however incontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury. Jurors may be perverse, the ends of justice may be defeated by unrighteous verdicts; but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one responding to the law, the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury. . . ."

It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act. It often is tempting to cast in terms of a "presumption" a conclusion which a court thinks probable from given facts. The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, in a larceny case, from selected circumstances which are present in this case, has declared a presumption of exactly opposite effect from the one announced by the trial court here:

". . . But where the taking is open and there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, and no denial, but an avowal, of the taking, a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent, which must be repelled by clear and convincing evidence before a conviction is authorized. . . ."

Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. 101, 104, 200 So. 368, 369.

We think presumptive intent has no place in this case. A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime. Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised by the judiciary. Even congressional power to facilitate convictions by substituting presumptions for proof is not without limit. Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463.

Moreover, the conclusion supplied by presumption in this instance was one of intent to steal the casings, and it was based on the mere fact that defendant took them. The court thought the only question was, "Did he intend to take the property?" That the removal of them was a conscious and intentional act was admitted. But that isolated fact is not an adequate basis on which the jury should find the criminal intent to steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive another of possession of property. Whether that intent existed, the jury must determine, nor only from the act of taking, but from that together with defendant's testimony and all of the surrounding circumstances.

Of course, the jury, considering Morissette's awareness that these casings were on government property, his failure to seek any permission for their removal, and his self-interest as a witness, might have disbelieved his profession of innocent intent and concluded that his assertion of a belief that the casings were abandoned was an afterthought. Had the jury convicted on proper instructions it would be the end of the matter. But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges. They might have concluded that the heaps of spent casings left in the hinterland to rust away presented an appearance of unwanted and abandoned junk, and that lack of any conscious deprivation of property or intentional injury was indicated by Morissette's good character, the openness of the taking, crushing and transporting of the casings, and the candor with which it was all admitted. They might have refused to brand Morissette as a thief. Had they done so, that too would have been the end of the matter.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result.

MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[Footnote 1]

341 U.S. 925.

[Footnote]

18 U.S.C. § 641, so far as pertinent, reads:

"Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof;"

"* * * *"

"Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."

[Footnote 3]

Morissette v. United States, 187 F.2d 427, 431.

[Footnote 4]

For a brief history and philosophy of this concept in Biblical, Greek, Roman, Continental and Anglo-American law see Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc.Soc.Sci. 126. For more extensive treatment of the development in English Law, see 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 448-511.

"Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong."

Pound, Introduction to Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law (1927).

[Footnote 5]

In Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 337 U. S. 248, we observed that

"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."

We also there referred to " . . . a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Id. at 337 U. S. 247. Such ends would seem illusory if there were no mental element in crime.

[Footnote 6]

4 Bl.Comm. 21.

[Footnote 7]

Examples of these texts and their alterations in successive editions in consequence of evolution in the law of "public welfare offenses," as hereinafter recited, are traced in Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55, 66.

[Footnote 8]

Exceptions came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent. Absence of intent also involves such considerations as lack of understanding because of insanity, subnormal mentality, or infancy, lack of volition due to some actual compulsion, or that inferred from doctrines of coverture. Most extensive inroads upon the requirement of intention, however, are offenses of negligence, such as involuntary manslaughter or criminal negligence and the whole range of crimes arising from omission of duty. Cf. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).

[Footnote 9]

Holmes, The Common Law, considers intent in the chapter on The Criminal Law, and earlier makes the pithy observation: "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." P. 3. Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc.Soc.Sci. 126, 127, points out that in American law "mens rea is not so readily constituted from any wrongful act" as elsewhere.

[Footnote 10]

In the Balint case, Chief Justice Taft recognized this, but rather overstated it by making no allowance for exceptions such as those mentioned in n 8.

[Footnote 11]

This trend and its causes, advantages and dangers have been considered by Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55; Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 549; Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 Col.L.Rev. 753, 967.

[Footnote 12]

The changes in English law are illustrated by Nineteenth Century English cases. In 1814, it was held that one could not be convicted of selling impure foods unless he was aware of the impurities. Rex v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 11 (K.B.1814). However, thirty-two years later, in an action to enforce a statutory forfeiture for possession of adulterated tobacco, the respondent was held liable even though he had no knowledge of, or cause to suspect, the adulteration. Countering respondent's arguments, Baron Parke said,

"It is very true that, in particular instances, it may produce mischief, because an innocent man may suffer from his want of care in not examining the tobacco he has received, and not taking a warranty; but the public inconvenience would be much greater if, in every case, the officers were obliged to prove knowledge. They would be very seldom able to do so."

Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 417 (Exch. 1846). Convenience of the prosecution thus emerged as a rationale. In 1866, a quarry owner was held liable for the nuisance caused by his workmen dumping refuse into a river, in spite of his plea that he played no active part in the management of the business and knew nothing about the dumping involved. His knowledge or lack of it was deemed irrelevant. Regina v. Stephens, L.R. 1 Q.B. 702 (1866). Bishop, referring to this decision, says,

"The doctrine of this English case may almost be deemed new in the criminal law. . . . And, properly limited, the doctrine is eminently worthy to be followed hereafter."

1 Bishop, New Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) § 1076. After these decisions, statutes prohibiting the sale of impure or adulterated food were enacted. Adulteration of Food Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 74, § 2 (1872)); Sale of Food and Drugs Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63). A conviction under the former was sustained in a holding that no guilty knowledge or intent need be proved in a prosecution for the sale of adulterated butter, Fizpatrick v. Kelly, L.R. 8 Q.B. 337 (1873), and in Betts v. Armstead, L.R. 20 Q.B.D. 771 (1888), involving the latter statute, it was held that there was no need for a showing that the accused had knowledge that his product did not measure up to the statutory specifications.

[Footnote 13]

The development of strict criminal liability regardless of intent has been roughly paralleled by an evolution of a strict civil liability for consequences regardless of fault in certain relationships, as shown by Workmen's Compensation Acts, and by vicarious liability for fault of others as evidenced by various Motor Vehicle Acts.

[Footnote 14]

Consequences of a general abolition of intent as an ingredient of serious crimes have aroused the concern of responsible and disinterested students of penology. Of course, they would not justify judicial disregard of a clear command to that effect from Congress, but they do admonish us to caution in assuming that Congress, without clear expression, intends in any instance to do so.

Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc.Soc.Sci. 126, 130, says,

". . . as long as in popular belief intention and the freedom of the will are taken as axiomatic, no penal system that negates the mental element can find general acceptance. It is vital to retain public support of methods of dealing with crime."

Again,

"The question of criminal intent will probably always have something of an academic taint. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the determination of the boundary between intent and negligence spells freedom or condemnation for thousands of individuals. The watchfulness of the jurist justifies itself at present in its insistence upon the examination of the mind of each individual offender."

Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55, 56, says:

"To inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement."

Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 549, 569, appears somewhat less disturbed by the trend, if properly limited, but, as to so-called public welfare crimes, suggests that

"There is no reason to continue to believe that the present mode of dealing with these offenses is the best solution obtainable, or that we must be content with this sacrifice of established principles. The raising of a presumption of knowledge might be an improvement."

(Italics added.)

In Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, the Court said,

"But the law at the same time is not so unreasonable as to attach culpability, and consequently to impose punishment, where there is no intention to evade its provisions. . . ."

[Footnote 15]

Holmes, The Common Law.

[Footnote 16]

For the place of the mental element in offenses against the revenues, see Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492; United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518.

[Footnote 17]

2 Russell on Crime (10th ed., Turner, 1950) 1037.

[Footnote 18]

2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 465.

[Footnote 19]

Examples of decision in diverse jurisdictions may be culled from any digest. Most nearly in point are Johnson v. State, 36 Tex. 375, holding that to take a horse running at large on the range is not larceny in the absence of an intent to deprive an owner of his property; Jordan v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 414, 296 S.W. 585, that, if at the time of taking parts from an automobile, the accused believed that the car had been abandoned by its owner, he should be acquitted; Fetkenhauer v. State, 112 Wis. 491, 88 N.W. 294, that an honest, although mistaken, belief by defendant that he had permission to take property should be considered by the jury; and Devine v. People, 20 Hun, N.Y., 98, holding that a claim that an act was only a practical joke must be weighed against an admitted taking of property.

Others of like purport are Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 163 So. 394; Nickerson v. State, 22 Ala.App. 640, 119 So. 243; People v. Williams, 73 Cal. App. 2d 154, 166 P.2d 63; Schiff v. People, 111 Colo. 333, 141 P.2d 892; Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. 101, 200 So. 368; Perdew v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 638, 86 S.W.2d 534, holding that appropriation by a finder of lost property cannot constitute larceny in the absence of intent; People v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 N.W. 770; People v. Will, 289 N.Y. 413, 46 N.E.2d 498; Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 146 N.E. 432; Thomas v. Kessler, 334 Pa. 7, 5 A.2d 187; Barnes v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 166 S.W.2d 708; Sandel v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 132, 97 S.W.2d 225; Weeks v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 406, 25 S.W.2d 855; Heskew v. State, 18 Tex.App. 275; Page v. Commonwealth, 148 Va. 733, 138 S.E. 510, holding reversible error to exclude evidence having a tendency to throw light on the question of the bona fides of one accused of larceny; Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 133 S.E. 764; State v. Levy, 113 Vt. 459, 35 A.2d 853, holding that the taking of another's property in good faith by inadvertence or mistake does not constitute larceny.

[Footnote 20]

Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55, 73, 84, cites and classifies a large number of cases and concludes that they fall roughly into subdivisions of (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of anti-narcotic Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or wellbeing of the community.

[Footnote 21]

Sayre points out that, in criminal syndicalism or sedition cases, where the pressure to convict is strong, it has been accomplished by dispensing with the element of intent, in some instances by analogy with the public welfare offense. Examples are State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 P. 211; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N.W. 358; State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 P. 107; State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 P. 107. Compare People v. McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445, 234 P. 91. This although intent is of the very essence of offenses based on disloyalty. Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1; Haupt v. United States, 330 U. S. 631, where innocence of intention will defeat a charge even of treason.

[Footnote 22]

United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32; United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460.

[Footnote 23]

18 U.S.C. § 81, Arson: " . . . willfully and maliciously . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 113, Assault: "(a) . . . with intent to commit murder or rape. . . . (b) . . . with intent to commit any felony, except murder or rape . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 152, Bankruptcy -- concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery: " . . . knowingly and fraudulently . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 201, Bribery and Graft: " . . . with intent to influence . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 471, Counterfeiting and Forgery: " . . . with intent to defraud . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 594, Intimidation of voters: " . . . for the purpose of . . . "; 18 U.S.C. § 1072, Concealing escaped prisoner: " . . . willfully . . . "; 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 162, Interference with a member of the National Labor Relations Board or an agent of the Board in his performance of his duties: " . . . willfully . . . "; 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a), Violations of provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act: " . . . willfully . . . "; 37 Stat. 251, 21 U.S.C. § 23, Packing or selling misbranded barrels of apples: " . . . knowingly. . . ."

[Footnote 24]

18 U.S.C. § 1112, Manslaughter, " . . . the unlawful killing of a human being without malice", if voluntary, carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment not to exceed ten years. If the killing is "with malice aforethought", the crime is murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, and, if of the first degree, punishable by death or life imprisonment, or, if of the second degree, punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or life.

[Footnote 25]

18 U.S.C. § 242; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91.

[Footnote 26]

I.R.C. §§ 145(a), 145(b), 53 Stat. 62, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 145(a), 145(b), as construed in Spies v. United States,317 U. S. 492; 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a), stating the criminal sanctions for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, provides that:

"No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection."

N.Y. Penal Law § 1306 provides that,

"Upon an indictment for larceny, it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowedly, under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable."

[Footnote 27]

U.S.Const. Art. III, § 3, cl. 1.

This provision was to prevent incrimination of mere mental operations such as "compassing" the death of the King. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1. To hold that a mental element is necessary to a crime is, of course, not to say that it is all that is necessary.

[Footnote 28]

The Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 641 states that it is derived from 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) §§ 82, 87, 100, and 101 which, in turn, are from Rev.Stat. §§ 5438 and 5439. We shall consider only the 1940 code sections and their interpretations.

18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 82 reads:

"Whoever shall take and carry away or take for his use, or for the use of another, with intent to steal or purloin . . . any property of the United States . . . shall be punished as follows. . . ."

In United States v. Anderson, 45 F. Supp. 943, a prosecution for conspiracy to violate that section, District Judge Yankwich said:

"It has been before the courts in very few cases. But such courts as have had cases under it, including our own Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that the object of the section is to introduce the crime of larceny into the Federal Criminal Code."

"In Frach v. Mass, 9 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 820, 821, we find these words: 'Larceny of property of the United States is made a crime by 18 U.S.C. § 82.'"

"This means of course, that, in interpreting the statute, we may apply the principles governing the common law crime of larceny, as interpreted by the courts of various states."

45 F. Supp. at 945.

United States v. Trinder, 1 F. Supp. 659, was a prosecution of a group of boys, under § 82, for "stealing" a government automobile. They had taken it for a joy ride without permission, fully intending to return it when they were through. Their plans went awry when the auto came to grief against a telephone pole. In dismissing the complaint, the District Judge said:

"Upon principle and authority, there was no stealing, but merely trespass; secret borrowing. At common law and likewise by the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 82) adopting common law terms, stealing in general imports larceny; that is, felonious taking and intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property."

1 F. Supp. at 660.

18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 87, entitled "Embezzling arms and stores", provides:

"Whoever shall steal, embezzle, or knowingly apply to his own use, or unlawfully sell, convey, or dispose of, any ordnance, arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other property of the United States, furnished or to be used for the military or naval service, shall be punished as prescribed in sections 80 and 82 to 86 of this title."

No cases appear to have been decided relating to the element of intent in the acts proscribed in that section.

18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 100, "Embezzling public moneys or other property", states that:

"Whoever shall embezzle, steal, or purloin any money, property, record, voucher, or valuable thing whatever, of the moneys, goods, chattels, records, or property of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

The only noted case of consequence is Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, to which the dissent below referred at some length. The appellant there was convicted of feloniously taking and carrying away certain personal property of the United States in violation of § 46 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 99, and had been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He argued that the five-year limitation of sentence in 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 100 for stealing property of the United States reduced the ten-year limitation in § 99 for feloniously taking and carrying away property of the United States to five years also.

The Court of Appeals rejected his argument, holding that the crime of "stealing" in § 100 was separate and distinct from the offense specified in § 99, on the ground that § 100 was a broadening of the common law crime of larceny to foreclose any avenue by which one might, in the process of pleading, escape conviction for one offense by proving that he had committed another only a hair's breadth different.

In the course of its opinion, it advanced the following pertinent observations:

"That felonious taking and carrying away of property which may be the subject of the offense constitutes the common law offense of larceny cannot be disputed. . . . However, it is doubtful if at common law any fixed definition or formula (as to the meaning of 'larceny') was not strained in its application to some of the cases clearly constituting the offense. Modern criminal codes treat the offense in various ways. Some define the offense by following the old cases, and are merely declaratory of the common law, while others have broadened the offense to include offenses previously known as embezzlement, false pretenses, and even felonious breaches of trust."

"As pointed out above, the modern tendency is to broaden the offense of larceny, by whatever name it may be called, to include such related offenses as would tend to complicate prosecutions under strict pleading and practice. In some of these statutes, the offense is denominated 'theft' or 'stealing.' No statute offers a clearer example of compromise between the common law and the modern code than the two sections here involved. Section 46 [18 U.S.C. § 99 (1940 ed.)] deals with robbery and larceny, the description of the latter being taken from the common law. Section 47 [18 U.S.C. § 100 (1940 ed.)] denounces the related offenses which might be included with those described in section 46 under a code practice seeking to avoid the pitfalls of technical pleading. In it, the offense of embezzlement is included by name, without definition. Then, to cover such cases as may shade into larceny, as well as any new situation which may arise under changing modern conditions and not envisioned under the common law, it adds the words steal or purloin. . . . Stealing, having no common law definition to restrict its meaning as an offense, is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that which rightfully belongs to another and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, but may or may not involve the element of stealth usually attributed to the word purloin. . . . Thus, in any case involving larceny as defined by the common law, section 46 [18 U.S.C. § 99 (1940 ed.)] would apply. Where the offense is embezzlement, or its nature so doubtful as to fall between larceny and embezzlement, it may be prosecuted under section 47 [18 U.S.C. § 100 (1940 ed.)]."

99 F.2d at 564-565.

The reference in Crabb v. Zerbst to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 99, the robbery and larceny statute then operative, suggests examination of its successor in today's code. For purpose of clarification, that section states that:

"Whoever shall rob another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, or shall feloniously take and carry away the same, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."

The Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 641, makes no mention of it as a successor to that section. The present robbery statute is 18 U.S.C. § 2112, "Personal property of United States", providing that:

"Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years."

The Reviser's Note to that section recites that it is derived from § 99 of the 1940 Code, and "That portion of said section 99 relating to felonious taking was omitted as covered by section 641 of this title", which makes it clear that, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 99 in the Note to 18 U.S.C. § 641, the crime of larceny by a felonious taking and carrying away has been transported directly from the former into the latter.

18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 101 is the forerunner of that part of present § 641 dealing with receiving stolen property, and has no application to the problem at hand.

The history of § 641 demonstrates that it was to apply to acts which constituted larceny or embezzlement at common law and also acts which shade into those crimes but which, most strictly considered, might not be found to fit their fixed definitions. It is also pertinent to note that it renders one subject to its penalty who "knowingly converts to his use" property of the United States. The word "converts" does not appear in any of its predecessors. 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 82 is applicable to

"Whoever shall take and carry away or take for his use, or for the use of another, with intent to steal or purloin . . . any property of the United States . . . shall be punished as follows. . . ."

18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 87 uses the words "knowingly apply to his own use". Neither 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) §§ 99, 100, nor 101 has any words resembling "knowingly converts to his own use." The 1948 Revision was not intended to create new crimes, but to recodify those then in existence. We find no suggestion that a guilty intent was not a part of each crime now embodied in § 641.

[Footnote 29]

18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 641.

[Footnote 30]

Had the indictment been limited to a charge in the words of the statute, it would have been defective if, in the light of the common law, the statute itself failed to set forth expressly, fully, and clearly all elements necessary to constitute the offense. United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611.

[Footnote 31]

Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill (Md.), 7, 52 Am.Dec. 670 (1850); Railroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 32 N.E. 476 (1892). The rationale underlying such cases is that, when one clearly assumes the rights of ownership over property of another, no proof of intent to convert is necessary. It has even been held that one may be held liable in conversion even though he reasonably supposed that he had a legal right to the property in question. Row v. Home Sav. Bank, 306 Mass. 522, 29 N.E.2d 552 (1940). For other cases in the same vein, see those collected in 53 Am.Jur. 852-854. These authorities leave no doubt that Morissette could be held liable for a civil conversion for his taking of the property here involved, and the instructions to the jury might have been appropriate in such a civil action. This assumes, of course, that actual abandonment was not proven, a matter which petitioner should be allowed to prove if he can.

[Footnote 32]

The Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 50, an Act "to consolidate and simplify the Law relating to Larceny triable on Indictment and Kindred Offences," provides:

"1. For the purposes of this Act -- "

"(1) A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof:"

"Provided that a person may be guilty of stealing any such thing notwithstanding that he has lawful possession thereof, if, being a bailee or part owner thereof, he fraudulently converts the same to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner. . . ."

For the growth and development of the crime of larceny in England, see 2 Russell on Crime (10th ed., Turner, 1950), 1037-1222, from which the material above was taken.

[Footnote 33]

N.Y.Penal Code, § 1290, defines larceny as follows:

"A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud another of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person other than the true owner, wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, by any means whatever, from the possession of the true owner or of any other person any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind, steals such property, and is guilty of larceny."

The same section provides further that it shall be no defense to a prosecution that:

"2. The accused in the first instance obtained possession of, or title to, such property lawfully, provided he subsequently wrongfully withheld or appropriated such property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled to the use and benefit of such property. . . ."

The Historical Note to that section discloses that it represents an attempt to abolish the distinctions between kinds of larcenies. Laws 1942, c. 732, § 1, provided:

"It is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served, and confusion and injustice avoided, by eliminating and abolishing the distinctions which have hitherto differentiated one sort of theft from another, each of which, under section twelve hundred and ninety of the penal law, was denominated a larceny, to-wit: common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick and device, obtaining property by false pretenses, and embezzlement."

[Footnote 34]

Cf. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv.L.Rev. 59; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumption, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 906.

Notes and Questions Notes and Questions

1.    When interpreting statutes, the Supreme Court sometimes brings to bear certain presumptions that reflect broader judicial concerns or policy goals. Here, the Court notes that "where Congress borrows terms of art...[from common law], it presumably knows and adopts the [general meanings surrounding those borrowed words]." And, "absent contrary direction," Congress adopts them without departing from such "widely accepted definitions." Is this a fair presumption? What would a clear "contrary direction" look like? Was this case an example of bad statutory drafting?

2.    The Court also gestures at the aims of punishment in this case, when it says that requiring a mens rea component to a crime enables "deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution." A crime without a mens rea element, the Court continues in a footnote, would make the ends of reformation and rehabilitation "seem illusory." What do you make of this rationale (that rehabilitation is the dominant objective of public prosecution)? By the same token, do you think strict liability crimes are mainly retributive? And would simply adding a mens rea element curb the overall retributive impulse of punishing for a crime? 

3.    The facts in Morissette revolve around a criminal conviction, but the court gestures toward a common form of strict liability in the civil context, "public welfare offenses." As the court describes: 

These cases do not fit neatly into any of such accepted classifications of common law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property, or public morals....Many [public welfare] violations...result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952). 

The case also cites a seminal 1933 article by Harvard Law professor Francis Sayre, listing some categories of public welfare offenses:

(1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of antinarcotic Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community." 

Id. at n. 20 (citing Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55, 73, 84 (1933)). 

What are some good examples of crimes that could be classified as "public welfare offenses"? Do you think these should be crimes that call for a mental element, or not? 

Staples v. United States Staples v. United States

Staples v. United States

United States Supreme Court

511 U.S. 600 (1994)

 

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Firearms Act (Act), 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872, imposes strict registration requirements on statutorily defined “firearms.” The Act includes within the term “firearm” a machinegun, § 5845(a)(6), and further defines a machinegun as “any weapon which shoots, ... or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger,” § 5845(b). Thus, any fully automatic weapon is a “firearm” within the meaning of the Act. Under the Act, all firearms must be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 5861(d) makes it a crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison for any person to possess a firearm that is not properly registered.

Upon executing a search warrant at petitioner's home, local police and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) recovered, among other things, an AR–15 rifle. The AR–15 is the civilian version of the military's M–16 rifle, and is, unless modified, a semiautomatic weapon. The M–16, in contrast, is a selective fire rifle that allows the operator, by rotating a selector switch, to choose semiautomatic or automatic fire. Many M–16 parts are interchangeable with those in the AR–15 and can be used to convert the AR–15 into an automatic weapon. No doubt to inhibit such conversions, the AR–15 is manufactured with a metal stop on its receiver that will prevent an M–16 selector switch, if installed, from rotating to the fully automatic position. The metal stop on petitioner's rifle, however, had been filed away, and the rifle had been assembled with an M–16 selector switch and several other M–16 internal parts, including a hammer, disconnector, and trigger. Suspecting that the AR–15 had been modified to be capable of fully automatic fire, BATF agents seized the weapon. Petitioner subsequently was indicted for unlawful possession of an unregistered machinegun in violation of § 5861(d).

At trial, BATF agents testified that when the AR–15 was tested, it fired more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger. It was undisputed that the weapon was not registered as required by § 5861(d). Petitioner testified that the rifle had never fired automatically when it was in his possession. He insisted that the AR–15 had operated only semiautomatically, and even then imperfectly, often requiring manual ejection of the spent casing and chambering of the next round. According to petitioner, his alleged ignorance of any automatic firing capability should have shielded him from criminal liability for his failure to register the weapon. He requested the District Court to instruct the jury that, to establish a violation of § 5861(d), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knew that the gun would fire fully automatically.”

The District Court rejected petitioner's proposed instruction and instead charged the jury as follows:

“The Government need not prove the defendant knows he's dealing with a weapon possessing every last characteristic [which subjects it] to the regulation. It would be enough to prove he knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.”

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to five years' probation and a $5,000 fine.

Whether or not § 5861(d) requires proof that a defendant knew of the characteristics of his weapon that made it a “firearm” under the Act is a question of statutory construction. As we observed in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), “[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.” Thus, we have long recognized that determining the mental state required for the commission of a federal crime requires “construction of the statute and ... inference of the intent of Congress.”

The language of the statute, the starting place in our inquiry, provides little explicit guidance in this case. Section 5861(d) is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation. It states simply that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Nevertheless, silence on this point by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal. On the contrary, we must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law.

There can be no doubt that this established concept has influenced our interpretation of criminal statutes. Indeed, we have noted that the common-law rule requiring mens rea has been “followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it.” Relying on the strength of the traditional rule, we have stated that offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored and have suggested that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.

According to the Government, however, the nature and purpose of the Act suggest that the presumption favoring mens rea does not apply to this case. The Government argues that Congress intended the Act to regulate and restrict the circulation of dangerous weapons. Consequently, in the Government's view, this case fits in a line of precedent concerning what we have termed “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses, in which we have understood Congress to impose a form of strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal. In construing such statutes, we have inferred from silence that Congress did not intend to require proof of mens rea to establish an offense.

For example, in Balint, we concluded that the Narcotic Act of 1914, which was intended in part to minimize the spread of addictive drugs by criminalizing undocumented sales of certain narcotics, required proof only that the defendant knew that he was selling drugs, not that he knew the specific items he had sold were “narcotics” within the ambit of the statute. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (stating in dicta that a statute criminalizing the shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs did not require knowledge that the items were misbranded or adulterated). As we explained in Dotterweich, Balint dealt with “a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” 320 U.S., at 280–281.

Such public welfare offenses have been created by Congress, and recognized by this Court, in “limited circumstances.” Typically, our cases recognizing such offenses involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items. In such situations, we have reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him “in responsible relation to a public danger,” he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation, and we have assumed that in such cases Congress intended to place the burden on the defendant to “ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute.” Balint, supra, 258 U.S., at 254. Thus, we essentially have relied on the nature of the statute and the particular character of the items regulated to determine whether congressional silence concerning the mental element of the offense should be interpreted as dispensing with conventional mens rea requirements.

The Government argues that § 5861(d) defines precisely the sort of regulatory offense described in Balint. In this view, all guns, whether or not they are statutory “firearms,” are dangerous devices that put gun owners on notice that they must determine at their hazard whether their weapons come within the scope of the Act. On this understanding, the District Court's instruction in this case was correct, because a conviction can rest simply on proof that a defendant knew he possessed a “firearm” in the ordinary sense of the term.

The Government seeks support for its position from our decision in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), which involved a prosecution for possession of unregistered grenades under § 5861(d). The defendant knew that the items in his possession were grenades, and we concluded that § 5861(d) did not require the Government to prove the defendant also knew that the grenades were unregistered. To be sure, in deciding that mens rea was not required with respect to that element of the offense, we suggested that the Act “is a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.” Grenades, we explained, “are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than the narcotics involved in United States v. Balint.” But that reasoning provides little support for dispensing with mens rea in this case.

[T]he Government urges that Freed's logic applies because guns, no less than grenades, are highly dangerous devices that should alert their owners to the probability of regulation. But the gap between Freed and this case is too wide to bridge. In glossing over the distinction between grenades and guns, the Government ignores the particular care we have taken to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.” In Liparota, we considered a statute that made unlawful the unauthorized acquisition or possession of food stamps. We determined that the statute required proof that the defendant knew his possession of food stamps was unauthorized, largely because dispensing with such a mens rea requirement would have resulted in reading the statute to outlaw a number of apparently innocent acts. Our conclusion that the statute should not be treated as defining a public welfare offense rested on the commonsense distinction that a “food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand grenade.”

Neither, in our view, can all guns be compared to hand grenades. Although the contrast is certainly not as stark as that presented in Liparota, the fact remains that there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country. Such a tradition did not apply to the possession of hand grenades in Freed or to the selling of dangerous drugs that we considered in Balint. In fact, in Freed we construed § 5861(d) under the assumption that “one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.” Here, the Government essentially suggests that we should interpret the section under the altogether different assumption that “one would hardly be surprised to learn that owning a gun is not an innocent act.” That proposition is simply not supported by common experience. Guns in general are not “deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials,” that put their owners on notice that they stand “in responsible relation to a public danger.”

The Government protests that guns, unlike food stamps, but like grenades and narcotics, are potentially harmful devices. Under this view, it seems that Liparota's concern for criminalizing ostensibly innocuous conduct is inapplicable whenever an item is sufficiently dangerous—that is, dangerousness alone should alert an individual to probable regulation and justify treating a statute that regulates the dangerous device as dispensing with mens rea. But that an item is “dangerous,” in some general sense, does not necessarily suggest, as the Government seems to assume, that it is not also entirely innocent. Even dangerous items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation. As suggested above, despite their potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence. Of course, we might surely classify certain categories of guns—no doubt including the machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces that Congress has subjected to regulation—as items the ownership of which would have the same quasi-suspect character we attributed to owning hand grenades in Freed. But precisely because guns falling outside those categories traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions, their destructive potential, while perhaps even greater than that of some items we would classify along with narcotics and hand grenades, cannot be said to put gun owners sufficiently on notice of the likelihood of regulation to justify interpreting § 5861(d) as not requiring proof of knowledge of a weapon's characteristics.

On a slightly different tack, the Government suggests that guns are subject to an array of regulations at the federal, state, and local levels that put gun owners on notice that they must determine the characteristics of their weapons and comply with all legal requirements. But regulation in itself is not sufficient to place gun ownership in the category of the sale of narcotics in Balint. The food stamps at issue in Liparota were subject to comprehensive regulations, yet we did not understand the statute there to dispense with a mens rea requirement. Moreover, despite the overlay of legal restrictions on gun ownership, we question whether regulations on guns are sufficiently intrusive that they impinge upon the common experience that owning a gun is usually licit and blameless conduct. Roughly 50 percent of American homes contain at least one firearm of some sort, and in the vast majority of States, buying a shotgun or rifle is a simple transaction that would not alert a person to regulation any more than would buying a car.

If we were to accept as a general rule the Government's suggestion that dangerous and regulated items place their owners under an obligation to inquire at their peril into compliance with regulations, we would undoubtedly reach some untoward results. Automobiles, for example, might also be termed “dangerous” devices and are highly regulated at both the state and federal levels. Congress might see fit to criminalize the violation of certain regulations concerning automobiles, and thus might make it a crime to operate a vehicle without a properly functioning emission control system. But we probably would hesitate to conclude on the basis of silence that Congress intended a prison term to apply to a car owner whose vehicle's emissions levels, wholly unbeknownst to him, began to exceed legal limits between regular inspection dates.

Here, there can be little doubt that, as in Liparota, the Government's construction of the statute potentially would impose criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state—ignorance of the characteristics of weapons in their possession—makes their actions entirely innocent. The Government does not dispute the contention that virtually any semiautomatic weapon may be converted, either by internal modification or, in some cases, simply by wear and tear, into a machinegun within the meaning of the Act. Such a gun may give no externally visible indication that it is fully automatic. But in the Government's view, any person who has purchased what he believes to be a semiautomatic rifle or handgun, or who simply has inherited a gun from a relative and left it untouched in an attic or basement, can be subject to imprisonment, despite absolute ignorance of the gun's firing capabilities, if the gun turns out to be an automatic.

We concur in the Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this point: “It is unthinkable to us that Congress intended to subject such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible ten-year term of imprisonment if ... what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional semi-automatic [weapon] turns out to have worn down into or been secretly modified to be a fully automatic weapon.” As we noted in Morissette, the “purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction.” We are reluctant to impute that purpose to Congress where, as here, it would mean easing the path to convicting persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the probability of strict regulation in the form of a statute such as § 5861(d).

The potentially harsh penalty attached to the violation of § 5861(d)—up to 10 years' imprisonment—confirms our reading of the Act. Historically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea. Certainly, the cases that first defined the concept of the public welfare offense almost uniformly involved statutes that provided for only light penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, not imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

Close adherence to the early cases described above might suggest that punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense. In this view, absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea.

We need not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide this case, however. Instead, we note only that where, as here, dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement. In such a case, the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.

In short, we conclude that the background rule of the common law favoring mens rea should govern interpretation of § 5861(d) in this case. Silence does not suggest that Congress dispensed with mens rea for the element of § 5861(d) at issue here. Thus, to obtain a conviction, the Government should have been required to prove that petitioner knew of the features of his AR–15 that brought it within the scope of the Act.

Practice Problem based on US v. X-Citement Video Practice Problem based on US v. X-Citement Video

Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 ed. and Supp. V) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Any person who—

(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if—

(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and

(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;

(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if—

(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and

(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;

....

shall be punished [by up to 10 years in prison].

Must the government prove that the defendant knew that the images he sent through the mails were of minors engaging in sexual activity? Or is it sufficient to show that she knew that she was shipping visual depictions and that those depictions were in fact of minors engaged in sexual activity? Under this statute, could a retailer seller of adult porn videos be convicted if he did not know that the producers of one video used underage performers? Could FedEx, or a FedEx delivery driver, be convicted even though he did not know what was in the package he delivered?

See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).

5.2 Knowing or Willful Violations 5.2 Knowing or Willful Violations

The cases in the section deal not with legal elements ("taking the property of another," "below the age of consent," etc.) but with those rare situations where the law will excuse a defendant who knows exactly what she is doing but is unaware that the law prohibits her conduct. As with most questions of mens rea, courts treat this idea of "willful" or "knowing" violation as a matter of legislative intent.

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985)

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The federal statute governing food stamp fraud provides that “whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations” is subject to a fine and imprisonment. 78 Stat. 708, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1). The question presented is whether in a prosecution under this provision the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations.

Petitioner Frank Liparota was the co-owner with his brother of Moon’s Sandwich Shop in Chicago, Illinois. He was indicted for acquiring and possessing food stamps in violation of § 2024(b)(1). The Department of Agriculture had not authorized petitioner’s restaurant to accept food stamps. At trial, the Government proved that petitioner on three occasions purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of Agriculture agent for substantially less than their face value. On the first occasion, the agent informed petitioner that she had $195 worth of food stamps to sell. The agent then accepted petitioner’s offer of $150 and consummated the transaction in a back room of the restaurant with petitioner’s brother. A similar transaction occurred one week later, in which the agent sold $500 worth of coupons for $350. Approximately one month later, petitioner bought $500 worth of food stamps from the agent for $300.

The controversy between the parties concerns the mental state, if any, that the Government must show in proving that petitioner acted “in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations.” The Government argues that petitioner violated the statute if he knew that he acquired or possessed food stamps and if in fact that acquisition or possession was in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations. According to the Government, no mens rea, or “evil-meaning mind,” … is necessary for conviction. Petitioner claims that the Government’s interpretation, by dispensing with mens rea, dispenses with the only morally blameworthy element in the definition of the crime. To avoid this allegedly untoward result, he claims that an individual violates the statute if he knows that he has acquired or possessed food stamps and if he also knows that he has done so in an unauthorized manner. Our task is to determine which meaning Congress intended….

Absent indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we believe that § 2024(b)(1) requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations. “The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” … [T]he failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a departure from this background assumption of our criminal law.

This construction is particularly appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. For instance, § 2024(b)(1) declares it criminal to use, transfer, acquire, alter, or possess food stamps in any manner not authorized by statute or regulations. The statute provides further that “[c]oupons issued to eligible households shall be used by them only to purchase food in retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the food stamp program at prices prevailing in such stores.” 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (emphasis added); see also 7 CFR § 274.10(a) (1985). This seems to be the only authorized use. A strict reading of the statute with no knowledge-of-illegality requirement would thus render criminal a food stamp recipient who, for example, used stamps to purchase food from a store that, unknown to him, charged higher than normal prices to food stamp program participants. Such a reading would also render criminal a nonrecipient of food stamps who “possessed” stamps because he was mistakenly sent them through the mail due to administrative error, “altered” them by tearing them up, and “transferred” them by throwing them away. Of course, Congress could have intended that this broad range of conduct be made illegal, perhaps with the understanding that prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid such harsh results. However, given the paucity of material suggesting that Congress did so intend, we are reluctant to adopt such a sweeping interpretation.

In addition, requiring mens rea is in keeping with our longstanding recognition of the principle that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability. ….

… [T]he Government contends that the §2024(b)(1) offense is a “public welfare” offense, which the Court defined in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S., at 252-253, to “depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.” Yet the offense at issue here differs substantially from those “public welfare offenses” we have previously recognized. In most previous instances, Congress has rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or safety. Thus, in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), we examined the federal statute making it illegal to receive or possess an unregistered firearm. In holding that the Government did not have to prove that the recipient of unregistered hand grenades knew that they were unregistered, we noted that “one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.” Id., at 609. Similarly, in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943), the Court held that a corporate officer could violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act when his firm shipped adulterated and misbranded drugs, even “though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting.” See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). The distinctions between these cases and the instant case are clear. A food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand grenade, see Freed, nor can the unauthorized acquisition or possession of food stamps be compared to the selling of adulterated drugs, as in Dotterweich.

We hold that in a prosecution for violation of § 2024(b)(1), the Government must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations. This holding does not put an unduly heavy burden on the Government in prosecuting violators of § 2024(b)(1). To prove that petitioner knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was unauthorized, for example, the Government need not show that he had knowledge of specific regulations governing food stamp acquisition or possession. Nor must the Government introduce any extraordinary evidence that would conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s state of mind. Rather, as in any other criminal prosecution requiring mens rea, the Government may prove by reference to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal. Reversed.

 

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title 26 § 7201 of the United States Code provides that any person “who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof” shall be guilty of a felony. Under 26 U. S. C. § 7203, “[a]ny person required under this title ... or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return . . . who willfully fails to . . . make such return” shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This case turns on the meaning of the word “willfully” as used in §§ 7201 and 7203.

Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot for American Airlines since 1973. He filed federal income tax returns through 1979 but thereafter ceased to file returns. He also claimed an increasing number of withholding allowances — eventually claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980 — and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on his W-4 forms that he was exempt from federal income taxes. In 1983, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982. Petitioner’s income during this period at all times far exceeded the minimum necessary to trigger the statutory filing requirement.

As a result of his activities, petitioner … was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. He was further charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 in violation of § 7201…. The tax offenses with which petitioner was charged are specific intent crimes that require the defendant to have acted willfully.

In the course of its instructions, the trial court advised the jury that to prove “willfulness” the Government must prove the voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence. The court further advised the jury that an objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with the law would not. The court … instructed the jury that if it found that Cheek “honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or to file tax returns” a not guilty verdict should be returned.

… [In response to a question from the jury,] the District Judge gave the jury an additional instruction. This instruction stated in part that “[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness” and that “[a]dvice or research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense.” The court also instructed the jury that “[p]ersistent refusal to acknowledge the law does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law.” Approximately two hours later, the jury returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty on all counts.

The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system. Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes.

The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term “willfully” as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws. …

In [United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933)], the Court interpreted the term "willfully" as used in the criminal tax statutes generally to mean "an act done with a bad purpose,"… or with "an evil motive." … In United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346 (1973), we described the term "willfully" as connoting "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty" ….

Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. … [C]arrying this burden requires negating a defendant’s claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws….

In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief. Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek’s good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages as income, including evidence showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that made it plain that wages should be returned as income.

It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek’s understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be. Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.…

Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are submissions of a different order. They do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax.

We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to require, file for a refund and, if denied, present his claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the courts. Also, without paying the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax Court, with the right to appeal to a higher court if unsuccessful. Cheek took neither course in some years, and when he did was unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is in no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness or provides a defense to criminal prosecution under §§ 7201 and 7203. Of course, Cheek was free in this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them adjudicated, but like defendants in criminal cases in other contexts, who “willfully” refuse to comply with the duties placed upon them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong.

…. It was therefore not error in this case for the District Judge to instruct the jury not to consider Cheek’s claims that the tax laws were unconstitutional. However, it was error for the court to instruct the jury that petitioner’s asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully.… [T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals [affirming the conviction] is vacated ….

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with “the complexity of the tax laws,” but with the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income?

…[I]t is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Income Tax Act of 1913 any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least minimum intellectual competence.

The District Court’s instruction that an objectively reasonable and good-faith misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness lends further, rather than less, protection to this defendant, for it adds an additional hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner should be grateful for this further protection, rather than be opposed to it. …

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

On the evening of October 20, 1988, defendant-petitioner Waldemar Ratzlaf ran up a debt of $160,000 playing blackjack at the High Sierra Casino in Reno, Nevada. The casino gave him one week to pay. On the due date, Ratzlaf returned to the casino with cash of $100,000 in hand. A casino official informed Ratzlaf that all transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash had to be reported to state and federal authorities. The official added that the casino could accept a cashier’s check for the full amount due without triggering any reporting requirement. The casino helpfully placed a limousine at Ratzlaf’s disposal, and assigned an employee to accompany him to banks in the vicinity. Informed that banks, too, are required to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, Ratzlaf purchased cashier’s checks, each for less than $10,000 and each from a different bank. He delivered these checks to the High Sierra Casino.

Based on this endeavor, Ratzlaf was charged with “structuring transactions” to evade the banks’ obligation to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000; this conduct, the indictment alleged, violated 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3). The trial judge instructed the jury that the Government had to prove defendant’s knowledge of the banks’ reporting obligation and his attempt to evade that obligation, but did not have to prove defendant knew the structuring was unlawful. Ratzlaf was convicted, fined, and sentenced to prison.

Ratzlaf maintained on appeal that he could not be convicted of “willfully violating” the antistructuring law solely on the basis of his knowledge that a financial institution must report currency transactions in excess of $10,000 and his intention to avoid such reporting. To gain a conviction for “willful” conduct, he asserted, the Government must prove he was aware of the illegality of the “structuring” in which he engaged. The Ninth Circuit … affirmed Ratzlaf’s conviction. We … now conclude that, to give effect to the statutory “willfulness” specification, the Government had to prove Ratzlaf knew the structuring he undertook was unlawful. We therefore reverse ….

… [Federal law] imposes a variety of reporting requirements on individuals and institutions regarding foreign and domestic financial transactions…. The reporting requirement relevant here, § 5313(a), applies to domestic financial transactions. Section 5313(a) reads:

“When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction [in amounts over $10,000, as defined by the Treasury Secretary in federal regulations] … shall file a report on the transaction at the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes...”

To deter circumvention of this reporting requirement, … an antistructuring provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, … which Ratzlaf is charged with “willfully violating,” reads:

“No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction—

“(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.”

The criminal enforcement provision at issue, 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) … reads:

“A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 U.S.C. §5311 et seg. or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter … shall be fined not more than $250,000, or [imprisoned for] not more than five years, or both.”

Section 5324 forbids structuring transactions with a “purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a).” Ratzlaf admits that he structured cash transactions, and that he did so with knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid, the banks’ duty to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000. The statutory formulation (§ 5322) under which Ratzlaf was prosecuted, however, calls for proof of “willful[ness]” on the actor’s part. The trial judge in Ratzlaf’s case … treated § 5322(a)’s “willfulness” requirement essentially as surplusage ….

“Willful,” this Court has recognized, is a “word of many meanings,” and “its construction [is] often . . . influenced by its context.” Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943). Accordingly, we view §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3) mindful of the complex of provisions in which they are embedded. In this light, we count it significant that § 5322(a)’s omnibus “willfulness” requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same subchapter, consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to require both “knowledge of the reporting requirement” and a “specific intent to commit the crime,” i.e., “a purpose to disobey the law.” [Citations omitted.]

The United States urges, however, that § 5324 violators, by their very conduct, exhibit a purpose to do wrong, which suffices to show “willfulness” …. “Structuring is not the kind of activity that an ordinary person would engage in innocently.” the United States asserts. It is therefore “reasonable,” the Government concludes, “to hold a structurer responsible for evading the reporting requirements without the need to prove specific knowledge that such evasion is unlawful.”

Undoubtedly there are bad men who attempt to elude official reporting requirements in order to hide from Government inspectors such criminal activity as laundering drug money or tax evasion. But currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious. … Nor is a person who structures a currency transaction invariably motivated by a desire to keep the Government in the dark. But under the Government’s construction an individual would commit a felony against the United States by making cash deposits in small doses, fearful that the bank’s reports would increase the likelihood of burglary, or in an endeavor to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth.

Courts have noted “many occasions” on which persons, without violating any law, may structure transactions “in order to avoid the impact of some regulation or tax.” … [A]s an amicus noted, countless taxpayers each year give a gift of $10,000 on December 31 and an identical gift the next day, thereby legitimately avoiding the taxable gifts reporting required by 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b).

… [W]e are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously “evil” or inherently “bad” that the “willfulness” requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant’s knowledge of the illegality of structuring. Had Congress wished to dispense with the requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction….

We do not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 199 (1991). In particular contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That, we hold, is what Congress has done with respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) and the provisions it controls. To convict Ratzlaf of the crime with which he was charged, violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3), the jury had to find he knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful. Because the jury was not properly instructed in this regard, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice O’CONNOR, and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.

… Petitioner Ratzlaf, obviously not a person of limited intelligence, was anything but uncomprehending as he traveled from bank to bank converting his bag of cash to cashier’s checks in $9,500 bundles. I am convinced that his actions constituted a “willful” violation of the antistructuring provision embodied in 31 U.S.C. § 5324. As a result of today’s decision, Waldemar Ratzlaf — to use an old phrase — will be “laughing all the way to the bank.” …

Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015)

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat ... to injure the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Petitioner was convicted of violating this provision under instructions that required the jury to find that he communicated what a reasonable person would regard as a threat. The question is whether the statute also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.

I.                

A

Anthony Douglas Elonis was an active user of the social networking Web site Facebook.... In May 2010, Elonis’s wife of nearly seven years left him, taking with her their two young children. Elonis began “listening to more violent music” and posting self-styled “rap” lyrics inspired by the music.... Eventually, Elonis changed the user name on his Facebook page from his actual name to a rap-style nom de plume, “Tone Dougie,” to distinguish himself from his “on-line persona.” The lyrics Elonis posted as “Tone Dougie” included graphically violent language and imagery. This material was often interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious,” with no intentional “resemblance to real persons.” Elonis posted an explanation to another Facebook user that “I’m doing this for me. My writing is therapeutic.”....

Elonis’s posts frequently included crude, degrading, and violent material about his soon-to-be ex-wife.... Elonis posted an adaptation of a satirical sketch that he and his wife had watched together. In the actual sketch, called “It’s Illegal to Say ...,” a comedian explains that it is illegal for a person to say he wishes to kill the President, but not illegal to explain that it is illegal for him to say that. When Elonis posted the script of the sketch, however, he substituted his wife for the President....

After viewing some of Elonis’s posts, his wife felt “extremely afraid for [her] life.”. A state court granted her a three-year protection-from-abuse order against Elonis (essentially, a restraining order).. Elonis referred to the order in another post on his “Tone Dougie” page[.] ...

At the bottom of this post was a link to the Wikipedia article on “Freedom of speech.” 

That same month, interspersed with posts about a movie Elonis liked and observations on a comedian’s social commentary, Elonis posted an entry [about a school shooting, which led to] FBI Agent Denise Stevens [creating] a Facebook account to monitor his online activity.. After the post about a school shooting, Agent Stevens and her partner visited Elonis at his house. Following their visit, during which Elonis was polite but uncooperative, Elonis posted another [threatening] entry on his Facebook page, called “Little Agent Lady,” which led to Count Five[.]...

B

A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats to injure patrons and employees of the park, his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). In the District Court, Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege that he had intended to threaten anyone. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Third Circuit precedent required only that Elonis “intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.” At trial, Elonis testified that his posts emulated the rap lyrics of the well-known performer Eminem, some of which involve fantasies about killing his ex-wife. In Elonis’s view, he had posted “nothing ... that hasn’t been said already.” The Government presented as witnesses Elonis’s wife and co-workers, all of whom said they felt afraid and viewed Elonis’s posts as serious threats.

Elonis requested a jury instruction that “the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat.” The District Court denied that request. The jury instructions instead informed the jury that

“A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.” 

The Government’s closing argument emphasized that it was irrelevant whether Elonis intended the postings to be threats—“it doesn’t matter what he thinks.” A jury convicted Elonis on four of the five counts against him, acquitting only on the charge of threatening park patrons and employees. Elonis was sentenced to three years, eight months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

Elonis renewed his challenge to the jury instructions in the Court of Appeals, contending that the jury should have been required to find that he intended his posts to be threats. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the intent required by Section 875(c) is only the intent to communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a threat....

II

A

An individual who “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another” is guilty of a felony and faces up to five years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) This statute requires that a communication be transmitted and that the communication contain a threat. It does not specify that the defendant must have any mental state with respect to these elements. In particular, it does not indicate whether the defendant must intend that his communication contain a threat....

B

The fact that the statute does not specify any required mental state, however, does not mean that none exists. We have repeatedly held that “mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent” should not be read “as dispensing with it.” ... This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” ... The “central thought” is that a defendant must be “blameworthy in mind” before he can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea, scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like.... We therefore generally “interpret [ ] criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them.” ...

This is not to say that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal before he may be found guilty. The familiar maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” typically holds true. Instead, our cases have explained that a defendant generally must “know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense,” ... even if he does not know that those facts give rise to a crime....

When interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into the statute “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’ ” ... In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is itself an adequate safeguard....

 C

[5] Section 875(c), as noted, requires proof that a communication was transmitted and that it contained a threat. * * * The parties agree that a defendant under Section 875(c) must know that he is transmitting a communication. But communicating something is not what makes the conduct “wrongful.” Here “the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct” is the threatening nature of the communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat.

Elonis’s conviction, however, was premised solely on how his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a “reasonable person” standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with “the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” ... Having liability turn on whether a “reasonable person” regards the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks—“reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence ... and we “have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes,” ... Under these principles, “what [Elonis] thinks” does matter. 

The Government is at pains to characterize its position as something other than a negligence standard, emphasizing that its approach would require proof that a defendant “comprehended [the] contents and context” of the communication.... The Government gives two examples of individuals who, in its view, would lack this necessary mental state—a “foreigner, ignorant of the English language,” who would not know the meaning of the words at issue, or an individual mailing a sealed envelope without knowing its contents.. But the fact that the Government would require a defendant to actually know the words of and circumstances surrounding a communication does not amount to a rejection of negligence. Criminal negligence standards often incorporate “the circumstances known” to a defendant.... Courts then ask, however, whether a reasonable person equipped with that knowledge, not the actual defendant, would have recognized the harmfulness of his conduct. That is precisely the Government’s position here: Elonis can be convicted, the Government contends, if he himself knew the contents and context of his posts, and a reasonable person would have recognized that the posts would be read as genuine threats. That is a negligence standard.

In support of its position the Government relies most heavily on Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In that case, the Court rejected the argument that individuals could be convicted of mailing obscene material only if they knew the “legal status of the materials” distributed. * * * Absolving a defendant of liability because he lacked the knowledge that the materials were legally obscene “would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law.” * * *  It was instead enough for liability that “a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of the materials.” Ibid.

This holding does not help the Government. In fact, the Court in Hamling approved a state court’s conclusion that requiring a defendant to know the character of the material incorporated a “vital element of scienter” so that “not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth ... is exorcised.”  * * * In this case, “calculated purveyance” of a threat would require that Elonis know the threatening nature of his communication. Put simply, the mental state requirement the Court approved in Hamling turns on whether a defendant knew the character of what was sent, not simply its contents and context.

Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 2019 – 2020, 2022 – 2023 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), nothing in Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896), undermines this reading. The defendant’s contention in Rosen was that his indictment for mailing obscene material was invalid because it did not allege that he was aware of the contents of the mailing. * * *  That is not at issue here; there is no dispute that Elonis knew the words he communicated. The defendant also argued that he could not be convicted of mailing obscene material if he did not know that the material “could be properly or justly characterized as obscene.” * * * The Court correctly rejected this “ignorance of the law” defense; no such contention is at issue here....

In light of the foregoing, Elonis’s conviction cannot stand. The jury was instructed that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state. That understanding “took deep and early root in American soil” and Congress left it intact here: Under Section 875(c), “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” 

 There is no dispute that the mental state requirement in Section 875(c) is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat....

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over the appropriate mental state for threat prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Save two, every Circuit to have considered the issue—11 in total—has held that this provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary meaning of those words in the relevant context. The outliers are the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have concluded that proof of an intent to threaten was necessary for conviction. Adopting the minority position, Elonis urges us to hold that § 875(c) and the First Amendment require proof of an intent to threaten. The Government in turn advocates a general-intent approach.

Rather than resolve the conflict, the Court casts aside the approach used in nine Circuits and leaves nothing in its place. Lower courts are thus left to guess at the appropriate mental state for § 875(c). All they know after today’s decision is that a requirement of general intent will not do. But they can safely infer that a majority of this Court would not adopt an intent-to-threaten requirement, as the opinion carefully leaves open the possibility that recklessness may be enough.

... The only dispute in this case is about the state of mind necessary to convict Elonis for making those posts. On its face, § 875(c) does not demand any particular mental state. As the Court correctly explains, the word “threat” does not itself contain a mens rea requirement. See ante, at 2008 – 2009. But because we read criminal statutes “in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded,” we require “some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, ... to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.” * * * Absent such indicia, we ordinarily apply the “presumption in favor of scienter” to require only “proof of general intent—that is, that the defendant [must] posses[s] knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” * * *

Under this “conventional mens rea element,” “the defendant [must] know the facts that make his conduct illegal,” but he need not know that those facts make his conduct illegal. 

...  Applying ordinary rules of statutory construction, I would read § 875(c) to require proof of general intent. To “know the facts that make his conduct illegal” under § 875(c), a defendant must know that he transmitted a communication in interstate or foreign commerce that contained a threat. Knowing that the communication contains a “threat”—a serious expression of an intention to engage in unlawful physical violence—does not, however, require knowing that a jury will conclude that the communication contains a threat as a matter of law. Instead, like one who mails an “obscene” publication and is prosecuted under the federal obscenity statute, a defendant prosecuted under § 875(c) must know only the words used in that communication, along with their ordinary meaning in context. ...  I respectfully dissent.