OPINION OF THE COURT

Wesley, J.

On this appeal we must resolve the issue of how child support should be calculated when parents have “shared custody” of their child. Balancing the policy considerations behind enactment of the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) against the practical challenges of applying the CSSA in shared custody situations, we hold that child support in a shared custody case should be calculated as it is in any other case. In this case, since the lower courts bypassed the initial three-step statutory formula set forth in the CSSA, we modify and are constrained to remit for a redetermination of child support.

The parties, both practicing attorneys in New York City, were married in September 1986. During their marriage, they had one child, a daughter Morton Elizabeth, born on March 15, 1989. They separated in July 1990 and in February 1992, settled the custody and visitation issues by stipulation. They agreed to a “shared time allocation,” whereby plaintiff (father) would have the child with him from Wednesday evening to Sunday evening one week, and Wednesday evening to Thursday morning the following week.

In April 1993, Supreme Court held a hearing to resolve the issue of child support. Plaintiff then earned $76,876 per year and defendant earned $83,118 per year.

In November 1995, Supreme Court issued a comprehensive opinion in which the court attempted to reconcile the shared custodial arrangement with the requirements of the CSSA (167 Mise 2d 749). The court noted that the statute speaks in terms of a single custodial parent and that “[t]he concept of shared parenting time simply does not appear anywhere in the statute” (id., at 750). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the CSSA “applies” to cases of shared custody (id., at 757).

The court rejected plaintiffs suggestion that it apply a “proportional offset” formula, which would reduce plaintiffs *726child support obligation based upon the amount of time he spends with his daughter. The court also noted that while other States have adopted various formulas that reduce child support based upon time spent with the child, the CSSA contains no similar formula.

The court then considered how the CSSA should be applied in a shared custody case. After reviewing the CSSA and the economic realities of shared custody, Supreme Court determined that “where there is extensive time sharing the court must look at the totality of the circumstances in both homes rather than rely on the [CSSA] percentages” (id., at 757). The court, therefore, held that “while the CSSA ‘applies’ to shared custody * * * the basic support percentages should not be used in any shared custody case” (id.). The court then applied the factors set out in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (f) in the CSSA and fixed plaintiffs basic child support obligation at $750 per month.

The Appellate Division affirmed and noted that “the parties’ unique shared custody arrangement warranted the IAS Court’s resort to the paragraph (f) factors for calculating child support under the [CSSA] * * * in preference to the percentage formula of paragraph (c)” (239 AD2d 106). We granted leave to appeal and now modify.

I.

As a threshold matter, we agree with the lower courts and the parties that the CSSA applies to cases of shared custody (see, Matter of Holmes v Holmes, 184 AD2d 185, 187). The more difficult issue we must resolve is how the CSSA should be applied in cases of shared custody, which in New York encompass a number of situations including joint decision making, joint legal custody or shared physical custody of the child.

The CSSA sets forth “a precisely articulated, three-step method” for determining the basic child support obligation (Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 652). As we outlined in Cassano:

“[S]tep one of the three-step method is the court’s calculation of the ‘combined parental income’ * * * Second, the court multiplies that figure, up to $80,000, by a specified percentage based upon the number of children in the household — 17% for one child — and then allocates that amount between the *727parents according to their share of the total income * * *

“Third, where the combined parental income exceeds $80,000 * * * the statute provides that ‘the court shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined parental income in excess of such dollar amount through consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of this subdivision and/or the child support percentage’ (Id., at 653; see, Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [1]-[3].)1

After completing this three-step statutory formula, under the CSSA the trial court must then order the noncustodial parent to pay a pro rata share of the basic child support obligation, unless it finds that amount to be “unjust or inappropriate” based on a consideration of the “paragraph (f)” factors (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [f]). Those factors include the financial resources of the parents and the child, the standard of living the child would have had if the marriage had not ended, nonmonetary contributions of the parents toward the child, extraordinary expenses incurred in exercising visitation and any other factors the court determines are relevant (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [fD.

Where the court finds the amount derived from the three-step statutory formula to be “unjust or inappropriate,” it must order payment of an amount that is just and appropriate (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [g]). If the court rejects the amount derived from the statutory formula, it must set forth in a written order “the amount of each party’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation” and the reasons the court did not order payment of that amount (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [g]).

Plaintiff argues that Supreme Court improperly resorted to the “paragraph (f)” factors, without first determining the basic child support obligation pursuant to the statutory formula. We agree.

The CSSA clearly requires the trial court to first calculate the basic child support obligation, using the three-step statutory formula, before resorting to the “paragraph (f)” factors (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [f], [g]). Indeed, even where *728the trial court rejects the amount derived from the statutory formula, it still must set forth that amount in its written order — “an unbending requirement that cannot be waived by either party or counsel” (Matter of Cassano v Cassano, supra, at 653-654).

The CSSA was the Legislature’s response to the Federal Government’s mandate that States establish mandatory guidelines for determining child support (Matter of Graby v Graby, 87 NY2d 605, 609). This statute replaced a discretionary system and was enacted to “create greater uniformity, predictability and equity in fixing child support awards, while at the same time maintaining a degree of judicial discretion necessary to address unique circumstances” (Matter of Cassano v Cassano, supra, at 652). Here, Supreme Court rejected the Legislature’s chosen method for determining child support, upset the statutory balance struck between predictability and flexibility, and returned to a discretionary approach for a whole class of cases.

Although the CSSA is silent on the issue of shared custody and speaks in terms of a “custodial” and “noncustodial” parent in the application of its methodology, we see no reason to abandon the statute, and its Federally mandated policy considerations, in shared custody cases. While “joint custody” is generally used to describe joint legal custody or joint decision making (see, e.g., Bliss v Ach, 56 NY2d 995, 998; Braiman v Braiman, 44 NY2d 584, 589-590), we are aware that many divorcing parents wish to maximize their parenting opportunities through expanded visitation or shared custody arrangements. However, the reach of the CSSA should not be shortened because of the terminology employed by divorcing parents in resolving their marital disputes and settling custody arrangements. In most instances, the court can determine the custodial parent for purposes of child support by identifying which parent has physical custody of the child for a majority of time (see, Matter of Holmes v Holmes, supra, at 189 [Casey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part]; see also, Nicholas v Cirelli, 209 AD2d 840; Harmon v Harmon, 173 AD2d 98). As noted by Supreme Court, “[t]he reality of the situation governs” (167 Misc 2d, at 753). Thus, even though each parent has a custodial period in a shared custody arrangement, for purposes of child support, the court can still identify the primary custodial parent.

New York was not a stranger to the concept of shared custody at the time the CSSA was enacted and there were at least two *729legislative proposals which expressly provided for an adjustment of the child support award in the event parents shared custody of a child (see, 1988 NY Senate Bill 6957-A [court may adjust the pro rata shares of the child support award where parents “share the physical custody of the child”]; 1985 NY Senate Bill 3733-A [court shall adjust child support award where noncustodial parent has physical custody of the child more than 30% of the time]).2 In light of this legislative history, it is clear that the Legislature considered making an adjustment for shared custody cases, but ultimately rejected the idea and intended the CSSA to apply as adopted. Thus, neither the legislative history nor the statute itself suggests that the Legislature chose to deviate from the initial three-step process in shared custody cases. We can only conclude that the Legislature saw fit not to create an exception to the CSSA for shared custody arrangements, nor will we.

There is no other basis for categorically rejecting application of the statutory formula in all shared custody cases. There will certainly be shared custody cases where the statutory formula yields a result that is just and appropriate, notwithstanding the additional time spent with the child (e.g., the noncustodial parent has the child only 30% of the time and earns substantially more than the custodial parent).3 Of course, there will also be shared custody cases where the statutory formula yields a result that is unjust or inappropriate. In those cases, however, the trial court can resort to the “paragraph (f)” factors and order payment of an amount that is just and appropriate (see, Domestic Relations Law §240 [1-b] [f], [g]). In addition, application of the formula by the trial court in its initial analysis of the basic child support obligation will facilitate effective appellate review (see, Matter of Cassano v Cassano, supra, at 655). Accordingly, Supreme Court should not have bypassed the three-step statutory formula set forth in the CSSA. The basic framework created by the Legislature can accommodate shared custody cases.

*730II.

Plaintiff also argues that we should sanction a “proportional offset” formula to bridge the shared custody gap he perceives in the statute. The proportional offset would reduce his child support obligation based upon the amount of time he actually spends with his daughter. Defendant objects to application of the formula, asserting that it is problematic, inappropriate, and has already been tested and abandoned in New York by one intermediate appellate court.

Under the proportional offset formula proposed by plaintiff, each parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is multiplied by the percentage of time the child spends with the other parent. The two resulting amounts are then offset against each other, and the “net” is paid to the parent with the lower amount (see, e.g., McCauley v McCauley, 172 Misc 2d 611, 615-616). This formula “operates on the theory that each parent owes child support to the other parent based on that parent’s income and the amount of time the child is cared for by the other parent” (Melli and Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody: Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 Hous L Rev 543, 565).

There are a number of reasons for rejecting the proportional offset formula. First, as we noted earlier, the legislative history and the statute clearly reject this methodology. While the proportional offset formula is currently in use in other States, that is because the Legislatures in those States expressly adopted a formula format (see, e.g., Colo Rev Stat § 14-10-115; Md Fam Code § 12-204; Utah Code Ann § 78-45-2; Va Code Arm § 20-108.2). The difficult policy choices inherent in creating an offset formula for shared custody arrangements are better left to the Legislature.

As Supreme Court noted, the proportional offset formula also fails to account for the generally accepted fact that shared custody is more expensive than sole custody. While it reduces certain costs for the custodial parent, shared custody actually increases the total cost of supporting a child by necessitating duplication of certain household costs in each parent’s home (see, The Economics of Shared Custody, op. cit., at 554; US Dept Health & Human Services Office of Child Support Enforcement, Development of Guidelines for Child Support *731Orders, at II-59 [1987]; Morgan, Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation and Application § 3.03 [a]).4

While the over-all cost of supporting a child increases with shared custody, the proportional formula, by offsetting the parents’ child support obligations, can greatly reduce the child support award and deprive the child of needed resources (see, Getman, Changing Formulas for Changing Families: Shared Custody Must Not Shortchange Children, 10 Fam Advoc 47, 49; Development of Guidelines for Child Support Orders, op. cit., at 11-58 [“many practitioners express the opinion that the amounts yielded by guidelines in shared custody cases are inequitable because they are too low”]). Thus, application of the proportional offset formula could potentially undermine one of the primary objectives of the CSSA — to increase child support awards so that children do not “unfairly bear the economic burden of [parental] separation” (see, Governor’s Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 567, at 1, 2, reprinted in 1989 NY Legis Ann, at 249-251).

The proportional offset formula generally comes into play only after the noncustodial parent’s time with the child crosses a certain threshold. For example, in Vermont, the noncustodial parent must have physical custody of the child 30% of the time for the formula to apply (Vt Stat Ann, tit 15, § 657). When the threshold is met, there is a “sharp decline” in child support (see, The Economics of Shared Custody, op. cit., at 565; Development of Guidelines for Child Support Orders, op. cit., at II-58). For example, where there is a 30% threshold, a 5% increase in visitation/custodial time may result in a 35% decrease in child support (see, The Economics of Shared Custody, op. cit., at 565). The precipitous drop in child support undoubtedly will encourage a noncustodial parent to seek more custodial time to reduce the child support obligation. In our view, parents should seek shared custody because they desire to spend more time with their children.

The proportional offset formula can also be difficult to apply. The main difficulty is in accurately calculating the percentage of time each parent spends with the child, especially where the parents split time on certain days. In this case, as in most cases, there are days when one parent has the child during the day and the other parent has the child at night. As a result, it *732is difficult to pinpoint a precise percentage of time that each parent spends with the child. Indeed, the parties hotly dispute the percentage of time plaintiff spends with the child. Plaintiff claims that he spends 42.9% of the time with his daughter, while defendant contends that plaintiff only spends between 32% and 36% of the time with the child.

Finally, the proportional offset formula has the undesirable potential of “encouraging a parent to keep a stop watch on visitation” in order to increase his or her shared custody percentage (Matter of Simmons v Hyland, 235 AD2d 67, 70). Notably, while the Third Department originally endorsed the proportional offset formula (Matter of Holmes v Holmes, 184 AD2d 185, supra), it has reconsidered its prior decision and has found the formula unworkable (Matter of Simmons v Hyland, supra).

For all of the foregoing reasons, we explicitly reject the proportional offset formula. Absent express direction from the Legislature in its precise child support guidelines, we will not reduce the parental resources available to children by applying this problematic formula (see, Matter of Graby v Graby, 87 NY2d, at 613). Shared custody arrangements do not alter the scope and methodology of the CSSA.

The trial court rejected the use of the three-step method for determination of the basic child support obligation as a matter of law. This was error. The matter must therefore be remitted to the trial court for application of the three-step process. If the trial court is satisfied that the amount of basic child support obligation is “unjust or inappropriate” because of the shared custody arrangement of the parents, the court may then utilize “paragraph (f)” to fashion an appropriate award.

We have reviewed plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by remitting the case to Supreme Court for a redetermination of child support, and, as so modified, affirmed.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

Order modified, without costs, and case remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated May 27, 2005, which, after a nonjury trial, awarded her child support in the sum of only $1,702.75 per week, maintenance in the sum of only $697 per week for a period of 10 years, 30% of the plaintiffs business, and equitable distribution in the sum of only $814,110.50, and denied her motion for an attorney’s fee, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of the same order and judgment, which, inter alia, applied the Child Support Standards Act to his income in excess of $80,000.

Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law *795and as a matter of discretion, (1) by deleting the ninth decretal paragraph thereof and substituting therefor a decretal paragraph stating “that plaintiff Michael G. DeVries is awarded the full value of the business entity known as ‘M. DeVries Concrete, Inc.’ or any successor entity, which he need not sell,” (2) by deleting from the tenth decretal paragraph thereof the words “the total amount of $814,110.50” and substituting therefor the words “the principal amount of $789,610.50,” (3) by deleting from the tenth decretal paragraph thereof the words “the sum of $150,000” and substituting therefor the words “the sum of $200,000” and (4) by deleting from the tenth decretal paragraph thereof the words “the remaining balance of $664,110.50 shall be paid in equal monthly installments of $5,534.25, commencing January 1, 2006, until paid in full,” and substituting therefor the words “the remaining balance of $589,610.50, plus annual amortized interest thereon computed at the legal rate pursuant to CPLR 5004, shall be paid to the defendant in 144 equal monthly installments commencing January 1, 2006, until principal and interest are paid in full”; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for the entry of an appropriate amended order and judgment in accordance herewith.

The plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erroneously imputed income to him for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation is without merit. In determining a party’s child support obligation, “a court need not rely upon the party’s own account of his or her finances, but may impute income based upon the party’s past income or demonstrated earning potential” (Rocanello v Rocanello, 254 AD2d 269 [1998]; see Curran v Curran, 2 AD3d 391, 392 [2003]). The court properly imputed income to the plaintiff since the evidence showed that he earned and spent well in excess of the income reported on his tax return.

The trial court’s determination of basic child support was proper. Since the actual combined parental income exceeded $80,000, the court, in its discretion, could apply either the applicable percentage, in this case at least 35% for five or more children, or the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (3); (f), or both, to the parental income in excess of $80,000 (see Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 653 [1995]; Finke v Finke, 15 AD3d 615, 618 [2005]). The court, applying the straight percentage, properly considered $300,000 of the plaintiffs imputed gross income in determining basic child *796support. The court providently exercised its discretion in calculating child support against $300,000 of the plaintiff’s imputed income based upon the standard of living that the parties’ children would have enjoyed had the marriage not dissolved (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [3]; [f]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, supra at 655), and upon the parties’ disparate financial circumstances which are apparent in the record.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff was liable for his pro rata share of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [5]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, supra at 655-656; Cohen v Cohen, 21 AD3d 341, 342 [2005]).

The amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and eveiy case must be determined on its unique facts (see Mazzone v Mazzone, 290 AD2d 495, 496 [2002]; Sperling v Sperling, 165 AD2d 338, 342 [1991]). The trial court properly considered all of the statutory factors, including the parties’ pre-separation standard of living, and providently exercised its discretion in awarding to the defendant maintenance in the amount of $697 per week for a period of 10 years. The amount and duration of the maintenance award will permit the defendant to become self-supporting.

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for an award of an attorney’s fee (see O’Shea v O’Shea, 93 NY2d 187, 193 [1999]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]).

With regard to the New Paltz property, the defendant proffered no evidence that either the plaintiff or DeVries Concrete, Inc., had any ownership interest in it. Moreover, there was conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff made any monetary investment in the New Paltz property, and if so, how much money was involved. Thus, the Supreme Court erred in including this property in the distributive award.

As to the plaintiffs business, M. DeVries Concrete, Inc., this Court has discretion to determine issues of equitable distribution that is as broad as that of the trial court (see O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 589 [1985]). Upon consideration of all relevant factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d), and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, including the defendant’s receipt of 70% of the nonbusiness marital assets (not including the New Paltz property), the payment to the defendant of the sum of $200,000 in equitable distribution up front, and the award of interest on the distributive *797balance calculated at the legal rate, the defendant was not entitled to any portion of the value of the plaintiffs business.

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.E, Ritter and Dillon, JJ., concur.

Spolzino, J., dissents in part and concurs in part and votes to modify the order and judgment by deleting the ninth and tenth decretal paragraphs thereof, and, as so modified, to affirm the order and judgment insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for further proceedings to determine the value of the plaintiffs business and thereafter for a new determination of the equitable distribution of the marital estate, with the following memorandum: I concur in my colleagues’ conclusions with respect to all of the issues raised on this appeal and cross appeal other than the equitable distribution of the marital estate. In that regard, I agree with the majority’s implicit conclusion that the sale of the plaintiff’s business when the youngest child reached the age of majority was an impermissible, albeit well-intended, method of distributing that marital asset. I do not agree, however, that the equitable distribution of the marital estate can be achieved without a determination of the value of the plaintiffs business.

The value of a marital asset is required to be established as of a date reasonably selected by the trial court within the period between commencement and trial (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [4] [b]). The manner by which the Supreme Court decided to distribute the plaintiff’s business here effectively establishes a valuation date for that marital asset outside the permissible period. While we have allowed the distribution of a marital residence by its sale at a later date, typically when the parties’ youngest child reaches the age of majority, we have done so because the needs of the children outweigh compliance with the statutory mandate (see Mitzner v Mitzner, 209 AD2d 487, 489 [1994]; Marano v Marano, 200 AD2d 718, 719 [1994]). The same considerations, however, do not apply to the distribution of a business interest, with respect to which we have strictly adhered to the statutory command (see Maddalena v Maddalena, 217 AD2d 606 [1995]).

If the marital interest in the plaintiff’s business is to be distributed on the basis of its value as of a date within the permissible range, however, that value must first be established. Since that did not occur here by reason of the inability of the financial evaluator to reach a conclusion, a result that the Supreme Court declined to ascribe to the fault of either party, further proceedings are, in my view, required. I would, therefore, modify the order and judgment by deleting the ninth and tenth *798decretal paragraphs thereof, and, as so modified, to affirm the order and judgment insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, and remit the matter for further proceedings to determine the value of the plaintiffs business and thereafter for a new determination of the equitable distribution of the marital estate (see Pickard v Pickard, 33 AD3d 202 [2006]).

*692Motion by the appellant for leave to reargue appeals from four orders of the Family Court, Westchester County, two dated August 3, 2004, and two dated August 4, 2004, which were determined by decision and order of this Court dated April 4, 2005 [17 AD3d 361], or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision and order of this Court, and cross motion by the respondent, inter alia, for leave to reargue the appeals.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the cross motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is

Ordered that the branch of the appellant’s motion which is for leave to reargue is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that the motion is otherwise denied; and it is further,

Ordered that the cross motion is denied; and it is further,

Ordered that upon reargument, the decision and order of this Court dated April 4, 2005, is recalled and vacated and the following decision and order is substituted therefor:

In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4 to vacate a child support agreement and modify the father’s child support obligation, the father appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (James, S.M.), dated August 3, 2004, which, inter alia, granted the petition and awarded the mother child support in the sum of $35,000 per month, child support arrears in the sum of $398,451.12, and an attorney’s fee in the sum of $60,000, (2) an order of the same court dated August 4, 2004, directing him to pay the mother the sum awarded for child support arrears, (3) an order of the same court also dated August 4, 2004, directing him to pay the mother the sum awarded for an attorney’s fee, and (4) an order of the same court (Klein, J.) dated September 30, 2004, which denied his objections to the order dated August 3, 2004, and the two orders dated August 4, 2004.

Ordered that the appeals from the order dated August 3, 2004, and the orders dated August 4, 2004, are dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as those orders were superseded by the order dated September 30, 2004; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated September 30, 2004, is modi*693fled, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the father’s objection to the awards of child support and child support arrears, and substituting therefor a provision sustaining those objections and directing the father to pay child support in the sum of $19,148.74 per month; as so modified, the order dated September 30, 2004, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, the order dated August 3, 2004, is modified accordingly, the order dated August 4, 2004, directing the father to pay child support arrears is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

In calculating the award of child support to the mother under Family Court Act § 413, the Support Magistrate erred in basing the award in part on the amount of child support the father paid for his other child by a different woman, particularly where no evidence was presented as to that child’s expenses, resources, and needs. To this end, in high income cases, the appropriate determination under Family Court Act § 413 (1) (f) for an award of child support on parental income in excess of $80,000 should be based on the child’s actual needs and the amount that is required for the child to live an appropriate lifestyle, rather than the wealth of one or both parties (see Anonymous v Anonymous, 286 AD2d 585 [2001]).

Here, the mother’s net worth statement and her extensive testimony at the hearing established that her expenses related to the child were $19,148.74 per month, exclusive of the child’s educational, health, medical, dental, school transportation, school supplies/books, security, and summer camp expenses, which in any case are paid by the father. Notably, this amount is deemed admitted as fact by the father due to his failure to comply with the compulsory financial disclosure requirements of Family Court Act § 424-a (see Miller-Glass v Glass, 237 AD2d 723, 724-725 [1997]). Accordingly, the Family Court erred in awarding $35,000 in monthly child support to the mother. Instead, the mother should have been awarded monthly child support in the sum of $19,148.74 to satisfy the child’s actual needs and to afford him an appropriate lifestyle (see Family Ct Act § 413). The arrears in child support must be recalculated in light of the change in monthly payments. Thus, we remit the matter to the Family Court, Westchester County.

The parties’ remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic in light of the foregoing. Schmidt, J.P., Krausman, Rivera and Fisher, JJ., concur.

*651OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge Kaye.

The focus of this appeal is the Child Support Standards Act (Family Ct Act § 413; Domestic Relations Law § 240), which includes a numeric formula for calculating the award of child support, prescribing criteria as to combined parental income under $80,000 and criteria as to income above that amount. We are asked to review an award determined by application of the statutory formula to combined parental income exceeding $80,000. We conclude that the award was proper and affirm the Appellate Division order so holding.

The parties here were divorced in 1986, with two children, one of whom is now emancipated. Plaintiff mother was awarded custody of the children and defendant father was ordered to pay $125 per week in child support. In 1989 plaintiff petitioned for an upward modification of the support award for the nonemancipated child pursuant to the newly enacted child support statute, and defendant cross-petitioned for a downward modification.

After taking evidence in a two-day hearing relating to the family’s income and expenses, the Hearing Examiner found a substantial increase in the parties’ financial circumstances warranting increased child support. On combined parental income of $99,944 (64.4% of it attributable to the father), the Hearing Examiner ordered defendant to pay $218 per week. That amount was determined by multiplying the parents’ total income by the statutory percentage (17%) and then allocating 64.4% of that amount to the father. The Hearing Examiner further ordered defendant to pay his pro rata share of the child’s private school costs1 and unreimbursed medical expenses.

Before Family Court, the father contended that the Hearing *652Examiner erred in applying the statutory percentage to income over $80,000 without setting forth reasons for that particular award. Family Court concluded that the statute permitted that and, absent good cause, refused to interfere with the Hearing Examiner’s exercise of discretion to apply the percentage. The Appellate Division agreed with the father that Family Court was required to state reasons for the award of child support on combined parental income over $80,000 but found that requirement satisfied by the Hearing Examiner’s in-depth consideration of the parties’ circumstances. The Appellate Division additionally affirmed the award of unreimbursed medical expenses. We now affirm.

The Child Support Standards Act, effective September 15, 1989, replaced a needs-based discretionary system with a precisely articulated, three-step method for determining child support. Enactment of this statute after long efforts signalled a new era in calculating child support awards (see generally, Reichler and Lefcourt, The New Child Support Standards Act, NY St BJ 36 [Feb. 1990]; Note, The Child Support Standards Act and the New York Judiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent Solution, 56 Brook L Rev 1299).

The Act had among its objectives the assurance that both parents would contribute to the support of the children, and that the children would not "unfairly bear the economic burden of parental separation” (Governor’s Program Bill Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 567, at 1). Emphasis was to shift "from a balancing of the expressed needs of the child and the income available to the parents after expenses to the total income available to the parents and the standard of living that should be shared with the child” (Reichler and Lefcourt, NY St BJ, op. cit., at 44; see also, Governor’s Approval Mem, 1989 NY Legis Ann, at 250 ["children will share in the economic status of both their parents”]).

Further, the Legislature perceived that the existing system produced inconsistent, unpredictable and often seemingly arbitrary results, which undermined the parties’ confidence in the fairness of the process (see, 1989 NY Legis Ann, at 248, citing Rep of NY Commn on Child Support, at 69). Consequently, the new statute sought to create greater uniformity, predictability and equity in fixing child support awards, while at the same time maintaining the degree of judicial discretion necessary to address unique circumstances (Letter of Assembly Sponsor Helene E. Weinstein to Governor Mario Cuomo, June 30, *6531989, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 567; Governor’s Program Bill Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 567, at 5).

As the statute directs, step one of the three-step method is the court’s calculation of "combined parental income” in accordance with Family Court Act § 413 (1) (b) (4)-(5) (see, Domestic Relations Law § 240 for analogous provisions). Second, the court multiplies that figure, up to $80,000, by a specified percentage2 based upon the number of children in the household — 17% for one child — and then allocates that amount between the parents according to their share of the total income (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [b] [3]; [c]).

Third, where combined parental income exceeds $80,000— the situation at issue in this case — the statute provides that "the court shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined parental income in excess of such dollar amount through consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of this subdivision and/or the child support percentage” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [c] [3]). The "paragraph (f)” factors include the financial resources of the parents and child, the health of the child and any special needs, the standard of living the child would have had if the marriage had not ended, tax consequences, nonmonetary contributions of the parents toward the child, the educational needs of the parents, the disparity in the parents’ incomes, the needs of other nonparty children receiving support from one of the parents, extraordinary expenses incurred in exercising visitation and any other factors the court determines are relevant (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [f]).

Whenever the basic child support obligation derived by application of the formula would be "unjust or inappropriate,” the court must consider the "paragraph (f)” factors. That is so whether parental income is above or below $80,000 (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [b] [1]; [c] [2], [3]). If the formula is rejected, the statute directs that the court "set forth, in a written order, the factors it considered” — an unbending requirement that *654cannot be waived by either party or counsel (Family Ct Act §413 [1] [g]).

The question now before us is whether the court must articulate a reason for its award of child support on parental income exceeding $80,000 when it chooses simply to apply the statutory percentage. Defendant urges not only that there must be a stated reason but also that the stated reason must relate to the needs of the child, much as under prior law.

That question has generated uncertainty. Some courts have calculated child support awards simply by applying the statutory percentages to parental income over $80,000 (see, e.g., De Bernardo v De Bernardo, 180 AD2d 500, 502-503; Rosen v Rosen, NYU, Oct. 9, 1990, at 31, col 5; Brown v Brown, NYU, July 16, 1990, at 30, col 2; Steel v Steel, 152 Misc 2d 880, 884). Others have rejected a "blind application” of the child support percentage to income over $80,000, requiring express findings as to the child’s actual needs (Harmon v Harmon, 173 AD2d 98, 111 ["a child is not a partner in the marital relationship, entitled to a 'piece of the action’ ”]; see also, Chasin v Chasin, 182 AD2d 862, 863; Colley v Colley, 200 AD2d 839, 841; Panossian v Panossian, 201 AD2d 983; Slankard v Chahinian, 204 AD2d 529, 531 [all reversing trial court as to child support]). The case law has even been read to limit the application of the percentages to income below $80,000 (see, Florescue, Relocation of Custodial Parent, NYU, June 14, 1993, at 4, col 6).

Obviously, determining what the Child Support Standards Act requires begins with the statute itself.

Where combined parental income is less than $80,000 the statute plainly directs that the court apply the formula percentages (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [c] [2]) — thus implementing the objectives of uniformity and predictability. Only where that amount would be "unjust or inappropriate” does the Act require the court to set forth reasons.

As to combined parental income over $80,000, the statute explicitly affords an option: the court may apply the factors set forth in section 413 (1) (f) "and/or the child support percentage” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [c] [3]; see also, 1 Tippins, New York Matrimonial Law and Practice § 5A:20; Reichler and Lefcourt, NY St BJ, op. cit, at 40). Pertinent as well to income above $80,000 is the provision that the court may disregard the formula if "unjust or inappropriate” but in that event, must give its reasons in a formal written order, which cannot be waived by either party (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [g]).

*655The parties’ arguments for and against requiring an elaboration of reasons where the statutory percentage is applied to income exceeding $80,000 center on the term "and/or” — a term that has long irked grammarians (see, e.g., Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage 29 [2d ed]). In that legislative purpose, not linguistic perfection, guides our determination, we must seek to give meaning to the term "and/or,” in the context of the statute’s over-all objective. Defendant’s insistence on an elaboration of needs-based reasons reads the word "or” out of the section and rolls back the calendar to pre-1989 law. In our view, "and/or” should be read to afford courts the discretion to apply the "paragraph (f)” factors, or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both in fixing the basic child support obligation on parental income over $80,000. That interpretation is consistent with the language of the section and with the objectives of the Child Support Standards Act.

That conclusion does not, however, end our analysis. Given that the statute explicitly vests discretion in the court and that the exercise of discretion is subject to review for abuse, some record articulation of the reasons for the court’s choice to apply the percentage is necessary to facilitate that review (see, CPLR 4213 [b]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 4213:2, at 336 [meaningful review is futile if court does not state facts upon which its decision rests]; see also, 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac |f 4213.07 [court must provide the ultimate facts which support its conclusions of law "in order to enlighten the parties and to make more effective the review of judgments on appeal”]). The stated basis for an exercise of discretion to apply the formula to income over $80,000 should, in sum and substance, reflect both that the court has carefully considered the parties’ circumstances and that it has found no reason why there should be a departure from the prescribed percentage.

In the present case, the Hearing Examiner conducted a two-day inquiry into the parties’ circumstances and set forth her findings in detail. The Appellate Division was satisfied, as are we, that there was sufficient record indication that no extraordinary circumstances were present, and application of the statutory 17% to the $19,214 income above $80,000 was therefore justified and not an abuse of discretion.

Finally, we affirm as well the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the father is required to pay his pro rata share of *656the child’s unreimbursed medical expenses. The statute specifies that the court "shall prorate each parent’s share of future reasonable health care expenses of the child not covered by insurance” (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [c] [5]). Defendant’s insistence that this order constitutes an impermissible open-ended obligation, as the Second Department earlier held (see, e.g., Chirk v Chirk, 170 AD2d 641) is meritless in light of the Act.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs.

Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs.

Mercure, J.P Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.), entered September 19, 2003 in Otsego County, ordering, inter alia, equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property, upon a decision of the court.

The parties were married in 1978 and separated in 1987. They have three children, born in 1981, 1985 and 1986, who defendant has allegedly failed to either visit or support for several years, resulting in child support arrears of approximately $15,500 as of April 28, 2003. Plaintiff commenced this action for *765divorce on the ground of abandonment in April 2003. The parties ultimately entered into an “opting out” agreement providing that defendant would withdraw his answer and allow plaintiff to proceed with the divorce and that Supreme Court would determine the issues of equitable distribution, child support and counsel fees upon the submissions of the parties. Subsequently, Supreme Court entered a judgment of divorce incorporating the opting out agreement, as well as the court’s decision and order distributing the parties’ sole marital asset— plaintiffs pension—equally between them, reducing defendant’s child support obligation to $25 per month and establishing child support arrears of $15,532.52. Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment.

Initially, we agree with defendant that Supreme Court properly set defendant’s child support obligation at $25 per month. Supreme Court may not impose a child support obligation that will reduce a noncustodial parent’s income, below the federal poverty level (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [d]). It is undisputed that defendant is unable to work due to a medical condition, has no assets and that his annual income— derived from Social Security—amounted to $6,900 in 2003, well below the federal poverty income guideline of $8,980 (see 68 Fed Reg 6456 [2003]). Thus, the basic child support obligation of $25 per month must be imposed (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] m.

With respect to the equitable distribution of the sole marital asset, however, we agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in failing to “set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [g]; see Ciaffone v Ciaffone, 228 AD2d 949, 950 [1996]). Although the factors “do not have to be specifically cited when the factual findings of the court otherwise adequately articulate that the relevant statutory factors were considered” (Rosenkranse v Rosenkranse, 290 AD2d 685, 686 [2002]), the record does not reflect which, if any, of the factors Supreme Court considered in determining that the pension benefit acquired during the marriage and prior to the commencement of this action should be distributed equally between the parties. Nor does the record on appeal provide a basis for informed review permitting us to substitute a discretionary determination for that of Supreme Court inasmuch as the parties failed to establish the present value of the pension, a timetable and manner of distribution to plaintiff, or provision for the payment of taxes on the distribution (see DeSantis v DeSantis, 205 AD2d 928, 929-930 [1994]; cf. Chasin v Chasin, 182 AD2d 862, 864 [1992]). Accordingly, this *766matter must be remitted to Supreme Court for a redistribution of the parties’ marital property. In this regard, we note that “[t]he distribution, based on the factors enumerated in the statute (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]), must be equitable, not merely a 50/50 split of assets” (Sarafian v Sarafian, 140 AD2d 801, 804 [1988]) and Supreme Court should take into consideration such factors as the appropriateness of an offset of support arrears against any award of marital property, defendant’s direct or indirect contribution to the acquisition of the pension and his alleged failure to support the family from early in the marriage (see Bittner v Bittner, 296 AD2d 516, 518 [2002]; Teabout v Teabout, 269 AD2d 719, 720 [2000]; Matwijczuk v Matwijczuk, 261 AD2d 784, 787-788 [1999]).

Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law and the facts, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as distributed the parties’ marital property; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for a redetermination of the equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property; and, as so modified, affirmed.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Robert B. Wiggins, J.

This case presents the issue of the effect that Family Court Act § 451 (3) (a) has on a modification petition filed by a parent who has been incarcerated since entry of the prior support order. I find that the Support Magistrate erred in failing to conduct a hearing to determine whether there was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a modification of petitioner’s support obligation.

L

Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking modification of a support order entered August 19, 2013 requiring him to pay $59 per month for basic child support and managed care for the support of his eight-year-old daughter. As the basis for standing to bring the petition, petitioner alleged that there had “been a substantial change in circumstances in that I am now incarcerated.” He further stated that his support obligation “should be decreased because I am incarcerated.”

On the hearing date, petitioner appeared by phone because he was incarcerated in the Ontario County Jail. Respondent did not appear. Upon petitioner taking the phone, the Support Magistrate introduced himself, indicated that they were “dealing with” his “modification petition, seeking to review your 50 dollar a month order, plus 9 dollars a month toward managed care, based upon the fact that you are currently incarcerated.” Immediately thereafter, without giving petitioner any opportunity to elaborate on his grounds for seeking modification, the Magistrate then said

“Mr. Hunter, I’m going to dismiss your petition, but I’m going to also explain to you why that is the case. Some years ago the New York State Legislature determined that incarceration was not a bar to filing a petition to modify. That is true. However, incarceration is not grounds to modify. Incarceration is a self-imposed hardship, it’s something you did to yourself, and your children are not required to subsidize your bad choices. Whatever you did to get yourself put in jail, again, is something that you did, it’s a choice you made, and it’s not grounds *975to modify. So, unless you have any questions, I am going to dismiss this Petition.”

There was no further discussion of the merits, and the Magistrate issued a summary “Order of Dismissal” that same day indicating that “the petition is dismissed due to no grounds.”

Petitioner filed his objections July 2, 2015, contending that the Magistrate’s determination was contrary to the mandate of Family Court Act § 451 (3) (a).* He further argues that his “incarceration has nothing to do with the non-payment of child-support . . . Therefore, my incarceration should be found to be a substantial change of circumstance and the order should be modified because I am incarcerated and can’t work.” Respondent filed no rebuttal.

IL

Resolution of this case requires analysis of the language of and legislative intent behind Family Court Act § 451 (3) (a), as well as the preexisting case law with respect to the effect of incarceration on a parent’s child support obligation.

Section 451 (3) (a) states that

“[t]he court may modify an order of child support, including an order incorporating without merging an agreement or stipulation of the parties, upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. Incarceration shall not be a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances provided such incarceration is not the result of non-payment of a child support order, or an offense against the custodial parent or child who is the subject of the order or judgment” (emphasis supplied).

The “[incarceration shall not be a bar” language was added in 2010 (see L 2010, ch 182, § 6). Prior to 2010, under the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Knights v Knights (71 NY2d 865 [1988]), and its progeny, where a parent was incarcerated, the resulting “financial hardship” was deemed to be “the result of his own wrongful conduct,” and he was therefore “not entitled to a reduction of his obligation to pay child support” (Matter of Niagara County Dept. of Social Servs. v Hueber, 89 AD3d 1433, 1433 [4th Dept 2011]). On its *976face, the new provision was clearly meant to reverse this rule. Moreover, the legislative history clearly indicates that this was the case as well. The “Assembly Memorandum in Support” of the bill explicitly states that the provision was “intended to address the impact of the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Knights v. Knights, 71 N.Y.2d 865 [(1988)] and thereby clarify that a court may modify an order of child support where a party has been incarcerated” (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 182 at 11). In other words, it was intended to overrule Knights.

III.

Turning then to this case, the Support Magistrate may initially have been technically correct in holding that section 451 (3) (a) does not make incarceration grounds to modify a child support obligation. However, a significant decrease in income can be grounds to modify, and such a decrease is more often than not the natural consequence of incarceration. Family court “pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed” (Matter of Whitaker v Murray, 50 AD3d 1185, 1186 [3d Dept 2008]), the court must “afford the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn therefrom” (Matter of C.H. v F.M., 130 AD3d 1028, 1028 [2d Dept 2015]), and family court “may sua sponte conform the pleadings to the evidence” (Matter of Barton v Barton, 111 AD3d 1348, 1349 [4th Dept 2013]). The reasonable inference to be drawn from petitioner’s allegation that he had been incarcerated since the last order is that, as a result, his income had been substantially reduced as well.

Moreover, after stating that incarceration did not constitute grounds to modify, the Magistrate went on to effectively apply the old Knights rule, thereby implicitly recognizing that petitioner was claiming that his financial circumstances had changed significantly for the worse as a result of his incarceration. As set forth above, however, section 451 (3) (a) was intended to overrule Knights. The Knights rule, succinctly stated, is that incarceration is a bar to a finding of a change in circumstances, because the resulting “financial hardship is the result of [petitioner’s] own wrongful conduct” (Hueber, 89 AD3d at 1433). Section 451 (3) (a) — in clear contravention to this prior rule — explicitly declares that such incarceration “shall not be a bar to finding a substantial change in circumstances” (emphasis supplied). Thus, the Magistrate erred in holding *977that petitioner’s incarceration could not constitute a change in circumstance because it was a self-imposed hardship. This was the old rule, and it was reversed by the enactment of section 451 (3) (a). Indeed, to hold that the old Knights rule continues to apply would be to completely eviscerate section 451 (3) (a) and render it utterly meaningless. If the Knights rule continued to be viable, and financial hardship as a result of incarceration were still deemed not to constitute a substantial change in circumstance, then when would incarceration ever not effectively serve as a bar to a modification petition? This, again, is contrary to both the language and legislative intent behind section 451 (3) (a).

While no reported cases have yet applied section 451 (3) (a), the only appellate decision to consider its potential impact supports the court’s conclusion as well. In Matter of Baltes v Smith (111 AD3d 1072 [3d Dept 2013]), the Support Magistrate applied the then recently enacted section 451 (3) (a) and granted an incarcerated father’s petition for a reduction of his support obligation. Family Court reversed, but only because the new provision applied prospectively only to petitions seeking modification of orders entered after October 13, 2010 — the effective date of the statute. The Third Department affirmed, concluding that, because the newly enacted section 451 (3) (a) was not applicable, the old Knights rule applied, and barred the incarcerated father’s claim of a change in circumstances. However, it referred to the Knights rule as “pre-amendment precedent” — implying that, in future, posi-amendment cases, the opposite result would hold.

Finally, none of the cases relied upon by the Support Magistrate in prior, similar modification petitions that he has denied supports the determination, because amended Family Court Act § 451 (a) (3) was not applicable in any of those cases. In Reback v Reback (93 AD3d 652 [2d Dept 2012]) the order sought to be modified was entered prior to the effective date of the amendment to Family Court Act § 451. The enabling legislation makes clear that the amended section 451 applies only to petitions seeking modification of orders entered after the effective date of the legislation (see Baltes, 111 AD3d at 1073, quoting L 2010, ch 182, § 13). In Matter of Niagara County Dept. of Social Servs. v Hueber (89 AD3d 1440 [4th Dept 2011]) the order at issue was not a modification, but an initial support order. As explained in Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. (Donna M.W.) v Jessica M.D. (31 Misc 3d 490, *978492-493 [Fam Ct, Franklin County 2011]), the amended section 451 applies only to modification petitions, not original applications for support. In Marcera v Marcera (87 AD3d 1276 [4th Dept 2011]), both were true — the order was entered prior to the effective date of the statute, and it was an original support order. Thus, in all of those cases, the amended section 451 was not applicable, and the Courts therefore properly applied the pre-amendment Knights rule.

IV

The court understands the Magistrate’s reluctance to allow incarceration to effectively serve as grounds for a finding of a change in circumstances. Indeed, this may often lead to absurd results. Say, for example, that a person engages in non-criminal misconduct at work, and is fired as a result. That misconduct may well serve as the basis for a finding that the loss of employment was a self-imposed hardship, barring a finding of a change in circumstance. If another person, on the other hand, commits a criminal violation at work and loses his employment as a result of his subsequent incarceration, that incarceration would not be a bar to a modification petition — a seemingly incongruous result. However, this court’s job is not to assess the wisdom of legislation, but to apply the law as written and intended by the legislature.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the Magistrate erred in applying the old Knights rule as a bar to the petition and dismissing the petition without a hearing to determine whether there has, in fact, been a significant diminution in income or other change of circumstances warranting a reduction in petitioner’s child support obligation. Therefore, the objections are sustained, and the matter is remitted to the Magistrate.