1 Class 1 - And so we begin - August 24 1 Class 1 - And so we begin - August 24
1.1 Contracting - How will we work together 1.1 Contracting - How will we work together
What promises do we make to each other?
Who are you? Who am I?
What do we already know about this topic?
what do you need in order to feel safe?
1.1.1. The Meaning of Dignity - Donna Hicks (video)
What is the difference between Dignity and Respect?
1.1.2 Excerpts from Dignity by Donna Hicks, PhD 1.1.2 Excerpts from Dignity by Donna Hicks, PhD
Ten Essential Elements and Ten Temptations to Violate Dignity
Essential Elements of Dignity
(What we should extend to others and would like for ourselves)
· Acceptance of Identity- Approach people as neither inferior nor superior to you; give others the freedom to express their authentic selves without fear of being negatively judged; interact without prejudice or bias, accepting how race, religion, gender, class, sexual orientation, age, disability, etc. are at core of their identities. Assume they have integrity.
· Recognition- Validate others for their talents, hard work, thoughtfulness, and help; be generous with praise; give credit to others for their contributions, ideas and experience.
· Acknowledgement- Give people your full attention by listening, hearing, validating and responding to their concerns and what they have been through.
· Inclusion-Make others feel that they belong at all levels of relationship (family, community, organization, nation).
· Safety- Put people at ease at two levels: physically, where they feel free of bodily harm; and psychologically, where they feel free of concern about being shamed or humiliated, that they feel free to speak without fear of retribution.
· Fairness- Treat people justly, with equality, and in an evenhanded way, according to agreed upon laws and rules.
· Independence- Empower people to act on their own behalf so that they feel in control of their lives and experience a sense of hope and possibility.
· Understanding- Believe what others think matters; give them the chance to explain their perspectives, express their points of view; actively listen in order to understand them.
· Benefit of the Doubt- Treat people as trustworthy; start with the premise that others have good motives and are acting with integrity.
· Accountability- Take responsibility for your actions; if you have violated the dignity of another, apologize; make a commitment to change hurtful behaviors.
The Ten Temptations to Violate Dignity
1. Taking the Bait. Don’t take the bait. Don’t let the bad behavior of others determine your own. Restraint is the better part of dignity. Don’t justify getting even. Do not do unto others as they do unto you if it will cause harm.
2. Saving Face. Don’t succumb to the temptation to save face. Don’t lie, cover up, or deceive yourself. Tell the truth about what you have done.
3. Shirking Responsibility. Don’t shirk responsibility when you have violated the dignity of others. Admit it when you make a mistake, and apologize if you hurt someone.
4. Seeking False Dignity. Beware of the desire for external recognition in the form of approval and praise. If we depend on others alone for the validation of our worth, we are seeking false dignity. Authentic dignity resides within us. Don’t be lured by false dignity.
5. Seeking False Security. Don’t let your need for connections compromise your dignity. If we remain in a relationship in which our dignity is routinely violated, our desire for connection has outweighed our need to maintain dignity.
6. Avoiding Conflict. Stand up for yourself. Don’t avoid confrontation when your dignity is violated. Take action. A violation is a signal that something in a relationship needs to change.
7. Being the Victim. Don’t assume that you are the innocent victim in a troubled relationship. Open yourself to the idea that you might be contributing to the problem. We need to look at ourselves as others see us.
8. Resisting Feedback. Don’t resist feedback from others. We often don’t know what we don’t know. We all have blind-spots; we all unconsciously behave in undignified ways. We need to overcome our self-protective instincts and accept constructive criticism. Feedback gives us an opportunity to grow.
9. Blaming and Shaming Others to Deflect Your Own Guilt. Don’t blame and shame others to deflect your guilt. Control the urge to defend yourself by making others look bad.
10. Engaging in False Intimacy and Demeaning Gossip. Beware of the tendency to connect by gossiping about others in a demeaning way. Being critical and judgmental about others when they are not present is harmful and undignified. If you want to create intimacy with another, speak the truth about yourself, about what is happening in your inner world, and invite the other person to do the same.
Donna Hicks, Ph.D., is an Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. She is the author of "Dignity: The Essential Role It Plays In Resolving Conflict" (Yale University Press). Copyright © 2011 by Donna Hicks. dhicks@wcfia.harvard.ed
Donna Hicks
Weatherland Center for the International Affairs
Harvard University
Copyright 2011 Donna Hicks
1.1.3. How to Honor Dignity by Donna Hicks, PhD
Excerpt from Leading With Dignity
1.1.4. How to Avoid Violating Dignity - by Donna Hicks
Excerpt from Leading with Dignity
1.2 Agreements vs Deals 1.2 Agreements vs Deals
1.2.1. Contracts and Deals - The Plan B Family (video)
By Professor Martha Ertman, author of Love's Promises: How Formal and Informal Contracts Shape All Kinds of Families
1.2.2 Provisions re: Marital Agreements 1.2.2 Provisions re: Marital Agreements
DRL § 236-B (3), (4), GOL § 303-3, § 5-311, sample acknowledgment
AGREEMENTS
McKinney’s DRL § 236 Special controlling provisions; prior actions or proceedings; new actions or proceedings PART B -NEW ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS
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3. Agreement of the parties. An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if
- such agreement is in writing,
- subscribed by the parties, and
- acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an acknowledgment of an agreement made before marriage may be executed before any person authorized to solemnize a marriage pursuant to subdivisions one, two and three of section eleven of this chapter. Such an agreement may include
(1) a contract to make a testamentary provision of any kind, or a waiver of any right to elect against the provisions of a will;
(2) provision for the ownership, division or distribution of separate and marital property;
(3) provision for the amount and duration of maintenance or other terms and conditions of the marriage relationship, subject to the provisions of section 5-311 of the general obligations law, and provided that such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of entry of final judgment; and
(4) provision for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any child of the parties, subject to the provisions of section two hundred forty of this article.
4. Compulsory financial disclosure.
a. In all matrimonial actions and proceedings in which alimony, maintenance or support is in issue, there shall be compulsory disclosure by both parties of their respective financial states. No showing of special circumstances shall be required before such disclosure is ordered. ....
McKinney's General Obligations Law § 3-303. Contracts in contemplation of marriage
A contract made between persons in contemplation of marriage, remains in full force after the marriage takes place.
McKinney's General Obligations Law § 5-311. Certain agreements between husband and wife void
Except as provided in section two hundred thirty-six of the domestic relations law, a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of his or her liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and therefore is likely to become a public charge. An agreement, heretofore or hereafter made between a husband and wife, shall not be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage or provides for the procurement of grounds of divorce
Sample Acknowledgement Language:
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ARTICLE XVIII
EXECUTION
This Agreement may be executed simultaneously in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and seals the day and year first above written to four counterparts hereof, each of which shall constitute an original.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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On the _____ day of _____________________, 20___, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said state, personally appeared _______________________, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she or he executed the same in her or his capacity, and that by her or his signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of which the individual acted, executed the instrument.
1.2.3 DRL §§ 10, 10-a, 10b 1.2.3 DRL §§ 10, 10-a, 10b
Marriage is a Civil Contract
1.3 Which Court Handles Which Types of Action? 1.3 Which Court Handles Which Types of Action?
1.3.1 Scheinkman Section 1.3 1.3.1 Scheinkman Section 1.3
Preliminary considerations—Subject-matter jurisdiction
11 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Domestic Relations § 1:3
New York Practice Series - New York Law of Domestic Relations
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July 2020 Update
Chapter 1. An Overview of the Divorce Process: Divorce and Separation
Alan D. Scheinkman
§ 1:3. Preliminary considerations—Subject-matter jurisdiction
In New York, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for divorce and separation.1 In addition, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over issues ancillary to the divorce or separation action, such as spousal maintenance and child custody and support.2 In actions for divorce but not in actions for judicial separation, the Supreme Court also has jurisdiction over equitable distribution of marital property.3
The Supreme Court and the Family Court have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order of protection or temporary order of protection. However, the Supreme Court may order that the protection order may be enforced or modified in the Supreme Court only.4
The Family Court has jurisdiction to issue orders of protection, either in a family offense proceeding or in proceedings governing juvenile delinquency, support, paternity, custody, persons in need of supervision, and child protection.5
The Supreme Court may not on its own motion consolidate actions or make, vacate, or modify orders of protection issued in Family Court involving the same parties, except upon motion and with notice to the nonmoving party who shall be given the opportunity to be heard.6
The Family Court also has jurisdiction to determine applications to fix child custody and temporary or permanent support, or a distribution of marital property if the Supreme Court refers such matters to the Family Court.7 Even in the absence of a referral, if there is no Supreme Court order granting temporary or permanent support or maintenance, the Family Court may entertain a petition and make an order of support for a spouse who is likely to become in need of public assistance or care.8 If the Supreme Court denies support to a spouse in an action for separation and there has been a final adjudication of that action, the Family Court may entertain a petition and order support for that spouse if the circumstances of the parties have changed or the petitioner is shown to be likely to become in need of public assistance or care.9
§ 1:3.Preliminary considerations—Subject-matter jurisdiction, 11 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Domestic Relations § 1:3
1.3.2 FCA § 115 1.3.2 FCA § 115
§ 115. Jurisdiction of family court
(a) The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
(i) abuse and neglect proceedings, as set forth in article ten;
(ii) support proceedings, as set forth in article four;
(iii) proceedings to determine paternity and for the support of children born out-of-wedlock, as set forth in article five;
(iv) proceedings to permanently terminate parental rights to guardianship and custody of a child:
(A) by reason of permanent neglect, as set forth in part one of article six of this act and paragraph (d) of subdivision four of section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law, (
B) by reason of mental illness, intellectual disability and severe or repeated child abuse, as set forth in paragraphs (c) and (e) of subdivision four of section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law, and
(C) by reason of the death of one or both parents, where no guardian of the person of the child has been lawfully appointed, or by reason of abandonment of the child for a period of six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition, where a child is under the jurisdiction of the family court as a result of a placement in foster care by the family court pursuant to article ten or ten-A of this act or section three hundred fifty-eight-a of the social services law, unless the court declines jurisdiction pursuant to section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law;
(v) proceedings concerning whether a person is in need of supervision, as set forth in article seven; and
(vi) proceedings concerning juvenile delinquency as set forth in article three.
(b) The family court has such other jurisdiction as is set forth in this act, including jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings and over applications for support, maintenance, a distribution of marital property and custody in matrimonial actions when referred to the family court by the supreme court, conciliation proceedings, and proceedings concerning physically handicapped and mentally defective or retarded children.
(c) The family court has such other jurisdiction as is provided by law, including but not limited to: proceedings concerning adoption and custody of children, as set forth in parts two and three of article six of this act; proceedings concerning the uniform interstate family support act, as set forth in article five-B of this act; proceedings concerning children in foster care and care and custody of children, as set forth in sections three hundred fifty-eight-a and three hundred eighty-four-a of the social services law and article ten-A of this act; proceedings concerning former foster children as set forth in article ten-B of this act; proceedings concerning destitute children, as set forth in article ten-C of this act; proceedings concerning guardianship and custody of children by reason of the death of, or abandonment or surrender by, the parent or parents, as set forth in sections three hundred eighty-three-c, three hundred eighty-four and paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision four of section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law; proceedings concerning standby guardianship and guardianship of the person as set forth in part four of article six of this act and article seventeen of the surrogate's court procedure act; and proceedings concerning the interstate compact on juveniles as set forth in chapter one hundred fifty-five of the laws of nineteen hundred fifty-five, as amended, the interstate compact on the placement of children, as set forth in section three hundred seventy-four-a of the social services law, and the uniform child custody jurisdiction and enforcement act, as set forth in article five-A of the domestic relations law.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) through (c) of this section, jurisdiction of the family court and tribal courts of Indian tribes designated by the Secretary of the Interior over those child custody proceedings provided for in articles three, seven, ten and ten-A of this act and sections three hundred fifty-eight-a and three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law involving Indian children as defined in subdivision thirty-six of section two of the social services law shall be subject to the terms and conditions set forth in applicable sections of title twenty-five of the United States code;1 provided that tribal courts of Indian tribes designated as such by the state of New York shall have jurisdiction over such child custody proceedings involving Indian children to the same extent as federally designated Indian tribes upon the approval of the state office of children and family services pursuant to section thirty-nine of the social services law.
(e) The family court has concurrent jurisdiction with the criminal court over all family offenses as defined in article eight of this act.
(f) The family court has jurisdiction to direct the commencement of proceedings to suspend the driving privileges, recreational licenses and permits, and license, permit, registration or authority to practice of persons who are delinquent in their child or combined child and spousal support obligations or persons who have failed, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with summonses, subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity and child support proceedings as set forth in sections four hundred fifty-eight-a, four hundred fifty-eight-b, four hundred fifty-eight-c, five hundred forty-eight-a, five hundred forty-eight-b, and five2 forty-eight-c of this act. Such jurisdiction shall include jurisdiction over all boards, departments, authorities or offices of the state for the purposes of implementing such section.
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 115 (McKinney)
1.4 Prenuptial Agreements 1.4 Prenuptial Agreements
1.4.1 Prenuptial Agreements 1.4.1 Prenuptial Agreements
mediate!
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
DRL § 236(B)
3. Agreement of the parties.
An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is
· in writing,
· subscribed by the parties, and
· acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an acknowledgment of an agreement made before marriage may be executed before any person authorized to solemnize a marriage …. Such an agreement may include
(1) a contract to make a testamentary provision of any kind, or a waiver of any right to elect against the provisions of a will;
(2) provision for the ownership, division or distribution of separate and marital property;
(3) provision for the amount and duration of maintenance or other terms and conditions of the marriage relationship, subject to the provisions of section 5-311 of the general obligations law, and provided that such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of entry of final judgment; and
(4) provision for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any child of the parties…. Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to affect the validity of any agreement made prior to the effective date of this subdivision.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 (McKinney)
§ 5-311. Certain agreements between husband and wife void
Except as provided in section two hundred thirty-six of the domestic relations law, a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of his or her liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and therefore is likely to become a public charge. An agreement, heretofore or hereafter made between a husband and wife, shall not be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage or provides for the procurement of grounds of divorce.
§ 6:1. Generally; statutory authority
An antenuptial agreement—also known as a premarital agreement—is a contract1 entered into by persons about to be married who wish to settle issues primarily relating to ownership and distribution of property in the event the relationship is terminated as a result of death or the failure of the marriage.2 The premarital agreement may also be used to resolve such concerns as support and custody. DRL § 236, Part B(3),3 authorizing antenuptial agreements, is reflective of a strong public policy in favor of individuals reaching their own decisions in resolving family concerns.4 There are two kinds of prenuptial agreements: in the first, the parties waive or opt out of the statutory scheme governing equitable distribution of property; in the second, the parties designate particular assets as marital or separate, defining the treatment of those specific assets in a later marital dissolution case.5 In the instance of the latter type of agreement, the parties could, for example, designate what otherwise be marital property as separate. In Avitzur v. Avitzur,6 the Court of Appeals stated that there “can be little doubt that a duly executed antenuptial agreement, by which the parties agree in advance of the marriage to the resolution of disputes that may arise after its termination, is valid and enforceable.”7 The Court of Appeals has repeatedly noted the “strong public policy in favor of individuals resolving their own family disputes.”8 The general judicial policy to encourage the private resolution of disputes extends to “marriage” agreements by which the parties agree in advance or during the marriage to the resolution of disputes that may arise after its termination.9
§ 6:2. Formalities of the agreement
In order for an antenuptial agreement to be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action, it must be in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.1 … The court held that there are two aspects to an acknowledgment: the oral declaration of the signer of the document and the written certificate, generally prepared by a notary public. As long as both elements are present, the acknowledgement will be upheld. Further, the court rejected an effort to set aside the agreement on the basis of minor discrepancies in the date on which the agreement was executed.
§ 6:2.Formalities of the agreement, 11 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Domestic Relations § 6:2
§ 6:4. Formalities of the agreement—Oral agreements
… an agreement made in consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry, is void unless some note or memorandum is in writing and signed by the party to be charged.1 Under this provision, as well as under 236, an oral antenuptial agreement is void
§ 6:4.Formalities of the agreement—Oral agreements, 11 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Domestic Relations § 6:4
1.4.2 Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis 1.4.2 Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis
Elizabeth Cioffi-Petrakis, Respondent, v Panagiotis Petrakis, Appellant.
[960 NYS2d 152]—
In an action, inter alia, to set aside a prenuptial agreement, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a *767judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bennett, J.), entered February 6, 2012, as, upon a decision of the same court (Falanga, J.), dated December 12, 2011, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him setting aside the prenuptial agreement.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In general, New York has a “strong public policy favoring individuals ordering and deciding their own interests through contractual arrangements” (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d 341, 344 [1998]; see Bloomfield v Bloomfield, 97 NY2d 188, 193 [2001]). “However, this right is not and has never been without limitation” (Kessler v Kessler, 33 AD3d 42, 45 [2006]). “[T]he State is deeply concerned with marriage and takes a supervisory role in matrimonial proceedings. . . . Indeed, in numerous contexts, agreements addressing matrimonial issues have been subjected to limitations and scrutiny beyond that afforded contracts in general” (id. at 46 [citation omitted]). Thus, while “there is a heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifests the true intention of the parties” (Brassey v Brassey, 154 AD2d 293, 295 [1989]), an agreement between spouses or prospective spouses may be invalidated if the party challenging the agreement demonstrates that it was the product of fraud, duress, or other inequitable conduct (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977]; Petracca v Petracca, 101 AD3d 695 [2012]; Weinstein v Weinstein, 36 AD3d 797, 798 [2007]; Lombardi v Lombardi, 235 AD2d 400 [1997]).
“In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact following a nonjury trial, this Court’s authority is as broad as that of the trial court and includes the power to render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that due regard must be given to the decision of a trial judge who was in the position to assess the evidence and the credibility of witnesses” (D’Argenio v Ashland Bldg., LLC, 78 AD3d 758, 758 [2010]).
Here, the Supreme Court reasonably resolved credibility issues in favor of the plaintiff, and its determination that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff to execute the prenuptial agreement was supported by the evidence. With respect to the material facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs testimony was “credible,” “convincing,” “unequivocal,” and consistent with “additional corroborative evidence,” and that any “inconsistencies” in her testimony related to “insignificant” matters. By contrast, the Supreme Court found the defendant’s “credibility to be suspect,” due in part, to his “patent evasiveness.” The Supreme *768Court’s credibility findings are supported by the record. The plaintiffs claim in this case rested largely on the credibility of the parties, and we decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination with respect thereto (see Reid v Reid, 57 AD3d 960 [2008]). On the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiff sustained her burden of establishing grounds to set aside the prenuptial agreement (cf. Petracca v Petracca, 101 AD3d at 695).
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Angiolillo, J.P., Sgroi, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.
1.4.3 Petracca v. Petracca 1.4.3 Petracca v. Petracca
Janine Petracca, Respondent, v Eugene Petracca, Appellant.
[956 NYS2d 77]
The parties were married on December 16, 1995. In March 1996, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement. The agreement provided that the jointly owned marital residence, which had been purchased for approximately $3.1 million after the parties were married, and which was subsequently renovated *696at a cost of between $3 million and $5 million, was the defendant’s separate property.
The agreement further provided that if the parties divorced, the plaintiff, who had not been employed other than as a homemaker since October 1995, would waive her interest in any business in which the defendant had an interest, including any appreciation in the value of such interests accruing during the marriage. At the time the agreement was entered into, the defendant valued his interests in these business entities at over $10 million. The plaintiff also waived any and all rights she had to the defendant’s estate, including her right to an elective share. At the time the agreement was entered into, the defendant valued his net worth at more than $22 million.
Finally, the agreement provided that if the parties divorced, the plaintiff would waive any right to maintenance except as provided in schedule “C” of the agreement, which indicated that the plaintiff could receive maintenance in the sum of between $24,000 and $36,000 per year, for varying lengths of time, depending on the duration of the marriage. The defendant’s obligation to pay the limited maintenance enumerated in the agreement was contingent upon his receipt of certain visitation with any children that the parties might have, and upon certain residency requirements imposed upon the plaintiff.
In 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment. In his answer, the defendant, among other things, sought enforcement of the postnuptial agreement. The defendant subsequently moved for a protective order in response to the plaintiff’s discovery demands, and the plaintiff cross-moved to set aside the postnuptial agreement.
A hearing was held at which both parties testified. The plaintiff testified that the defendant had presented the postnuptial agreement to her for signature days after her 42nd birthday, and shortly after she had suffered a miscarriage. She testified that the defendant had “bullied” her into signing the agreement by threatening that they would not have any children and that the marriage would be over if she did not consent to the postnuptial agreement. The plaintiff testified that she and the defendant had agreed to have children prior to the marriage, and that their agreement to have children had been an important factor in her decision to marry him. She signed the agreement within days of receiving it and, although she reviewed some portions of it, she did not understand its terms and did not consult an attorney. The plaintiff also adduced evidence demonstrating that the statement of the defendant’s net *697worth contained in the agreement was inaccurate at the time it was made in that it was undervalued by at least $11 million.
When the defendant testified, he denied any knowledge of the plaintiffs miscarriage and stated that he had wanted the post-nuptial agreement in order to protect his son from a prior marriage. The defendant testified that the parties had discussed the issue of entering into a postnuptial agreement prior to the marriage and that they had negotiated the postnuptial agreement over the course of many weeks. The defendant testified that his attorney had drafted the agreement and that he believed that the plaintiff had consulted with her own attorney, although she had not disclosed her attorney’s name to him. The defendant explained that the marital residence had been purchased in both parties’ names because the plaintiff said she wanted to have her name on it “for perception purposes, for other people,” but that she had been willing to sign the agreement converting it into the defendant’s separate property shortly after its purchase.
In a decision made after the hearing, the Supreme Court expressed doubts as to the defendant’s veracity and credited the plaintiffs testimony over conflicting portions of the defendant’s testimony. The court found that the plaintiff had not been represented by counsel and had been precluded from effectively-analyzing the financial impact of the postnuptial agreement due to the inaccuracies contained in the financial disclosures that had been incorporated into the agreement. The court determined that the terms of the agreement were “wholly unfair” and, after examining the totality of the circumstances, concluded that it was unenforceable. In a subsequent order, made upon the decision, the court granted the plaintiffs cross motion to set aside the postnuptial agreement.
In general, a postnuptial agreement “which is regular on its face will be recognized and enforced by the courts in much the same manner as an ordinary contract” (Levine v Levine, 56 NY2d 42, 47 [1982]; see Rauso v Rauso, 73 AD3d 888, 889 [2010]; Cioffi-Petrakis v Petrakis, 72 AD3d 868, 869 [2010]; Whitmore v Whitmore, 8 AD3d 371, 372 [2004]). However, “[agreements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring the utmost of good faith” (Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 72 [1977]; see Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d 341, 345 [1998]; O'Malley v O'Malley, 41 AD3d 449, 451 [2007]; Manes v Manes, 277 AD2d 359, 361 [2000]). Accordingly, “courts have thrown their cloak of protection” over postnuptial agreements, “and made it their business, when confronted, to see to it that they are arrived at *698fairly and equitably, in a manner so as to be free from the taint of fraud and duress, and to set aside or refuse to enforce those born of and subsisting in inequity” (Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d at 72; see Infante v Infante, 76 AD3d 1048, 1049 [2010]).
Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, post-nuptial agreements “are closely scrutinized by the courts, and such agreements are more readily set aside in equity under circumstances that would be insufficient to nullify an ordinary contract” (Levine v Levine, 56 NY2d at 47; see Kabir v Kabir, 85 AD3d 1127, 1127 [2011]; Manes v Manes, 277 AD2d at 361; Cardinal v Cardinal, 275 AD2d 756, 757 [2000]). “To warrant equity’s intervention, no actual fraud need be shown, for relief will be granted if the [agreement] is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other’s overreaching” (Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d at 72-73; see Infante v Infante, 76 AD3d at 1049; OMalley v OMalley, 41 AD3d at 451; Frank v Frank, 260 AD2d 344, 345 [1999]; see also Levine v Levine, 56 NY2d at 47).
In determining whether a postnuptial agreement is invalid, “courts may look at the terms of the agreement to see if there is an inference, or even a negative inference, of overreaching in its execution” (Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d at 73; see Terio v Terio, 150 AD2d 675, 675-676 [1989]; Stern v Stern, 63 AD2d 700, 700-701 [1978]). A spouse seeking to set aside a postnuptial agreement initially “bears the burden to establish a fact-based, particularized inequality” (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d at 346; see Matter of Barabash, 84 AD3d 1363, 1364 [2011]; D’Elia v D’Elia, 14 AD3d 477, 478-479 [2005]; accord Brennan-Duffy v Duffy, 22 AD3d 699, 700 [2005]; Chambers v McIntyre, 5 AD3d 344, 345 [2004]). Where this initial burden is satisfied, a proponent of a postnuptial agreement “suffers the shift in burden to disprove fraud or overreaching” (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d at 346; see Matter of Barabash, 84 AD3d at 1364; D’Elia v D’Elia, 14 AD3d at 478-479).
Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that the terms of the post-nuptial agreement were manifestly unfair given the nature and magnitude of the rights she waived, particularly the relinquishment of her property rights in the marital residence and her waiver of all of her inheritance rights, in light of the vast disparity in the parties’ net worth and earnings (see Manes v Manes, 277 AD2d at 361; Frank v Frank, 260 AD2d at 345; Terio v Terio, 150 AD2d at 675-676; Stern v Stern, 63 AD2d at 700-701; see also O’Malley v O’Malley, 41 AD3d at 451; Pisano v Pisano, 71 AD2d 670, 670 [1979]; cf. Levine v Levine, 56 NY2d at 47). Furthermore, inasmuch as the terms of the agreement were manifestly unfair to the plaintiff and were unfair when the *699agreement was executed, they give rise to an inference of overreaching (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d at 73; Terio v Terio, 150 AD2d at 675-676; Stern v Stern, 63 AD2d at 700-701). This inference of overreaching is bolstered by the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, including her testimony, regarding the circumstances which led her to give her assent to the post-nuptial agreement (see Kabir v Kabir, 85 AD3d at 1127; Cardinal v Cardinal, 275 AD2d at 757; Terio v Terio, 150 AD2d at 675-676). The defendant’s testimony which tended to show that he did not engage in overreaching raised an issue of credibility, and we decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination with respect thereto (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492 [1983]; Reid v Reid, 57 AD3d 960 [2008]).
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs cross motion to set aside the parties’ postnuptial agreement. Eng, P.J., Florio, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.