144 S.Ct. 1812

Supreme Court of the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE v. MUÑOZ

|

Decided June 21, 2024

Opinion

Justice BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.

Luis Asencio-Cordero seeks to enter the United States to live with Sandra Muñoz, his wife. To obtain the necessary visa, he submitted an application at the United States consulate in San Salvador. A consular officer denied his application, however, after finding that Asencio-Cordero is affiliated with MS–13, a transnational criminal gang. Because of national security concerns, the consular officer did not disclose the basis for his decision. And because Asencio-Cordero, as a noncitizen, has no constitutional right to enter the United States, he cannot elicit that information or challenge the denial of his visa.

Muñoz, on the other hand, is a citizen, and she filed her own challenge to the consular officer's decision. She reasons as follows: The right to live with her noncitizen spouse in the United States is implicit in the “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment; the denial of her husband's visa deprived her of this interest, thereby triggering her right to due process; the consular officer violated her right to due process by declining to disclose the basis for finding Asencio-Cordero inadmissible; and this, in turn, enables judicial review, even though visa denials are ordinarily unreviewable by courts.

Muñoz's argument fails at the threshold. Her argument is built on the premise that the right to bring her noncitizen spouse to the United States is an unenumerated constitutional right. To establish this premise, she must show that the asserted right is “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). She cannot make that showing. In fact, Congress's longstanding regulation of spousal immigration—including through bars on admissibility—cuts the other way.

I

A

To be admitted to the United States, a noncitizen typically needs a visa. 66 Stat. 181, 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a). Visa decisions are made by the political branches. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702–703, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018); see also Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 29 S.Ct. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909) (explaining that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete”). As a general matter, Congress sets the terms for entry, and the Department of State implements those requirements at United States Embassies and consulates in foreign countries.¹

Congress has streamlined the visa process for noncitizens with immediate relatives in the United States. The citizen-relative must first file a petition with U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency housed within the Department of Homeland Security, to have the noncitizen classified as an immediate relative. If USCIS approves the petition, then the noncitizen may apply for a visa. As part of this process, the noncitizen submits written materials and interviews with a consular officer abroad. 

Ordinarily, a consular officer who denies a visa application “because the officer determines the alien to be inadmissible” must “provide the alien with a timely written notice that ... (A) states the determination, and (B) lists the specific provision or provisions of law under which the alien is inadmissible.” § 1182(b)(1). The statute requires no explanation, however, “to any alien inadmissible” on certain grounds related to crime and national security. § 1182(b)(3). This case involves a noncitizen to whom this statutory exception applies.

B

Sandra Muñoz, an American citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, a Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. Several years later, the couple began taking steps to obtain an immigrant visa for Asencio-Cordero. Muñoz filed a petition to classify her husband as an immediate relative, which USCIS granted. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(1)(A). Because Asencio-Cordero had entered the United States unlawfully, he was required to return to El Salvador and submit his visa application at a consulate there. See §§ 1154(b), 1202; 22 C.F.R. § 42. He met with a consular officer in San Salvador and underwent several interviews. 

In December 2015, the officer denied Asencio-Cordero's application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) [INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii). That provision renders inadmissible a noncitizen whom the officer “knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in” certain specified offenses or “any other unlawful activity.” Ibid. The officer provided no additional details—but, given the reason for the visa denial, even the statutory citation was more information than Asencio-Cordero was entitled to receive. § 1182(b)(3).

Asencio-Cordero guessed (as it turns out, accurately) that he was denied a visa based on a finding that he was a member of MS–13, a transnational criminal gang. He also guessed (again, accurately) that this finding was based at least in part on the conclusion that his tattoos signified gang membership. Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz denied that Asencio-Cordero was affiliated with MS–13 or any other gang, and they pressed the consulate to reconsider the officer's finding. When the consulate held firm, they appealed to the Department of State, submitting evidence that the tattoos were innocent. A Department official informed Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz that the Department agreed with the consulate's determination. The next day, the consul in San Salvador notified them that Asencio-Cordero's application had gone through multiple rounds of review—including by the consular officer, consular supervisors, the consul himself, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the State Department's Immigration Visa Unit—and none of these reviews had “ ‘revealed any grounds to change the finding of inadmissibilty.’ ”

Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz sued the Department of State, the Secretary of State, and the United States consul in San Salvador. They alleged, among other things, that the State Department had abridged Muñoz’s constitutional liberty interest in her husband's visa application by failing to give a sufficient reason why Asencio-Cordero is inadmissible under the “unlawful activity” bar.

The District Court agreed and ordered discovery. In a sworn declaration, an attorney adviser from the State Department explained that Asencio-Cordero was deemed inadmissible because he belonged to MS–13. The finding was “based on the in-person interview, a criminal review of ... Asencio[-]Cordero, and a review of [his] tattoos.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 124a. In addition to the affidavit, the State Department provided the District Court with confidential law enforcement information, which it reviewed in camera, identifying Ascencio-Cordero as a member of MS–13. Satisfied, the District Court granted summary judgment to the State Department.

The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Consistent with circuit precedent, it held that Muñoz, as a citizen, had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her husband's visa application. Because of that interest, the Ninth Circuit said, the Due Process Clause required the State Department to give Muñoz a “ ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ ” for denying her husband's visa. 50 F.4th 906, 916 (2022) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766–770, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972)). The initial statutory citation did not qualify, 50 F.4th at 917–918, and the later affidavit was untimely, id., at 921–922. Delay carried a serious consequence for the State Department. Visa denials are insulated from judicial review by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. But the Ninth Circuit held that by declining to give Muñoz more information earlier in the process, the State Department had forfeited its entitlement “to shield its visa decision from judicial review.” Id., at 924. The panel remanded for the District Court to consider the merits of Muñoz's suit, which include a request for a declaration invalidating the finding that Asencio-Cordero is inadmissible and an order demanding that the State Department readjudicate Asencio-Cordero's application.²

II

“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.’ ” Trump, 585 U.S., at 702, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977)). Congress may delegate to executive officials the discretionary authority to admit noncitizens “immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–591, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952). When it does so, the action of an executive officer “to admit or to exclude an alien” “is final and conclusive.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950); see also Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138–139, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020); Mandel, 408 U.S., at 765–766, 92 S.Ct. 2576; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). The Judicial Branch has no role to play “unless expressly authorized by law.” Knauff, 338 U.S., at 543, 70 S.Ct. 309. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not authorize judicial review of a consular officer's denial of a visa; thus, as a rule, the federal courts cannot review those decisions.⁴ This principle is known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

We have assumed that a narrow exception to this bar exists “when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U. S. citizen.” Trump, 585 U.S., at 703, 138 S.Ct. 2392. In that event, the Court has considered whether the Executive gave a “‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’” for denying the visa. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 103–104, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 192 L.Ed.2d 183 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S., at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576). If so, the inquiry is at an end—the Court has disclaimed the authority to “‘look behind the exercise of that discretion,’” much less to balance the reason given against the asserted constitutional right. Din, 576 U.S., at 104, 135 S.Ct. 2128.

 Asencio-Cordero cannot invoke the exception himself, because he has no “constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.” Mandel, 408 U.S., at 762, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Thus, so far as Asencio-Cordero is concerned, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies. Muñoz, however, is an American citizen, and she asserts that the denial of her husband's visa violated her constitutional rights, thereby enabling judicial review. Specifically, she argues that the State Department abridged her fundamental right to live with her spouse in her country of citizenship—and that it did so without affording her the fair procedure guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

[W]e hold that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.

III

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to provide due process of law before it deprives someone of “life, liberty, or property.” Under our precedent, the Clause promises more than fair process: It also “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258. When a fundamental right is at stake, the Government can act only by narrowly tailored means that serve a compelling state interest. Id., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258. Identifying unenumerated rights carries a serious risk of judicial overreach, so this Court “exercise[s] the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” Id., at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, Glucksberg’s two-step inquiry disciplines the substantive due process analysis. First, it insists on a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, it stresses that “the Due Process Clause specially protects” only “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.” Id., at 720–721, 117 S.Ct. 2258.

We start with a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258. Muñoz invokes the “fundamental right of marriage,” but the State Department does not deny that Muñoz (who is already married) has a fundamental right to marriage. Muñoz claims something distinct: the right to reside with her noncitizen spouse in the United States. That involves more than marriage and more than spousal cohabitation—it includes the right to have her noncitizen husband enter (and remain in) the United States.

It is difficult to pin down the nature of the right Muñoz claims. The logic of her position suggests an entitlement to bring Asencio-Cordero to the United States—how else could Muñoz enjoy the asserted right to live with her noncitizen husband in her country of citizenship? Yet Muñoz disclaims that characterization, insisting that “[she] does not advance a substantive right to immigrate one's spouse.” This concession is wise, because such a claim would ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny—and it would be remarkable to put the Government to the most demanding test in constitutional law in the field of immigration, an area unsuited to rigorous judicial oversight. Fiallo, 430 U.S., at 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473 (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control’”).

Though understandable, Muñoz's concession makes characterizing the asserted right a conceptually harder task. Here is her formulation: a “marital right ... sufficiently important that it cannot be unduly burdened without procedural due process as to an inadmissibility finding that would block her from residing with her spouse in her country of citizenship.” So described, the asserted right is neither fish nor fowl. It is fundamental enough to be implicit in “liberty;” but, unlike other implied fundamental rights, its deprivation does not trigger strict scrutiny. See Din, 576 U.S., at 99, 135 S.Ct. 2128 (plurality opinion) (observing that this argument posits “two categories of implied rights protected by the Due Process Clause: really fundamental rights, which cannot be taken away at all absent a compelling state interest; and not-so-fundamental rights, which can be taken away so long as procedural due process is observed”). This right would be in a category of one: a substantive due process right that gets only procedural due process protection. Ibid.

We need not decide whether such a category exists, because Muñoz cannot clear the second step of Glucksberg’s test: demonstrating that the right to bring a noncitizen spouse to the United States is “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history *1823 and tradition.’ ” 521 U. S., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258. On the contrary, the through line of history is recognition of the Government's sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens. And Muñoz points to no subsidiary tradition that curbs this authority in the case of noncitizen spouses.

From the beginning, the admission of noncitizens into the country was characterized as “of favor [and] not of right.” J. Madison, Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800). Consistent with this view, the 1798 Act Concerning Aliens gave the President complete discretion to remove “all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” 1 Stat. 571 (emphasis deleted). The Act made no exception for spouses—or, for that matter, other family members.

The United States had relatively open borders until the late 19th century. But once Congress began to restrict immigration, “it enacted a complicated web of regulations that erected serious impediments to a person's ability to bring a spouse into the United States.” Din, 576 U.S., at 96, 135 S.Ct. 2128 (plurality opinion). One of the first federal immigration statutes, the Immigration Act of 1882, required executive officials to “examine” noncitizens and deny “permi[ssion] to land” to “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.” 22 Stat. 214. The Act provided no exception for citizens’ spouses. And when Congress drafted a successor statute that expanded the grounds of inadmissibility, it again gave no special treatment to the marital relationship. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.

There are other examples. . . . That is not to say that Congress has not extended special treatment to marriage—it has. For instance, the War Brides Act of 1945 provided that the noncitizen spouses of World War II veterans would be exempt from certain admissibility bars and documentary requirements. Closer to home, Asencio-Cordero's visa application rested on his marriage to Muñoz, which made him eligible for immigrant status. But while Congress has made it easier for spouses to immigrate, it has never made spousal immigration a matter of right. On the contrary, qualifications and restrictions have long been the norm.

Of particular relevance to Muñoz, Congress has not exempted spouses from inadmissibility restrictions like the INA's unlawful-activity bar. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy is a striking example from this Court. In Knauff, a United States citizen (and World War II veteran) found himself similarly situated to Muñoz: His noncitizen wife was denied admission for security reasons, based on “information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.” 338 U.S. at 541, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309. We held that the War Brides Act did not supersede the statute on which the Attorney General had relied. So, “[a]s all other aliens, petitioner had to stand the test of security.” Nor was she entitled to a hearing, because “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” The Attorney General's decision was “final and conclusive,” and he did not have to divulge the reason for it. Id., at 543, 70 S.Ct. 309.⁷

Knauff thus reaffirmed the longstanding principle “that the United States can, as a matter of public policy ... forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders,” and “[n]o limits can be put by the courts upon” that power.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896). Congress's authority to “formulat[e] ... policies” concerning the entry of noncitizens “has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government,” representing “not merely ‘a page of history,’ but a whole volume.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954) (citation omitted). “[T]he Court's general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion.” Mandel, 408 U.S., at 765–766, 92 S.Ct. 2576; see also id., at 765, 92 S.Ct. 2576 (“[T]he power to exclude aliens is ‘inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government’ ”).⁸ While “families of putative immigrants certainly have an interest in their admission,” it is a “fallacy” to leap from that premise to the conclusion that United States citizens have a “ ‘fundamental right’ ” that can limit how Congress exercises “the Nation's sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners.” Fiallo, 430 U.S., at 795, n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 1473.

To be sure, Congress can use its authority over immigration to prioritize the unity of the immigrant family. It has frequently done just that. But the Constitution does not require this result; moreover, Congress's generosity with respect to spousal immigration has always been subject to restrictions, including bars on admissibility. This is an area in which more than family unity is at play: Other issues, including national security and foreign policy, matter too. Thus, while Congress may show special solicitude to noncitizen spouses, such solicitude is “a matter of legislative grace rather than fundamental right.” Muñoz has pointed to no evidence suggesting otherwise.⁹

IV

As the State Department observes, Muñoz’s claim to a procedural due process right in someone else's legal proceeding would have unsettling collateral consequences. Consider where her logic leads: Could a wife challenge her husband's “assignment to a remote prison or to an overseas military deployment, even though prisoners and service members themselves cannot bring such challenges”? Reply Brief 13. Could a citizen assert procedural rights in the removal proceeding of her spouse? Brief for Petitioners 30. Muñoz's position would usher in a new strain of constitutional law, for the Constitution does not ordinarily prevent the government from taking actions that “indirectly or incidentally” burden a citizen's legal rights

Lest there be any doubt, Mandel does not hold that citizens have procedural due process rights in the visa proceedings of others. The Ninth Circuit seems to have read Mandel that way, but that is a misreading.

 In Mandel, the Attorney General refused to waive inadmissibility and grant Ernest Mandel, a self-described “ ‘revolutionary Marxist,’ ” a temporary visa to attend academic conferences in the United States. 408 U.S., at 756, 92 S.Ct. 2576. A group of professors sued on the ground that the Executive's discretion to grant a waiver was limited by their First Amendment right to hear Mandel speak; they insisted that “the First Amendment claim should prevail, at least where no justification is advanced for denial of a waiver.” Id., at 769, 92 S.Ct. 2576. In response, the Attorney General asserted that “Congress has delegated the waiver decision to the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason may be given.” Ibid.

 But because “the Attorney General did inform Mandel's counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver,” the Court chose not to resolve this statutory argument. Ibid. (emphasis added). Instead, it said that so long as the Executive gives a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying a waiver under § 212(a)(28) of the INA—the statutory provision at issue—“the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.” Id., at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The Court expressly declined to address whether a constitutional challenge would “be available for attacking [an] exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced.” Ibid.

 Thus, the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” in Mandel was the justification for avoiding a difficult question of statutory interpretation; it had nothing to do with procedural due process. Indeed, a procedural due process claim was not even before the Court. The professors argued that the denial of Mandel's visa directly deprived them of their First Amendment rights, not that their First Amendment rights entitled them to procedural protections in Mandel's visa application process. Id., at 754, 92 S.Ct. 2576. To make an argument logically analogous to that of the professors, Muñoz would have to claim that the denial of Asencio-Cordero's visa violated her substantive due process right to bring her noncitizen spouse to the United States—thereby triggering the State Department's obligation to demonstrate why denying him the visa is the least restrictive means of serving the Government's interest in national security. But, as we have explained, Muñoz has disavowed that argument, which cannot succeed in any event because the asserted right is not a longstanding and “ ‘deeply rooted’ ” tradition in this country. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258.

 The bottom line is that procedural due process is an odd vehicle for Muñoz's argument, and Mandel does not support it. Whatever else it may stand for, Mandel does not hold that a citizen's independent constitutional right (say, a free speech claim) gives that citizen a procedural due process right to a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for why someone else's visa was denied. And Muñoz is not constitutionally entitled to one here.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

“The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). After U. S. citizen Sandra Muñoz and her Salvadoran husband spent five years of married life in the United States, the Government told her that he could no longer reenter the country. If she wanted to live together with him and their child again, she would have to move to El Salvador. The reason? A consular officer's bare assertion that her husband, who has no criminal record in the United States or El Salvador, planned to engage in “unlawful activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). Muñoz argues that the Government, having burdened her fundamental right to marriage, owes her one thing: the factual basis for excluding her husband.

 The majority could have resolved this case on narrow grounds under longstanding precedent. This Court has already recognized that excluding a noncitizen from the country can burden the constitutional rights of citizens who seek his presence. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–770, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). Acknowledging the Government's power over admission and exclusion, the Mandel Court held that “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the exclusion sufficed to justify that burden. Id., at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. In this case, after protracted litigation, the Government finally explained that it denied Muñoz's husband a visa because of its belief that he had connections to the gang MS–13. Regardless of the validity of that belief, it is a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” Ibid.; see also ante, at 1827 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). Under this Court's precedent, that is enough.

 Instead, the majority today chooses a broad holding on marriage over a narrow one on procedure.¹ It holds that Muñoz's right to marry, live with, and raise children alongside her husband entitles her to nothing when the Government excludes him from the country. Despite the majority's assurance two Terms ago that its eradication of the right to abortion “does not undermine ... in any way” other entrenched substantive due process rights such as “the right to marry,” “the right to reside with relatives,” and “the right to make decisions about the education of one's children,” the Court fails at the first pass. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 256–257, 142 S.Ct. 2228, 213 L.Ed.2d 545 (2022). Because, to me, there is no question that excluding a citizen's spouse burdens her right to marriage, and that burden requires the Government to provide at least a factual basis for its decision, I respectfully dissent.. . .

50 U.S.C. §21. Restraint, regulation, and removal

Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety.

145 S.Ct. 1364

Supreme Court of the United States.

A. A. R. P.

v.

TRUMP

May 16, 2025

Per Curiam.

The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. § 4067, 50 U.S.C. § 21, to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025). Applicants are two detainees identified as members of TdA and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the AEA.

I

On April 17, 2025, the District Court denied the detainees’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against summary removal under the AEA.  The detainees allege that, hours later, putative class members were served notices of AEA removal and told that they would be removed “tonight or tomorrow.” On April 18 at 12:34 a.m. central time, the detainees moved for an emergency TRO. At 12:48 p.m., the detainees moved for a ruling on that motion or a status conference by 1:30 p.m.  At 3:02 p.m., they appealed “the constructive denia[l]” of the emergency TRO to the Fifth Circuit. The detainees also applied to this Court for a temporary injunction.

We understood the Government to assert the right to remove the detainees as soon as midnight central time on April 19. The Government addressed the detainees’ allegations on April 18 only at an evening hearing before the District Court for the District of Columbia, where the detainees had separately sought relief. The Government guaranteed that no putative class members would be removed that day. But it further represented that, in its view, removal of putative class members as soon as the next day “would be consistent with” its due process obligations, and it “reserve[d] the right” to take such action. Id., at 26; see id., at 16 (explanation by the court that “tomorrow ... starts at 12:01 a.m.”). Evidence now in the record (although not all before us on April 18) suggests that the Government had in fact taken steps on the afternoon of April 18 toward removing detainees under the AEA—including transporting them from their detention facility to an airport and later returning them to the facility. Had the detainees been removed from the United States to the custody of a foreign sovereign on April 19, the Government may have argued, as it has previously argued, that no U. S. court had jurisdiction to order relief.

At 12:52 a.m. eastern time (11:52 p.m. central time), we ordered the Government—in light of all these circumstances—“not to remove any member of the putative class of detainees” in order to preserve our jurisdiction to consider the application. 604 U. S. ––––, 145 S.Ct. 1364, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2025). We invited the Government to respond to that application after the Fifth Circuit ruled. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the detainees’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for injunction pending appeal as premature, on the ground that the detainees “gave the [district] court only 42 minutes to act.” We now construe the application as a petition for writ of certiorari from the decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Reply 15. We grant the petition as well as the application for injunction pending further proceedings, vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings. 

II

The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). A district court's inaction in the face of extreme urgency and a high risk of “serious, perhaps irreparable,” consequences may have the effect of refusing an injunction. 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3924.1, pp. 174, 180–181 (3d ed. 2012) (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955)). Here the District Court's inaction—not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and 28 minutes—had the practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing an imminent threat of severe, irreparable harm. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ––––, ––––, 145 S.Ct. 1003, 1006, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2025) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect” against “the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” We have long held that “no person shall be” removed from the United States “without opportunity, at some time, to be heard.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903). Due process requires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, **1368 *95 to apprise interested parties” and that “afford[s] a reasonable time ... to make [an] appearance.” Accordingly, in J. G. G., this Court explained—with all nine Justices agreeing—that “AEA detainees must receive notice ... that they are subject to removal under the Act ... within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief ” before removal. 604 U. S., at ––––, 145 S.Ct. at 1006. In order to “actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee must have sufficient time and information to reasonably be able to contact counsel, file a petition, and pursue appropriate relief.

The Government does not contest before this Court the applicants’ description of the notice afforded to AEA detainees in the Northern District of Texas, nor the assertion that the Government was poised to carry out removals imminently. The Government has represented elsewhere that it is unable to provide for the return of an individual deported in error to a prison in El Salvador, see Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25–cv–951 (D Md.), ECF Docs. 74, 77, where it is alleged that detainees face indefinite detention, see Application for Injunction 11. The detainees’ interests at stake are accordingly particularly weighty. Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster. But it is not optimal for this Court, far removed from the circumstances on the ground, to determine in the first instance the precise process necessary to satisfy the Constitution in this case. We remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for that purpose.

To be clear, we decide today only that the detainees are entitled to more notice than was given on April 18, and we grant temporary injunctive relief to preserve our jurisdiction while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated. See post, at 1377 - 1378 (ALITO, J., dissenting). We did not on April 19—and do not now—address the underlying merits of the parties’ *96 claims regarding the legality of removals under the AEA. We recognize the significance of the Government's national security interests as well as the necessity that such interests be pursued in a manner consistent with the Constitution. In light of the foregoing, lower courts should address AEA cases expeditiously.

* * *

The application for an injunction pending further proceedings is granted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Fifth Circuit. In resolving the detainees’ appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of success on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal pursuant to the President's March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class's due process claims against summary removal. The Government is enjoined from removing the named plaintiffs or putative class members in this action under the AEA pending order by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or putative class members under other lawful authorities.

Same problem as in Block 24, but your client claims that he is not in fact left-handed, something he was not given an opportunity to demonstrate to consular officers in the wake of the visa denial (he claims that a wrist injury temporarily prevented him from writing with his right hand). Assess the probability of success of a constitutional claim.

145 S.Ct. 1003

Supreme Court of the United States.

TRUMP

v.

1. G. G.

April 7, 2025

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*671 This matter concerns the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), an entity that the State Department has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. See 90 Fed. Reg. 10030 (2025). The President issued Proclamation No. 10903, invoking the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. § 4067, 50 U.S.C. § 21, to detain and remove Venezuelan nationals “who are members of TdA.” Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, 90 Fed. Reg. 13034. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the implementation of, and their removal under, the Proclamation. Initially, the detainees sought relief in habeas among other causes of action, but they dismissed their habeas claims. On March 15, 2025, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing any removal of the named plaintiffs and preventing removal under the AEA of a provisionally certified class consisting of “[a]ll noncitizens in U.S. custody who are subject to” the Proclamation. Minute Order on Motion To Certify Class in No. 25−cv−00766. On March 28, the District Court extended the TROs for up to an additional 14 days. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(b)(2). The D. C. Circuit denied the Government's emergency motion to stay the orders. The Government then applied to this Court, seeking vacatur of the orders. We construe these TROs as appealable injunctions. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

We grant the application and vacate the TROs. The detainees seek equitable relief against the implementation of the Proclamation and against their removal under the AEA. They challenge the Government's interpretation of the Act and assert that they do not fall within the category of removable alien enemies. But we do not reach those arguments. Challenges to removal under the AEA, a statute which largely “ ‘preclude[s] judicial review,’ ” Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 163–164, 68 S.Ct. 1429, 92 L.Ed. 1881 (1948), must be brought in habeas. Cf. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–235, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953) (holding that habeas was the only cause of action available to challenge deportation under immigration statutes that “preclud[ed] judicial intervention” beyond what was necessary to vindicate due process rights). Regardless of whether the detainees formally request release from confinement, because their claims for relief “‘necessarily imply the invalidity’” of their confinement and removal under the AEA, their claims fall within the “core” of the writ of habeas corpus and thus must be brought in habeas. The detainees are confined in Texas, so venue is improper in the District of Columbia. As a result, the Government is likely to succeed on the merits of this action.

 The detainees also sought equitable relief against summary removal. Although judicial review under the AEA is limited, we have held that an individual subject to detention and removal under that statute is entitled to “‘judicial review’” as to “questions of interpretation and constitutionality” of the Act as well as whether he or she “is in fact an alien enemy fourteen years of age or older.” (Under the Proclamation, the term “alien enemy” is defined to include “all Venezuelan citizens 14 years of age or older who are members of TdA, are within the United States, and are not actually naturalized or lawful permanent residents of the United States.” 90 Fed. Reg. 13034.) The detainees’ rights against summary removal, however, are not currently in dispute. The Government expressly agrees that “TdA members subject to removal under the Alien Enemies Act get judicial review.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law” in the context of removal proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). So, the detainees are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard “appropriate to the nature of the case.” More specifically, in this context, AEA detainees must receive notice after the date of this order that they are subject to removal under the Act. The notice must be afforded within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue before such removal occurs.

 For all the rhetoric of the dissents, today's order and per curiam confirm that the detainees subject to removal orders under the AEA are entitled to notice and an opportunity to challenge their removal. The only question is which court will resolve that challenge. For the reasons set forth, we hold that venue lies in the district of confinement. The dissents would have the Court delay resolving that issue, requiring—given our decision today—that the process begin anew down the road. We see no benefit in such wasteful delay.

 The application to vacate the orders of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is granted. The March 15, 2025 minute orders granting a temporary restraining *674 order and March 28, 2025 extension of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, case No. 1:25-cv-766, are vacated.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, and with whom Justice BARRETT joins as to Parts II and III–B, dissenting.

*675 Three weeks ago, the Federal Government started sending scores of Venezuelan immigrants detained in the United States to a foreign prison in El Salvador. It did so without any due process of law, under the auspices of the Alien Enemies Act, a 1798 law designed for times of war. Between the start of these removals and now, a District Court has been expeditiously considering the legal claims of a group of detainees (hereafter plaintiffs), who allege that their summary removal violates the Constitution and multiple statutes. The District Court ordered a pause on plaintiffs’ removals until it could consider their motion for a preliminary injunction at a hearing tomorrow, on April 8. Still, a majority of the Court sees fit to speak to this issue today.

Critically, even the majority today agrees, and the Federal Government now admits, that individuals subject to removal under the Alien Enemies Act are entitled to adequate notice and judicial review before they can be removed. That should have been the end of the matter. Yet, with “barebones briefing, no argument, and scarce time for reflection,” Department of Education v. California, 604 U. S. ––––, ––––, 145 S.Ct. 966, 969, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, (2025) (KAGAN, J., dissenting), the Court announces that legal challenges to an individual's removal under the Alien Enemies Act must be brought in habeas petitions in the district where they are detained.

 The Court's legal conclusion is suspect. The Court intervenes anyway, granting the Government extraordinary relief and vacating the District Court's order on that basis alone. It does so without mention of the grave harm Plaintiffs will face if they are erroneously removed to El Salvador or regard for the Government's attempts to subvert the judicial process throughout this litigation. Because the Court should not reward the Government's efforts to erode the rule *676 of law with discretionary equitable relief, I respectfully dissent.

 IA

This case arises out of the President's unprecedented peacetime invocation of a wartime law known as the Alien Enemies Act. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577. Enacted in 1798 by a Congress consumed with fear of war with France, the Alien Enemies Act provided a wartime counterpart to the widely denounced Alien Friends Act, which granted the President sweeping power to detain and expel any noncitizen he deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 571. Unlike the Alien Friends Act, which lapsed in disrepute as James Madison deemed it “a monster that must for ever disgrace its parents,” the Founders saw the Alien Enemies Act as a constitutional exercise of Congress's powers to “declare War,” to “raise and support Armies,” and to “provide for calling forth the Militia to ... suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cls. 11–15.¹

 To that end, the Act grants the President power to detain and remove foreign citizens of a “hostile nation or government” when “there is a declared war” with such nation or when a “foreign nation” threatens “invasion or predatory incursion” against the territory of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 4067, 50 U.S.C. § 21. Before today, U. S. Presidents have invoked the Alien Enemies Act only three times, each in the context of an ongoing war: the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II.²

 That changed on March 14, 2025, when President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act to address an alleged “Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua,” a criminal organization based in Venezuela. See Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033. There is, of course, no ongoing war between the United States and Venezuela. Nor is Tren de Aragua itself a “foreign nation.” § 21. The President's Proclamation nonetheless asserts that Tren de Aragua is “undertaking hostile actions and conducting irregular warfare against the territory of the United States both directly and at the direction ... of the Maduro regime in Venezuela.” 90 Fed. Reg. 13034. Based on these findings, the Proclamation declares that “all Venezuelan citizens 14 years of age or older who are members of [Tren de Aragua]” and are not “naturalized [citizens] or lawful permanent residents” are liable to “immediate apprehension, detention, and removal” as alien enemies. Ibid.

 Congress requires the President to “mak[e] public proclamation” of his intention to invoke the Alien Enemies Act. § 21. President Trump did just the opposite. In what can be understood only as covert preparation to skirt both the requirements of the Act and the Constitution's guarantee of due process, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began moving Venezuelan migrants from Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention centers across the country to the El Valle Detention Facility in South Texas before the President had even signed the Proclamation. ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, –––– 2025 WL 890401, *3 (D DC, Mar. 24, 2025). The transferred detainees, most of whom denied past or present affiliation with any gang, did not know the reason for their transfer until the evening of Friday, **1009 March 14, when they *678 were apparently “pulled from their cells and told that they would be deported the next day to an unknown destination.” Ibid.

 B

Suspecting that the President had covertly signed a Proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act, several lawyers anticipated their clients’ imminent deportation and filed a putative class action in the District of Columbia. App. to Brief in Opposition To Application To Vacate 9a (App. to BIO). They contested that Tren de Aragua had committed or attempted the kind of “ ‘invasion’ ” or “ ‘predatory incursion’ ” required to invoke the Alien Enemies Act. Ibid. They also asserted that it would violate the Due Process Clause to deport their clients before they had any chance to challenge the Government's allegations of gang membership. Id., at 26a. The plaintiffs did not seek release from custody, but asked the court only to restrain the Government's planned deportations under the Proclamation. Id., at 9a, 29a.

 In the early morning of March 15, the District Court informed the Government of the lawsuit and scheduled an emergency hearing. Despite knowing of plaintiffs’ claim that it would be unlawful to remove them under the Proclamation, the Government ushered the named plaintiffs onto planes along with dozens of other detainees, all without any opportunity to contact their lawyers, much less notice or opportunity to be heard. See ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *5.

 The Government's plan, it appeared, was to rush plaintiffs out of the country before a court could decide whether the President's invocation of the Alien Enemies Act was lawful or whether these individuals were, in fact, members of Tren de Aragua. Plaintiff J. G. G., for example, had no chance to tell a court that the tattoos causing DHS to suspect him of gang membership were unrelated to a gang. He avers that he is a tattoo artist who “got [an] eye tattoo because [he] saw it on Google” and “thought it looked cool.” Ibid. Plaintiff G. F. F., too, was denied the chance to inform a court that the Government accused him of being an “associate/affiliate of Tren d[e] Aragua” based solely on his presence at a party of strangers, which he attended at the “insistence of a friend.” Decl. of G. Carney, ECF Doc. 3–4, at 1.

 C

Recognizing the emergency the Government had created by deporting plaintiffs without due process, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order that same morning. The order prohibited the Government from removing the five named plaintiffs, including J. G. G. and G. F. F., pending ongoing litigation. G. F. F., who had been “on a plane for about forty minutes to an hour” as “crying and frightened” individuals were forced on board, was subsequently retrieved from the plane by a guard who told him he “ ‘just won the lottery.’ ”

 The court then set an emergency hearing for 5 p.m. that same day, at which it planned to consider plaintiffs’ claim that temporary relief should be extended to a class of all noncitizens subject to the anticipated Proclamation. See ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *4. Despite notice to the Government of the Court's scheduled hearing, DHS continued to load up the two planes with detainees and scheduled their immediate departure. See Tr. 12 (Mar. 15, 2025) (Two flights “were scheduled for this afternoon that may have already taken off or [will] during this hearing”); Tr. 9 (Apr. 3, 2025) (Government **1010 counsel agreeing that DHS was “acting in preparation of the proclamation before it was posted”). Not until an hour before the District Court's scheduled hearing, and only moments before the Government planned to send its planes off to El Salvador, did the White House finally publish the Proclamation on its website.

At its 5 p.m. hearing, the District Court provisionally certified a class of Venezuelan noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. See Tr. 23, 25 (Mar. 15, 2025). It then issued an oral temporary restraining order prohibiting the Government from removing all members of the class pursuant to the Proclamation for 14 days. Id., at 42. The order did not disturb the Government's ability to apprehend or detain individuals pursuant to the Proclamation or its authority to deport any individual under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See ibid.; see ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *1. All it required of the Government was a pause in deportations pursuant to the Proclamation until the court had a chance to review their legality. See Tr. 4 (Apr. 3, 2025) (“All th[e] [TROs] did was order that the government could not summarily deport in-custody noncitizens who were subject to the proclamation without a hearing”). The court further directed that “any plane containing” individuals subject to the Proclamation “that is going to take off or is in the air needs to be returned to the United States.” Tr. 43 (Mar. 15, 2025).

 D

Concerns about the Government's compliance with the order quickly followed. Even now, the District Court continues to investigate what happened via show-cause proceedings. In those proceedings, the Government took the position that it had no legal obligation to obey the District Court's orders directing the return of planes in flight because they were issued from the bench. See Tr. 17 (Mar. 17, 2025) (“[O]ral statements are not injunctions”). Of course, as the Government well knows, courts routinely issue rulings from the bench, and those rulings can be appealed, including to this Court, in appropriate circumstances.³

 The District Court, for its part, has surmised that “the Government knew as of 10 a.m. on March 15 that the Court would hold a hearing later that day,” yet it “hustled people onto those planes in hopes of evading an injunction or perhaps preventing [individuals] from requesting the habeas hearing to which the Government now acknowledges they are entitled.” ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *5. Rather than turn around the planes that were in the air when the Court issued its order, moreover, the Federal Government landed the planes full of alleged Venezuelan nationals in El Salvador and transferred them directly into El Salvador's Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT). Ibid.

 Deportation directly into CECOT presented a risk of extraordinary harm to these Plaintiffs. The record reflects that inmates in Salvadoran prisons are “ ‘highly likely to face immediate and intentional **1011 life-threatening harm at the hands of state actors.’ ” Id., at ––––, 2025 WL 890401 at *16 (quoting App. to BIO 258a). CECOT detainees are frequently “denied communication with their relatives and lawyers, and only appear before courts in online hearings, often in groups of several hundred detainees at the same time.” App. to BIO 260a. El Salvador has boasted that inmates in CECOT “ ‘will never leave,’ ” ibid., and plaintiffs present evidence that “inmates are rarely allowed to leave their cells, have no regular access to drinking water or adequate food, sleep standing up because of overcrowding, and are held in cells where they do not see sunlight for days,” ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *16. One scholar attests that an estimated 375 detainees have died in Salvadoran prisons since March 2022. Ibid.

 What if the Government later determines that it sent one of these detainees to CECOT in error? Or a court eventually *682 decides that the President lacked authority under the Alien Enemies Act to declare that Tren de Aragua is perpetrating or attempting an “invasion” against the territory of the United States? The Government takes the position that, even when it makes a mistake, it cannot retrieve individuals from the Salvadoran prisons to which it has sent them. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition in Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25–cv–951 (D Md., Mar. 31, 2025), ECF Doc. 11, at 7–9. The implication of the Government's position is that not only noncitizens but also United States citizens could be taken off the streets, forced onto planes, and confined to foreign prisons with no opportunity for redress if judicial review is denied unlawfully before removal. History is no stranger to such lawless regimes, but this Nation's system of laws is designed to prevent, not enable, their rise.

E

Even as the Government has continued to litigate whether its March 15 deportations complied with the District Court's orders, it simultaneously sought permission to resume summary deportations under the Proclamation. The District Court, first, denied the Government's motion to vacate its temporary restraining order, rejecting the assertion that “the President's authority and discretion under the [Alien Enemies Act] is not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny.” App. to BIO 71a. At the very least, the District Court concluded, the plaintiffs were “likely to succeed” on their claim that, “before they may be deported, they are entitled to individualized hearings to determine whether the Act applies to them at all.” ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *2. The D. C. Circuit, too, denied the Government a requested stay and kept in place the District Court's pause on deportations under the Alien Enemies Act pending further proceedings. 2025 WL 914682, *1 (per curiam) (Mar. 26, 2025).

 It is only this Court that sees reason to vacate, for the second time this week, a temporary restraining order standing *683 “on its last legs.” Department of Education, 604 U. S., at ––––, 145 S.Ct. at 970 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). Not content to wait until tomorrow, when the District Court will have a chance to consider full preliminary injunction briefing at a scheduled hearing, this Court intervenes to relieve the Government of its obligation under the order.

 II

Begin with that upon which all nine Members of this Court agree. The Court's order today dictates, in no uncertain terms, that “individual[s] subject to detention and removal under the [Alien Enemies Act are] entitled to ‘judicial review’ as to  ‘questions of interpretation and constitutionality’ of the Act as well as whether he or she ‘is in fact an alien enemy fourteen years of age or older.’ ” Therefore, under today's order, courts below will probe, among other things, the meaning of an “invasion” or “predatory incursion,” 50 U.S.C. § 21, and ask, for example, whether any given individual is in fact a member of Tren de Aragua. Even the Government has now largely conceded that point. Application 19.

 So too do we all agree with the per curiam’s command that the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to afford plaintiffs “notice after the date of this order that they are subject to removal under the Act, ... within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue before such removal occurs.” Ante, at 1006. That means, of course, that the Government cannot usher any detainees, including plaintiffs, onto planes in a shroud of secrecy, as it did on March 15, 2025. Nor can the Government “immediately resume” removing individuals without notice upon vacatur of the TRO, as it promised the D. C. Circuit it would do. See 2025 WL 914682, *13 (Millett, J., concurring) (referencing oral argument before that court). To the extent the Government removes even one individual without affording him notice and *684 a meaningful opportunity to file and pursue habeas relief, it does so in direct contravention of an edict by the United States Supreme Court.

 III

In light of this agreement, the Court's decision to intervene in this litigation is as inexplicable as it is dangerous. Recall that, when the District Court issued its temporary restraining order on March 15, 2025, the Government was engaged in a covert operation to deport dozens of immigrants without notice or an opportunity for hearings. The Court's ruling today means that those deportations violated the Due Process Clause's most fundamental protections. See ante, at 1006 (reiterating that notice and an opportunity for a hearing are required before a deportation under the Alien Enemies Act). The District Court rightly intervened to prohibit temporarily the Government from deporting more individuals in this manner, based on its correct assessment that the plaintiffs were likely entitled to more process. ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2025 WL 890401, *2.

 Against the backdrop of the U. S. Government's unprecedented deportation of dozens of immigrants to a foreign prison without due process, a majority of this Court sees fit to vacate the District Court's order. The reason, apparently, is that the majority thinks plaintiffs’ claims should have been styled as habeas actions and filed in the districts of their detention. In reaching that result, the majority flouts well-established limits on its jurisdiction, creates new law on the emergency docket, and elides the serious threat our intervention poses to the lives of individual detainees.

[The dissent continued to critique procedural aspects of the majority’s opinion.]