By its plain language, § 1182(f) grants the President broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States. The President lawfully exercised that discretion based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interest. And plaintiffs’ attempts to identify a conflict with other provisions in the INA, and their appeal to the statute’s purposes and legislative history, fail to overcome the clear statutory language.

A

The text of § 1182(f) states:

“Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”

By its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference to the President in every clause. It entrusts to the President the decisions whether and when to suspend entry (“[w]henever [he] finds that the entry” of aliens “would be detrimental” to the national interest); whose entry to suspend (“all aliens or any class of aliens”); for how long (“for such period as he shall deem necessary”); and on what conditions (“any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate”). It is therefore unsurprising that we have previously observed that § 1182(f) vests the President with “ample power” to impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated in the INA.

The Proclamation falls well within this comprehensive delegation. The sole prerequisite set forth in § 1182(f) is that the President “find[ ]” that the entry of the covered aliens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement here. He first ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. The President then issued a Proclamation setting forth extensive findings describing how deficiencies in the practices of select foreign governments—several of which are state sponsors of terrorism—deprive the Government of “sufficient information to assess the risks [those countries’ nationals] pose to the United States.” Proclamation § 1(h)(i). Based on that review, the President found that it was in the national interest to restrict entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information —both to protect national security and public safety, and to induce improvement by their home countries. The Proclamation therefore “craft[ed] ... country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances,” while securing the Nation “until such time as improvements occur.” Ibid.²

Plaintiffs believe that these findings are insufficient. They argue, as an initial matter, that the Proclamation fails to provide a persuasive rationale for why nationality alone renders the covered foreign nationals a security risk. And they further discount the President’s stated concern about deficient vetting because the Proclamation allows many aliens from the designated countries to enter on nonimmigrant visas.

Such arguments are grounded on the premise that § 1182(f) not only requires the President to make a finding that entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” but also to explain that finding with sufficient detail to enable judicial review. That premise is questionable. But even assuming that some form of review is appropriate, plaintiffs’ attacks on the sufficiency of the President’s findings cannot be sustained. The 12–page Proclamation—which thoroughly describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations underlying the President’s chosen restrictions—is more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under § 1182(f). Contrast Presidential Proclamation No. 6958, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1996) (President Clinton) (explaining in one sentence why suspending entry of members of the Sudanese government and armed forces “is in the foreign policy interests of the United States”); Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50–51 (1981) (President Reagan) (explaining in five sentences why measures to curtail “the continuing illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the southeastern United States” are “necessary”). ***

In short, the language of § 1182(f) is clear, and the Proclamation does not exceed any textual limit on the President’s authority.

President Donald Trump can’t stop using — and abusing — his legal authority to block the entry of noncitizens into the country.

When he issued a travel ban on citizens of Muslim-majority countries early in his first term, he did so by invoking Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows him to block any foreigner if he deems that their entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”

When he issued a proclamation turning away noncitizens who could not demonstrate the ability to pay for their health care costs, he cited Section 212(f).

When he halted most legal immigration at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, first from China and then from other countries, there was Section 212(f) again.

Finally, last week, he announced that he would block foreign students from receiving student visas to attend Harvard University and implement a travel ban on 12 countries, as well as restrictions on seven others. The travel ban took effect on Monday, just after midnight, and the legal framework for both orders was built on Section 212(f).

Some of Trump’s attempts to invoke Section 212(f) have been challenged in court. Judges struck down several versions of Trump’s first-term travel ban before the third iteration was ultimately upheld by the US Supreme Court (after it was expanded to include non-Muslim-majority countries). Former President Joe Biden rescinded the travel ban, as well as the Covid-19 and health care-related bans, when he took office, refusing to defend them in legal challenges.

Most recently, a federal judge in Massachusetts also blocked Trump’s order on Harvard students, and as of Monday, the State Department had returned to processing international student visas.

However, in testing the limits of 212(f) through these policies, Trump has succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to affirm his broad powers to ban foreign nationals under immigration law, marking a key expansion of executive authority.

While previous presidents invoked Section 212(f), none of them did so as frequently or as aggressively as Trump. The law has become a key tool to keep people out as Trump tries to implement his restrictive vision of US immigration policy.

How Trump expanded presidential powers to ban foreigners

Before Trump, both Democratic and Republican presidents used the 212(f) authority sparingly. It was typically employed in order to enforce United Nations sanctions or target individuals or groups associated with terrorism, human rights violations, drug trafficking, or specific international crises.

Former President Barack Obama, for instance, used the authority to block Russian officials from entering the US following their country’s 2014 invasion of Crimea.

Former President George W. Bush used it to block Syrian officials after the 2005 assassination of the Lebanese prime minister at the hands of the Syrian-backed militant group Hezbollah, which the US designates as a terrorist organization.

Former President Bill Clinton used it to impose restrictions on Nigerian military officials who impeded the country’s transition to democracy by annulling the country’s 1993 elections.

Trump’s conceptualization of 212(f), however, is markedly different. He has used the authority to block broad swaths of noncitizens from a variety of countries, not just their government officials or people involved in criminal activity. He has not spared US visa or green card holders in some cases, including those affected by his first travel ban.

That has created a new legal paradigm that has afforded the president sweeping powers to keep immigrants out.

The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision narrowly upholding Trump’s first travel ban made that shift clear. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the majority opinion that Section 212(f) “exudes deference to the President in every clause.” For that reason, the court refused to question the superficial national security rationale Trump provided for the travel ban.

That’s despite substantial evidence that the actual motivation behind the ban was, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it in the dissent, “anti-Muslim animus” that violated the Constitution’s religious liberty protections. That evidence included Trump’s 2015 campaign statements calling for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” which lower-court judges pointed to in blocking earlier versions of the travel ban in 2017.

The question is whether the justices will again defer to Trump if the new travel ban and ban on international students at Harvard come before the Supreme Court.

According to Stephen Yale-Loehr, a retired immigration law professor at Cornell Law School, “court challenges to this travel ban are likely, but they may fail.” However, Yale-Loehr said, “even if this expansion is legal, it is not good policy. We are not necessarily safer by banning immigrants from these countries.”

Notably, the new travel ban includes exemptions for green card holders, noncitizens from affected countries who are already in the US, and athletes from the affected countries competing in international competitions like the Olympics. He’s also invoked the potential for visa overstays, in addition to the usual national security grounds, in the rationale for his latest ban.

All of that might help Trump’s case if the policy is challenged in court. Unlike a blanket ban on immigrants from the affected countries, it is tailored to withstand legal scrutiny by targeting only would-be immigrants who are currently not in the US. Additionally, the ban’s invocation of national security concerns puts it in territory where the president has generally been afforded considerable discretion by the courts. (A fact he has taken advantage of in issuing a flurry of national emergency declarations on all sorts of issues.)

Given the particulars of the new ban and the administration’s previous history before the Court, some immigrant advocates have turned to Congress, rather than the courts, to intervene. They are asking for a legislative fix to stop Trump from implementing policies that will affect both US citizens who might be separated from their families and citizens of foreign countries hoping to enter the US, though such a measure would almost certainly have to wait on unified Democratic control of government.

“Congress must act by codifying guardrails that prevent the wholesale banning of nationals from entire regions of the world under the pretext of ‘national security,’” Guerline Jozef, executive director of the immigrant advocacy group Haitian Bridge Alliance, said in a statement.

Consider application of the 12/16/25 proclamation in the following cases:

A Togolese national for whom a visa recently became available under the 4^th family-based preference.

A dual citizen of Somalia and Italy.

A Haitian national who has a job offer to work as a researcher at Temple. The national has a PhD in economics. Would it make any difference if the individual were already in the US on a J-1 visa?

An Iranian national present in the United States on an F-1 visa who recently married an American citizen.

Venezuelan athletes traveling to United States to participate in the 2028 Olympics.

A Sudanese national who previously secured permanent residence status who is returning from a temporary visit in Japan.

And with respect to the 9/19/25 proclamation on H1B visa holders:

A Nigerian national who received her M.A. in the United States on an F-1 visa and is currently doing a year of OPT-authorized work at an accounting firm which would now like to hire her on an H-1B.

(f) Authority To suspend or restrict the entry of a class of aliens.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, determines, based on specific and credible facts, that the entry of any aliens or class of aliens into the United States would undermine the security or public safety of the United States or the preservation of human rights, democratic processes or institutions, or international stability, the President may temporarily—

(A) suspend the entry of such aliens or class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants; or

(C) Foreign policy

(i) In general

An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception for officials

An alien who is an official of a foreign government or a purported government, or who is a candidate for election to a foreign government office during the period immediately preceding the election for that office, shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) solely because of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States

(iii) Exception for other aliens

An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) because of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.

(iv) Notification of determinations

If a determination is made under clause (iii) with respect to an alien, the Secretary of State must notify on a timely basis the chairmen of the Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and of the Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Relations of the Senate of the identity of the alien and the reasons for the determination.

Passed at the height of McCarthyism during the Cold War, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 was one of the most draconian and comprehensive pieces of federal immigration legislation enacted in the 20th century. It also represented the culmination of ideological exclusion and deportation laws in the United States, including previous immigration restrictions. It also added new categories of individuals to exclude or deport, such as those who were members of or affiliated with the Communist Party of the United States, and those who advocated or who were members of or affiliated with organizations that advocated “the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship.” Under the act, the attorney general held the power to deport and exclude foreign noncitizens, as well as to admit them, granting them a waiver of inadmissibility. Congress had passed the act, overriding President Truman’s veto. Truman described some of its provisions as a form of “thought control” and “inconsistent with our democratic ideals.”

In 1952, a few months after the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published a special issue discussing the detrimental effects of ideological exclusion laws on free exchange and inquiry essential to scientific discovery. Foreign scientists from England and France described their challenging experiences attempting to obtain a visa and the damage done to the United States’s reputation—depicted as fearful and repressive. One American contributor to the issue noted that ideological exclusion had turned ill-informed U.S. consular officials into censors. Rather than risk making a mistake by admitting the “wrong” person and endangering their careers, these consular officials often opted to delay or deny visas instead of granting them. Also during this time was national and international press coverage of the exclusion of British-born film star Charlie Chaplin. When Chaplin left to promote his new film “Limelight” in Europe, the then-attorney general revoked his reentry permit and demanded that Chaplin “prove his worth and right to enter the United States.” Chaplin refused and relocated to Switzerland.

In 1953, the Justice Department announced it would ideologically deport 12,000 people from the United States. Those foreign noncitizens who were targeted for ideological deportation included former members of the Communist Party who had lived in the United States for decades and who had American-born children and families. In reality, between 1950 and 1956, 231 foreign noncitizens were ideologically deported. Yet that number did not reflect the fear of deportation and the threat of being separated from children and spouses, or of those who chose to leave. It was not the number of those ideologically deported but, rather, it was the “chilling effect,” the fear, intimidation, and self-censorship that was the most effective form of political repression.

In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952), the Supreme Court upheld ideological deportation, consistent with the First Amendment legal precedent at that time. But, by the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the rollback of McCarthyism and Cold War political repression was underway. By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court had expanded First Amendment protections to include the right to receive information and the right to hear, and had provided more protection for advocacy and free speech.

Despite the end of McCarthyism, the expansion of protections under the First Amendment, and immigration reform through the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, the ideological exclusion and deportation provisions in the McCarran-Walter Act remained. Members of Congress had no incentive to repeal the provisions and risk appearing weak on communism, and the focus of fear and repression had largely shifted to New Left activists and anti-Vietnam War protesters.

In Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), the Supreme Court upheld the Nixon administration’s use of these provisions to ideologically exclude Belgian Marxist economist Ernest Mandel. Yet, in its decision, the Court also provided a new pathway to challenge exclusion by determining that the American university and college professors who invited Mandel to come to the United States to speak on their campuses did have the standing to sue to challenge Mandel’s ideological exclusion as it implicated their First Amendment rights, including the right to receive information.

Later in 1977, Congress passed the McGovern Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. The move was intended to align the legislation with that of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975—an agreement signed by 35 nations that called for freer movement of individuals and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The legislation provided more oversight and protection against ideological exclusion based on guilt by association and served as a check on the executive branch’s use of discretion and power. The McGovern Amendment applied to Section 212(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act, which also pertained to membership in or affiliation with organizations that advocated the “economic, international, or governmental doctrines of world communism.” Under the McGovern Amendment, the secretary of state should recommend that the attorney general grant a waiver of inadmissibility unless the secretary of state determined the admission of the foreign noncitizen “would be contrary to the security interests of the United States” and certified this determination to Congress.

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration used the McCarran-Walter Act to deny nonimmigrant visas to foreign noncitizens who were critical of U.S. foreign policy based on their affiliations and memberships. The Reagan administration also circumvented the McGovern Amendment by denying the visas under Section 212(a)(27), which was not subject to the McGovern Amendment’s certification requirement. This provision pertained to foreign noncitizens whom the government had reason to believe sought entry “solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities that would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.” Legal challenges to these visa denials were successful as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit held that the Reagan administration had not established an independent basis to deny the visas under Section 212(a)(27), instead of 212(a)(28).

Meanwhile, members of Congress sought to repeal the ideological exclusion and deportation provisions under the McCarran-Walter Act, with Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) leading the charge. In a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing in 1984, representatives from civil liberties and human rights organizations—including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and PEN America—described the chilling effect and damage created by ideological restrictions, including the inhibition of free exchange and inquiry, embarrassment and humiliation felt by Americans and by foreign noncitizens, many of whom simply refused to attempt to visit the United States. American novelist William Styron testified before Congress about the detrimental effects on writers. Having faced ideological exclusion, Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes and Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez were also outspoken critics of the McCarran-Walter Act’s provisions and called for their repeal. American writers E.L. Doctorow, John Irving, and Susan Sontag, as well as American playwright Arthur Miller and American poet Carolyn Forché, also criticized the act. Irving described the ideological exclusion provisions as the “vestiges of McCarthyism” that “shame us today.” These provisions had been used to ideologically exclude, as well as to deport, in order to suppress dissent and criticism of the United States and its foreign policies, including expression that was protected under the First Amendment.

In his testimony on behalf of the Reagan administration in another House Judiciary subcommittee hearing held in 1987, State Department legal adviser Abraham D. Sofaer expressed support for the repeal of the ideological restrictions based on advocacy and association in Section 212(a)(28), but expressed concern over removing Section 212(a)(27) for foreign policy reasons. He proposed repealing parts of the ideological exclusion and deportation provisions, but also providing the executive branch with the authority to deny visas to foreign noncitizens if admission to the United States would “implicate potentially serious foreign policy consequences.”

That year, Congress added the Moynihan-Frank Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which prohibited exclusion or deportation from the United States “because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the United States.” It was celebrated as “an affirmation of the principles of the First Amendment” and ensured that foreign noncitizens facing ideological exclusion or deportation were subject to the same free expression and association standards and protections as American citizens under the First Amendment. 

A few years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 repealed Sections 212(a)(27) and 212(a)(28), added a new foreign policy provision, and incorporated the previous amendments to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. It included the language from the Moynihan-Frank Amendment for past, current, and expected beliefs, statements, or associations protected by the First Amendment but also added a foreign policy exception for exclusions and deportations. Thus, under this new provision, foreign noncitizens were excludable or deportable if the secretary of state has “reasonable ground to believe” that their “entry or proposed activities” or their “presence or activities in the United States” would have “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.” To authorize exclusion or deportation, the secretary of state must determine that the foreign noncitizen’s admission or presence would “compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.” However, the secretary also must timely notify the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary and Foreign Affairs committees of the identity of the foreign noncitizen and “the reasons for the determination.” This notification requirement was similar to the McGovern Amendment’s certification requirement, in order to provide additional congressional oversight to prevent abuse of power and discretion.

Within the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990, in a conference report, members of Congress described their intention for this new foreign policy provision to be used “sparingly and not merely because there is a likelihood that an alien will make critical remarks about the United States or its policies.” The conferees emphasized that if exclusion [or deportation] was because of a foreign noncitizen’s beliefs, statements, or associations, it must be “linked” to a “compelling foreign policy interest,” which would be held to a higher standard than the “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences standard.” Admission and presence of a foreign noncitizen must have a “clear negative impact” on United States foreign policy. They cited the admission of the former Shah of Iran to the United States in 1979, which sparked the Iranian hostage crisis and directly affected foreign relations, as an example of when the foreign policy provision permitting exclusion or deportation would be appropriate. A “mere entry into the United States could result in imminent harm to the lives and property of United States persons abroad (as occurred with the former Shah of Iran), or when an alien’s entry would violate a treaty or international agreement to which the United States is a party.” And, the conferees intended for the secretary of state’s notification requirement to indicate that the provision was to be used “only in unusual circumstances.” 

Civil liberties organizations, including the ACLU, objected to the inclusion of the foreign policy provision. They argued the provision could still be used to ideologically exclude or deport and, thus, it would undermine the intent behind the Moynihan-Frank Amendment and the repeal of the ideological exclusion and deportation provisions in the McCarran-Walter Act. Arthur C. Helton, of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now known as Human Rights First), expressed his concerns about the inclusion of the foreign policy provision, describing it as a “legacy of the Cold War.” Dismissing assurances that the foreign policy provision would be rarely used, Helton warned, “You can be sure that, someday, you will see these powers being reached for and exercised. There is no reason to look at our border in an ideological fashion.”

President Trump hates a British journalist who has written various pieces criticizing his policies. The journalist currently holds a multiple entry B-1 visa. He has been invited to give a speech at a think tank in Washington. Could he be deemed inadmissible under 212(a)(3)(C)?