The Department's Enforcement Priorities

Congress has defined the Department's role and responsibilities regarding the enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Effective immediately, and consistent with Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution and Section 3331 of Title 5, United States Code, Department personnel shall faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States against all removable aliens.

Except as specifically noted above, the Department no longer will exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement. In faithfully executing the immigration laws, Department personnel should take enforcement actions in accordance with applicable law. In order to achieve this goal, as noted below, I have directed ICE to hire 10,000 officers and agents expeditiously, subject to available resources, and to take enforcement actions consistent with available resources. However, in order to maximize the benefit to public safety, to stem unlawful migration and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation, Department personnel should prioritize for removal those aliens described by Congress in Sections 212(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)(C), 235(b) and (c), and 237(a)(2) and (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Additionally, regardless of the basis of removability, Department personnel should prioritize removable aliens who: (1) have been convicted of any criminal offense; (2) have been charged with any criminal offense that has not been resolved; (3) have committed acts which constitute a chargeable criminal offense; (4) have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter before a governmental agency; (5) have abused any program related to receipt of public benefits; (6) are subject to a final order of removal but have not complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or (7) in the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.

Strengthening Programs to Facilitate the Efficient and Faithful Execution of the Immigration Laws of the United States

Facilitating the efficient and faithful execution of the immigration laws of the United States-and prioritizing the Department's resources-requires the use of all available systems and enforcement tools by Department personnel.

Through passage of the immigration laws, Congress established a comprehensive statutory regime to remove aliens expeditiously from the United States in accordance with all applicable due process of law. I determine that the faithful execution of our immigration laws is best achieved by using all these statutory authorities to the greatest extent practicable. Accordingly, Department personnel shall make full use of these authorities.

Criminal aliens have demonstrated their disregard for the rule of law and pose a threat to persons residing in the United States. As such, criminal aliens are a priority for removal. . . .

Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion

Unless otherwise directed, Department personnel may initiate enforcement actions against removable aliens encountered during the performance of their official duties and should act consistently with the President's enforcement priorities identified in his Executive Order and any further guidance issued pursuant to this memorandum. Department personnel have full authority to arrest or apprehend an alien whom an immigration officer has probable cause to believe is in violation of the immigration laws. They also have full authority to initiate removal proceedings against any alien who is subject to removal under any provision of the INA, and to refer appropriate cases for criminal prosecution. The Department shall prioritize aliens described in the Department's Enforcement Priorities (Section A) for arrest and removal. This is not intended to remove the individual, case-by-case decisions of immigration officers.

The exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to any alien who is subject to arrest, criminal prosecution, or removal in accordance with law shall be made on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the head of the field office component, where appropriate, of CBP, ICE, or USCIS that initiated or will initiate the enforcement action, regardless of which entity actually files any applicable charging documents: CBP Chief Patrol Agent, CBP Director of Field Operations, ICE Field Office Director, lCE Special Agent-in-Charge, or the USCIS Field Office Director, Asylum Office Director or Service Center Director.

Except as specifically provided in this memorandum, prosecutorial discretion shall not be exercised in a manner that exempts or excludes a specified class or category of aliens from enforcement of the immigration laws. The General Counsel shall issue guidance consistent with these principles to all attorneys involved in immigration proceedings.

Foundational Principle: The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion

It is well established in the law that federal government officials have broad discretion to decide who should be subject to arrest, detainers, removal proceedings, and the execution of removal orders. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration arena is a deep-rooted tradition. The United States Supreme Court stated this clearly in 2012:

"A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all."

In an opinion by Justice Scalia about twelve years earlier, the Supreme Court emphasized that enforcement discretion extends throughout the entire removal process, and at each stage of it the executive has the discretion to not pursue it.

It is estimated that there are more than 11 million undocumented or otherwise removable noncitizens in the United States. We do not have the resources to apprehend and seek the removal of every one of these noncitizens. Therefore, we need to exercise our discretion and determine whom to prioritize for immigration enforcement action.

In exercising our discretion, we are guided by the fact that the majority of undocumented noncitizens who could be subject to removal have been contributing members of our communities for years. They include individuals who work on the frontlines in the battle against COVID, lead our congregations of faith, teach our children, do back-breaking farm work to help deliver food to our table, and contribute in many other meaningful ways. Numerous times over the years, and presently, bipartisan groups of leaders have recognized these noncitizens' contributions to state and local communities and have tried to pass legislation that would provide a path to citizenship or other lawful status for the approximately 11 million undocumented noncitizens.

The fact an individual is a removable noncitizen therefore should not alone be the basis of an enforcement action against them. We will use our discretion and focus our enforcement resources in a more targeted way. Justice and our country's well-being require it.

By exercising our discretionary authority in a targeted way, we can focus our efforts on those who pose a threat to national security, public safety, and border security and thus threaten America's well-being. We do not lessen our commitment to enforce immigration law to the best of our ability. This is how we use the resources we have in a way that accomplishes our enforcement mission most effectively and justly.

Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities

We establish civil immigration enforcement priorities to most effectively achieve our goals with the resources we have. We will prioritize for apprehension and removal noncitizens who are a threat to our national security, public safety, and border security.

Threat to National Security

A noncitizen who engaged in or is suspected of terrorism or espionage, or terrorism-related or espionage-related activities, or who otherwise poses a danger to national security, is a priority for apprehension and removal.

Threat to Public Safety

A noncitizen who poses a current threat to public safety, typically because of serious criminal conduct, is a priority for apprehension and removal.

Whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety is not to be determined according to bright lines or categories. It instead requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.

There can be aggravating factors that militate in favor of enforcement action. Such factors can include, for example:

• the gravity of the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed;
• the nature and degree of harm caused by the criminal offense;
• the sophistication of the criminal offense;
• use or threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon;
• a serious prior criminal

Conversely, there can be mitigating factors that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. Such factors can include, for example:

• advanced or tender age;
• lengthy presence in the United States;
• a mental condition that may have contributed to the criminal conduct, or a physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment;
• status as a victim of crime or victim, witness, or party in legal proceedings;
• the impact of removal on family in the United States, such as loss of provider or caregiver;
• whether the noncitizen may be eligible for humanitarian protection or other immigration relief;
• military or other public service of the noncitizen or their immediate family;
• time since an offense and evidence of rehabilitation;
• conviction was vacated or

The above examples of aggravating and mitigating factors are not exhaustive. The circumstances under which an offense was committed could, for example, be an aggravating or mitigating factor depending on the facts. The broader public interest is also material in determining whether to take enforcement action. For example, a categorical determination that a domestic violence offense compels apprehension and removal could make victims of domestic violence more reluctant to report the offense conduct. The specific facts of a case should be determinative.

Again, our personnel must evaluate the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly. The overriding question is whether the noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety. Some of the factors relevant to making the determination are identified above.

The decision how to exercise prosecutorial discretion can be complicated and requires investigative work. Our personnel should not rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone. Rather, our personnel should, to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue. The gravity of an apprehension and removal on a noncitizen's life, and potentially the life of family members and the community, warrants the dedication of investigative and evaluative effort.

Threat to Border Security

A noncitizen who poses a threat to border security is a priority for apprehension and removal. A noncitizen is a threat to border security if:

• they are apprehended at the border or port of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States; or
• they are apprehended in the United States after unlawfully entering after November 1,

There could be other border security cases that present compelling facts that warrant enforcement action. In each case, there could be mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. Our personnel should evaluate the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly.

Section 1. Purpose. Over the last 4 years, the prior administration invited, administered, and oversaw an unprecedented flood of illegal immigration into the United States. Millions of illegal aliens crossed our borders or were permitted to fly directly into the United States on commercial flights and allowed to settle in American communities, in violation of longstanding Federal laws. Many of these aliens unlawfully within the United States present significant threats to national security and public safety, committing vile and heinous acts against innocent Americans. Others are engaged in hostile activities, including espionage, economic espionage, and preparations for terror-related activities. Many have abused the generosity of the American people, and their presence in the United States has cost taxpayers billions of dollars at the Federal, State, and local levels. Enforcing our Nation’s immigration laws is critically important to the national security and public safety of the United States. The American people deserve a Federal Government that puts their interests first and a Government that understands its sacred obligation to prioritize the safety, security, and financial and economic well-being of Americans. This order ensures that the Federal Government protects the American people by faithfully executing the immigration laws of the United States.

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible and removable aliens, particularly those aliens who threaten the safety or security of the American people. Further, it is the policy of the United States to achieve the total and efficient enforcement of those laws, including through lawful incentives and detention capabilities.

Sec. 3. Faithful Execution of the Immigration Laws. In furtherance of the policies described in section 2 of this order: [various Biden administration policies] are hereby revoked; and (b) Executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall take all appropriate action to promptly revoke all memoranda, guidance, or other policies based on the Executive Orders revoked in section 3(a) of this order and shall employ all lawful means to ensure the faithful execution of the immigration laws of the United States against all inadmissible and removable aliens. 

Sec. 4. Civil Enforcement Priorities. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take all appropriate action to enable the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to set priorities for their agencies that protect the public safety and national security interests of the American people, including by ensuring the successful enforcement of final orders of removal. Further, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that the primary mission of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations division is the enforcement of the provisions of the INA and other Federal laws related to the illegal entry and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States and the enforcement of the purposes of this order.

Sec. 5. Criminal Enforcement Priorities. The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall take all appropriate action to prioritize the prosecution of criminal offenses related to the unauthorized entry or continued unauthorized presence of aliens in the United States. 

146 S.Ct. 1

Supreme Court of the United States.

NOEM v. VASQUEZ PERDOMO (2025)

Opinion

The application for stay presented to Justice KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is granted. The July 11, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, case No. 2:25–cv–5605, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice KAVANAUGH, concurring in the grant of the application for stay.

I vote to grant the Government's application for an interim stay pending appeal of the District Court's injunction.

The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes immigration officers to “interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.” 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). Immigration officers “may briefly detain” an individual “for questioning” if they have “a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned ... is an alien illegally in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2025); see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). The reasonable suspicion inquiry turns on the “totality of the particular circumstances.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 885, n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2574; Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744.

The Government estimates that at least 15 million people are in the United States illegally. Many millions illegally entered (or illegally overstayed) just in the last few years.

Illegal immigration is especially pronounced in the Los Angeles area, among other locales in the United States. About 10 percent of the people in the Los Angeles region are illegally in the United States—meaning about 2 million illegal immigrants out of a total population of 20 million.

Not surprisingly given those extraordinary numbers, U. S. immigration officers have prioritized immigration enforcement in the Los Angeles area. The Government sometimes makes brief investigative stops to check the immigration status of those who gather in locations where people are hired for day jobs; who work or appear to work in jobs such as construction, landscaping, agriculture, or car washes that often do not require paperwork and are therefore attractive to illegal immigrants; and who do not speak much if any English. If the officers learn that the individual they stopped is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, they promptly let the individual go. If the individual is illegally in the United States, the officers may arrest the individual and initiate the process for removal.

Immigration stops based on reasonable suspicion of illegal presence have been an important component of U. S. immigration enforcement for decades, across several presidential administrations. In this case, however, the District Court enjoined U.S. immigration officers from making investigative stops in the Los Angeles area when the stops are based on the following factors or combination of factors: (i) presence at particular locations such as bus stops, car washes, day laborer pickup sites, agricultural sites, and the like; (ii) the type of work one does; (iii) speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent; and (iv) apparent race or ethnicity.¹ …

To stop an individual for brief questioning about immigration status, the Government must have reasonable suspicion that the individual is illegally present in the United States. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 880–882, 95 S.Ct. 2574; Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and “considerably short” of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 885, n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2574; Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744. Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 884–885, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (listing “[a]ny number of factors” that contribute to reasonable suspicion of illegal presence). To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court's case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a “relevant factor” when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887, 95 S.Ct. 2574.

Under this Court's precedents, not to mention common sense, those circumstances taken together can constitute at least reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the United States. Importantly, reasonable suspicion means only that immigration officers may briefly stop the individual and inquire about immigration status. If the person is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter. Only if the person is illegally in the United States may the stop lead to further immigration proceedings.

In short, given this Court's precedents, the Government has demonstrated a fair prospect of success both on standing and Fourth Amendment grounds. To conclude otherwise, this Court would likely have to overrule or significantly narrow two separate lines of precedents: the Lyons line of cases with respect to standing and the Brignoni-Ponce line of cases with respect to immigration stops based on reasonable suspicion. In this interim posture, plaintiffs have not made a persuasive argument for this Court to overrule or narrow either line of precedent, much less both of them.

… To be sure, I recognize and fully appreciate that many (not all, but many) illegal immigrants come to the United States to escape poverty and the lack of freedom and opportunities in their home countries, and to make better lives for themselves and their families. And I understand that they may feel somewhat misled by the varying U.S. approaches to immigration enforcement over the last few decades. But the fact remains that, under the laws passed by Congress and the President, they are acting illegally by remaining in the United States—at least unless Congress and the President choose some other legislative approach to legalize some or all of those individuals now illegally present in the country. And by illegally immigrating into and remaining in the country, they are not only violating the immigration laws, but also jumping in front of those noncitizens who follow the rules and wait in line to immigrate into the United States through the legal immigration process. For those reasons, the interests of illegal immigrants in evading questioning (and thus evading detection of their illegal presence) are not particularly substantial as a legal matter.

Moreover, as for stops of those individuals who are legally in the country, the questioning in those circumstances is typically brief, and those individuals may promptly go free after making clear to the immigration officers that they are U. S. citizens or otherwise legally in the United States. . .

Especially in an immigration case like this one, it is also important to stress the proper role of the Judiciary. The Judiciary does not set immigration policy or decide enforcement priorities. It should come as no surprise that some Administrations may be more laissez-faire in enforcing immigration law, and other Administrations more strict. Article III judges may have views on which policy approach is better or fairer. But judges are not appointed to make those policy calls. We merely ensure, in justiciable cases, that the Executive Branch acts within the confines of the Constitution and federal statutes. Just as this Court a few years ago declined to step outside our constitutionally assigned role to improperly compel greater Executive Branch enforcement of the immigration laws, see United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 143 S.Ct. 1964, 216 L.Ed.2d 624; Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 142 S.Ct. 2528, 213 L.Ed.2d 956, we now likewise must decline to step outside our constitutionally assigned role to improperly restrict reasonable Executive Branch enforcement of the immigration laws. Consistency and neutrality are hallmarks of good judging, and in my view, we abide by those enduring judicial values in this case by granting the stay.

In sum, the Government has demonstrated a fair prospect of success on the merits and has met the other factors for an interim stay pending appeal of the District Court's injunction. I therefore vote to grant the Government's application.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

In early June, the Government launched immigration enforcement raids across Los Angeles and its surrounding counties. During the raids, teams of armed and masked agents pulled up to car washes, tow yards, farms, and parks and began seizing individuals on sight, often before asking a single question.

A Federal District Court found that these raids were part of a pattern of conduct by the Government that likely violated the Fourth Amendment. Based on the evidence before it, the court held that the Government was stopping individuals based solely on four factors: (1) their apparent race or ethnicity; (2) whether they spoke Spanish or English with an accent; (3) the type of location at which they were found (such as a car wash or bus stop); and (4) the type of job they appeared to work. Concluding that stops based on these four factors alone, even when taken together, could not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonable suspicion, the District Court temporarily enjoined the Government from continuing its pattern of unlawful mass arrests while it considered whether longer-term relief was appropriate.

Instead of allowing the District Court to consider these troubling allegations in the normal course, a majority of this Court decides to take the once-extraordinary step of staying the District Court's order. That decision is yet another grave misuse of our emergency docket. We should not have to live in a country where the Government can seize anyone who looks Latino, speaks Spanish, and appears to work a low wage job. Rather than stand idly by while our constitutional freedoms are lost, I dissent.

I.A

In early June, the Government launched “Operation At Large” in Los Angeles, deploying roving patrols of armed and masked immigration agents to local car washes, Home Depots, tow yards, bus stops, farms, recycling centers, churches, and parks. Over the course of the next month, the Government made nearly 2,800 immigration-related arrests and detained many more.

For instance, on June 9, immigration agents arrived at a tow yard in Montebello “carrying handguns” and “military-style rifle[s].” *7 ECF Doc. 45–9, p. 6.¹ Jason Gavidia, a Latino U. S. citizen, was working on his car in the tow yard that day. A masked agent ordered Gavidia to “ ‘[s]top right there’ ” and began asking him questions. Ibid. Agents then asked Gavidia whether he is “American at least three times”; three times, Gavidia affirmed that he is. Ibid. Unsatisfied, the agents asked Gavidia for the name of the hospital in which he was born, and when Gavidia could not immediately recall, the agents racked a rifle, took Gavidia's phone, “pushed [him] up against the metal gated fence, put [his] hands behind [his] back, and twisted [his] arm.” Id., at 6–7. Agents released Gavidia only after he offered up his REAL ID. That ID was never returned to him.

Less than 10 miles away in Whittier, immigration agents raided a car wash managed by U. S. citizen Jorge Viramontes. In the nine days between June 9 and 19, agents returned four times, each instance in the middle of the workday. On one occasion, an agent questioned Viramontes, asking if he is a citizen and requesting that he show his ID. Viramontes replied that he is a dual U. S. and Mexican citizen and supplied his California driver's license. The agent said the ID was insufficient, “grabbed [his] arm,” escorted him to a vehicle, and drove him to a “warehouse area” for further questioning. ECF Doc. 45–4, p. 6. Agents detained Viramontes for 20 minutes while they made calls to verify his U. S. citizenship and examined his Mexican ID before eventually driving him back to work.

Other Operation At Large encounters have included even more force and even fewer questions. For example, agents pulled up in four unmarked cars to a bus stop in Pasadena; “the doors opened and men in masks with guns started running at” three Latino men who were having their morning coffee, waiting to be picked up for work. ECF Doc. 45–1, p. 5. In Glendale, nearly a dozen masked agents with guns “jumped out of ... cars” at a Home Depot, and began “chasing” and “tackl[ing]” Latino day laborers without “identify[ing] themselves as ICE or police, ask[ing] questions, or say[ing] anything else.” ECF Doc. 45–6, pp. 5–6. In downtown Los Angeles, agents “jumped out of a van, rushed up to [a tamale vendor], surrounded him, and handled him violently,” all “[w]ithout asking ... any questions.” ECF Doc. 38–9, p. 7; see also, e.g., ECF Doc. 45–14, p. 5 (masked agents with guns “ran out of the vehicles and rushed towards the workers” at a car wash); ECF Doc. 45–11, pp. 5–6 (three masked agents wearing bullet-proof vests got out of a car with “rifles” at a Home Depot and tear-gassed the crowd).

The operation has sparked “panic and fear” across Los Angeles and its surrounding areas. ECF Doc. 45–8, p. 10. Some have likened the detentions to “kidnapping[s].” ECF Doc. 45–2, p. 5; ECF Doc. 45–3, p. 5; ECF Doc. 45–7, p. 7. One Latino U. S. citizen “feel[s] like [he] need[s] to carry [his] passport for protection, in case federal agents stop [him] again.” ECF Doc. 45–21, p. 5. Another Latino U. S. citizen similarly “worries that as a visibly Latino man, he could be detained” if he does not carry his passport, but “decided against [doing so] because he believes that as an American, he should not have to live like that in his own country.” ECF Doc. 38–9, at 6. Many are “struggl[ing] to make ends meet” because they are “afraid to go to work.” ECF Doc. 45–8, at 15; see ECF Doc. 45–13, p. 8. *8 Others are “reluctant to attend school meetings” and “pick their children up from school” for fear of being detained. ECF Doc. 45–8, at 12. … 

A

The Government, and now the concurrence, has all but declared that all Latinos, U. S. citizens or not, who work low wage jobs are fair game to be seized at any time, taken away from work, and held until they provide proof of their legal status to the agents’ satisfaction. As the District Court found, and the Government does not meaningfully contest, the present evidence reveals that the Operation At Large “seizures occurred based solely upon the four enumerated factors, either alone or in combination.” App. 100a. The Government now asks this Court to bless that conduct, at least temporarily, by issuing a stay. The Government, however, has not demonstrated the necessary likelihood of success on the merits to warrant this Court's extraordinary intervention.

1

The Fourth Amendment “imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). “[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that seizure be reasonable.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As relevant here, officers may stop an individual “only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the individual “may be illegally in the country.” Id., at 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574. This requires “more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

Critically, a set of facts cannot constitute reasonable suspicion if it “describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent” people. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam). In Brignoni-Ponce, *11 for example, the Court held that “Mexican ancestry” alone did not constitute reasonable suspicion to support stops by Border Patrol agents, even near the border, because “[l]arge numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry.” 422 U.S. at 886–887, 95 S.Ct. 2574. So too in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51–52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Court held that standing in an alley in a “neighborhood frequented by drug users” did not rise to reasonable suspicion because that activity was “no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood.” See also Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 385, n. 1, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020) (reiterating the need for “an individualized suspicion that a particular citizen was engaged in a particular crime” beyond just a “demographic profile” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Fourth Amendment thus prohibits exactly what the Government is attempting to do here: seize individuals based solely on a set of facts that “describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent” people. Reid, 448 U.S., at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752. As the District Court correctly held, the four factors—apparent race or ethnicity, speaking Spanish or English with an accent, location, and type of work—are “no more indicative of illegal presence in the country than of legal presence.” App. 105a. The factors also in no way reflect the kind of individualized inquiry the Fourth Amendment demands. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S., at 21, n. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“This demand for specificity ... is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (relying on particularized facts about the vehicle and its passengers to justify stop based on reasonable suspicion). Allowing the seizure of any Latino speaking Spanish at a car wash in Los Angeles tramples the constitutional requirement that officers “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

The Government, joined by the concurrence, brushes aside this Court's precedent with an appeal to probability, arguing that the “high prevalence” of undocumented immigrants in the Central District “should enable agents to stop a relatively broad range of individuals.” Application to Stay TRO 28. Without even a citation, the Government asserts that “10 percent of the population in the Central District” is unlawfully present, so it is “inevitable and unremarkable” that immigration officers would target any Latino person, or any person speaking accented English, or any person standing in a particular type of location, or any person working a low wage job in the greater Los Angeles area. Ibid. Never mind that nearly 47 percent of the Central District's population identifies as Hispanic or Latino. App. 45a; ECF Doc. 45–19, pp. 6–7. Never mind that over 37 percent of the population of Los Angeles County speaks Spanish at home, and over 55 percent speak a language other than English. App. 46a. “Of course, aggregate statistics ... cannot substitute for the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires.” Glover, 589 U.S., at 390, 140 S.Ct. 1183, n. (KAGAN, J., concurring).⁶

In fact, the Court rejected a similar argument levied by the Government in Brignoni-Ponce. There, the Government asserted that it could stop drivers of apparent Mexican ancestry in border areas because most undocumented immigrants in those areas are Mexican and most “leave the border area in private vehicles.” 422 U.S. at 879, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Unlike today, the Court there rightly rejected the Government's rationales because they would cover “a large volume of legitimate traffic as well.” Id., at 882, 95 S.Ct. 2574. “[W]ithout any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying [undocumented] immigrants,” the Government's broad, statistical approach to reasonable suspicion “would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Rather, the Court found that reasonable suspicion required additional factors, particularly ones specific to a given vehicle or individual, such as “[t]he driver's behavior,” whether the vehicle is “heavily loaded” or has “an extraordinary number of passengers,” or whether the officer “observe[s] persons trying to hide.” Id., at 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574. The holding and reasoning in Brignoni-Ponce clearly supports, rather than undermines, the District Court's injunction here. Contra, ante, at 3–4 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant of application for stay).

Next, the Government moves beyond background demographics and argues that the four factors limited by the TRO could, in some hypothetical scenarios, give rise to reasonable suspicion. For example, the Government posits that if agents had intelligence that a workplace was “known to have hired 100” undocumented individuals “the prior week,” immigration enforcement officials might well have reasonable suspicion to stop a person at that site. Application to Stay TRO 25. This argument fares no better than the first. As an initial matter, that proffered scenario falls outside the scope of the TRO. A seizure on those hypothetical facts would not rest solely on the four factors but would instead incorporate an additional probative fact: the intelligence about a particular employer's recent hiring decisions. App. 107a. Nothing in the TRO prevents the Government from conducting such a seizure.

In any event, Operation At Large bears little resemblance to the Government's hypothetical. The Government has provided no evidence showing that its seizures were based on credible intelligence about a particular employer at a particular location. Indeed, the Government submitted no evidence about what facts its agents relied upon to conduct most of the seizures documented in the record. Rather, its declarations suggest that the Government generally targeted locations based on the “types of businesses” that, in the agents’ generalized experiences, undocumented immigrants supposedly frequent. ECF Doc. 71–2, at 2 (emphasis added). That is plainly insufficient to give rise to a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] particular person” under the Fourth Amendment. *13 Cortez, 449 U.S., at 417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690.⁷ …

The Fourth Amendment protects every individual's constitutional right to be “free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574. After today, that may no longer be true for those who happen to look a certain way, speak a certain way, and appear to work a certain type of legitimate job that pays very little. Because this is unconscionably irreconcilable with our Nation's constitutional guarantees, I dissent.