Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted the writ in this case to consider a narrow but important question in the application of the federal perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621:1 whether a witness *353may be convicted of perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally true but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative implication.

Petitioner is the sole owner of Samuel Bronston Productions, Inc., a company that between 1958 and 1964, produced motion pictures in various European locations. For these enterprises, Bronston Productions opened bank accounts in a number of foreign countries; in 1962, for example, it had 37 accounts in five countries. As president of Bronston Productions, petitioner supervised transactions involving the foreign bank accounts.

In June 1964, Bronston Productions petitioned for an arrangement with creditors under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. On June 10, 1966, a referee in bankruptcy held a § 21 (a) hearing to determine, for the benefit of creditors, the extent and location of the company’s assets.2 Petitioner’s perjury *354conviction was founded on the answers given by him as a witness at that bankruptcy hearing, and in particular on the following colloquy with a lawyer for a creditor of Bronston Productions:

“Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. Have you ever?

“A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.

“Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss banks?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. Have you ever?

“A. No, sir.”

It is undisputed that for a period of nearly five years, between October 1959 and June 1964, petitioner had a personal bank account at the International Credit Bank in Geneva, Switzerland, into which he made deposits and upon which he drew checks totaling more than $180,000. It is likewise undisputed that petitioner’s answers were literally truthful, (a) Petitioner did not at the time of questioning have a Swiss bank account, (b) Bronston Productions, Inc., did have the account in Zurich described by petitioner, (c) Neither at the time *355of questioning nor before did petitioner have nominees who had Swiss accounts. The Government’s prosecution for perjury went forward on the theory that in order to mislead his questioner, petitioner answered the second question with literal truthfulness but unresponsively addressed his answer to the company’s assets and not to his own — thereby implying that he had no personal Swiss bank account at the relevant time.

At petitioner’s trial, the District Court instructed the jury that the “basic issue” was whether petitioner “spoke his true belief.” Perjury, the court stated, “necessarily involves the state of mind of the accused” and “essentially consists of wilfully testifying to the truth of a fact which the defendant does not believe to be true”; petitioner’s testimony could not be found “wilfully” false unless at the time his testimony was given petitioner “fully understood the questions put to him but nevertheless gave false answers knowing the same to be false.” The court further instructed the jury that if petitioner did not understand the question put to him and for that reason gave an unresponsive answer, he could not be convicted of perjury. Petitioner could, however, be convicted if he gave an answer “not literally false but when considered in the context in which it was given, nevertheless constitute [d] a false statement.”3 *356The jury began its deliberations at 11:30 a. m. Several times it requested exhibits or additional instructions from the court, and at one point, at the request of the jury, the District Court repeated its instructions in full. At 6:10 p. m., the jury returned its verdict, finding petitioner guilty on the count of perjury before us today and not guilty on another charge not here relevant.

In the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended, as he had in post-trial motions before the District Court, that the key question was imprecise and suggestive of various interpretations. In addition, petitioner contended that he could not be convicted of perjury on the basis of testimony that was concededly truthful, however unresponsive. A divided Court of Appeals held that the question was readily susceptible of .a responsive reply and that it adequately tested the defendant’s belief in the veracity of his answer. The Court of Appeals further held that, “[f]or the purposes of 18 U. S. C. § 1621, an answer containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by negative implication, when the answer is intentionally given in place of the responsive answer called for by a proper question, is perjury.” 453 F. 2d 555, 559. In this Court, petitioner renews his attack on the specificity of the question asked him and the legal sufficiency of his answer to support a conviction for perjury. The problem of the ambiguity of the question is not free from doubt, but we need not reach that issue. *357Even assuming, as we do, that the question asked petitioner specifically focused on petitioner’s personal bank accounts, we conclude that the federal perjury statute cannot be construed to sustain a conviction based on petitioner’s answer.

The statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621, substantially identical in its relevant language to its predecessors for nearly a century, is “a federal statute enacted in an effort to keep the course of justice free from the pollution of perjury.” United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 58, 68 (1951). We have held that the general federal perjury provision is applicable to federal bankruptcy proceedings. Hammer v. United States, 271 U. S. 620 (1926). The need for truthful testimony in a § 21 (a) bankruptcy proceeding is great, since the proceeding is “a searching inquiry into the condition of the estate of the bankrupt, to assist in discovering and collecting the assets, and to develop facts and circumstances which bear upon the question of discharge.” Travis v. United States, 123 F. 2d 268, 271 (CA10 1941). Here, as elsewhere, the perpetration of perjury “well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. .. .” United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 574 (1937).

There is, at the outset, a serious literal problem in applying § 1621 to petitioner’s answer. The words of the statute confine the offense to the witness who “willfully . . . states . . . any material matter which he does not believe to be true.” Beyond question, petitioner’s answer to the crucial question was not responsive if we assume, as we do, that the first question was directed at personal bank accounts. There is, indeed, an implication in the answer to the second question that there was never a personal bank account; in casual conversation this interpretation might reasonably be drawn. But we are not dealing with casual conversation and the statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully *358state any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true.4

The Government urges that the perjury statute be construed broadly to reach petitioner’s answer and thereby fulfill its historic purpose of reinforcing our adversary factfinding process. We might go beyond the precise words of the statute if we thought they did not adequately express the intention of Congress, but we perceive no reason why Congress would intend the drastic sanction of a perjury prosecution to cure a testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question by counsel alerb — as every examiner ought to be — to the incongruity of petitioner’s unresponsive answer. Under the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive. Sometimes the witness does not understand the question, or may in an excess of caution or apprehension read too much or too little into it. It should come as no surprise that a participant in a bankruptcy proceeding may have something to conceal and consciously tries to do so, or that a debtor may be embarrassed at h'is plight and yield information reluctantly. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe ; testimonial interrogation, and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry. If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to *359the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.

It is no answer to say that here the jury found that petitioner intended to mislead his examiner. A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether “he does not believe [his answer] to be true.” To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners, and might well fear having that responsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mislead” or “perjurv by implication.” The seminal modern treatment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy overshadowed all others during the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law offense: “that the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.” Study of Perjury, reprinted in Report of New York Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc. No. 60, p. 249 (1935). A leading 19th century commentator, quoted by Dean Wigmore, noted that the English law “throws every fence round a person accused of perjury,” for

“the obligation of protecting witnesses from oppression, or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having borne false testimony, is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts. To repress that crime, prevention is better than cure: and the law of England relies, for this purpose, on the means provided for detecting and exposing the crime at the moment of commission, — such as publicity, *360cross-examination, the aid of a jury, etc.; and on the infliction of a severe, though not excessive punishment, wherever the commission of the crime has been clearly proved.” W. Best, Principles of the Law of Evidence § 606 (C. Chamberlayne ed. 1883).

See J. Wigmore, Evidence 275-276 (3d ed. 1940). Addressing the same problem, Montesquieu took as his starting point the French tradition of capital punishment for perjury and the relatively mild English punishment of the pillory. He thought the disparity between the punishments could be explained because the French did not permit the accused to present his own witnesses, while in England “they admit of witnesses on both sides, and the affair is discussed in some measure between them; consequently false witness is there less dangerous, the accused having a remedy against the false witnesses, which he has not in France.” Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, quoted in Study of Perjury, supra, p. 253.

Thus, we must read § 1621 in light of our own and the traditional Anglo-American judgment that a prosecution for perjury is not the sole, or even the primary, safeguard against errant testimony. While “the lower federal courts have not dealt with the question often,” and while their expressions do not deal with unresponsive testimony and are not precisely in point, “it may be said that they preponderate against the respondent’s contention.” United States v. Norris, 300 U. S., at 576. The cases support petitioner’s position that the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner — so long as the witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry. United States v. Wall, 371 F. 2d 398 (CA6 1967); United States v. Slutzky, 79 F. 2d 504 (CA3 *3611935); Galanos v. United States, 49 F. 2d 898 (CA6 1931); United States v. Cobert, 227 F. Supp. 915 (SD Cal. 1964).

The Government does not contend that any misleading or incomplete response must be sent to the jury to determine whether a witness committed perjury because he intended to sidetrack his questioner. As the Government recognizes, the effect of so unlimited an interpretation of §1621 would be broadly unsettling. It is said, rather, that petitioner’s testimony falls within a more limited category of intentionally misleading responses with an especially strong tendency to mislead the questioner. In the federal cases cited above, the Government tells us the defendants gave simple negative answers “that were both entirely responsive and entirely truthful .... In neither case did the defendant — as did petitioner here — make affirmative statements of one fact that in context constituted denials by negative implication of a related fact.” Thus the Government isolates two factors which are said to require application of the perjury statute in the circumstances of this case: the unresponsiveness of petitioner’s answer and the affirmative cast of that answer, with its accompanying negative implication.

This analysis succeeds in confining the Government’s position, but it does not persuade us that Congress intended to extend the coverage of § 1621 to answers unresponsive on their face but untrue only by “negative implication.” Though perhaps a plausible argument can be made that unresponsive answers are especially likely to mislead,5 any such argument must, *362we think, be predicated upon the questioner's being aware of the unresponsiveness of the relevant answer. Yet, if the questioner is aware of the unresponsiveness of the answer, with equal force it can be argued that the very unresponsiveness of the answer should alert counsel to press on for the information he desires. It does not matter that the unresponsive answer is stated in the affirmative, thereby implying the negative of the question actually posed; for again, by hypothesis, the examiner’s awareness of unresponsiveness should lead him to press another question or reframe his initial question with greater precision. Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.

It may well be that petitioner's answers were not guileless but were shrewdly calculated to evade. Nevertheless, we are constrained to agree with Judge Lumbard, who dissented from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that any special problems arising from the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the “questioner’s acuity” and not by a federal perjury prosecution.

Reversed.

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:

Laura Kross appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in March 1993, after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont before Franklin S. Billings, Jr., J. Kross was indicted on five counts of making false declarations in a civil deposition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and the jury found her guilty on three counts. The Sentencing Guidelines called for a range of 15-21 months in prison, but the district judge departed downward six levels and sentenced Kross to three concurrent terms of three years probation. Kross argues on appeal that the district judge erred in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment on various grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Factual Background

Earth People’s Park (the Park), a 592-acre parcel of land in the extreme northeastern corner of Vermont, is owned by Earth People’s Park, Inc., a California corporation (the Corporation). Since the founding of the Park in 1970, the Corporation has allowed people to come to the Park at no charge in order to live in harmony with nature. Kross resided in the Park from 1971 to 1979, when she moved to nearby Brownington, Vermont.

In 1990, the United States filed a civil forfeiture complaint against the Park pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). United States v. Earth People’s Park, Consisting of 592 Acres, More or Less, Located in Norton, Vermont, with all Appurtenances and Attachments Thereon, Civil No. 90-273 (D.Vt.) (pending). The United States sought forfeiture on the grounds that the property was being used for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana. The Corporation asserted the defense of innocent ownership, claiming that it had no knowledge of illegal drug-related activity at the Park.

The Assistant United States Attorney conducting the forfeiture litigation deposed Kross in January 1991, at which time she was accompanied by an attorney representing the Corporation. The testimony of Kross at the *753deposition formed the basis for the three counts of the indictment (Counts III, IV and V) on which she was convicted. Count III set forth her responses to questions about her knowledge of illegal drug use in the Park, as follows:1

Q: Did you ever see anyone smoking marijuana in the Park?

A: Not to the best of my recollection. When I lived up there, I kept pretty much to myself.

Q: With regard to Koslosky, Greenip and Brown and Gagliola/2 did you ever see them smoking marijuana in the Park?

A: No, uh-uh.

Q: Do you have any information as to whether they did smoke marijuana in the Park?

A: No, nobody’s ever come and said that to me.

Count IV concerned her knowledge of marijuana cultivation in the Park:

Q: Did you ever see anyone grow marijuana on [Earth People’s] Park property?

A: No.

Q: Even if you didn’t see anyone grow it. Did you ever see anyone grow it there?

A: No. It’s a big 600 acres.

Q: Did you ever have any information about [Koslosky, Greenip, Brown and Gagliola] growing marijuana in the Park?

A: Definitely not.

Count V concerned her prior criminal history:

Q: Have you ever been arrested?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever been charged by State or Federal authorities with any crime?

A: No.

Q: Really, I’m not asking whether you’ve been convicted; Pm asking whether you’ve been charged?

A: No, not that I remember.

At trial, the government presented testimony to show that Kross was aware of the use and cultivation of the marijuana by Park residents. Evidence also showed that Kross had been charged with felonies in Vermont state court in 1980 and 1990.

II. Discussion

Kross argues that the district court erred in denying her pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the information sought in the deposition was immaterial to the underlying forfeiture proceeding, that the deposition questions at issue were fundamentally ambiguous and that her statements were literally true.

A. Materiality

Section 1623(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:

Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (Emphasis supplied).

Kross contends that the indictment should have been dismissed because none of her allegedly false declarations were material to the civil forfeiture action. We disagree.

We have consistently held in the grand jury context that a false declaration is “material” within the meaning of § 1623 when it has “‘a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation.’ ” United States v. Kiszewski 877 F.2d 210, 218 (2d *754Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980)). We have pointed out that in a § 1623 prosecution for false declarations to a grand jury,

[mjatters arguably cumulative or collateral to the grand jury’s objective in a given case are considered for their potential to aid that body, not for the probability of assistance from a truthful answer.

United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1993). Because the grand jury’s function is investigative, materiality in that context is “broadly construed.” Id. However, we have apparently not yet addressed the issue of materiality under § 1623 in the context of a deposition in a civil matter. The purpose of civil discovery is also investigative, and the scope of discovery includes any information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).

The Fifth Circuit has held that for purposes of § 1623, materiality in a civil discovery deposition is not limited to evidence admissible at trial, but includes matters properly the subject of and material to a deposition under Rule 26(b)(1). United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 77, 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993). The Ninth and Sixth Circuits have also adapted a materiality definition under § 1623 to the civil deposition context. ' See United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1146-48 (6th Cir.1989). But the resultant definition is considerably narrower than that of the Fifth Circuit: it requires not merely discoverability under Rule 26(b)(1), but also the tendency of the false statement itself to affect the outcome of the underlying civil suit for which the deposition was taken. See Clark, 918 F.2d at 847; Adams, 870 F.2d at 1147.

The facts of the present case favor a broad construction of the definition of materiality similar to the approach we have already used in the grand jury context. While a government deposition in a forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 is civil in form, forfeiture actions are predicated upon a nexus between the property and criminal activity. See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2d Cir.1989), reh’g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990). Under the circumstances of this case, we see no persuasive reason not to apply the broad standard for materiality of whether a truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit.

We turn now to apply this broad standard to the facts of this case. With respect to Counts III and IV, Kross maintains that she was not. an agent of the Corporation. Therefore, she argues, any knowledge she may have had concerning drug use or cultivation at the Park was not attributable to the Corporation and was thus immaterial to the forfeiture proceeding against the Corporation. At the time the questions were asked, however, the government was entitled to explore her knowledge based on the theory that she was an agent. Certainly, Kross’ denial of agency would not end the matter, in view of evidence that she had represented herself to the Assistant conducting the deposition as the agent of the Corporation and had acted as its agent in the past. In any case, even if Kross was not the Corporation’s agent, the information sought was material in that it concerned not only her knowledge of drug activity at the Park, but also the existence of drug activity.

As to Count III, Kross further argues that the information sought was immaterial to. the forfeiture suit because marijuana smoking is not a felony justifying forfeiture under Title 21. Thus, she argues, even if she had testified that she had knowledge of marijuana smoking, that would not have demonstrated that the Park was being used to facilitate the more serious narcotics crimes that could justify a forfeiture. We disagree with this reasoning. It is true that neither marijuana smoking nor knowledge thereof constitutes independent grounds for civil forfeiture. Nevertheless, evidence of marijuana smoking on Park property was material at the discovery stage of the forfeiture proceeding because such evidence might lead to evi*755dence of cultivation or distribution of marijuana, which would justify forfeiture.

With respect to Count IV, Kross also argues that she “could reasonably have understood” the questions to refer to the time when she lived in the Park in the 1970s. Thus, she claims, her answer about marijuana cultivation was immaterial because it did not concern the drug crimes that formed the basis for the 1990 forfeiture proceeding, but rather concerned activity predating the five-year statute of ■ limitations period for § 881 forfeiture actions. Kross’ argument is unconvincing, however, because the questioner clearly asked Kross if she had “ever” seen or had information about marijuana cultivation in the Park. In addition, as the district court correctly found,

Although evidence of pre-1985 drug crimes could not legally constitute a basis forfor-feiture, evidence that [the Corporation] knew of illegal pre-1985 drug activity could certainly have led to information that the [Corporation was not an “innocent owner,” as well as an inference that the [Corporation failed to satisfy its affirmative duty to safeguard the property from further drug activity.

Furthermore, the prior marijuana cultivation, while not the basis for the forfeiture proceeding, is nonetheless relevant to discovery regarding the later cultivation that did form the basis for the proceeding.

With respect to Count V, Kross argues that the statements regarding her prior criminal history were not material because they could have produced no useful testimony. Furthermore, she argues, the Assistant United States Attorney already knew of the prior charges against her.

Turning to the latter argument first, whether the questioner knows the answer to a question is irrelevant to materiality. Cf. United States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 645, 646 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S.Ct. 2645, 45 L.Ed.2d 696 (1975). As to the usefulness of truthful responses, the 1990 charges eventually resulted in a conviction. Since Kross was convicted of welfare fraud, a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement,” evidence of the conviction might have been admissible at trial of the forfeiture action to impeach Kross’s credibility if she were a witness. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Though matters relating to the credibility of a prospective witness might not always be material within the meaning of the perjury statute, see United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (2d Cir.1971), in this case there was evidence that Kross represented herself to the prosecutor as an agent of the owner of the defendant property. In such circumstances, matters affecting her credibility were material. Cf. United States v. Salinas, 923 F.2d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir.1991) (witness’s credibility material where witness was defendant in underlying action); United States v. Sablosky, 810 F.2d 167, 169 (8th Cir.1987) (same).

Although the 1980 charges were ultimately dismissed, the charges concerned marijuana possession. Thus, truthful testimony concerning those charges might have led to evidence of other drug-related activity by Kross.

B. Ambiguity

Kross contends that her statements referred to in Counts III and IV of the indictment cannot have been perjurious because the questions asked were fundamentally ambiguous. She argues that because the questions were asked in the context of other questions about the year 1975, she assumed the questions referred to marijuana smoking and cultivation in the year 1975. According to Kross, the indictment alleges that she grew marijuana sometime between 1976 and 1990 and thus fails to allege that her answer was false.

While it is true that answers to “fundamentally ambiguous” questioning may be insufficient to support a perjury conviction, United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir.1986), Kross’ argument is wholly without merit. The indictment in fact alleges that Kross knew of and participated in marijuana cultivation between 1975 and 1990. Moreover, in both instances, the questioner clearly asked Kross if she had “ever” seen anyone *756smoking or growing marijuana in the Park. We agree with the district court that “ever” is not an imprecise word.

C. Literal Truth

Kross argues that her answer to the third question in Count III, “No, nobody’s ever come and said that to me,” was “literally true,” .if unresponsive, and thus could not have constituted perjury. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 373-74. She claims the statement was true because no one ever told her that Koslosky, Greenip, Brown, and Gag-liola were smoking marijuana in the Park. Kross advances the same argument with respect to her answer to the third question in Count IV, concerning whether she had information about the four men growing marijuana in the Park. She claims that by her answer, she meant that no one had told her about growing marijuana.

We reject this argument. Even assuming that her answer to the third question in Count III was literally true, the count also includes two questions and answers on the same topic which were answered responsively in the negative. As for Count IV, the “literal truth” argument is preposterous, since Kross gave the fully responsive and unequivocal answer, “Definitely not” to a question that asked her whether she ever had any information about the four men growing marijuana in the Park.

We have examined all of appellant’s arguments and find them to be without merit. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Per Curiam Opinion; Concurrence by Judge KOZINSKI; Concurrence by Judge N.R. SMITH; Concurrence by Judge

REINHARDT; Concurrence by Judge W. FLETCHER; Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

During a grand jury proceeding, defendant gave a rambling, non-responsive answer to a simple question. Because there is insufficient evidence that Statement C was material, defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is not supported by the record. Whatever section 1503’s scope may be in other circumstances, defendant’s conviction here must be reversed.

A reversal for insufficient evidence implicates defendant’s right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1028 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)). His conviction and sentence must therefore be vacated, and he may not be tried again on that count.

REVERSED.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,

with whom Circuit Judges O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, CALLAHAN and NGUYEN join,

concurring:

Can a single non-responsive answer by a grand jury witness support a conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503?

I

Defendant, who was then a professional baseball player, was summoned before a grand jury and questioned for nearly three hours about his suspected use of steroids. He was subsequently charged with four counts of making false statements and one count of obstruction of justice, all based on his grand jury testimony. The jury con*583victed him on the obstruction count and was otherwise unable to reach a verdict.

The jury instructions identified seven of defendant’s statements that the government alleged obstructed justice. The jury, however, found only one statement obstructive. That statement was referred to as Statement C at trial and is italicized in the passage below:

Q: Did Greg[, your trainer,]' ever give you anything that required a syringe to inject yourself with?

A: I’ve only had one doctor touch me. And that’s my only personal doctor. Greg, like I said, we don’t get into each others’ personal lives. We’re ' Mends, but I don’t — we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because he knows I don’t want — don’t come to my house talking baseball. If you want to come to my house and talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good Mends. You come around talking about baseball, you go on. I don’t talk about his business. You know what I mean?

Q: Right.

A: That’s what keeps our friendship. You know, I am sorry, but that— you know, that — I was a celebrity child, not just in baseball by my own instincts. I became a celebrity child with a famous father. I just don’t get into other people’s business because of my father’s situation, you see. '

Defendant was again asked about inject-able steroids immediately following this exchange and a few other times during his testimony. He provided direct responses to the follow-up questions. For example, he was asked whether he ever “injected [him]self with anything that Greg ... gave [him].” He responded “I’m not that talented, no.” The government believed that those answers were false but, as noted, 'the jury failed to convict defendant on the false statement counts.

The district court rejected defendant’s post-verdict motion for acquittal on the obstruction count and a three-judge panel affirmed. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890 (9th Cir.2013). We granted en banc rehearing. United States v. Bonds, 757 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2014).

II

A. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), which defendant was convicted of violating, 'provides in relevant part as follows: “Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).” Known as the omnibus clause, this language “was designed to proscribe all manner of corrupt methods of obstructing justice.” United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981). We have held that a defendant “corruptly” obstructs justice if he acts “with the purpose of obstructing justice.” Id.

As should be apparent, section 1503’s coverage is vast. By its literal terms, it applies to all stages of the criminal and civil justice process, not just to conduct in the courtroom but also to trial preparation, discovery and pretrial motions. Indeed, it arguably covers conduct taken in anticipation that a civil or criminal case might be filed, such as tax planning, hiding assets or talking to police. And the text of the omnibus clause, in concert with our definition of corruptly, encompasses any act that a jury might infer was intended to “influence, obstruct, or impede ... the due administration of justice.” That’s true even if no actual obstruction occurs, because the clause’s use of “endeavors” makes “success *584... irrelevant.” See United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 503 (5th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Stretched to its limits, section 1503 poses a significant hazard for everyone involved in our system of justice, because so much of what the adversary process calls for could be construed as obstruction. Did a tort plaintiff file a complaint seeking damages far in excess of what the jury ultimately awards? That could be viewed as corruptly endeavoring to “influence ... the due administration of justice” by seeking to recover more than the claim deserves. So could any of the following behaviors that make up the bread and butter of litigation: filing an answer that denies liability for conduct that is ultimately adjudged wrongful or malicious; unsuccessfully filing (or opposing) a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; seeking a continuance in order to inflict delay on the opposing party; frivolously taking an appeal or petitioning for certiorari — the list is endless. Witnesses would be particularly vulnerable because, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[u]nder the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive.” Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973).

Lawyers face the most pervasive threat under such a regime. Zealous advocacy sometimes calls for pushing back against an adversary’s just case and casting a despicable client in a favorable light, yet such conduct could be described as “endeavoring] to ... impede ... the due administration of justice.” Even routine advocacy provides ample occasion for stumbling into the heartland of the omnibus clause’s sweeping coverage. Oral arguments provide a ready example. One need not spend much time in one of our courtrooms to hear lawyers dancing around questions from the bench rather than giving pithy, direct answers. There is, for instance, the ever popular “but that is not this case” retort to a hypothetical, which could be construed as an effort to divert the court and thereby “influence ... the due administration of justice.”

It is true that any such maneuver would violate section 1503 only if it were done “corruptly.” But it is equally true that we have given “corruptly” such a broad construction that it does not meaningfully cabin the kind of conduct that is subject to prosecution. As noted, we have held that a defendant acts “corruptly,” as that term is used in section 1503, if he does so “with the purpose of obstructing justice.” Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 852. In the examples above, a prosecutor could argue that a complaint was filed corruptly because it was designed to extort a nuisance settlement, or an answer was filed corruptly because its principal purpose was to pressure a needy plaintiff into an unjust settlement, or that the lawyer who parried a judicial hypothetical with “but that is not this case” was endeavoring to distract the court so' it would reach a wrong result. That a jury or a judge might not buy such an argument is neither here nor there; a criminal prosecution, even one that results in an acquittal, is a life-wrenching event. Nor does an acquittal wipe clean the suspicion that a guilty defendant got off on a technicality.

We have no doubt that United States Attorneys and their Assistants would use the power to prosecute for such crimes judiciously, but that is not the point. Making everyone who participates in our justice system a potential criminal defendant for conduct that is nothing more than the ordinary tug and pull of litigation risks chilling zealous advocacy. It also gives prosecutors the immense and unreviewable *585power to reward Mends and punish enemies by prosecuting the latter and giving the former a pass. The perception that prosecutors have such a potent weapon in their arsenal, even if never used, may well dampen the fervor with which lawyers, particularly those representing criminal defendants, will discharge their duties. The amorphous nature of the statute is also at odds with the constitutional requirement that individuals have fair notice as to what conduct may be criminal. See United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir.2014) (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010)).

B. Because the statute sweeps so broadly, due process calls for prudential limitations on the government’s power to prosecute under it. Such a limitation already exists in our case law interpreting section 1503: the requirement of materiality. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1128-29 (9th Cir.2010). Materiality screens out many of the statute’s troubling applications by limiting convictions to those situations where an act “has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body.” See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1124. Put another way, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged conduct was capable of influencing a decisionmaking person or entity — for example, by causing it to cease its investigation, pursue different avenues of inquiry or reach a different outcome. See United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 840 (9th Cir.2003) (finding statement material because it could have affected the “decision-making process”); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C.Cir.1956) (noting that, to be material, a statement “must have some weight in the process of reaching a decision”).

In weighing materiality, we consider “the intrinsic capabilities of the ... statement itself,” rather than the statement’s actual effect on the decisionmaker, see United States v. Serv. Deli Inc., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), and we evaluate the statement in “the context in which [it was] made,” United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir.2005); Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 703 (noting that in context, a statement was “rob[bed] ... of any materiality — any possible influence upon the [decisionmaker] in reaching its decision”).

We start with the self-evident proposition that Statement C, standing alone, did not have the capacity to divert the government from its investigation or influence the grand jury’s decision whether to indict anyone. Here it is again:

That’s what keeps our Mendship. You know, I am sorry, but that — you know, that — I was a celebrity child, not just in baseball by my own instincts. I became a celebrity child with a famous father. I just don’t get into other people’s business because of my father’s situation, you see.

The statement says absolutely nothing pertinent to the subject of the grand jury’s investigation. Even when paired with the question that prompted it,

Did Greg ever give you anything that required a syringe to inject yourself with?

Statement C communicates nothing of value or detriment to the investigation. Had the answer been “I’m afraid of needles,” it would have been plausible to infer an unspoken denial, with the actual words serving as an explanation or elaboration. But, as given, the answer did not enlighten, *586obfuscate, confirm or deny anything within the scope of the question posed.

The most one can say about this statement is that it was non-responsive and thereby impeded the investigation to a small degree by wasting the grand jury’s time and trying the prosecutors’ patience. But real-life witness examinations, unlike those in movies and on television, invariably are littered with non-responsive and irrelevant answers. This happens when the speaker doesn’t understand the question, begins to talk before thinking (lawyers do this with surprising frequency), wants to avoid giving a direct answer (ditto), or is temporizing. Courtrooms are pressure-laden environments and a certain number of non-responsive or irrelevant statements can be expected as part of the give-and-take of courtroom discourse. Because some non-responsive answers are among the road hazards of witness examination, any one such statement is not, standing alone, “capable of influencing ... the decision of [a] decisionmaking body.” See Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1124.

This is true even if, as the government now argues, Statement C is literally false. An irrelevant or wholly non-responsive answer says nothing germane to the subject of the investigation, whether it’s true or false. For example, if a witness is asked, “Do you own a gun?” it makes no difference whether he answers “The sky is blue” or “The sky is green.” That the second statement is false makes it no more likely to impede the investigation than the first.

Statement C does not, however, stand alone. It was a small portion of a much longer examination, and we must look at the record as a whole to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the statement capable of influencing the grand jury’s investigation, in light of defendant’s entire grand jury testimony. If, for example, a witness engages in a pattern of irrelevant statements, or launches into lengthy disquisitions that are clearly designed to waste time and preclude the questioner from continuing his examination, the jury could find that the witness’s behavior was capable of having some sway.

On careful review of the record, we find insufficient evidence to render Statement C material. In conducting this review, we are mindful that we must give the jury the benefit of the doubt and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of its verdict. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). At the same time, we must conduct our review with some rigor for the prudential reasons discussed above. See pp. 583-85 supra.

The government charged a total of seven statements, only one of which the jury found to be obstructive. Two of these statements (including Statement C) appear to be wholly irrelevant — verbal detours with no bearing on the proceedings. One statement is “I don’t know,” followed by a brief explanation for the lack of knowledge. The rest are direct answers that the government claimed were false, all concerning whether defendant’s trainer had provided or injected him with steroids. In the context of three hours of grand jury testimony, these six additional statements are insufficient to render the otherwise innocuous Statement C material. If this were enough to establish materiality, few witnesses or lawyers would be safe from prosecution.

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge,

with whom Circuit Judges WARDLAW, CALLAHAN, and FRIEDLAND join,

concurring:

I agree that no reasonable juror could have found Bonds guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503.

*587Bonds was convicted of obstructing justice by offering a “misleading or evasive” statement — Statement C — to the grand jury. The Government expressly declined to seek a conviction on the grounds that Statement C was false.1 When evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Statement C violated § 1503, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This standard of review requires us to determine whether the jury could “draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. In this particular case, we must determine whether a single truthful but evasive or misleading answer could constitute evidence of obstruction of justice under § 1503. It cannot.

Section 1503(a) punishes those who “corruptly ... influence, obstruct ], or impede[], or endeavor[] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.”2 The Supreme Court has imposed a materiality requirement on the broad reach of § 1503, requiring that “the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government is required to prove materiality to the jury. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511-12, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). The Supreme Court further instructs us, when dealing with the sweeping language of § 1503, to “exercise[] restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute ... out of concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.” Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1.

Congress could not have intended § 1503 to be so broadly applied as to reach a single truthful but evasive statement *588such as Statement C. Our conclusion that Statement C could not have “the natural and probable effect” of impeding the grand jury’s investigative function stems from two sources: (1) the Government’s duty to clarify merely misleading or evasive testimony and (2) relevant precedent indicating that the Government must show that truthful but misleading or evasive testimony must amount to a refusal to testify before it is material. Taken together, these two sources lead to the conclusion that a single truthful but evasive or misleading statement cannot satisfy § 1503’s materiality requirement.3

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), requires the conclusion that Statement C does not violate § 1503. Although Bronston dealt with a conviction for perjury, the Supreme Court’s language regarding the government’s duty to conduct competent and thorough questioning is illuminating. In short, “[t]he burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry.” Id. at 360, 93 S.Ct. 595. Extending § 1503’s reach to transient evasive or misleading statements would obviate the prosecutor’s duty to thoroughly examine the witness. Id. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595 (noting that competent cross-examination should be conducted “by counsel alert — as every examiner ought to be — to the incongruity of [the witness’s] unresponsive answer”). It would be contrary to the statute’s purpose to allow the government to permit an evasive or misleading statement to go unchallenged, in the hopes of obtaining an obstruction of justice conviction later. The government is obligated to do all it can to obtain a direct statement in response to its questioning. The truth-seeking function of the grand jury may be impaired by lax questioning as much, if not more than, an inarticulate or wandering answer.

Bronston counsels that, to convict a defendant for violating § 1503, the jury must find more than that the witness uttered an evasive or misleading statement at some point during his testimony — the “natural and probable effect” of a single truthful but evasive or misleading statement is merely to prompt follow-up questions. Given this burden, Statement C did not have the natural or probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice, because the Government had a duty to clarify any single misleading or evasive statement Bonds made.

2.

The Supreme Court’s materiality standard reinforces Bronston’s core . holding: we should not find liability for a single statement that is merely misleading or evasive. The judicially-created materiality requirement is a primary objective limitation on § 1503’s expansive reach. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, *5891128-29 (9th Cir.2010). This materiality standard necessarily takes into account the context of the charged conduct, evaluating whether the misleading or evasive statement could have “the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administrative of justice” given the entirety of a witness’s examination. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government may not isolate a single statement, prove it misleading or evasive, and argue that the statement is material based solely on that fact.

Evasive or misleading statements are different from false statements. Instead of providing the tribunal with bad information, information that can be evaluated for its capability to influence, a misleading or evasive statement is meant to divert or slow the truth-seeking function in the first instance; it does not so much influence an investigation as divert.it by depriving the question of its force. In this sense, offering evasive or misleading testimony is closely analogous to the destruction of evidence. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981) (“the destruction or concealment of documents can fall within the prohibition of the statute” by “suppress[ing] evidence”). We should evaluate the materiality of evasive or misleading testimony the same way: for its capability to impede the investigative function of the grand jury.

The Fifth Circuit’s explanation of the materiality standard in United States v. Griffin is particularly persuasive precedent. A false, misleading, or evasive statement may be material, taken in the context of the entire examination, when it amounts to “a flat refusal to testify.” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1979). Evasive or misleading testimony, in this light, can only obstruct the due administration of justice when it completely thwarts the investigative nature of the tribunal— when it derails the grand jury “as effectively as if [the witness] refused to answer the question at all.” Id. The proper question is hot whether a statement had the intrinsic capability to influence the grand jury, but whether the statement, viewed in the context of the witness’s testimony as a whole, “closed off entirely the avenue of inquiry being pursued by” the grand jury. United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir.1971) (“The blatantly evasive witness achieves th[e] effect [of impeding the gathering of relevant evidence] as surely by erecting a screen of feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a potential witness to absent himself.”).

Applying the materiality standard a single truthful but evasive or misleading statement can never be material. Our examination ,of Statement C — a single evasive or misleading statement — reveals why. No rational juror could have found that Statement C amounted to a refusal to testify, such that Bonds’s testimony thwarted the grand jury’s investigative function.

In summary, the “natural and probable effect” of a single true but evasive response to the government’s questioning is not to impede the grand jury but, rather, to prompt follow-up questioning. A statement that “goes off into the cosmos” merely triggers the prosecutor’s duty to pin the witness down and elicit a clear response. Indeed, that is exactly what happened in this case. Faced with a rambling response, the prosecutor restated the same question and elicited a direct, unambiguous answer from Bonds: -“No.” No rational juror could conclude that Bonds refused to answer the question; it is plain in the record that Bonds gave his testimony to *590the grand jury. Further, this is thus not a situation in which a witness testified evasively for so long and with such persistence that the grand jury’s investigation would likely have been thwarted, as would be required for the testimony to be material. Statement C was therefore not material, and Bonds’s conviction must be reversed.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

Because I concur not only with the per curiam opinion but also with parts of Judge Kozinski’s and Judge N.R. Smith’s opinions (while disagreeing with other parts), I offer my separate views regarding what is in a fact a very simple case, as well as my thoughts concerning the proper construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the obstruction of justice statute.

I.

My answer to the question with which Judge Kozinski begins his opinion, “Can a single non-responsive answer by a grand jury witness support a conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503?” is simple: No. My response would be the same regardless of the context in which the answer was given.

I reach the conclusion that Bonds’s Statement C was not material and thus could not (and did not) obstruct justice on different and narrower grounds than does Judge Kozinski. I do not agree, for example, with his opinion’s sweeping statements regarding the scope of the statute or with its intimations that nonresponsive answers that are not later cured by way of direct replies might constitute obstruction of justice. Similarly, I would not suggest that there may be a category of non-responsive or irrelevant answers that could be characterized as evasive or misleading and thus subject to differing treatment from other kinds of nonresponsive answers.

In my opinion, Statement C “cannot be. said to have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due administration of justice.’ ” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995).1 As Judge Kozinski himself puts it, “[it] says absolutely nothing pertinent to the subject of the grand jury’s investigation.” Kozinski Op. at 585. At most, Statement C was non-responsive, and in no respect could it (or did it) constitute a criminal act.

I concur with Judge Kozinski’s opinion as well as Judge N.R. Smith’s insofar as they state that Statement C could not have been material even if it had been false. A non-responsive answer that is false is “no more likely to impede the investigation than” a non-responsive answer that is true. Kozinski Op. at 586; see also N.R. Smith Op. at 588 n. 3. Indeed, even “perjured relevant testimony ... need not necessarily ... obstruct or halt the judicial process.” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28, 66 S.Ct. 78, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945) (emphasis added) (explaining that contempt for “obstructing] the administration of justice,” under predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 401, required more than a false statement). I also agree heartily with Judge Kozinski’s statements that “a certain number of non-responsive or irrelevant statements can be expected as part of the give-and-take of courtroom discourse,” and that we must consider the practicalities of “real-life witness examinations” when interpreting the statute. Kozinski Op. at 586. Moreover, in my view the appropriate course in the event of material false testimony is a perjury prosecution, not a prosecution for obstruction of justice. *591In fact, the prosecutors tried to convict Bonds of perjury on several counts in this very proceeding, but had no better luck with the jury in that effort than they have had with this court on today’s appeal.

Unlike Judge Kozinski, I concur with the part of Judge N.R. Smith’s opinion that would hold that the “natural and probable effect” test articulated in United States v. Aguilar constitutes the proper standard for materiality with respect to § 1503.2 I also concur with the part of Judge N.R. Smith’s opinion that would hold that under Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), the natural and probable effect of Statement C is merely that counsel will have to ask follow-up questions. Faced with a statement that is “unresponsive on [its] face,” id. at 361, 93 S.Ct. 595, “[i]t is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial interrogation ... is a probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry. If a' witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.” Id. at 358-59, 93 S.Ct. 595. In the instant case, the prosecutors did exactly that: they continued to press Bonds until he gave a direct answer.

The breadth of Judge Kozinski’s opinion, its unwarranted speculation regarding context, and its use of United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1124 (9th Cir.2010), rather than Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357, to define the materiality requirement prevent me from joining more of that opinion than I have. As to Judge N.R. Smith’s opinion, I find it in several respects more persuasive than Judge Kozinski’s, especially in its use of the Aguilar standard for materiality and its discussion of Bronston. However, in the end, I cannot join that opinion either, for several reasons. One, I disagree that a flat refusal to testify may be prosecuted under § 1503. Two, I do not agree that non-responsive answers are in any respect “closely related to the destruction of evidence.” N.R. Smith Op. at 588. In my view, had Bonds refused to testify or continued to answer evasively, the appropriate course would have been a contempt proceeding, not an obstruction of justice prosecution. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Ortloff, 708 F.2d 1455, 1457-58 (9th Cir.1983). Three, I do not agree with the unnecessary and, in my view, incorrect discussion of misleading or evasive testimony or with his implicit endorsement of United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.1979), as the proper rule for this circuit. See N.R. Smith Op. at 5.

Many fundamental questions persist regarding the meaning and scope of § 1503, notwithstanding our court’s broad construction of the statute in the past, see generally United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1981), and the Supreme Court’s indication of a similar view in dictum in Aguilar, see generally 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520. Both Judge Kozinski’s and Judge N.R. Smith’s opinions have much to commend them. However, neither succeeds in its efforts to answer the critical questions regarding the purpose and role of the statute, in Judge N.R. Smith’s ease at least, partly because of currently conflicting circuit law that he may, understandably, be reluctant to overrule in light of the Supreme Court dictum in Aguilar. See N.R. Smith Op. at 587 n. 2. Rather than attempting to resolve those problems in this case, however, I would simply hold that Bonds’s answer in no way *592constitutes a violation of § 1503 because it is non-responsive and thus nonmaterial, and that his prosecution for the charged offense was therefore wholly unwarranted under the law. I would leave the rest of the speculation and the unnecessary, if not erroneous, analysis in my colleagues’ opinions to another time, preferably after the Supreme Court has spoken.

II.

My own view is that § 1503 should not be construed as covering testimony of witnesses at court proceedings. I explain my reading of the statute only briefly in light of what appears to me to be the Supreme Court’s current view of the law — a view that also causes me to refrain from suggesting at this time that we overrule Ninth Circuit cases that construe § 1503 overly broadly, see Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 851-52, or that apply it to in-court testimony. See Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1125-29. Although our court has previously affirmed a § 1503 conviction based on in-court testimony, see id., the Supreme Court has never done so and has indicated its view only in dictum contained in Aguilar. See 515 U.S. at 600-01, 115 S.Ct. 2357. Given the history and circumstances of § 1503,1 would hope that the Court would not follow the Aguilar dictum when it confronts the issue directly.3

The history underlying § 1503 strongly supports the conclusion that in-court testimony is not a subject of criminal sanctions under that statute. The predecessor to § 1503 was originally enacted in 1831 in response to abuse of the contempt power by a federal district judge who had imprisoned a man for publishing a criticism of one of his opinions. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 41, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941). In establishing the crime of obstruction of justice, Congress created, as Nye put it, a “geographical” divide between the conduct constituting that crime and conduct subject to contempt: “misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice” constituted contempt under section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1831, whereas persons outside of court who “corruptly, or by threats of force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice” committed the crime of obstruction of justice under section 2. Id. at 46-49, 61 S.Ct. 810 (emphasis added). Section 1 survives today as 18 U.S.C. § 401, the contempt statute, while section 2 became the clause of § 1503 at issue in this case. Thus, the original understanding of the crime of obstruction of justice was that it applied to conduct outside the presence of a court. Such was and is the intent of Congress, and “[w]e cannot by process of interpretation obliterate the distinctions which Congress drew.” Nye, 313 U.S. at 50, 61 S.Ct. 810.

When one considers the other criminal statutes available to punish in-court misbehavior by a witness — that is, misconduct during testimony — this “geographical” delineation, id. at 48, 61 S.Ct. 810, whereby only out-of-court conduct constitutes obstruction of justice under § 1503, makes sense. A false statement made during in-court testimony constitutes perjury. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623. A failure to answer a question or a material evasion that the witness refuses to correct during in-court testimony constitutes contempt. I *593seriously doubt that the obstruction of justice statute was intended to duplicate these crimes. Something more than a witness merely lying or being non-responsive during testimony is required in order to violate § 1503. Otherwise, the crime of obstruction of justice would be to that extent wholly superfluous.

More important, the argument for coverage of such actions under § 1503 hinges entirely on the single word “corruptly.” The other specified means of obstructing justice enumerated in that section — “by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication” — when viewed in context dictate the opposite conclusion: “corruptly” does not describe the in-court conduct of a witness, but rather, like those enumerated means, describes the conduct of a third party who seeks to obstruct the proceedings. The specified means necessarily describe the attempts of a third party to affect the judicial proceedings by corrupt means. As Judge W. Fletcher explains, the interpretative canon noscitur a sociis — literally “[i]t is known from its associates” — tells us that “the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990). Because obstructing proceedings by “threats or force” plainly refers to the conduct of persons outside of court who seek to obstruct the proceedings and not to the witness who is testifying in court in the proceedings, “corruptly” must similarly be understood as referring to the means used by third parties to influence, obstruct, or impede proceedings, and not to in-court testimony by a witness who may well be the object but not the subject of the corrupt tactics.

Even if § 1503 covered in-court conduct, “corruptly” would, under the noscitur a sociis canon, as well as under any other reasonable means of statutory construction, require a greater magnitude of misconduct than simply giving a false or non-responsive answer to a question. Clearly, a mere lie or evasive answer is not akin to using threats or force to cause another to lie. Indeed, the Supreme Court has on occasion recognized that lies and evasive answers are part and parcel of the process of uncovering the truth through adversarial witness examination. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595; Michael, 326 U.S. at 227-28, 66 S.Ct. 78. The use of threats or force to impede a proceeding, by contrast, is not a customary incident of that process and constitutes a far more serious offense. “Corruptly” in the obstruction of justice statute covers conduct at the same level of obstruction as the use of threats or force and may not properly be interpreted so as to bring a mere lie or evasive answer by a witness within the scope of the statute. Although I am not certain that “corruptly” is limited to bribery as Judge W. Fletcher' contends, I am wholly confident that it does describe conduct of that magnitude and not a simple lie or evasive answer by a witness during in-court testimony.

For the reasons discussed above, I would hope that the Supreme Court would revisit its dictum in Aguilar and would conclude that § 1503 does not cover a witness’s in-court testimony. After all, Congress has enacted criminal statutes other than § 1503 that sufficiently address a witness’s in-court conduct. The problems created by the misuse of § 1503 by overeager prosecutors to punish witnesses for what they say in court are all too evident from the facts of this case. It is time for them to cease using that section as a substitute for vigorous cross-examination or for the criminal statutes that properly apply to in-court testimony.

*594In short, this case involves nothing more than an irrelevant, rambling statement made by a witness during the course of a grand jury investigation. Statement C was not material and could not possibly have interfered with the due administration of justice. I therefore concur in the per curiam opinion (and the parts of Judge Kozinski’s and Judge N.R. Smith’s opinions that I have identified above). Bonds’s conviction for obstruction of justice cannot stand and he may not be retried on the same charge.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,

concurring in the judgment:

I strongly but respectfully disagree with the rationale advanced by the per curiam opinion and by the principal concurrence. I concur only in the judgment.

The issue before us is the meaning of the federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Section 1503(a) provides, in relevant part:

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States ... or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

(Emphasis added.) Section 1503(a) applies to obstruction of justice, as defined by the statute, in both criminal and civil proceedings. Section 1503(b) provides punishments of varying severities, depending on the nature of the act. The most lenient punishment is “imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.” Id. § 1503(b)(3).

Bonds was prosecuted under the second, or “omnibus,” clause of § 1503(a), the emphasized portion above. The government and the principal concurrence read the word “corruptly” at the beginning of the clause to refer to a state of mind, meaning “with intent to influence, intimidate, or impede the due administration of justice.” They read the clause as criminalizing even entirely truthful statements, so long as those statements are made with such intent.

In the government’s view, any truthful answer given in the course of civil or criminal litigation, if intended to influence, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice, violates the omnibus clause. At oral argument, the government made terrifyingly clear the result of its reading of the statute. The government contended that the obstruction statute criminalizes a truthful but intentionally evasive or misleading answer to an interrogatory in civil litigation. The government also contended that the statute criminalizes a truthful but intentionally evasive or misleading answer during appellate oral argument:

Q: I think it’s a common experience among all of us on the appellate court to ask of the lawyer in front of us in a criminal case that’s come up on appeal: “Counsel, could you please explain to me what happened at trial?” and for the lawyer arguing from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to say, “Your Honor, I was not the trial attorney.” Now, sometimes that’s an evasive answer. They may well know the answer, but it’s true that they weren’t the trial attorney____ Has the lawyer just committed a crime? ... [T]he answer that I just hypothesized was . designed , to put me off the track.... A truthful but evasive answer.

*595A: I think that would be obstructive, Your Honor.

When asked how many San Francisco lawyers it planned to throw in jail, the government declined to specify.

The principal concurrence agrees with the government’s reading of the statute. But it seeks to limit the scope of its operation, writing, “Because the statute sweeps so broadly, due process calls for prudential limitations on the. government’s power to prosecute under it.” Concurrence at 585. According to the concurrence, “due process” and “prudence” dictate that a truthful but intentionally evasive or misleading statement can be prosecuted under the statute only if it was “material.” Id. at 585. The concurrence defines “material” as “capable of influencing a decisionmaking person or entity.” Id. at 585.

Applying its prudence-based definition of materiality, the principal concurrence tells us that Bonds’s wandering and non-responsive answer was not material and therefore not criminal, even if given with intent to influence, obstruct, or impede. It concludes, “Statement C, standing alone, did not have the capacity to divert the government from its investigation or influence the grand jury’s decision whether to indict anyone.” Id. at 585. The concurrence contrasts Bonds’s answer with an answer that would have been criminal. Bonds was asked, “Did Greg ever .give you anything that required a syringe to'inject yourself with?” If Bonds had answered “I’m afraid of needles,” the concurrence tells us that he could have been successfully prosecuted. Id. If Bonds had given that answer, “it would have been plausible to infer an unspoken denial, with the actual words serving as an explanation or elaboration.” Id.

The principal concurrence’s “prudential” narrowing of “the government’s power to prosecute” is hardly reassuring. An attorney who provides a truthful but evasive answer to an interrogatory in civil litigation often does so in the hope that his answer will “influence the decisionmaking person” who receives it. If there is a' reasonable chance that the hope will be realized, the attorney is a criminal. An appellate attorney who answers during oral argument, “I was not the trial attorney,” sometimes knows what happened at trial but gives that answer in the hope that the judge will not pursue the matter. This attorney, too, may be a criminal.

I disagree. The omnibus clause of § 1503(a) is not an open-ended provision whose constitutionality we can uphold only by manufacturing a “prudential” limitation on the government’s power to prosecute. Rather, it is a narrowly targeted provision that had a specific meaning when enacted and whose text has remained substantially unchanged for over 180 years. The key to a proper understanding of the statute is the meaning of the word “corruptly.”

I. Meaning of “Corruptly”

As used in § 1503(a), “corruptly” does not describe a state of mind. Rather, it describes a forbidden means of influencing, obstructing, or impeding the due administration of justice. As used in § 1503(a), “corruptly” most likely means “by bribery.” There are two arguments supporting this reading: first, the text of the statute; second, a comparison with 18 U.S.C. § 1621, the federal perjury statute.

A. Text of the Statute

The predecessor to § 1503(a) was enacted in 1831, in reaction to perceived'Overreaching by a federal judge who had held a lawyer in contempt for an out-of-court writing. See Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss *596King, Contempt by Publication in the United States: To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 Colum. L.Rev. 401, 423-31 (1928). The 1831 statute had two parts. The first described, and set limits on, the contempt power of federal judges. The second, at issue in this case, criminalized out-of-court conduct that improperly sought to influence judicial proceedings. Section 1503(a) is the successor to the second part.

The 1831 statute read, in relevant part: And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall be liable to prosecution therefor....

Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (emphasis added). For convenience, I quote again the .corresponding provisions of the modern § 1503(a):

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, ... in the discharge of his duty ... or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added). The omnibus clause, highlighted above, is at issue here.

There are three differences between the omnibus clause as originally enacted in 1831 and as it appears today. First, in 1872, Congress enacted a provision that prohibited obstruction “by threatening letters, or any threatening communications,” in addition to the 1831 prohibitions on obstruction “corruptly” and “by threats or force.” Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 420, 17 Stat. 378, 378. As part of the general revision and codification of the federal criminal code in 1909, Congress simplified the statute by replacing “any threatening letters, or any threatening communications,” with “any threatening letter or communication.” Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113. Second, the 1831 law prohibited obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. The 1872 statute added-a prohibition against influencing its administration. Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 420, 17 Stat. 378, 378. Third, as part of the 1909 revision, the comma after “corruptly” was dropped, almost certainly inadvertently. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113. There had been a comma after the word “corruptly” in both the first and omnibus clauses in the 1831 and 1872 statutes, and a comma was retained after “corruptly” in the first clause of the obstruction statute. See Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488; Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 420, 17 Stat. 378, 378; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113. No reason was given in 1909 for dropping the comma after the word “corruptly” in the second, omnibus clause.

As written in 1831, the omnibus clause provided two methods, separated by commas, by which a person could improperly “obstruct or impede” the “due administration of justice.” A person could do it “corruptly,” or he could do it “by threats or force.” As written in 1872, the clause provided three such methods, again separated by commas, by which a person could improperly “influence, obstruct, or impede” the “due administration of justice.” *597A person could do it “corruptly,” “by threats or force,” or “by threatening letters, or any threatening communications.” Finally, as revised and codified in 1909, the clause continued to provide three means, now partially separated by commas, by which a person could “influence, obstruct, or impede”: a person could do it “corruptly,” “by threats or force,” or “by threatening letter or communication.” The omnibus clause has remained essentially unchanged since the 1909 general revision and codification.

A “commonsensical interpretive principle” is that “words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Text 15-16 (2012). The 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, published three years before the enactment of the original version of § 1503(a), gave two definitions for corruptly:

1. In a corrupt manner; with corruption; viciously; wickedly; without integrity. We have dealt very corruptly against thee. Nehemiah 1.

2. By bribery. A judgment was obtained corruptly.

A contemporaneous document, as well as an interpretive canon, show that when it wrote the word “corruptly,” Congress was likely using the narrow and specific second definition.

The National Intelligencer, publisher of the Register of Debates and the predecessor to what later became the Congressional Record, reported an action of the House of Representatives on the Senate Bill that became the 1831 statute. It reported that on Wednesday, March 2, 1831, the House amended and then agreed to the Senate Bill punishing “attempts to corrupt or intimidate jurors”:

The Senate’s amendments to the Act declaratory of the powers of the Courts of the United States on the subject of Contempts; adding a second section for punishing all attempts to corrupt or im timidate jurors, & c. was amended on the suggestion of Mr. BUCHANAN, and then agreed to.

Twenty-First Congress, Second Session, Daily National Intelligencer, Mar. 3, 1831 (emphasis added). The reference is to the first clause rather than the omnibus clause of the statute, but there is no reason to believe that “corruptly” had different meanings in the two parallel clauses. The National Intelligencer’s use of the infinitive, “to corrupt,” in connection with the direct object, “jurors,” indicates that the prohibition against acting “corruptly” was a prohibition against a specific act — corrupting, or attempting to corrupt, jurors, and thereby obstructing or impeding justice. That is, the prohibition against acting “corruptly” was a narrow and specific prohibition against bribing jurors, using the second definition. It was not a broad general prohibition against acting “wickedly” or “viciously” in obstructing or impeding justice.

The text following the word “corruptly” in the omnibus clause of § 1503(a) reinforces the conclusion that it means “by bribery.” In the current version, there are three specific forbidden methods of “influencing, obstructing, or impeding the due administration of justice”: (1) “corruptly,” (2) “by threats or force,” or (3) “by any threatening letter or communication.” In the 1831 version, there were two specific forbidden methods: (1) “corruptly,” or (2) “by threats or force.” Where statutory terms “are susceptible of multiple and wide-ranging meanings ... those meanings are narrowed by the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis — which counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is *598associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). “The maxim noscitur a sociis, ... while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961); see also United States v. Kimsey, 668 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir.2012) (even when an interpretation is conceivable “based on etymology alone,” that definition is “severely undermined” when it is illogical in light of the neighboring statutory terms).

The text of the omnibus clause of § 1503(a) is precisely the kind of text to which the canon applies. Several methods of obstructing the administration of justice are listed immediately following the word “corruptly”: “by threats,” by “force,” “by threatening letter,” and by threatening “communication.” These are not states of mind. They are specific methods of obstructing justice. We can read “corruptly” as describing a state of mind. Or we can read it as describing another specific method of “influencing, obstructing, or impeding” the “due ádministration of justice.” The canon of noscitur a sociis, as well as common sense, instruct us to choose the latter.

Read in light of a contemporaneous dictionary meaning of “corruptly,” in light of the contemporaneous report on the bill that became the predecessor to § 1503(a), and in light of the noscitur a sociis canon, I conclude that § 1503(a) forbids individuals from obstructing the administration of justice (1) by bribery, (2) by threats or force, or (3) by any threatening letter or communication.

B. Comparison to Perjury

. A comparison of the federal obstruction of justice statute with the federal perjury statute reinforces the conclusion that “corruptly” means “by bribery.” The obstruction of justice statute prescribes different ranges of punishment depending on the act. The most lenient is “imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(3). The federal perjury statute, by contrast, prescribes only one .range of punishment. It provides that someone found guilty of perjury “shall ... be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621.

If we accept the principal concurrence’s reading of the word “corruptly,” a person who makes a material truthful statement with the intent to “influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice” may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to ten years. A person who makes a material untruthful statement with the same intent may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to only half that. It makes - no sense for Congress to punish a truthful statement more severely than a lie. If, on the other hand, we accept that “corruptly” means “by bribery” in § 1503(a), the disparity in punishment makes perfect sense.

In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), the Court explained the difference between truthful but misleading statements, on the one hand, and perjurious statements, on the other. The Court faced a question related to the question now before us: “whether a witness may be convicted of perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally true but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative implication.” Id. at 352-53, 93 S.Ct. 595.

The government had charged Bronston with violating § 1621, the federal perjury statute, based on statements he had made *599at a hearing before a bankruptcy referee. When asked whether he had ever had any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Bronston replied that his “company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.” Id. at 354, 93 S.Ct. 595. Bronston did not mention that he had previously had a personal bank account in Geneva. Id. Bronston’s answer was true. His company had indeed had an account in Zurich. However, his answer, while true, was designed to mislead the questioner. The United States successfully prosecuted Bronston for perjury on the theory that he had testified under oath “with literal truthfulness but unresponsively.” Id. at 355, 93 S.Ct. 595. The Court reversed Bronston’s conviction because “the federal perjury statute cannot be construed to sustain a conviction based on [his] answer.” Id. at 357, 93 S.Ct. 595.

The Court explained, “[W]e perceive no reason why Congress would intend the drastic sanction of a perjury prosecution to cure a testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question by counsel alert — as every examiner ought to be — to the incongruity of [Bronston]’s unresponsive answer.” Id. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595. “If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.” Id. at 358-59, 93 S.Ct. 595. This is so even when a witness’s answers were “not guileless but were shrewdly calculated to evade.” Id. at 362, 93 S.Ct. 595.

The Court rejected the very argument that the government makes in the case now before us:

It is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the witness] intended to mislead his examiner. A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was'intended to mislead'or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether “he does not believe (his answer) to be true.” To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners,, and might well fear having that responsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mislead” or “perjury by implication.” The seminal modern treatment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy overshadowed all others during the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law offense: “that the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.”

Id. at 359, 93 S.Ct. 595 (citation omitted). Simply put, “any special problems arising from the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the ‘questioner’s acuity’ and not by a federal perjury prosecution.” Id. at 362, 93 S.Ct. 595.

The government and the principal concurrence brush Bronston aside. That is not so easily done, for the Court’s reasoning is as applicable to this case as to Bronston’s. In either case, “[a] jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.” Id. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595. “To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know.” Id. Further, and perhaps more important, if the concurrence is right about the meaning of “corruptly” in *600§ 1503(a), the Court’s careful parsing of the perjury statute in Bronston was wasted effort. If the concurrence is right, a prosecutor seeking to convict someone who may or may not have testified truthfully will never need to pursue a perjury conviction. The prosecutor can get an obstruction of justice conviction, carrying twice the penalty, for half the effort.

II. United States v. Aguilar

Supreme Court dictum describing § 1503(a) does not change my conclusion. In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), the Court reversed a conviction of U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar for obstruction of justice in violation of the omnibus clause of § 1503(a). A grand jury had been investigating a conspiracy to influence another district judge. One of the suspected conspirators, Abe Chapman, was a distant relation of Aguilar. When Aguilar learned that Chapman had been named in a federal wiretap authorization, Aguilar warned him. During a subsequent grand jury investigation, FBI agents questioned Aguilar about his knowledge of the wiretap and the underlying conspiracy. Aguilar falsely stated that he did not know about either. His false statements provided the basis for his conviction under the omnibus clause.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because “[t]he action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority.” Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. “In other words, the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

In dictum, the Court distinguished false statements made to an FBI agent from statements made directly to a grand jury. The Court assumed that such statements made to the grand jury would be covered by the omnibus clause. It wrote that Aguilar’s conduct “falls on the other side of the statutory line from that of one who delivers false documents or testimony to the grand jury itself. Conduct of the latter sort all but assures that the grand jury will consider the material in its deliberations.” Id. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357.

If I were compelled to treat the Court’s dictum as a controlling statement of law, I would not be able to argue, consistent with the view of the Supreme Court, that the word “corruptly” in § 1503(a) means “by bribery.” But I do not believe I am so compelled. “We do not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly,” because “it serves as a prophecy of what that Court might hold.” McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). But the Court has instructed that while “dictum ‘may be followed if sufficiently persuasive,’ it ‘ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit.’ ” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n. 17 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935)).

I do not believe the Court’s dictum in Aguilar was “considered” in the requisite sense. The question whether false statements made directly to the grand jury violate the omnibus clause was not before the Court. In his opposition to certiorari, Aguilar had conceded that, “as the government notes, the courts have routinely applied Section 1503 to false testimony to the grand jury.” Brief in Opposition at 18-19, Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (No. 94-270). The govern*601ment highlighted that concession in its merits brief. Brief of Petitioner at 20, Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (No. 94-270) (“as respondent has conceded, ‘the courts have routinely-applied Section 1503 to false testimony to the grand jury.’ ”). In the context of his suit, Aguilar’s concession makes sense, for it enabled him to focus his argument more narrowly, and to argue that even if the omnibus clause covered false statements made to a grand jury, his false statements to an FBI agent were not covered. The Court accepted without challenge the strategic concession that false statements to the grand jury were covered, and held that, even so, Aguilar’s conduct fell outside the omnibus clause. The Court was thus not asked to consider the question whether false statements were covered by the omnibus clause because that question had been taken off the table. The question presented in the case now before us— whether truthful but evasive statements are covered by the omnibus clause — was so remote from the contemplation of the parties that there had been no need even to take it off the table. . .

No argument was made to the Court in Aguilar about the meaning of “corruptly” in 1831, when the obstruction of justice statute was enacted. Nor was any argument made to the Court about the disparity in sentencing between the perjury statute and the obstruction of justice statute. Had the government sought a conviction under the omnibus clause based on a true but evasive or misleading statement to a grand jury, and had these arguments been presented to the Court, it is not at all clear that the Court would have read the statute as broadly as its dictum suggests.

It is possible that I am wrong and that I am required to regard the Court’s dictum in Aguilar as controlling. I do not believe that this is so, but if it is I encourage the Court to revisit, either in this ease or another, the question of the scope of the omnibus clause of § 1503(a). If the Court does revisit the question, I think it likely— perhaps very likely — that it will conclude, as I do, that the word “corruptly,” as used in § 1503(a), means “by bribery.”

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

There is no joy in this dissenting judge. The per curiam and concurring opinions have struck out.1

Strike One — The per curiam and concurring opinions second-guess the jury’s verdict rather than deferring to it.

I join the principal concurring opinion in its view that context matters in determining whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction in this case. See Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 586. A vital part of that context is the evidence before the jury. After all, it is that evidence we examine to determine whether any reasonable juror could have convicted the defendant. In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.2015).

Barry Bonds was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. That statute provides for the punishment of “[wjhoever, corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice ...”

*602At the trial of this matter, the jurors were informed that the charges against Bonds stemmed from his appearance before a grand jury investigating steroid use by athletes. The obstruction of justice count alleged that Bonds gave “material Grand Jury testimony that was intentionally evasive, false, and misleading.” Prior to his grand jury testimony, Bonds was granted immunity from prosecution if he complied with the immunity order. Special Agent Novitsky read the immunity order to the jury. The order provided in pertinent part:

Barry Bonds may be called to testify before the grand jury; and

In the judgment of the United States Attorney, the testimony and other information to be obtained from Barry Bonds is necessary to the public interest; and

It is therefore ordered that Barry Bonds, soon as he may be called, shall testify under oath and provide other information, including documents, in this case and in any further ancillary proceedings.

It is further ordered that the testimony and' other information compelled from-Barry Bonds pursuant to this order ... may not be used against him in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, false declaration, or otherwise failing to comply with this order.

The purpose of immunizing a witness in exchange for his. testimony is to ensure that the witness, freed from the specter of prosecution, will provide complete and truthful testimony. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107,1126 (9th Cir.2010) (observing that “[t]he purpose of the immunity order in [the BALCO] case was to compel the witness to testify truthfully and in good faith before the grand jury to assist it in its investigation”) (emphasis in the original). Giving evasive testimony is inconsistent with the obligation to provide complete and truthful testimony. See United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1979) (“[A]n obstruction of justice results when attempts to gather relevant evidence ... are frustrated by the use of corrupt or false means. The blatantly evasive witness achieves this effect as surely by erecting a screen of feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a potential witness to absent himself.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, charges were brought against Bonds for obstruction of justice.

At trial, Special Agent Novitsky described the BALCO Laboratories investigation primarily involving the distribution of anabolic steroids. One of the principal targets of 'the criminal investigation was Greg Anderson, Bonds’ fitness trainer. According to Agent Novitsky, execution of search warrants at BALCO Laboratories produced a “treasure [trove] of drugs and documents indicating usage and distribution [of anabolic steroids] to elite professional athletes.” Authorities also found “physical evidence in terms of drugs that pertained to ... steroid distribution” following a search of Anderson’s residence. Specifically, samples from Anderson’s residence were revealed to be a “designer anabolic steroid.” Authorities also recovered $60,000 from a safe in Anderson’s residence and a bag of syringes in his vehicle.

It was against this backdrop that Bonds was immunized and brought before the grand jury to testify, with the grand jury process considered a continuation of the investigation. Bonds was not a target of the grand jury. Rather, he and other athletes were expected to testify candidly and truthfully to further the investigation into those who were the targets of the grand jury.

*603Agent Novitsky testified that the inconsistencies between Bonds’ testimony and other evidence before the grand jury regarding the relationship between the athletes and the steroid distributors, including the evasions, required the investigators to conduct additional inquiries that would not have been necessary had Bonds given non-evasive testimony. We cannot say with certainty that no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise. Indeed, drawing all inferences in favor of the government, a reasonable juror could reasonably conclude that Bonds’ evasive testimony diverted the investigation, thereby impeding the administration of justice. See id.

From the inception of this nation’s system of justice, the jury has played an integral role in the administration of justice. See City of Morgantown, W.Va. v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 337 U.S. 254, 258, 69 S.Ct. 1067, 93 L.Ed. 1347 (1949) (articulating that “[tjrial by jury is a vital and cherished right, integral in our judicial system”). We defer to the wisdom of twelve ordinary citizens, selected by the parties, who hear the evidence and follow the instructions given by the judge to reach a verdict. See Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir.2013) (“Although the evidence presented at trial could yield an alternative inference, we must respect the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts....”) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Overturning a jury verdict, particularly on a sufficiency of evidence challenge, is rare, as it should be. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). This “reviewing court may not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only whether any rational trier of fact could have made that finding.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (first emphasis added). Regrettably, little consideration is given in the per curiam and concurring opinions to the entirety of the evidence introduced during Bonds’ trial. Indeed, the principal concurring opinion focuses on “the intrinsic capabilities of the statement itself,” as determined on appeal. Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 585 (emphasis in the original). However, as discussed below, this analysis applies to false statements rather than to evasive statements. Importing an inapplicable analysis to overturn the jury’s considered verdict appears to be a means of “reaching] the conclusion that seems best” to my concurring colleagues. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Rubin, 490 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). We know that the jury deliberated carefully because it convicted Bonds on only one of four charged counts. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir.1998), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (observing that “the fact that the jury rendered a mixed verdict ... suggests that it reviewed the evidence rationally and independently”) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s considered verdict, and the verdict warrants deference rather than second-guessing. See Long, 736 F.3d at 896.

When Bonds was asked before the grand jury if Anderson had ever given him anything that required a syringe to inject himself with (a yes or no question), Bonds launched into the following rambling soliloquy:

I’ve only had one doctor touch me. And that’s my only personal doctor. Greg, like I said, we don’t get into each others’ personal lives. We’re friends, but I don’t — we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because he knows I don’t *604want — don’t come to my house talking baseball. If you want to come to my house and talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good friends. You come around talking about baseball, you go on. I don’t talk about his business, You know what I mean?

That’s what keeps our friendship. You know, I ’ am sorry, but that — you know, that — I was a celebrity child, not just in baseball by my own instincts. I became a celebrity child with a famous father. I just don’t get into other people’s business because of my father’s situation, you see.

This rambling, non-response answered the following unasked questions:

[Question: How many doctors have touched (treated?) you?]

Answer: I’ve only had one doctor touch me. And that’s my only personal doctor.

[Question: Do you and Greg (Anderson) get into each others’ personal lives?]

Answer: Greg, like I said, we don’t get into each others’ personal lives.

[Question: Do you and Anderson get into each others’ professional lives?]

Answer: We’re friends, but I don’t — we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because he knows I don’t want — don’t come to my house talking baseball. If you want to come to my house and talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good friends. You come around talking about baseball, you go on. I don’t talk about his business.

[Question: What keeps your friendship with Anderson?]

Answer: That’s [not getting into each other’s personal or professional lives] what keeps our friendship.

[Question: Were you a celebrity child?]

Answer: You know, I am sorry, but that — you know, that — I was a celebrity child, not just in baseball by my own instincts. I became a celebrity child with, a famous father. I just don’t get into other people’s business because of my father’s situation, you see.

Despite these extended . responses to unasked questions, Bonds studiously avoided answering the question that was actually asked: “Did [Anderson] ever give you anything that required a syringe to inject yourself with?”

The jury pondered Bonds’ response in conjunction with Agent Novitsky’s testimony that Bonds’ response required the investigators to search for other evidence that Anderson provided steroids to Bonds. That evidence included testimony from other athletes who acknowledged receiving steroid injections, and from Steve Hoskins, Bonds’ childhood best friend and personal assistant, who had discussions with Bonds about steroid injections and who heard Bonds complain about pain associated with the injections. Hoskins also witnessed Anderson and Bonds enter a bedroom “a couple of times” at Bonds’ Arizona residence, with Anderson holding a needle that Hoskins believed was for steroid injections. Hoskins also recounted an incident when Anderson refused to inject Bonds and Bonds stated that he would “give it to himself.” Hoskins testified that Bonds’ shoe size increased, his glove size changed, and his body got bigger, heavier and “a lot more muscular.” During Hos-kins’ testimony, an audiotape was played that Hoskins made of Anderson discussing providing steroids to Bonds. Hoskins was growing increasingly concerned about Bonds’ steroid use and wanted Bonds’ father to intervene. Because Anderson and Bonds,denied the use of steroids, Hoskins hoped to use the tape to convince Bonds’ father that Hoskins’ concern was justified. *605The tape was ultimately provided to investigating agents.

A former girlfriend of Bonds testified that Bonds revealed to her that a lump on Bonds’ elbow was caused by steroid use. She also observed Anderson and Bonds regularly enter a bedroom in Bonds’ Arizona residence with a satchel, locking the door after them and remaining inside for approximately twenty minutes. At the same time, the former girlfriend noted significant physical changes in Bonds, including a dramatic increase in size, acne on his upper shoulders and back, rapid hair loss, testicular atrophy, and decreased sexual performance. In addition, Bonds became “increasingly aggressive, irritable, agitated, very impatient, almost violent.” The jury was informed by the Chief Science Officer of the United States Anti-Doping Agency that these are typical side effects of anabolic steroid use.

Finally, Kathy Hoskins, sister to Steve Hoskins, testified that she actually witnessed Anderson administer a shot into Bonds’ “bellybutton” with a syringe, “like the Doctor with a syringe in the bellybutton.” According to Kathy Hoskins, Bonds commented that the injection was “a little some.some, when I go on the road, you know we can’t detect it, you can’t catch it.”

After hearing this evidence, the jury was instructed that to convict Bonds of obstructing justice, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The defendant corruptly, that is, for the purpose of obstructing justice,

2. obstructed, influenced, or impeded, or endeavored to obstruct, influence, or impede the grand jury proceeding in which defendant testified,

3. by knowingly giving material testimony that was intentionally evasive, false or misleading.

The instruction on materiality informed the jury that:

A statement was material if it had a natural tendency to influence or was capable of influencing a decision of the grand jury.

The government alleges that the underlined portion of the following statements constitute material testimony that was intentionally evasive, false or misleading. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of count 5, you must all agree that one or more of the following statements was material and intentionally evasive, false or misleading, with all of you unanimously agreeing as to which statement or statements so qualify!.] '

So instructed, the jury reasonably found that Bonds’ rambling statement was evasive. Under the sufficiency of evidence standard, we draw all inferences in fayor of the government when determining whether any rational juror could have found that Bonds’ evasive testimony materially impeded the grand jury’s performance of its investigatory function. See Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204; see also United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 699, 701 (10th Cir.1980) (“The ultimate question ... is not whether the defendant told the truth but whether the defendant obstructed or interfered with the process of truthfinding in an investigation ... ”).

Evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 1503 even if “it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or is not wholly inconsistent with every conclusion of guilt [because] [a] jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir.1984) (citation, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The principal concurring opinion acknowledges that the sufficiency of evidence standard of review is a demanding one, but *606nevertheless elects to apply the standard with “some rigor.” Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 586. Without citation to any precedent supporting the addition of “rig- or” to the governing standard of review, that language sounds suspiciously close to a euphemism for second-guessing the jury and “reaching] the conclusion that seems best” to those joining the principal concurrence. Rubin, 490 F.3d at 724 (citation omitted).

As the principal concurring opinion acknowledges, § 1503 sweeps broadly. See Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 583.Ap-plying that broad statute to the facts of this case, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence before the jury that Bonds sought to corruptly impede the work of the grand jury. See id. We are not called upon to determine how far '§ 1503 can be prudentially applied. Nor need we decide whether attorneys at oral argument could be prosecuted for giving evasive answers to questions from members of the oral argument panel. Such a discussion is more akin to resolving a claim that a statute is overbroad, an issue that is not before us in this appeal. In any event, a hypothetical overreach of the statute cannot affect Bonds’ conviction for conduct that falls squarely within the statute. See United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir.1985) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 was not vague or overbroad because “[t]he reach of the statute is clearly limited to such constitutionally unprotected and purportedly illicit activity as that undertaken by [the defendant] ...”).

The jury necessarily found that Bonds’ evasive testimony was material because it was instructed that it had to make that finding before Bonds could be convicted of violating § 1503. Nevertheless, the principal concurring opinion relies upon the “self-evident proposition” that Bonds’ evasive statement “did not have the capacity to divert the government from its investigation ...” Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 585. But this conclusion ignores Agent Novitsky’s testimony and the jury’s finding of fact. At a minimum, the jury’s finding is supported by Agent Novitsky’s testimony that Bonds’ evasive responses diverted and impeded the investigation by requiring the investigators to determine whether Bonds was being injected with steroids unknowingly, and whether Bonds’ inconsistent testimony compromised the testimony of the other witnesses. See Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1528 (noting that “marginal” evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of justice). The jury chose “among reasonable constructions of the evidence,” and we must respect that choice rather than second-guess it as the concurring opinions do. Id. at 1526 (citation omitted).

Strike Two — The per curiam and concurring opinions disregard precedent that supports upholding the jury’s verdict.

This is not the first time we have considered whether evasive testimony may serve as the basis for an obstruction of justice charge. It may be the first time we have considered the statute as applied to a famous athlete. But that should not be the deciding factor, and there is no other reason to interpret the statute differently in this case.

In United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851 (9th Cir.1981), we reiterated that the “obstruction of justice statute was designed to proscribe all manner of corrupt methods of obstructing justice.... ” (citing Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir.1949)). In Rasheed, the defendant had destroyed or concealed subpoenaed documents, and we concluded that the suppression of documentary evidence violated the’obstruction of justice statute as much *607as the suppression of testimonial evidence. See id. at 852. The defendant argued that when she appeared before the grand jury, she acknowledged that she had not produced all the subpoenaed documents. See id. at 853. She asserted that the government excused her from any further obligation of production, resulting in a lack of sufficient evidence to support a conviction for obstruction of justice. See id. We disagreed, holding that the obstruction of justice was complete when defendant directed destruction or concealment of the documents. See id. We clarified that the actions of the prosecutor “in no way negated] the commission of the crime. At best, [the prosecutor’s] relieving [the defendant] of further production indicates that justice was not, in fact, obstructed. This is not a defense.... ” Id. (emphasis added). We explained that once it was established that the defendant acted with “the intent to obstruct justice and endeavored to do so[,] [t]his is' sufficient for guilt under section 1503----” Id. The same analysis is applicable to Bonds’ evasive testimony. Once Bonds acted with the intent to evade giving the testimony that was compelled by the immunity order, the obstruction of justice offense was complete. See id. Even if Bonds eventually ceased his evasive efforts, his prior intent to obstruct was not negated. See id. Bonds’ evasive testimony could and did interfere with the continued BALCO investigation as reflected in the testimony of Agent Novitsky. See id.; see also Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204 (observing that justice is obstructed “when attempts to gather relevant evidence ... are frustrated by [a] blatantly evasive witness”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Other circuits agree. See United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir.1972) (holding that “concealing data recorded in one’s memory” through blatant evasion constitutes obstruction of justice); see also United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir.1985) (describing “obviously evasive” answers as “concealment of evidence” within the scope of § 1503). In Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1528, the Eleventh Circuit similarly characterized the defendant’s conduct as obstructive when he gave evasive answers before the grand jury. The Eleventh Circuit described the facts of the case as reflecting that the defendant knew there were irregularities in a certain bank account, that the account was held under a fictitious name, and that the grand jury was seeking to learn the true identity of the account holder. Although the court acknowledged that the government could have questioned the defendant more effectively, it nonetheless held that a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant’s evasive answers were intended to obstruct the grand jury’s investigation. See id.

Ignoring these cases, in my view, creates an unwarranted circuit split and disregards our own precedent without justification.

Strike Three — The concurring opinions rely on precedent more applicable to perjury than to obstruction of justice.

The principal concurring opinion cites this language from Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973): “Under the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive.” Kozinski Concurring Opinion, p. 584. However, the cited language does not support a conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support Bonds’ conviction. In Bronston, the United States Supreme Court addressed the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (not the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503), and decided the issue of *608whether a witness may be convicted of perjury for giving an answer that is literally true, but non-responsive to the question asked. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 352-53, 93 S.Ct. 595. There was absolutely no discussion of evasive testimony or obstruction of justice.

The defendant in Bronston answered several questions posed during adversarial bankruptcy proceedings concerning whether he or his company had Swiss bank accounts. See id. at 354, 93 S.Ct. 595. Although the defendant denied having Swiss bank accounts, there was evidence that the defendant had a personal bank account in a Swiss bank for a prior period of five years. See id. It was undisputed that the defendant’s answers were literally truthful because the defendant did not have a Swiss bank account “at the time of questioning ...” Id. In the context of a prosecution for perjury, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he cases support petitioner’s position that the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner— so long as the witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry.” Id. at 360, 93 S.Ct. 595 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

There is a notable statutory distinction between the perjury at issue in Bronston and the obstruction of justice at issue in this case. In Bronston, the Supreme Court expressed its unwillingness to expand the perjury statute’s reach to encompass literally truthful answers beyond the limits established by Congress. See id. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595. In its current form, the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, provides:

Whoever — (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury ...

18 U.S.C. § 1621 (emphases added). Importantly, the perjury statute specifically requires that the defendant have knowledge that the statement itself was not true. See id. The perjury statute is much more forgiving in its knowledge requirement than the elements delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for obstruction of justice. Notably, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not contain any comparable requirement of known falsity. Rather, the obstruction of justice statute merely requires that the defendant “endeavor [] to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror ...” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has articulated, “the term ‘endeavor’ ... makes conduct punishable where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way....” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 601-02, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). The obstruction of justice statute does not make a distinction between obstructive statements that are false and those that are evasive and not literally false. The statute requires only that the defendant intend his statement to obstruct justice.

It is questionable whether the “literal truth” underpinnings of Bronston apply *609outside the confínes of adversarial proceedings where opposing counsel are expected to continuously hone their questions to require definitive answers, and a judge is present to control uncooperative witnesses. In contrast, the grand jury is a non-adversarial, investigatory proceeding with no judge presiding. Moreover, Bonds was given immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. See United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 92 (1st Cir.2008) (questioning “whether the literal truth defense as articulated in Bronston is appropriately invoked outside the context of adversary questioning....”).

In Bronston, the defendant’s responses were literally truthful based on the specific questions posed. In other words, the questions in Bronston permitted the defendant to exploit the vagaries of the questions while still providing literally truthful answers. In contrast, the government in this case directly and unambiguously inquired of Bonds, “Did Greg ever give you anything that required a syringe to inject yourself with?” Bonds’ answer that he was a celebrity child was literally truthful in only the most attenuated and superficial manner, as it had nothing to do with the question asked.2 Unlike in Bronston, there were no nuances to exploit in the direct question posed to Bonds. In United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.2004), we recognized this limitation with respect to Bronston. (“Bronston’s rule is limited to cases in which the statement is indisputably true, though misleading because it was unresponsive to the question asked.... ”). Unlike in Bronston, and considering his evasive and misleading answer, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Bonds endeavored to impede the grand jury’s investigation. See United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1416 (3d Cir.1994) (“Normally, it is for the petit jury to decide which construction the defendant placed on the question....”) (citation omitted); see also Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204 (“[A]n obstruction of justice results when attempts to gather relevant evidence by a judicial body, which is charged by law with the task of investigating and punishing crime, are frustrated by the use of corrupt or false means. The blatantly evasive witness achieves this effect as surely by erecting a screen of feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a potential witness to absent himself”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 699 (10th Cir.1980) (holding that Bronston’s literal truth defense was inapplicable to an obstruction of justice offense because “Bronston involved a perjury prosecution in which the question was whether the defendant had told the truth. The ultimate question in the case at bar is not whether the defendant told the truth but whether the defendant obstructed or interfered with the process of truthfinding in an investigation in the process of enforcing the law”).

*610“The function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury . paints with a broad brush.... ” United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991) (citation omitted). Given the importance of the grand jury’s investigative role, there is no reason to permit an immunized grand jury witness to obstruct the administration of justice by endeavoring to influence or impede the grand jury’s investigation. It would appear that if there was ever a moment for a witness not to engage in obstructive testimony, it would be before a grand jury.

Application of Bronston’s literal truth analysis guts the obstruction of justice provision prohibiting any attempt to “corruptly ... endeavor to influence ... or impede any grand or petit juror ...” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Equating obstruction of justice with perjury actually superimposes the heightened knowledge requirement contained in the perjury statute upon the “endeavor to influence or impede” provisions of the obstruction statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). Specifically, Bronston’s requirement that an attorney must ask clarifying questions in order to cure potentially perjurious testimony should not be extended to a witness afforded immunity who attempts to obstruct a grand jury investigation through misleading and evasive answers. Bonds was liable for obstruction of justice at the moment he endeavored to influence or impede the grand jury’s investigation with his misleading and evasive answer to the government’s direct and unambiguous question. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (holding that a defendant may be convicted of obstruction of justice “where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way”). In Aguilar, the Supreme Court delineated the dichotomy between perjury and the intent to obstruct justice:

Were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, justice. Under our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.

Id. at 602 As the Supreme Court emphasized, “[t]his is not to say that the defendant’s actions need to be successful; an endeavor suffices ...” Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citation omitted). Despite the jury’s inability to unanimously find that Bonds committed perjury, the government presented sufficient evidence that Bonds’ evasive answer interfered with the administration of justice. See id.

Once Bonds corruptly endeavored to impede the investigatory function of the grand jury, his crime was complete. See Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 853. Contrary to the views expressed in the, concurring opinions, the obstruction cannot be undone by blaming the prosecutor for failing to prevent the obstruction. See id. (“[The prosecutor’s] actions in no way negate the commission of the crime. At best, his relieving [the defendant] of further production indicates that justice was not, in fact, obstructed. This is not a defense.... ”); see also Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1528 (observing that although the prosecutor could have questioned the witness more effectively, a reasonable jury could have nevertheless found the testimony to be evasive in an effort to obstruct justice).

None of the cases cited in the principal concurring opinion support the notion that there is insufficient evidence to sustain an *611obstruction of justice conviction in this case, where the jury was instructed on materiality and specifically found that Bonds’ statement obstructed justice. See Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1129 (upholding a conviction for obstruction of justice where the jury found materiality and obstructive statements); cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769-70, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) (discussing generally concealment of a material fact in the denaturalization context); United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 840 (9th Cir.2003) (discussing materiality generally in the perjury context); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C.Cir.1956) (discussing materiality in the false statement context); United States v. Serv. Deli Inc., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir.1998) (same); United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 350-51 (3d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d Cir.2007) (discussing materiality generally in the bank fraud context). To the extent that the principal concurring opinion cites these cases for the proposition that the grand jury function must be subject to influence for the obstruction conviction to stand, I disagree. See, e.g. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (explaining that a defendant may be convicted of obstruction of justice even if his attempt to obstruct is foiled). Moreover, the jury in this case was instructed on materiality and found Bonds’ statement obstructive pursuant to that instruction. Absent a complete superimposition of the “literally true” Bronston analysis, the cases cited in the principal concurring opinion simply do not provide a basis for reversing Bonds’ conviction.

Final Pitch

Barry Bonds received a grant of immunity in exchange for his truthful and candid testimony before the grand jury. Rather than aiding the grand jury in its investigatory quest, Bonds elected to obstruct the grand jury process by giving evasive testimony. There is sufficient evidence to support his conviction because the jury was instructed that it must find his evasive testimony to be material before rendering a guilty verdict. In my view, the per curiam and concurring opinions impermissibly second-guess the jury verdict,. disregard our precedent, create an unwarranted circuit split and import inapplicable principles from Bronston into the obstruction of justice analysis. I cry foul.

Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is a federal crime under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 to make any false or fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.1 To establish a violation of §1001, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity. This case presents the question whether the Gov*65ernment also must prove that the false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.

HH

Respondent E small Yermian was convicted m the District Court of Central California on three counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, in violation of § 1001. The convictions were based on false statements respondent supplied his employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire. Respondent was hired in 1979 by Guitón Industries, a defense contractor. Because respondent was to have access to classified material in the course of his employment, he was required to obtain a Department of Defense Security Clearance. To this end, Gulton’s security officer asked respondent to fill out a “Worksheet For Preparation of Personnel Security Questionnaire.”

In response to a question on the worksheet asking whether he had ever been charged with any violation of law, respondent failed to disclose that in 1978 he had been convicted of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. In describing his employment history, respondent falsely stated that he had been employed by two companies that had in fact never employed him. The Guitón security officer typed these false representations onto a form entitled “Department of Defense Personnel Security Questionnaire.” Respondent reviewed the typed document for errors and signed a certification stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge” and that he understood “that any misrepresentation or false statement . . . may subject [him] to prosecution under section 1001 of the United States Criminal Code.” App. 33.

After witnessing respondent’s signature, Gulton’s security officer mailed the typed form to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office for processing. Government investigators subsequently discovered that respondent had submitted *66false statements on the security questionnaire. Confronted with this discovery, respondent acknowledged that he had responded falsely to questions regarding his criminal record and employment history. On the basis of these false statements, respondent was charged with three counts in violation of § 1001.

At trial, respondent admitted to having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements he had submitted in response to the Department of Defense security questionnaire. He explained that he had made the false statements so that information on the security questionnaire would be consistent with similar fabrications he had submitted to Guitón in his employment application. Respondent’s sole defense at trial was that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements would be transmitted to a federal agency.2

Consistent with this defense, respondent requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge that his statements were false at the time they were made, but also that he had actual knowledge that those statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.3 The District Court rejected that request and instead instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent “knew or should have known *67that the information was to be submitted to a government agency.”4 Respondent’s objection to this instruction was overruled, and the jury returned convictions on all three counts charged in the indictment.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court had erred in failing to give respondent’s requested instruction. 708 F. 2d 365 (1983). The Court of Appeals read the statutory terms “knowingly and willfully” to modify both the conduct of making false statements and the circumstance that they be made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” The court therefore concluded that “as an essential element of a section 1001 violation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew at the time he made the false statement that it was made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.” Id., at 371 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that the “reasonably foreseeable” standard provided by the District Court’s jury instructions satisfied any element of intent possibly associated with the requirement that false statements be made within federal agency jurisdiction. Id., at 371-372.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conflicts with decisions by the three other Courts of Appeals *68that have considered the issue. United States v. Baker, 626 F. 2d 512 (CA5 1980); United States v. Lewis, 587 F. 2d 854 (CA6 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Stanford, 589 F. 2d 285 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 983 (1979). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 464 U. S. 991 (1983), and now reverse.

II

The only issue presented in this case is whether Congress intended the terms “knowingly and willfully” in § 1001 to modify the statute’s jurisdictional language, thereby requiring the Government to prove that false statements were made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.5 The issue thus presented is one of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we turn first to the language of the statute.

A

The relevant language of § 1001 provides:

“Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined . . . .”

The statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements be made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States” is a jurisdictional requirement. Its primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern. Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense. Indeed, we have held that “the existence of the fact *69that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute.” United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 676-677, n. 9 (1975). Certainly in this case, the statutory language makes clear that Congress did not intend the terms “knowingly and willfully” to establish the standard of culpability for the jurisdictional element of § 1001. The jurisdictional language appears in a phrase separate from the prohibited conduct modified by the terms “knowingly and willfully.” Any natural reading of § 1001, therefore, establishes that the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify only the making of “false, fictitious or fraudulent statements,” and not the predicate circumstance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.6 Once this is clear, there is no basis for requiring proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. The statute contains no language suggesting any additional element of intent, such as a requirement that false statements be “knowingly made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction,” or “with the intent to deceive the Federal Government.” On its face, therefore, § 1001 requires that the Government prove that false statements were made knowingly and willfully, and it unambiguously dispenses with any requirement that the Government also prove that those statements were made with actual knowledge -of federal *70agency jurisdiction.7 Respondent’s argument that the legislative history of the statute supports a contrary interpretation is unpersuasive.

B

The first federal criminal statute prohibiting the making of a false statement in matters within the jurisdiction of any federal agency was the Act of October 23, 1918 (1918 Act), ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015.8 That Act provided in pertinent part:

“[Wjhoever, ... for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, . . . shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be fined . . . .”

Interpreting that provision in United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339 (1926), this Court held that only false statements made with intent to cause “pecuniary or property loss” to the Federal Government were prohibited. Id., at 346-347. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the *71terms “with the intent of . . . defrauding” the Federal Government “should be construed as being used not merely in its primary sense of cheating the Government out of property or money, but also in the secondary sense of interfering with or obstructing one of its lawful governmental functions by deceitful and fraudulent means.” Id., at 346. The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to prohibit all intentional deceit of the Federal Government, it would have used the broad language then employed in § 37 of the Penal Code, which “by its specific terms, extends broadly to every conspiracy ‘to defraud the United States in any manner and for any purpose,’ with no words of limitation whatsoever.” Ibid.

Concerned that the 1918 Act, as thus narrowly construed, was insufficient to protect the authorized functions of federal agencies from a variety of deceptive practices, Congress undertook to amend the federal false-statements statute in 1934.9 The 1934 provision finally enacted, however, rejected the language suggested in Cohn, and evidenced a conscious choice not to limit the prohibition to false statements made with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government.

The first attempt to amend the false-statements statute was unsuccessful. After debates in both Houses, Congress passed H. R. 8046. That bill provided in pertinent part:

“[E]very person who with the intent to defraud the United States knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false or fraudulent . . . statement, . . . concerning or pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, establishment, administration, agency, office, board, or commission of the United States, . . . shall be punished by . . . fine ... or by imprisonment... , or by *72both . . . 78 Cong. Rec. 3724 (1934) (emphasis added).10

President Roosevelt, however, vetoed the bill because it prohibited only those offenses already covered by the 1918 Act, while reducing the penalties.11 This was hardly the measure needed to increase the protection of federal agencies from the variety of deceptive practices plaguing the New Deal administration.

To remedy the President’s concerns, Congress quickly passed a second bill that broadened the scope of the federal false-statements statute by omitting the specific-intent language of the prior bill. The 1934 provision finally enacted into law provided in pertinent part:

“[WJhoever shall knowingly .and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, ... in any matter within the juris*73diction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined . . . Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.

Noticeably lacking from this enactment is any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction. If Congress had intended to impose either requirement, it would have modified the prior bill by replacing the phrase “with intent to defraud the United States” with the phrase “with intent to deceive the United States,”12 or by inserting the phrase “knowing such statements to be in any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal agency.” That Congress did not include such language, either in the 1934 enactment or in the 1948 revision, provides convincing evidence that the statute does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement.13

Finally, there is no support in the legislative history for respondent’s argument that the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” The terms “knowingly and willfully” appeared in the 1918 Act, but the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]” did not. It is clear, therefore, that in the 1918 Act the terms “know*74ingly and willfully” did not require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement. Nor does the legislative history suggest that by adding the jurisdictional prerequisite to the current provision Congress intended to extend the scope of those two terms. The jurisdictional language was added to the current provision solely to limit the reach of the false-statements statute to matters of federal interest.

By requiring proof of specific intent to defraud the United States, Congress limited the 1918 prohibition to matters pertaining to federal concern. There was no reason, therefore, to include the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” Once the specific-intent language of the 1918 Act was eliminated, however, the current jurisdictional phrase was necessary to ensure that application of the federal prohibition remained limited to issues of federal concern. There is no indication that the addition of this phrase was intended also to change the meaning of the terms “knowingly and willfully” to require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement. As this Court observed in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955), the 1934 enactment “deleted all words as to purpose,” and inserted the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction” of a federal agency “simply to compensate for the deleted language as to purpose — to indicate that not all falsifications but only those made to government organs were reached.” Id., at 506, 507-508.

Ill

Respondent argues that absent proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, § 1001 becomes a “trap for the unwary,” imposing criminal sanctions on “wholly innocent conduct.” Whether or not respondent fairly may characterize the intentional and deliberate lies prohibited by the statute (and manifest in this case) as “wholly innocent conduct,” this argument is not sufficient to overcome the express statutory language of §1001. Respondent does not argue that Congress lacks the power to impose criminal sanctions for *75deliberately false statements submitted to a federal agency, regardless of whether the person who made such statements actually knew that they were being submitted to the Federal Government. Cf. Feola, 420 U. S., at 676, n. 9. That is precisely what Congress has done here. ' In the unlikely event that § 1001 could be the basis for imposing an unduly harsh result on those who intentionally make false statements to the Federal Government, it is for Congress and not this Court to amend the criminal statute.14

I — I <3

Both the plain language and the legislative history establish that proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required under § 1001. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.

It is so ordered.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

It is common ground that in a prosecution for the making of false statements the Government must prove that the defendant actually knew that the statements were false at the *76time he made them. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64, 68-70 (1969). The question presented here is whether the Government must also prove that the defendant actually knew, that his statements were made in a matter within “the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” The Court concludes that the plain language and the legislative history of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 conclusively establish that the statute is intended to reach false statements made without actual knowledge of federal involvement in the subject matter of the false statements. I cannot agree.

The Court nonetheless proceeds on the assumption that some lesser culpability standard is required in § 1001 prosecutions, but declines to decide what that lesser standard is. Even if I agreed with the Court that actual knowledge of federal involvement is not required here, I could not agree with the Court’s disposition of this case because it reverses the Court of Appeals without determining for itself, or remanding for the lower court to determine, whether the jury instructions in respondent’s case were proper. I think that our certiorari jurisdiction is best exercised to resolve conflicts in statutory construction, and not simply to decide whether a jury in a particular case was correctly charged as to the elements of the offense. But here the Court, in a remarkable display of left-footedness, accomplishes neither result: reading its opinion from beginning to end, one neither knows what the congressionally intended element of intent is, nor whether the jury was properly instructed in this case.

I — I

I think that in this case, [a]fter seizing] every thing from which aid can be derived/ United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C. J.), we are left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971). Notwithstanding the majority’s repeated, but sparsely supported, assertions that the evidence of Congress’ intent not to require actual knowledge is “convincing,” and “unambiguous],” ante, at 69, and n. 7, 73, I believe that the *77language and legislative history of §1001 can provide “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). I therefore think that the canon of statutory construction which requires that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes . . . be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), is applicable here. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that actual knowledge of federal involvement is a necessary element for conviction under § 1001.

The federal false-statements statute, 18 U. S. C. §1001, provides that

“[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” (emphasis added).

The majority correctly begins its analysis with the language of the statute, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981), but in my view, it incorrectly concludes that the statutory language is unambiguous.

In drawing that conclusion, the Court does no more than point out that the “in any matter” language is placed at the beginning of the sentence in a phrase separate from the láter phrase specifying the prohibited conduct. The Court then concludes that under any “natural reading” of the statute, it is clear that “knowingly and willfully” modify only the phrase specifying the prohibited conduct. Ante, at 69-70. Although “there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing ‘plain’ or ‘unambiguous’ language” in a statute, United States v. Turkette, supra, at 580, the Court’s reasoning here amounts to little more than simply pointing to the ambiguous phrases and proclaiming them clear. In my view, it is quite impossible to tell which phrases the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify, and the magic wand of ipse dixit does *78nothing to resolve that ambiguity. I agree with the Court of Appeals that

“neither the grammatical construction nor the punctuation of the statute indicates whether the ‘knowingly and willfully’ phrase modifies only the phrase ‘makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements’ or the broader phrase ‘in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements.’” 708 F. 2d 365, 368 (CA9 1983) (emphasis in original).

Nor does the fact that the “in any matter” language appears as an introductory phrase at the beginning of the statute support the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend that phrase to be modified by the culpability language. This is so because, before the 1948 revision of the statute— a housekeeping overhaul intended to make no substantive changes, United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 508 (1955) — the “in any matter” language in fact did not appear as an introductory phrase in the statute. Before the 1948 revision, the 1934 statute read as follows:

“[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . -. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 (emphasis added).

Turning its attention, as it must, to that version of the statute, the Court again does no more than proclaim that the most “natural reading,” even of the 1934 statute, with the “in any matter” language at the end rather than at the beginning of the statute, is that “knowingly and willfully” modify only the making of false statements. Ante, at 69, n. 6. But the fact that the Court’s “natural reading” has not seemed so *79natural to the judges of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, nor for that matter to me, indicates that the Court’s reading, though certainly a plausible one, is not at all compelled by the statutory language. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §46.04 (4th ed. 1973 and 1984 Cum. Supp.).

The legislative history is similarly unclear, but in my view, slightly more supportive of respondent’s position than of the Court’s position. It is in any event certainly not the kind of clear expression of legislative intent which is sufficient to explain an otherwise ambiguous statute and to overcome the application of the rule of lenity.

As the Court points out, the 1918 Act was the first federal prohibition on the making of false statements, and that Act included language requiring that the prohibited false statements be made “for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department thereof.” Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015. All agree that that quoted language directly supports the Court of Appeals’ holding here, Brief for United States 10, and the Court rests its entire holding on the absence of that language in the current statute. Ante, at 71-74.

Examination of the evolution of the statute, however, reveals only meager support for the Court’s conclusion that Congress made “a conscious choice,” ante, at 71, to eliminate the requirement of actual knowledge of federal involvement when it deleted the quoted language. To me, the change in the statutory language is as readily explained by Congress’ desire to eliminate, not the intent requirement, but rather the “cheating and swindling or defrauding” language — language which this Court in United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339, 346-347 (1926), had relied on in construing the 1918 Act narrowly to apply only to “the fraudulent causing of pecuniary or property loss” to the Federal Government.

In Cohn the Court expressly rejected the Government’s argument that Congress intended the 1918 Act to go beyond *80merely protecting the Government from being cheated out of its own money or property, and in addition intended it to protect the Government from the interference with and obstruction of any of its lawful functions by deceitful or fraudulent means. Ibid. The Court specifically focused on the use of the word “defraud” in the statute and concluded that even when used in connection with the words “cheating and swindling,” the word “defraud” is only to be given its ordinary •meaning of “fraudulently] causing. . . pecuniary or property loss.” Ibid.

The restricted scope of the 1918 Act resulting from the Cohn decision became a serious problem with the advent of the New Deal programs in the 1930’s. Early in 1934 Secretary of the Interior Ickes contacted the Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and proposed a false-statements bill, intended to be broader than the 1918 Act, that would fill a gap he perceived in the present Criminal Code. See H. R. Rep. No. 829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 2858-2859 (1934). In particular the Secretary was concerned that there were at present no statutes outlawing, for example, the presentation of false documents and statements to the Department of the Interior in connection with the shipment of “hot oil,” or to the Public Works Administration in connection with the transaction of business with that agency. See S. Rep. No. 1202, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934).

To address the Secretary’s concerns, both the House and the Senate tried their hands at drafting a bill penalizing the making of false statements in connection with areas of federal agency concern. The House version, H. R. 8046, which was the version finally passed, provided:

“[E]very person who with intent to defraud the United States knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false . . . statement, . . . concerning or pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, establishment, administration, agency, office, board, or commis*81sion of the United States . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” ' 78 Cong. Rec. 3724 (1934) (emphasis added).

The language of the bill and the House Report accompanying the bill made clear that H. R. 8046 required proof that the defendant actually knew that his fraudulent statements were directed at the Federal Government. The House Report explicitly noted that the “rights of the accused are protected by the provision that the act must be committed willfully and knowingly and with intent to defraud the United States.” H. R. Rep. No. 829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (emphasis added). Statements made on the floor of both Houses during consideration of the bills indicate that the legislators understood that the purpose of the legislation was to deter those individuals “hovering over every department of the Government like obscene harpies, like foul buzzards” intending to deceive the Federal Government. 78 Cong. Rec. 2858 (1934); see id., at 3724.

In spite of the noble goals and colorful metaphors that H. R. 8046 carried with it, President Roosevelt vetoed the bill for what seems now to be a rather obvious reason. In his veto message President Roosevelt pointed out that the statute as drafted was superfluous — it prohibited the very same conduct that was already prohibited by the 1918 Act and it even specified lesser penalties for that conduct. Id., at 6778-6779. Indeed in comparing the bill with the 1918 Act, it is all too obvious that when Congress made the prohibition depend on an intent to defraud, it subjected the new statute to the same narrowing construction that the Court had given to the 1918 Act in Cohn — the very construction that had created the need for the new Act. Thus, to eliminate the President’s problems with the bill, Congress simply enhanced the penalties provision and omitted the limiting language. That language, of course, was the “intent to defraud the United States” language. Another bill, H. R. *828912, was then passed by both Houses, 78 Cong. Rec. 12452 (1934), and, for purposes of this case, the statute assumed its present form, except for the phraseology changes made in the 1948 revision previously discussed.

Of course the Court is correct that Congress could have made its intent clearer by rewriting the limiting language so as to require an “intent to deceive” rather than an “intent to defraud” the Federal Government. See ante, at 73, and n. 13. But the fact still remains that nowhere in the admittedly sparse legislative history is there any indication that Congress intended the postveto changes to alter the culpability requirement that had been a part of the Act since 1918. Indeed in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, 94 (1941), we pointed out that the purpose of the amendment simply was to “omi[t] the limiting words which had been deemed to make the former provision applicable only to cases where pecuniary or property loss to the government had been caused” (footnote omitted). It seems to me highly unlikely that, without so much as a hint of explanation, Congress would have changed the statute from one intended to deter the perpetration of deliberate deceit on the Federal Government, to one intended to criminalize the making of even the most casual false statements so long as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency function. The latter interpretation would substantially extend the scope of the statute even to reach, for example, false statements privately made to a neighbor if the neighbor then uses those statements in connection with his work for a federal agency.

Of course “[i]t is not unprecedented for Congress to enact [such] stringent legislation,” United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 709 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But I cannot subscribe to the Court’s interpretation of this statute in such a way as to “make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law,” Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286 (1982), when the legislative history *83simply “fails to evidence congressional awareness of the statute’s claimed scope.” Id., at 290. Thus, I would hold that the rule of lenity is applicable in this case and that it requires the Government to prove that a defendant in a § 1001 prosecution had actual knowledge that his false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction.

I — I h — I

Seemingly aware of the broad range of conduct that § 1001 could sweep within its scope under today’s interpretation, the Court apparently does not hold that the words “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States” are jurisdictional words only and that no state of mind is required with respect to federal agency involvement. Ante, at 68-69, and n. 5. Instead, the Court suggests that some lesser state of mind may well be required in § 1001 prosecutions in order to prevent the statute from becoming a “trap for the unwary.” Ante, at 75, n. 14. Accordingly, it expressly declines to decide whether the trial judge erred in its jury instructions in this case. Ibid.

In my view, the Court has simply disregarded the clearest, albeit not conclusive, evidence of legislative intent and then has invited lower courts to improvise a new state-of-mind requirement, almost out of thin air, in order to avoid the unfairness of the Court’s decision today. I think that the Court’s opinion will engender more confusion than it will resolve with respect to the culpability requirement in § 1001 cases not before the Court. And, unfortunately, it tells us absolutely nothing about whether respondent Yermian received a proper jury instruction in the case that is before the Court.

If the proper standard is something other than “actual knowledge” or “reasonable foreseeability,” then respondent is entitled to a new trial and a proper instruction under that standard. The Court seems to believe that the question of the proper culpability requirement is not before it, ante, at 68, n. 5, 75, n. 14, because it apparently concludes that that *84question is not embraced in the Governments’ petition for certiorari asking for review of the Court of Appeals’ holding with respect to the actual knowledge standard. See Pet. for Cert. I. Apparently the Court believes that respondent should have filed a cross-petition for certiorari if he wished to raise the issue of the proper standard and the propriety of the jury instructions in his case. But it is an elementary proposition that a “cross-petition is not necessary to enable a party to advance any ground, even one rejected or not raised below, in support of the judgment in his favor.” R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 478 (5th ed. 1978); see Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). Here, respondent’s alternative argument for a “recklessness” standard, if accepted, mandates affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment below that he is entitled to a new trial. If the Court is unwilling to decide the issue itself, I believe that at a minimum it must remand for a decision on the issue, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970) (dictum), rather than simply leaving the propriety of respondent’s conviction in a state of limbo.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether there is an exception to criminal liability under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for a false statement that consists of the mere denial of wrongdoing, the so-called "exculpatory no.”

I

While acting as a union officer during 1987 and 1988, petitioner James Brogan accepted cash payments from JRD Management Corporation, a real estate company whose employees were represented by the union. On October 4,1993, federal agents from the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service visited petitioner at his home. The agents identified themselves and explained that they were seeking petitioner’s cooperation in an investigation of JRD and various individuals. They told petitioner that if he wished to cooperate, he should have an attorney contact the United States Attorney’s Office, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one could be appointed for him.

The agents then asked petitioner if he would answer some questions, and he agreed. One question was whether he had received any cash or gifts from JRD when he was a union officer. Petitioner’s response was “no.” At that point, the *400agents disclosed that a search of JED headquarters had produced company records showing the contraiy. They also told petitioner that lying to federal agents in the course of an investigation was a crime. Petitioner did not modify his answers, and the interview ended shortly thereafter.

Petitioner was indicted for accepting unlawful cash payments from an employer in violation of 29 U. S. C. §§ 186(b)(1), (a)(2), and (d)(2), and making a false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. He was tried, along with several co-defendants, before a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was found guilty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, 96 F. 3d 85 (1996). We granted cer-tiorari on the issue of the “exculpatory no.” 520 U. S. 1263 (1997).

II

At the time petitioner falsely replied “no” to the Government investigators’ question, 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (1988 ed.) provided:

“Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

By its terms, 18 U. S. C. § 1001 covers “any” false statement — that is, a false statement “of whatever kind,” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The word “no” in response to a question assuredly makes a “statement,” see, e. g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 2461 (2d ed. 1950) (def. *4012: “That which is stated; an embodiment in words of facts or opinions”), and petitioner does not contest that his utterance was false or that it was made “knowingly and willfully.” In fact, petitioner concedes that under a “literal reading” of the statute he loses. Brief for Petitioner 5.

Petitioner asks us, however, to depart from the literal text that Congress has enacted, and to approve the doctrine adopted by many Circuits which excludes from the scope of § 1001 the “exculpatory no.” The central feature of this doctrine is that a simple denial of guilt does not come within the statute. See, e. g., Moser v. United States, 18 F. 3d 469, 473-474 (CA7 1994); United States v. Taylor, 907 F. 2d 801, 805 (CA8 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F. 2d 1222, 1224 (CA9 1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F. 2d 179, 183 (CA4 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F. 2d 714, 717-719 (CA11 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F. 2d 874, 880-881 (CA10 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F. 2d 178, 183-184 (CA1 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 935 (1976). There is considerable variation among the Circuits concerning, among other things, what degree of elaborated tale-telling carries a statement beyond simple denial. See generally Annot., 102 A. L. R. Fed. 742 (1991). In the present case, however, the Second Circuit agreed with petitioner that his statement would constitute a “true ‘exculpatory n[o]’ as recognized in other circuits,” 96 F. 3d, at 37, but aligned itself with the Fifth Circuit (one of whose panels had been the very first to embrace the “exculpatory no,” see Paternostro v. United States, 311 F. 2d 298 (CA5 1962)) in categorically rejecting the doctrine, see United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F. 3d 1040 (CA5 1994) (en banc).

Petitioner’s argument in support of the “exculpatory no” doctrine proceeds from the major premise that § 1001 criminalizes only those statements to Government investigators that “pervert governmental functions”; to the minor premise that simple denials of guilt to Government investigators do not pervert governmental functions; to the conclusion that *402§ 1001 does not criminalize simple denials of guilt to Government investigators. Both premises seem to us mistaken. As to the minor: We cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely denying guilt in a Government investigation does not pervert a governmental function. Certainly the investigation of wrongdoing is a proper governmental function; and since it is the very purpose of an investigation to uncover the truth, any falsehood relating to the subject of the investigation perverts that function. It could be argued, perhaps, that a disbelieved falsehood does not pervert an investigation. But making the existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or the persuasiveness of the liar) would be exceedingly strange; such a defense to the analogous crime of perjury is certainly unheard of.1 Moreover, as we shall see, the only support for the “perversion of governmental functions” limitation is a statement of this Court referring to the possibility (as opposed to the certainty) of perversion of function — a possibility that exists whenever investigators are told a falsehood relevant to their task.

In any event, we find no basis for the major premise that only those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions are covered by § 1001. Petitioner derives this premise from a comment we made in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 (1941), a ease involving the predecessor to § 1001. That earlier version of the statute subjected to criminal liability “ ‘whoever shall knowingly and willfully . . . make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, *403or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or-fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States....'" Id., at 92-93. The defendant in Gilliland, relying on the' interpretive canon ejusdem, generis, 2 argued that the statute should be read to apply only to matters in which the Government has a financial or proprietary interest. In rejecting that argument, we noted that Congress had specifically amended the statute to cover “ ‘any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States,’ ” thereby indicating “the congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described.” Id., at 93. Petitioner would elevate this statement to a holding that § 1001 does not apply where a perversion of governmental functions does not exist. But it is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy — even assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute itself.. The holding of Gilliland certainly does not exemplify such a practice, since it rejected the defendant’s argument for a limitation that the text of the statute would not bear. And even the relied-upon dictum from Gilliland does not support restricting text to supposed purpose, but to the contrary acknowledges the reality that the reach of a statute often exceeds the precise evil to be eliminated. There is no inconsistency whatever between the proposition that Congress intended “to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result” and the propo*404sition that the statute forbids all “the deceptive practices described.” Ibid.

The second line of defense that petitioner invokes for the “exculpatory no” doctrine is inspired by the Fifth Amendment. He argues that a literal reading of § 1001 violates the “spirit” of the Fifth Amendment because it places a “cornered suspect” in the “cruel trilemma” of admitting guilt, remaining silent, or .falsely denying guilt. Brief for Petitioner 11. This “trilemma” is wholly of the guilty suspect’s own making, of course. An innocent person will not find himself in a similar quandary (as one commentator has put it, the innocent person lacks even a “lemma,” Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 989, 1016 (1996)). And even the honest and contrite guilty person will not regard the third prong of the “trilemma” (the blatant lie) as an available option. The bon mot “cruel trilemma” first appeared in Justice Goldberg’s opinion for the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 878 U. S. 52 (1964), where it was used to explain the importance of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when subpoenaed to testify in an official inquiry. Without that right, the opinion said, he would be exposed “to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Id., at 55. In order to validate the “exculpatory no,” the elements of this “cruel trilemma” have now been altered — ratcheted up, as it were, so that the right to remain silent, which was the liberation from the original trilemma, is now itself a cruelty. We are not disposed to write into our law this species of compassion inflation.

Whether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the heartstrings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie. “[Pjroper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to swear falsely.” United States v. Ap *405 felbaum, 445 U. S. 115, 117 (1980). See also United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174, 180 (1977); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64, 72 (1969). Petitioner contends that silence is an “illusory” option because a suspect may fear that his silence will be used against him later, or may not even know that silence is an available option. Brief for Petitioner 12-13. As to the former: It is well established that the faet that a person’s silence can be used against him — either as substantive evidence of guilt or to impeach him if he takes the stand — does not exert a form of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful lie. See United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 81-82 (1969). And as for the possibility that the person under investigation may be unaware of his right to remain silent: In the modern age of frequently dramatized “Miranda” warnings, that is implausible. Indeed, we found it implausible (or irrelevant) 30 years ago, unless the suspect was “in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 445 (1966).

Petitioner repeats the argument made by many supporters of the “exculpatory no,” that the doctrine is necessary to eliminate the grave risk that § 1001 will become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse. The supposed danger is that overzealous prosecutors will use this provision as a means of “piling on” offenses — sometimes punishing the denial of wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing itself. The objectors’ principal grievance on this score, however, lies not with the hypothetical prosecutors but with Congress itself, which has decreed the obstruction of a legitimate investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious one. It is not for us to revise that judgment. Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate, moreover, any history of prosecutorial excess, either before or after widespread judicial acceptance of the “exculpatory no.” And finally, if there is a problem of supposed “overreaching” it is hard to see how the doctrine of the “exculpatory no” could solve it. It is easy enough for *406an interrogator to press the liar from the initial simple denial to a more detailed fabrication that would not qualify for the exemption.

Ill

A brief word in response to the dissent’s assertion that the Court may interpret a criminal statute more narrowly than it is written: Some of the eases it cites for that proposition represent instances in which the Court did not purport to be departing from a reasonable reading of the text, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 77-78 (1994); Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286-287 (1982). In the others, the Court applied what it thought to be a background interpretive principle of general application. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619 (1994) (construing statute to contain common-law requirement of mens rea); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 446 (1932) (construing statute not to cover violations produced by entrapment); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (construing statute not to apply extraterritorially to noncitizens). Also into this last category falls the dissent’s correct assertion that the present statute does not “mak[e] it a crime for an undercover narcotics agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler.” Post, at 419 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Criminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of the law. See, e.g., 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 142(a), p. 121 (1984) (“Every American jurisdiction recognizes some form of law enforcement authority justification”).

It is one thing to acknowledge and accept such well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to .be read as broadly as they are written, but are subject to ease-by-ease exceptions. The problem with adopting such an expansive, user-friendly judicial rule is that there is no way of knowing when, or how, the rule is to be *407invoked. As to the when: The only reason Justice Stevens adduces for invoking it here is that a felony conviction for this offense seems to him harsh. Which it may well be. But the instances in which courts may ignore harsh penalties are set forth in the Constitution, see Art. I, § 9; Art. III, § 3; Amdt. 8; Amdt. 14, § 1; and to go beyond them will surely leave us at sea. And as to the how: There is no reason in principle why the dissent chooses to mitigate the harshness by saying that § 1001 does not embrace the “exculpatory no,” rather than by saying that § 1001 has no application unless the defendant has been warned of the consequences of lying, or indeed unless the defendant has been put under oath. We are again at sea.

To be sure, some of this uncertainty would be eliminated, at our stage of judging, if we wrenched out of its context the principle quoted by the dissent from Sir Edward Coke, that “communis opinio is of good authoritie in law,”3 and if we applied that principle consistently to a consensus in the judgments of the courts of appeals. (Of course the courts of appeals themselves, and the district courts, would still be entirely at sea, until such time as a consensus would have developed.) But the dissent does not propose, and its author has not practiced, consistent application of the principle, see, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 713 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“We think the text of § 1001 forecloses any argument that we should simply ratify the body of eases adopting the judicial function exception”); Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 468 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the unanimous conclusions of the Courts of Appeals that interpreted the criminal statute at *408issue); thus it becomes yet another user-friendly judicial rule to be invoked ad libitum.

In sum, we find nothing to support the “exculpatory no” doctrine except the many Court of Appeals decisions that have embraced it. While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of this Court’s jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread. Because the plain language of § 1001 admits of no exception for an “exculpatory no,” we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the opinion of the Court except for its response to petitioner’s argument premised on the potential for prosecutorial abuse of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 as now written {ante, at 405-406). On that point I have joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion espousing congressional attention to the risks inherent in the statute’s current breadth.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter joins,

concurring in the judgment.

Because a false denial fits the unqualified language of 18 U. S. C. § 1001, I concur in the affirmance of Brogan’s conviction. I write separately, however, to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture crimes. I note, at the same time, how far removed the “exculpatory no” is from the problems Congress initially sought to address when it *409proscribed falsehoods designed to elicit a benefit from the Government or to hinder Government operations.

I

At the time of Brogan’s offense, § 1001 made it a felony “knowingly and willfully” to make “any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations” in “any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (1988 ed.). That encompassing formulation arms Government agents with authority not simply to apprehend lawbreakers, but to generate felonies, crimes of a kind that only a Government officer could prompt.1

This case is illustrative. Two federal investigators paid an unannounced visit one evening to James Brogan’s home. The investigators already possessed records indicating that Brogan, a union officer, had received cash from a company that employed members of the union Brogan served. (The agents gave no advance warning, one later testified, because they wanted to retain the element of surprise. App. 5.) When the agents asked Brogan whether he had received any money or gifts from the company, Brogan responded “No.” The agents asked no further questions. After Brogan just said “No,” however, the agents told him: (1) the Government had in hand the records indicating that his answer was false; and (2) lying to federal agents in the course of an investigation is a crime. Had counsel appeared on the spot, Brogan likely would have received and followed advice to amend his *410answer, to say immediately: “Strike that; I plead not guilty." But no counsel attended the unannounced interview, and Brogan divulged nothing more. Thus, when the interview ended, a federal offense had been completed — even though, for all we can tell, Brogan’s unadorned denial misled no one.

A further illustration. In United States v. Tabor, 788 F. 2d 714 (CA11 1986), an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent discovered that Tabor, a notary public, had violated Florida law by notarizing a deed even though two signatories had not personally appeared before her (one had died five weeks before the document was signed). With this knowledge in hand, and without “warn[ing] Tabor of the possible consequences of her statements,” id., at 718, the agent went to her home with a deputy sheriff and questioned her about the transaction. When Tabor, regrettably but humanly, denied wrongdoing, the Government prosecuted her under § 1001. See id., at 716. An IRS agent thus turned a violation of state law into a federal felony by eliciting a lie that misled no one. (The Eleventh Circuit reversed the § 1001 conviction, relying on the “exculpatory no” doctrine. Id., at 719.)

As these not altogether uncommon episodes show,2 § 1001 may apply to encounters between agents and their targets *411“under extremely informal circumstances which do not sufficiently alert the person interviewed to the danger that false statements may lead to a felony conviction.” United States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (DC 1974). Because the questioning occurs in a noncustodial setting, the suspect is not informed of the right to remain silent. Unlike proceedings in which a false statement can be prosecuted as perjury, there may be no oath, no pause to concentrate the speaker’s mind on the importance of his or her answers. As in Brogan’s ease, the target may not be informed that a false “No” is a criminal offense until after he speaks.

At oral argument, the Solicitor General forthrightly observed that § 1001 could even be used to “escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. More likely to occur, “if an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of a crime, she can ask questions about other elements to which she already knows the answers. If the suspect lies, she can then use the crime she has prompted as leverage or can seek prosecution for the lie as a substitute for the crime she cannot prove.” Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1273, 1278 (1990) (footnote omitted). If the statute of limitations has run on an offense — as it had on four of the five payments Brogan was accused of accepting — the prosecutor can endeavor to revive the ease by instructing an investigator to elicit a fresh denial of guilt.3 Prosecution in these circumstances is not an instance of Gov*412ernment “punishing the denial of wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing itself,” ante, at 405; it is, instead, Government generation of a crime when the . underlying suspected wrongdoing is or has become nonpunishable.

It is doubtful Congress intended § 1001 to east so large a net. First enacted in 1868 as part of the prohibition against filing fraudulent claims with the Government, the false statement statute was originally limited to statements that related to such filings. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-697. In 1918, Congress broadened the prohibition to cover other false statements made “for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States.” Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, § 35, 40 Stat. 1015-1016. But the statute, we held, remained limited to “cheating the Government out of property or money.” United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339, 346 (1926).

“The restricted scope of the 1918 Act [as construed in Cohn] became a serious problem with the advent of the New Deal programs in the 1930’s.” United States v. Yermian, 468 U. S. 63, 80 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); The new regulatory agencies relied heavily on self-reporting to assure compliance; if regulated entities could file false reports with impunity, significant Government interests would be subverted even though the Government would not be deprived of any property or money. See generally United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, 93-95 (1941). The Secretary of the Interior, in particular, expressed concern that “there were at present no statutes outlawing, for example, the presentation of false documents and statements to the Department of the Interior in connection with the shipment of ‘hot oil,’ or to the Public Works Administration in connection with the transaction of business with that agency.” United States v. Yermian, 468 U. S., at 80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

*413In response to the Secretary’s request, Congress amended the statute in 1934 to include the language that formed the basis for Brogan’s prosecution. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 707 (1995) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the 1934 Act was passed at the behest of ‘the Secretary of the Interior to aid the enforcement of laws relating to the functions of the Department of the Interior.’”) (quoting United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S., at 93-94). Since 1934, the statute, the relevant part of which remains the same today,4 has prohibited the making of “any false or fraudulent statements or representations ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder.” Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, § 35, 48 Stat. 996.

As the lower courts that developed the “exculpatory no” doctrine concluded, the foregoing history demonstrates that § 1001’s “purpose was to protect the Government from the affirmative, aggressive and voluntary actions of persons who take the initiative; and to protect the Government from being the victim of some positive statement which has the tendency and effect of perverting normal and proper governmental activities and functions.” Paternostro v. United States, 311 F. 2d 298, 302 (CA5 1962); accord, United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205 (Md. 1955). True, “the 1934 amendment, which added the current statutory language, was not limited by any specific set of circumstances that may have precipitated its passage.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 480 (1984). Yet it is noteworthy that Congress enacted that amendment to address concerns quite far removed from suspects’ false denials of criminal misconduct, in the course of informal interviews initiated by Government *414agents. Cf. ALI, Model Penal Code § 241.3, Comment 1, p. 151 (1980) (“inclusion of oral misstatements” in § 1001 was “almost [an] accidental consequenefe] of the history of that law”).

III

Even if the encompassing language of §1001 precludes judicial declaration of an “exculpatory no” defense, the core concern persists: “The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime.” Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 372 (1958).5 The Government has not been blind to this concern. Notwithstanding the prosecution in this case and the others eited supra, at 410-411, and n. 2, the Department of Justice has long noted its reluctance to approve §1001 indictments for simple false denials made to investigators. Indeed, the Government once asserted before this Court that the arguments supporting the “exculpatory no” doctrine “are forceful even if not necessarily dispositive.” Memorandum for United States in Nunley v. United States, O. T. 1977, No. 77-5069, p. 7; see also id., at 7-8 (explaining that “[t]he legislative history affords no express indication that Congress meant Section 1001 to prohibit simple false denials of guilt to government officials having no regulatory responsibilities other than the discovery and deterrence of crime”).

In Nunley, we vacated a § 1001 conviction and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment, at the Solicitor General’s suggestion. Nunley v. United States, 434 U. S. 962 (1977). The Government urged such a course because the prosecution had been instituted without prior approval from the Assistant Attorney General, and such permission was “normally refused” in eases like Nunley’s, where the *415statements “essentially constituted] mere denials of guilt.” Memorandum for United States, supra, at 8.

Since Nunley, the Department of Justice has maintained a policy against bringing §1001 prosecutions for statements amounting to an “exculpatory no.” At the time the charges against Brogan were filed, the United States Attorneys’ Manual firmly declared: “Where the statement takes the form of an ‘exculpatory no,’ 18 U. S. C. § 1001 does not apply regardless who asks the question.” United States Attorneys’ Manual ¶ 9-42.160 (Oct. 1, 1988). After the Fifth Circuit abandoned the “exculpatory no” doctrine in United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F. 3d 1040 (1994) (en banc), the manual was amended to read: “It is the Department’s policy that it is not appropriate to charge a Section 1001 violation where a suspect, during an investigation, merely denies his guilt in response to questioning by the government.” United States Attorneys’ Manual ¶ 9-42.160 (Feb. 12, 1996).6

. These pronouncements indicate, at the least, the dubious propriety of bringing felony prosecutions for bare exculpatory denials informally made to Government agents.7 Although today’s decision holds that such prosecutions can be sustained under the broad language of §1001, the Department of Justice’s prosecutorial guide continues to caution restraint in each exercise of this large authority.

*416HH

The Court’s opinion does not instruct lower courts automatically to sanction prosecution or conviction under § 1001 in all instances of false denials made to criminal investigators. The Second Circuit, whose judgment the Court affirms, noted some reservations. That court left open the question whether “to violate Section 1001, a person must know that it is unlawful to make such a false statement.” United States v. Wiener, 96 F. 3d 35, 40 (1996). And nothing that court or this Court said suggests that “the mere denial of criminal responsibility would be sufficient to prove such [knowledge].” Ibid. Moreover, “a trier of fact might acquit on the ground that a denial of guilt in circumstances indicating surprise or other lack of reflection was not the product of the requisite criminal intent,” ibid., and a jury could be instructed that it would be permissible to draw such an inference. Finally, under the statute currently in force, a false statement must be “materia[1]” to violate § 1001. See False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459.

The controls now in place, however, do not meet the basic issue, i. e., the sweeping generality of § 1001’s language. Thus, the prospect remains that an overzealous prosecutor or investigator — aware that a person has committed some suspicious acts, but unable to make a criminal case — will create a crime by surprising the suspect, asking about those acts, and receiving a false denial. Congress alone can provide the appropriate instruction.

Congress has been alert to our decisions in this area, as its enactment of the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996. (passed in response to our decision in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695 (1995)) demonstrates. Similarly, after today’s decision, Congress may advert to the “exculpatory no” doctrine and the problem that prompted its formulation.

*417The matter received initial congressional consideration some years ago. Legislation to revise and recodify the federal criminal laws, reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1981 but never enacted, would have established a “defense to a prosecution for an oral false statement to a law enforcement officer” if “the statement was made ‘during the course of an investigation of an offense or a possible offense and the statement consisted of a denial, unaccompanied by any other false statement, that the declarant committed or participated in the commission of such offense.'” S. Rep. No. 97-307, p. 407 (1981). In common with the “exculpatory no” doctrine as it developed in the lower courts, this 1981 proposal would have made the defense “available only when the false statement consists solely of a denial of involvement in a crime.” Ibid. It would not have protected a denial “if accompanied by any other false statement (e. g., the assertion of an alibi).” Ibid. 8

The 1981 Senate bill covered more than an “exculpatory no” defense; it addressed frontally, as well, unsworn oral statements of the kind likely to be made without careful deliberation or knowledge of the statutory prohibition against false statements. The bill would have criminalized false oral statements to law enforcement officers only “where the statement is either volunteered (e. g., a false alarm or an unsolicited false accusation that another person has committed an offense) or is made after a warning, designed to impress on the defendant the seriousness of the interrogation and his obligation to speak truthfully.” Id., at 408.

More stringent revision, following the lead of the Model Penal Code and the 1971 proposal of a eongressionally chartered law reform commission, would excise unsworn oral *418statements from § 1001 altogether. See ALI, Model Penal Code §§ 241.3, 241.4, 241.5 (1980); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report §§ 1352, 1354 (1971). A reeodifieation proposal reported by the House Judiciary Committee in 1980 adopted that approach. It would have applied the general false statement provision only to statements made in writing or recorded with the speaker’s knowledge, see H. R. Rep. No. 96-1396, pp. 181-183 (1980); unsworn oral statements would have been penalized under separate provisions, and only when they entailed misprision of a felony, false implication of another, or false statements, about an emergency, see id., at 182. The 1971 law reform commission would have further limited §1001; its proposal excluded from the false statement prohibition all “information given during the course of an investigation into possible commission of an offense unless the information is given in an official proceeding or the declarant is otherwise under a legal duty to give the information.” National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report §1852(3).

In sum, an array of recommendations has been made to refine § 1001 to block the statute’s use as a generator of erime while preserving the measure’s important role in protecting the workings of Government. I do not divine from the Legislature’s silence any ratification of the “exculpatory no” doctrine advanced in lower courts. The extensive airing this issue has received, however, may better inform the exercise of Congress’ lawmaking authority.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Breyer joins,

dissenting.

Although I agree with nearly all of what Justice Ginsburg has written in her concurrence — a concurrence that raises serious concerns that the Court totally ignores — I dissent for the following reasons.

*419The mere fact that a false denial fits within the unqualified language of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for rejecting a well-settled interpretation of that statute. It is not at all unusual for this Court to conclude that the literal text of a criminal statute is broader than the coverage intended by Congress. See, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605, 619 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 518 U. S. 64, 68-69 (1994) (departing from “most natural grammatical reading” of statute because of “anomalies which result from this construction,” and presumptions with respect to scienter in criminal statutes and avoiding constitutional questions); id., at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that lower court interpretation of statute rejected by the Court was “quite obviously the only grammatical reading”); Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that statute prohibiting the making of false statements to a bank was inapplicable to depositing of a “bad check” because “the Government’s interpretation ... would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law”); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 485, 448 (1932) (“We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting [a Prohibition Act] statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them”); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.) (holding that although “words ‘any person or persons,’ [in maritime robbery statute] are broad enough to comprehend every human being[,] . . . general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them”). Although the text of § 1001, read literally, makes it a crime for an undercover narcotics agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler, I am confident *420that Congress did not intend any such result. As Justice Ginsburg has explained, it seems equally clear that’ Congress did not intend to make every “exculpatory no” a felony.1

Even if that were not clear, I believe the Court should show greater respect for the virtually uniform understanding of the bench and the bar that persisted for decades with, as Justice Ginsburg notes, ante, at 414-415, the approval of this Court as well as the Department of Justice.2 See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 192-198 (1994) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 362-364, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).3 Or, as Sir Edward Coke phrased it, “it is the common opinion, and communis *421 opinio is of good authoritie in law.”4 1 E. Coke, Institutes 186a (15th ed. 1794).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.