Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

A jury convicted United States District Judge Robert Aguilar of one count of illegally disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c), and of one count of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice in violation of § 1503. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction under § 2232(c) but reversed the conviction under § 1503. After rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions. We granted certio-rari to resolve a conflict among the Federal Circuits over whether § 1503 punishes false statements made to potential grand jury witnesses, and to answer the important question whether disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization expires violates § 2232(c). 513 U. S. 1013 (1994).

Many facts remain disputed by the parties. Both parties appear to agree, however, that a motion for postconviction relief filed by one Michael Rudy Tham represents the starting point from which events bearing on this case unfolded. Tham was an officer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and was convicted of embezzling funds from the local affiliate of that organization. In July 1987, he filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to have his conviction set aside. The motion was assigned to Judge Stanley Weigel. Tham, seeking to enhance the odds that his petition would be granted, asked Edward Solomon and Abraham Chalupowitz, a.k.a. Abe Chapman, to assist him by capitalizing on their respective acquaintances with another judge in the Northern District of California, respondent Aguilar. Respondent knew Chapman as a distant relation by marriage and knew Solomon from law school. Solomon and Chapman met with *596respondent to discuss Tham’s case, as a result of which respondent spoke with Judge Weigel about the matter.

Independent of the embezzlement conviction, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified Tham as a suspect in an investigation of labor racketeering. On April 20, 1987, the FBI applied for authorization to install a wiretap on Tham’s business phones. Chapman appeared on the application as a potential interceptee. Chief District Judge Robert Peckham authorized the wiretap. The 30-day wiretap expired by law on May 20,1987,18 U. S. C. §2518(5), but Chief Judge Peckham maintained the secrecy of the wiretap under §2518(8)(d) after a showing of good cause. During the course of the racketeering investigation, the FBI learned of the meetings between Chapman and respondent. The FBI informed Chief Judge Peckham, who, concerned with appearances of impropriety, advised respondent in August 1987 that Chapman might be connected with criminal elements because Chapman’s name had appeared on a wiretap authorization.

Five months after respondent learned that Chapman had been named in a wiretap authorization, he noticed a man observing his home during a visit by Chapman. He alerted his nephew to this fact and conveyed the message (with an intent that his nephew relay the information to Chapman) that Chapman’s phone was being wiretapped. Respondent apparently believed, in error, both that Chapman’s phones were tapped in connection with the initial application and that the initial authorization was still in effect. Chief Judge Peckham had in fact authorized another wiretap on Tham’s phones effective from October 1987 through the period in which respondent made the disclosure, but there is no suggestion in the record that the latter had any specific knowledge of this reauthorization.

At this point, respondent’s involvement in the two separate Tham matters converged. Two months after the disclo*597sure to his nephew, a grand jury began to investigate an alleged conspiracy to influence the outcome of Tham’s habeas case. Two FBI agents questioned respondent. During the interview, respondent lied about his participation in the Tham case and his knowledge of the wiretap. The grand jury returned an indictment; a jury convicted Aguilar of one count of disclosing a wiretap, 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c), and one count of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice, §1503. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the § 2232(c) conviction but reversed the § 1503 conviction.

On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions for the reason that the conduct in each instance was not covered by the statutory language. 21 F. 3d 1475 (1994). The court concluded that § 2232(c) requires the disclosure of a pending wiretap application or an authorization that had not expired because the purpose of the statute was to thwart interference with the “‘possible interception’” of the wiretap of which the defendant had knowledge. Id., at 1480. Finding the interception in this case impossible once the authorization had expired, it held respondent’s disclosure was not covered by the plain language of the statute. The Court of Appeals also found that respondent had not interfered with a pending judicial proceeding under § 1503. It first noted that the grand jury had not authorized or directed the FBI investigation. It then held that merely uttering false statements does not “ ‘corruptly influence’ ” within the meaning of the statute. Id., at 1485-1486. It drew this conclusion, in part, from 1988 amendments to § 1512, which added a prohibition on corrupt persuasion of. witnesses. The court read the corrupt persuasion prohibited by § 1512 to require an active attempt to persuade a witness to tell a false story, and used the language in § 1512 as a guide to interpret the omnibus clause of § 1503 narrowly.

*598 I — i

Section 1503 provides:

“Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corrwptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 1503 (emphasis added).

The statute is structured as follows: first it proscribes persons from endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede grand or petit jurors or court officers in the discharge of their duties; it then prohibits injuring grand or petit jurors in their person or property because of any verdict or indictment rendered by them; it then prohibits injury of any court officer, commissioner, or similar officer on account of the performance of his official duties; finally, the “Omnibus Clause” serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. The latter clause, it can be seen, is far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute. Respondent *599was charged with a violation of the Omnibus Clause, to wit: with “corruptly endeavoring] to influence, obstruct, and impede the . .. grand jury investigation.” App. 106.

The first case from this Court construing the predecessor statute to § 1503 was Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893). There we held that “a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court.” Id., at 206. The Court reasoned that a person lacking knowledge of a pending proceeding necessarily lacked the evil intent to obstruct. Id., at 207. Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have likewise tended to place metes and bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provision. The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F. 2d 596, 598 (CA9 1982) (citing cases). Some courts have phrased this showing as a “nexus” requirement — that the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Wood, 6 F. 3d 692, 696 (CA10 1993); United States v. Walasek, 527 F. 2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (CA3 1975). In other words, the endeavor must have the “ ‘natural and probable effect’ ” of interfering with the due administration of justice. Wood, supra, at 695; United States v. Thomas, 916 F. 2d 647, 651 (CA11 1990); Walasek, supra, at 679. This is not to say that the defendant’s actions need be successful; an “endeavor” suffices. United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 143 (1921). But as in Pettibone, if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.

*600Although respondent urges various broader grounds for affirmance,1 we find it unnecessary to address them because we think the “nexus” requirement developed in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals is a correct construction of § 1503. We have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U. S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,” McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). We do not believe that uttering false statements to an investigating agent — and that seems to be all that was proved here — who might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient to make out a violation of the catchall provision of § 1503.

The Government did not show here that the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents. The Government argues that respondent “understood that his false statements would be provided to the grand jury” and that he made the statements with the intent to thwart the grand jury investigation and not just the FBI investigation. Brief for United States 18. The Government supports its argument with a citation to the transcript of the recorded conversation between Aguilar and the FBI agent at the point where Aguilar asks whether he is a target of a grand jury investigation. The agent responded to the question by stating:

“[T]here is a Grand Jury meeting. Convening I guess that’s the correct word. Um some evidence will be heard I’m . . . I’m sure on this issue.” App. 86.

*601Because respondent knew of the pending proceeding, the Government therefore contends that Aguilar’s statements are analogous to those made directly to the grand jury itself, in the form of false testimony or false documents.2

We think the transcript citation relied upon by the Government would not enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury, and that the evidence goes no further than showing that respondent testified falsely to an investigating agent. Such conduct, we believe, falls on the other side of the statutory line from that of one who delivers false documents or testimony to the grand jury itself. Conduct of the latter sort all but assures that the grand jury will consider the material in its deliberations. But what use will be made of false testimony given to an investigating agent who has not been subpoenaed or otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury is far more speculative. We think it cannot be said to have the “natural and probable effect” of interfering with the due administration of justice.

Justice Scalia criticizes our treatment of the statutory language for reading the word “endeavor” out of it, inasmuch as it excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would “only unnaturally and improbably be successful.” Post, at 612. This criticism is unwarranted. Our reading of the statute gives the term “endeavor” a useful function to fulfill: It makes conduct punishable where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some *602way. Were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, justice. Under our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.

Justice Scalia also apparently believes that any act, done with the intent to “obstruct... the due administration of justice,” is sufficient to impose criminal liability. Under the dissent’s theory, a man could be found guilty under § 1503 if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to his wife about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI agent might decide to interview her and that she might in turn be influenced in her statement to the agent by her husband’s false account of his whereabouts. The intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but the man’s culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute than we usually require in order to impose criminal liability.

► — I

Section 2232(c) prohibits the disclosure of information that a wiretap has been sought or authorized. The statute reads:

“Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under chapter 119 to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c).

This section is much more precisely targeted than is the catchall provision of § 1503 discussed above. The first clause defines the element of knowledge required for the act to be criminal: knowledge that an officer has been authorized or *603has sought authorization to intercept a communication. The second clause defines the required intent with which the act be done: “in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception.” The third clause defines the punishable act: “gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception.” Respondent persuaded the Court of Appeals to hold that the wiretap application or authorization must be pending or in esse at the time of the disclosure, but we do not believe any such requirement is to be found in the statutory language.

Respondent here urges the reasoning accepted by the Court of Appeals. “[T]he purpose of the statute is to prevent interference with ‘possible interception.’ ” 21 F. 3d, at 1480. Once a wiretap has expired or been denied, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, there is no “‘possible interception’” to disclose or attempt to disclose. Ibid. The narrow purpose of the statute is further evidenced by the statute’s intent requirement, which limits punishable disclosures to those undertaken with the intent to interfere with “‘such interception’” of which the defendant “has knowledge.” Ibid. Under the circumstances, the disclosure of an expired wiretap not only fails to violate the terms of the statute, it fails to implicate any interest protected by § 2232(c). Brief for Respondent 38.

But this argument, we think, fails in the face of the statutory language itself. The term “such interception” is part of the intent requirement in the second clause; the defendant must intend to obstruct the interception made pursuant to the application or authorization of which he has the knowledge required by the first clause. The phrase “possible interception” is found in the third clause, which describes the act which offends the statute. A defendant intending to disclose the existence of a pending application would ordinarily have no way of knowing whether the application or authorization had resulted in an interception, and that is doubtless why the third clause uses the term “possible” interception. *604It was not intended to limit the offense to cases where the interception based upon the application or authorization was factually possible, but to recognize the fact that at the time the prohibited notice was given it very likely could not be known whether or not there would be an interception.

The Court of Appeals thought its result justified by its view that the aim of the statute was to prevent interference with “possible” interceptions, and that if an interception was not possible because the wiretap was no longer in place at the time of the disclosure, that interest was not threatened. But the statute is aimed at something more than the interference with interceptions; it is aimed at disclosure of wiretap orders or applications which may lead to interceptions. The offense is complete at the time the notice is given, when it often cannot be known whether any interception will take place.

Justice Stevens argues that § 2232(c) criminalizes disclosures of pending applications without a need to rely on the word “ ‘possible.’ ” Post, at 608. That is not so. The reference to pending applications occurs only in the clause specifying the knowledge element. The actus reus element must be independently satisfied. Without the word “possible,” the statute would only prohibit giving notice of “the interception”: It would not reach the giving of notice of an application which has not yet resulted in an authorization or an authorization which has not yet resulted in an interception. That Congress could have accomplished the same result by phrasing the statute differently — for instance, by repeating “‘such interception’” in the third clause, ibid. — does not undercut the fact that the word “possible” is necessary in the statute as written to criminalize such behavior.3

*605Acceptance of respondent’s position would open the door to additional claims of “impossibility” other than the fact that the application or order was not pending at the time of the disclosure. Some sort of mechanical failure, or the departure of the person whose conversation was to be intercepted from the place at which the reception was authorized, are two which come to mind. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 333 (1966), we expressed reservations about the “continuing validity [of] the doctrine of ‘impossibility,’ with all its subtleties,” in the law of criminal attempt, and we would require much more than the statutory language before us to believe that Congress intended to engraft it onto the language of § 2232(c).

Finally, respondent urges us to read the statute to exclude disclosures of expired wiretaps because of concern that a broader construction would run counter to the First Amendment. We see no necessity for such a restrictive construction of the statute. It is true that the Government may not generally restrict individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in the absence of a “state interest of the highest order.” Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 103 (1979). But the statute here in question does not impose such a restriction generally, but only upon those who disclose wiretap information “in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent” the interception. Nor was the respondent simply a member of the general *606public who happened to lawfully acquire possession of information about the wiretap; he was a Federal District Court Judge who learned of a confidential wiretap application from the judge who had authorized the interception, and who wished to preserve the integrity of the court. Government officials in sensitive confidential positions may have special duties of nondisclosure. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(e) (prohibiting the disclosure of grand jury information). Likewise, protective orders may be imposed in connection with information acquired through civil discovery without violating the First Amendment. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 31 (1984). As to one who voluntarily assumed a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling members of the public. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). In this case, Chief Judge Peckham postponed the notification of parties named in the application in order to maintain the secrecy of the wiretap. See 18 U. S. C. §2518(l)(d). We think the Government’s interest is quite sufficient to justify the construction of the statute as written, without any artificial narrowing because of First Amendment concerns.

Respondent raised below a challenge to the jury instructions, but the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to respondent’s conviction under § 1503 and reverse with respect to respondent’s conviction under § 2232(c). We remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Although I agree with the Court’s disposition of the 18 U. S. C. § 1503 issue, and also with its rejection of the First *607Amendment challenge to respondent’s conviction for disclosing a wiretap application under § 2232(c), I believe the Court of Appeals correctly construed § 2232(c) to invalidate respondent’s conviction under that statute.

When respondent was convicted of disclosing a 30-day wiretap authorization that had expired months before the disclosure, he was convicted of an attempt to do the impossible: interfere with a nonexistent wiretap. Traditionally, the law does not proscribe an attempt unless the defendant’s intent is accompanied by “a dangerous probability that [the unlawful result] will happen.” Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905) (Holmes, J.). Whether such a dangerous probability exists, of course, depends ultimately on what result we interpret the statute as having declared unlawful. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.3, pp. 44-45 (1986). In this case, there was no dangerous probability that respondent actually would reveal the existence of a wiretap or wiretap application because none existed to reveal. We should abjure a construction of a criminal statute that leads to criminalizing nothing more than an evil intent accompanied by a harmless act, particularly when, as here, the statutory language does not clearly extend liability so far. Cf. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 14-15 (1978).

Indeed, the text of § 2232(c) favors a reading that requires, as an essential element of the offense, the possibility of interference with an authorized interception. Both the second and third clauses of the statute support this straightforward interpretation. The second clause requires that the defendant intend to impede “such interception.” That phrase refers to an interception that the defendant knows a federal officer “has been authorized or has applied for authorization” to make. After the authorization expires, no “such interception” can occur. Moreover, to infer that “such interception” includes any interception that might be made pursuant to any subsequent reauthorization severely undermines the *608statute’s knowledge requirement by making actual knowledge of an initial, limited authorization the linchpin of liability for disclosing later, entirely conjectural or nonexistent authorizations. That inference contradicts our usual practice of giving strict effect to scienter provisions. See, e. g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68-71 (1994).

The third clause of § 2232(c) describes the notice that a defendant must attempt to give a third person in order to violate the statute as notice of “the possible interception.” The definite article necessarily refers to an interception that is “authorized” (or for which federal officers have applied for authorization) per the second clause, thereby imposing authorization as a requirement to satisfy the next word, “possible.” I agree with the Court that interceptions prevented by mechanical failures or the departure of the suspect are “possible” within the meaning of the statute, see ante, at 603-604, as long as those interceptions, however unlikely, are legally “authorized.” The wholly theoretical interception that respondent was convicted of attempting to impede was not authorized, nor had federal officers even sought authorization for it; therefore, it was not “possible” within the meaning of the statute.

The Court’s attempt to explain the word “possible” as an assurance that the statute will cover interceptions that may or may not result from a pending application, see ante, at 604, is unpersuasive. Because the statute plainly criminalizes disclosures of pending applications, “possible” does not need to do the work the Court assigns it. The phrase “such interception,” already used in the second clause, would do just as well. The function of “possible” must be to place some temporal limitation on potential liability under the statute. Under the Court’s reasoning, respondent could be found guilty if he had disclosed a 10-year-old application or authorization. The word “possible,” properly understood, would prevent such an absurd result by limiting liability to *609interceptions that could actually be made pursuant to present or pending authorization.

As the Court notes in response to this opinion, see ibid., under its reading the third clause serves to define the actus reus element of the crime, just as Congress could have done by replacing the phrase “notice of the possible interception” with the unambiguous phrase “notice of such authorization or application.” That unambiguous language, however, would not achieve the temporal limitation on liability that I believe Congress intended to achieve with the words “possible interception.” The Court appears to acknowledge the need for such a limitation. See ante, at 604-605, n. 3. Rather than recognizing the limitation the statute contains, however, the Court hints that it might in some future case invent one. Limiting liability to the time before the authorizing judge announces the wiretap may well be “plausible,” ibid., but no plausible basis exists for finding that limitation in the words of the statute. A wiser course than judicial legislation, I submit, is simply to adopt a literal, reasonable construction of the text that Congress drafted.

I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II of the Court’s opinion. I would reverse the Court of Appeals, and would uphold respondent’s conviction, on the count charging violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1503.

HH

The “omnibus clause” of § 1503, under which respondent was charged, provides:

“Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob*610structs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

This makes criminal not just success in corruptly influencing the due administration of justice, but also the “endeavor” to do so. We have given this latter proscription, which respondent was specifically charged with violating, see App. 106-107, a generous reading: “The word of the section is ‘endeavor,’ and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word ‘attempt,’ and it describes any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent.” United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 143 (1921) (emphasis added) (interpreting substantially identical predecessor statute). Under this reading of the statute, it is even immaterial whether the endeavor to obstruct pending proceedings is possible of accomplishment. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 333 (1966), we dismissed out of hand the “impossibility” defense of a defendant who had sought to convey a bribe to a prospective juror through an intermediary who was secretly working for the Government. “Whatever continuing validity,” we said, “the doctrine of ‘impossibility’.. . may continue to have in the law of criminal attempt, that body of law is inapplicable here.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).1

Even read at its broadest, however, § 1503’s prohibition of “endeavors” to impede justice is not without limits. To “endeavor” means to strive or work for a certain end. Webster’s New International Dictionary 844 (2d ed. 1950); 1 New *611Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 816 (1993). Thus, § 1503 reaches only purposeful efforts to obstruct the due administration of justice, i. e., acts performed with that very object in mind. See, e. g., United States v. Mullins, 22 F. 3d 1365, 1370 (CA6 1994); United States v. Ryan, 455 F. 2d 728, 734 (CA9 1972). This limitation was clearly set forth in our first decision construing § 1503’s predecessor statute, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893), which held an indictment insufficient because it had failed to allege the intent to obstruct justice. That opinion rejected the Government’s contention that the intent required to violate the statute could be found in “the intent to commit an unlawful act, in the doing of which justice was in fact obstructed”; to justify a conviction, it said, “the specific intent to violate the statute must exist.” Id., at 207. Pettibone did acknowledge, however — and here is the point that is distorted to produce today’s opinion — that the specific intent to obstruct justice could be found where the defendant intentionally committed a wrongful act that had obstruction of justice as its “natural and probable consequence.” Ibid.

Today’s “nexus” requirement sounds like this, but is in reality quite different. Instead of reaffirming that “natural and probable consequence” is one way of establishing intent, it substitutes “ ‘ “natural and probable effect” ’ ” for intent, requiring that factor even when intent to obstruct justice is otherwise clear. See ante, at 599, quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F. 3d 692, 695 (CA10 1993), which in turn quotes United States v. Thomas, 916 F. 2d 647, 651 (CA11 1990).2 *612But while it is quite proper to derive an intent requirement from § 1503’s use of the word “endeavor,” it is quite impossible to derive a “natural and probable consequence” requirement. One would be “endeavoring” to obstruct justice if he intentionally set out to do it by means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful. As we said in Russell, “any effort or essay” corruptly to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice constitutes a forbidden endeavor, 255 U. S., at 143, even, as we held in Osborn, an effort that is incapable of having that effect, see 385 U. S., at 333.

The Court does not indicate where its “nexus” requirement is to be found in the words of the statute. Instead, it justifies its holding with the assertion that “[w]e have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that a fair warning should be given ... of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.” Ante, at 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But “exercising restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute” (which is what the rule of lenity requires, see United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348 (1971)) is quite different from importing extratextual requirements in order to limit the reach of a federal criminal statute, which is what the Court has done here. By limiting §1503 to acts having the “natural and probable effect” of interfering with the due administration of justice, the Court effectively reads the word “endeavor,” which we said in Russell embraced “any effort or essay” to obstruct justice, 255 U. S., at 143, out of the omnibus clause, leaving a prohibition of only actual obstruction and competent attempts.

*613II

The Court apparently adds to its “natural and probable effect” requirement the requirement that the defendant know of that natural and probable effect. See ante, at 599 (“[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct”). Separate proof of such knowledge is not, I think, required for the orthodox use of the “natural and probable effect” rule discussed in Pettibone: Where the defendant intentionally commits a wrongful act that in fact has the “natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice, “the unintended wrong may derive its character from the wrong that was intended.” 148 U. S., at 207. Or, as we would put the point in modern times, the jury is entitled to presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.

While inquiry into the state of the defendant’s knowledge seems quite superfluous to the Court’s opinion (since the act performed did not have the requisite “natural and probable effect” anyway), it is necessary to my disposition of the case. As I have said, I think an act committed with intent to obstruct is all that matters; and what one can fairly be thought to have intended depends in part upon what one can fairly be thought to have known. The critical point of knowledge at issue, in my view, is not whether “respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury,” ante, at 601 (emphasis added) (a heightened burden imposed by the Court’s knowledge-of-natural-and-probable-effect requirement), but rather whether respondent knew — or indeed, even erroneously believed — that his false statement might be provided to the grand jury (which is all the knowledge needed to support the conclusion that the purpose of his lie was to mislead the jury). Applying the familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), to the proper question, I find that a rational juror could readily *614have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent had corruptly endeavored to impede the due administration of justice, i. e., that he lied to the FBI agents intending to interfere with a grand jury investigation into his misdeeds.

Recorded conversations established that respondent knew a grand jury had been convened, App. 47; that he had been told he was a target of its investigation, id., at 68; and that he feared he would be unable to explain his actions if he were subpoenaed to testify, id., at 51. Respondent himself testified that, at least at the conclusion of the interview, it was his “impression” that his statements to the FBI agents would be reported to the grand jury. 9 Tr. 1360 (Aug. 14, 1990). The evidence further established that respondent made false statements to the FBI agents that minimized his involvement in the matters the grand jury was investigating. See App. 73, 76, 81, 83-84, 86. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, I am simply unable to conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent lied specifically because he thought the agents might convey what he said to the grand jury — which suffices to constitute a corrupt endeavor to impede the due administration of justice. In fact, I think it would be hard for a juror to conclude otherwise.

III

Since I find against respondent on the § 1503 count, I must consider several other grounds offered by respondent for affirming the Court of Appeals’ setting aside of his conviction. First, invoking the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, he argues that, since all the rest of § 1503 refers only to actions directed at jurors and court officers,3 the omnibus clause can*615not apply to actions directed at witnesses. But the rule of ejusdem generis, which “limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified,” Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936); accord, Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980), has no application here. Although something of a catchall, the omnibus clause is not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable (e. g., “fishing rods, nets, hooks, bobbers, sinkers, and other equipment”). Rather, it is one of the several distinct and independent prohibitions contained in § 1503 that share only the word “Whoever,” which begins the statute, and the penalty provision which ends it. Indeed, given the already broad terms of the other clauses in § 1503, to limit the omnibus clause in the manner respondent urges would render it superfluous. See United States v. Howard, 569 F. 2d 1331, 1333 (CA5 1978).

Respondent next contends that because Congress in 1982 enacted a different statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1512, dealing with witness tampering, and simultaneously removed from § 1503 the provisions it had previously contained specifically addressing efforts to influence or injure witnesses, see Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1249-1250, 1253, his witness-related conduct is no longer punishable under the omnibus clause of §1503. The 1982 amendment, however, did nothing to alter the omnibus clause, which by its terms encompasses corrupt “endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of *616justice.” The fact that there is now some overlap between §1503 and §1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself. It hardly leads to the conclusion that § 1503 was, to the extent of the overlap, silently repealed. It is not unusual for a particular act to violate more than one criminal statute, see, e. g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342 (1911), and in such situations the Government may proceed under any statute that applies, see, e. g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1979); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. 43, 45-46 (1952). It is, moreover, “a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.” United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 164, 168 (1976); see also Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936).

Finally, respondent posits that the phrase “ ‘corruptly . . . endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede’ may be unconstitutionally vague,” in that it fails to provide sufficient notice that lying to potential grand jury witnesses in an effort to thwart a grand jury investigation is proscribed. Brief for Respondent 22, n. 13. Statutory language need not be colloquial, however, and the term “corruptly” in criminal laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes “[a]n act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. ... It includes bribery but is more comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly done though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by another.” United States v. Ogle, 613 F. 2d 233, 238 (CA10) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 825 (1980). See also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 276 (3d ed. 1969); Black’s Law Dictionary 345 (6th ed. 1990). As the District Court here instructed the jury:

“An act is done corruptly if it’s done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or *617expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or a benefit of another person.” App. 117.

Moreover, in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible. Acts specifically intended to “influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice” are obviously wrongful, just as they are necessarily “corrupt.” See Ogle, supra, at 239; United States v. North, 910 F. 2d 843, 941 (CADC) (Silber-man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified, 920 F. 2d 940 (1990); United States v. Reeves, 752 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA5), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 834 (1985).

* * *

The “nexus” requirement that the Court today engrafts into § 1503 has no basis in the words Congress enacted. I would reverse that part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment which set aside respondent’s conviction under that statute.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A clause in § 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code makes it a felony "corruptly or by force" to "endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title." 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The question here concerns the breadth of that statutory phrase. Does it cover virtually all governmental efforts to collect taxes? Or does it have a narrower scope? In our view, "due administration of [the Tax Code]" does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near-universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary processing of income tax returns. Rather, the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit.

I

The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue, § 7212(a), has two substantive clauses. The first clause, which we shall call the "Officer Clause," forbids

*1105"corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavor[ing] to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under [the Internal Revenue Code]." Ibid. (emphasis added).

The second clause, which we shall call the "Omnibus Clause," forbids

"corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code]." Ibid. (emphasis added).

As we said at the outset, we here consider the scope of the Omnibus Clause. (We have placed the full text of § 7212 in the Appendix, infra .)

Between 2004 and 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opened, then closed, then reopened an investigation into the tax activities of Carlo Marinello, the petitioner here. In 2012 the Government indicted Marinello, charging him with violations of several criminal tax statutes including the Omnibus Clause. In respect to the Omnibus Clause the Government claimed that Marinello had engaged in at least one of eight different specified activities, including "failing to maintain corporate books and records," "failing to provide" his tax accountant "with complete and accurate" tax "information," "destroying ... business records," "hiding income," and "paying employees ... with cash." 839 F.3d 209, 213 (C.A.2 2016).

Before the jury retired to consider the charges, the judge instructed it that, to convict Marinello of violating the Omnibus Clause, it must find unanimously that he engaged in at least one of the eight practices just mentioned, that the jurors need not agree on which one, and that he did so "corruptly," meaning "with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit, either for [himself] or for another." App. in No. 15-2224(CA2), p. 432. The judge, however, did not instruct the jury that it must find that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to interfere with that investigation. The jury subsequently convicted Marinello on all counts.

Marinello appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He argued, among other things, that a violation of the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to show that the defendant had tried to interfere with a "pending IRS proceeding," such as a particular investigation. Brief for Appellant in No. 15-2224, pp. 23-25. The appeals court disagreed. It held that a defendant need not possess " 'an awareness of a particular [IRS] action or investigation.' " 839 F.3d, at 221 (quoting United States v. Wood, 384 Fed.Appx. 698, 704 (C.A.2 2010) ; alteration in original). The full Court of Appeals rejected Marinello's petition for rehearing, two judges dissenting. 855 F.3d 455 (C.A.2 2017).

Marinello then petitioned for certiorari, asking us to decide whether the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to prove the defendant was aware of "a pending IRS action or proceeding, such as an investigation or audit," when he "engaged in the purportedly obstructive conduct." Pet. for Cert. i. In light of a division of opinion among the Circuits on this point, we granted the petition. Compare United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952 (C.A.6 1998) (requiring showing of a pending proceeding), with 839 F.3d, at 221 (disagreeing with Kassouf ).

II

In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), we interpreted a similarly worded criminal statute. That statute made it a *1106felony "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, [to] influenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e], or endeavo[r] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The statute concerned not (as here) "the due administration of" the Internal Revenue Code but rather "the due administration of justice ." (We have placed the full text of § 1503 in the Appendix, infra .)

In interpreting that statute we pointed to earlier cases in which courts had held that the Government must prove "an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings." Aguilar, supra, at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citing United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (C.A.9 1982) ). We noted that some courts had imposed a " 'nexus' requirement": that the defendant's "act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings." Aguilar, supra, at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citing United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (C.A.10 1993), and United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (C.A.3 1975) ). And we adopted the same requirement.

We set forth two important reasons for doing so. We wrote that we "have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that 'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' " Aguilar, supra, at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) ; citation omitted). Both reasons apply here with similar strength.

As to Congress' intent, the literal language of the statute is neutral. The statutory words "obstruct or impede" are broad. They can refer to anything that "block[s]," "make[s] difficult," or "hinder[s]." Black's Law Dictionary 1246 (10th ed. 2014) (obstruct); Webster's New International Dictionary (Webster's) 1248 (2d ed. 1954) (impede); id., at 1682 (obstruct); accord, 5 Oxford English Dictionary 80 (1933) (impede); 7 id., at 36 (obstruct). But the verbs "obstruct" and "impede" suggest an object-the taxpayer must hinder a particular person or thing. Here, the object is the "due administration of this title." The word "administration" can be read literally to refer to every "[a]ct or process of administering" including every act of "managing" or "conduct[ing]" any "office," or "performing the executive duties of" any "institution, business, or the like." Webster's 34. But the whole phrase-the due administration of the Tax Code-is best viewed, like the due administration of justice, as referring to only some of those acts or to some separable parts of an institution or business. Cf. Aguilar, supra, at 600-601, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (concluding false statements made to an investigating agent, rather than a grand jury, do not support a conviction for obstruction of justice).

Here statutory context confirms that the text refers to specific, targeted acts of administration. The Omnibus Clause appears in the middle of a statutory sentence that refers specifically to efforts to "intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity." 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (emphasis added). The first part of the sentence also refers to "force or threats of force," which the statute elsewhere defines as "threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family ." Ibid. (emphasis added). The following subsection refers to the "forcibl[e] rescu[e]" of "any property after it shall have been seized under" the *1107Internal Revenue Code. § 7212(b) (emphasis added). Subsections (a) and (b) thus refer to corrupt or forceful actions taken against individual identifiable persons or property. And, in that context the Omnibus Clause logically serves as a "catchall" in respect to the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not as a "catchall" for every violation that interferes with what the Government describes as the "continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known" administration of the Internal Revenue Code. Brief in Opposition 9.

Those who find legislative history helpful can find confirmation of the more limited scope of the Omnibus Clause in the House and Senate Reports written when Congress first enacted the Omnibus Clause. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). According to the House Report, § 7212"provides for the punishment of threats or threatening acts against agents of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other officer or employee of the United States, or members of the families of such persons, on account of the performance by such agents or officers or employees of their official duties" and "will also punish the corrupt solicitation of an internal revenue employee ." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, at A426 (emphasis added). The Senate Report also refers to the section as aimed at targeting officers and employees. It says that § 7212"covers all cases where the officer is intimidated or injured; that is, where corruptly, by force or threat of force, directly or by communication, an attempt is made to impede the administration of the internal-revenue laws." S. Rep. No. 1622, at 147 (emphasis added). We have found nothing in the statute's history suggesting that Congress intended the Omnibus Clause as a catchall applicable to the entire Code including the routine processing of tax returns, receipt of tax payments, and issuance of tax refunds.

Viewing the Omnibus Clause in the broader statutory context of the full Internal Revenue Code also counsels against adopting the Government's broad reading. That is because the Code creates numerous misdemeanors, ranging from willful failure to furnish a required statement to employees, § 7204, to failure to keep required records, § 7203, to misrepresenting the number of exemptions to which an employee is entitled on IRS Form W-4, § 7205, to failure to pay any tax owed, however small the amount, § 7203. To interpret the Omnibus Clause as applying to all Code administration would potentially transform many, if not all, of these misdemeanor provisions into felonies, making the specific provisions redundant, or perhaps the subject matter of plea bargaining. Some overlap in criminal provisions is, of course, inevitable. See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965) (affirming conviction for tax evasion despite overlap with other provisions). Indeed, as the dissent notes, post, at 1115 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), Marinello's preferred reading of § 7212 potentially overlaps with another provision of federal law that criminalizes the obstruction of the "due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 1505. But we have not found any case from this Court interpreting a statutory provision that would create overlap and redundancy to the degree that would result from the Government's broad reading of § 7212 -particularly when it would " 'render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.' " Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (quoting *1108Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) ; see also Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1084-1085, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion).

A broad interpretation would also risk the lack of fair warning and related kinds of unfairness that led this Court in Aguilar to "exercise" interpretive "restraint." See 515 U.S., at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357 ; see also Yates, supra, at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1087-1088 ; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-704, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005). Interpreted broadly, the provision could apply to a person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes, see 26 C.F.R. § 31.3102-1(a)(2017) ; IRS, Publication 926, pp. 5-6 (2018), leaves a large cash tip in a restaurant, fails to keep donation receipts from every charity to which he or she contributes, or fails to provide every record to an accountant. Such an individual may sometimes believe that, in doing so, he is running the risk of having violated an IRS rule, but we sincerely doubt he would believe he is facing a potential felony prosecution for tax obstruction. Had Congress intended that outcome, it would have spoken with more clarity than it did in § 7212(a).

The Government argues that the need to show the defendant's obstructive conduct was done "corruptly" will cure any overbreadth problem. But we do not see how. The Government asserts that "corruptly" means acting with "the specific intent to obtain an unlawful advantage" for the defendant or another. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; accord, 839 F.3d, at 218. Yet, practically speaking, we struggle to imagine a scenario where a taxpayer would "willfully" violate the Tax Code (the mens rea requirement of various tax crimes, including misdemeanors, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203, 7204, 7207 ) without intending someone to obtain an unlawful advantage. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) ( "Willfulness ... requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty") A taxpayer may know with a fair degree of certainty that her babysitter will not declare a cash payment as income-and, if so, a jury could readily find that the taxpayer acted to obtain an unlawful benefit for another. For the same reason, we find unconvincing the dissent's argument that the distinction between "willfully" and "corruptly"-at least as defined by the Government-reflects any meaningful difference in culpability. See post, at 1114 - 1115.

Neither can we rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the statute's scope. True, the Government used the Omnibus Clause only sparingly during the first few decades after its enactment. But it used the clause more often after the early 1990's. Brief for Petitioner 9. And, at oral argument the Government told us that, where more punitive and less punitive criminal provisions both apply to a defendant's conduct, the Government will charge a violation of the more punitive provision as long as it can readily prove that violation at trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-47, 55-57; see Office of the Attorney General, Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download (as last visited Mar. 16, 2018).

Regardless, to rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute's highly abstract general statutory language places great power in the hands of the prosecutor. Doing so risks allowing "policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections," Smith v. Goguen, *1109415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), which could result in the nonuniform execution of that power across time and geographic location. And insofar as the public fears arbitrary prosecution, it risks undermining necessary confidence in the criminal justice system. That is one reason why we have said that we "cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.' " McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 2372-2373, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) ). And it is why "[w]e have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute." Aguilar, supra, at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357.

III

In sum, we follow the approach we have taken in similar cases in interpreting § 7212(a)'s Omnibus Clause. To be sure, the language and history of the provision at issue here differ somewhat from that of other obstruction provisions we have considered in the past. See Aguilar, supra (interpreting a statute prohibiting the obstruction of "the due administration of justice"); Arthur Andersen, supra (interpreting a statute prohibiting the destruction of an object with intent to impair its integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding); Yates, supra (interpreting a statute prohibiting the destruction, concealment, or covering up of any "record, document, or tangible object with the intent to" obstruct the "investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States"). The Government and the dissent urge us to ignore these precedents because of those differences. The dissent points out, for example, that the predecessor to the obstruction statute we interpreted in Aguilar, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, prohibited influencing, intimidating, or impeding "any witness or officer in any court of the United States" or endeavoring "to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of justice therein ." Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 202, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (citing Rev. Stat. § 5399; emphasis added); see post, at 1115 - 1116. But Congress subsequently deleted the word "therein," leaving only a broadly worded prohibition against obstruction of "the due administration of justice." Act of June 25, 1948, § 1503, 62 Stat. 769-770. Congress then used that same amended formulation when it enacted § 7212, prohibiting the "obstruction of the due administration" of the Tax Code. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 855. Given this similarity, it is helpful to consider how we have interpreted § 1503 and other obstruction statutes in considering § 7212. The language of some and the underlying principles of all these cases are similar. We consequently find these precedents-though not controlling-highly instructive for use as a guide toward a proper resolution of the issue now before us. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005).

We conclude that, to secure a conviction under the Omnibus Clause, the Government must show (among other things) that there is a "nexus" between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action. That nexus requires a "relationship in time, causation, or logic with the [administrative] proceeding." Aguilar, 515 U.S., at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citing Wood, 6 F.3d, at 696 ). By "particular administrative proceeding" we do not mean every act carried out by IRS employees in the course of their "continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known"

*1110administration of the Tax Code. Brief in Opposition 9. While we need not here exhaustively itemize the types of administrative conduct that fall within the scope of the statute, that conduct does not include routine, day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary course by the IRS, such as the review of tax returns. The Government contends the processing of tax returns is part of the administration of the Internal Revenue Code and any corrupt effort to interfere with that task can therefore serve as the basis of an obstruction conviction. But the same could have been said of the defendant's effort to mislead the investigating agent in Aguilar. The agent's investigation was, at least in some broad sense, a part of the administration of justice. But we nevertheless held the defendant's conduct did not support an obstruction charge. 515 U.S., at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357. In light of our decision in Aguilar, we find it appropriate to construe § 7212's Omnibus Clause more narrowly than the Government proposes. Just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review her tax return every year does not transform every violation of the Tax Code into an obstruction charge.

In addition to satisfying this nexus requirement, the Government must show that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S., at 703, 707-708, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (requiring the Government to prove a proceeding was foreseeable in order to convict a defendant for persuading others to shred documents to prevent their "use in an official proceeding"). It is not enough for the Government to claim that the defendant knew the IRS may catch on to his unlawful scheme eventually. To use a maritime analogy, the proceeding must at least be in the offing.

For these reasons, the Second Circuit's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX

26 U.S.C. § 7212 : "Attempts to interfere with administration of internal revenue laws

"(a) Corrupt or forcible interference

"Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than $3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term 'threats of force', as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family.

"(b) Forcible rescue of seized property

"Any person who forcibly rescues or causes to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt or endeavor so to do, shall, excepting in cases otherwise provided for, for every such offense, be fined not more than $500, or not more than double the value of the property so rescued, whichever *1111is the greater, or be imprisoned not more than 2 years."

18 U.S.C. § 1503 : "Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally

"(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

"(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is-

"(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;

"(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and

"(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both."

Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO joins, dissenting.

The Omnibus Clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) makes it a felony to "corruptly ... endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title." "[T]his title" refers to Title 26, which contains the entire Tax Code and authorizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to calculate, assess, and collect taxes. I would hold that the Omnibus Clause does what it says: forbid corrupt efforts to impede the IRS from performing any of these activities. The Court, however, reads "this title" to mean "a particular [IRS] proceeding." Ante, at 1109. And that proceeding must be either "pending" or "in the offing." Ante, at 1110. The Court may well prefer a statute written that way, but that is not what Congress enacted. I respectfully dissent.

I

Petitioner Carlo J. Marinello, II, owned and managed a company that provided courier services. Marinello, however, kept almost no records of the company's earnings or expenditures. He shredded or discarded most business records. He paid his employees in cash and did not give them tax documents. And he took tens of thousands of dollars from the company each year to pay his personal expenses.

Unbeknownst to Marinello, the IRS began investigating him in 2004. The IRS learned that he had not filed a tax return-corporate or individual-since at *1112least 1992. But the investigation came to a standstill because the IRS did not have enough information about Marinello's earnings. This was not surprising given his diligent efforts to avoid creating a paper trail. After the investigation ended, Marinello consulted a lawyer and an accountant, both of whom advised him that he needed to file tax returns and keep business records. Despite these warnings, Marinello did neither for another four years.

In 2009, the IRS decided to investigate Marinello again. In an interview with an IRS agent, Marinello initially claimed he was exempt from filing tax returns because he made less than $1,000 per year. Upon further questioning, however, Marinello changed his story. He admitted that he earned more than $1,000 per year, but said he " 'never got around' " to paying taxes. 839 F.3d 209, 212 (C.A.2 2016). He also admitted that he shredded documents, did not keep track of the company's income or expenses, and used the company's income for personal bills. His only excuse was that he "took the easy way out." Ibid. After just a few hours of deliberation, a jury convicted Marinello of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede the due administration of the Tax Code, § 7212(a).

II

Section 7212(a)'s Omnibus Clause prohibits "corruptly ... obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." I agree with the Court's interpretations of "obstruct or impede" and "due administration," which together refer to conduct that hinders the IRS' performance of its official duties. See ante, at 1106 - 1107. I also agree that the object of these words-the thing a person is prohibited from obstructing the due administration of-is "this title," i.e., Title 26, which contains the entire Tax Code. See ante, at 1106. But I part ways when the Court concludes that the whole phrase "due administration of the Tax Code" means "only some of" the Tax Code-specifically "particular [IRS] proceeding [s], such as an investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action." Ante, at 1106 -1107, 1109. That limitation has no basis in the text. In my view, the plain text of the Omnibus Clause prohibits obstructing the due administration of the Tax Code in its entirety, not just particular IRS proceedings.

A

The words "this title" cannot be read to mean "only some of this title." As this Court recently reiterated, phrases such as "this title" most naturally refer to the cited provision "as a whole." Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 816, 823-824, ---L.Ed.2d ---- (2018). Congress used "this title" throughout Title 26 to refer to the Tax Code in its entirety. See, e.g., § 7201 ("[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title"); § 7203 ("[a]ny person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title ... to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to [do so]"). And, "[w]hen Congress wanted to refer only to a particular subsection or paragraph, it said so." NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 929, 939, 197 L.Ed.2d 263 (2017) ; see, e.g., § 7204 (criminalizing willfully failing to furnish a statement "required under section 6051"); § 7207 (criminalizing willfully furnishing fraudulent or materially false information "required pursuant to section 6047(b), section 6104(d), or subsection (i) or (j) of section 527"); § 7210 (criminalizing neglecting to appear or produce documents "required under *1113section 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2), 6427(j)(2), 7602, 7603, and 7604(b)"). Thus, "this title" must refer to the Tax Code as a whole.

The phrase "due administration of this title" likewise refers to the due administration of the entire Tax Code. As this Court has recognized, "administration" of the Tax Code includes four basic steps: information gathering, assessment, levy, and collection. See Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1129-1130, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015). The first "phase of tax administration procedure" is "information gathering." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1129-1130 ; see, e.g., §§ 6001-6096. "This step includes private reporting of information used to determine tax liability, including reports by third parties who do not owe the tax." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1129-1130 (citation omitted). The "next step in the process" is "assessment," which includes "the process by which [a taxpayer's liability] is calculated" and the "official recording of a taxpayer's liability." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1129-1130 ; see, e.g., §§ 6201-6241. After information gathering and assessment come "levy" and "collection." See id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1130 ; see, e.g., §§ 6301-6344. Levy refers to "a specific mode of collection under which the Secretary of the Treasury distrains and seizes a recalcitrant taxpayer's property." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1130. Collection refers to "the act of obtaining payment of taxes due." Ibid.

Subtitle F of the Tax Code-titled "Procedure and Administration"-contains directives related to each of these steps. It requires taxpayers to keep certain records and file certain returns, § 6001; specifies that taxpayers with qualifying incomes must file returns, § 6012; and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to create returns for taxpayers who fail to file returns or who file fraudulent ones, § 6020. It requires the Secretary to make inquiries, determinations, and assessments of tax liabilities. § 6201. And it authorizes the Secretary to collect and levy taxes. §§ 6301, 6331. Subtitle F also gives the Secretary the power to commence proceedings to recover unpaid taxes or fees, §§ 7401-7410, and to conduct investigations into the accuracy of particular returns, §§ 7601-7613.

Accordingly, the phrase "due administration of this title" refers to the entire process of taxation, from gathering information to assessing tax liabilities to collecting and levying taxes. It is not limited to only a few specific provisions within the Tax Code.

B

The Court rejects this straightforward reading, describing the "literal language" of the Omnibus Clause as "neutral." Ante, at 1106. It concludes that the statute prohibits only acts related to a pending or imminent proceeding. Ante, at 1109 - 1110. There is no textual or contextual support for this limitation.

The text of the Omnibus Clause is not "neutral"; it omits the limitation that the Court reads into it. The Omnibus Clause nowhere suggests that "only some of" the processes in the Tax Code are covered, ante, at 1106 -1107, or that the line between covered and uncovered processes is drawn at some vague notion of "proceeding." The Omnibus Clause does not use the word "proceeding" at all, but instead refers to the entire Tax Code, which covers much more than that. This Court cannot "lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply." Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005).

*1114Having failed to find its proposed limit in the text, the Court turns to context. However, its two contextual arguments fare no better.

First, the Court contends that the Omnibus Clause must be limited to pending or imminent proceedings because the other clauses of § 7212 are limited to actions "taken against individual identifiable persons or property." Ante, at 1107. But specific clauses in a statute typically do not limit the scope of a general omnibus clause. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008) (explaining that the ejusdem generis canon does not apply to a "disjunctive" phrase in a statute "with one specific and one general category"). Nor do the other clauses in § 7212 contain the pending-or-imminent-proceeding requirement that the Court reads into the Omnibus Clause. See § 7212(a) (prohibiting efforts to "intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity"); § 7212(b) (prohibiting "forcibly rescu[ing] or caus[ing] to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title"). They thus provide no support for the Court's atextual limitation.

Second, the Court asserts that its reading prevents the Omnibus Clause from overlapping with certain misdemeanors in the Tax Code. Ante, at 1107 - 1108 (discussing §§ 7203, 7204, 7205 ). But there is no redundancy problem because these provisions have different mens rea requirements. The Omnibus Clause requires that an act be done "corruptly," but the misdemeanor provisions require that an act be done "willfully." The difference between these mens rea requirements is significant. While "willfully" requires proof only "that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty," Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991), "corruptly" requires proof that the defendant "act[ed] with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit either for [himself] or for some other person," United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 31 (C.A.1 2014) (collecting cases); see also Black's Law Dictionary 414 (rev. 4th ed. 1951) ("corruptly" "generally imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage"). In other words, "corruptly" requires proof that the defendant not only knew he was obtaining an "unlawful benefit" but that his "objective" or "purpose" was to obtain that unlawful benefit. See 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 114 (2016) (explaining that specific intent requires both knowledge and purpose).

The Court dismisses the significance of the different mens rea requirements, see ante, at 1108, but this difference is important under basic principles of criminal law. The law recognizes that the same conduct, when committed with a higher mens rea, is more culpable and thus more deserving of punishment. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (plurality opinion). For that reason, different mens rea requirements often differentiate culpability for the same conduct. See, e.g., 40 C.J. S., Homicide § 80 (2014) (explaining that the distinction between first- and second-degree murder is based on the defendant's state of mind); § 103 (same for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter). Unless the Court means to cast doubt on this well-established principle, it should not casually dismiss the different mens rea requirements in the Omnibus Clause and the various misdemeanors in the Tax Code.

Even if the Omnibus Clause did overlap with these other misdemeanors, that would prove little. For better or worse, redundancy abounds in both the criminal law *1115and the Tax Code. This Court has repeatedly declined to depart from the plain meaning of the text simply because the same conduct would be criminalized under two or more provisions. See, e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. ----, ----, n. 4, 134 S.Ct. 2384, 2390-2391, n. 4, 189 L.Ed.2d 411 (2014) ("No doubt, the overlap between the two clauses is substantial on our reading, but that is not uncommon in criminal statutes"); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714, n. 14, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 131 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995) ("Congress may, and often does, enact separate criminal statutes that may, in practice, cover some of the same conduct"); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 352, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965) (allowing the Government to proceed on a felony tax evasion charge even though that charge " 'covered precisely the same ground' " as two misdemeanors in the Tax Code). In fact, the Court's interpretation of the Omnibus Clause does not eliminate the redundancy. Certain misdemeanor offenses in the Tax Code-such as failing to obey a summons, § 7210-apply to conduct that takes place during a proceeding and, thus, would still violate the Omnibus Clause under the Court's interpretation. The Court's interpretation also makes the Omnibus Clause largely redundant with 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which already prohibits "corruptly ... endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States." Avoiding redundancy is thus not a reason to favor the Court's interpretation. Cf. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013) ("[T]he canon against surplusage 'assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute' ").*

C

The Court contends that its narrow reading of "due administration of this title" is supported by three decisions interpreting other obstruction statutes, though it admits that the "language and history" of the Omnibus Clause "differ somewhat" from those other obstruction provisions. Ante, at 1108 - 1109 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) ; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005) ; Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion)). "[D]iffer somewhat" is putting it lightly. The differences between the Omnibus Clause and those other obstruction statutes demonstrate why the former does not contain the Court's proceeding requirement.

Aguilar interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The omnibus clause of § 1503 forbids corruptly endeavoring to obstruct "the due administration of justice." The Court concluded that this language requires the prosecution to prove a "nexus" between the defendant's obstructive act and "judicial proceedings." 515 U.S., at 599-600, 115 S.Ct. 2357. But this nexus requirement *1116was based on the specific history of § 1503. The predecessor to that statute prohibited obstructing "the due administration of justice" "in any court of the United States." Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 202, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (citing Rev. Stat. § 5399). Based on this statutory history, the Court assumed that § 1503 continued to refer to the administration of justice in a court. Aguilar, supra, at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. None of that history is present here.

Arthur Andersen is even further afield. There the Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A), which prohibits "knowingly ... corruptly persuad[ing] another person ... with intent to ... cause or induce [that] person to ... withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding." Relying on Aguilar, the Court concluded that § 1512(b)(2)(A) required the Government to show a "nexus" with "[a] particular proceeding." 544 U.S., at 707-708, 125 S.Ct. 2129. But this nexus requirement came from the statutory text, which expressly included "an official proceeding." If anything, then, § 1512(b)(2)(A) cuts against the Court's interpretation of the Omnibus Clause because it shows that Congress knows how to impose a "proceeding" requirement when it wants to do so. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 248, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010) ; Jama, 543 U.S., at 341, 125 S.Ct. 694.

Yates underscores this point. There the Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which prohibits obstructing "the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." The four Justices in the plurality recognized that this language made § 1519 broader than other obstruction statutes: Section 1519"covers conduct intended to impede any federal investigation or proceeding, including one not even on the verge of commencement." 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1087. The plurality contrasted the term "official proceeding" with the phrase "investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency," noting that the latter is broader. Id., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1084-1085. The same is true for the broad language of the Omnibus Clause.

In sum, these cases demonstrate that, when text and history justify it, this Court interprets obstruction statutes to include a proceeding requirement. But we have never inserted such a requirement into an obstruction statute without textual or historical support. Today the Court does precisely that.

D

All else having failed, the Court invokes lenity-sounding concerns to justify reading its proceeding requirement into the Omnibus Clause. See ante, at 1106, 1107 - 1108. But the rule of lenity applies only if after applying ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, "there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended." Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court identifies no such grievous ambiguity in the Omnibus Clause, and breadth is not the same thing as ambiguity. The Omnibus Clause is both "very broad" and "very clear." Yates, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1086 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Lenity does not apply.

If the Court is concerned that the Omnibus Clause does not give defendants "fair warning" of what it prohibits, ante, at 1107 - 1108, I am hard pressed to see how today's decision makes things better. The Court outlines its atextual proceeding requirement *1117in only the vaguest of terms. Under its interpretation, the prosecution must prove a "nexus" between the defendant's conduct and some "particular administrative proceeding." Ante, at 1109. "[P]articular administrative proceeding" is defined negatively as "not ... every act carried out by IRS employees in the course of their 'continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known' administration of the Tax Code." Ante, at 1109 - 1110. Further, the Government must prove that the proceeding was "reasonably foreseeable" to the defendant. Ante, at 1110. "Reasonably foreseeable" is again defined negatively as "not ... that the defendant knew the IRS may catch onto his unlawful scheme eventually." Ibid. It is hard to see how the Court's statute is less vague than the one Congress drafted, which simply instructed individuals not to corruptly obstruct or impede the IRS' administration of the Tax Code.

E

To be sure, § 7212(a) is a sweeping obstruction statute. Congress may well have concluded that a broad statute was warranted because "our tax structure is based on a system of self-reporting" and "the Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability." United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145, 95 S.Ct. 915, 43 L.Ed.2d 88 (1975). Whether or not we agree with Congress' judgment, we must leave the ultimate "[r]esolution of the pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly ... for Congress." United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 80 L.Ed.2d 492 (1984). "[I]t is not our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted." Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 217, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010).

The Court frets that the Omnibus Clause might apply to "a person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes," "leaves a large cash tip in a restaurant," "fails to keep donation receipts from every charity," or "fails to provide every record to an accountant." Ante, at 1108. Whether the Omnibus Clause would cover these hypotheticals-and whether the Government would waste its resources identifying and prosecuting them-is debatable. But what should not be debatable is that the statute covers Marinello, who systematically shredded documents and hid evidence about his company's earnings to avoid paying taxes even after warnings from his lawyer and accountant. It is not hard to find similar cases prosecuted under the Omnibus Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1221-1222 (C.A.10 2015) (defendant hid taxable income in elaborate system of trusts); Floyd, 740 F.3d, at 26-27, 31-32 (defendant created elaborate scheme to avoid paying payroll taxes).

The Court, in its effort to exclude hypotheticals, has constructed an opening in the Omnibus Clause large enough that even the worst offenders can escape liability. In doing so, it failed to heed what this Court recognized in a similar case: "[T]he authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system." Bisceglia, supra, at 146, 95 S.Ct. 915.

* * *

Regardless of whether this Court thinks the Omnibus Clause should contain a proceeding requirement, it does not have one. Because the text prohibits all efforts to *1118obstruct the due administration of the Tax Code, I respectfully dissent.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

After a jury trial, Amiel Cueto was convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and three counts of obstruction of justice, in violation of the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The district court sentenced Cueto to 87 months imprisonment and imposed monetary penalties. Cueto now appeals his convictions and sentence, arguing that: (1) the conviction for conspiracy to defraud is invalid because of constitutional infirmities as well as insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the convictions for obstruction of justice are also invalid because of constitutional infirmities and insufficiency of the evidence; (3) he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously excluded certain defense evidence; and (4) his sentence should be vacated and remanded because the district court erroneously calculated his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

Thomas Venezia owned B & H Vending/Ace Music Corporation (“B & H”), a vending and amusement business, and operated an illegal video gambling business through a pattern of racketeering activities and illegal gambling payouts, in violation of state and federal anti-gambling and racketeering laws. Venezia hired Amiel Cueto, an attorney, to represent him as well as to defend the tavern owners associated with B & H in the event of any arrests and/or criminal charges for their participation in the illegal gambling operation. In March of 1995, Venezia and B & H were indicted on federal racketeering charges, in addition to other related charges including illegal gambling.1 Throughout the investigation and prior to Venezia’s indictment, Cueto served as Venezia’s lawyer and advisor. Cueto was not Venezia’s attorney of record during the trial; nonetheless, the record indicates that Venezia continued to rely on Cueto’s advice throughout the prosecution of the racketeering case.

On December 2, 1995, Venezia and B & H were convicted of racketeering, illegal gambling, and conspiracy arising out of the oper*625ation of the illegal gambling business. United States v. B & H Vending/Ace Music Corp. & Thomas Venezia, et al., No. 95-30024. Seven months later, another federal grand jury returned a second indictment naming Cueto, Venezia, and Robert Roman-ik, a local public official and investigator who worked for Cueto and Venezia. They were charged with, inter alia: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and (2) obstruction of justice, in violation of the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, for their conduct throughout the investigation of Venezia and his illegal gambling operation and the indictment and prosecution of the racketeering ease. This second indictment is the impetus for the current appeal.

To understand the context of the instant indictment, convictions, and appeal, we examine the nature and scope of Cueto’s relationship with Venezia, his association with the illegal gambling operation, and his involvement in the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of Venezia, the illegal gambling operation, and the racketeering enterprise. In 1987, Venezia purchased a vending and amusement business, later known as B & H, which operated an illegal video gambling business for about eight years. B & H supplied video poker games to local bars in the metropolitan area of East St. Louis, Illinois, including a Veterans of Foreign Wars Post (‘VFW”) on Scott Air Force Base, and the tavern owners agreed to make illegal gambling payouts to its customers.2 State agents believed the video games were being used for illegal gambling purposes, and beginning in 1992, the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (“ILCC”) and the State Police initiated a joint investigation in St. Clair County, which targeted illegal gambling operations in Southern Illinois.

The ILCC has broad investigatory powers to supervise liquor licensees, and ILCC Agent Bonds Robinson worked on the task force and investigated the gambling operations in cooperation with the state police. Initially, Robinson worked in a non-undercover capacity as part of the state investigation to determine, in the course of routine liquor inspections, whether any establishment was making illegal gambling payouts. Agents of the ILCC began to strictly enforce the gambling regulations and frequently visited the taverns to ensure compliance. Eventually, the FBI became interested in the state’s investigation, and ultimately decided to use Robinson in a federal investigation of illegal gambling operations in St. Clan* County, particularly Venezia’s gambling operation.3 At some later point, Robinson assumed an undercover role for the FBI as a corrupt liquor agent in an attempt to gather evidence against Venezia and B & H. Soon thereafter, the state police raided the VFW Post, seized B & H’s video poker games, and arrested two VFW employees for maintaining an illegal gambling establishment. After the raid, Venezia and B & H supplied additional video games to the VFW, which continued to provide its customers with illegal gambling payouts.

In an attempt to gather evidence, Robinson, who was present at the VFW raid, indicated that Venezia could avoid further interruptions of his illegal gambling operation if he were to offer a bribe to discourage the investigation and the interference, and he suggested to Venezia that they meet. Vene-zia consulted with Cueto, who instructed Venezia to meet with Tom Daley, one of his law partners at the time. In an attempt to portray Robinson as a dishonest agent, Daley reported to the ILCC that Robinson had solicited a bribe at the VFW. A meeting was then scheduled between Venezia and Robinson, who met at B & H corporate headquarters. Robinson taped the conversation at the FBI’s request, and the tape was introduced into evidence in the racketeering case and at Cueto’s trial.'4 Soon after the meeting, the *626VFW was raided again; B & H video poker games were seized, and two employees were arrested. The ILCC issued an administrative violation to the VFW as well as a warning to remove the illegal gambling machines, otherwise, its liquor license would be revoked. Again, Venezia consulted with Cueto, about the raids, the criminal charges, and the prosecutions, and they discussed available options and courses of action.

First, Cueto and Venezia drafted a letter, detailing Robinson’s alleged “corrupt” conduct and accusing him of soliciting bribes, and delivered it to St. Clair County State’s Attorney Robert Haida. Cueto also filed a complaint in state court against Robinson, in which Cueto alleged that Robinson was a corrupt agent. See Venezia v. Robinson, No. 92-CH 299. Cueto obtained a court order that required Robinson to appear for a hearing in People v. Moore, one of the gambling prosecutions arising from the VFW raid.5 Pursuant to the order, Robinson appeared in state court, and Cueto immediately served him with a subpoena, which required him to appear in court within fifteen minutes for an injunction hearing in Venezia v. Robinson. Cueto had prepared a petition, requesting either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary and permanent injunction against alleged extortion and other vexation to prevent Robinson from interfering with the operation of Venezia’s business. Robinson had not seen a copy of the complaint, had not been served with process, and was not represented by counsel.

At the hearing, Robinson’s requests for an attorney were denied, and the state court judge permitted Cueto to question Robinson about the FBI’s investigation (which at that point was still a covert operation) and the evidence it had obtained in the course of the investigation. Without permitting Robinson to put on a defense and without articulating any findings of fact or conclusions of law, the state court entered a preliminary injunction against Robinson, which indefinitely enjoined him from interfering with Venezia’s business operations. Venezia then returned to the VFW, as well as other taverns affiliated with the gambling operation, to advise them that a state court judge had entered an injunction against Robinson and that he could no longer interfere with their establishments and the illegal gambling operation.

Notwithstanding the injunction and pursuant to instructions from the Director of ILCC to continue his routine liquor inspections, Robinson visited another establishment associated with B & H’s gambling operation and discovered that the tavern owner was providing illegal gambling payouts on some of the video machines. Thereafter, Dorothy McCaw was arrested for operating and maintaining an illegal gambling establishment, and she signed a written confession for her participation in illegal gambling activities. Upon learning of the inspection and arrest, Venezia contacted Cueto, who arranged for Venezia and Romanik, the third individual charged in the instant indictment, to obtain another statement from McCaw. Cueto then drafted a letter to the ILCC, State’s Attorney Haida, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, and the FBI, claiming that his client was suffering damage as a result of Robinson’s “unlawful” interference with the opération of Venezia’s business and threatened that if the conduct continued, he would file suit against the ILCC, in addition to Robinson, for damages incurred. Without McCaw’s knowledge, Cueto attached to that letter the statement she had given to Venezia and Romanik, which supported Cueto’s allegations of interference. Cueto also filed a rule to show cause in state court, which described Robinson’s violations of the injunction and requested the court to find him in contempt; McCaw’s statement also was attached to the rule to show cause, again without her knowledge.

Represented by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, Robinson filed a motion to remove the rule to show cause in Venezia v. Robinson to federal district court pursuant to 28 *627U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). In the removal proceeding, the district court determined that Robinson had been working for the FBI under the control of a federal agent during the VFW raids, which therefore established federal jurisdiction. After removal, the district court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the complaint. Venezia v. Robinson, No. 92 CV 867. Cueto filed an appeal in this court, challenging the dissolution of the injunction and the dismissal of the complaint. Recognizing that the injunction hearing had violated Robinson’s rights to due process, we affirmed the district court’s order. Venezia v. Robinson, 16 F.3d 209 (7th Cir.1994). Cueto filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which also was denied. See 613 U.S. 816, 115 S.Ct. 71, 130 L.Ed.2d 26 (1994).

During the investigation, the record indicates that Cueto and Venezia developed more than a professional attorney-client relationship, entering into various financial transactions and business deals, some of which involved secret partnerships. A few examples include: (1) they purchased unimproved real estate, developed the real estate, built and managed a topless nightclub (Club Exposed), which operated some of B & H’s illegal gambling machines; (2) Venezia and Cueto incorporated Millennium III, an asbestos removal company, and applied for and obtained a $600,000 line of credit to complete the purchase acquisition; and (3) Venezia purchased Cueto’s office building and moved B & H corporate headquarters into it. The record demonstrates that in order to obtain financing, Venezia reported B & H as a principal asset on his financial statements and loan applications to establish the necessary credit he and Cueto needed to become joint borrowers on various loans. Moreover, the record indicates that the lender in the Millennium purchase relied upon Venezia’s financial statement in its decision to loan the money for the acquisition. See Transcript, 19:112-113.

About the time the Millennium purchase was finalized, state police and Robinson arrested George Vogt, a B & H customer, for gambling. At a hearing in the state’s prosecution of Vogt, Robinson testified and Cueto cross-examined him. After the hearing, Cue-to again approached State’s Attorney Haida, provided him with the transcripts from the Vogt hearing, and urged Haida to indict Robinson for perjury. Thereafter, Haida commenced an investigation of Robinson’s activities. Nothing came of Cueto’s allegations of perjury, and the investigation ended without any charges being filed.

The investigation of Venezia and B & H began in early 1992, and the events discussed above occurred over a period of approximately three years. We briefly mentioned some of the initial business and financial dealings between Venezia and Cueto, but to avoid an even longer discussion of these background facts, we think it unnecessary to specifically discuss every financial transaction contained in the record except to point out that together Venezia and Cueto participated in various business transactions, in which millions of dollars exchanged hands to finance the purchases of various real- estate interests and construction costs relating to various development projects, including certain gambling operations.6’ The indictment specifically charged that Club Exposed, the nightclub owned by Venezia and Cueto, Millennium III, as well as other business transactions in which they were involved, depended upon the continued operation of B & H and the illegal gambling business to secure and to cover the various loans and debts they incurred in their financial ventures.

Even after Cueto became a business partner of Venezia and invested in various real estate and development projects with him, he continued to give Venezia legal advice. Although Cueto was not an attorney of record, he participated in the preparation of Vene-zia’s defense in the racketeering prosecution. Cueto continued to urge State’s Attorney Haida to indict Robinson for perjury. He also contacted Congressman Jerry Costello, who owned an equal one-third partnership interest in a gambling development project with Cueto and Venezia, and asked the Congressman to contact Haida and to offer him a seat on the judiciary in exchange for Haida’s *628recommendation that Cueto be appointed as the next State’s Attorney. Cueto also began to publish a newspaper, the East Side Review, and authored an article in which he indicated that in the next election he intended to run for St. Clair County State’s Attorney, and in the event he was elected, he would prosecute Robinson.7

In August of 1994, the government empaneled a grand jury to examine the evidence obtained in the FBI’s investigation of Vene-zia and B & H, and the grand jury also initiated its own investigation of these allegations. In response, Cueto prepared and filed various motions to hinder the investigation and to discharge the grand jury, all of which were denied. Notwithstanding the defense tactics and delays, the grand jury indicted Venezia, among others; he was prosecuted, and ultimately, convicted for operating an illegal gambling enterprise, in -addition to other related convictions.

Seven months after the racketeering convictions in July of 1996, another grand jury returned a separate nine count indictment against Cueto, Venezia, and Romanik. It is this indictment and the subsequent convictions on various counts of this indictment that are the subject of this appeal.8 Count 1 of the indictment charged Cueto in a three-part conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, alleging that he misused his office as an attorney and unlawfully and intentionally conspired with Venezia and Romanik to impede, impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful function of the FBI, the grand jury, and the federal district court in connection with the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of Venezia, B & H, and the illegal gambling operation and racketeering enterprise. The indictment alleged that Cueto and Venezia’s business relationship created Cueto’s financial motive for his participation in the conspiracy, in which he endeavored to protect the illegal gambling enterprise and to maintain its continued operation in order to safeguard his personal financial interests.

In the first part of the conspiracy, the government charged that Cueto conspired to impede and delay the FBI investigation primarily by attacking the reputation of ILCC Agent Bonds Robinson and by urging the St. Clair County State’s Attorney to investigate, indict, and prosecute Robinson for alleged extortion. Second, the indictment alleged that Cueto conspired to influence and hinder the function of the grand jury by filing false motions, which attacked the operations of the FBI and the Office of the United States Attorney, in an attempt to delay and disrupt the investigation and to discharge the grand jury. Finally, the third aspect of the conspiracy focused on Cueto’s attempts to obstruct the proceedings in federal district court by persuading Venezia’s (and his co-defendants’) defense counsel to file various motions, including a motion to disqualify the district court judge assigned to hear- the racketeering case.

Counts 2, 6, and 7 of the indictment charged obstruction of justice in violation of the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. §' 1503,9 alleging that Cueto corruptly endeavored to use his office as an attorney to influence, obstruct, and impair the due administration of justice in various court proceedings in connection with the prosecution of Venezia, his illegal gambling- operation, and the racketeering enterprise in United States v. B & H Vending/Ace Music Corp. & Thomas Venezia, et al. Specifically, Count 2 of the indict*629ment charged that Cueto corruptly endeavored to influence the due administration of justice in Venezia v. Robinson by filing or causing to be filed pleadings in connection with the proceedings in federal district court, an appellate brief in this court, and a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Count 6 involved Cueto’s actions in regard to ILCC Agent Bonds Robinson, and the indictment charged that Cueto corruptly endeavored to obstruct the lawful function of the federal grand jury in his attempts to encourage and to persuade State’s Attorney Haida to indict Robinson. Count 7 also focused on the filing of various court papers, and the indictment alleged that Cueto corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede the proceedings in federal district court by preparing and filing and urging defense counsel to prepare and file false pleadings and court papers in connection with the racketeering ease.

After a jury trial, Cueto was convicted of the charges in Counts 1, 2, 6, and 7 and the district court ordered him to serve a prison term of 87 months, to be followed by two years of supervised release, and imposed monetary penalties. Cueto filed a timely notice of appeal. He asserts several arguments on appeal, challenging his convictions and sentence. First, Cueto contends that the conviction for conspiracy to defraud the government is invalid, arguing that: (1) the meaning of “conspiracy to defraud” in § 371 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment; and (2) his conviction may rest on a constitutionally or legally invalid theory because the conduct charged in the indictment includes lawful conduct that was undertaken openly and in public view. Next,, Cueto challenges each conviction for obstruction of justice in violation of the omnibus clause of § 1503 as invalid, arguing that: (1) the omnibus clause of § 1503 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment; (2) the omnibus clause of § 1503 does not cover either the filing of court papers or attempts to encourage a state prosecutor to investigate another state official for misconduct; (3) the conduct charged fails to satisfy the nexus requirement as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995); and (4) an attempt to persuade a prosecutor to take action against a state officer for misconduct is speech protected by the First Amendment.

Cueto also asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred when it excluded certain defense evidence: (1) the transcript of the state injunction hearing'in Venezia v. Robinson; (2) Robinson’s testimony at a hearing in one of the state’s gambling prosecutions, People v. Vogt, arising from Venezia’s illegal gambling operation; and (3) Venezia’s grand jury testimony, which Cueto wanted to use for impeachment purposes. He also claims that the district court erred by redacting portions of certain documents and newspaper articles. Finally, Cueto argues that his sentence should be vacated and remanded because the district court judge erroneously calculated his sentence by not grouping the obstruction of justice convictions. With these'facts as background, we now consider the issues presented for review and examine each argument in turn.

Analysis

Before we begin our analysis, we discuss the appropriate standard of review, our particular role in this review, and the limited scope of this decision. Our ruling today does not interfere with legitimate avenues of advocacy of even the most zealous of attorneys; we do nothing more than consider the constitutionality of certain criminal statutes aimed at protecting the sanctity and integrity of our justice system from corrupt influences and apply them in a sober and impartial fashion. Ultimately, we consider the sufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecution in our revieiy of the jury’s guilty verdict. Appellate review' of a jury’s verdict is limited; if any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we are bound to affirm the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We-have repeatedly recognized that defendants challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at trial face a “nearly insurmountable hurdle.” See, *630 e.g., United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir.1997) (citing other cases).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Jackson, 103 F.3d 561, 567 (7th Cir.1996). We defer to the jury’s credibility determinations, its weighing of the evidence, and its drawing of reasonable inferences and overturn a verdict only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore, 115 F.3d at 1363. With that said, we recognize that the defendant asserts various other arguments challenging his convictions and sentence, and we discuss those standards of review at the point in our analysis when we consider those alternative arguments.

I. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Cueto asserts several arguments with respect to his convictions on Counts 2, 6, and 7 for obstruction of justice, contending that the omnibus clause of § 1503 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment and, alternatively, that the evidence established at trial on these counts is insufficient to support his convictions. We address each argument in turn and begin with the constitutional challenges. Cueto argues that “much of what lawyers do — are attempts to influence the justice system,” and that the omnibus clause of § 1503 was not intended to apply to the type of conduct charged in the indictment. Appellant’s Brief at 17 (emphasis in original). Questions regarding the constitutionality or scope of a statute are reviewed de novo. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-98, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

“[I]n determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language. If the language is unambiguous, ordinarily it is to be regarded as conclusive unless there is ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.’ ” Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). The omnibus clause of § 1503 is a catch-all provision that states:

Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration of law, shall be imprisoned....

18 U.S.C. § 1503 (emphasis added). This clause was intended to ensure that criminals could not circumvent the statute’s purpose “by devising novel and creative schemes that would interfere with the administration of justice but would nonetheless fall outside the scope of § 1503’s specific prohibitions.” United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir.1997). “The obstruction of justice statute was drafted with an eye to ‘the variety of corrupt methods by which the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined.’ ” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 206 (5th Cir.1979) (citation omitted).

Cueto also contends that the vagueness problems are exacerbated by this court’s broad construction of the term “corruptly,” arguing that it fails to provide meaningful and adequate notice as to what conduct is proscribed by the statute. The Seventh Circuit has approved a jury instruction which articulates a definition for the term “corruptly,” and the district court judge included this definition in its instructions to the jury:

Corruptly means to act with the purpose of obstructing justice. The United States is not required to prove that the defendant’s only or even main purpose was to obstruct the due administration of justice. The government only has to establish that the defendant should have reasonably seen that the natural and probable consequences of his acts was the obstruction of *631justice. Intent may be inferred from all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Any act, by any party, whether lawful or unlawful on its face, may violate Section 1503, if performed with a corrupt motive.

See Transcript, 32:68-69. The mere fact that a term “covers a broad spectrum of conduct” does not render it vague, and the requirement that a statute must give fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed “cannot be used as a shield by one who is already bent on serious wrongdoing.” Griffin, 589 F.2d at 206-207.

There is little case authority directly on point to consider whether an attorney acting in his professional capacity could be criminally liable under the omnibus clause of § 1503 for traditional litigation-related conduct that results in an obstruction of justice. “Correct application of Section 1503 thus requires, in a very real sense, that the factfinder discern — by direct evidence or from inference — the motive which led an individual to perform particular actions.... ‘Intent may make any otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot.’ ” United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 991 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394, 36 S.Ct. 367, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916)). Therefore, it is not the means employed by the defendant that are specifically prohibited by the statute; instead, it is the defendant’s corrupt endeavor which motivated the action. Otherwise lawful conduct, even acts undertaken by an attorney in the course of representing a client, can transgress § 1503 if employed with the corrupt intent to accomplish that which the statute forbids. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 992 (“means, though lawful in themselves, can cross the line of illegality if (i) employed with a corrupt motive, (ii) to hinder the due administration of justice, so long as (iii) the means have the capacity to obstruct”).

We are not persuaded by Cueto’s constitutional challenges, and his focus is misplaced. The government’s theory of prosecution is predicated on the fact that Cueto held a personal financial interest in protecting the illegal gambling enterprise, which formed the requisite corrupt intent for his conduct to qualify as violations of the statute.10 Cueto focuses entirely on the legality of his conduct, and not the requisite criminal intent proscribed by § 1503. It is undisputed that an attorney may use any lawful means to defend his client, and there is no risk of criminal liability if those means employed by the attorney in his endeavors to represent his client remain within the scope of lawful conduct. However, it is the corrupt endeavor to protect the illegal gambling operation and to safeguard his own financial interest, which motivated Cueto’s otherwise legal conduct, that separates his conduct from that which is legal.

Even though courts may be hesitant, with good reason and caution, to include traditional litigation-related conduct within the scope of § 1503, the omnibus clause has been interpreted broadly in accordance with congressional intent to promote the due administration of justice and to prevent the miscarriage of justice, and an individual’s status as an attorney engaged in litigation-related conduct does not provide protection from prosecution for criminal conduct. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357; see also United States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.1994); Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 990 (“a criminal lawyer has no license to act as a lawyer-criminal”). Cueto’s arguments have no merit. As a lawyer, he possessed a heightened awareness of the law and its scope, and he cannot claim lack of fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed by § 1503 to shield himself from criminal liability, particularly when he was already “bent on serious wrongdoing.” Griffin, 589 F.2d at 206-207. More so than an ordinary individual, an attorney, in particular a criminal defense attorney, has a sophisticated understanding of the type of *632conduct that constitutes criminal violations of the law. There is a discernable difference between an honest lawyer who unintentionally submits a false statement to the court and an attorney with specific corrupt intentions who files papers in bad faith knowing that they contain false representations and/or inaccurate facts in an attempt to hinder judicial proceedings. It is true that, to a certain extent, a lawyer’s conduct influences judicial proceedings, or at least attempts to affect the outcome of the proceedings. However, that influence stems from a lawyer’s attempt to advocate his client’s interests within the scope of the law. It is the “corrupt endeav- or” to influence the due administration of justice that is the heart of the offense, and Cueto’s personal financial interest is the heart of his corrupt motive.

An amicus brief submitted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“Association”) also questions the proper scope of the omnibus clause of § 1503, and the Association articulates its fears that if we affirm Cueto’s convictions, criminal defense attorneys will be subject to future prosecutions not only for actual misconduct, but also for apparent and inadvertent wrongdoing, notwithstanding a lawyer’s good faith advocacy. The Association believes that this type of sweeping prosecution will sufficiently chill vigorous advocacy and eventually destroy the delicate balance between prosecution and defense which is necessary to maintain the effective operation of the criminal justice system. Although the Association discusses valid policy concerns and asserts legitimate arguments, some of which we generally agree with, we are also concerned with the flipside of its argument. If lawyers are not punished for their criminal conduct and corrupt endeavors to manipulate the administration of justice, the result would be the same: the weakening of an ethical adversarial system and the undermining of just administration of the law. We have the responsibility to ensure that the integrity of the criminal justice system is maintained and that protection includes granting to both the prosecution and the defense flexibility and “discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), in addition to enforcing mechanisms of punishment, which necessarily include criminal prosecution, to prevent abuses of the system.

We have carefully examined the fears articulated by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in addition to the arguments put forth by the defendant, that a decision upholding the application of the omnibus clause of § 1503 to litigation-related conduct may deter or somehow chill the criminal defense lawyers in zealous advocacy, and we find those concerns to be exaggerated, at least as considered in light of the facts in the present case. Although we appreciate that it is of significant importance to avoid chilling vigorous advocacy and to maintain the balance of effective representation, we also recognize that a lawyer’s misconduct and criminal acts are not absolutely immune from prosecution. We cannot ignore Cueto’s corrupt endeavors to manipulate the administration of justice and his clear criminal violations of the law. As the First Circuit recognized in Cintolo:

Nothing in the caselaw, fairly read, suggests that lawyers should be plucked gently from the maddening crowd and sheltered from the rigors of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 in the manner urged by appellant and by the amici. Nor is there sufficient public policy justification favoring such a result. To the contrary, the overriding public policy interest is that “[t]he attorney-client relationship cannot ... be used to shield or promote illegitimate acts.... ” “[A]t-torneys, just like all other persons, ... are not above the law and are subject to its full application under appropriate circumstances.”

818 F.2d at 993-94 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the omnibus clause of § 1503 may be used to prosecute a lawyer’s litigation-related criminality and that neither the omnibus clause of § 1503 nor this court’s construction of the term “corruptly” is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment for which Cueto was convicted.

We now turn to Cueto’s argument that his convictions on the obstruction of justice counts were not supported by suffi*633cient evidence. Cueto’s task is a formidable one, and an examination of the record illuminates that the evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly supports the jury’s verdict. In order to establish a violation of 8 1503, the government must demonstrate that: (1) there was a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant knew of the proceeding; (3) he influenced, obstructed, or impeded, or endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; and (4) he did so corruptly. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.1995). There must be a nexus between the defendant’s efforts and the judicial proceeding sought to be corruptly influenced. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598-599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. However, a defendant’s actions need not be successful in order to be prosecuted under the statute.. All that is required is that the defendant has knowledge or notice that his actions are likely to affect the just administration of the subject proceedings. Id.

Again the focus of Cueto’s argument is misplaced; he argues that his conduct does not fall within the scope of the omnibus clause of § 1503 and that the government presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate his guilt. Cueto, however, fails to address the essence of the government’s allegations and, ultimately, the basis for his convictions; it is his corrupt endeavor to obstruct the administration of justice that transforms his traditional litigation-related conduct into criminal violations of the law. The gloss which Cueto places on the evidence manifestly misapprehends both the jury’s fact finding function and our role in the review of the verdict. In light of the considerable circumstantial evidence in support of its assessment of the situation, the jury was reasonably entitled to disbelieve Cueto’s characterization of his conduct and to accept the contrary interpretation urged by the government that Cueto, with a corrupt purpose, endeavored to obstruct the due administration of justice. That finding cannot be lightly overturned. Indeed, the record adequately supports the conclusion that Cue-to’s conduct, though nominally litigation-related conduct on behalf of his client, was undertaken with the corrupt intent to protect Venezia, Venezia’s associates, and his business from criminal prosecution and to safeguard his personal financial interest in the illegal gambling operation, whatever the costs and consequences to the due administration of justice.

The charges in Count 2 of the indictment included allegations of a corrupt endeavor to obstruct the due administration of justice in Venezia v. Robinson by filing pleadings in federal district court and a continued attempt to hinder the proceedings by filing an appeal in this court and a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The evidence demonstrates that Cue-to successfully exposed the FBI's investigation, uncovered the evidence it had gathered, obtained the injunction against Robinson, and continued to file frivolous appeals after the district court dismissed the injunction and the complaint. See Transcript, 15:62-63; 16:71-72. Government agents, in fact, testified that the investigation was disrupted and that Cueto “blew the lid off the ongoing investigation.” See Transcript, 3:44; 16:55-59. The jury was amply justified in concluding that Cueto’s repeated filings were motivated by his attempt to protect his client from prosecution and to safeguard his financial interest. Cueto’s actions may qualify as traditional litigation-related conduct in form, but not in substance, and the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Cueto clearly intended and corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration of justice in Venezia v. Robinson.

Similar to Count 2, Count 7 includes allegations of preparing and filing and causing defense counsel to prepare and file false pleadings and other court papers; the indictment specifically charged Cueto with encouraging defense counsel in the racketeering case to file false motions and pleadings for the purpose of impeding and obstructing the administration of justice in that case. We have no doubt that Cueto in fact intended to interfere with the investigation, attempted to delay the indictment, and endeavored to obstruct the proceedings in federal district court in connection with the prosecution of Venezia. See Transcript, 23:74; 25:17. We simply are not dealing with non-corrupt, le*634gitimate involvement in the preparation of Venezia’s (and his co-defendants’) defense. Nor are we dealing with inadvertent interference. From the evidence presented at trial, the jury was amply justified in concluding without a doubt that Cueto corruptly endeavored to obstruct the district court’s proceedings in the gambling and racketeering prosecution.

In response to his conviction on Count 6, Cueto argues that his conviction should be reversed because the Aguilar nexus is absent; he contends that the government presented insufficient evidence to establish the relationship between his attempts to persuade State’s Attorney Haida to investigate and indict Robinson and a pending-judicial proceeding.11 Cueto contends that at the time the conduct charged in the indictment occurred, the grand jury had not yet been empaneled and that Venezia had not been indicted in the racketeering case, and therefore the nexus is lacking. His argument, however, mischaracterizes the frame of time at issue in addition to the indictment and the charges therein. “It is well established that investigations undertaken with the intention of presenting evidence before a grand jury are sufficient to constitute ‘the due administration of justice’ under § 1503.” Maloney, 71 F.3d at 657.

Though Cueto’s initial calls and letters to State’s Attorney Haida may pre-date the empaneling of the grand jury, the phone call to Congressman Costello occurred after the indictment was unsealed. In addition, his letters to the State’s Attorney occurred throughout the investigation, and the evidence indicates that Cueto knew of the investigation. Accordingly, Cueto’s conduct prior to the empaneling of the grand jury as well as his subsequent acts to encourage State’s Attorney Haida to investigate and prosecute Agent Robinson have the requisite nexus to the judicial proceedings; there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond doubt that Cueto repeatedly attempted to urge Haida to prosecute Robinson knowing that an investigation into Robinson’s conduct would hinder the government’s ability to continue to investigate Venezia ánd the gambling operation.

Whatever the contours of the line between traditional lawyering and criminal conduct, they must inevitably be drawn case-by-case. We refuse to accept the notion that lawyers may do anything, including violating the law, to zealously advocate their clients’ interests and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they were “just doing their job.” As the First Circuit stated in Cintolo, “[w]e refuse to chip some sort of special exception for lawyers into the brickwork of § 1503.” 818 F.2d at 996. We respect the importance of allowing defense counsel to perform legitimate activities without hindrance and recognize the potential dangers that could arise if prosecutors were permitted to inquire into the motives of criminal defense attorneys ad hoc. This case, however, does not create that avenue of inquiry; our conclusion is limited to the specific facts of this case. Viewing the facts and inferences most favorably to the government, as we are required to do, there was ample basis for the jury to find that Cueto corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration of justice. The jury was justified in concluding that Cueto had the requisite knowledge of the FBI’s investigation of Venezia, the grand jury’s inquiry, and the district court’s proceedings and then acted in a manner that had the natural and probable effect of interfering with the lawful function of those governmental entities and the due administration of justice. His role as a defense attorney did *635not insulate him from the criminal consequences of his corruptly-motivated actions. Accordingly, we affirm Cueto’s convictions on Counts 2, 6, and 7.

II. Conspiracy To Defraud The United States

Cueto next challenges his conviction on Count 1 for conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment. He claims that the “conspiracy to defraud” clause is void for vagueness in the instant case because neither the statutory language, the legislative history, nor the ease law interpreting § 371 provides adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that conduct such as that charged in the instant indictment would violate the statute. Cueto also argues that his conviction should be reversed because it may rest on a legally or constitutionally invalid theory.

Count 1 of the indictment charged Cueto with conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of § 371, which states:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

18 U.S.C. § 371. We have recognized that the statute is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of the government; neither the conspiracy’s goal nor the means used to achieve it need to be independently illegal. United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir.1994). To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to defraud, the record must demonstrate: (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective against the United States; (2) one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and (3) an intent to commit the substantive offense — in • this case, the intent to obstruct justice. United States v. Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1202 (7th Cir.1994). Intent, as well as the agreement, may be inferred from circumstantial evidence concerning the relationship'of the parties, their overt acts, and the totality of their conduct. United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 933 (7th Cir.1989).

-The meaning of “conspiracy to defraud” is framed in general terms; it is impossible for Congress to anticipate, identify, and define each and every context in which an agreement to act would qualify as a conspiracy to defraud. As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), “general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, ... even though ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’ ” 117 S.Ct. at 1227 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of conspiracy to defraud:

To conspire to defraud the United States means ... to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane, or the overreaching of those charged with carrying-out the governmental intention.

265 U.S. at 188, 44 S.Ct. 511. The fact that § 371 has been applied to agreements not expressly anticipated by Congress nor specifically articulated in the statute does not demonstrate ambiguity nor does it create vagueness problems. “A statute can be unambiguous without addressing every interpretative theory offered by a party. It need only be ‘plain to. anyone reading the Act’ that the statute encompasses the conduct at issue.” Salinas v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 469, 475, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcraft, 501 U.S. 452, 467, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 *636L.Ed.2d 410 (1991)). In fact, the Second Circuit has recognized that an indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud need only articulate with particularity “the essential nature of the alleged fraud.” United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 90-91 (2d Cir.1991).

Although § 371 does not specifically articulate that Cueto’s various acts, which impaired the FBI’s investigation, impeded the inquiries of the grand jury, and delayed and obstructed the proceedings in the district court, fall within its scope, the instant indictment alleges with particularity “the essential nature of the alleged fraud” and identifies Cue-to’s specific conduct which furthered the conspiracy. The allegations in the indictment specifically describe the conduct charged as part of the essential nature of the alleged fraud, which provides the basis of Cueto’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud. As applied to the conduct charged in the instant indictment, the conspiracy to defraud clause of § 371 is not unconstitutionally vague, and the plain and ordinary meaning of “conspiracy to defraud” necessarily reaches Cueto’s conduct.

Cueto, however, argues that the specificity of the indictment is problematic and far-reaching because it includes noncriminal conduct, which may not properly be a valid básis for the criminal charges and, ultimately, his conviction on Count 1. Cueto contends that his conduct is lawful “lawyering conduct” and that he cannot be guilty of a conspiracy to commit acts which are not criminal. To the contrary, the record clearly demonstrates that his conduct, which necessarily includes his corrupt endeavors, was not typical conduct of a lawyer and that it certainly was not lawful lawyering conduct. Based on our earlier determinations that there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Cueto on the obstruction of justice charges for his litigation-related conduct, we can similarly dispose of the present argument. Although his actions initially may have stemmed from routine, even vigorous, advocacy, at some point his conduct exceeded the scope of lawful lawyering conduct. “ ‘[A]cts which are themselves legal lose their legal character when they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme.’ ” United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1312 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962)). Indeed, it is evident that many of his actions were prohibited by the rules of professional responsibility and the canons of legal ethics. See Transcript, 22:1-114. Although those violations do not necessarily constitute criminal violations of the law, they are further evidence of an intent to participate in the conspiracy.

We recognize that Cueto may initially have been hired in his professional capacity to provide legal advice and representation, but it was equally reasonable for the jury to conclude from the evidence presented at trial that his representation also was undertaken for a criminal purpose in an attempt to protect the illegal gambling operation and to prevent government interference and that Cueto’s role in the conspiracy was to use the power of his office as an attorney for the corrupt purpose of impairing, impeding, and obstructing the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of the illegal gambling and racketeering enterprise. Similarly, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Cueto agreed to participate in this scheme for his personal financial gain; the income generated by Venezia’s illegal gambling operation was used to fund additional business ventures pursued in partnership with Cueto. Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that the government proved the elements of § 371 beyond a reasonable doubt and that Cueto conspired with others and purposefully and knowingly participated in a corrupt scheme to defraud the United States. Accordingly, we find no error with Cueto’s conviction on Count 1.

III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ÜF THE DISTRICT Court

Cueto also claims that he is entitled to a new trial based on the district court’s incorrect evidentiary rulings. He challenges three specific evidentiary rulings, in which the district court excluded the tran*637script of the state injunction hearing in Vene-zia v. Robinson and Robinson’s testimony at the Vogt hearing and admitted redacted portions of certain documents. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir.1997). The defendant has “a heavy burden in challenging a trial court’s evidentiary rulings on appeal....” United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489-90 (7th Cir.1990). The trial court’s rulings are given special deference “because of the trial judge’s first-hand exposure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of his familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the likely impact of the evidence in the context of the entire proceeding.” United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 329 (7th Cir.1992). Under an abuse of discretion standard, reversal is warranted “only when the trial judge’s ‘decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where the record contains no evidence on which he rationally could have based that decision....’” Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563-564 (7th Cir.1984)).

Cueto first complains that the district court’s decision to exclude the transcript of the injunction hearing prevented him from showing that he had a reasonable belief that Robinson was in fact a corrupt agent. The district court refused to admit the transcript of the hearing into evidence because, among other reasons, the hearing was conducted in violation of Robinson’s rights as determined by this court in Venezia v. Robinson, 16 F.3d 209 (7th Cir.1994). Specifically, Robinson received notice of the injunction hearing through fraudulent pretenses created by Cueto, and the state court judge denied Robinson his right to counsel and conducted the hearing in violation of his right to due process of law. The district court recognized that Cueto should not be able to profit from his own wrongdoing and therefore excluded the transcript. We find no error with this determination.

Next, Cueto contends that the court erred by denying him the ability to present testimony to demonstrate his reasonable belief that Robinson perjured himself at the Vogt hearing. The record shows that the district court limited Cueto’s testimony because he intended to attack Robinson’s credibility and to discuss testimony Robinson had given in other court proceedings. The district court ruled that the proposed evidence was hearsay and excluded it. We agree with the district court’s ruling that Cueto should not be permitted to discuss on the witness stand testimony Robinson had given in other court proceedings. Fed.R.Evid. 801. The court also determined that because Robinson was never called as a witness his credibility could not be attacked. . See Transcript, 26:120-121. We find no error in the court’s decision to exclude this evidence.

Finally, Cueto argues that the redacted documents, admitted by the district court, provided an incomplete and inaccurate description of his purpose for publishing the East Side Revieio articles and his reasons for submitting various filings to the court. However, the record demonstrates that the district court redacted the various documents because in a pre-trial motion, the judge had determined that prosecutorial misconduct was not a viable defense and the documents in question included various allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and attacked the integrity of the prosecutors. The court refused to allow any discussion of or reference to allegations of governmental misconduct to be presented to the jury. Cueto disregards the record and does not address- the specific grounds for the trial court’s rulings on the exclusion of this evidence. We conclude that the court’s decision to redact the documents was proper; admission of the documents in their entirety would have impermissibly placed allegations of prosecutorial conduct before the jury. See United States v. Glover, 101 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir.1996).

For the sake of argument, even if the district court’s rulings were erroneous, reversal is not required so long as the errors were harmless, and “harmful error results only if the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1429 (7th Cir.1993). A defendant is entitled *638to a new trial only if there is “a reasonable possibility” that the exclusion of the evidence had “a prejudicial effect upon the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Berry, 92 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir.1996). When viewed in the context of the entire trial and the totality of the evidence, the jury heard substantial evidence to support the government’s theory of prosecution. The admission of the excluded evidence would not have produced a different result in this case; the jury possessed more than enough evidence to convict Cueto for conspiring to defraud the government and for obstructing the due administration of justice. Thus, even if the district court’s evi-dentiary rulings were erroneous, the errors were harmless, and Cueto is not entitled to a new trial.

Cueto also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach Venezia with his grand jury testimony during cross-examination. Normally, we review a trial court’s restriction on or limitation of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir.1995). However, where the restriction impacts the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, the review is de novo. Id. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). So long as cross-examination elicits adequate information to allow a jury to assess a witness’s credibility, motives, or possible bias, the Sixth Amendment is not compromised by a limitation on cross-examination. Sasson, 62 F.3d at 883.

On direct examination, Venezia admitted that he had perjured himself in his grand jury testimony to protect Cueto. See Transcript, 5:223-229. As such, the value of his grand jury testimony was limited. Nonetheless, Cueto contends that Venezia’s grand jury testimony was crucial to impeach other aspects of his testimony at trial. Mere restrictions on the scope of cross-examination do not necessarily constitute a constitutional error in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). So long as defense counsel has sufficient opportunity to cross examine a witness, it is of peripheral concern to the Sixth Amendment how much opportunity counsel gets to “hammer [a] point home to the jury.” Sasson, 62 F.3d at 882. Even though the district court excluded Venezia’s grand jury testimony, Cueto had ample opportunity to demonstrate Venezia’s lack of credibility during cross-examination. We therefore conclude that Cueto’s Sixth Amendment right was not compromised.

IV. SENTENCING ISSUES

Finally, Cueto contends that the district court erroneously calculated his sentence, arguing that the three counts of obstruction of justice should have been grouped pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 3D1.2. We review the district court’s factual determinations underlying the application of the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir.1995). A district court’s decision between two permissible choices involves resolution of facts that requires the perspective and special competence of the trial judge, and courts of appeals give due deference to the trial judge’s determinations, “for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).

Section 3D1.2 requires that the sentencing judge group any count “involving the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. This section contemplates a grouping decision based on a “single course of conduct with a single criminal objective” and does not authorize the grouping of offenses that do not represent essentially one composite harm. Id. at Ap*639plication Note 4.12 A primary consideration in this section is whether the offenses involve different victims, and “victim” is defined as the person “who is directly and most seriously affected by the offense.... ” Id. at Application Note 2. For offenses in which there are no identifiable victims, the victim for purposes of this section is the societal interest that is harmed, and the grouping decision is based on “the nature of the interest invaded by each offense.” United States v. Bruder, 945 F.2d 167, 170 (7th Cir.1991).

This case is a “victimless” crime, so the harm to societal interests must be considered. Cueto argues that his. crimes harmed the same societal interests and fall within the scope of Sentencing Guideline § 3D1.2. Instead, the district court accepted the government’s argument that different societal interests were harmed in each offense of conviction and consequently the judge considered each count separately for purposes of calculating of Cueto’s sentence.13

The district court relied primarily on this court’s decision in United States v. Owolabi, in which we affirmed a judge’s decision not to group an immigration offense and a counterfeit securities offense. 69 F.3d at 167. Cue-to attempts to distinguish Owolabi from the present case, arguing that his offenses involved convictions under the same statute, unlike the conduct charged in Owolabi which involved separate offenses of conviction. He argues that the conduct for which he was convicted ultimately shared a common goal with a singular purpose: to obstruct the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of the illegal gambling and racketeering case. In his reply brief, Cueto emphasizes that the government characterized his actions as “a unitary effort” to prevent the government from shutting down the gambling operation, and he contends that the government cannot abandon that theory of a unitary purpose to justify the imposition of a longer sentence based upon its argument that multiple societal interests were harmed. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 30.

We do not dispute Cueto’s argument that the government characterized Cueto’s actions as a unitary effort with a common goal, and we certainly recognize that the instant case is distinguishable from Owolabi because Cue-to’s offenses of conviction involve violations of the same statute. Notwithstanding these arguments, Cueto’s conduct invaded three distinct societal interests — the proper functioning of the FBI, the grand jury, and the district court — and each entity has a fundamentally separate and unique governmental function. Cueto’s conduct disrupted and interfered with the lawful function of various governmental entities at different times throughout a period of approximately two or three years. His purpose may have involved only one criminal objective, but it certainly did not involve a single course of action. The district court’s determination that the societal interests harmed were sufficiently distinct to preclude grouping was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we conclude that district court judge properly applied Sentencing Guideline § 3D 1.2 when he calculated Cue-to’s sentence.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, keeping in mind the limited scope of our holding, we Affirm the defendant’s convictions and the sentence imposed by the district court.

Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

As Enron Corporation’s financial difficulties became public in 2001, petitioner Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron’s auditor, instructed its employees to destroy documents pursuant to its document retention policy. A jury found that this action made petitioner guilty of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1512(b) (2)(A) and (B). These sections make it a crime to “knowingly us[e] intimidation or physical force, threate[n], or corruptly persuad[e] another person... with intent to ... cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” documents for use in, an “official proceeding.”1 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We hold that the jury instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a “corrup[t] persuasión]” conviction under § 1512(b), and therefore reverse.

Enron Corporation, during the 1990’s, switched its business from operation of natural gas pipelines to an energy conglomerate, a move that was accompanied by aggressive accounting practices and rapid growth. Petitioner audited Enron’s publicly filed financial statements and provided internal audit and consulting services to it. Petitioner’s “en*699gagement team” for Enron was headed by David Duncan. Beginning in 2000, Enron’s financial performance began to suffer, and, as 2001 wore on, worsened.2 On August 14, 2001, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), unexpectedly resigned. Within days, Sherron Watkins, a senior accountant at Enron, warned Kenneth Lay, Enron’s newly reappointed CEO, that Enron could “implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” Brief for United States 2. She likewise informed Duncan and Michael Odom, one of petitioner’s partners who had supervisory responsibility over Duncan, of the looming problems.

On August 28, an article in the Wall Street Journal suggested improprieties at Enron, and the SEC opened an informal investigation. By early September, petitioner had formed an Enron “crisis-response” team, which included Nancy Temple, an in-house counsel.3 On October 8, petitioner retained outside counsel to represent it in any litigation that might arise from the Enron matter. The next day, Temple discussed Enron with other in-house counsel. Her notes from that meeting reflect that “some SEC investigation” is “highly probable.” Id., at 8.

On October 10, Odom spoke at a general training meeting attended by 89 employees, including 10 from the Enron en*700gagement team. Odom urged everyone to comply with the firm’s document retention policy.4 He added: “ ‘[I]f it’s destroyed in the course of [the] normal policy and litigation is filed the next day, that’s great.... [W]e’ve followed our own policy, and whatever there was that might have been of interest to somebody is gone and irretrievable.’” 374 F. 3d 281, 286 (CA5 2004). On October 12, Temple entered the Enron matter into her computer, designating the “Type of Potential Claim” as “Professional Practice — Government/Regulatory Inv[estigation].” App. JA-127. Temple also e-mailed Odom, suggesting that he “ ‘remin[d] the engagement team of our documentation and retention policy.’” Brief for United States 6.

On October 16, Enron announced its third quarter results. That release disclosed a $1.01 billion charge to earnings.5 The following day, the SEC notified Enron by letter that it had opened an investigation in August and requested certain information and documents. On October 19, Enron forwarded a copy of that letter to petitioner.

*701On the same day, Temple also sent an e-mail to a member of petitioner’s internal team of accounting experts and attached a copy of the document policy. On October 20, the Enron crisis-response team held a conference call, during which Temple instructed everyone to “[m]ake sure to follow the [document] policy.” Brief for United States 7 (brackets in original). On October 23, Enron CEO Lay declined to answer questions during a call with analysts because of “potential lawsuits, as well as the SEC inquiry.” Ibid. After the call, Duncan met with other Andersen partners on the Enron engagement team and told them that they should ensure team members were complying with the document policy. Another meeting for all team members followed, during which Duncan distributed the policy and told everyone to comply. These, and other smaller meetings, were followed by substantial destruction of paper and electronic documents.

On October 26, one of petitioner’s senior partners circulated a New York Times article discussing the SEC’s response to Enron. His e-mail commented that “the problems are just beginning and we will be in the cross hairs. The marketplace is going to keep the pressure on this and is going to force the SEC to be tough.” Id., at 8. On October 30, the SEC opened a formal investigation and sent Enron a letter that requested accounting documents.

Throughout this time period, the document destruction continued, despite reservations by some of petitioner’s managers.6 On November 8, Enron announced that it would *702issue a comprehensive restatement of its earnings and assets. Also on November 8, the SEC served Enron and petitioner with subpoenas for records. On November 9, Duncan’s secretary sent an e-mail that stated: “Per Dave— No more shredding. . . . We have been officially served for our documents.” Id., at 10. Enron filed for bankruptcy less than a month later. Duncan was fired and later pleaded guilty to witness tampering.

In March 2002, petitioner was indicted in the Southern District of Texas on one count of violating §§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). The indictment alleged that, between October 10 and November 9, 2001, petitioner “did knowingly, intentionally and corruptly persuade . . . other persons, to wit: [petitioner’s] employees, with intent to cause” them to withhold documents from, and alter documents for use in, “official proceedings, namely: regulatory and criminal proceedings and investigations.” App. JA-139. A jury trial followed. When the case went to the jury, that body deliberated for seven days and then declared that it was deadlocked. The District Court delivered an “Allen charge,” Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896), and, after three more days of deliberation, the jury returned a. guilty verdict. The District Court denied petitioner’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 374 F. 3d, at 284. It held that the jury instructions properly conveyed the meaning of “corruptly persuades” and “official proceeding”; that the jury need not find any consciousness of wrongdoing; and that there was no reversible error. Because of a split of authority regarding the meaning of § 1512(b), we granted certiorari.7 543 U. S. 1042 (2005).

*703Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides criminal sanctions for those who obstruct justice. Sections 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), part of the witness tampering provisions, provide in relevant part:

“Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to .. . cause or induce any person to ... withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”

In this case, our attention is focused on what it means to “knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e]” another person “with intent to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” documents for use in, an “official proceeding.”

“We have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U. S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,’ McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931).” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600 (1995).

Such restraint is particularly appropriate here, where the act underlying the conviction — “persua[sion]”—is by itself innocuous. Indeed, “persuading]” a person “with intent to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” testimony or documents from a Government proceeding or Government official *704is not inherently malign.8 Consider, for instance, a mother who suggests to her son that he invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, or a wife who persuades her husband not to disclose marital confidences, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U. S. 40 (1980).

Nor is it necessarily corrupt for an attorney to “per-suad[e]” a client “with intent to . . . cause” that client to “withhold” documents from the Government. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383 (1981), for example, we held that Upjohn was justified in withholding documents that were covered by the attorney-client privilege from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See id., at 395. No one would suggest that an attorney who “persuade[d]” Upjohn to take that step acted wrongfully, even though he surely intended that his client keep those documents out of the IRS’ hands.

“Document retention policies,” which are created in part to keep certain information from getting into the hands of others, including the Government, are common in business. See generally Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 Ford. J. Corp. & Fin. L. 721 (2003). It is, of course, not wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document retention policy under ordinary circumstances.

Acknowledging this point, the parties have largely focused their attention on the word “corruptly” as the key to what may or may not lawfully be done in the situation presented here. Section 1512(b) punishes not just “corruptly persuading]” another, but “knowingly . . . corruptly persuading]” another. (Emphasis added.) The Government suggests that “knowingly” does not modify “corruptly per*705suades,” but that is not how the statute most naturally reads. It provides the mens rea — “knowingly”—and then a list of acts — “uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades.” We have recognized with regard to similar statutory language that the mens rea at least applies to the acts that immediately follow, if not to other elements down the statutory chain. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68 (1994) (recognizing that the “most natural grammatical reading” of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (2) “suggests that the term ‘knowingly’ modifies only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives, distributes, or reproduces”); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985). The Government suggests that it is “questionable whether Congress would employ such an inelegant formulation as ‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuades.’” Brief for United States 35, n. 18. Long experience has not taught us to share the Government’s doubts on this score, and we must simply interpret the statute as written.

The parties have not pointed us to another interpretation of “knowingly . . . corruptly” to guide us here.9 In any event, the natural meaning of these terms provides a clear answer. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144-145 (1995). “[K]nowledge” and “knowingly” are normally associated with awareness, understanding, or consciousness. See Black’s Law Dictionary 888 (8th ed. 2004) (hereinafter Black’s); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252-1253 (1993) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d); American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 725 (1981) (hereinafter Am. Hert.). “Corrupt” and “corruptly” are normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. See Black’s 371; Webster’s 3d 512; Am. Hert. 299-300. Joining these meanings together here makes sense both linguisti-*706eally and in the statutory scheme. Only persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to “knowingly . . . corruptly per-suadí].” And limiting criminality to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing sensibly allows § 1512(b) to reach only those with the level of “culpability ... we usually require in order to impose criminal liability.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 602; see also Liparota v. United States, supra, at 426.

The outer limits of this element need not be explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is striking how little culpability the instructions required. For example, the jury was told that, “even if [petitioner] honestly and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you may find [petitioner] guilty.” App. JA-213. The instructions also diluted the meaning of “corruptly” so that it covered innocent conduct. Id., at JA-212.

The parties vigorously disputed how the jury would be instructed on “corruptly.” The District Court based its instruction on the definition of that term found in the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction for § 1503. This pattern instruction defined “corruptly” as “ ‘knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the integrity’ ” of a proceeding. Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 3 (emphasis deleted). The Government, however, insisted on excluding “dishonestly” and adding the term “impede” to the phrase “subvert or undermine.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court agreed over petitioner’s objections, and the jury was told to convict if it found petitioner intended to “subvert, undermine, or impede” governmental factfinding by suggesting to its employees that they enforce the document retention policy. App. JA-212.

These changes were significant. No longer was any type of “dishonest[y]” necessary to a finding of guilt, and it was enough for petitioner to have simply “impede[d]” the Government’s factfinding ability. As the Government conceded *707at oral argument, “ ‘[ijmpede’ ” has broader connotations than “‘subvert’” or even ‘“[u]ndermine,’” see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, and many of these connotations do not incorporate any “corrupt[ness]” at all. The dictionary defines “impede” as “to interfere with or get in the way of the progress of” or “hold up” or “detract from.” Webster’s 3d 1132. By definition, anyone who innocently persuades another to withhold information from the Government “get[s] in the way of the progress of” the Government. With regard to such innocent conduct, the “corruptly” instructions did no limiting work whatsoever.

The instructions also were infirm for another reason. They led the jury to believe that it did not have to find any nexus between the “persua[sion]” to destroy documents and any particular proceeding.10 In resisting any type of nexus element, the Government relies heavily on § 1512(e)(1), which states that an official proceeding “need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” It is, however, one thing to say that a proceeding “need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,” and *708quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen. A “knowingly . . . corrup[t] persaude[r]” cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents under a document retention policy when he does not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material.

We faced a similar situation in Aguilar, supra. Respondent Aguilar lied to a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in the course of an investigation and was convicted of “ 'corruptly endeavoring] to influence, obstruct, and impede [a]... grand jury investigation’ ” under § 1503. 515 U. S., at 599. All the Government had shown was that Aguilar had uttered false statements to an investigating agent “who might or might not testify before a grand jury.” Id., at 600. We held that § 1503 required something more — specifically, a “nexus” between the obstructive act and the proceeding. Id., at 599-600. “[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,” we explained, “he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.” Id., at 599.

For these reasons, the jury instructions here were flawed in important respects. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.