Thompson, J. P., Weinstein, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50.

The defendant was accused and now stands convicted of robbery in the first degree for having aided and abetted two other individuals in a gunpoint robbery which occurred at the Sun Wah Restaurant, located on Hempstead Turnpike in Uniondale, New York. The defendant, who was apprehended while driving the "getaway" vehicle, contends that the judgment of conviction must be reversed since the prosecution failed to establish that he intended to commit the crime or that he intended to assist in its execution. We agree.

It is well settled that in order to hold an alleged accessory liable for the crime committed by the principal actors, the People must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged accessory possessed the mental culpability necessary to commit the crime charged, and that in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the principals (see, Penal Law § 20.00; People v La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d 405; People v Hayes, 117 AD2d 621, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 668; People v Capella, 111 AD2d 179). While the prosecution established that the defendant may have unwittingly aided the principal actors to the extent that he [582] drove them away from the scene of the crime, proof that the defendant harbored any intent to commit robbery or that he intentionally aided in the perpetration thereof was lacking in this case. Indeed, the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), established nothing more than that the defendant drove the vehicle in which the actual perpetrators were discovered and ultimately apprehended. The defendant's conviction, however, cannot be premised on the mere fact that he was present in the automobile, without further proof that he assumed a purposeful role in the crime or that he intended its result (see, People v Cummings, 131 AD2d 865, 867). "Without adequate proof of a shared intent with the principal actor[s] there is no community of purpose and, therefore no basis for finding [that the] defendant acted in concert with the actual [perpetrators]" (see, People v McLean, 107 AD2d 167, 169, affd 65 N.Y.2d 758).

The record in this case is devoid of evidence that the defendant "knew beforehand of, much less [intentionally] participated in" the robbery at the Sun Wah Restaurant (see, People v Cummings, supra, at 867). This conclusion is buttressed, inter alia, by the exculpatory testimony of Andre John, one of the perpetrators of the robbery, who stated that the defendant knew nothing about the robbery.

In light of our determination that the indictment must be dismissed, the defendant's remaining contentions need not be addressed.

E. Andrew Walton and David R. Garner for Richard W. Flayhart, appellant.

Thomas J. Snider for Beatrice Flayhart, appellant.

Charles A. Gardner, District Attorney (Jane M. Getman of counsel), for respondent.

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur with Judge TITONE; Judge HANCOCK, JR., concurs in a separate opinion.

[740] TITONE, J.

Defendants Richard and Beatrice Flayhart, who are husband and wife, were charged with reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the theory that, acting together and with the requisite culpable mental states, they engaged in conduct that brought about the death of Richard's brother, Terry Flayhart. Terry, who lived with defendants during the last period of his life, was mentally retarded and afflicted with a number of ailments, including cerebral palsy and epilepsy. The People's case against defendants was based on the premise that Terry, who weighed approximately 75 pounds just before his death, had died of neglect while he was living in defendants' home and was totally dependent upon their care.

The medical evidence introduced at defendants' trial showed that Terry had died of malnutrition and inflammation of the lungs, with pneumonia as a complicating factor. There was also evidence that the lung inflammation was the result of Terry's having aspirated food from his stomach which had been ingested some six hours earlier. The other evidence against defendants consisted primarily of their own statements [741] to Sheriff's deputies regarding their care of Terry, some background information relating to Terry's history, proof of a $122,000 trust fund that had been established to pay for Terry's care and proof that Terry had not seen his regular doctor during the last two years of his life.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court submitted the charged counts to the jury, along with an instruction on accomplice liability under Penal Law § 20.00. The jury found defendants guilty of criminally negligent homicide, and each defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Appellate Division. This appeal, taken by permission of a Judge of this court, ensued.

Defendants' primary contention on their appeals to this court is that the convictions cannot be sustained because it is logically impossible to "aid and abet" criminally negligent homicide, an unintentional crime. Specifically, they contend that the crime of which they were convicted is nonexistent because one cannot "intentionally aid" another to "fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death, the requisite mental state for criminally negligent homicide (see, Penal Law § 15.05 [4]; § 20.00).

However, Penal Law § 20.00 imposes accessorial liability on an accomplice not for aiding or encouraging another to reach a particular mental state, but rather for intentionally aiding another to engage in conduct which constitutes the charged offense while himself "acting with the mental culpability required for the commission" of that offense. Thus, defendants were convicted because the jury found that each of them, while "fail[ing] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death, intentionally aided the other to engage in certain conduct, such as failure to provide food and medical care, which ultimately brought about Terry Flayhart's death (see, Penal Law § 125.10). There is no logical or conceptual difficulty with such convictions (see, People v Abbott, 84 AD2d 11; see also, Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 125, at 491; cf., People v Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602).

Defendants also make a number of claims relating to the fairness of their trial. Only two of these merit comment.

Defendant Richard Flayhart argues that the trial court committed reversible error when, over timely objection, it permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence that he was in [742] line to inherit the trust fund that had been established to pay for Terry's care in the event that Terry died. The trust fund evidence was admitted on the theory that it constituted proof of a motive. Defendant contends that the admission of this evidence was improper because it was irrelevant to any material issue in this case involving unintentional crimes.

Contrary to defendant's contention, however, the trust fund evidence was not wholly irrelevant. In addition to the criminally negligent homicide count on which he was ultimately convicted, defendant was charged with reckless manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]), which includes as an element awareness of and conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). Although this element is not the same as an "intentional" mental state within the technical meaning of Penal Law § 15.05 (1) (having a "conscious objective * * * to cause [a] result or to engage in [prohibited] conduct"), it does suggest some deliberate mental activity — i.e., conscious disregard for a known risk. In this respect, the term "unintentional" crime is something of a misnomer when applied to the crime of reckless manslaughter.

Because reckless manslaughter includes an element of deliberate conduct, the admission of evidence of a motive may be justified in a proper case. In this instance, for example, the jury could have considered the trust fund as some evidence of defendant Richard Flayhart's incentive to disregard the obvious risk that his brother would die if his basic medical and nutritional needs were neglected. Thus, its admission in evidence was not erroneous.

Both defendants also argue that the trial court erred in the manner in which it handled certain photographs of Terry's body that were made available during their trial. The court refused to permit the jury to examine the photographs during either the defense attorneys' cross-examination of the People's medical expert or their summations. However, the photographs were marked as exhibits and the jury was permitted to inspect them during its deliberations. Defendants now contend that they were prejudiced by the court's rulings.

Although the court's decisions in relation to the photographs were somewhat unusual, we cannot say that they constituted an abuse of the court's discretionary power to manage the conduct of the courtroom proceedings and determine the manner in which the jury would be exposed to stark [743] photographic evidence (see, People v Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356). The trial court refused defense counsels' request to allow the jury to view the photographs during cross-examination and summations because it was concerned that the jury would be distracted by the graphic physical evidence and also because it feared that the jury would use the photographs as a basis for forming an opinion before all of the evidence was complete. We note that the court did not prevent counsel from referring to the photographs during summation or showing them to the People's medical expert during cross-examination. Moreover, as the trial court observed, the jury was entitled to request a readback of the expert's testimony if, after deliberating, it found itself confused about any references that might have been made to the photographs. Since no prejudice or error is evident, there is no basis to disturb the convictions or rulings below.

Defendants' remaining contentions are either unpreserved or without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

HANCOCK, JR., J. (concurring).

I concur in the result and the majority opinion except for one point. I cannot agree that the trust agreement was properly admitted into evidence. Proof that a defendant would profit by the death of the victim is, of course, relevant and, at times, persuasive circumstantial evidence that the defendant desired the victim's death and had a motive for causing it. It is, therefore, relevant on the question of whether the defendant intentionally caused the victim's death (see, People v Fitzgerald, 156 N.Y. 253, 258). But evidence that the defendant desired the victim's death and, therefore, intended to cause it, cannot be relevant where the defendant is not charged with acting intentionally, i.e., acting with a "conscious objective * * * to cause such result" (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]).

The defendants here are not charged with intentional conduct but with acting recklessly. As the term is used in the Penal Law a "person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would [744] observe in the situation" (§ 15.05 [3]). A finding of recklessness requires two inquiries: (1) whether the person was, in fact, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, a subjective element; and (2) whether such person's conscious disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from a standard of reasonable care, an objective element. I believe that analysis shows that proof of the existence of the trust fund cannot be relevant to either component.

Obviously, proof that a defendant would profit from the victim's death and, therefore, arguably desired it can have no bearing on the first element: whether defendant had knowledge or an awareness of a risk to the victim. Nor can such evidence of motive or desire be relevant on the question of whether a defendant's conduct, in disregarding the risk, constituted a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care. Reckless conduct differs from negligent conduct in the degree of deviation. If the deviation is gross, it is reckless or grossly negligent conduct. But, it is still negligent conduct — conduct based on an objective standard. It is not intentional conduct, and because it is not, proof of defendants' intent, motive, or desire is irrelevant (see, People v Terry, 104 AD2d 572, 573; People v Falu, 37 AD2d 1025, 1026; see also, People v Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 605-606).

Finally, contrary to the People's argument the fact that defendants would have profited from the victim's death cannot be admissible on the question of whether their disregard of the substantial risk was a conscious disregard. The word "conscious" as used in Penal Law § 15.05 (3), I submit, refers to the actor's mental process of knowing, perceiving, or being aware of the risk (see, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 482 [1986]). It does not, as the People contend, connote conduct that is in any sense intentional, deliberate, or willful. To read that meaning into the term produces a concept that is elusive, to say the least — intentionally or deliberately disregarding a risk of an unintended result of that disregard. It would also contradict the underlying theory of a reckless crime, i.e., a crime where the result is unintended and criminality depends on the extent of the deviation of the conduct from an objective reasonable standard. I cannot believe the Legislature had this in mind.

In sum, the admission of proof bearing on defendant's intent in committing an unintentional crime was plain error. In view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt of the lesser crime of [745] criminal negligence, however, I am persuaded that a reversal is not required (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241).

Order affirmed.

Roger L. Stavis, Steven R. Kartagener and Stanley N. Lupkin for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Carol A. Remer-Smith and Norman Barclay of counsel), for respondent.

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur.

[142] TITONE, J.

Defendant Murray Kaplan was convicted of first degree criminal sale of a controlled substance (Penal Law § 220.43) because of his involvement in a narcotics network which operated out of a garment business office located in the Empire State Building. His primary contention on appeal is that although the culpable state required for the commission of this crime is "knowledge," the trial court should have instructed the jury that defendant could not be held liable as an accomplice unless he acted with the specific intent to sell a controlled substance. We conclude that such an instruction is not required and that, accordingly, the conviction should be affirmed.

From May 1, 1986 to February 17, 1987, the police investigated [143] a cocaine ring which apparently operated out of an office maintained by defendant's cousin, Mike Kaplan, in the Empire State Building. Detective Janis Grasso, posing as a drug courier for someone named "Ronnie" from Atlantic City, engaged in a series of transactions, primarily with Mike Kaplan. The charges against defendant were based on his actions on October 15, 1986, when, pursuant to a prior phone call, Grasso went to Kaplan's office to purchase 10 ounces of cocaine and found Kaplan, Kaplan's brother and defendant present. After introducing Grasso to the other two men, Mike Kaplan told defendant "to take care of the young lady." Defendant got off the couch, walked to a file cabinet in the room, removed a manila envelope from it, and placed it on the desk in front of Grasso. She in turn took out $15,000 in prerecorded buy money and placed it on the table. Defendant picked up the money, took it over to the table and began counting it. At the same time, Grasso opened the manila envelope, took out a zip-lock plastic bag, and placed the drugs into her purse remarking that "it looks nice."

Defendant was subsequently charged with, inter alia, criminal sale of a controlled substance.^[1] Before the case was submitted to the jury, defense counsel asked the court to instruct the jurors that in order to convict defendant as an accomplice they must find that he had "specific intent" to sell a controlled substance, and that he had to "share the intent or purpose of the principal actors." The court denied defendant's request, noting that the mental culpability required for criminal sale was not "intent" but "knowledge" and, further, that the standard charge for accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant "intentionally aided" the other participants. Following the court's charge, which tracked the language of the applicable statutes, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal sale.^[2] The Appellate Division, First Department, [144] affirmed defendant's conviction, without opinion, and leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of this court.

Penal Law § 20.00 provides that a person may be held criminally liable as an accomplice when he performs certain acts and does so "with the mental culpability required for the commission" of the substantive crime. Despite this language, defendant argues, based on case law predating the present Penal Law, that even though the substantive crime with which he was charged — criminal sale of a controlled substance — requires only knowledge,^[3] the statute should be construed to require proof of a more exacting mens rea, namely specific intent to sell.

Under section 2 of the former Penal Law, a person could be convicted as a principal if he "aid[ed] and abett[ed] in [the] commission [of a crime]". The former Penal Law, however, did not specifically state what type of acts were required for conviction (see, Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Law of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 20, at 32 [1967]; 7 Zett, New York Criminal Practice ¶ 62.1 [2]). Consequently, in order to prevent the imposition of criminal liability for the principal's crime on someone who may have been merely present, the courts required proof that the aider or abetter "`share[d] the intent or purpose of the principal actor'" (People v La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 412, quoting 1 Burdick, Crimes § 221, at 297; see, People v Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 73-74 [accomplice had knowledge of and shared guilty purposes of principle]; People v Fasano, 11 N.Y.2d 436, 443 [accomplice must be "engaged in a common purpose or design"]; see also, Comment, Jury Instructions in Aiding and Abetting Cases, 68 Colum L Rev 774, 777-780).

Defendant's argument is that this "shared intent or purpose" test required proof, in his case, that he acted with the specific intent to sell cocaine. However, any lack of clarity that previously existed under section 2 of the former Penal Law was eliminated by the adoption of section 20.00 of the revised Penal Law, which specifies that an accomplice must have acted with the "mental culpability required for the [145] commission" of the particular crime. Further, we have already construed section 20.00 as not requiring specific intent within the meaning of Penal Law § 15.05 (1) when the substantive crime does not involve such intent (see, People v Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737, 741). Finally, the "shared intent or purpose" language from our earlier cases, which appears occasionally even in cases arising under the modern statute (see, e.g., People v Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 831 ["community of purpose"]; People v Cummings, 131 AD2d 865; People v McLean, 107 AD2d 167, 169, affd 65 N.Y.2d 758), cannot be read for the proposition, advanced by defendant, that a specific wish to commit the principal's substantive crime is required in all circumstances, including those involving substantive crimes with mental states other than that defined in Penal Law § 15.05 (1). Indeed, the "shared intent or purpose" test set forth in the case law merely establishes that acts undertaken in relative innocence and without a conscious design to advance the principal's crime will not support a conviction for accomplice liability. The same conclusion, however, is implicit in the specific requirement in Penal Law § 20.00 that the accomplice "solicit[ ], request[ ], command[ ], importune[ ], or intentionally aid[ ]" (emphasis added) the principal, since all of the delineated acts import goal-directed conduct (see, 7 Zett, New York Criminal Practice ¶ 62.1 [2]).

The distinction made here is a subtle, but important, one. It is well illustrated by our holding in People v Flayhart (supra), in which we concluded that the defendants could be guilty as accomplices to the crime of criminally negligent homicide under Penal Law § 125.10, even though neither defendant had the victim's death as a "conscious object" (see, Penal Law § 15.05 [1]). This result flowed naturally from the fact that both defendants could be found to have "fail[ed] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death — the "mental culpability required for the crime" (Penal Law § 20.00 ["acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof"]) — and that both engaged in deliberate conduct to advance the common enterprise, i.e., the egregious neglect of the victim.

Similarly, in People v Lipton (54 N.Y.2d 340), this court upheld various counts of a physician's conviction arising out of a scheme in which the defendant wrote prescriptions for controlled substances that were subsequently either used by himself and his codefendants or sold to others by one of his codefendants (id., at 344). The court's statement in dictum [146] that the physician could not have been liable as an accomplice to an illegal sale absent a "specific interest in having the actual drugs sold to some third party" or some other form of "specific intent" (id., at 349), was an apparent reference to the "intentionally aiding" requirement of Penal Law § 20.00, as distinguished from the statutory mens rea requirement that the accomplice act with the level of mental culpability required for the principal's crime.

For the same reasons, we reject defendant's alternative argument that the crime of which he was convicted under the court's charge is indistinguishable from second degree criminal facilitation, a class C felony (Penal Law § 115.05). A person is guilty of second degree criminal facilitation when "believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a class A felony, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such class A felony" (Penal Law § 115.05 [emphasis supplied]). This statute was enacted to provide an additional tool in the prosecutorial arsenal for situations where the "facilitator" knowingly aided the commission of a crime but did not possess the mental culpability required for commission of the substantive crime (see, Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Law of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 115, at 432-433; see generally, People v Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 377; People v Gordon, 32 N.Y.2d 62, 65; Staff Notes of Commission on Revision of Penal Law and Criminal Code, Proposed New York Penal Law, McKinney's Spec Pamph, at 328 [1964]). Additionally an "accomplice" and a "facilitator" are distinguishable in that the accomplice must have intentionally aided the principal in bringing forth a result, while the facilitator need only have provided assistance "believing it probable" that he was rendering aid.

In defendant's case there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, knowing the substance in question was cocaine, defendant intentionally aided Mike Kaplan by delivering it to Detective Grasso (see, People v Dordal, 55 N.Y.2d 954; People v Payne, 135 AD2d 746; People v Serra, 104 AD2d 66; People v Bray, 99 AD2d 470). The evidence established that after being asked by Mike Kaplan to "take care of" Detective Grasso, defendant immediately went to a file cabinet drawer, retrieved a package containing cocaine, and gave the package to Grasso in exchange for money which defendant immediately began to count. That defendant neither negotiated nor arranged the [147] transactions does not affect his liability as an accomplice, and the court was not required to include specific intent to sell as an element in its charge on accessorial liability. The elements were adequately conveyed when the court told the jury that it must find both that defendant acted with the specific intent required for the substantive offense, i.e., knowledge that the substance was cocaine, and that he "intentionally aided" the sale.

We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and they are either unpreserved or without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Order affirmed.

[1] The additional charges were (1) a conspiracy count, which was severed; (2) sale and possession counts arising out of an alleged August 26, 1986 incident, which were dismissed before trial; (3) a possession count arising out of the October 15, 1986 incident, which was dismissed on the prosecutor's motion and (4) sale and possession counts involving an incident occurring on August 5, 1986, as to which the jurors in the present action were unable to agree.

[2] Along with defendant, Mike Kaplan, and six others were also indicted and charged with conspiracy, sale, and possession of narcotics as a result of the investigation. All of these defendants have either been convicted, or have pleaded guilty, to some or all of the counts against them.

[3] Penal Law § 220.43 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells" (emphasis supplied). A person acts knowingly "when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists" (Penal Law § 15.05 [2]). In contrast, a person acts intentionally "when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct" (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]).

All concur, except Boomer, J., who dissents in part and votes to reverse and reinstate the indictment in the following memorandum.

Present — Callahan, J. P., Boomer, Balio and Lawton, JJ.

Order modified, on the law, and as modified, affirmed, in accordance with the following memorandum:

The People appeal from the dismissal of an indictment charging the defendant with criminal facilitation in the second degree and as an accessory to felony murder, attempted robbery, criminal possession of a weapon and criminal use of a firearm.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (People v Lancaster, 114 AD2d 92, 95), the record before the Grand Jury reveals that defendant, knowing that her husband and two of his friends were planning to rob someone of cocaine, cut her stockings for use as masks and gave gloves to her husband. The next evening the masks and gloves were used in a robbery attempt, and a young woman was shot and killed. Competent evidence was presented constituting prima facie proof that defendant, believing it probable that other persons intended to commit a crime, engaged in conduct which provided a means to commit a crime and which in fact aided the principal actors to commit a felony. Since this evidence constitutes prima facie proof of every element of criminal facilitation in the second degree, or a lesser included offense, the court erred by dismissing the criminal facilitation count (CPL 70.10 [1]; 190.65 [1]; People v Deitsch, 97 AD2d 327, 329).

The court's dismissal of the remaining counts predicated upon defendant's accessorial conduct was proper. Although she knowingly provided a means for the commission of a robbery, there is no proof that she shared the intent of the principal actors in the sense that she, herself, intended to commit the robbery or related crimes, or that she was to profit therefrom or had any interest in their success or failure (see, Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 20.00, p 44). Under these circumstances, the defendant cannot be criminally liable as an accessory (Penal Law § 20.00; see also, People v Bray, 99 AD2d 470; People v Thomas, 66 AD2d 1001; 31 NY Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 177, 178).

Accordingly, the order is modified by denying the motion to dismiss the criminal facilitation count of the indictment and the indictment is, to that extent, reinstated.

[556] Boomer, J. (dissenting).

I disagree with the majority that "there is no proof that [defendant] shared the intent of the principal actors". Since intent is the operation of a person's mind, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Intent may be inferred, however, from the acts and conduct of the defendant before the crime. Here, knowing that her husband and two of his friends were planning an armed robbery, defendant willingly aided them in the commission of the robbery by providing them with masks and gloves.

Contrary to the statement of the majority, there is no requirement that an accessory, herself, intend to commit the crime or profit therefrom. Accessorial liability requires only that the defendant knowingly aid another in the commission of the crime with the intent that the crime be committed. A showing of benefit or stake in the outcome strengthens the inference that the aider intended that the crime be committed, but such a showing is not necessary to prove intent. Moreover, it could be inferred that defendant expected to benefit from her husband's share of the proceeds of the crime.

The evidence before the Grand Jury need not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only establish a prima facie case. The evidence before the Grand Jury was sufficient to prove a prima facie case of accessorial liability based upon the inference of intent drawn from defendant's acts in light of the knowledge she had of the planned crime (see, People v Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 375; see also, Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 282).

Accordingly, the order should be reversed and the indictment reinstated.

Concur — Murphy, P. J., Carro, Rosenberger, Ross and Kassal, JJ.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence upon which the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree rests, shows [446] no more than that upon being asked by an undercover police officer where narcotics could be purchased, the defendant called to an individual named Stephens whom he referred to as "Panama". The undercover then purchased crack cocaine from Stephens using pre-recorded buy money. At the time of his arrest shortly after the transaction, the defendant possessed neither narcotics nor buy money.

While this evidence certainly demonstrated that the defendant was able to identify a local purveyor of narcotics, it did not show, as would have been necessary to sustain his conviction as an accomplice for criminal sale of a controlled substance, that he shared the seller's intent to bring the transaction about (see, Penal Law § 20.00). What is more, by merely responding to the undercover's inquiry as to who had drugs for sale, the defendant did nothing to solicit or request, much less demand or importune the illicit sale (see, ibid.). The necessary conditions for establishing accomplice liability having been thus left unsatisfied, and there being no other capacity in which the defendant may be said to have participated in the charged sale, his conviction must be reversed and the indictment dismissed.

Also requiring reversal is the second of the two judgments here at issue convicting the defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to that offense only after he had been convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance and it is clear that but for his conviction of the latter offense the defendant would not have entered the plea he did. Accordingly, since the conviction without which the defendant's plea would not have been made has now been reversed, the plea must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings upon the indictment charging the defendant with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.