6 White Collar Crime- Financial crimes without violence 6 White Collar Crime- Financial crimes without violence

6.1 Model Penal Code- Theft by Deception 6.1 Model Penal Code- Theft by Deception

Section 223.3. Theft by Deception.

 A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception.  A person deceives if he purposely:

 (1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind;  but deception as to a person's intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;  or

 (2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction;  or

 (3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship;  or

 (4) fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which he transfers or encumbers in consideration for the property obtained, whether such impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of official record.

 The term "deceive" does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
  

6.3 Fraud 6.3 Fraud

6.3.1 US v. Kelly, 590 U.S. ____ 2020 6.3.1 US v. Kelly, 590 U.S. ____ 2020

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 18–1059

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BRIDGET ANNE KELLY, PETITIONER v.UNITED STATES

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit


[May 7, 2020]

 

 Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

 For four days in September 2013, traffic ground to a halt in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The cause was an unannounced realignment of 12 toll lanes leading to the George Washington Bridge, an entryway into Manhattan administered by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. For decades, three of those access lanes had been reserved during morning rush hour for commuters coming from the streets of Fort Lee. But on these four days—with predictable  consequences—only a single lane was set aside. The public officials who ordered that change claimed they were reducing the number of dedicated lanes to conduct a traffic study. In fact, they did so for a political reason—to punish the mayor of Fort Lee for refusing to support the New Jersey Governor’s reelection bid.

 Exposure of their behavior led to the criminal convictions we review here. The Government charged the responsible officials under the federal statutes prohibiting wire fraud and fraud on a federally funded program or entity. See 18 U. S. C. §§1343, 666(a)(1)(A). Both those laws target fraudulent schemes for obtaining property. See §1343 (barring  fraudulent schemes “for obtaining money or property”); §666(a)(1)(A) (making it a crime to “obtain[ ] by fraud . . . property”). The jury convicted the defendants, and the lower courts upheld the verdicts.

 The question presented is whether the defendants committed property fraud. The evidence the jury heard no doubt shows wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power. But the federal fraud statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct. Under settled precedent, the officials could violate those laws only if an object of their dishonesty was to obtain the Port Authority’s money or property. The Government contends it was, because the officials sought both to “commandeer” the Bridge’s access lanes and to divert the wage labor of the Port Authority employees used in that effort. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. We disagree. The realignment of the toll lanes was an exercise of regulatory power—something this Court has already held fails to meet the statutes’ property requirement. And the employees’ labor was just the incidental cost of that regulation, rather than itself an object of the officials’ scheme. We therefore reverse the convictions.

I

 The setting of this case is the George Washington Bridge. Running between Fort Lee and Manhattan, it is the busiest motor-vehicle bridge in the world. Twelve lanes with tollbooths feed onto the Bridge’s upper level from the Fort Lee side. Decades ago, the then-Governor of New Jersey committed to a set allocation of those lanes for the morning commute. And (save for the four days soon described) his plan has lasted to this day. Under the arrangement, nine of the lanes carry traffic coming from nearby highways. The three remaining lanes, designated by a long line of traffic cones laid down each morning, serve only cars coming from Fort Lee.

 The case’s cast of characters are public officials who  worked at or with the Port Authority and had political ties to New Jersey’s then-Governor Chris Christie. The Port Authority is a bi-state agency that manages bridges, tunnels, airports, and other transportation facilities in New York and New Jersey. At the time relevant here, William Baroni was its Deputy Executive Director, an appointee of Governor Christie and the highest ranking New Jersey official in the agency. Together with the Executive Director (a New York appointee), he oversaw “all aspects of the Port Authority’s business,” including operation of the George Washington Bridge. App. 21 (indictment). David Wildstein (who became the Government’s star witness) functioned as Baroni’s chief of staff. And Bridget Anne Kelly was a Deputy Chief of Staff to Governor Christie with special responsibility for managing his relations with local officials. She often worked hand-in-hand with Baroni and Wildstein to deploy the Port Authority’s resources in ways that would encourage mayors and other local figures to support the Governor.

 The fateful lane change arose out of one mayor’s resistance to such blandishments. In 2013, Governor Christie was up for reelection, and he wanted to notch a large, bipartisan victory as he ramped up for a presidential campaign. On his behalf, Kelly avidly courted Democratic mayors for their endorsements—among them, Mark Sokolich of Fort Lee. As a result, that town received some valuable benefits from the Port Authority, including an expensive shuttle-bus service. But that summer, Mayor Sokolich informed Kelly’s office that he would not back the Governor’s campaign. A frustrated Kelly reached out to Wildstein for ideas on how to respond. He suggested that getting rid of the dedicated Fort Lee lanes on the Bridge’s toll plaza would cause rush-hour traffic to back up onto local streets, leading to gridlock there. Kelly agreed to the idea in an admirably concise e-mail: “Time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee.” App. 917 (trial exhibit). In a later  phone conversation, Kelly confirmed to Wildstein that she wanted to “creat[e] a traffic jam that would punish” Mayor Sokolich and “send him a message.” Id., at 254 (Wildstein testimony). And after Wildstein relayed those communications, Baroni gave the needed sign-off.

 To complete the scheme, Wildstein then devised “a cover story”—that the lane change was part of a traffic study, intended to assess whether to retain the dedicated Fort Lee lanes in the future. Id., at 264. Wildstein, Baroni, and Kelly all agreed to use that “public policy” justification when speaking with the media, local officials, and the Port Authority’s own employees. Id., at 265. And to give their story credibility, Wildstein in fact told the Port Authority’s engineers to collect “some numbers on how[ ] far back the traffic was delayed.” Id., at 305. That inquiry bore little resemblance to the Port Authority’s usual traffic studies. According to one engineer’s trial testimony, the Port Authority never closes lanes to study traffic patterns, because “computer-generated model[ing]” can itself predict the effect of such actions. Id., at 484 (testimony of Umang Patel); see id., at 473–474 (similar testimony of Victor Chung). And the information that the Port Authority’s engineers collected on this singular occasion was mostly “not useful” and “discarded.” Id., at 484–485 (Patel testimony). Nor did Wildstein or Baroni show any interest in the data. They never asked to review what the engineers had found; indeed, they learned of the results only weeks later, after a journalist filed a public-records request. So although the engineers spent valuable time assessing the lane change, their work was to no practical effect.

 Baroni, Wildstein, and Kelly also agreed to incur another cost—for extra toll collectors—in pursuit of their object. Wildstein’s initial thought was to eliminate all three dedicated lanes by not laying down any traffic cones, thus turning the whole toll plaza into a free-for-all. But the Port Authority’s chief engineer told him that without the cones  “there would be a substantial risk of sideswipe crashes” involving cars coming into the area from different directions. Id., at 284 (Wildstein testimony). So Wildstein went back to Baroni and Kelly and got their approval to keep one lane reserved for Fort Lee traffic. That solution, though, raised another complication. Ordinarily, if a toll collector on a Fort Lee lane has to take a break, he closes his booth, and drivers use one of the other two lanes. Under the one-lane plan, of course, that would be impossible. So the Bridge manager told Wildstein that to make the scheme work, “an extra toll collector” would always have to be “on call” to relieve the regular collector when he went on break. Id., at 303. Once again, Wildstein took the news to Baroni and Kelly. Baroni thought it was “funny,” remarking that “only at the Port Authority would [you] have to pay a toll collector to just sit there and wait.” Ibid. Still, he and Kelly gave the okay.

 The plan was now ready, and on September 9 it went into effect. Without advance notice and on the (traffic-heavy) first day of school, Port Authority employees placed traffic cones two lanes further to the right than usual, restricting cars from Fort Lee to a single lane. Almost immediately, the town’s streets came to a standstill. According to the Fort Lee Chief of Police, the traffic rivaled that of 9/11, when the George Washington Bridge had shut down. School buses stood in place for hours. An ambulance struggled to reach the victim of a heart attack; police had trouble responding to a report of a missing child. Mayor Sokolich tried to reach Baroni, leaving a message that the call was about an “urgent matter of public safety.” Id., at 323. Yet Baroni failed to return that call or any other: He had agreed with Wildstein and Kelly that they should all maintain “radio silence.” Id., at 270. A text from the Mayor to Baroni about the locked-in school buses—also unanswered—went around the horn to Wildstein and Kelly. The last replied:  “Is it wrong that I am smiling?” Id., at 990 (Kelly text message). The three merrily kept the lane realignment in place for another three days. It ended only when the Port Authority’s Executive Director found out what had happened and reversed what he called their “abusive decision.” Id., at 963 (e-mail of Patrick Foye).

 The fallout from the scheme was swift and severe. Baroni, Kelly, and Wildstein all lost their jobs. More to the point here, they all ran afoul of federal prosecutors. Wildstein pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges and agreed to cooperate with the Government. Baroni and Kelly went to trial on charges of wire fraud, fraud on a federally funded program or entity (the Port Authority), and conspiracy to commit each of those crimes. The jury found both of them guilty on all counts. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Baroni’s and Kelly’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F. 3d 550, 560–579 (2018). We granted certiorari. 588 U. S. ___ (2019).

II

 The Government in this case needed to prove property fraud. The federal wire fraud statute makes it a crime to effect (with use of the wires) “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U. S. C. §1343. Construing that disjunctive language as a unitary whole, this Court has held that “the money-or- property requirement of the latter phrase” also limits the former. McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 358 (1987). The wire fraud statute thus prohibits only deceptive “schemes to deprive [the victim of] money or property.” Id., at 356. Similarly, the federal-program fraud statute bars “obtain[ing] by fraud” the “property” (including money) of a federally funded program or entity like the Port Authority. §666(a)(1)(A). So under either provision, the Government  had to show not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in deception, but that an “object of the[ir] fraud [was] ‘property.’ ” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 26 (2000).1

 That requirement, this Court has made clear, prevents these statutes from criminalizing all acts of dishonesty by state and local officials. Some decades ago, courts of appeals often construed the federal fraud laws to “proscribe[ ] schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government.” McNally, 483 U. S., at 355. This Court declined to go along. The fraud statutes, we held in McNally, were “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Id., at 360. They did not authorize federal prosecutors to “set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials.” Ibid. Congress responded to that decision by enacting a law barring fraudulent schemes “to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services”—regardless of whether the scheme sought to divest the victim of any property. §1346. But the vagueness of that language led this Court to adopt “a limiting construction,” confining the statute to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 405, 410 (2010). We specifically rejected a proposal to construe the statute as encompassing “undisclosed self-dealing by a public official,” even when he hid financial interests. Id., at 409. The upshot is that federal fraud law leaves much public corruption to the States (or their electorates) to rectify. Cf. N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:30–2 (West 2016) (prohibiting the unauthorized exercise of official functions). Save for bribes or kickbacks (not at issue here), a state or local official’s fraudulent schemes violate that law only when, again, they are “for obtaining money or property.” 18 U. S. C. §1343; see §666(a)(1)(A) (similar).

  The Government acknowledges this much, but thinks Baroni’s and Kelly’s convictions remain valid. According to the Government’s theory of the case, Baroni and Kelly “used a lie about a fictional traffic study” to achieve their goal of reallocating the Bridge’s toll lanes. Brief for United States 43. The Government accepts that the lie itself—i.e., that the lane change was part of a traffic study, rather than political payback—could not get the prosecution all the way home. See id., at 43–44. As the Government recognizes, the deceit must also have had the “object” of obtaining the Port Authority’s money or property. Id., at 44. The scheme met that requirement, the Government argues, in two ways. First, the Government claims that Baroni and Kelly sought to “commandeer[ ]” part of the Bridge itself—to “take control” of its “physical lanes.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59. Second, the Government asserts that the two defendants aimed to deprive the Port Authority of the costs of compensating the traffic engineers and back-up toll collectors who performed work relating to the lane realignment. On either theory, the Government insists, Baroni’s and Kelly’s scheme targeted “a ‘species of valuable right [or] interest’ that constitutes ‘property’ under the fraud statutes.” Brief for United States 22 (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 356 (2005)).

 We cannot agree. As we explain below, the Government could not have proved—on either of its theories, though for different reasons—that Baroni’s and Kelly’s scheme was “directed at the [Port Authority’s] property.” Brief for United States 44. Baroni and Kelly indeed “plotted to reduce [Fort Lee’s] lanes.” Id., at 34. But that realignment was a quintessential exercise of regulatory power. And this Court has already held that a scheme to alter such a regulatory choice is not one to appropriate the government’s property. See Cleveland, 531 U. S., at 23. By contrast, a scheme to usurp a public employee’s paid time is one to take the government’s property. But Baroni’s and Kelly’s plan  never had that as an object. The use of Port Authority employees was incidental to—the mere cost of implementing—the sought-after regulation of the Bridge’s toll lanes.

 Start with this Court’s decision in Cleveland, which reversed another set of federal fraud convictions based on the distinction between property and regulatory power. The defendant there had engaged in a deceptive scheme to influence, to his own benefit, Louisiana’s issuance of gaming licenses. The Government argued that his fraud aimed to deprive the State of property by altering its licensing decisions. This Court rejected the claim. The State’s “intangible rights of allocation, exclusion, and control”—its prerogatives over who should get a benefit and who should not—do “not create a property interest.” Ibid. Rather, the Court stated, those rights “amount to no more and no less than” the State’s “sovereign power to regulate.” Ibid.; see id., at 20 (“[T]he State’s core concern” in allocating gaming licenses “is regulatory”). Or said another way: The defendant’s fraud “implicate[d] the Government’s role as sovereign” wielding “traditional police powers”—not its role “as property holder.” Id., at 23–24. And so his conduct, however deceitful, was not property fraud.

 The same is true of the lane realignment. Through that action, Baroni and Kelly changed the traffic flow onto the George Washington Bridge’s tollbooth plaza. Contrary to the Government’s view, the two defendants did not “commandeer” the Bridge’s access lanes (supposing that word bears its normal meaning). They (of course) did not walk away with the lanes; nor did they take the lanes from the Government by converting them to a non-public use. Rather, Baroni and Kelly regulated use of the lanes, as officials responsible for roadways so often do—allocating lanes as between different groups of drivers. To borrow Cleveland’s words, Baroni and Kelly exercised the regulatory rights of “allocation, exclusion, and control”—deciding that  drivers from Fort Lee should get two fewer lanes while drivers from nearby highways should get two more. They did so, according to all the Government’s evidence, for bad reasons; and they did so by resorting to lies. But still, what they did was alter a regulatory decision about the toll plaza’s use—in effect, about which drivers had a “license” to use which lanes. And under Cleveland, that run-of-the-mine exercise of regulatory power cannot count as the taking of property.

 A government’s right to its employees’ time and labor, by contrast, can undergird a property fraud prosecution. Suppose that a mayor uses deception to get “on-the-clock city workers” to renovate his daughter’s new home. United States v. Pabey, 664 F. 3d 1084, 1089 (CA7 2011). Or imagine that a city parks commissioner induces his employees into doing gardening work for political contributors. See United States v. Delano, 55 F. 3d 720, 723 (CA2 1995). As both defendants agree, the cost of those employees’ services would qualify as an economic loss to a city, sufficient to meet the federal fraud statutes’ property requirement. See Brief for Respondent Baroni 27; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. No less than if the official took cash out of the city’s bank account would he have deprived the city of a “valuable entitlement.” Pasquantino, 544 U. S., at 357.

 But that property must play more than some bit part in a scheme: It must be an “object of the fraud.” Id., at 355; see Brief for United States 44; supra, at 6–7. Or put differently, a property fraud conviction cannot stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the scheme.2 In the home-and-garden examples cited above,  that constraint raised no problem: The entire point of the fraudsters’ plans was to obtain the employees’ services. But now consider the difficulty if the prosecution in Cleveland had raised a similar employee-labor argument. As the Government noted at oral argument here, the fraud on Louisiana’s licensing system doubtless imposed costs calculable in employee time: If nothing else, some state worker had to process each of the fraudster’s falsified applications. But still, the Government acknowledged, those costs were “[i]ncidental.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 63. The object of the scheme was never to get the employees’ labor: It was to get gaming licenses. So the labor costs could not sustain the conviction for property fraud. See id., at 62–63.

 This case is no different. The time and labor of Port Authority employees were just the implementation costs of the defendants’ scheme to reallocate the Bridge’s access lanes. Or said another way, the labor costs were an incidental (even if foreseen) byproduct of Baroni’s and Kelly’s regulatory object. Neither defendant sought to obtain the services that the employees provided. The back-up toll collectors—whom Baroni joked would just “sit there and wait”—did nothing he or Kelly thought useful. App. 303; see supra, at 5. Indeed, those workers came onto the scene only because the Port Authority’s chief engineer managed to restore one of Fort Lee’s lanes to reduce the risk of traffic accidents. See supra, at 5. In the defendants’ original plan, which scrapped all reserved lanes, there was no reason for extra toll collectors. And similarly, Baroni and Kelly did not hope to obtain the data that the traffic engineers spent their time collecting. By the Government’s own account, the traffic study the defendants used for a cover story was a “sham,” and they never asked to see its results. Brief for United  States 4, 32; see supra, at 5. Maybe, as the Government contends, all of this work was “needed” to realize the final plan—“to accomplish what [Baroni and Kelly] were trying to do with the [B]ridge.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. Even if so, it would make no difference. Every regulatory decision (think again of Cleveland, see supra, at 11) requires the use of some employee labor. But that does not mean every scheme to alter a regulation has that labor as its object. Baroni’s and Kelly’s plan aimed to impede access from Fort Lee to the George Washington Bridge. The cost of the employee hours spent on implementing that plan was its incidental byproduct.

 To rule otherwise would undercut this Court’s oft- repeated instruction: Federal prosecutors may not use property fraud statutes to “set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials.” McNally, 483 U. S., at 360; see supra, at 7. Much of governance involves (as it did here) regulatory choice. If U. S. Attorneys could prosecute as property fraud every lie a state or local official tells in making such a decision, the result would be—as Cleveland recognized—“a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction.” 531 U. S., at 24. And if those prosecutors could end-run Cleveland just by pointing to the regulation’s incidental costs, the same ballooning of federal power would follow. In effect, the Federal Government could use the criminal law to enforce (its view of ) integrity in broad swaths of state and local policymaking. The property fraud statutes do not countenance that outcome. They do not “proscribe[ ] schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government.” McNally, 483 U. S., at 355; see supra, at 7. They bar only schemes for obtaining property.

III

 As Kelly’s own lawyer acknowledged, this case involves an “abuse of power.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. For no reason  other than political payback, Baroni and Kelly used deception to reduce Fort Lee’s access lanes to the George Washington Bridge—and thereby jeopardized the safety of the town’s residents. But not every corrupt act by state or local officials is a federal crime. Because the scheme here did not aim to obtain money or property, Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


Notes

1  The conspiracy verdicts raise no separate issue. None of the parties doubts that those convictions stand or fall with the substantive offenses. If there was property fraud here, there was also conspiracy to commit it. But if not, not.

2  Without that rule, as Judge Easterbrook has elaborated, even a practical joke could be a federal felony. See United States v. Walters, 997 F. 2d 1219, 1224 (CA7 1993). His example goes: “A [e-mails] B an invitation to a surprise party for their mutual friend C. B drives his car to the place named in the invitation,” thus expending the cost of gasoline. Ibid. “But there is no party; the address is a vacant lot; B is the butt of a joke.” Ibid. Wire fraud? No. And for the reason Judge Easterbrook gave: “[T]he victim’s loss must be an objective of the [deceitful] scheme rather than a byproduct of it.” Id., at 1226.

6.3.2 United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, (2d Cir. 2021) 6.3.2 United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, (2d Cir. 2021)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James GATTO, aka Jim, Merl Code, Christian Dawkins, Defendants-Appellants.

Edward B. Diskant, Assistant United States Attorney (Aline R. Flodr, Eli J. Mark, Noah D. Solowiejczyk, and Won S. Shin, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York, for Appellee. Michael S. Schachter (Casey E. Donnelly, on the brief), Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellant James Gatto. Andrew A. Mathias, Nexsen Pruet, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Defendant-Appellant Merl Code. Steven Haney, Haney Law Group, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, for Defendant-Appellant Christian Dawkins.

Edward B. Diskant, Assistant United States Attorney (Aline R. Flodr, Eli J. Mark, Noah D. Solowiejczyk, and Won S. Shin, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York, for Appellee.

Michael S. Schachter (Casey E. Donnelly, on the brief), Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellant James Gatto.

Andrew A. Mathias, Nexsen Pruet, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Defendant-Appellant Merl Code.

Steven Haney, Haney Law Group, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, for Defendant-Appellant Christian Dawkins.

Before: Lynch and Chin, Circuit Judges, and Engelmayer, District Judge.

Judge Lynch Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part in a separate opinion.

Chin, Circuit Judge:

In this case, defendants-appellants James Gatto, Merl Code, and Christian Dawkins ("Defendants") were convicted of engaging in a scheme to defraud three universities by paying tens of thousands of dollars to the families of high school basketball players to induce them to attend the universities, which were sponsored by Adidas, the sports apparel company, and covering up the payments so that the recruits could certify to the universities that they had complied with rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") barring student-athletes and recruits from being paid.

At trial, Defendants admitted that they engaged in the scheme and broke NCAA rules, but argued that what they did was not criminal. On appeal, they contend that the government failed to prove that they intended to defraud the universities -- North Carolina State University ("N.C. State"), the University of Kansas ("Kansas"), and the University of Louisville ("Louisville") (collectively, the "Universities") -- and that their intent instead was to help the Universities by bringing them top recruits to ensure winning basketball programs. They contend that, "in the real world, ... universities engage in an all-out arms race to recruit the best talent, motivated by the tens of millions of dollars that can be earned each year by a successful men's basketball program," Appellants' Br. at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that they "broke NCAA rules out of a genuine desire to see the Universities' basketball teams succeed," Appellants' Br. at 96. They argue that under-the-table payments to student-athletes are widespread in college sports, and that, indeed, many college coaches are aware of and endorse the practice. And they argue, as they did in their opening statements at trial, that "[t]he kids on the court, ... the ones whose blood, sweat and tears is making this game a billion dollar industry, they are not allowed to earn a dime." App'x at 107.

We have no doubt that a successful men's basketball program is a major source of revenue at certain major universities, but we need not be drawn into the debate over the extent to which college sports is a business. Instead, our task is to determine whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants knowingly and intentionally engaged in a scheme, through the use of wires, to defraud the Universities of property, i.e. , financial aid that they could have given to other students. We conclude that the government did. We also reject Defendants' arguments that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On appeal from a conviction following a jury trial, the "facts are drawn from the trial evidence and described in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Wilson , 709 F.3d 84, 85 (2d Cir. 2013).

I. The Landscape

The NCAA is a private organization that oversees collegiate sports in America. It promulgates rules that its member universities must follow, among which is the requirement that all student-athletes must remain amateurs to be eligible to compete for their schools. This means that the student-athletes -- and their families -- may not accept payments of any form for the student-athletes' playing or agreeing to play their sport. This rule extends from the time when the student-athletes are still in high school and are being recruited to play at the collegiate level.

There are, however, exceptions. Colleges are permitted, for example, to offer athletic-based aid to a certain number of student-athletes, to cover tuition, room, and board. And the schools themselves are permitted to enter into sponsorship agreements with sports apparel brands, which allow them to provide their student-athletes with clothing and footwear that they receive from their corporate sponsors. Essentially, these sponsorship agreements are marketing deals. Major sports apparel brands, including Adidas, Nike, and Under Armour, enter into such contracts to promote their brands. Under these agreements, student-athletes must wear the brand of the company their school has partnered with when they compete for their school -- that is, at practice and during games.

II. The Scheme

Gatto was Adidas's director of global sports marketing for basketball. He managed the sports marketing budget, and part of his job entailed overseeing the relationship that Adidas had with various schools, including N.C. State, Kansas, and Louisville. This included helping to ensure the success of the sponsorship agreements Adidas signed with the Universities pursuant to which Adidas paid the Universities for the right to provide their NCAA sports teams with Adidas apparel.

Gatto worked with Code and Thomas Joseph Gassnola, both Adidas consultants. He also worked informally with Dawkins, an aspiring sports agent, and Munish Sood, a financial advisor. Together, these men paid the families of top-tier high school basketball recruits -- including Dennis Smith Jr., Billy Preston, and Brian Bowen Jr. (collectively, the "Recruits") -- to entice those players to enroll at one of the Universities. This activity violated NCAA rules, and if the NCAA were to discover the payments, the players would not be permitted to play in games and the Universities would be subject to penalties. As a result, Defendants and those who assisted them concealed these payments by falsifying Adidas invoices to make it seem as though the payments were going to youth basketball teams affiliated with the Amateur Athletic Union ("AAU"), a non-profit, multi-sport organization that, among other things, facilitates youth basketball tournaments. In reality, the money was being funneled through AAU teams with which some Defendants were affiliated to the families of top basketball prospects. In addition to creating fake expense reports to mask these payments, Defendants used phones that were not registered in their names while communicating with the Recruits' families.

Per the NCAA bylaws, every member institution must certify that its prospective student-athletes are amateurs and thus eligible to compete. Consequently, the Universities required all their recruits to sign paperwork attesting that they were aware of and in compliance with the NCAA bylaws. By signing the certifications, the recruits affirmed, among other things, that they had not used their "athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport." App'x at 780. A recruit's athletic-based aid was contingent upon his certifying his eligibility. Those in charge of compliance at the Universities explained that they would have never awarded athletic-based aid to the Recruits had they known they were ineligible to compete, and the head coaches' contracts required the coaches to be stewards of the NCAA rules and report any suspected violations.

A. N.C. State

Smith verbally committed to play basketball for N.C. State in September 2015. At the time, he was one of the top recruits in North Carolina, but, according to Gassnola, there were rumors that he was going to change his mind about which college he would attend. To ensure that Smith enrolled at N.C. State, Gassnola gave the Smith family $40,000 in the Fall 2015. He was reimbursed by Adidas via Gatto, who filed false invoices to facilitate the repayment. Shortly after the Smith family received the $40,000 payment, Smith signed forms enrolling at N.C. State indicating that he was compliant with the NCAA eligibility rules. He played one season at N.C. State before being selected as the ninth overall pick in the 2017 NBA Draft.

B. Kansas

Preston verbally committed to play for Kansas in Fall 2016. After Preston committed, however, Gassnola heard that the Preston family was accepting money from sports agents and financial advisors, thereby putting Preston's eligibility in jeopardy. Because, according to Gassnola, he thought that he was better-equipped to prevent illicit payments from being discovered, Gassnola arranged to pay the Preston family to stop them from taking money from others and preserve Preston's NCAA eligibility. With Gatto's permission, Gassnola paid the Preston family around $50,000. Gassnola paid the money and then, with the help of Gatto, submitted false AAU expense reports to Adidas for reimbursement. In November 2016, Preston signed forms indicating that he was compliant with the NCAA eligibility rules. His ineligibility, however, was discovered, and he never played for Kansas.

C. Louisville

Bowen committed to play for Louisville in May 2017. Around the same time, Bowen's family agreed to accept $100,000 from Adidas, to be paid in four installments. These payments were to be funneled through an AAU program with which Code was affiliated. On June 1, 2017 and June 9, 2017, Bowen signed forms accepting athletic-based aid and indicating that he was compliant with the NCAA eligibility rules. Around a month later, on July 13, 2017, Bowen's father was paid the first installment of $25,000. Defendants were arrested before any other payments were made, and Bowen, whom Louisville decided to withhold from competition, withdrew from Louisville after one semester to play professional basketball.

III. Procedural History

Defendants were charged in a superseding indictment filed on August 14, 2018 with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud for the role they played in recruiting Smith, Preston, and Bowen. Trial began on October 1, 2018. Defendants objected to certain of the district court's evidentiary rulings as well as to portions of its instructions to the jury. On October 24, 2018, the jury found Defendants guilty of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. On January 17, 2019, the district court issued an opinion explaining some of its evidentiary rulings. Defendants were sentenced in March 2019 -- Gatto principally to nine months' imprisonment and Code and Dawkins principally to six months' imprisonment each. The district court also ordered Defendants to pay restitution to the Universities for their actual losses in awarding athletic scholarships to the Recruits.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendants raise three principal arguments: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain their wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud convictions; (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence; and (3) the district court erroneously instructed the jury. We address these issues in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Applicable Law

"We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo ." United States v. Anderson , 747 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2014). A defendant "bears a heavy burden" when he tries to "overturn a jury verdict on sufficiency grounds," as we draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor and defer to the jury when there are "competing inferences." Id. at 59-60 (internal quotation marks omitted). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: "(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use of the ... wires to further the scheme." United States v. Binday , 804 F.3d 558, 569 (2d Cir. 2015) ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Here, the parties do not dispute the third element.

As to the "scheme to defraud" element, there must be "proof that defendants possessed a fraudulent intent." United States v. Starr , 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, defendants must either intend to harm their victim or contemplate that their victim may be harmed. Id. ("Although the government is not required to prove actual injury, it must, at a minimum, prove that defendants contemplated some actual harm or injury to their victims. Only a showing of intended harm will satisfy the element of fraudulent intent."). Although as a general matter "contemplate" can mean either "to think about" or "to have in view as a purpose," we have clarified that only the latter definition comports with the "fraudulent intent" requirement for conviction. United States v. Gabriel , 125 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1997). This distinction often "poses no additional obstacle for the government" because "fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself" if "the necessary result of the actor's scheme is to injure others." United States v. D'Amato , 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[i]ntent may be proven through circumstantial evidence, including by showing that [a] defendant made misrepresentations to the victim(s) with knowledge that the statements were false." United States v. Guadagna , 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) ; see also United States v. MacPherson , 424 F.3d 183, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2005).

As to the "object of the scheme" element, a defendant need not literally obtain money or property -- in the sense of putting money into his own pocket -- to violate the wire fraud statute. See Porcelli v. United States , 404 F.3d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding it was sufficient to convict defendant of wire fraud where the tax scheme involved him keeping money he already had by virtue of his not paying taxes); see also United States v. Males , 459 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2006). And because individuals have the right to control their property, depriving the victim of "economic information it would consider valuable in deciding how to use its assets" satisfies the object-of-the-scheme element. United States v. Finazzo , 850 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2017). Still, as the Supreme Court recently noted, "a property fraud conviction cannot stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the scheme." Kelly v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1573, 206 L.Ed.2d 882 (2020). Loss to the victim "must play more than some bit part in a scheme: It must be an object of the fraud." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Application

Defendants argue that they "were convicted of a fraud they did not know about." Appellants' Br. at 42. In other words, they contend that there was no scheme to defraud because Defendants did not know that false representations would be made to the Universities. Defendants also argue that even if there were such a scheme, the government failed to prove that the Universities' athletic-based aid was an object of that scheme. We disagree in both respects.

1. Scheme to Defraud

Defendants have not shown that the government failed to present enough evidence for "any rational trier of fact," Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a scheme to defraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Although Defendants are correct that the government did not provide direct evidence that proved Defendants knew the Recruits had to sign eligibility certifications to earn athletic-based aid, the government did present enough circumstantial evidence for the jury to have reached that conclusion. See Guadagna , 183 F.3d at 129 (noting that circumstantial evidence that "show[s] ... defendant made misrepresentations to the victim(s) with knowledge that the statements were false" may prove intent); see also United States v. Quattrone , 441 F.3d 153, 169 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[C]ourts ... may not reject a jury verdict simply because it rests even wholly on circumstantial evidence.").

First, Defendants were sophisticated actors who were involved in all aspects of top-tier basketball in America, including the amateur grassroots leagues, college basketball programs, and the NBA. Gatto was the head of global sports marketing for Adidas, one of the top sports apparel companies in the world, and he was in charge of Adidas's entire basketball marketing budget. Code worked for Nike, another top apparel company, for fourteen years where he cultivated relationships with grassroots, high school, and college basketball programs before he began consulting for Adidas. And Dawkins spent time working for a sports agency recruiting NBA prospects. The jury was therefore presented with evidence of Defendants' proximity to -- and involvement in -- all things basketball.

Second, Defendants went to great lengths to prevent both Adidas and the Universities from discovering that they were paying the Recruits' families. Defendants worked together to disguise their funneling of tens of thousands of dollars to the Recruits' families to induce the Recruits to enroll at Adidas-sponsored schools. Indeed, Defendants had to lie to Adidas to get reimbursed for these secretive payments, as those in charge of the budget at Adidas knew the payments violated both "NCAA regulation and Adidas policy" and would not have signed off on them had they known the truth. Supp. App'x at 311. Their furtive behavior indicates that they knew their actions were wrong. When coupled with their sophistication, it was reasonable for the jury to infer they knew the Recruits had to deceive the Universities about their eligibility.

Third, Defendants' co-conspirators admitted on wiretaps that their conduct violated NCAA rules. Gassnola, who worked directly under Gatto, explained to the jury that had the Universities learned that Smith's family had been paid, he "would have been deemed ineligible" and "would never have played [at N.C. State]." App'x at 283-84. Sood, another co-conspirator, stated that he knew that giving money to NCAA athletes was not permitted under NCAA rules and could have led to those players losing their scholarships. Even if the co-conspirators' knowledge could not be imputed to Defendants, it is nevertheless circumstantial evidence the jury was permitted to consider. See United States v. Gordon , 987 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir. 1993).

Fourth, Code and Dawkins acknowledged that Bowen had to sign an NCAA form for his commitment to Louisville to be complete. And Dawkins was recorded on a wiretap discussing the need to avoid a paper trail "because some of it is whatever you want to call it, illegal, against NCAA rules, or whatever." Supp. App'x at 47. Accordingly, these statements, together with Defendants' sophistication, steps taken to conceal their actions, and co-conspirators' statements, surely show that Defendants knew that the Recruits had to sign eligibility forms to compete in the NCAA, and constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendants knew a materially false representation had to be made for the scheme to succeed. See United States v. Reifler , 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006).

2. Object of Scheme

Similarly, the jury was also presented with enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that the Universities' athletic-based aid was "an object" of their scheme. See Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1573 ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343. In Kelly , better known as the "Bridgegate" case, state officials devised a scheme to punish the mayor of Fort Lee, New Jersey, for declining to endorse the incumbent New Jersey governor in his reelection bid. Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1568. To do so, politically appointed Port Authority officials closed traffic lanes that led from Fort Lee to the George Washington Bridge for four days under the guise that they were conducting a traffic study. Id. The study, however, was a sham; no official was interested in the data it produced. Id. at 1570. The government charged the officials with property fraud, arguing that they commandeered the traffic lanes and deprived the state of property by paying extra wages to perpetuate the scheme. Id. at 1571-72. The officials who did not plead guilty went to trial and were convicted, id. at 1571, but the Supreme Court overturned their convictions, id. at 1574.

The unanimous Kelly Court found that property was not an object of the scheme. Id. at 1572. It explained that the traffic study was a "sham," intended only to cover up the defendants' misconduct and the additional wages were "implementation costs" that only became necessary because an additional toll booth operator was needed after the original plan was altered to avoid traffic accidents. Id. at 1574. Because the officials' only goal was political retaliation -- to create a headache for the Fort Lee mayor -- and the officials were indifferent about the unintended additional costs of carrying out the plan, they were not guilty of property fraud. Id. The Kelly Court held that "a property fraud conviction cannot stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the scheme." Id . at 1573.

This case is different from Kelly . Here, the loss of property -- the Universities' funds set aside for financial aid -- was at the heart of Defendants' scheme. Their original plan included inducing the Universities to give the Recruits financial aid by concealing from the Universities the payments made to the Recruits' families in fear that if they were discovered the Recruits would not be permitted to compete. Importantly, the scheme depended on the Universities awarding ineligible student-athletes athletic-based aid; without the aid, the recruits would have gone elsewhere. And if the Recruits' ineligibility had been discovered by the schools, the scheme would have failed. After all, the Recruits would have never been permitted to play in the NCAA for Adidas-sponsored schools, defeating the purpose of the payments and potentially derailing the Recruits' professional careers.

Defendants have asserted that they intended to "assist the Universities' recruiting efforts" by luring the best basketball players to Adidas-sponsored schools to better market their brand. Appellants' Supp. Br. at 6. Defendants may have had multiple objectives, but property need only be "an object" of their scheme, Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1572 (emphasis added), not the sole or primary goal. Unlike in Kelly , where there was a sham study and additional wages were paid only after the original plan was scaled back due to safety concerns, id. at 1574, here, depriving Universities of athletic-based aid was at the center of the plan.

Finally, the evidence, construed in the government's favor, showed that Defendants deprived the Universities of information that would have helped them decide whether to award the Recruits athletic-based aid. This deprivation was enough to support a wire fraud conviction. See Finazzo , 850 F.3d at 111. As discussed above, hiding the Recruits' ineligibility was essential to Defendants' scheme -- had the Universities known the Recruits were ineligible, they would not have offered them athletic-based aid or roster spots on their basketball teams. Similarly, it was reasonable for the jury to find that Defendants knew the Recruits had to misrepresent their eligibility to deceive the Universities into giving them athletic-based aid. Thus, it is evident that Defendants' scheme facilitated the withholding of valuable information that would have caused the Universities not to dispense with their property. See United States v. Lebedev , 932 F.3d 40, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we conclude that the jury rationally found that Defendants committed wire fraud.

II. Evidentiary Rulings

We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. McDermott , 245 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001), and such rulings will only be overturned if they are "arbitrary and irrational," United States v. White , 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012). "Even if a decision was manifestly erroneous, we will affirm if the error was harmless." United States v. Litvak , 889 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An "error is harmless if it is highly probable that it did not contribute to the verdict." United States v. Gomez , 617 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2010).

Defendants argue that the district court erroneously excluded expert testimony and other evidence relevant to their defense. We address these issues in turn.

A. Expert Testimony

The district court's determination whether to admit expert testimony is guided by Fed. R. Evid. 702. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 589-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Generally, an expert may be permitted to testify if he is qualified, reliable, and helpful. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Of course, courts must also determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant, see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and, if so, whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."). Thus, although an expert may otherwise be qualified to testify, the district court can nevertheless exclude his testimony if it finds the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial. United States v. Dukagjini , 326 F.3d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Of course, expert testimony, like other forms of evidence, ‘may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ " (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 )). Although "a trial judge is given broad discretion to weigh these competing interests," this "does not mean immunity from accountability." United States v. Jamil , 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). On appeal, we "must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect." Id.

Defendants sought to call an expert witness to discuss the myriad of benefits -- both quantitative and qualitative -- that a successful men's basketball program bestows upon a university. Defendants argue that this testimony would have proven that they intended to help, not harm, the schools when they paid the Recruits' families to entice the Recruits to attend Adidas-sponsored schools. But the district court did not permit the expert to testify.

First, it found that the expert's testimony would not have been helpful because it was based on a study conducted in preparation for litigation and therefore "would have shed no light on [D]efendants' states of mind at the time the crimes allegedly were committed." S. App'x at 47-48. Second, the district court found, "[i]n any case," S. App'x at 48, that the information the expert would have presented was substantially more prejudicial than probative. It noted that allowing the expert to testify could have invited improper acquittals by enticing the jury to base its decision on the perceived unreasonableness or unfairness of the NCAA's amateurism rules. The district court explained how permitting the expert to testify would have introduced an improper defense -- that Defendants were not guilty of wire fraud because they believed the Universities would ultimately benefit from their actions.

We agree with the lower court's ruling, which was neither arbitrary nor irrational. Even if we assume Defendants' expert's testimony would have been helpful, it was substantially more prejudicial than probative. No doubt, universities stand to profit if their men's basketball programs are successful. It is even possible, as Defendants' expert would have suggested, that a cost-benefit analysis would reveal that universities come out net-positive when they commit recruiting violations. But this does not help Defendants. The law is clear: a defendant cannot negate the fraud he committed by wishing that everything works out for his victim in the end. Calderon , 944 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2019) ("[T]he fact that the defendant believes (rightly or wrongly) that he will 'ultimately' be able to work things out so that the victim suffers no loss is no excuse for the real and immediate loss contemplated to result from defendant's fraudulent conduct.") (quoting United States v. Rossomando , 144 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) ); see also United States v. Ferguson , 676 F.3d 260, 280 (2d Cir. 2011). That the Universities might have ultimately benefitted monetarily from having top tier recruits would not have changed whether Defendants were guilty of wire fraud, and the evidence might have clouded the issue for the jury. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Other Evidentiary Challenges

Defendants also challenge several other evidentiary rulings. None of their arguments have merit.

1. Phone Calls

Defendants sought to admit the contents of several recorded phone calls. In one of those calls, Code and Dawkins discussed a high school basketball recruit not involved in this case. In that conversation, which the district court excluded, the two noted that the recruit's family was asking a school for money in exchange for their son's commitment to play for that school's basketball team. Code and Dawkins discussed how it was worthwhile for the school to meet those demands because it stood to profit substantially from that player. Although the district court did not clearly explain its reasoning, there are at least two acceptable reasons for it to have excluded the call. First, assuming, as Defendants argue, that the information from the call fit within the state of mind hearsay exception, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), it was not unreasonable for the district court to determine that the call -- which did not concern any of the recruits in this case and involved conduct that occurred after the payments alleged in the indictment were made -- was irrelevant. Second, admitting this phone call could have led the jury down the impermissible road of considering the wisdom of the NCAA's amateurism rules instead of the actions of Defendants. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this call.

Defendants also take issue with the district court's exclusion of other phone calls in which various NCAA coaches purportedly encouraged Defendants to violate the amateurism rules. Defendants contend that this evidence proved they were doing "what the Universities wanted and expected their corporate apparel sponsors to do." Appellants' Br. at 114. They also argue that the calls would have contradicted the testimony of Gassnola, one of the government's cooperating witnesses. The district court, however, found the prejudicial effect of these calls to substantially outweigh their probative value, and it did not admit them. This was not an abuse of discretion.

First, at least one coach on these calls worked at a school not involved in this case, and therefore his discussion of practices elsewhere had little relevance here. Second, to the extent the calls were relevant, allowing such testimony could have confused the jury, as it would have required the jury to learn about individuals not involved in the case. Third, even if we accept that coaches encouraged NCAA recruiting violations -- there was testimony, for example, that Pitino, Louisville's coach, needed "[p]lausible deniability," App'x at 640 -- that the coaches asked Defendants to pay the Recruits' families was not a defense unless, as we discuss further below, the coaches were unconflicted and acting in good faith on behalf of their Universities, see D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1257-58. In addition, a closer examination of the calls Defendants sought to admit further refutes this argument. When the topic of compensating recruits came up, for example, one coach said: "I have got to shut my door." D. Ct. Dkt. No. 259 at 28. That this coach did not want to have a conversation about violating NCAA rules with his door open indicates that his school did not condone such behavior. Another coach said he kept his relationship with Dawkins "off the book," which the jury reasonably could have understood to mean off the record. D. Ct. Dkt. No. 259 at 31. Thus, this evidence is of limited utility to the extent it supposedly proves that Defendants believed they were doing what the Universities here wanted, as it cuts against any argument that the coaches were unconflicted and acting in good faith. See D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1257-58. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.

We also disagree that admitting the phone calls would have called into question Gassnola's veracity. Gassnola testified that he would not have told a University that he had paid a recruit's family member because "[t]hey wouldn't have liked [that] very much." App'x at 293. Defendants argue that the phone calls in which various coaches solicited this sort of help would have contradicted this testimony. We are not persuaded. The evidence Defendants sought to admit -- phone calls that Gassnola was not a part of -- consisted of coaches speaking guardedly about NCAA violations because they knew what they were doing was wrong. It is wholly consistent that Gassnola would have refrained from discussing the payments with University personnel. Flaunting such violations to the Universities, after all, would have put their compliance departments in difficult situations. Thus, we are not persuaded that Defendants' cross-examination of Gassnola was inhibited because the district court excluded the phone calls, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the phone calls.

2. Recruiting Violations

Defendants also sought to present evidence of Louisville's previous recruiting infractions "to demonstrate that ... Louisville had a history of violating NCAA rules in order to recruit talented athletes, and thus, [Defendants] had no reason to think they were defrauding Louisville by doing the same." Appellants' Br. at 117. In particular, Defendants wanted the jury to learn that Louisville was sanctioned for providing recruits who visited Louisville with exotic dancers and prostitutes. Importantly, Defendants sought to introduce an NCAA Committee on Infractions ("COI") decision that found, inter alia , that Louisville committed recruiting violations by providing impermissible benefits to prospective players. As the district court noted, the COI decision is "somebody's opinion of what the facts were." App'x at 153. Accordingly, the decision itself was not a fact, and it therefore could not be admitted into evidence by a University compliance officer who was not involved in the investigation. The district court also excluded the evidence under Rule 403. Again, this was not an abuse of discretion.

Notably, Defendants stipulated with the government that Louisville previously violated NCAA rules and was sanctioned because of it. This permitted Defendants to argue -- as two of them did in summation -- that they did not think they were defrauding the Universities by committing recruiting violations because Louisville itself had previously disregarded NCAA rules. Indeed, this is why they sought to admit the violations in the first place. That the district court did not allow the intricate details of high school recruits being provided escorts and prostitutes to distract the jury from the scheme at issue in the case was not an abuse of discretion.

3. Compliance Witnesses

Defendants also sought to admit evidence to challenge the Universities' compliance officers' collective testimony that they were diligent stewards of NCAA rules. In essence, Defendants wanted to demonstrate that the Universities took "calculated risk[s]" when they awarded athletic-based aid to ineligible recruits. Appellants' Br. at 122. To a large extent, Defendants reassert the same reason for why their expert should have been allowed to testify. Because we have already rejected this argument above, we write only to address whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination about certain NCAA guidelines. We conclude it did not.

On cross-examination, Defendants were not permitted to question the compliance officers about specific instances in which student-athletes who competed for the Universities were temporarily deemed ineligible and then readmitted to play under the NCAA reinstatement guidelines. According to Defendants, ineligible student-athletes who did not know that their families accepted improper benefits may be reinstated to their teams after serving suspensions. Because these penalties are temporary and unencumbering, as the argument goes, the Universities were willing to risk getting caught because the reward outweighed the risk. The district court found that the evidence was beyond the scope of direct examination, not relevant, and substantially more prejudicial than probative. We agree.

A trial court "is accorded broad discretion in controlling the scope and extent of cross-examination." United States v. James , 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize that it is "unrealistic to expect that direct examination and cross-examination will be perfectly congruent," and we have noted that "[t]he latter need only be reasonably related to the former." United States v. Caracappa , 614 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir. 2010).

Here, on direct examination, the government discussed the NCAA reinstatement guidelines in reference to the sanctions a university could face. It did not discuss how a student-athlete who has been deemed ineligible goes about getting reinstated or the penalties such student-athlete might face. It was not an abuse of the district court's broad discretion to prevent Defendants from asking questions about specific instances in which student-athletes not involved in this case were deemed ineligible and eventually reinstated. Moreover, this line of questioning would have confused the jury and distracted it from the issue in the case: whether Defendants withheld valuable information from the Universities to defraud them of athletic-based aid. Indeed, Defendants' entire argument that the Universities took calculated risks by signing ineligible student-athletes because the penalty for doing so was meager is not responsive to the prosecution's theory that Defendants concealed the Recruits' ineligibility from the Universities. Thus, to the extent that Universities weighed the consequences of issuing athletic-based aid to ineligible recruits, Defendants prevented them from doing so here by misrepresenting that Bowen, Preston, and Smith were in compliance with NCAA rules.

III. Jury Instructions

"We review de novo a district court's jury instruction," United States v. Roy , 783 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2015), "and will vacate a conviction for an erroneous charge unless the error was harmless," United States v. Nouri , 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). If, however, "a defendant fails to make a timely objection, we review the instruction for plain error." Id . A jury charge is adequate if "taken as a whole, [it] is correct and sufficiently covers the case so that a jury can intelligently determine the questions presented to it." Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039 , 838 F.3d 265, 280 (2d Cir. 2016) ; see also United States v. Dyer , 922 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] jury charge must be viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial."). "A jury instruction is erroneous if it either fails adequately to inform the jury of the law or misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard." United States v. George , 779 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2015).

Defendants argue that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on: (1) conscious avoidance; (2) the meaning of "obtain" in 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ; (3) the "right to control"; and (4) the requisite intent. We address these issues in turn. A. Conscious Avoidance

The doctrine of conscious avoidance (i.e. , "willful blindness") prevents defendants from avoiding criminal liability by "deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances" and that, if known, would render them guilty of a crime. Glob.Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. , 563 U.S. 754, 766, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 179 L.Ed.2d 1167 (2011). This doctrine has two requirements: "(1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact." Id. at 769, 131 S.Ct. 2060.

A conscious avoidance jury charge "permits a jury to find that a defendant had culpable knowledge of a fact when the evidence shows that the defendant intentionally avoided confirming the fact." United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). Such a charge may be given when (1) the defendant claims to lack "some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction" and (2) there is enough evidence for "a rational juror [to] reach the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact." United States v. Fofanah , 765 F.3d 141, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2014). The instruction "permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no evidence that the defendant possessed actual knowledge." United States v. Ferrarini , 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000). When a defendant challenges the factual basis for a jury's finding of conscious avoidance, he is essentially challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and therefore "bears a heavy burden." See United States v. Aina-Marshall , 336 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2003).

In pertinent part, the district court here explained that the jury "may find that a defendant acted with the necessary knowledge as to particular facts on the basis that the defendant consciously avoided learning those facts by deliberately closing his eyes to what otherwise would have been clear." App'x at 450. The court was clear that because Defendants denied that they knew the Recruits had to sign eligibility certifications, the jury could find that it was Defendants' "consci[ous] intention" -- as compared to their "carelessness or negligence" -- to remain ignorant of facts to "escape the consequences of criminal law." App'x at 451. Importantly, the court noted that a conscious avoidance argument "is not a substitute for proof. It is simply another fact you may consider in deciding what the defendant knew." App'x at 451.

Defendants raise several arguments for why the conscious avoidance jury instruction was erroneous. None is persuasive. First, Defendants argue that that the government failed to show that Defendants deliberately avoided confirming the facts, and therefore the conscious avoidance charge should not have been given. While it is true that conscious avoidance requires more than a reckless or negligent disregard of the facts, see Glob.-Tech Appliances , 563 U.S. at 769-70, 131 S.Ct. 2060, the government met its burden here. As discussed in detail above, the jury heard ample evidence demonstrating that Defendants knew the Recruits had to misrepresent their eligibility for the scheme to succeed. Moreover, the district court's charge accurately instructed the jury on the law, and the jury reasonably concluded Defendants consciously avoided learning of the eligibility forms.

Next, Defendants contend that it was impossible for them to have consciously avoided learning that the Recruits had to sign eligibility forms for the scheme to succeed because the forms were completed after the payments were made. This argument is unavailing. We have previously rejected the proposition that "a conscious avoidance instruction is only appropriate where the crime includes knowledge of an existing fact as an element." United States v. Gurary , 860 F.2d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Rather, such a charge is appropriate when there is "proof of notice of high probability" that future conduct will occur. Id. at 527. Although the charge may be inappropriate in certain one-off crimes where at best the jury is left to speculate what the defendant may have foreseen happening, but see Ferguson , 676 F.3d at 279 (conscious avoidance charge was permissible where "parameters of the deal were developed over a number of months, and there were numerous forward-looking meetings, emails, and negotiations"), it is a permissible charge when defendants' repeated conduct makes it all-the-more likely that they remained willfully blind. Gurary , 860 F.2d at 527. Here, Defendants were involved in at least three schemes that spanned several years. Accordingly, the charge was appropriate.

Third, Defendants argue that the district court gave two inconsistent charges, asking the jury to find that Defendants consciously avoided a fact while also willfully causing a result. There is no inconsistency here. Willful causation is a form of secondary liability where an actor can be found guilty of a crime if he purposefully caused another to act criminally. See United States v. Nolan , 136 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1998) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) ("Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."). The district court's instruction as to conscious avoidance permitted the jury to impute knowledge onto Defendants. The willful causation charge, conversely, permitted the jury to impute a third party's actions onto Defendants. Here, it allowed the jury to attribute the Recruits' false statements to Defendants, who both persuaded the Recruits to sign on with the Universities and rendered them ineligible by violating NCAA rules. These two charges are compatible. In any event, even assuming the district court committed error, any such error was harmless, as the jury could have found that Defendants had actual knowledge that false representations would be made to the Universities. See Ferrarini , 219 F.3d at 154 ("[A]n erroneously given conscious avoidance instruction constitutes harmless error if the jury was charged on actual knowledge and there was overwhelming evidence to support a finding that the defendant instead possessed actual knowledge of the fact at issue." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B. "Obtain"

A defendant is guilty of wire fraud if he "devises or intends to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises" and uses wires to further that scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that a plain reading of the statute makes it clear that the law requires that property or money be obtained by the defendant from the victim, and the district court erred by not making this clear to the jury. We are not persuaded.

The district court instructed the jury, in relevant part, that Defendants had to have made or caused another to make a false statement that involved a "material fact ... that would reasonably be expected to influence, or that is capable of influencing, the decision of the [Universities to award the Recruits athletic-based aid]." App'x at 441. It made clear that Defendants did not need to profit from the fraud; they did, however, need to "contemplate[ ] depriving the victim ... of money or property," App'x at 443. Indeed, the court was explicit: "[A] victim can be deprived of money or property ... when it is deprived of the ability to make an informed economic decision about what to do with its money or property." App'x at 444. This instruction, as noted above, accurately explains the law. See United States v. Carlo , 507 F.3d 799 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Since a defining feature of most property is the right to control the asset in question, we have recognized that the property interests protected by the [wire fraud] statute[ ] include the interest of a victim in controlling his or her own assets.").

First, Defendants rely on two canons of statutory interpretation -- that courts are bound by what the text of a statute says and that courts must apply the ordinary meaning of the words in a statute. They contend that the words "obtaining" and "defraud" in § 1343 unambiguously mean that a defendant must personally obtain property from the victim to be convicted of wire fraud. This interpretation conflicts with our Court's precedent. As noted above, we have held that the wire fraud statute is violated when the defendant prevents the victim from making an informed economic decision about the victim's property, regardless of who ultimately benefits from the victim's property. See Finazzo , 850 F.3d at 111 (approving a jury instruction that explained that "the right to control one's assets is injured when a victim is deprived of potentially valuable economic information it would consider valuable in deciding how to use its assets") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Binday , 804 F.3d at 581 (approving a jury instruction that explained that "a person can also be deprived of money or property when he is deprived of the ability to make an informed economic decision about what to do with his money or property"). Indeed, a defendant "does not need to literally obtain money or property to violate the [wire or mail fraud] statute[s]." Porcelli , 404 F.3d at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Males , 459 F.3d at 158 (same).

Further, Section 1343 punishes the individual who devises the scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ("Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud , or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ..." is guilty of wire fraud. (emphasis added)). What matters, therefore, is that there was a scheme to defraud a victim of money or property. By the plain language of the statute, the identity of the ultimate beneficiary is not dispositive and the plain meaning of the word "obtain" is sufficiently capacious to encompass schemes by defendants to obtain money for the benefit of a favored third party. See United States v. Johnson , 945 F.3d 606, 610-11 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming a bank executive's wire fraud conviction when his misrepresentations caused the victim to confer a benefit on the bank rather than himself). Thus, a victim's loss need not flow directly to the defendant for the defendant to be guilty of wire fraud. See United States v. Calderon , 944 F.3d at 88-90 (holding that a wire fraud scheme contemplated actual harm to the victims when modifications to bills of lading exposed banks "to risk of default or non-reimbursement" from foreign correspondent banks and increased the risk the government would not reimburse the victim banks if a foreign bank defaulted).

Second, Defendants rely on case law. They contend that Supreme Court precedent and several out-of-circuit cases also require that the defendant personally obtain the victim's property. Not so. Although, as discussed above, obtaining the victim's property must be "an object of the fraud," Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1573, there is no precedent mandating that the victim's property flow directly to the defendant. Nor should there be. Surely a defendant would be guilty of fraud if he deceived a victim into providing money or property to the defendant's relative, friend, or favorite charity, rather than directly to the defendant himself. Such an act would come within the plain meaning of the statute: the deception would be for the purpose of obtaining money or property from the victim for a person of defendant's choosing.

Defendants also misread Carpenter v. United States , 484 U.S. 19, 108 S.Ct. 316, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987), claiming that it stands for the proposition that a defendant must obtain property from the victim. The language Defendants quote, however, is the Court reiterating an argument made by one of the parties -- it is not the Court's holding. Compare Appellants' Br. at 63 ("[A]fter McNally , the requirement that the defendant ‘obtain ... money or property from the [victim]’ is a ‘necessary element’ of wire fraud."); with Carpenter , 484 U.S. at 25, 108 S.Ct. 316 ("Petitioners assert that ... they did not obtain any ‘money or property’ from the [victim], which is a necessary element of the crime under our decision last Term in [McNally ]."). Indeed, the Court in Carpenter explains that the property fraud statutes "reach any scheme to deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." Carpenter , 484 U.S. at 27, 108 S.Ct. 316 (emphasis added). Once again, there is no requirement that the property flow to the defendant.

Nor are we bound or persuaded by the out-of-circuit precedent that Defendants cite. We address only the case on which Defendants most heavily rely. In United States v. Walters , the Seventh Circuit explained that "[l]osses that occur as byproducts of a deceitful scheme do not satisfy the statutory requirement" for property fraud. 997 F.2d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993). We do not quarrel with this rule, which was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1573. The facts of Walters , however, are distinguishable.

Norby Walters was an aspiring sports agent who gave NCAA student-athletes cars and money with the hope that they would retain him as their agent when they turned professional. Walters , 997 F.2d at 1221. This, of course, violated the NCAA's amateurism rules. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that because "[t]he athletes' pro prospects depended on successful completion of their collegiate careers," id. , it could "assume that Walters knew that the universities would ask [the] athletes to verify that they were eligible to compete as amateurs," id. at 1222, and Walters "promised to lie to the universities" about the payments if asked, id. at 1221.

The Walters Court acknowledged that the case was close: "Everything ... turns on matters of degree. Did the schemers foresee that the mails would be used? Did the mailing advance the success of the scheme? Which parts of a scheme are 'essential'? Such questions lack obviously right answers." Id. at 1222. Ultimately, the Court found that Walters did not "conceive[ ] a scheme in which mailings played a role." Id. In other words, Walters did not satisfy a critical element of the mail fraud statute: he did not intend to mail anything. Id. ("For all Walters cared, the [eligibility] forms could sit forever in cartons. Movement to someplace else was irrelevant."). Here, the equivalent element in the wire fraud statute is the use of wires, which Defendants do not -- and cannot -- dispute. Accordingly, Defendants' reliance on Walters is misplaced, and, for the reasons noted above, the district court did not err in its instructions on the meaning of "obtain."

C. Right to Control

Because one has a right to control one's property, "a wire fraud charge under a right-to-control theory can be predicated on a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information." Lebedev , 932 F.3d at 48 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Finazzo , 850 F.3d at 111 ("[M]isrepresentations or non–disclosure of information cannot support a [wire fraud] conviction under the 'right to control' theory unless those misrepresentations or non–disclosures can or do result in tangible economic harm."). In other words, as discussed above, depriving a victim of "potentially valuable economic information it would consider valuable in deciding how to use its assets" prevents the victim from exercising its right to control its property and can therefore support a wire fraud conviction. Finazzo , 850 F.3d at 111.

Defendants' "right to control" argument is essentially a refashioning of its "obtain" arguments, which we have addressed above. Here, Defendants argue that "the Universities' ability to make an informed economic decision about scholarships is not property, because it is not an interest that holds any independent economic value." Appellants' Br. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, they contend that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the right-to-control theory. They challenge the following portion of the district court's instruction:

[A] victim can be deprived of money or property also when it is deprived of the ability to make an informed economic decision about what to do with its money or property -- in other words, when it is deprived of the right to control the use of its assets. I instruct you that a victim's loss of the right to control the use of its assets constitutes deprivation of money or property if, and only if, the scheme could have caused or did cause tangible economic harm to the victim.

 

App'x at 444.

There is no doubt that the Universities' scholarship money is a property interest with independent economic value. First, and most obviously, the Universities awarded tuition, room, and board to the Recruits. Without these awards, the Recruits would have had to pay tens of thousands of dollars to attend the schools. Second, there are a finite number of athletic-based scholarships that each University can award. Thus, giving a scholarship to one student necessarily precludes another student from receiving that same scholarship. And because the Universities would not have awarded the Recruits this aid had they known the Recruits were ineligible to compete, withholding that information is a quintessential example of depriving a victim of its right to control its assets. Accordingly, the district court's instructions accurately reflected the law, and it therefore did not err in this respect. See Finazzo , 850 F.3d at 111.

D. Intent

As discussed above, a defendant must act with fraudulent intent to be convicted of wire fraud. Thus, if the victim -- or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the victim -- gives permission to the defendant to act in the manner at issue, the defendant cannot be found guilty of wire fraud. See United States v. Bonanno , 430 F.2d 1060, 1064, 1064 n.5 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that use of others' credit cards "without permission " constituted evidence of "intent to mislead" in a mail fraud conviction) (emphasis added). An agent can either have actual authority to act, which is when the agent receives "explicit permission from the principal to act on its behalf," Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine & Trading Inc. , 697 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2012), or apparent authority to act, which is when an agent has the ability to bind the principal to transactions with third parties because representations that the principal made to the third party make it reasonable for the third party to believe the agent has such an ability, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1993). "It is the law in this circuit, as well as generally, that customarily only the representation of the principal to the third party can create apparent authority, not the representation of the agent alone." Id. (emphasis added).

Certain corporate agents, however, inherently have apparent authority to represent their principals, even if the principal does not make a specific representation to the third party. See D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1258. For there to be apparent authority in such a circumstance, two elements must be met: (1) the principal is making a lawful decision to conceal the relationship with the agent and (2) the agent is acting in good faith and not profiting from the decision. Id.

Defendants argue that they did not have the requisite fraudulent intent because their scheme was designed to help the Universities recruit top-tier players. Indeed, they argue that the men's basketball coaches asked them to make payments to the Recruits' families. Accordingly, Defendants take issue with the district court's jury instruction on intent, which they contend should have made clear that the jury could acquit if it found that Defendants believed the men's basketball coaches had the apparent authority to instruct them to violate NCAA rules. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, the district court did just that.

As an introduction to the concept of agency law, the district court instructed the jury as follows:

Each of the alleged victims and intended victims of the crimes charged in the indictment is a university. Universities, of course, are not human beings. They can think or act only through their agents -- that is to say, their officers, their employees, and their other authorized representatives. So, the knowledge, the intentions, the statements, and the actions of a university officer, employee, or other representative -- and that includes basketball coaches -- are considered to be those of the university to the extent, but only to the extent, that the officer, employee, or other representative is, first of all, acting within the scope of the authority of that officer, agent, or representative and, second of all, without any purpose to profit personally or otherwise benefit him or herself in a manner that is not fully aligned with the interests of the university.

 

App'x at 438-39.

Defendants characterize this as an actual authority jury instruction. We disagree. As the district court noted, the words "actual authority" do not appear anywhere in this instruction. While this alone is not dispositive, the context in which the instruction was given is. See Garnett , 838 F.3d at 280 (A jury charge is adequate if "taken as a whole, [it] is correct and sufficiently covers the case so that a jury can intelligently determine the questions presented to it"). Here, the district court was introducing the concept of agency law to the jury. Its instruction accurately explained how the Universities had to act through their agents, which it made clear included the men's basketball coaches. This was a crucial explanation that set up the court's apparent authority instruction, which it gave shortly thereafter. In relevant part, the district court instructed the jury as follows:

Now, as to certain of the universities, one or more of the defendants contends that they lacked intent to defraud because they acted in good faith at the request of one or more university basketball coaches. An individual who does not work for a university and who engages in (otherwise legal) conduct to mislead the university lacks an intent to defraud the university if three things are true: First, he or she was acting at the request of an agent of the alleged victim university; second, the agent had apparent authority to make that request; and, third, the agent appeared to be unconflicted and acting in good faith for the benefit of the victim university and not to serve his or her own interests in a manner that was not fully aligned with the interests of the university.

 

App'x at 447. The district court went on to explain each of the three prongs in detail.

Defendants contend that the district court's instruction was unnecessarily complex and legally incorrect. Again, we disagree. The thrust of Defendants' argument is that the district court misapplied D'Amato , a case where a lawyer (D'Amato) was hired by a vice president of a corporation to lobby D'Amato's brother, a United States senator. D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1252-53. But the district court's jury instructions accurately explained the apparent authority rule from D'Amato . From a legal standpoint, this alone ends the inquiry, as the jury instruction neither "fail[ed to] adequately ... inform the jury of the law [n]or misle[d] the jury as to the correct legal standard." George , 779 F.3d at 117. Defendants' argument that they were merely following coaches' instructions when they paid the Recruits' families also misunderstands D'Amato . Even assuming that the Universities' coaches encouraged Defendants to pay Recruits' families to steer the Recruits toward their basketball programs -- indeed, Defendants discussed giving Pitino "[p]lausible deniability," App'x at 640 -- Defendants would have had to have believed that the coaches were acting in good faith. In other words, if we analogize the head coaches to corporate agents, D'Amato teaches that Defendants would have had to believe that the coaches' commands were made in good faith to carry out the principals' (i.e. , the Universities') objectives. See D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1258 (explaining that a party may "follow[ ] the instructions of an appropriate corporate agent who appears to be unconflicted and acting in good faith"). On this record, the jury could have reasonably found that this was not the case.

The jury was shown the head coaches' contracts, which required them to ensure their players were eligible to compete and provided incentives if their teams had successful seasons. Defendants were sophisticated actors in the world of college sports, as discussed in detail above, who surely were generally aware of the coaches' obligations to comply with NCAA rules and likely knew there were financial incentives tied to their teams' successes. Thus, any argument that Defendants believed the coaches were acting in good faith by violating their contracts to secure top talent is unreasonable.

Moreover, there is no indication that the Universities condoned surreptitiously paying Recruits' families to entice Recruits to play for their basketball teams. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 986 F.2d at 20 ("It is the law in this circuit, as well as generally, that customarily only the representation of the principal to the third party can create apparent authority, not the representation of the agent alone." (emphasis added)). Instead, there is evidence to the contrary -- compliance officers from the Universities testified about the harsh NCAA sanctions their institutions would face if such activity occurred and was discovered. In any event, there is also no indication that the coaches ever instructed Defendants to conceal the payments. In D'Amato , the corporate agent was forthright about the need to create false reports and funnel the payments through D'Amato's law partner. 39 F.3d at 1254-55. This -- along with the fact that payments were repeatedly approved by others who worked at the corporation, id. at 1253-54, 1261 -- made it plausible that D'Amato believed this was business-as-usual and approved by the corporation. Here, by contrast, Defendants themselves took these precautions, which shows that they knew what they were doing was against the Universities' wishes. As Dawkins stated in a recorded phone call, "I would never tell Rick anything like this because I don't want to put him in jeopardy." Supp. App'x at 142. These actions belie the notion that the activity was approved by the Universities.

Because the district court's jury instruction accurately reflected the law on apparent authority, it did not err.

CONCLUSION

At trial, Defendants argued that their intent was not to harm but to help the Universities, and they also sought to offer evidence that they were not the only individuals who have paid high school basketball recruits to attend certain universities. The ends, however, do not justify the means, and that others are engaging in improper behavior does not make it lawful. See Gonnella v. S.E.C. , 954 F.3d 536, 549 (2d Cir. 2020) ("[T]he fact that behavior is common does not mean it is not fraud."); see also Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 135 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("Even a universal industry practice may still be fraudulent.").

Defendants concede that they broke the NCAA rules, but contend that they did not act criminally. But "the essence of fraud is misrepresentation, made with the intent to induce another person to take action ‘without the relevant facts necessary to make an informed ... decision.’ " United States v. Rutigliano , 887 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Binday , 804 F.3d at 579 ). Fraud involves "a departure from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play," United States v. Ragosta , 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Goldblatt , 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987) ), and depriving one of property through "dishonest methods or schemes" or "trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching," Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as the jury could have reasonably found, Defendants deprived the Universities of property -- athletic-based aid that they could have awarded to students who were eligible to play -- by breaking NCAA rules and depriving the Universities of relevant information through fundamentally dishonest means.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED .

Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the Court that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the jury was properly instructed as to the governing law. I believe, however, that the case is much closer as to certain of the district court's evidentiary rulings than the majority allows, and that some of the evidence offered by the defense should have been admitted. Ultimately, I conclude that the erroneous exclusion of that evidence was not harmless. I therefore join in the thoughtful and thorough opinion for the Court, except with respect to Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 of the Discussion section. For the reasons discussed below, I agree that the convictions of Gatto and Code as to counts one and two should be affirmed. But given the potential effect that the erroneously excluded evidence may have had on the verdict as to certain counts, Gatto's conviction as to count three and Dawkins's convictions on counts one and two should be reversed.

I. Overview

The district court in this case had to walk a fine line with respect to its evidentiary rulings. The defendants’ activities occurred in the context of the controversial world of big-time college athletics. Many reasonable people believe that the institution of major college sports has far outgrown its founding assumptions, which postulate that college sports are pursued as an avocation by student-athletes who compete for the love of the game and the honor of their schools. Today, college athletics is a billion-dollar industry, which generates enormous revenues for universities – and enormous salaries for college coaches, who in the case of public universities are often the highest-paid public employees in their states. Those revenues and salaries are made profitable by the fact that the students who play for the teams receive no compensation (beyond free tuition for classes they often have little time to complete) for working what many – including some of the players themselves and some demanding coaches – view as full-time jobs as athletic performers. The disconnect between the athletes’ financial value to their schools and the refusal to pay them what their market value would command if they were acknowledged as full-time professional athletes creates an opportunity for corruption and covert rule-breaking. It is against this backdrop that the district court had to make its careful evidentiary decisions balancing the probative value of various proffered pieces of evidence against the potential of that evidence to prejudice the jury by playing to the likelihood that at least some jurors might believe that the colleges that the defendants were accused of defrauding were themselves corrupt and unworthy of protection.

The defendants in this case were accused of defrauding three universities, by paying cash bounties to the families of outstanding high school basketball players to secure their enrollment at those universities, in violation of the universities’ proclaimed policies, so that the universities awarded the athletes valuable scholarships to which they were not entitled under those policies and NCAA rules. The bounties were paid from the funds of a prominent manufacturer of athletic gear and attire, a sponsor of the universities’ athletic programs, in violation of the proclaimed policies of that company. The sponsorship gave the company a stake in the competitive success of the sponsored programs, which would enhance the visibility and allure of the company's products, and helped secure the good will of the athletes, in the event they became successful professional basketball players and were offered endorsement deals by the company and its competitors. The sums involved were substantial in relation to the resources of the recruits and their families, but modest in comparison to the sums earned by professional athletes for their endorsements.

The defendants, as the majority notes, acknowledged that their actions violated NCAA rules and the official policies of the universities, that the bounties rendered the athletes ineligible to compete for the universities, and that the payments were concealed from the highest officials of the universities and the university compliance officers whose job it was to police the rules and policies in question. Their principal defense, however, was that they had no intent to deceive or defraud, because they genuinely believed the cynical proposition that the universities engaged in massive hypocrisy, and were in fact happy for the defendants to make their secret payments, as long as the universities were allowed to pretend that they were being deceived. In other words, defendants maintained that they believed that the universities wanted to obtain the best available athletes for their teams (which made more money for the universities the more successful they were on the basketball court) by any means necessary, so long as the universities could claim "[p]lausible deniability." App'x at 640. The defendants offered evidence that they maintain would have supported their asserted lack of intent to deceive the universities, but some of that evidence was excluded by the district court. A principal prong of their appeal relates to those evidentiary rulings.

As the majority acknowledges, to secure a conviction the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants intended to deceive the universities. The defendants were permitted to argue that they believed that the universities knew, in general terms, what the defendants were doing, precisely because that belief, if they genuinely held it, would defeat an intent to deceive. But what sort of evidence could help the defendants persuade the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about whether the defendants genuinely believed what they claimed they believed? If, for example, the president of one of the universities had called the defendants in to his or her office, and told them that the university welcomed their efforts to secure the best basketball players for its team, by bribing the athletes if necessary, but that the defendants had to keep those payments secret, surely that would support the conclusion that the universities were not defrauded; if defendants claimed that they had been told by their superiors at the company that the university president had conveyed that message to the head of the company, such statements (whether or not true) would also support the conclusion that the defendants genuinely believed that the university was not being deceived, regardless of whether the university's compliance officers were in on the secret.

But under the defendants’ theory of how the world works, such conversations would be extremely unlikely to occur, and indeed, the defendants did not claim that any such conversations had taken place. The hypocritical façade the defendants claim they believed existed would not permit any but the most oblique signals of approval, for any explicit authorization of the payments risked blowing the cover of the whole industry. So the defendants were reduced to offering what they contended was circumstantial evidence to support their claimed belief. That evidence took various forms, but two principal examples consisted of conversations, recorded without their knowledge, between two of the defendants themselves or between individual defendants and athletic coaches at the victim universities and other institutions, which they argue explained and justified their cynical conclusions. In effect, they wanted to argue that anyone who operated in their milieu would have been led to believe exactly what they purportedly believed.

The problem for the district court is that this kind of evidence could be taken by a jury in several ways. On the one hand, such evidence arguably supported the conclusion it was offered to prove: that a reasonable person in the defendants’ position would have believed that the universities did not care what they did, so long as the result was a winning team and so long as any under-the-table payments were kept secret. But on the other, a jury could also take such evidence as indicating two further possible conclusions, which might inure to the defendants’ benefit, but which were distinctly not legal defenses.

First, the defendants’ argument is easily confused with a different argument, that was also part of the defendants’ professed belief system: that their activities did not really hurt the universities, or even expose them to significant risk, but instead offered the universities only great financial benefits. Much of the evidence offered by the defendants suggested that, if the universities cared only about the financial bottom line of their athletic programs, they should not mind occasional (or even frequent) violations of the NCAA rules. The proffered evidence suggested that such breaches were common, were infrequently detected, and when detected resulted in penalties that were insignificant in comparison to the financial benefits of maintaining successful teams. But that argument does not support a valid defense. It is not a defense to fraud, for example, that the fraudster lies to investors to get them to buy a stock that the fraudster genuinely believes will "work out well in the end" for the investors, but that they would not buy if told the truth; such a belief does not justify selling stock by means of material misrepresentations. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon , 944 F.3d 72, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, given the absence of any direct evidence that the universities knew of and approved the payments, evidence that the system did not provide adequate incentives for rule compliance more directly supported the proposition that someone in defendants’ position could have genuinely believed that he was acting in the university's financial interest – a non-defense that might have confused the jurors.

Second, evidence of this sort might persuade a reasonable juror, already skeptical of the universities’ professed belief in amateurism, to conclude that the NCAA and the universities were corrupt, exploitative institutions who deserved whatever happened to them, and that the defendants, by helping the athletes’ families secure some small portion of the compensation they were fairly due for their valuable labor and for the risks to their health and future careers that they were taking by playing sports, were the good guys. Such a "Robin Hood" defense – that the defendants were essentially robbing the rich to help the poor – is of course also not a legal defense.

How much and what kinds of evidence should be allowed into the trial, and how to balance the probative and prejudicial aspects of particular pieces of evidence, is a delicate task that is confided to the sound discretion of the district court. See United States v. White , 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) ("We review evidentiary rulings ... for abuse of discretion."). Like the majority, I am loath to second-guess the judgments of the experienced district judge, who was much closer to the lengthy and complex course of this prosecution than are we appellate judges, on these delicate questions. For the most part, I reach similar conclusions to those presented by the majority, finding the decisions of the district court to be reasonable resolutions of the difficult balancing required. Moreover, where I might think that particular rulings were erroneous, even taking account of the deferential standard of review, there are further questions about whether, in light of the full record of the case, any such errors require a new trial, or were merely harmless. Trials are rarely perfect, and individual pieces of evidence are not usually so compelling that their presence or absence is potentially dispositive of the case.

Finally, before turning to the individual rulings contested by the appellants, let me suggest a framework for thinking about these close questions. The issue in this case, as the majority opinion clearly and correctly notes, is not whether we like or despise the system created by the NCAA rules, nor whether we think that system is rife with the potential for, or with widespread examples of, cheating of all kinds. It is whether these defendants deceived these particular victims about the particular athletes to whose families the payments at issue in this case were made. To my mind, then, the closer the evidence comes to supporting the view that the defendants believed that the specific payments proven in this case were secretly condoned by the particular university involved, the more likely that the probative force of the evidence outweighed the potential prejudice identified above. In contrast, the closer the evidence comes to being generalized evidence that "everybody does it," or that the system itself is corrupt or exploitative in some larger sense, the more likely it is that the prejudice of suggesting that the jury should reject the entire enterprise will outweigh the more tangential value it might have in supporting defendants’ professed belief that they were not really deceiving the people from whom they were, concededly, hiding what they were doing.

Though I agree with the majority that we should affirm many of the district court's evidentiary rulings because the prejudicial effect of suggesting non-defense defenses is too great, I write about some of them to point out that the evidence is not irrelevant. It has probative value – but the district court made a reasonable decision to keep it out on grounds that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. As to other rulings, however, the district court's decision to exclude relevant evidence due to its prejudicial effect was not reasonable. Ultimately, I conclude that the erroneous rulings were not harmless, at least as to certain defendants and certain counts.

II. Evidence Properly Excluded

A. The Expert Report

The defendants’ expert report is an example of a generalized piece of evidence that the district court was well within its discretion to find substantially more prejudicial than probative, because it tends to signal that universities benefit from this sort of fraud and provides limited probative value as to the defendants’ intent to deceive. The majority assumes that the report would have been helpful to the defense before holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the report was substantially more prejudicial than probative. When reviewing the district court, we "must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect." United States v. Jamil , 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983), quoting United States v. Brady , 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1979). An evidentiary ruling should not be overturned unless it was "arbitrary and irrational." White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard of review, I too would affirm the district court's exclusion of the report.

The report provided some support to the defendants’ assertion that they did not intend to deceive the universities. The expert report opined that the value of an athlete to a university generally outweighs the penalties associated with recruiting the athlete in violation of the rules, assuming that the university is caught breaking the rules at all. The jurors were aware of the various sanctions that the NCAA can impose for rule-breaking; such evidence was part of the government's argument that the defendants’ conduct harmed the universities by exposing them to the risk of financial loss. The expert report could have provided the jury with the other side of the equation: the myriad of benefits that a university may receive from recruiting and retaining athletes and creating successful sports programs.

With that information, the jury could have inferred that the defendants and the universities, as participants in the system, knew of these benefits and of the limited costs of being caught violating the ostensible rules of the system. The jury might then have concluded that the defendants believed that the universities knew that activities like theirs were very likely occurring within their programs, and deliberately closed their eyes to such activities because the benefits of those actions were very likely to result in a net positive outcome for the schools. The defendants’ case rested on why they acted the way they did, and this evidence would have been probative as to their intent precisely because it could have helped explain how the world of NCAA recruiting works.

But the evidence could have also been extremely prejudicial. The defense admitted that the report showed that the benefits of breaking NCAA recruitment rules generally outweigh the risks, but the report did not address the specific practices of any of the universities involved in this case. The district court aptly noted that highlighting the benefits that universities reap from recruits "would have been likely to turn the jury's focus to the wisdom or fairness of the NCAA rules that were violated." S. App'x at 48. In turn, that focus may have influenced the jury to put the NCAA rules on trial, and if they believed the rules were unreasonable, there would be a substantial risk the jurors would overlook the defendants’ fraud, even if the evidence demonstrated that the particular universities involved were trying to run clean programs.

The report also could have pushed the jury towards a finding of "no harm, no foul." As the district court noted, the expert report explains the benefits a university could gain after an athlete receives a scholarship to attend the school, "that is after the immediate deprivation of property ... [takes] place." S. App'x at 51. Under the law, it makes no difference whether a victim of fraud ultimately benefits from the immediate loss caused by the fraudulent conduct. See Calderon , 944 F.3d at 90 (describing a "no ultimate harm" jury instruction). In other words, if the expert report had been admitted, the jury might have looked to the benefits a university may receive from recruits to excuse the defendants’ fraudulent conduct, even though the fact that a victim ultimately profited as a result of the fraud is not a valid excuse for deliberate deceptive conduct.

The district court had to balance these competing concerns. While the report provided some probative value supporting a valid defense, it was prejudicial because it could have shifted focus to the reasonableness of the NCAA rules or to whether the universities ultimately benefitted in the long run. After balancing these issues, the district court found that the report's prejudicial value substantially outweighed its probative value. While the opposite decision might also have been acceptable, I cannot find the district court's decision "arbitrary and irrational." White , 692 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). A proper use for the report is specific: to support that the defendants held a belief that the universities in this case knew what they were doing. Its improper uses are general: to suggest that the entire system is unfair and universities generally benefit from rules violations even when they are caught. The report's general nature – addressing the system of high-level college athletics as a whole – reduces its probative value as to the particular conduct involved in this case and enhances, rather than diminishes, its prejudicial effect. Thus, the district court was well within its discretion to find that the risk of prejudice in admitting the expert report substantially outweighed its probative value.

B. Details of Louisville's Prior Infractions

The district court also precluded the defense from presenting evidence of Louisville's previous recruiting infractions detailed in an NCAA Committee on Infractions ("COI") decision. The COI found that Louisville provided prospective recruits with exotic dancers and prostitutes during visits to the school. The defendants sought to introduce the COI ruling as proof of their lack of intent to deceive, because Louisville's history of rule-breaking may have persuaded the jury that the school tolerated such conduct. Instead, the court allowed the defendants to introduce a stipulation indicating that Louisville "committed Level I-Aggravated violations," which are violations that "seriously undermine[ ] or threaten[ ] the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model." App'x at 1167. The stipulation confirmed that Louisville was sanctioned for the violation. In the court's view, the stipulation allowed the defendants to make their argument – that they genuinely did not believe they were defrauding Louisville because the school had previously violated the same rules that the defendants violated – without showing the jury the specific details in the COI decision.

The defendants argue that precluding them for introducing the specific violation outlined in the COI ruling prevented them from showing that Louisville's prior violations were far more serious than the payments at issue in this case. The defendants wanted to show the jury that Louisville committed extreme violations and did not suffer much from those violations. That the defendants knew of these more extreme violations made it more likely that they believed that Louisville condoned their payments to the families of recruits. But that the details in the COI report are more salacious than those in this case does not necessarily make those violations more extreme from the standpoint of the NCAA. Moreover, rewarding teen-aged recruits with sexual favors is sufficiently repulsive that the jurors might recoil viscerally from such practices, perceive the violation as morally worse than providing financial support for the athletes’ hard-pressed families, and judge the universities harshly and the defendants minor violators in comparison. Reasonable minds can differ about whether this kind of prejudicial effect is so overwhelming as to justify excluding the evidence, but the district court's ruling was entirely reasonable and far from "arbitrary and irrational." White , 692 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants were able to argue that Louisville committed Level I-Aggravated violations without focusing the jury on the sordid details of the actual report, which may have influenced the jury in ways that were not relevant to the trial.

C. NCAA Reinstatement Guidelines

I would also affirm the district court's decision to exclude evidence that could have rebutted the testimony of the compliance officers of the victim universities. The compliance officers testified that they would not have allowed awarding a scholarship to an ineligible athlete. The government wanted to show the jury that the universities typically followed the NCAA rules, and the defendants sought to introduce evidence that, in reality, the schools took calculated risks and awarded scholarships to elite recruits who they knew would be ineligible for competition for some portion of the season as a result.

The district court excluded the NCAA's "Student-Athlete Reinstatement Guidelines" and the defendants’ attempts to cross-examine the compliance officers as to those guidelines. The guidelines provide for forfeiture of 30% of the regular season as the maximum penalty for an athlete who has violated recruiting rules. Thus, the maximum penalty would allow a rule-breaker to be reinstated after missing only early-season games. And that is the maximum punishment; the NCAA may give a shorter punishment to an athlete whose culpability was mitigated in some way. The defendants argue that these guidelines show that a school risks very little in recruiting an ineligible athlete. The lack of any real punishment made it more likely that the universities approved of the defendants’ actions because they would benefit more from the presence of the athlete than they would be hurt by the penalty if the payments were discovered.

The district court excluded the guidelines and limited cross-examination in part because it found that the evidence was not relevant. The district court was correct to the extent that evidence that a financially motivated university might rationally take a calculated risk to violate the rules in pursuit of the rewards of a successful program would not show that a particular university was not, objectively, deceived and defrauded, because a school cannot take a calculated risk in recruiting an ineligible athlete unless it is privy to that risk. But the evidence would have been relevant to the defendants’ state of mind, that is, as to whether they genuinely believed that the universities approved of the defendants’ conduct, because the fact that there was little financial risk involved in breaking the rules made it more likely that the university would approve of rule-breaking. So the guidelines had some relevance to a valid defense.

Nevertheless, it was again within the district court's discretion to exclude the guidelines and limit the defendants’ cross-examination because the risk that the evidence would lead the jury to consider an invalid defense substantially outweighed its limited probative value. The guidelines do not show that the compliance officers who testified were lying when they testified to their own efforts to enforce the NCAA rules, nor do they show that the defendants had any reason to believe that these particular universities wanted them to violate those rules. Instead, the guidelines could be taken to suggest that the NCAA system is a kind of sham, because universities aren't really on the hook for violations committed by people like defendants: the student-athlete may suffer in the short term, but the universities don't. Such evidence may support the general idea that the NCAA and the universities are the real bad guys here, but that argument diverts the jury from the legitimate defense that the defendants thought their activities were condoned by the victim universities.

III. Phone Calls Involving Defendants and Coaches

The district court also excluded several phone calls that the defendants argue would have helped them prove that they did not intend to defraud the universities in this case. These conversations present the most difficult issues in this appeal. The defendants challenge the district court's rulings as to only a few of those calls. Though the majority gives short shrift to the defendants’ arguments, the calls present close questions as to whether the district court erred in excluding them. As to certain of the calls, indeed, I conclude that the evidence should have been admitted.

A. The Call Between Code and Dawkins

First, the district court excluded a phone call between defendants Merl Code and Christian Dawkins, in which they discussed their understanding that the family of a recruit was asking Kansas for money before committing to play basketball at the school. During the call, Code and Dawkins agree that paying the athlete "has to be worth it for the school ... for the money they'll make off [of the athlete]." App'x at 1707. Although the athlete being discussed was not implicated in the scheme charged in the indictment, the defendants contend that the call was relevant because it demonstrated that they believed the universities were happy to violate the rules if they received valuable players for their teams.

The majority characterizes the call as irrelevant, because it did not concern any of the recruits in the case and occurred after the defendants made the payments at issue. But the conversation clearly reflected how Code and Dawkins viewed the world of NCAA recruiting, and it strikes me as a strained assumption that these views had somehow developed in the few weeks between the time that the defendants made the last of the payments and the date of this conversation. The defense here is that the defendants believed that they were not deceiving the universities, and the phone call had some probative value as to that belief.

But we are back to the balancing act that the district court was obligated to apply throughout this trial. The call may have had some probative value as to the defendants’ general states of mind, but that probative value is limited and partial. To the extent the call could be taken to suggest what the defendants believed the universities wanted, any reflection of that belief is inferential: the defendants’ belief in the great financial value to Kansas of the presence of a particular recruit might lead one to infer that they thought the universities wanted their apparel company to make whatever payments were necessary to induce certain athletes to commit to the universities.

A more direct inference, however, is that the defendants believed simply that what they were doing would benefit Kansas in the long run. The defendants do not state that they thought that Kansas officials were aware of or approved of the payments being demanded by the recruit being discussed, let alone that they thought the university was aware of or would approve of the payments made to the Kansas recruit whose family they themselves paid. In fact, they do not reference the payments at issue in this case at all during this conversation.

While I find the issue closer than the majority does, in the end, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that a conversation showing that the defendants believed that universities generally benefit from rule-breaking is too distant from the issue at the heart of this case – whether the defendants genuinely believed that these specific victim schools knew and condoned what they were doing – and too proximate to the invalid defense that they were deceiving Kansas officials for their own good. Evidence of such a belief may confuse the jury about what is and what is not a proper defense, and generates precisely the kind of prejudice the district court was trying to avoid.

B. Calls Between Defendants and Coaches

The district court also excluded certain calls between a defendant and a representative of a school. The defendants argue that these calls corroborated their claim "that the basketball coaches at the Universities specifically asked them to break NCAA rules" and helped refute testimony from a witness who testified that Kansas basketball coaches "wouldn't have liked it very much" if they had been told of the payments to the recruits’ families. Appellants’ Br. at 116. The district court excluded the calls as irrelevant and prejudicial, and the majority lumps them together and upholds the district court's decision.

I agree that one call was properly excluded because it involves a coach from a school that is not involved in this case – and indeed, defendants themselves do not challenge the exclusion of this call on appeal. In that call, the coach tells Dawkins that he "can get [Dawkins] what [he] need[s]" to secure a recruit. App'x at 1687. The call may have fueled defendants’ good faith belief in the cynical proposition that "all the universities do it; they just don't want to be told about it." But, as the majority says, the risk of prejudice associated with admitting a call about miscellaneous cheating at another school to tar the victims in this case, or to intimate that the alleged victims in this case held the views that the defendants claim they attributed to universities, is a bridge too far. It would divert the focus of the trial from whether the victims here were defrauded to whether the jury should believe that college athletics is rife with corruption. But two of the excluded calls involved coaches from the universities in this case, and the majority glosses over the probative value of those calls. In one, Dawkins and a Louisville assistant coach discussed a recent business dinner the coach had attended where one of his associates "was trying to pick [his] brain on [Dawkins]." Id . at 1717. The coach told the associate that he "[doesn't] really talk about" his and Dawkins's relationship; he keeps that connection "off the book[s]." Id . In another call, a Kansas assistant coach called Code to discuss a different recruit who is not implicated in the conduct charged in this case. In that call, the coach described the recruit's family "ask[ing] about some stuff." Id . at 1713. The coach told the family "we'll talk about that if you decide [to come to Kansas]." Id . The coach then told Code "I've got to just try to work and figure out a way. Because if that's what it takes to get him[,] ... we're going to have to do it some way." Id . The coach stated that he would "talk with Jimmy [Gatto]" about funneling money to the family through an amateur team. Id . at 1714. Code says he will "talk to Jim today too." Id . The coach then described how he might also ask Gatto to help pay for the recruit's brother to visit Kansas despite acknowledging "not [being] allowed to pay for it." Id . at 1715.

The majority gives two reasons why these calls should be excluded. First, the calls would "confuse[ ] the jury, as it would have required the jury to learn about individuals not involved in the case." Majority Op. at 119. Alternatively, the majority would hold that the calls were irrelevant because they could not support a valid defense unless the coaches were "unconflicted and acting in good faith." Id . at 29. Neither reason is persuasive.

As to the first reason, I would have more confidence in the jury. The government was concerned that the calls involved people that the jury had not heard about. But the calls were not overly complicated; they involved two defendants and two coaches from victim schools discussing top basketball recruits. If the calls would have "required the jury to learn about individuals not involved in the case," Majority Op. at 119, surely the number of such individuals was not so large as to justify excluding otherwise relevant evidence because the calls mentioned a few individuals who were not a part of the charged conduct.

As to the second reason, the majority makes inferences best left for the jury to decide. The majority notes that the calls are probative of a valid defense only if the coaches on the calls were "unconflicted and acting in good faith" on behalf of their university, United States v. D'Amato , 39 F.3d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1994), but that is not technically correct. Rather, the calls support a valid defense if the defendants have a good faith belief that the coaches "appear[ ] to be unconflicted and acting in good faith" regardless of whether the coaches are actually in conflict with their schools. Id . at 1257-58. These calls could very well have helped the jury infer such a good faith belief. The first call could have supported the inference that Dawkins genuinely believed that, while Louisville did not want the defendants’ malfeasance advertised to the public, the school tacitly condoned the rule-breaking, so long as it was kept "off the book[s]." App'x at 1717. The second made it more likely that Code and Gatto believed Kansas officials expected to get recruits in ways that violate the NCAA rules because the call is itself an example of a Kansas official doing just that. The government argues that conversations with assistant coaches inherently lack probative value, because the coaches themselves were lower level employees who had their own reasons to circumvent the universities’ policies – they wanted to keep their jobs by fielding winning teams, giving them a motive to violate NCAA recruiting rules themselves or to wink at violations by others, whether or not the highest officials of the universities sincerely demanded that the coaches operate within the rules. But to give blanket credence to this argument seems to me overly simplistic. If the coaches believed that they needed to win to retain their jobs, their financial incentive aligned with that of the universities in fielding a winning team, and the pressure on them to win or be fired emanated from the officials who publicly professed a commitment to compliance. The assistant coaches cannot simply be written off as minor functionaries. Wherever they ranked on an organization chart, they were essentially the contact persons for the defendants, who were their counterparts at the apparel company. If they were implicated in the defendants’ activities, even as they insisted on hiding their approval, a jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendants held a good faith belief that the attitudes of these coaches reflected the view of the universities involved. Whether the assistant coaches were too low in the hierarchy for a reasonable person in Code's or Dawkins's position to infer that they spoke for the university is a judgment for the jury to make, and the jury was not allowed to hear the calls to decide what inferences to draw.

The evidence from which the majority infers that these coaches were not unconflicted and were acting in bad faith should have been left to the jury. The majority cites a conversation between Code and Dawkins in which they reference their understanding that Head Coach Rick Pitino of Louisville wanted "plausible deniability" about recruiting infractions. Id . at 640. But that Pitino wanted plausible deniability does not necessarily mean that he knew Louisville would not tolerate cheating. It could equally well mean that he was speaking for the university itself, which (the defendants’ theory held) wanted to get winning players but also wanted precisely such deniability. Id .

The majority also cites the coaches’ conduct on two of the excluded calls as indicative of conflict. In one call, the coach closed his door while talking on the phone. In another, the coach made statements about keeping his relationship with Dawkins off the books. But while these actions could be construed, as the majority interprets them, as "cut[ting] against any argument that the coaches were unconflicted and acting in good faith," Majority Op. at 119, they could also have indicated that the universities wanted deniability as to impropriety that they condoned. It all depends on from whom the coaches wanted to keep things secret. A reasonable jury could infer that the coaches were afraid not that the universities would disapprove of their condoning the defendants’ conduct, but that the coaches knew – as defendants argued – that the universities could not tolerate having it known that they were condoning it. This is a subtle but important distinction. A coach would not be conflicted if he was doing exactly what the university wanted: winking at the defendants’ off-the-books payments to players’ families, but preserving the façade that he was not involved and did not know what was going on.

Aside from these calls’ probative value as to the defendants’ intent, the defendants argue that it would have also called into question the testimony of a cooperating witness – another company representative, Thomas Joseph Gassnola – who testified that he would not have told Kansas officials that he paid a recruit's family because "[the university] wouldn't have liked it very much." App'x at 293. The majority does not believe that these calls would contradict Gassnola's testimony because, in their view, the calls showed that the coaches "knew what they were doing was wrong." Majority Op. at 119-120. But "wrong" is a treacherous word in this context. Of course, the payments were "wrong" insofar as they violated NCAA rules, and anyone, from the defendants to the coaches to the university presidents, who tacitly or overtly condoned such payments would not want that information to become publicly known. But that the coaches – and the defendants – knew that what they were doing violated NCAA rules, does not mean that they knew that high-level university policy-makers were genuinely disapproving of the payments. Kings who would like "meddlesome priest[s]" disposed of generally would not be happy to have those who take the hint report back overtly about what they had done.

It would not be necessary for a jury to conclude that, or even to entertain reasonable doubt as to whether, the highest university officials were in fact as hypocritical as the defendants professed to believe they were. The excluded calls reflect conversations that the defendants had with university representatives at their own level of contact that could lead a reasonable person in defendants’ position to believe that those officials were speaking for their employers in condoning the rule-breaking. The defense's argument was that the defendants really did believe that this was the case. Even if it heard the excluded calls, the jury could have rejected that defense and found that the defendants and the coaches with whom they dealt were guided by their own self-interest. But it could also have inferred that, under all the circumstances, there was reasonable doubt about whether the defendants believed that the universities simply preferred not to be told what was happening. These are issues that go to the heart of the defense, and the jury should have been permitted to draw its own conclusions from this evidence, which reflected actual discussions between defendants and representatives of the "victimized" schools. Thus, the district court's conclusion that these two calls were irrelevant was erroneous.

But was the probative value of these two calls high enough to make the district court's decision under Rule 403 arbitrary and irrational? In the first call, the coach implied that his relationship with Dawkins was something that he needed to hide by keeping it "off the book[s]." App'x at 1717. On the call, the coach referred to Louisville's success in recruiting "five-stars" that year and opined that this was the "[b]est class in Coach Pitino's history." Id . at 1719. Dawkins then replies "[o]n the heels of a ... whore scandal," referencing the misconduct reported in the COI findings. Id . The call did not directly implicate the assistant coach (or Louisville) in Dawkins's rule-breaking. The coach did not say, for example, that he kept his relationship with Dawkins off the books because Dawkins was assisting his team to recruit players in ways that broke NCAA rules – though of course the jury could have certainly inferred as much from the call. The call's probative value is also reduced by the fact that the coach in question was only a young assistant, far removed from the policy-making apparatus of the university.

Still, the conversation cannot be considered mere evidence of generalized corruption in college athletics. It involves statements made to one of the defendants by a basketball coach who was a key point of contact for that defendant with Louisville. If the government is going to prosecute people at Dawkins's level, who are not likely to have direct contact with university presidents, athletic directors, or even head coaches, excluding evidence of what such defendants were told by university officials at their own level cannot be justified.

In the second call, an assistant coach from Kansas directly discussed rule-breaking with Code, though the recruit at issue was not implicated in the conduct charged in this case. The coach said that he needed "to figure out a way" to get money and housing for a recruit's family, and admitted that he would have to route the money through a third party to avoid detection by the NCAA. Id . at 1713. The coach then mentioned that he would talk with Jimmy Gatto – another defendant in this case – about how to get the money to the family. Surely a conversation in which a coach from a victim university discusses with one defendant soliciting help from another defendant to break the NCAA rules would be extremely relevant to whether those defendants believe that the university the coach represents condones such rule-breaking.

On the one hand, the defendants’ case hinged on showing that they believed they were not deceiving the universities, but they had few opportunities to make their case to the jury. On the other hand, the government was able to prove intent from "the scheme itself" if "the necessary result of the ... scheme [was] to injure others." D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the probative value of these calls, when considering that the central defense was to challenge scienter, was high. Though these are close and difficult judgments to make, I respectfully conclude that the district court's evidentiary rulings failed to appreciate the substantial probative value of these calls. In fact, the district court concluded – and the majority agrees – that the calls had little to no relevance to a valid defense in the first instance. In so doing, the district court "obviated the need for [a Rule 403 ] balancing and cast doubt as to the balancing made" by "shifting the ... balancing test considerably in the Government's favor." White , 692 F.3d at 247. Thus, I would conclude that excluding the calls exceeded the wide bounds of the district court's discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403.

IV. Harmless Error

That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however. We will not overturn a conviction if the error was harmless. A harmless evidentiary exclusion is one in which "we can conclude with fair assurance ... did not substantially influence the jury." United States v. Oluwanisola , 605 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we will still affirm if it is "highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict." United States v. Stewart , 907 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a preliminary matter, the excluded calls would not logically affect Code's convictions for wire fraud against Louisville and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The erroneously excluded call between Code and the assistant coach from Kansas is harmless as to Code because it is not likely that the call would influence the jury's conclusion on Code's intent to deceive Louisville. There is no evidence that Code knew of the call between Dawkins and the Louisville coach, so there is no reason to believe that the other excluded call would have substantially influenced the jury's verdict on that count. Finally, the errors would not affect Code's conviction for conspiracy because his conviction for wire fraud coupled with the government's ample proof of the existence of a conspiracy supports his conviction on the conspiracy count. See Calderon , 944 F.3d at 92.

Whether the errors affected Gatto's or Dawkins's convictions is a closer question. Gatto was convicted of three counts: wire fraud as to Louisville and Kansas and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Dawkins, like Code, was charged and convicted for wire fraud as to Louisville and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The erroneously excluded call between Dawkins and the Louisville coach was directly relevant to his understanding of the expectations of that university, and the call between Code and the Kansas coach may have influenced the jury's verdict as to Gatto because the call was probative of Gatto's intent to deceive Kansas.

When assessing whether improperly excluded evidence was harmless error, we consider, inter alia, the importance of the evidence to the defense, whether the evidence is cumulative, and the strength of the government's case on the factual issue. Oluwanisola , 605 F.3d at 134. "[T]he strength of the government's case is the most critical factor in assessing whether the error was harmless." United States v. McCallum , 584 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2009).

The government's evidence on fraudulent intent was not anemic. The jury was allowed to infer "fraudulent intent ... from the scheme itself." D'Amato , 39 F.3d at 1257. The government supported that inference by presenting evidence tending to indicate that Louisville, Kansas, and North Carolina followed NCAA rules. Compliance officers from each university testified that they enforced – and trained their staff and players to comply with – NCAA rules because the NCAA would penalize the universities or their coaches for any violations. Gassnola testified that Kansas's coaches "wouldn't have liked it" if he let them know that the defendants were paying money to the families of recruits, presumably to support the inference that the defendants knew that the schools did not approve of their conduct. App'x at 293. The government used its closing argument to stress that the defendants endeavored to conceal their actions at every turn: they used burner phones, made payments using cash and multiple bank accounts, and discussed the need to be careful when talking around others. In sum, the government's case centered on circumstantial evidence that could indicate to a jury that the defendants’ arguments that they did not intend to deceive the universities were unpersuasive. The jury agreed with the government after deliberating for less than three days. But the government's evidence could have also supported the defendants’ theory that they wanted to hide their payments from the NCAA, while being careful to give the universities plausible deniability by not discussing their actions openly with certain university officials. That the schools had compliance officers to enforce NCAA rules, and that a university "wouldn't have liked it" if it knew that the defendants were paying money to a recruit's family, does not directly negate that theory because the defendants’ job was to keep the rule-breaking under wraps from all parties, including the universities themselves. That does not mean, however, that the universities were deceived if they were in fact indifferent to whether rules were broken, so long as the violations were sufficiently hidden from the university's leadership, the NCAA, and the public. And crucially, the jury did not need to agree that what the defendants believed was happening was, in fact, happening. The defense simply needed to create reasonable doubt as to the defendants’ belief about what the universities knew about their scheme.

I cannot find, with high probability, that the district court's exclusion of the call between Code and the assistant coach from Kansas did not affect Gatto's conviction for wire fraud as to Kansas. Stewart , 907 F.3d at 688. In the call, the coach admitted that he knew that paying for a recruit's brother to visit the school violated the NCAA rules, yet he planned to ask "Jimmy" for help in routing funds to the family through an amateur team, all in the hopes of getting the recruit to eventually commit to Kansas because "it's [his] job" to do so. App'x at 1715. Had the jury heard this call, it may have believed that the coach did call Gatto to ask him to provide the money. In turn, that would make it more likely that Gatto genuinely did not intend to defraud Kansas by his actions at issue in this case. Of course, just because a coach at the school asked Gatto to break the NCAA rules in one instance does not mean that the university condoned or approved of such rule breaking in others, but it does make it more likely that Gatto believed that he was not defrauding Kansas. Given that Gatto exercised his right not to testify at trial, the call would have been critical to understanding what was in Gatto's mind near the time that these payments were made. By excluding the call, the district court may have substantially affected the jury's decision to find Gatto guilty of wire fraud as to Kansas.

The error, however, was harmless as to Gatto's convictions for wire fraud against Louisville and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. As the defense admitted in closing, the jury heard evidence that Gatto called Coach Pitino after Code asked Gatto to route money to a Louisville recruit. The defense argued that the only reason Gatto would call Coach Pitino immediately after receiving this request would be to ask him if that is what he (and Louisville) wanted, but the jury rejected that theory. The excluded call between Code and the Kansas coach would not have provided the jury with anything more to help them find that Gatto did not intend to deceive Louisville, and there is no reason to believe that Gatto knew of the excluded call between Dawkins and Louisville. Because Gatto's conviction for wire fraud as to Louisville was not affected by the excluded calls, that conviction stands. Given Gatto's substantive conviction, the jury's verdict convicting him of conspiracy to commit wire fraud also stands.

The district court's exclusion of the call between Dawkins and the assistant coach from Louisville was not harmless as to Dawkins's convictions, however. The government argues that there was "overwhelming evidence" that Dawkins knew that Louisville did not approve of the payments because he admitted that they "could not be disclosed to the Universities (or coaches)." Appellee's Br. at 75. The call discussing Pitino's "plausible deniability", App'x at 640, and Dawkins's admission that he "would never tell Rick [Pitino] anything ... because I don't want to put him in jeopardy," Supp. App'x at 142, could support an inference that Dawkins knew that Coach Pitino and Louisville did not want him to make the payments at issue in this case. But if the excluded call showing a coach from Louisville describing his relationship with Dawkins as "off the books" was shown to the jury, App'x at 1718, that might have changed the jury's perspective on Dawkins's argument that he was trying to give Pitino and Louisville plausible deniability in the event of an NCAA investigation, despite their knowing full well what was occurring. Because Dawkins too exercised his right not to testify, this call was a crucial piece of evidence that could have helped support the defense's theory about intent when little other evidence was available.

In excluding the call, the district court may have substantially affected the jury's decision to find Dawkins guilty of wire fraud as to Louisville, and the error also necessarily affected Dawkins's conviction on the conspiracy count. To support a conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government has the burden of proving "that the defendant acted with specific intent to obtain money or property by means of a fraudulent scheme." United States v. Carlo , 507 F.3d 799, 801 (2d Cir. 2007). Thus, to find Dawkins guilty of conspiracy, the jury must have found that he intended to defraud a victim university. Given that the district court's error may have influenced the jury's decision as to Dawkins's intent to deceive Louisville, and given that there was no evidence that Dawkins intended to defraud any other victim university, I cannot conclude with confidence that his conviction for conspiracy was not substantially affected by the evidentiary exclusion. By excluding the calls, the district court erroneously deprived Gatto and Dawkins of a fair opportunity to convince the jury that they did not intend to deceive the victim universities. Thus, I would overturn Gatto's conviction on count three and Dawkins's convictions on counts one and two.

* * *

I fear I have belabored the evidentiary issues in this case at undue length. For the most part, I agree with the majority's bottom line: the nature of the prosecution confronted the able district judge with a series of delicate and difficult evidentiary problems, to which the judge for the most part made reasonable, if not indisputable, responses. In many cases, it is easy to police a line between evidence that supports a defendant's good faith and evidence that merely attacks the reputation or probity of the victims. In this case, however, the vices with which defendants sought to tar the alleged victims were not extraneous to the alleged fraud. This was not a case in which the defendants sought to prove that their victims had done bad things that had little or nothing to do with the scheme of which defendants were accused, but which might make a jury feel that the defendants were unworthy of the law's protection.

Here, the defendants’ argument was that the things the government said they stole from the universities – the scholarship money provided to the athletes and the university's ability to comply with NCAA rules and avoid penalties – were things that they reasonably believed the universities were in fact happy enough to give up in the pursuit of greater financial benefit. The defendants claimed to believe that by not openly acknowledging the rules violations they committed, they were deceiving no one, because the universities in fact knew that such violations happened regularly. The universities did not know of the specific payments made by these particular defendants not because the defendants pulled the wool over the victims’ eyes, but because the alleged victims desired not to know too much, in order to preserve a hypocritical pretense of compliance while pursuing the financial and reputational benefits of maintaining successful athletic programs without paying the athletes whose skills and hard work generate the profits that go to the adult coaches and schools.

Such a cynical theory may be a caricature of how college sports are in fact conducted. No doubt many university officials and athletic coaches genuinely attempt to comply with rules derived from a model of amateurism that some others desecrate, and that is difficult to maintain in a world where winning games and making money can come to be seen as the highest goals. To whatever extent the defendants’ professed beliefs correspond to reality, evidence to that effect would be difficult to come by; the essence of the defense is that the universities pretended to want to run clean programs, and that this pretense required those who funneled payments to hard-pressed families of student athletes to operate in secret, as if they were deceiving universities that themselves were trying to hide what makes their programs successful. And in the absence of evidence directly supporting their claims, defendants fell back on evidence that provides only limited, indirect support for their specific theory, and that does so by painting a grim picture of widespread corruption and hypocrisy without quite engaging the government's evidence suggesting that at least these particular victims were genuinely defrauded.

The district court was ultimately right to try to prevent the defendants from putting the entire NCAA system on trial for its exploitation of athletes under circumstances that make violations of the sort in which these defendants engaged all but inevitable, or even to appear morally justified in providing some recompense to those whose labor generates the money that enriches others. Whatever value such a trial might have in the court of public opinion, and however such a "defense" might affect the wise judgment of prosecutors as to what cases are worth the expenditure of significant law enforcement resources, the legal issues in a case like this are far narrower.

By the same token, a venture into the underside of college athletic recruiting opens up significant questions about the motivations and beliefs of the participants. We should be particularly careful not to sweep too broadly in declaring out of bounds evidence that does indeed support the defendants’ claims about what they believed. The cynicism of their claimed beliefs does not do them much credit, but on this record one is left with a queasy feeling that the deeper cynicism may be in the system within which they operate.

People like the defendants operate at the seamiest margin of amateur sports. They (and the athletes and their families who succumb to their offers) are violating the rules by which the universities, cynically or sincerely, have agreed to be bound – rules of which the athletes are well aware, and with which they are required to represent that they have complied. And such violations are not victimless. Only a few athletes have the talent to skip the college game and succeed at the highest professional level. A few more are realistic candidates for such success, if they are properly trained and groomed by the opportunity to compete in college programs. Most who compete in college have an opportunity to earn a degree that will stand them in good stead even if they do not play professional sports – but only if they can pay for their education with their labor on behalf of the school's teams. But all are vulnerable to losing those scholarships, and having their vocational training disrupted, if they are publicly known to have violated the rules. Whether or not those who bribe aspiring athletes to sign onto a particular college's basketball program have defrauded the universities, they expose the youthful athletes to a high degree of risk.

It is not for judges to decide whether it makes sense to use federal law enforcement revenues to pursue the relatively low-level agents of corruption in this system. Our only responsibility is to decide whether the defendants have been tried and convicted on the charges brought against them in accordance with the law, including the applicable rules of evidence. The questions in this case are very close, and the experienced trial judge and my colleagues on this panel have honorably applied the governing rules. Our disagreements are narrow, and involve only a few of the many close evidentiary calls forced on the judge by the nature of the charges. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion that uphold those rulings that I find erroneous and prejudicial, and from the judgment of the court insofar as it affirms Gatto's conviction on count three and Dawkins's convictions on counts one and two.

 

6.4 Bribery 6.4 Bribery

6.4.2 United States v. Blagojevich 6.4.2 United States v. Blagojevich

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rod BLAGOJEVICH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-3853.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 13, 2013.

Decided July 21, 2015.

*732Debra Riggs Bonamici, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Leonard Goodman, Attorney, Len Goodman Law Office LLC, Lauren Faust Kaeseberg, Attorney, Kaplan & Sorosky, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

*733EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Rod Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes after two jury trials. The crimes include attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The first trial ended with a conviction on the false-statement count and a mistrial on the others after the jury could not agree. The second trial produced convictions on 17 additional counts. At the time of his arrest in December 2008, Bla-gojevich was Governor of Illinois; the state legislature impeached and removed him from office the next month. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment on the counts that authorize 20-year maximum terms, and lesser terms on all other counts. All sentences run concurrently, so the total is 168 months. Because the charges are complex, the trials long, and the issues numerous, an effort to relate many details would produce a book-length opinion. Instead we present only the most important facts and discuss only the parties’ principal arguments. All else has been considered but does not require discussion.

The events leading to Blagojevich’s arrest began when Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election for President in November 2008. When Obama took office in January 2009, Blagoje-vich would appoint his replacement, to serve until the time set by a writ of election. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir.2010). Before the 2008 election, federal agents had been investigating Bla-gojevich and his associates. Evidence from some of those associates had led to warrants authorizing the interception of Blagojevich’s phone calls. (The validity of these warrants has not been contested on this appeal.) Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza.

Through intermediaries (his own and the President-elect’s), Blagojevich sought a favor from Sen. Obama in exchange for appointing Valerie Jarrett, who Blagojevich perceived as the person Sen. Obama would like to have succeed him. Blagojevich asked for an appointment to the Cabinet or for the President-elect to persuade a foundation to hire him at a substantial salary after his term as Governor ended, or find someone to donate $10 million and up to a new “social-welfare” organization that he would control. The President-elect was not willing to make a deal, and Blago-jevich would not appoint Jarrett without compensation, saying: “They’re not willing to give me anything except appreciation. Fuck them.”

Blagojevich then turned to supporters of Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr., offering the appointment in exchange for a $1.5 million “campaign contribution.” (We put “campaign contribution” in quotation marks because Blagojevich was serving his second term as Governor and had decided not to run for a third. A jury was entitled to conclude that the money was for his personal benefit rather than a campaign.) Blagojevich broke off negotiations after learning about the wiretaps, and he was arrested before he could negotiate with anyone else.

The indictment charged these negotiations as attempted extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951, plus corrupt solicitation of funds (18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 666(a)(1)(B)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346). The indictment also charged Blagojevich with other attempts to raise money in exchange for the performance of official acts, even though federal law forbids any payment (or agreement to pay), including a campaign contribution, in exchange for the performance of an official act. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. *734257, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991). We give just 'two examples.

First, when lobbyists for Children’s Memorial Hospital sought an increase in reimbursement rates for Medicaid patients, Blagojevich (through intermediaries) replied that he would approve an extra $8 to $10 million of reimbursement in exchange for a “campaign contribution” of $50,000. Blagojevich initially approved a rate increase but delayed and then rescinded it when waiting for a contribution; he was arrested before any money changed hands.

Second, after the state legislature had approved an extension of a program that taxed casinos for the benefit of racetracks — see Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 651 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.2011) (en banc); Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2014) — but before Blagojevich signed the bill, he attempted to ensure that John Johnston, who owned interests in two of the racetracks, fulfilled a $100,000 “campaign” pledge. Blagojevich had intermediaries inform Johnston that the bill would not be signed until the money arrived. Blagojevich was arrested before he signed the bill (and before Johnston signed a check).

These charges led to guilty verdicts at the second trial. The charge that produced a guilty verdict at the first trial was that Blagojevich had lied to the FBI in 2005, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Investigations of Blagojevich’s associates began shortly after he took office as Governor in 2003, and by 2005 the FBI wanted to ask Blagojevich what he knew about his associates’ conduct. He agreed to an interview in his lawyer’s office. Agents asked whether Blagojevich took contributions into account when approving state contracts or making appointments. He replied “that he does not track who contributes to him and does not want to know and does not keep track of how much they contribute to him.” So an agent testified, relying on his notes. At Blagojevich’s insistence, the interview was not recorded, but a jury could find the agent’s testimony accurate. The jury also concluded that this answer was knowingly false, because in 2005 and earlier Blagojevich regularly found out who contributed how much. (The jury was told to assess-the honesty of this answer based solely on how Blagoje-vich had conducted himself from 2003 through 2005.)

Blagojevich now asks us to hold that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any count. The argument is frivolous. The evidence, much of it from Blagoje-vich’s own mouth, is overwhelming. To the extent there are factual disputes, the jury was entitled to credit the prosecution’s evidence and to find that Blagojevich acted with the knowledge required for conviction.

But a problem in the way the instructions told the jury to consider the evidence requires us to vacate the convictions on counts that concern Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet. A jury could have found that Blago-jevich asked the President-elect for a private-sector job, or for funds that he could control, but the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Sen. Obama was for a position in the Cabinet. The instructions treated all proposals alike. We conclude, however, that they are legally different: a proposal to trade one public act for another, a form of logrolling, is fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.

Because the instructions do not enable us to be sure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary after leaving the *735Governorship, these convictions cannot stand. Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), and United States v. Rivera Borrero, 771 F.3d 973 (7th Cir.2014), with Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). (Perhaps because the jury deadlocked at the first trial, the United States does not seriously contend that any error was harmless; a one-line statement in the brief differs from an argument. Cf. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60-62, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) (an error of this kind is not “structural”).)

McCormick describes the offense as a quid pro quo: a public official performs an official act (or promises to do so) in exchange for a private benefit, such as money. See also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999); United States v. McDonnell, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 11889 (4th Cir. July 10, 2015). A political logroll, by contrast, is the swap' of one official act for another. Representative A agrees with Representative B to vote for milk price supports, if B agrees to vote for tighter controls on air pollution. A President appoints C as an ambassador, which Senator D asked the President to do, in exchange for D’s promise to vote to confirm E as a member of the .National Labor Relations Board. Governance would hardly be possible without these accommodations, which allow each public official to achieve more of his principal objective while surrendering something about which he cares less, but the other politician cares more strongly.

A proposal to appoint a particular person to one office (say, the Cabinet) in exchange for someone else’s promise to appoint a different person to a different office (say, the Senate), is a common exercise in logrolling. We asked the prosecutor at oral argument if, before this case, logrolling had been the basis of a criminal conviction in the history of the United States. Counsel was unaware of any earlier conviction for an exchange of political favors. Our own research did not turn one up. It would be more than a little surprising to Members of Congress if the judiciary found in the Hobbs Act, or the mail fraud statute, a rule making everyday politics criminal.

Let’s work this through statute by statute. Section 1951, the Hobbs Act, which underlies Counts 21 and 22, forbids' interference with commerce by robbery or extortion. Blagojevich did not rob anyone, and extortion, a defined term, “means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right” (§ 1951(b)(2)). The indictment charged Blagojevich with the “color of official right” version of extortion, but none of the evidence suggests that Blagojevich claimed to have an “official right” to a job in the Cabinet. He did have an “official right” to appoint a new Senator, but unless a position in the Cabinet is “property” from the President’s perspective, then seeking it does not amount to extortion. Yet a political office belongs to the people, not to the incumbent (or to someone hankering after the position). Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000), holds that state and municipal licenses, and similar documents, are not “property” in the hands of a public agency. That’s equally true of public positions. The President-elect did not have a property interest in any Cabinet job, so an attempt to get him to appoint a particular person to the Cabinet is not an attempt to secure “property” from the President (or the citizenry at large).

*736 Sekhar v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013), shows that the phrase “obtaining of property” in the Hobbs Act must not be extended just to penalize shady dealings. Sekhar holds that a recommendation about investments is not “property” under § 1951(b)(2) for two principal reasons: first, in the long history of extortion law it had never before been so understood (similarly, political logrolling has never before been condemned as extortion); second, the making of a recommendation is not trans-ferrable. The Court restricted “property” to what one owner can transfer to another. By that standard a job in the Cabinet (or any other public job) is not “property” from the employer’s perspective. It is not owned by the person with appointing power, and it cannot be deeded over. The position may be filled by different people, but the position itself is not a transferrable property interest. A position is “held” or “occupied” but not “obtained,” and under Sekhar something that cannot be “obtained” also cannot be the subject of extortion.

Section 666, the basis (through a conspiracy charge) of Count 23, forbids theft or bribery in publicly funded programs (of which the State of Illinois is one). Count 23 relies on § 666(a)(1)(B), which makes it a crime for an agent of a covered organization to solicit “corruptly ... anything of value” in connection with a transaction worth $5,000 or more. “Corruptly” refers to the recipient’s state of mind and indicates that he understands the payment as a bribe or gratuity. United States v. Hawkins, 111 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.2015). It would not be plausible to describe a political trade of favors as an offer or attempt to bribe the other side. What is more, § 666(c) provides that the section as a whole does not apply “to bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.” Compensation for a job by someone other than a ghost worker is a “bona fide salary” — and, as we’ve pointed out, the “usual course of business” in politics includes logrolling.

The indictment also charged Blago-jevich with wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. That the negotiations used the phone system is indisputable, but where’s the fraud? Blagojevieh did not try to deceive Sen. Obama. The prosecutor contended that Blagojevieh deprived the public of its intangible right to his honest services, which 18 U.S.C. § 1346 defines as a form of fraud. To call this an honest-services fraud supposes an extreme version of truth in politics, in which a politician commits a felony unless the ostensible reason for an official act also is the real one. So if a Governor appoints someone to a public commission and proclaims the appointee “the best person for the job,” while the real reason is that some state legislator had asked for a friend’s appointment as a favor, then the Governor has committed wire fraud because the Governor does not actually believe that the appointee is the best person for the job. That’s not a plausible understanding of § 1346, even if (as is unlikely) it would be valid under the First Amendment as a criminal penalty for misleading political speech. And no matter what one makes of the subject, the holding of Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), prevents resort to § 1346 to penalize political horsetrading. Skilling holds that only bribery and kickbacks violate § 1346. So unless political logrolling is a form of bribery, which it is not, § 1346 drops out.

The prosecutor insists, however, that Blagojevich’s situation is different and uncommon because he sought a post in the *737Cabinet for himself. It isn’t clear to us that this is unusual. The current Secretary of State was appointed to that position from a seat in the Senate, and it wouldn’t surprise us if this happened at least in part because he had performed a political service for the President. Ambassadors, too, come from the House or Senate (or from state politics) as part of political deals.

Some historians say that this is how Earl Warren came to be Chief Justice of the United States: he delivered the California delegation at the 1952 Republican convention to Eisenhower (rather than Senator Taft) in exchange for a commitment to appoint him to the next vacancy on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice 7 (1998); Arthur Paul-son, Realignment and Party Revival: Understanding American Electoral Politics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century 86 (2000). Whether this account is correct is debatable, see Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made 6-11 (2006), and Chief Justice Warren himself denied that a deal had been made (though perhaps a political debt had been incurred), The Memoirs of Earl Warren 250-61 (1977). If the prosecutor is right, and a swap of political favors involving a job for one of the politicians is a felony, then if the standard account is true both the President of the United States and the Chief Justice of the United States should have gone to prison. Yet although historians and political scientists have debated whether this deal was made, or whether if made was ethical (or politically unwise), no one to our knowledge has suggested that it violated the statutes involved in this case. (Whether it might have violated 18 U.S.C. § 599, and whether that statute is compatible with the First Amendment, are issues we do not address.)

Let us go through the three statutes again. McCormick holds that a politician’s offer to perform a. valuable service can violate § 1951 as extortion if it involves a quid pro quo: a public act in exchange for a valuable return promise. We’ve already explained, however, why logrolling does not violate § 1951. The exclusion in § 666(c) for bona fide employment also applies no matter who gets the job. Who would get the public job does not matter to § 1346 either. Indeed, the analysis in United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.2007), applies to Blagojevich too. Thompson reversed convictions under § 666 and § 1346 that had been obtained on a theory that a public employee’s interest in keeping her job meant that she violated federal law if she performed any aspect of her job in ways that she knew she shouldn’t. (The asserted error in Thompson was an incorrect ranking of bidders for a travel-services contract.) Thompson holds, among other things, that the interest in receiving a salary from a, public job is not a form of private benefit for the purpose of federal criminal statutes.

Put to one side for a moment the fact that a position in the Cabinet carries a salary. Suppose that Blagojevich had asked, instead, that Sen. Obama commit himself to supporting a program to build new bridges and highways in Illinois as soon as he became President. Many politicians believe that public-works projects promote their re-election. If the prosecutor is right that a public job counts as a private benefit, then the benefit to a politician from improved chances of election to a paying job such as Governor — or a better prospect of a lucrative career as a lobbyist after leaving office — also would be a private benefit, and we would be back to the proposition that all logrolling is criminal. Even a politician who asks another *738politician for favors only because he sincerely believes that these favors assist his constituents could be condemned as a felon, because grateful constituents make their gratitude known by votes or post-office employment.

What we have said so far requires the reversal of the convictions on Counts 5, 6, 21, 22, and 23, though the prosecutor is free to try again without reliance on Bla-gojevich’s quest for a position in the Cabinet. (The evidence that Blagojevich sought money in exchange for appointing Valerie Jarrett to the Senate is sufficient to convict, so there is no double-jeopardy obstacle to retrial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).) Because many other convictions remain and the district judge imposed concurrent sentences, the prosecutor may think retrial unnecessary — but the judge may have considered the sought-after Cabinet appointment in determining the length of the sentence, so we remand for re-sentencing across the board. (The concluding part of this opinion discusses some other sentencing issues.)

With the exception of the proposed Cabinet deal, the jury instructions are unexceptionable. They track McCormick. Much of Blagojevich’s appellate presentation assumes that extortion can violate the Hobbs Act only if a quid pro quo is demanded explicitly, but the statute does not have a magic-words requirement. New politicians say, on or off the record, “I will exchange official act X for payment Y.” Similarly persons who conspire to rob banks or distribute drugs do not propose or sign contracts in the statutory language. “Nudge, nudge, wink, wink, you know what I mean” can amount to extortion under the Hobbs Act, just as it can furnish the gist of a Monty Python sketch.

Blagojevich contends that he was entitled to an instruction that, if he believed in good faith that his conduct was lawful, then he must be acquitted. That is not so; an open-ended “good faith” defense would be either a mistake-of-law defense in disguise or an advice-of-counsel defense without demonstrating advice of counsel. This circuit’s pattern jury instructions call for a good-faith instruction only when the statute contains a term such as “willful” that (as understood for that particular statute) makes knowledge of the law essential. Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 6.10 (2012 revision).

Suppose Blagojevich believed that winks and nudges avoid the McCormick standard. That would be legally wrong, and the fact that he believed it would not support acquittal unless mistake of law is a defense. Blagojevich does not argue that knowledge of the law is essential to conviction under § 666 or § 1951, so there’s no basis for a good-faith instruction. See United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 942 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689-90 (7th Cir.2008). It is enough for the instruction to cover the mental elements required by each statute. That a given defendant wants to apply the phrase “good faith” to the lack of essential knowledge or intent does not imply the need for a separate instruction; a jury’s task is hard enough as it is without using multiple phrases to cover the same subject. These instructions defined the statutes’ mens rea elements correctly; no more was required.

The argument for a good-faith instruction relies principally on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991), but that’s a different kettle of fish. The Justices read the word “willfully” in a particular tax law to require proof that the accused knew the law, which the Justices saw as technical and beyond the ken of many taxpayers. The word *739“willfully” does not appear in any of the statutes that Blagojevieh was charged with violating. Anyway, he does not deny knowing the rule of McCormick, under which the exchange of - an official act for a private benefit is illegal, so Cheek would not help him even if it applied. The “good faith” argument is just a stalking horse for the contention that the quid pro 'quo must be stated explicitly and cannot be implied from hints and nudges; as we have rejected that contention directly, it cannot be resuscitated in the form of a “good faith” instruction untethered from statutory language.

The district judge did give a good-faith instruction limited to the wire-fraud counts, which have an intent requirement within the scope of § 6.10. The judge used the language of § 6.10, as modified to fit the specific charges, and added one sentence at the end. Here’s how the instruction wrapped up:

The burden is not on the defendant to prove his good faith; rather, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite intent. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew his acts were unlawful.

Blagojevieh contends that this instruction’s final sentence is improper. To the contrary, the sentence just reminds the jury that mistake of law is not a defense. The wire-fraud statute requires a specific intent to defraud but not wilfulness or any other proxy for knowledge of the law. To the extent that Blagojevieh may think that a need to show intent to defraud is the same as a need to show knowledge about what the law requires, he misreads United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1430 (7th Cir.1994). See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 410-11, 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833) (distinguishing these two subjects). The district judge was concerned that Bla-gojevich had been trying to argue mistake-of-law indirectly even though none of the statutes requires legal knowledge; under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion to add a caution to the instructions. Cf. United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir.2015) (an instruction is proper unless “as a whole [it] misled the jury as to the applicable law”).

We now take up challenges to the admission and exclusion of evidence. Each trial lasted about a month, so there were plenty of evidentiary rulings. On the whole, the district judge allowed the defense considerable latitude, but Blagojevieh can’t complain about the rulings in his favor. He does complain about several that went the prosecution’s way, and we discuss three of them.

The first concerns a ruling that excluded wiretap transcripts showing that at the same time Blagojevieh was asking the President-elect for something in exchange for appointing Valerie Jarrett to the Senate, he was asking Michael- Madi-gan (Speaker of the state’s House of Representatives) to support his political program in exchange for appointing Lisa Madigan, Michael’s daughter, to the Senate. Blagojevich’s lawyers contended that his objective all along was to appoint Lisa Madigan, then (and now) the Attorney General of Illinois. The district judge did not allow this wiretap evidence, ruling that it would divert attention from the indictment’s charges. A bank robber cannot show that on many other occasions he entered a bank without pulling a gun on a teller, nor can a teller charged with embezzlement show how often .he made correct entries in the books.

As we’ve mentioned, the district court gave the defense a long leash, and the judge was entitled to conclude that evidence about negotiations with Speaker Madigan would sidetrack this trial. See *740Fed.R.Evid. 403. The Madigan conversations could have shown that Blagojevich was negotiating with many people for the best deal; they would not have shown that any of his requests to the President-elect or Rep. Jackson was lawful. The judge did permit Blagojevich to testify that he had planned to appoint Lisa Madigan all along and that he was deceiving rather than extorting the President-elect. (In the end, however, he appointed Roland Burris, not Lisa Madigan.) Some transcripts admitted for other purposes also contained Lisa Madigan’s name.

Come the closing argument, the prosecutor used the judge’s ruling to advantage, stating:

And the Lisa Madigan deal, you’ll have the calls, November 1st through November 13th. Go back and look at the calls and see how many times Lisa Madigan is actually mentioned.... That’s one, and two, how often is she mentioned in a way that she is not a stalking horse, and you’re not going to find it. She was a stalking horse.

Blagojevich contends that this argument violated the Due Process Clause by so misleading the jury that it could no longer think rationally about his guilt. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986).

Having persuaded the judge to keep most Madigan transcripts out of evidence, the prosecutor should not have argued that the record contains very few references to her. The paucity of references was a result of the prosecutor’s strategy, not the defense’s strategy or a shortage of references in the recordings. But Darden sets a very high bar for a due-process challenge to a prosecutor’s closing argument. In the main, the right response is argument from the defense or correction from the judge, not reversal on appeal. Especially not when the trial lasted five weeks and the prosecutorial comment lasted a few seconds. It is extraordinarily unlikely that this comment, about what is (as we have mentioned) a collateral if not an irrelevant matter, could have affected the jury’s evaluation of the contention that Blagojevich violated the Hobbs Act and § 666 by asking the President-elect or Rep. Jackson for cash (or a lucrative private-sector job) in exchange for Blagojevich’s appointment of the new Senator.

The second evidentiary subject concerns a recording of a conversation between John Harris, Blagojevich’s chief of staff, and William Quinlan, his general counsel. Harris testified; Quinlan did not. During the direct examination of Harris, the prosecutor introduced a recording of a call between Harris and Quinlan, during which Harris asked why Blagojevich had not yet signed the bill extending the racetrack subsidy, and Quinlan replied: “Ah, let’s just say, it is what you think.” The district judge admitted the statement “not for [its] truth but for the effect [it] had on ... Harris and the decisions that he ma[de] as a result of th[e] conversation.” The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit hearsay, which is an out of court statement used to prove the truth of the matter stated, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)(2), but with the judge’s limitation Quinlan’s statement was not hearsay. The prosecutor then asked Harris what he understood (he answered that Blagojevich “was holding the bill because he wanted to talk to [people] about getting campaign contributions from the racetrack owners before he signed”) and what actions he took as a result. No problems so far.

Once again, though, a problem cropped up in the closing argument. The prosecutor said this:

*741John Harris talks to the defendant, and you got that call at Tab 54, and he asks him what to do about the racing bill because what he knows is he has approved it, there’s a green light. The defendant tells him in that call “I’m sitting on the bill.” He already had a hold on that bill as of noon of November the 26th.
What John Harris told you is that the excuse that he got from the defendant on that call made no sense to him, it was a red flag. He said something to him like “I want to see how it all fits together.” What Harris told you there is there was nothing to see on this bill about how it fit in with anything else that was pending at that time. And so what John Harris says, “I bet he’s holding this up for a campaign contribution.” John Harris goes to Bill Quinlan, he tells him what his concern is, and he asks him to talk to the defendant and And out if that’s what he’s doing. And you got the call at Tab 56 where Bill Quinlan confirms that’s exactly what the defendant is doing. ‘And what John Harris testified is once he knew that, he stepped out, and he left it to the defendant and Lon Monk [a lobbyist; formerly Blago-jevich’s chief of staff] to figure out. He knew he wasn’t going to be able to do anything once he had a hold on that bill waiting for a campaign contribution.

The language we have italicized is the problem. It takes Quinlan’s statement as the proposition that Blagojevich was waiting for money. That’s a hearsay use. The only proper use of the statement was for the effect it had on Harris.

Perhaps one could rescue the argument by saying that the italicized sentence is just shorthand for the permitted use of Quinlan’s recorded words: Harris understood them as confirming his belief that Blagojevich was holding the bill in order to extract money from racetrack owners. Jurors might have been hard pressed to tell the difference between “Quinlan confirmed X” and “Harris understood Quinlan to confirm X.” This may reflect adversely on the hearsay doctrine; jurors do not draw subtle distinctions just because they have been part of the common law since the eighteenth century. At all events, “subtle” is the important word. Given the duration of this trial and the power of the evidence, the fact that a prosecutor says “Quinlan confirmed X” when he should have said “Harris understood Quinlan to have confirmed X” cannot have affected the outcome. The judge himself seems to have missed the distinction, despite his earlier ruling. The likelihood of prejudice from this misstatement is minute, and without prejudice there’s no basis for a reversal. See United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 764 (7th Cir.2013).

Now for the third evidentiary issue, and the last we discuss. During trial, the judge admitted evidence that, before his arrest, Blagojevich had retained the services of lawyers with experience in criminal, defense. Blagojevich’s appellate brief contends that the only function of this evidence was to imply consciousness of guilt. The prosecutor replies, however, that this evidence served a different function: to address what seemed to be a developing advice-of-counsel defense. To this Blagojevich rejoins that he never raised such a defense, so the evidence was both irrelevant and prejudicial.

“Advice of counsel is not a freestanding defense, though a lawyer’s fully informed opinion that certain conduct is lawful (followed by conduct strictly in com- ■ pliance with that opinion) can negate the mental state required for some crimes, including fraud.” United States v. Roti 484 F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir.2007), Blagoje-vich did not mount an advice-of-counsel *742defense. He did not fully reveal his actions to any lawyer, did not receive an opinion that the acts were lawful, and did not comport himself strictly in compliance with any such opinion. But he hinted in that direction. Here is some of his testimony:

• “I immediately had Mary [Stewart] find Bill Quinlan for me so that I could talk to Bill Quinlan my lawyer, the governor’s lawyer, about what do I do about this, how do I handle this, because I wanted to be very careful that I don’t get caught up in something that I’m not aware of that isn’t — that is potentially wrong and could very well be wrong.” Tr. 3809.
• “And then I was reconstructing for Bill Quinlan, my lawyer, basically, you know, spilling whatever I knew, whatever was coming into my mind to him about that call, about that conversation about the fundraising requests from Patrick Magoon [the President of Children’s Memorial Hospital] in connection with Dusty Baker [a former manager of the Chicago Cubs who was lobbying on Magoon’s behalf] calling me. And so I was relating this to Bill Quinlan ... because I was basically trying to find out from Quinlan do you think I said something wrong? Could I have done — could I have stumbled into crossing a line of some sort?” .Tr. 4078.
• “Q: Why were you telling Bill Quin-lan that? A: Because Bill Quinlan’s my general counsel, he’s my lawyer and he was in many ways, you know, a — he was in many ways — you know, he — I talked to him about everything that was remotely connected to anything that was on legal issues or pending investigation and all the rest because I wanted to be careful not to do anything wrong.” Tr. 4079.
• “Bill Quinlan ... was my general counsel, and there was nothing I would do of any magnitude that I felt I needed to discuss with my general counsel, my lawyer Bill Quinlan.” Tr. 4092.
• “Q: Did you also have several conversations with Bill Quinlan about the Senate seat? A: Yes. I talked to Bill Quinlan about it constantly, continuously, almost every day. Almost every day. Q: Did you have conversations with Bill Quinlan about [establishing] a 501(c)(4) [social-welfare organization] in relation to the Senate seat? A: I had several conversations with Bill Quinlan about a 501(c)(4) in relation to the Senate seat.” Tr. 4112.

The prosecutor objected to all of this testimony, observing that Blagojevich had not tried to meet the requirements of an advice-of-counsel defense, but the judge allowed the testimony (this is one of the many examples of resolving debatable questions in the defense’s favor). Having asserted that he consulted with counsel, Blagojevich opened the door to evidence that he had other lawyers too yet was keeping mum about what they told him. That’s an appropriate topic for evidence and for comment during closing argument.

Sentencing is the only other subject that requires discussion. The- district judge concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines recommend a range of 360 months to life imprisonment for Blagojevich’s offenses, and the actual sentence is 168 months. Instead of expressing relief, Blagojevich maintains' that the sentence is too high because the range was too high. The judge erred in two respects, Blagojevich contends: first, the judge included as loss the $1.5 million that, he found, Blagojevich *743had asked Rep. Jackson’s supporters to supply. See U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b)®. He calls this finding “speculative.” The judge also added four levels under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a) after finding that Blagojevich was the leader or organizer of criminal activity that included five or more participants or was “otherwise extensive”. Bla-gojevieh contends that the many persons he consulted or used as intermediaries should not count.

The district judge did not err in either respect. The $1.5 million figure did not come out of a hat; it was a number discussed in the recordings. That nothing came of these overtures does not affect the calculation of loss under § 2Cl.l(b)(2), because it is an amount Blagojevich intended to receive from criminal conduct even' though not a sum anyone else turned out to be willing (or able) to pay. As for the leadership enhancement for an “otherwise extensive” organization: This applies whether or not the defendant’s subordinates and associates are criminally culpable. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 Application Note 3. The numbers involved here substantially exceed five and qualify as “otherwise extensive.”

Any error in the Guidelines calculation went in Blagojevieh’s favor. After calculating the 360-to-life range, the judge concluded that it is too high and began making reductions, producing a range of 151 to 188 months. For example, the judge gave Blagojevich a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and took off two more for good measure, even though he pleaded not guilty, denied culpability at two lengthy trials, and even now contends that the evidence is insufficient on every count and that he should have been acquitted across the board. That’s the antithesis of accepting responsibility. The judge reduced the range further by deciding not to count all of the $1.5 million as loss, even though he had decided earlier that it is the right figure. The prosecutor has not filed a cross-appeal in quest of a higher sentence but is entitled to defend the actual sentence of 168 months (and to ask for its re-imposition on remand) without needing to file an appeal. Removing the convictions on the Cabinet counts does not affect the range calculated under the Guidelines. It is not possible to call 168 months unlawfully high for Blagojevich’s erimés, but the district judge should consider on remand whether it is the most appropriate sentence.

The convictions on Counts 5, 6, 21, 22, and 23 are vacated; the remaining convictions are affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for retrial on the vacated counts. Circuit Rule 36 will not apply. If the prosecutor elects to drop these charges, then the district court should proceed directly to resentencing. Because we have affirmed the convictions on most counts and concluded that the advisory sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to be released pending these further proceedings.

6.4.3 McDonnell v. United States 6.4.3 McDonnell v. United States

Robert F. McDONNELL, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 15-474.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 27, 2016.
Decided June 27, 2016.

Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

*2361John L. Brownlee, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Steven D. Gordon, Timothy J. Taylor, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC, Noel J. Francisco, Henry W. Asbill, Yaakov M. Roth, Charlotte H. Taylor, James M. Burnham, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Sonja M. Ralston, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 2014, the Federal Government indicted former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, on bribery charges. The charges related to the acceptance by the McDonnells of $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams, while Governor McDonnell was in office. Williams was the chief executive officer of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that had developed a nutritional supplement made from anatabine, a compound found in tobacco. Star Scientific hoped that Virginia's public universities would perform research studies on anatabine, and Williams wanted Governor McDonnell's assistance in obtaining those studies.

To convict the McDonnells of bribery, the Government was required to show that Governor McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an "official act" in exchange for the loans and gifts. The parties did not agree, however, on what counts as an "official act." The Government alleged in the indictment, and maintains on appeal, that Governor McDonnell committed at least five "official acts." Those acts included "arranging meetings" for Williams with other Virginia officials to discuss Star Scientific's product, "hosting" events for Star Scientific at the Governor's Mansion, and "contacting other government officials" concerning studies of anatabine. Supp. App. 47-48. The Government also argued more broadly that these activities constituted "official action" because they related to Virginia business development, a priority of Governor McDonnell's administration. Governor McDonnell contends that merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or contacting an official-without more-does not count as an "official act."

At trial, the District Court instructed the jury according to the Government's broad understanding of what constitutes an "official act," and the jury convicted both Governor and Mrs. McDonnell on the bribery charges. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Governor McDonnell's conviction, and we granted review to clarify the meaning of "official act."

I

A

On November 3, 2009, petitioner Robert McDonnell was elected the 71st Governor of Virginia. His campaign slogan was "Bob's for Jobs," and his focus in office was on promoting business in Virginia. As Governor, McDonnell spoke about economic development in Virginia "on a daily basis" and attended numerous "events, ribbon cuttings," and "plant facility openings." App. 4093, 5241. He also referred thousands of constituents to meetings with members of his staff and other government officials. According to longtime staffers, Governor McDonnell likely had more *2362events at the Virginia Governor's Mansion to promote Virginia business than had occurred in "any other administration." Id., at 4093.

This case concerns Governor McDonnell's interactions with one of his constituents, Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams. Williams was the CEO of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that developed and marketed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from anatabine, a compound found in tobacco. Star Scientific hoped to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval of Anatabloc as an anti-inflammatory drug. An important step in securing that approval was initiating independent research studies on the health benefits of anatabine. Star Scientific hoped Virginia's public universities would undertake such studies, pursuant to a grant from Virginia's Tobacco Commission.

Governor McDonnell first met Williams in 2009, when Williams offered McDonnell transportation on his private airplane to assist with McDonnell's election campaign. Shortly after the election, Williams had dinner with Governor and Mrs. McDonnell at a restaurant in New York. The conversation turned to Mrs. McDonnell's search for a dress for the inauguration, which led Williams to offer to purchase a gown for her. Governor McDonnell's counsel later instructed Williams not to buy the dress, and Mrs. McDonnell told Williams that she would take a rain check. Id., at 2203-2209.

In October 2010, Governor McDonnell and Williams met again on Williams's plane. During the flight, Williams told Governor McDonnell that he "needed his help" moving forward on the research studies at Virginia's public universities, and he asked to be introduced to the person that he "needed to talk to." Id., at 2210-2211. Governor McDonnell agreed to introduce Williams to Dr. William Hazel, Virginia's Secretary of Health and Human Resources. Williams met with Dr. Hazel the following month, but the meeting was unfruitful; Dr. Hazel was skeptical of the science behind Anatabloc and did not assist Williams in obtaining the studies. Id., at 2211-2217, 3738-3749.

Six months later, Governor McDonnell's wife, Maureen McDonnell, offered to seat Williams next to the Governor at a political rally. Shortly before the event, Williams took Mrs. McDonnell on a shopping trip and bought her $20,000 worth of designer clothing. The McDonnells later had Williams over for dinner at the Governor's Mansion, where they discussed research studies on Anatabloc. Id., at 6560.

Two days after that dinner, Williams had an article about Star Scientific's research e-mailed to Mrs. McDonnell, which she forwarded to her husband. Less than an hour later, Governor McDonnell texted his sister to discuss the financial situation of certain rental properties they owned in Virginia Beach. Governor McDonnell also e-mailed his daughter to ask about expenses for her upcoming wedding.

The next day, Williams returned to the Governor's Mansion for a meeting with Mrs. McDonnell. At the meeting, Mrs. McDonnell described the family's financial problems, including their struggling rental properties in Virginia Beach and their daughter's wedding expenses. Mrs. McDonnell, who had experience selling nutritional supplements, told Williams that she had a background in the area and could help him with Anatabloc. According to Williams, she explained that the "Governor says it's okay for me to help you and-but I need you to help me. I need you to help me with this financial situation." Id., at 2231. Mrs. McDonnell then asked Williams for a $50,000 loan, in addition to a *2363$15,000 gift to help pay for her daughter's wedding, and Williams agreed.

Williams testified that he called Governor McDonnell after the meeting and said, "I understand the financial problems and I'm willing to help. I just wanted to make sure that you knew about this." Id., at 2233. According to Williams, Governor McDonnell thanked him for his help. Ibid. Governor McDonnell testified, in contrast, that he did not know about the loan at the time, and that when he learned of it he was upset that Mrs. McDonnell had requested the loan from Williams. Id., at 6095-6096. Three days after the meeting between Williams and Mrs. McDonnell, Governor McDonnell directed his assistant to forward the article on Star Scientific to Dr. Hazel.

In June 2011, Williams sent Mrs. McDonnell's chief of staff a letter containing a proposed research protocol for the Anatabloc studies. The letter was addressed to Governor McDonnell, and it suggested that the Governor "use the attached protocol to initiate the 'Virginia Study' of Anatabloc at the Medical College of Virginia and the University of Virginia School of Medicine." Id., at 2254. Governor McDonnell gave the letter to Dr. Hazel. Id., at 6121-6122. Williams testified at trial that he did not "recall any response" to the letter. Id., at 2256.

In July 2011, the McDonnell family visited Williams's vacation home for the weekend, and Governor McDonnell borrowed Williams's Ferrari while there. Shortly thereafter, Governor McDonnell asked Dr. Hazel to send an aide to a meeting with Williams and Mrs. McDonnell to discuss research studies on Anatabloc. The aide later testified that she did not feel pressured by Governor or Mrs. McDonnell to do "anything other than have the meeting," and that Williams did not ask anything of her at the meeting. Id., at 3075. After the meeting, the aide sent Williams a "polite blow-off" e-mail. Id., at 3081.

At a subsequent meeting at the Governor's Mansion, Mrs. McDonnell admired Williams's Rolex and mentioned that she wanted to get one for Governor McDonnell. Williams asked if Mrs. McDonnell wanted him to purchase a Rolex for the Governor, and Mrs. McDonnell responded, "Yes, that would be nice." Id., at 2274. Williams did so, and Mrs. McDonnell later gave the Rolex to Governor McDonnell as a Christmas present.

In August 2011, the McDonnells hosted a lunch event for Star Scientific at the Governor's Mansion. According to Williams, the purpose of the event was to launch Anatabloc. See id., at 2278. According to Governor McDonnell's gubernatorial counsel, however, it was just lunch. See id., at 3229-3231.

The guest list for the event included researchers at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University. During the event, Star Scientific distributed free samples of Anatabloc, in addition to eight $25,000 checks that researchers could use in preparing grant proposals for studying Anatabloc. Governor McDonnell asked researchers at the event whether they thought "there was some scientific validity" to Anatabloc and "whether or not there was any reason to explore this further." Id., at 3344. He also asked whether this could "be something good for the Commonwealth, particularly as it relates to economy or job creation." Ibid. When Williams asked Governor McDonnell whether he would support funding for the research studies, Governor McDonnell "very politely" replied, "I have limited decision-making power in this area." Id., at 3927.

In January 2012, Mrs. McDonnell asked Williams for an additional loan for the *2364Virginia Beach rental properties, and Williams agreed. On February 3, Governor McDonnell followed up on that conversation by calling Williams to discuss a $50,000 loan.

Several days later, Williams complained to Mrs. McDonnell that the Virginia universities were not returning Star Scientific's calls. She passed Williams's complaint on to the Governor. While Mrs. McDonnell was driving with Governor McDonnell, she also e-mailed Governor McDonnell's counsel, stating that the Governor "wants to know why nothing has developed" with the research studies after Williams had provided the eight $25,000 checks for preparing grant proposals, and that the Governor "wants to get this going" at the universities. Id., at 3214, 4931. According to Governor McDonnell, however, Mrs. McDonnell acted without his knowledge or permission, and he never made the statements she attributed to him. Id., at 6306-6308.

On February 16, Governor McDonnell e-mailed Williams to check on the status of documents related to the $50,000 loan. A few minutes later, Governor McDonnell e-mailed his counsel stating, "Please see me about Anatabloc issues at VCU and UVA. Thanks." Id., at 3217. Governor McDonnell's counsel replied, "Will do. We need to be careful with this issue." Ibid. The next day, Governor McDonnell's counsel called Star Scientific's lobbyist in order to "change the expectations" of Star Scientific regarding the involvement of the Governor's Office in the studies. Id., at 3219.

At the end of February, Governor McDonnell hosted a healthcare industry reception at the Governor's Mansion, which Williams attended. Mrs. McDonnell also invited a number of guests recommended by Williams, including researchers at the Virginia universities. Governor McDonnell was present, but did not mention Star Scientific, Williams, or Anatabloc during the event. Id., at 3671-3672. That same day, Governor McDonnell and Williams spoke about the $50,000 loan, and Williams loaned the money to the McDonnells shortly thereafter. Id., at 2306, 2353.

In March 2012, Governor McDonnell met with Lisa Hicks-Thomas, the Virginia Secretary of Administration, and Sara Wilson, the Director of the Virginia Department of Human Resource Management. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Virginia's health plan for state employees. At that time, Governor McDonnell was taking Anatabloc several times a day. He took a pill during the meeting, and told Hicks-Thomas and Wilson that the pills "were working well for him" and "would be good for" state employees. Id., at 4227. Hicks-Thomas recalled Governor McDonnell asking them to meet with a representative from Star Scientific; Wilson had no such recollection. Id., at 4219, 4227. After the discussion with Governor McDonnell, Hicks-Thomas and Wilson looked up Anatabloc on the Internet, but they did not set up a meeting with Star Scientific or conduct any other follow-up. Id., at 4220, 4230. It is undisputed that Virginia's health plan for state employees does not cover nutritional supplements such as Anatabloc.

In May 2012, Governor McDonnell requested an additional $20,000 loan, which Williams provided. Throughout this period, Williams also paid for several rounds of golf for Governor McDonnell and his children, took the McDonnells on a weekend trip, and gave $10,000 as a wedding gift to one of the McDonnells' daughters. In total, Williams gave the McDonnells over $175,000 in gifts and loans.

B

In January 2014, Governor McDonnell was indicted for accepting payments, loans, *2365gifts, and other things of value from Williams and Star Scientific in exchange for "performing official actions on an as-needed basis, as opportunities arose, to legitimize, promote, and obtain research studies for Star Scientific's products." Supp. App. 46. The charges against him comprised one count of conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, three counts of honest services fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, six counts of Hobbs Act extortion, and two counts of making a false statement. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349 (honest services fraud); § 1951(a) (Hobbs Act extortion); § 1014 (false statement). Mrs. McDonnell was indicted on similar charges, plus obstructing official proceedings, based on her alleged involvement in the scheme. See § 1512(c)(2) (obstruction).

The theory underlying both the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges was that Governor McDonnell had accepted bribes from Williams. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (construing honest services fraud to forbid "fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks"); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260, 269, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (construing Hobbs Act extortion to include " 'taking a bribe' ").

The parties agreed that they would define honest services fraud with reference to the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. That statute makes it a crime for "a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly" to demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree "to receive or accept anything of value" in return for being "influenced in the performance of any official act." § 201(b)(2). An "official act" is defined as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit." § 201(a)(3).

The parties also agreed that obtaining a "thing of value ... knowing that the thing of value was given in return for official action" was an element of Hobbs Act extortion, and that they would use the definition of "official act" found in the federal bribery statute to define "official action" under the Hobbs Act. 792 F.3d 478, 505 (C.A.4 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result of all this, the Government was required to prove that Governor McDonnell committed or agreed to commit an "official act" in exchange for the loans and gifts from Williams. See Evans, 504 U.S., at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881 ("the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense").

The Government alleged that Governor McDonnell had committed at least five "official acts":

(1) "arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc";
(2) "hosting, and ... attending, events at the Governor's Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific's products to doctors for referral to their patients";
(3) "contacting other government officials in the [Governor's Office] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine";
*2366(4) "promoting Star Scientific's products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific's business to exclusive events at the Governor's Mansion"; and
(5) "recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor's Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company's products could lower healthcare costs." Supp. App. 47-48 (indictment).

The case proceeded to a jury trial, which lasted five weeks. Pursuant to an immunity agreement, Williams testified that he had given the gifts and loans to the McDonnells to obtain the Governor's "help with the testing" of Anatabloc at Virginia's medical schools. App. 2234. Governor McDonnell acknowledged that he had requested loans and accepted gifts from Williams. He testified, however, that setting up meetings with government officials was something he did "literally thousands of times" as Governor, and that he did not expect his staff "to do anything other than to meet" with Williams. Id., at 6042.

Several state officials testified that they had discussed Anatabloc with Williams or Governor McDonnell, but had not taken any action to further the research studies. Id., at 3739-3750 (Dr. Hazel), 3075-3077 (aide to Dr. Hazel), 4218-4220 (Sara Wilson), 4230-4231 (Lisa Hicks-Thomas). A UVA employee in the university research office, who had never spoken with the Governor about Anatabloc, testified that she wrote a pro/con list concerning research studies on Anatabloc. The first "pro" was the "[p]erception to Governor that UVA would like to work with local companies," and the first "con" was the "[p]olitical pressure from Governor and impact on future UVA requests from the Governor." Id., at 4321, 4323 (Sharon Krueger).

Following closing arguments, the District Court instructed the jury that to convict Governor McDonnell it must find that he agreed "to accept a thing of value in exchange for official action." Supp. App. 68. The court described the five alleged "official acts" set forth in the indictment, which involved arranging meetings, hosting events, and contacting other government officials. The court then quoted the statutory definition of "official act," and-as the Government had requested-advised the jury that the term encompassed "acts that a public official customarily performs," including acts "in furtherance of longer-term goals" or "in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end." Id., at 69-70.

Governor McDonnell had requested the court to further instruct the jury that the "fact that an activity is a routine activity, or a 'settled practice,' of an office-holder does not alone make it an 'official act,' " and that "merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, 'official acts,' even if they are settled practices of the official," because they "are not decisions on matters pending before the government." 792 F.3d, at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). He also asked the court to explain to the jury that an "official act" must intend to or "in fact influence a specific official decision the government actually makes-such as awarding a contract, hiring a government employee, issuing a license, passing a law, or implementing a regulation." App. to Pet. for Cert. 147a. The District Court declined to give Governor McDonnell's proposed instruction to the jury.

The jury convicted Governor McDonnell on the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges, but acquitted him on the false statement charges. Mrs. McDonnell was also convicted on most of *2367the charges against her. Although the Government requested a sentence of at least ten years for Governor McDonnell, the District Court sentenced him to two years in prison. Mrs. McDonnell received a one-year sentence.

Following the verdict, Governor McDonnell moved to vacate his convictions on the ground that the jury instructions "were legally erroneous because they (i) allowed the jury to convict [him] on an erroneous understanding of 'official act,' and (ii) allowed a conviction on the theory that [he] accepted things of value that were given for future unspecified action." 64 F.Supp.3d 783, 787 (E.D.Va.2014). The District Court denied the motion. Id., at 802. In addition, Governor McDonnell moved for acquittal on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and that the Hobbs Act and honest services statute were unconstitutionally vague. Crim. No. 3:14-CR-12 (ED Va., Dec. 1, 2014), Supp. App. 80, 82-92. That motion was also denied. See id., at 92-94. (He also raised other challenges to his convictions, which are not at issue here.)

Governor McDonnell appealed his convictions to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the definition of "official action" in the jury instructions on the ground that it deemed "virtually all of a public servant's activities 'official,' no matter how minor or innocuous." 792 F.3d, at 506. He also reiterated his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted. Id., at 509, n. 19, 515.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari. 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 891, 193 L.Ed.2d 784 (2016). Mrs. McDonnell's separate appeal remains pending before the Court of Appeals.

II

The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the term "official act." Section 201(a)(3) defines an "official act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit."

According to the Government, "Congress used intentionally broad language" in § 201(a)(3) to embrace "any decision or action, on any question or matter, that may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity." Brief for United States 20-21 (Government's emphasis; alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The Government concludes that the term "official act" therefore encompasses nearly any activity by a public official. In the Government's view, "official act" specifically includes arranging a meeting, contacting another public official, or hosting an event-without more-concerning any subject, including a broad policy issue such as Virginia economic development. Id., at 47-49; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-30.

Governor McDonnell, in contrast, contends that statutory context compels a more circumscribed reading, limiting "official acts" to those acts that "direct [ ] a particular resolution of a specific governmental decision," or that pressure another official to do so. Brief for Petitioner 44, 51. He also claims that "vague corruption laws" such as § 201 implicate serious constitutional concerns, militating "in favor of a narrow, cautious reading of these criminal statutes." Id., at 21.

Taking into account the text of the statute, the precedent of this Court, and the constitutional concerns raised by Governor McDonnell, we reject the Government's *2368reading of § 201(a)(3) and adopt a more bounded interpretation of "official act." Under that interpretation, setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qualify as an "official act."

A

The text of § 201(a)(3) sets forth two requirements for an "official act": First, the Government must identify a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" that "may at any time be pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official. Second, the Government must prove that the public official made a decision or took an action "on" that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so. The issue here is whether arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event-without more-can be a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," and if not, whether it can be a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."

The first inquiry is whether a typical meeting, call, or event is itself a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." The Government argues that nearly any activity by a public official qualifies as a question or matter-from workaday functions, such as the typical call, meeting, or event, to the broadest issues the government confronts, such as fostering economic development. We conclude, however, that the terms "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" do not sweep so broadly.

The last four words in that list-"cause," "suit," "proceeding," and "controversy"-connote a formal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination. See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (using "cause," "suit," and "controversy" in a related statutory context to refer to judicial proceedings); Black's Law Dictionary 278-279, 400, 1602-1603 (4th ed. 1951) (defining "cause," "suit," and "controversy" as judicial proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (using "proceeding" to refer to trials, hearings, or the like "before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer"). Although it may be difficult to define the precise reach of those terms, it seems clear that a typical meeting, telephone call, or event arranged by a public official does not qualify as a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."

But what about a "question" or "matter"? A "question" could mean any "subject or aspect that is in dispute, open for discussion, or to be inquired into," and a "matter" any "subject" of "interest or relevance." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1394, 1863 (1961). If those meanings were adopted, a typical meeting, call, or event would qualify as a "question" or "matter." A "question" may also be interpreted more narrowly, however, as "a subject or point of debate or a proposition being or to be voted on in a meeting," such as a question "before the senate." Id., at 1863. Similarly, a "matter" may be limited to "a topic under active and usually serious or practical consideration," such as a matter that "will come before the committee." Id., at 1394.

To choose between those competing definitions, we look to the context in which the words appear. Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, "a word is known by the company it keeps." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). While "not an inescapable rule," this canon "is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." Ibid. For example, *2369in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995), a statute defined the word "prospectus" as a "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication." Id., at 573-574, 115 S.Ct. 1061 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that although the word "communication" could in the abstract mean any type of communication, "it is apparent that the list refers to documents of wide dissemination," and that inclusion "of the term 'communication' in that list suggests that it too refers to a public communication." Id., at 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061.

Applying that same approach here, we conclude that a "question" or "matter" must be similar in nature to a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." Because a typical meeting, call, or event arranged by a public official is not of the same stripe as a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee, it does not qualify as a "question" or "matter" under § 201(a)(3).

That more limited reading also comports with the presumption "that statutory language is not superfluous." Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299, n. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006). If "question" and "matter" were as unlimited in scope as the Government argues, the terms "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" would serve no role in the statute-every "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" would also be a "question" or "matter." Under a more confined interpretation, however, "question" and "matter" may be understood to refer to a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," but that does not necessarily fall into one of those prescribed categories.

Because a typical meeting, call, or event is not itself a question or matter, the next step is to determine whether arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event may qualify as a "decision or action" on a different question or matter. That requires us to first establish what counts as a question or matter in this case.

In addition to the requirements we have described, § 201(a)(3) states that the question or matter must be "pending" or "may by law be brought" before "any public official." "Pending" and "may by law be brought" suggest something that is relatively circumscribed-the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as complete. In particular, "may by law be brought" conveys something within the specific duties of an official's position-the function conferred by the authority of his office. The word "any" conveys that the matter may be pending either before the public official who is performing the official act, or before another public official.

The District Court, however, determined that the relevant matter in this case could be considered at a much higher level of generality as "Virginia business and economic development," or-as it was often put to the jury-"Bob's for Jobs." Supp. App. 88; see, e.g., App. 1775, 2858, 2912, 3733. Economic development is not naturally described as a matter "pending" before a public official-or something that may be brought "by law" before him-any more than "justice" is pending or may be brought by law before a judge, or "national security" is pending or may be brought by law before an officer of the Armed Forces. Under § 201(a)(3), the pertinent "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must be more focused and concrete.

For its part, the Fourth Circuit found at least three questions or matters *2370at issue in this case: (1) "whether researchers at any of Virginia's state universities would initiate a study of Anatabloc"; (2) "whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission" would "allocate grant money for the study of anatabine"; and (3) "whether the health insurance plan for state employees in Virginia would include Anatabloc as a covered drug." 792 F.3d, at 515-516. We agree that those qualify as questions or matters under § 201(a)(3). Each is focused and concrete, and each involves a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit, administrative determination, or hearing.

The question remains whether-as the Government argues-merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official qualifies as a decision or action on any of those three questions or matters. Although the word "decision," and especially the word "action," could be read expansively to support the Government's view, our opinion in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), rejects that interpretation.

In Sun-Diamond, the Court stated that it was not an "official act" under § 201 for the President to host a championship sports team at the White House, the Secretary of Education to visit a high school, or the Secretary of Agriculture to deliver a speech to "farmers concerning various matters of USDA policy." Id., at 407, 119 S.Ct. 1402. We recognized that "the Secretary of Agriculture always has before him or in prospect matters that affect farmers, just as the President always has before him or in prospect matters that affect college and professional sports, and the Secretary of Education matters that affect high schools." Ibid. But we concluded that the existence of such pending matters was not enough to find that any action related to them constituted an "official act." Ibid. It was possible to avoid the "absurdities" of convicting individuals on corruption charges for engaging in such conduct, we explained, "through the definition of that term, " i.e., by adopting a more limited definition of "official acts." Id., at 408, 119 S.Ct. 1402.

It is apparent from Sun-Diamond that hosting an event, meeting with other officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing alone, a "decision or action" within the meaning of § 201(a)(3), even if the event, meeting, or speech is related to a pending question or matter. Instead, something more is required: § 201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make a decision or take an action on that question or matter, or agree to do so.

For example, a decision or action to initiate a research study-or a decision or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics-would qualify as an "official act." A public official may also make a decision or take an action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" by using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an "official act." In addition, if a public official uses his official position to provide advice to another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an "official act" by another official, that too can qualify as a decision or action for purposes of § 201(a)(3). See United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 234, 34 S.Ct. 512, 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914) (finding "official action" on the part of subordinates where their superiors "would necessarily rely largely upon the reports and advice of subordinates ... who were more directly acquainted with" the "facts and circumstances of particular cases").

Under this Court's precedents, a public official is not required to actually *2371make a decision or take an action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; it is enough that the official agree to do so. See Evans, 504 U.S., at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881. The agreement need not be explicit, and the public official need not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain. Nor must the public official in fact intend to perform the "official act," so long as he agrees to do so. A jury could, for example, conclude that an agreement was reached if the evidence shows that the public official received a thing of value knowing that it was given with the expectation that the official would perform an "official act" in return. See ibid. It is up to the jury, under the facts of the case, to determine whether the public official agreed to perform an "official act" at the time of the alleged quid pro quo . The jury may consider a broad range of pertinent evidence, including the nature of the transaction, to answer that question.

Setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling an official (or agreeing to do so) merely to talk about a research study or to gather additional information, however, does not qualify as a decision or action on the pending question of whether to initiate the study. Simply expressing support for the research study at a meeting, event, or call-or sending a subordinate to such a meeting, event, or call-similarly does not qualify as a decision or action on the study, as long as the public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official or provide advice, knowing or intending such advice to form the basis for an "official act." Otherwise, if every action somehow related to the research study were an "official act," the requirement that the public official make a decision or take an action on that study, or agree to do so, would be meaningless.

Of course, this is not to say that setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or making a phone call is always an innocent act, or is irrelevant, in cases like this one. If an official sets up a meeting, hosts an event, or makes a phone call on a question or matter that is or could be pending before another official, that could serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act. A jury could conclude, for example, that the official was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending matter. And if the official agreed to exert that pressure or give that advice in exchange for a thing of value, that would be illegal.

The Government relies on this Court's decision in Birdsall to support a more expansive interpretation of "official act," but Birdsall is fully consistent with our reading of § 201(a)(3). We held in Birdsall that "official action" could be established by custom rather than "by statute" or "a written rule or regulation," and need not be a formal part of an official's decisionmaking process. 233 U.S., at 230-231, 34 S.Ct. 512. That does not mean, however, that every decision or action customarily performed by a public official-such as the myriad decisions to refer a constituent to another official-counts as an "official act." The "official action" at issue in Birdsall was "advis[ing] the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contrary to the truth," that the facts of the case warranted granting leniency to certain defendants convicted of "unlawfully selling liquor to Indians." Id., at 227-230, 34 S.Ct. 512. That "decision or action" fits neatly within our understanding of § 201(a)(3) : It reflected a decision or action to advise another official on the pending question whether to grant leniency.

In sum, an "official act" is a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."

*2372The "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must involve a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee. It must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official. To qualify as an "official act," the public official must make a decision or take an action on that "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," or agree to do so. That decision or action may include using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an "official act," or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an "official act" by another official. Setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or agreeing to do so)-without more-does not fit that definition of "official act."

B

In addition to being inconsistent with both text and precedent, the Government's expansive interpretation of "official act" would raise significant constitutional concerns. Section 201 prohibits quid pro quo corruption-the exchange of a thing of value for an "official act." In the Government's view, nearly anything a public official accepts-from a campaign contribution to lunch-counts as a quid ; and nearly anything a public official does-from arranging a meeting to inviting a guest to an event-counts as a quo . See Brief for United States 14, 27; Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35, 44-46.

But conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time. The basic compact underlying representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns-whether it is the union official worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder why it took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm. The Government's position could cast a pall of potential prosecution over these relationships if the union had given a campaign contribution in the past or the homeowners invited the official to join them on their annual outing to the ballgame. Officials might wonder whether they could respond to even the most commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink from participating in democratic discourse.

This concern is substantial. White House counsel who worked in every administration from that of President Reagan to President Obama warn that the Government's "breathtaking expansion of public-corruption law would likely chill federal officials' interactions with the people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform their duties." Brief for Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae 6. Six former Virginia attorneys general-four Democrats and two Republicans-also filed an amicus brief in this Court echoing those concerns, as did 77 former state attorneys general from States other than Virginia-41 Democrats, 35 Republicans, and 1 independent. Brief for Former Virginia Attorneys General as Amici Curiae 1-2, 16; Brief for 77 Former State Attorneys General (Non-Virginia) as Amici Curiae 1-2.

None of this, of course, is to suggest that the facts of this case typify normal political interaction between public officials and their constituents. Far from it. But the Government's legal interpretation is not confined to cases involving extravagant gifts or large sums of money, and we cannot construe a criminal statute on the *2373assumption that the Government will "use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). The Court in Sun-Diamond declined to rely on "the Government's discretion" to protect against overzealous prosecutions under § 201, concluding instead that "a statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the latter." 526 U.S., at 408, 412, 119 S.Ct. 1402.

A related concern is that, under the Government's interpretation, the term "official act" is not defined "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," or "in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Skilling, 561 U.S., at 402-403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the " 'standardless sweep' " of the Government's reading, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), public officials could be subject to prosecution, without fair notice, for the most prosaic interactions. "Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison" for up to 15 years raises the serious concern that the provision "does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Our more constrained interpretation of § 201(a)(3) avoids this "vagueness shoal." Skilling, 561 U.S., at 368, 130 S.Ct. 2896.

The Government's position also raises significant federalism concerns. A State defines itself as a sovereign through "the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). That includes the prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state officials and their constituents. Here, where a more limited interpretation of "official act" is supported by both text and precedent, we decline to "construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards" of "good government for local and state officials." McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) ; see also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 410-411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (rejecting a "broad concept of extortion" that would lead to "an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States").

III

A

Governor McDonnell argues that his convictions must be vacated because the jury was improperly instructed on the meaning of "official act" under § 201(a)(3) of the federal bribery statute. According to Governor McDonnell, the District Court "refused to convey any meaningful limits on 'official act,' giving an instruction that allowed the jury to convict [him] for lawful conduct." Brief for Petitioner 51. We agree.

The jury instructions included the statutory definition of "official action," and further defined the term to include "actions that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official's position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law." Supp. App. 69-70. The instructions also stated that "official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs," including acts "in furtherance of longer-term goals" or "in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end." Id., at 70. In light of *2374our interpretation of the term "official acts," those instructions lacked important qualifications, rendering them significantly overinclusive.

First, the instructions did not adequately explain to the jury how to identify the "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." As noted, the Fourth Circuit held that "the Government presented evidence of three questions or matters": (1) "whether researchers at any of Virginia's state universities would initiate a study of Anatabloc"; (2) "whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission" would "allocate grant money for the study of anatabine"; and (3) "whether the health insurance plan for state employees in Virginia would include Anatabloc as a covered drug." 792 F.3d, at 515-516.

The problem with the District Court's instructions is that they provided no assurance that the jury reached its verdict after finding those questions or matters. The testimony at trial described how Governor McDonnell set up meetings, contacted other officials, and hosted events. It is possible the jury thought that a typical meeting, call, or event was itself a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." If so, the jury could have convicted Governor McDonnell without finding that he committed or agreed to commit an "official act," as properly defined. To prevent this problem, the District Court should have instructed the jury that it must identify a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" involving the formal exercise of governmental power.

Second, the instructions did not inform the jury that the "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must be more specific and focused than a broad policy objective. The Government told the jury in its closing argument that "[w]hatever it was" Governor McDonnell had done, "it's all official action." App. to Pet. for Cert. 263a-264a. Based on that remark, and the repeated references to "Bob's for Jobs" at trial, the jury could have thought that the relevant "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" was something as nebulous as "Virginia business and economic development," as the District Court itself concluded. Supp. App. 87-88 ("The alleged official actions in this case were within the range of actions on questions, matters, or causes pending before McDonnell as Governor as multiple witnesses testified that Virginia business and economic development was a top priority in McDonnell's administration"). To avoid that misconception, the District Court should have instructed the jury that the pertinent "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought before any public official," such as the question whether to initiate the research studies.

Third, the District Court did not instruct the jury that to convict Governor McDonnell, it had to find that he made a decision or took an action-or agreed to do so-on the identified "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," as we have construed that requirement. At trial, several of Governor McDonnell's subordinates testified that he asked them to attend a meeting, not that he expected them to do anything other than that. See, e.g., App. 3075, 3739-3740, 4220. If that testimony reflects what Governor McDonnell agreed to do at the time he accepted the loans and gifts from Williams, then he did not agree to make a decision or take an action on any of the three questions or matters described by the Fourth Circuit.

The jury may have disbelieved that testimony or found other evidence that Governor McDonnell agreed to exert *2375pressure on those officials to initiate the research studies or add Anatabloc to the state health plan, but it is also possible that the jury convicted Governor McDonnell without finding that he agreed to make a decision or take an action on a properly defined "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." To forestall that possibility, the District Court should have instructed the jury that merely arranging a meeting or hosting an event to discuss a matter does not count as a decision or action on that matter.

Because the jury was not correctly instructed on the meaning of "official act," it may have convicted Governor McDonnell for conduct that is not unlawful. For that reason, we cannot conclude that the errors in the jury instructions were "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accordingly vacate Governor McDonnell's convictions.

B

Governor McDonnell raises two additional claims. First, he argues that the charges against him must be dismissed because the honest services statute and the Hobbs Act are unconstitutionally vague. See Brief for Petitioner 58-61. We reject that claim. For purposes of this case, the parties defined honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion with reference to § 201 of the federal bribery statute. Because we have interpreted the term "official act" in § 201(a)(3) in a way that avoids the vagueness concerns raised by Governor McDonnell, we decline to invalidate those statutes under the facts here. See Skilling, 561 U.S., at 403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (seeking "to construe, not condemn, Congress' enactments").

Second, Governor McDonnell argues that the charges must be dismissed because there is insufficient evidence that he committed an "official act," or that he agreed to do so. Brief for Petitioner 44-45. Because the parties have not had an opportunity to address that question in light of the interpretation of § 201(a)(3) adopted by this Court, we leave it for the Court of Appeals to resolve in the first instance. If the court below determines that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Governor McDonnell of committing or agreeing to commit an "official act," his case may be set for a new trial. If the court instead determines that the evidence is insufficient, the charges against him must be dismissed. We express no view on that question.

* * *

There is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that. But our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the Government's boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute. A more limited interpretation of the term "official act" leaves ample room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the statute and the precedent of this Court.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.