MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ROBERT D. POTTER, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Motion for partial summary judgment, and Plaintiff’s Motions to compel production of documents, for an in camera inspection, and to reschedule discovery. The Court heard oral argument of both parties on their respective summary judgment motions on August 31, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by W. Thad Adams, III of Charlotte; Defendant, by Lawrence K. Nodine of Atlanta and Michael D. McCoy of Charlotte.

Plaintiff sued Defendant for copyright infringement, claiming that Defendant infringed her copyright on several designs, mostly cute animals, for use on nursery room accessories. Defendant placed these designs on nursery room storage jars, which it marketed to the public.

The Parties’ respective motions for partial summary judgment center on the availability of statutory damages and attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 505 (1982). Defendant urges that Plaintiff is barred from recovering §§ 504 and 505 damages because her registration of the copyright was untimely. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982). Defendant, though not admitting Plaintiff’s ownership of the copyright, argues that it commenced “infringement” more than three months before Plaintiff registered her copyright in the designs. Moreover, Defendant contends, Plaintiff is not entitled to § 412’s three-month grace period, so that, even if the alleged infringement commenced less than three months prior to registration, §§ 504 and 505 damages are unavailable. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 412(1) with 17 U.S.C. § 412(2).

Three copyrighted designs are involved here. Two designs, “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates,” will be considered together, for Defendant committed identical acts at the same times with respect to these two designs. The “Country Traditions” design will be considered separately. Plaintiff registered all three of the designs on April 21 or 22, 1986.

The pertinent statutes are part of the Copyright Act of 1976, which completely revamped the nation’s copyright laws. For purposes of these motions, the exclusive rights in question are set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and (5).

Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;

*239(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, ... to display the copyrighted work publicly.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 504, the owner of a copyright is entitled to choose between recovering actual damages from an infringer, or recovering statutory damages of between $250 and $50,000. Section 505 allows a copyright owner to recover attorney’s fees and costs. The damages provided for in §§ 504 and 505 are limited by 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), which reads:

In any action under this title, other than an action instituted under section 411(b), no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for—

(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its registration; or

(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.

Defendant moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff is not entitled to §§ 504 and 505 damages by virtue of § 412. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the same issue.

The parties agree that the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs were displayed at a Juvenile Manufacturers Products Association (“JMPA”) trade show in Dallas, Texas in October, 1985, and that the products bearing the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs were received in the United States from an overseas manufacturer at least as early as January 1986. Similarly, the parties do not dispute that the Vice President of Marketing for Defendant Pansy Ellen Products requested, by letter dated December 20, 1985, that an overseas manufacturer produce “a few samples” of products bearing the “Country Traditions” design. The parties agree that products bearing the “Country Traditions” designs did not arrive in the United States until after April 21 or 22, 1986.

I. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” Designs.

The question which must be answered to determine Plaintiff’s eligibility for §§ 504 and 505 damages is “when did infringement commence?” Defendant first argues that Plaintiff is bound by her statement in the Complaint that, “[cjommencing in 1985, the exact date being presently unknown to Plaintiff, Defendants began marketing a ‘nursery jar organizer set’ ” bearing “artwork which is the subject of ... [Plaintiff’s] copyright applications.” Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 9 and 10. The Court is not inclined to place such a restrictive construction on the allegations of the Complaint. Plaintiff will be allowed to argue that infringement commenced at a time other than that alleged as the commencement of “marketing” of infringing copies.

More damaging to Plaintiff’s case is the admitted display of jars bearing the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs at the 1985 Dallas trade show. Although in her briefs Plaintiff claims that the only infringements at issue in this case are “the reproducing of the copyrighted work in copies, the preparation of derivative works ... and the distribution of copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Plaintiff also seeks recovery for Defendant’s acts of “displaying the copyrighted work publicly,” Amended Complaint 1115. If the 1985 trade show constituted a public display of the copyrighted designs in violation of Plaintiff’s right under 17 U.S.C. § 106(5), then Defendant’s infringement commenced in October, 1985, and Plaintiff is precluded from recovering statutory damages and attorney’s fees regardless of whether her work *240is published or unpublished as contemplated by § 412.

The Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) represents the first time that Congress recognized an exclusive right to display a copyrighted work as a component of copyright. H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5659, 5676; 2 M.B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.20[A] (1987). The Act defines “display” as a showing of a copy of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A “public display” is a display “at a place open to the public or ... where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” Id. The parties do not appear to contest the characterization of the trade show display as a “display;” rather, the issue is whether it was a public display.

Plaintiff argues that the showing at the Dallas Trade show was not public because attendance at the trade show was restricted to “members of the Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association and only qualified buyers ... are permitted to attend.” Affidavit of Brenda P. Thomas 113, Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff cites case law construing the 1909 Copyright Act’s judicially-created concepts of “publication” and “limited publication.” Plaintiff attempts to equate “public display” under the 1976 Act with “publication” under the 1909 Act. Plaintiff does this without any attempt to acknowledge that the copyright laws were overhauled in 1976, or that the right of public display is a newly sanctioned right. Cf. Technicon Med. Info. Systems Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032, 1034 n. 4 (7th Cir.1982) (noting that 1909 Act remains relevant for “ ‘undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978’ ”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106, 103 S.Ct. 732, 74 L.Ed.2d 955 (1983).

Applying a literal construction to Congress’ definition of “public display” leads to the conclusion that the display at the Dallas trade show was public. Though limited to JMPA members, the audience consisted of “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F.Supp. 653 (D.Kan.1986), the court held that performance of copyrighted songs at defendant’s private club constituted a public performance, notwithstanding that the club was classified as “private” under Kansas law. 650 F.Supp. at 656. By contrast, the use of a copyrighted turkey decoy in a hunt was held not to be a public display. Streeter v. Rolfe, 491 F.Supp. 416, 421 (W.D.La.1980).

Clearly, the Dallas trade show is closer to the private club involved in Ackee than to the hunting party in Streeter. The public display of the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs at the October, 1985 trade show constituted the commencement of infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 412. Since October, 1985 was more than three months prior to Plaintiff’s registration of the copyright on August 21 and 22, 1986, it is unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the designs were published or unpublished. Even if the designs were published, thereby entitling Plaintiff to § 412(2)’s three-month grace period, registration was untimely and Plaintiff cannot recover statutory damages under § 504 or costs and attorney’s fees under § 505 for infringement of the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs.1 Accordingly, De*241fendant’s Motion for partial summary judgment on the § 412 issue will be granted as to the “My Bear” and “Pastel Playmates” designs; Plaintiff’s corresponding motion will be denied.2

B. “Country Traditions” Design

The only act respecting the “Country Traditions” design which Defendant committed prior to Plaintiff’s registering her copyright was the act of authorizing or requesting the Taiwan manufacturer to produce “a few samples” of product bearing this design. If this act constituted infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright, then Plaintiff is not entitled to recover the statutory damages and attorney’s fees afforded by 17 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 505.

As with the right of public display discussed above, the Court deals here with a right newly recognized by Congress: the right “to authorize” infringing acts. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); H.R.Rep. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 5659, 5674. The Copyright Act does not include a definition of “authorize;” however, the legislative history indicates that the inclusion of the right “to authorize” the exercise of the usual rights attendant upon copyright was intended to emphasize that “contributory infringers,” as courts had coined the phrase under the 1909 Act, were liable for copyright infringement even though they did not directly commit a 1909 act infringement. H.R.Rep. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5659, 5674.

The right “to authorize” reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, and public performance and display of the copyrighted work has been construed in only one case, Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.1986). Peter Starr is very nearly on point here, for the court there examined the effect of an authorization occurring inside of the United States, authorizing acts to be committed outside of the United States. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant in Peter Starr had executed a contract with an overseas motion picture company for overseas exhibition of the plaintiff’s copyrighted film. The defendant and the overseas company executed the contract in the United States. When the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint alleged no infringing acts occurring within the United States. The court found that the plaintiff had alleged an act of infringement within the United States: the authorization of the overseas infringement. 783 F.2d at 1443.

Precisely the same situation is presented in the case at bar. The undisputed facts show that Defendant’s agent authorized the Taiwan manufacturer to reproduce the copyrighted “Country Traditions” design by letter sent from the United States. The authorization thus occurred here, and constituted the commencement of infringement as contemplated in 17 U.S.C. § 412.

Plaintiff urges that it was not the authorization in Peter Starr that was important; rather, it was the execution of the contract authorizing the overseas distribution. But the Peter Starr court made clear that the only reason that the court focused upon the execution of the contract was because the plaintiff alleged that it was the execution of the contract which constituted the infringing authorization. See 783 F.2d at 1442 n. 2 (noting issue of fact whether “authorization” occurred during contract negotiations in France or during contract *242 execution in U.S.).3 It is not necessary that a contract be executed in order for an infringing authorization to occur. It being undisputed that Defendant authorized reproduction of the “Country Traditions” design in December, 1985, and that the act of authorizing such reproduction occurred in the United States, Plaintiff is precluded from recovering §§ 504 and 505 statutory damages and attorney’s fees for Defendant’s infringement of the “Country Traditions” design.4

II. MOTION TO COMPEL

Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to produce seven documents which Defendant claims are protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (scope of discovery includes “any matter, not privileged, ...”). Defendant “inadvertently” produced three of the documents, referred to as documents numbers 1-3, in response to Plaintiff’s request for production. When Defendant apprised Plaintiff of its claim that the three documents it produced were privileged, Plaintiff asked that Defendant provide a list of all requested documents, produced or not, as to which Defendant claimed a privilege.5

Plaintiff claims that the list produced by Defendant inadequately describes the documents.6 Plaintiff also claims that, with respect to those documents which were produced, though inadvertently, the privilege *243has been waived. Plaintiff argues further that, since all of the documents are from Defendant’s employees to Defendant’s attorneys, no privilege attaches because no legal advice is contained therein. Plaintiff requests that the Court conduct an in camera review of the documents to determine whether each is privileged. The Court has done so, and finds that the claim of privilege is valid as to document No. 5, and either is invalid or has been waived with respect to the other documents.

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s argument that, because no legal advice was contained in the documents, they are not protected, is specious. It is client confidences, not attorney advice, that are protected by the privilege.

The Fourth Circuit adheres to the standard for attorney-client privilege enunciated in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.Mass.1950):

The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.”

United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir.1982); quoting United Shoe Machinery, 89 F.Supp. at 358-59. Where a corporation asserts the privilege, the concept of “client” is more complicated because the corporation cannot act except through agents. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682-83, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court, examining the scope of the privilege, took into account corporate counsel’s need of obtaining information from varying levels of corporate agents. 449 U.S. at 391, 101 S.Ct. at 683. The Court rejected the more constricting “control group” test in favor of a flexible standard for determining when employee communications to corporate counsel are privileged. 449 U.S. at 392-94,101 S.Ct. at 684-85.

Under Upjohn Co., then, the fact that lower-echelon corporate agents made the communications at issue is unimportant. If “[t]he communications ... were made ... to counsel for [Pansy Ellen] acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel,” 449 U.S. at 394, 101 S.Ct. at 685, then the communications are privileged.

With respect to documents Nos. 5-7, the claim of privilege is warranted. All three are communications intended either directly or ultimately for the corporation’s counsel to enable counsel to defend the pending lawsuit. These documents fall squarely within the scope of the privilege as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. Defendant is not required to produce documents Nos. 5-7.

Documents Nos. 1-4 were produced during discovery, though inadvertently according to Defendant. Voluntary production, even where inadvertent, effects a waiver of privilege. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F.Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C.1970).

Plaintiff and Defendant had agreed that several depositions would be taken on July 29, 1987. When the brouhaha over the privileged documents developed, Plaintiff unilaterally cancelled these depositions.

Since Plaintiff’s counsel already possessed documents 1 through 4 when he cancelled the depositions, and this Court has held that he is not entitled to documents Nos. 5-7, Plaintiff’s counsel has succeeded only in further delaying this case. Nonetheless, it is this Court’s opinion that so many of the depositions mentioned in the Court’s Order of June 22, 1987, as have not yet been accomplished, should be allowed; provided that on no *244account shall these depositions be a cause for delaying the trial of this case on any calendar on which it may appear.

Judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum of Decision.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT,

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff’s Motion for partial summary judgment, and Plaintiff’s Motions to compel production, for an in camera inspection, and to reschedule discovery. This Order and Judgment is entered in accordance with the Memorandum of Decision filed simultaneously herewith.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

(1) That Defendant’s Motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of statutory damages and attorney’s fees is GRANTED;

(2) That Plaintiff’s Motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of statutory damages and attorney’s fees is DENIED;

(3) That Plaintiff’s Motion to compel production of documents is DENIED insofar as it relates to documents not already produced;

(4) That Plaintiff’s Motion for an in camera review is GRANTED; and

(5) That Plaintiff’s Motion to reschedule discovery is GRANTED and discovery is rescheduled as follows:

Plaintiff shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order and Judgment to accomplish the depositions as mentioned in this Court’s Order of June 22, 1987; provided, that the scheduling of these depositions shall not be cause for delay of the trial of this case on any calendar on which it may appear.

(b) The Brooks Furniture framework superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible. Pp. 1756 - 1758.

(1) Brooks Furniture is too restrictive in defining the two categories of cases in which fee awards are allowed. The first category-cases involving litigation or certain other misconduct-appears to extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. But that is not the appropriate benchmark. A district court may award fees in the rare case in which a party's unreasonable, though not independently sanctionable, conduct is so "exceptional" as to justify an award. For litigation to fall within the second category, a district court must determine that the litigation is both objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to be "exceptional." The Federal Circuit imported this second category from *1752Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611, but that case's standard finds no roots in § 285's text and makes little sense in the context of the exceptional-case determination. Pp. 1756 - 1758.

(2) Brooks Furniture is so demanding that it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous. Because courts already possess the inherent power to award fees in cases involving misconduct or bad faith, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141, this Court has declined to construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly so as to avoid rendering them superfluous. See, e.g.,Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648. Pp. 1757 - 1758.

(3) Brooks Furniture 's requirement that proof of entitlement to fees be made by clear and convincing evidence is not justified by § 285, which imposes no specific evidentiary burden. Nor has this Court interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require such a burden of proof. See, e.g.,Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 519, 114 S.Ct. 1023. P. 1758.

496 Fed.Appx. 57, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to footnotes 1-3.

Rudolph A. Telscher, Jr., St. Louis, MO, for Petitioner.

Roman Martinez, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.

Carter G. Phillips, Washington, DC, for the Respondent.

Rudolph A. Telscher, Jr., Counsel of Record, Kara R. Fussner, Steven E. Holtshouser, Daisy Manning, Harness, Dickey & Pierce, PLC, St. Louis, MO, for Petitioner.

Carter G. Phillips, Ryan C. Morris, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, Larry R. Laycock, David R. Wright, Jared J. Braithwaite, Maschoff Brennan, Laycock Gilmore, Israelsen & Wright, Salt Lake City, UT, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.^*

Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court to award attorney's fees in patent litigation. It provides, in its entirety, that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "[a] case may be deemed exceptional" under § 285 only in two limited circumstances: "when there has been some material inappropriate conduct," or when the litigation is both "brought in subjective bad faith" and "objectively baseless." Id., at 1381. The question before us is whether the Brooks Furniture framework *1753is consistent with the statutory text. We hold that it is not.

I

A

Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in patent litigation. Rather, the "American Rule" governed: " '[E]ach litigant pa[id] his own attorney's fees, win or lose....' " Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013). In 1946, Congress amended the Patent Act to add a discretionary fee-shifting provision, then codified in § 70, which stated that a court "may in its discretion award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent case." 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946 ed.).¹

Courts did not award fees under § 70 as a matter of course. They viewed the award of fees not "as a penalty for failure to win a patent infringement suit," but as appropriate "only in extraordinary circumstances." Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (C.A.9 1951). The provision enabled them to address "unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar force," which made a case so unusual as to warrant fee-shifting. Ibid.; see also Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 451 (C.A.3 1951) (listing as "adequate justification[s]" for fee awards "fraud practiced on the Patent Office or vexatious or unjustified litigation").

Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting provision and recodified it as § 285. Whereas § 70 had specified that a district court could "in its discretion award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party," the revised language of § 285 (which remains in force today) provides that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." We have observed, in interpreting the damages provision of the Patent Act, that the addition of the phrase "exceptional cases" to § 285 was "for purposes of clarification only." ²General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653, n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983); see also id., at 652, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 2058. And the parties agree that the recodification did not substantively alter the meaning of the statute.³

For three decades after the enactment of § 285, courts applied it-as they had applied § 70-in a discretionary manner, assessing various factors to determine whether a given case was sufficiently "exceptional" to warrant a fee award. See, e.g., True Temper Corp. v. CF & I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508-509 (C.A.10 1979); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 597 (C.A.7 1971);

*1754Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480-481 (C.A.8 1965).

In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and vested it with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1295. In the two decades that followed, the Federal Circuit, like the regional circuits before it, instructed district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances when making fee determinations under § 285. See, e.g.,Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 688, 691 (C.A.Fed.1984) ("Cases decided under § 285 have noted that 'the substitution of the phrase "in exceptional cases" has not done away with the discretionary feature' "); Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 (C.A.Fed.2000) ("In assessing whether a case qualifies as exceptional, the district court must look at the totality of the circumstances").

In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit abandoned that holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid and mechanical formulation. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005), the court held that a case is "exceptional" under § 285 only "when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions." Id., at 1381. "Absent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent," the Federal Circuit continued, fees "may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless." Ibid. The Federal Circuit subsequently clarified that litigation is objectively baseless only if it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed," iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (2011), and that litigation is brought in subjective bad faith only if the plaintiff "actually know[s]" that it is objectively baseless, id., at 1377.⁴

Finally, Brooks Furniture held that because "[t]here is a presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith[,] ... the underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by clear and convincing evidence." 393 F.3d, at 1382.

B

The parties to this litigation are manufacturers of exercise equipment. The respondent, ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 ('710 patent), which discloses an elliptical exercise machine that allows for adjustments to fit the individual stride paths of users. ICON is a major manufacturer of exercise equipment, *1755but it has never commercially sold the machine disclosed in the '710 patent. The petitioner, Octane Fitness, LLC, also manufactures exercise equipment, including elliptical machines known as the Q45 and Q47.

ICON sued Octane, alleging that the Q45 and Q47 infringed several claims of the '710 patent. The District Court granted Octane's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Octane's machines did not infringe ICON's patent. 2011 WL 2457914 (D.Minn., June 17, 2011). Octane then moved for attorney's fees under § 285. Applying the Brooks Furniture standard, the District Court denied Octane's motion. 2011 WL 3900975 (D.Minn., Sept. 6, 2011). It determined that Octane could show neither that ICON's claim was objectively baseless nor that ICON had brought it in subjective bad faith. As to objective baselessness, the District Court rejected Octane's argument that the judgment of noninfringement "should have been a foregone conclusion to anyone who visually inspected" Octane's machines. Id., *2. The court explained that although it had rejected ICON's infringement arguments, they were neither "frivolous" nor "objectively baseless." Id., *2-*3. The court also found no subjective bad faith on ICON's part, dismissing as insufficient both "the fact that [ICON] is a bigger company which never commercialized the '710 patent" and an e-mail exchange between two ICON sales executives, which Octane had offered as evidence that ICON had brought the infringement action "as a matter of commercial strategy." ⁵Id., *4.

ICON appealed the judgment of noninfringement, and Octane cross-appealed the denial of attorney's fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed both orders. 496 Fed.Appx. 57 (2012). In upholding the denial of attorney's fees, it rejected Octane's argument that the District Court had "applied an overly restrictive standard in refusing to find the case exceptional under § 285." Id., at 65. The Federal Circuit declined to "revisit the settled standard for exceptionality." Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 570 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 49, 186 L.Ed.2d 962 (2013), and now reverse.

II

The framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.

A

Our analysis begins and ends with the text of § 285: "The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." This text is patently clear. It imposes one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent litigation:

*1756The power is reserved for "exceptional" cases.

The Patent Act does not define "exceptional," so we construe it " 'in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.' " Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1893, 185 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2013); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, ----, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3226, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010) ("In patent law, as in all statutory construction, '[u]nless otherwise defined, "words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" ' "). In 1952, when Congress used the word in § 285 (and today, for that matter), "[e]xceptional" meant "uncommon," "rare," or "not ordinary." Webster's New International Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1934); see also 3 Oxford English Dictionary 374 (1933) (defining "exceptional" as "out of the ordinary course," "unusual," or "special"); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 435 (11th ed. 2008) (defining "exceptional" as "rare"); Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 526 (C.A.D.C.1985) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.) (interpreting the term "exceptional" in the Lanham Act's identical fee-shifting provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), to mean "uncommon" or "not run-of-the-mill").

We hold, then, that an "exceptional" case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is "exceptional" in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. ⁶ As in the comparable context of the Copyright Act, " '[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,' but instead equitable discretion should be exercised 'in light of the considerations we have identified.' " Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994).

B

1

The Federal Circuit's formulation is overly rigid. Under the standard crafted in Brooks Furniture, a case is "exceptional" only if a district court either finds litigation-related misconduct of an independently sanctionable magnitude or determines that the litigation was both "brought in subjective bad faith" and "objectively baseless." 393 F.3d, at 1381. This formulation superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible.

For one thing, the first category of cases in which the Federal Circuit allows fee awards-those involving litigation misconduct or certain other misconduct-appears to extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. See ibid. (defining litigation-related misconduct to include "willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions"). But sanctionable conduct is not the appropriate benchmark. Under the standard announced *1757today, a district court may award fees in the rare case in which a party's unreasonable conduct-while not necessarily independently sanctionable-is nonetheless so "exceptional" as to justify an award of fees.

The second category of cases in which the Federal Circuit allows fee awards is also too restrictive. In order for a case to fall within this second category, a district court must determine both that the litigation is objectively baseless and that the plaintiff brought it in subjective bad faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award. Cf. Noxell, 771 F.2d, at 526 ("[W]e think it fair to assume that Congress did not intend rigidly to limit recovery of fees by a [Lanham Act] defendant to the rare case in which a court finds that the plaintiff 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons'.... Something less than 'bad faith,' we believe, suffices to mark a case as 'exceptional' ").

ICON argues that the dual requirement of "subjective bad faith" and "objective baselessness" follows from this Court's decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993) (PRE ), which involved an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of antitrust law. It does not. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine-established by Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965)-defendants are immune from antitrust liability for engaging in conduct (including litigation) aimed at influencing decisionmaking by the government. PRE, 508 U.S., at 56, 113 S.Ct. 1920. But under a "sham exception" to this doctrine, "activity 'ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action' does not qualify for Noerr immunity if it 'is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.' " Id., at 51, 113 S.Ct. 1920. In PRE, we held that to qualify as a "sham," a "lawsuit must be objectively baseless" and must "concea[l] 'an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor....' " Id., at 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (emphasis deleted). In other words, the plaintiff must have brought baseless claims in an attempt to thwart competition ( i.e., in bad faith).

In Brooks Furniture, the Federal Circuit imported the PRE standard into § 285. See 393 F.3d, at 1381. But the PRE standard finds no roots in the text of § 285, and it makes little sense in the context of determining whether a case is so "exceptional" as to justify an award of attorney's fees in patent litigation. We crafted the Noerr-Pennington doctrine-and carved out only a narrow exception for "sham" litigation-to avoid chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. See PRE, 508 U.S., at 56, 113 S.Ct. 1920 ("Those who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability"). But to the extent that patent suits are similarly protected as acts of petitioning, it is not clear why the shifting of fees in an "exceptional" case would diminish that right. The threat of antitrust liability (and the attendant treble damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15) far more significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere shifting of attorney's fees. In the Noerr-Pennington context, defendants seek immunity from a judicial declaration that their filing of a *1758lawsuit was actually unlawful; here, they seek immunity from a far less onerous declaration that they should bear the costs of that lawsuit in exceptional cases.

2

We reject Brooks Furniture for another reason: It is so demanding that it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law exception to the general "American rule" against fee-shifting-an exception, "inherent" in the "power [of] the courts" that applies for " 'willful disobedience of a court order' " or "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons....' " Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). We have twice declined to construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that doing so would render them superfluous, given the background exception to the American rule, see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) ( per curiam), and we again decline to do so here.

3

Finally, we reject the Federal Circuit's requirement that patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under § 285 by "clear and convincing evidence," Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d, at 1382. We have not interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 519, 114 S.Ct. 1023;Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). And nothing in § 285 justifies such a high standard of proof. Section 285 demands a simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one. Indeed, patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, see, e.g., Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688, 9 S.Ct. 428, 32 L.Ed. 803 (1889), and that is the "standard generally applicable in civil actions," because it "allows both parties to 'share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,' " Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

POSNER, Circuit Judge.

After Anodyne successfully defended against Nightingale’s suit, see 589 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.2009), the district judge granted the defendant’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $72,747. The award was based on 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), which allows attorneys’ fees to be awarded to prevailing parties in Lanham Act suits — but only in “exceptional cases,” a term we shall try to clarify in this opinion because of the surprising lack of agreement among the federal courts of appeals concerning its meaning in the Act. See, e.g., 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30.101 (4th ed.2010); 4 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 23:67 (4th ed.2010). The judge had granted summary judgment in favor of Anodyne on Nightingale’s Lanham Act claim early in the litigation. Nightingale, which had not appealed that ruling, contends that no award of attorneys’ fees is justified, because the case is not “exceptional.”

The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits apply different tests of exceptionality depending on whether it was the plaintiff or the defendant who prevailed. In the Fourth and D.C. Circuits a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees if the defendant’s infringement (most cases under the Lanham Act charge trademark infringement) was willful or in bad faith (these terms being regarded as synonyms), while a prevailing defendant “can qualify for an award of attorney fees upon a showing of ‘something less than bad faith’ by the plaintiff,” such as “economic coercion, groundless arguments, and failure to cite controlling law.” Retail Services Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir.2004); Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808-09 (D.C.Cir.1987).

In the Tenth Circuit the prevailing plaintiff has to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith, while the prevailing defendant need only show “(1) ... lack of any foundation [of the lawsuit], (2) the plaintiffs bad faith in bringing the suit, (3) the unusually vexatious and oppressive manner in which it is prosecuted, or (4) perhaps for other reasons as well.” National Ass’n of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir.2000). Given the fourth item in this list, the Tenth Circuit can hardly be said to have a test.

The Sixth Circuit asks in the case of a prevailing plaintiff whether the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiffs trademark was “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate,” and in the case of a prevailing defendant whether the plaintiffs suit was “oppressive.” Eagles, Ltd. v. American Eagle Foundation, 356 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir.2004). As factors indicating oppressiveness, Eagles quotes the Tenth Circuit’s list but states in the alternative, quoting (see id. at 729) our opinion in S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625, 627 (7th Cir.2001), that “a suit is oppressive if it lacked merit, had elements of an abuse of process claim, and plaintiffs conduct unreasonably increased the cost of defending against the suit.”

The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits require prevailing defendants, as well *961as prevailing plaintiffs, to prove that their opponent litigated in bad faith, or (when the defendant is the prevailing party) that the suit was a fraud. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221-22 (2d Cir.2003); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527-28 (5th Cir.2002); Lipscher v. LRP Publications, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir.2001); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit adds that a court considering a prevailing defendant’s application for an award of attorneys’ fees should “consider the merits and substance of the civil action when examining the plaintiffs’ good or bad faith.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., supra, 280 F.3d at 528.

The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, like the Second and the Eleventh, do not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants; neither do they require a showing of bad faith. Tamizo Roofing Products, Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.2002) (“willfulness short of bad faith or fraud will suffice when equitable considerations justify an award and the district court supportably finds the case exceptional”); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir.2000) (“culpable conduct on the part of the losing party” is required but “comes in a variety of forms and may vary depending on the circumstances of a particular case”); Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.1997) (“a finding that the losing party has acted in bad faith may provide evidence that the case is exceptional” but “other exceptional circumstances may [also] warrant a fee award”); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir.1987) (“bad faith is not a prerequisite” to an award). Yet a later Ninth Circuit decision interprets “exceptional” to mean “the defendant acted maliciously, fraudulently, deliberately, or willfully” (note the echo of the Sixth Circuit’s Eagles decision) or the plaintiffs case was “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.” Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615 (9th Cir.2010).

And where are we, the Seventh Circuit, in this jumble? In Door Systems, Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc., 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir.1997), we said that the test was whether the conduct of the party from which the payment of attorneys’ fees was sought had been “oppressive,” and that “whether the plaintiffs suit was oppressive” turned on whether the suit “was something that might be described not just as a losing suit but as a suit that had elements of an abuse of process, whether or not it had all the elements of the tort.” But that, we said, “would not be the right question if the plaintiff had prevailed and was seeking the award of attorneys’ fees. In such a case the focus would be on whether the defendant had lacked a solid justification for the defense or had put the plaintiff to an unreasonable expense in suing.” Id. The quoted passage was actually discussing the award of attorneys’ fees under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. But fees were also sought under the Lanham Act, and the opinion — seeking to make sense of one of the definitions of “exceptional” (namely, “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful”) that is found, as we noted earlier, in the cases — suggests that the test is the same under both statutes: “oppressive,” in the sense expounded in Door Systems. Id. at 1031-32.

In later cases we said that oppressive conduct by a plaintiff that might justify an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the defendant would be conduct that “lacked merit, had elements of an abuse of process claim, and plaintiffs conduct in the litiga*962tion unreasonably increased the cost of defending against the suit,” S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., supra, 249 F.3d at 627; see also Central Mfg., Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 883-84 (7th Cir.2007); that oppressive conduct by defendants included not only willful infringement of the plaintiffs trademark but also “vexatious litigation conduct,” TE-TA-MA Truth Foundation-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 392 F.3d 248, 261-63 (7th Cir.2004); and that a finding that a suit was oppressive could be “based solely on the weakness” of the plaintiffs claims, S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., supra, 249 F.3d at 627, or the plaintiffs “vexatious litigation conduct.” TE-TA-MA Truth Foundation-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, supra, 392 F.3d at 263. So “vexatious litigation conduct” by the losing party can justify the award of attorneys’ fees to the winner, regardless of which side engages in such conduct, as long as it’s the losing side.

It is surprising to find so many different standards for awarding attorneys’ fees in Lanham Act cases. The failure to converge may be an illustration of “circuit drift”: the heavy caseloads and large accumulations of precedent in each circuit induce courts of appeals to rely on their own “circuit law,” as if each circuit were a separate jurisdiction rather than all being part of a single national judiciary enforcing a uniform body of federal law. But whether the difference in standards generates actual differences in result is unclear because the opinions avoid commitment by using vague words and explicit escape clauses, with the Tenth Circuit’s catchall (“perhaps for other reasons as well”) taking the prize. To decide whether the standards differ more than semantically would require a close study of the facts of each case.

It may be helpful in the interest of clarity, simplicity, and uniformity to start with first principles, by asking why the Lanham Act makes an exception, albeit a narrow one (if “exceptional” is to be given proper force), to the “American” rule that forbids shifting the litigation expenses of the prevailing party to the loser.

The reason has been said to be that “the public interest in the integrity of marks as a measure of quality of products” is so great that it would be “unconscionable not to provide a complete remedy including attorney fees for acts which courts have characterized as malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, and willful,” and the award of fees “would make a trademark owner’s remedy complete in enforcing his mark against willful infringers, and would give defendants a remedy against unfounded suits.” S.Rep. No. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp. 7132, 7136-7137. In addition, the patent and copyright statutes authorize the award of attorneys’ fees, id. at 5, and trademark law protects an analogous form of intellectual property.

A more practical concern is the potential for businesses to use Lanham Act litigation for strategic purposes — not to obtain a judgment or defeat a claim but to obtain a competitive advantage independent of the outcome of the case by piling litigation costs on a competitor. Almost all cases under the Act (this one, as we’ll see, is a rare exception), whether they are suits for trademark infringement or for false advertising, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), are between competitors. The owner of a trademark might bring a Lanham Act suit against a new entrant into his market, alleging trademark infringement but really just hoping to drive out the entrant by imposing heavy litigation costs on him. See, e.g., Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 987 (7th Cir.2004). *963“Trademark suits, like much other commercial litigation, often are characterized by firms’ desire to heap costs on their rivals, imposing marketplace losses out of proportion to the legal merits.” Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories, 201 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir.2000). “The increased ease of bringing suit in federal court and the greater availability of remedies may extend the competitive battlefield beyond the ‘shelves of the supermarket’ and into the halls of the courthouse. Commentators have already suggested that the availability of large damage awards will motivate firms to litigate false advertising suits aggressively in the hope of winning large damage awards and impairing the competitiveness of a business rival, particularly a new entrant.” James B. Kobak Jr. & Mary K. Fleck, “Commercial Defamation Claim Added to Revised Lanham Act,” Nat’l L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, p. 33. Similarly, a large firm sued for trademark infringement by a small one might mount a scorched-earth defense to a meritorious claim in the hope of imposing prohibitive litigation costs on the plaintiff.

These, then, are the types of suit rightly adjudged “exceptional”; for in a battle of equals each contestant can bear his own litigation costs without impairing competition.

When the plaintiff is the oppressor, the concept of abuse of process provides a helpful characterization of his conduct. Unlike malicious prosecution, which involves filing a baseless suit to harass or intimidate an antagonist, abuse of process is the use of the litigation process for an improper purpose, whether or not the claim is colorable. “The gist of the abuse of process tort is said to be misuse of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed, usually to compel the victim to yield on some matter not involved in the suit---- If the plaintiff can show instigation of a suit for an improper purpose without probable cause and with a termination favorable to the now plaintiff, she has a malicious prosecution or a wrongful litigation claim, not a claim for abuse of process---- [T]he abuse of process claim permits the plaintiff to recover without showing the traditional want of probable cause for the original suit and without showing termination of that suit.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 438 (2001). Abuse of process is a prime example of litigating in bad faith.

The term “abuse of process” is not used to describe behavior by defendants. Id. It has been said that “while it is obvious that the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution are prevalent and damaging to both innocent defendants as well as the judicial process, it is not so obvious where the line is that separates an attorney’s zealous advocacy from his tortious interference with the litigation processes.” Leah J. Pollema, “Beyond the Bounds of Zealous Advocacy: The Prevalence of Abusive Litigation in Family Law and the Need for Tort Remedies,” 75 U. Mo.-Kan. City L.Rev. 1107, 1117 (2007). But the need to draw that line is the same whether the plaintiff is attacking or the defendant is defending. If a defendant’s trademark infringement or false advertising is blatant, his insistence on mounting a costly defense is the same misconduct as a plaintiffs bringing a case (frivolous or not) not in order to obtain a favorable judgment but instead to burden the defendant with costs likely to drive it out of the market. Predatory initiation of suit is mirrored in predatory resistance to valid claims.

We conclude that a case under the Lanham Act is “exceptional,” in the sense of warranting an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the winning party, if the losing party was the plaintiff and was guilty of abuse of process in suing, or if *964the losing party was the defendant and had no defense yet persisted in the trademark infringement or false advertising for which he was being sued, in order to impose costs on his opponent.

This approach captures the concerns that underlie the various tests and offers a pathway through the semantic jungle. It can account for most of the case outcomes in the various circuits with the exception of those that make it easier for prevailing defendants to obtain attorneys’ fees than prevailing plaintiffs. The usual rule, notably in civil rights cases, is the reverse: a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, while a prevailing defendant is entitled to such an award only if the plaintiffs suit was frivolous. E.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522-23, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-24, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Sullivan v. William A. Randolph, Inc., 504 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir.2007). But those are cases in which the plaintiff is an individual and the defendant a corporation or other institution, implying an asymmetry of resources for litigation. Plaintiffs and defendants in Lanham Act cases usually are symmetrically situated: they are businesses. Of course they may be very different in size, but this is not a reason for a general rule favoring prevailing plaintiffs or prevailing defendants, for there is no correlation between the size of a party and which side of the litigation he’s on. Big businesses sue big and small businesses for trademark infringement and false advertising, and small businesses sue big and small businesses for the same torts. Disparity in size will often be relevant in evaluating the legitimacy of the suit or defense, but it is as likely to favor the defendant as the plaintiff.

But there’s a puzzle: cases such as Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), state that one of the inherent powers of a federal court is to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” For similar formulations, see, e.g., Mach v. Will County Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.2009); Mañez v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578, 585, 591-92 (7th Cir.2008). That sounds a lot like the abuse of process test that we think best describes the exceptional case that merits an award of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. But if we are right about our interpretation of “exceptional case,” the question arises why Congress bothered to include a fee-shifting provision in the Act; for didn’t the courts already have inherent power to award fees for abuse of process in Lanham Act cases?

Although the fee provision of the Lanham Act dates only from 1975, already by then the courts’ inherent power to assess fees for abusive litigation was recognized. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). But in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719-20, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967), decided eight years before the fee provision was added to the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court held that attorneys’ fees could not be awarded in cases under the Act; it was that decision which prompted Congress to add the fee-shifting provision. Fleischmann rejected the proposition that courts could award fees in cases under the Act without explicit statutory authorization. “The recognized exceptions to the general rule [of no fee shifting] were not ... developed in the *965context of statutory causes of action for which the legislature had prescribed intricate remedies.... [I]n the Lanham Act, Congress meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed. It provided not only for injunctive relief, but also for compensatory recovery measured by the profits that accrued to the defendant by virtue of his infringement, the costs of the action, and damages which may be trebled in appropriate circumstances .... When a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily be implied.” Id. This reasoning is consistent with interpreting the Lanham Act’s “exceptional case” provision as having the same substantive content as the inherent power held inapplicable to Lanham Act cases. The puzzle is solved.

A procedural issue remains to be considered. Abuse of process is the name of a tort. A tort is proved in a tort suit. But a proceeding for an award of attorneys’ fees is not a suit; it is a tail dangling from a suit. We don’t want the tail to wag the dog, and this means that an elaborate inquiry into the state of mind of the party from whom reimbursement of attorneys’ fees is sought should be avoided. It should be enough to justify the award if the party seeking it can show that his opponent’s claim or defense was objectively unreasonable — was a claim or defense that a rational litigant would pursue only because it would impose disproportionate costs on his opponent — in other words only because it was extortionate in character if not necessarily in provable intention. That should be enough to make a case “exceptional.”

In this case, however, there is more. Nightingale, a provider of home healthcare services, had bought several infrared lamps from Anodyne that were designed to relieve pain and improve circulation, paying $6,000 for each lamp. Its Lanham Act claim was that Anodyne’s sales representative had falsely represented that the lamp had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of peripheral neuropathy. The device was FDA-approved and ivas intended for the treatment of peripheral neuropathy, and though the FDA had not approved it for that purpose this did not preclude a physician or other healthcare provider, such as Nightingale, from prescribing the device to patients as a treatment for that condition. The decision to prescribe such “off-label usage,” as it is called, is deemed a professional judgment for the healthcare provider to make. 21 U.S.C. § 396.

Nightingale told its patients that Anodyne’s device was intended for treating peripheral neuropathy, but as far as appears did not tell them that it had been approved by the FDA for the treatment of that condition — a representation that could have gotten Nightingale into trouble with the agency. And when it replaced Anodyne’s lamps with the virtually identical lamps of another company (apparently for reasons of price, unrelated to the scope of the FDA’s approval), it advertised them just as it had advertised Anodyne’s lamps — as devices for the treatment of peripheral neuropathy.

Not only had the Lanham Act claim no possible merit (which would not by itself demonstrate an abuse of process), but the district judge found that Nightingale had made the claim in an attempt to coerce a price reduction from Anodyne. Nightingale would have been content to continue buying Anodyne’s lamps, as indicated by its purchasing lamps that were subject to the same limited FDA approval and advertising them the same way. The fact that *966the FDA had not approved Anodyne’s lamps for treatment of peripheral neuropathy was thus of no consequence, for neither had it approved for that purpose the lamps that Nightingale bought to replace Anodyne’s. To bring a frivolous claim in order to obtain an advantage unrelated to obtaining a favorable judgment is to commit an abuse of process.

Nightingale continues its frivolous litigation tactics in this court by arguing that Anodyne has “unclean hands” because it failed to turn over certain documents during discovery. It is apparent that the documents are not within the scope of Nightingale’s discovery demand once omitted matter indicated by an ellipsis in Nightingale’s quotation from the demand is restored.

Nightingale argues that even if Anodyne is entitled to reimbursement for some of the attorneys’ fees that it incurred, the district court’s award is excessive because it includes fees for defending against claims (discussed in our previous opinion) that were based on state law rather than the Lanham Act. But Anodyne showed that the work that its lawyers had performed in defending against the Lanham Act claim could not be separated from their work in defending against the other claims, and Nightingale presented no rebuttal.

We not only affirm the judgment of the district court but also grant Anodyne’s motion for fees and costs pursuant to Rule 38 of the appellate rules, and we dismiss as moot Anodyne’s motion to strike Nightingale’s brief and appendix.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that, in a case of infringement, courts "may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (2007) (en banc), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted a two-part test for determining when a district court may increase damages pursuant to § 284. Under Seagate, a patent owner must first "show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." Id., at 1371. Second, the patentee must demonstrate, again by clear and convincing evidence, that the risk of infringement "was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer." Ibid. The question before us is whether this test is consistent with § 284. We hold that it is not.

I

A

Enhanced damages are as old as U.S. patent law. The Patent Act of 1793 mandated treble damages in any successful infringement suit. See Patent Act of 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 322. In the Patent Act of 1836, however, Congress changed course and made enhanced damages discretionary, specifying that "it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by [the] verdict ... not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the circumstances of the case." Patent Act of 1836, § 14, 5 Stat. 123. In construing that new provision, this Court explained that the change was prompted by the "injustice" of subjecting a "defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith" to the same treatment as the "wanton and malicious pirate." Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 488, 14 L.Ed. 1024 (1854). There "is no good reason," we observed, "why taking a man's property in an invention should be trebly punished, while the measure of damages as to other property is single and actual damages." Id., at 488-489. But "where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive or exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant." Id., at 489.

The Court followed the same approach in other decisions applying the 1836 Act, finding enhanced damages appropriate, for instance, "where the wrong [had] been done, under aggravated circumstances,"

*1929Dean v. Mason, 20 How. 198, 203, 15 L.Ed. 876 (1858), but not where the defendant "appeared in truth to be ignorant of the existence of the patent right, and did not intend any infringement," Hogg v. Emerson, 11 How. 587, 607, 13 L.Ed. 824 (1850). See also Livingston v. Woodworth, 15 How. 546, 560, 14 L.Ed. 809 (1854) ("no ground" to inflict "penalty" where infringers were not "wanton").

In 1870, Congress amended the Patent Act, but preserved district court discretion to award up to treble damages "according to the circumstances of the case." Patent Act of 1870, § 59, 16 Stat. 207. We continued to describe enhanced damages as "vindictive or punitive," which the court may "inflict" when "the circumstances of the case appear to require it." Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 143-144, 8 S.Ct. 894, 31 L.Ed. 664 (1888) ; Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 174, 12 S.Ct. 825, 36 L.Ed. 658 (1892) (infringer knowingly sold copied technology of his former employer). At the same time, we reiterated that there was no basis for increased damages where "[t]here is no pretence of any wanton and wilful breach" and "nothing that suggests punitive damages, or that shows wherein the defendant was damnified other than by the loss of the profits which the plaintiff received." Cincinnati Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminating Co. v. Western Siemens-Lungren Co., 152 U.S. 200, 204, 14 S.Ct. 523, 38 L.Ed. 411 (1894).

Courts of Appeals likewise characterized enhanced damages as justified where the infringer acted deliberately or willfully, see, e.g., Baseball Display Co. v. Star Ballplayer Co., 35 F.2d 1, 3-4 (C.A.3 1929) (increased damages award appropriate "because of the deliberate and willful infringement"); Power Specialty Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 80 F.2d 874, 878 (C.A.2 1936) ("wanton, deliberate, and willful" infringement); Brown Bag Filling Mach. Co. v. Drohen, 175 F. 576, 577 (C.A.2 1910) ("a bald case of piracy"), but not where the infringement "was not wanton and deliberate," Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (C.A.2 1930), or "conscious and deliberate," Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 986 (C.A.6 1938).

Some early decisions did suggest that enhanced damages might serve to compensate patentees as well as to punish infringers. See, e.g., Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326, 7 S.Ct. 217, 30 L.Ed. 392 (1886) (noting that "[t]here may be damages beyond" licensing fees "but these are more properly the subjects" of enhanced damage awards). Such statements, however, were not for the ages, in part because the merger of law and equity removed certain procedural obstacles to full compensation absent enhancement. See generally 7 Chisum on Patents § 20.03[4][b][iii], pp. 20-343 to 20-344 (2011). In the main, moreover, the references to compensation concerned costs attendant to litigation. See Clark, 119 U.S., at 326, 7 S.Ct. 217 (identifying enhanced damages as compensation for "the expense and trouble the plaintiff has been put to"); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 372, 14 L.Ed. 181 (1852) (enhanced damages appropriate when defendant was "stubbornly litigious" or "caused unnecessary expense and trouble to the plaintiff"); Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2, 8-9, 16 L.Ed. 479 (1860) (discussing enhanced damages in the context of "counsel fees"). That concern dissipated with the enactment in 1952 of 35 U.S.C. § 285, which authorized district courts to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in "exceptional cases" under the Patent Act. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness Inc., 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1755, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014).

*1930It is against this backdrop that Congress, in the 1952 codification of the Patent Act, enacted § 284. "The stated purpose" of the 1952 revision "was merely reorganization in language to clarify the statement of the statutes." Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505, n. 20, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 12 L.Ed.2d 457 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court accordingly described § 284 -consistent with the history of enhanced damages under the Patent Act-as providing that "punitive or 'increased' damages" could be recovered "in a case of willful or bad-faith infringement." Id., at 508, 84 S.Ct. 1526 ; see also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 227, n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 87 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985) ( "willful infringement"); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648, n. 11, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (describing § 284 damages as "punitive").

B

In 2007, the Federal Circuit decided Seagate and fashioned the test for enhanced damages now before us. Under Seagate, a plaintiff seeking enhanced damages must show that the infringement of his patent was "willful." 497 F.3d, at 1368. The Federal Circuit announced a two-part test to establish such willfulness: First, "a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent," without regard to "[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer." Id., at 1371. This objectively defined risk is to be "determined by the record developed in the infringement proceedings." Ibid. "Objective recklessness will not be found" at this first step if the accused infringer, during the infringement proceedings, "raise[s] a 'substantial question' as to the validity or noninfringement of the patent." Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 844 (C.A.Fed.2015). That categorical bar applies even if the defendant was unaware of the arguable defense when he acted. See Seagate, 497 F.3d, at 1371 ; Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (C.A.Fed.2010).

Second, after establishing objective recklessness, a patentee must show-again by clear and convincing evidence-that the risk of infringement "was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer." Seagate, 497 F.3d, at 1371. Only when both steps have been satisfied can the district court proceed to consider whether to exercise its discretion to award enhanced damages. Ibid.

Under Federal Circuit precedent, an award of enhanced damages is subject to trifurcated appellate review. The first step of Seagate -objective recklessness-is reviewed de novo ; the second-subjective knowledge-for substantial evidence; and the ultimate decision-whether to award enhanced damages-for abuse of discretion. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1008 (C.A.Fed.2012) ; Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (C.A.Fed.2011).

C

1

Petitioner Halo Electronics, Inc., and respondents Pulse Electronics, Inc., and Pulse Electronics Corporation (collectively, Pulse) supply electronic components. 769 F.3d 1371, 1374-1375 (C.A.Fed.2014). Halo alleges that Pulse infringed its patents for electronic packages containing transformers designed to be mounted to the surface of circuit boards. Id., at 1374.

*1931In 2002, Halo sent Pulse two letters offering to license Halo's patents. Id., at 1376. After one of its engineers concluded that Halo's patents were invalid, Pulse continued to sell the allegedly infringing products. Ibid.

In 2007, Halo sued Pulse. Ibid. The jury found that Pulse had infringed Halo's patents, and that there was a high probability it had done so willfully. Ibid. The District Court, however, declined to award enhanced damages under § 284, after determining that Pulse had at trial presented a defense that "was not objectively baseless, or a 'sham.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1513, p. 64a (quoting Bard, 682 F.3d, at 1007 ). Thus, the court concluded, Halo had failed to show objective recklessness under the first step of Seagate . App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1513, at 65a. The Federal Circuit affirmed. 769 F.3d 1371 (2014).

2

Petitioners Stryker Corporation, Stryker Puerto Rico, Ltd., and Stryker Sales Corporation (collectively, Stryker) and respondents Zimmer, Inc., and Zimmer Surgical, Inc. (collectively, Zimmer), compete in the market for orthopedic pulsed lavage devices. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1520, p. 49a. A pulsed lavage device is a combination spray gun and suction tube, used to clean tissue during surgery. Ibid. In 2010, Stryker sued Zimmer for patent infringement. 782 F.3d 649, 653 (C.A.Fed.2015). The jury found that Zimmer had willfully infringed Stryker's patents and awarded Stryker $70 million in lost profits. Ibid. The District Court added $6.1 million in supplemental damages and then trebled the total sum under § 284, resulting in an award of over $228 million. App. in No. 14-1520, pp. 483-484.

Specifically, the District Court noted, the jury had heard testimony that Zimmer had "all-but instructed its design team to copy Stryker's products," App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1520, at 77a, and had chosen a "high-risk/high-reward strategy of competing immediately and aggressively in the pulsed lavage market," while "opt[ing] to worry about the potential legal consequences later," id., at 52a. "[T]reble damages [were] appropriate," the District Court concluded, "[g]iven the one-sidedness of the case and the flagrancy and scope of Zimmer's infringement." Id., at 119a.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of infringement but vacated the award of treble damages. 782 F.3d, at 662. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that enhanced damages were unavailable because Zimmer had asserted "reasonable defenses" at trial. Id., at 661-662.

We granted certiorari in both cases, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 356, 193 L.Ed.2d 289 (2015), and now vacate and remand.

II

A

The pertinent text of § 284 provides simply that "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. That language contains no explicit limit or condition, and we have emphasized that the "word 'may' clearly connotes discretion." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (2005) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) ).

At the same time, "[d]iscretion is not whim." Martin, 546 U.S., at 139, 126 S.Ct. 704. "[I]n a system of laws discretion is rarely without limits," even when the statute "does not specify any limits *1932upon the district courts' discretion." Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). "[A] motion to a court's discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." Martin, 546 U.S., at 139, 126 S.Ct. 704 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D.Va.1807) (Marshall, C.J.); alteration omitted). Thus, although there is "no precise rule or formula" for awarding damages under § 284, a district court's "discretion should be exercised in light of the considerations" underlying the grant of that discretion. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1756 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 534, 114 S.Ct. 1023 ).

Awards of enhanced damages under the Patent Act over the past 180 years establish that they are not to be meted out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a "punitive" or "vindictive" sanction for egregious infringement behavior. The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or-indeed-characteristic of a pirate. See supra, at 1928 - 1930. District courts enjoy discretion in deciding whether to award enhanced damages, and in what amount. But through nearly two centuries of discretionary awards and review by appellate tribunals, "the channel of discretion ha[s] narrowed," Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 772 (1982), so that such damages are generally reserved for egregious cases of culpable behavior.

B

The Seagate test reflects, in many respects, a sound recognition that enhanced damages are generally appropriate under § 284 only in egregious cases. That test, however, "is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts." Octane Fitness, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1755 (construing § 285 of the Patent Act). In particular, it can have the effect of insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any liability for enhanced damages.

1

The principal problem with Seagate 's two-part test is that it requires a finding of objective recklessness in every case before district courts may award enhanced damages. Such a threshold requirement excludes from discretionary punishment many of the most culpable offenders, such as the "wanton and malicious pirate" who intentionally infringes another's patent-with no doubts about its validity or any notion of a defense-for no purpose other than to steal the patentee's business. Seymour, 16 How., at 488. Under Seagate, a district court may not even consider enhanced damages for such a pirate, unless the court first determines that his infringement was "objectively" reckless. In the context of such deliberate wrongdoing, however, it is not clear why an independent showing of objective recklessness-by clear and convincing evidence, no less-should be a prerequisite to enhanced damages.

Our recent decision in Octane Fitness arose in a different context but points in the same direction. In that case we considered § 285 of the Patent Act, which allows district courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in "exceptional" cases. 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit had adopted a two-part test for determining when a case qualified as exceptional, requiring that the claim asserted be both objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith. We rejected that test *1933on the ground that a case presenting "subjective bad faith" alone could "sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award." 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1757. So too here. The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.

The Seagate test aggravates the problem by making dispositive the ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable (even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial. The existence of such a defense insulates the infringer from enhanced damages, even if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it. Under that standard, someone who plunders a patent-infringing it without any reason to suppose his conduct is arguably defensible-can nevertheless escape any comeuppance under § 284 solely on the strength of his attorney's ingenuity.

But culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) ("intent" denotes state of mind in which "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act" or "believes" them to be "substantially certain to result from it"); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 34, p. 212 (5th ed. 1984) (describing willful, wanton, and reckless as "look[ing] to the actor's real or supposed state of mind"); see also Kolstad v. American Dental Assn., 527 U.S. 526, 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) ("Most often ... eligibility for punitive awards is characterized in terms of a defendant's motive or intent"). In Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007), we stated that a person is reckless if he acts "knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize" his actions are unreasonably risky. Id., at 69, 127 S.Ct. 2201 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court found that the defendant had not recklessly violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the defendant's interpretation had "a foundation in the statutory text" and the defendant lacked "the benefit of guidance from the courts of appeals or the Federal Trade Commission" that "might have warned it away from the view it took." Id., at 69-70, 127 S.Ct. 2201. Nothing in Safeco suggests that we should look to facts that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he acted.*

Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of culpable behavior. Yet none of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow a finding of egregious misconduct. As with any exercise of discretion, courts should continue to take into account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount. Section 284 permits district courts to exercise *1934their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test. Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, however, such punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.

2

The Seagate test is also inconsistent with § 284 because it requires clear and convincing evidence to prove recklessness. On this point Octane Fitness is again instructive. There too the Federal Circuit had adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof, for awards of attorney's fees under § 285 of the Patent Act. Because that provision supplied no basis for imposing such a heightened standard of proof, we rejected it. See Octane Fitness, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1758. We do so here as well. Like § 285, § 284"imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one." Ibid. And the fact that Congress expressly erected a higher standard of proof elsewhere in the Patent Act, see 35 U.S.C. § 273(b), but not in § 284, is telling. Furthermore, nothing in historical practice supports a heightened standard. As we explained in Octane Fitness, "patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard." 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1758. Enhanced damages are no exception.

3

Finally, because we eschew any rigid formula for awarding enhanced damages under § 284, we likewise reject the Federal Circuit's tripartite framework for appellate review. In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014), we built on our Octane Fitness holding to reject a similar multipart standard of review. Because Octane Fitness confirmed district court discretion to award attorney fees, we concluded that such decisions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Highmark, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1747.

The same conclusion follows naturally from our holding here. Section 284 gives district courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages. It "commits the determination" whether enhanced damages are appropriate "to the discretion of the district court" and "that decision is to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1748.

That standard allows for review of district court decisions informed by "the considerations we have identified." Octane Fitness, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1756 (internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate review framework adopted by the Federal Circuit reflects a concern that district courts may award enhanced damages too readily, and distort the balance between the protection of patent rights and the interest in technological innovation. Nearly two centuries of exercising discretion in awarding enhanced damages in patent cases, however, has given substance to the notion that there are limits to that discretion. The Federal Circuit should review such exercises of discretion in light of the longstanding considerations we have identified as having guided both Congress and the courts.

III

For their part, respondents argue that Congress ratified the Seagate test when it passed the America Invents Act of 2011 and reenacted § 284 without pertinent change. See Brief for Respondents in No. 14-1513 27 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) ). But the language Congress reenacted unambiguously confirmed discretion *1935in the district courts. Congress's retention of § 284 could just as readily reflect an intent that enhanced damages be awarded as they had been for nearly two centuries, through the exercise of such discretion, informed by settled practices. Respondents point to isolated snippets of legislative history referring to Seagate as evidence of congressional endorsement of its framework, but other morsels-such as Congress's failure to adopt a proposed codification similar to Seagate -point in the opposite direction. See, e.g., H.R. 1260, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(e) (2009).

Respondents also seize on an addition to the Act addressing opinions of counsel. Section 298 provides that "[t]he failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel" or "the failure of the infringer to present such advice to the court or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed." 35 U.S.C. § 298. Respondents contend that the reference to willfulness reflects an endorsement of Seagate 's willfulness test. But willfulness has always been a part of patent law, before and after Seagate . Section 298 does not show that Congress ratified Seagate 's particular conception of willfulness. Rather, it simply addressed the fallout from the Federal Circuit's opinion in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (1983), which had imposed an "affirmative duty" to obtain advice of counsel prior to initiating any possible infringing activity, id., at 1389-1390. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, p. 53 (2011).

At the end of the day, respondents' main argument for retaining the Seagate test comes down to a matter of policy. Respondents and their amici are concerned that allowing district courts unlimited discretion to award up to treble damages in infringement cases will impede innovation as companies steer well clear of any possible interference with patent rights. They also worry that the ready availability of such damages will embolden "trolls." Trolls, in the patois of the patent community, are entities that hold patents for the primary purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers, often exacting outsized licensing fees on threat of litigation.

Respondents are correct that patent law reflects "a careful balance between the need to promote innovation" through patent protection, and the importance of facilitating the "imitation and refinement through imitation" that are "necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989). That balance can indeed be disrupted if enhanced damages are awarded in garden-variety cases. As we have explained, however, they should not be. The seriousness of respondents' policy concerns cannot justify imposing an artificial construct such as the Seagate test on the discretion conferred under § 284.

* * *

Section 284 gives district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages against those guilty of patent infringement. In applying this discretion, district courts are "to be guided by [the] sound legal principles" developed over nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of the Patent Act. Martin, 546 U.S., at 139, 126 S.Ct. 704 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those principles channel the exercise of discretion, limiting the award of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement. The Seagate test, in contrast, unduly confines the ability of district courts to exercise the discretion conferred on them. Because both cases before us were decided under the Seagate framework, we vacate the judgments of the Federal Circuit and *1936remand the cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice KENNEDY and Justice ALITO join, concurring.

I agree with the Court that In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (C.A.Fed.2007) (en banc), takes too mechanical an approach to the award of enhanced damages. But, as the Court notes, the relevant statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 284, nonetheless imposes limits that help produce uniformity in its application and maintain its consistency with the basic objectives of patent law. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). I write separately to express my own understanding of several of those limits.

First, the Court's references to "willful misconduct" do not mean that a court may award enhanced damages simply because the evidence shows that the infringer knew about the patent and nothing more. Ante, at 1933 - 1934. " '[W]illfu [l]' is a 'word of many meanings whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears.' " Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007). Here, the Court's opinion, read as a whole and in context, explains that "enhanced damages are generally appropriate ... only in egregious cases ." Ante, at 1932 (emphasis added); ante, at 1934 (Enhanced damages "should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct" (emphasis added)). They amount to a " 'punitive' " sanction for engaging in conduct that is either "deliberate" or "wanton." Ante, at 1931 - 1932; compare Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 12 L.Ed.2d 457 (1964) ("bad-faith infringement"), and Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 488, 14 L.Ed. 1024 (1854) ("malicious pirate"), with ante, at 1932 - 1934, and n. 1 ("objective recklessness"). The Court refers, by way of example, to a " 'wanton and malicious pirate' who intentionally infringes another's patent-with no doubts about its validity or any notion of a defense-for no purpose other than to steal the patentee's business." Ante, at 1932. And while the Court explains that "intentional or knowing" infringement "may" warrant a punitive sanction, the word it uses is may, not must . Ante, at 1932 - 1933. It is "circumstanc[e]" that transforms simple knowledge into such egregious behavior, and that makes all the difference. Ante, at 1933 - 1934.

Second, the Court writes against a statutory background specifying that the "failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel ... may not be used to prove that the accused infringer wilfully infringed." § 298. The Court does not weaken this rule through its interpretation of § 284. Nor should it. It may well be expensive to obtain an opinion of counsel. See Brief for Public Knowledge et al. as Amici Curiae 9 ("[O]pinion[s] [of counsel] could easily cost up to $100,000 per patent"); Brief for Internet Companies as Amici Curiae 13 (such opinions cost "tens of thousands of dollars"). Such costs can prevent an innovator from getting a small business up and running. At the same time, an owner of a small firm, or a scientist, engineer, or technician working there, might, without being "wanton" or "reckless," reasonably determine that its product does not infringe a particular patent, or that that patent is probably invalid. Cf. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2117, 186 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013) (The "patent['s][own] descriptions highlight the problem[s] with its claims"). I do not say *1937that a lawyer's informed opinion would be unhelpful. To the contrary, consulting counsel may help draw the line between infringing and noninfringing uses. But on the other side of the equation lie the costs and the consequent risk of discouraging lawful innovation. Congress has thus left it to the potential infringer to decide whether to consult counsel-without the threat of treble damages influencing that decision. That is, Congress has determined that where both "advice of counsel" and "increased damages" are at issue, insisting upon the legal game is not worth the candle. Compare § 298 with § 284.

Third, as the Court explains, enhanced damages may not "serve to compensate patentees" for infringement-related costs or litigation expenses. Ante, at 1929 - 1930. That is because § 284 provides for the former prior to any enhancement. § 284 (enhancement follows award of "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement"); see ante, at 1929 - 1930. And a different statutory provision, § 285, provides for the latter. Ibid. ; Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1756, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014) (fee awards may be appropriate in a case that is " 'exceptional' " in respect to "the unreasonable manner in which [it] was litigated").

I describe these limitations on enhanced damages awards for a reason. Patent infringement, of course, is a highly undesirable and unlawful activity. But stopping infringement is a means to patent law's ends. Through a complex system of incentive-based laws, patent law helps to encourage the development of, disseminate knowledge about, and permit others to benefit from useful inventions. Enhanced damages have a role to play in achieving those objectives, but, as described above, that role is limited.

Consider that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office estimates that more than 2,500,000 patents are currently in force. See Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, A. Marco, M. Carley, S. Jackson, & A. Myers, The USPTO Historical Patent Files: Two Centuries of Invention, No. 2015-1, p. 32, fig. 6 (June 2015). Moreover, Members of the Court have noted that some "firms use patents ... primarily [to] obtai[n] licensing fees." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Amici explain that some of those firms generate revenue by sending letters to " 'tens of thousands of people asking for a license or settlement' " on a patent " 'that may in fact not be warranted.' " Brief for Internet Companies as Amici Curiae 12; cf. Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Jan. 16, 1814), in 6 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 295 (H. Washington ed. 1854) (lamenting "abuse of the frivolous patents"). How is a growing business to react to the arrival of such a letter, particularly if that letter carries with it a serious risk of treble damages? Does the letter put the company "on notice" of the patent? Will a jury find that the company behaved "recklessly," simply for failing to spend considerable time, effort, and money obtaining expert views about whether some or all of the patents described in the letter apply to its activities (and whether those patents are even valid)? These investigative activities can be costly. Hence, the risk of treble damages can encourage the company to settle, or even abandon any challenged activity.

To say this is to point to a risk: The more that businesses, laboratories, hospitals, and individuals adopt this approach, the more often a patent will reach beyond its lawful scope to discourage lawful activity, and the more often patent-related demands will frustrate, rather than "promote,"

*1938the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (C.A.Fed.2011) (patent holder "acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend [patent] litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement"); In re MPHJ Technology Invs., LLC, 159 F.T.C. 1004, 1007-1012 (2015) (patent owner sent more than 16,000 letters demanding settlement for using "common office equipment" under a patent it never intended to litigate); Brief for Internet Companies as Amici Curiae 15 (threat of enhanced damages hinders "collaborative efforts" to set "industry-wide" standards for matters such as internet protocols); Brief for Public Knowledge et al. as Amici Curiae 6 (predatory patent practices undermined "a new and highly praised virtual-reality glasses shopping system"). Thus, in the context of enhanced damages, there are patent-related risks on both sides of the equation. That fact argues, not for abandonment of enhanced damages, but for their careful application, to ensure that they only target cases of egregious misconduct.

One final point: The Court holds that awards of enhanced damages should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ante, at 1934 - 1935. I agree. But I also believe that, in applying that standard, the Federal Circuit may take advantage of its own experience and expertise in patent law. Whether, for example, an infringer truly had "no doubts about [the] validity" of a patent may require an assessment of the reasonableness of a defense that may be apparent from the face of that patent. See ante, at 1932. And any error on such a question would be an abuse of discretion. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. ----, ----, n. 2, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748, n. 2, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014) ("A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Understanding the Court's opinion in the ways described above, I join its opinion.

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Joel Tenenbaum illegally downloaded and distributed music for several years. A group of recording companies sued Ten-enbaum, and a jury awarded damages of $675,000, representing $22,500 for each of thirty songs whose copyright Tenenbaum violated. Tenenbaum appeals the award, claiming that it is so large that it violates his constitutional right to due process of law. We hold that the award did not violate Tenenbaum’s right to due process, and we affirm.

I. Background

From 1999 to at least 2007, Tenenbaum downloaded and distributed copyrighted music without authorization, using various *69peer-to-peer networks.1 Tenenbaum knew that his conduct was illegal, but he pressed on, ignoring warnings from his father, his college, and recording companies. In 2007, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Warner Bros. Records Inc., Arista Records LLC, Atlantic Recording Corporation,2 and UMG Recordings, Inc. (together, “Sony”), sued Tenenbaum under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., for statutory damages and injunctive relief. Sony pursued claims for thirty copyrighted works, although Tenenbaum had apparently distributed far more. During discovery, Tenenbaum lied about his activities, blaming unidentified burglars and a foster child living in his parents’ home, among others. Only at trial did Tenenbaum admit that he had distributed as many as five thousand songs.

The district court held as a matter of law that Tenenbaum had violated the Copyright Act, and a jury found that Ten-enbaum’s violations were willful. The court instructed the jury that the Copyright Act provides for damages between $750 and $150,000 for each willful violation. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). The court also gave the jury a set of non-exhaustive factors that it might wish to consider in issuing its award, including the nature of the infringement; the defendant’s purpose and intent; the profit that the defendant reaped, if any, or the expense that the defendant saved; the revenue lost by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement; the value of the copyright; the duration of the infringement; the defendant’s continuation of infringement after notice or knowledge of copyright claims; and the need to deter this defendant and other potential infring-ers. The jury awarded Sony $22,500 for each of Tenenbaum’s thirty violations (15% of the statutory maximum), for a total award of $675,000. Tenenbaum moved for a reduction in the award, arguing that remittitur was appropriate and that the award was so high that it violated his right to due process. The court bypassed the issue of remittitur and held that the award violated due process, reducing it to $67,500. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F.Supp.2d 85 (D.Mass. 2010). In doing so, the court relied on BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that an excessive award of punitive damages can violate due process.

Sony appealed the reduction of the award. We vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the principle of constitutional avoidance required the court to address the issue of remittitur before determining whether the award violated due process. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum (Tenenbaum II), 660 F.3d 487, 508-15 (1st Cir.2011). We also suggested that if the district court were to evaluate the constitutionality of the award on remand, it should rely not on Gore, but on St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 40 S.Ct. 71, 64 L.Ed. 139 (1919), in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an award of statutory damages. Tenenbaum II, 660 F.3d at 512-13.

On remand,3 the district court decided that remittitur was inappropriate and that the original award of $675,000 comported *70with due process, relying on Williams. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum (Tenenbaum III), No. 07-cv-11446, 2012 WL 3639053 (D.Mass. Aug. 23, 2012). Tenenbaum now appeals the decision on the constitutionality of the damage award, but not the decision on remittitur.

II. Analysis

This appeal presents two questions. First, what is the correct standard for evaluating the constitutionality of an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act? Second, did the award of $675,000 violate Tenenbaum’s right to due process? We review these questions of law de novo. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).

A. Evaluating the Constitutionality of Statutory Damages

In Williams, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to an Arkansas statute that subjected railroads to penalties of 50 to 300 dollars, plus costs, for each offense of charging passengers fares that exceeded legal limits. See Williams, 251 U.S. at 64, 40 S.Ct. 71. After the St. Louis, I.M. & S. Railroad collected from two passengers a fare of 66 cents more than the law allowed, the passengers brought suit pursuant to the statute. Id. Each passenger obtained a judgment of 75 dollars plus fees — an award within the statutory range. Id. The railroad challenged the statutory award as unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process Clause. Id. The Court rejected the railroad’s due process argument, holding that a statutory damage award violates due process only “where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” Id. at 66-67, 40 S.Ct. 71.

Gore and its progeny, which Tenenbaum argues should apply here, address the related but distinct issue of when a jury’s award of punitive damages is so excessive that it violates due process. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589. In Gore, the Court, animated by the principle that due process requires that civil defendants receive fair notice of the severity of the penalties their conduct might subject them to, id., identified three “guideposts” for a court’s consideration of whether a punitive damage award is so excessive that it deprives a defendant of due process: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, id. at 575-80, 116 S.Ct. 1589, (2) the ratio of the punitive award to the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, id. at 580-83, 116 S.Ct. 1589, and (3) the disparity between the punitive award issued by the jury and the civil or criminal penalties authorized in comparable cases, id. at 583-85, 116 S.Ct. 1589.

Here, the district court correctly chose to apply the Williams standard. By its own terms, Williams applies to awards of statutory damages, which the jury awarded in this case, while Gore applies to awards of punitive damages, which the jury did not award. Gore did not overrule Williams, and the Supreme Court has not suggested that the Gore guideposts should extend to constitutional review of statutory damage awards. The concerns regarding fair notice to the parties of the range of possible punitive damage awards, which underpin Gore, are simply not present in a statutory damages case where the statute itself provides notice of the scope of the potential award. Moreover, Gore’s second and third guideposts cannot logically apply to an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act. The second due process guidepost requires a comparison between the award and the harm to the plaintiff, but a plaintiff seeking statutory damages *71under the Copyright Act need not prove actual damages. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233, 73 S.Ct. 222, 97 L.Ed. 276 (1952). The third guidepost requires a comparison between the award and the authorized civil and criminal penalties in comparable cases. Because an award of statutory damages is by definition an authorized civil penalty, this guidepost would require a court to compare the award to itself, a nonsensical result. Therefore, we conclude, as have other courts, that the standard articulated in Williams governs the review of an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir.2012); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir.2007).

B. Constitutionality of the Award Against Tenenbaum

To determine whether “the penalty prescribed [against Tenenbaum] is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly dispropor-tioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable,” Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67, 40 S.Ct. 71, we will examine the purpose of statutory damages under the Copyright Act, as well as Tenenbaum’s behavior.

Statutory damages under the Copyright Act are designed not only to provide “reparation for injury,” but also “to discourage wrongful conduct.” F.W. Woolworth Co., 344 U.S. at 233, 73 S.Ct. 222. As we explained in Tenenbaum II, in 1999 Congress increased the minimum and maximum statutory awards under the Copyright Act because of new technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works. 660 F.3d at 500. At trial, Sony presented evidence that Ten-enbaum’s activities led to the same type of harm that Congress foresaw: loss of the value of its copyrights, reduced income and profits, and job losses. Id. at 502-03.

On appeal, Tenenbaum invites us to assume that he is “the most heinous of noncommercial copyright infringers.” We need not go so far as to accept his offer.4 The evidence of Tenenbaum’s copyright infringement easily justifies the conclusion that his conduct was egregious. Tenenb-aum carried on his activities for years in spite of numerous warnings, he made thousands of songs available illegally, and he denied responsibility during discovery. Much of this behavior was exactly what Congress was trying to deter when it amended the Copyright Act. Therefore, we do not hesitate to conclude that an award of $22,500 per song, an amount representing 15% of the maximum award for willful violations and less than the maximum award for non-willful violations, comports with due process.

Tenenbaum argues that the award of $675,000 violates due process because it is not tied to the actual injury that he caused, which he estimates to be no more than $450, or the cost of 30 albums at $15 each. But this argument asks us to disregard the deterrent effect of statutory damages, the inherent difficulty in proving damages in a copyright suit, and Sony’s evidence of the harm that it suffered from conduct such as Tenenbaum’s. More importantly, the Supreme Court held in Williams that statutory damages are not to be measured this way:

Nor does giving the penalty to the aggrieved [party] require that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust its amount *72to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state.

251 U.S. at 66, 40 S.Ct. 71; see also Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 at 909-10 (rejecting, in a case with similar facts, the district court’s conclusion that “statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages”). For these reasons, we find Tenenbaum’s arguments unpersuasive.5

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the jury’s award of $675,000 did not violate Tenenb-aum’s right to due process. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.