BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another product and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and remand.

I

Juicy Whip, Inc., is the assignee of United States Patent No. 5,575,405, which is entitled “Post-Mix Beverage Dispenser With an Associated Simulated Display of Beverage.” A “post-mix” beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate and water in separate locations until the beverage is ready to be dispensed. The syrup and water are mixed together immediately before the beverage is dispensed, which is usually after the consumer requests the beverage. In contrast, in a “pre-mix” beverage dispenser, the syrup concentrate and water are pre-mixed and the beverage is stored in a display reservoir bowl until it is ready to be dispensed. The display bowl is said to stimulate impulse buying by providing the consumer with a visual beverage display. A pre-mix display bowl, however, has a limited capacity and is subject to contamination by bacteria. It therefore must be refilled and cleaned frequently.

The invention claimed in the ’405 patent is a post-mix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. The claims require the post-mix dispenser to have a transparent bowl that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the dispensed beverage and is resistant to bacterial growth. The claims also require that the dispenser create the visual impression that the bowl is the principal source of the dispensed beverage, although in fact the beverage is mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers.

Claim 1 is representative of the claims at issue. It reads as follows:

In a post-mix beverage dispenser of the type having an outlet for discharging beverage components in predetermined proportions to provide a serving of dispensed beverage, the improvement which comprises:

a transparent bowl having no fluid connection with the outlet and visibly containing a quantity of fluid;

said fluid being resistant to organic growth and simulating the appearance of the dispensed beverage;

said bowl being positioned relative to the outlet to create the visual impression *1366that said bowl is the reservoir and principal source of the dispensed beverage from the outlet; and

said bowl and said quantity of fluid visible within said bowl cooperating to create the visual impression that multiple servings of the dispensed beverage are stored within said bowl.

Juicy Whip sued defendants Orange Bang, Inc., and Unique Beverage Dispensers, Inc., (collectively, “Orange Bang”) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that they were infringing the claims of the ’405 patent. Orange Bang moved for summary judgment of invalidity, and the district court granted Orange Bang’s motion on the ground that the invention lacked utility and thus was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The court concluded that the invention lacked utility because its purpose was to increase sales by deception, i.e., through imitation of another product. The court explained that the purpose of the invention “is to create an illusion, whereby customers believe that the fluid contained in the bowl is the actual beverage that they are receiving, when of course it is not.” Although the court acknowledged Juicy Whip’s argument that the invention provides an accurate representation of the dispensed beverage for the consumer’s benefit while eliminating the need for retailers to clean their display bowls, the court concluded that those claimed reasons for the patent’s utility “are not independent of its deceptive purpose, and are thus insufficient to raise a disputed factual issue to present to a jury.” The court further held that the invention lacked utility because it “improves the prior art only to the extent that it increases the salability of beverages dispensed from post-mix dispensers”; an invention lacks utility, the court stated, if it confers no benefit to the public other than the opportunity for making a product more salable. Finally, the court ruled that the invention lacked utility because it “is merely an imitation of the pre-mix dispenser,” and thus does not constitute a new and useful machine.

II

Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides that “[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” .may obtain a patent on the invention or discovery. The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is “useful” under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534, 86 S.Ct. 1033, 16 L.Ed.2d 69 (1966); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“To violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result”); Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir.1903) (test for utility is whether invention “is incapable of serving any beneficial end”).

To be sure, since Justice Story’s opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D.Mass.1817), it has been stated that inventions that are “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society” are unpatentable. As examples of such inventions, Justice Story listed “a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination.” Id. at 1019. Courts have continued to recite Justice Story’s formulation, see Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53, 20 USPQ2d 1332, 1338 (Fed.Cir.1991); In re Nelson, 47 C.C.P.A. 1031, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79, 126 USPQ 242, 249 (CCPA 1960), but the principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied *1367broadly in recent years. For example, years ago courts invalidated patents on gambling devices on the ground that they were immoral, see e.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir.1922); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D.Cal.1897); National Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D.Ill.1889), but that is no longer the law, see In re Murphy, 200 USPQ 801 (PTO Bd.App.1977).

In holding the patent in this case invalid for lack of utility, the district court relied on two Second Circuit cases dating from the early years of this century, Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir.1900), and Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.1925). In the Rickard case, the court held invalid a patent on a process for treating tobacco plants to make their leaves appear spotted. At the time of the invention, according to the court, cigar smokers considered cigars with spotted wrappers to be of superior quality, and the invention was designed to make unspotted tobacco leaves appear to be of the spotted — and thus more desirable — type. The court noted that the invention did not promote the burning quality of the leaf or improve its quality in any way; “the only effect, if not the only object, of such treatment, is to spot the tobacco, and counterfeit the leaf spotted by natural causes.” Id. at 869.

The Aristo Hosiery case concerned a patent claiming a seamless stocking with a structure on the back of the stocking that imitated a seamed stocking. The imitation was commercially useful because at the time of the invention many consumers regarded seams in stockings as an indication of higher quality. The court noted that the imitation seam did not “change or improve the structure or the utility of the article,” and that the record in the case justified the conclusion that true seamed stockings were superior to the seamless stockings that were the subject of the patent. See Aristo Hosiery, 7 F.2d at 1004. “At best,” the court stated, “the seamless stocking has imitation marks for the purposes of deception, and the idea prevails that with such imitation the article is more salable.” Id. That was not enough, the court concluded, to render the invention patentable.

We decline to follow Rickard and Aristo Hosiery, as we do not -regard them as representing the correct view of the doctrine of utility under the Patent Act of 1952. The fact that one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.

It is not at all unusual for a product to be designed to appear to viewers to be something it is not. For example, cubic zirconium is designed to simulate a diamond, imitation gold leaf is designed to imitate real gold leaf, synthetic fabrics are designed to simulate expensive natural fabrics, and imitation leather is designed to look like real leather. In each case, the invention of the product or process that makes such imitation possible has “utility” within the meaning of the patent statute, and indeed there are numerous patents directed toward making one product imitate another. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,762,968 (method for producing imitation grill marks on food without using heat); U.S. Pat. No. 5,899,038 (laminated flooring imitating wood); U.S. Pat. No. 5,571,545 (imitation hamburger). Much of the value of such products resides.in the fact that they appear to be something they are not. Thus, in this case the claimed post-mix dispenser meets the statutory requirement of utility by embodying the features of a post-mix dispenser while imitating the visual appearance of a pre-mix dispenser.

The fact that customers may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the display tank does not deprive the invention of utility. Orange Bang has not argued that it is unlawful to display a representation of the beverage in the manner that *1368fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the invention, even though the fluid is not what the customer will actually receive. Moreover, even if the use of a reservoir containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the invention unpatentable. The requirement of “utility” in patent law is not a directive to the Patent and Trademark Office or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive trade practices. Other agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, are assigned the task of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food products. Cf. In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 474-76, 186 USPQ 11, 19 (CCPA 1975) (stating that it is not the province of the Patent Office to determine, under • section 101, whether drugs are safe). As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, “Congress never intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that term those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general welfare of the community are promoted.” Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 344, 347-48, 26 L.Ed. 565 (1880).

Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting from patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public. The district court therefore erred in holding that the invention of the ’405 patent lacks utility because it deceives the public through imitation in a manner that is designed to increase product sales.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

*854GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:

This is a copyright infringement suit, arising under the now-superseded Copyright Act of 1909.1 But it is more than the usual commercial contest between copyright holder and alleged infringer. The infring-ers asserted as an affirmative defense that the copyrighted material — a movie — was obscene, and that, therefore, under the equitable rubric of “unclean hands” plaintiffs were barred from relief. After viewing the film the court found it obscene, adopted the unclean hands rationale, and denied relief to the copyright owners. Review of this holding requires us to consider the constitutional limits upon the power granted to Congress to issue copyrights, the manner in which Congress has chosen to exercise that power, and the applicability of the unclean hands doctrine.

Plaintiffs-appellants owned a properly registered copyright on a motion picture titled “Behind the Green Door,” issued under the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (repealed). Two groups of defendants, each group consisting of a theater and several individuals, obtained copies of the movie < without plaintiffs’ permission and infringed the copyright by exhibiting the film at the theaters. The Lido Art Theater group did not appear for trial, default judgment was entered against it and a statutory penalty awarded to plaintiffs. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) (repealed). The Cinema Adult Theater group appeared for trial, and after a bench trial the court found in its favor. On appeal the Cinema Adult group has not appeared.

We hold that the district court erred in permitting the assertion of obscenity as an affirmative defense to the claim of infringement, and, accordingly, reverse without reaching the question whether the film is obscene.

I. The statutory language

The statutory provision that controls in this case reads:

The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author.

17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) (repealed). Motion pictures are unquestionably “writings” under the Copyright Act.2

The district court did not base its decision on standards found within the Act, which it described as “silent as to works which are subject to registration and copyright.” The Act is not “silent.” Rather, the statutory language “all the writings of an author” is facially all-inclusive, within itself admitting of no exceptions. There is not even a hint in the language of § 4 that the obscene nature of a work renders it any less a copyrightable “writing.” There is no other statutory language from which it can be inferred that Congress intended that obscene materials could not be copyrighted.3

Moreover, there is good reason not to read an implied exception for obscenity into the copyright statutes. The history of content-based restrictions on copyrights, trademarks, and patents suggests that the absence of such limitations in the Copyright Act of 1909 is the result of an intentional policy choice and not simply an omission. See generally 74 Colum.L.Rev. 1351, 1354 *855n.27 (1974). From the first copyright act in 1790, Congress has seldom added restrictions on copyright based on the subject matter of the work, and in each instance has later removed the content restriction.4 These congressional additions and subsequent deletions, though certainly not conclusive, suggest that Congress has been hostile to content-based restrictions on copy-rightability.5 In contrast Congress has placed explicit content-related restrictions in the current statutes governing the related areas of trademarks and patents. The Lanham Act prohibits registration of any trademark that “[cjonsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), and inventions must be shown to be “useful” before a patent is issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals that Congress intends to continue the policy of the 1909 Act of avoiding content restrictions on copyrightability. In recommending passage of the 1976 Act, the House Judiciary Committee stated:

The phrase “original works of authorship,” [§ 102] which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.

H. R.Rep.No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 5659, 5664 (emphasis added).

It appears to us that Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its copyright power, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is best served by allowing all creative works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded copyright protection regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to the public taste to reward creators of useful works and to deny creators of useless works any reward. It is not surprising that Congress would choose to rely on public acceptability as a measure of a work’s worth rather than on the judgment of such public officials as the Register of Copyrights6 and federal and state judges. As Justice Holmes said, in rejecting the argument that under an earlier version of the Copyright Act the courts had a duty to pass upon the artistic merits of engravings and prints,

It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.

*856At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had. learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value, — it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value, — and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52, 23 S.Ct. 298, 300, 47 L.Ed. 460, 462 (1903). The Ninth Circuit has recently voiced similar concerns in rejecting the defense of fraudulent content in copyright infringement actions:

There is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a copyrighted work. The gravity and immensity of the problems, theological, philosophical, economic and scientific, that would confront a court if this view were adopted are staggering to contemplate. It is surely not a task lightly to be assumed, and we decline the invitation to assume it.

Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (CA9, 1973).

In our view, the absence of content restrictions on copyrightability indicates that Congress has decided that the constitutional goal of encouraging creativity would not be best served if an author had to concern himself not only with the marketability of his work but also with the judgment of government officials regarding the worth of the work.

Further, if Congress were receptive to subject matter restrictions on copyright, there are many reasons why it would be unlikely to choose obscenity as one of those restrictions. Obscenity law is a concept not adapted for use as a means for ascertaining whether creative works may be copyrighted. Obscenity as a constitutional doctrine has developed as an effort to create a tolerable compromise between First Amendment considerations and police power. It is an awkward, barely acceptable concept that continues to dog our judicial system and society at large. The purpose underlying the constitutional grant of power to Congress to protect writings is the promotion of original writings, an invitation to creativity. This is an expansive purpose with no stated limitations of taste or governmental acceptability. Such restraints, if imposed, would be antithetical to promotion of creativity. The pursuit of creativity requires freedom to explore into the gray areas, to the cutting edge, and even beyond. Obscenity, on the other hand, is a limiting doctrine constricting the scope of acceptability of the written word.7

Denial of [copyright] Registration could work to discourage the development of the Arts. At least one commentator has argued that denial of registration will increase the circulation of material to the public, by removing the right to sue for unauthorized publication and dissemination of copied material. [Cite omitted.] This view, however, ignores the potentially discouraging effect a stated policy of denial on the ground of obscenity would have on authors, publishers and promoters of works inhabiting the hazy border between obscenity and protected speech.

Schneider, supra note 3, at 719.

Society’s view of what is,, moral and immoral continually changes. To give one example, in Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. *857Cas. p. 920 (No. 9173) (C.C.Cal.1867), the play “The Black Crook,” because it featured women clad in flesh-colored tights, was held to be “grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people” and hence uncopyrightable. By the early part of this century, it had become clear that this judgment reflected the moral standards - of a bygone era:

This case [Martineta ] probably is no more than a reflection of contemporary public opinion. The “Black Crook” with its plentitude of pink fleshings, scandalous as it may have seemed in the days of crinolines when legs — unless their very existence was genteelly denied — were vehicles, not spectacles, would probably bore a sophisticated modern audience, but would scarcely shock them. It would only make the tired business man tireder.

Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 Mich.L. Rev. 390, 398 (1920). It is obvious that many works shocking to the sensibilities of the public in 1920 would be entirely inoffensive today.

Denying copyright protection to works adjudged obscene by the standards of one era would frequently result in lack of copyright protection (and thus lack of financial incentive to create)8 for works that later generations might consider to be not only non-obscene but even of great literary merit. See Phillips, Copyright in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6 Anglo-Am.L.Rev. 138, 168-69 (1977). Many works that are today held in high regard have been adjudged obscene in previous eras. English courts of the nineteenth century found the works of Byron, Southey and Shelley to be immoral. See U.S. v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (CA2,1934). American courts have found these books, among others, obscene: Edmund Wilson, Memories of Hecate County, see People v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79, 93 L.Ed. 398 (1948); Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn, see Besig v. U. S., 208 F.2d 142 (CA9,1953); Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre, see Attorney General v. Book Named “God’s Little Acre”, 326 Mass. 281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950); Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit, see Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); D. H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterly’s Lover, see Commonwealth v. Delacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930); Theodore Dreiser, An American Tragedy, see Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930). See gener *858 ally Lewis, Literature, Obscenity and Law (1976) ; Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Material, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 40 (1938).

*857The first amendment and copyright are . mutually supportive. The financial incentive provided by copyright encourages the development and exchange of ideas which furthers the first amendment’s purpose of promoting the “exposition of ideas.” [quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942)] Of course, financial gain is only one of many reasons for creative expression; but copyright permits many authors and composers to devote their lives to creative endeavor. Without it, they would have to pursue more mundane careers in order to earn a living. While the absence of copyright would not put an end to literary and artistic endeavor, it would substantially inhibit such efforts.

Furthermore, creative activity does not, in itself, result in effective expression. Modes of expression must be disseminated in order to reach an audience or readership. This requires physical effort, and investment in tangible goods and services is necessary to distribute the various forms of expression. Effective dissemination of creative work costs money.

All distribution of expression would not cease in the absence of copyright. An author or other person with beneficent motives might pay for the distribution, at little or no cost to the recipient. This sort of largesse is routinely inflicted on the public during political campaigns. An author also might be able to earn some money by selling quickly before pirates could market their copies. However, the large amounts of capital presently invested in disseminating information and thought in newspapers, magazines, books, movies, and other forms of copyrightable material would flow elsewhere if there were no property right to protect the value of these investments.

The Supreme Court has implied a “right to hear” in the first amendment. In essence, this is the right to reach an audience or readership. The economic basis of copyright facilitates exercise of this right by providing the financial wherewithal for its exercise.

*858Further, Congress in not enacting an obscenity exception to copyrightability avoids substantial practical difficulties and delicate First Amendment issues. Since what is obscene in one local community may be non-obscene protected speech in another, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), and the copyright statute does not in other respects vary in its applicability from locality to locality,9 Congress in enacting an obscenity exception would create the dilemma of choosing, between using community standards that would (arguably unconstitutionally)10 fragment the uniform national standards of the copyright system and venturing into the uncharted waters of a national obscenity standard.11 See Phillips, Copyright in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6 Anglo-Am.L.Rev. 138, 170-71 (1977) ; Schneider, supra note 3, at 715; Comment, Constitutional Protection of Obscene Material Against Censorship as Correlated with Copyright Protection of Obscene Material Against Infringement, 31 S.Cal.L.Rev. 301, 306 (1958); 46 Fordham L.Rev. 1037, 1043-47 (1978). We can only conclude that we must read the facially all-inclusive 1909 copyright statute as containing no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials, and as therefore providing for the copyright of all creative works, obscene or non-obscene, that otherwise meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.12

II. Constitutionality of the copyright statute

The conclusion that -the 1909 Act was all-inclusive13 and did not provide an exception for obscenity does not end our inquiry, however. We mttsj; consider whether-the statute, in allowing copyright of obscene material, was constitutional and whether despite congressional intent the courts should take it upon themselves to permit the defense of obscenity in copyright infringement cases. We first turn to the question of constitutionality.

*859The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution provides that “The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .” U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The district court construed this clause to limit the congressional power to grant copyrights solely to works that promote the sciences and useful arts.14 If one carries the district court’s reasoning to its necessary conclusion, Congress acted unconstitutionally in enacting an all-inclusive statute that allows copyrighting of non-useful works (such as, arguably, obscenity)15 as well as useful works. Several lower courts and commentators have agreed with this construction of the Copyright and Patent Clause.16 Other commentators disagree, however, and argue that Congress has power to grant copyrights even for individual works that cannot be shown to promote the useful arts so long as Congress in its exercise of its copyright power generally promotes the constitutional goal.17 In our view the district court’s reading of the Copyright and Patent Clause is unduly restrictive of Congress’ power and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s broad view of the congressional powers granted by this Clause. As one commentator has pointed out,

The words of the copyright clause of the constitution do not require that writings shall promote science or useful arts: they *860require that Congress shall promote those ends. It could well be argued that by passing general laws to protect all works, Congress better fulfills its designated ends than it would by denying protection to all books the contents of which were open to real or imagined objection. .

Phillips, supra note 15, at 165-66 (emphasis original).

In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), the Supreme Court addressed the scope of congressional power under the Copyright and Patent Clause. In this patent case the Court held that although Congress’ power under this Clause is limited to action that promotes the useful arts, it is up to Congress to decide upon the means by which the constitutional command will best be effectuated:

Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23. Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.

Id. at 6, 86 S.Ct. at 688,15 L.Ed.2d at 550.18 Congress has authority to make any law that is “necessary and proper” for the execution of its enumerated Article I powers, U.S.Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, including its copyright power, and the courts role' in judging whether Congress has exceeded its Article I powers is limited. The courts will not find that Congress has exceeded its power so long as the means adopted by Congress for achieving a constitutional end are “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to achieving that end. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579, 605 (1819). It is by the lenient standard of McCulloch that we must judge whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional powers in enacting an all-inclusive copyright statute.

Judging by this standard, it is obvious that although Congress could require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the useful arts (as it has with patents),19 it need not do so. As discussed in the previous section, Congress could reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativity is not to impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable works. By making this choice Congress removes the chilling effect of governmental judgments on potential authors and avoids the strong possibility that governmental officials (including judges) will err in separating the useful from the non-useful. Moreover, unlike patents, the grant of a copyright to a non-useful work impedes the progress of the sciences and the useful arts only very slightly, if at all, for the possessor of a copyright does not have any right to block further dissemination or use of the ideas contained in his works.20 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1879).

The all-inclusive nature of the 1909 Act reflects the policy judgment that encouraging the production of wheat also requires the protection of a good deal of chaff. We cannot say this judgment was so unreasonable as to exceed congressional power. We conclude that the protection of all writings, without regard to their content, is a constitutionally permissible means of promoting science and the useful arts.

*861III. Judicially-created defenses to infringement actions involving immoral or obscene works.

Some courts have denied legal redress in infringement suits to holders of copyrights on immoral or obscene works by applying judicially-created doctrines. Two of these doctrines are largely vestiges of a bygone era and need be addressed only briefly. The theory that judges should act as conservators of the public morality was succinctly summarized by the court in Shook v. Daly, 49 How.Prac. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup.Ct.1895): “The rights of the writer are secondary to the rights of the public to be protected from what is subversive of good morals.” Application of this theory by the English courts in the nineteenth century led to the suppression of works because they were inconsistent with Biblical teachings or because they were seditious. See 46 Ford-ham L.Rev. 1037, 1038-39 (1978); Schneider, supra note 3, at 694-96. Although this theory has been relied on as recently as 1963, see Dane v. M. & H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. 426, 429 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1963) (common law copyright protection denied striptease because it did not “elevate, cultivate, inform, or improve the moral or intellectual natures of the audience”), it is evident to us that it is inappropriate for a court, in the absence of some guidance or authorization from the legislature, to interpose its moral views between an author and his willing audience.

A second judicially-created doctrine, the theory that a person can have no property in obscene works, merely expresses by means of a legal fiction the underlying judicial moral conclusion that the work is not worthy of protection. The doctrine has not been adopted in this country, see Schneider, supra note 3, at 696-97, and should not be. Cf. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 251, 25 S.Ct. 637, 640, 49 L.Ed. 1031, 1039 (1905): “If, then, the plaintiffs’ collection of information is otherwise entitled to protection, it does not cease to be so, even if it is information concerning illegal acts. The statistics of crime are property to the same extent as any other statistics, even if collected by a criminal who furnishes some of the data.”

The third judicially created doctrine, that of unclean hands, has seldom been relied upon by courts that have denied copyright to obscene or immoral works. For the most part, only English courts have relied on this theory. See generally Chafee, supra note 3, at 1065 — 70. Of the various American cases allowing obscenity as a defense to a copyright infringement action, few even mention the doctrine of unclean hands. See Bullard v. Esper, 72 F.Supp. 548, 549 (N.D. Tex.1947) (semble); Richardson v. Miller, 20 Fed.Cas. 722 (No. 11,791) (C.C.D.Mass.1877). Nevertheless, since the district court permitted obscenity to be asserted as a defense through the medium of the unclean hands rubric, the concept of unclean hands requires more extended discussion.

Assuming for the moment that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands has any field of application in this case, it should not be used as a conduit for asserting obscenity as a limit upon copyright protection. Creating a defense of obscenity — in the ñamé of unclean hands or through any other vehicle — adds a defense not authorized by Congress that may, as discussed above, actually frustrate the congressional purpose underlying an all-inclusive copyright statute. It will discourage creativity by freighting it with a requirement of judicial approval. Requiring authors of controversial, unpopular, or new material to go through judicial proceedings to validate the content of their writings is antithetical to the aim of copyrights. If the copyright holder cannot obtain financial protection for his work because of actual or possible judicial objections to the subject matter, the pro-creativity purpose of the copyright laws will be undercut.

The Supreme Court and this court have held that equitable doctrines should not be applied where their application will defeat the purpose of a statute. See, e. g., Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 20 L.Ed.2d 982, 990 (1968) (“We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief *862where a private suit serves important public purposes.”); Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 601-02 (CA5, 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 3161, 49 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1976); accord Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (CA8, 1979); Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App.D.C. 216, 19 F.2d 690 (1927); Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H. W. Wright & Co., 377 F.Supp. 570, 583-84 (D.Md.1973); Comment, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wisc.L.Rev. 1158, 1170 n.101; cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214, 71 S.Ct. 259, 261, 95 L.Ed. 219, 224 (1951) (irrelevant in private Sherman Act suit that plaintiff had also violated Sherman Act).21 Because the private suit of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action furthers the congressional goal of promoting creativity, the courts should not concern themselves with the moral worth of the plaintiff.22

• Furthermore, the need for an additional check on obscenity is not apparent. Most if not all states have statutes regulating the dissemination of obscene materials, and there is an array of federal statutes dealing with this subject, as well. See note 16 supra. As Professor Chafee concluded, the difficulty inherent in formulating a workable obscenity defense to copyright is sufficient reason not to allow such a defense unless the other criminal and civil statutes dealing with the obscenity problem are shown to be plainly ineffective:

Sometimes the legislature has expressly entrusted questions of obscenity to the courts, as in criminal statutes, and then judges have to do the best they can, but the results have been quite erratic. This should be a warning against rushing into new obscenity jobs which no legislature has told, them to undertake.

The penalties for obscenity are defined by statute. Why should the courts add a new penalty out of their own heads by denying protection to a registered copyright which complies with every provision of the copyright act? ... I think that the added penalty is justifiable only if there is a serious need for extra pressure to induce obedience to the criminal law. In the obscenity situation, this need is not obvious.

Chafee, supra note 3, at 1068-69.

The effectiveness of controlling obscenity by denying copyright protection is open to question. The district court thought that on the whole the long-term discouragement of the creation of obscene works would outweigh the short-term increase in the dissemination of obscene works caused by the refusal of an injunction. This theory, reached without empirical evidence or expert opinion, is at least doubtful. Many commentators disagree and are of the view that denial of injunctions against infringers *863of obscene materials will only increase the distribution of such works.23 The existence of this difference of view, which we need not resolve, makes clear that the question of how to deal with the relationship between copyrights and obscenity is not best suited for case-by-case judicial resolution but is instead most appropriately resolved by legislatures. Congress has not chosen to refuse copyrights on obscene materials, and we should be cautious in overriding the legislative judgment on this issue.

Finally, permitting obscenity as a defense would introduce an unmanageable array of issues into routine copyright infringement actions. It was for this reason that the Ninth Circuit rejected the defense of fraudulent content in copyright infringement cases. See Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (CA9,1973), accord 2 M. Nimmer, On Copyright § 2.17, at 2-194. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F.Supp. 330, 337 (N.D.Ga.1974) (James C. Hill, District Judge) (rejecting violation of antitrust law as defense in trademark infringement suit because it would convert courts into “a battleground for extensive antitrust litigation whenever a trademark holder seeks any, totally unrelated, equitable relief”).

Now, we turn to examine our momentary assumption that the unclean hands doctrine can be invoked at all in this ease. For reasons that we have set out, obscenity is not an appropriate defense in an infringement action, whether piggybacked on the unclean hands rubric or introduced in some other manner. But even if obscenity were not objectionable as a defense, the unclean hands doctrine could not properly be used as the vehicle for that defense.

The maxim of unclean hands is not applied where plaintiff’s misconduct is not directly related to the merits of the controversy between the parties, but only where the wrongful acts “in some measure affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect of something brought before the court for adjudication.” Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245, 54 S.Ct. 146, 148, 78 L.Ed. 293, 297 (1933). The alleged wrongdoing of the plaintiff does not bar relief unless the defendant can show that he has personally been injured by the plaintiff’s conduct. Lawler v. Gillam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1294 (CA4, 1978). The doctrine of unclean hands “does not purport to search out or deal with the general moral attributes or standing of a litigant.” NLRB v. Fickett-Brown Mfg. Co., 140 F.2d 883, 884 (CA5, 1944). Here it is clear that plaintiffs’ alleged wrongful conduct24 has not changed the equitable relationship between plaintiffs and defendants and has not injured the defendants in any way.

The district court’s invocation of unclean hands was based upon an ancient Fifth Circuit case, Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (CA5, 1915). Stone & McCarrick held that a plaintiff in a copyright infringement action is barred from recovery by the doctrine of unclean hands where the copyrighted material has the effect of fraudulently deceiving or mis*864leading the public. Relying on trademark casés, the court concluded that in copyright cases deceit that causes injury to the public could give rise to unclean hands just as injury to the defendant gives rise to unclean hands in other equitable suits. In the present case, the court coupled this notion of “public injury” assertable as an unclean hands defense with a concept of obscenity as an injury to the public at large.

Stone & McCarrick is inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases holding, as discussed above, that an equitable doctrine should not be applied in a way that will frustrate the purpose of a federal statute. See, e. g., Perma-Life Mufflers, supra; Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., supra. Stone & McCarrick does not simply apply a traditional equitable doctrine; it goes further and extends the doctrine of unclean hands to a situation not covered by the doctrine at common law and thus subverts a statutory purpose. This is plainly unacceptable under modern precedents.25

It is immediately apparent that limiting copyright protection on a broad public injury rationale would lead to absurd and unacceptable results. Unless the public injury rationale is limited, as it was in Morton Salt and its progeny, n.25, supra, to misuses that frustrate the particular purposes of the copyright (or trademark or patent) statute, an infringer could defend by alleging, for example, that the copyright holder has failed to pay income taxes on revenue derived from the copyright. Arguably an in-fringer could defend on the ground that the work had been transported into the state in the copyright owner’s truck that does not meet federal safety and pollution requirements or by an interstate carrier not certificated as required by the Interstate Commerce Act. The possibilities are well nigh limitless. See generally Chafee, supra, note 3, at 1071-74. We have found no copyright, trademark, or patent case subsequent to Stone & McCarrick relying on the general principle that the rights of a holder of a *865government-granted monopoly are limited by an infringer’s right to assert as a defense any “injury” to the general public. Whatever vitality, if any, Stone & McCar-nck presently may have, we decline to extend its holding to this case. Thus, even if we thought obscenity an appropriate de^ fense, Stone & McCarrick is an inadequate justification for using unclean hands as the vehicle for allowing the obscenity defense.26

In the present case the copyright holders’ actions are not inconsistent with any policy of the copyright laws. The infringers’ attempt to immunize their illegal acts by wrapping themselves in the mantle of a “public injury” caused by plaintiffs is antithetical to the purpose of these laws. The effort cannot be sustained. In an appropriate case a misuse of the copyright statute that in some way subverts the purpose of the statute — the promotion of originality — might constitute a bar to judicial relief.27 This is not such a case. The unclean hands doctrine was not applicable.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

NIES, Circuit Judge.

Budge Manufacturing Co., Inc., appeals from the final decision of the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refusing registration of LOVEE LAMB for “automotive seat covers,” application Serial No. 507,974 filed November 9, 1984. The basis for rejection is that the term LAMB is deceptive matter within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1982), as applied to Budge's goods which are made wholly from synthetic fibers. We affirm.

Opinion

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars registration of a mark which: “Consists of or comprises ... deceptive ... matter_” As stated in In re Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391, 1396, 160 USPQ 233, 236 (CCPA 1969): “The proscription [of section 2(a)] is not against misdescriptive terms unless they are also deceptive.” Thus, that a mark or part of a mark may be inapt or misdescriptive as applied to an *775applicant’s goods does not make it “deceptive.” Id. (AUTOMATIC RADIO not a deceptive mark for air conditioners, ignition systems, and antennas). Recognizing that premise, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has sought to articulate a standard by which “deceptive matter” under section 2(a) can be judged. In this case, the board applied the three-part test which was stated in In re Shapely, Inc., 231 USPQ 72, 73 (TTAB 1986): (1) whether the term is mis-deseriptive as applied to the goods, (2) if so, whether anyone would be likely to believe the misrepresentation, and (3) whether the misrepresentation would materially affect a potential purchaser’s decision to buy the goods.

Budge argues that the board was bound to follow the standard articulated in In re Simmons, Inc., 192 USPQ 331 (TTAB 1976). Per Budge, Simmons sets forth a different standard in that it requires as a minimum that “the mark convey some information, upon which an intended customer may reasonably rely, concerning something about the character, quality, function, composition or use of the goods to induce the purchase thereof, but which information, in fact, is misleadingly false.” Id. at 332.

The standard applied by the board for determining deceptive matter in section 2(a) cases has not been uniformly articulated in some material respects. For example, in at least one opinion an intent to mislead was required to establish section 2(a) deeeptiveness. See Steinberg Bros., Inc. v. Middletown Rubber Corp., 137 USPQ 319, 321 (TTAB 1963). However, while phrased differently, we discern no material difference between the standard set forth in Shapely and that in Simmons. Budge points to no substantive difference and, indeed, merely quarrels over the different result here from that in Simmons. Thus, we need not address the question of the extent to which panels of the board are required to follow prior decisions of other board panels.1

What is more significant, in any event, is that this court is bound only by its own precedent, none of which Budge discusses. Although we will give deference in appropriate circumstances to a board’s decision on a question of law, we are, of course, not bound by such rulings. See, e.g., In re Dr. Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508, 510, 5 USPQ2d 1207, 1209 (Fed.Cir.1987). Where the issue relates to deceptive misdescriptiveness within the meaning of 2(a), we are in general agreement with the standard set out by the board in Shapely, with the following amplification in part drawn from Simmons:

(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality, function, composition or use of the goods?

(2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the misdescription actually describes the goods?

(3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the decision to purchase?

In ex parte prosecution, the burden is initially on the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to put forth sufficient evidence that the mark for which registration is sought meets the above criteria of unregistrability. Mindful that the PTO has limited facilities for acquiring evidence — it cannot, for example, be expected to conduct a survey of the marketplace or obtain consumer affidavits2 — we conclude that the evidence of record here is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of deceptiveness. That evidence shows with respect to the three-pronged test:

(1) Budge admits that its seat covers are not made from lamb or sheep products. Thus, the term LAMB is misdes-criptive of its goods.

(2) Seat covers for various vehicles can be and are made from natural lambskin and sheepskin. Applicant itself makes *776automobile seat covers of natural sheepskin. Lambskin is defined, inter alia, as fine-grade sheep skin. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 639 (unabr. 1976). The board’s factual inference is reasonable that purchasers are likely to believe automobile seat covers denominated by the term LAMB or SHEEP are actually made from natural sheep or lamb skins.

(3) Evidence of record shows that natural sheepskin and lambskin is more expensive than simulated skins and that natural and synthetic skins have different characteristics. Thus, the misrepresentation is likely to affect the decision to purchase.

Faced with this prima facie case against registration, Budge had the burden to come forward with countering evidence to overcome the rejection. It wholly failed to do so.

Budge argues that its use of LAMB as part of its mark is not misdescriptive when considered in connection with the text in its advertising, which states that the cover is of “simulated sheepskin.”3 Some, but not all, of Budge’s specimen labels also have this text. This evidence is unpersuasive. In R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786, 51 CCPA 946, 140 USPQ 276 (1964), a similar argument was made that the mark DURA-HYDE on shoes was not deceptive as an indication of leather because of tags affixed to the shoes proclaiming the legend “Outwears leather.” In discounting the evidence, the court stated: “The legends constitute advertisement material separate and apart from any trademark significance.” Id. at 790, 51 CCPA at 951, 140 USPQ at 279. To the same effect is In re Bonide Chemical Co., 46 F.2d 705, 18 CCPA 909, 8 USPQ 297 (1931). There the court held, with respect to a clarifying statement made in advertising circulars, which the applicant urged negated the deceptive nature of the mark, “This argument is beside the issue. It is the word of the mark, not the statement of an advertising circular which appellant seeks to register. ...” Id. at 708, 18 CCPA at 913, 8 USPQ at 300.

Thus, we conclude that the board properly discounted Budge’s advertising and labeling which indicate the actual fabric content. Misdescriptiveness of a term may be negated by its meaning in the context of the whole mark inasmuch as the combination is seen together and makes a unitary impression. A.F. Gallun & Sons Corp. v. Aristocrat Leather Prods., Inc., 135 USPQ 459, 460 (TTAB 1962) (COPY CALF not misdescriptive, but rather suggests imitation of calf skin). The same is not true with respect to explanatory statements in advertising or on labels which purchasers may or may not note and which may or may not always be provided. The statutory provision bars registration of a mark comprising deceptive matter. Congress has said that the advantages of registration may not be extended to a mark which deceives the public. Thus, the mark standing alone must pass muster, for that is what the applicant seeks to register, not extraneous explanatory statements.

Budge next argues that no reasonable purchaser would expect to purchase lambskin automobile seat covers because none made of lambskin are on the market. Only sheepskin automobile seat covers are being made, per Budge. Not only was no evidence submitted on the point Budge seeks to make, only statements of Budge’s attorney, but also the argument is without substance. The board properly equated sheepskin and lambskin based on the dictionary definition which indicates that the terms may be used interchangeably. In addition, while Budge would discount the evidence presented that bicycle and airline seat coverings are made of lambskin, we conclude that it does support the board’s finding that there is nothing incongruous about automobile seat covers being made from lambskin. We also agree with the board’s conclusion that any differences be*777tween sheepskin and lambskin would not be readily apparent to potential purchasers of automobile seat covers. The board’s finding here that purchasers are likely to believe the misrepresentation is not clearly erroneous.

To overturn the board’s finding that mis-describing synthetic fabric as “lamb” would affect a purchaser’s decision to purchase the item, Budge merely reiterates its argument that its advertising negates the possibility of misdescriptiveness. We find that argument no more persuasive in this context than previously and, in any event, wholly unresponsive to this issue.

Finally, we note the evidence of Budge’s extensive sales since 1974 under the mark. However, it is too well established for argument that a mark which includes deceptive matter is barred from registration and cannot acquire distinctiveness. See R. Neumann & Co., 326 F.2d at 788, 51 CCPA at 949, 140 USPQ at 278, and cases cited therein, principally Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 23 S.Ct. 161, 47 L.Ed. 282 (1903).

Conclusion

None of the facts found by the board have been shown to be clearly erroneous nor has the board erred as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the board’s decision that Budge’s mark LOVEE LAMB for automobile seat covers made from synthetic fibers is deceptive within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) and is, thus, barred from registration.

AFFIRMED.

NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I agree that the TTAB decision should be affirmed, and with most of what the court well says. There is one matter, however, as to which I do not wholly agree, much as I respect the court’s expertise in this field.

We have an unfortunate tendency to believe we must always utter the last word and lay down the ultimate law on all the subjects confided to us. Here we have a TTAB decision with which we find nothing wrong, and two previous TTAB decisions dealing with the same general subject. That is, all three are concerned with the Lanham Act provision barring from registration, trademarks which are “deceptive,” and in all three the alleged deception was words making it appear that material actually of synthetic fibers was natural. The task consisted of applying one word in a statute to the few words or single word of a trademark, in light of the actual composition as acknowledged by the applicant. Lawyers are ostensibly, and I hope often actually, trained to construe statutes and other written words according to the intent of those who utter them and the understanding of those who read them. The task in the three cases was one for lawyers, and the three opinions afford internal evidence that the TTAB suffers no shortage of those who know how to do it well. They do not need us to tell them how to do it. If we do so, we clamp down a rigid formula for them to conform to, with a prospect of their being harried by lawyers for alleged nonconformity to the formula forever thereafter, with the simple ultimate issue forgotten.

No one can tell what future cases will bring or whether our formula will aid the solution of future cases, or hinder it. In re Simmons, Inc., one of our three cases, well illustrates my point. The mark: “White Sable” for paint brush bristles, is construed in light of the fact that the animal, sable, is extremely dark and that is so well known that “sable” as an adjective, serves as a synonym for black, as in “sable plumage.” As the white sable is a fictitious animal, the mark “white sable” cannot deceptively represent that the hairs in the brush came from a real animal. Who could prescribe beforehand how to deal with such a case? To deal with it after it arose, by an unhampered board, was no trick at all.

In the case before us, the board asked itself: “is anyone likely to believe the product is made of lamb or sheepskin?” The question might, perhaps ideally, be “is any reasonable person * * * ” because unreasonable persons are likely to believe anything. It is clearly what the board meant. This court transforms that question in its formula to this:

*778If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the misdescription actually describes the goods?

Thus “anyone,” a single individual, is transmuted into a class of persons. I readily can picture the fun future counsel will have with this. They can demand that the board, with its limited investigative facilities as we acknowledge, first define who are the prospective purchasers, old, young, Ph.D’s, illiterates, etc.? Then, what are their tastes, their intellectual quirks, their degree of gullibility?

A simple issue, mostly or wholly of law, is transmuted into a wide-ranging factual inquiry. Is the board to indulge in guesswork and speculation as to this suppositi-tious class, and its mores? We reprehended this approach in a recent “likelihood of confusion” case, Amalgamated v. Amalgamated, 842 F.2d 1270, 6 USPQ2d 1305 (Fed.Cir.1988); (cf. B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 6 USPQ2d 1719 (Fed.Cir.1988)). Is it to conduct a sweeping inquest, the process known outside the Beltway as “making a federal case out of it.” Far better, it seems to me, is not to fix anything when nothing is broke.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Miracle Tuesday LLC (“Miracle Tuesday”) appeals from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) which affirmed the trademark examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark JPK PARIS 75 and design on grounds that it is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3). In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC, No. 77649391, 2011 WL 481332, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 32 (TTAB Feb. 3, 2011) (“Board Decision ”). Because we find that the Board’s refusal to register the mark was based on substantial evidence, we affirm.

Background

On January 14, 2009, Miracle Tuesday filed an intent-to-use application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) seeking to register the mark JPK PARIS 75 and design, shown below, in connection with sunglasses, wallets, handbags and purses, travel bags, suitcases, belts, and shoes:1

*1342

The letters “JPK” are the initials of Jean-Pierre Klifa, who is the manager of Miracle Tuesday and designer of the goods at issue.

In support of its registration application, Miracle Tuesday submitted four articles discussing consumer purchasing decisions and a declaration from Mr. Klifa. The declaration explained that Mr. Klifa is a French citizen who lived in Paris for approximately twenty-two years until 1986, and currently resides in the United States. Although Mr. Klifa indicated in his declaration that he exhibited at two trade shows while in Paris, he did not identify which goods he exhibited at those shows.

On July 23, 2009, the examining attorney issued a final decision refusing to register the mark on grounds that it was “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” in relation to the identified goods.2 In that decision, the examiner found that: (1) the primary significance of the mark is Paris; and (2) Paris is famous for fashion, including the types of fashion accessories identified in the application. Turning to the origin of the goods identified, the examiner found that the only connection between the goods and Paris is that Mr. Klifa is Parisian. Because Paris is famous as a source of the goods at issue, the examiner found that the misrepresentation regarding the geographic origin of the goods would be a material factor in a significant portion of the relevant consumers’ decision to buy the goods.

Miracle Tuesday appealed the examiner’s refusal to register the mark to the Board and the Board affirmed. First, the Board pointed to several undisputed facts, including that: (1) Paris is a well-known city in France and is a center of design and fashion; (2) Miracle Tuesday is a Nevada limited liability company with its primary place of business in Miami, Florida; (3) Mr. Klifa once lived in Paris but now resides in the United States, and has done so for some time; and (4) Mr. Klifa designs handbags.

Turning to the primary significance of the mark, the Board rejected Miracle Tuesday’s argument that the monogram “JPK” is the dominant portion of the mark. Instead, the Board found that the designation “Paris” in the mark “serves to identify the geographic origin of the products” such that “consumers seeing applicant’s products bearing applicant’s mark will assume that such products have a connection with Paris either in their manufacture or their design.” Board Decision, 2011 WL 481332, at *1, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 32, at *5. The Board also rejected Miracle Tuesday’s argument that there is a connection between the goods identified in the application and Paris solely because Mr. Klifa once lived and worked there. Finally, the Board found the evidence sufficient to show that a substantial portion of relevant consumers would be deceived into believing that the goods came from Paris. *1343Accordingly, the Board found that the mark JPK PARIS 75 and design is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive as applied to Miracle Tuesday’s goods.

Miracle Tuesday timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

Discussion

Under Section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act, a mark may not be registered on the principal register if the mark, “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3). A mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, and thus barred from registration, if: (1) “the primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic location”; (2) “the consuming public is likely to believe the place identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that place”; and (3) “the misrepresentation was a material factor in the consumer’s decision” to purchase the goods. In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2003).

Whether a mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive is a question of fact. In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2001). We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, Miracle Tuesday does not challenge the Board’s finding that the primary significance of the mark is Paris; it focuses its arguments on the second and third elements of the Board’s Section 2(e)(3) refusal. Specifically,-Miracle Tuesday argues that the Board erred when it: (1) found that the goods identified do not originate in Paris even though the designer of the goods has significant ties to Paris; (2) applied the wrong standard in concluding that the use of the word Paris in the mark is deceptive; and (3) failed to consider certain material evidence in reaching its decision. For the reasons explained below, each of these arguments lacks merit.

A. Association & Origin

Because Miracle Tuesday does not challenge the Board’s determination as to the first element of a Section 2(e)(3) refusal, we turn directly to the second element which asks “whether the public would reasonably identify or associate the goods sold under the mark with the geographic location contained in the mark.” Save Venice N.Y., 259 F.3d at 1353-54. This element involves two questions: (1) whether there is an association between the goods and the place identified (“a goods/place association”); and (2) whether the applicant’s goods in fact come from that place. See Cal. Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1341 (the PTO must ask whether “the consuming public is likely to believe the place identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that place”)!

As to the first inquiry, the examiner has the initial burden of submitting evidence to establish a goods/place association and the burden then shifts to the applicant to rebut this showing with evidence “that the public would not actually believe the goods derive from the geographic location identified by the mark.” Save Venice N.Y., 259 F.3d at 1354. This *1344court has explained that the PTO is not required to establish an “actual goods/ place association.” Pacer Tech, 338 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added). Instead, the PTO need only “establish ‘a reasonable predicate for its conclusion that the public would be likely to make the particular goods/place association on which it relies.’ ” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 768 (Fed.Cir.1985)).3

Where, as here, a case involves goods rather than services, we have held that “the goods-place association often requires little more than a showing that the consumer identifies the place as a known source of the product.” In re Les Halles De Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citations omitted). Therefore, to establish a goods/place association, “the case law permits an inference that the consumer associates the product with the geographic location in the mark because that place is known for producing the product.” Id. (citation omitted).

It is undisputed that Paris is famous for fashion and fashion accessories, including the types of goods identified in the application. Because relevant purchasers are likely to think of Paris as a known source for fashion accessories, we agree with the Board that there is sufficient evidence of a goods/place association between Paris and the goods listed.

The second inquiry under this element asks whether the goods will in fact originate from the named place. It is undisputed that goods may be deemed to originate in a geographic location if they are manufactured there. Origin can be predicated on factors other than manufacture, however, where the circumstances justify such a connection. See Corporacion Habanos S.A. v. Anncas Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1791 (TTAB 2008) (“[A] product may be found to originate from a place, even though the product is manufactured elsewhere.”). Indeed, at oral argument, the PTO conceded that, in appropriate circumstances, “the place of design can be enough.” See Oral Argument at 17:58, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/ oral-argument-recordings/2011-1373/all. Similarly, if the goods contain a main component or ingredient from the place identified in the mark, that connection can be sufficient to find that the goods originate from that place. See Corporación Habanos, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1791 (“[A] product might be found to originate from a place where the main component or ingredient was made in that place.” (citation omitted)); see also Loew’s Theatres, 769 F.2d at 768 (evidence that tobacco is “one in a short list of principal crops” in Durango, Mexico was sufficient to show that the public would likely believe that chewing tobacco under the mark DURANGO originated there). And, a product might be found to originate from a place where the applicant has its headquarters or research and development facilities, even when the manufacturing facilities are elsewhere. See In re Nantucket Allserve, Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1144, 1145-46 (TTAB 1993) (identifying Nantucket as the principal origin of applicant’s products, even though the goods were manufactured elsewhere, because the company had its headquarters and research and development center on Nantucket).

Here, the Board found that Miracle Tuesday is located in Miami, its designer is *1345not located in Paris, and the goods at issue are designed and produced somewhere other than Paris. The Board rejected Miracle Tuesday’s argument that the fact that Mr. Klifa lived and worked in Paris for twenty-two years is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the products originated in Paris. The Board concluded that, “[a]l-though Mr. Klifa may still consider himself to be Parisian, the goods that applicant seeks to register are not because there is no current connection between the goods and Paris.” Board Decision, 2011 WL 481332, at *2, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 32, at

On appeal, Miracle Tuesday argues that the Board took an overly restrictive view of the word “originates.” Specifically, it argues that its designer — Mr. Klifa — has a significant connection with Paris and that customers are more interested in the designer’s origin than the origin of the goods themselves. In support of this position, Miracle Tuesday references red carpet events where interviewers ask celebrities “who are you wearing?” rather than “where was it made?”

Regardless of whether today’s consumers consider and care about the origin of the designer of the goods they purchase, the relevant inquiry under the statute is whether there is a connection between the goods and Paris — not between the designer and Paris. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (a mark is not registrable if, “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the fact that Mr. Klifa lived in Paris over twenty-five years ago is insufficient to establish that the goods to now be marketed under the proposed mark originate there. On this record, there is no evidence that Mr. Klifa’s activities while he lived in Paris had anything to do with designing handbags or the other goods identified in the application. Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Klifa exhibited any of the types of goods at issue at the Parisian trade shows he attended. Given the statutory focus on the geographic origin of the goods, Miracle Tuesday’s attempts to shift the inquiry to the historical origin of the designer must fail.

Although there is support for the proposition that goods need not be manufactured in the named place to originate there — and we do not endorse application of a contrary rule here — it is clear that there must be some other direct connection between the goods and the place identified in the mark (e.g., the place identified is where the goods are designed or distributed, where the applicant is headquartered or has its research and development facility, or where a main component of the good originates). Here, Miracle Tuesday concedes that the goods identified in the application do not originate in Paris. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Miracle Tuesday revealed that the goods at issue “are made outside the United States, in Asia.” See Oral Argument at 3:03. The record further reveals that the goods identified are designed in Miami, and there is no evidence that a main component of the goods, or even any component of the goods, comes from Paris. Simply put, there is no evidence of a current connection between the goods and Paris.

Given that Paris is a world-renowned fashion center and is well-known as a place where fashion goods and accessories are designed, manufactured, and sold, we agree with the Board that “the relevant public would likely believe that [Miracle Tuesday’s] products offered under the mark JPK PARIS 75 and design come from Paris (ie., that a goods/place association exists) when in fact the goods will not come from that place.” Board Decision, 2011 WL 481332, at *2, 2011 TTAB LEX*1346IS 32, at *8.4 And, because there is no evidence showing a direct connection between Miracle Tuesday’s goods and Paris, the Board properly found that there is insufficient evidence that the goods originate in Paris.

B. Materiality

The third and final element of a Section 2(e)(3) refusal focuses on materiality and asks “whether a substantial portion of the relevant consumers is likely to be deceived” by the mark’s misrepresentation of a goods/place association. In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2009). In Spirits International, we held that, “to establish a prima facie case of materiality there must be some indication that a substantial portion of the relevant consumers would be materially influenced in the decision to purchase the product or service by the geographic meaning of the mark.” Id. at 1357. We have also held that “the PTO may raise an inference in favor of materiality with evidence that the place is famous as a source of the goods at issue.” Les Halles De Paris, 334 F.3d at 1374.5

Applying these standards, the Board stated that:

Because we have determined that the primary significance of Paris to the relevant public is the geographic place, and in view of the renown and reputation of fashion designs originating in Paris, we may infer that at least a substantial portion of consumers who encounter applicant’s mark featuring the word “Paris” on applicant’s products are likely to be deceived into believing that those products come from or were designed in Paris.

Board Decision, 2011 WL 481332, at *3, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 32, at *9. Accordingly, the Board found that the materiality factor was satisfied.

On appeal, Miracle Tuesday argues that the Board applied the wrong standard for materiality and that it was required to find that the use of the word Paris “does in fact deceive the public.” Appellant’s Br. 14. According to Miracle Tuesday, because there is a substantial connection between Mr. Klifa and Paris, the reference to Paris in the mark is a true statement that is not deceptive. Miracle Tuesday’s arguments are without merit.

First, Miracle Tuesday points to our decision in Les Halles De Paris as evidence that the PTO “must show some heightened standard to show a false association between the services and the relevant geographic location.” Appellant’s Reply 6. Miracle Tuesday’s argument is fundamentally flawed, however, given that this ease involves a mark to identify goods whereas Les Halles De Paris involved an application to register a mark for restaurant services. Indeed, in Les Halles De Paris, we specifically recognized that: (1) “the standard under section 2(e)(3) is more difficult to satisfy for service marks than for marks on goods”; and (2) “geographic marks in connection with services are less likely to mislead thé public than geographic marks on goods.” Les Halles De Paris, 334 F.3d at 1374.6 Given these differences, we drew *1347a distinction between the evidence necessary to give rise to an inference of materiality for goods and that necessary to give rise to that same inference for services. Although for goods, evidence that a place is famous as a source of those goods is sufficient to raise an inference of materiality, when dealing with service marks, we held that there must be a heightened association between the services and geographic location. See id. at 1374-75 (“In other words, an inference of materiality arises in the event of a very strong services-place association. Without a particularly strong services-place association, an inference would not arise, leaving the PTO to seek direct evidence of materiality.”). Because this case involves goods — rather than services — Miracle Tuesday’s reliance on the portion of Les Halles De Paris creating a heightened standard for service marks is misplaced.7

As the Board correctly noted, the fact that Paris is famous for fashion and design gives rise to an inference that a substantial portion of relevant customers would be deceived into thinking the goods identified came from Paris. Miracle Tuesday points to no evidence that would rebut this inference. Instead, as noted above, Miracle Tuesday maintains that customers care more about the origin of the designer than the origin of the goods and seems to argue that, where the mark involves a fashion designer, it should be treated as a service mark, with an attendant heightened level of materiality required. See Appellant’s Br. 16 (“The relationship of the designer to Paris [is] not so far from a service performed by the designer, much as a restaurant service where a heightened materiality test is required.”). Miracle Tuesday cites no authority for this proposition and ignores the fact that its application for registration is directed to goods, not services. Because our analysis must focus on the information provided in the application, Mr. Klifa’s early years in Paris are effectively irrelevant, and certainly insufficient to overcome a proper inference of materiality.

For all of these reasons, we agree with the Board that the geographic misrepresentation in the mark is material and would deceive a substantial portion of the relevant consumers regarding the source of the goods outlined in the application.

C. Evidentiary Issue

Finally, Miracle Tuesday argues the Board failed to consider certain scholarly articles it submitted regarding consumer purchasing decisions and “country of origin” issues. Because the Board did not specifically refer to the articles in its decision, Miracle Tuesday assumes that they *1348were not considered. According to Miracle Tuesday, the articles “show that customers are not necessarily concerned about the country of origin or country of manufacture of a product, but other features of the product, which in this particular instance arguably includes ‘source’ of the designer, or ‘origin’ of the designer.... ” Appellant’s Br. 24.

In response, the PTO argues that the articles “are irrelevant to the proper statutory inquiry of whether the goods come from the place named by the mark” and thus the Board “had no obligation to address them in its decision.” Appellee’s Br. 15, n.7. The PTO further argues that the Board fully considered Miracle Tuesday’s theory that goods need not be manufactured in a place to originate there. We agree with the PTO on both points.

First, as previously discussed, the relevant inquiry under the statute focuses on the origin of the goods — not the origin of the designer. Second, the mere fact that the Board did not recite all of the evidence it considered does not mean the evidence was not, in fact, reviewed. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2003) (‘We presume that a fact finder reviews all the evidence presented unless he explicitly expresses otherwise.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, as the PTO argues, it is clear that the Board fully considered Miracle Tuesday’s theory of the word “originate.” See Board Decision, 2011 WL 481332, at *2, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 32, at *6-7 (considering and rejecting the argument that, “because the creative force behind applicant’s products lived and worked in Paris for 23 years, the Board should consider the design of applicant’s products as having originated in Paris”). Accordingly, we find that Miracle Tuesday’s evidentiary challenge lacks merit.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and because we find that Miracle Tuesday’s remaining arguments are without merit, we affirm the Board’s refusal to register the mark JPK PARIS 75 and design under Section 2(e)(3).

AFFIRMED

MEREDITH, District Judge.

On November 30, 1987, the Honorable Judge Thomas G. Hull entered his Order denying injunctive relief to appellant Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corporation (BPB), a Virginia corporation, which owned a validly registered trademark in the phrase APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES. Appellants argued that appellee, Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, should be enjoined from their use of APPALACHIAN LOG HOMES as it constituted an infringement of BPB’s registered mark. The District Court ruled for the defendant-appellee and we now affirm the decision of the District Court.

BPB applied for a registered trademark for the term APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES in December of 1981 and as evidence of the establishment of secondary meaning, BPB informed the Patent and Trademark Office that it had spent $100,-000 in advertising the name APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES and had received approximately $2,000,000 in gross sales of log residences under that name. On August 30, 1983, the Patent and Trademark Office, pursuant to Title 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), issued a certificate of registration for the mark APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES.

From January of 1980, BPB advertised the name APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES on a regular basis in various periodicals including Log Home Guide, Country Homes, The Log Home Annual, Mother Earth News, Alternative House Builder, and Better Building Ideas. BPB specifically advertised in Tennessee during the Knoxville Home Show in April of 1981, including radio and newspaper advertising. A dealership for Appalachian Log Structures was established in Seymour, Tennessee in January of 1981. In addition, in June of 1981 an Appalachian Log Structure dealership was established in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, which notably was the home of Ken Winter, the financier of Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., though no evidence indicated that Winter had prior knowledge of Appalachian Log Structures.

Appellee, Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., began using its name in the east Tennessee area in August of 1981. The name was chosen to represent the location in which the business was located and the kind of product that was sold. The record does not reflect any prior knowledge on the part of appellee of the existence of Appalachian Log Structures.

Appalachian Log Homes builds only handcrafted log homes using Western Hemlock logs with a flat hand-hewn surface and connecting dovetail notches on the logs. The Western Hemlock logs are taken from the core of the tree, measure six inches in depth, twelve inches in height and *593are up to forty feet in length. Their massive size requires a fifteen (15) ton crane to set the logs and thus the residences cannot be sold as a do-it-yourself kit.

On the other hand, BPB through Appalachian Log Structures, manufactures a variety of log structures including commercial buildings and log residences. BPB utilizes primarily round, pressure treated logs of much shorter length made from pine. The logs are notched so that they ultimately form a solid wood wall and can be erected by the home buyer. BPB also manufactures hand-hewn square logs with dovetailed ends.

The testimony of Dr. Leonard W. Brink-man, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Tennessee was offered by appellee as evidence of the geographically descriptive nature of the term APPALACHIAN. Dr. Brinkman testified that he teaches a course at the University of Tennessee entitled “Geography of Appalachia” and that the term APPALACHIAN refers to an area “extending from the southern part of the State of New York to the central part of the state of Alabama, and in an east-west direction from the Blue Ridge and Smokey Mountains to the plateau regions of Ohio and states to the southwest.” (Joint Appendix Pg. 68A). Furthermore, the term APPALACHIAN is used in governmental activity to name a Regional Commission in the Appalachian area, to identify a region for study within the Department of Agriculture and in a report to the news media regarding the rivers, forests, and mountains of the southern Appalachian region. In 1910, the Appalachian Exposition was held in Knoxville, Tennessee. Dr. Brinkman testified that the term APPALACHIAN has been used in the public domain since 1902. A map prepared by the United States Geological Survey was introduced and the title of the map was the “Appalachian Region.” The map indicated that the “Appalachian Region” extends into the east Tennessee area as well as West Virginia, the western counties of Virginia and the western counties of North Carolina.

The appellee offered the testimony of Larry Hagood, a licensed attorney in the State of Tennessee who found by virtue of his research that the term APPALACHIAN was used in 132 business titles in North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.

The Lanham Act provides in pertinent part that:

No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—

* * * * * *

(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when applied to the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive ... or (2) when applied to the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive.... (f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a) — (d) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods and commerce. The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as applied to the applicant’s goods and commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years next preceding the date of the filing of the application.

Title 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Receipt of a registered trademark automatically invokes a statutory presumption that the trademark is valid. Title 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). The statutory presumption shifts the burden of proof to the party challenging the validity of the mark. WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir.1984); Scientific Applications, Inc. v. Energy Conservation Corp., 436 F.Supp. 354 (D.C.Ga.1977). Furthermore, the District Court may not overrule the decision of registerability of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) unless the party challenging the mark argues persuasively that the mark was ineligible for protection. Scientific Applications, 436 F.Supp. at 360. Validity of a registered trademark is contingent on de*594termining first whether the mark is (1) arbitrary and fanciful; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; or (4) generic. WLWC Centers, Inc. v. Winners Corp., 563 F.Supp. 717, 719 (D.Tenn.1983). Neither generic nor descriptive terms are protectable without establishing secondary meaning. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 (2nd Cir.1984). A mark is descriptive:

“... if it describes: the intended purpose, function or use of the goods; the class of users of the goods; a desirable characteristic of the goods; or the end effect upon the user.”

Wynn Oil Co. & Classic Car Wash Inc. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1190 (6th Cir.1988). If the mark “imparts information directly, it is descriptive.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 587 F.Supp. 330, 335 (E.D.Mo.1984); affirmed 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.1984). APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES refers to either the origin of the log structures or to a particular style of log structures. The term LOG is a generic term commonly used to denote a rough cut portion of a tree and the term STRUCTURE is a commonly used descriptive term. The parties do not dispute the classification of the terms LOG and STRUCTURE as made by the District Court. Instead the controversy centers on whether APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES is a primarily geographically descriptive term.

The appellee introduced substantial evidence supporting the District Court’s determination that APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES is primarily geographically descriptive. The Appalachian region has been publicly acknowledged as a distinct, identifiable region since 1902. Furthermore, the regionally descriptive term APPALACHIAN is used in 132 businesses located in the Appalachian region. The Lanham Act does not protect primarily geographically descriptive marks.

“It is plain that the congressionally established prohibition against registration of geographical names or terms basically stems from the realization that most terms in the vocabulary of this science are generic or descriptive. Thus, Congress has expressly left accessible to all potential users those names of subdivisions of the earth — regions, nations, counties, town, rivers, lakes, and other natural and artificial geographical units — which could be employed to draw public attention to the origin of a product or the situs of a business. It would obviously promote unfair competition to proscribe for all save a single producer the name of a region and thereby preclude other producers of the same product in the same region from indicating their product’s origin.”

World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.1971). Where it is determined that the mark as perceived by potential purchasers describes the geographic origin of the goods the mark is primarily geographically descriptive. In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d 95, 99 (U.S.Ct.C. & P.A.1982). To further clarify whether the mark is primarily geographically descriptive, it is valuable to examine the possibility that the geographic term is “minor, obscure, remote or unconnected with the goods.” Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 486 (5th Cir.1971); In re Brauere: Aying Franz Inselkammen, KG, 217 U.S. P.Q. 73, 75 (T.T.A.B.1983); V & V Food Products, Inc. v. Cacique Cheese Co., 683 F.Supp. 662, 671 (N.D.Ill.1988). Use of a geographic term such as DUTCH to describe paint, WORLD to describe carpets, EUROPEAN to describe health spas, TOU-RAINE to describe coffee, and NANTUCKET to describe men’s shirts is entirely arbitrary. The protected mark has no relationship to the source of the goods since none of the goods were manufactured in the geographic area described. In each of these instances the mark was protectable and not precluded under the primarily geographically descriptive category. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2). National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 135, 100 L.Ed. 778 (1955); World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 485; Health Industries v. European Health Spas, 489 F.Supp. 860, 867-868 (S.D.S.D.1980); LaTouraine Coffee Co. Inc. v. Lorraine Cof *595 fee Co., Inc., 157 F.2d 115, 116-117 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied 329 U.S. 771, 67 S.Ct. 189, 91 L.Ed. 663 (1946); Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99. The case at bar presents a slightly different situation in that the evidence reflects that Appalachian Log Structures is located in Virginia, one of the “Appalachian” states. The APPALACHIAN reference is therefore not merely arbitrary or fanciful. The Legislative History of the Lanham Act points out that where a logical connection can be made between the product and the geographical term, the term is geographically descriptive.

“To illustrate, the word ‘Alaska’ would probably have no descriptive or geographical meaning applied to bananas, but applied to canned salmon would unquestionably have a descriptive as well as geographical meaning.”

Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 107. The permissible inference to be drawn from the use of the term APPALACHIAN in this instance is to describe the origin of the product.

APPALACHIAN could be used to refer to a particular style of log structures as well and indeed, the District Court concluded without supporting evidence that it referred to a “type of rustic architecture associated with our geographical region of the country.” (Joint Appendix 11A) BPB vehemently argues that the court’s conclusion in light of the evidence to the contrary is clearly erroneous and that failure to adduce evidence that the Appalachian region is known for log homes is fatal to the District Court’s decision. We decline to follow BPB’s assertion.

Though more than a geographic name is required in order to meet the “primarily geographically descriptive” category, there is no requirement that the challenger to a trademark demonstrate that the area is noted for the goods in question. The proper inquiry is “What meaning, if any, does the term convey to the public with respect to the goods on which the name is used?” Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 102. When a geographic name is used on goods, it does not represent a single source but refers to the area in which the goods originated. A “goods/place association” by the public is therefore presumed. Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 102. The District Court properly found that a goods/place association is made by the term regardless of whether the area was noted for the production of those goods.

A trademark that is primarily geographically descriptive must have acquired secondary meaning to invoke the protection of the Lanham Act. The purpose of requiring the establishment of secondary meaning is to give effect to those geographic marks which no longer cause the public to associate the goods with a particular place but to associate the goods with a particular source. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co. Ltd., 609 F.2d 655 (2nd Cir.1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1601, 63 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980). The geographical term no longer primarily denotes the geographic area, but with secondary meaning it primarily denotes a single source for the product.

When BPB applied for registration of the mark APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES in December of 1981, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) requested evidence to establish secondary meaning of the term. BPB furnished the PTO with gross sales figures and advertising expense figures. At the trial of this matter, evidence was elicited from Mr. Parson of BPB by appellant that from 1979 to 1981 BPB achieved $2,000,000 in gross sales and from 1980 to 1981 BPB expended approximately $100,000 in advertising the mark. Additionally, through cross-examination of Mr. Parsons, appellant offered evidence that BPB had used the mark in the general community from January of 1980 until August of 1981 when appellee began using the name APPALACHIAN LOG HOMES. The term therefore had twenty months in which to acquire secondary meaning. The PTO granted the registration of APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES as BPB’s mark on August 30, 1983.

The critical question for this Court is whether the evidence was sufficient for the District Court to properly overrule the PTO decision of registerability and to conclude that secondary meaning *596did not exist. Secondary meaning is proved when by a preponderance of the evidence it can be determined that the attitude of the consuming public toward the mark denotes “a single thing coming from a single source.” Aloe Cream Laboratories v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.1970), quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146, 41 S.Ct. 113, 113, 65 L.Ed. 189 (1920). Direct proof of secondary meaning is difficult to obtain. Aloe Cream, 423 F.2d at 849. Absent direct proof, the Court must draw reasonable inferences from evidence of long-term usage, from considerable effort and expenditure of money toward developing a reputation and good will for the trademark. WLWC Centers, 563 F.Supp. at 723. Sales volume, though relevant, is not necessarily sufficient to indicate recognition of the mark by purchasers as an indication of the source. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (U.S.C.C.P.A.1977); In re International Spike, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 505, 507 (TTAB 1976). Advertising expense also is relevant but will not, standing alone, establish secondary meaning. Scientific Applications v. Energy Conservation Corp., 436 F.Supp. 354, 361 (N.D.Ga.1977). Where advertising expenditures are required to “merely survive” in the competitive market, advertising expenditures cannot be used to prove secondary meaning. WLWC Centers, 563 F.Supp. at 724. However, extensive advertising which results in consumer association with a single source can establish secondary meaning. (Emphasis added). Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3rd Cir.1978). The duration of use of the mark can establish secondary meaning where the duration is more than a relatively short period. In WLWC Centers, the Court determined that three years was insufficient to prove that the mark had acquired secondary meaning. WLWC Centers, 563 F.Supp. at 723.

The PTO granted registration of APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES solely upon evidence of sales and advertisement. Though deference is given the PTO decision, the presumption is rebuttable. In addition to the evidence presented to the PTO, undisputed evidence of use of the mark for a very short duration was before the Court. We find that the additional evidence of short duration was, as the District Court noted, “highly relevant” and was therefore sufficient to rebut the PTO finding of secondary meaning.

BPB asserts that secondary meaning was proven by advertising expenditures, sales achieved, the company’s climb to the top of the industry and the testimony of Mr. Parsons that APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES had secondary meaning. No consumer evidence was submitted. The evidentiary burden necessary to establish secondary meaning is substantial. Bank of Texas v. Commerce Southwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.1984). Though BPB’s advertising expenditures for the mark are relevant, there is no evidence to establish the amount as extensive or to distinguish it as beyond that necessary to survive in the market. The gross sales figure of $2,000,000 encompasses three years and includes commercial as well as residential buildings and averages approximately $666,000 in gross sales each of the three years. The significance of BPB’s climb to the top of the market is limited by the fact that no evidence establishes that it occurred before appellee began using its name. Secondary meaning must be established prior to others use of a similar name. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2nd Cir.1980). The testimony of Fletcher Parsons that APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES had acquired secondary meaning must be viewed with skepticism. Mr. Parsons, as co-owner of BPB, has a recognizable interest in obtaining a favorable ruling and without supporting facts this portion of his testimony was properly disregarded. Secondary meaning was not established by BPB.

Having agreed with the District Court’s finding that APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES was unprotectable, there is no need to review the issues raised on appeal which assume registerability. Therefore, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

*597KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I write briefly to express my concurrence in the result articulated by the majority opinion. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a), the PTO’s registration creates only a “prima facie” presumption that the mark is valid. The registration “shall not preclude an opposing party from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.” Id. It is well-settled that “under the Lanham Act, registration by itself does not enlarge a registrant’s substantive rights in a mark.” Amer. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir.1974) (citing Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 566, 19 L.Ed.2d 601 (1967)). Indeed, Lanham Act registration does not shift the ultimate burden of proof, but merely imposes on a challenger of a trademark “the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption; it does not shift the ultimate burden of proof.” Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 575, 578 (S.D.N.Y.1987). See also House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney, 151 F.2d 261, 265 (3d Cir.1945) (ultimate burden of proving claimed validity of registered trademark rests with registrant); Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F.Supp. 112 (D.N.J.1956) (same), aff'd, 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.1957).

In the case at bar, the ultimate burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff. Once the defendant had rebutted the plaintiff’s pri-ma facie presumption anchored in plaintiff’s registration of the mark by evidence that the mark was merely geographically descriptive and that it had not been used for an extended period of time, defendant had satisfied its burden of going forward. When the presumption arising from registration was rebutted, the ultimate burden of proof including proof of secondary meaning reverted to the plaintiff. On rebuttal, plaintiff failed to satisfy its ultimate burden of proof by introducing sufficient secondary meaning of the mark. See Bank of Tex. v. Commerce Southwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.1984) (evi-dentiary burden necessary to establish secondary meaning for a geographically descriptive term is substantial); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 794 (5th Cir.1983) (if term descriptive, rather than inherently distinctive, burden necessary to establish secondary meaning is substantial); Telemed Corp. v. Tel Med Corp., 588 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir.1978) (same).

It was not “clearly erroneous” for the district court to conclude that plaintiff had failed to meet this substantial burden. Plaintiff’s advertising was in itself insufficient to prove secondary meaning. Application of Andes Candies, Inc., 478 F.2d 1264, 1267 (C.C.P.A.1973); Amer. Footwear Corp. v. Gen’l Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1601, 63 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980). Nor was evidence concerning the volume of sales persuasive. Twentieth Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1755, 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A.1977).

Because of the very limited period during which the mark had been used, and given the absence of any direct evidence of consumer testimony as to secondary meaning, I conclude that plaintiff has not met its burden of proving secondary meaning and accordingly concur in the result of the majority opinion.

RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES is a geographically descriptive mark, I dissent because I believe the majority erred in finding no secondary meaning had been established. When the Patent and Trademark Office registers a proposed mark, that mark is presumptively valid. The Second Circuit, in Aluminum Fabricating Company of Pittsburgh v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.1958), made explicit its belief that one chai-*598lenging a registered mark must submit very persuasive evidence on its behalf:

We are of the opinion that [15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) ] means not only that the burden of going forward is on the contestant of the registration but there is a strong presumption of validity so that the party claiming invalidity has the burden of proof and in order to prevail it must put something more into the scales than the registrant. In a case such as this, where [both sides are strong], the courts should not overrule the action of the Patent Office to whose care Congress has entrusted the preliminary determination as to whether a mark fulfills the requirements of the statute.

259 F.2d at 316. This passage was cited approvingly by the court for the Western District of Tennessee in Tigrett Industries, Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 313 (W.D.Tenn.1963). This court used similar language in Wynn Oil Company v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.1988), in which we recognized that, absent strong evidence from the challenger, district courts should accept the judgment of the Patent and Trademark Office, “which is undoubtedly expert in these matters.” At 1190. Not only does this general presumption exist, but when the PTO approves a mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), it has necessarily determined that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning. Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of South Florida, 200 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 282 (1978); Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers’ Educational and Coop. Union, 247 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.1957).

There is thus a strong presumption in favor of the PTO’s finding that BPB established secondary meaning, and the district court could find the defendant to have rebutted this presumption only if the defendant offered convincing proof that the PTO determination was erroneous. Here, Appalachian Log Homes’ only real evidence is the fact that BPB used its mark for a relatively short time before approval. While the length of time the mark has been used is undoubtedly a relevant factor, it is only one of several to be considered. American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., Ltd., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir.1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.1976); King-Size, Inc. v. Frank’s King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F.Supp. 1138 (S.D.Tex.1982); 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15.20. Here, the other relevant factors, such as extent of advertising, the company’s success, and widespread recognition, argue in favor of a finding of secondary meaning. Additionally, the relatively short period of use was certainly a factor the PTO must have considered in deciding whether to approve the mark for registration. The PTO found a secondary meaning had been established, and Appalachian Log Homes offered only very weak evidence to dispute that finding. I would REVERSE the district court on its ruling as to secondary meaning.