MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

GERTNER, District Judge:

This case raises complex allegations of trademark infringement on the internet— through the use of trademarks in search engines, in sponsored links, and on commercial websites. The Plaintiff, Hearts on Fire Co., LLC (“Hearts on Fire”), principally claims that one of its competitors, Blue Nile, Inc. (“Blue Nile”), committed trademark infringement when it used the Plaintiffs trademark as a keyword to trigger search engine advertisements known as “sponsored links.” While sponsored linking is a common form of internet advertising, the use of a competitor’s trademark to trigger these links has generated both litigation and academic debate.1

The Complaint encompasses three different uses of the Plaintiffs mark by Blue Nile: (1) the Defendant’s purchase of the trademark as a search engine keyword, which displayed a sponsored link directing the computer user to Blue Nile’s website whenever the phrase “hearts on fire” was entered as a search-term, (2) the display of trademarked text in the Blue Nile advertisement attached to the sponsored link, and (3) the search results list generated within the Blue Nile website when the computer user searches there for the phrase “hearts on fire.” Together, the Plaintiff argues, these uses constitute a course of conduct likely to confuse internet shoppers, improperly diverting them to its competitor’s website.

The Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss (document # 5). Significantly, the Defendant’s present motion is not directed toward Plaintiffs allegation that the trademark “hearts on fire” appeared alongside *278Defendant’s sponsored link. See Compl. ¶ 21. Blue Nile agrees that this allegation, if true, amounts to infringement. Def. Mot. to Dismiss Mem. at 1 (document # 6). Rather, Blue Nile asks this Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs allegation that the Defendant’s use of the trademark to trigger the sponsored link constitutes infringement under Section 32(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. Likewise, the Defendant argues that Plaintiffs third theory is unavailing, because Blue Nile does not use the “hearts on fire” trademark on its own website.

For the reasons below, the Court finds that Blue Nile’s adoption of the Plaintiffs trademark as a search engine keyword constitutes a “use” within the meaning of the Lanham Act. To be sure, this use is not, by itself, enough to prove infringement. If the Plaintiff can show that the resulting sponsored links and the content of the Blue Nile website likely led to consumer confusion, Blue Nile’s purchase of the search term would meet the requirements of the Act. Accordingly, Blue Nile’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff sells trademarked diamonds and jewelry to authorized retailers, many of whom resell these diamonds online. Compl. ¶ 2 (document # 1). “Hearts on Fire” is a registered trademark of the Plaintiff, and the name of the Plaintiffs diamond company. Id. at ¶ 14. The Plaintiff does not sell diamonds directly to the public, though it does “provide services relating to the sale of jewelry,” including a public website that promotes the trademarked jewelry and directs customers to authorized dealers of the trademarked diamonds. Id. The Plaintiff considers itself a “recognized worldwide industry leader,” which has used the trademark “Hearts on Fire” to promote its diamonds since as early as 1996. Id.

The Defendant, Blue Nile, operates an online diamond and jewelry retail store where consumers can purchase diamonds. Id. at 3. Importantly, the Defendant is not an authorized dealer of Hearts on Fire diamonds and consumers cannot buy the Plaintiffs trademarked diamonds at the Defendant’s website. Id.

The mechanisms of the alleged infringement, which is based upon keyword purchasing and the display of search engine sponsored links, warrant some description. When a consumer wants to search the internet for information, she or he often begins at a search engine, such as Google or Yahoo. Once there, the computer user types words or phrases into a search box on the search engine website. The search engine then generates a list of web addresses, called a “search results list,” that may be relevant to the computer user’s interests based on the searched-for word or phrase. Search engines use complex algorithms to search their databases and determine which web addresses will appear in the search results list. These algorithms generally rank the web addresses according to relevancy, using factors such as whether the search terms appear on the webpage and whether previous computer users using that search term have decided to click on the link to the web address. See Jackson v. Scotts Co., 2009 WL 321010, at *6 n. 32 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Preston Gralla, How the Internet Works 192 (7th ed. 2004)); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comm’ns Corp., 55 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1077 (C.D.Cal.1999).

In addition to search results based on relevancy, many search engines also display so-called “sponsored links” on their results page. These sponsored links are a form of advertising, by which the search engine permits a company to purchase a keyword or phrase which triggers the paid advertisement. Specifically, when a com*279puter user enters a search that includes the purchased keyword, a link to the website of the company that purchased the keyword, together with a small advertisement, appears near the top of the results list displayed. This listing is usually demarcated, quite accurately, as a “sponsored link.” All in all, purchasing a keyword allows a company to circumvent the search engine’s usual relevancy factors and prominently display its sponsored link to internet users.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant paid a search engine, www. webcrawler.com, to display a sponsored link with the web address of the Defendant’s website when a computer user searched for the phrase “hearts on fire.” Compl. ¶ 21. The text of the sponsored link, which included the Plaintiffs trademark, reads as follows:

Ideal Cut Diamonds at Blue Nile

Find hearts on fire diamonds at Forbes Favorite Online Jeweler.

Sponsored by: www.bluenile.com.

Id. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant has used the “hearts on fire” keyword to trigger Blue Nile sponsored links that do not include the trademark in them text. Id. at ¶ 23. In either case, if the internet user clicks the sponsored link and proceeds to the Defendant’s web address, www.bluenile.com, the Blue Nile website contains an internal search engine that exclusively searches web pages within the Defendant’s website. If the computer user then types the trademarked phrase into the Defendant’s search box, a list of search results containing the individual words of the trademark are displayed— i.e., a list of webpages with the words “hearts” or “on fire” — albeit none of these results containing the exact trademarked phrase. Id. at ¶ 24.

The Plaintiff alleges that these uses of its mark, either separately or together, constitute trademark infringement under Section 32(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114,2 unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),3 unfair competition at common law, and unfair and deceptive practices under M.G.L. ch. 93A. Compl. ¶ 37. Plaintiff is harmed because Defendant’s use of the “hearts on fire” trademark confuses consumers, diverting potential internet customers from their original intent to buy the Plaintiffs diamonds and directing them instead to the Defendant’s website. Id. at ¶ 27. Whether this diversion' — -achieved through the purchase of sponsored links triggered by the trademarked phrase— constitutes trademark infringement is the central issue here.

*280II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this Court must determine whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Court must accept as true the claims in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Plaintiff. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim. See Miranda v. Ponce Fed’l Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99). The Plaintiffs factual allegations, however, must be more than speculative, and require more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, dismissal would be appropriate if “it appears from the facts alleged that the claimant cannot recover on any viable theory.” Rumford Pharm., Inc. v. City of East Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir.1992).

III. DISCUSSION

The Defendant has filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking to eliminate the first and third theories of trademark violation that the Plaintiff pursues, namely the Defendant’s purchase of the “hearts on fire” trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored links, and the results when “hearts on fire” is entered into the Defendant’s internal search engine. As described above, the Defendant has not challenged the allegation that the sponsored link’s display of the exact trademarked phrase as part of the accompanying advertisement, if proved, would amount to a trademark violation.

A. The Lanham Act

The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., serves two basic purposes: foremost, preventing the use of similar or identical marks in a way that confuses the public about the actual source of the goods and services; and second, the protection of the goodwill that companies have built up in their trademarks. See, e.g., ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 445 F.3d 841, 846 (5th Cir.2006); S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong.2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S.Code Cong. Serv. 1274-76 (stating that the Lanham Act would “secure trademark owners in the goodwill which they have built up and ... protect the public from imposition by the use of counterfeit and imitated marks”). To establish liability, the Plaintiff must ultimately prove that (1) it owns and uses the “Hearts on Fire” trademark; (2) the Defendant used the trademark without the Plaintiffs permission; and (3) the Defendant’s use was likely to confuse consumers, thereby causing the Plaintiff harm. See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2008). While the Plaintiff has clearly pleaded facts sufficient to show that it owns the trademark, the parties debate whether the keyword purchase constitutes a “use” under the Lan-ham Act and what standard of confusion the Plaintiff must meet.

B. The “Use” Requirement

As an initial matter, this Court must resolve whether the purchase of a trademarked keyword to trigger a sponsored link constitutes a “use” of that trademark, as the first prong of the Lanham Act requires. The circuits have split on the issue; the First Circuit has not yet squarely decided such a case.4

*281At present, the Second Circuit stands alone in holding that the purchase of a competitor’s trademark to trigger internet advertising does not constitute a use for the purposes of the Lanham Act. The pivotal case, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU. Com, Inc., did not involve sponsored links as here, but rather a different form of internet advertising known as “pop-up ads.” 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir.2005); see also Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 402 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (applying rationale of 1-800 Contacts to sponsored links). In 1-800 Contacts, Vision Direct, a phone directory company and competitor of 1-800 Contacts, Inc., paid WhenU.com to display a pop-up advertisement on a computer user’s screen whenever he or she entered “www.1800 contacts.com” as a web address. Id. at 405. The pop-up ad created a new window with Vision Direct’s advertisement, temporarily blocking the 1800contacts.com website from view. Id.

Crucially, the Second Circuit held that the www.1800contacts.com web address was “similar, but not identical” to the corn-pany’s protected trademark, “1-800 CONTACTS.” Id. at 408. Likewise, because the pop-up advertisement did not actually display the 1-800 Contacts trademark anywhere in its text, the Second Circuit held that there was no “use” of the trademark within the meaning of the Lanham Act.5 In this view, only the web address — not the trademark itself — was used to trigger the Vision Direct advertisement, and even that use was confined to an internal software directory never seen by the internet user. As such, the Second Circuit found that the pop-up ad did not rely on any use of the trademark itself, nor did it create any possibility of “visual confusion” with 1-800 Contacts’ mark. Id. at 409.

While 1-800 Contacts carefully distinguished the pop-up advertisement context from the keyword context, id. at 410, lower courts in the Second Circuit have gone further. They have applied that same reasoning to keyword cases, holding that a company’s purchase of a competitor’s trademark to trigger sponsored links does not qualify as a “use.” Merck & Co. v. *282 Mediplan Health Consulting Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 402 (S.D.N.Y.2006); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 393 (N.D.N.Y.2006); Site-Pro-1 Inc. v. Better Metal LLC, 506 F.Supp.2d 123 (E.D.N.Y.2007). Whether such an extension of the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 1-800 Contacts, a pop-up ad case, is warranted in a sponsored-link case like this one is questionable.

Indeed, outside of the Second Circuit, other circuits agree that the purchase of trademarks to trigger banner advertisements on a search results page is a “use” under the Lanham Act.6 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.2004); Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.2006). District courts have followed suit when applying these decisions to the purchase of trademarked keywords to trigger sponsored links. See Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F.Supp.2d 205, 207 (D.Mass.2007) (finding keyword-purchasing a “use” for trademark purposes and collecting cases on both sides); J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, 2007 WL 30115 (E.D.Pa.2007) (finding trademark use in sponsored linking but allowing defendant’s motion to dismiss on other grounds); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.Supp.2d 310 (D.N.J.2006); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D.Va.2004).

Rather than relying only on the Act’s definitions section as the Second Circuit has done, see note 5, supra, these courts often look also to its civil remedies provision, which defines “use” more broadly. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definitions section), with 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (civil remedies provision); see also Boston Duck Tours, 527 F.Supp.2d at 207 (finding that “sponsored linking necessarily entails the ‘use’ of the plaintiffs mark as part of a mechanism for advertising,” based on the statute’s “plain language”). In particular, the civil remedies provision penalizes the “use in commerce” of “any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (emphasis added); see also note 2, supra. The purchase of a competitor’s trademai'k to trigger seai'ch-engine advertising is precisely such a use in commerce, even if the trademark is never affixed to the goods themselves. In effect, one company has relied on its competitor’s trademark to place advertisements for its own products in front of consumers searching for that exact mark. The Lan-ham Act’s use requirement is not so narrow or cramped that it would fail to treat this conduct as a “use in commerce.”

Even the Act’s definitions section, which pre-dates the advent of internet commerce and advertising, treats as a “use in commerce” any use of the trademai’k on “displays associated” with the goods offered for sale. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. On the facts of this case, by contrast to 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d 400, a computer user’s search for the trademarked phrase necessarily involves a display of that trademark as part of the search-i’esults list. For instance, if a computer user searches for the “hearts on fire” trademark at www.webcrawler. com, the text “Web search results for ‘hearts on fire’ ” is prominently displayed above the search results, including the sponsored links. Indeed, this display is exactly what the Defendant paid for: the association of Blue Nile’s sponsored link with the searched-for trademark.

In light of the Lanham Act’s language and the broader purposes of the trade*283mark statute, there is little question that the purchase of a trademarked keyword to trigger sponsored links constitutes a “use” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.

C. Likelihood of Confusion

Although Blue Nile’s alleged keyword purchase fulfills the “use” prong of the Lanham Act, it is only one element of trademark infringement and does not constitute a violation in and of itself. The Plaintiff still must prove a likelihood of confusion, which generally involves a far more fact-specific inquiry: whether “the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care.” Int'l, Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir.1996).

At this stage in the case, there is no suggestion that diverted consumers inadvertently believed they were purchasing Hearts on Fire diamonds at Blue Nile’s website. No diamonds appearing on the website purport to be Hearts on Fire diamonds. Rather, Plaintiff relies on allegations of pre-sale confusion to support its infringement claim. See Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 8-12 (asserting both “traditional” pre-sale confusion and initial interest confusion). Most relevant in light of this partial Motion to Dismiss is Plaintiffs argument that even those sponsored links which did not display its trademark likely confused consumers. That is, the simple fact an internet user entered a search for its trademarked diamonds and, in response, received a link to Blue Nile’s diamond retail website was enough to confuse the online shopper — even if the sponsored link did not use the trademark in its text at all. This sequence, according to the Plaintiff, was actionable because it sparked an initial interest in Blue Nile’s products, leading its potential customers astray in violation of trademark protections.

1. Initial Interest Confusion

The Plaintiff argues that the likelihood of confusion prong can be fulfilled in this case by resort to a trademark doctrine called “initial interest confusion.” Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 11 (document # 12). A somewhat ill-defined concept, initial interest confusion refers to a type of pre-sale confusion that has not been fully explored or addressed by the First Circuit.7 Generally speaking, pre-sale confusion refers to a potential purchaser’s temporary confusion about the actual source of goods or services under consideration, even where that confusion is resolved by the actual moment of sale. There is no question that this type of confusion falls squarely within the scope of trademark violations contemplated by the Lanham Act. In fact, the 1962 amendments to the Act explicitly brought pre-sale confusion within the ambit of trademark protections. Lanham Act, § 32(l)(a), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a); Oct. 9, 1962, Pub.L. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 773 (removing the term “purchasers” to expand trademark protection to situations involving pre-sale as well as point-of-sale and post-sale confusion). Obviously, bringing pre-sale confusion within the Act did not lighten plaintiffs’ burden of showing confusion. They still must show that “an appreciable number of reasonably prudent consumers” would likely be confused about the source of the marketed goods or services at some point during the pre-sale process. See Keds Corp., 888 F.2d at 222-23.

*284Initial interest confusion targets one specific type of pre-sale confusion: It involves confusion at the very earliest stage — not with respect to the source of specific goods or services under consideration, but during the process of searching and canvassing for a particular product. The classic example is where a consumer sets out in search of one trademarked good, but is then sidetracked en route to his or her original destination by a competitor’s advertisement or offering. He or she is never confused as to the source or origin of the product he eventually purchases, but he may have arrived there through either misdirection or mere redirection. In effect, initial interest confusion involves the diversion of the consumer’s attention from one trademarked good to a competing good, even if he is not confused about the source of the products he ultimately considers or buys.

Early “initial interest confusion” cases in the bricks-and-mortar world involved the use of similar trademarks that might mislead a consumer searching for a particular product. In these cases, which appear relatively rare, the consumer did not buy the item believing that it was the trademarked good. Rather, he was confused at an early point in the pre-sale process. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975) (piano company using similar name to trademarked company misled consumers); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.1987) (oil company with name invoking plaintiffs trademarked logo confused oil traders into investing a considerable amount of time and effort into pre-sale negotiations with the defendant).8

As trademark doctrine has evolved, particularly in the internet context, initial interest confusion has been invoked in a widening range of scenarios. One was illustrated by the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.1999). There, the court compared invisible embedding of the plaintiffs trademark in the defendant’s webpage (i.e., meta-tags) to a misleading billboard:

Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it ‘Blockbuster’) puts up a billboard on a highway reading— ‘West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7’ — where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.

Id. at 1064. In this scenario, the trademark is employed not to fool the consumer about his eventual purchase, but to lead him astray on false pretenses and into the arms of a competitor. The Ninth Circuit held that this use of a competitor’s trademark in a meta-tag constituted infringement under an initial interest theory; a number of other courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir.2006); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir.2002); JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J.2006). Using a competitor’s trademark to lure a consumer off the highway and into one’s store, in this view, is little *285different from confusing the consumer when he steps through the door.

As a hypothetical, the Ninth Circuit’s billboard example may state a perfectly plausible case of trademark infringement. One company has used a direct display of its competitor’s mark to confuse consumers in a fashion that is costly, sustained, and not easily reversed. Whether the mark is used on the competing goods themselves or on a sign pointing the way makes little difference in the trademark calculus. The culprit has misappropriated the goodwill embodied by the protected mark and has increased consumer search costs through misdirection. But rarely are cases so clear as the Ninth Circuit’s billboard — particularly on the internet — and certainly not this one.

Indeed, sponsored link advertising invites a second type of comparison: Initial interest confusion, for example, has been invoked in circumstances where one company “piggybacks” on its competitor’s trademark, rewarding his search for one particular product with a choice among several similar items. Infringement is not nearly so obvious from this vantage point. Rather than a misleading billboard, this analogy is more akin to a menu-one that offers a variety of distinct products, all keyed to the consumer’s initial search. Sponsored linking may achieve precisely this result, depending on the specific product search and its context. When a consumer searches for a trademarked item, she receives a search results list that includes links to both the trademarked product’s website and a competitor’s website. Where the distinction between these vendors is clear, she now has a simple choice between products, each of which is as easily accessible as the next. If the consumer ultimately selects a competitor’s product, she has been diverted to a more attractive offer but she has not been confused or misled.9 While she may have gotten to the search-results list via the trademarked name, once there, the advertised products are easily distinguished.

In much the same way, keyword purchasing may, in many cases, be analogized to a drug store that “typically places its own store-brand generic products next to the trademarked products they emulate in order to induce a customer who has specifically sought out the trademarked product to consider the store’s less-expensive alternative.” 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir.2005). The generic product capitalizes on the recognizable brand name but the consumer benefits by being offered a lower-cost product. At no point is the consumer confused about the alternatives presented to her. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L.Rev. 777, 785 (2004) (arguing that the primary purpose of the Lan-ham Act is to reduce consumer search costs). The goodwill invested in the protected mark remains undisturbed while the consumer reaps the benefit of competing goods.10 Trademark infringement would seem to be unsupportable in this scenario. *286Mere diversion, without any hint of confusion, is not enough.

2. Balancing Consumer Confusion and Consumer Search Costs

To be sure, the sponsored links appearing on a search-results page will not always be a menu of readily distinguished alternatives. With the intense competition for internet users’ attention and mouse-clicks, online merchants may well be tempted to blur these distinctions, hoping to create and capitalize on initial consumer confusion. Such conduct undoubtedly begins to sound in trademark infringement. Thus, where a plaintiff has plausibly alleged some consumer confusion, even at an initial stage of his product search, the question is a far closer one. The First Circuit does view pre-sale confusion, generally, as actionable — as the amended statute allows and as most circuits have since found.11 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a). But the First Circuit has never addressed initial interest confusion. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2000) (crediting the lower court for its “refusal to enter the ‘initial interest confusion’ thicket”); EMC Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 59 F.Supp.2d 147, 150 (D.Mass.1999) (concluding that the First Circuit had not squarely considered or taken a position on initial interest confusion); Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 290 F.Supp.2d 241 (D.R.I.2003) (collecting initial interest confusion cases), rev’d on other grounds, 376 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.2004). But see Northern Light Tech. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F.Supp.2d 96, 113 (D.Mass.2000) (finding initial interest confusion “not cognizable” under the First Circuit’s trademark law), affd on other grounds, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.2001) (without discussion of initial interest confusion).12 Without First Circuit guidance, *287this Court is obliged to decide whether a plaintiff pleading initial interest confusion may state a claim for trademark infringement. Based on the twin goals of trademark protection, see note 10, supra, the Court concludes that initial interest confusion can support a claim under the Lan-ham Act — but only where the plaintiff has plausibly alleged that consumers were confused, and not simply diverted.

Many cases, including this one, will fall somewhere between the incarnations of so-called initial interest confusion discussed above — the misleading billboard or the choice-enhancing menu. The Court’s task is to distinguish between them. As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with the many scholars who find the deceptive billboard analogy often inapt in the internet context. See, e.g., Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark Use: The Parallel World of Keyword Ads, 98 Trademark Rep. 873, 896 (2008); Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 371, 427-29 (2006). Unlike the deceived shopper who is unlikely to get back on the highway, the internet consumer can easily click the ‘back’ button on her web browser and return almost instantly to the search results list to find the sought-after brand. Her added search costs, in other words, may often be very low while her comparative choice among products is greatly expanded.

The ease with which an internet shopper can reverse course counsels against over-expansive trademark protection, as any confusion may be extremely temporary and quickly remedied. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2000) (per curiam) (observing that the content of Defendant’s website strongly indicated that the site had little to do with the Plaintiffs business); Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that consumers reaching the defendant’s website were falsely led to believe that it belonged to trademark owner and only gradually realized their mistake); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282 (D.N.J.1998) (same). The choice-enhancing properties of internet advertising should not be stifled on account of fleeting confusion among competing products. Trademark protections must ultimately accrue to the consumer’s benefit. See Dogan & Lemley, supra, at 778-789 (citing S.Rep. No. 79-1333, at 1-17; E.I. Du pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S.Ct. 575, 61 L.Ed. 1016 (1917)).

The crucial question in these cases is one of degree: Whether the consumer is likely confused in some sustained fashion by the sponsored link and the defendant’s website, or whether the link serves instead as a benign and even beneficial form of comparison shopping. The menu analogy described above — where the competing products are clearly distinguished — is not, in and of itself, truly a case of confusion at all, and therefore cannot support an infringement claim. In fact, in order for a plaintiff pleading initial interest confusion to prevail, that confusion must be more than momentary and more than a “mere possibility.” Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 n. 20 (2d Cir.1975). As with any alleged trademark violation, plaintiffs must show a genuine and “substantial” likelihood of confusion. See Star Fin. Sens., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1996) (requiring evidence of a substantial likelihood of confusion); Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir.1983) (holding that evidence showing a few instances of temporary confusion was insufficient to support trademark infringe*288ment). The alleged confusion must be truly costly to the consumer.

This principle was implicit in the bricks-and-mortar cases that laid the groundwork for initial interest confusion as well as the Ninth Circuit’s billboard analogy, which assumed that the deceived shopper, once diverted, would not get back on the highway. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.1987) (competitor’s logo confused oil traders into investing a considerable amount of time and effort into pre-sale negotiations with the defendant); Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341-42 (similar mark would entice even sophisticated consumers to consider defendant’s pianos, even if any confusion was resolved prior to any purchase). Where, as here, a plaintiff has alleged a plausible likelihood of confusion based on the overall context in which a consumer performs his internet search, see infra, he has stated a claim for trademark infringement and may proceed on an initial interest theory.

3. Blue Nile’s Sponsored Links

In assessing the likelihood of confusion, the first question for the Court is, which of the two scenarios above apply to Blue Nile’s sponsored links: Were consumers misdirected by the search results, like a misleading billboard, or simply offered a menu of distinct, competing products? And second, if consumers were potentially misdirected by Blue Nile’s sponsored links, was that potential for confusion sufficient to state a claim for trademark infringement?

Before proceeding, it is useful to review what conduct is presently before the Court. The sponsored link identified by Hearts on Fire in its Complaint resembles the billboard hypothetical above because it involved a direct display of the “Hearts on Fire” trademark. Compl. ¶ 21. Not even Blue Nile contests, at this stage of the litigation, that this allegation states a claim for trademark infringement. Def. Mot. to Dismiss Mem. at 1 (document # 6). The question is whether Blue Nile’s use of the trademark as a keyword trigger for sponsored links whose text did not contain the plaintiffs trademark is actionable. Compl. ¶ 23.

On the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Court finds that Hearts on Fire has stated a claim for trademark infringement, even where Blue Nile’s sponsored links did not display the protected mark. In particular, the Plaintiff has offered sufficient allegations to support its claim that consumers were likely confused, and potentially misled, by Blue Nile’s use of the trademark as a trigger for its sponsored links. While these advertisements may not have displayed the mark itself, the surrounding context supplies a sufficient basis to support allegations of consumer confusion at this early stage of the litigation.

Hearts on Fire is a diamond wholesaler, while Blue Nile is an internet diamond retailer; the two companies are not plain or obvious competitors. In fact, the Plaintiff sells its products online through authorized retailers who operate their own websites. A consumer who had just entered a search for Hearts on Fire diamonds might easily believe that the Defendant was one such authorized retailer when presented with Blue Nile’s sponsored link, even if the accompanying text did not contain the trademarked phrase. This conclusion is perfectly commonsensical under the circumstances, even if search engines often return irrelevant results. Moreover, if the consumer clicked on the sponsored link thinking that he would find the sought-after diamonds at Blue Nile’s website, Plaintiff alleges that on arrival nothing there would immediately alert him to his mistake. Whether this likely confusion was sufficiently sustained on all the *289facts for Plaintiff to prevail on its infringement claim is a question for summary judgment. For now, the Plaintiff has alleged enough.

Looking ahead, the First Circuit has identified eight criteria that a court should look to when determining whether a trademark use is likely to confuse an appreciable number of consumers: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between their channels of trade; (4) the relationship between their advertising; (5) the classes of their prospective purchasers; (6) any evidence of actual confusion of internet consumers; (7) the defendant’s subjective intent in using the mark; and (8) the overall strength of the mark. See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir.1981)). Importantly, though “evidence of actual confusion is ‘often deemed the best evidence of possible future confusion, proof of actual confusion is not essential to finding likelihood of confusion.’ ” Venture Tape, 540 F.3d at 61-62 (quoting Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 120 (1st Cir.2006)); see also Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir.1999) (“[DJifficulties in gathering evidence of actual confusion make its absence generally unnoteworthy.”). Indeed, the First Circuit has acknowledged the difficulty of obtaining such evidence in the internet context. See Venture Tape, 540 F.3d at 61-62. Thus, while proof of actual confusion is not required to show trademark infringement, the Plaintiff must still prove likely confusion based on inferences from the other seven factors.

In addition to these familiar factors, under the circumstances here, the likelihood of confusion will ultimately turn on what the consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given the context. This content and context includes: (1) the overall mechanics of web-browsing and internet navigation, in which a consumer can easily reverse course; (2) the mechanics of the specific consumer search at issue; (3) the content of the search results webpage that was displayed, including the content of the sponsored link itself; (4) downstream content on the Defendant’s linked website likely to compound any confusion; (5) the web-sawy and sophistication of the Plaintiffs potential customers; (6) the specific context of a consumer who has deliberately searched for trademarked diamonds only to find a sponsored link to a diamond retailer; and, in light of the foregoing factors, (7) the duration of any resulting confusion. This list is not exhaustive, but it identifies what the Court views as the most relevant elements to showing a likelihood of confusion in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Blue Nile’s Motion to Dismiss (document # 5) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

OPINION

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff General Motors Corporation (“GM”) sued defendants Tong Yang Industry Company, Limited (“Tong Yang”), a Taiwanese manufacturer of automobile replacement grilles bearing two GM trademarks, and Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. (“Keystone”), a distributor of Tong Yang’s grilles, for trademark infringement and unfair competition. On the issue of likelihood of confusion — the sole issue on appeal — the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied GM’s motion for summary judgment. We agree with the District Court that there is no likelihood of confusion “at the point of sale” to body shops and on the internet. We disagree and reverse and remand on the issue of likelihood of “downstream” consumer confusion due to genuine disputes of material fact regarding the visibility of the allegedly infringing portion of the grilles.

I. BACKGROUND

GM, currently the world’s largest automaker, manufacturers and sells replacement parts for its vehicles. Tong Yang produces and sells aftermarket replacement parts for automobiles, including some manufactured by GM. Tong Yang sells these parts to distributors like Keystone, which in turn sells most of the parts to collision repair shops (including some owned by GM) and also sells some parts to individuals over the internet.

GM owns registered trademarks in the Chevrolet “bow tie” design and the “GMC” design. The instant case arose out of Tong Yang’s manufacturing and Keystone’s distribution of replacement grilles with “placeholders” bearing these two designs. See Exhibits A and B.

For Chevrolets, the placeholder is a recessed space on the front of the grille in the shape of a bow tie in which a heavy plastic GM “bow tie” emblem is inserted. For GMC vehicles, the placeholder is a raised pedestal upon which a red-lettered “GMC” emblem is mounted. Each emblem is a separate part always purchased from GM and is secured to the placeholder with studs or pins extending from the back of the emblem so as to pass through holes in the placeholder. After inserted and secured in the placeholder of a Chevrolet grille, the “bow tie” emblem partially or wholly fills the “bow tie” recess. Similarly, when mounted onto a placeholder of a GMC grille, the “GMC” emblem wholly or partially covers the underlying “GMC” logo on the placeholder. See Exhibits C and D.

After GM filed suit, Tong Yang changed its grilles to remove the trademarked “bow tie” and “GMC” designs from its placeholders. These modifications have apparently decreased demand for the Tong Yang grilles.

GM’s complaint alleges that the defendants’ use of the trademarks constitutes: (1) trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); (2) unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); (3) trademark infringement under Michigan common law; and (4) unfair competition under *354Michigan common law. The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment on the dispositive issue for all these claims — whether the defendants’ use of the trademarks is likely to cause confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the replacement grilles, i.e., that GM manufactured or sponsored the manufacture of the defendants’ grilles. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that there is no likelihood of confusion. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment on claims of trademark infringement or unfair competition. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir.2005). Summary judgment should be granted whenever “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

III. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

GM’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims under state and federal law are closely related, and their resolution hinges on the central issue of likelihood of confusion:

[TJrademark infringement is a type of unfair competition ....

In many factual situations, the same result is reached whether the legal wrong is called trademark infringement or unfair competition. In such cases the courts often lump them together and speak of them as identical concepts. Today, the keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public. Whatever route one travels, whether by trademark infringement or unfair competition, the signs give direction to the same enquiry— whether defendant’s acts are likely to cause confusion.

J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 2:7-2:8 (4th ed.1996); see also Auto-Zone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that federal trademark and unfair competition claims require the likelihood of confusion inquiry); Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1123 (6th Cir.1996) (“[Fjalse designation is simply a species of unfair competition ... That the two claims are one and the same is made clear both by the language of the statute, and by many cases.”); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir.1983) (stating that Michigan common law unfair competition claims use the same likelihood of confusion test as the Lanham Act); K’Arsan Corp. v. Christian Dior Perfumes, Inc., No. 97-1867, 1998 WL 777987, at *8 (6th Cir. Oct.21, 1998) (unpublished) (stating that the likelihood of confusion inquiry applies to claims of unfair competition and of trademark infringement under Michigan common law).

Our Court employs an eight-factor test for determining likelihood of confusion:

1. strength of the plaintiffs mark;

2. relatedness of the goods;

3. similarity of the marks;

4. evidence of actual confusion;

5. marketing channels used;

6. likely degree of purchaser care;

7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; [and]

8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.

*355 Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.1982)). Even though a court must balance these factors when evaluating likelihood of confusion, id., not all of them are necessarily helpful in any given case, see Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir.1997). Moreover, this list, though generally the predominate focus of analysis, is not exhaustive, and “[ojther variables may come into play depending on the particular facts presented.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 n. 11 (9th Cir.1979).

This Court has joined the vast majority of courts in extending the likelihood of confusion inquiry beyond only the point of sale. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.1991); 3 McCarthy, supra, at § 23:5. Accordingly, we will first address likelihood of confusion at the point of sale before venturing downstream.

A. Point-of-Sale Confusion

Likelihood of confusion at the point of sale involves a purchaser’s confusion as to a product’s origin or sponsorship occurring at the time of purchase. 3 McCarthy, supra, at § 23:5. The points of sale for most of Tong Yang’s grilles are collision repair shops, but some are sold directly to individuals over the internet. We need not exhaustively apply the eight-factor test to reach the rather obvious conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion at the point of sale because buyers are expressly informed that they are not purchasing GM grilles.

There can be no likelihood of confusion at the point of sale where a defendant conspicuously and unequivocally informs buyers that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the source of the product. In Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, this Court noted that there was no likelihood of point-of-sale confusion where a manufacturer of “knockoff’ Ferraris informed his purchasers that his significantly cheaper cars were not genuine Ferraris. 144 F.2d at 1244-45. Similarly, customers knowing they are purchasing a knockoff designer purse or Rolex watch simply do not confuse the counterfeit with the original. See Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107-08 (2d Cir.2000); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F.Supp. 484, 487-88 (S.D.Fla.1986).

Likewise, in the instant case, no purchaser has reason to be confused as to the origin of the replacement grilles. Collision repair shops ordering Tong Yang parts do so intentionally and generally at the bidding of insurance companies because non-original equipment is less expensive and reduces the cost of repairing a vehicle. Moreover, GM grilles are made by SiegelRobert, Inc., and carry the molded letters “SRI” to identify their origin, whereas Tong Yang grilles are marked “OTN” and “Made in Taiwan.” In addition, Tong Yang grilles are shipped in boxes and packaging markedly different from those containing GM grilles with conspicuous logos of Tong Yang and/or Keystone. The invoice accompanying Tong Yang parts conspicuously carries the following disclaimer:

THESE REPLACEMENT PARTS ARE NOT MANUFACTURED BY THE ORIGINAL MANUFACTURER. THESE PARTS ARE REPLACEMENT FOR THE OEM PARTS, AND MANUFACTURED IN TAIWAN FOR NORTH AMERICA MARKET.

(J.A. at 0373, 0382.) An automobile owner would have to possess complete ignorance of this disclaimer, her insurance contract, and ordinary automobile repair practices *356to be confused as to the origin of a Tong Yang grille when getting her vehicle repaired. Individuals purchasing grilles directly from Keystone over the internet receive the same source information as collision repair shops and likewise could scarcely be confused. In short, the transparent and conspicuous indications that Tong Yang manufactured its grilles make confusion at the point of sale all but impossible.

B. Downstream Confusion

In addition to point-of-sale confusion, the Sixth Circuit recognizes that a likelihood of downstream confusion, also called “post-sale” confusion, is actionable: “Since Congress intended to protect the reputation of the manufacturer as well as to protect purchasers, the Act’s protection is not limited to confusion at the point of sale.” Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245; see also 3 McCarthy, supra, at § 23:5. Thus, injection of knockoffs into the stream of commerce may lead to a likelihood of confusion among the general public. To assess the likelihood of downstream confusion, we first apply the eight-factor test and then discuss the potential harm from the influx of Tong Yang’s grilles into the stream of commerce.

1. Eight-Factor Test

Applying the eight-factor test to this case favors a finding of likelihood of confusion among the general viewing public.

i. Strength of the Plaintiff’s Mark

It is beyond dispute that Chevrolet’s “bow tie” and the “GMC” design are strong trademarks in that the public readily accepts them as hallmarks of GM. See Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir.1985); see also Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d at 1116-18. This factor, therefore, favors a likelihood of confusion.

ii. Relatedness of the Goods

The goods are at least somewhat closely related. Our Court has adopted the following three categories of cases for assessing the relatedness of goods:

(1) direct competition of [goods], in which case confusion is likely if the marks are sufficiently similar; (2) [goods] are somewhat related but not competitive, so that likelihood of confusion may or may not result depending on other factors; and (3) [goods] are totally unrelated, in which case confusion is unlikely ... These categories are helpful in gauging how important relatedness may be in the ultimate likelihood of confusion determination.

Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1108 (6th Cir.1991) (internal citation omitted). The goods are identical in that, as the District Court noted, “both parties produce replacement grilles for the same GM vehicles.” (J.A. at 0165.) The grilles, however, are generally not directly competitive because, again in the words of the District Court, “the parties generally sell their goods to different buyers.” (Id.) Accordingly, this factor also favors GM.

in. Similarity of the Marks

In general, “[s]imilarity of marks is a factor of considerable weight.” Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 283. The trademarks at issue are virtually identical apparently with only trivial differences. This factor further points towards a likelihood of confusion.

iv. Evidence of Actual Confusion

For obvious reasons, evidence of actual confusion is the most important factor in assessing a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 284. Due to the rarity of this type of *357evidence, however, this factor is weighed heavily only when such evidence exists. Id. GM has “theorized possible methods for Defendants’ customers to defraud subsequent purchasers” and has cited an instance where a collision repair shop attempted unsuccessfully to return to GM a grille manufactured neither by GM nor Tong Yang (J.A. at 0167), but GM has not proved that any member of the general public has mistaken a Tong Yang grille for a GM grille. Thus, GM has not presented evidence of actual confusion.

v.Marketing Channels Used

“This factor ... consists of considerations of how and to whom the respective goods or services of the parties are sold.” Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1110. This factor involves two considerations: (1) whether the parties use the same means to market the product, and (2) whether the “predominant customers” are the same. Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 285. There is less likelihood of confusion “if the services of one party are sold through different marketing media in a different marketing context than those of another seller.” Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1110. The same is true “[i]f one mark user sells exclusively at retail and the other exclusively to commercial buyers ... since no one buyer ever buys both products.” Id. (quoting 2 McCarthy, supra, at § 24:7 (2d ed.1984)). Since this factor focuses on the point of sale, it has little bearing on the question of downstream confusion. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245.

vi.Likely Degree of Purchaser Care

This factor involves assessing (1) the type of goods at issue, and (2) the level of sophistication of the purchaser. As to the first inquiry, “when services are expensive or unusual, the buyer can be expected to exercise greater care in her purchases,” and there is accordingly less likelihood of confusion. Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1111. A sophisticated purchaser exercises a high degree of care and is less likely to be confused as to a product’s origin. Id. This factor also focuses on the point of sale and is, therefore, generally inapplicable to downstream confusion. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245.

vii.Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Mark

“If a party chooses a mark with the intent of causing confusion, that fact alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of confusing similarity.” Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1111. “Intent is relevant because purposeful copying indicates that the alleged infringer, who has at least as much knowledge as the trier of fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, believes that his copying may divert some business from the senior user.” Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 286. Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. There can be little question that Tong Yang intentionally copied GM’s trademarks. Tong Yang reverse engineers the grilles to look as close as possible to the original equipment manufactured by GM. Accordingly, this factor favors GM.1

viii.Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines

“[A] ‘strong possibility’ that either party will expand his business to com*358pete with the other or be marketed to the same consumers will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing.” Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1112. Expansion could be geographic or an increase in products or services. Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 287. The District Court noted that there is no evidence that either party plans to expand its grille manufacturing business. Accordingly, this factor favors the defendants.

In sum, although the eight-factor test is arguably less important in assessing downstream confusion than point-of-sale confusion since two of the factors (5 and 6) focus on the point of sale, see Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245, the analysis favors a likelihood of downstream confusion here because, of the remaining six factors, four (1, 2, 3 and 7) favor GM, and only two (4 and 8) favor Tong Yang.

2. Downstream Harm

Our review of cases discussing the harm of injecting knockoffs into the stream of commerce further signals the likelihood of downstream confusion in this case. Even without point-of-sale confusion, knockoffs can harm the public and the original manufacturer in a number of ways, including: (1) the viewing public, as well as subsequent purchasers, may be deceived if expertise is required to distinguish the original from the counterfeit, see Hermes, 219 F.3d at 108; (2) the purchaser of an original may be harmed if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the original’s value by making the previously scarce commonplace, see id.) (3) consumers desiring high quality products may be harmed if the original manufacturer decreases its investment in quality in order to compete more economically with less expensive knockoffs, see United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n. 6 (11th Cir.1987); (4) the original manufacturer’s reputation for quality may be damaged if individuals mistake an inferior counterfeit for the original, see Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1244-45; (5) the original manufacturer’s reputation for rarity may be harmed by the influx of knockoffs onto the market, see id.; and (6) the original manufacturer may ,be harmed if sales decline due to the public’s fear that what they are purchasing may not be the original, see Hermes, 219 F.3d at 108. On the other hand, courts should be wary of overprotecting public domain ideas and works whose exploitation can lead to economic efficiency, greater competition, and lower costs for consumers.2 Cf. 1 McCarthy, supra, at § 2:2 (reciting the policies underlying the laws of trademark and unfair competition).

Applying these principles in Ferrari S.P.A Esercizio, this Court upheld the verdict of a bench trial enjoining the production of knockoff Ferrari automobiles which could damage Ferrari’s reputation for quality and rarity. 944 F.2d at 1245. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in cases involving knockoff Rolex watches, Rolex Watch U.S.A., 645 F.Supp. at 488, designer purses, Hermes, 219 F.3d at 108, and other products, see 3 McCarthy, supra, at § 23:7.

The instant case carries similar potential for downstream confusion and corresponding harm to GM and the public — if the public can actually see the underlying placeholders after the “bow tie” or “GMC” emblems are affixed to the grilles. Unaided by the defendants’ conspicuously *359marked packaging, the invoice disclaimer, or a collision shop’s expertise, the viewing public could mistake a Tong Yang grille for a GM grille. Such confusion could damage GM’s reputation for quality if the public associates any inferior attributes (e.g., improper fit or cracking) of Tong Yang’s grilles with GM. Other types of possible downstream harm, such as that resulting from a product’s reduced scarcity, however, are largely inapplicable to this case. Nonetheless, visibility of the placeholder after the automobile is repaired and returned to the road may harm the public and GM.

3. Visibility of Placeholder After GM Emblem Is Affixed

If the placeholder cannot be seen after the Chevrolet “bow tie” or “GMC” emblem is affixed, the wholly hidden placeholder cannot cause downstream confusion as to origin or sponsorship. After all, that which defies perception cannot confuse. Cf. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir.1987) (In a suit involving knockoff Polo shirts, the placement of the defendant’s mark inside the back of the neck of each shirt did not prevent a likelihood of confusion stemming from the defendant’s placement of the Polo trademark on the front of each shirt.); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F.Supp. 735, 747 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.1986) (“Because the mark is consistently visible to the purchasing public as a constant advertisement of the product on which an evaluation of it is affixed, the similarity of the marks in a post-sale setting must be taken into consideration.”).

The parties dispute whether the placeholder can be seen after the emblem is secured. GM maintains that the placeholder remains visible:

The molded marks are readily visible to the car owner when the grille is installed

... [T]he molded “bow tie” trademark surrounds the medallion to present a proportioned trademark in comparison to the size of the grille. The molded “GMC” trademark is likewise undeniably visible, projecting a three dimensional mark with the medallion on the front surface of the molded GMC ....

Keystone admitted that the molded GMC in the grille could be seen:

Q: The next sentence says: [“]The

placeholder ... for the grille cannot even be seen.[”] You can see the placeholder as a GMC factory grille, true?

A: Yes.

(GM Final Brief at 35.)

On the other hand, Tong Yang argues that “[o)nce the trademark emblem is attached, only the emblem, and not the placeholder, is visible.” (Tong Yang Final Brief at 6.) Keystone appears to take a middle ground, stating that “the mounted emblem hides virtually all of the accused receiver structure.” (Keystone Final Brief at 6.)

The District Court improperly resolved in favor of the defendants this factual dispute regarding the visibility of the placeholders after each emblem is affixed. If the placeholders remain visible, the related question is raised whether the placeholders are sufficiently visible to cause a likelihood of confusion. These genuine disputes of material fact render summary judgment inappropriate, a common disposition in evaluating likelihood of confusion. See Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1267 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 n. 5 (9th Cir.1985)) (“This case underscores our warning that ‘trial courts disfavor deciding trademark cases in summary judgments because the ultimate issue is so inherently factual.’ ”).

*360IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that the defendants’ use of GM’s Chevrolet “bow tie” and “GMC” trademarks does not pose a likelihood of point-of-sale confusion. We also hold that there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ placeholders remain visible after the “bow tie” or “GMC” emblem is affixed to the defendants’ replacement grilles, and, if so, whether that visibility is sufficient to create a likelihood of downstream confusion. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denial of GM’s motion for summary judgment. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*361APPENDIX

CAVANAUGH, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order which granted Appellee University Orthopedics’ (“UO”) motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action filed by Appellant Pennsylvania State University (“PSU”). We reverse and remand.

UO is a professional medical corporation located in State College, Pennsylvania, which provides orthopedic and sports medicine services. PSU is a state-supported institution of higher education based in State College, Pennsylvania, which, through its College of Medicine, operates a network of health care facilities throughout the State College and central Pennsylvania area. Through the Penn State Center for Sports Medicine located in State College, PSU offers orthopedic and sports medicine services to the general public.

The dispute in this case arose over UO’s use of the word “university” in conjunction with its medical practice. PSU’s health care services are grouped under the name “University Health Services” and it employs the word “university” in connection with many of the medical services it offers. PSU alleged the use of “university” by UO was designed to cause consumers of medical services to believe that UO was affiliated with PSU. UO has used “university” not only as part of its logo, but in a variety of promotional materials and advertisements.

In 1992, in order to minimize consumer confusion, PSU and UO executed a “Release Agreement.” In exchange for PSU agreeing not to sue to enforce its common law rights, UO agreed to include a disclaimer that it is not affiliated with PSU in all its advertisements and literature. Despite this agreement, PSU alleged that UO subsequently failed to include the required disclaimer on a number of its advertisements. It further alleged that UO’s use of “university” continued to cause confusion among medical service consumers.

On December 9, 1994 PSU filed an equity action against UO seeking injunctive relief and damages. PSU’s complaint contained four counts: count 1 — breach of contract; count 2 — unfair competition by infringement of common law rights; count 3 — violation.of Pennsylvania’s anti-dilution statute; and count 4 — violation of § 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”). After the pleadings closed, UO filed a motion for summary judgment and PSU filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. The trial court granted UO’s motion as to all four counts and dismissed PSU’s complaint.

With respect to PSU’s claim of unfair competition and trademark infringement, the court found that PSU failed to raise a “pass*867ing off’ theory of liability.1 As such, it concluded that PSU was required to prove that it had a legal right to the exclusive use of the word “university.” The court then found that “university” was a generic term and that UO was entitled to summary judgment on the issues of unfair competition and trademark infringement. The court also concluded that summary judgment was appropriate on the breach of contract claim because the Release Agreement was not enforceable. The court reasoned the agreement was not supported by consideration because PSU’s promise not to sue was illusory, as it had no proprietary right to the word “university.” Following the entry of summary judgment, PSU filed this appeal.

When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our scope of review is plehary. American States v. Maryland Casualty, 427 Pa.Super. 170, 180, 628 A.2d 880, 885 (1993).

[A] motion for summary judgment may be granted only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In passing on a motion for summary judgment, this Court will view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.... Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases which are free from doubt.

Dublin by Dublin v. Shuster, 410 Pa.Super. 1, 5, 598 A.2d 1296, 1298 (1991). “[T]he grant of summary judgment will only be reversed for an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion.” Carns v. Yingling, 406 Pa.Super. 279, 282, 594 A.2d 387, 339 (1991) (citations omitted).

We begin with an examination of PSU’s claim for relief under federal law— § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).2 PSU argues the court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of UO on this claim on the basis of the trial court’s incorrect conclusion that PSU cannot claim an exclusive right to use of the word “university.” PSU maintains that even if “university” is a generic term, it has, nonetheless, pled sufficient facts and produced sufficient documentary evidence to show “passing off” and preclude the entry of summary judgment on a § 43(a) claim.3 We agree.

A claim of unfair competition encompasses trademark infringement, but also includes a broader range of unfair practices, which may generally be described as a misappropriation of the skill, expenditures and labor of another. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir.1989).

Federal courts have long held that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends protection to unregistered trademarks on the principle that unlicensed use of a designation serving the function of a registered mark constitutes a false designation or representation. A designation may only receive protection, however, if the public recognizes it as identifying the claimant’s *868“goods or services and distinguishing them from those of others.” 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15:1 at 667 (2d ed.1984). Such identification depends, in the first instance, on a designation’s level of inherent distinctiveness, and for this purpose, courts have divided designations into four categories: arbitrary (or fanciful) terms, which bear “no logical or suggestive relation to the actual characteristics of the goods;” suggestive terms, which suggest rather than describe the characteristics of the goods; descriptive terms, which describe a characteristic or ingredient of the article to which it refers, and generic terms, which function as the common descriptive name of a product class. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 n. 8 (1st Cir.1980).

A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir.1986). Arbitrary or suggestive marks are considered inherently distinctive and automatically qualify for trademark protection; while descriptive marks are afforded such protection only where “secondary meaning” — that consumers identify the term with the claimant — is proven. Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.1997). A generic term may not be appropriated from the public domain for the exclusive use of one party; thus, trademark protection is never afforded generic terms. Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co. Inc., 30 F.3d 348, 358 (2d Cir.1994).

Here, the trial court found that “university” was a generic term and PSU does not challenge that determination. After reviewing the record and pertinent legal authority, we agree with the trial court that “university” is a generic term. See Genesee, supra (classification of term is fact-bound determination; so long as trial court utilized correct legal standard, court’s classification will be upheld unless clearly erroneous).4 “A generic term is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus [the product category] of which the particular product is a species.” Forschner, supra. It is a term so commonly descriptive of a product or service that it does not identify the specific source of the product or service. A.J. Canfield, supra at 296-98. “University” has been defined as an institution of higher learning providing facilities for teaching and research and authorized to grant academic degrees. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1271 (1979); Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397, 48 A. 277 (1901). Here, the primary significance of “university” indicates a nature or class — institutions of higher learning — rather than specific origin — PSU. The term fits squarely within the definition of generic: PSU is a species of the broader, general, generic term “university.” This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis..

The mere use of a competitor’s generic name will not constitute a § 43(a) unfair competition claim. Forschner, supra. Such a claim may lie, however, where a company’s use of the competitor’s generic name confuses the public into mistakenly purchasing its product in the belief it is the product of the competitor. Murphy, supra. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated:

If the name of one manufacturer’s product is generic, a competitor’s use of that name, without more, does not give rise to an unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 939 (7th Cir.1986). Nevertheless, such a claim “might be supportable if consumer confusion or a likelihood of consumer confusion arose from the failure of the defendant to adequately identify itself as the source of the product.” Id. (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 997 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102, 100 S.Ct. 1067, 62 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980)); see also Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., *869729 F.2d 1136, 1142 (7th Cir.1984); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1148, 1151 n. 1, 1987 WL 11382 (N.D.Ill.1987). Analogously, if an organization’s own name is generic, a competitor’s subsequent use of that name may give rise to an unfair competition claim if the competitor’s failure adequately to identify itself as distinct from the first organization causes confusion or a likelihood of confusion. See Liquid Controls, 802 F.2d at 939-40 (suggesting that “Liquid Controls Corp.” could have a valid claim against “Liquid Control Corp.” if there were more evidence of confusion than merely misdirected mail).

In either situation, the subsequent competitor cannot be prevented from using the generic term to denote itself or its product, but it may be enjoined from passing itself or its product off as the first organization or its product. Thus, a court may require the competitor to take whatever steps are necessary to distinguish itself or its product from the first organization or its product.

Blinded Veterans Association v. Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1989):5

The likelihood of confusion exists when “consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the squrce of a different product or service identified by a similar mark.” Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting, Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir.1992)). “Proof of actual confusion is not necessary; likelihood of confusion is all that need be shown.” Fisons, supra (quoting, Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir.1991)). Moreover, it is not necessary to prove intent to deceive on the part of the passer off. Blinded Veterans, supra at 1045. Intent to deceive, where present, is, nonetheless, probative evidence of a likelihood of confusion. Id. Thus, under federal law, a company has a cause of action against a competitor, even though the company does not possess the exclusive right to use a particular term, where it can prove the likelihood of confusion.6

We begin our analysis by examining PSU’s complaint, in light of the trial court’s conclusion that it failed to plead a claim of “passing off.” After reviewing the complaint, we find that PSU did, in fact, specifically raise the “passing off’ theory and pled sufficient facts to establish a claim of unfair competition. PSU alleged that its use of the word “university” in conjunction with its medical services, including orthopedic and sports medicine services, has come to indicate to actual and potential consumers that such services originate with PSU or from those affiliated with PSU. It further alleged that UO exploited a nonexistent relationship with PSU by advertising its orthopedic and sports medicine services using the word “university” and by suggesting or implying an affiliation with PSU. It also alleged UO’s use of the word “university” was a deception of the public, that it was a false representation of fact likely to cause confusion as to the actual provider of the medical services and that UO was passing itself off as having an affiliation with PSU.

Additionally, in opposition to UO’s motion for summary judgment, PSU submitted to the court documentary evidence which sup*870ported the factual allegations of its complaint. This evidence consisted of a number of advertisements in which UO failed to include a disclaimer indicating that it was not affiliated with PSU and other advertisements in which the disclaimer was printed in the smallest available readable type. UO also distributed numerous “promotional” items, such as pens, T-shirts, sweatshirts, warm-up jackets, caps and refrigerator magnets, which contained the word “university” but did not include a disclaimer. There was also evidence that UO distributed advertisements at PSU sporting events. UO indicated in some advertisements that one of its physicians served as “Team Surgeon for Penn State athletes since 1989.” Finally, the evidence submitted by PSU indicates that actual confusion occurred between its center for sports medicine and UO’s practice. PSU documented at least 34 instances, over a seven-month period, when consumers of medical services or members of the medical community mistakenly contacted its Center for Sports Medicine, believing they were contacting UO.

In view of the pleadings and evidence of record, we conclude that there exists genuine issues of material fact as to whether UO’s use of the generic word “university,” in conjunction with its medical practice, would be reasonably likely to cause confusion or the likelihood of confusion among the public and whether consumers of medical services, viewing UO’s name and advertisements, would be reasonably likely to assume an affiliation with PSU. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of UO on PSU’s claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

PSU next contends the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on its common law unfair competition claim on the basis of its incorrect conclusion that PSU cannot claim an exclusive right to use of the word “university.” As with its claim under the Lanham Act,- PSU maintains that even if “university” is a generic term, it has pled sufficient facts and produced sufficient documentary evidence to show “passing off’ and preclude the entry of summary judgment on its common law unfair competition claim. We agree.

Common law liability for unfair competition (which includes trademark infringement) is governed by local law. Goebel Brewing Co. v. Esslingers, Inc., 373 Pa. 334, 342, 95 A.2d 523, 525-26 (1953). Federal law, however, serves as persuasive authority because, for many years, it governed these areas almost exclusively and spawned a large body of federal decisions. Id. As with federal law, the common law of trademarks is a portion of the broader law of unfair competition. Id.

In Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413, 36 S.Ct. 357, 360, 60 L.Ed. 713, the Supreme Court said, — “This essential element (i.e.,, ‘passing off or deception) is the same in trademark cases as in eases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trademark infringement. In fact, the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition (citing cases).” The action for unfair competition “exists today separate and apart from any statutory rights which the owner of the trademark possesses”. House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney, 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 261; 265. In Manz v. Philadelphia Brewing Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1940, 37 F.Supp. 79, 80 it was recognized that “ * * * trade-names can only be protected against use or imitation on the ground of unfair competition.” The gist of the action lies in the deception practiced in “passing off’ the goods of one for that of another. See B.V.D. Co. v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 272 Pa. 240, 242,116 A. 508; Pennsylvania Centred Brewing Company v. Anthracite Beer Company, 258 Pa. 45, 50, 101 A. 925; Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, D.C.E.D.Pa.1942, 44 F.Supp. 405, 407. As was said in Vick Chemical Co. v. Vick Medicine Co., D.C.S.D.Ga., 8 F.2d 49, 50, and quoted (a paraphrase) with approval in Winthrop Chemical Co., Inc. v. Weinberg, 3 Cir., 60 F.2d 461, 463, — “the ‘underlying principle of law of unfair competition is to prevent substitution by deception,’ a principle recognized by this court in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 3 Cir., 7 F.2d 962.”

Id.

The law of unfair competition also requires that a company, entering a field *871already occupied by a rival of established reputation, “must do nothing which will unnecessarily create or increase confusion between his goods or business and the goods or business of the rival.” Id. (quoting, Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, D.C.W.D.Pa., 79 F.Supp. 622, 685-36, citing Pennsylvania Central Brewing Company v. Anthracite Beer Company, supra). Moreover,

[t]he trading on another’s business reputation by úse of deceptive selling practices or other means is enjoinable on the grounds of unfair competition. If the particular use in question is reasonably likely to produce confusion in the public mind, equity will restrain the unfair practice and compel an accounting of the profits gained thereby. Thomsom-Porcelite Co. v. Harad, 1947, 356 Pa. 121, 51 A.2d 605; Stroehmann Bros. Co. v. Manbeck Baking Co., 1938, 331 Pa. 96, 200 A. 97; 87 C.J.S. Trade Marks, etc. §§ 91-93, pp. 325-333 (1954).

Morgan’s Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 635, 136 A.2d 838, 848 (1957).

As with federal law, descriptive, geographical and generic words, as well as words of common or general usage belong to the public and are not capable of exclusive appropriation. Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Restaurant & Catering, Inc., 371 Pa. 92, 96, 88 A.2d 734, 736 (1952). However, a competitor’s use of a name, label, symbol or trademark may be enjoined where the mark has acquired a secondary meaning. Id. In order to establish secondary meaning, it must be shown that people in the trade or the purchasing public perceives the word or name as standing for the business of a particular company. Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 438 Pa. 528, 534, 266 A.2d 87, 90 (1970). A generic term, even where it has developed a secondary meaning, is never granted trademark protection. AJ. Can-field, supra; see also Quality Weaving Co. v. Regan, 245 Pa.Super. 66, 369 A.2d 296 (1976)(where a descriptive word lacks secondary meaning it is incapable of exclusive appropriation). Nonetheless, an action for unfair competition on the basis of a likelihood of confusion may still lie.

As noted supra, PSU’s argument regarding the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on its common law claim is identical to that proffered as to its federal claim under the Lanham Act. PSU argues that it does not have to prove it possesses a right to the exclusive use of the term “university”; and that even if “university” is a generic term, there are sufficient facts to support a claim of “passing off.”

We agree with the trial court insofar as it concluded that PSU did not establish it possessed a legal right to the exclusive use of the word “university.” A generic term by definition is incapable of exclusive appropriation. Nonetheless, as we have already concluded that summary judgment was improperly entered with respect to PSU’s federal claim, we also now conclude, based upon the averments of fact in PSU’s complaint and the documentary evidence submitted by PSU, that summary judgment was erroneously entered on PSU’s common law unfair competition claim under a “passing off’ theory. There exists genuine issues of material fact as to whether UO’s use of the generic term “university,” in conjunction with its medical practice, would be reasonably likely to cause confusion or the likelihood of confusion among the public and whether consumers of medical services viewing UO’s name and advertisements would be reasonably likely to assume an affiliation with PSU. As such, the grant of summary judgment on this claim was improper.

We note that Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 438 Pa. 528, 266 A.2d 87 (1970), Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Steinberg, 325 Pa. 273, 189 A. 473 (1937) and Quality Weaving Co. v. Regan, 245 Pa.Super. 66, 369 A.2d 296 (1976), relied upon by the trial court in support of its decision to grant summary judgment, do not require a contrary result.

In Zimmerman, plaintiff operated three motels in the Harrisburg area, each of which contained “Holiday” or “Holiday Inn” in its name. In 1952, plaintiff became the first to use the word “Holiday” in conjunction with a motel in Pennsylvania. In 1958, defendant Holiday Inns of America opened its first Pennsylvania “Holiday Inn,” to be followed *872by several more in the next five years. Plaintiff, in 1963, filed an equity action to enjoin defendant Holiday Inns of America from alleged unfair competition by its use of the name “Holiday Inn” in rendering hotel, motel and restaurant services within Pennsylvania. The trial court found that plaintiff had established a secondary meaning in the name “Holiday” in the Harrisburg area and .enjoined defendant from encroaching on plaintiffs market area — a twenty-two mile radius from the center of Harrisburg.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. The court stated that an exclusive right to use a common word like “Holiday” will only exist where there is proof the word has taken a secondary meaning. This entails people in the trade or purchasing public, coming to perceive the word or name as standing for the business of a particular owner. The court concluded the evidence supported the finding that plaintiff had established a secondary meaning of the word “Holiday” for a motel, but only within the twenty-two mile radius of Harrisburg.

Zimmerman is clearly distinguishable from the present case. PSU does not claim the right to exclusive use of the word “university,” but rather, seeks protection against unfair competition by UO under a “passing off’ theory. Failing to establish a right of exclusive use or a secondary meaning of “university,” an injunction enjoining use of the word or name in controversy will not issue. Nonetheless, where unfair competition has been established, by proof of confusion or a likelihood of confusion under a “passing off’ theory, other forms of injunctive relief may be available.

In Quaker State, the plaintiff sought- to enjoin a competitor from using “Quaker City” or “Quaker” in connection with the sale of motor oil. In affirming the trial court’s denial of an injunction, the Supreme Court concluded that a secondary meaning of the descriptive word “Quaker” had not been established. The Court also found that “passing off’ was not established as there was no evidence the two products were deceptively similar. Indeed, the Court noted the names “Quaker State” and “Quaker City” were clearly different and the advertisements and containers of each company differed significantly. Quaker State differs and is distinguishable, from the present case. Although PSU has not established a right of exclusive use or a secondary meaning of “university,” it has produced sufficient evidence of “passing off’ to preclude the entry of summary judgment.

In Quality Weaving, both plaintiff and defendant were in the label manufacturing business in the Philadelphia area and used the word “quality” in their respective company names. The trial court found that plaintiffs company name and the word “quality” had acquired a secondary meaning in the label industry, as both specifically indicated plaintiffs label business. Accordingly, the court enjoined defendant from using the word “quality” in conjunction with its label business in the Philadelphia area. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the decree, finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish a secondary meaning of the descriptive word “quality.” As such, the court concluded that plaintiff could not expropriate “quality” to its exclusive use in the context of the label business.

Quality Weaving only addressed the Specific issue of whether plaintiff established a secondary meaning of the descriptive word “quality,” such that defendant would be enjoined from its use in conjunction with its label business. It does not discuss a “passing off’ theory or whether some other form of relief may be appropriate. The Court did indicate, however, that there was no evidence of. “passing off’ and that any confusion between plaintiff and defendant was both minimal and incidental. As such, this case lends nothing to our analysis of PSU’s common law unfair competition claim.

PSU’s final argument is the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on its breach of contract claim because the Release Agreement was legally enforceable and unambiguous and UO breached the agreement by failing to honor its contractual promise to use a disclaimer in its advertising and promotional literature. It further contends the court’s conclusion that the agreement was not supported by consideration was erroneous because its promise to not commence suit on its unfair competition claims *873constituted adequate consideration. Finally, PSU contends that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its breach of contract claim in view of UO’s admission that it failed to use a disclaimer in several instances.

The agreement entered into by PSU and UO provided that PSU would not sue to enforce its legal rights in exchange for UO’s promise to:

include a disclaimer that it is not affiliated with the University in any and all advertisements and literature, in all television and/or radio commercials, and in all other materials and publications using the identifier “University” in association with or as part of an identifier for the Orthopedic Center.

The trial court concluded that, absent a proprietary right by PSU to control the use of the word “university,” UO was free to use it without restriction and there was no consideration for UO’s agreement to employ a disclaimer. Performance of an act that a person is already legally obligated to do is not sufficient consideration to support an agreement. Cohen v. Sabin, 452 Pa. 447, 453, 307 A.2d 845, 849 (1973). Similarly, the surrender of a nonexistent legal right is insufficient consideration. However, the surrender or compromise of a doubtful or disputed claim and forbearance to sue thereon is sufficient consideration. Id.

Here, PSU, as demonstrated by our discussion and analysis supra, clearly possessed legal recourse against UO which meets or exceeds the threshold of “a doubtful or disputed claim.” PSU pled facts and produced documentary evidence which create genuine issues of material fact as to whether UO engaged in unfair competition by providing orthopedic and sports medicine services in the State College area. Moreover, there exists genuine issues of material fact in regard to UO’s alleged breach of the Release Agreement. Although UO admittedly failed to include a disclaimer on several advertisements, it claims these omissions occurred infrequently, were a mere oversight and thus, do not constitute a material breach. Furthermore, it maintains, contrary to the assertions of PSU, that its failure to use a disclaimer on many other items, such as pens, T-shirts, sweatshirts, etc., not promotional in nature, was not covered by the agreement and does not constitute a material breach of the agreement. As such, we conclude the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on PSU’s breach of contract claim.7

We conclude the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of UO on its claim for unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, its claim for common law unfair competition and its claim for breach of contract. The court erroneously concluded that PSU had failed to plead the theory of “passing off” in relation to its claims for unfair competition and that PSU was required to prove an exclusive right to use of the word “university” in order to obtain relief. The court also erroneously concluded the Release Agreement entered into by PSU and UO was not supported by adequate consideration. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of UO and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.8

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is the main focus of *1203this appeal. In the court below Web Printing Controls Company, Inc. (WPC) brought a “reverse passing off”1 claim against Oxy-Dry Corporation (Oxy-Dry). After a bench trial the district court entered judgment in Oxy-Dry’s favor. The court found as true much of what WPC alleged. It believed, however, that where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to recover noninjunctive relief under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must show injury caused by actual confusion; and it concluded that WPC failed to make such a showing. Because WPC failed to prove injury caused by actual confusion, the court held that WPC did not establish a violation of the Lanham Act, and, consequently, WPC could recover nothing. In our judgment, the lower court erred. To prove a violation of the Lanham Act, proof of injury caused by actual confusion is unnecessary.

I.

The district court rendered judgment after a bench trial. Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court rendering such a judgment to “find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law.” The district court’s memorandum order and opinion is the apotheosis of what Rule 52 requires. Forty-five pages in length (30 of which concern findings of fact), it organizes a complex factual situation into a form easily fathomable, one to which the knife of legal analysis may readily be applied. Although we differ at one point with the district court’s legal analysis, we find completely free from fault its findings of fact, findings we draw on for this summary of WPC’s relationship with Oxy-Dry.

WPC is a maker of certain high-tech printing equipment. It has a trademark, which it affixes to its products. In the late ’70’s WPC was a start-up company with a small share of the printing market and no sales force. To bolster its presence in this market, WPC entered into an oral marketing agreement with Oxy-Dry, which was an established and well-respected manufacturer and distributor in the printing market. The agreement provided for Oxy-Dry salesmen to sell WPC products. Oxy-Dry would handle all sales functions, make the deal with the customer, “buy” the products from WPC and “resell” them to the final customer at a mark-up. WPC would deliver the products and all associated technical services. By this arrangement WPC hoped to establish its product in the printing market and garner goodwill; Oxy-Dry hoped to make sales (and profits) and acquire knowledge of the high-tech market niche that WPC’s products served.

In the course of this relationship Oxy-Dry obliterated, hid, or otherwise confused WPC’s trademark, usually by attaching a combined Oxy-Dry/WPC trademark to WPC’s products (over WPC’s trademark) or by taking full credit, one way or another, for WPC’s products. WPC complained about Oxy-Dry’s practice, but in the end acquiesced, perhaps realizing that there was value in associating strongly with the Oxy-Dry name.

In 1980 WPC apparently changed its mind about the merits of acquiescing in Oxy-Dry’s misbranding. The oral agreement between Oxy-Dry and WPC was reduced to writing; one of the clauses of the written agreement was that Oxy-Dry would sell WPC products only under the WPC trademark. It did not. Oxy-Dry continued to misbrand WPC’s products, and it took steps to otherwise claim credit for the quality of those products. This time WPC did not acquiesce in Oxy-Dry’s practice, and the relationship between the two was ended.

On its own, WPC took steps to secure its market. Although WPC had little evidence showing that Oxy-Dry’s misbranding actu*1204ally confused any customers, it spent large sums in a marketing campaign to make sure that none of its customers, or potential customers, were confused. The campaign seemed to work. WPC’s sales post-Oxy-Dry grew quite well; this, despite Oxy-Dry’s introduction of its own brand of competing, high-tech printing equipment.

II.

In its thorough opinion, the lower court stated its belief that WPC had to prove five elements to “prevail on its claim”: (1) Oxy-Dry misbranded WPC’s goods; (2) the misbranding was “material”; (3) Oxy-Dry caused WPC’s goods to enter interstate commerce; (4) the misbranding caused a likelihood of confusion; and (5) WPC was injured. The court found that the first three elements were proved, and it is clear that they were. Regarding the fourth element, “confusion,” the court held that when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief a “likelihood of confusion” is all that the plaintiff must prove, but when a plaintiff seeks monetary relief the confusion element merges with the fifth element, “injury”: a plaintiff then must prove injury as a result of actual confusion in order to prevail. For this proposition the district court relied on Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202 (7th Cir.1982). The district court found that WPC had brought forth some evidence of actual confusion, but not more than a de minimis amount. Moreover, the court found a lack of evidence showing that WPC was injured. Thus, the court held that WPC had failed to prove injury caused by actual confusion and, as a result, had failed to establish a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

But the elements necessary to establish a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act do not include any involving actual injury or actual confusion. As set out in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), a violation of the Lanham Act is established upon proof only of the following: First, that the defendant used in connection with goods or services a false designation of origin or false description or representation. Second, that the defendant caused such goods and services to enter into commerce. Third, that the plaintiff is a person “who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged as a result thereof.” In modern day parlance, and in the context of this suit, a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is shown by (1) Oxy-Dry's material misbranding of WPC's products, (2) Oxy-Dry’s introduction of WPC’s products into interstate commerce, and (3) the likelihood that consumers will be confused by Oxy-Dry’s material misbranding. See Schutt, supra, 673 F.2d at 206. See also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 & n. 16 (7th Cir.1976). In the course of its opinion, the district court made clear that these three elements had been proven.2 Thus, WPC established a violation of the Lanham Act, its lack of proof on actual injury or actual confusion notwithstanding.

It seems to us that the district court confused a Lanham Act violation with a Lanham Act remedy. It confused the elements necessary to prove a breach of the law with elements necessary to justify a certain remedy for that breach. It mixed two stages of inquiry — violation of the law; remedies for the violation — that should be kept separate.

The inquiries should be kept separate because a violation of the Lanham Act can be remedied in more ways than one. The usual way, and the way which in this case riveted the court’s attention, is by an award of damages. A plaintiff wishing to *1205recover damages for a violation of the Lan-ham Act must prove the defendant’s Lan-ham Act violation, that the violation caused actual confusion among consumers of the plaintiffs product, and, as a result, that the plaintiff suffered actual injury, i.e., a loss of sales, profits, or present value (goodwill). WPC did not prove the elements essential to a recovery of damages, of course, so to it that avenue of relief is foreclosed.3 Other avenues of relief, however, are not foreclosed. In the past, courts have fashioned wide-ranging relief for a violation of the Lanham Act, allowing remedies such as a recovery of defendant’s profits, an award of costs of the action, and, in some exceptional cases, an award of attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1124, 107 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1990); Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738 (7th Cir.1985). See also General Electric Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531 (7th Cir.1989); NuPulse, Inc. v. Schlueter Co., 853 F.2d 545 (7th Cir.1988). These remedies flow not from the plaintiff’s proof of its injury or damage, but from its proof of the defendant’s unjust enrichment or the need for deterrence, for example, or, in the case of costs, merely from its proof of the defendant’s Lanham Act violation. To collapse the two inquiries of violation and remedy into one which asks only of the plaintiff’s injury, as did the district court, is to read out of the Lanham Act the remedies that do not rely on proof of “injury caused by actual confusion.” And this, of course, is improper.

The district court relied on Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc. for the leveling proposition that injury caused by actual confusion is necessary to prove a Lanham Act violation. In so doing it misread Schutt, generalizing incorrectly from a particular case to a universal rule. In Schutt, the plaintiff sought recovery of money damages for the defendant’s alleged violation of Lanham Act section 43(a). We pointed out that “[t]he test to be used in determining whether a violation has occurred is whether ‘the evidence indicates a likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake on the part of the consuming public.’ ” 673 F.2d at 206 (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.1978)). As far as Lanham Act violations are concerned, then, we said in Schutt exactly what we say here. We went on in Schutt to consider the narrower issue of the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for damages. See id., at 207. We held that “a higher standard of proof is required for the grant of money damages,” that “[a] party seeking such relief is required to show not only the likelihood of ... confusion, but must demonstrate that it has been damaged by actual consumer reliance on the misleading statements.” Id., at 206. As far as Lan-ham Act damages are concerned, then, we again said in Schutt exactly what we say here.

Thus Schutt is entirely consistent with our present opinion. The problem lies not with Schutt’s rules of law, but with an improper merging of those rules. In Schutt, our statements concerning the claim for damages were not meant to be confused with our statements concerning the claim of violation. The inquiry into each — violation and relief — again was separate. Summary judgment was proper in Schutt on the plaintiff’s failure to show injury caused by actual confusion only because the summary judgment was limited to the plaintiff’s claim for damages. If the plaintiff in Schutt had made other claims, claims not for damages (in the traditional sense) but for equitable relief such as a request for defendant’s profits on an unjust enrichment theory, the plaintiff’s *1206failure to show injury caused by actual confusion would have been insufficient to support summary judgment against it. See Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941. Thus, the rule for the particular case in Schutt, a case involving a claim for damages only, cannot be generalized to fit all claims arising under the Lanham Act. It cannot be generalized to fit the claims in this case.4

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.5 In so doing, however, we wish to disturb none of the court’s findings of fact and as little as possible of its legal analysis. WPC has shown that Oxy-Dry violated section 43(a) of the Lan-ham Act. It has not shown, however, that it is entitled to a “grant of monetary damages.” Whether it is entitled to a recovery of some or all of the defendant’s profits, or to a recovery of its attorneys’ fees or litigation costs, we do not decide. We leave those issues on remand for the district court.

Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Circuit Rule 36 shall not apply.