OPINION

PER CURIAM.

1. INTRODUCTION

This case raises issues concerning the protection of ideas. It arises out of John Reeves’ claims that in 1991 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska) appropriated his idea for a visitor center at a popular turnout overlooking the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The superior court granted summary judgment to Alyeska. We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1985 Alyeska created a visitor turnout at Mile 9 of the Steese Highway between Fox and Fairbanks.1 The turnout had informational signs and provided visitors a view of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Before Alyeska constructed the turnout, visitors gained access to the pipeline by a nearby road and trespassed on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline right-of-way.

John Reeves, owner of Gold Dredge No. 8, a tourist attraction outside Fairbanks and near the turnout, contacted Alyeska in January 1991 to discuss a tourism idea he had. He spoke with Keith Burke, Alyeska’s Fairbanks Manager. After receiving Burke’s assurance that the tourism idea was “between us,” Reeves orally disclosed his idea to build a visitor center at the turnout. He proposed that Alyeska lease him the land and he build the center, sell Alyeska merchandise, and display a “pig” 2 and a cross-section of pipe.

Burke told him the idea “look[ed] good” and asked Reeves to submit a written proposal, which Reeves did two days later. The proposal explained Reeves’ idea of operating a visitor center, on land leased to him by Alyeska. The proposal included plans to provide small tours, display a “pig,” pipe *1134valve, and section of pipe, sell refreshments and pipeline memorabilia, and plant corn and cabbage.

After submitting the proposal, Reeves met with Burke once again. At this meeting Burke told Reeves the proposal looked good and was exactly what he wanted. In Reeves’ words, Burke told him, “We’re going to do this deal, and I’m going to have my Anchorage lawyers draw it.” Reeves claimed he and Burke envisioned that the visitor center would be operating by the 1991 summer tourist season.

Reeves alleges that Alyeska agreed during this meeting (1) to grant access to the turnout for twenty years; (2) to allow Reeves to construct and operate an information center; and (3) to allow Reeves to sell merchandise and charge a $2.00 admission fee. Reeves stated that, in exchange, he agreed to pay Alyeska ten percent of gross receipts.

Over the next several months, Burke allegedly told Reeves that the deal was “looking good” and not to worry because it takes time for a large corporation to move. However, in spring 1991, Burke told Reeves that the visitor center was such a good idea that Alyeska was going to implement it without Reeves. By August 1991 Alyeska had installed a portable building at the turnout to serve as a visitor center; it built a permanent log cabin structure in 1992.

The members of the Alyeska Pipeline Club North (APCN) operated the visitor center and sold T-shirts, hats, and other items.3 APCN does not charge admission. A section of pipeline and a “pig” are on display. APCN employees provide information and answer visitors’ questions. Members of APCN had suggested in 1987 that Alyeska create a visitor center at the turnout. However, Alyeska had rejected the idea at that time. Before meeting with Reeves, Burke did not know that APCN’s visitor center idea had been raised and rejected by Alyeska in 1987.

Approximately 100,000 people visited the visitor center each summer in 1992 and 1993. It grossed over $50,000 in sales each year. The net profit for 1993 was calculated to be $5,000-$15,000. APCN received all the profit.

Reeves filed suit in May 1993. By amended complaint, he alleged a variety of tort and contract claims. Judge Charles R. Pengilly granted Alyeska’s motion for summary judgment on all claims; Reeves appeals. Reeves also appeals the superior court’s denial of Reeves’ motion to compel production of Burke’s daily calendar.

III. DISCUSSION

We will review a grant of summary judgment de novo and will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Department of Health and Social Serv. v. Alaska State Hosp. and Nursing Home Ass’n, 856 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Alaska 1993); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Alaska 1979). We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any alternative ground appearing in the record. Far North Sanitation, Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Util. Comm’n, 825 P.2d 867, 869 n. 2 (Alaska 1992). To succeed on summary judgment a movant must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, all “reasonable inferences of fact from proffered materials must be drawn against the moving party ... and in favor of the non moving party.” Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Alaska 1992) (quoting Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, 787 P.2d 109, 116 (Alaska 1990)).

Reeves sued Alyeska on claims of breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel, breach of implied contract, quasi-contract (unjust enrichment and quantum meruit), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of license and/or lease agreement, and various torts related to the contractual relationships alleged.

*1135This case presents several questions of first impression concerning the protection of business ideas. Reeves claims that Alyeska contracted for both the disclosure and use of his idea. Alyeska maintains that Reeves’ “idea” was not novel or original and that an Alyeska employee had proposed an identical idea in 1987. Therefore, Alyeska argues that most of Reeves’ claims fail because his idea was not novel or original. Alyeska also argues that Reeves’ claims are barred by the statute of frauds. Before reaching the merits of Reeves’ claims we must first briefly discuss the law relating to the protection of ideas and the roles of novelty and originality.

A. Protection of Ideas

The law pertaining to the protection of ideas must reconcile the public’s interest in access to new ideas with the perceived injustice of permitting some to exploit commercially the ideas of others. See 3 David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 16.01, at 16-2 to 16-3 (1994). Federal law addresses the protection of new inventions and the expression of ideas. Federal patent law protects inventors of novel, nonobvious, and useful inventions by excluding others from “making, using, or selling the invention” for a period of seventeen years. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150, 109 S.Ct. 971, 977, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989). Federal copyright law protects an individual’s tangible expression of an idea, but not the intangible idea itself. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Copyright law creates a monopoly for the author that allows him or her to benefit economically from the author’s creative efforts. It does not create a monopoly on the idea from which the expression originates; the idea remains available for all to use. Nimmer, supra, § 16.01, at 16-2 to 16-3. Reeves’ claims do not fall under these federal protections because his idea is not a new invention, nor is it expressed in a copyrighted work. Nevertheless, federal law is not the only protection available to individuals and their ideas.

Creating a middle ground between no protection and the legal monopolies created by patent and copyright law, courts have protected ideas under a variety of contract and contract-like theories. See Nimmer, supra, §§ 16.02-16.06 (discussing and compiling cases that have applied or rejected theories of property, express contract, implied contract, quasi-contract, and confidential relationships to protect ideas). These theories protect individuals who spend their time and energy developing ideas that may benefit others. It would be inequitable to prevent these individuals from obtaining legally enforceable compensation from those who voluntarily choose to benefit from the services of the “idea-person.” See Nimmer, supra, § 16.01, at 16-3. The California Supreme Court expressed this concept in the following manner:

Generally speaking, ideas are as free as the air and as speech and the senses, and as potent or weak, interesting or drab, as the experiences, philosophies, vocabularies, and other variables of the speaker and listener may combine to produce, to portray, or to comprehend. But there can be circumstances when neither air nor ideas may be acquired without cost. The diver who goes deep in the sea, even as the pilot who ascends high in the troposphere, knows full well that for life itself he, or someone on his behalf, must arrange for air (or its respiration-essential element, oxygen) to be specifically provided at the time and place of need. The theatrical producer likewise may be dependent for his business life on the procurement of ideas from other persons as well as the dressing up and portrayal of his self-conceptions; he may not find his own sufficient for survival.

Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (1956). The scope of idea protection, although primarily raised in the entertainment field, is not limited to that industry; it may also apply to business and scientific ideas. See Nimmer, supra § 16.01 n. 7.

We have not had occasion to address these theories in the context of the protection of ideas.4 In addressing each of Reeves’ claims *1136we must determine whether the special nature of ideas affects the application of traditional contract and contract-like claims. In making these determinations we are mindful of the competing policies of retaining the free exchange of ideas and compensating those who develop and market their ideas. On the one hand, protecting ideas by providing compensation to the author for their use or appropriation rewards the idea person and encourages the development of creative and intellectual ideas which will benefit humankind. On the other hand, protecting ideas also inevitably restricts their free use, potentially delaying or restricting the benefit any given idea might confer on society. See Nimmer, supra, § 16.01.

Reeves argues that requiring novelty and originality, as did the trial court, erroneously imports property theories into contract-based claims. He contends that so long as the parties bargained for the disclosure of the idea, the disclosure serves as consideration and the idea itself need not have the qualities of property. Alyeska argues that novelty and originality should be employed as limiting factors in idea cases because these cases are based on a theory of idea as intellectual property. Alyeska contends that in order to be protected, an idea must have “not been suggested to or known by the public at any prior time.”

We find that the manner in which requirements such as novelty or originality are applied depends largely on which theory of recovery is pursued. Thus, we will address the parties’ arguments concerning novelty as they apply to each of Reeves’ theories of recovery.

B. Express Contract Claims

Reeves argues that he and Alyeska entered into three different oral contracts: (1) a confidentiality or disclosure agreement by which Alyeska promised not to use Reeves’ idea without his participation, if Reeves disclosed the idea;5 (2) a lease agreement by which Alyeska promised to lease the turnout to Reeves in exchange for a percentage of the center’s profits; and (3) a memorialization agreement by which Alyeska promised to commit the agreement to writing.

Alyeska argues that Reeves alleged a single contract which “consisted of an agreement to keep Reeves’ idea confidential, an agreement to lease land and an agreement to reduce the terms of the prior agreement to writing.” It contends that to allow Reeves to argue he had three independent contracts would be inconsistent with his position at summary judgment and should therefore be precluded on appeal.

We disagree with Alyeska’s analysis. Reeves has consistently argued that there were three agreements. It is of minor importance that he sometimes refers to these agreements as “a single binding contract.” If any of the alleged agreements possesses the necessary elements to form a contract, Reeves is entitled to seek damages for breach of that agreement. We must analyze the legal relationships created by the parties’ words and actions rather than the semantic tags the parties attach to their arguments.6 We consider each of the three alleged agree*1137ments in turn.7 Before returning to a discussion of the protection of ideas, we must determine whether the statute of frauds, AS 09.25.010, defeats any of Reeves’ claims.

1. The Disclosure Agreement

Reeves alleges that in exchange for the disclosure of his idea, Alyeska promised to keep the idea confidential and not to use the idea without entering into a contract with Reeves to implement the idea. Reeves’ deposition testimony, when all inferences are taken in his favor, supports the existence of a disclosure agreement. Reeves testified that in his early conversations with Burke, he told Burke that he was in the tourism industry and had an idea that would help Alyeska. Reeves stated that Burke told him the idea “was between us.” Reeves testified that he “didn’t offer anything to Keith Burke until [Reeves] was told by [Burke] that we had a deal. This was between me and him, and this was going no place else.” Reeves also testified that Burke had promised confidentiality and that Reeves believed that he and Burke had a “done deal.”

Alyeska does not respond separately to Reeves’ disclosure agreement claim. It instead argues that, notwithstanding Reeves’ assertion there were three agreements, Reeves actually alleged only one contract, which included a purported twenty-year lease agreement. It argues that the statute of frauds applies because the alleged agreement concerns a lease for a period longer than one year and because performance would not be completed within one year.8

We conclude that the statute of frauds does not apply to the alleged disclosure agreement. That alleged agreement was to be completed within one year. If Alyeska chose to implement the idea, it was to enter into a lease agreement with Reeves by the summer tourist season. Moreover, Reeves’ disclosure to Alyeska constituted full performance of his side of the contract for disclosure. The statute of frauds consequently does not apply. AS 09.25.020(1); See Carter v. Hoblit, 755 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 1988) (holding statute of frauds did not bar claim because party fully performed his obligation under the agreement); Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal.App.3d 161, 88 Cal.Rptr. 319, 335 (1970).

2. The Lease Agreement

Reeves claims he had an oral contract with Alyeska to lease the turnout for twenty years. Reeves concedes that this agreement *1138falls within the scope of the statute of frauds because it was for a long-term lease that could not be performed within one year. AS 09.25.010(a)(1),(6). Reeves argues, however, that two exceptions to the statute of frauds apply: first, he performed fully his contract duties, and second, Alyeska should be es-topped from asserting the statute of frauds.

Alaska recognizes an exception to the statute of frauds if “there has been full performance on one side accepted by the other in accordance with the contract.” AS 09.25.020. Reeves first asserts that by revealing his idea and drafting and submitting the written proposal, he performed his side of the agreement, at least insofar as he could before Alyeska breached the agreement.

We disagree. Rather than looking to his duties under the alleged lease agreement, Reeves argues he performed by disclosing his idea. However, he previously argued that disclosing the idea was the consideration for the disclosure agreement. If the three agreements are to stand as separate contracts, as Reeves argues, his act of disclosing the idea cannot also serve as full performance of the lease agreement.

Submitting the written proposal does not constitute full performance either. Reeves submitted the proposal as a preparatory act for a possible future agreement. The proposal itself states, “I propose to lease from Alyeska-” (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that the parties had not yet entered into a lease agreement by the time the proposal was created. A reasonable juror could not conclude that submitting the proposal constituted performance of a future lease contract. Moreover, the alleged lease agreement imposed three specific duties on Reeves. As argued by Reeves, Alyeska was to grant Reeves access and lease the turnout to him for twenty years, allow him to construct and operate an information center, and allow him to sell merchandise and charge admission. Reeves states, “In exchange, Reeves agreed (1) to pay Alyeska 10% of his gross receipts ... (2) explain the positive aspects of the pipeline to visitors ... and (B) commence in the summer of 1991.” (Emphasis added.) Reeves did not perform or partially perform any of those duties. Thus, his full performance argument fails.

Reeves next contends that Alyeska should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds. He argues that because it was Alyeska’s duty to draft the contract, it should not be allowed to benefit from its failure to perform.

We have never specifically adopted a promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds. However, other jurisdictions recognize this exception.9 It also is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 (1981), which states in part:

Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance

(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.

The Restatement’s second illustration of section 139 is based on Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.1954). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 Reporters Note (1981) (explaining that the second illustration to section 139 is based on Stephenson). Reeves argues that his reliance on Alyeska’s promise to prepare a draft and execute a written contract is comparable to the facts of Stephenson.

In Stephenson, an airline pilot had tenure rights that guaranteed his position following a six-month leave of absence. 217 F.2d at 296. He took leave to explore a job opportunity with Alaska Airlines and moved to Anchorage. Id. As the six months neared *1139completion, he sought definite employment from Alaska Airlines. Id. Alaska Airlines orally agreed to employ him for two years and to put the employment agreement in writing. Id. at 297. However, Alaska Airlines never executed a written agreement and it fired Stephenson within one year. Id. In the subsequent breach of contract action, the court held that the airline could not assert the statute of frauds because Stephenson had detrimentally relied on the oral agreement to put the employment agreement into writing. Id. at 298. It stated that “[when one looks at the Restatement of Contracts] one must conclude that there was an intention to carry promissory estoppel (or call it what you will) into the statute of frauds if the additional factor of a promise to reduce the contract to writing is present.” Id.

Reeves argues that he relied detrimentally on Alyeska to draw up the agreement by not hiring his own lawyer to draw it up, by revealing the idea, and by typing and submitting the written proposal.

We conclude that Reeves did not rely on Alyeska’s promise to the extent necessary to prevent the application of the statute of frauds. Promissory estoppel requires a substantial change in position on the part of the promisee in reliance on the promise. Ze-man, 699 P.2d at 1284. Although there is evidence of some change in position, Reeves’ actions in reliance on Alyeska’s promise to memorialize the agreement are insufficient to estop Alyeska from asserting the statute of frauds.

First, the idea was not disclosed in reliance on the alleged lease agreement; disclosure occurred before an oral lease agreement could have existed. Reeves has presented no evidence that Alyeska agreed to enter into a lease before Burke heard Reeves’ idea. Therefore, although disclosing the idea changed Reeves’ position, the idea was not disclosed in reliance on the lease agreement or memorialization agreement. Second, Reeves did not materially change his position when he forwent hiring his own attorney to draft the document. Reeves has presented no evidence that Alyeska would have executed a written contract if Reeves had provided one. Third, Reeves could not have typed and submitted the written proposal in reliance on the alleged lease agreement because the proposal was submitted before the promise was made.

In the absence of any substantial change in position, the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds does not apply. Reeves’ claim based on an express contract for a lease was properly dismissed on summary judgment.

3. The Memorialization Agreement

Reeves argues that the agreement to memorialize the contract does not fall within the statute of frauds because performance was to be completed within one year. He argues that Alyeska promised to “memorialize the agreement and prepare the documents for execution.” Assuming that Alyeska’s alleged promise to prepare the documents included the related promise to execute the documents, the statute of frauds applies.10

Legal authorities agree generally that when parties promise to execute a written memorandum of a contract, if the underlying contract falls under the statute of frauds, the promise to execute the written contract also falls under the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Orthomet, Inc. v. A.B. Medical, Inc., 990 F.2d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n agreement to subsequently enter into a written contract must also satisfy the statute of frauds.”); 2 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 283, at 31-34 (1950);11 *11403 Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 524A, 691-92 (1960).12

We agree with the weight of authority and hold that an oral promise to execute a written contract, where a written contract is necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds, must itself satisfy the statute of frauds. To hold otherwise would allow the statute of frauds to be circumvented merely by asserting that the parties orally agreed to put the contract in writing.

C. Impliedr-Wr-Fact Contract

The trial court’s opinion did not address whether Reeves established a contract implied-in-fact.13 Reeves argues that he “submitted uncontroverted evidence sufficient to find as a matter of law that Alyeska’s actions established a contract implied in fact.” We conclude that Alyeska failed to carry its burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Zeman, 699 P.2d at 1280.

Reeves has made out a prima facie case for an implied contract. We have held that an implied-in-fact contract, like an express contract, is based on the intentions of the parties. “It arises where the court finds from the surrounding facts and circumstances that the parties intended to make a contract but failed to articulate their promises and the court merely implies what it feels the parties really intended.” Martens v. Metzgar, 524 P.2d 666, 672 (Alaska 1974) (quoting Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir.1956)).

In Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987), the court listed the requirements for demonstrating an implied-in-fact contract under California law:

[0]ne must show: that he or she prepared the work; that he or she disclosed the work to the offeree for sale; under all circumstances attending disclosure it can be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered (i.e., the offeree must have the opportunity to reject the attempted disclosure if the conditions were unacceptable); and the reasonable value of the work.

There are three primary factual scenarios under which ideas may be submitted to another. See Nimmer, supra § 16.05. The first involves an unsolicited submission that is involuntarily received. Id. at 16-33. The idea is submitted without warning; it is transmitted before the recipient has taken any action which would indicate a promise to pay for the submission. Id. at 16-33 to 16-34. Under this scenario, a contract will not be implied. Desny, 299 P.2d at 270; Nimmer, supra, § 16.05[B], at 16-34.

The second involves an unsolicited submission that is voluntarily received. Nimmer, supra, § 16.05[C], at 16-36. In this situation, the idea person typically gives the recipient advance warning that an idea is to be disclosed; the recipient has an opportu*1141nity to stop the disclosure, but through inaction allows the idea to be disclosed. Id. at 16-36 to 16-37. Under California law, if the recipient at the time of disclosure understands that the idea person expects to be paid for the disclosure of the idea, and does not attempt to stop the disclosure, inaction may be seen as consent to a contract. Desny, 299 P.2d at 267; Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal.App.2d 593, 54 Cal.Rptr. 130, 139 (1966).

This view has been criticized as unfairly placing a duty on the recipient to take active measures to stop the submission. Nimmer, supra § 16.05[C], at 16-38. The critics argue that inaction generally should not be considered an expression of consent to a contract. Id.

We believe that a contract should not be implied under this scenario. An implied-in-fact contract is based on circumstances that demonstrate that the parties intended to form a contract but failed to articulate their promises. Martens, 524 P.2d at 672. Only under exceptional circumstances would inaction demonstrate an intent to enter a contract.14

The third scenario involves a solicited submission. Nimmer, supra § 16.05[D], at 16-40. Here, a request by the recipient for disclosure of the idea usually implies a promise to pay for the idea if the recipient uses it. Desny, 299 P.2d at 267; Nimmer, supra § 16.05[D] at 16-40. Nimmer states,

The element of solicitation of plaintiffs idea by defendant is therefore of great importance in establishing an implied contract. If defendant makes such a request, even if he attempts to frame the request in ambiguous or exculpatory language, most courts will nevertheless imply a promise to pay if the idea is used.

Id. at 16-40 to 16-41.

Reeves argues that Alyeska solicited his idea. He alleges that Burke asked him what the idea was, and later requested a written proposal. He contends that the request and Alyeska’s later use of the idea created an implied contract for payment. These allegations are sufficient to survive summary judgment. A reasonable fact-finder could determine that Burke’s actions implied a promise to pay for the disclosure of Reeves’ idea. A fact-finder could also determine that Reeves volunteered the idea before Burke took any affirmative action that would indicate an agreement to pay for the disclosure. These possible conclusions present genuine issues of material fact.

Relying largely on cases from New York, Alyeska argues that novelty and originality should be required in an implied-in-fact claim. Reeves responds that we should follow California’s example and not require novelty as an essential element of this sort of claim.

Idea-based claims arise most frequently in the entertainment centers of New York and California, but New York requires novelty, whereas California does not.15 Compare Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S.Ct. 391, 102 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988), with Donahue, 54 Cal.Rptr. at 140.

We prefer the California approach. An idea may be valuable to the recipient merely because of its timing or the manner in which it is presented. Cf. Donahue, 54 Cal.Rptr. at 140. In Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal.App.2d *1142435, 319 P.2d 776 (1957), the court stated that “the fact that the [recipient of the idea] may later determine, with a little thinking, that he could have had the same ideas and could thereby have saved considerable money for himself, is no defense against the claim of the [idea person]. This is so even though the material to be purchased is abstract and unprotected material.” Id. 319 P.2d at 781.

Implied-in-fact contracts are closely related to express contracts. Each requires the parties to form an intent to enter into a contract. It is ordinarily not the court’s role to evaluate the adequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties. Carroll v. Lee, 148 Ariz. 10, 712 P.2d 923, 926-27 (1986). The bargain should be left in the hands of the parties. If parties voluntarily choose to bargain for an individual’s services in disclosing or developing a non-novel or unoriginal idea, they have the power to do so. The Desny court analogized the services of a writer to the services of a doctor or lawyer and determined there was little difference; each may provide a product that is not novel or original. Desny, 299 P.2d at 266. It held that it would not impose an additional requirement of novelty on the work. Although Reeves is not a writer, his ideas are entitled to no less protection than those of writers, doctors, or lawyers. Therefore, Reeves should be given the opportunity to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract for disclosure of his idea.

D. Promissory Estoppel

Reeves claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Alyeska on his promissory estoppel claim. He argues that there were genuine fact questions. Alyeska argues that Reeves presented no evidence of detrimental reliance.

Under Alaska law, a promissory es-toppel claim has four requirements:

1) The action induced amounts to a substantial change of position;

2) it was either actually foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by the promisor;

3) an actual promise was made and itself induced the action or forbearance in reliance thereon; and

4) enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice.

Zeman, 699 P.2d at 1284. Reference to a set formula does not determine whether particular promises and actions satisfy the requirements of promissory estoppel; all circumstances are to be considered. Id.; 1A Corbin, supra, § 200, at 216.

Reeves contends that in reliance on promises made by Alyeska in context of separate disclosure, lease, and memorialization agreements, he took two actions that changed his position: he disclosed the idea, and he failed to hire an attorney to draft the contract. Although forbearance may sometimes be considered an action that changes one’s position, Zeman, 699 P.2d at 1284, Reeves’ failure to hire an attorney did not amount to a substantial change of position. As noted above, even if Reeves had present ed a written contract to Alyeska, no evidence permits an inference Alyeska would have executed it.

By disclosing his idea, however, Reeves substantially changed his position. Once he disclosed the idea, Reeves’ ability to bargain for terms was significantly reduced. It was reasonably foreseeable that a promise of confidentiality and a promise to allow Reeves to participate in any use of the idea would induce disclosure. There was evidence permitting an inference Alyeska’s alleged promises induced the disclosure. Consequently, genuine fact disputes exist regarding the first three requirements for promissory es-toppel.

The fourth requirement, that enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice, presents fact questions that ordinarily should not be decided on summary judgment. State v. First Nat’l Bank of Ketchikan, 629 P.2d 78, 82 n. 4 (Alaska 1981). The record demonstrates that this issue presents fact questions. It is therefore necessary to remand Reeves’ promissory estoppel claim based on his disclosure of the idea in reliance on promises of confidentiality and participation.16

*1143E. Quasi-Contract Claim

Reeves argues that Alyeska was unjustly enriched because it solicited and received Reeves’ services, ideas, and opinions without compensating Reeves. He argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Alyeska on his quasi-contract cause of action.17

We have required the following three elements for a quasi-contract claim:

1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;

2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and

3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying the value thereof.

Alaska Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743, 746 (Alaska 1987). Quasi-contracts are “judicially-created obligations to do justice.” Id. “Consequently, the obligation to make restitution that arises in quasi-contract is not based upon any agreement between the parties, objective or subjective.” Id.

The trial court understood Reeves to be arguing that his idea was a property right that was stolen by Alyeska. Reeves, however, argues that “Alyeska took Reeves’ concept, proposal and services without any payment to Reeves.” (Emphasis added.) Reeves’ quasi-contract claims must be divided into two categories. His claim that Alyes-ka appropriated his idea for a visitor center is necessarily a property-based claim that seeks recovery for the value of the idea itself; Reeves seeks a recovery based on “his” idea. His claims that Alyeska benefitted from his proposal and services, however, do not necessarily rely on the visitor center idea being property; these claims are based on his services of disclosing and drafting the proposal. The property and non-property claims are treated differently.

An idea is usually not regarded as property because our concept of property implies something that can be owned and possessed to the exclusion of others. Desny, 299 P.2d at 265; Nimmer, supra, § 16.02, at 16-5. To protect an idea under a property theory requires that the idea possess proper•ty-like traits. Courts consider the elements of novelty or originality necessary for a claim of “ownership” in an idea or concept. See Murray, 844 F.2d at 993-94, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S.Ct. 391, 102 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988); Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, 9 Cal.App.3d 996, 88 Cal.Rptr. 679, 690 (1970); Garrido v. Burger King Corp., 558 So.2d 79, 84 (Fla.App.1990); Eenkhoorn v. New York Telephone Co., 148 Misc.2d 999, 568 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (N.Y.Sup.1990); Nimmer, supra, § 16.03[B], These elements distinguish protectable ideas from ordinary ideas that are freely available for others to use. It is the element of originality or novelty that lends value to the idea itself.

If the idea is not distinguished in this manner, its use cannot satisfy the requirements of a quasi-contract claim. The idea, even if beneficial to the defendant, cannot be conferred if the plaintiff has no right of possession. With no right of possession, the idea cannot be said to have been con*1144ferred by the plaintiff.18 Nimmer, supra, § 16.03[B]. Despite Reeves’ protestations, the idea of establishing a visitor center near the pipeline is neither original nor novel.19

Nevertheless, not all of Reeves’ quasi-contract claims require that his idea be considered property and consequently novel or original. Reeves argues that Alyeska was unjustly enriched “by Reeves’ efforts on its behalf, not merely on the ‘concept that [Reeves’] idea was intellectual property.’” Therefore, we must analyze whether the parties’ transactions give rise to a quasi-contract.

The facts alleged by Reeves demonstrate that Burke specifically asked Reeves to draw up a proposal and that Alyeska was going to “do this deal.” There is also evidence Reeves was familiar with the Fairbanks summer tourist industry and had special expertise in that area. These facts present a genuine issue of fact as to whether Alyeska benefited from Reeves’ experience or his written plan. Thus, there is a question of fact whether Reeves’ idea had value to Alyes-ka in its timing or in how it was presented, rather than in its novelty or originality. Reeves’ endorsement of the idea, in combination with his experience in the Fairbanks tourism industry, may have also been valuable to Alyeska. The fact that Alyeska rejected a similar idea in 1987 may indicate that some feature of Reeves’ plan or presentation caused Alyeska to go forward with a visitor center. If Reeves’ services unjustly enriched Alyeska, he should be compensated for the value of those services.20

F. Reeves’ Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The trial court granted summary judgment to Alyeska on Reeves’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It stated that although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract governed by Alaska law, it concluded that this claim must fail because it believed that no contract existed. See Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979) (recognizing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts); O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526 (Alaska 1988) (declining to recognize a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing independent of the contractual relationship).21 Reeves argues that because there is evidence of three distinct contracts, the claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing raises a factual question for the jury. See 3A Corbin, supra § 654B, at 96 (1960 & supp. 1994) (“Good faith always involves questions of fact.”). Because we hold that there is evidence of a contract for disclosure of the idea, we must remand Reeves’ claim for good faith and fair dealing in regard to that agreement.

G. Reeves’ Tort Claims

The trial court granted summary judgment to Alyeska on Reeves’ tort claims of fraud *1145and negligent misrepresentation because Reeves cited no evidence of detrimental reliance. Because Reeves presented evidence of detrimental reliance in regard to disclosing the idea, we remand the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims which are based on a disclosure agreement. However, the trial court did not err in dismissing the tort claims that are dependent on the lease or memorial-ization agreements.

H. Discovery of Burke’s Daily Calendar

Reeves argues that Alyeska should have been compelled to produce an unredact-ed copy of Burke’s daily calendar.22 During discovery, Reeves requested “[a]ny desk calendars or other calendars, diaries, or notes that refer or relate to any meeting or discussion with plaintiff.” Alyeska did not object to the request and responded by producing a redacted version of Burke’s daily calendar. Alyeska intended the redactions to eliminate any materials “that were not requested and had no relevancy to the pending action.” The trial court denied Reeves’ motion to compel because it concluded that Alyeska’s interpretation of the request was reasonable. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Alyeska’s response was reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE that part of the summary judgment entered for Alyeska on Reeves’ express contract, implied contract, promissory estoppel, quasi-contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and related tort claims based on the alleged disclosure agreement, and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the summary judgment entered for Alyeska on the remainder of Reeves’ claims, including those based on the alleged lease and memorialization agreements. We AFFIRM the trial court’s deeision not to compel production of an unredact-ed version of Burke’s daily calendar.

SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge

Plaintiff-appellant Craig P. Nadel (“Na-del”) brought this action against defendant-appellee Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc. (“Play-By-Play”) for breach of contract, quasi contract, and unfair competition. The thrust of Nadel’s complaint was that Play-By-Play took his idea for an upright, sound-emitting, spinning plush toy and that, contrary to industry custom, Play-By-Play used the idea in its “Tornado Taz” product without paying him compensation. Play-By-Play also filed several counterclaims against Nadel, alleging that Nadel falsely told other members of the toy industry that Play-By-Play had stolen his idea, thereby harming its ability to receive toy concepts from toy industry members.

For the reasons that follow, we vacate that part of the district court’s order granting Play-By-Play’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Nadel’s complaint and affirm that part of the district court’s order dismissing Play-ByPlay’s counterclaims.

BACKGROUND

Nadel is a toy idea man. Toy companies regularly do-business with-independent inventors such as Nadel in order to develop and market new toy concepts as quickly as possible. To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the standard custom and practice in the toy industry calls for companies to treat the submission of an idea as confidential. If the company subsequently uses *372the disclosed idea, industry custom provides that the company shall compensate the inventor, unless, of course, the disclosed idea was already known to the company.

In 1996, Nadel developed the toy concept at issue in this case. He transplanted the “eccentric mechanism” 1 found in several hanging Halloween toys then on the market — such as “Spooky Skull” and “Shaking Mutant Pumpkin” — and placed the mechanism inside of a plush toy monkey skin to develop the prototype for a new table-top monkey toy. This plush toy figure sat upright, emitted sound, and spun when placed on a flat surface.

In October 1996, Nadel met with Neil Wasserman, an executive at Play-By-Play who was responsible for the development of its plush toy line. According to Nadel, he showed his prototype monkey toy to Wasserman, who expressed interest in adapting the concept to a non-moving, plush Tazmanian Devil toy that Play-ByPlay was already producing under license from Warner Bros. Nadel contends that, consistent with industry custom, any ideas that he disclosed to Wasserman during their October 1996 meeting were subject to an agreement by Play-By-Play to keep such ideas confidential and to compensate Nadel in the event of their use.

Nadel claims that he sent his prototype monkey toy to Wasserman as a sample and awaited the “Taz skin” and voice tape, which Wasserman allegedly said he would send, so that Nadel could make a sample spinningdaughing Tazmanian Devil toy for Play-By-Play. Wasserman never provided Nadel with the Taz skin and voice tape, however, and denies ever having received the prototype monkey toy from Nadel.

Notwithstanding Wasserman’s denial, his secretary, Melissa Rodriguez, testified that Nadel’s prototype monkey toy remained in Wasserman’s office for several months. According to Ms. Rodriguez, the monkey toy was usually kept in a glass cabinet behind Wasserman’s desk, but she remembered that on one occasion she had seen it on a table in Wasserman’s office. Despite Nadel’s multiple requests, Wasser-man did not return Nadel’s prototype monkey toy until February 1997, after Play-by-Play introduced its “Tornado Taz” product at the New York Toy Fair.

The parties do not dispute that “Tornado Taz” has the same general characteristics as Nadel’s prototype monkey toy. Like Nadel’s toy, Tornado Taz is a plush toy that emits sounds (including “screaming,” “laughing,” “snarling,” and “grunting”), sits upright, and spins by means of an internal eccentric vibration mechanism.

Nadel claims that, in violation of their alleged agreement, Play-By-Play used his idea without paying him compensation. Play-By-Play contends, however, that it independently developed the Tornado Taz product concept and that Nadel is therefore not entitled to any compensation. Specifically, Play-By-Play maintains that, as early as June or July of 1996, two of its officers — Wasserman and Slattery — -met in Hong Kong and began discussing ways to create a spinning or vibrating Tazmanian Devil, including the possible use of an eccentric mechanism. Furthermore, Play-By-Play claims that in late September or early October 1996, it commissioned an outside manufacturing agent — Barter Trading of Hong Kong — to begin developing Tornado Taz.

Play-By-Play also argues that, even if it did use Nadel’s idea to develop Tornado Taz, Nadel is not entitled to compensation because Nadel’s concept was unoriginal and non-novel to the toy industry in October 1996. In support of this argument, Play-By-Play has submitted evidence of various toys, commercially available prior to October 1996, which used eccentric motors and allegedly contained the same *373characteristics as Nadel’s prototype monkey toy.

In connection with its counterclaims, Play-By-Play alleges that Nadel falsely told other members of the toy industry that Play-By-Play had stolen his toy idea, thereby damaging its ability to receive new toy concepts from toy industry members. Play-By-Play claims, for example, that Nadel frustrated its business negotiations with a company called Wow Wee. Specifically, Play-By-Play alleges that because of Nadel’s false statements, Wow Wee broke off its business negotiations with Play-ByPlay and approached other toy manufacturers before ultimately returning to Play-By-Play to conclude a deal. Play-ByPlay contends that it suffered damages because of the resultant delay in bringing Wow Wee’s toy concept to market.

Similarly, Play-By-Play alleges that Na-déis false statements damaged its business relationship with Andrew Ferber, a toy developer. Ferber was a former business associate of Nadel who attended Na-del’s October 1996 meeting with Wasser-man so that he could pitch his “conductive ink” technology to Play-By-Play for possible use in a Looney Tunes pillow. ■ A follow-up meeting between Wasserman and Ferber was scheduled, but Wasserman never appeared for that meeting. Ferber testified that he learned of Nadel’s lawsuit from Nadel and that he would be less willing to do business with Play-By-Play as a result. Ferber and Play-By-Play have not done business together.

DISCUSSION

1. NADEL’S CLAIMS

On January 21, 1999, the district court granted Play-By-Play’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Nadel’s claims for breach of contract, quasi contract, and unfair competition.2 Interpreting New York law, the district court stated that “a party is not entitled to recover for theft of an idea unless the idea is novel or original.” Nadel v. Play By Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1999). Applying that principle to Nadel’s claims, the district court concluded that, even if the spinning toy concept were novel to Play-By-Play. at the time Nadel made the disclosure to Wasserman in October 1996, Nadel’s claims must nonetheless fail for lack of novelty or originality because “numerous toys containing the characteristics of [Nadel’s] monkey were in existence prior to [ ] October 1996.” Id. at 186. In essence, the district court interpreted New York law to require that, when a plaintiff claims that a defendant has either (1) misappropriated his idea (a “property-based claim”) or (2) breached an express or implied-in-fact contract by using such idea (a “contract-based claim”), the idea at issue must be original or novel generally. See id. at 184 n. 1. Thus, according to the district court, a finding that an idea was novel as to Play By Play — i.e., novel to the buyer — cannot suffice to sustain any of Nadel’s claims. See id.

On appeal, Nadel challenges the district court’s conclusion that a showing of novelty to the buyer — i.e., that Nadel’s idea was novel to Play-By-Play at the time of his October 1996 disclosure — cannot suffice to sustain his claims for breach of contract, quasi contract, and unfair competition under New York law. Nadel claims, moreover, that the record contains a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether his toy idea was novel to Play-By-Play at the time of his October 1996 disclosure to Wasserman and that the district court therefore erred in granting Play-ByPlay’s motion for summary judgment.

Nadel’s factual allegations present a familiar submission-of-idea case: (1) the *374parties enter into a pre-disclosure confidentiality agreement; (2) the idea is subsequently disclosed to the prospective buyer; (3) there is no post-disclosure contract for payment based on use; and (4) plaintiff sues defendant for allegedly using the disclosed idea under either a contract-based or property-based theory. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a finding of novelty as to Play-By-Play can suffice to provide consideration for Nadel’s contract claims against Play-By-Play. Accordingly, because we also find that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadel’s idea was novel to Play-By-Play at the time of his October 1996 disclosure, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Nadel’s contract claims. With respect to Nadel’s misappropriation claim, we similarly vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceédings to determine whether Nadel’s idea was original or novel generally.

A. Submission-of-Idea Cases Under New York Law

Our analysis begins with the New York Court of Appeals’ most recent discussion of the law governing idea submission cases, Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 470, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095 (1993). In Apfel, the Court of Appeals discussed the type of novelty an idea must have in order to sustain a contract-based or property-based claim for its uncompensated use. Specifically, Apfel clarified an important distinction between .the requirement of “novelty to the buyer” for contract claims, on the one hand, and “originality” (or novelty generally) for misappropriation claims, on the other hand.

Under the facts of Apfel, the plaintiff disclosed his idea to the defendant pursuant to a confidentiality agreement and, subsequent to disclosure, entered into another agreement wherein the defendant agreed to pay a stipulated price for the idea’s use. See id. at 474, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. The defendant used the idea but refused to pay plaintiff pursuant to the post-disclosure agreement on the asserted ground that “no contract existed between the parties because the sale agreement lacked consideration.” Id. at 475, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. The defendant argued that an idea could not constitute legally sufficient consideration unless it was original or novel generally and that, because plaintiffs idea was not original or novel generally (it had been in the public domain at the time of the post-disclosure agreement), the idea provided insufficient consideration to support the parties’ post-disclosure contract. See id. at 474-75, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095.

In rejecting defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient consideration to support plaintiffs contract claim because the idea at issue had value to the defendant at the time the parties concluded their post-disclosure agreement. See id. at 476, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. The Apfel court noted that “traditional principles of contract law” provide that parties “are free to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or of dubious value,” id. at 475, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095, and that, so long as the “defendant received something of value” under the contract, the contract would not be void for lack of consideration, id. at 476, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. See also id. at 478, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095 (“[T]he buyer knows what he or she is buying and has agreed that the idea has value, and the Court will not ordinarily go behind that determination.”).

The Apfel court explicitly rejected defendant’s contention that the court should carve out “an exception to traditional principles of contract law” for submission-of-idea cases by requiring that an idea must also be original or novel generally in order to constitute valid consideration. Id. at 477, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. *375In essence, the defendant sought to impose a requirement that an idea be novel in absolute terms, as opposed to only the defendant buyer, in order to constitute valid consideration for the bargain. In rejecting this argument, the Apfel court clarified the standards for both contract-based and property-based claims in submission-of-idea cases. That analysis guides our decision here.

The Apfel court first noted that “novelty as an element of an idea seller’s claim” is a distinct element of proof with respect to both (1) “a claim based on a property theory” and (2) “a claim based on a contract theory.” Id. at 477, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. The court then proceeded to discuss how the leading submission-of-idea case — Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257 (1972) — treated novelty with respect to property-based and contract-based claims.3 First, the Apfel court explained that the plaintiffs property-based claims for misappropriation were dismissed in Downey because “the elements of novelty and originality [were] absent,” ie., the ideas were so common as to be unoriginal and known generally. Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 477, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095 (quoting Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257) (alteration in original); accord Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61-62, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257 (holding that the submitted idea — marketing Jell-0 to children under the name “Mr. Wiggle” — was “lacking in novelty and originality” because the idea was merely the “use of a word (‘wiggley’ or ‘wiggle’) descriptive of the most obvious characteristic of Jell-O, with the prefix ‘Mr.’ added”). Second, the Apfel court explained that the plaintiffs contract claims in Dovmey had been dismissed on the separate ground that the “defendant possessed plaintiffs ideas prior to plaintiff’s disclosure [and thus], the ideas could have no value to defendant and could not supply consideration for any agreement between the parties.” Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 477, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095; accord Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 62, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257 (finding that, where defendant had used the words “wiggles” and “wigglewam” in prior advertising, defendant could “rel[y] on its own previous experience” and “was free to make use of ‘Mr. Wiggle’ without being obligated to compensate the plaintiff’).

By distinguishing between the two types of claims addressed in Dovmey and the different bases for rejecting each claim, the New York Court of Appeals clarified that the novelty requirement in submission-of-idea cases is different for misappropriation of property and breach of contract claims. The Court of Appeals underscored this important distinction by citing Ferber v. Sterndent Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 782, 433 N.Y.S.2d 85, 412 N.E.2d 1311 (1980), which also refers to the two different types of novelty, ie., novelty to the buyer and novelty generally. See Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 477, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095 (citing Ferber, 51 N.Y.2d at 782, 433 N.Y.S.2d 85, 412 N.E.2d 1311). In Ferber, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant because “[p]laintiff failed to produce any evidence to support his claim that the idea which he disclosed to defendants was novel either in the abstract or as to them.” Ferber, 51 N.Y.2d at 783, 433 N.Y.S.2d 85, 412 N.E.2d 1311 (emphasis added); see also Bram v. Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 33 A.D.2d 1010, 307 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1st Dep’t 1970) (holding that summary judgment should have been *376granted to defendants on all claims where plaintiffs idea was both “lacking in novelty” and “had been utilized by the defendants ... prior to its submission”).

Thus, the Apfel court refused to read Downey and “similar decisions”4 as requiring originality or novelty generally in all cases involving disclosure of ideas. See Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 476-77, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095 (“These decisions do not support [the] contention that novelty [in absolute terms] is required in all cases involving disclosure of ideas.”). Rather, the Apfel court clarified that the longstanding requirement that an idea have originality or general novelty in order to support a misappropriation claim does not apply to contract claims. See Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 161 Misc.2d 627, 614 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 (1994) (noting that “the Apfel court did not repudiate the long line of cases requiring novelty in certain situations^] ... the Apfel court merely clarified that novelty is not required in all cases”). For contract-based claims in submission-of-idea cases, a showing of novelty to the buyer will supply sufficient consideration to support a contract.

Moreover, Apfel made clear that the “novelty to the buyer” standard is not limited to cases involving an express post-disclosure contract for payment based on an idea’s use. The Apfel court explicitly discussed the pre-disclosure contract scenario present in the instant case, where “the buyer and seller contract for disclosure of the idea with payment based on use, but no separate postdisclosure contract for the use of the idea has been made.” Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. In such a scenario, a seller might, as Nadel did here, bring an action against a buyer who allegedly used his ideas without payment, claiming both misappropriation of property and breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract.5 The Apfel court recognized that *377these cases present courts with the .difficult problem of determining “whether the idea the buyer was using was, in fact, the seller’s.” Id. at 478, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095. Specifically, the court noted that, with respect to a misappropriation of property claim, it is difficult to “prove that the buyer obtained the idea from [the seller] and nowhere else.” Id. With respect to a breach of contract claim, the court noted that it would be inequitable to enforce a contract if “it turns out upon. disclosure that the buyer already possessed the idea.” Id. The court then concluded that, with respect to these cases, “[a] showing of novelty, at least novelty as to the buyer” should address these problems.6 Id.

We note, moreover, that the “novelty to the buyer” standard comports with traditional principles of contract law. While an idea may be unoriginal or non-novel in a general sense, it may have substantial value to a particular buyer who is unaware of it and therefore willing to enter into contract to acquire and exploit it. See Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 475-76, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095; Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 841, 877 n. 151 (1998) (noting that, if a valuable idea is already known to an industry but has not yet been acquired by a prospective buyer, one of two circumstances may exist: “(1) the person[ ] ha[s] not identified the potential value of the easily acquired information; or (2) the person! ] ha[s] not identified the means, however easy or proper, for obtaining the valuable information”). As the. Apfel court emphasized, “the buyer may reap benefits from such a contract in a number of ways — for instance, by not having to expend resources pursuing the idea through other channels or by having a profit-making idea implemented sooner rather than later.” Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 478, 600 N.Y.S.2d 433, 616 N.E.2d 1095.

In fact, the notion that an unoriginal idea may still be novel' (and valuable) to a particular buyer is not itself a novel proposition. In Keller v. American Chain Co., 255 N.Y. 94, 174 N.E. 74 (1930)—which is cited by Apfel—the parties entered into a verbal pre-disclosure contract whereby the plaintiff allegedly agreed to disclose money-saving information to the defendant in exchange for one-third of the savings realized. See id. at 96-97, 174 N.E. 74. The disclosed idea—that the defendant could use a more favorable freight rate classification for his auto chains — was not original or novel to the industry, as several railroads already adhered to the lower rate. See id. at 97-98, 174 N.E. 74. Nonetheless, the Keller court stated that, where the defendant used and benefited from information otherwise unknown to it, there can be sufficient consideration to enforce *378the parties’ pre-disclosure contract.7 See id. at 98, 174 N.E. 74.

In contrast to contract-based claims, a misappropriation claim can only arise from the taking of an idea that is original or novel in absolute terms, because the law of property does not protect against the misappropriation or theft of that which is free and available to all. See Murray v. National Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir.1988) (“Since ... non-novel ideas are not protectible as property, they cannot be stolen.”); cf. Ed Graham Prods., Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 75 Misc.2d 334, 347 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (1973) (“Ideas such as those presented by the plaintiff are in the public domain and may freely be used by anyone with impunity.”); Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 65 Misc.2d 412, 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (1970) (“An idea is impalpable, intangible, incorporeal, yet it may be a stolen gem of great value, or mere dross of no value at all, depending on its novelty and uniqueness.”).

Finally, although the legal requirements for contract-based claims and property-based claims are well-defined, we note that the determination of novelty in a given case is not always clear. Cf. AEB & Assocs. Design Group, Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 853 F.Supp. 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“In establishing an idea’s ■ originality, a plaintiff cannot rest on mere assertions, but must demonstrate some basis in fact for its claims.”). The determination of whether an idea is original or novel depends upon several factors, including, inter alia, the idea’s specificity or generality (is it a generic concept or one of specific application?), its commonality (how many people know of this idea?), its uniqueness (how different is this idea from generally known ideas?), and its commercial availability (how widespread is the idea’s use in the industry?). Cf. Murray, 844 F.2d at 993 (“In assessing whether an idea is in the public domain, the central issue is the uniqueness of the creation.”); AEB & Assocs., 853 F.Supp. at 734 (“[N]ovelty cannot be found where the idea consists of nothing more than a variation on a basic theme.”); Educational Sales Programs, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (noting that an idea “must show[] genuine novelty and invention, and not a merely clever or useful adaptation of existing knowledge” in order to be considered original or novel). Thus, for example, a once original or novel idea may become so widely disseminated over the course of time that it enters the body of common knowledge. When this occurs, the idea ceases to be novel or original. See, e.g., Murray, 844 F.2d at 989, 991-92 (affirming district court’s finding that plaintiff’s idea for a television sitcom about “Black American family life” was not novel or original because it “merely combined two ideas which had been circulating in the industry for a number of years—namely, the family situation comedy, which was a standard formula, and the casting of black actors in non-stereotypical roles,” even though “the portrayal of a nonstereotypical black family on television was indeed a breakthrough”).

Moreover, in assessing the interrelationship between originality and novelty to the buyer, we note that in some cases an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in novelty that its obviousness bespeaks widespread and public knowledge of the idea, and such knowledge is therefore imputed to the buyer. See Soule, 195 N.Y.S. at 575 (noting that the idea that an increase in the wholesale price of groceries would result in an increase in profits was “not new” in 1922, “not original,” and left the court “at a loss to understand how it could be deemed valuable”).8 In such *379cases, a court may conclude, as a matter of law, that the idea lacks both the originality necessary to support a misappropriation claim and the novelty to the buyer necessary to support a contract claim. See id. at 576 (“No person can by contract monopolize an idea that is common and general to the whole world.”); Ed Graham Prods., 347 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (“[W]here plaintiffs idea is wholly lacking in novelty, no cause of action in contract or tort can stand ....”) (emphasis added); Educational Sales Programs, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 843-44 (“Nothing is bestowed if the facts of a ‘secret’ imparted in confidence are already the subject of general knowledge.”).

While we find New York case law in this area to be relatively clear when viewed through the prism of Apfel, we nonetheless recognize some post-Apfel confusion among the courts. Accordingly, we discuss briefly the post-Apfel decisions in New York in an effort to address any lingering uncertainty.

In the first of two post-Apfel decisions in New York — Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 161 Misc.2d 627, 614 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1994) — the plaintiff alleged that the defendant misappropriated its ideas for an interactive telephone game in violation- of a pre-disclosure confidentiality agreement. See id. at 880-81. The Oasis Music court correctly began its contract analysis by reciting Apfel’s “novelty as to the buyer” standard. See id. at 881. But after concluding that the various aspects of plaintiffs ideas already existed in the public domain, the court appeared to dismiss plaintiffs claims for lack of novelty generally. See id. at 882-84. In light of Apfel, we read the Oasis Music opinion to hold that, because plaintiffs ideas had such a high degree of commonality, the ideas were so unoriginal that, as a matter of law, they were non-novel to the buyer. See id. at 883 (“Thus, the plaintiff acknowledges that its program is based on ideas and concepts already in the public domain, and has failed to demonstrate the originality or novelty of its theme.”).

In the other post-Apfel decision in New York-Marraccini v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc., 221 A.D.2d 95, 644 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d Dep’t 1996) — the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached their pre-dis-closure agreement and misappropriated his idea for a “Pop TV” music channel. See id. at 876. On appeal from the Supreme Court, New York’s Appellate Division reiterated Downey’s statement that, “[w]hen there is no postdisclosure agreement for the use of an idea, ‘no promise to pay for its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the elements of novelty and originality are absent, since the property right in an idea is based upon these two elements.’ ” Id. at 877 (quoting Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257). We agree with the Marraccini court’s statement that “Doumey ... and its progeny remain[ ] intact,” id., insofar as that line of cases was clarified by Apfel, but we conclude that the Marraccini court’s reliance on Downey’s language for the proposition that the consideration for the contract in contract-based claims must consist of originality or novelty generally — -as opposed to just novelty to the buyer — has been foreclosed by Apfel. 9 We do not understand *380 Apfel’s holding to be limited only to situations where there is an express post-disclosure contract between the parties.

In sum, we find that New York law in submission-of-idea cases is governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the buyer in order to find consideration.10 Such claims involve a fact-specific inquiry that focuses on the perspective of the particular buyer. By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. This is so because unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and available to all. Finally, an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in novelty generally that, as a matter of law, the buyer is deemed to have knowledge of the idea. In such cases, neither a property-based nor a contract-based claim for uncompensated use of the idea may lie.

In light of New York’s law governing submission-of-idea cases, we next consider whether Nadel’s toy idea was original or novel in absolute terms so as to support his misappropriation claim and whether his idea was novel as to Play-By-Play so as to support his contract claims.

B. Nadel’s Misappropriation Claim

This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 764 (2d Cir.1998). In so doing, we must consider the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. See id. at 764-65. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See id.

In this case, the district court did not decide whether Nadel’s idea—a plush toy that sits upright, emits sounds, and spins on a flat surface by means of an internal eccentric motor—was inherently lacking in originality. See Nadel, 34 F.Supp.2d at 185 (“[We] need [not] reach the issue of whether combining elements of two commercially available toys to make another toy may be novel or is, as a matter of law, merely a ‘clever adaptation of existing technology,’ for Play-By-Play has demonstrated that plaintiffs idea was one which was already in use in the industry at the time that it was submitted”). We therefore remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Nadel’s idea exhibited “genuine novelty or invention” or whether it was “a merely clever or useful adaptation of existing knowledge.” Educational Sales Programs, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 844.

Moreover, insofar as the district court found that Nadel’s idea lacked originality and novelty generally because similar toys were commercially available prior to October 1996, we believe that there remains a genuine issue of material fact on this point. While the record contains testimony of Play-By-Play’s toy expert— Bert Reiner—in support of the finding that Nadel’s product concept was already used in more than a dozen different plush toys prior to October 1996, the district court cited the “Giggle Bunny” toy as the *381only such example. See Nadel, 34 F.Supp.2d at 185. Nadel disputes Reiner’s contention and claims, furthermore, that the district court erroneously relied on an undated video depiction of the Giggle Bunny toy to conclude that upright, sound-emitting, spinning plush toys were commercially available prior to October 1996.

With respect to the Giggle Bunny evidence, we agree with Nadel that the Giggle Bunny model depicted in the undated video exhibit is physically different from the earlier Giggle Bunny model known to be commercially available in 1994. Drawing all factual inferences in Nadel’s favor, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the upright, sound-emitting, spinning plush Giggle Bunny shown in the video exhibit was commercially available prior to October 1996, and we certainly cannot conclude based on this one exhibit that similar toys were in the public domain at that time.

Moreover, although we find highly probative Mr. Reiner’s testimony that numerous toys with the same general characteristics of Nadel’s toy idea were commercially available prior to October 1996, his testimony and related evidence are too ambiguous and incomplete to support a finding of unoriginality as a matter of law. Mr. Reiner’s testimony fails to specify precisely which (if any) of the enumerated plush toys were designed to (1) sit upright, (2) on a flat surface, (3) emit sounds, and (4) spin or rotate (rather than simply vibrate like “Tickle Me Elmo,” for example). Without this information, a reasonable finder of fact could discount Mr. Reiner’s testimony as vague and inconclusive.

On remand, the district court is free to consider whether further discovery is warranted to determine whether Nadel’s product concept was inherently original or whether it was novel to the industry prior to October 1996. A finding of unoriginality or lack of general novelty would, of course, preclude Nadel from bringing a misappropriation claim against Play-ByPlay. Moreover, in evaluating the originality or general novelty of Nadel’s idea in connection with his misappropriation claim, the district may consider whether the idea is so unoriginal that Play-By-Play should, as a matter of law, be deemed to have already possessed the idea, and dismiss Nadel’s contract claims on that ground.

C. Nadel’s Contract Claims

Mindful that, under New York law, a finding of novelty as, to Play-ByPlay will provide sufficient consideration to support Nadel’s contract claims, we next consider whether the record exhibits a genuine issue of material fact on this point.

Reading the record in a light most favorable to Nadel, see Quinn, 159 F.3d at 764, we conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadel’s idea was, at the time he disclosed it to Wasserman in early October 1996, novel to Play-By-Play. Notably, the timing of Play-By-Play’s development and release of Tornado Taz in relation to Nadel’s October 1996 disclosure is, taken alone, highly probative. Moreover, although custom in the toy industry provides that a company shall promptly return all samples if it already possesses (or does not want to use) a disclosed idea, Play-By-Play in this case failed to return Nadel’s prototype monkey toy for several months, despite Nadel’s multiple requests for its return. According to Wasserman’s secretary, Melissa Rodriguez, Nadel’s sample was not returned until after the unveiling of “Tornado Taz” at the New York Toy Fair in February 1997. Ms. Rodriguez testified that from October 1996 through February 1997, Nadel’s sample was usually kept in a glass cabinet behind Wasserman’s desk, and on one occasion, she remembered seeing it on a table in Wasserman’s office. These facts give rise to the reasonable inference that Play-By-Play may have used Nadel’s prototype as a model for the development of Tornado Taz.

*382None of the evidence adduced by Play-By-Play compels a finding- to the contrary on summary judgment. With regard to the discussions that Play-By-Play purportedly had in June or July of 1996 about possible ways to create a vibrating or spinning Tazmanian Devil toy, those conversations only lasted, according to Mr. Slat-tery, “a matter of five minutes.” Play-By-Play may have “discussed the concept,” as Mr. Slattery testified, but the record provides no evidence suggesting that, in June or July of 1996, Play-ByPlay understood exactly how it could apply eccentric motor technology to make its Tazmanian Devil toy spin rather than, say, vibrate like Tickle Me Elmo. Similarly, although Play-By-Play asserts that it commissioned an outside manufacturing agent — Barter Trading of Hong Kong — to begin developing Tornado Taz in late September or early October of 1996, Play-ByPlay admits that it can only “guess” the exact date. Play-By-Play cannot confirm that its commission of Barter Trading predated Nadel’s alleged disclosure to Was-serman on or about October 9, 1996. Nor has Play-By-Play produced any' documents, technical or otherwise, relating to its purported business venture with Barter Trading or its independent development of a spinning Tornado Taz prior to October 1996. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Play-By-Play actually contacted Barter Trading, if at all, after learning of Nadel’s product concept, and that Play-By-Play’s development of Tornado Taz is attributable to Nadel’s disclor sure.

We therefore conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadel’s idea was, at the time he disclosed it to Wasserman in early October 1996, novel to Play-By-Play. As to whether the other elements necessary to find a valid express or implied-in-fact contract are present here, e.g., mutual assent, legal capacity, legal subject matter, see Maas, 94 N.Y.2d at 93-94, 699 N.Y.S.2d 716, 721 N.E.2d 966, we leave that determination to the district court to address, if necessary, on remand. Cf. Nadel, 34 F.Supp.2d at 184-86 (dismissing contract claim only on ground that Nadel’s idea lacked general novelty and thus would not suffice as consideration).

II. PLAY-BY-PLAY’S COUNTERCLAIMS

Play-By-Play argues on cross-appeal that the district court erred in granting ■Nadel’s motion for summary judgment on three of its counterclaims: (1) tortious interference with prospective business relations; (2) violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and (3) unfair competition. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm that part of the district court’s judgment granting Nadel’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Play-By-Play’s counterclaims.

A. Tortious Interference With Prospective Business Relations

Under New York law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations are: (1) business relations with a third party; (2) the defendant’s interference with those business relations; (3) the defendant acted with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) injury to the business relationship. See Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted). Upon a de novo review of the rec- ' ord, see Quinn, 159 F.3d at 764, we agree with the district court that Play-By-Play has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support its claim for tortious interference with business relations.

With respect to Play-By-Play’s relations with Wow Wee, Play-By-Play failed to establish by any competent evidence that Wow Wee interrupted its business discussions with Play-By-Play because of anything Nadel said or did. Play-ByPlay’s allegation is based solely on its “suspicions,” which cannot suffice to support a claim for tortious interference. Further*383more, with respect to its relations with Ferber, Play-By-Play had one meeting with Ferber to discuss the potential development of a new toy technology, but no specific details were discussed. Another meeting was scheduled, but Wasserman never appeared for that meeting. Based on these facts, we find that Play-By-Play and Ferber did not have a sufficient “business relation” with which Nadel could have interfered.

B. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act & Unfair Competition

Both a section 43(a)(1)(B) claim under the Lanham Act and an unfair competition claim under New York common law require that misleading or untruthful statements have been made for the purpose of commercial advertising or promoting a party’s goods, services, or commercial activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp.1999) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce any ... false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable....”); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir.1997) (“ ‘Under New York law, common law unfair competition claims closely resemble Lanham Act claims except insofar as the state law claim may require an additional element of bad faith or intent.’ ”) (quoting Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1112, 1131 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1477 (2d Cir.1993)). Based on our review of the record, we agree with the district court that Nadel’s statements to others, if actually made, cannot reasonably be said to have been made for the purpose of commercial advertising or promotion. See Nadel, 34 F.Supp.2d at 186.

Furthermore, although the district court did not explicitly address the merits of Play-By-Play’s counterclaim under section 43(a)(1)(A), we note that Play-By-Play’s reliance on that subsection is also misplaced. Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act ordinarily addresses confusion caused by a defendant’s trademark and is not so broad as to encompass Nadel’s alleged statements to others regarding the intellectual origin of Play-ByPlay’s “Tornado Taz” toy product. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce any ... false or misleading representation of fact, which ■... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the ... origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable -”) (emphasis added); see also 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, ch. 27 (4th ed.1999) (discussing the scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of Nadel’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Play-By-Play’s counterclaims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that part of the district court’s judgment dismissing Play-By-Play’s counterclaims. We vacate that part of the district court’s judgment granting Play-By-Play’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Na-del’s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

This matter comes on before this court on Robert V. Baer’s (“Baer”) appeal from an order of the district court entered February 20, 2004, granting summary judgment to the defendants, David Chase and DC Enterprises, Inc. (together called “Chase”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). This dispute centers on the creation and development of the well-known television series, The Sopranos. Through this action, Baer seeks compensation for what he perceives was his role in the creation and development of the popular and financially successful television series.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chase, who originally was from New Jersey, but relocated to Los Angeles in 1971, is the creator, producer, writer and director of The Sopranos. Chase has numerous credits for other television productions as well. Before Chase met Baer, Chase had worked on a number of projects involving organized crime activities based in New Jersey, including a script for “a mob boss in therapy,” a concept that, in part, would become the basis for The Sopranos.

In 1995, Chase was producing and directing a Rockford Files “movie-of-the-week” when he met Joseph Urbancyk who was working on the set as a camera operator and temporary director of photography. Chase mentioned to Urbancyk that he was looking for new material and for writers who could develop feature film screenplays that Chase later might rewrite and direct. Urbancyk also overheard Chase say that the creators of The Rockford Files were looking to assign additional writers for their “movie of the week” project.

Urbancyk became the connection between Chase and Baer as a result of Ur-bancyk’s long-time friendship with Baer and his knowledge of Baer’s interest in pursuing a career in writing, directing and producing. Baer, who was a New Jersey attorney, recently had left his employment in the Union County Prosecutor’s Office in Elizabeth, New Jersey, where he had worked for the previous six years.

*613Urbancyk urged Baer to write a script for The Rockford, Files. Baer did so and gave it to Urbancyk who passed it on to Chase. Chase considered Baer’s work “interesting” and asked Urbancyk if Baer had any plans to be in Los Angeles. Upon hearing of Chase’s interest, Baer flew to Los Angeles to meet with Chase.

Chase, Urbancyk and Baer met for lunch on June 20, 1995. At that time Chase informed Baer that he would be unable to use Baer’s screenplay, as the remaining slots in The Rockford Files had been filled. The lunch continued, however, with Baer describing his experience as a prosecutor. Baer also pitched the idea to shoot “a film or television shows about the New Jersey Mafia.” App. at 40. At that time Baer was unaware of Chase’s previous work involving mob activity premised in New Jersey. At the lunch there was no reference to any payment that Chase might make to Baer for the latter’s services and the parties agree that they did not reach any agreement on that day.

In October 1995, Chase visited New Jersey for three days. During this “research visit” Baer arranged meetings for Chase with Detective Thomas Koezur, Detective Robert A. Jones, and Tony Spirito who provided Chase with information, material and personal stories about their experiences with organized crime. Koezur served as a tour guide and drove Chase and Baer to various locations in northern New Jersey. Koezur also arranged a lunch between Chase and Spirito. Spirito told true and sometimes personal stories involving loan sharking, a power struggle with two uncles involving a family business, and two individuals, Big Pussy and Little Pussy Russo.1 Chase also met with Jones, a detective with the Union County Prosecutor’s office who had experience investigating organized crime. Baer does not dispute that virtually all of the ideas and locations that he “contributed” to Chase existed in the public record.

After returning to Los Angeles, Chase sent Baer a copy of a draft of a Sopranos screenplay that he had written, which was dated December 20, 1995. Baer asserts that after he read it he called Chase and made various comments with regard to it. Baer claims that the two spoke at least four times during the following year and that he sent a letter to Chase dated February 10, 1997, discussing The Sopranos script. Baer ensured that Chase received the letter by confirming its arrival with Chase’s assistant. On this appeal we accept Baer’s allegations regarding his input into The Sopranos draft.

Notwithstanding his February 10, 1997 letter, at his deposition Baer claimed that he last rendered services to Chase in 1995. Thus, Baer’s testimony included the following:

Q. During any of those conversations after October of 1995, [when Chase visited New Jersey] did you provide any further information to Mr. Chase other than in relation to the sexual assault?

A. Not really.

Q. No?

A. Not really. The screen play was done and there wasn’t really any need for it at that point as far as I knew. Q. So everything that you had done and to which you claim entitlement was done by the end of October 1995?

A. Yes in terms of assisting him in helping with this project that would be true.

App. at 343-44.2 Notwithstanding this testimony, in Baer’s later certification dated October 3, 2003, in opposition to Chase’s motion for summary judgment he sought to clarify his deposition testimony, stating:

*614117. I also sent him a letter dated February 10, 1997 discussing the Sopranos script prior to making a trip to Los Angeles. After sending the letter, I spoke with Chase’s assistant, Kelly Kockzak, who confirmed that Chase had received it. This letter represents the last services I provided to Defendants. Most of my services were provided in 1995.

App. at 69.

Baer asserts that he and Chase orally agreed on three separate occasions that if the show became a success, Chase would “take care of’ Baer, and “remunerate [Baer] in a manner commensurate to the true value of [his services].” App. at 113. According to Baer, he and Chase first made this oral agreement on the telephone during one of their first two or three conversations during the summer of 1995. The second occasion was on the telephone and occurred immediately prior to Chase’s October 1995 visit to New Jersey. The third time the parties reached the agreement was in person when they met in New Jersey in October 1995.

Baer claims that on each of these occasions the parties had the same conversation in which Chase offered to pay Baer, stating “you help me; I pay you.” App. at 112-13. Baer always rejected Chase’s offer, reasoning that Chase would be unable to pay him “for the true value of the services [Baer] was rendering.” Id. Each time Baer rejected Chase’s offer he did so with a counteroffer, “that I would perform the services while assuming the risk that if the show failed [Chase] would owe me nothing. If, however, the show succeeded he would remunerate me in a manner commensurate to the true value of my services.” Id. at 113. Baer acknowledges that this counteroffer, which in these proceedings we treat as having become the parties’ agreement, always was oral and did not include any fixed term of duration or price. There is no other evidence in the record of any other discussion between Baer and Chase regarding the terms of the contract. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, Chase accepts Baer’s version of the events as true and thus concedes there was an oral agreement to the extent that Baer sets it forth. Notwithstanding this agreement, insofar as we can ascertain, other than Baer’s calls to Chase after he received the Sopranos script, the next time Baer heard anything from or about Chase was when he received a phone call from Detective Koczur telling him that Chase was in Elizabeth shooting The Sopranos. In fact, Chase has not paid Baer for his services.

On or about May 15, 2002, Baer filed a verified complaint against Chase in the district court and thereafter on May 2, 2003, Baer filed an amended verified complaint. Baer’s amended complaint advanced ten claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied contract; (3) breach of quasi-contract; (4) common law fraud; (5) equitable fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125; (9) unfair competition and misappropriation under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-1 (West 2001); and (10) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. App. at 137-48. Baer subsequently withdrew the federal unfair competition claim.3 Eventu*615ally Chase brought a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) alleging that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and: he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Chase claimed that the, alleged contract and implied contract were too vague, ambiguous and lacking in essential terms to be enforced and the statute of frauds barred the actions based on them. Moreover, Chase claimed that the statute of limitations barred the breach of quasi-contract quantum meruit claim. Finally, Chase alleged that each of Baer’s six remaining claims was lacking in merit. Baer did not file a cross-motion for complete or partial summary judgment.

The district court granted Chase’s motion, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of Baer’s claims. The district court held with respect to the claims raised on this appeal that: the contract claims were unenforceable due to vagueness, uncertainty, and the lack of essential terms in the contract; the statute of limitations barred the quasi-contract claim; and the misappropriation tort claim was without merit due to a lack of novelty. In addition, the district court made certain rulings with respect to evidence that we describe below which Baer challenges.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that the parties were of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Our jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as this timely appeal is from a final order of the district court granting Chase’s motion for summary judgment. We make a plenary review of the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Chase. See Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 566 n. 3 (3d Cir.2002)). Insofar as the case involves 'state law, New Jersey law is applicable.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Baer’s Implied-In-Fact Contract Claim

Baer predicates his contract claim on this appeal on an implied-in-fact contract rather than on the oral agreement he reached with Chase. The issue with respect to the implied-in-fact contract claim concerns whether Chase and Baer entered into an enforceable contract for services Baer rendered that aided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. In the district court Baer offered two alternative theories in which a purported contract was formed: the “oral agreement/success contingency” and an implied-in-fact contract.

The parties agree for purposes of the summary judgment motion that there was a contingent oral agreement providing for Chase to compensate Baer, depending on Chase’s “success,” in exchange for the aid Baer provided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. As we noted above, the parties reached the oral agreement in three exchanges in which Baer proposed: “that I would perform the services while assuming the risk that if the show failed [Chase] would owe me nothing. If, however, the show succeeded he would remunerate me in a manner commensurate to the true value of my services.” App. at 113. As we have indicated, for purposes of the summary judgment motion only, Chase accepts this version of the events so we will regard the existence of the oral agreement as not in dispute.

*616The district court held, and Baer concedes on appeal, that this oral agreement was “too vague to be enforced” as an express contract. Appellant’s br. at 30-31; see Baer v. Chase, 2004 WL 350050, at *6 (Feb. 20, 2004) (“The contract as articulated by the Plaintiff lacks essential terms, and is vague, indefinite and uncertain; no version of the alleged agreement contains sufficiently precise terms to constitute an enforceable contract.”). This description of the oral agreement leaves at issue Baer’s contention that the district court overlooked the existence of an enforceable implied-in-fact contract, rendering Chase liable for the services that Baer provided.

1. The Distinction Between Express And Implied-In-Fact Contracts

The distinction between express and implied contracts rests on alternative methods of contract formation. Contracts are “express” when the parties state their terms and “implied” when the parties do not state their terms. The distinction is based not on the contracts’ legal effect but on the way the parties manifest their mutual assent. In re Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir.1987) (“An implied-in-fact contract, therefore, is a true contract arising from mutual agreement and intent to promise, but in circumstances in which the agreement and promise have not been verbally expressed. The agreement is rather inferred from the conduct of the parties.”); see Baltimore O.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597, 58 Ct.Cl. 709, 43 S.Ct. 425, 426-27, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1923). In other words, the terms “express” and “implied” do not denote different kinds of contracts, but rather reference the evidence by which the parties demonstrate their agreement. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 N.J. 17, 158 A.2d 825, 828 (N.J.1960).

Baer’s attempt to find an implied-in-fact contract in his dealings with Chase does not strengthen his claim that Chase breached his contract with him. There is only one contract at issue, Chase’s promise to compensate Baer for services he rendered which aided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. Chase’s stipulation that there was such a contract has the consequence of making Baer’s attempts to label this agreement “implied” rather than “express” to advance a distinction without a difference as the mode of contract formation, as we will explain, is immaterial to the disposition of the breach of contract claim. In other words, inasmuch as the parties agree for purposes of these summary judgment proceedings that there was an agreement, the manner in which they formed the contract is immaterial because different legal consequences do not flow from analyzing the alleged contract as implied-in-fact rather than express. See Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. Essex County, 111 N.J. 67, 543 A.2d 34, 39 (1988) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 158 A.2d at 828 (“[A] true contract implied in fact ‘is in legal effect an express contract,’ and varies from the latter only insofar as the parties’ agreement and assent thereto have been manifested by conduct instead of words.”)). The district court was therefore correct in its holding that “[bjecause the Defendants have assumed the existence of a contract as the Plaintiff has described it for the purposes of the motion there is no issue regarding formation of the contract or assent, and the Plaintiffs distinction between express and implied contracts is irrelevant.” Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *5 (citations omitted).

Moreover, Baer’s claim of an implied-in-fact contract, in the face of an express agreement governing the same subject matter, is legally untenable. There cannot be an implied-in-fact contract *617if there is an express contract that covers the same subject matter. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d at 1229-30; see Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 191-92, 44 S.Ct. 58, 58-59, 68 L.Ed. 244 (1923). In other words, express contract and implied-in-fact contract theories are mutually exclusive.

In In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 831 F.2d 1221, we addressed the relationship between express and implied contracts. In that case the government sought recovery under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act for funds it paid to Penn Central in an attempt to sustain routine operations at the financially ailing railroad company. The government and the railroad had entered into a number of express agreements pursuant to the Act to effectuate these loans. The government later claimed that Penn Central performed unauthorized work, resulting in the overpayment of $22.3 million to it. The government argued that the Act dictated the specific and limited manner in which the government loan money could be utilized, and, accordingly, sought return of its funding expended on “unauthorized” activities.

In response, Penn Central put forth an . interpretation of the Act in which the alleged unauthorized activities would have been acceptable under its requirements. In the alternative, it maintained that it had an entered into a separate and enforceable implied-in-fact contract with the government to continue using these funds for the activities in which it was engaged, even if they were deemed outside the scope of the Act. Id. at 1225.

We focused on and disallowed the railroad’s attempt to prove the existence of both express and implied-in-fact agreements dealing with the same subject. We stated, “no implied-in-fact contract may be found when, as here, the parties have an express agreement dealing with the same subject.” Id. at 1229. The operative principle here and in Penn Central Transportation Company is the same. As noted above, there is only one agreement at issue in the present case, Chase’s promise to pay Baer for the services he rendered. Chase concedes the existence of the oral express agreement as alleged by Baer. Consequently, the fundamental contract law principle that implied and express contacts are mutually exclusive forecloses Baer’s attempt to establish that there was an implied-in-fact contract.

New Jersey law, applicable here, recognizes the mutual exclusivity of express and implied contracts. Roselle Park Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Friedlander, 116 N.J.L. 32, 181 A. 316, 317 (1935) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a contract cannot arise by implication in fact where there is an express contract between the parties relating to the same subject matter....”). The existence of an express contract, however, does not preclude the existence of an implied contract if the implied contract is distinct from the express contract. Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 754-55 (Fed.Cir.1990); see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Africa Corp., 239 F.Supp.2d 402, 409 (D.Del.2002) (“A party may assert the existence of an express contract and implied-in-fact contract only if the terms of the contracts alleged differ in some manner.”); ITT Fed. Support Servs., Inc. v. United States, 209 Ct.Cl. 157, 531 F.2d 522, 528 n. 12 (1976) (“The implied contract, if it is to be valid, must be entirely unrelated to the express contract. The existence of an express contract precludes the existence of an implied contract dealing with the same subject.”).

Baer’s alleged implied-in-fact contract, however, rather than being distinct from or unrelated to the express oral contract is identical to it. The stipulated oral agreement included Chase’s promise to compensate Baer for the services and *618ideas that Baer provided Chase. Baer now asks that we find an implied-in-fact contract that subjects Chase to liability for the very same undertaking. Baer provides a litany of facts which indicate that Chase may have used his services or prospered from his ideas. Nevertheless, in light of Chase’s stipulation to the existence of an agreement governing this subject matter, this evidence is immaterial to the issues raised by the summary judgment motion with respect to Baer’s attempt to establish that there was an implied-in-fact contract between the parties.

The question is not whether Chase entered into an agreement with Baer or whether Chase utilized his ideas. We already deem these matters, for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment and this appeal, as established. The question is whether Chase’s nonverbal actions prove there was a contract distinct from the express agreement or expanding on the terms of the agreement to make it enforceable. The answer is clearly that the actions do not do so. The alleged implied-in-fact contract completely mirrors the acknowledged express contract’s subject matter. Baer nowhere demonstrates that the subject matter of the alleged implied-in-fact contract is distinct, more definite in terms of price and duration, or covers a subject matter divergent from the oral agreement. The district court, therefore, would have erred if it had analyzed this case on the basis that there was a separate implied-in-fact contract distinct from the express contract that governed the identical subject matter.

2. Definitiveness As To Price and Duration In An “Idea Submission” Case

Even assuming that Baer had been able to demonstrate that he had an implied-in-fact contract with Chase, his contention that an implied-in-fact contract claim in an idea submission case need not be definite as to price and duration, would be incorrect. Baer asserts that the district court’s holding “that the absence of a price and duration term render[s] an implied contract in an idea submission scenario too vague to be enforced ... is contrary to the law in virtually every jurisdiction that has ever considered the issue.” Appellant’s br. at 34. Baer’s claim fails on three grounds: (1) there is no distinction between express and implied contracts, aside from issues of contract formation; (2) definiteness with respect to price and duration is necessary for idea submission cases under New Jersey contract law; and (3) the district court was correct in holding that the contract Baer alleges existed was too ambiguous and indefinite to be enforceable.

a. An Implied-In-Fact Contract Has The Same Legal Consequences As An Express Contract.

In fact there are no distinctions in legal effect, at least in the context of this case, when a promise is implied rather than express. See Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., 123 F.Supp.2d 802, 816-17 (2001) (“The only difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract is that the parties’ agreement has been manifested by conduct instead of words.”). No rationale exists to conclude that definiteness as to the essential terms of a contract could be an exception from this fundamental principle. We therefore determine if in any “idea submission case,” whether predicated on an express or implied contract, definiteness is a requirement to create an enforceable contract.

b. A Contract Involving An Idea Submission Must Be Definite With Respect To All Essential Terms To Be Enforceable Under New Jersey Contract Law.

In fact “[a] contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be suffi*619ciently definite so ‘that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.’ ” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (1992) (citing West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d 402, 410 (1958); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 126 A.2d 646, 650-51 (1956); Leitner v. Braen, 51 N.J.Super. 31, 143 A.2d 256, 259-60 (1958)). Therefore parties create an enforceable contract when they agree on its essential terms and manifest an intent that the terms bind them. West Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 410; see Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 95 A.2d 391, 397 (1953); California Natural v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 465, 470 (D.N.J.1986). If parties to an agreement do not agree on one or more essential terms of the purported agreement courts generally hold it to be unenforceable. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284 (citing Heim v. Shore, 56 N.J.Super. 62, 151 A.2d 556, 561-62 (1959) (holding agreement unenforceable because parties did not agree on terms of payment; principal amount of mortgage, due date, and interest rate)).

New Jersey contract law focuses on the performance promised when analyzing an agreement to determine if it is too vague to be enforced. “An agreement so deficient in the specification of its essential terms that the performance by each party cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty is not a contract, and clearly is not an enforceable one.” Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F.Supp. 1020, 1025 (D.N.J.1995) (citing Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat’l Bank, 163 N.J.Super. 463, 395 A.2d 222, 227 (1978)). A contract, therefore, is unenforceable for vagueness when its essential terms are too indefinite to allow a court to determine with reasonable certainty what each party has promised to do. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284; see West Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 410 (“To be enforceable as a contractual undertaking, an agreement must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.”).

New Jersey law deems the price term, i.e., the amount of compensation, an essential term of any contract. MDC Inv. Prop., L.L.C. v. Marando, 44 F.Supp.2d 693, 698-99 (D.N.J.1999) (citing Weichert, 608 A.2d at 287). An agreement lacking definiteness of price, however, is not unenforceable if the parties specify a practicable method by which they can determine the amount. Moorestown Mgmt., Inc. v. Moorestown Bookshop, Inc., 104 N.J.Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623, 628 (1969). However, in the absence of an agreement as to the manner or method of determining compensation the purported agreement is invalid. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 287. Additionally, the duration of the contract is deemed an essential term and therefore any agreement must be sufficiently definitive to allow a court to determine the agreed upon length of the contractual relationship. Lo Bosco, 891 F.Supp. at 1026 (“With regard to contracts for services in return for a percentage of some yet-to-be-determined number, such as profits, sales, etc., the courts [of and in New Jersey] look to whether there are certain dates of commencement and termination.”).

The New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly has held that an implied-in-fact contract “must be sufficiently definite [so] that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284 (citations and internal quotations omitted). If possible, courts will “attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the terms of a bargain to make it enforceable[,]” Paley v. Barton Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 82 N.J.Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682, 686 (1964), and in doing so may refer to “commercial practice *620or other usage or custom.” Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Serv. Inc., 974 F.Supp. 441, 458 (D.N.J.1997). But the courts recognize that a contract is “unenforceable for vagueness when its terms are too indefinite to allow a court to determine with reasonable certainty what each party has promised to do.” Id. at 457.

Baer premises his argument on his view that New Jersey should disregard the well-established requirement of definiteness in its contract law when the subject-matter of the contract is an “idea submission.” He cites extensively to a string of cases from various jurisdictions which he urges support his contention. See, e.g., Wrench L.L.C v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir.2001); Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.2000); Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d 802. Baer contends that these cases support the proposition that “[ejvery Circuit that has published on the issue, has upheld implied contract claims where price and duration were absent and a price term was implied as the reasonable value of the ideas conveyed.” Appellant’s br. at 34.

Baer’s argument is inaccurate and misleading. He attempts to transform cases where the issues raised pertain to adequacy of consideration and discrepancies over the use of submitted facts, into the proposition that implied-in-fact contracts involving idea submissions need not be sufficiently definite. For example: Wrench, 256 F.3d at 459-63, reversed a summary judgment disposition that held that novelty was required to prove consideration and sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim; Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 816-19, held that a plaintiff must prove that an idea disclosed to the defendant was novel in order to find consideration for the alleged contract and denied summary judgment because a material issue existed over novelty and use; Nadel, 208 F.3d at 374, reversed a summary judgment granted “only on ground that [the plaintiffs] idea lacked general novelty and thus would not suffice as consideration” and remanded for the district court to determine “whether the other elements necessary to find a valid express or implied-in-fact contract are present here.” Id. at 382. None of the cases Baer cites holds that there is not a definiteness requirement necessary to create an enforceable contract in idea submission cases. Duffy’s holding is helpful in summarizing the actual law to be derived from the above cited cases: “The existence of novelty to the buyer only addresses the element of consideration necessary for the formation of a contract. Thus, apart from consideration, the formation of a contract will depend upon the presence of other elements.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 818 (citing Nadel, 208 F.3d at 377 n. 5).

New Jersey precedent does not support Baer’s attempt to carve out an exception to traditional principles of contract law for submission-of-idea cases. The New Jersey courts have not provided even the slightest indication that they intend to depart from their well-established requirement that enforceability of a contract requires definiteness with respect to the essential terms of that contract. Accordingly, we will not relax the need for Baer to demonstrate definiteness as to price and duration with respect to the contract he entered into with Chase.

3. The Alleged “Contract” Regardless Of Labels Is Too Vague To Be Enforced.

The final question with respect to the Baer’s contract claim, therefore, is whether his contract is enforceable in light of the traditional requirement of definitiveness in New Jersey contract law for a contract to be enforceable. A contract may be expressed in writing, or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways and partly in others. Troy v. Rutgers, 168 *621N.J. 354, 774 A.2d 476, 482-83 (2001). There is a point, however, at which interpretation becomes alteration. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d at 1226 (citing Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.1980)). In this case, even when all of the parties’ verbal and non-verbal actions are aggregated and viewed most favorably to Baer, we cannot find a contract that is distinct and definitive enough to be enforceable.

Nothing in the record indicates that the parties agreed on how, how much, where, or for what period Chase would compensate Baer. The parties did not discuss who would determine the “true value” of Baer’s services, when the “true value” would be calculated, or what variables would go into such a calculation. There was no discussion or agreement as to the meaning of “success” of The Sopranos. There was no discussion how “profits” were to be defined. There was no contemplation of dates of commencement or termination of the contract. And again, nothing in Baer’s or Chase’s conduct, or the surrounding circumstances of the relationship, shed light on, or answers, any of these questions. The district court was correct in its description of the contract between the parties: “The contract as articulated by the Plaintiff lacks essential terms, and is vague, indefinite and uncertain; no version of the alleged agreement contains sufficiently precise terms to constitute an enforceable contract.” Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *6. We therefore will affirm the district court’s rejection of Baer’s claim to recover under a- theory of implied-in-fact contract.

B. Baer’s Quasi-Contract Claim

Our rejection of Baer’s implied-in-fact contract claim does not preclude him from recovering on his quasi-contract claim and thus in view of the district court’s disposition of that claim we consider when the statute of limitations started running on it. This inquiry has two parts: (1) application of the discovery rule; and (2) whether the district court erred in disregarding Baer’s certification in opposition to Chase’s motion for summary judgment, particularly when it is clear that evidence in the record corroborated the certification. The court disregarded the certification on the grounds that it conflicted with Baer’s prior deposition testimony. This statute of limitations inquiry is critical as the district court did not reject the quasi-contract claim on the merits, and there is no doubt that in an appropriate case, depending on the facts, that a party may recover on a quasi-contract claim even if there was no actual contract.

If, in fact, Baer’s deposition was accurate, everything to which he claims entitlement for compensation had been completed by the end of October 1995, some six years and seven months before he filed this lawsuit. In that circumstance, as we explain below, the district court would have held correctly that the New Jersey statute of limitations barred Baer’s quasi-contract claim unless the discovery rule postponed the commencement of the limitations period. But the deposition testimony may have been incomplete as there is evidence in the record refuting the portion of it indicating that Baer’s last rendition of services was in October 1995, as it is undisputed that Baer sent a letter to Chase on -February 10, 1997, critiquing Chase’s early screenplay of The Sopranos. Indeed, this letter was already in the record at the time of the deposition. In addition, Baer corrected the “misstatement” in his deposition by reference to the “undisputed facts that were already in evidence” in his certification in opposition to Chase’s motion for summary judgment.

Preliminarily on the statute of limitations issue we observe that under New Jersey law, non-personal injury actions involving monetary damages must be *622“commenced within 6 years after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1 (West 2000). Moreover, there is no dispute between the parties that the six-year statute of limitations governs quasi-contract claims. See Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 2S1 N.J.Super. 353, 688 A.2d 130, 140-41 (1997). The initial issue here, however, is an inquiry into when the statute started to run.

Baer challenges the district court’s holding that a quasi-contract claim “accrued, if at all” for the purposes of statute of limitations, when Baer rendered his final services in October 1995. Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *9. Baer asserts that “the Court did not address Plaintiffs contention that the discovery rule should be applied and as a result the cause of action did not accrue until The Sopranos first aired on January 10, 1999.” Appellant’s br. at 58.

In New Jersey as elsewhere “[t]he discovery rule postpones the commencement of a cause of action until a Plaintiff knows, or should have known, of facts which establish that an injury has occurred, and that fault for that injury can be attributed to another.” Riemer v. St. Clare’s Riverside Med. Ctr., 300 N.J.Super. 101, 691 A.2d 1384, 1388-89 (1997) (citing Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 424 A.2d 1169, 1171 (1981) (“[The rule] provides that in an appropriate case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim ... (or) knows or has reason to know that he has a right of redress.”)).

Baer, however, does not cite any New Jersey decision applying the discovery rule to delay the time when the statute of limitations begins to run on a quasi-eon-tract claim.4 Moreover, while most jurisdictions have not ruled explicitly on whether the discovery rule should apply in quantum meruit cases, those that have addressed the issue have chosen not to utilize the discovery rule, but rather to employ a “last rendition of services” test. Thus, in Rabinowitz v. Mass. Bonding & Insurance Co., 119 N.J.L. 552, 197 A. 44, 47 (1938), the court used a last “rendition of services” calculation in an unjust enrichment claim. Additionally, the court in Ko-pin, 688 A.2d at 140, cited a New York case granting summary judgment predicated on the statute of limitations in a quantum meruit case in which there was a failure of proof as to when the plaintiff completed his performance, Wint v. Fields, 177 A.D.2d 425, 576 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y.App.Div.1991). See also GSGSB, Inc. v. New York Yankees, 862 F.Supp. *6231160, 1171 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“[A] cause of action for quantum meruit begins to run when the final service has been performed.”) (citing Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F.Supp. 714, 722 (S.D.N.Y.1986)); Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916); County of Broome v. Board of Educ., 65 Misc.2d 418, 317 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1971).

Baer’s rationale in urging us to adopt the discovery rule for quantum meruit claims is doctrinally untenable as well. He alleges that “at the time Plaintiffs services were completed, Plaintiff reasonably believed that remuneration for those services was governed by a contractual agreement contingent upon the success of the show.” Appellant’s br. at 59. Baer therefore contends, “there is no possible way that Plaintiff knew or should have known that a cause of action had accrued until such time as The Sopranos aired on January 10,1999.” Id. He misunderstands the nature of a quantum meruit claim with respect to the statute of limitations. “In cases based on quasi-contract liability, the intention of the parties is entirely disregarded .... ” Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Carp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 219 A.2d 332, 334 (1966). In other words, Baer’s belief that he was going to get paid if and when the show was a success is irrelevant because his understanding of his oral contract, even if correct, does not govern his quasi-contract claim inasmuch as a quasi-contract claim is not a “real” contract based on mutual consent and understanding of the parties. The essence of a quasi-contract claim is not the expectancy of the parties, but rather the unjust enrichment of one of them. It therefore would be inappropriate to look at Baer’s -expectations of payment, rather than at the services he provided Chase.

Zic v. Italian Government Travel Office, 149 F.Supp.2d 473 (N.D.Ill.2001), addressed the question of when a cause of action accrued and started the running of the clock on the statute of limitations in a quantum-, meruit suit. The plaintiff argued that his claim did not begin until the defendant failed to recognize accrued seniority or to make retroactive salary increases to which he claimed entitlement. Id. at 476. The district court stated that this argument, “misunderstands the essence of a quantum meruit claim, which is not the plaintiffs expectancy of payment, but the unjust enrichment of the defendant.” Id. The court held' that the cause of action accrues upon presentment and subsequent rejection of a bill for services, or as soon as the services were rendered. Id. at 475-76.

It is clear that any application of the discovery rule would be inappropriate in analyzing whether the statute of limitations ran on Baer’s quantum-meruit claim. The district court was therefore correct in utilizing a last rendition of services test to analyze whether Baer’s claim was time barred.

The district court, utilizing the last services rendered test, held that the statute of limitations barred Baer’s quasi-contract claim based on his deposition testimony that he last rendered services in October 1995. The district court disregarded Baer’s later certification and the February 10,1997 letter, holding:

[I]n this case, the Plaintiffs deposition testimony regarding the date that performance was complete was a fact of crucial importance to his case, his performance and the February 10, 1997 letter were the subject of extensive questioning, and the Plaintiff had access to the-relevant information at the time of his deposition.

Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *9.

This disposition brings us to the second aspect of our statute of limitations discussion, the “sham affidavit” doctrine. *624In this regard we have held that a party-may not create a material issue of fact to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit disputing his or her own sworn testimony without demonstrating a plausible explanation for the conflict. Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir.1991). The “sham affidavit” doctrine refers to the trial courts’ “practice of disregarding an offsetting affidavit that is submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment when the affidavit contradicts the affiant’s prior deposition testimony.” Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 797 A.2d 138, 144 (2002). When a party does not explain the contradiction between the subsequent affidavit and the prior deposition, the alleged factual issue in dispute can be perceived as a “sham,” thereby not creating an impediment to a grant of summary judgment based on the deposition. Id. Though the district court did not refer to the “sham affidavit” doctrine by name, it utilized its logic and cited precedent applying it in disregarding Baer’s certification.

The “sham affidavit” doctrine has its roots in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 577-78 (2d Cir.1969). There the court, noting that the plaintiff was unable to justify an inconsistency between his deposition testimony and a later affidavit, disregarded the affidavit and determined that summary judgment should be granted against the plaintiff, explaining:

If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.

Id. at 578.

While many state and federal jurisdictions have incorporated the logic of Perma in assessing subsequently filed conflicting affidavits following a deposition, its application has not been applied without regard for the surrounding circumstances. 11 Janies Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.14[l][f| at 56-179 (3d ed. 1997) (“If a party’s deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless a legitimate reason can be given for discrepancies.”). Thus, it is clear that merely because there is a discrepancy between deposition testimony and the deponent’s later affidavit a district court is not required in all cases to disregard the affidavit. Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 894 (5th Cir.1980); see Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1090 (7th Cir.1977) (summary judgment was improper even though party’s testimony was “not a paradigm of cogency or persuasiveness,” inasmuch it was not a “transparent sham”).

In Kennett-Murray, 622 F.2d 887, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to apply Perma and the “sham affidavit” doctrine in an action in which an employer sought recovery on a promissory note and employment contract from a former employee. Id. at 889. The central issue in dispute concerned “whether a genuine issue exist[ed] as to [a] question of fraud.” Id. at 893. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment primarily relying on the defendant’s deposition in which he testified that the plaintiffs vice president had not made any representations about the note or the employment contract. Id. at 892. The court, because of inconsistencies with the earlier testimony, disregarded a subsequently filed affidavit supporting the defendant’s allegations of fraud, which if, considered, would have raised a material issue of fact. Id.

The court of appeals recognized that a court “cannot disregard a party’s affidavit *625merely because it conflicts to some degree with an earlier deposition” and that “a genuine issue can exist by virtue of a party’s affidavit even if it conflicts with earlier testimony of the party’s deposition.” Id. at 893. In reversing the summary judgment order, it held that the subsequent affidavit was in fact not a “sham,” as the defendant’s affidavit did not claim to raise a new or distinct matter, but rather explained certain aspects of his deposition testimony that caused confusion. Id. at 894. The court additionally relied on the fact that the affidavit could not be said to constitute a reformulation of the defendant’s general defense nor was it at odds with the general theory he put forth in the deposition. Id. at 894-95.

In Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.1988), the plaintiff was the mother of a child born with birth defects who made eight sworn factual statements tending to negate the defendant drug manufacturer’s liability. Later, facing an almost certain loss on summary judgment, she submitted a flatly contradictory affidavit which did not contain an explanation for her change in position. We adopted the logic of Perma, and held that the district court properly could ignore the later affidavit. We, however, did recognize that “there are situations in which sworn testimony can quite properly be corrected by a subsequent affidavit ... [and][w]here the witness was confused at the earlier deposition or for some other reason misspoke, the subsequent correcting or clarifying affidavit may be sufficient to create a material dispute of fact.” Id. at 705.

Baer argues that his deposition statement was “clearly, and understandably, mistaken,” reasoning that “he was thinking in terms of the overwhelming majority of his services.” Appellant’s br. at 62. The district court refused to accept Baer’s “mistake” argument, relying on the fact that the matter that was of critical importance to his claim and the subject of repeated questioning. Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *9.

If Baer had advanced only the argument that he had made a mistake, exclusion of the later certification might have been appropriate. The district court, however, overlooked the importance of the evidence existing in the record, i.e., the February 10, 1997 letter that buttressed Baer’s subsequent certification. We therefore must address the question of whether corroborating evidence as to the substance of a later certification ameliorates the concerns that gave rise to the “sham affidavit” doctrine, thereby allowing a subsequent competing affidavit to create a dispute as to a genuine issue of a material fact.

When there is independent evidence in the record to bolster an' otherwise questionable affidavit, courts generally have refused to disregard the affidavit. See Bushell v. Wackenhut Int’l, Inc., 731 F.Supp. 1574, 1578 (S.D.Fla.1990) (third party’s deposition testimony can lend credence to subsequent affidavit). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held the introduction of evidence can help rebut a charge of a “sham” affidavit. Thus, in Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir.2000), the same court that had decided Perma recognized that “a party’s deposition testimony as to a given fact does not foreclose a trial or an eviden-tiary hearing where that testimony is contradicted by evidence other than the deponent’s subsequent affidavit, for when such other evidence is available, the concern that the proffered issue of fact is a mere ‘sham’ is alleviated.” The court held that the district court properly allowed a party to introduce documentary evidence to support his residency claims contrary to his deposition. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Delaney v. Deere & Co., 219 F.3d 1195, *6261196 n. 1 (10th Cir.2000), in which it stated that, “[w]hile a party may not defeat summary judgment by contradicting deposition testimony in a subsequent affidavit, new evidence may furnish a good faith basis for the inconsistency.”

Baer’s ability to point to evidence in the record that corroborates his later affidavit alleviates the concern that he merely filed an erroneous certification out of desperation to avoid summary judgment. Moreover, Chase does not deny receiving the letter and his personal assistant told Baer that Chase, in fact, had received the letter. And finally, Chase himself has provided the letter in discovery. Given this evidence which corroborates the certification, the concern that Baer’s claim that he performed services as late as February 10,1997, is either desperate or erroneous is eliminated, and therefore the court should have analyzed the letter and the circumstances surrounding it and Baer’s certification when ruling on the summary judgment motion on the statute of limitations issue.5 The district court therefore erred, at least procedurally, in granting Chase’s summary judgment motion based on the statute of limitations with respect to Baer’s quantum meruit claim. We therefore will reverse the summary judgment on this point and will remand the question of whether Baer presented a timely and otherwise valid quasi-contract claim to the district court for further consideration.6

*627C. Baer’s Misappropriation Claim

Baer next raises the issue of whether the district court erred in holding that the fact that the ideas he advanced existed in the public domain precluded those ideas, alone or in combination, from" possessing the requisite novelty so that their use cannot be the basis for a claim for common law ■ idea misappropriation. The cause of action of “misappropriation” is based on tort principles rather than on contract law. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40, cmt. a. The premise behind the tort is that when a party misappropriates another’s confidential idea or some other type of property, the law imposes an obligation on that party to pay the other restitution for its improper use. Id.; Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 808.

There is no dispute between the parties that this ease is governed by the leading precedent on the misappropriation of ideas in New Jersey, Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J.Super. 311, 258 A.2d 153, 156-57 (1969), aff'd, 114 N.J.Super. 221, 275 A.2d 759 (1971); see also Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 509, 513. n. 6 (D.N.J.2004) (citing Flemming test in misappropriation claim); Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 347 N.J.Super. 71, 788 A.2d 906, 914 (2002) (same); The court in Flemming articulated the test for determining whether the law will imply an obligation to pay for a confidentially submitted idea: When “a person communicates a novel idea to another with the intention that the latter may use the idea and compensate him for such use, the other party is liable for such use and must pay compensation if ... (1) the idea was novel; (2) it was made in confidence [to the defendant]; and (3) it was adopted and made use of [by the defendant in connection with his own activities].” Flemming, 258 A.2d at 156-57 (citing Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 462 (7th Cir.1952); De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F.Supp. 977 (S.D.N.Y.1944), aff'd, 159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.1947); Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines. Inc., 333 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.1964)).

Thus, the misappropriation issue on appeal is whether the ideas Baer provided were novel. While novelty is clearly a prerequisite to establish a misappropriation claim in New Jersey, Johnson, 788 A.2d at 914-15, the courts have not articulated clearly the test for determining whether an idea is sufficiently novel to warrant protection. See Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 808. Two leading cases dealing with the parameters of New Jersey misappropriation . law arose in federal courts deciding state law issues, Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d 802, and Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 2000 WL 223833 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.25, 2000), aff'd, 234 F.3d 1261 (2d Cir.2000) (table).

As the district court noted in Duffy, it is unclear whether the issue of novelty is “an issue of fact, for the fact finder, a question of law, for the jury or a mixed question of fact and law.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 808. The Flemming opinion followed a bench trial so such a determination was unnecessary. Flemming, 258 A.2d at 154. The district court in Bergin, though deciding the case-under New Jersey law, looked to New York law and held that “[w]hether an idea is novel is an issue of law which may be decided on a motion for summary judgment.” Bergin, 2000 WL 223833, at *9. The Duffy court held that the “New *628Jersey Supreme Court would determine that although some of the factors relevant to a determination of novelty may be factual, the ultimate determination of whether an idea is novel is a question of law for the court.” 123 F.Supp.2d at 809. Duffy relied on the similarities to a court’s role with respect to “obviousness” in patent cases, citing Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 716 (Fed.Cir.1991), and cases holding that the “novelty” determination is a matter of law. See Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 809 (citing extensive list of cases that hold that the determination of novelty is a question of law). Additionally, Duffy indicated that “even courts holding that the question is a factual one have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on the basis of lack of novelty when the underlying facts do not support a finding of novelty.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 163 Ga.App. 721, 296 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1982)). We believe that the district court here was correct in its conclusion as to how the New Jersey Supreme Court would decide this issue and it is therefore necessary to determine the “novelty” of Baer’s contribution.

The predicates on which a property right in an idea may be based are novelty and originality. See Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 286 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1972). A misappropriation claim, unlike a contract-based claim, only can arise from the taking of an idea that is original or novel because the law of property does not protect against the appropriation of that which is free and available to all. Nadel, 208 F.3d at 378. Therefore, anyone may use ideas in the public domain freely with impunity. See Ed Graham Prods., Inc. v. National Broad, Co., 75 Misc.2d 334, 347 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1973).

The district court here acknowledged Duffy’s observation that the law of “unfair competition ‘is an amorphous area of jurisprudence’ and ‘knows of no clear boundaries.’” Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *12 (citing Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 815). For example, the court in D%ffy noted that the Flemming court, “did not discuss a specific test that should be used to determine whether an idea is novel.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 809.

The present facts, however, do not compel us to set forth a broad description of what is novel in our disposition of Baer’s misappropriation claim. Though Flem-ming did not articulate a test for affirmatively determining when an idea is “novel,” the court did cite examples of ideas that would not be novel. The Flemming court recognized that even an otherwise novel idea would lose its novelty if it was “in the domain of public knowledge” before the defendant used it. Flemming, 258 A.2d at 157-58. The Duffy court expanded on this conclusion by noting “[a]n idea will not satisfy [the novelty requirement] if it is not significantly different from, or is an obvious adaptation or combination of ideas in the public domain.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 810. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying New Jersey law, also noted in Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 234 F.3d 1261 (2d Cir.2000) (table), available at 2000 WL 1678777, at *3, that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate where the defendant knew of the idea or the idea was ‘a matter[ ] in the domain of public knowledge before the plaintiff disclosed it to the defendant.’ ” Other jurisdictions have taken like positions. See Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 65 Misc.2d 412, 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1970) (“The idea need not reflect the ‘flash of genius,’ but it must shown genuine novelty and invention, and not a merely clever or useful adaptation of existing knowledge.”); Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 161 Misc.2d 627, 614 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882-84 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1994) (declining to attribute novelty where ideas *629were variations and adaptations of existing knowledge in the public domain). We conclude, similarly, that the- New Jersey Supreme Court, if addressed with the issue, would hold that ideas lose their novelty if they are in the domain of public knowledge before use. Such ideas cannot be misappropriated.

Baer admits that all of the locations he identified to Chase exist in the public domain.7 In addition, many of the stories and potential plot lines that Baer “provided” Chase existed in the public record.8 Moreover, as the district court noted, the additional ideas and stories that Baer claims were misappropriated were not his stories; “associates” of Baer actually told them to Chase:

In particular, the Plaintiff seeks compensation for Spirito’s story of rivalry with his uncles in the aftermath of his father’s death, that Koczur’s account to Chase that many waste management companies were alleged to be involved with organized crime, Spirito’s story of his experiences with a ‘loan shark’ and Jones’s description of the way in which organized crime uses loan shark debts to take over a business, Jones’s description of the operation of ‘cutout’ schemes used by organized crime, Koczur’s information regarding the involvement of the DeCavalcante crime family in Saint Anthony’s Church in Elizabeth, and a story told to Chase by Jones about Morris Levy’s horse farm.

Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *13 (emphasis, added). It is clear that virtually all of Baer’s alleged contributions either existed in the public domain or concerned stories and facts he did not provide.

■ Baer argues that he did not simply introduce these third-parties to Chase, but rather “the majority of ideas were suggested by Plaintiff prior to the meeting.” Appellant’s br. at 67. Baer alleges that his aggregating and combining of ideas was essential in “put[ting] it all together” and “creat[ing] the ‘template’ for The Sopranos.” Appellant’s br. at 66. Baer alleges that it is “their combination that gives these ideas originality.” Id. at 68. In other words, Baer’s contribution in essence was “choosing” which ideas, existing in the public domain, he would present to Chase.

Aggregation of ideas and expression do not by themselves create novelty. In Duffy the plaintiff argued that “its idea was novel because [it] spent many months deciding the organization and layout of the data so its products could be readily understood by nonprofessional investors.... [It] stated that it was the format that made Duffy’s reports unique and proprietary to [it].” 123 F.Supp.2d at 812. The plaintiff in Duffy took data, fields and information in the public domain and organized them to create a “mutual fund report card.” Id. The court held that, though the organization and layout of the data may involve some originality, this articulation of originality went more to an idea’s expression than to the idea itself. Id. It is well-established that an idea’s expression is not entitled to protection under a state’s misappropriation law. Id. As the court in Duffy recognized, “To the extent a state’s *630law purports to impose liability for the misappropriation of an idea’s expression, such a law would be preempted by federal copyright law.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 812 n. 5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106, Wilson v. Mr. Tee’s, 855 F.Supp. 679, 684-85 (D.N.J.1994); Rowe v. Golden W. Television Prods., 184 N.J.Super. 264, 445 A.2d 1165 (1982)). Despite Baer’s creativity in combining stories and facts existing in the public domain, New Jersey does not protect this mode of originality under its misappropriation law. Thus, the district court correctly granted Chase summary judgment on Baer’s misappropriation claim.

D. District Court’s Exclusion of Expert Report

The final issue raised on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding Baer’s expert report from consideration on issues of liability. Early in the litigation, the court bifurcated the case into liability and damage phases, with expert discovery not being contemplated or authorized by any scheduling order. Baer’s attorney later retained John Agoglia as an “expert witness” regarding “the damages aspect of case” to be used by Baer “should [Defendant] raise an issue regarding the calculation of damages at summary judgment.” App. at 902, 914.

Faced with the summary judgment motion, Baer attempted to include Agoglia’s report which stated “a contribution of such ideas and services [as those made by Baer] toward the creation of a television series such as The Sopranos ... would commonly be rewarded with fixed payments and/or production bonuses and or a sliding scale of profit participation and/or screen credits in recognition of such contributions, or any combination thereof.” App. at 27. The district court excluded Agoglia’s report based on the fact that he was not presented as a liability expert and that his report did not opine on liability. App. at 175.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by disregarding the report with respect to a summary judgment motion focusing solely on issues of liability. Agoglia was not presented as an expert on liability. We agree with the court’s assessment that, “I don’t see how somebody who was put forth under Rule 26 as a damages expert is going to be able to bootstrap liability issues into a summary judgment motion.” App. at 196. The damage expert’s testimony had no relevance to the questions of formation or enforceability of the purported contract. Chase named Agoglia to be an expert witness on damages; his opinions with respect to liability are simply beside the point.

Baer’s brief allocates little space in presenting an argument as to how the court erred in excluding the damages report from the liability phase of the trial. Bear clearly presented Agoglia as a damages expert to the district court and his adversary. The court did not err in refusing Baer’s attempts to “bootstrap” a damages witness who repeatedly agreed that he had no legal training to testify as an expert on liability.

IV. CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the district court erroneously disregarded Baer’s certification, which, if considered, might have precluded the grant of summary judgment on the quantum meruit claim on a statute of limitations basis, we will reverse the order of the district court entered February 20, 2004, and remand the case for further proceedings in the district court solely on that claim. Otherwise we will affirm the order of February 20, 2004. The parties will bear their own costs in this appeal.