10 Dogs 10 Dogs

10.1 United States v. Place 10.1 United States v. Place

UNITED STATES v. PLACE

No. 81-1617.

Argued March 2, 1983

Decided June 20, 1983

*697O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 710. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 720.

Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and John Fichter De Pue.

James D. Clark argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily *698detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. Given the enforcement problems associated with the detection of narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such a detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible investigative detention of the luggage.

pH

Respondent Raymond J. Place’s behavior aroused the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to New York’s La Guardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied with the request and consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage.

Prompted by Place’s parting remark that he had recognized that they were police, the agents inspected the address tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that neither address existed and that the telephone number Place had given the airline belonged to a third address on the same street. On the basis of their encounter with Place and this information, the Miami agents called Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New York to relay their information about Place.

Two DEA agents waited for Place at the arrival gate at La Guardia Airport in New York. There again, his behavior aroused the suspicion of the agents. After he had claimed his two bags and called a limousine, the agents decided to approach him. They identified themselves as federal narcotics agents, to which Place responded that he knew they were “cops” and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned. *699One of the agents informed Place that, based on their own observations and information obtained from the Miami authorities, they believed that he might be carrying narcotics. After identifying the bags as belonging to him, Place stated that a number of police at the Miami Airport had surrounded him and searched his baggage. The agents responded that their information was to the contrary. The agents requested and received identification from Place — a New Jersey driver’s license, on which the agents later ran a computer check that disclosed no offenses, and his airline ticket receipt. When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and that Place was free to accompany them. Place declined, but obtained from one of the agents telephone numbers at which the agents could be reached.

The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, where they subjected the bags to a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller of the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. Approximately 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure of respondent’s luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when they secured a search warrant from a Magistrate for the smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.

Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). In the District Court, Place moved to suppress the contents of the luggage seized from him at La Guardia Airport, claiming that the warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his Fourth Amendment rights.1 The District Court denied the motion. *700Applying the standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), to the detention of personal property, it concluded that detention of the bags could be justified if based on reasonable suspicion to believe that the bags contained narcotics. Finding reasonable suspicion, the District Court held that Place’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by seizure of the bags by the DEA agents. 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (EDNY 1980). Place pleaded guilty to the possession charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal of the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 660 F. 2d 44 (1981). The majority assumed both that Terry principles could be applied to justify a warrantless seizure of baggage on less than probable cause and that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop of Place. The majority concluded, however, that the prolonged seizure of Place’s baggage exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop and consequently amounted to a seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1104 (1982), and now affirm.

) — I h — I

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) Although in the context of personal property, and particularly containers, the Fourth Amendment challenge is *701typically to the subsequent search of the container rather than to its initial seizure by the authorities, our cases reveal some general principles regarding seizures. In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized.2 See, e. g., Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 (1927). Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971).3 For example, “objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant,” Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), because, under these circumstances, the risk of the item’s disappearance or use for its intended purpose before a *702warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in possession. See also G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 354 (1977).

In this case, the Government asks us to recognize the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on the basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of opening the luggage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities’ suspicion. Specifically, we are asked to apply the principles of Terry v. Ohio, supra, to permit such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime. In our view, such application is appropriate.

In Terry the Court first recognized “the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than probable cause.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 698 (1981). In approving the limited search for weapons, or “frisk,” of an individual the police reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous, the Court implicitly acknowledged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 392 U. S., at 22.4 That implicit proposition was embraced openly in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972), where the Court relied on Terry to hold that the police officer lawfully made a forcible stop of the suspect to investigate an informant’s tip that the suspect was carry*703ing narcotics and a concealed weapon. See also Michigan v. Summers, supra (limited detention of occupants while authorities search premises pursuant to valid search warrant); United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (stop near border of vehicle suspected of transporting illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (brief investigative stop near border for questioning about citizenship and immigration status).

The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of “the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 392 U. S., at 20. We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause.

We examine first the governmental interest offered as a justification for a brief seizure of luggage from the suspect’s custody for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation. The Government contends that, where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a traveler’s luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial. We agree. As observed in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 561 (1980) (opinion of Powell, J.), “[t]he public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit.”

Respondent suggests that, absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of *704probable cause. Our prior cases, however, do not support this proposition. In Terry, we described the governmental interests supporting the initial seizure of the person as “effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” 392 U. S., at 22. Similarly, in Michigan v. Summers we identified three law enforcement interests that justified limited detention of the occupants of the premises during execution of a valid search warrant: “preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,” “minimizing the risk of harm” both to the officers and the occupants, and “orderly completion of the search.” 452 U. S., at 702-703. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect”). The test is whether those interests are sufficiently “substantial,” 452 U. S., at 699, not whether they are independent of the interest in investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects. The context of a particular law enforcement practice, of course, may affect the determination whether a brief intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests on less than probable cause is essential to effective criminal investigation. Because of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police to make brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels.5

*705Against this strong governmental interest, we must weigh the nature and extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when the police briefly detain luggage for limited investigative purposes. On this point, respondent Place urges that the rationale for a Terry stop of the person is wholly inapplicable to investigative detentions of personalty. Specifically, the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised on the notion that a Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusive of a person’s liberty interests than a formal arrest. In the property context, however, Place urges, there are no degrees of intrusion. Once the owner’s property is seized, the dispossession is absolute.

We disagree. The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner.6 Moreover, the police may confine their investi*706gation to an on-the-spot inquiry — for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog7— or transport the property to another location. Given the fact that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime.

In sum, we conclude that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.

The purpose for which respondent’s luggage was seized, of course, was to arrange its exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Obviously, if this investigative procedure is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent’s luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test — no matter how brief — could not be justified on less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20; United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S., at 421; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 881-882; Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146.

The Fourth Amendment “protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations *707of privacy.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 7. We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 13. A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.

In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here — exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine — did not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

S HH H-Í

There is no doubt that the agents made a “seizure of Place’s luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when, following his refusal to consent to a search, the agent told Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge to secure issuance of a warrant. As we observed in Terry, “[t]he manner in which the seizure . . . [was] con*708ducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it was] warranted at all.” 392 U. S., at 28. We therefore examine whether the agents’ conduct in this case was such as to place the seizure within the general rule requiring probable cause for a seizure or within Terry’s exception to that rule.

At the outset, we must reject the Government’s suggestion that the point at which probable cause for seizure of luggage from the person’s presence becomes necessary is more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person himself. The premise of the Government’s argument is that seizures of property are generally less intrusive than seizures of the person. While true in some circumstances, that premise is faulty on the facts we address in this case. The precise type of detention we confront here is seizure of personal luggage from the immediate possession of the suspect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage within the traveler’s immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect’s possessory interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary. The person whose luggage is detained is technically still free to continue his travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the luggage. Moreover, he is not subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement or to the public indignity of being personally detained. Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return.8 Therefore, when the police seize luggage from the *709suspect’s custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person’s luggage on less than probable cause. Under this standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop.

The length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause. Although we have recognized the reasonableness of seizures longer than the momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation. We note that here the New York agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival at La Guardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests.9 Thus, although we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop,10 we have never *710approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979).

Although the 90-minute detention of respondent’s luggage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of respondent’s luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.

>

We conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of respondent’s luggage was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of his luggage was inadmissible, and Place’s conviction must be reversed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

concurring in the result.

In this case, the Court of Appeals assumed both that the officers had the “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify an “investigative” stop of respondent under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, and that the principles of Terry apply to seizures of property. See 660 F. 2d 44, 50 (CA2 1981); ante, at 700. The court held simply that “the prolonged seizure of [respondent’s] baggage went far beyond a mere investigative stop and amounted to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” 660 F. 2d, at 50. See also id., *711at 52, 53. I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on this ground.

Instead of simply affirming on this ground and putting an end to the matter, the Court decides to reach, and purportedly to resolve, the constitutionality of the seizure of respondent’s luggage on less than probable cause and the exposure of that luggage to a narcotics detection dog. See ante, at 706-707. Apparently, the Court finds itself unable to “resist the pull to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis than the record before [it] imperatively requires.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 581 (1969). Because the Court reaches issues unnecessary to its judgment and because I cannot subscribe to the Court’s analysis of those issues, I concur only in the result.

I — l

I have had occasion twice m recent months to discuss the limited scope of the exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement created by Terry and its progeny. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 509 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 362 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). Unfortunately, the unwarranted expansion of that exception which the Court endorses today forces me to elaborate on my previously expressed views.

In Terry the Court expressly declined to address “the constitutional propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation.” 392 U. S., at 19, n. 16.1 The Court was con*712fronted with “the quite narrow question” of “whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.” Id., at 15. In addressing this question, the Court noted that it was dealing “with an entire rubric of police conduct — necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat— which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.” Id., at 20. As a result, the conduct involved in the case had to be “tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The Court’s inquiry into the “reasonableness” of the conduct at issue was based on a “ ‘balancing [of] the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’” Id., at 21, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 537 (1967). The Court concluded that the officer’s conduct was reasonable and stated its holding as follows:

“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of *713the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” 392 U. S., at 30.

In Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), the Court relied on Terry to endorse “brief” investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion. 407 U. S., at 145-146. In this regard, the Court stated that “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Id., at 146. The weapons search upheld in Adams was very limited and was based on Terry’s safety rationale. 407 U. S., at 146. The Court stated that the purpose of a “limited” weapons search “is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. ...” Ibid.

In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), the Court relied on Terry and Adams in holding that “when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” 422 U. S., at 881.2 The Court based this relaxation of the traditional probable-cause requirement on the importance of the governmental interest in stemming the flow of illegal aliens, on the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and on the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border. Ibid. The Court noted the limited holdings of Terry and Adams and while authorizing the police to “question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and . . . ask them to explain suspicious circumstances,” the Court expressly stated that “any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.” 422 U. S., at 881-882. See also *714 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 93 (1979) (“The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an exception whose ‘narrow scope’ this Court ‘has been careful to maintain’” (footnote omitted)); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 209-212 (1979) (discussing the narrow scope of Terry and its progeny).3

It is clear that Terry, and the cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely limited searches based on reasonable suspicion. They do not provide the police with a commission to employ whatever investigative techniques they deem appropriate. As I stated in Florida v. Royer, “[t]he scope of a Terry-type ‘investigative’ stop and any attendant search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception would ‘swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures [and searches] are “reasonable” only if based on probable cause.’” 460 U. S., at 510 (concurring in result), quoting Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 213.

II

In some respects the Court’s opinion in this case can be seen as the logical successor of the plurality opinion in Florida v. Royer, supra. The plurality opinion in Royer contained considerable language which was unnecessary to the judgment, id., at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in result), regarding the permissible scope of Terry investigative stops. See 460 U. S., at 501-507, and n. 10. Even assuming, however, that the Court finds some support in Royer for its discussion of the scope of Terry stops, the Court today goes *715well beyond Royer in endorsing the notion that the principles of Terry permit “warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on the basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of opening the luggage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities’ suspicion.” Ante, at 702. See also ante, at 706. In addition to being unnecessary to the Court’s judgment, see supra, at 711, this suggestion finds no support in Terry or its progeny and significantly dilutes the Fourth Amendment’s protections against government interference with personal property. In short, it represents a radical departure from settled Fourth Amendment principles.

As noted supra, at 711-712, Terry and the cases that followed it authorize a brief “investigative” stop of an individual based on reasonable suspicion and a limited search for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects that the individual is armed and presently dangerous. The purpose of this brief stop is “to determine [the individual’s] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146. Anything more than a brief stop “must be based on consent or probable cause.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. During the course of this stop, “the suspect must not be moved or asked to move more than a short distance; physical searches are permitted only to the extent necessary to protect the police officers involved during the encounter; and, most importantly, the suspect must be free to leave after a short time and to decline to answer the questions put to him.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring). It is true that Terry stops may involve seizures of personal effects incidental to the seizure of the person involved. Obviously, an officer cannot seize a person without also seizing the personal effects that the individual has in his possession at the time. But there is a difference between *716incidental seizures of personal effects and seizures of property independent of the seizure of the person.

The Fourth Amendment protects “effects” as well as people from unreasonable searches and seizures. In this regard, Justice Stevens pointed out in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), that “[t]he [Fourth] Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen — the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy.” Id., at 747 (opinion concurring in judgment). “A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter.” Ibid. Even if an item is not searched, therefore, its seizure implicates a protected Fourth Amendment interest. For this reason, seizures of property must be based on probable cause. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1, 3 (1980); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 351 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51-52 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 309-310 (1967). See also Texas v. Brown, supra, at 747-748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Neither Terry nor its progeny changed this rule.

In this case, the officers’ seizure of respondent and their later independent seizure of his luggage implicated separate Fourth Amendment interests. First, respondent had a protected interest in maintaining his personal security and privacy. Terry allows this interest to be overcome, and authorizes a limited intrusion, if the officers have reason to suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Second, respondent had a protected interest in retaining possession of his personal effects. While Terry may authorize seizures of personal effects incident to a lawful seizure of the person, nothing in the Terry line of cases authorizes the police to seize personal property, such as luggage, independent of the seizure of the person. Such seizures significantly expand the scope of a Terry stop and may not be effected on less than probable *717cause.4 Obviously, they also significantly expand the scope of the intrusion.

The officers did not develop probable cause to arrest respondent during their encounter with him. See 660 F. 2d, at 50. Therefore, they had to let him go. But despite the absence of probable cause to arrest respondent, the officers seized his luggage and deprived him of possession. Respondent, therefore, was subjected not only to an invasion of his personal security and privacy, but also to an independent dispossession of his personal effects based simply on reasonable suspicion. It is difficult to understand how this intrusion is not more severe than a brief stop for questioning or even a limited, on-the-spot patdown search for weapons.

In my view, as soon as the officers seized respondent’s luggage, independent of their seizure of him, they exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry stop and violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, the officers’ seizure of respondent’s luggage violated the established rule that seizures of personal effects must be based on probable cause. Their actions, therefore, should not be upheld.

The Court acknowledges that seizures of personal property must be based on probable cause. See ante, at 700-702. Despite this recognition, the Court employs a balancing test drawn from Terry to conclude that personal effects may be seized based on reasonable suspicion. See ante, at 703-706.5 *718In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), the Court stated that “[t]he narrow intrusions involved in [Terry and its progeny] were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the ‘long-prevailing standards’ of probable cause . . . only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.” Id., at 212. As Dunaway suggests, the use of a balancing test in this case is inappropriate. First, the intrusion involved in this case is no longer the “narrow” one contemplated by the Terry line of cases. See supra, at 717. In addition, the intrusion involved in this case involves not only the seizure of a person, but also the seizure of property. As noted, supra, at 711-712, Terry and its progeny did not address seizures of property. Those cases left unchanged the rule that seizures of property must be based on probable cause. See supra, at 716-717. The Terry balancing test should not be wrenched from its factual and conceptual moorings.

There are important reasons why balancing inquiries should not be conducted except in the most limited circumstances. Terry and the cases that followed it established “isolated exceptions to the general rule that the Fourth Amendment itself has already performed the constitutional balance between police objectives and personal privacy.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). “[T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers engaged in the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ ” Dunaway v. New York, *719 supra, at 213, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). The truth of this proposition is apparent when one considers that the Court today has employed a balancing test "to swallow the general rule that [seizures of property] are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause.” 442 U. S., at 213. Justice Blackmun’s concern over “an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable,” post, at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted), is certainly justified.

Ill

The Court also suggests today, in a discussion unnecessary to the judgment, that exposure of respondent’s luggage to a narcotics detection dog “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Ante, at 707. In the District Court, respondent did “not contest the validity of sniff searches per se. . . .” 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (EDNY 1980). The Court of Appeals did not reach or discuss the issue. It was not briefed or argued in this Court. In short, I agree with Justice Blackmun that the Court should not address the issue. See post, at 723-724 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).

I also agree with Justice Blackmun’s suggestion, ibid., that the issue is more complex than the Court’s discussion would lead one to believe. As Justice Stevens suggested in objecting to “unnecessarily broad dicta” in United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), the use of electronic detection techniques that enhance human perception implicates “especially sensitive concerns.” Id., at 288 (opinion concurring in judgment). Obviously, a narcotics detection dog is not an electronic detection device. Unlike the electronic “beeper” in Knotts, however, a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they could do using only their own senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s *720privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).

I have expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U. S. 1022, 1025-1026 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certio-rari). In Doe, I suggested that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a different case. Id., at 1026, n. 4. In any event, I would leave the determination of whether dog sniffs of luggage amount to searches, and the subsidiary question of what standards should govern such intrusions, to a future case providing an appropriate, and more informed, basis for deciding these questions.

IV

Justice Douglas was the only dissenter in Terry. He stated that “[tjhere have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand.” 392 U. S., at 39 (dissenting opinion). Today, the Court uses Terry as a justification for submitting to these pressures. Their strength is apparent, for even when the Court finds that an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated it cannot resist the temptation to weaken the protections the Amendment affords.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

concurring in the judgment.

For me, the Court’s analysis in Part III of its opinion is quite sufficient to support its judgment. I agree that on the facts of this case, the detention of Place’s luggage amounted to, and was functionally identical with, a seizure of his person. My concern with the Court’s opinion has to do (a) with its general discussion in Part II of seizures of luggage under the Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), exception to the war*721rant and probable-cause requirements, and (b) with the Court’s haste to resolve the dog-sniff issue.

I

In providing guidance to other courts, we often include in our opinions material that, technically, constitutes dictum. I cannot fault the Court’s desire to set guidelines for Terry seizures of luggage based on reasonable suspicion. I am concerned, however, with what appears to me to be an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable.1

I pointed out in dissent in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 513 (1983), that our prior cases suggest a two-step evaluation of seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment generally prohibits a seizure unless it is pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized. See ante, at 701; Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 514 (dissenting opinion). The Court correctly observes that a warrant may be dispensed with if the officer has probable cause and if some exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent cir*722cumstances, is applicable. Ante, at 701. While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable seizures, the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most seizures to the judgment of courts or government officers: the Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a seizure is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 744-745 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Terry v. Ohio, however, teaches that in some circumstances a limited seizure that is less restrictive than a formal arrest may constitutionally occur upon mere reasonable suspicion, if “supported by a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 514 (dissenting opinion). See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700 (1981). When this exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements is applicable, a reviewing court must balance the individual’s interest in privacy against the government’s law enforcement interest and determine whether the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Id., at 699-701. Only in this limited context is a court entitled to engage in any balancing of interests in determining the validity of a seizure.

Because I agree with the Court that there is a significant law enforcement interest in interdicting illegal drug traffic in the Nation’s airports, ante, at 704; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 513, 519 (dissenting opinion), a limited intrusion caused by a temporary seizure of luggage for investigative purposes could fall within the Terry exception. The critical threshold issue is the intrusiveness of the seizure.2 In this *723case, the seizure went well beyond a minimal intrusion and therefore cannot fall within the Terry exception.

HH l — H

The Court s resolution of the status of dog sniffs under the Fourth Amendment is troubling for a different reason. The District Court expressly observed that Place “does not contest the validity of sniff searches per se.” 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (EDNY 1980).3 While Place may have possessed such a claim, he chose not to raise it in that court. The issue also was not presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, contrary to the Court’s apparent intimation, ante, at 706, an answer to the question is not necessary to the decision. For the purposes of this case, the precise nature of the legitimate investigative activity is irrelevant. Regardless of the validity of a dog sniff under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure was too intrusive. The Court has no need to decide the issue here.

As a matter of prudence, decision of the issue is also unwise. While the Court has adopted one plausible analysis of the issue, there are others. For example, a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion. Neither party has had an opportunity to brief the issue, and the Court grasps for the appropriate analysis of the problem. Although it is not essential that the Court ever adopt the views of one of the parties, it should not decide an issue on which neither party has expressed any opinion at all. The Court is certainly in no position to consider all the ramifica*724tions of this important issue. Certiorari is currently pending in two cases that present the issue directly. United States v. Beale, No. 82-674; Waltzer v. United States, No. 82-5491. There is no reason to avoid a full airing of the issue in a proper case.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

10.2 ILLINOIS v. CABALLES 10.2 ILLINOIS v. CABALLES

ILLINOIS v. CABALLES

No. 03-923.

Argued November 10, 2004

Decided January 24, 2005

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 410. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 417. Rehnquist, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Mary Fleming, Assistant Attorneys General.

Assistant Attorney General Wray argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, James A. Feldman, and John A. Drennan.

*406 Ralph E. Meczyk argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lawrence H. Hyman *

Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived, respondent’s ear was on the shoulder of the road and respondent was in Gillette’s vehicle. While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent’s car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes.

*407Respondent was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and a $256,136 fine. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence and to quash his arrest. He held that the officers had not unnecessarily prolonged the stop and that the dog alert was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to conduct the search. Although the Appellate Court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because the canine sniff was performed without any “‘specific and articulable facts’ ” to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog “unjustifiably enlarged] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.” 207 Ill. 2d 504, 510, 802 N. E. 2d 202, 205 (2003).

The question on which we granted certiorari, 541 U. S. 972 (2004), is narrow: “Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.” Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we proceed on the assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no information about respondent except that he had been stopped for speeding; accordingly, we have omitted any reference to facts about respondent that might have triggered a modicum of suspicion.

Here, the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the highway was based on probable cause and was coneededly lawful. It is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 124 (1984). A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery *408of contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N. E. 2d 275 (2002). We may assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while; respondent was being unlawfully detained.

In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette’s conversations with respondent and the precise timing of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to determine whether he had improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur. We have not recounted those details because we accept the state court’s conclusion that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.

Despite this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the initially lawful traffic stop became an unlawful seizure solely as a result of the canine sniff that occurred outside respondent’s stopped car. That is, the court characterized the dog sniff as the cause rather than the consequence of a constitutional violation. In its view, the use of the dog converted the citizen-police encounter from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation, and because the shift in purpose was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed narcotics, it was unlawful. In our view, conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Our cases hold that it did not.

Official conduct that does not “compromise any legitimate interest in privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, 466 U. S., at 123. We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed “legitimate,” and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” Ibid. This is because the expecta*409tion “that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities” is not the same as an interest in “privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” Id., at 122 (punctuation omitted). In United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), we treated a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as “sui generis” because it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” Id., at 707; see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 40 (2000). Respondent likewise concedes that “drug sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contraband.” Brief for Respondent 17. Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the existence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no evidence or findings that support his argument. Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk.

Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog — one that “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,” Place, 462 U. S., at 707 — during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.

This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity — in that case, intimate details in a *410home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

. It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case.

Justice Souter,

dissenting.

I would hold that using the dog for the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the car’s trunk was a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on any other ground. I would accordingly affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and I respectfully dissent.

In United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), we categorized the sniff of the narcotics-seeking dog as “sui generis" under the Fourth Amendment and held it was not a search. Id., at 707. The classification rests not only upon the limited nature of the intrusion, but on a further premise that experience has shown to be untenable, the assumption that trained sniffing dogs do not err. What we have learned about the fallibility of dogs in the years since Place was decided would itself be reason to call for reconsidering Place’s decision against treating the intentional use of a trained dog as a search. The portent of this very case, however, adds insist*411ence to the call, for an uncritical adherence to Place would render the Fourth. Amendment indifferent to suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment review entirely unless it is treated as a search. We should not wait for these developments to occur before rethinking Place’s analysis, which invites such untoward consequences.1

At the heart both of Place and the Court’s opinion today is the proposition that sniffs by a trained dog are sui generis because a reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to nothing but the presence of contraband.2 See ibid. (“[T]he sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”); ante, at 409 (assuming that “a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog” will only reveal “ ‘the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item’ ” (quoting Place, supra, at 707)). Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff can only reveal the presence of items devoid of any legal use, the sniff “does not implicate legitimate privacy interests” and is not to be treated as a search. Ante, at 409.

The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether *412owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine. See, e. g., United States v. Kennedy, 131 F. 3d 1371, 1378 (CA10 1997) (describing a dog that had a 71% accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F. 3d 1373, 1378, n. 3 (CA10 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously alerted 4 times out of 19 while working for the postal service and 8% of the time over its entire career); United States v. Limares, 269 F. 3d 794, 797 (CA7 2001) (accepting as reliable a dog that gave false positives between 7% and 38% of the time); Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 159, 60 S. W. 3d 464, 476 (2001) (speaking of a dog that made between 10 and 50 errors); United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F. 3d 499, 511 (CA11 2003) (noting that because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert "is of little value”), vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F. 3d 1225 (CA11 2004); United States v. Carr, 25 F. 3d 1194, 1214-1217 (CA3 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial portion of United States currency ... is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert to their presence”). Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are' “generally reliable” shows that dogs in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depending on the length of the search. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13; Federal Aviation Admin., K. Garner et al., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A Baseline Study 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared by Auburn U. Inst, for Biological Detection Systems). In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.

Once the dog’s fallibility is recognized, however, that ends the justification claimed in Place for treating the sniff as sui generis under the Fourth Amendment: the sniff alert does not necessarily signal hidden contraband, and opening the container or enclosed space whose emanations the dog has *413sensed will not necessarily reveal contraband or any other evidence of crime. This is not, of course, to deny that a dog’s reaction may provide reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, to search the container or enclosure; the Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success to justify a search for evidence or contraband. The point is simply that the sniff and alert cannot claim the certainty thát Place assumed, both in treating the deliberate use of sniffing dogs as sui generis and then taking that characterization as a reason to say they are not searches subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. And when that aura of uniqueness disappears, there is no basis in Place’s reasoning, and no good reason otherwise, to ignore the actual function that dog sniffs perform. They are conducted to obtain information about the contents of private spaces beyond anything that human senses could perceive, even when conventionally enhanced. The information is not provided by independent third parties beyond the reach of constitutional limitations, but gathered by the government’s own officers in order to justify searches of the traditional sort, which may or may not reveal evidence of crime but will disclose anything meant to be kept private in the area searched. Thus in practice the government’s use of a trained narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts about private enclosures, to be used to justify á further and complete search of the enclosed area. And given the fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose “intimate details” without revealing contraband, just as a thermal-imaging device might do, as described in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001).3

*414It makes sense, then, to treat a sniff as the search that it amounts to in practice, and to rely on the body of our Fourth Amendment cases, including Kyllo, in deciding whether such a search is reasonable. As a general proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object of enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 41-42 (2000). Since the police claim to have had no particular suspicion that Caballes was violating any drug law,4 this sniff search must stand or fall on its being ancillary to the traffic stop that led up to it. It is true that the police had probable cause to stop the car for an offense committed in the officer’s presence, which Caballes concedes could have justified his arrest. See Brief for Respondent 31. There is no occasion to consider authority incident to arrest, however, see Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113 (1998), for the police did nothing more than detain Caballes long enough to check his record and write a ticket. As a consequence, the reasonableness of the search must be assessed in relation to the actual delay the police chose to impose, and as Justice Ginsburg points out in her opinion, post, at 419-420, the Fourth Amendment consequences of stopping for a traffic citation are settled law.

*415In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439-440 (1984), followed in Knowles, supra, at 117, we held that the analogue of the common traffic stop was the limited detention for investigation authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). While Terry authorized a restricted incidental search for weapons when reasonable suspicion warrants such a safety measure, id., at 25-26, the Court took care to keep a Terry stop from automatically becoming a foot in the door for all investigatory purposes; the permissible intrusion was bounded by the justification for the detention, id., at 29-30.5 Although facts disclosed by enquiry within this limit might give grounds to go further, the government could not otherwise take advantage of a suspect’s immobility to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention. That has to be the rule unless Terry is going to become an open sesame for general searches, and that rule requires holding that the police do not have reasonable grounds to conduct sniff searches for drugs simply because they have stopped someone to receive a ticket for a highway offense. Since the police had no indication of illegal activity beyond the speed of the car in this case, the sniff search should be held unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and its fruits should be suppressed.

Nothing in the case relied upon by the Court, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984), unsettled the limit of reasonable enquiry adopted in Terry. In Jacobsen, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment search occurred when federal agents analyzed powder they had already lawfully obtained. The Court noted that because the test could only reveal whether the powder was cocaine, the owner had no legitimate privacy interest at stake. 466 U. S., at 123. *416As already explained, however, the use of a sniffing dog in cases like this is significantly different and properly treated as a search that does indeed implicate Fourth Amendment protection.

In JacobSen, once the powder was analyzed, that was effectively the end of the matter: either the powder was cocaine, a fact the owner had no legitimate interest in concealing, or it was not cocaine, in which case the test revealed nothing about the powder or anything else that was not already legitimately obvious to the police. But in the case of the dog sniff, the dog does not smell the disclosed contraband; it smells a closed container. An affirmative reaction therefore does not identify a substance the police already legitimately possess, but informs the police instead merely of a reasonable chance of finding contraband they have yet to put their hands on. The police will then open the container and discover whatever lies within, be it marijuana or the owner’s private papers. Thus, while Jacobsen could rely on the assumption that the enquiry in question would either show with certainty that a known substance was contraband or would reveal nothing more, both the certainty and the limit on disclosure that may follow are missing when the dog sniffs the car.6

*417The Court today does not go so far as to say explicitly that sniff searches by dogs trained to sense contraband always get a free pass under the Fourth Amendment, since it reserves judgment on the constitutional significance of sniffs assumed to be more intrusive than a dog’s walk around a stopped car, ante, at 409. For this reason, I do not take the Court’s reliance on Jacobsen as actually signaling recognition of a broad authority to conduct suspicionless sniffs for drugs in any parked car, about which Justice Ginsburg is rightly concerned, post, at 422, or on the person 6f any pedestrian minding his own business on a sidewalk. But the Court’s stated reasoning provides no apparent stopping point short of such excesses. For the sake of providing a workable framework to analyze cases on facts like these, which are certain to come along, I would treat the dog sniff as the familiar search it is in fact, subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.7

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter joins,

dissenting.

Illinois State Police Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped Roy Caballes for driving 71 miles per hour in a zone with a posted *418speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Trooper Craig Graham of the Drug Interdiction Team heard on the radio that Trooper Gillette was making a traffic stop. Although Gillette requested no aid, Graham decided to come to the scene to conduct a dog sniff. Gillette informed Caballes that he was speeding and asked for the usual documents — driver’s license, car registration, and proof of insurance. Caballes promptly provided the requested documents but refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. After calling his dispatcher to check on the validity of Caballes’ license and for outstanding warrants, Gillette returned to his vehicle to write Caballes a warning ticket. Interrupted by a radio call on an unrelated matter, Gillette was still writing the ticket when Trooper Graham arrived with his drug-detection dog. Graham walked the dog around the car, the dog alerted at Caballes’ trunk, and, after opening the trunk, the troopers found marijuana. 207 Ill. 2d 504, 506-507, 802 N. E. 2d 202, 203 (2003).

The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Id., at 506, 802 N. E. 2d, at 202. Adhering to its decision in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N. E. 2d 275 (2002), the court employed a two-part test taken from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), to determine the overall reasonableness of the stop. 207 Ill. 2d, at 508, 802 N. E. 2d, at 204. The court asked first “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Ibid. (quoting People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-519, 713 N. E. 2d 556, 565 (1999) (in turn quoting Terry, 392 U. S., at 19-20)). “[I]t is undisputed,” the court observed, “that the traffic stop was properly initiated”; thus, the dispositive inquiry trained on the “second part of the Terry test,” in which “[t]he State bears the burden of establishing that the conduct remained within the scope of the stop.” 207 Ill. 2d, at 509, 802 N. E. 2d, at 204.

*419The court concluded that the State failed to offer sufficient justification for the canine sniff: “The police did not detect the odor of marijuana in the car or note any other evidence suggesting the presence of illegal drugs.” Ibid. Lacking “specific and articulable facts” supporting the canine sniff, ibid, (quoting Cox, 202 Ill. 2d, at 470-471, 782 N. E. 2d, at 281), the court ruled, “the police impermissibly broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this case into a drug investigation.” 207 Ill. 2d, at 509, 802 N. E. 2d, at 204.1 I would affirm the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment and hold that the drug sniff violated the Fourth Amendment.

In Terry v. Ohio, the Court upheld the stop and subsequent frisk of an individual based on an officer’s observation of suspicious behavior and his reasonable belief that the suspect was armed. See 392 U. S., at 27-28. In a Terry-type investigatory stop, “the officer’s action [must be] justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id., at 20. In applying Terry, the Court has several times indicated that the limitation on “scope” is not confined to the duration of the seizure; it also encompasses the manner in which the seizure is conducted. See, e. g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 188 (2004) (an officer’s request that an individual identify himself “has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 235 (1985) (examining, under Terry, *420both “the length and intrusiveness of the stop and detention”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop [and] the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion ....”).

“A routine traffic stop,” the Court has observed, “is a relatively brief encounter and ‘is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop .. . than to a formal arrest.’ ” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984)); see also ante, at 415 (Souter, J., dissenting) (The government may not “take advantage of a suspect’s immobility to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention.”).2 I would apply Terry’s reasonable-relation test, as the Illinois Supreme Court did, to determine whether the canine sniff impermissibly expanded the scope of the initially valid seizure of Caballes.

It is hardly dispositive that the dog sniff in this case may not have lengthened the duration of the stop. Cf. ante, at 407 (“A seizure . . . can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the initial] mission.”). Terry, it merits repetition, instructs that any investigation must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 392 U. S., at 20 (emphasis added). The unwar*421ranted and nonconsensual expansion of the seizure here from a routine traffic stop to a drug investigation broadened the scope of the investigation in a manner that, in my judgment, runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.3

The Court rejects the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment and, implicitly, the application of Terry to a traffic stop converted, by calling in a dog, to a drug search. The Court so rules, holding that a dog sniff does not render a seizure that is reasonable in time unreasonable in scope. Ante, at 408. Dog sniffs that detect only the possession of contraband may be employed without offense to the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasons, because they reveal no lawful activity and hence disturb no legitimate expectation of privacy. Ante, at 408-409.

In my view, the Court diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s force by abandoning the second Terry inquiry (was the police action “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [justifiying] the [initial] interference”). 392 U. S., at 20. A drug-detection dog is an intimidating animal. Cf. United States v. Williams, 356 F. 3d 1268, 1276 (CA10 2004) (McKay, J., dissenting) (“drug dogs are not lap dogs”). Injecting such an animal into a routine traffic stop changes the character of the encounter between the police and the motorist. The stop becomes broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some cases) longer. Caballes — who, as far as Troopers Gillette and Graham knew, was guilty solely of driving six miles per hour over the speed limit — was exposed to the embarrassment and intimidation of being investigated, on a public thoroughfare, for drugs. Even if the drug sniff is not characterized as a Fourth Amendment “search,” cf. Indian *422 apolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707 (1983), the sniff surely broadened the scope of the traffic-violation-related seizure.

The Court has never removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend the guilty. See, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 717 (1984) (Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to police monitoring of a beeper in a house even if “the facts [justify] believing that a crime is being or will be committed and that monitoring the beeper wherever it goes is likely to produce evidence of criminal activity.”); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.”). Under today’s decision, every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment of the law-abiding population.

The Illinois Supreme Court, it seems to me, correctly apprehended the danger in allowing the police to search for contraband despite the absence of cause to suspect its presence. Today’s decision, in contrast, clears the way for suspi-cionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. Compare, e. g., United States v. Ludwig, 10 F. 3d 1523, 1526-1527 (CA10 1993) (upholding a search based on a canine drug sniff of a parked car in a motel parking lot conducted without particular suspicion), with United States v. Quinn, 815 F. 2d 153, 159 (CA1 1987) (officers must have reasonable suspicion that a car contains narcotics at the moment a dog sniff is performed), and Place, 462 U. S., at 706-707 (Fourth Amendment not violated by a dog sniff of a piece of luggage that was seized, pre-sniff, based on suspicion of drugs). Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn green.

*423Today’s decision also undermines this Court’s situation-sensitive balancing of Fourth Amendment interests in other contexts. For example, in Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334, 338-339 (2000), the Court held that a bus passenger had an expectation of privacy in a bag placed in an overhead bin and that a police officer’s physical manipulation of the bag constituted an illegal search. If canine drug sniffs are entirely exempt from Fourth Amendment inspection, a sniff could substitute for an officer’s request to a bus passenger for permission to search his bag, with this significant difference: The passenger would not have the option to say “No.”

The dog sniff in this case, it bears emphasis, was for drug detection only. A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests not presented here, would be an entirely different matter. Detector dogs are ordinarily trained not as all-purpose sniffers, but for discrete purposes. For example, they may be trained for narcotics detection or for explosives detection or for agricultural products detection. See, e. g., U. S. Customs & Border Protection, Canine Enforcement Training Center Training Program Course Descriptions, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/canines/ training_program.xml (all Internet materials as visited Dec. 16, 2004, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (describing Customs training courses in narcotics detection); Transportation Security Administration, Canine and Explosives Program, http://www.tsa.gov/public/display7themes32 (describing Transportation Security Administration’s explosives detection canine program); U. S. Dept, of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA’s Detector Dogs: Protecting American Agriculture (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/detdogs.pdf (describing USD A Beagle Brigade detector dogs trained to detect prohibited fruits, plants, and meat); see also Jennings, Origins and History of Security and Detector Dogs, in Canine Sports Medicine and Surgery 16,18-19 (M. Bloomberg, J. Dee, & R. Taylor eds. 1998) (describing narcotics-detector *424dogs used by Border Patrol and Customs, and bomb detector dogs used by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Secret Service, but noting the possibility in some circumstances of cross training dogs for multiple tasks); S. Chapman, Police Dogs in North America 64, 70-79 (1990) (describing narcotics- and explosives-detection dogs and noting the possibility of cross training). There is no indication in this case that the dog accompanying Trooper Graham was trained for anything other than drug detection. See 207 Ill. 2d, at 507, 802 N. E. 2d, at 203 (“Trooper Graham arrived with his drug-detection dog . . . .”); Brief for Petitioner 3 (“Trooper Graham arrived with a drug-detection dog ....”).

This Court has distinguished between the general interest in crime control and more immediate threats to public safety. In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990), this Court upheld the use of a sobriety traffic checkpoint. Balancing the State’s interest in preventing drunk driving, the extent to which that could be accomplished through the checkpoint program, and the degree of intrusion the stops involved, the Court determined that the State’s checkpoint program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 455. Ten years after Sitz, in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, this Court held that a drug interdiction checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. Despite the illegal narcotics traffic that the Nation is struggling to stem, the Court explained, a “general interest in crime control” did not justify the stops. Id., at 43-44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court distinguished the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz on the ground that those checkpoints were designed to eliminate an “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb.” 531 U. S., at 43.

The use of bomb-detection dogs to check vehicles for explosives without doubt has a closer kinship to the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz than to the drug checkpoints in Edmond. As the Court observed in Edmond: “[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tai*425lored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack . . . 531 U. S., at 44. Even if the Court were to change course and characterize a dog sniff as an independent. Fourth Amendment search, see ante, p. 410 (Souter, J., dissenting), the immediate, present danger of explosives would likely justify a bomb sniff under the special needs doctrine. See, e. g., ante, at 417, n. 7 (Souter, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements for a search when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make those requirements impracticable (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment))).

* * *

For the reasons stated, I would hold that the police violated Caballes’ Fourth Amendment rights when, without cause to suspect wrongdoing, they conducted a dog sniff of his vehicle. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.

10.3 Florida v. Harris 10.3 Florida v. Harris

FLORIDA v. HARRIS

No. 11-817.

Argued October 31, 2012

Decided February 19, 2013

*238Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General of Florida, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Associate Deputy *239Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Chief-Assistant Attorney General, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney General.

Joseph R. Palmore argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

Glen P. Gifford argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

*240Justice Kagan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this ease, we consider how a court should determine if the “alert” of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held that the State must in every case present an exhaustive set of records, including a log of the dog’s performance in the field, to establish the dog’s reliability. See 71 So. 3d 756, 775 (2011). We think that demand inconsistent with the “flexible, common-sense standard” of probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 239 (1983).

HH

William Wheetley is a K-9 Officer in the Liberty County, Florida Sheriff’s Office. On June 24, 2006, he was on a routine patrol with Aldo, a German shepherd trained to detect certain narcotics (methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy). Wheetley pulled over respondent Clayton Harris’s truck because it had an expired license plate. On approaching the driver’s-side door, Wheetley saw that Harris was “visibly nervous,” unable to sit still, shaking, and breathing rapidly. App. 62. Wheetley also noticed an open can of beer in the truck’s cup holder. Ibid. Wheetley asked Harris for consent to search the truck, but Harris refused. At that point, Wheetley retrieved Aldo from the patrol car and walked him around Harris’s truck for a “free air sniff.” Id., at 63. Aldo alerted at the driver’s-side door handle—signaling, through a distinctive set of behaviors, that he smelled drugs there.

Wheetley concluded, based principally on Aldo’s alert, that he had probable cause to search the truck. His search did not turn up any of the drugs Aldo was trained *241to detect. But it did reveal 200 loose pseudoephedrine pills, 8,000 matches, a bottle of hydrochloric acid, two containers of antifreeze, and a coffee filter full of iodine crystals—all ingredients for making methamphetamine. Wheetley accordingly arrested Harris, who admitted after proper Miranda warnings that he routinely “cooked” methamphetamine at his house and could not go “more than a few days without using” it. Id., at 68. The State charged Harris with possessing pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing methamphetamine.

While out on bail, Harris had another run-in with Wheet-ley and Aldo. This time, Wheetley pulled Harris over for a broken brake light. Aldo again sniffed the truck’s exterior, and again alerted at the driver’s-side door handle. Wheet-ley once more searched the truck, but on this occasion discovered nothing of interest.

Harris moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given Wheetley probable cause for a search. At the hearing on that motion, Wheetley testified about both his and Aldo’s training in drug detection. See id., at 52-82. In 2004, Wheetley (and a different dog) completed a 160-hour course in narcotics detection offered by the Dothan, Alabama Police Department, while Aldo (and a different handler) completed a similar, 120-hour course given by the Apopka, Florida Police Department. That same year, Aldo received a one-year certification from Drug Beat, a private company that specializes in testing and certifying K-9 dogs. Wheetley and Aldo teamed up in 2005 and went through another, 40-hour refresher course in Dothan together. They also did four hours of training exercises each week to maintain their skills. Wheetley would hide drugs in certain vehicles or buildings while leaving others “blank” to determine whether Aldo alerted at the right places. Id., at 57. According to Wheet-ley, Aldo’s performance in those exercises was “really good.” Id., at 60. The State introduced “Monthly Canine Detection *242Training Logs” consistent with that testimony: They showed that Aldo always found hidden drugs and that he performed “satisfactorily” (the higher of two possible assessments) on each day of training. Id., at 109-116.

On cross-examination, Harris’s attorney chose not to contest the quality of Aldo’s or Wheetley’s training. She focused instead on Aldo’s certification and his performance in the field, particularly the two stops of Harris’s truck. Wheetley conceded that the certification (which, he noted, Florida law did not require) had expired the year before he pulled Harris over. See id., at 70-71. Wheetley also acknowledged that he did not keep complete records of Aldo’s performance in traffic stops or other field work; instead, he maintained records only of alerts resulting in arrests. See id., at 71-72, 74. But Wheetley defended Aldo’s two alerts to Harris’s seemingly narcotics-free truck: According to Wheetley, Harris probably transferred the odor of methamphetamine to the door handle, and Aldo responded to that “residual odor.” Id., at 80.

The trial court concluded that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s truck and so denied the motion to suppress. Harris then entered a no-contest plea while reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling. An intermediate state court summarily affirmed. 989 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. App. 2008) (per curiam,).

The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wheet-ley lacked probable cause to search Harris’s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. “[W]hen a dog alerts,” the court wrote, “the fact that the dog has been trained and certified is simply not enough to establish probable cause.” 71 So. 3d, at 767. To demonstrate a dog’s reliability, the State needed to produce a wider array of evidence:

“[T]he State must present . . . the dog’s training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field perform-nance records (including any unverified alerts), and evi-*243denee concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog’s reliability.” Id., at 775.

The court particularly stressed the need for “evidence of the dog’s performance history,” including records showing “how often the dog has alerted in the field without illegal contraband having been found.” Id., at 769. That data, the court stated, could help to expose such problems as a handler’s tendency (conscious or not) to “cue [a] dog to alert” and “a dog’s inability to distinguish between residual odors and actual drugs.” Id., at 769, 774. Accordingly, an officer like Wheetley who did not keep full records of his dog’s field performance could never have the requisite cause to think “that the dog is a reliable indicator of drugs.” Id., at 773.

Chief Justice Canady dissented, maintaining that the majority’s “elaborate and inflexible evidentiary requirements” went beyond the demands of probable cause. Id., at 775. He would have affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the strength of Aldo’s training history and Harris’s “fail[ure] to present any evidence challenging” it. Id., at 776.

We granted certiorari, 566 U. S. 904 (2012), and now reverse.

II

A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when “the facts available to [him] would ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’ ” that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)); see Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U. S. 364, 370-371 (2009). The test for probable cause is not reducible to “precise definition or quantification.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U. S. 366, 371 (2003). “Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . *244have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.” Gates, 462 U. S., at 235. All we have required is the kind of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” Id., at 238, 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating whether the State has met this practical and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances. See, e. g., Pringle, 540 U. S., at 371; Gates, 462 U. S., at 232; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). We have rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach. In Gates, for example, we abandoned our old test for assessing the reliability of informants’ tips because it had devolved into a “complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules,” any one of which, if not complied with, would derail a finding of probable cause. 462 U. S., at 235. We lamented the development of a list of “inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case.” Id., at 230, n. 6. Probable cause, we emphasized, is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id., at 232.

The Florida Supreme Court flouted this established approach to determining probable cause. To assess the reliability of a drug-detection dog, the court created a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off.1 Most prominently, an alert cannot establish *245probable cause under the Florida court’s decision unless the State introduces comprehensive documentation of the dog’s prior “hits” and “misses” in the field. (One wonders how the court would apply its test to a rookie dog.) No matter how much other proof the State offers of the dog’s reliability, the absent field performance records will preclude a finding of probable cause. That is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. It is, indeed, the very thing we criticized in Gates when we overhauled our method for assessing the trustworthiness of an informant’s tip. A gap as to any one matter, we explained, should not sink the State’s case; rather, that “deficiency ... may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to . . . other indicia of reliability.” Id., at 233. So too here, a finding of a drug-detection dog’s reliability cannot depend on the State’s satisfaction of multiple, independent evidentiary requirements. No more for dogs than for human informants is such an inflexible checklist the way to prove reliability, and thus establish probable cause.

Making matters worse, the decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import. Errors may abound in such records. If a dog on patrol fails to alert to a car containing drugs, the mistake usually will go undetected because the officer will not initiate a search. Field data thus may not capture a dog’s false negatives. Conversely (and more relevant here), if the dog alerts to a car in which the officer finds no narcotics, the dog may not have made a mistake at all. The dog may have detected substances that were too well hidden or present in quantities too small for the officer to locate. Or the dog may have smelled the residual odor of drugs previously in the vehicle *246or on the driver’s person.2 Field data thus may markedly overstate a dog’s real false positives. By contrast, those inaccuracies—in either direction—do not taint records of a dog’s performance in standard training and certification settings. There, the designers of an assessment know where drugs are hidden and where they are not—and so where a dog should alert and where he should not. The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments.3

For that reason, evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organiza*247tion has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs. After all, law enforcement units have their own strong incentive to use effective training and certification programs, because only accurate drug-detection dogs enable officers to locate contraband without incurring unnecessary risks or wasting limited time and resources.

A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses. The defendant, for example, may contest the adequacy of a certification or training program, perhaps asserting that its standards are too lax or its methods faulty. So too, the defendant may examine how the dog (or handler) performed in the assessments made in those settings. Indeed, evidence of the dog’s (or handler’s) history in the field, although susceptible to the kind of misinterpretation we have discussed, may sometimes be relevant, as the Solicitor General acknowledged at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-24 (“[T]he defendant can ask the handler, if the handler is on the stand, about field performance, and then the court can give that answer whatever weight is appropriate”). And even assuming a dog is generally reliable, circumstances surrounding a particular alert may undermine the case for probable cause—if, say, the officer cued the dog (consciously or not), or if the team was working under unfamiliar conditions.

In short, a probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any other. The court should allow the parties to make their best case, consistent with the usual rules of criminal procedure. And the court should then evaluate the proffered evidence to decide what all the cir*248cumstances demonstrate. If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the court should find probable cause. If, in contrast, the defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing evidence. In all events, the court should not prescribe, as the Florida Supreme Court did, an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements. The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.

Ill

And here, Aldo’s did. The record in this case amply supported the trial court’s determination that Aldo’s alert gave Wheetley probable cause to search Harris’s truck.

The State, as earlier described, introduced substantial evidence of Aldo’s training and his proficiency in finding drugs. See supra, at 241-242. The State showed that two years before alerting to Harris’s truck, Aldo had successfully completed a 120-hour program in narcotics detection, and separately obtained a certification from an independent company. And although the certification expired after a year, the Sheriff’s Office required continuing training for Aldo and Wheet-ley. The two satisfied the requirements of another, 40-hour training program one year prior to the search at issue. And Wheetley worked with Aldo for four hours each week on exercises designed to keep their skills sharp. Wheetley testified, and written records confirmed, that in those settings Aldo always performed at the highest level.

Harris, as also noted above, declined to challenge in the trial court any aspect of Aldo’s training. See supra, at 242. To be sure, Harris’s briefs in this Court raise questions about *249that training’s adequacy—for example, whether the programs simulated sufficiently diverse environments and whether they used enough blind testing (in which the handler does not know the location of drugs and so cannot cue the dog). See Brief for Respondent 57-58. Similarly, Harris here queries just how well Aldo performed in controlled testing. See id., at 58. But Harris never voiced those doubts in the trial court, and cannot do so for the first time here. See, e. g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528, 534 (1964). As the case came to the trial court, Aldo had successfully completed two recent drug-detection courses and maintained his proficiency through weekly training exercises. Viewed alone, that training record—with or without the prior certification—sufficed to establish Aldo’s reliability. See supra, at 246-248.

And Harris’s cross-examination of Wheetley, which focused on Aldo’s field performance, failed to rebut the State’s case. Harris principally contended in the trial court that because Wheetley did not find any of the substances Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s two alerts must have been falseé See Brief for Respondent 1; App. 77-80. But we have already described the hazards of inferring too much from the failure of a dog’s alert to lead to drugs, see supra, at 245-246; and here we doubt that Harris’s logic does justice to Aldo’s skills. Harris cooked and used methamphetamine on a regular basis; so as Wheetley later surmised, Aldo likely responded to odors that Harris had transferred to the driver’s-side door handle of his truck. See supra, at 242. A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to such odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but in fact is not. See n. 2, supra. And still more fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948). For the reasons already stated, Wheetley had good cause to view Aldo as a reliable detector of drugs. And no special circumstance here gave Wheetley reason to *250discount Aldo’s usual dependability or distrust his response to Harris’s truck.

Because training records established Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that showing, we agree with the trial court that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s truck. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

It is so ordered.

10.4 Florida v. Jardines, 569 US 1 (2013) 10.4 Florida v. Jardines, 569 US 1 (2013)

United States Supreme Court

FLORIDA v. JARDINES(2013)

No. 11-564

Argued: October 31, 2012Decided: March 26, 2013

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

     We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

I

     In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines' home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home for fifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around the home, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn.      Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines' home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.

     Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing in part to the dog's "wild" nature, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, and tendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approached Jardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog "began tracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and forth," engaging in what is called "bracketing," "back and forth, back and forth." Id., at A- 33 to A-34. Detective Bartelt gave the dog "the full six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could] give him" to do this--he testified that he needed to give the dog "as much distance as I can." Id., at A-35. And Detective Pedraja stood back while this was occurring, so that he would not "get knocked over" when the dog was "spinning around trying to find" the source. Id., at A-38.

     After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor's strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to his vehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for narcotics.

     On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When the warrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis.

     At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trial court granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved the trial court's decision to suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use of the trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines' home was a Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based upon information gathered in that search. 73 So. 3d 34 (2011).

     We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).

II

     The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "the Government obtains information by physically intruding" on persons, houses, papers, or effects, "a 'search' within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2012) (slip op., at 6, n. 3). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), property rights "are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64 (1992)--but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area," United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

     That principle renders this case a straightforward one. The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house--in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.

A

     The Fourth Amendment "indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections": persons, houses, papers, and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176 (1984). The Fourth Amendment does not, therefore, prevent all investigations conducted on private property; for example, an officer may (subject to Katz) gather information in what we have called "open fields"--even if those fields are privately owned--because such fields are not enumerated in the Amendment's text. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924).

     But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment's "very core" stands "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). This right would be of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man's property to observe his repose from just outside the front window.

     We therefore regard the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"--what our cases call the curtilage--as "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver, supra, at 180. That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the distinction between the home and the open fields is "as old as the common law," Hester, supra, at 59, so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called the "curtilage or homestall," for the "house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 223, 225 (1769). This area around the home is "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically," and is where "privacy expectations are most heightened." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986).

     While the boundaries of the curtilage are generally "clearly marked," the "conception defining the curtilage" is at any rate familiar enough that it is "easily understood from our daily experience." Oliver, 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12. Here there is no doubt that the officers entered it: The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and "to which the activity of home life extends." Ibid.

B

     Since the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area, we turn to the question of whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.1 While law enforcement officers need not "shield their eyes" when passing by the home "on public thoroughfares," Ciraolo, 476 U. S., at 213, an officer's leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment's protected areas. In permitting, for example, visual observation of the home from "public navigable airspace," we were careful to note that it was done "in a physically nonintrusive manner." Ibid. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765), a case "undoubtedly familiar" to "every American statesman" at the time of the Founding, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886), states the general rule clearly: "[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." 2 Wils. K. B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their companion's firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of Jardines' home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.

     "A license may be implied from the habits of the country," notwithstanding the "strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close." McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626 (1951). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.2 Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no more than any private citizen might do." Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16).

     But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker.3 To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to--well, call the police. The scope of a license--express or implied--is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to an officer's checking out an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics. Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.4

     The State points to our decisions holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___ (2011); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996). But those cases merely hold that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant will not be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer's real reason for the stop was racial harassment. See id., at 810, 813. Here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.

III

     The State argues that investigation by a forensic narcotics dog by definition cannot implicate any legitimate privacy interest. The State cites for authority our decisions in United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984), and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), which held, respectively, that canine inspection of luggage in an airport, chemical testing of a substance that had fallen from a parcel in transit, and canine inspection of an automobile during a lawful traffic stop, do not violate the "reasonable expectation of privacy" described in Katz.

     Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this. Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mounted GPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katz standard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had "no 'reasonable expectation of privacy' " in his whereabouts on the public roads, Jones, 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5)--a proposition with at least as much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 278 (1983). But because the GPS receiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thus intruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle's movements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5). The Katz reasonable-expectations test "has been added to, not substituted for," the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8).

     Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines' home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.

     For a related reason we find irrelevant the State's argument (echoed by the dissent) that forensic dogs have been commonly used by police for centuries. This argument is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), that surveillance of the home is a search where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use" to "explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion." Id., at 40 (emphasis added). But the implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) is that when the government uses a physical intrusion to explore details of the home (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bring along is irrelevant.

*  *  *

     The government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore affirmed.

It is so ordered.

 


Kagan, J., concurring

 569 U. S. ____ (2013)

No. 11-564

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JOELIS JARDINES

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of florida

[March 26, 2013]

 


     Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor join, concurring.

     For me, a simple analogy clinches this case--and does so on privacy as well as property grounds. A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-powered binoculars. See ante, at 7, n. 3. He doesn't knock or say hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home's furthest corners. It doesn't take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no one. Has your "visitor" trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign flyers? Yes, he has. And has he also invaded your "reasonable expectation of privacy," by nosing into intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure? Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Yes, of course, he has done that too.

     That case is this case in every way that matters. Here, police officers came to Joelis Jardines' door with a super-sensitive instrument, which they deployed to detect things inside that they could not perceive unassisted. The equip-ment they used was animal, not mineral. But contra the dissent, see post, at 2 (opinion of Alito, J.) (noting the ubiquity of dogs in American households), that is of no significance in determining whether a search occurred. Detective Bartelt's dog was not your neighbor's pet, come to your porch on a leisurely stroll. As this Court discussed earlier this Term, drug-detection dogs are highly trained tools of law enforcement, geared to respond in distinctive ways to specific scents so as to convey clear and reliable information to their human partners. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. ___ (2013) (slip op. at 2-3, 7-8). They are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell). And as in the hypothetical above, that device was aimed here at a home--the most private and inviolate (or so we expect) of all the places and things the Fourth Amendment protects. Was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds to-day. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well.

     The Court today treats this case under a property rubric; I write separately to note that I could just as happily have decided it by looking to Jardines' privacy interests. A decision along those lines would have looked . . . well, much like this one. It would have talked about " 'the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' " Ante, at 4 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)). It would have insisted on maintaining the "practical value" of that right by preventing police officers from standing in an adjacent space and "trawl[ing] for evidence with impunity." Ante, at 4. It would have explained that " 'privacy expectations are most heightened' " in the home and the surrounding area. Ante, at 4-5 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986)). And it would have determined that police officers invade those shared expectations when they use trained canine assistants to reveal within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise have found there. See ante, at 6-7, and nn. 2-3.

     It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so align. The law of property "naturally enough influence[s]" our "shared social expectations" of what places should be free from governmental incursions. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 111 (2006); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143, n. 12 (1978). And so the sentiment "my home is my own," while originating in property law, now also denotes a common understanding--extending even beyond that law's formal protections--about an especially private sphere. Jardines' home was his property; it was also his most intimate and familiar space. The analysis proceeding from each of those facts, as today's decision reveals, runs mostly along the same path.

     I can think of only one divergence: If we had decided this case on privacy grounds, we would have realized that Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), already resolved it.1 The Kyllo Court held that police officers conducted a search when they used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat emanating from a private home, even though they committed no trespass. Highlighting our intention to draw both a "firm" and a "bright" line at "the entrance to the house," id., at 40, we announced the following rule:

"Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Ibid.

That "firm" and "bright" rule governs this case: The police officers here conducted a search because they used a "device . . . not in general public use" (a trained drug-detection dog) to "explore details of the home" (the presence of certain substances) that they would not otherwise have discovered without entering the premises.

     And again, the dissent's argument that the device is just a dog cannot change the equation. As Kyllo made clear, the "sense-enhancing" tool at issue may be "crude" or "sophisticated," may be old or new (drug-detection dogs actually go back not "12,000 years" or "centuries," post, at 2, 8, 12, but only a few decades), may be either smaller or bigger than a breadbox; still, "at least where (as here)" the device is not "in general public use," training it on a home violates our "minimal expectation of privacy"--an expectation "that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable." 533 U. S., at 34, 36.2 That does not mean the device is off-limits, as the dissent implies, see post, at 11-12; it just means police officers cannot use it to examine a home without a warrant or exigent circumstance. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403-404 (2006) (describing exigencies allowing the warrantless search of a home).

     With these further thoughts, suggesting that a focus on Jardines' privacy interests would make an "easy cas[e] easy" twice over, ante, at 10, I join the Court's opinion in full.

 


Alito, J., dissenting

 569 U. S. ____ (2013)

No. 11-564

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JOELIS JARDINES

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of florida

[March 26, 2013]

 


     Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus- tice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

     The Court's decision in this important Fourth Amendment case is based on a putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence.

     The law of trespass generally gives members of the public a license to use a walkway to approach the front door of a house and to remain there for a brief time. This license is not limited to persons who intend to speak to an occupant or who actually do so. (Mail carriers and persons delivering packages and flyers are examples of individuals who may lawfully approach a front door without intending to converse.) Nor is the license restricted to categories of visitors whom an occupant of the dwelling is likely to welcome; as the Court acknowledges, this license applies even to "solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the license even extends to police officers who wish to gather evidence against an occupant (by asking potentially incriminating questions).

     According to the Court, however, the police officer in this case, Detective Bartelt, committed a trespass because he was accompanied during his otherwise lawful visit to the front door of respondent's house by his dog, Franky. Where is the authority evidencing such a rule? Dogs have been domesticated for about 12,000 years;1 they were ubiquitous in both this country and Britain at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment;2 and their acute sense of smell has been used in law enforcement for centuries.3 Yet the Court has been unable to find a single case--from the United States or any other common-law nation--that supports the rule on which its decision is based. Thus, trespass law provides no support for the Court's holding today.

     The Court's decision is also inconsistent with the reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test that the Court adopted in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). A reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public, and a reasonable person will not count on the strength of those odors remaining within the range that, while detectible by a dog, cannot be smelled by a human.

     For these reasons, I would hold that no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case, and I would reverse the decision below.

I

     The opinion of the Court may leave a reader with the mistaken impression that Detective Bartelt and Franky remained on respondent's property for a prolonged period of time and conducted a far-flung exploration of the front yard. See ante, at 4 ("trawl for evidence with impunity"), 7 ("marching his bloodhound into the garden"). But that is not what happened.

     Detective Bartelt and Franky approached the front door via the driveway and a paved path--the route that any visitor would customarily use4--and Franky was on the kind of leash that any dog owner might employ.5 As Franky approached the door, he started to track an airborne odor. He held his head high and began "bracketing" the area (pacing back and forth) in order to determine the strongest source of the smell. App. 95-96. Detective Bartelt knew "the minute [he] observed" this behavior that Franky had detected drugs. Id., at 95. Upon locating the odor's strongest source, Franky sat at the base of the front door, and at this point, Detective Bartelt and Franky immediately returned to their patrol car. Id., at 98.

     A critical fact that the Court omits is that, as respondent's counsel explained at oral argument, this entire process--walking down the driveway and front path to the front door, waiting for Franky to find the strongest source of the odor, and walking back to the car--took approximately a minute or two. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. Thus, the amount of time that Franky and the detective remained at the front porch was even less. The Court also fails to mention that, while Detective Bartelt apparently did not personally smell the odor of marijuana coming from the house, another officer who subsequently stood on the front porch, Detective Pedraja, did notice that smell and was able to identify it. App. 81.

II

     The Court concludes that the conduct in this case was a search because Detective Bartelt exceeded the boundaries of the license to approach the house that is recognized by the law of trespass, but the Court's interpretation of the scope of that license is unfounded.

A

     It is said that members of the public may lawfully proceed along a walkway leading to the front door of a house because custom grants them a license to do so. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626 (1951); Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass. 198, 220 (1852); J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law §823, p. 378 (1889). This rule encompasses categories of visitors whom most homeowners almost certainly wish to allow to approach their front doors--friends, relatives, mail carriers, persons making deliveries. But it also reaches categories of visitors who are less universally welcome--"solicitors," "hawkers," "peddlers," and the like. The law might attempt to draw fine lines between categories of welcome and unwelcome visitors, distinguishing, for example, between tolerable and intolerable door-to-door peddlers (Girl Scouts selling cookies versus adults selling aluminum siding) or between police officers on agreeable and disagreeable missions (gathering information about a bothersome neighbor versus asking potentially incriminating questions). But the law of trespass has not attempted such a difficult taxonomy. See Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F. 3d 1345, 1351 (CA7 1995) ("[C]onsent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for perfectly understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent"); cf. Skinner v. Ogallala Public School Dist., 262 Neb. 387, 402, 631 N. W. 2d 510, 525 (2001) ("[I]n order to determine if a business invitation is implied, the inquiry is not a subjective assessment of why the visitor chose to visit the premises in a particular instance"); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 159, 131 A. 2d 470, 473-474 (1957) (noting that "there are many cases in which an invitation has been implied from circumstances, such as custom," and that this test is "objective in that it stresses custom and the appearance of things" as opposed to "the undisclosed intention of the visitor").

     Of course, this license has certain spatial and temporal limits. A visitor must stick to the path that is typically used to approach a front door, such as a paved walkway. A visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander into the backyard, or take other circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a visitor would customarily use. See, e.g., Robinson v. Virginia, 47 Va. App. 533, 549-550, 625 S. E. 2d 651, 659 (2006) (en banc); United States v. Wells, 648 F. 3d 671, 679-680 (CA8 2011) (police exceeded scope of their implied invitation when they bypassed the front door and proceeded directly to the back yard); State v. Harris, 919 S. W. 2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ("Any substantial and unreasonable departure from an area where the public is impliedly invited exceeds the scope of the implied invitation . . . " (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §2.3(c), p. 578 (2004) (hereinafter LaFave); id., §2.3(f), at 600-603 ("[W]hen the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment" (footnotes omitted)).

     Nor, as a general matter, may a visitor come to the front door in the middle of the night without an express invitation. See State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 233, 923 P. 2d 469, 478 (App. 1996) ("Furtive intrusion late at night or in the predawn hours is not conduct that is expected from ordinary visitors. Indeed, if observed by a resident of the premises, it could be a cause for great alarm").

     Similarly, a visitor may not linger at the front door for an extended period. See 9 So. 3d 1, 11 (Fla. App. 2008) (case below) (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is no such thing as squatter's rights on a front porch. A stranger may not plop down uninvited to spend the afternoon in the front porch rocking chair, or throw down a sleeping bag to spend the night, or lurk on the front porch, looking in the windows"). The license is limited to the amount of time it would customarily take to approach the door, pause long enough to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay longer), leave.

     As I understand the law of trespass and the scope of the implied license, a visitor who adheres to these limitations is not necessarily required to ring the doorbell, knock on the door, or attempt to speak with an occupant. For example, mail carriers, persons making deliveries, and individuals distributing flyers may leave the items they are carrying and depart without making any attempt to converse. A pedestrian or motorist looking for a particular address may walk up to a front door in order to check a house number that is hard to see from the sidewalk or road. A neighbor who knows that the residents are away may approach the door to retrieve an accumulation of newspapers that might signal to a potential burglar that the house is unoccupied.

     As the majority acknowledges, this implied license to approach the front door extends to the police. See ante, at 6. As we recognized in Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___ (2011), police officers do not engage in a search when they approach the front door of a residence and seek to engage in what is termed a "knock and talk," i.e., knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the purpose of gathering evidence. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 16) ("When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do"). See also 1 LaFave §2.3(e), at 592 ("It is not objectionable for an officer to come upon that part of the property which has been opened to public common use" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even when the objective of a "knock and talk" is to obtain evidence that will lead to the homeowner's arrest and prosecution, the license to approach still applies. In other words, gathering evidence--even damning evidence--is a lawful activity that falls within the scope of the license to approach. And when officers walk up to the front door of a house, they are permitted to see, hear, and smell whatever can be detected from a lawful vantage point. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986) ("The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares"); Cada, supra, at 232, 923 P. 2d, at 477 ("[P]olice officers restricting their activity to [areas to which the public is impliedly invited] are permitted the same intrusion and the same level of observation as would be expected from a reasonably respectful citizen" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 1 LaFave §§2.2(a), 2.3(c), at 450-452, 572-577.

B

     Detective Bartelt did not exceed the scope of the license to approach respondent's front door. He adhered to the customary path; he did not approach in the middle of the night; and he remained at the front door for only a very short period (less than a minute or two).

     The Court concludes that Detective Bartelt went too far because he had the "objectiv[e] . . . purpose to conduct a search." Ante, at 8 (emphasis added). What this means, I take it, is that anyone aware of what Detective Bartelt did would infer that his subjective purpose was to gather evidence. But if this is the Court's point, then a standard "knock and talk" and most other police visits would likewise constitute searches. With the exception of visits to serve warrants or civil process, police almost always approach homes with a purpose of discovering information. That is certainly the objective of a "knock and talk." The Court offers no meaningful way of distinguishing the "objective purpose" of a "knock and talk" from the "objective purpose" of Detective Bartelt's conduct here.

     The Court contends that a "knock and talk" is different because it involves talking, and "all are invited" to do that. Ante, at 7-8, n. 4 (emphasis deleted). But a police officer who approaches the front door of a house in accordance with the limitations already discussed may gather evidence by means other than talking. The officer may observe items in plain view and smell odors coming from the house. Ciraolo, supra, at 213; Cada, 129 Idaho, at 232, 923 P. 2d, at 477; 1 LaFave §§2.2(a), 2.3(c), at 450-452, 572-577. So the Court's "objective purpose" argument cannot stand.

     What the Court must fall back on, then, is the particular instrument that Detective Bartelt used to detect the odor of marijuana, namely, his dog. But in the entire body of common-law decisions, the Court has not found a single case holding that a visitor to the front door of a home commits a trespass if the visitor is accompanied by a dog on a leash. On the contrary, the common law allowed even unleashed dogs to wander on private property without committing a trespass. G. Williams, Liability for Animals 136-146 (1939); J. Ingham, A Treatise on Property in Animals Wild and Domestic and the Rights and Responsibilities Arising Therefrom 277-278 (1900). Cf. B. Markesinis & S. Deakin, Tort Law 511 (4th ed. 1999).

     The Court responds that "[i]t is not the dog that is the problem, but the behavior that here involved use of the dog." Ante, at 7, n. 3. But where is the support in the law of trespass for this proposition? Dogs' keen sense of smell has been used in law enforcement for centuries. The antiquity of this practice is evidenced by a Scottish law from 1318 that made it a crime to "disturb a tracking dog or the men coming with it for pursuing thieves or seizing malefactors." K. Brown et al., The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, (St Andrews, 2007-2013), online at http://www.rps.ac.uk/mss/1318/9. If bringing a tracking dog to the front door of a home constituted a trespass, one would expect at least one case to have arisen during the past 800 years. But the Court has found none.

     For these reasons, the real law of trespass provides no support for the Court's holding today. While the Court claims that its reasoning has "ancient and durable roots," ante, at 4, its trespass rule is really a newly struck counterfeit.

III

     The concurring opinion attempts to provide an alternative ground for today's decision, namely, that Detective Bartelt's conduct violated respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy. But we have already rejected a very similar, if not identical argument, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 409-410 (2005), and in any event I see no basis for concluding that the occupants of a dwelling have a reasonable expectation of privacy in odors that emanate from the dwelling and reach spots where members of the public may lawfully stand.

     It is clear that the occupant of a house has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to odors that can be smelled by human beings who are standing in such places. See United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478, 482 (1985) ("After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 111 (1965) (scent of fermenting mash supported probable cause for warrant); United States v. Johnston, 497 F. 2d 397, 398 (CA9 1974) (there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy from drug agents with inquisitive nostrils"). And I would not draw a line between odors that can be smelled by humans and those that are detectible only by dogs.

     Consider the situation from the point of view of the occupant of a building in which marijuana is grown or methamphetamine is manufactured. Would such an occupant reason as follows? "I know that odors may emanate from my building and that atmospheric conditions, such as the force and direction of the wind, may affect the strength of those odors when they reach a spot where members of the public may lawfully stand. I also know that some people have a much more acute sense of smell than others,6 and I have no idea who might be standing in one of the spots in question when the odors from my house reach that location. In addition, I know that odors coming from my building, when they reach these locations, may be strong enough to be detected by a dog. But I am confident that they will be so faint that they cannot be smelled by any human being." Such a finely tuned expectation would be entirely unrealistic, and I see no evidence that society is prepared to recognize it as reasonable.

     In an attempt to show that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odor of marijuana wafting from his house, the concurrence argues that this case is just like Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), which held that police officers conducted a search when they used a thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from a house. Ante, at 3-4 (opinion of Kagan, J.). This Court, however, has already rejected the argument that the use of a drug-sniffing dog is the same as the use of a thermal imaging device. See Caballes, 543 U. S., at 409-410. The very argument now advanced by the concurrence appears in Justice Souter's Caballes dissent. See id., at 413, and n. 3. But the Court was not persuaded.

     Contrary to the interpretation propounded by the concurrence, Kyllo is best understood as a decision about the use of new technology. The Kyllo Court focused on the fact that the thermal imaging device was a form of "sense-enhancing technology" that was "not in general public use," and it expressed concern that citizens would be "at the mercy of advancing technology" if its use was not restricted. 533 U. S., at 34-35. A dog, however, is not a new form of "technology or a "device." And, as noted, the use of dogs' acute sense of smell in law enforcement dates back many centuries.

     The concurrence suggests that a Kyllo-based decision would be "much like" the actual decision of the Court, but that is simply not so. The holding of the Court is based on what the Court sees as a " 'physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.' " Ante, at 3 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). As a result, it does not apply when a dog alerts while on a public sidewalk or street or in the corridor of a building to which the dog and handler have been lawfully admitted.

     The concurrence's Kyllo-based approach would have a much wider reach. When the police used the thermal imaging device in Kyllo, they were on a public street, 533 U. S., at 29, and "committed no trespass." Ante, at 3. Therefore, if a dog's nose is just like a thermal imaging device for Fourth Amendment purposes, a search would occur if a dog alerted while on a public sidewalk or in the corridor of an apartment building. And the same would be true if the dog was trained to sniff, not for marijuana, but for more dangerous quarry, such as explosives or for a violent fugitive or kidnaped child. I see no ground for hampering legitimate law enforcement in this way.

IV

     The conduct of the police officer in this case did not constitute a trespass and did not violate respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy. I would hold that this conduct was not a search, and I therefore respectfully dissent.

 


 

FOOTNOTES


Footnote 1

 At oral argument, the State and its amicus the Solicitor General argued that Jardines conceded in the lower courts that the officers had a right to be where they were. This misstates the record. Jardines conceded nothing more than the unsurprising proposition that the officers could have lawfully approached his home to knock on the front door in hopes of speaking with him. Of course, that is not what they did.


Footnote 2

 With this much, the dissent seems to agree--it would inquire into " 'the appearance of things,' " post, at 5 (opinion of Alito, J.), what is "typica[l]" for a visitor, ibid., what might cause "alarm" to a "resident of the premises," ibid., what is "expected" of "ordinary visitors," ibid., and what would be expected from a " 'reasonably respectful citizen,' " post, at 7. These are good questions. But their answers are incompatible with the dissent's outcome, which is presumably why the dissent does not even try to argue that it would be customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc., for a stranger to explore the curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.


Footnote 3

 The dissent insists that our argument must rest upon "the particular instrument that Detective Bartelt used to detect the odor of marijuana"--the dog. Post, at 8. It is not the dog that is the problem, but the behavior that here involved use of the dog. We think a typical person would find it " 'a cause for great alarm' " (the kind of reaction the dissent quite rightly relies upon to justify its no-night-visits rule, post, at 5) to find a stranger snooping about his front porch with or without a dog. The dissent would let the police do whatever they want by way of gathering evidence so long as they stay on the base-path, to use a baseball analogy--so long as they "stick to the path that is typically used to approach a front door, such as a paved walkway." Ibid. From that vantage point they can presumably peer into the house through binoculars with impunity. That is not the law, as even the State concedes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.


Footnote 4

 The dissent argues, citing King, that "gathering evidence--even damning evidence--is a lawful activity that falls within the scope of the license to approach." Post, at 7. That is a false generalization. What King establishes is that it is not a Fourth Amendment search to approach the home in order to speak with the occupant, because all are invited to do that. The mere "purpose of discovering information," post, at 8, in the course of engaging in that permitted conduct does not cause it to violate the Fourth Amendment. But no one is impliedly invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to do nothing but conduct a search.

 

FOOTNOTES


Footnote 1

 The dissent claims, alternatively, that Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 409-410 (2005), controls this case (or nearly does). See post, at 9, 11. But Caballes concerned a drug-detection dog's sniff of an automobile during a traffic stop. See also Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. ___ (2013). And we have held, over and over again, that people's expectations of privacy are much lower in their cars than in their homes. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 345 (2009); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 303 (1999); New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 115 (1986); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality opinion).


Footnote 2

 The dissent's other principal reason for concluding that no violation of privacy occurred in this case--that police officers themselves might detect an aroma wafting from a house--works no better. If officers can smell drugs coming from a house, they can use that information; a human sniff is not a search, we can all agree. But it does not follow that a person loses his expectation of privacy in the many scents within his home that (his own nose capably tells him) are not usually detectible by humans standing outside. And indeed, Kyllo already decided as much. In response to an identical argument from the dissent in that case, see 533 U. S., at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that humans can sometimes detect "heat emanating from a building"), the Kyllo Court stated: "The dissent's comparison of the thermal imaging to various circumstances in which outside observers might be able to perceive, without technology, the heat of the home . . . is quite irrelevant. The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment. . . . In any event, [at the time in question,] no outside observer could have discerned the relative heat of Kyllo's home without thermal imaging." Id., at 35, n. 2.

 

FOOTNOTES


Footnote 1

 See, e.g., Sloane, Dogs in War, Police Work and on Patrol, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 385 (1955-1956) (hereinafter Sloane).


Footnote 2

 M. Derr, A Dog's History of America 68-92 (2004); K. Olsen, Daily Life in 18th-Century England 32-33 (1999).


Footnote 3

 Sloane 388-389.


Footnote 4

 See App. 94; App. to Brief for Respondent 1A (depiction of respondent's home).


Footnote 5

 The Court notes that Franky was on a 6-foot leash, but such a leash is standard equipment for ordinary dog owners. See, e.g., J. Stregowski, Four Dog Leash Varieties, http://dogs.about.com/od/ toyssupplies/tp/Dog-Leashes.htm (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 21, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).


Footnote 6

 Some humans naturally have a much more acute sense of smell than others, and humans can be trained to detect and distinguish odors that could not be detected without such training. See E. Hancock, A Primer on Smell, http://www.jhu.edu/jhumag/996web/smell.html. Some individuals employed in the perfume and wine industries, for example, have an amazingly acute sense of smell. Ibid.

10.5 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) 10.5 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015)

Dog sniff after completion of traffic stop.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–9972

_________________

DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v.  

 UNITED STATES   

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT   

[April 21, 2015]  

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable seizures. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop.  We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.  A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a ticket for the violation.  Id., at 407.  The Court so recognized in Caballes, and we adhere to the line drawn in that decision.

I

 Just after midnight on March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of Nebraska State Highway 275 for one or two seconds and then jerk back onto the road.  

Nebraska law prohibits driving on highway shoulders, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §60–6,142 (2010), and on that basis, Struble pulled the Mountaineer over at 12:06 a.m. Struble is a  K–9 officer with the Valley Police Department in Nebraska, and his dog Floyd was in his patrol car that night.  Two men were in the Mountaineer: the driver, Dennys Rodriguez, and a front-seat passenger, Scott Pollman.  Struble approached the Mountaineer on the passenger’s side. After Rodriguez identified himself, Struble asked him why he had driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to avoid a pothole.  Struble then gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Rodriguez to accompany him to the patrol car.  Rodriguez asked if he was required to do so, and Struble answered that he was not.  Rodriguez decided to wait in his own vehicle.

 After running a records check on Rodriguez, Struble returned to the Mountaineer. Struble asked passenger Pollman for his driver’s license and began to question him about where the two men were coming from and where they were going. Pollman replied that they had traveled to Omaha, Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was for sale and that they were returning to Norfolk, Nebraska.  Struble returned again to his patrol car, where he completed a records check on Pollman, and called for a second officer. Struble then began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of the road.

 Struble returned to Rodriguez’s vehicle a third time to issue the written warning.  By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished explaining the warning to Rodriguez, and had given back to Rodriguez and Pollman the documents obtained from them.  As Struble later testified, at that point, Rodriguez and Pollman “had all their documents back and a copy of the written warning.  I got all the reason[s] for the stop out of the way[,] . . . took care of all the business.”  App. 70.

 Nevertheless, Struble did not consider Rodriguez “free to leave.” Id., at 69–70. Although justification for the traffic stop was “out of the way,” id., at 70, Struble asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle.  Rodriguez said no.  Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer.  Rodriguez complied. At 12:33 a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived.  Struble retrieved his dog and led him twice around the Mountaineer. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway through Struble’s second pass. All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine.

 Rodriguez was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska on one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.

 After receiving evidence, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied.  The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert.  App. 100 (apart from “information given by the dog,” “Officer Struble had [no]thing other than a rather large hunch”). He further found that no reasonable suspicion supported the detention once Struble issued the written warning.  He concluded, however, that under Eighth Circuit precedent, extension of the stop by “seven to eight minutes” for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore permissible.

 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions and denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, “dog sniffs that occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions.” App. 114 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 448 F. 3d 1014, 1016 (CA8 2006)).  The court thus agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the “7 to 10 minutes” added to the stop by the dog sniff “was not of constitutional significance.” App. 114. Impelled by that decision, Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five years in prison.

 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  The “seven- or eightminute delay” in this case, the opinion noted, resembled delays that the court had previously ranked as permissible. 741 F. 3d 905, 907 (2014).  The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the delay here constituted an acceptable “de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty.” Id., at 908. Given that ruling, the court declined to reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez’s detention after issuing the written warning.

 We granted certiorari to resolve a division among lower courts on the question whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.  573 U. S. ___ (2014). Compare, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 270 F. 3d 625, 632 (CA8 2001) (postcompletion delay of “well under ten minutes” permissible), with, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶13, 229 P. 3d 650, 658 (2010) (“[W]ithout additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.”).

II

 A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.  “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.”  Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)).  See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 330 (2009).  Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407, and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at 6–7.  See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”).  Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Ibid.  See also Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407.  Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed. See Sharpe, 470 U. S., at 686 (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation”).

 Our decisions in Caballes and Johnson heed these constraints. In both cases, we concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention.  Johnson, 555 U. S., at 327–328 (questioning); Caballes, 543 U. S., at 406, 408 (dog sniff). In Caballes, however, we cautioned that a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket.  543 U. S., at 407.  And we repeated that admonition in Johnson:  The seizure remains lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” 555 U. S., at 333.  See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 (2005) (because unrelated inquiries did not “exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,] . . . no additional Fourth Amendment justification . . . was required”).  An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.  But contrary to JUSTICE ALITO’s suggestion, post, at 4, n. 2, he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. But see post, at 1–2 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (premising  opinion on the dissent’s own finding of “reasonable suspicion,” although the District Court reached the opposite conclusion, and the Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue).

 Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.”  Caballes, 543 U. S., at 408.  Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658–660 (1979).  See also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c), pp. 507–517 (5th ed. 2012).  These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Prouse, 440 U. S., at 658–659; LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c), at 516 (A “warrant check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses.”).

 A dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at “detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 40–41 (2000).  See also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 7–8). Candidly, the Government acknowledged at oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.  Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.

 In advancing its de minimis rule, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). See United States v. $404,905.00 in U. S. Currency, 182 F. 3d 643, 649 (CA8 1999).  In Mimms, we reasoned that the government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety outweighs the “de minimis” additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.  434 U. S., at 110–111. See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413–415 (1997) (passengers may be required to exit vehicle stopped for traffic violation).  The Eighth Circuit, echoed in JUSTICE THOMAS’s dissent, believed that the imposition here similarly could be offset by the Government’s “strong interest in interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation’s highways.”  $404,905.00 in U. S. Currency, 182 F. 3d, at 649; see post, at 9.

 Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police officers,” Johnson, 555 U. S., at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.  Cf. United States v. Holt, 264 F. 3d 1215, 1221–1222 (CA10 2001) (en banc) (recognizing officer safety justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Stewart, 473 F. 3d 1265, 1269 (CA10 2007).  On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission. See supra, at 6–7. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours.  But cf. post, at 2–3 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis.  Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.  The Government argues that an officer may “incremental[ly]” prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.  Brief for United States 36–39.  The Government’s argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. See also post, at 2–5 (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting) (embracing the Government’s argument).  The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do.  See Knowles, 525 U. S., at 115–117. In this regard, the Government acknowledges that “an officer always has to be reasonably diligent.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49.  How could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of “time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.”  Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407.  As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic stop “prolonged beyond” that point is “unlawful.” Ibid.  The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, as JUSTICE ALITO supposes, post, at 2–4, but whether conducting the sniff “prolongs”—i.e., adds time to—“the stop,” supra, at 6.

III

 The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff in this case was not independently supported by individualized suspicion, see App. 100, and the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s findings, see id., at 112–113. The Court of Appeals, however, did not review that determination.  But see post, at 1, 10–12 (THOMAS, J.,   dissenting) (resolving the issue, nevermind that the Court of Appeals left it unaddressed); post, at 1–2 (ALITO,  J.,  dissenting) (upbraiding the Court for addressing the sole issue decided by the Court of Appeals and characterizing the Court’s answer as “unnecessary” because the Court, instead, should have decided an issue the Court of Appeals did not decide). The question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit consideration on remand.

*  *  *

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

 

 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting.

 My join in JUSTICE THOMAS’ dissenting opinion does not extend to Part III. Although the issue discussed in that Part was argued here, the Court of Appeals has not addressed that aspect of the case in any detail.  In my view the better course would be to allow that court to do so in the first instance.

 

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, and with whom J USTICE KENNEDY joins as to all but Part III, dissenting.

 Ten years ago, we explained that “conducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.”  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 408 (2005). The only question here is whether an officer executed a stop in a reasonable manner when he waited to conduct a dog sniff until after he had given the driver a written warning and a backup unit had arrived, bringing the overall duration of the stop to 29 minutes.  Because the stop was reasonably executed, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.  The Court’s holding to the contrary cannot be reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of common police practices. It was also unnecessary, as the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to continue to hold the driver to conduct the dog sniff. I respectfully dissent.

I

 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 4.  As the text indicates, and as we have repeatedly confirmed, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006).  We have defined reasonableness “in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996), and by considering “the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing,” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 326 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When traditional protections have not provided a definitive answer, our precedents have “analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 171 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Although a traffic stop “constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment],” such a seizure is constitutionally “reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 809–810 (1996). But “a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Caballes, supra, at 407.

 Because Rodriguez does not dispute that Officer Struble had probable cause to stop him, the only question is whether the stop was otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. See Brief for Appellant in No. 13–1176 (CA8), p. 4, n. 2.  I easily conclude that it was. Approximately 29 minutes passed from the time Officer Struble stopped Rodriguez until his narcotics-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs.  That amount of time is hardly out of the ordinary for a traffic stop by a single officer of a vehicle containing multiple occupants even when no dog sniff is involved. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 497 F. 3d 606 (CA6 2007) (22 minutes); United States v. Barragan, 379 F. 3d 524 (CA8 2004) (approximately 30 minutes). During that time, Officer Struble conducted the ordinary activities of a traffic stop—he approached the vehicle, questioned Rodriguez about the observed violation, asked Pollman about their travel plans, ran serial warrant checks on Rodriguez and Pollman, and issued a written warning to Rodriguez. And when he decided to conduct a dog sniff, he took the precaution of calling for backup out of concern for his safety. See 741 F. 3d 905, 907 (CA8 2014); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam) (officer safety is a “legitimate and weighty” concern relevant to reasonableness).

As Caballes makes clear, the fact that Officer Struble waited until after he gave Rodriguez the warning to conduct the dog sniff does not alter this analysis.  Because “the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog . . . generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests,” 543 U. S., at 409, “conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner,” id., at 408. The stop here was “lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.”  Ibid. As in Caballes, “conducting a dog sniff [did] not change the character of [the] traffic stop,” ibid., and thus no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.  

II

 Rather than adhere to the reasonableness requirement that we have repeatedly characterized as the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” Brigham City, supra, at 403, the majority constructed a test of its own that is inconsistent with our precedents.

                                                         

A  

 The majority’s rule requires a traffic stop to “en[d] when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”  Ante, at 5.  “If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission” and he may hold the individual no longer. Ante, at 8 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The majority’s rule thus imposes a oneway ratchet for constitutional protection linked to the characteristics of the individual officer conducting the stop: If a driver is stopped by a particularly efficient officer, then he will be entitled to be released from the traffic stop after a shorter period of time than a driver stopped by a less efficient officer. Similarly, if a driver is stopped by an officer with access to technology that can shorten a records check, then he will be entitled to be released from the stop after a shorter period of time than an individual stopped by an officer without access to such technology.

 I “cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable and can be made to turn upon such trivialities.” Whren, 517 U. S., at 815 (citations omitted). We have repeatedly explained that the reasonableness inquiry must not hinge on the characteristics of the individual officer conducting the seizure.  We have held, for example, that an officer’s state of mind “does not invalidate [an] action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”  Id., at 813 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have spurned theories that would make the Fourth Amendment “change with local law enforcement practices.”  Moore, supra, at 172. And we have rejected a rule that would require the offense establishing probable cause to be “closely related to” the offense identified by the arresting officer, as such a rule would make “the constitutionality of an arrest . . . vary from place to place and from time to time, depending on whether the arresting officer states the reason for the detention and, if so, whether he correctly identifies a general class of offense for which probable cause exists.”  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In Devenpeck, a unanimous Court explained: “An arrest made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances would not. We see no reason to ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such arbitrarily variable protection.”  Ibid.  The majority’s logic would produce similarly arbitrary results. Under its reasoning, a traffic stop made by a rookie could be executed in a reasonable manner, whereas the same traffic stop made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer in precisely the same circumstances might not, if in fact his knowledge and experience made him capable of completing the stop faster. We have long rejected interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that would produce such haphazard results, and I see no reason to depart from our consistent practice today.

B

 As if that were not enough, the majority also limits the duration of the stop to the time it takes the officer to complete a narrow category of “traffic-based inquiries.”  Ante, at 8. According to the majority, these inquiries include those that “serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Ante, at 6.  Inquiries directed to “detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” are not traffic-related inquiries and thus cannot count toward the overall duration of the stop.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

 The combination of that definition of traffic-related inquiries with the majority’s officer-specific durational limit produces a result demonstrably at odds with our decision in Caballes. Caballes expressly anticipated that a traffic stop could be reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff. We explained that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred in Caballes, where the “duration of the stop . . . was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop,” but suggested a different result might attend a case “involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.”  543 U. S., at 407–408 (emphasis added).  The dividing line was whether the overall duration of the stop exceeded “the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission,” id., at 407, not, as the majority suggests, whether the duration of the stop “in fact” exceeded the time necessary to complete the trafficrelated inquiries, ante, at 8.

 The majority’s approach draws an artificial line between dog sniffs and other common police practices.  The lower courts have routinely confirmed that warrant checks are a constitutionally permissible part of a traffic stop, see, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 172 F. 3d 775, 778 (CA11 1999); United States v. Mendez, 118 F. 3d 1426, 1429 (CA10 1997); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F. 2d 431, 437 (CA5 1993), and the majority confirms that it finds no fault in these measures, ante, at 6. Yet its reasoning suggests the opposite. Such warrant checks look more like they are directed to “detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” than to “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  Perhaps one could argue that the existence of an outstanding warrant might make a driver less likely to operate his vehicle safely and responsibly on the road, but the same could be said about a driver in possession of contraband.  A driver confronted by the police in either case might try to flee or become violent toward the officer.  But under the majority’s analysis, a dog sniff, which is directed at uncovering that problem, is not treated as a traffic-based inquiry. Warrant checks, arguably, should fare no better.  The majority suggests that a warrant check is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop because it can be used “‘to  determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses.’”   Ante, at 6 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c), p. 516 (5th ed. 2012)). But as the very treatise on which the majority relies notes, such checks are a “manifest[ation of] the ‘war on drugs’ motivation so often underlying [routine traffic] stops,” and thus are very much like the dog sniff in this case. Id., §9.3(c), at 507–508.

 Investigative questioning rests on the same basis as the dog sniff. “Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 185 (2004).  And the lower courts have routinely upheld such questioning during routine traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 570 F. 3d 1009, 1013 (CA8 2009); United States v. Childs, 277 F. 3d 947, 953–954 (CA7 2002).  The majority’s reasoning appears to allow officers to engage in some questioning aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Ante, at 5.  But it is hard to see how such inquiries fall within the “seizure’s ‘mission’ [of] ad- dress[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the stop,” or “attend[ing] to related safety concerns.”  Ibid.  Its reasoning appears to come down to the principle that dogs are different.

C

 On a more fundamental level, the majority’s inquiry elides the distinction between traffic stops based on probable cause and those based on reasonable suspicion.  Probable cause is the “traditional justification” for the seizure of a person.  Whren, 517 U. S., at 817 (emphasis deleted); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 207–208 (1979).  This Court created an exception to that rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), permitting “police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than probable cause,” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 698 (1981). Reasonable suspicion is the justification for such seizures. Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 3).

 Traffic stops can be initiated based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  Although the Court has commented that a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest,” it has rejected the notion “that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439, and n. 29 (1984) (citation omitted).  Although all traffic stops must be executed reasonably, our precedents make clear that traffic stops justified by reasonable suspicion are subject to additional limitations that those justified by probable cause are not.  A traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion, like all Terry stops, must be “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”  Hiibel, 542 U. S., at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It also “cannot continue for an excessive period of time or resemble a traditional arrest.”  Id., at 185–186 (citation omitted).  By contrast, a stop based on probable cause affords an officer considerably more leeway. In such seizures, an officer may engage in a warrantless arrest of the driver, Atwater, 532 U. S., at 354, a warrantless search incident to arrest of the driver, Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5), and a warrantless search incident to arrest of the vehicle if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found there, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 335 (2009).

 The majority casually tosses this distinction aside.  It asserts that the traffic stop in this case, which was undisputedly initiated on the basis of probable cause, can last no longer than is in fact necessary to effectuate the mission of the stop.  Ante, at 8. And, it assumes that the mission of the stop was merely to write a traffic ticket, rather than to consider making a custodial arrest.  Ante, at 5. In support of that durational requirement, it relies primarily on cases involving Terry stops. See ante, at 5–7 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323 (2009) (analyzing “stop and frisk” of passenger in a vehicle temporarily seized for a traffic violation); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (1985) (analyzing seizure of individuals based on suspicion of marijuana trafficking); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion) (analyzing seizure of man walking through airport on suspicion of narcotics activity)).

The only case involving a traffic stop based on probable cause that the majority cites for its rule is Caballes. But, that decision provides no support for today’s restructuring of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In Caballes, the Court made clear that, in the context of a traffic stop supported by probable cause, “a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.”  543 U. S., at 408.  To be sure, the dissent in Caballes would have “appl[ied] Terry’s reasonable-relation test . . . to determine whether the canine sniff impermissibly expanded the scope of the initially valid seizure of Caballes.”  Id., at 420 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).  But even it conceded that the Caballes majority had “implicitly [rejected] the application of Terry to a traffic stop converted, by calling in a dog, to a drug search.” Id., at 421.

 By strictly limiting the tasks that define the durational scope of the traffic stop, the majority accomplishes today what the Caballes dissent could not: strictly limiting the scope of an officer’s activities during a traffic stop justified by probable cause. In doing so, it renders the difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion virtually meaningless in this context.  That shift is supported neither by the Fourth Amendment nor by our precedents interpreting it. And, it results in a constitutional framework that lacks predictability.  Had Officer Struble ar- rested, handcuffed, and taken Rodriguez to the police station for his traffic violation, he would have complied with the Fourth Amendment.  See Atwater, supra, at 354– 355. But because he made Rodriguez wait for seven or eight extra minutes until a dog arrived, he evidently committed a constitutional violation.  Such a view of the Fourth Amendment makes little sense.

III

 Today’s revision of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was also entirely unnecessary.  Rodriguez suffered no Fourth Amendment violation here for an entirely independent reason: Officer Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue to hold him for investigative purposes.  Our precedents make clear that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to conduct an investigative traffic stop when that officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”  Prado Navarette, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at “the whole picture,” ibid., taking into account “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Officer Struble testified that he first became suspicious that Rodriguez was engaged in criminal activity for a number of reasons. When he approached the vehicle, he  smelled an “overwhelming odor of air freshener coming from the vehicle,” which is, in his experience, “a common attempt to conceal an odor that [people] don’t want . . . to be smelled by the police.”  App. 20–21.  He also observed, upon approaching the front window on the passenger side of the vehicle, that Rodriguez’s passenger, Scott Pollman, appeared nervous.  Pollman pulled his hat down low, puffed nervously on a cigarette, and refused to make eye contact with him.  The officer thought he was “more nervous than your typical passenger” who “do[esn’t] have anything to worry about because [t]hey didn’t commit a [traffic] violation.”  Id., at 34.

 Officer Struble’s interactions with the vehicle’s occupants only increased his suspicions.  When he asked Rod- riguez why he had driven onto the shoulder, Rodriguez claimed that he swerved to avoid a pothole.  But that story could not be squared with Officer Struble’s observation of the vehicle slowly driving off the road before being jerked back onto it. And when Officer Struble asked Pollman where they were coming from and where they were going, Pollman told him they were traveling from Omaha, Nebraska, back to Norfolk, Nebraska, after looking at a vehicle they were considering purchasing.  Pollman told the officer that he had neither seen pictures of the vehicle nor confirmed title before the trip.  As Officer Struble explained, it “seemed suspicious” to him “to drive . . . approximately two hours . . . late at night to see a vehicle sight unseen to possibly buy it,” id., at 26, and to go from Norfolk to Omaha to look at it because “[u]sually people leave Omaha to go get vehicles, not the other way around” due to higher Omaha taxes, id., at 65.

 These facts, taken together, easily meet our standard for reasonable suspicion.  “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion,” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124 (2000), and both vehicle occupants were engaged in such conduct.  The officer also recognized heavy use of air freshener, which, in his experience, indicated the presence of contraband in the vehicle. “[C]ommonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” further support the officer’s conclusion that Pollman’s story about their trip was likely a cover story for illegal activity. Id., at 125. Taking into account all the relevant facts, Officer Struble possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct the dog sniff.  Rodriguez contends that reasonable suspicion cannot exist because each of the actions giving rise to the officer’s suspicions could be entirely innocent, but our cases easily dispose of that argument. Acts that, by themselves, might be innocent can, when taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion.  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 274–275 (2002). Terry is a classic example, as it involved two individuals repeatedly walking back and forth, looking into a store window, and conferring with one another as well as with a third man.  392 U. S., at 6. The Court reasoned that this “series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, . . . together warranted further investigation,” id., at 22, and it has reiterated that analysis in a number of cases, see, e.g., Arvizu, supra, at 277; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1989).  This one is no different.

*  *  *

 I would conclude that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment here.  Officer Struble possessed probable cause to stop Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder, and he executed the subsequent stop in a reasonable manner. Our decision in Caballes requires no more. The majority’s holding to the contrary is irreconcilable with Caballes and a number of other routine police practices, distorts the distinction between traffic stops justified by probable cause and those justified by reasonable suspicion, and abandons reasonableness as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.  I respectfully dissent.

 

 

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.

 This is an unnecessary,[1] impractical, and arbitrary decision. It addresses a purely hypothetical question: whether the traffic stop in this case would be unreasonable if the police officer, prior to leading a drug-sniffing dog  around the exterior of petitioner’s car, did not already have reasonable suspicion that the car contained drugs.  In fact, however, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion, and, as a result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at issue.

 The relevant facts are not in dispute. Officer Struble, who made the stop, was the only witness at the suppression hearing, and his testimony about what happened was not challenged. Defense counsel argued that the facts recounted by Officer Struble were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but defense counsel did not dispute those facts or attack the officer’s credibility. Similarly, the Magistrate Judge who conducted the hearing did not question the officer’s credibility.  And as JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion shows, the facts recounted by Officer Struble “easily meet our standard for reasonable suspicion.”  Ante, at 11 (dissenting opinion); see also, e.g., United  

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2

 

States v. Carpenter, 462 F. 3d 981, 986–987 (CA8 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff based on implausible travel plans and nervous conduct); United States v. Ludwig, 641 F. 3d 1243, 1248–1250 (CA10 2011) (finding reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff where, among other things, the officer smelled “strong masking odors,” the defendant’s “account of his travel was suspect,” and the defendant “was exceptionally nervous throughout his encounter”).

 Not only does the Court reach out to decide a question not really presented by the facts in this case, but the Court’s answer to that question is arbitrary. The Court refuses to address the real Fourth Amendment question: whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged.  Instead, the Court latches onto the fact that Officer Struble delivered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims that the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a citation or warning is handed over to the driver.  The Court thus holds that the Fourth Amendment was vio- lated, not because of the length of the stop, but simply be- cause of the sequence in which Officer Struble chose to perform his tasks.

 This holding is not only arbitrary; it is perverse since Officer Struble chose that sequence for the purpose of protecting his own safety and possibly the safety of others.  See App. 71–72.  Without prolonging the stop, Officer Struble could have conducted the dog sniff while one of the tasks that the Court regards as properly part of the traffic stop was still in progress, but that sequence would have entailed unnecessary risk.  At approximately 12:19 a.m., after collecting Pollman’s driver’s license, Officer Struble did two things. He called in the information needed to do a records check on Pollman (a step that the Court recognizes was properly part of the traffic stop), and he requested that another officer report to the scene.  Officer Struble had decided to perform a dog sniff but did not want to do that without another officer present. When occupants of a vehicle who know that their vehicle contains a large amount of illegal drugs see that a drugsniffing dog has alerted for the presence of drugs, they will almost certainly realize that the police will then proceed to search the vehicle, discover the drugs, and make arrests.  Thus, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that an alert will increase the risk that the occupants of the vehicle will attempt to flee or perhaps even attack the officer.  See, e.g., United States v. Dawdy, 46 F. 3d 1427, 1429 (CA8 1995) (recounting scuffle between officer and defendant after drugs were discovered).

 In this case, Officer Struble was concerned that he was outnumbered at the scene, and he therefore called for backup and waited for the arrival of another officer before conducting the sniff.  As a result, the sniff was not completed until seven or eight minutes after he delivered the warning. But Officer Struble could have proceeded with the dog sniff while he was waiting for the results of the records check on Pollman and before the arrival of the second officer. The drug-sniffing dog was present in Officer Struble’s car.  If he had chosen that riskier sequence of events, the dog sniff would have been completed before the point in time when, according to the Court’s analysis, the authority to detain for the traffic stop ended.  Thus, an action that would have been lawful had the officer made the unreasonable decision to risk his life became un- lawful when the officer made the reasonable decision to wait  a few minutes for backup.  Officer Struble’s error— apparently—was following prudent procedures motivated by legitimate safety concerns. The Court’s holding therefore makes no practical sense. And nothing in the Fourth Amendment, which speaks of reasonableness, compels this arbitrary line.

 The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going forward.[2]  It is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot fathom the reason for that requirement.  (I would love to be the proverbial fly on the wall when police instructors teach this rule to officers who make traffic stops.)  For these reasons and those set out in JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion, I respectfully dissent.  

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[1] See Brief in Opposition 11–14.

[2] It is important to note that the Court’s decision does not affect procedures routinely carried out during traffic stops, including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Ante, at 6. And the Court reaffirms that police “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.” Ibid.  Thus, it remains true that police may ask questions aimed at uncovering other criminal conduct and may order occupants out of their car during a valid stop.  See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 333 (2009); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 414–415 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam).