5 Cal.5th 522
Supreme Court of California.

Dawn L. HASSELL et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Ava BIRD, Defendant;
Yelp Inc., Objector and Appellant.

S235968

Date Filed: July 2, 2018

Attorneys and Law Firms

Aaron Schur; Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, San Francisco, Deborah A. Adler and Rochelle L. Wilcox, Los Angeles, for Objector and Appellant.

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Patrick J. Carome, Ari Holtzblatt and Mark D. Flanagan, Palo Alto, for Airbnb, Inc., Automattic Inc., craigslist, Inc., Facebook, Inc., IAC/InterActiveCorp, Reddit, Inc., Snap Inc., Pinterest, Inc., Thumbtack, Inc., Twitter, Inc., and Yahoo! Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

J. Joshua Wheeler; Katie Townsend, Bruce D. Brown, Gregg P. Leslie and Ariel B. Glickman for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, American Society of News Editors, Association of Alternative Newsmedia, BuzzFeed, The E.W. Scripps Company, International Documentary Association, Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University, The McClatchy Company, Media Law Resource Center, MPA—The Association of Magazine Media, National Press Photographers Association, News Media Alliance, Online News Association, Radio Television Digital News Association, Reporters Without Borders, The Seattle Times Company, Society of Professional Journalists, Student Press Law Center and Tully Center for Free Speech as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, David H. Kramer, Palo Alto, Shelby Pasarell Tsai, San Francisco, Brian M. Willen and Jason B. Mollick for Google Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

NYU Technology Law & Policy Clinic and Jason M. Schultz for Change.org, Engine, GitHub, Inc., A Medium Corporation, Patreon, Inc., SiteJabber and Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf Objector and of Appellant.

Public Citizen Litigation Group, Paul Alan Levy; Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic, Phillip R. Malone, Jef Pearlman, Daniel Chao and Erica Sollazzo for Public Citizen, Inc., and Floor64, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Greenberg Traurig, Ian C. Ballon, East Palo Alto, and Lori Chang, Los Angeles, for Glassdoor, Inc., and TripAdvisor LLC as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy B. Rosen, Burbank, Scott P. Dixler and Matthew C. Samet for ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties, ACLU of Southern California, Avvo, California Anti-SLAPP Project, Electronic Frontier Foundation, First Amendment Coalition and Public Participation Project as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

University of Arizona College of Law and Jane Yakowitz Bambauer for First Amendment and Internet Law Scholars as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Fenwick & West, Andrew P. Bridges, Tyler G. Newby, Guinevere Jobson and Armen N. Nercessian, San Francisco, for Internet Association and Consumer Technology Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Brown White & Osborn, Kenneth P. White, Los Angeles, and Evelina Gentry for Ava Bird as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Anette J. Beebe; Gingras Law Office and David S. Gingras for XCentric Ventures, LLC as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic at UCLA School of Law and Eugene Volokh, Los Angeles, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Objector and Appellant.

Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier, Monique Olivier, San Francisco, and J. Erick Heath for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Harder Mirell & Abrams, Douglas E. Mirell, Beverly Hills, Charles J. Harder, Los Angeles, and Dilan E. Esper for Erwin Chemerinsky, Valencia Corridor Merchants Association, Derik Lewis, Aaron Morris and Henry Karnilowicz as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Opinion

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

In this case, we consider the validity of a court order, entered upon a default judgment in a defamation case, insofar as it directs appellant Yelp Inc. (Yelp) to remove certain consumer reviews posted on its website. Yelp was not named as a defendant in the underlying lawsuit, brought by plaintiffs Dawn Hassell and the Hassell Law Group, and did not participate in the judicial proceedings that led to the default judgment. Instead, Yelp became involved in this litigation only after being served with a copy of the aforementioned judgment and order.

Yelp argues that, to the extent the removal order would impose upon it a duty to remove these reviews, the directive violates its right to due process under the federal and state Constitutions because it was issued without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. Yelp also asserts that this aspect of the order is invalid under the Communications Decency Act of 1996, relevant provisions of which (found at 47 U.S.C. § 230, hereinafter referred to as section 230)[FN1] relate, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” (§ 230(c)(1) ), and “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section” (§ 230(e)(3) ).

The Court of Appeal rejected Yelp's arguments. We reverse. The Court of Appeal erred in regarding the order to Yelp as beyond the scope of section 230. That court reasoned that the judicial command to purge the challenged reviews does not impose liability on Yelp. But as explained below, the Court of Appeal adopted too narrow a construction of section 230. In directing Yelp to remove the challenged reviews from its website, the removal order improperly treats Yelp as “the publisher or speaker of ... information provided by another information content provider.” (§ 230(c)(1).) The order therefore must be revised to comply with section 230.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2012, defendant Ava Bird approached the Hassell Law Group, owned by Dawn Hassell (who is hereinafter referred to as Hassell), to represent her in a personal injury matter. That August, Bird and the law firm entered into a representation agreement. After e-mail exchanges and communication difficulties led Hassell to conclude that Bird was unhappy with the firm's performance, the Hassell Law Group withdrew from representation in September 2012. Hassell notified Bird of this decision via e-mail.

Several months later, on January 28, 2013, a one-star (out of five) review of the Hassell Law Group appeared on Yelp. This website, available to anyone with Internet access, provides a forum for reviews and ratings of businesses and other entities. Individuals with Yelp accounts author the reviews and issue the ratings. Individual reviews and ratings appear on the Yelp website together with the author's Yelp user name and location. A reviewed business may post a public response to a user review; this response will appear directly below the review on Yelp's website. Yelp also combines individual ratings into an aggregate rating for each business.
The one-star review was posted by Yelp user “Birdzeye B.” from Los Angeles, California. It provided in full (with the spelling, spacing, capitalization, and punctuation in this and all other quoted reviews per the originals) as follows:

“well, here is another business that doesn't even deserve one star. basically, dawn hassell made a bad situation much worse for me. she told me she could help with my personal injury case from falling through a floor, then reneged on the case because her mom had a broken leg, or something like that, and that the insurance company was too much for her to handle. and all of this after i met with her office (not her personally, she was nowhere to be found) signed paperwork to ‘hire’ them and gained confidence in her office (due mostly to yelp reviews) so, in all fairness, i have to share my experience so others can be forewarned. she will probably not do anything for you, except make your situation worse. in fact, after signing all the paperwork with her office, like a broken record, they repeated ‘DO NOT TALK TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY’ over and over and over. and over and over. so I honored that and did not speak to them. but the hassell law group didn't ever speak with the insurance company either, neglecting their said responsibilities and not living up to their own legal contract! nor did they bother to communicate with me, the client or the insurance company AT ALL. then, she dropped the case because of her mother and seeming lack of work ethic. (a good attorney wont do this, in fact, they aren't supposed to) to save your case, STEER CLEAR OF THIS LAW FIRM! and research around to find a law firm with a proven track record of success, a good work ethic, competence and long term client satisfaction. there are many in the bay area and with some diligent smart interviewing, you can find a competent attorney, but this wont be one of them.”

Hassell believed Bird to be the author of this review, and sent her an e-mail. Hassell wrote Bird that “[y]ou are certainly free to write a review about your experience and provide constructive feedback. But slandering someone and intentionally trying to damage their business and reputation is illegal.” Disputing statements in the review, Hassell requested that Bird remove or revise it, and wrote that “[i]f you are unwilling to talk to me or respond, I will assume you don't intend to work this out [with] me directly and I will retain a defamation attorney this week to file a legal action against you for slander and defamation.” Bird responded with a lengthy e-mail of her own, in which she stated that Hassell would “have to accept the permanent, honest review [I] have given you.

Shortly thereafter, on February 6, 2013, another one-star review of the Hassell Law Group was posted on Yelp. This review was from the user “J.D.,” identified as hailing from Alameda, California. It provided in full as follows: “Did not like the fact that they charged me their client to make COPIES, send out FAXES, POSTAGE, AND FOR MAKING PHONE CALLS about my case!!! Isn't that your job. That's just ridiculous!!! They Deducted all those expenses out of my settlement.”

On April 10, 2013, plaintiffs filed suit against Bird in San Francisco Superior Court. The verified complaint alleged that Bird wrote both of the previously discussed reviews, that these reviews were libelous, and that in posting the reviews, Bird cast plaintiffs in a false light and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Hassell. Plaintiffs sought general, special, and punitive damages, as well as “injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant Ava Bird from continuing to defame plaintiffs as complained of herein, and requiring Defendant Ava Bird to remove each and every defamatory review published by her about plaintiffs, from Yelp.com and from anywhere else they appear on the internet.” Yelp was not named as a defendant. At oral argument before this court, counsel for plaintiffs candidly acknowledged that this omission was intentional. Plaintiffs anticipated that if they added Yelp as a defendant and integrated the company into the action at that time, Yelp could respond by asserting immunity under section 230.

After several attempts at personal service failed, plaintiffs effected substitute service. On April 17, 2013, the summons and complaint were left with another individual at the address where Bird was believed to reside. In November 2013, with Bird not yet having appeared in the case, plaintiffs moved for entry of a default judgment. In the interim, “Birdzeye B.” had posted on Yelp an “update” of her review of the Hassell Law Group. This update (which henceforth will be described as a review), dated April 29, 2013, provided as follows:

“here is an update on this review.

dawn hassell has filed a lawsuit against me over this review I posted on yelp! she has tried to threaten, bully, intimidate, harass me into removing the review! she actually hired another bad attorney to fight this. lol! well, looks like my original review has turned out to be truer than ever! avoid this business like the plague folks! and the staff at YELP has stepped up and is defending my right to post a review. once again, thanks YELP! and I have reported her actions to the Better Business Bureau as well, so they have a record of how she handles business. another good resource is the BBB, by the way.”

In a declaration filed in support of the request for a default judgment, Hassell explained that she had connected the January 2013 review to Bird “[b]ased on the poster's user name being similar to Ms. Bird's real name and the details such as ‘falling through a floor.’ ” Hassell also averred that the review from “J.D.” had been written by Bird. She further related that since the first of the challenged reviews had been posted, the Hassell Law Group had seen a significant decrease in user activity on Yelp that suggested interest in the firm, and that as a result of this review, its overall Yelp rating had dropped to 4.5 stars.

A “prove-up” evidentiary hearing was held on January 14, 2014.[FN2] Hassell was sworn as a witness and gave testimony at this session. After the hearing, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, awarding general and special damages and costs totaling $557,918.85. The court also ordered Bird “to remove each and every defamatory review published or caused to be published by her about plaintiffs HASSELL LAW GROUP and DAWN HASSELL from Yelp.com and from anywhere else they appear on the internet within 5 business days of the date of the court's order.” The court's order also provides that Bird, and “her agents, officers, employees or representatives, or anyone acting on her behalf, are further enjoined from publishing or causing to be published any written reviews, commentary, or descriptions of DAWN HASSELL or the HASSELL LAW GROUP on Yelp.com or any other internet location or website.” Finally, the order states that “Yelp.com is ordered to remove all reviews posted by AVA BIRD under user names ‘Birdzeye B.’ and ‘J.D.’ attached hereto as Exhibit A and any subsequent comments of these reviewers within 7 business days of the date of the court's order.” Exhibit A includes the January 2013 and April 2013 reviews by “Birdzeye B.,” and the February 2013 review by “J.D.”[FN3]

Yelp was served with a copy of the default judgment later that month.[FN4] In response, Yelp's in-house counsel wrote Hassell a letter that identified several perceived deficiencies with the judgment and removal order. The letter accordingly advised that “Yelp sees no reason at this time to remove the reviews at issue.” The letter added that Yelp reserved the right to revisit this decision if it were to receive additional facts responsive to its concerns. Hassell was told that if an action were pursued against Yelp premised on its publication of the reviews, Yelp would “promptly seek dismissal of such action and its attorneys' fees under California's anti-SLAPP law.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Hassell responded by letter dated April 30, 2014, explaining her position and asking Yelp to reconsider and remove the reviews.

The next month, Yelp filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. In its supporting brief, Yelp argued that to the extent the order to remove the posts was aimed at it, the directive violated Yelp's due process rights, exceeded the scope of relief requested in the complaint, and was barred by section 230. Yelp also argued that Hassell had not given proper notice of the action to Bird, nor connected the challenged reviews to Bird sufficiently to justify an injunction.[FN5] Yelp requested that the default judgment be set aside and vacated in its entirety, or in the alternative, “modified to eliminate all provisions that compel Yelp to act in any manner, or restrain Yelp from engaging in any conduct.”

The superior court denied the motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. In its order denying the motion, the court quoted this court's generic assessment that “ ‘[i]n matters of injunction ... it has been a common practice to make the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined person may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc., though not parties to the action, and this practice has always been upheld by the courts.’ ” (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 906, 141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727.) The superior court applied this principle to the present case because, in the court's view, there was a “factual basis to support Hassell's contention that Yelp is aiding and abetting Bird's violation of the injunction.” As evidence of this aiding and abetting, the superior court noted that “Yelp highlighted at least one of Bird's defamatory reviews by featuring it as a ‘Recommended Review,’ ” that “a litany of favorable reviews are not factored into the Hassell Law [Group]'s star rating, appearing to give emphasis to Bird's defamatory review,” that Yelp was moving “to set aside the judgment in its entirety, including the portions of the judgment that pertain only to Bird” and otherwise was advancing arguments “on Bird's behalf,” and that “notwithstanding a judicial finding that Bird's reviews are defamatory, Yelp refuses to delete them.”

Yelp appealed. It reasserted on appeal that the order, to the extent that it commanded Yelp to remove the challenged reviews, violated the company's due process rights, as well as section 230. (Hassell v. Bird (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341, 1355, 1361, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.)[FN6] The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. It first found no due process violation in allowing the injunction to run against Yelp. As had the superior court, the Court of Appeal regarded Yelp as being among the actors to whom the injunction could properly extend, even though it was not a party to the proceedings that led to the injunction. (Id., at pp. 1355-1357, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) The Court of Appeal also found no merit in Yelp's related argument that, regardless of whether an injunction normally can run against nonparties, the injunction here could not properly extend to it because such a reach would unduly limit the dissemination of speech. The Court of Appeal questioned the premise of this argument, opining that “it appears to us that the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher of Bird's speech, but rather as the administrator of the forum that Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews.” (Id., at p. 1358, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) The Court of Appeal also observed that in Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 156 P.3d 339, this court ruled that “ ‘an injunction issued following a trial that determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the defendant from repeating the defamation, is not a prior restraint and does not offend the First Amendment.’ ” (Hassell v. Bird, at p. 1360, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203, quoting Balboa Island, at p. 1148, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 156 P.3d 339.) The Court of Appeal concluded that “[u]nder the authority of Balboa Island ... the trial court had the power to make the part of this order requiring Yelp to remove the three specific statements ... because the injunction prohibiting Bird from repeating those statements was issued following a determination at trial that those statements are defamatory.” (Id., at p. 1360, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.)

Turning to Yelp's section 230 argument, the Court of Appeal recognized that “section 230 has been construed broadly to immunize ‘providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties’ ” (Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203, quoting Fair Housing Coun., San Fernando v. Roommates.com (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, fn. omitted), and that in Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510 (Barrett ), this court similarly regarded section 230 as, in the words of the Court of Appeal, “afford[ing] interactive service providers broad immunity from tort liability for third party speech” (Hassell v. Bird, at p. 1362, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203). The Court of Appeal further acknowledged that “section 230 also ‘precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.’ ” (Id., at pp. 1361-1362, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203, quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 330 (Zeran ).)

The Court of Appeal nevertheless determined that section 230 does not prohibit a directive that Yelp remove the challenged reviews. The court reasoned that “[t]he removal order does not violate ... section 230 because it does not impose any liability on Yelp. In this defamation action, [plaintiffs] filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and [were] awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp.” (Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.)

The Court of Appeal recognized that other courts (e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772 (Kathleen R.); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. (E.D.Va. 2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532; Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group (E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002, No. 02-1964), 2002 WL 31844907; Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2014) 152 So.3d 727) had construed section 230 immunity as extending to claims for injunctive relief. (Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) But the Court of Appeal regarded those cases as inapposite because they involved situations in which section 230 immunity had been interposed by a named party at a stage of the proceedings when the cases merely involved allegations of improper conduct by a third party, “and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider's Web site” in a case filed against only the third party. (Hassell v. Bird, at pp. 1364-1365, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) The court also rejected the argument that the prospect of contempt sanctions would amount to “liability” under the statute. (Id., at p. 1365, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) According to the Court of Appeal, “sanctioning Yelp for violating a court order would not implicate section 230 at all; it would not impose liability on Yelp as a publisher or distributor of third party content.” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal thus affirmed the superior court's order denying Yelp's motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, albeit with instructions to the superior court to modify the order on remand so that it compelled only the removal of the three challenged reviews. (Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365-1366, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.)[FN7] We granted review.

II. Discussion

Before this court, Yelp renews the constitutional and statutory arguments it raised before the Court of Appeal. Namely, Yelp maintains that the removal order does not comport with due process insofar as it directs Yelp to remove the three reviews at issue without affording prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Yelp also claims that this aspect of the order violates section 230 by treating it as “the publisher or speaker of ... information provided by another information content provider.” (§ 230(c)(1); see also § 230(e)(3).) Because the statutory argument is dispositive, there is no need to address the due process question. (See Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1102, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 324 P.3d 50 [“[o]ur jurisprudence directs that we avoid resolving constitutional questions if the issue may be resolved on narrower grounds”]; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230-231, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225.)

A. Section 230

Section 230 appears within the Communications Decency Act of 1996,[FN8] enacted as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56). Congress enacted section 230 “for two basic policy reasons: to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.” (Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1122; see also Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 50-54, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510 [reviewing the legislative history of section 230].) One of the impetuses for section 230 was a judicial decision opining that because an operator of Internet bulletin boards had taken an active role in policing the content of these fora, for purposes of defamation law it could be regarded as the “publisher” of material posted on these boards by users. (Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1995) 23 Media L.Rep. 1794, [1995 WL 323710]; see also Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 50-53, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)

Section 230 begins with a series of findings and policy declarations. The findings include, “The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens” (§ 230(a)(1) ), and “The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation” (§ 230(a)(4) ). The policies include the goals “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media” (§ 230(b)(1) ), and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation” (§ 230(b)(2) ).

Implementing these views, section 230(c)(1) provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”[FN9] Section 230(e)(3), meanwhile, relates in relevant part, “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” (§ 230(f)(2).) The term “information content provider,” meanwhile, “means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” (§ 230(f)(3).)

B. Judicial Construction of Section 230

The immunity provisions within section 230 “have been widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity against defamation liability for those who use the Internet to publish information that originated from another source.” (Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510; accord, Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 [“[c]ourts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly in all cases arising from the publication of user-generated content”]; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at p. 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust”].) Although a full review of the substantial body of case law interpreting section 230 is unnecessary to resolve this case, an overview of certain leading decisions follows.

1. Zeran

Section 230 was the subject of an early and influential construction in Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d 327. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 41, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510 [describing Zeran as “[t]he leading case on section 230 immunity”].) The lawsuit in Zeran involved messages posted on an America Online, Inc. (AOL) online bulletin board. (Zeran, at p. 329.) These messages promoted t-shirts, bumper stickers, and key chains bearing offensive content, and added that anyone interested in purchasing one of these items should contact the plaintiff at his home phone number. (Ibid.) As a result of these posts, the plaintiff—who in fact had no connection to the wares—was inundated by angry phone calls, including death threats. (Ibid.) The plaintiff subsequently brought a negligence claim against AOL, alleging that AOL took an unreasonably long time to remove the messages, “refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter.” (Id., at p. 328.)

AOL claimed immunity under section 230. (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 328.) In affirming a grant of judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of AOL on this ground (id., at p. 330), the federal court of appeals in Zeran emphasized the broad parameters of the statutory grant of immunity. The court observed, “By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” (Ibid.) The Zeran court continued, “The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.” (Ibid.)

The plaintiff in Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d 327, argued that section 230 should be read narrowly, so that AOL could be held liable as a “distributor” of the online posts. (Zeran, at pp. 331-332.) In rejecting this limited view of section 230 immunity, the Zeran court stressed that if the notice-based legal standard for defamation liability that applies to distributors of printed information was transplanted to the Internet, it would place online intermediaries in an untenable position. “If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability,” the court observed, “they would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—from any party, concerning any message. Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information. Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet context." (Zeran, at p. 333.) In the same vein, the court also stressed that “notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could simply ‘notify’ the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally defamatory.” (Ibid.)

2. Kathleen R.

Other courts have followed Zeran in adopting a broad view of section 230's immunity provisions. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) Several decisions by the Courts of Appeal of this state, for example, have advanced a similar understanding of section 230. (See, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 567-575, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 [section 230 immunity applies to tort claims against a social networking website, brought by minors who claimed that they had been assaulted by adults they met on that website]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2007) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 804-808, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 [section 230 immunity applies to tort claims against an employer that operated an internal computer network used by an employee to allegedly communicate threats against the plaintiff]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 828-836, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 [section 230 immunity applies to tort and statutory claims against an auction website, brought by plaintiffs who allegedly purchased forgeries from third party sellers on the website].)

Among the decisions of the Courts of Appeal construing section 230, the ruling in Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, is particularly relevant here, for as recognized by the Court of Appeal below, the court in Kathleen R. held that section 230 immunity extends to claims for injunctive relief.
The plaintiff in Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, filed suit against a city after her son, a minor, used computers at the city library to download sexually explicit photos from the Internet. (Id., at p. 690, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) She brought claims under state and federal law. (Id., at p. 691, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) The plaintiff sought injunctive relief in connection with all of her causes of action, with her state-law claims seeking to prevent the city “from acquiring or maintaining computers which allow people to access obscenity or minors to access harmful sexual matter; from maintaining any premises where minors have that ability; and from expending public funds on such computers.” (Ibid.)

The court in Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, held that section 230 barred all of the plaintiff's state-law claims, even insofar as they sought injunctive relief.[FN10] (Kathleen R., at p. 698, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) In reaching this result, the court expressly rejected the plaintiff's position that section 230 immunity does not adhere to the extent that a plaintiff pursues declaratory or injunctive relief, as opposed to damages. (Kathleen R., at p. 698, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) The court reasoned, “Section 230 provides broadly that ‘[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.’ (§ 230(e)(3), italics added.) Thus, even if for purposes of section 230 ‘liability’ means only an award of damages [citation], the statute by its terms also precludes other causes of action for other forms of relief.” (Kathleen R., at p. 698, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.) The court also observed that the plaintiff's pursuit of injunctive relief, if it came to fruition, could “prevent [the city] from providing open access to the Internet on its library computers,” which would “contravene section 230's stated purpose of promoting unfettered development of the Internet no less than her damage claims.” (Ibid.)

3. Barrett

In the one prior occasion we have had to construe section 230, we, too, have read its provisions as conferring broad immunity.

In Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, the plaintiffs sued for defamation after the defendant posted copies of an assertedly libelous article on two websites. (Id., at pp. 40-41, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) The defendant had received the article from another individual via an e-mail. (Id., at p. 41, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)

In vacating an order entered by the superior court, which had granted the defendant's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court of Appeal in Barrett adopted the same narrow reading of the word “publisher” within section 230(c)(1) that had been rejected by the court in Zeran—i.e., it construed section 230 as being concerned only with preventing online intermediaries from being held liable under standards applicable to publishers, while leaving distributor liability, where appropriate, intact. In the view of the Court of Appeal in Barrett, when the defendant in that case reposted the article she had received from another online source, she acted as a distributor of this information. (Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) This designation meant that the defendant could be held liable if she distributed a defamatory statement with notice of its libelous character. (Id., at pp. 39, 41, 44-45, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)

We reversed. Our unanimous majority opinion in Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, rejected both the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the term “publisher” within section 230(c)(1), and a comparably constrained construction of the term “user” within that same subsection that would distinguish between “passive” users who could claim section 230 immunity and “active” users who could not. (Barrett, at p. 63, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) As had the Zeran court, we declined to read section 230(c)(1) as leaving Internet intermediaries subject to liability on the same terms applicable to distributors of printed material. Instead, we endorsed as “sound” Zeran's construction of “publisher” (Barrett, at p. 48, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510), and adopted a similarly “inclusive” interpretation of that word (id., at p. 49, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510). We observed, “the terms of section 230(c)(1) ... reflect the intent to promote active screening by service providers of online content provided by others. Congress implemented its intent ... by broadly shielding all providers from liability for ‘publishing’ information received from third parties. Congress contemplated self-regulation, rather than regulation compelled at the sword point of tort liability.” (Id., at p. 53, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, fn.omitted.) Later, we reiterated that section 230 confers “blanket immunity from tort liability for online republication of third party content.” (Barrett, at p. 57, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)[FN11]

Our analysis in Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, also elaborated upon Congress's intent in enacting section 230, and the practical consequences associated with a cramped construction of the statute. We explained, “It is inaccurate to suggest that Congress was indifferent to free speech protection when it enacted section 230,” given the statute's many findings extolling the value of Internet speech and evincing legislators' interest in further development of this forum. (Barrett, at p. 56, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) We also noted that “[t]he provisions of section 230(c)(1), conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are themselves a strong demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free market for online expression.” (Ibid.) A limited construction of section 230 would conflict with Congress's goal of facilitating online discourse, we observed, because “subjecting Internet service providers and users to defamation liability” for the republication of online content—even under the standards applicable to distributors—“would tend to chill online speech.” (Barrett, at p. 56, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at pp. 1123-1124, Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-1028, Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at p. 538, Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C. 1998) 992 F.Supp. 44, 52, Donato v. Moldow (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2005) 374 N.J.Super. 475, 865 A.2d 711, 726.) This chilling effect could materialize for reasons including the fact that “[a]ny investigation of a potentially defamatory Internet posting is ... a daunting and expensive challenge.” (Id., at p. 57, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)

In closing, our opinion in Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, voiced some qualms about the result it reached. It explained that “[w]e share the concerns of those who have expressed reservations about the Zeran court's broad interpretation of section 230 immunity. The prospect of blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has disturbing implications.” (Id., at pp. 62-63, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) But, we added, these concerns were of no legal consequence, because the tools of statutory interpretation compelled a broad construction of section 230. (Barrett, at p. 63, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.)

C. Analysis

In construing section 230, we apply our standard approach to statutory interpretation. “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ [Citation.]” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616-617, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 389 P.3d 848.)

Our analysis of the statute begins with an uncontroversial observation: Yelp could have promptly sought and received section 230 immunity had plaintiffs originally named it as a defendant in this case. There is no doubt that Yelp is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service” within the meaning of section 230(c)(1) (see Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 [concluding that as an operator of a website, Yahoo acts as a provider of an interactive computer service] ), or that the substance of the reviews was provided to Yelp by “another information content provider” (§ 230(c)(1); see Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc. (N.Y. 2011) 17 N.Y.3d 281, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1019-1020). Had plaintiffs' claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light been alleged directly against Yelp, these theories would be readily understood as treating Yelp as the “publisher or speaker” of the challenged reviews. (See, e.g., Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 63, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510 [section 230 applies to claims for defamation]; Bennett v. Google, LLC (D.C. Cir. 2018) 882 F.3d 1163, 1164, 1169 [section 230 applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC (6th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 398, 402, 417 [section 230 applies to claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light].) This immunity, moreover, would have shielded Yelp from the injunctive relief that plaintiffs seek.  (See Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 687, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772; Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at pp. 539-540; Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., supra, 2002 WL 31844907 at pp. *4-*5; Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., supra, 152 So.3d at p. 731.)

The question here is whether a different result should obtain because plaintiffs made the tactical decision not to name Yelp as a defendant. Put another way, we must decide whether plaintiffs' litigation strategy allows them to accomplish indirectly what Congress has clearly forbidden them to achieve directly. We believe the answer is no.

Even though plaintiffs did not name Yelp as a defendant, their action ultimately treats it as “the publisher or speaker of ... information provided by another information content provider.” (§ 230(c)(1).) With the removal order, plaintiffs seek to overrule Yelp's decision to publish the three challenged reviews. Where, as here, an Internet intermediary's relevant conduct in a defamation case goes no further than the mere act of publication—including a refusal to depublish upon demand, after a subsequent finding that the published content is libelous—section 230 prohibits this kind of directive. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 48, 53, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510; Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330 [under section 230, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred”]; Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., supra, 152 So.3d at p. 731 [“[a]n action to force a website to remove content on the sole basis that the content is defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 230”].)[FN12]

Plaintiffs assert in their briefing that “Yelp's duty to comply [with the removal order] does not arise from its status as a publisher or speaker, but as a party through whom the court must enforce its order.” To plaintiffs, “the removal order simply prohibits Yelp from continuing to be the conduit through which Bird violates her injunction.” Just as other courts have rebuffed attempts to avoid section 230 through the “creative pleading” of barred claims (Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 836 F.3d 1263, 1266), we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' description of the situation before the court. It is true that plaintiffs obtained a default judgment and injunction in a lawsuit that named only Bird as a defendant. And it is also true that as a general rule, when an injunction has been obtained, certain nonparties may be required to comply with its terms. (See, e.g., Ross v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 906, 141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727.) But this principle does not supplant the inquiry that section 230(c)(1) requires. Parties and nonparties alike may have the responsibility to comply with court orders, including injunctions. But an order that treats an Internet intermediary “as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” nevertheless falls within the parameters of section 230(c)(1). (Cf. Giordano v. Romeo (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2011) 76 So.3d 1100, 1102 [recognizing that an online intermediary may claim section 230 immunity from injunctive relief associated with a defamation claim, notwithstanding a lower-court determination that at least part of the challenged online post was defamatory].) In substance, Yelp is being held to account for nothing more than its ongoing decision to publish the challenged reviews. Despite plaintiffs' generic description of the obligation they would impose on Yelp, in this case this duty is squarely derived from “the mere existence of the very relationship that Congress immunized from suit.” (Klayman v. Zuckerberg (D.C. Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 1354, 1360.)[FN13]

At the same time, we recognize that not all legal duties owed by Internet intermediaries necessarily treat them as the publishers of third party content, even when these obligations are in some way associated with their publication of this material. (See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1107 [regarding section 230 immunity as inapplicable to a claim of promissory estoppel alleging that an Internet intermediary promised to remove offensive content].) In this case, however, Yelp is inherently being treated as the publisher of the challenged reviews, and it has not engaged in conduct that would take it outside section 230's purview in connection with the removal order. The duty that plaintiffs would impose on Yelp, in all material respects, wholly owes to and coincides with the company's continuing role as a publisher of third party online content.

In his dissent, Justice Cuéllar argues that even if the injunction cannot on its face command Yelp to remove the reviews, the removal order nevertheless could run to Yelp through Bird under an aiding and abetting theory premised on conduct that remains inherently that of a publisher. (See dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 904, 913–915, 921–924, 420 P.3d at pp. 807, 815–816, 822–824.) We disagree. As applied to such behavior, Justice Cuéllar's approach would simply substitute one end-run around section 230 immunity for another. (Accord, Blockowicz v. Williams (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563, 568.) As for the other scenarios involving materially different types of conduct that Justice Cuéllar might hypothesize, such as conspiracies between a named party and an Internet republisher who has not been named as a party, it suffices for now to say that they are not before this court, and we have no occasion to consider whether they could lead to some remedy vis-à-vis the republisher.[FN14]

Plaintiffs also assert that Yelp cannot claim section 230 immunity because, under section 230(e)(3), no “cause of action” has been alleged directly against it as a defendant, and in their view making Yelp subject to an injunction does not amount to the imposition of “liability.” This argument reads constraining force into the language within section 230(e)(3) that provides, “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” This phrasing does not provide strong support for, much less compel, plaintiffs' construction. Section 230(e)(3) does not expressly demand that a cause of action always must be alleged directly against an Internet intermediary as a named defendant for the republisher to claim immunity under the statute. And in common legal parlance at the time of section 230's enactment, “liability” could encompass more than merely the imposition of damages. (See Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 914 [defining “liability” as “a broad legal term” that “has been referred to as of the most comprehensive significance, including almost every character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, or likely”].)[FN15]

Even more fundamentally, plaintiffs' interpretation misses the forest for the trees. Section 230(e)(3) underscores, rather than undermines, the broad scope of section 230 immunity by prohibiting not only the imposition of “liability” under certain state-law theories, but also the pursuit of a proscribed “cause of action.” (See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. (4th Cir. 2009) 591 F.3d 250, 254 [section 230 is not just a “ ‘defense to liability’ ”; it instead confers “ ‘immunity from suit’ ” (italics omitted) ]; Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., supra, 152 So.3d at p. 731.) This inclusive language, read in connection with section 230(c)(1) and the rest of section 230, conveys an intent to shield Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated with defending against state-law claims that treat them as the publisher or speaker of third party content, and from compelled compliance with demands for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff's allegations, similarly assign them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua publisher. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 53, 56, 57, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510; Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., supra, 570 F.3d at pp. 1101-1102; Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330.) As evidenced by section 230's findings, Congress believed that this targeted protection for republishers of online content would facilitate the ongoing development of the Internet. (See § 230(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(2).)

These interests are squarely implicated in this case. An injunction like the removal order plaintiffs obtained can impose substantial burdens on an Internet intermediary. Even if it would be mechanically simple to implement such an order, compliance still could interfere with and undermine the viability of an online platform. (See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., supra, 261 F.Supp.2d at p. 540 [“in some circumstances injunctive relief will be at least as burdensome to the service provider as damages, and is typically more intrusive”].) Furthermore, as this case illustrates, a seemingly straightforward removal order can generate substantial litigation over matters such as its validity or scope, or the manner in which it is implemented. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 57, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) Section 230 allows these litigation burdens to be imposed upon the originators of online speech. But the unique position of Internet intermediaries convinced Congress to spare republishers of online content, in a situation such as the one here, from this sort of ongoing entanglement with the courts.[FN16]

To summarize, we conclude that in light of Congress's designs with respect to section 230, the capacious language Congress adopted to effectuate its intent, and the consequences that could result if immunity were denied here, Yelp is entitled to immunity under the statute. Plaintiffs' attempted end-run around section 230 fails.[FN17]

The dissents see this case quite differently. The dissenting justices would endorse plaintiffs' gambit as consistent with Congress's intent in enacting section 230. We disagree on several levels with the dissents' construction of section 230.[FN18] The narrow, grudging view of section 230's immunity provisions advanced in both dissents is at odds with this court's analysis in Barrett, and for that matter with the views of virtually all courts that have construed section 230. Although Justice Cuéllar, in his dissent, repeatedly suggests that Yelp somehow improperly or prematurely injected itself into this action in a manner material to the necessary analysis (e.g., dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 905–906, 916–917, 917, 420 P.3d at pp. 808–809, 817–818, 818), with this case's unusual litigation posture—which was engineered by plaintiffs, not Yelp—it was perfectly appropriate for Yelp to seek clarification of its legal obligations before plaintiffs chose to initiate contempt proceedings against it. Additionally, although the dispositive nature of Yelp's section 230 argument makes it unnecessary to dwell on the due process concerns addressed by Justice Kruger in her concurring opinion (see generally conc. opn. of Kruger, J., post ), at a bare minimum we find it troubling that the dissents' approach, if it were the law, could create unfortunate incentives for plaintiffs to provide little or no prejudgment notice to persons or entities that could assert immunity as defendants. A plaintiff might reason that if even informal notice were provided, a nonparty republisher might seek to intervene as a defendant and claim immunity prior to the entry of judgment.[FN19]

Perhaps the dissenters' greatest error is that they fail to fully grasp how plaintiffs' maneuver, if accepted, could subvert a statutory scheme intended to promote online discourse and industry self-regulation. What plaintiffs did in attempting to deprive Yelp of immunity was creative, but it was not difficult. If plaintiffs' approach were recognized as legitimate, in the future other plaintiffs could be expected to file lawsuits pressing a broad array of demands for injunctive relief against compliant or default-prone original sources of allegedly tortious online content. Injunctions entered incident to the entry of judgments in these cases then would be interposed against providers or users of interactive computer services who could not be sued directly, due to section 230 immunity. As evinced by the injunction sought in Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, which demanded nothing less than control over what local library patrons could view on the Internet (id., at p. 691, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772), the extension of injunctions to these otherwise immunized nonparties would be particularly conducive to stifling, skewing, or otherwise manipulating online discourse—and in ways that go far beyond the deletion of libelous material from the Internet. Congress did not intend this result, any more than it intended that Internet intermediaries be bankrupted by damages imposed through lawsuits attacking what are, at their core, only decisions regarding the publication of third party content.

For almost two decades, courts have been relying on section 230 to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief when their claims inherently treat an Internet intermediary as a publisher or speaker of third party conduct. Certainly in some instances where immunity has been recognized prior to judgment, the plaintiff was in fact defamed or otherwise suffered tortious harm susceptible to being remedied through an injunction. Yet Congress has declined to amend section 230 to authorize injunctive relief against mere republishers, even as it has limited immunity in other ways. (See Pub.L.No. 115-164, § 4 (April 11, 2018) 132 Stat. 1253 [amending section 230 to add section 230(e)(5), clarifying that immunity does not apply to certain civil claims and criminal actions associated with sex trafficking].) Although this acquiescence is not itself determinative, it provides a final indication that the dissenting justices are simply substituting their judgment for that of Congress regarding what amounts to good policy with regard to online speech. But that is not our role.

Even as we conclude that Yelp is entitled to immunity, we echo Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, in emphasizing that our reasoning and result do not connote a lack of sympathy for those who may have been defamed on the Internet. (Barrett, at p. 63, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510.) Nevertheless, on this record it is clear that plaintiffs' legal remedies lie solely against Bird, and cannot extend—even through an injunction—to Yelp.

On this last point, we observe that plaintiffs still have powerful, if uninvoked, remedies available to them. Our decision today leaves plaintiffs' judgment intact insofar as it imposes obligations on Bird. Even though neither plaintiffs nor Bird can force Yelp to remove the challenged reviews, the judgment requires Bird to undertake, at a minimum, reasonable efforts to secure the removal of her posts. A failure to comply with a lawful court order is a form of civil contempt (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(5) ), the consequences of which can include imprisonment (see In re Young (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1052, 1054, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 892 P.2d 148). Much of the dissents' rhetoric regarding the perceived injustice of today's decision assumes that plaintiffs' remaining remedies will be ineffective. One might more readily conclude that the prospect of contempt sanctions would resonate with a party who, although not appearing below, has now taken the step of filing an amicus curiae brief with this court.

III. Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, section 230 immunity applies here. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it affirmed the trial court's denial of Yelp's motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. That motion should have been granted to the extent that it sought to delete from the order issued upon entry of the default judgment any requirement that Yelp remove the challenged reviews or subsequent comments of the reviewers. The cause is remanded for further proceedings as appropriate in light of this court's disposition.

Footnotes

[FN1] Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to title 47 of the United States Code.

[FN2] In a matter such as the one at bar, upon entry of a default, “[t]he plaintiff thereafter may apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint. The court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in the plaintiff's favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount stated in the complaint, ... as appears by the evidence to be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. (b).)

[FN3] The Court of Appeal used the term “removal order” to describe only the sentence within the order that explicitly directs Yelp to remove the three reviews. We use this same term to describe the order generally.

[FN4] In connection with their opposition to Yelp's motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment, plaintiffs supplied documentation indicating that in May 2013, their attorney sent Yelp a facsimile that included a copy of the complaint against Bird, as well as the January 2013 and February 2013 reviews underlying the action. Counsel's facsimile cover letter concluded with his “expect[ation]” that Yelp would “cause these two utterly false and unprivileged reviews to be removed as soon as possible.”

[FN5] After not appearing below, Ms. Bird has submitted an amicus curiae brief to this court. In her brief, Bird acknowledges writing the January 2013 “Birdzeye B.” review, but denies authoring the February 2013 review from “J.D.”

[FN6] The Court of Appeal's opinion also addressed several other issues not encompassed within our grant of review. (See Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1348-1354, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) We express no views regarding the Court of Appeal's analysis of those topics. We likewise have no occasion to opine on whether the challenged reviews are in fact defamatory, in whole or in part. Our analysis assumes the correctness of the superior court's determination on this point.

[FN7] This modification owed to the Court of Appeal's conclusion that “to the extent the trial court additionally ordered Yelp to remove subsequent comments that Bird or anyone else might post, the removal order is an overbroad prior restraint on speech.” (Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) The Court of Appeal therefore remanded the case “to the trial court with directions that it modify the removal order consistent with this limitation.” (Ibid.)

[FN8] Provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 different from the ones presently before the court were struck down as unconstitutional in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874.

[FN9] Section 230(c)(2), another immunity provision within the statute, provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—[¶] (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or [¶] (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).” Yelp's claim of immunity invokes section 230(c)(1), not section 230(c)(2).

[FN10] The court in Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, rejected the plaintiff's federal claim on a different ground. (Id., at pp. 698-702, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772.)

[FN11] Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510, was clear that section 230 immunity is broad—not all-encompassing. We recognized, for example, that “[a]t some point, active involvement in the creation of a defamatory Internet posting would expose [an otherwise immunized] defendant to liability as an original source.” (Barrett, at p. 60, fn. 19, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510; see also § 230(e)(1), (2), (4), (5) [describing areas of the law as to which section 230 immunity has no effect].)

[FN12] Although not directly pertinent to this case, we observe that in another instance where Congress became aware of procedural end-runs around section 230, it took steps to rein in these practices—instead of regarding a judgment so obtained as a fait accompli that must be enforced, without further consideration of the circumstances surrounding it.

Specifically, in 2010 Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq. This measure responded to concerns that defamation judgments were being obtained in countries that did not recognize the same free-speech protections as those provided in the United States, “significantly chilling American free speech and restricting both domestic and worldwide access to important information” in the United States. (Sen.Rep. No. 111-224, 2d Sess., p. 2 (2010).)

To combat forum shopping and “ensure that American authors, reporters, and publishers have nationwide protection from foreign libel judgments” (Sen.Rep. No. 111-224, supra, at p. 2), the SPEECH Act includes provisions such as one providing that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. [§] 230) unless the domestic court determines that the judgment would be consistent with section 230 if the information that is the subject of such judgment had been provided in the United States.” (28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1).)

[FN13] In arguing that section 230 immunity should not apply, Justice Liu emphasizes that here there was a judicial determination—albeit through an uncontested proceeding—that the challenged reviews are defamatory. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 898–899, 420 P.3d at pp. 802–803.) We recognize that in applying section 230 a distinction could, in theory, be drawn between situations in which an injunction (or its extension to a nonparty) follows from a judicial finding of some kind, and scenarios where there has been no such determination. But we see no persuasive indication that this is a distinction Congress wanted courts to regard as decisive in circumstances such as these. (Accord, Giordano v. Romeo, supra, 76 So.3d at p. 1102.)

[FN14] As previously noted, when the trial court denied Yelp's motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, it emphasized several facts that, in the court's opinion, indicated Yelp was aiding and abetting Bird's violation of the injunction. The court observed that Yelp had featured at least one of Bird's defamatory reviews as a “Recommended Review”; that Yelp had not factored some positive reviews into the Hassell Law Group's overall rating; that Yelp had raised arguments in connection with its motion that would invalidate the judgment entirely, as opposed to merely the portion of the removal order specifically directed at it; and that Yelp refused to remove the reviews at issue, “notwithstanding a judicial finding that Bird's reviews are defamatory.”
Even though it upheld the removal order in most respects, the Court of Appeal did not rely on an aiding and abetting theory to justify the extension of the injunction to Yelp. (See Hassell v. Bird, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) We expressly reject the argument, offered by Justice Cuéllar in his dissent (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 922, 420 P.3d at pp. 822–823), that the circumstances stressed by the trial court (plus, perhaps, Yelp's letter to Hassell, in which it explained its decision not to remove the reviews) might somehow serve to deprive Yelp of immunity. Most of these facts involve what are clearly publication decisions by Yelp. (See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, supra, 755 F.3d at pp. 414-415.) Meanwhile, we do not regard the letter relating the basis for Yelp's decision, or Yelp's failure to make only pinpoint challenges to the injunction in court, as somehow transforming the company into something other than a publisher of third party content for purposes of the removal order. Section 230 immunity is not that fragile.

[FN15] Justice Cuéllar would define “liability” within section 230(e)(3) as “a financial or legal obligation.” (Dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 908–909, 420 P.3d at p. 811.) His dissenting opinion then proceeds as if the broad word “legal” within this very definition is irrelevant. This oversight is in a sense understandable, because, inconveniently, plaintiffs absolutely regard Yelp as having a “legal obligation” to comply with the removal order.

Yet Justice Cuéllar's equation of “liability” under section 230(e)(3) with only financial obligations raises other questions that cannot be satisfactorily answered. Among them, if “liability” involves only financial debts, it is unclear why Congress recently felt the need to exclude from section 230 immunity certain state-law criminal actions associated with sex trafficking. (§ 230(e)(5)(B), (C).)

[FN16] There are numerous reasons why a removal order that appears facially valid may nevertheless be challenged by an Internet intermediary as illegitimate. As detailed in the amicus curiae brief submitted by Professor Eugene Volokh, a document that purports to represent a proper removal order might have been fraudulently obtained, secured after only meager attempts at service, or represent a forgery. A removal order also may be overbroad (as Bird claims to be the case here), or otherwise inaccurate or misleading.
Professor Volokh's brief incorporates a request for judicial notice of court filings that assertedly illustrate these concerns. We denied this request for judicial notice by a separate order. Formal notice is unnecessary to recognize the basic point being made—to wit, that plaintiffs' position, if accepted, would open the door to fraud and to sharp litigating tactics. (See People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 119, fn. 5, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624 [denying a request for judicial notice of case files because such notice “is not necessary ... to envision” the general circumstances evinced in the cases].)

[FN17] Other shortcomings of plaintiffs' approach further expose it as something quite different from what Congress intended. These include the fact that even if it were accepted, plaintiffs' vehicle for avoiding section 230 immunity would offer no remedy for those wronged by authors who write anonymously or using a pseudonym, and whose identities cannot be ascertained through third party discovery in cases filed against Doe defendants. For in those instances, no judgments, default or otherwise, could be obtained against the authors. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 474; Flythe v. Solomon and Strauss, LLC (E.D.Pa., June 8, 2011, No. 09-6120), 2011 WL 2314391 at *1 [“default judgments cannot be entered against unnamed or fictitious parties because they have not been properly served”].)

[FN18] We also dispute Justice Cuéllar's characterizations of various aspects of this opinion. Yet we see no need to address each of the numerous instances where his dissent misstates our views. It is enough to recall former Justice Werdegar's observation that “[c]haracterization by the ... dissenters of the scope of the majority opinion is, of course, dubious authority.” (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 271, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)

[FN19] Justice Cuéllar's dissenting opinion could be construed as allowing an injunction that on its face runs only against a party to be enforced, via a feeble aiding and abetting theory, against a different person or entity that also had been named as a party, but had successfully invoked section 230 immunity prior to the entry of judgment. (See, e.g., dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 921–924, 420 P.3d at pp. 822–824.) If that were the law, Justice Cuéllar would be correct that the incentive to intervene might be dampened because the invocation of section 230 immunity might have little practical effect in the long run. But it is not the law.