3 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 3 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

3.1 U.S. v. Morris 3.1 U.S. v. Morris

928 F.2d 504 (1991)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Robert Tappan MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 774, Docket 90-1336.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued December 4, 1990.
Decided March 7, 1991.

Thomas A. Guidoboni, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.

Ellen R. Meltzer, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty., Syracuse, N.Y., Mark D. Rasch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellee.

[505] Before NEWMAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges, and DALY, District Judge.[1]

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents two narrow issues of statutory construction concerning a provision Congress recently adopted to strengthen protection against computer crimes. Section 2(d) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988), punishes anyone who intentionally accesses without authorization a category of computers known as "[f]ederal interest computers" and damages or prevents authorized use of information in such computers, causing loss of $1,000 or more. The issues raised are (1) whether the Government must prove not only that the defendant intended to access a federal interest computer, but also that the defendant intended to prevent authorized use of the computer's information and thereby cause loss; and (2) what satisfies the statutory requirement of "access without authorization."

These questions are raised on an appeal by Robert Tappan Morris from the May 16, 1990, judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of New York (Howard G. Munson, Judge) convicting him, after a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). Morris released into INTERNET, a national computer network, a computer program known as a "worm"[2] that spread and multiplied, eventually causing computers at various educational institutions and military sites to "crash" or cease functioning.

We conclude that section 1030(a)(5)(A) does not require the Government to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally prevented authorized use and thereby caused loss. We also find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Morris acted "without authorization" within the meaning of section 1030(a)(5)(A). We therefore affirm.

FACTS

In the fall of 1988, Morris was a first-year graduate student in Cornell University's computer science Ph.D. program. Through undergraduate work at Harvard and in various jobs he had acquired significant computer experience and expertise. When Morris entered Cornell, he was given an account on the computer at the Computer Science Division. This account gave him explicit authorization to use computers at Cornell. Morris engaged in various discussions with fellow graduate students about the security of computer networks and his ability to penetrate it.

In October 1988, Morris began work on a computer program, later known as the INTERNET "worm" or "virus." The goal of this program was to demonstrate the inadequacies of current security measures on computer networks by exploiting the security defects that Morris had discovered. The tactic he selected was release of a worm into network computers. Morris designed the program to spread across a national network of computers after being inserted at one computer location connected to the network. Morris released the worm into INTERNET, which is a group of national networks that connect university, governmental, and military computers around the country. The network permits communication and transfer of information between computers on the network.

Morris sought to program the INTERNET worm to spread widely without drawing attention to itself. The worm was supposed to occupy little computer operation time, and thus not interfere with normal use of the computers. Morris programmed the worm to make it difficult to detect and read, so that other programmers would not be able to "kill" the worm easily.

[506] Morris also wanted to ensure that the worm did not copy itself onto a computer that already had a copy. Multiple copies of the worm on a computer would make the worm easier to detect and would bog down the system and ultimately cause the computer to crash. Therefore, Morris designed the worm to "ask" each computer whether it already had a copy of the worm. If it responded "no," then the worm would copy onto the computer; if it responded "yes," the worm would not duplicate. However, Morris was concerned that other programmers could kill the worm by programming their own computers to falsely respond "yes" to the question. To circumvent this protection, Morris programmed the worm to duplicate itself every seventh time it received a "yes" response. As it turned out, Morris underestimated the number of times a computer would be asked the question, and his one-out-of-seven ratio resulted in far more copying than he had anticipated. The worm was also designed so that it would be killed when a computer was shut down, an event that typically occurs once every week or two. This would have prevented the worm from accumulating on one computer, had Morris correctly estimated the likely rate of reinfection.

Morris identified four ways in which the worm could break into computers on the network:

(1) through a "hole" or "bug" (an error) in SEND MAIL, a computer program that transfers and receives electronic mail on a computer;

(2) through a bug in the "finger demon" program, a program that permits a person to obtain limited information about the users of another computer;

(3) through the "trusted hosts" feature, which permits a user with certain privileges on one computer to have equivalent privileges on another computer without using a password; and

(4) through a program of password guessing, whereby various combinations of letters are tried out in rapid sequence in the hope that one will be an authorized user's password, which is entered to permit whatever level of activity that user is authorized to perform.

On November 2, 1988, Morris released the worm from a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. MIT was selected to disguise the fact that the worm came from Morris at Cornell. Morris soon discovered that the worm was replicating and reinfecting machines at a much faster rate than he had anticipated. Ultimately, many machines at locations around the country either crashed or became "catatonic." When Morris realized what was happening, he contacted a friend at Harvard to discuss a solution. Eventually, they sent an anonymous message from Harvard over the network, instructing programmers how to kill the worm and prevent reinfection. However, because the network route was clogged, this message did not get through until it was too late. Computers were affected at numerous installations, including leading universities, military sites, and medical research facilities. The estimated cost of dealing with the worm at each installation ranged from $200 to more than $53,000.

Morris was found guilty, following a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). He was sentenced to three years of probation, 400 hours of community service, a fine of $10,050, and the costs of his supervision.

DISCUSSION

I. The intent requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A)

Section 1030(a)(5)(A), covers anyone who

(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby

(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year period; ... [emphasis added].

The District Court concluded that the intent requirement applied only to the accessing and not to the resulting damage. [507] Judge Munson found recourse to legislative history unnecessary because he considered the statute clear and unambiguous. However, the Court observed that the legislative history supported its reading of section 1030(a)(5)(A).

Morris argues that the Government had to prove not only that he intended the unauthorized access of a federal interest computer, but also that he intended to prevent others from using it, and thus cause a loss. The adverb "intentionally," he contends, modifies both verb phrases of the section. The Government urges that since punctuation sets the "accesses" phrase off from the subsequent "damages" phrase, the provision unambiguously shows that "intentionally" modifies only "accesses." Absent textual ambiguity, the Government asserts that recourse to legislative history is not appropriate. See Burlington N.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Holroyd, 732 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir.1984).

With some statutes, punctuation has been relied upon to indicate that a phrase set off by commas is independent of the language that followed. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code). However, we have been advised that punctuation is not necessarily decisive in construing statutes, see Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344, 53 S.Ct. 152, 153, 77 L.Ed. 350 (1932), and with many statutes, a mental state adverb adjacent to initial words has been applied to phrases or clauses appearing later in the statute without regard to the punctuation or structure of the statute. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-29, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2088-90, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting food stamps provision); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 446-50 (D.C.Cir.) (interpreting government "revolving door" statute), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 564, 107 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667-69 (3d Cir.1984) (interpreting the conservation act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). In the present case, we do not believe the comma after "authorization" renders the text so clear as to preclude review of the legislative history.

The first federal statute dealing with computer crimes was passed in 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 1984)). The specific provision under which Morris was convicted was added in 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-474, along with some other changes. The 1986 amendments made several changes relevant to our analysis.

First, the 1986 amendments changed the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(2) from "knowingly" to "intentionally." See Pub.L. No. 99-474, section 2(a)(1). The subsection now covers anyone who

(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).

According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress changed the mental state requirement in section 1030(a)(2) for two reasons. Congress sought only to proscribe intentional acts of unauthorized access, not "mistaken, inadvertent, or careless" acts of unauthorized access. S.Rep. No. 99-432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2479, 2483 [hereinafter Senate Report].

Also, Congress expressed concern that the "knowingly" standard "might be inappropriate for cases involving computer technology." Id. The concern was that a scienter requirement of "knowingly" might encompass the acts of an individual "who inadvertently `stumble[d] into' someone else's computer file or computer data," especially where such individual was authorized [508] to use a particular computer. Id. at 6, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483. The Senate Report concluded that "[t]he substitution of an `intentional' standard is designed to focus Federal criminal prosecutions on those whose conduct evinces a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer files or data belonging to another." Id., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2484. Congress retained the "knowingly" standard in other subsections of section 1030. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(4).

This use of a mens rea standard to make sure that inadvertent accessing was not covered is also emphasized in the Senate Report's discussion of section 1030(a)(3) and section 1030(a)(5), under which Morris was convicted. Both subsections were designed to target "outsiders," individuals without authorization to access any federal interest computer. Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The rationale for the mens rea requirement suggests that it modifies only the "accesses" phrase, which was the focus of Congress's concern in strengthening the scienter requirement.

The other relevant change in the 1986 amendments was the introduction of subsection (a)(5) to replace its earlier version, subsection (a)(3) of the 1984 act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984). The predecessor subsection covered anyone who

knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such computer is operated for or on behalf of the Government of United States and such conduct affects such operation.

The 1986 version changed the mental state requirement from "knowingly" to "intentionally," and did not repeat it after the "accesses" phrase, as had the 1984 version. By contrast, other subsections of section 1030 have retained "dual intent" language, placing the scienter requirement at the beginning of both the "accesses" phrase and the "damages" phrase. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).

Morris notes the careful attention that Congress gave to selecting the scienter requirement for current subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5). Then, relying primarily on comments in the Senate and House reports, Morris argues that the "intentionally" requirement of section 1030(a)(5)(A) describes both the conduct of accessing and damaging. As he notes, the Senate Report said that "[t]he new subsection 1030(a)(5) to be created by the bill is designed to penalize those who intentionally alter, damage, or destroy certain computerized data belonging to another." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The House Judiciary Committee stated that "the bill proposes a new section (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)) which can be characterized as a `malicious damage' felony violation involving a Federal interest computer. We have included an `intentional' standard for this felony and coverage is extended only to outside trespassers with a $1,000 threshold damage level." H.R.Rep. No. 99-612, 99th Cong.2d Sess. at 7 (1986). A member of the Judiciary Committee also referred to the section 1030(a)(5) offense as a "malicious damage" felony during the floor debate. 132 Cong.Rec. H3275, 3276 (daily ed. June 3, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Hughes).

The Government's argument that the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A) applies only to the "accesses" phrase is premised primarily upon the difference between subsection (a)(5)(A) and its predecessor in the 1984 statute. The decision to state the scienter requirement only once in subsection (a)(5)(A), along with the decision to change it from "knowingly" to "intentionally," are claimed to evince a clear intent upon the part of Congress to apply the scienter requirement only to the "accesses" phrase, though making that requirement more difficult to satisfy. This reading would carry out the Congressional objective of protecting the individual who "inadvertently `stumble[s] into' someone else's computer file." Senate Report at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483.

[509] The Government also suggests that the fact that other subsections of section 1030 continue to repeat the scienter requirement before both phrases of a subsection is evidence that Congress selectively decided within the various subsections of section 1030 where the scienter requirement was and was not intended to apply. Morris responds with a plausible explanation as to why certain other provisions of section 1030 retain dual intent language. Those subsections use two different mens rea standards; therefore it is necessary to refer to the scienter requirement twice in the subsection. For example, section 1030(a)(1) covers anyone who

(1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct obtains information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data ... with the intent or reason to believe that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Since Congress sought in subsection (a)(1) to have the "knowingly" standard govern the "accesses" phrase and the "with intent" standard govern the "results" phrase, it was necessary to state the scienter requirement at the beginning of both phrases. By contrast, Morris argues, where Congress stated the scienter requirement only once, at the beginning of the "accesses" phrase, it was intended to cover both the "accesses" phrase and the phrase that followed it.

There is a problem, however, with applying Morris's explanation to section 1030(a)(5)(A). As noted earlier, the predecessor of subsection (a)(5)(A) explicitly placed the same mental state requirement before both the "accesses" phrase and the "damages" phrase. In relevant part, that predecessor in the 1984 statute covered anyone who "knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, ... and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer...." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). This earlier provision demonstrates that Congress has on occasion chosen to repeat the same scienter standard in the "accesses" phrase and the subsequent phrase of a subsection of the Computer Fraud Statute. More pertinently, it shows that the 1986 amendments adding subsection (a)(5)(A) placed the scienter requirement adjacent only to the "accesses" phrase in contrast to a predecessor provision that had placed the same standard before both that phrase and the subsequent phrase.

Despite some isolated language in the legislative history that arguably suggests a scienter component for the "damages" phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), the wording, structure, and purpose of the subsection, examined in comparison with its departure from the format of its predecessor provision persuade us that the "intentionally" standard applies only to the "accesses" phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), and not to its "damages" phrase.

II. The unauthorized access requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A)

Section 1030(a)(5)(A) penalizes the conduct of an individual who "intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization." Morris contends that his conduct constituted, at most, "exceeding authorized access" rather than the "unauthorized access" that the subsection punishes. Morris argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of "unauthorized access," and that even if the evidence sufficed, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on his "theory of defense."

We assess the sufficiency of the evidence under the traditional standard. Morris was authorized to use computers at Cornell, Harvard, and Berkeley, all of which were on INTERNET. As a result, Morris was authorized to communicate with other computers on the network to send electronic mail (SEND MAIL), and to find out certain information about the users of other computers [510] (finger demon). The question is whether Morris's transmission of his worm constituted exceeding authorized access or accessing without authorization.

The Senate Report stated that section 1030(a)(5)(A), like the new section 1030(a)(3), would "be aimed at `outsiders,' i.e., those lacking authorization to access any Federal interest computer." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. But the Report also stated, in concluding its discussion on the scope of section 1030(a)(3), that it applies "where the offender is completely outside the Government, ... or where the offender's act of trespass is interdepartmental in nature." Id. at 8, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2486 (emphasis added).

Morris relies on the first quoted portion to argue that his actions can be characterized only as exceeding authorized access, since he had authorized access to a federal interest computer. However, the second quoted portion reveals that Congress was not drawing a bright line between those who have some access to any federal interest computer and those who have none. Congress contemplated that individuals with access to some federal interest computers would be subject to liability under the computer fraud provisions for gaining unauthorized access to other federal interest computers. See, e.g., id. (stating that a Labor Department employee who uses Labor's computers to access without authorization an FBI computer can be criminally prosecuted).

The evidence permitted the jury to conclude that Morris's use of the SEND MAIL and finger demon features constituted access without authorization. While a case might arise where the use of SEND MAIL or finger demon falls within a nebulous area in which the line between accessing without authorization and exceeding authorized access may not be clear, Morris's conduct here falls well within the area of unauthorized access. Morris did not use either of those features in any way related to their intended function. He did not send or read mail nor discover information about other users; instead he found holes in both programs that permitted him a special and unauthorized access route into other computers.

Moreover, the jury verdict need not be upheld solely on Morris's use of SEND MAIL and finger demon. As the District Court noted, in denying Morris' motion for acquittal,

Although the evidence may have shown that defendant's initial insertion of the worm simply exceeded his authorized access, the evidence also demonstrated that the worm was designed to spread to other computers at which he had no account and no authority, express or implied, to unleash the worm program. Moreover, there was also evidence that the worm was designed to gain access to computers at which he had no account by guessing their passwords. Accordingly, the evidence did support the jury's conclusion that defendant accessed without authority as opposed to merely exceeding the scope of his authority.

In light of the reasonable conclusions that the jury could draw from Morris's use of SEND MAIL and finger demon, and from his use of the trusted hosts feature and password guessing, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

Morris endeavors to bolster his sufficiency argument by contending that his conduct was not punishable under subsection (a)(5) but was punishable under subsection (a)(3). That concession belies the validity of his claim that he only exceeded authorization rather than made unauthorized access. Neither subsection (a)(3) nor (a)(5) punishes conduct that exceeds authorization. Both punish a person who "accesses" "without authorization" certain computers. Subsection (a)(3) covers the computers of a department or agency of the United States; subsection (a)(5) more broadly covers any federal interest computers, defined to include, among other computers, those used exclusively by the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A), and adds the element of causing damage or loss of use of a value of $1,000 or more. If Morris violated subsection (a)(3), as he concedes, then his conduct in inserting the worm into the INTERNET [511] must have constituted "unauthorized access" under subsection (a)(5) to the computers of the federal departments the worm reached, for example, those of NASA and military bases.

To extricate himself from the consequence of conceding that he made "unauthorized access" within the meaning of subsection (a)(3), Morris subtly shifts his argument and contends that he is not within the reach of subsection (a)(5) at all. He argues that subsection (a)(5) covers only those who, unlike himself, lack access to any federal interest computer. It is true that a primary concern of Congress in drafting subsection (a)(5) was to reach those unauthorized to access any federal interest computer. The Senate Report stated, "[T]his subsection [(a)(5)] will be aimed at `outsiders,' i.e., those lacking authorization to access any Federal interest computer." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. But the fact that the subsection is "aimed" at such "outsiders" does not mean that its coverage is limited to them. Congress understandably thought that the group most likely to damage federal interest computers would be those who lack authorization to use any of them. But it surely did not mean to insulate from liability the person authorized to use computers at the State Department who causes damage to computers at the Defense Department. Congress created the misdemeanor offense of subsection (a)(3) to punish intentional trespasses into computers for which one lacks authorized access; it added the felony offense of subsection (a)(5) to punish such a trespasser who also causes damage or loss in excess of $1,000, not only to computers of the United States but to any computer within the definition of federal interest computers. With both provisions, Congress was punishing those, like Morris, who, with access to some computers that enable them to communicate on a network linking other computers, gain access to other computers to which they lack authorization and either trespass, in violation of subsection (a)(3), or cause damage or loss of $1,000 or more, in violation of subsection (a)(5).

Morris also contends that the District Court should have instructed the jury on his theory that he was only exceeding authorized access. The District Court decided that it was unnecessary to provide the jury with a definition of "authorization." We agree. Since the word is of common usage, without any technical or ambiguous meaning, the Court was not obliged to instruct the jury on its meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Chenault, 844 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.1988) ("A trial court need not define specific statutory terms unless they are outside the common understanding of a juror or are so technical or specific as to require a definition.").

An instruction on "exceeding authorized access" would have risked misleading the jury into thinking that Morris could not be convicted if some of his conduct could be viewed as falling within this description. Yet, even if that phrase might have applied to some of his conduct, he could nonetheless be found liable for doing what the statute prohibited, gaining access where he was unauthorized and causing loss.

Additionally, the District Court properly refused to charge the jury with Morris's proposed jury instruction on access without authorization. That instruction stated, "To establish the element of lack of authorization, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Morris was an `outsider,' that is, that he was not authorized to access any Federal interest computer in any manner." As the analysis of the legislative history reveals, Congress did not intend an individual's authorized access to one federal interest computer to protect him from prosecution, no matter what other federal interest computers he accesses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

[1] The Honorable T.F. Gilroy Daly of the District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

[2] In the colorful argot of computers, a "worm" is a program that travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself to the operating system of the computer it "infects." It differs from a "virus," which is also a migrating program, but one that attaches itself to the operating system of any computer it enters and can infect any other computer that uses files from the infected computer.

3.2 U.S. v. Czubinski 3.2 U.S. v. Czubinski

Page 1069

106 F.3d 1069
79 A.F.T.R.2d 97-1664, 65 USLW 2571,
97-2 USTC P 50,622
UNITED STATES, Appellee,
v.
Richard W. CZUBINSKI, Defendant--Appellant.
No. 96-1317.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
Heard Oct. 7, 1996.
Decided Feb. 21, 1997.

Page 1071

        Susan B. Hanmer, with whom Oliver C. Mitchell, Jr., Louis J. Scerra, Jr., Boston, MA, and Goldstein & Manello, P.C., were on brief, for defendant-appellant.

        S. Theodore Merritt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Boston, MA, and Amy B. Lederer, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, were on brief, for appellee.

        Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

        TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

        Defendant-appellant Richard Czubinski ("Czubinski") appeals his jury conviction on nine counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and four counts of computer fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). The wire fraud and computer fraud prosecution that led to the conviction survived serious challenges put forward by Czubinski in various pre-trial motions. Given the broad scope of the federal fraud statutes, motions charging insufficient pleadings or selective prosecution generally deserve careful consideration. We need not scrutinize the lower court's rejection of the defendant's arguments in favor of dismissing the indictment, however, because we reverse the conviction on the clearer ground that the trial evidence mustered by the government was insufficient to support a guilty verdict, and hold that the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted on all counts. Unauthorized browsing of taxpayer files, although certainly inappropriate conduct, cannot, without more, sustain this federal felony conviction.

BACKGROUND

I. Pertinent Facts

        On an appeal from a jury conviction, we review the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 384 (1st Cir.1985). The evidence in this case, so presented, is inadequate to support convictions on either the wire fraud or computer fraud charges.

        For all periods relevant to the acts giving rise to his conviction, the defendant Czubinski was employed as a Contact Representative in the Boston office of the Taxpayer Services Division of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). To perform his official duties, which mainly involved answering questions from taxpayers regarding their returns, Czubinski routinely accessed information from one of the IRS's computer systems known as the Integrated Data Retrieval System ("IDRS"). Using a valid password given to Contact Representatives, certain search codes, and taxpayer social security numbers, Czubinski was able to retrieve, to his terminal screen in Boston, income tax return information regarding virtually any taxpayer--information that is permanently stored in the IDRS "master file" located in Martinsburg, West Virginia. In the period of Czubinski's employ, IRS rules plainly stated that employees with passwords and access codes were not permitted to access files on IDRS outside of the course of their official duties. 1

        In 1992, Czubinski carried out numerous unauthorized searches of IDRS files. He knowingly disregarded IRS rules by looking at confidential information obtained by performing computer searches that were outside of the scope of his duties as a Contact Representative, including, but not limited to, the searches listed in the indictment. 2 Audit

Page 1072

        Nothing in the record indicates that Czubinski did anything more than knowingly disregard IRS rules by observing the confidential information he accessed. No evidence suggests, nor does the government contend, that Czubinski disclosed the confidential information he accessed to any third parties. The government's only evidence demonstrating any intent to use the confidential information for nefarious ends was the trial testimony of William A. Murray, an acquaintance of Czubinski who briefly participated in Czubinski's local Invisible Knights of the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") chapter and worked with him on the David Duke campaign. Murray testified that Czubinski had once stated at a social gathering in "early 1992" that "he intended to use some of that information to build dossiers on people" involved in "the white supremacist movement." Trial Transcript, Vol. 2 at 170, 188. There is, however, no evidence that Czubinski created dossiers, took steps toward making dossiers (such as by printing out or recording the information he browsed), or shared any of the information he accessed in the years following the single comment to Murray. No other witness testified to having any knowledge of Czubinski's alleged intent to create "dossiers" on KKK members.

        The record shows that Czubinski did not perform any unauthorized searches after 1992. He continued to be employed as a Contact Representative until June 1995, when a grand jury returned an indictment against him on ten counts of federal wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and four counts of federal interest computer fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).

        The portion of the indictment alleging wire fraud states that Czubinski defrauded the IRS of confidential property and defrauded the IRS and the public of his honest services by using his valid password to acquire confidential taxpayer information as part of a scheme to: 1) build "dossiers" on associates in the KKK; 2) seek information regarding an assistant district attorney who was then prosecuting Czubinski's father on an unrelated criminal charge; and 3) perform opposition research by inspecting the records of a political opponent in the race for a Boston City Councilor seat. The wire fraud indictment, therefore, articulated particular personal ends to which the unauthorized access to confidential information through interstate wires was allegedly a means.

        The portion of the indictment setting forth the computer fraud charges stated that Czubinski obtained something of value, beyond the mere unauthorized use of a federal interest computer, by performing certain searches--searches representing a subset of those making up the mail fraud counts.

II. Proceedings Below

        After indictment and arraignment in June 1995, Czubinski filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, a motion to strike surplusage from the indictment, and a motion for discovery from the government relating to a claim of selective prosecution. In separate orders, a magistrate judge and the district court rejected all of these motions. Specifically, the district court rejected Czubinski's argument that counts 1 through 10 of the indictment must be dismissed because "browsing"

Page 1073

        On December 15, 1995, the district court denied Czubinski's motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts except for count 3, 3 and on that day the jury returned a verdict finding Czubinski guilty on all thirteen remaining counts. On appeal, Czubinski challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, including the rejection of a selective prosecution claim, the finding that he had not made out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, the admission at trial of allegedly inflammatory evidence of Czubinski's white supremacist activities, the denial of his motion for acquittal, the jury instructions, and the sentencing determination.

        We reverse on the ground that the district court erred in denying Czubinski's motion for acquittal, and therefore bypass Czubinski's other claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 is the proper vehicle for a defendant to make a sufficiency challenge. See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim.2d § 467 (1982). The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal presents a question of law, and our review is de novo. See United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 604 (1st Cir.1996). We determine anew whether "the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a).

        In determining the evidentiary sufficiency of a guilty verdict, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir.1995). The scope of review is over the totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial: we "take a hard look at the record" and "reject those evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative." United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir.1995).

DISCUSSION

I. The Wire Fraud Counts

        We turn first to Czubinski's conviction on the nine wire fraud counts. 4 To support a conviction for wire fraud, the government must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant's knowing and willing participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud with the specific intent to defraud, and (2) the use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir.1993)). Although defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal places emphasis on shortcomings in proof with regard to the second element, by arguing that the wire transmissions at issue were not proved to be interstate, we find the

Page 1074

5

        The government pursued two theories of wire fraud in this prosecution: first, that Czubinski defrauded the IRS of its property, under section 1343, by acquiring confidential information for certain intended personal uses; second, that he defrauded the IRS and the public of their intangible right to his honest services, under sections 1343 and 1346. 6 We consider the evidence with regard to each theory, in turn.

A. Scheme to Defraud IRS of Property

        The government correctly notes that confidential information may constitute intangible "property" and that its unauthorized dissemination or other use may deprive the owner of its property rights. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26, 108 S.Ct. 316, 320, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987) ("Confidential business information has long been recognized as property.... [A newspaper] had a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the schedule and contents" of a particular column.). Where such deprivation is effected through dishonest or deceitful means, a "scheme to defraud," within the meaning of the wire fraud statute, is shown. See id. at 27, 108 S.Ct. at 321. Thus, a necessary step toward satisfying the "scheme to defraud" element in this context is showing that the defendant intended to "deprive" another of their protected right.

        The government, however, provides no case in support of its contention here that merely accessing confidential information, without doing, or clearly intending to do, more, is tantamount to a deprivation of IRS property under the wire fraud statute. In Carpenter, for example, the confidential information regarding the contents of a newspaper column was converted to the defendants's use to their substantial benefit. See id. at 27, 108 S.Ct. at 321 (defendants participated in "ongoing scheme to share profit from trading in anticipation" of newspaper column). We do not think that Czubinski's unauthorized browsing, even if done with the intent to deceive the IRS into thinking he was performing only authorized searches, constitutes a "deprivation" within the meaning of the federal fraud statutes.

        Binding precedents, and good sense, support the conclusion that to "deprive" a person of their intangible property interest in confidential information under section 1343, either some articulable harm must befall the holder of the information as a result of the defendant's activities, or some gainful use must be intended by the person accessing the information, whether or not this use is profitable in the economic sense. 7 Here,

Page 1075

        All of the cases cited by the government in support of their contention that the confidentiality breached by Czubinski's search in itself constitutes a deprivation of property in fact support our holding today, for they all involve, at a minimum, a finding of a further intended use of the confidential information accessed by the defendants. The government's best support comes from United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir.1978), in which a former employee of a computer systems firm secretly accessed its files, but never was shown to have sold or used the data he accessed, and was nevertheless convicted of wire fraud. The affirming Fourth Circuit held, however, that a jury could have reasonably found that, at the time the defendant raided a competitor's computer system, he intended to retrieve information that would be helpful for his own start-up, competing computer firm. In the instant case, Czubinski did indeed access confidential information through fraudulent pretenses--he appeared to be performing his duties when in fact he used IRS passwords to perform unauthorized searches. Nevertheless, it was not proven that he intended to deprive the IRS of their property interest through either disclosure or use of that information.

        The resolution of the instant case is complex because it is well-established that to be convicted of mail or wire fraud, the defendant need not successfully carry out an intended scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1989) (defendant need only participate in a scheme to defraud with the intent to achieve its illicit objectives); Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 160 (where circumstantial evidence suffices to prove intent to accomplish scheme to defraud, actual use of confidential information need not be shown). The government does not contend either that Czubinski actually created dossiers or that he accomplished some other end through use of the information. It need not do so. All that the government was required to prove was the intent to follow through with a deprivation of the IRS's property and the use or foreseeable use of interstate wire transmissions pursuant to the accomplishment of the scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir.1987). In the case at bar, the government failed to make even this showing.

        The fatal flaw in the government's case is that it has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Czubinski intended to carry out a scheme to deprive the IRS of its property interest in confidential information. Had there been sufficient proof that Czubinski intended either to create dossiers for the sake of advancing personal causes or to disseminate confidential information to third parties, then his actions in searching files could arguably be said to be a step in furtherance of a scheme to deprive the IRS of its property interest in confidential information. The government's case regarding Czubinski's intent to make any use of the information he browsed rests on the testimony of one witness at trial who stated that Czubinski once remarked at a social gathering that he intended to build dossiers on potential KKK informants. 8 We must assume, on this appeal, that Czubinski did indeed make such a comment. Nevertheless, the fact that during the months following this remark--that is, during the period in which Czubinski made his unauthorized searches--he did not create dossiers (there was no evidence that he created dossiers either during or after the period of his unauthorized searches); given the fact that he did not even take steps toward creating dossiers, such as recording or printing out the information; given the fact that no other person testifying as to Czubinski's involvement in white supremacist organizations had any knowledge of Czubinski's alleged intent to create dossiers or use confidential information; and given the fact that not a single piece of evidence suggests

Page 1076

        Mere browsing of the records of people about whom one might have a particular interest, although reprehensible, is not enough to sustain a wire fraud conviction on a "deprivation of intangible property" theory. Curiosity on the part of an IRS officer may lead to dismissal, but curiosity alone will not sustain a finding of participation in a felonious criminal scheme to deprive the IRS of its property.

B. Honest Services Fraud (Section 1346)

        In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the mail and wire fraud statutes do not prohibit schemes to defraud individuals of their intangible, nonproperty right to honest government services. Id. at 359-60, 107 S.Ct. at 2881-82. 9 Congress responded to McNally in 1988 by enacting section 1346, the honest services amendment, which provides:

For the purposes of this chapter, the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

        18 U.S.C. § 1346 (effective Nov. 11, 1988). We have held, after considering the relevant legislative history, that section 1346 effectively restores to the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes 10 their pre-McNally applications to government officials' schemes to defraud individuals of their intangible right to honest services. See Grandmaison, 77 F.3d at 566 (collecting cases). 11

        We recently had the opportunity to discuss, at some length, the proper application of the section 1346 honest services amendment to the wrongful acts of public officials. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 722-26. The discussion and holding in Sawyer directly guide our disposition of the instant appeal. 12 First, as a general matter, we noted in Sawyer that although the right to honest services "eludes easy definition," honest services convictions of public officials typically involve serious corruption, such as embezzlement of public funds, bribery of public officials, or the failure of public decision-makers to disclose certain conflicts of interest. Id. at 724. Second, we cautioned that "[t]he broad scope of the mail fraud statute, however, does not encompass every instance of official misconduct that results in the official's personal gain." Id. at 725. Third, and most importantly, Sawyer holds that the government must not merely indicate wrongdoing by a public official, but must also demonstrate that the wrongdoing at issue is intended to prevent or call into question the proper or impartial performance of that public servant's official duties. Id. at 725 (citing pre-McNally precedent to demonstrate that even where public

Page 1077

        Applying these principles to Czubinski's acts, it is clear that his conviction cannot stand. First, this case falls outside of the core of honest services fraud precedents. Czubinski was not bribed or otherwise influenced in any public decisionmaking capacity. Nor did he embezzle funds. He did not receive, nor can it be found that he intended to receive, any tangible benefit. His official duty was to respond to informational requests from taxpayers regarding their returns, a relatively straightforward task that simply does not raise the specter of secretive, self-interested action, as does a discretionary, decision-making role. Cf. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1251 (8th Cir.1976) (finding no mail fraud violation where city employee accepted gratuities in connection with non-discretionary duty).

        Second, we believe that the cautionary language of Sawyer is particularly appropriate here, given the evidence amassed by the defendant at trial indicating that during his span of employment at IRS, he received no indication from his employer that this workplace violation--the performance of unauthorized searches--would be punishable by anything more than dismissal. 13 "To allow every transgression of state governmental obligations to amount to mail fraud would effectively turn every such violation into a federal felony; this cannot be countenanced." Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 728. Here, the threat is one of transforming governmental workplace violations into felonies. We find no evidence that Congress intended to create what amounts to a draconian personnel regulation. We hesitate to imply such an unusual result in the absence of the clearest legislative mandate.

        These general considerations, although serious, are not conclusive: they raise doubts as to the propriety of this conviction that can be outweighed by sufficient evidence of a scheme to defraud. The third principle identified in Sawyer, instructing us as to the basic requirements of a scheme to defraud in this context, settles any remaining doubts. The conclusive consideration is that the government simply did not prove that Czubinski deprived, or intended to deprive, the public or his employer of their right to his honest services. Although he clearly committed wrongdoing in searching confidential information, there is no suggestion that he failed to carry out his official tasks adequately, or intended to do so.

        The government alleges that, in addition to defrauding the public of his honest services, Czubinski has defrauded the IRS as well. The IRS is a public entity, rendering this contention sufficiently answered by our holding above that Czubinski did not defraud the public of his honest services. Even if the IRS were a private employer, however, the pre-McNally honest services convictions involving private fraud victims indicate that there must be a breach of a fiduciary duty to an employer that involves self-dealing of an order significantly more serious than the misconduct at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1332-34 (D.C.Cir.1983) (employee took bribes and did not disclose that contractor was overcharging); United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir.1983) (employees used corporate funds for non-corporate purposes); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 931 (3d Cir.1982) (union official bribed into accepting lower wages for union members). Once again, the government has failed to prove that Czubinski intended to use the IRS files he browsed for any private purposes, and hence his actions, however reprehensible, do not rise to the level of a scheme to defraud his employer of his honest services.

Page 1078

II. The Computer Fraud Counts

        Czubinski was convicted on all four of the computer fraud counts on which he was indicted; these counts arise out of unauthorized searches that also formed the basis of four of the ten wire fraud counts in the indictment. Specifically, he was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), a provision enacted in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. Section 1030(a)(4) applies to:

whoever ... knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer.

        We have never before addressed section 1030(a)(4). Czubinski unquestionably exceeded authorized access to a Federal interest computer. 14 On appeal he argues that he did not obtain "anything of value." We agree, finding that his searches of taxpayer return information did not satisfy the statutory requirement that he obtain "anything of value." The value of information is relative to one's needs and objectives; here, the government had to show that the information was valuable to Czubinski in light of a fraudulent scheme. The government failed, however, to prove that Czubinski intended anything more than to satisfy idle curiosity.

        The plain language of section 1030(a)(4) emphasizes that more than mere unauthorized use is required: the "thing obtained" may not merely be the unauthorized use. It is the showing of some additional end--to which the unauthorized access is a means--that is lacking here. The evidence did not show that Czubinski's end was anything more than to satisfy his curiosity by viewing information about friends, acquaintances, and political rivals. No evidence suggests that he printed out, recorded, or used the information he browsed. No rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Czubinski intended to use or disclose that information, and merely viewing information cannot be deemed the same as obtaining something of value for the purposes of this statute. 15

        The legislative history further supports our reading of the term "anything of value." "In the game of statutory interpretation, statutory language is the ultimate trump card," and the remarks of sponsors of legislation are authoritative only to the extent that they are compatible with the plain language of section 1030(a)(4). Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 699 (1st Cir.1994) (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 1218, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984)). Here, a Senate co-sponsor's comments suggest that Congress intended section 1030(a)(4) to punish attempts to steal valuable data, and did not wish to punish mere unauthorized access:

The acts of fraud we are addressing in proposed section 1030(a)(4) are essentially thefts in which someone uses a federal interest computer to wrongly obtain something of value from another.... Proposed section 1030(a)(4) is intended to reflect the distinction between the theft of information, a felony, and mere unauthorized access, a misdemeanor.

        132 Cong. Rec. 7128, 7129, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1986). The Senate Committee Report further underscores the fact that this section should apply to those who steal information through unauthorized access as part of an illegal scheme:

The Committee remains convinced that there must be a clear distinction between

Page 1079

        S. Rep. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2488. For the same reasons we deemed the trial evidence could not support a finding that Czubinski deprived the IRS of its property, see discussion of wire fraud under section 1343 supra, we find that Czubinski has not obtained valuable information in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme for the purposes of section 1030(a)(4).

CONCLUSION

        We add a cautionary note. The broad language of the mail and wire fraud statutes are both their blessing and their curse. They can address new forms of serious crime that fail to fall within more specific legislation. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 645, 651, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974) (observing that the mail fraud statute serves "as a first line of defense" or "stopgap device" to tackle new types of frauds before particularized legislation is developed) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). On the other hand, they might be used to prosecute kinds of behavior that, albeit offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably be expected by the instigators to form the basis of a federal felony. The case at bar falls within the latter category. Also discomforting is the prosecution's insistence, before trial, on the admission of inflammatory evidence regarding the defendant's membership in white supremacist groups purportedly as a means to prove a scheme to defraud, when, on appeal, it argues that unauthorized access in itself is a sufficient ground for conviction on all counts. Finally, we caution that the wire fraud statute must not serve as a vehicle for prosecuting only those citizens whose views run against the tide, no matter how incorrect or uncivilized such views are.

        For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on counts 1, 2, and 4 through 14, to be in error. The defendant's conviction is thus reversed on all counts.

---------------

1 In 1987 Czubinski signed an acknowledgment of receipt of the IRS Rules of Conduct, which contained the following rule:

Employees must make every effort to assure security and prevent unauthorized disclosure of protected information data in the use of Government owned or leased computers. In addition, employees may not use any Service computer system for other than official purposes.

See Government's Exhibit 1. In addition, Czubinski received separate rules regarding use of the IDRS, one of which states:

Access only those accounts required to accomplish your official duties.

See Government's Exhibit 3.

2 The indictment charged ten counts of wire fraud for accessing the return information of ten different entities; the four computer fraud counts (counts eleven through fourteen) identified unauthorized searches that also underlay four of the ten wire fraud counts (counts one, two, eight and nine).

3 On count 3, the district court ruled that there was insufficient proof showing that the search alleged in count 3 was not requested by the taxpayer whose files were browsed.

4 The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire ... communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

5 We do not find that it was irrational for a trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Czubinski's searches caused information from the IDRS master file in Martinsburg, West Virginia, to be sent to his terminal in Boston. The interstate element could reasonably be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Testimony of Edward Makaskill, Trial Transcript, Vol. 3 at 82 (explaining that certain command codes used by Czubinski generally access information from out-of-state computer).

6 The district court's jury instructions on the wire fraud counts repeat both of the scheme to defraud theories:

In this case, the government has charged Mr. Czubinski with devising a scheme or artifice, that is, a plan, to do two things:

(1) to defraud the IRS, the United States Government, and the citizens and taxpayers of the United States by depriving them of their intangible right to his honest services as an IRS employee; and

(2) to defraud the IRS and to obtain its property, that is, confidential taxpayer information, by false pretenses, representations and promises.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 4 at 76-77.

7 For example, had the government established that Czubinski disclosed or intended to disclose taxpayer information, then the deprivation or intended deprivation of property rights would have been shown.

8 Testimony of William J. Murray. See Background, supra.

9 Before McNally, however, the fraud statutes had been "read as a broad shield" by this and other circuits, applying, for example, to cases of corruption on the ground that the defendant had used the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the public of its intangible right to honest services. See, e.g., Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.1987) (applying, pre-McNally, mail fraud statute to local political corruption); see generally United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 565 (1st Cir.1996) (discussing change wrought by McNally ).

10 Identical standards apply in determining the "scheme to defraud" element under the mail and wire fraud statutes. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 586 n. 11 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. at 320 n. 6).

11 Finding insufficient evidence to convict, we do not reach the issue of whether the honest services amendment raises vagueness concerns. Cf. United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568-69 (11th Cir.1995) (rejecting facial vagueness and overbreadth challenge to section 1346).

12 In Sawyer, we vacated and remanded for further factfinding the mail and wire fraud conviction of a private lobbyist who was found to have violated Massachusetts' gift and gratuity statutes in the course of his lobbying activities. See 85 F.3d at 730-31. The conviction was vacated because the violation of the gift statute, in itself, was held insufficient to establish a scheme to defraud the public of its intangible right to honest services. See id.

13 See Appendices to Czubinski's Motion to Dismiss (including February 8, 1994 IRS memorandum to employees indicating that the probable penalty for "unauthorized accessing" of taxpayer information ranges from "Reprimand" to "Removal").

14 "[T]he term 'exceeds authorized access' means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).

15 The district court, in denying a motion to dismiss the computer fraud counts in the indictment, found that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the confidential taxpayer information was itself a "thing of value" to Czubinski, given his ends. The indictment, of course, alleged specific uses for the information, such as creating dossiers on KKK members, that were not proven at trial. In light of the trial evidence--which, as we have said, indicates that there was no recording, disclosure or further use of the confidential information--we find that Czubinski did not obtain "anything of value" through his unauthorized searches.

3.3 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein 3.3 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein

951 F. Supp. 2d 212

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

Robert FELDSTEIN, Manoo Desai, Nicolas Kociuk, Richard Hagen, Deepaksrivats Thirumalai, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–40007–TSH.
June 10, 2013.

Attorneys and Law Firms  

Anthony A. Froio, Christopher P. Sullivan, Morgia D. Holmes, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi LLP, Boston, MA, Mia A. Storm, Sara E. Janes, Sherrard Hayes, Timothy Cleveland, Weisbart Springer Hayes, LLP, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

Franklin Brockway Gowdy, Rollin B. Chippey, II, Sharon R. Smith, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, CA, Melinda S. Riechert, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Peter J. Mee, Todd S. Holbrook, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

HILLMAN, District Judge.

This is an action for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, breach of contract, violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), and conspiracy.[FN1] Plaintiff Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “AMD”) has already sought and received a Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) against four defendants, and a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against the fifth defendant.[FN2] The four enjoined defendants, Feldstein, Hagen, Desai, and Kociuk (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss all claims against them under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendant Thirumalai has not yet moved to dismiss the charges against him, so like this Court's prior Memorandum and Order on Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 105), this order does not address the claims against him.

I. Standard of Review

In a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard set forth in Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice if it offers “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff's well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and original alterations omitted). Therefore, under the Twombly/ Iqbal standard, Plaintiff's claim must clear two hurdles, (1) the pleaded facts must contain sufficient particularity to be plausible, and (2) they must also, if assumed to be true, establish a prima facie case for relief.

Furthermore, where a party filing or opposing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) presents matters outside the pleadings which are considered by the court, the motion to dismiss will be treated as one for summary judgment in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Trans–Spec Truck Serv. Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008). Courts may consider documents the authenticity of which are not in dispute—such as public records—without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Id.

II. Facts

A substantial quantity of extrinsic evidence has already been presented to the Court as part of Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary Injunction. However, under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Court will rely only upon the facts contained in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint or incorporated therein by reference. For the sake of brevity, the Court hereby incorporates the statement of facts set forth in its prior order (Docket No. 105) to the extent that that statement reflects the facts included in the Second Amended Complaint.[FN3]

III. Discussion

Defendants individually move to dismiss every claim against them. The Court will address the motions of Feldstein, Hagen, Desai, and Kociuk collectively in this order, considering each Count in turn.

A. Counts I and II, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

Count I, raised against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk, is for misappropriation of Trade Secrets under Massachusetts common law; Count II, raised against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk, is for misappropriation of trade secrets under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, § 42, and § 42A. For the reasons set forth in this Court's prior order, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to misappropriation. Even considering only the evidence included in the Complaint these allegations contain a level of specificity sufficient to surpass the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility threshold.

B. Count III, Unfair Competition under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A

Count III, against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk is for unfair competition under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A, § 11. This claim is dismissed as against all three defendants as they correctly assert the “intra-enterprise” exception to Chapter 93A, § 11. See Guest–Tek Interactive Entm't, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D. Mass. 2009). Plaintiff attempts to define the employer-employee relationship as existing within normal trade and commerce. This position has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Bertrand v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 728 F.2d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 1984); id. (citing Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston University, 425 Mass. 1, 23, 679 N.E.2d 191 (1997); Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 13–14, 444 N.E.2d 1262 (1983)).

Plaintiff further argues that the misappropriation claims against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are wholly independent from their employment at AMD, and therefore are no bar to the Chapter 93A claim. See Specialized Tech. Res., Inc. v. JPS Elastomerics Corp., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 841, 847, 957 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (2011). That is not an accurate assessment of Plaintiff's pleaded claims. AMD has not alleged any facts suggesting that Defendants misappropriated trade secrets through means other than abusing their positions as AMD employees. Consequently, the employee/employer relationship is a necessary element of the misappropriation claims. See Guest–Tek, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 46. Plaintiff's unfair competition claim is therefore properly barred as a matter of law by the “intra-enterprise” exception and the motions to dismiss will be allowed.[FN4]

C. Count IV, violation of the CFAA

Count IV, raised against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk, is for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. AMD alleges that Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk have knowingly, and with intent to defraud, accessed AMD's protected computer network either without authorization or in a manner than exceeded their authorized access.[FN5] Originally passed in 1984 and amended several times since, the CFAA created an entirely new category of crimes to address the issue of computer hacking. The CFAA is anything but a well-settled area of law, courts in different circuits have adopted significantly different interpretations of this act over the past decade. Compare United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.2012), and Wentworth–Douglass Hosp. v. Young & Novis Prof'l Ass'n, 10–CV–120–SM, 2012 WL 2522963 (D.N.H. June 29, 2012), with United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), and Guest–Tek, 665 F.Supp.2d 42.

Most relevant to this case are § 1030(a)(2)(C) and § 1030(a)(4). § 1030(a)(2)(C) states that it is a violation of the statute to “intentionally [access] a computer without authorization or exceed[ ] authorized access and thereby [obtain]—... information from any protected computer.” The breadth of this provision is difficult to understate. § 1030(a)(4) provides that it is a violation of the CFAA to

knowingly and with intent to defraud, [access] a protected computer without authorization, or [exceed] authorized access, and by means of such conduct [further] the intended fraud and [obtain] anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1–year period.

Neither the term “without authorization” nor the word “authorization” are defined by the CFAA, although the act does define “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). Despite this statutory definition the exact parameters of “authorized access” remain elusive.

Courts have generally adopted one of two positions when interpreting the CFAA. A narrow interpretation reflects a technological model of authorization, whereby the scope of authorized access is defined by the technologically implemented barriers that circumscribe that access. Thus if Company C maintains two secure servers, X and Y, and issues Employee E valid login credentials for Server X but not for Server Y, then Employee E has authorized access to Server X, but not to Server Y. Any data accessed by Employee E from Server X would be with authorization no matter how Employee E used that information. However, if Employee E used his/her Server X access to illicitly access Server Y, any data thus accessed on Server Y would be outside the scope of authorization.

By contrast, a broader interpretation defines access in terms of agency or use. Thus wherever an employee breaches a duty or loyalty, or a contractual obligation, or otherwise acquires an interest adverse to the employer, their authorization to access information stored on an employer's computer terminates and all subsequent access is unauthorized/exceeds the scope of authorization, whether or not the access is still technologically enabled. Thus, using the example stated above, Employee E would exceed the scope of his/her authorized access if data accessed from Server X was used for some purpose that was prohibited by Employee E's contractual or legal obligations to Company C.

Proponents of a narrower interpretation suggest that Congress' intent in passing the CFAA was to address computer hacking activities and not to supplement state misappropriation of trade secrets laws. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 (majority opinion). They further argue that expanding the definition of authorization to encompass extrinsic contractual agreements has far-reaching and undesirable consequences, such as potentially transforming idle internet browsing at work into a federal crime. Id. at 860. Proponents of a broader interpretation point to the sweeping language of the CFAA itself, as well as a consistent pattern of amendments expanding the scope of the CFAA over the past twenty years, as evidence that Congress did intend for the CFAA to have these wide-ranging effects. Guest–Tek, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 45. Furthermore, they argue that other statutory provisions, such as the “intent to defraud” requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), will prevent the CFAA from criminalizing benign activities such as workplace procrastination. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 866 (Silverman, J., dissenting).

There is no express indication in the legislative history of the CFAA that Congress intended for employers to sue at-will employees to recover economic damages resulting from time spent looking at personal emails instead of working. See id. at 857–58 (majority opinion). However, any information stored on any computer can satisfy the textual requirements of § 1030(a)(2)(C). Therefore, if this Court were to adopt a broad interpretation of the term of art “access that exceeds the scope of authorization” then arguably any violation of a contractual obligation regarding computer use becomes a federal tort so long as a very minimal damages threshold is met ($5,000 in any twelve-month period).[FN6] The dissenting opinion in Nosal dismissed this concern, noting that the CFAA provision at issue in that case, § 1030(a)(4), included an “intent to defraud” requirement that effectively differentiated between harmless workplace procrastination and more serious theft of intellectual property. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 866 (Silverman, J., dissenting). This case demonstrates the shortcomings of that position as AMD's allegations apply to both § 1030(a)(4) and § 1030(a)(2)(C) which includes no such fraud requirement.

Moreover, as the majority in Nosal noted, these features are substantially more troubling in a criminal context. Id. 676 F.3d at 860–61 (majority opinion). It is not possible to define authorization narrowly for some CFAA violations and broadly for others. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (holding that “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning”). It is obviously absurd to impose criminal liability for checking personal email at the workplace, or some similarly innocuous violation of an employee computer use agreement. Nor is it acceptable to rely solely upon prosecutorial discretion to refrain from prosecuting trivial offenses. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (majority opinion). As between a broad definition that pulls trivial contractual violations into the realm of federal criminal penalties, and a narrow one that forces the victims of misappropriation and/or breach of contract to seek justice under state, rather than federal, law, the prudent choice is clearly the narrower definition.

At the time of this order, the First Circuit has not clearly articulated its position on this issue. Some district judges have read EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. (EF Cultural I ), 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) as an endorsement of the broader interpretation. Guest–Tek, 665 F.Supp.2d 42. Others have read EF Cultural I as supporting a broad interpretation only in dicta, and have adopted a narrower interpretation. Wentworth–Douglass, 10–CV–120–SM, 2012 WL 2522963. It is not clear to me that EF Cultural I is a plain endorsement of a broad interpretation. In that case, the employee/defendant worked at a travel-booking website and gave unique information to a competitor that allowed that competitor to log into the employer's website as a tour leader and obtain sensitive pricing information to which the competitor would otherwise not have had access. EF Cultural I, 274 F.3d at 583 n. 14. This detail shifts EF Cultural I much more clearly into the realm of “access that exceeds authorization,” because it involves gaining access to information through means of a deception, i.e., pretending to be a tour leader.

Turning to the case at hand, AMD has not pleaded any analogous facts. AMD favors a broader interpretation of the CFAA and alleges that merely by violating their contractual agreements and/or their duty of loyalty to AMD, Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk rendered access that would otherwise have been authorized “without authorization” or “exceeding authorization” because they possessed an interest adverse to that of AMD. The Second Amended Complaint includes specific facts about when and how Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk logged into AMD's secure network with valid login credentials and accessed confidential AMD information which they later retained in violation of their respective contractual agreements with AMD. The Court notes that while the Second Amended Complaint alleges intent to defraud on the part of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk, it is sparse on the details of any such fraud or deception.[FN7]

Plaintiff's allegations are thus insufficient to sustain a CFAA claim under a narrow interpretation the CFAA and, for the reasons stated above, the narrower interpretation is preferable. However, this is an unsettled area of federal law, and one where courts have yet to establish a clear pleading standard. Given the incomplete nature of the evidentiary record and out of an abundance of caution, I will not dismiss these claims at this time. If AMD can plead specific details indicating that some or all of the defendants used fraudulent or deceptive means to obtain confidential AMD information, and/or that they intentionally defeated or circumvented technologically implemented restrictions to obtain confidential AMD information, then the CFAA claims will surpass the Twombly/Iqbal standard. Otherwise these claims will be dismissed once the factual record is complete.[FN8]

D. Count V, Breach of Employees Duty of Loyalty

Count V, raised against Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk, is for breach of *220 the employee's duty of loyalty under Massachusetts common law. Under Massachusetts law, this duty attaches to some, but not all, employees. Executives, directors, other senior officers, and partners must refrain from competing with their employer during their employment. E.g., Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729, 736 (1st Cir. 1982); Sterling Research, Inc. v. Pietrobono, 2005 WL 3116758 at *10 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 2005); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 433, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (1989) (partners). AMD's Second Amended Complaint clearly identifies Feldstein as such an executive.[FN9] Combined with the sufficiency of the misappropriation claims against him, AMD established a prima facie case for breach of the employee's duty of loyalty and Feldstein's motion to dismiss fails.

AMD has not, however, pleaded that Desai and Kociuk were executives, officers or directors of AMD. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 214–221 (Docket No. 91). Desai was a senior manager of ASIC/Layout design and Kociuk was an engineer reporting directly to Desai. “Rank-and-file” employees are not captured by the employee's duty of loyalty unless they occupy “a position of trust and confidence.” TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D. Mass.2008). Plaintiff pleads that Desai and Kociuk both had access to confidential AMD information, and therefore held such positions of “trust and confidence.” Pl.'s Opp, to Mot. to Dismiss at 11–12 (Docket No. 69) (citing id.; Meehan, 404 Mass. at 438, 535 N.E.2d 1255; Inner–Tite Corp. v. Brozowski, 27 Mass.L.Rptr. 204, 2010 WL 3038330 (2010)).[FN10]

The Court is wary of holding that any employee given access to any confidential information owes a fiduciary duty to his or her employer. However, as hardware designers working for a high-tech business that generates much of its revenue from intellectual property, they had access to confidential information of substantial value. Construing all factual ambiguities in favor of AMD, it is plausible that Desai and Kociuk held special positions of trust and confidence and did owe AMD a fiduciary duty. However, in order to sustain these allegations through summary judgment, AMD must produce specific evidence sufficient to establish that Desai and Kociuk were in positions entrusting them with a level of “trust and confidence” analogous to that of a law firm associate or regional sales manager.[FN11] Therefore Desai and Kociuk's motions to dismiss Count V will be denied..

E. Count VI, Breach of Contract

Count VI, raised against all Defendants, is for breach of contract, through (1) failing to return confidential AMD information at the end of their employment and/or (2) solicitation of AMD employees. For the reasons set for this in this Court's prior order, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim as against all defendants. Even considering only the evidence included in the Complaint, or incorporated into the same by reference, Plaintiff has pleaded a claim sufficient to surpass the Twombly/Iqbal threshold as against all Defendants.[FN12]

F. Count VII, Conspiracy to Misappropriate Trade Secrets

Count VII, raised against Desai and Kociuk, is for conspiracy. AMD alleges that Desai and Kociuk conspired to misappropriate trade secrets, and/or violate the CFAA, and/or breach their employee's duty of loyalty. In order to prove a civil conspiracy, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties ‘to inflict a wrong or injury upon another,’ and (2) ‘an overt act that results in damages.’ ” Grant v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Mass. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, AMD has pleaded a prima facie claim for relief for misappropriation of trade secrets against both Desai and Kociuk. Plaintiff also pleaded specific facts regarding email exchanges between Desai and Kociuk that could, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, be construed as acting in concert to commit the misappropriation. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 65 (Docket No. 91). Thus Plaintiff's conspiracy claim also surpasses the Twombly/Iqbal threshold.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' individual motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 42–45) will be ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) with regard to Count I (Misappropriation of trade secrets under Massachusetts common law) the motions of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are DENIED;

(2) with regard to Count II (misappropriation of trade secrets under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, §§ 42, 42A) the motions of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are DENIED;

(3) with regard to Count III (unfair competition under Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 93A, § 11) the motions of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are ALLOWED;

(4) with regard to Count IV (violation of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030) the motions of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are DENIED;

(5) with regard to Count V (breach of the employee's duty of loyalty under Massachusetts common law) the motions of Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are DENIED;

(6) with regard to Count VI (breach of contract) the motions of Feldstein, Hagen, and Desai, are DENIED; *222 (7) with regard to Count VII (conspiracy) the motions of Desai and Kociuk are DENIED.

SO ORDERED

Footnotes:

[FN1] Plaintiff brings a total of seven claims. Count I, raised against Feldstein, Desai, Kociuk and Thirumalai, is for misappropriation of Trade Secrets under Massachusetts common law. Count II, raised against Feldstein, Desai, Kociuk and Thirumalai, is for misappropriation of trade secrets under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, § 42, and § 42A. Count III, raised against Feldstein, Desai, Kociuk, and Thirumalai, is for unfair competition under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A, § 11. Count IV, raised against Feldstein, Desai, Kociuk and Thirumalai, is for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Count V, raised against Feldstein, Desai, Kociuk and Thirumalai, is for breach of the employee's duty of loyalty under Massachusetts common law. Count VI, raised against all Defendants, is for breach of contract, through (1) failing to return confidential AMD information at the end of their employment and (2) solicitation of AMD employees. Count VII, raised against Desai and Kociuk, is for conspiracy.

[FN2] The five defendants are as follows: Defendant Robert Feldstein (“Feldstein”), Defendant Manoo Desai (“Desai”), Defendant Nicolas Kociuk (“Kociuk”), Defendant Richard Hagen (“Hagen”), and Defendant Deepaksrivat Thirumalai (“Thirumalai”). Thirumalai was not originally a party to this suit, and was added to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in March 2013.

[FN3] The testimony presented to the Court in February 2013 at the preliminary injunction hearing is not contained in the complaint, nor are the specific details of the forensic analysis conducted by Elysium Digital. The Business Protection Agreements (“BPAs”) signed by Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk are incorporated into the Second Amended Complaint by reference, as are the contents of the emails presented to the Court at that hearing.

[FN4] Defendants simply do not compete with AMD in a fashion cognizable under Chapter 93A, § 11. The alleged misappropriation could form the basis of a Chapter 93A, § 11 claim against an actual market competitor (e.g., Nvidia) if AMD could show that the alleged misappropriation occurred and that the competitor participated therein. No such competitor is named in the Second Amended Complaint.

[FN5] The Second Amended Complaint does not specify which provision of the CFAA Feldstein, Desai, and Kociuk allegedly violated. So long as AMD pleads damages in excess of $5,000 within a twelve-month period (as per 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I), § 1030(g)) AMD can maintain a civil action for a violation of any provision of the statute.

[FN6] AMD has pleaded that the “diagnostic measures AMD took after it learned of the defendants' unlawful access and copying and/or transmitting of information, including but not limited to the costs of engaging a computer forensics firm” is in excess of $5,000. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 210 (Docket No. 91). The Court is troubled by the implication that the mere act of ascertaining whether or not there has been a violation of the CFAA is likely to cost enough money to meet the statutory threshold for violating the CFAA.

[FN7] The word “fraud” does not appear at all in the “Facts” section of the Second Amended Complaint. Indeed, the word “fraud” appears only six times in the Second Amended Complaint. Five of those times it is used in the title of the “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” and the sixth time is paragraph 209, where AMD alleges that Felstein, Desai, and Kociuk intended to “defraud” AMD. No further details are provided.

[FN8] The Court notes that even if the CFAA claims are dismissed at a later date, the pendant state law claims need not be remanded to state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Delgado v. Pawtucket Police Dep't, 668 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2012). It would be extremely inefficient to remand this case to state court given the quantity of evidence already presented to this Court.

[FN9] AMD also pleads that Hagen occupied an executive/director level position before moving to Nvidia, and thus owed AMD a fiduciary duty. However, AMD does not allege that Hagen breached this duty and he is not included in Count V of the Second Amended Complaint.

[FN10] In Inner–Tite, the employee in question was not merely entrusted with confidential information; he was a regional sales manager who “worked independently, was entrusted with sensitive and confidential information, and [was] the public face of [his employer].” Inner–Tite Corp. v. Brozowski, 20100156, 2010 WL 3038330 (Mass.Super. Apr. 14, 2010). In Meehan, the employee was an associate attorney, handling a substantial caseload, who allegedly lured his clients to a new law firm. Meehan, 404 Mass. at 438, 535 N.E.2d 1255. As an attorney actively working with clients, the associate in Meehan was, like the regional sale manager in Inner–Tite, a “public face” for his employer, and thus entrusted with a substantial level of trust and confidence.

[FN11] With regard to Desai and Kociuk, the Second Amended Complaint includes only the conclusory statement that they “occupied positions of trust and confidence” by virtue of their access to confidential information. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 215 (Docket No. 91).

[FN12] The sole exception was Plaintiff's solicitation claim against Feldstein, where Plaintiff failed to meet the stringent standard for injunctive relief. However, AMD has pleaded specific facts regarding Feldstein's meeting with Desai immediately prior to her interview with Nvidia that, in the light most favorable to AMD, establish a plausible prima facie case for solicitation sufficient to meet the lower threshold of Rule 12(b)(6).