CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[264] Ted D. Ayres argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Jackson A. Wright.

James M. Smart, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Michael K. Whitehead.^[1]

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Joel H. Paget for the Association for the Coordination of University Religious Affairs; by Wilkes C. Robinson and Jane E. Nelson for Bible Study; by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., and Kenneth F. Ripple for the Center for Constitutional Studies et al.; by Barry A. Fisher for the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity; by Nathan Lewin, Daniel D. Chazin, and Dennis Rapps for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and by Wilfred R. Caron for the United States Catholic Conference.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Earl W. Trent, Jr., for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; by J. Robert Brame, John W. Whitehead, and James J. Knicely for the National Association of Evangelicals; and by Donald L. Reidhaar for the Regents of the University of California.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents the question whether a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities [265] of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.

I

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City^[2] to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognize over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the costs to the University.

From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities.^[3] In 1977, however, the University informed the group that it could no longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship of religious teaching."^[4]

[266] Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri.^[5] They alleged that the University's discrimination against religious activity and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (1979). It found the regulation not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the State [267] could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. 480 F. Supp., at 915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the University could not discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (1980). Rejecting the analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. Id., at 1315-1320. The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students' " `social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity.' " Ibid. (quoting from the University bulletin's description of the student activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1).

We granted certiorari. 450 U. S. 909. We now affirm.

II

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.^[6] The Constitution [268] forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. See, e.g., Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175, and n. 8 (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session, "[w]here the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).

The University's institutional mission, which it describes as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment [269] rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960).

Here UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).^[7] In order to justify discriminatory [270] exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980).^[8]

III

In this case the University claims a compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.

A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to [271] other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States.^[9] We agree that the interest of the University in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the [policy] must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).

In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech,^[10] would have a secular purpose^[11] and would [272] avoid entanglement with religion.^[12] But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the "primary effect" of advancing religion.^[13]

[273] The University's argument misconceives the nature of this case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content to their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972).^[14] In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.

We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely effects. It is possible — perhaps even foreseeable — that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, [274] 771 (1973); see, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).

We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.

First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University . . . to religious goals" than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or any other group eligible to use its facilities. 635 F. 2d, at 1317.^[15]

Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 781-782, and n. 38. If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments. [275] or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., supra, at 747 (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S., at 658, n. 6.^[16] At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect."

B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for religion,^[17] the University claims a compelling interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution.^[18]

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause,^[19] a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free [276] speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the case before us.

On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the state interest asserted here — in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution — is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech.

IV

Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.^[20] Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).^[21] Finally, [277] we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S., at 188-189, that recognize a university's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.

The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulations of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards.

For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

As the Court recognizes, every university must "make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources," ante, at 276. The Court appears to hold, however, that those judgments must "serve a compelling state interest" wherever they are based, even in part, on the content of speech. Ante, at 269-270. This conclusion apparently flows from the Court's suggestion that a student activities program — from which the public may be excluded, ante, at 267-268, n. 5 — must be managed as though it were a "public forum."^[22] In my opinion, the use of the terms "compelling [278] state interest" and "public forum" to analyze the question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public universities.

Today most major colleges and universities are operated by public authority. Nevertheless, their facilities are not open to the public in the same way that streets and parks are. University facilities — private or public — are maintained primarily for the benefit of the student body and the faculty. In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written. In addition, in encouraging students to participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make decisions concerning the content of those activities.

Because every university's resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a particular time — one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet — the First Amendment would not require that the room he reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a "compelling state interest" to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of [279] this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges,^[23] and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like "compelling state interest."^[24]

[280] Thus, I do not subscribe to the view that a public university has no greater interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol Hill. A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more relevant to its educational mission than others. But the university, like the police officer, may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state university is to deny recognition to a student organization — or is to give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other student — it must have a valid reason for doing so. Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169.^[25]

In this case I agree with the Court that the University has not established a sufficient justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship on the campus. The primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the University's fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since the record discloses no danger [281] that the University will appear to sponsor any particular religion, and since student participation in the Cornerstone meetings is entirely voluntary, the Court properly concludes that the University's fear is groundless. With that justification put to one side, the University has not met the burden that is imposed on it by Healy.

Nor does the University's reliance on the Establishment Clause of the Missouri State Constitution provide a sufficient justification for the discriminatory treatment in this case.^[26] As I have said, I believe that the University may exercise a measure of control over the agenda for student use of school facilities, preferring some subjects over others, without needing to identify so-called "compelling state interests." Quite obviously, however, the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege.^[27] It seems apparent that the policy under attack would allow groups of young philosophers to meet to discuss their skepticism that a Supreme Being exists, or a group of political scientists to meet to debate the accuracy of the view that religion is the "opium of the people." If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be permitted. The fact that their expression of faith includes ceremonial conduct is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for suppressing their discussion entirely.

Accordingly, although I do not endorse the Court's reasoning, I concur in its judgment.

[282] JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the majority rejects petitioners' argument that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution prohibits the use of university buildings for religious purposes. A state university may permit its property to be used for purely religious services without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. With this I agree. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 813 (1973) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 661 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J.). The Establishment Clause, however, sets limits only on what the State may do with respect to religious organizations; it does not establish what the State is required to do. I have long argued that Establishment Clause limits on state action which incidentally aids religion are not as strict as the Court has held. The step from the permissible to the necessary, however, is a long one. In my view, just as there is room under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state policies that may incidentally burden religion. In other words, I believe the State to be a good deal freer to formulate policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does the majority. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 422-423 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority's position will inevitably lead to those contradictions and tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses warned against by Justice Stewart in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 416.

The University regulation at issue here provides in pertinent part:

"No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. Student congregations of local [283] churches or of recognized denominations or sects, although not technically recognized campus groups, may use the facilities . . . under the same regulations that apply to recognized campus organizations, provided that no University facilities may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."

Although there may be instances in which it would be difficult to determine whether a religious group used university facilities for "worship" or "religious teaching," rather than for secular ends, this is not such a case. The regulation was applied to respondents' religious group, Cornerstone, only after the group explicitly informed the University that it sought access to the facilities for the purpose of offering prayer, singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles. Cornerstone described their meetings as follows: "Although these meetings would not appear to a casual observer to correspond precisely to a traditional worship service, there is no doubt that worship is an important part of the general atmosphere." Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 910 (1979).^[28] The issue here is only whether the University [284] regulation as applied and interpreted in this case is impermissible under the Federal Constitution. If it is impermissible, it is because it runs afoul of either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the court below and accepted by the majority, is founded on the proposition that because religious worship uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.^[29] Not only is it protected, they argue, but religious worship qua speech is not different from any other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly wrong. Were it right, the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech.

Although the majority describes this argument as "novel," ante, at 269, n. 6, I believe it to be clearly supported by our previous cases. Just last Term, the Court found it sufficiently [285] obvious that the Establishment Clause prohibited a State from posting a copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall that a statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). That case necessarily presumed that the State could not ignore the religious content of the written message, nor was it permitted to treat that content as it would, or must, treat other — secular — messages under the First Amendment's protection of speech. Similarly, the Court's decisions prohibiting prayer in the public schools rest on a content-based distinction between varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its content, a prayer is indistinguishable from a biology lesson. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Operation of the Free Exercise Clause is equally dependent, in certain circumstances, on recognition of a content-based distinction between religious and secular speech. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court struck down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a state requirement that made a declaration of belief in God a condition of state employment. A declaration is again a speech act, but it was the content of the speech that brought the case within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.

If the majority were right that no distinction may be drawn between verbal acts of worship and other verbal acts, all of these cases would have to be reconsidered. Although I agree that the line may be difficult to draw in many cases, surely the majority cannot seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn.^[30] If that were the case, the majority would [286] have to uphold the University's right to offer a class entitled "Sunday Mass." Under the majority's view, such a class would be — as a matter of constitutional principle — indistinguishable from a class entitled "The History of the Catholic Church."^[31]

There may be instances in which a State's attempt to disentangle itself from religious worship would intrude upon secular speech about religion. In such a case, the State's action would be subject to challenge under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. This is not such a case. This case involves religious worship only; the fact that that worship is accomplished through speech does not add anything to respondents' argument. That argument must rely upon the claim that the State's action impermissibly interferes with the free exercise of respondents' religious practices. Although this is a close question, I conclude that it does not.

Plausible analogies on either side suggest themselves. Respondents argue, and the majority agrees, that by permitting any student group to use its facilities for communicative purposes other than religious worship, the University has created a "public forum." Ante, at 267-268. With ample [287] support, they argue that the State may not make content-based distinctions as to what groups may use, or what messages may be conveyed in, such a forum. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). The right of the religious to nondiscriminatory access to the public forum is well established. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). Moreover, it is clear that there are bounds beyond which the University could not go in enforcing its regulation: I do not suppose it could prevent students from saying grace before meals in the school cafeteria, or prevent distribution of religious literature on campus.^[32]

Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that allowing use of their facilities for religious worship is constitutionally indistinguishable from directly subsidizing such religious services: It would "fun[d] a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). They argue that the fact that secular student groups are entitled to the in-kind subsidy at issue here does not establish that a religious group is entitled to the same subsidy. They could convincingly argue, for example, that a state university that pays for basketballs for the basketball team is not thereby required to pay for Bibles for a group like Cornerstone.^[33]

[288] A third analogy suggests itself, one that falls between these two extremes. There are a variety of state policies which incidentally benefit religion that this Court has upheld without implying that they were constitutionally required of the State. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (state loan of textbooks to parochial school students); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (release of students from public schools, during school hours, to perform religious activities away from the school grounds); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (state provision of transportation to parochial school students). Provision of university facilities on a uniform basis to all student groups is not very different from provision of textbooks or transportation. From this perspective the issue is not whether the State must, or must not, open its facilities to religious worship; rather, it is whether the State may choose not to do so.

Each of these analogies is persuasive. Because they lead to different results, however, they are of limited help in reaching a decision here. They also demonstrate the difficulty in reconciling the various interests expressed in the Religion Clauses. In my view, therefore, resolution of this case is best achieved by returning to first principles. This requires an assessment of the burden on respondents' ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs and practices and of the State's interest in enforcing its regulation.

Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation would require them to meet "about a block and a half" from campus under conditions less comfortable than those previously available on campus.^[34] I view this burden on free exercise [289] as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the State need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation furthers some permissible state end. The State's interest in avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting religious worship — in maintaining a definitive separation between church and State — is such an end. That the State truly does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by the treatment of religion in the State Constitution.^[35] Thus, I believe the interest of the State is sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents' ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs.

On these facts, therefore, I cannot find that the application of the regulation to prevent Cornerstone from holding religious worship services in University facilities violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I would not hold as the majority does that if a university permits students and others to use its property for secular purposes, it must also furnish facilities to religious groups for the purposes of worship and the practice of their religion. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jerold Blumoff and Marc D. Stern for the American Jewish Congress; and by Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Meyer Eisenberg for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

[2] The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.

[3] Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 (WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms and in the student center. These meetings were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences.

[4] The pertinent regulations provide as follows:

"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University facilities. . . .

"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring services of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious group."

There is no chapel on the campus of UMKC. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.

Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a meeting where they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910.

[5] Respondent Clark Vincent and Florian Chess, a named plaintiff in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board of Curators.

[6] This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. See generally Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly `the marketplace of ideas.' " Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate . . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id.,at 181, 184.

At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view. A university differs in significant respects for public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.

[7] The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech." Post, at 284. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the First Amendment. See post, at 283-284, and n. 2, 286. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., which assumed that religious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," post, at 285, constituting "worship." There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.

First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," post, at 283, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading" — all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject matter — and become unprotected "worship."

Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw the distinction would require the university — and ultimately the courts — to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970).

Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See post, at 284-285. But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.

[8] See also Healy v. James, supra,at 184:

"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legititify interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a `heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."

[9] "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).

[10] As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between "religious" speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an establishment or religion — and "nonreligious" speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an establishment or religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). The dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech" and religious "worship." See post, at 285, and n. 3. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially unmanageable.

[11] It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the forum with which the University desires no association.

Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker.

[12] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious worship" and "religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310, 1318 (CA8 1980). Initially, the University would need to determine which words and activities fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 198 U. S. App. D. C. 198, 203, 613 F. 2d 931, 936 (1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.

[13] In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relief primarily on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld the grant of federal financing assistance to sectarian colleges for secular purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." Id.,at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that state funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used by religious organizations.

We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussion. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).

[14] This case is different from cases in which religious groups claim that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if state accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.

[15] University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 685-686. The University argues that the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, App. 18, 19. In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student Handbook 25.

[16] This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent agreement that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973).

[17] See, e.g., Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.) (en banc) (holding Missouri Constitution requires stricter separation of church and State than does Federal Constitution), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 815-816, 163 S. W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1942) (en banc) (same).

[18] See Mo. Const., Art. 1, §§ 6, 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (WD Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974), the District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with its own Constitution.

[19] U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

[20] See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The nature of a place, `the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable,' " quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)).

[21] In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 277-287, JUSTICE STEVENS expresses concern that use of the terms "compelling state interest" and "public forum" may "undermine the academic freedom of public universities." As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See also n. 5, supra. Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by the University it self.

[22] As stated by the Court, "[i]n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions." Ante, at 269-270. See also ante, this page, n. 20 ("Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by the University itself").

[23] In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, Justice Frankfurter forcefully spoke of "the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university . . . ." Id.,at 261 (concurring in result). Justice Frankfurter quoted with approval portions of an address by T. H. Huxley:

" `It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for itself of academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' " Id., at 263.

Although these comments were not directed at a public university's concern with extracurricular activities, it is clear that the "atmosphere" of a university includes such a critical aspect of campus life. See also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (opinion of POWELL, J.) ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment"); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879 (1879). Cf. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, reprinted in The Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 77-81 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972).

[24] In Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party,440 U. S. 173, JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed concern with

"what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as `compelling [state] interest' and `least drastic [or restrictive] means.' I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a `compelling state interest' is. If it means `convincingly controlling,' or `incapable of being overcome' upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, `least drastic means' is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less `drastic' or a little less `restrictive' in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down." Id., at 188-189 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted).

[25] In Healy, the Court stated:

"The opinions below also assumed that petitioner had the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the College. While petitioners have not challenged the procedural requirement that they file an application in conformity with the rules of the College, they do question the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with the National [Students for a Democratic Society]. For reasons to be stated later in this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation to be a controlling one. But, apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had failed an application in conformity with the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to justify its decision of rejection. It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disrupting on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a `heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action." 408 U. S., at 183-184 (footnotes and citations omitted).

[26] The University's asserted determination to keep Church and State completely separate, pursuant to the alleged dictates of the Missouri Constitution, is not without qualification. The very regulations at issue provide that "[n]o regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University facilities. . . ." See ante, at 266, n. 3.

[27] See Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 Geo. L. J. 727 (1980).

[28] Cornerstone was denied access to University facilities because it intended to use those facilities for regular religious services in which "worship is an important part of the general atmosphere." There is no issue here as to the application of the regulation to "religious teaching." Reaching this issue is particularly inappropriate in this case because nothing in the record indicates how the University has interpreted the phrase "religious teaching" or even whether it has ever been applied to activity that was not clearly "religious worship." The District Court noted that plaintiffs did not contend that they were "limited, in any way, for holding on campus meetings that do not include religious worship services." 480 F. Supp., at 913. At oral argument, counsel for the University indicated that the regulation would not bar discussion of biblical texts under circumstances that did not constitute "religious worship." Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. The sole question in this case involves application of the regulation to prohibit regular religious worship services in University buildings.

[29] Given that the majority's entire argument turns on this description of religious services as speech, it is surprising that the majority assumes this proposition to require no argument. The majority assumes the conclusion by describing the University's action as discriminating against "speakers based on their desire to . . . engage in religious worship and discussion." Ante, at 269. As noted above, it is not at all clear that the University has discriminated or intends to discriminate against "religious discussion" — as a preliminary matter, it is not even clear what the majority means by "religious discussion" or how it entered the case. That religious worship is a form of speech, the majority takes to have been established by three cases. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). None of these cases stand for this proposition. Heffron and Saia involved the communication of religious views to a nonreligious, public audience. Talk about religion and about religious beliefs, however, is not the same as religious services of worship. Niemotko was an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory denial of one religious group's access to a public park. The Court specifically stated that it was not addressing the question of whether the State could uniformly deny all religious groups access to public parks. 340 U. S., at 272.

[30] Indeed, while footnote 6 of the majority opinion suggests that no intelligible distinction may be drawn between worship and other forms of speech, footnote 9 recognizes that the Establishment Clause "requires" that such a line be drawn. The majority does not adequately explain why the State is "required" to observe a line in one context, but prohibited from voluntarily recognizing it in another context.

[31] Counsel for respondents was somewhat more forthright in recognizing the extraordinary breadth of his argument, than is the majority, Counsel explicitly stated that once the distinction between speech and worship is collapsed a university that generally provides student groups access to its facilities would be constitutionally required to allow its facilities to be used as a church for the purpose of holding "regular church services." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Similarly, although the majority opinion limits its discussion to student groups, counsel for respondents recognized that the First Amendment argument relied upon would apply equally to nonstudent groups. He recognized that respondents' submission would require the University to make available its buildings to the Catholic Church and other denominations for the purpose of holding religious services, if University facilities were made available to nonstudent groups. Id., at 39. In other words, the University could not avoid the conversion of one of its buildings into a church, as long as the religious group meets the same neutral requirements of entry — e.g., rent — as are imposed on other groups.

[32] There are obvious limits on the scope of this analogy. I know of no precedent holding that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of speech — including speech about religion — it must be open to regular religious worship services as well. I doubt that the State need stand by and allow it public forum to become a church for any religious sect that chooses to stand on its right of access to that forum.

[33] There are, or course, limits to this subsidy argument. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), demonstrate that in certain circumstances the State may be required to "subsidize," at least indirectly, religious practices, under circumstances in which it does not and need not subsidize similar behavior founded on secular motives.

[34] Respondents also complain that the University action has made their religious message less attractive by suggesting that it is not appropriate fare for the college campus. I give no weight to this because it is indistinguishable from an argument that respondents are entitled to the appearance of an endorsement of their beliefs and practices from the University.

[35] Since 1820, the Missouri Constitution has contained provisions requiring a separation of church and State. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the state constitutional provisions are "not only more explicit but more restrictive than the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution." Paster v. Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97, 102 (1974).

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[385] White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 397. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 397.

Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Keith A. Fournier, Mark N. Troobnick, James M. Henderson, Sr., Jordan W. Lorence, Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Walter M. Weber, and John Stepanovich.

John W. Hoefling argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Center Moriches Union Free School District et al. was Ross Paine Masler. Respondent Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, filed a brief pro se. With him on the brief were Jerry Boone, Solicitor [385] General, and Lillian Z. Cohen and Jeffrey I. Slonim, Assistant Attorneys General.^[1]

Justice White, delivered the opinion of the Court.

New York Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1993) authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the use of school property for 10 specified purposes when the property is not in use for school purposes. Among the permitted uses is the holding of "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general public." § 414(c).^[2] The list of permitted uses does not include meetings for religious purposes, and a New York appellate court in Trietley v. Board of Ed. of Buffalo, 409 N. Y. S. 2d 912, 915 (App. Div. 1978), ruled that local boards could not allow student bible clubs to meet [387] on school property because "[r]eligious purposes are not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414." In Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F. 2d 79, 83-84 (1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted Trietley as an authoritative interpretation of state law. Furthermore, the Attorney General of New York supports Trietley as an appropriate approach to deciding this case.

Pursuant to § 414's empowerment of local school districts, the Board of Center Moriches Union Free School District (District) has issued rules and regulations with respect to the use of school property when not in use for school purposes. The rules allow only 2 of the 10 purposes authorized by § 414: social, civic, or recreational uses (Rule 10) and use by political organizations if secured in compliance with § 414 (Rule 8). Rule 7, however, consistent with the judicial interpretation of state law, provides that "[t]he school premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes." App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a.

The issue in this case is whether, against this background of state law, it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to deny a church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today.

I

Petitioners (Church) are Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church in the community of Center Moriches, and its pastor John Steigerwald. Twice the Church applied to the District for permission to use school facilities to show a six-part film series containing lectures by Doctor James Dobson.^[3] A brochure [388] provided on request of the District identified Dr. Dobson as a licensed psychologist, former associate clinical professor of pediatrics at the University of Southern California, best-selling author, and radio commentator. The brochure stated that the film series would discuss Dr. Dobson's views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early stage. The brochure went on to describe the contents of each of the six parts of the series.^[4] The District denied the first application, saying [389] that "[t]his film does appear to be church related and therefore your request must be refused." App. 84. The second application for permission to use school premises for showing the film series, which described it as a "Family oriented movie — from a Christian perspective," id., at 91, was denied using identical language.

The Church brought suit in the District Court, challenging the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Speech and Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to each cause of action, the Church alleged that the actions were undertaken under color of state law, in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, rejecting all the Church's claims. With respect to the free-speech claim under the First Amendment, the District Court characterized the District's facilities as a "limited public forum." The court noted that the enumerated purposes for which § 414 allowed access to school facilities did not include religious worship or instruction, that Rule 7 explicitly proscribes using school facilities for religious purposes, and that the Church had conceded that its showing of the film series would be for religious purposes. 770 F. Supp. 91, 92, 98-99 (EDNY 1991). The District Court stated that once a limited public forum is opened to a particular type of speech, selectively denying access to other activities of the same genre is forbidden. Id., at 99. Noting that the District had not opened its facilities to organizations [390] similar to Lamb's Chapel for religious purposes, the District Court held that the denial in this case was viewpoint neutral and, hence, not a violation of the Freedom of Speech Clause. Ibid. The District Court also rejected the assertion by the Church that denying its application demonstrated a hostility to religion and advancement of nonreligion not justified under the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. 736 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (1990).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "in all respects." 959 F. 2d 381, 389 (CA2 1992). It held that the school property, when not in use for school purposes, was neither a traditional nor a designated public forum; rather, it was a limited public forum open only for designated purposes, a classification that "allows it to remain non-public except as to specified uses." Id., at 386. The court observed that exclusions in such a forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, ibid., and ruled that denying access to the Church for the purpose of showing its film did not violate this standard. Because the holding below was questionable under our decisions, we granted the petition for certiorari, 506 U. S. 813 (1992), which in principal part challenged the holding below as contrary to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.^[5]

II

There is no question that the District, like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46 (1983); Postal Service v. Council of Green- [391] burgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129-130 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47 (1966). It is also common ground that the District need not have permitted after-hours use of its property for any of the uses permitted by N. Y. Educ. Law § 414. The District, however, did open its property for 2 of the 10 uses permitted by § 414. The Church argued below that because under Rule 10 of the rules issued by the District, school property could be used for "social, civic, and recreational" purposes, the District had opened its property for such a wide variety of communicative purposes that restrictions on communicative uses of the property were subject to the same constitutional limitations as restrictions in traditional public forums such as parks and sidewalks. Hence, its view was that subject matter or speaker exclusions on District property were required to be justified by a compelling state interest and to be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Perry, supra, at 45; Cornelius, supra, at 800. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected this submission, which is also presented to this Court. The argument has considerable force, for the District's property is heavily used by a wide variety of private organizations, including some that presented a "close question," which the Court of Appeals resolved in the District's favor, as to whether the District had in fact already opened its property for religious uses. 959 F. 2d, at 387.^[6] We need [392] not rule on this issue, however, for even if the courts below were correct in this respect — and we shall assume for present purposes that they were — the judgment below must be reversed.

With respect to public property that is not a designated public forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes, we have said that "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in [393] light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 806, citing Perry Education Assn., supra, at 49. The Court of Appeals appeared to recognize that the total ban on using District property for religious purposes could survive First Amendment challenge only if excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The court's conclusion in this case was that Rule 7 met this test. We cannot agree with this holding, for Rule 7 was unconstitutionally applied in this case.^[7]

The Court of Appeals thought that the application of Rule 7 in this case was viewpoint neutral because it had been, and would be, applied in the same way to all uses of school property for religious purposes. That all religions and all uses for religious purposes are treated alike under Rule 7, however, does not answer the critical question whether it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.

There is no suggestion from the courts below or from the District or the State that a lecture or film about child rearing and family values would not be a use for social or civic purposes otherwise permitted by Rule 10. That subject matter is not one that the District has placed off limits to any and all speakers. Nor is there any indication in the record before us that the application to exhibit the particular film series involved here was, or would have been, denied for any reason other than the fact that the presentation would have [394] been from a religious perspective. In our view, denial on that basis was plainly invalid under our holding in Cornelius, supra, at 806, that

"[a]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum . .. or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created . . . , the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."

The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible under Rule 10, and its exhibition was denied solely because the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint. The principle that has emerged from our cases "is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others." City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984). That principle applies in the circumstances of this case; as Judge Posner said for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to discriminate "against a particular point of view. . . would . . . flunk the test . . . [of] Cornelius, provided that the defendants have no defense based on the establishment clause." May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F. 2d 1105, 1114 (1986).

The District, as a respondent, would save its judgment below on the ground that to permit its property to be used for religious purposes would be an establishment of religion forbidden by the First Amendment. This Court suggested in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981), that the interest of the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "may be [a] compelling" one justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment; but the Court went on to hold that permitting use of university [395] property for religious purposes under the open access policy involved there would not be incompatible with the Court's Establishment Clause cases.

We have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of the claimed defense on the ground that the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation are unfounded. The showing of this film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members. The District property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. As in Widmar, supra, at 271-272, permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series involved in this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971): The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.^[8]

The District also submits that it justifiably denied use of its property to a "radical" church for the purpose of proselytizing, since to do so would lead to threats of public unrest and even violence. Brief for Respondent Center Moriches [396] Union Free School District et al. 4-5, 11-12, 24. There is nothing in the record to support such a justification, which in any event would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the presentation of a religious point of view about a subject the District otherwise opens to discussion on District property.

We note that the New York State Attorney General, a respondent here, does not rely on either the Establishment Clause or possible danger to the public peace in supporting the judgment below. Rather, he submits that the exclusion is justified because the purpose of the access rules is to promote the interests of the public in general rather than sectarian or other private interests. In light of the variety of the uses of District property that have been permitted under Rule 10, this approach has its difficulties. This is particularly so since Rule 10 states that District property may be used for social, civic, or recreational use "only if it can be non-exclusive and open to all residents of the school district that form a homogeneous group deemed relevant to the event." App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. At least arguably, the Rule does not require that permitted uses need be open to the public at large. However that may be, this was not the basis of the judgment that we are reviewing. The Court of Appeals, as we understand it, ruled that because the District had the power to permit or exclude certain subject matters, it was entitled to deny use for any religious purpose, including the purpose in this case. The Attorney General also defends this as a permissible subject-matter exclusion rather than a denial based on viewpoint, a submission that we have already rejected.

The Attorney General also argues that there is no express finding below that the Church's application would have been granted absent the religious connection. This fact is beside the point for the purposes of this opinion, which is concerned with the validity of the stated reason for denying the [397] Church's application, namely, that the film series sought to be shown "appeared to be church related."

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Given the issues presented as well as the apparent unanimity of our conclusion that this overt, viewpoint-based discrimination contradicts the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that there has been no substantial showing of a potential Establishment Clause violation, I agree with Justice Scalia that the Court's citation of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), is unsettling and unnecessary. The same can be said of the Court's use of the phrase "endorsing religion," see ante, at 395, which, as I have indicated elsewhere, cannot suffice as a rule of decision consistent with our precedents and our traditions in this part of our jurisprudence. See Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 655 (1989) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). With these observations, I concur in part and concur in the judgment.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court's conclusion that the District's refusal to allow use of school facilities for petitioners' film viewing, while generally opening the schools for community activities, violates petitioners' First Amendment free-speech rights (as does N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1993), to the extent it compelled the District's denial, see ante, at 386-387). I also agree with the Court that allowing Lamb's Chapel to use school facilities poses "no realistic danger" of a violation of the Establishment Clause, ante, at [398] 395, but I cannot accept most of its reasoning in this regard. The Court explains that the showing of petitioners' film on school property after school hours would not cause the community to "think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed," and further notes that access to school property would not violate the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Ante, at 395.

As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 586-587 (1992), conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. See, e. g., Weisman, supra, at 644 (Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 655-657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 346-349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 107-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id., at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U. S. 125, [399] 134-135 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U. S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment); Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).

The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. See, e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting instances in which Court has not applied Lemon test). When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, see, e. g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985) (striking down state remedial education program administered in part in parochial schools); when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislative chaplains). Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than helpful signposts," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973). Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.

For my part, I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced. See, e. g., Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools — An Update, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (1987); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 495 (1986); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 1; Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1 (1984); R. Cord, Separation of Church and State (1982); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673 (1980). I will decline to apply Lemon — whether it validates [400] or invalidates the government action in question — and therefore cannot join the opinion of the Court today.^[9]

I cannot join for yet another reason: the Court's statement that the proposed use of the school's facilities is constitutional because (among other things) it would not signal endorsement of religion in general. Ante, at 395. What a strange notion, that a Constitution which itself gives "religion in general" preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement of religion in general. The attorney general of New York not only agrees with that strange notion, he has an explanation for it: "Religious advocacy," he writes, "serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those who already believe." Brief for Respondent Attorney General 24. That was not the view of those who adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It suffices to point out that during the summer of 1789, when it was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress enacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance that the Confederation Congress had adopted in 1787 — Article III of which provides: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to "religion in general" is not what our cases, both old and recent, demand. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313-314 (1952) ("When the state encourages religious [401] instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for church property); Lynch, 465 U. S., at 673 (the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions . . . . Anything less would require the `callous indifference' we have said was never intended" (citations omitted)); id., at 683 ("[O]ur precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action"); Marsh, supra; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 (1987) (exemption for religious organizations from certain provisions of Civil Rights Act).

* * *

For the reasons given by the Court, I agree that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment forbids what respondents have done here. As for the asserted Establishment Clause justification, I would hold, simply and clearly, that giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate that provision because it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect.

----------

[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Edward C. DuMont, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr.; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David H. Remes, T. Jeremy Gunn, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Elliot M. Mincberg; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Laurence Gold, and Walter A. Kamiat; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Steven T. McFarland, Bradley P. Jacob, and Karon Owen Bowdre; for Concerned Women for America et al. by Wendell R. Bird and David J. Myers; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by Nathan Lewin and Dennis Rapps; and for the Rutherford Institute by James J. Knicely and John W. Whitehead.

Jay Worona, Pilar Sokol, and Louis Grumet filed a brief for the New York State School Boards Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

[2] Section 414(e) authorizes the use of school property "[f]or polling places for holding primaries and elections and for the registration of voters and for holding political meetings. But no meetings sponsored by political organizations shall be permitted unless authorized by a vote of a district meeting, held as provided by law, or, in cities by the board of education thereof."

[3] Shortly before the first of these requests, the Church had applied for permission to use school rooms for its Sunday morning services and for Sunday School. The hours specified were 9 a.m.to 1 p.m.and the time period one year beginning in the next month. 959 F.2d 381, 383 (CA2 1992). Within a few days the District wrote petitioners that the application "requesting use of the high school for your Sunday services" was denied, citing both N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 and the District's Rule 7 barring uses for religious purposes. The Church did not challenge this denial in the courts and the validity of this denial is not before us.

[4]

"Turn Your Heart Toward Homeis available now in a series of six discussion-provoking films:

"1) A FATHER LOOKS BACK emphasizes how swiftly time passes and appeals to all parents to `turn their hearts toward home' during the allimportant child-rearing years. (60 minutes.)

"2) POWER IN PARENTING: THE YOUNG CHILD begins by exploring the inherent nature of power, and offers many practical helps for facing the battlegrounds in child-rearing — bedtime, mealtime and other confrontations so familiar to parents. Dr. Dobson also takes a look at areas of conflict in marriage and other adult relationships. (60 minutes.)

"3) POWER IN PARENTING: THE ADOLESCENT discusses father/ daughter and mother/son relationships, and the importance of allowing children to grow to develop as individuals. Dr. Dobson also encourages parents to free themselves of undeserved guilt when their teenagers choose to rebel. (45 minutes.)

"4) THE FAMILY UNDER FIRE views the family in the context of today's society, where a "civil war of values" is being waged. Dr. Dobson urges parents to look at the effects of governmental interference, abortion and pornography, and to get involved. To preserve what they care about most — their own families! (52 minutes.)

Note: This film contains explicit information regarding the pornography industry. Not recommended for young audiences.

"5) OVERCOMING A PAINFUL CHILDHOOD includes Shirley Dobson's intimate memories of a difficult childhood with her alcoholic father. Mrs. Dobson recalls the influences which brought her to a loving God who saw her personal circumstances and heard her cries for help. (40 minutes.)

"6) THE HERITAGE presents Dr. Dobson's powerful closing remarks. Here he speaks clearly and convincingly of our traditional values which, if properly employed and defended, can assure happy, healthy, strengthened homes and family relationships in the years to come. (60 minutes.) " App. 87-88.

[5] The petition also presses the claim by the Church, rejected by both courts below, that the rejection of its application to exhibit its film series violated the Establishment Clause because it and Rule 7's categorical refusal to permit District property to be used for religious purposes demonstrate hostility to religion. Because we reverse on another ground, we need not decide what merit this submission might have.

[6] In support of its case in the District Court, the Church presented the following sampling of the uses that had been permitted under Rule 10 in 1987 and 1988:

"A New Age religious group known as the `Mind Center' Southern Harmonize Gospel Singers Salvation Army Youth Band Hampton Council of Churches' Billy Taylor Concert Center Moriches Co-op Nursery School's Quilting Bee Manorville Humane Society's Chinese Auction Moriches Bay Power Squadron Unkechaug Dance Group Paul Gibson's Baseball Clinic Moriches Bay Civic Association Moriches Chamber of Commerce's Town Fair Day Center Moriches Drama Club Center Moriches Music Award Associations' `Amahl & the Night Visitors' Saint John's Track and Field Program Girl Scouts of Suffolk [C]ounty Cub Scouts Pack 23 Boy Scout Troop #414." 770 F. Supp. 91, 93, n. 4 (EDNY 1991).

The Church claimed that the first three uses listed above demonstrated that Rule 10 actually permitted the District property to be used for religious purposes as well as a great assortment of other uses. The first item listed is particularly interesting and relevant to the issue before us. The District Court referred to this item as "a lecture series by the Mind Center, purportedly a New Age religious group." Id., at 93. The Court of Appeals described it as follows:

"The lecture series, `Psychology and The Unknown,' by Jerry Huck, was sponsored by the Center Moriches Free Public Library. The library's newsletter characterized Mr. Huck as a psychotherapist who would discuss such topics as parapsychology, transpersonal psychology, physics and metaphysics in his 4-night series of lectures. Mr. Huck testified that he lectured principally on parapsychology, which he defined by `reference to the human unconscious, the mind, the unconscious emotional system or the body system.' When asked whether his lecture involved matters of both a spiritual and a scientific nature, Mr. Huck responded: `Itwas all science. Anything I speak on based on parapsychology, analytic, quantum physicists [sic].' Although some incidental reference to religious matters apparently was made in the lectures, Mr. Huck himself characterized such matters as `a fascinating sideline' and `not the purpose of the [lecture].' " 959 F. 2d, at 388.

[7] Although the Court of Appeals apparently held that Rule 7 was reasonable as well as viewpoint neutral, the court uttered not a word in support of its reasonableness holding. If Rule 7 were to be held unreasonable, it could be held facially invalid, that is, it might be held that the rule could in no circumstances be applied to religious speech or religious communicative conduct. In view of our disposition of this case, we need not pursue this issue.

[8] While we are somewhat diverted by Justice Scalia's evening at the cinema, post, at 398-399, we return to the reality that there is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled. This case, like Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 (1987), presents no occasion to do so. Justice Scalia apparently was less haunted by the ghosts of the living when he joined the opinion of the Court in that case.

[9] The Court correctly notes, ante, at 395, n. 7, that I joined the opinion in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 (1987), which considered the Lemon test. Lacking a majority at that time to abandon Lemon, we necessarily focused on that test, which had been the exclusive basis for the lower court's judgment. Here, of course, the lower court did not mention Lemon, and indeed did not even address any Establishment Clause argument on behalf of respondents. Thus, the Court is ultimately correct that Presiding Bishop provides a useful comparison: It was as impossible to avoid Lemon there, as it is unnecessary to inject Lemon here.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[230] Allen E. Daubman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Verne Moore, Jr., Marc D. Stern, and Amy Adelson.

Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for private respondents. With him on the brief were Douglas W. Davis, Robert K. Skolrood, Douglas Veith, and Charles E. Rice. Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer.^[1]

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs et al. by Douglas Laycock, Samuel E. Ericsson, Forest D. Montgomery, Oliver S. Thomas, J. Brent Walker, and Wilford W. Kirton, Jr.; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Nancy J. Gannon; for Concerned Women for America by Jordan W. Lorence, Cimron Campbell, and Wendell R. Bird; for Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism by Wendell R. Bird; for the Knights of Columbus by Kevin T. Baine and Kevin J. Hasson; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by John W. Whitehead; for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics by Albert L. Jordan; for the United States Catholic Conference by Mark E. Chopko and John A. Liekweg; for Tara Lynn Burr et al. by Michael W. McConnell, Robert Hale, Michael J. Woodruff, Kimberlee W. Colby, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Thomas C. Hill, Robert J. Cynkar, and David L. White; for Richard Collin Mangrum, pro se; and for Dr. David Moshman by Andrew J. Ekonomou.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., by Robert R. Thompson; and for Specialty Research Associates, Inc., by Thomas Patrick Monaghan.

[231] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III.

This case requires us to decide whether the Equal Access Act, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, prohibits Westside High School from denying a student religious group permission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time, and if so, whether the Act, so construed, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

I

Respondents are current and former students at Westside High School, a public secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska. At the time this suit was filed, the school enrolled about 1,450 students and included grades 10 to 12; in the 1987-1988 school year, ninth graders were added. Westside High School is part of the Westside Community Schools system, an independent public school district. Petitioners are the Board of Education of Westside Community Schools (District 66); Wayne W. Meier, the president of the school board; James E. Findley, the principal of Westside High School; Kenneth K. Hanson, the superintendent of schools for the school district; and James A. Tangdell, the associate superintendent of schools for the school district.

Students at Westside High School are permitted to join various student groups and clubs, all of which meet after school hours on school premises. The students may choose from approximately 30 recognized groups on a voluntary basis. A list of student groups, together with a brief description of each provided by the school, appears in the Appendix to this opinion.

School Board Policy 5610 concerning "Student Clubs and Organizations" recognizes these student clubs as a "vital part of the total education program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills." App. 488. Board Policy 5610 also provides that each club shall have faculty sponsorship and that [232] "clubs and organizations shall not be sponsored by any political or religious organization, or by any organization which denies membership on the basis of race, color, creed, sex or political belief." App. 488. Board Policy 6180 on "Recognition of Religious Beliefs and Customs" requires that "[s]tudents adhering to a specific set of religious beliefs or holding to little or no belief shall be alike respected." App. 462. In addition, Board Policy 5450 recognizes its students' "Freedom of Expression," consistent with the authority of the board. App. 489.

There is no written school board policy concerning the formation of student clubs. Rather, students wishing to form a club present their request to a school official who determines whether the proposed club's goals and objectives are consistent with school board policies and with the school district's "Mission and Goals" — a broadly worded "blueprint" that expresses the district's commitment to teaching academic, physical, civic, and personal skills and values. Id., at 473-478.

In January 1985, respondent Bridget Mergens met with Westside's Principal, Dr. Findley, and requested permission to form a Christian club at the school. The proposed club would have the same privileges and meet on the same terms and conditions as other Westside student groups, except that the proposed club would not have a faculty sponsor. According to the students' testimony at trial, the club's purpose would have been, among other things, to permit the students to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together. Membership would have been voluntary and open to all students regardless of religious affiliation.

Findley denied the request, as did Associate Superintendent Tangdell. In February 1985, Findley and Tangdell informed Mergens that they had discussed the matter with Superintendent Hanson and that he had agreed that her request should be denied. The school officials explained that school policy required all student clubs to have a faculty sponsor, [233] which the proposed religious club would not or could not have, and that a religious club at the school would violate the Establishment Clause. In March 1985, Mergens appealed the denial of her request to the board of education, but the board voted to uphold the denial.

Respondents, by and through their parents as next friends, then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that petitioners' refusal to permit the proposed club to meet at Westside violated the Equal Access Act, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, which prohibits public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance and that maintain a "limited open forum" from denying "equal access" to students who wish to meet within the forum on the basis of the content of the speech at such meetings, § 4071(a). Respondents further alleged that petitioners' actions denied them their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and the free exercise of religion. Petitioners responded that the Equal Access Act did not apply to Westside and that, if the Act did apply, it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. The United States intervened in the action pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403 to defend the constitutionality of the Act.

The District Court entered judgment for petitioners. The court held that the Act did not apply in this case because Westside did not have a "limited open forum" as defined by the Act — all of Westside's student clubs, the court concluded, were curriculum-related and tied to the educational function of the school. The court rejected respondents' constitutional claims, reasoning that Westside did not have a limited public forum as set forth in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), and that Westside's denial of respondents' request was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, see Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 273 (1988).

[234] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 867 F. 2d 1076 (1989). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in concluding that all the existing student clubs at Westside were curriculum related. The Court of Appeals noted that the "broad interpretation" advanced by the Westside school officials "would make the [Equal Access Act] meaningless" and would allow any school to "arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content," which was "exactly the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the [Act]." Id., at 1078. The Court of Appeals instead found that "[m]any of the student clubs at WHS, including the chess club, are noncurriculum-related." Id., at 1079. Accordingly, because it found that Westside maintained a limited open forum under the Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Act applied to "forbi[d] discrimination against [respondents'] proposed club on the basis of its religious content." Ibid.

The Court of Appeals then rejected petitioners' contention that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. Noting that the Act extended the decision in Widmar v. Vincent, supra, to public secondary schools, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[a]ny constitutional attack on the [Act] must therefore be predicated on the difference between secondary school students and university students." 867 F. 2d, at 1080 (footnote omitted). Because "Congress considered the difference in the maturity level of secondary students and university students before passing the [Act]," the Court of Appeals held, on the basis of Congress' factfinding, that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 492 U. S. 917 (1989), and now affirm.

II

A

In Widmar v. Vincent, supra, we invalidated, on free speech grounds, a state university regulation that prohibited [235] student use of school facilities " `for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.' " Id., at 265. In doing so, we held that an "equal access" policy would not violate the Establishment Clause under our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). In particular, we held that such a policy would have a secular purpose, would not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and would not result in excessive entanglement between government and religion. Widmar, 454 U. S., at 271-274. We noted, however, that "[u]niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Id., at 274, n. 14.

In 1984, Congress extended the reasoning of Widmar to public secondary schools. Under the Equal Access Act, a public secondary school with a "limited open forum" is prohibited from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a meeting within that forum on the basis of the "religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings." 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071(a) and (b). Specifically, the Act provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings." § 4071(a).

A "limited open forum" exists whenever a public secondary school "grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." § 4071(b). "Meeting" is defined to include "those activities of student groups which are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum." § 4072(3). [236] "Noninstructional time" is defined to mean "time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." § 4072(4). Thus, even if a public secondary school allows only one "noncurriculum related student group" to meet, the Act's obligations are triggered and the school may not deny other clubs, on the basis of the content of their speech, equal access to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.

The Act further specifies that a school "shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum" if the school uniformly provides that the meetings are voluntary and student initiated; are not sponsored by the school, the government, or its agents or employees; do not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and are not directed, controlled, conducted, or regularly attended by "nonschool persons." §§ 4071(c)(1), (2), (4), and (5). "Sponsorship" is defined to mean "the act of promoting, leading, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting." § 4072(2). If the meetings are religious, employees or agents of the school or government may attend only in a "nonparticipatory capacity." § 4071(c)(3). Moreover, a State may not influence the form of any religious activity, require any person to participate in such activity, or compel any school agent or employee to attend a meeting if the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to that person's beliefs. §§ 4071 (d)(1), (2), and (4).

Finally, the Act does not "authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any school," § 4071(e), or "limit the authority of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to [237] assure that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary," § 4071(f).

B

The parties agree that Westside High School receives federal financial assistance and is a public secondary school within the meaning of the Act. App. 57-58. The Act's obligation to grant equal access to student groups is therefore triggered if Westside maintains a "limited open forum" — i.e., if it permits one or more "noncurriculum related student groups" to meet on campus before or after classes.

Unfortunately, the Act does not define the crucial phrase "noncurriculum related student group." Our immediate task is therefore one of statutory interpretation. We begin, of course, with the language of the statute. See, e.g., Mallard v. United States District Court, Southern District of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 300 (1989); United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 604 (1986). The common meaning of the term "curriculum" is "the whole body of courses offered by an educational institution or one of its branches." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 557 (1976); see also Black's Law Dictionary 345 (5th ed. 1979) ("The set of studies or courses for a particular period, designated by a school or branch of a school"). Cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 271 (high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism class was part of the curriculum). Any sensible interpretation of "noncurriculum related student group" must therefore be anchored in the notion that such student groups are those that are not related to the body of courses offered by the school. The difficult question is the degree of "unrelatedness to the curriculum" required for a group to be considered "noncurriculum related."

The Act's definition of the sort of "meeting[s]" that must be accommodated under the statute, § 4071(a), sheds some light on this question. "The term `meeting' includes those activities of student groups which are . . . not directly related to the school curriculum." § 4072(3) (emphasis added). Congress' [238] use of the phrase "directly related" implies that student groups directly related to the subject matter of courses offered by the school do not fall within the "noncurriculum related" category and would therefore be considered "curriculum related."

The logic of the Act also supports this view, namely, that a curriculum-related student group is one that has more than just a tangential or attenuated relationship to courses offered by the school. Because the purpose of granting equal access is to prohibit discrimination between religious or political clubs on the one hand and other noncurriculum-related student groups on the other, the Act is premised on the notion that a religious or political club is itself likely to be a noncurriculum-related student group. It follows, then, that a student group that is "curriculum related" must at least have a more direct relationship to the curriculum than a religious or political club would have.

Although the phrase "noncurriculum related student group" nevertheless remains sufficiently ambiguous that we might normally resort to legislative history, see, e.g., James, supra, at 606, we find the legislative history on this issue less than helpful. Because the bill that led to the Act was extensively rewritten in a series of multilateral negotiations after it was passed by the House and reported out of committee by the Senate, the Committee Reports shed no light on the language actually adopted. During congressional debate on the subject, legislators referred to a number of different definitions, and thus both petitioners and respondents can cite to legislative history favoring their interpretation of the phrase. Compare 130 Cong. Rec. 19223 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (curriculum-related clubs are those that are "really a kind of extension of the classroom"), with ibid. (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (in response to question whether school districts would have full authority to decide what was curriculum related, "[w]e in no way seek to limit that discretion"). See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal [239] Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 37-39 (1986).

We think it significant, however, that the Act, which was passed by wide, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, reflects at least some consensus on a broad legislative purpose. The Committee Reports indicate that the Act was intended to address perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public schools, see H. R. Rep. No. 98-710, p. 4 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-357, pp. 10-11 (1984), and, as the language of the Act indicates, its sponsors contemplated that the Act would do more than merely validate the status quo. The Committee Reports also show that the Act was enacted in part in response to two federal appellate court decisions holding that student religious groups could not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, meet on school premises during noninstructional time. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-710, supra, at 3-6 (discussing Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 669 F. 2d 1038, 1042-1048 (CA5 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1155-1156 (1983), and Brandon v. Guilderland Bd. of Ed., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1123 (1981)); S. Rep. No. 98-357, supra, at 6-9, 11-14 (same). A broad reading of the Act would be consistent with the views of those who sought to end discrimination by allowing students to meet and discuss religion before and after classes.

In light of this legislative purpose, we think that the term "noncurriculum related student group" is best interpreted broadly to mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school. In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular course; or if participation in the group results in academic [240] credit. We think this limited definition of groups that directly relate to the curriculum is a commonsense interpretation of the Act that is consistent with Congress' intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act's requirements.

For example, a French club would directly relate to the curriculum if a school taught French in a regularly offered course or planned to teach the subject in the near future. A school's student government would generally relate directly to the curriculum to the extent that it addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school. If participation in a school's band or orchestra were required for the band or orchestra classes, or resulted in academic credit, then those groups would also directly relate to the curriculum. The existence of such groups at a school would not trigger the Act's obligations.

On the other hand, unless a school could show that groups such as a chess club, a stamp collecting club, or a community service club fell within our description of groups that directly relate to the curriculum, such groups would be "noncurriculum related student groups" for purposes of the Act. The existence of such groups would create a "limited open forum" under the Act and would prohibit the school from denying equal access to any other student group on the basis of the content of that group's speech. Whether a specific student group is a "noncurriculum related student group" will therefore depend on a particular school's curriculum, but such determinations would be subject to factual findings well within the competence of trial courts to make.

Petitioners contend that our reading of the Act unduly hinders local control over schools and school activities, but we think that schools and school districts nevertheless retain a significant measure of authority over the type of officially recognized activities in which their students participate. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. [241] 675 (1986). First, schools and school districts maintain their traditional latitude to determine appropriate subjects of instruction. To the extent that a school chooses to structure its course offerings and existing student groups to avoid the Act's obligations, that result is not prohibited by the Act. On matters of statutory interpretation, "[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve on it." Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U. S. 120, 126 (1989). Second, the Act expressly does not limit a school's authority to prohibit meetings that would "materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school." § 4071(c)(4); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 509 (1969). The Act also preserves "the authority of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary." § 4071(f). Finally, because the Act applies only to public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance, § 4071(a), a school district seeking to escape the statute's obligations could simply forgo federal funding. Although we do not doubt that in some cases this may be an unrealistic option, Congress clearly sought to prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content of a student group's speech, and that obligation is the price a federally funded school must pay if it opens its facilities to noncurriculum-related student groups.

The dissent suggests that "an extracurricular student organization is `noncurriculum related' if it has as its purpose (or as part of its purpose) the advocacy of partisan theological, political, or ethical views." Post, at 276; see also post, at 271, 290 (Act is triggered only if school permits "controversial" or "distasteful" groups to use its facilities); post, at 291 ("noncurriculum" subjects are those that " `cannot properly be included in a public school curriculum' "). This interpretation of the Act, we are told, is mandated by Congress' intention to [242] "track our own Free Speech Clause jurisprudence," post, at 279, n. 10, by incorporating Widmar's notion of a "limited public forum" into the language of the Act. Post, at 271-272.

This suggestion is flawed for at least two reasons. First, the Act itself neither uses the phrase "limited public forum" nor so much as hints that that doctrine is somehow "incorporated" into the words of the statute. The operative language of the statute, 20 U. S. C. § 4071(a), of course, refers to a "limited open forum," a term that is specifically defined in the next subsection, § 4071(b). Congress was presumably aware that "limited public forum," as used by the Court, is a term of art, see, e.g., Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45-49 (1983), and had it intended to import that concept into the Act, one would suppose that it would have done so explicitly. Indeed, Congress' deliberate choice to use a different term — and to define that term — can only mean that it intended to establish a standard different from the one established by our free speech cases. See Laycock, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 36 ("The statutory `limited open forum' is an artificial construct, and comparisons with the constitutional [`limited public forum'] cases can be misleading"). To paraphrase the dissent, "[i]f Congress really intended to [incorporate] Widmar for reasons of administrative clarity, Congress kept its intent well hidden, both in the statute and in the debates preceding its passage." Post, at 281-282, n. 15.

Second, and more significant, the dissent's reliance on the legislative history to support its interpretation of the Act shows just how treacherous that task can be. The dissent appears to agree with our view that the legislative history of the Act, even if relevant, is highly unreliable, see, e.g., post, at 274-275, n. 5, and 281-282, n. 15, yet the interpretation it suggests rests solely on a few passing, general references by legislators to our decision in Widmar, see post, at 274, and n. 4. We think that reliance on legislative history is hazardous at best, but where " `not even the sponsors of the bill [243] knew what it meant,' " post, at 281, n. 15 (quoting Laycock, supra, at 38 (citation omitted)), such reliance cannot form a reasonable basis on which to interpret the text of a statute. For example, the dissent appears to place great reliance on a comment by Senator Levin that the Act extends the rule in Widmar to secondary schools, see post, at 274, n. 4, but Senator Levin's understanding of the "rule," expressed in the same breath as the statement on which the dissent relies, fails to support the dissent's reading of the Act. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19236 (1984) ("The pending amendment will allow students equal access to secondary schools student-initiated religious meetings before and after school where the school generally allows groups of secondary school students to meet during those times") (emphasis added). Moreover, a number of Senators, during the same debate, warned that some of the views stated did not reflect their own views. See, e.g., ibid. ("I am troubled with the legislative history that you are making here") (statement of Sen. Chiles); id., at 19237 ("[T]here have been a number of statements made on the floor today which may be construed as legislative history modifying what my understanding was or what anyone's understanding might be of this bill") (statement of Sen. Denton). The only thing that can be said with any confidence is that some Senators may have thought that the obligations of the Act would be triggered only when a school permits advocacy groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. That conclusion, of course, cannot bear the weight the dissent places on it.

C

The parties in this case focus their dispute on 10 of Westside's approximately 30 voluntary student clubs: Interact (a service club related to Rotary International); Chess Club; Subsurfers (a club for students interested in scuba diving); National Honor Society; Photography Club; Welcome to Westside Club (a club to introduce new students to the [244] school); Future Business Leaders of America; Zonta Club (the female counterpart to Interact); Student Advisory Board (student government); and Student Forum (student government). App. 60. Petitioners contend that all of these student activities are curriculum related because they further the goals of particular aspects of the school's curriculum. The Welcome to Westside Club, for example, helps "further the School's overall goal of developing effective citizens by requiring student members to contribute to their fellow students." Brief for Petitioners 16. The student government clubs "advance the goals of the School's political science classes by providing an understanding and appreciation of government processes." Id., at 17. Subsurfers furthers "one of the essential goals of the Physical Education Department — enabling students to develop life-long recreational interests." Id., at 18. The Chess Club "supplement[s] math and science courses because it enhances students' ability to engage in critical thought processes." Id., at 18-19. Participation in Interact and the Zonta Club "promotes effective citizenship, a critical goal of the WHS curriculum, specifically the Social Studies Department." Id., at 19.

To the extent that petitioners contend that "curriculum related" means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals, however, we reject that argument. To define "curriculum related" in a way that results in almost no schools having limited open fora, or in a way that permits schools to evade the Act by strategically describing existing student groups, would render the Act merely hortatory. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[A] limited open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by what it says"). As the court below explained:

"Allowing such a broad interpretation of `curriculum-related' would make the [Act] meaningless. A school's administration could simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and choose which student clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs to [245] some broadly defined educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content. This is exactly the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the [Act]. A public secondary school cannot simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and then discriminate against a particular student group on the basis of the content of the speech of that group." 867 F. 2d, at 1078.

See also Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F. 2d 608, 614 (CA9 1989) ("Complete deference [to the school district] would render the Act meaningless because school boards could circumvent the Act's requirements simply by asserting that all student groups are curriculum related").

Rather, we think it clear that Westside's existing student groups include one or more "noncurriculum related student groups." Although Westside's physical education classes apparently include swimming, see Record, Tr. of Preliminary Injunction Hearing 25, counsel stated at oral argument that scuba diving is not taught in any regularly offered course at the school, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Based on Westside's own description of the group, Subsurfers does not directly relate to the curriculum as a whole in the same way that a student government or similar group might. App. 485-486. Moreover, participation in Subsurfers is not required by any course at the school and does not result in extra academic credit. Id., at 170-171, 236. Thus, Subsurfers is a "noncurriculum related student group" for purposes of the Act. Similarly, although math teachers at Westside have encouraged their students to play chess, id., at 442-444, chess is not taught in any regularly offered course at the school, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, and participation in the Chess Club is not required for any class and does not result in extra credit for any class, App. 302-304. The Chess Club is therefore another "noncurriculum related student group" at [246] Westside. Moreover, Westside's principal acknowledged at trial that the Peer Advocates program — a service group that works with special education classes — does not directly relate to any courses offered by the school and is not required by any courses offered by the school. Id., at 231-233; see also id., at 198-199 (participation in Peer Advocates is not required for any course and does not result in extra credit in any course). Peer Advocates would therefore also fit within our description of a "noncurriculum related student group." The record therefore supports a finding that Westside has maintained a limited open forum under the Act.

Although our definition of "noncurriculum related student activities" looks to a school's actual practice rather than its stated policy, we note that our conclusion is also supported by the school's own description of its student activities. As reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion, the school states that Band "is included in our regular curriculum"; Choir "is a course offered as part of the curriculum"; Distributive Education "is an extension of the Distributive Education class"; International Club is "developed through our foreign language classes"; Latin Club is "designed for those students who are taking Latin as a foreign language"; Student Publications "includes classes offered in preparation of the yearbook (Shield) and the student newspaper (Lance)"; Dramatics "is an extension of a regular academic class"; and Orchestra "is an extension of our regular curriculum." These descriptions constitute persuasive evidence that these student clubs directly relate to the curriculum. By inference, however, the fact that the descriptions of student activities such as Subsurfers and chess do not include such references strongly suggests that those clubs do not, by the school's own admission, directly relate to the curriculum. We therefore conclude that Westside permits "one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time," § 4071(b). Because Westside maintains a "limited open forum" under the Act, it is prohibited from [247] discriminating, based on the content of the students' speech, against students who wish to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.

The remaining statutory question is whether petitioners' denial of respondents' request to form a religious group constitutes a denial of "equal access" to the school's limited open forum. Although the school apparently permits respondents to meet informally after school, App. 315-316, respondents seek equal access in the form of official recognition by the school. Official recognition allows student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair. Id., at 434-435. Given that the Act explicitly prohibits denial of "equal access . . . to. . . any students who wish to conduct a meeting within [the school's] limited open forum" on the basis of the religious content of the speech at such meetings, § 4071(a), we hold that Westside's denial of respondents' request to form a Christian club denies them "equal access" under the Act.

Because we rest our conclusion on statutory grounds, we need not decide — and therefore express no opinion on — whether the First Amendment requires the same result.

III

Petitioners contend that even if Westside has created a limited open forum within the meaning of the Act, its denial of official recognition to the proposed Christian club must nevertheless stand because the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, petitioners maintain that because the school's recognized student activities are an integral part of its educational mission, official recognition of respondents' proposed club would effectively incorporate religious activities into the school's official program, endorse participation in the religious club, and provide [248] the club with an official platform to proselytize other students.

We disagree. In Widmar, we applied the three-part Lemon test to hold that an "equal access" policy, at the university level, does not violate the Establishment Clause. See 454 U. S., at 271-275 (applying Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612-613). We concluded that "an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose," 454 U. S., at 271 (footnotes omitted), and would in fact avoid entanglement with religion. See id., at 272, n. 11 ("[T]he University would risk greater `entanglement' by attempting to enforce its exclusion of `religious worship' and `religious speech' "). We also found that although incidental benefits accrued to religious groups who used university facilities, this result did not amount to an establishment of religion. First, we stated that a university's forum does not "confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." Id., at 274. Indeed, the message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion. "The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 641 (1978) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Second, we noted that "[t]he [University's] provision of benefits to [a] broad . . . spectrum of groups" — both nonreligious and religious speakers — was "an important index of secular effect." 454 U. S., at 274.

We think the logic of Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act. As an initial matter, the Act's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of "political, philosophical, or other" speech as well as religious speech is a sufficient basis for meeting the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 586 (1987) [249] (Court "is normally deferential to a [legislative] articulation of a secular purpose"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 394-395 (1983) (Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute"). Congress' avowed purpose — to prevent discrimination against religious and other types of speech — is undeniably secular. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 335-336 (1987); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773 (1973). Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. Because the Act on its face grants equal access to both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act's purpose was not to " `endorse or disapprove of religion,' " Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)).

Petitioners' principal contention is that the Act has the primary effect of advancing religion. Specifically, petitioners urge that, because the student religious meetings are held under school aegis, and because the State's compulsory attendance laws bring the students together (and thereby provide a ready-made audience for student evangelists), an objective observer in the position of a secondary school student will perceive official school support for such religious meetings. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593 (1989) (Establishment Clause inquiry is whether the government " `convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or [250] a particular religious belief is favored or preferred' ") (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 70 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).

We disagree. First, although we have invalidated the use of public funds to pay for teaching state-required subjects at parochial schools, in part because of the risk of creating "a crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting — at least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters — the powers of government to the support of the religious denomination operating the school," School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 385 (1985), there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969) (no danger that high school students' symbolic speech implied school endorsement); West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) (same). See generally Note, 92 Yale. L. J. 499, 507-509 (1983) (summarizing research in adolescent psychology). The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated. "[P]articularly in this age of massive media information . . . the few years difference in age between high school and college students [does not] justif[y] departing from Widmar." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 556 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).

Indeed, we note that Congress specifically rejected the argument that high school students are likely to confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion. See S. Rep. No. 98-357, p. 8 (1984); id., at 35 ("[S]tudents below the college level are capable of distinguishing between State-initiated, school sponsored, or teacher-led religious [251] speech on the one hand and student-initiated, student-led religious speech on the other"). Given the deference due "the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government," Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 319 (1985); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64 (1981), we do not lightly second-guess such legislative judgments, particularly where the judgments are based in part on empirical determinations.

Second, we note that the Act expressly limits participation by school officials at meetings of student religious groups, §§ 4071(c)(2) and (3), and that any such meetings must be held during "noninstructional time," § 4071(b). The Act therefore avoids the problems of "the students' emulation of teachers as role models" and "mandatory attendance requirements," Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S., at 584; see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203, 209-210 (1948) (release time program invalid where students were "released in part from their legal duty [to attend school] upon the condition that they attend the religious classes"). To be sure, the possibility of student peer pressure remains, but there is little if any risk of official state endorsement or coercion where no formal classroom activities are involved and no school officials actively participate. Moreover, petitioners' fear of a mistaken inference of endorsement is largely self-imposed, because the school itself has control over any impressions it gives its students. To the extent a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is not an endorsement of the views of the club's participants, see Widmar, 454 U. S., at 274, n. 14 (noting that university student handbook states that the university's name will not be identified with the aims, policies, or opinions of any student organization or its members), students will reasonably understand that the school's official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, religious speech.

[252] Third, the broad spectrum of officially recognized student clubs at Westside, and the fact that Westside students are free to initiate and organize additional student clubs, see App. 221-222, counteract any possible message of official endorsement of or preference for religion or a particular religious belief. See Widmar, 454 U. S., at 274 ("The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect"). Although a school may not itself lead or direct a religious club, a school that permits a student-initiated and student-led religious club to meet after school, just as it permits any other student group to do, does not convey a message of state approval or endorsement of the particular religion. Under the Act, a school with a limited open forum may not lawfully deny access to a Jewish students' club, a Young Democrats club, or a philosophy club devoted to the study of Nietzsche. To the extent that a religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no message of government endorsement of religion. Thus, we conclude that the Act does not, at least on its face and as applied to Westside, have the primary effect of advancing religion. See id., at 275 ("At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the university's] open forum, . . . the advancement of religion would not be the forum's `primary effect' ").

Petitioners' final argument is that by complying with the Act's requirements, the school risks excessive entanglement between government and religion. The proposed club, petitioners urge, would be required to have a faculty sponsor who would be charged with actively directing the activities of the group, guiding its leaders, and ensuring balance in the presentation of controversial ideas. Petitioners claim that this influence over the club's religious program would entangle the government in day-to-day surveillance of religion of the type forbidden by the Establishment Clause.

[253] Under the Act, however, faculty monitors may not participate in any religious meetings, and nonschool persons may not direct, control, or regularly attend activities of student groups. §§ 4071(c)(3) and (5). Moreover, the Act prohibits school "sponsorship" of any religious meetings, § 4071(c)(2), which means that school officials may not promote, lead, or participate in any such meeting, § 4072(2). Although the Act permits "[t]he assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes," ibid., such custodial oversight of the student-initiated religious group, merely to ensure order and good behavior, does not impermissibly entangle government in the day-to-day surveillance or administration of religious activities. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 305-306 (1985). Indeed, as the Court noted in Widmar, a denial of equal access to religious speech might well create greater entanglement problems in the form of invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech at meetings at which such speech might occur. See 454 U. S., at 272, n. 11.

Accordingly, we hold that the Equal Access Act does not on its face contravene the Establishment Clause. Because we hold that petitioners have violated the Act, we do not decide respondents' claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 63

STUDENT ACTIVITIES

August, 1984

BAND — This activity is included in our regular curriculum. Extensions of this activity include Marching Band, Ensembles, Pep Band, and Concert Jazz Band. Performances, [254] presentations, and programs are presented throughout the school year.

CHESS CLUB — This activity is for those interested in playing chess. Opportunities to play are held after school throughout the school year.

CHEERLEADERS — A girls sport cheerleader team is made up of a junior varsity and varsity. The boys sport cheerleaders consist of sophomores, junior varsity, and varsity. Tryouts for these spirit groups are held each spring.

CHOIR — This is a course offered as part of the curriculum. Extensions of this class include Boys and Girls Glee, Warrior Voices, and Concert and Chamber Choirs. Membership in these activities are [sic] determined by enrollment and tryouts.

CLASS OFFICERS — Voting and selection of junior and senior class officers for the following year are held each spring. Students interested in being a class officer will need to secure support, be willing to make a presentation to their class, and serve their class in an officer capacity for the following year.

DISTRIBUTIVE EDUCATION (DECA) — This is an organization that is an extension of the Distributive Education class. Membership in this activity is offered to those students involved in D. E. The club for the current year is formulated at the beginning of school each fall.

SPEECH & DEBATE — This is an activity for students interested in participating on a competitive level in both speech and debate. The season begins the first week in November and continues through March.

DRILL SQUAD & SQUIRES — These are spirit groups primarily concerned with performing at half time at football and basketball games. Selection for these squads is made in the spring of each school year. These marching units are also support groups for other athletic teams.

[255] FUTURE BUSINESS LEADERS OF AMERICA (FBLA) — This is a club designed for students interested in pursuing the field of business. It is open to any student with an interest. Membership begins in the fall of each school year.

FUTURE MEDICAL ASSISTANTS (FMA) — This is a club designed for students with an interest in pursuing any area of medicine. The organization assists in securing blood donations from individuals at Westside High School for the Red Cross. Meetings are held to inform the membership about opportunities in the medical field. Memberships are accepted at the beginning of school each fall.

INTERACT — This is a boys volunteer organization associated with the Rotary Club of America. Its basic function is to do volunteer work within the community. They [sic] are also a support and spirit group for our athletic teams. Membership is open to 11th and 12th grade boys; with membership opportunities being available in the fall of each school year.

INTERNATIONAL CLUB — This is a club designed to help students understand people from other countries and is developed through our foreign language classes. French, German, Spanish, and Latin teachers encourage membership in this organization in the fall of each year. Sponsorship of foreign students, who attend Westside, is one of their [sic] major activities.

LATIN CLUB (Junior Classical League) — This is a club designed for those students who are taking Latin as a foreign language. This club competes in competitive situations between schools and is involved with state competition as well. Students have the opportunity to join JCL beginning in the fall of each school year.

MATH CLUB — This club is for any student interested in mathematics. Meetings are held periodically during the school year.

[256] STUDENT PUBLICATIONS — This activity includes classes offered in preparation of the yearbook (Shield) and the student newspaper (Lance). Opportunities to learn about journalism are provided for students interested in these areas. Membership in Quill and Scroll is an extension of a student's involvement in school publications.

STUDENT FORUM — Each homeroom elects one representative as a member of the student forum. Their responsibility is to provide ideas, make suggestions, and serve as one informational group to the staff and administration for student government. Selections are made for this membership in the fall of each school year.

DRAMATICS — This activity is an extension of a regular academic class. School plays, one-act plays, and musicals are provided for students with an interest and ability in these areas. Tryouts for these productions are announced prior to the selection of individuals for these activities.

CREATIVE WRITING CLUB — This is an organization that provides students, with the interest and capability, an opportunity to do prose and poetry writing. This club meets periodically throughout the year and publishes the students' work. Any student with an interest is encouraged to become a member.

PHOTOGRAPHY CLUB — This is a club for the student who has the interest and/or ability in photography. Students have an opportunity to take photos of school activities. A dark room is provided for the students' use. Membership in this organization begins in the fall of each school year.

ORCHESTRA — This activity is an extension of our regular curriculum. Performances are given periodically throughout the year. Tryouts are held for some special groups within the orchestra. All students signed up for that class have the opportunity to try out.

OUTDOOR EDUCATION — This activity is an opportunity for interested students to be involved in the elementary [257] school Outdoor Education Program. High school students are used as camp counselors and leaders for this activity. Students are solicited to help work prior to the fall and spring Outdoor Ed Program.

SWIMMING TIMING TEAM — Offers an interested student a chance to be a part of the Timing Team that is used during the competitive swimming season. Regular season meets, invitational meets, and the metro swim meet are swimming activities at which these volunteers will work. Membership in this group is solicited prior to the beginning of the competitive season.

STUDENT ADVISORY BOARD (SAB) — Is another facet of student government. Members are elected from each class to represent the student body. These elections are held at the same time class officers are elected. Any student has an opportunity to submit their name for consideration.

INTRAMURALS — Are offered to Westside students these following times. Basketball begins the latter part of November and continues through February. Co-educational volleyball is the spring intramural activity. Announcements are made to students so they can organize and formulate teams prior to the beginning of these activities.

COMPETITIVE ATHLETICS — Westside High School offers students the opportunity to try out and participate in eighteen varsity sports. Twenty-seven different competitive teams are available for students at each grade level. The seasons when these are offered and the procedures for getting involved can be found in the Warrior Bulletin that is published and distributed in August, prior to the opening of school.

ZONTA CLUB (Z Club) — Is a volunteer club for girls associated with Zonta International. Approximately one hundred junior and senior girls are involved in this volunteer organization. Eleventh and twelfth grade students are encouraged to join in the fall of each school year.

[258A] SUBSURFERS — Is a club designed for students interested in learning about skin and scuba diving and other practical applications of that sport. Opportunities in the classroom and in our pool are made available for students involved in this activity. Membership is solicited in the fall and spring of each year.

WELCOME TO WESTSIDE CLUB — Is an organization for students who are interested in helping students new to District 66 and to Westside High School. Activities are held for them which are geared toward helping them become a part of our school curriculum and activities.

WRESTLING AUXILIARY — Is for girls interested in supporting our competitive wrestling team. Membership is solicited prior to the competitive wrestling season.

NATIONAL HONOR SOCIETY — Westside Honor Society is a chapter of the national organization and is bound by its rules and regulations. It is open to seniors who are in the upper 15% of their class. Westside in practice and by general agreement of the local chapter has inducted only those juniors in the upper 7% of their class. The selection is made not only upon scholarship but also character, leadership, and service. A committee meets and selects those students who they believe represent the high qualities of the organization. Induction into NHS is held in the spring of each year.

[258B] JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

The Court's interpretation of the statutory term "noncurriculum related groups" is proper and correct, in my view, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I further agree that the Act does not violate the Establishment Clause, and so I concur in the judgment; but my view of the analytic premise that controls the establishment question differs from that employed by the plurality. I write to explain [259] why I cannot join all that is said in Part III of JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S opinion.

I

A brief initial comment on the statutory issue is in order. The student clubs recognized by Westside school officials are a far cry from the groups given official recognition by university officials in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). As JUSTICE STEVENS points out in dissent, one of the consequences of the statute, as we now interpret it, is that clubs of a most controversial character might have access to the student life of high schools that in the past have given official recognition only to clubs of a more conventional kind. See post, at 271, 276.

It must be apparent to all that the Act has made a matter once left to the discretion of local school officials the subject of comprehensive regulation by federal law. This decision, however, was for Congress to make, subject to constitutional limitations. Congress having decided in favor of legislative intervention, it faced the task of formulating general statutory standards against the background protections of the Free Speech Clause, as well as the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Given the complexities of our own jurisprudence in these areas, there is no doubt that the congressional task was a difficult one. While I cannot pretend that the language Congress used in the Act is free from ambiguity in some of its vital provisions, the Court's interpretation of the phrase "noncurriculum related" seems to me to be the most rational and indeed the most plausible interpretation available, given the words and structure of the Act and the constitutional implications of the subject it addresses.

There is one structural feature of the statute that should be noted. The opinion of the Court states that "[i]f the meetings are religious, employees or agents of the school or government may attend only in a `nonparticipatory capacity.' " Ante, at 236 (quoting 20 U. S. C. § 4071(c)(3)). This is based upon a provision in the Act in which nonparticipation is one [260] of several statutory criteria that a school must meet in order to "be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum." § 4071(c). It is not altogether clear, however, whether satisfaction of these criteria is the sole means of meeting the statutory requirement that schools with noncurriculum related student groups provide a "fair opportunity" to religious clubs. § 4071(a). Although we need not answer it today, left open is the question whether school officials may prove that they are in compliance with the statute without satisfying all of the criteria in § 4071(c). But in the matter before us, the school has not attempted to comply with the statute through any means, and we have only to determine whether it is possible for the statute to be implemented in a constitutional manner.

II

I agree with the plurality that a school complying with the statute by satisfying the criteria in § 4071(c) does not violate the Establishment Clause. The accommodation of religion mandated by the Act is a neutral one, and in the context of this case it suffices to inquire whether the Act violates either one of two principles. The first is that the government cannot "give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact `establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' " County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 659 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 678 (1984)). Any incidental benefits that accompany official recognition of a religious club under the criteria set forth in the § 4071(c) do not lead to the establishment of religion under this standard. See Widmar, supra, at 273-274. The second principle controlling the case now before us, in my view, is that the government cannot coerce any student to participate in a religious activity. Cf. County of Allegheny, supra, at 659. The Act is consistent with this standard [261] as well. Nothing on the face of the Act or in the facts of the case as here presented demonstrates that enforcement of the statute will result in the coercion of any student to participate in a religious activity. The Act does not authorize school authorities to require, or even to encourage, students to become members of a religious club or to attend a club's meetings, see §§ 4071(c), (d), 4072(2); the meetings take place while school is not in session, see §§ 4071(b), 4072(4); and the Act does not compel any school employee to participate in, or to attend, a club's meetings or activities, see §§ 4071(c), (d)(4).

The plurality uses a different test, one which asks whether school officials, by complying with the Act, have endorsed religion. It is true that when government gives impermissible assistance to a religion it can be said to have "endorsed" religion; but endorsement cannot be the test. The word endorsement has insufficient content to be dispositive. And for reasons I have explained elsewhere, see Allegheny County, supra, its literal application may result in neutrality in name but hostility in fact when the question is the government's proper relation to those who express some religious preference.

I should think it inevitable that a public high school "endorses" a religious club, in a commonsense use of the term, if the club happens to be one of many activities that the school permits students to choose in order to further the development of their intellect and character in an extracurricular setting. But no constitutional violation occurs if the school's action is based upon a recognition of the fact that membership in a religious club is one of many permissible ways for a student to further his or her own personal enrichment. The inquiry with respect to coercion must be whether the government imposes pressure upon a student to participate in a religious activity. This inquiry, of course, must be undertaken with sensitivity to the special circumstances that exist in a secondary school where the line between voluntary and [262] coerced participation may be difficult to draw. No such coercion, however, has been shown to exist as a necessary result of this statute, either on its face or as respondents seek to invoke it on the facts of this case.

For these reasons, I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that "noncurriculum" must be construed broadly to "prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content of a student group's speech." Ante, at 241. As the majority demonstrates, such a construction "is consistent with Congress' intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act's requirements." Ante, at 240. In addition, to the extent that Congress intended the Act to track this Court's free speech jurisprudence, as the dissent argues, post, at 279, n. 10, the majority's construction is faithful to our commitment to nondiscriminatory access to open fora in public schools. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 267 (1981). When a school allows student-initiated clubs not directly tied to the school's curriculum to use school facilities, it has "created a forum generally open to student groups" and is therefore constitutionally prohibited from enforcing a "content-based exclusion" of other student speech. Id., at 277. In this respect, the Act as construed by the majority simply codifies in statute what is already constitutionally mandated: schools may not discriminate among student-initiated groups that seek access to school facilities for expressive purposes not directly related to the school's curriculum.

The Act's low threshold for triggering equal access, however, raises serious Establishment Clause concerns where secondary schools with fora that differ substantially from the forum in Widmar are required to grant access to student religious groups. Indeed, as applied in the present case, the Act mandates a religious group's access to a forum that is dedicated to promoting fundamental values and citizenship as [263] defined by the school. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the operation of the Act in such circumstances, but it does require schools to change their relationship to their fora so as to disassociate themselves effectively from religious clubs' speech. Thus, although I agree with the plurality that the Act as applied to Westside could withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny, ante, at 247-253 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ.), I write separately to emphasize the steps Westside must take to avoid appearing to endorse the Christian club's goals. The plurality's Establishment Clause analysis pays inadequate attention to the differences between this case and Widmar and dismisses too lightly the distinctive pressures created by Westside's highly structured environment.

I

A

This case involves the intersection of two First Amendment guarantees — the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause. We have long regarded free and open debate over matters of controversy as necessary to the functioning of our constitutional system. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 ((1972) ("To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship"). That the Constitution requires toleration of speech over its suppression is no less true in our Nation's schools. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 512 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 280-281 (1988) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

But the Constitution also demands that the State not take action that has the primary effect of advancing religion. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). [264] The introduction of religious speech into the public schools reveals the tension between these two constitutional commitments, because the failure of a school to stand apart from religious speech can convey a message that the school endorses rather than merely tolerates that speech. Recognizing the potential dangers of school-endorsed religious practice, we have shown particular "vigilan[ce] in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 583-584 (1987). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 40 (1985) (invalidating statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203 (1948) (invalidating statute providing for voluntary religious education in the public schools). This vigilance must extend to our monitoring of the actual effects of an "equal access" policy. If public schools are perceived as conferring the imprimatur of the State on religious doctrine or practice as a result of such a policy, the nominally "neutral" character of the policy will not save it from running afoul of the Establishment Clause.^[2]

B

We addressed at length the potential conflict between toleration and endorsement of religious speech in Widmar. There, a religious study group sought the same access to university facilities that the university afforded to over 100 [265] officially recognized student groups, including many political organizations. In those circumstances, we concluded that granting religious organizations similar access to the public forum would have neither the purpose nor the primary effect of advancing religion. 454 U. S., at 270-275. The plurality suggests that our conclusion in Widmar controls this case. Ante, at 248-253. But the plurality fails to recognize that the wide-open and independent character of the student forum in Widmar differs substantially from the forum at Westside.

Westside currently does not recognize any student club that advocates a controversial viewpoint. Indeed, the clubs at Westside that trigger the Act involve scuba diving, chess, and counseling for special education students. Ante, at 245-246. As a matter of school policy, Westside encourages student participation in clubs based on a broad conception of its educational mission. See App. 488; ante, at 231. That mission comports with the Court's acknowledgment "that public schools are vitally important `in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' and as vehicles for `inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.' " Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). Given the nature and function of student clubs at Westside, the school makes no effort to disassociate itself from the activities and goals of its student clubs.

The entry of religious clubs into such a realm poses a real danger that those clubs will be viewed as part of the school's effort to inculcate fundamental values. The school's message with respect to its existing clubs is not one of toleration but one of endorsement. As the majority concedes, the program is part of the "district's commitment to teaching academic, physical, civic, and personal skills and values." Ante, at 232. But although a school may permissibly encourage its students to become well rounded as student-athletes, student-musicians, and student-tutors, the Constitution forbids [266] schools to encourage students to become well rounded as student-worshippers. Neutrality towards religion, as required by the Constitution, is not advanced by requiring a school that endorses the goals of some noncontroversial secular organizations to endorse the goals of religious organizations as well.

The fact that the Act, when triggered, provides access to political as well as religious speech does not ameliorate the potential threat of endorsement. The breadth of beneficiaries under the Act does suggest that the Act may satisfy the "secular purpose" requirement of the Establishment Clause inquiry we identified in Lemon, supra, at 612-613. But see post, at 284-285, n. 20 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the crucial question is how the Act affects each school. If a school already houses numerous ideological organizations, then the addition of a religion club will most likely not violate the Establishment Clause because the risk that students will erroneously attribute the views of the religion club to the school is minimal. To the extent a school tolerates speech by a wide range of ideological clubs, students cannot reasonably understand the school to endorse all of the groups' divergent and contradictory views. But if the religion club is the sole advocacy-oriented group in the forum, or one of a very limited number, and the school continues to promote its student-club program as instrumental to citizenship, then the school's failure to disassociate itself from the religious activity will reasonably be understood as an endorsement of that activity. That political and other advocacy-oriented groups are permitted to participate in a forum that, through school support and encouragement, is devoted to fostering a student's civic identity does not ameliorate the appearance of school endorsement unless the invitation is accepted and the forum is transformed into a forum like that in Widmar.

For this reason, the plurality's reliance on Widmar is misplaced. The University of Missouri took concrete steps to ensure "that the University's name will not `be identified in [267] any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members,' " 454 U. S., at 274, n. 14 (quoting University of Missouri student handbook). Westside, in contrast, explicitly promotes its student clubs "as a vital part of the total education program [and] as a means of developing citizenship." App. 488. And while the University of Missouri recognized such clubs as the Young Socialist Alliance and the Young Democrats, Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310, 1312, n. 1, (CA8 1980), Westside has recognized no such political clubs, App. 488.

The different approaches to student clubs embodied in these policies reflect a significant difference, for Establishment Clause purposes, between the respective roles that Westside High School and the University of Missouri attempt to play in their students' lives. To the extent that a school emphasizes the autonomy of its students, as does the University of Missouri, there is a corresponding decrease in the likelihood that student speech will be regarded as school speech. Conversely, where a school such as Westside regards its student clubs as a mechanism for defining and transmitting fundamental values, the inclusion of a religious club in the school's program will almost certainly signal school endorsement of the religious practice.

Thus, the underlying difference between this case and Widmar is not that college and high school students have varying capacities to perceive the subtle differences between toleration and endorsement, but rather that the University of Missouri and Westside actually choose to define their respective missions in different ways. That high schools tend to emphasize student autonomy less than universities may suggest that high school administrators tend to perceive a difference in the maturity of secondary and university students. But the school's behavior, not the purported immaturity of high school students, is dispositive. If Westside stood apart from its club program and expressed the view, endorsed by Congress through its passage of the Act, that high school students [268] are capable of engaging in wide-ranging discussion of sensitive and controversial speech, the inclusion of religious groups in Westside's forum would confirm the school's commitment to nondiscrimination. Here, though, the Act requires the school to permit religious speech in a forum explicitly designed to advance the school's interest in shaping the character of its students.

The comprehensiveness of the access afforded by the Act further highlights the Establishment Clause dangers posed by the Act's application to fora such as Westside's. The Court holds that "[o]fficial recognition allows student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair." Ante, at 247 (citing App. 434-435). Students would be alerted to the meetings of the religion club over the public address system; they would see religion club material posted on the official school bulletin board and club notices in the school newspaper; they would be recruited to join the religion club at the school-sponsored Club Fair. If a school has a variety of ideological clubs, as in Widmar, I agree with the plurality that a student is likely to understand that "a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Ante, at 250. When a school has a religion club but no other political or ideological organizations, however, that relatively fine distinction may be lost.

Moreover, in the absence of a truly robust forum that includes the participation of more than one advocacy-oriented group, the presence of a religious club could provide a fertile ground for peer pressure, especially if the club commanded support from a substantial portion of the student body. Indeed, it is precisely in a school without such a forum that intolerance for different religious and other views would be most dangerous and that a student who does not share the religious beliefs of his classmates would perceive "that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." [269] Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 70 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment).

The plurality concedes that there is a "possibility of student peer pressure," ante, at 251, but maintains that this does not amount to "official state endorsement." Ibid. This dismissal is too facile. We must remain sensitive, especially in the public schools, to "the numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others." County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 627-628 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). When the government, through mandatory attendance laws, brings students together in a highly controlled environment every day for the better part of their waking hours and regulates virtually every aspect of their existence during that time, we should not be so quick to dismiss the problem of peer pressure as if the school environment had nothing to do with creating and fostering it. The State has structured an environment in which students holding mainstream views may be able to coerce adherents of minority religions to attend club meetings or to adhere to club beliefs. Thus, the State cannot disclaim its responsibility for those resulting pressures.

II

Given these substantial risks posed by the inclusion of the proposed Christian club within Westside's present forum, Westside must redefine its relationship to its club program. The plurality recognizes that such redefinition is necessary to avoid the risk of endorsement and construes the Act accordingly. The plurality holds that the Act "limits participation by school officials at meetings of student religious groups," ante, at 251 (citing §§ 4071(c)(2) and (3)), and requires religion club meetings to be held during noninstructional time, ibid. (citing § 4071(b)). It also holds that schools may not sponsor any religious meetings. Ante, at 253 (citing § 4072(2)). Finally, [270] and perhaps most importantly, the plurality states that schools bear the responsibility for taking whatever further steps are necessary to make clear that their recognition of a religious club does not reflect their endorsement of the views of the club's participants. Ante, at 251.

Westside thus must do more than merely prohibit faculty members from actively participating in the Christian club's meetings. It must fully disassociate itself from the club's religious speech and avoid appearing to sponsor or endorse the club's goals. It could, for example, entirely discontinue encouraging student participation in clubs and clarify that the clubs are not instrumentally related to the school's overall mission. Or, if the school sought to continue its general endorsement of those student clubs that did not engage in controversial speech, it could do so if it also affirmatively disclaimed any endorsement of the Christian club.

III

The inclusion of the Christian club in the type of forum presently established at Westside, without more, will not assure government neutrality toward religion. Rather, because the school endorses the extracurricular program as part of its educational mission, the inclusion of the Christian club in that program will convey to students the school-sanctioned message that involvement in religion develops "citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills." App. 488. We need not question the value of that message to affirm that it is not the place of schools to issue it. Accordingly, schools such as Westside must be responsive not only to the broad terms of the Act's coverage, but also to this Court's mandate that they effectively disassociate themselves from the religious speech that now may become commonplace in their facilities.

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

The dictionary is a necessary, and sometimes sufficient, aid to the judge confronted with the task of construing an opaque [271] Act of Congress. In a case like this, however, I believe we must probe more deeply to avoid a patently bizarre result. Can Congress really have intended to issue an order to every public high school in the Nation stating, in substance, that if you sponsor a chess club, a scuba diving club, or a French club — without having formal classes in those subjects — you must also open your doors to every religious, political, or social organization, no matter how controversial or distasteful its views may be? I think not. A fair review of the legislative history of the Equal Access Act (Act), 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, discloses that Congress intended to recognize a much narrower forum than the Court has legislated into existence today.

I

The Act's basic design is easily summarized: when a public high school has a "limited open forum," it must not deny any student group access to that forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech of the group. Although the consequences of having a limited open forum are thus quite clear, the definition of such a forum is less so. Nevertheless, there is considerable agreement about how this difficulty must be resolved. The Court correctly identifies three useful guides to Congress' intent. First, the text of the statute says that a school creates a limited open forum if it allows meetings on school premises by "noncurriculum related student groups," a concept that is ambiguous at best.^[3] Ante, at 237. Second, because this concept is ambiguous, the statute must be interpreted by reference to its general purpose, as revealed by its overall structure and by the legislative history. See ante, at 238-239. Third, the Act's legislative history reveals that Congress intended to guarantee student religious groups access to high school fora comparable to the college forum involved in [272] Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Ante, at 235, 239. All of this is common ground, shared by the parties and by every Court of Appeals to have construed the Act.^[4]

A fourth agreement would seem to follow from these three. If "noncurriculum related" is an ambiguous term, and if it must therefore be interpreted in light of congressional purpose, and if the purpose of Congress was to ensure that the rule of Widmar applied to high schools as it did to colleges, then the incidence of the Act in this case should depend upon whether, in light of Widmar, Westside would have to permit the Christian student group to meet if Westside were a college.^[5] The characteristics of the college forum in Widmar should thus provide a useful background for interpreting the meaning of the undefined term "noncurriculum related student groups." But this step the Court does not take, and it is accordingly here that I part company with it.

Our decision in Widmar encompassed two constitutional holdings. First, we interpreted the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to determine whether the University of Missouri at Kansas City had, by its own policies, abdicated discretion that it would otherwise have to make content-based discriminations among student groups seeking to meet on its campus. We agreed that it had. 454 U. S., at 269; see also id., at 280-281 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Next, we interpreted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to determine whether the university was prohibited from permitting student-initiated religious groups to participate in that forum. We agreed that it was [273] not. Id., at 270-277; see also, id., at 280-281 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

To extend Widmar to high schools, then, would require us to pose two questions. We would first ask whether a high school had established a forum comparable under our Free Speech Clause jurisprudence to that which existed in Widmar. Only if this question were answered affirmatively would we then need to test the constitutionality of the Act by asking whether the Establishment Clause has different consequences when applied to a high school's open forum than when applied to a college's. I believe that in this case the first question must instead be answered in the negative, and that this answer ultimately proves dispositive under the Act just as it would were only constitutional considerations in play.

The forum at Westside is considerably different from that which existed at the University of Missouri. In Widmar, we held that the university had created "a generally open forum," id., at 269. Over 100 officially recognized student groups routinely participated in that forum. Id., at 265. They included groups whose activities not only were unrelated to any specific courses, but also were of a kind that a state university could not properly sponsor or endorse. Thus, for example, they included such political organizations as the Young Socialist Alliance, the Women's Union, and the Young Democrats. See id., at 274; Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310, 1312, and n. 1 (CA8 1980). The university permitted use of its facilities for speakers advocating transcendental meditation and humanism. Since the university had allowed such organizations and speakers the use of campus facilities, we concluded that the university could not discriminate against a religious group on the basis of the content of its speech. The forum established by the state university accommodated participating groups that were "noncurriculum related" not only because they did not mirror the school's classroom instruction, but also because they advocated [274] controversial positions that a state university's obligation of neutrality prevented it from endorsing.

The Court's opinion in Widmar left open the question whether its holding would apply to a public high school that had established a similar public forum. That question has now been answered in the affirmative by the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and by this Court. I agree with that answer. Before the question was answered judicially, Congress decided to answer it legislatively in order to preclude continued unconstitutional discrimination against high school students interested in religious speech. According to Senator Hatfield, a cosponsor of the Act: "All [it] does is merely to try to protect, as I say, a right that is guaranteed under the Constitution that is being denied certain students." 130 Cong. Rec. 19218 (1984). As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the Act codified the decision in Widmar, "extending that holding to secondary public schools." 867 F. 2d 1076, 1079, and n. 1 (CA8 1989).^[6] What the Court of Appeals failed to recognize, however, is the critical difference between the university forum in Widmar and the high school forum involved in this case. None of the clubs at the high school are even arguably controversial or partisan.^[7]

[275] Nor would it be wise to ignore this difference. High school students may be adult enough to distinguish between those organizations that are sponsored by the school and those which lack school sponsorship even though they participate in a forum that the school does sponsor. See ante, at 250. But high school students are also young enough that open fora may be less suitable for them than for college students. The need to decide whether to risk treating students as adults too soon, or alternatively to risk treating them as children too long, is an enduring problem for all educators. The youth of these students, whether described in terms of "impressionability" or "maturity," may be irrelevant to our application of the constitutional restrictions that limit educational discretion in the public schools, but it surely is not irrelevant to our interpretation of the educational policies that have been adopted. We would do no honor to Westside's administrators or the Congress by assuming that either treated casually the differences between high school and college students when formulating the policy and the statute at issue here.^[8]

[276] For these reasons, I believe that the distinctions between Westside's program and the University of Missouri's program suggest what is the best understanding of the Act: An extracurricular student organization is "noncurriculum related" if it has as its purpose (or as part of its purpose) the advocacy of partisan theological, political, or ethical views. A school that admits at least one such club has apparently made the judgment that students are better off if the student community is permitted to, and perhaps even encouraged to, compete along ideological lines. This pedagogical strategy may be defensible or even desirable. But it is wrong to presume that Congress endorsed that strategy — and dictated its nationwide adoption — simply because it approved the application of Widmar to high schools. And it seems absurd to presume that Westside has invoked the same strategy by recognizing clubs like the Swimming Timing Team and Sub-surfers which, though they may not correspond directly to anything in Westside's course offerings, are no more controversial than a grilled cheese sandwich.

Accordingly, as I would construe the Act, a high school could properly sponsor a French club, a chess club, or a scuba diving club simply because their activities are fully consistent with the school's curricular mission. It would not matter whether formal courses in any of those subjects — or in directly related subjects — were being offered as long as faculty encouragement of student participation in such groups would be consistent with both the school's obligation of neutrality and its legitimate pedagogical concerns. Nothing in Widmar implies that the existence of a French club, for example, would create a constitutional obligation to allow student members of the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist Party to [277] have access to school facilities.^[9] More importantly, nothing in that case suggests that the constitutional issue should turn on whether French is being taught in a formal course while the club is functioning.

Conversely, if a high school decides to allow political groups to use its facilities, it plainly cannot discriminate among controversial groups because it agrees with the positions of some and disagrees with the ideas advocated by others. Again, the fact that the history of the Republican Party might be taught in a political science course could not justify a decision to allow the young Republicans to form a club while denying Communists, white supremacists, or Christian Scientists the same privilege. In my judgment, the political activities of the young Republicans are "noncurriculum related" for reasons that have nothing to do with the content of the political science course. The statutory definition of what is "noncurriculum related" should depend on the constitutional concern that motivated our decision in Widmar.

In this case, the District Judge reviewed each of the clubs in the high school program and found that they are all "tied to the educational function of the institution." App. B to Pet. for Cert. 25-26. He correctly concluded that this club system "differs dramatically from those found to create an open forum policy in Widmar and Bender." Id., at 26.^[10] I agree [278] with his conclusion that, under a proper interpretation of the Act, this dramatic difference requires a different result.

As I have already indicated, the majority, although it agrees that Congress intended by this Act to endorse the application of Widmar to high schools, does not compare this case to Widmar. Instead, the Court argues from two other propositions: first, that Congress intended to prohibit discrimination against religious groups; and, second, that the statute must not be construed in a fashion that would allow school boards to circumvent its reach by definitional fiat. I am in complete agreement with both of these principles. I do not, however, believe that either yields the conclusion which the majority adopts.

First, as the majority correctly observes, Congress intended the Act to prohibit schools from excluding — or believing that they were legally obliged to exclude — religious student groups solely because the groups were religious. Congress was clearly concerned with two lines of decisions in the Courts of Appeals: one line prohibiting schools that wished to admit student-initiated religious groups from doing so, see Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dist., 669 F. 2d 1038, 1042-1048 (CA5 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1155 (1983), and a second line allowing schools to exclude religious groups solely because of Establishment Clause concerns, see Brandon v. Guilderland Bd. of Ed., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1123 (1981); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (MD Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F. 2d 538 (CA3 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U. S. 534 (1986).^[11] See ante, at 239. These cases, however, involve only schools which either desire to recognize religious student groups, or [279] schools which, like the University of Missouri at Kansas City, purport to exclude religious groups from a forum that is otherwise conceded to be open. It is obvious that Congress need go no further than our Widmar decision to redress this problem, and equally obvious that the majority's expansive reading of "noncurriculum related" is irrelevant to the congressional objective of ending discrimination against religious student groups.

Second, the majority is surely correct that a " `limited open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by what it says.' " Ante, at 244, quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 19222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy). If, however, it is the recognition of advocacy groups that signals the creation of such a forum, I see no danger that school administrators will be able to manipulate the Act to defeat Congressional intent.^[12] Indeed, it seems to me that it is the majority's own test that is suspect on this score.^[13] It would appear that the school could alter the "noncurriculum related" status of Subsurfers, see ante, at 245, simply by, for example, including one day of scuba instruction in its swimming classes, or by requiring [280] physical education teachers to urge student participation in the club, or even by soliciting regular comments from the club about how the school could better accommodate the club's interest within coursework.^[14] This may be what the school does rather than what it says, but the "doing" is mere bureaucratic procedure unrelated to the substance of the forum or the speech it encompasses.

Not only is the Court's preferred construction subject to manipulation, but it also is exceptionally difficult to apply even in the absence of deliberate evasion. For example, the Court believes that Westside's swim team is "directly related" to the curriculum, but the scuba diving club is not. Ibid. The Court's analysis makes every high school football program a borderline case, for while many schools teach football in physical education classes, they usually teach touch football or flag football, and the varsity team usually plays tackle football. Tackle football involves more equipment and greater risk, and so arguably stands in the same relation to touch football as scuba diving does to swimming. Likewise, it would appear that high school administrators might reasonably have difficulty figuring out whether a cheerleading squad or pep club might trigger the Act's application. The answer, I suppose, might depend upon how strongly students were encouraged to support the football team. Obviously, every test will produce some hard cases,^[15] but the Court's test seems to produce nothing but hard cases.

[281] For all of these reasons, the argument for construing "noncurriculum related" by recourse to the facts of Widmar, and so by reference to the existence of advocacy groups, seems to me overwhelming. It provides a test that is both more simple and more easily administered than what the majority has crafted. Indeed, the only plausible answer to this construction of the statute is that it could easily be achieved without reference to the exotic concept of "noncurriculum related" organizations. This point was made at length on the Senate floor by Senator Gorton.^[16] Senator Hatfield answered that the term had been recommended to him by lawyers, apparently in an effort to capture the distinctions important to the judiciary's construction of the Free Speech Clause.^[17]

[282] Congress may sometimes, however, have a clear intent with respect to the whole of a statute even when it muddles the definition of a particular part, just as, in other cases, the intent behind a particular provision may be clear though the more comprehensive purpose of the statute is obscure. In this case, Congress' general intent is — as Senator Gorton certainly understood — a necessary guide to the Act's more particular terms. In answer to this strategy, the Court points out that references to Widmar must be considered in context. Ante, at 242-243. That is surely so. But when this is done it becomes immediately clear that those references are neither "few" nor "passing" nor even "general," ante, at 242; they are instead the sheet anchors holding fast a debate that would otherwise be swept away in a gale of confused utterances.^[18]

[283] We might wish, along with Senator Gorton, that Congress had chosen a better term to effectuate its purposes. But our own efforts to articulate "public forum" analysis have not, in my opinion, been altogether satisfactory. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 833 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).^[19] Lawyers and legislators seeking to capture our distinctions in legislative terminology should be forgiven if they occasionally stumble.^[20] Certainly [284] we should not hold Congress to a standard of precision we ourselves are sometimes unable to obtain. "Our duty is to ask what Congress intended, and not to assay whether Congress might have stated that intent more naturally, more artfully, or more pithily." Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 106 (1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

II

My construction of the Act makes it unnecessary to reach the Establishment Clause question that the plurality decides.^[21] It is nevertheless appropriate to point out that the question is much more difficult than the plurality assumes.^[22] [285] The plurality focuses upon whether the Act might run afoul of the Establishment Clause because of the danger that some students will mistakenly believe that the student-initiated religious clubs are sponsored by the school.^[23] I believe that the [286] plurality's construction of the statute obliges it to answer a further question: whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause by authorizing religious organizations to meet on high school grounds even when the high school's teachers and administrators deem it unwise to admit controversial or partisan organizations of any kind.

Under the plurality's interpretation of the Act, Congress has imposed a difficult choice on public high schools receiving federal financial assistance. If such a school continues to allow students to participate in such familiar and innocuous activities as a school chess or scuba diving club, it must also allow religious groups to make use of school facilities. Indeed, [287] it is hard to see how a cheerleading squad or a pep club, among the most common student groups in American high schools, could avoid being "noncurriculum related" under the majority's test. The Act, as construed by the majority, comes perilously close to an outright command to allow organized prayer, and perhaps the kind of religious ceremonies involved in Widmar, on school premises.

We have always treated with special sensitivity the Establishment Clause problems that result when religious observances are moved into the public schools. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 583-584 (1987). "The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools . . . ." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As the plurality recognizes, ante, at 251, student-initiated religious groups may exert a considerable degree of pressure even without official school sponsorship. "The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." McCollum, 333 U. S., at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 290-291 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Testimony in this case indicated that one purpose of the proposed Bible Club was to convert students to Christianity. App. 185. The influence that could result is the product not only of the Act and student-initiated speech, but also of the compulsory attendance laws, which we have long recognized to be of special constitutional importance in this context. Id., at 252-253; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60, n. 51 (1985). Moreover, the speech allowed is not simply the individual expression of personal conscience, as was the case in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969), or West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), but is instead the collective statement of an organization [288] — a "student club," with powers and responsibilities defined by that status — that would not exist absent the State's intervention.^[24]

I tend to agree with the plurality that the Constitution does not forbid a local school district, or Congress, to bring organized religion into the schools so long as all groups, religious or not, are welcomed equally if "they do not break either the laws or the furniture."^[25] That Congress has such authority, however, does not mean that the concerns underlying the Establishment Clause are irrelevant when, and if, that authority is exercised.^[26] Certainly we should not rush to embrace the conclusion that Congress swept aside these concerns by the hurried passage of clumsily drafted legislation.^[27]

[289] There is an additional reason, also grounded in constitutional structure, why the Court's rendering of the Act is unsatisfying: So construed, the Act alters considerably the balance between state and federal authority over education, a balance long respected by both Congress and this Court. See, e.g., Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 863-864 (1982). The traditional allocation of responsibility makes sense for pedagogical, political, and ethical reasons.^[28] We have, of course, sometimes found it necessary to limit local control over schools in order to protect the constitutional integrity of public education. "That [boards of education] are educating [290] the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 637; see also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33 (1990). Congress may make similar judgments, and has sometimes done so, finding it necessary to regulate public education in order to achieve important national goals.

The Court's construction of this Act, however, leads to a sweeping intrusion by the Federal Government into the operation of our public schools, and does so despite the absence of any indication that Congress intended to divest local school districts of their power to shape the educational environment. If a high school administration continues to believe that it is sound policy to exclude controversial groups, such as political clubs, the Ku Klux Klan, and perhaps gay rights advocacy groups, from its facilities, it now must also close its doors to traditional extracurricular activities that are noncontroversial but not directly related to any course being offered at the school. Congress made frequent reference to the primacy of local control in public education, and the legislative history of the Act is thus inconsistent with the Court's rigid definition of "noncurriculum related groups."^[29] Indeed, [291] the very fact that Congress omitted any definition in the statute itself is persuasive evidence of an intent to allow local officials broad discretion in deciding whether or not to create limited public fora. I see no reason — and no evidence of congressional intent — to constrain that discretion any more narrowly than our holding in Widmar requires.

III

Against all these arguments the Court interposes Noah Webster's famous dictionary. It is a massive tome but no match for the weight the Court would put upon it. The Court relies heavily on the dictionary's definition of "curriculum." See ante, at 237. That word, of course, is not the Act's; moreover, the word "noncurriculum" is not in the dictionary. Neither Webster nor Congress has authorized us to assume that "noncurriculum" is a precise antonym of the word "curriculum." "Nonplus," for example, does not mean "minus" and it would be incorrect to assume that a "nonentity" is not an "entity" at all. Purely as a matter of defining a newly coined word, the term "noncurriculum" could fairly be construed to describe either the subjects that are "not a part of the current curriculum" or the subjects that "cannot properly be included in a public school curriculum." Either of those definitions is perfectly "sensible" because both describe subjects "that are not related to the body of courses offered by the school." See ante, at 237. When one considers the basic purpose of the Act, and its unquestioned linkage to our decision in Widmar, the latter definition surely is the more "sensible."

I respectfully dissent.

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[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, and Lee Boothby; for People for the American Way by William R. Weissman, David W. Danner, and Susan M. Liss; for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al. by Richard E. Shevitz, Ruti G. Teitel, Meyer Eisenberg, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Steven M. Freeman, and Jill L. Kahn; and for the National School Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon.

[2] As a majority of this Court today holds, see ante, at 249-250 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ.); infra, at 270, the Establishment Clause proscribes public schools from "conveying a message `that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred,' " County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 627 (1989) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)), even if such schools do not actually "impos[e] pressure upon a student to participate in a religious activity," ante, at 261 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

[3] For an extensive discussion of the phrase and its ambiguity, see Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 36-41 (1986).

[4] Brief for Petitioners 58-59; Brief for Respondents 34-40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17-19, and nn. 21-22 (Act codifies Widmar); id., at 22 ("noncurriculum related" is an undefined term); id., at 25 ("noncurriculum related" should be construed by reference to the "larger objectives" of the Act); 867 F. 2d 1076, 1078-1079 (CA8 1989); Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F. 2d 608, 613-614 (CA9 1989).

[5] We would, of course, then have to consider, as the Court does now, whether the Establishment Clause permits Congress to apply Widmar's reasoning to secondary schools.

[6] The Court of Appeals quoted the following comment by Senator Levin:

"[T]he pending amendment is constitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar against Vincent. This amendment merely extends a similar constitutional rule as enunciated by the Court in Widmar to secondary schools." 130 Cong. Rec. 19236 (1984).

Other Senators agreed. See id., at 19221 (statement of Sen. Leahy); id., at 19237 ("[T]he Court was right in Widmar, and this bill seeks only to clarify and extend the law of that case a bit. . . . What we seek to do by this amendment is make clear that the same rule of law applies to students in our public secondary schools") (statement of Sen. Bumpers); id., at 19239 (statement of Sen. Biden). See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17-19, nn. 21-22 (collecting references to Widmar from Senate and House debates).

[7] The Court of Appeals also put too much weight upon the existence of a chess club at Westside. The court quoted an exchange between Senator Gorton and Senator Hatfield in which Senator Hatfield, a cosponsor of the Act, told Senator Gorton that a chess club would be "noncurriculum related" under the Act. 867 F. 2d, at 1078-1079. The exchange is completely inconclusive, however, when read in context. Senator Gorton's questions were designed to show that Senator Hatfield could not offer any satisfactory definition of "noncurriculum related." Senator Gorton's strategy succeeded, and in the course of the exchange Senator "Hatfield offered just about every possible interpretation in less than two columns of the Congressional Record." Laycock, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 37. Senator Hatfield eventually conceded that whether a chess club was "noncurriculum related" would depend upon what the school district's lawyers had to say about it. 130 Cong. Rec. 19225 (1984). This Court's majority does not place any special emphasis upon Senator Hatfield's reference to chess clubs, see ante, at 245-246 (discussing chess clubs without reference to the legislative history), and I agree that it deserves none.

[8] What I have said before of universities is true a fortiori with respect to high schools: A school's extracurricular activities constitute a part of the school's teaching mission, and the school accordingly must make "decisions concerning the content of those activities." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 278 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Absent good reason to hold otherwise, these decisions should be left to teachers. Id., at 279, and n. 2. See also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 691, and n. 1 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

[9] Although I recognize that JUSTICE MARSHALL reads Widmar more broadly, I respectfully disagree with that reading. Moreover, even if language in Widmar supported that reading, the language would be dictum, given the distinction — acknowledged to be critical — between "the wide-open and independent character of the student forum in Widmar" and the substantially different character of Westside's program. See ante, at 265 (MARSHALL, J., concurring).

[10] In Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (MD Pa. 1983), the school officials conceded that any organization conducive to the intellectual or moral growth of students could meet during the activities period. Unlike the school officials in this case, the Williamsport officials had not claimed that the forum was limited on the basis of whether a group presented a one-sided view of controversial subjects. Id., at 706-707.

[11] The Bender litigation was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit when the Act was drafted, and was much discussed by the Act's sponsors.

[12] Since the statute as I construe it would track our own Free Speech Clause jurisprudence, administrators could no more escape the Act's restrictions by mere labeling than they could escape the First Amendment itself by such means.

[13] According to the Court:

"In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular course; or if participation in the group results in academic credit." Ante, at 239-240.

The Court clarifies the meaning of the second part of this test by suggesting that "[a] school's student government would generally relate directly to the curriculum to the extent that it addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school." Ante, at 240. Likewise, the fact that the International Club is " `developed through our foreign language classes' " suffices to satisfy the Court's test, presumably as a result of its first prong. See ante, at 246.

[14] The club's membership might have a special interest in seeing more attention devoted to ichthyological topics in biology classes, in adding oceanographic examples to physics classes, and in allowing advanced students in the school shops to design snorkeling gear. As I understand the majority's test, Subsurfers would not be "noncurriculum related" so long as the club made such suggestions as these on a regular basis, even if the Westside administration regularly thanked the club and rejected every suggestion it made. See ante, at 240 (discussing the student government).

[15] Under my reading of the statute, for example, a difficult case might be posed if a district court were forced to decide whether a high school's Nietzsche Club were concerned with philology or doctrine. None of the very common clubs at Westside, however, causes any difficulties for this test, while nearly all of them present close questions if examined pursuant to the Court's rubric. The Nietzsche Club is a problem that can be dealt with when it actually arises.

[16] Senator Gorton proposed replacing the Act with another, which read:

"No public secondary school receiving Federal financial assistance shall prohibit the use of school facilities for meetings during noninstructional time by voluntary student groups solely on the basis that some or all of the speech engaged in by members of such groups during their meetings is or will be religious in nature." 130 Cong. Rec. 19225 (1984).

[17] Senator Hatfield attributed the Act's complex terminology to "too many lawyers wanting to put something down to satisfy one particular legal point of view, one legal school, or one precedent, or one court decision, or one experience." Ibid.

In light of this admission and similar statements, it is astonishing that the United States asks us to believe that Congress, by using the phrase "noncurriculum related," intended to reject Widmar's definition of an "open forum" in favor of a definition that would be "highly specific" and less confusing. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-21. I am instead inclined to agree with Professor Laycock, who observes that "[a] House opponent [of the Act] was surely correct when he said that not even the sponsors of the bill knew what it meant." Laycock, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 38. The bill's supporters admitted that its language was murky, but suggested that something was better than nothing. See 130 Cong. Rec. 20946 (statement of Rep. Hyde). If Congress really intended to depart from Widmar for reasons of administrative clarity, Congress kept its intent well hidden, both in the statute and in the debates preceding its passage.

[18] The Court makes a gallant, and commendable, effort to vindicate Congress' peculiar diction. But I fear that in the end the Court's dogged persistence leads it to miss the forest for the trees. The Court quite properly points out that Congress' general intent cannot be established by a single reference, or even several statements, sundered from context. One can, of course, no more deduce the meaning of legislative history by quoting one randomly chosen Senator than one can capture the meaning of a play by quoting one randomly chosen character. To say that Polonius, Claudius, and Gertrude express differing views about Hamlet's "antic disposition" is not to say that Hamlet has no meaning. No reader of the congressional drama in this case can come away unimpressed by its focus upon Widmar: The congressional actors quite clearly agreed that Widmar's rule should be extended to high schools, but were confused about how to draft a statute that did so. Nothing quoted by the Court so much as hints at a contrary reading.

The Court's discussion of Senator Levin's speech, ante, at 243, is especially puzzling. The Court says that this dissent "plac[es] great reliance on a comment by Senator Levin." Ibid. In fact, Senator Levin's remark is 1 among 4 specific citations in a single footnote, and is further buttressed by the more than 20 additional citations collected in the brief of the United States as amicus curiae. See n. 4, supra. The footnote singles out Senator Levin for special attention not because his views are of unique importance, but because his remarks were quoted by the Court of Appeals. Ibid. Still odder is the Court's own use of Senator Levin. The Court quotes the Senator as saying, "The pending amendment will allow students equal access to secondary schools student-initiated religious meetings before and after school where the school generally allows groups of secondary school students to meet during those times." 130 Cong. Rec. 19236 (1984). The Court emphasizes the word "generally." This word, however, puts Senator Levin in square opposition to the Court's reading of the Act. I agree with the Senator that the Act authorizes meetings by religious student-initiated groups in schools that permit meetings by student groups in general; the Court, however, must show that the Act authorizes such meetings even in schools that have a less generally open forum, one defined specifically enough to exclude partisan ideological organizations. Senator Levin's statement does not help the Court.

Nor can the Court claim any assistance from the reservations expressed by Senators Chiles and Denton about the legislative history, ante, at 243: When their remarks are considered in context, it becomes immediately apparent that both men were addressing specific problems completely unrelated to the Act's connection with Widmar.

[19] See also Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219, 1223-1225 (1984); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-24 (2d ed. 1988).

[20] The Court would have us believe that the step is not a stumble but a pirouette: The Court declares that any possible interpretation of the Act must concede that Congress intended to draw a subtle distinction between a "limited public forum" and a "limited open forum." Ante, at 242. For the reasons given in n. 15, supra,I find this suggestion implausible: The drafting of this legislation was not so finely choreographed.

Moreover, this Court's own opinion in Widmar refers, in quick succession and without apparent distinction, to "a forum generally open to the public," 454 U. S., at 268; "a generally open forum," id., at 269; and "a public forum," id., at 270. The District Court opinion in Bender — an opinion of great concern to Congress when it passed this Act — observed that "a university which accommodates student organizations by making its facilities `generally open' for their meetings will have created a `limited' public forum." 563 F. Supp., at 705. In the same month the Act was passed, the Court of Appeals' opinion in Bender closed the circle by using "limited open forum" to describe the First Amendment status of both the college forum in Widmar and the high school forum in Bender. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F. 2d 538, 547, n. 12 (CA3 1984); id., at 550. It would be wrong to say that the Court today slices these distinctions too thin: There is in fact no distinction for the slicing.

Even were I to accept the Court's premise, however, it would not lead me to the Court's conclusion. It does not seem that a "limited open forum" would be, as the Court must suppose, narrower in scope than a "limited public forum." Dictionary definitions, which the Court seems to favor, point in the opposite direction.

[21] We consider Establishment Clause questions under the three-part analysis set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971): "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,. . . ; finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " (Citations omitted.)

[22] The difficulty of the constitutional question compounds the problems with the Court's treatment of the statutory issue. In light of the ambiguity which it concedes to exist in both the statutory text and the legislative history, the Court has an obligation to adopt an equally reasonable construction of the Act that will avoid the constitutional issue. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979).

[23] The plurality also considers briefly, and then rejects, the possibility that the Act may lack the "secular purpose" required by the Establishment Clause. See ante, at 248-249. In my view, that question, too, is closer than the plurality suggests. There is no doubt that the purpose of this Act is to facilitate meetings by religious student organizations at public high schools. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. 19216 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton). There would nevertheless be no problem with the Act if it did no more than redress discrimination against religion. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 338 (1987) (characterizing as "proper" the statutory "purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion," even if the resulting exemption does not "come packaged with benefits to secular entities"). Under the Court's reading of the Act, however, Congress had a considerably more expansive purpose: that of authorizing religious groups to meet even in schools that prohibit assembly of all partisan organizations and thus do not single out religious groups in particular. The Act also authorizes meetings of political or philosophic as well as religious groups, but it is clear that Congress was principally interested in religious speech. Ante, at 239. The application of Lemon's secular purpose requirement to the Act thus becomes more complicated.

When examining this issue, the plurality quite properly recognizes that we must distinguish between religious motives and religious purposes. See ante, at 249. The plurality, however, misapplies the distinction. If a particular legislator were to vote for a bill on the basis of a personal, religious belief that free speech is a good thing, the legislator would have a religious motive. That motive would present no problem under the Establishment Clause. If, however, the legislator were to vote for the bill on the basis of a prediction that the resulting speech would be religious in character, then the legislator would have a religious purpose. That would present a problem under the Establishment Clause. It is, moreover, entirely possible that this religious purpose might exist even absent a religious motive, as would be the case if the legislator's only reason for favoring religious speech was a belief that it would tend to produce cooperative behavior and so reduce the crime rate. It is the latter, not the former, kind of religious intention that is at issue here. As such, the plurality's analysis of Lemon's purpose requirement presupposes that having a religious purpose for enacting a statute becomes analogous to having a religious motive for enacting the statute whenever the statute confers some incidental benefit upon secular activity. With this I cannot agree.

To survive scrutiny under the Lemon test, it is not enough that a statute's sponsors identify some secular goals allegedly served by the Act. We have held that a statute is unconstitutional if it "does not have a clearly secular purpose," Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985), or if its "primary purpose was to . . . provide persuasive advantage to a particular religious doctrine." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 592 (1987). A law requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in school classrooms is not vindicated by the possibility that reading it would teach students about a "fundamental legal code," Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980), and a law requiring recitation of the Lord's Prayer is likewise not saved by assertions — true or not — that such a practice serves the "promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 223 (1963).

In sum, the crucial question, under the purpose requirement of the Lemon test, is whether the challenged statute reflects a judgment that it would be desirable for people to be religious or to adhere to a particular religion. The plurality is correct to observe that it is irrelevant whether the legislature itself behaved religiously when it made (or abstained from making) that judgment. The plurality's observation, however, is likewise irrelevant to the question before us. The Act may nevertheless comply with the purpose requirement of the Lemon test by encompassing political and philosophic as well as religious speech, but that conclusion requires more explanation than the Court provides.

[24] Respondents have sought not merely access to school meeting rooms, but also "the same rights, privileges, terms and conditions accorded to other clubs" at Westside. Brief for Respondents 1, and n. 2. In this respect, at least, this case resembles Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988), more than it does Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. Cf. Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. Law & Ed. 23, 36 (1989) (stressing distinction between "cases . . . in which students seek only to prevent state interference with their communicative activities, and cases . . . in which students seek active assistance in the dissemination of their ideas").

[25] The quotation is from Congressman Frank, who spoke in support of the bill on the House floor. 130 Cong. Rec. 20933 (1984).

[26] The bill enjoyed "wide, bipartisan" support in both Houses, ante, at 239, but it likewise provoked thoughtful, bipartisan opposition in each body. Senator Chafee was among those who opposed the bill; he warned his colleagues that passing it might secure religious access to the schools only at the price of educational quality: "Legislation to encourage religious and political activity in the schools will do little to resolve our problems in education but could lead to discord between those whose cooperation in the drive for excellence in education is more important than ever." 130 Cong. Rec. 19248 (1984).

[27] Professor Laycock summarizes the circumstances of the Act's passage as follows:

"The bill was completely rewritten in a series of multilateral negotiations after it was passed by the House and reported out of committee in the Senate. Thus, the committee reports cast no light on the language actually adopted. Senator Hatfield offered the negotiated compromise as a floor amendment in the midst of the Senate's rush to adjourn for the Fourth of July. He repeatedly emphasized that as many as 1,000 people had been involved in the negotiations that produced the compromise version, and that not all the senators sponsoring the compromise agreed with everything in it. Senator Gorton accurately observed that too many cooks had spoiled the broth. But Hatfield had a large majority committed to his compromise, and he resisted any change that might have caused the deal to fall apart. The Hatfield compromise later passed the House under a special rule that precluded amendments and limited debate to one hour." 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 37 (footnotes omitted).

[28] As a matter of pedagogy, delicate decisions about immersing young students in ideological cross-currents ought to be made by educators familiar with the experience and needs of the particular children affected and with the culture of the community in which they are likely to live as adults. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 271-272. As a matter of politics, public schools are often dependent for financial support upon local communities. The schools may be better able to retain local favor if they are free to shape their policies in response to local preferences. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49-53 (1973). As a matter of ethics, it is sensible to respect the desire of parents to guide the education of their children without surrendering control to distant politicians. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-403 (1923).

[29] See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. 19217 (1984) ("I am fully committed to the proposition that schools and education in general must be under the guidance and control of local school districts, local school boards, State school boards, and so forth. But where there is an action that is taken by such an official body, representing the public schools, which denies a right that is guaranteed under the Constitution, then the Congress of the United States, I think, has a duty and an obligation to step in and remedy that violated right") (statement of Sen. Hatfield). The Court does not suggest that Westside has deprived its students of any constitutionally guaranteed rights in this case. See also id., at 20941 ("The bill only applies if the school voluntarily creates a limited open forum. Everything is left to the local option. Everything is left to the local administrators and the local school board") (statement of Rep. Goodling).

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[101] Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which Breyer, JJ., joined in part. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 120. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 127. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 130. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 134.

Thomas Marcelle argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

Frank W. Miller argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Benjamin J. Ferrara and Norman H. Gross.^[1]

[102] Justice Thomas, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents two questions. The first question is whether Milford Central School violated the free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school. The second question is whether any such violation is justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause. We conclude that Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation.

I

The State of New York authorizes local school boards to adopt regulations governing the use of their school facilities. In particular, N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000) enumerates several purposes for which local boards may open their schools to public use. In 1992, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) enacted a community use policy adopting seven of § 414's purposes for which its building could be used after school. App. to Pet. for Cert. D1-D3. Two of the stated purposes are relevant here. First, district residents may use the school for "instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts." Id., at D1. Second, the school is available for "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public." Ibid.

[103] Stephen and Darleen Fournier reside within Milford's district and therefore are eligible to use the school's facilities as long as their proposed use is approved by the school. Together they are sponsors of the local Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford's policy, in September 1996 the Fourniers submitted a request to Dr. Robert McGruder, interim superintendent of the district, in which they sought permission to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings in the school cafeteria. App. in No. 98-9494 (CA2), p. A-81. The next month, McGruder formally denied the Fourniers' request on the ground that the proposed use—to have "a fun time of singing songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing scripture," ibid. —was "the equivalent of religious worship." App. H1—H2. According to McGruder, the community use policy, which prohibits use "by any individual or organization for religious purposes," foreclosed the Club's activities. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.

In response to a letter submitted by the Club's counsel, Milford's attorney requested information to clarify the nature of the Club's activities. The Club sent a set of materials used or distributed at the meetings and the following description of its meeting:

"The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking attendance. As she calls a child's name, if the child recites a Bible verse the child receives a treat. After attendance, the Club sings songs. Next Club members engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible story and explains how it applies to Club members' lives. The Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier distributes treats and the Bible verses for memorization." App. in No. 98-9494 (CA2), at A-30.

McGruder and Milford's attorney reviewed the materials and concluded that "the kinds of activities proposed to be [104] engaged in by the Good News Club were not a discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, development of character and development of morals from a religious perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction itself." Id., at A-25. In February 1997, the Milford Board of Education adopted a resolution rejecting the Club's request to use Milford's facilities "for the purpose of conducting religious instruction and Bible study." Id., at A-56.

In March 1997, petitioners, the Good News Club, Ms. Fournier, and her daughter Andrea Fournier (collectively, the Club), filed an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against Milford in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The Club alleged that Milford's denial of its application violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, its right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and its right to religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq.^[2]

The Club moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the school from enforcing its religious exclusion policy against the Club and thereby to permit the Club's use of the school facilities. On April 14, 1997, the District Court granted the injunction. The Club then held its weekly afterschool meetings from April 1997 until June 1998 in a high school resource and middle school special education room. App. N12.

In August 1998, the District Court vacated the preliminary injunction and granted Milford's motion for summary judgment. 21 F. Supp. 2d 147 (NDNY 1998). The court found that the Club's "subject matter is decidedly religious in nature, and not merely a discussion of secular matters [105] from a religious perspective that is otherwise permitted under [Milford's] use policies." Id., at 154. Because the school had not permitted other groups that provided religious instruction to use its limited public forum, the court held that the school could deny access to the Club without engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The court also rejected the Club's equal protection claim.

The Club appealed, and a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 202 F. 3d 502 (2000). First, the court rejected the Club's contention that Milford's restriction against allowing religious instruction in its facilities is unreasonable. Second, it held that, because the subject matter of the Club's activities is "quintessentially religious," id., at 510, and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure `moral and character development,' " id., at 511, Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Judge Jacobs filed a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that the school's restriction did constitute viewpoint discrimination under Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993).

There is a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether speech can be excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of the speech. Compare Gentala v. Tucson, 244 F. 3d 1065 (CA9 2001) (en banc) (holding that a city properly refused National Day of Prayer organizers' application to the city's civic events fund for coverage of costs for city services); Campbell v. St. Tammany's School Bd., 206 F. 3d 482 (CA5 2000) (holding that a school's policy against permitting religious instruction in its limited public forum did not constitute viewpoint discrimination), cert. pending, No. 00-1194;^[3]Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School Dist. No. 10, 127 F. 3d 207 (CA2 1997) (concluding that a ban on religious services and [106] instruction in the limited public forum was constitutional), with Church on the Rock v. Albuquerque, 84 F. 3d 1273 (CA10 1996) (holding that a city's denial of permission to show the film Jesus in a senior center was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); and Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F. 3d 1501 (CA8 1994) (holding unconstitutional a school use policy that prohibited Good News Club from meeting during times when the Boy Scouts could meet). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 531 U. S. 923 (2000).

II

The standards that we apply to determine whether a State has unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use of a public forum depend on the nature of the forum. See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983). If the forum is a traditional or open public forum, the State's restrictions on speech are subject to stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a limited public forum. Id., at 45-46. We have previously declined to decide whether a school district's opening of its facilities pursuant to N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 creates a limited or a traditional public forum. See Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 391-392. Because the parties have agreed that Milford created a limited public forum when it opened its facilities in 1992, see Brief for Petitioners 15-17; Brief for Respondent 26, we need not resolve the issue here. Instead, we simply will assume that Milford operates a limited public forum.

When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified "in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995); see also Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 392-393. The State's power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint, [107] Rosenberger, supra, at 829, and the restriction must be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum," Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985).

III

Applying this test, we first address whether the exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination. We are guided in our analysis by two of our prior opinions, Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger. In Lamb's Chapel, we held that a school district violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it excluded a private group from presenting films at the school based solely on the films' discussions of family values from a religious perspective. Likewise, in Rosenberger, we held that a university's refusal to fund a student publication because the publication addressed issues from a religious perspective violated the Free Speech Clause. Concluding that Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club based on its religious nature is indistinguishable from the exclusions in these cases, we hold that the exclusion constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Because the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether it is unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum.^[4]

[108] Milford has opened its limited public forum to activities that serve a variety of purposes, including events "pertaining to the welfare of the community." App. to Pet. for Cert. D1. Milford interprets its policy to permit discussions of subjects such as child rearing, and of "the development of character and morals from a religious perspective." Brief for Appellee in No. 98-9494 (CA2), p. 6. For example, this policy would allow someone to use Aesop's Fables to teach children moral values. App. N11. Additionally, a group could sponsor a debate on whether there should be a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in public schools, id., at N6, and the Boy Scouts could meet "to influence a boy's character, development and spiritual growth," id., at N10—N11. In short, any group that "promote[s] the moral and character development of children" is eligible to use the school building. Brief for Appellee in No. 98-9494 (CA2), at 9.

Just as there is no question that teaching morals and character development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford's policy, it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character development to children. For example, no one disputes that the Club instructs children to overcome feelings of jealousy, to treat others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if it does so in a nonsecular way. Nonetheless, because Milford found the Club's activities to be religious in nature— "the equivalent of religious instruction itself," 202 F. 3d, at 507—it excluded the Club from use of its facilities.

[109] Applying Lamb's Chapel,^[5] we find it quite clear that Milford engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it excluded the Club from the afterschool forum. In Lamb's Chapel, the local New York school district similarly had adopted § 414's "social, civic or recreational use" category as a permitted use in its limited public forum. The district also prohibited use "by any group for religious purposes." 508 U. S., at 387. Citing this prohibition, the school district excluded a church that wanted to present films teaching family values from a Christian perspective. We held that, because the films "no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible" under the rule, the teaching of family values, the district's exclusion of the church was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id., at 394.

Like the church in Lamb's Chapel, the Club seeks to address a subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the teaching of morals and character, from a religious standpoint. Certainly, one could have characterized the film presentations in Lamb's Chapel as a religious use, as the Court of Appeals did, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 959 F. 2d 381, 388-389 (CA2 1992). And one easily could conclude that the films' purpose to instruct that "`society's slide toward humanism . . . can only be counterbalanced by a loving home where Christian values are instilled from an early age,' " id., at 384, was "quintessentially religious," 202 F. 3d, at 510. The only apparent difference [110] between the activity of Lamb's Chapel and the activities of the Good News Club is that the Club chooses to teach moral lessons from a Christian perspective through live storytelling and prayer, whereas Lamb's Chapel taught lessons through films. This distinction isinconsequential. Both modes of speech use a religious viewpoint. Thus, the exclusion of the Good News Club's activities, like the exclusion of Lamb's Chapel's films, constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

Our opinion in Rosenberger also is dispositive. In Rosenberger, a student organization at the University of Virginia was denied funding for printing expenses because its publication, Wide Awake, offered a Christian viewpoint. Just as the Club emphasizes the role of Christianity in students' morals and character, Wide Awake "`challenge[d] Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and . . . encourage[d] students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.' " 515 U. S., at 826. Because the university "select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints," we held that the denial of funding was unconstitutional. Id., at 831. Although in Rosenberger there was no prohibition on religion as a subject matter, our holding did not rely on this factor. Instead, we concluded simply that the university's denial of funding to print Wide Awake was viewpoint discrimination, just as the school district's refusal to allow Lamb's Chapel to show its films was viewpoint discrimination. Ibid. Given the obvious religious content of Wide Awake, we cannot say that the Club's activities are any more "religious" or deserve any less First Amendment protection than did the publication of Wide Awake in Rosenberger.

Despite our holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court of Appeals, like Milford, believed that its characterization of the Club's activities as religious in nature [111] warranted treating the Club's activities as different in kind from the other activities permitted by the school. See 202 F. 3d, at 510 (the Club "is doing something other than simply teaching moral values"). The "Christian viewpoint" is unique, according to the court, because it contains an "additional layer" that other kinds of viewpoints do not. Id., at 509. That is, the Club "is focused on teaching children how to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ," which it characterized as "quintessentially religious." Id., at 510. With these observations, the court concluded that, because the Club's activities "fall outside the bounds of pure `moral and character development,' " the exclusion did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id., at 511.

We disagree that something that is "quintessentially religious" or "decidedly religious in nature" cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint. See 202 F. 3d, at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject matters"). What matters for purposes of the Free Speech Clause is that we can see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation for their lessons. It is apparent that the unstated principle of the Court of Appeals' reasoning is its conclusion that any time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and character, the discussion is simply not a "pure" discussion of those issues. According to the Court of Appeals, reliance on Christian principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other foundations for thought or viewpoints do not. We, however, have never reached such a conclusion. Instead, we reaffirm our holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosen- [112] berger that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint. Thus, we conclude that Milford's exclusion of the Club from use of the school, pursuant to its community use policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.^[6]

IV

Milford argues that, even if its restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination, its interest in not violating the Establishment Clause outweighs the Club's interest in gaining equal access to the school's facilities. In other words, according to Milford, its restriction was required to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. We disagree.

We have said that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "may be characterized as compelling," and therefore may justify content-based discrimination. [113] Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981). However, it is not clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S., at 394-395 (noting the suggestion in Widmar but ultimately not finding an Establishment Clause problem). We need not, however, confront the issue in this case, because we conclude that the school has no valid Establishment Clause interest.

We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford's in two previous free speech cases, Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. In particular, in Lamb's Chapel, we explained that "[t]he showing of th[e] film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members." 508 U. S., at 395. Accordingly, we found that "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed." Ibid. Likewise, in Widmar, where the university's forum was already available to other groups, this Court concluded that there was no Establishment Clause problem. 454 U. S., at 272-273, and n. 13.

The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this case. As in Lamb's Chapel, the Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent, not just to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford made its forum available to other organizations. The Club's activities are materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Thus, Milford's reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing.

Milford attempts to distinguish Lamb's Chapel and Widmar by emphasizing that Milford's policy involves elementary school children. According to Milford, children will perceive that the school is endorsing the Club and will feel coercive pressure to participate, because the Club's activities [114] take place on school grounds, even though they occur during nonschool hours.^[7] This argument is unpersuasive.

First, we have held that "a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion." Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 839 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, [the Court has] consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion" (emphasis added)); id., at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[N]eutrality is an important reason for upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges"). Milford's implication that granting access to the Club would do damage to the neutrality principle defies logic. For the "guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse." Rosenberger, supra, at 839. The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups. Because allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Good News Club.

[115] Second, to the extent we consider whether the community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club's activities, cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 592-593 (1992), the relevant community would be the parents, not the elementary school children. It is the parents who choose whether their children will attend the Good News Club meetings. Because the children cannot attend without their parents' permission, they cannot be coerced into engaging in the Good News Club's religious activities. Milford does not suggest that the parents of elementary school children would be confused about whether the school was endorsing religion. Nor do we believe that such an argument could be reasonably advanced.

Third, whatever significance we may have assigned in the Establishment Clause context to the suggestion that elementary school children are more impressionable than adults, cf., e. g., id., at 592; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 390 (1985) (stating that "symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice"), we have never extended our Establishment Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during nonschool hours merely because it takes place on school premises where elementary school children may be present.

None of the cases discussed by Milford persuades us that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has gone this far. For example, Milford cites Lee v. Weisman for the proposition that "there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools," 505 U. S., at 592. In Lee, however, we concluded that attendance at the graduation exercise was obligatory. Id., at 586. See also Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290 (2000) (holding the school's policy of permitting prayer at [116] football games unconstitutional where the activity took place during a school-sponsored event and not in a public forum). We did not place independent significance on the fact that the graduation exercise might take place on school premises, Lee, supra, at 583. Here, where the school facilities are being used for a nonschool function and there is no government sponsorship of the Club's activities, Lee is inapposite.

Equally unsupportive is Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987), in which we held that a Louisiana law that proscribed the teaching of evolution as part of the public school curriculum, unless accompanied by a lesson on creationism, violated the Establishment Clause. In Edwards, we mentioned that students are susceptible to pressure in the classroom, particularly given their possible reliance on teachers as role models. See id., at 584. But we did not discuss this concern in our application of the law to the facts. Moreover, we did note that mandatory attendance requirements meant that state advancement of religion in a school would be particularly harshly felt by impressionable students.^[8] But we did not suggest that, when the school was not actually advancing religion, the impressionability of students would be relevant to the Establishment Clause issue. Even if Edwards had articulated the principle Milford believes it did, the facts in Edwards are simply too remote from those here [117] to give the principle any weight. Edwards involved the content of the curriculum taught by state teachers during the schoolday to children required to attend. Obviously, when individuals who are not schoolteachers are giving lessons after school to children permitted to attend only with parental consent, the concerns expressed in Edwards are not present.^[9]

Fourth, even if we were to consider the possible misperceptions by schoolchildren in deciding whether Milford's permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause, the facts of this case simply do not support Milford's conclusion. There is no evidence that young children are permitted to loiter outside classrooms after the schoolday has ended. Surely even young children are aware of events for which their parents must sign permission [118] forms. The meetings were held in a combined high school resource room and middle school special education room, not in an elementary school classroom. The instructors are not schoolteachers. And the children in the group are not all the same age as in the normal classroom setting; their ages range from 6 to 12.^[10] In sum, these circumstances simply do not support the theory that small children would perceive endorsement here.

Finally, even if we were to inquire into the minds of schoolchildren in this case, we cannot say the danger that children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum. This concern is particularly acute given the reality that Milford's building is not used only for elementary school children. Students, from kindergarten through the 12th grade, all attend school in the same building. There may be as many, if not more, upperclassmen as elementary school children who occupy the school after hours. For that matter, members of the public writ large are permitted in the school after hours pursuant to the community use policy. Any bystander could conceivably be aware of the school's use policy and its exclusion of the Good News Club, and could suffer as much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary school children could suffer from perceived endorsement. Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 835-836 (expressing the concern that viewpoint discrimination can chill individual thought and expression).

[119] We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do, under the assumption that any risk that small children would perceive endorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the Club's religious activity. We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive. Cf. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 779-780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[B]ecause our concern is with the political community writ large, the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from . . . discomfort . . . . It is for this reason that the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious [speech takes place]" (emphasis added)). There are countervailing constitutional concerns related to rights of other individuals in the community. In this case, those countervailing concerns are the free speech rights of the Club and its members. Cf. Rosenberger, supra, at 835 ("Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here"). And, we have already found that those rights have been violated, not merely perceived to have been violated, by the school's actions toward the Club.

We are not convinced that there is any significance in this case to the possibility that elementary school children may witness the Good News Club's activities on school premises, and therefore we can find no reason to depart from our holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Accordingly, we conclude that permitting the Club to meet on the school's premises would not have violated the Establishment Clause.^[11]

[120] V

When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Because Milford has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim, we do not address the question whether such a claim could excuse Milford's viewpoint discrimination.

* * *

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion but write separately to explain further my views on two issues.

I

First, I join Part IV of the Court's opinion, regarding the Establishment Clause issue, with the understanding that its consideration of coercive pressure, see ante, at 115, and perceptions of endorsement, see ante, at 115, 117-118, "to the extent" that the law makes such factors relevant, [121] is consistent with the belief (which I hold) that in this case that extent is zero. As to coercive pressure: Physical coercion is not at issue here; and so-called "peer pressure," if it can even be considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities, one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association that is constitutionally protected, see, e. g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461 (1958). What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas—and the private right to exert and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, see, e. g., Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108-109 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307-310 (1940), not banned by the Establishment Clause. A priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot.

As to endorsement, I have previously written that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 770 (1995). The same is true of private speech that occurs in a limited public forum, publicly announced, whose boundaries are not drawn to favor religious groups but instead permit a cross-section of uses. In that context, which is this case, "erroneous conclusions [about endorsement] do not count." Id., at 765. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("I would hold, simply and clearly, that giving [a private religious group] nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect").

[122] II

Second, since we have rejected the only reason that respondent gave for excluding the Club's speech from a forum that clearly included it (the forum was opened to any "us[e] pertaining to the welfare of the community," App. to Pet. for Cert. D1), I do not suppose it matters whether the exclusion is characterized as viewpoint or subject-matter discrimination. Lacking any legitimate reason for excluding the Club's speech from its forum—"because it's religious" will not do, see, e. g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 532-533, 546 (1993); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877-878 (1990)—respondent would seem to fail First Amendment scrutiny regardless of how its action is characterized. Even subject-matter limits must at least be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum," Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985).^[12] But I agree, in any event, that respondent did discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.

As I understand it, the point of disagreement between the Court and the dissenters (and the Court of Appeals) [123] with regard to petitioner's Free Speech Clause claim is not whether the Good News Club must be permitted to present religious viewpoints on morals and character in respondent's forum, which has been opened to secular discussions of that subject, see ante, at 108.^[13] The answer to that is established by our decision in Lamb's Chapel, supra. The point of disagreement is not even whether some of the Club's religious speech fell within the protection of Lamb's Chapel. It certainly did. See ante, at 108; 202 F. 3d 502, 509 (CA2 2000) (the Club's "teachings may involve secular values such as obedience or resisting jealousy").

The disagreement, rather, regards the portions of the Club's meetings that are not "purely" "discussions" of morality and character from a religious viewpoint. The Club, for example, urges children "who already believe in the Lord Jesus as their Savior" to "[s]top and ask God for the strength and the `want' . . . to obey Him," 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (NDNY 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it invites children who "don't know Jesus as Savior" to "trust the Lord Jesus to be [their] Savior from sin," ibid. The dissenters and the Second Circuit say that the presence of such additional speech, because it is purely religious, transforms the Club's meetings into something different in kind from other, nonreligious activities that teach moral and character development. See post, at 132-133 (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at 137-138 (Souter, J., dissenting); 202 F. 3d, at 509-511. Therefore, the argument goes, excluding the Club is not viewpoint discrimination. I disagree.

Respondent has opened its facilities to any "us[e] pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such us[e] shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general [124] public." App. to Pet. for Cert. D1. Shaping the moral and character development of children certainly "pertain[s] to the welfare of the community." Thus, respondent has agreed that groups engaged in the endeavor of developing character may use its forum. The Boy Scouts, for example, may seek "to influence a boy's character, development and spiritual growth," App. N10—N11; cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 649 (2000) ("[T]he general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: `[t]o instill values in young people' " (quoting the Scouts' mission statement)), and a group may use Aesop's Fables to teach moral values, App. N11. When the Club attempted to teach Biblical-based moral values, however, it was excluded because its activities "d[id] not involve merely a religious perspective on the secular subject of morality" and because "it [was] clear from the conduct of the meetings that the Good News Club goes far beyond merely stating its viewpoint." 202 F. 3d, at 510.

From no other group does respondent require the sterility of speech that it demands of petitioners. The Boy Scouts could undoubtedly buttress their exhortations to keep "morally straight" and live "clean" lives, see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, supra, at 649, by giving reasons why that is a good idea—because parents want and expect it, because it will make the scouts "better" and "more successful" people, because it will emulate such admired past Scouts as former President Gerald Ford. The Club, however, may only discuss morals and character, and cannot give its reasons why they should be fostered—because God wants and expects it, because it will make the Club members "saintly" people, and because it emulates Jesus Christ. The Club may not, in other words, independently discuss the religious premise on which its views are based—that God exists and His assistance is necessary to morality. It may not defend the premise, and it absolutely must not seek to persuade the children that the premise is true. The children must, so to say, take it on faith. This is blatant viewpoint discrimination. [125] Just as calls to character based on patriotism will go unanswered if the listeners do not believe their country is good and just, calls to moral behavior based on God's will are useless if the listeners do not believe that God exists. Effectiveness in presenting a viewpoint rests on the persuasiveness with which the speaker defends his premise—and in respondent's facilities every premise but a religious one may be defended.

In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), we struck down a similar viewpoint restriction. There, a private student newspaper sought funding from a student-activity fund on the same basis as its secular counterparts. And though the paper printed such directly religious material as exhortations to belief, see id., at 826 (quoting the paper's self-described mission "`to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means' "); id., at 865 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("`The only way to salvation through Him is by confessing and repenting of sin. It is the Christian's duty to make sinners aware of their need for salvation' " (quoting the paper)); see also id., at 865-867 (quoting other examples), we held that refusing to provide the funds discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, because the religious speech had been used to "provid[e] . . . a specific premise . . . from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered," id., at 831 (opinion of the Court). The right to present a viewpoint based on a religion premise carried with it the right to defend the premise.

The dissenters emphasize that the religious speech used by the Club as the foundation for its views on morals and character is not just any type of religious speech—although they cannot agree exactly what type of religious speech it is. In Justice Stevens's view, it is speech "aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith," post, at 130; see also post, at 133-134, n. 3. This does not, to begin with, distinguish Rosenberger, which [126] also involved proselytizing speech, as the above quotations show. See also Rosenberger, supra, at 844 (referring approvingly to the dissent's description of the paper as a "wor[k] characterized by . . . evangelism"). But in addition, it does not distinguish the Club's activities from those of the other groups using respondent's forum—which have not, as Justice Stevens suggests, see post, at 131-132, been restricted to roundtable "discussions" of moral issues. Those groups may seek to inculcate children with their beliefs, and they may furthermore "recruit others to join their respective groups," post, at 131. The Club must therefore have liberty to do the same, even if, as Justice Stevens fears without support in the record, see ibid., its actions may prove (shudder!) divisive. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S., at 395 (remarking that worries about "public unrest" caused by "proselytizing" are "difficult to defend as a reason to deny the presentation of a religious point of view"); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 684-685 (1984) (holding that "political divisiveness" could not invalidate inclusion of crèche in municipal Christmas display); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 310-311.

Justice Souter, while agreeing that the Club's religious speech "may be characterized as proselytizing," post, at 139, n. 3, thinks that it is even more clearly excludable from respondent's forum because it is essentially "an evangelical service of worship," post, at 138. But we have previously rejected the attempt to distinguish worship from other religious speech, saying that "the distinction has [no] intelligible content," and further, no "relevance" to the constitutional issue. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6 (1981); see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S., at 109 (refusing to distinguish evangelism from worship).^[14] Those holdings [127] are surely proved correct today by the dissenters' inability to agree, even between themselves, into which subcategory of religious speech the Club's activities fell. If the distinction did have content, it would be beyond the courts' competence to administer. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 269, n. 6; cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 616-617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("I can hardly imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more deliberately to be avoided where possible," than "comparative theology"). And if courts (and other government officials) were competent, applying the distinction would require state monitoring of private, religious speech with a degree of pervasiveness that we have previously found unacceptable. See, e. g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., supra, at 844-845; Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 269, n. 6. I will not endorse an approach that suffers such a wondrous diversity of flaws.

* * *

With these words of explanation, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Breyer, concurring in part.

I agree with the Court's conclusion and join its opinion to the extent that they are consistent with the following three observations. First, the government's "neutrality" in respect to religion is one, but only one, of the considerations relevant to deciding whether a public school's policy violates the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 839 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); [128] Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 774, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As this Court previously has indicated, a child's perception that the school has endorsed a particular religion or religion in general may also prove critically important. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 389-390 (1985); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 395 (1993); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 592-594 (1989). Today's opinion does not purport to change that legal principle.

Second, the critical Establishment Clause question here may well prove to be whether a child, participating in the Good News Club's activities, could reasonably perceive the school's permission for the Club to use its facilities as an endorsement of religion. See Ball, supra, at 390 ("[A]n important concern of the effects test is whether . . . the challenged government action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices"). The time of day, the age of the children, the nature of the meetings, and other specific circumstances are relevant in helping to determine whether, in fact, the Club "so dominate[s]" the "forum" that, in the children's minds, "a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval." Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., supra, at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Third, the Court cannot fully answer the Establishment Clause question this case raises, given its procedural posture. The specific legal action that brought this case to the Court of Appeals was the District Court's decision to grant Milford Central School's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. We now hold that the school was not entitled to [129] summary judgment, either in respect to the Free Speech or the Establishment Clause issue. Our holding must mean that, viewing the disputed facts (including facts about the children's perceptions) favorably to the Club (the nonmoving party), the school has not shown an Establishment Clause violation.

To deny one party's motion for summary judgment, however, is not to grant summary judgment for the other side. There may be disputed "genuine issue[s]" of "material fact," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), particularly about how a reasonable child participant would understand the school's role, cf. post, at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court itself points to facts not in evidence, ante, at 117 ("There is no evidence that young children are permitted to loiter outside classrooms after the schoolday has ended"), ante, at 118 ("There may be as many, if not more, upperclassmen as elementary school children who occupy the school after hours"), identifies facts in evidence which may, depending on other facts not in evidence, be of legal significance, ibid. (discussing the type of room in which the meetings were held and noting that the Club's participants "are not all the same age as in the normal classroom setting"), and makes assumptions about other facts, ante, at 117-118 ("Surely even young children are aware of events for which their parents must sign permission forms"), ante, at 118 ("Any bystander could conceivably be aware of the school's use policy and its exclusion of the Good News Club, and could suffer as much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary school children could suffer from perceived endorsement"). The Court's invocation of what is missing from the record and its assumptions about what is present in the record only confirm that both parties, if they so desire, should have a fair opportunity to fill the evidentiary gap in light of today's opinion. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56(c) (summary judgment appropriate only where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and movant "is entitled to a judgment as a [130] matter of law"), 56(f) (permitting supplementation of record for summary judgment purposes where appropriate).

Justice Stevens, dissenting.

The Milford Central School has invited the public to use its facilities for educational and recreational purposes, but not for "religious purposes." Speech for "religious purposes" may reasonably be understood to encompass three different categories. First, there is religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic from a religious point of view. The film in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), illustrates this category. See id., at 388 (observing that the film series at issue in that case "would discuss Dr. [James] Dobson's views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early stage"). Second, there is religious speech that amounts to worship, or its equivalent. Our decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), concerned such speech. See id., at 264-265 (describing the speech in question as involving "religious worship"). Third, there is an intermediate category that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith.

A public entity may not generally exclude even religious worship from an open public forum. Id., at 276. Similarly, a public entity that creates a limited public forum for the discussion of certain specified topics may not exclude a speaker simply because she approaches those topics from a religious point of view. Thus, in Lamb's Chapel we held that a public school that permitted its facilities to be used for the discussion of family issues and child rearing could not deny access to speakers presenting a religious point of view on those issues. See 508 U. S., at 393-394.

But, while a public entity may not censor speech about an authorized topic based on the point of view expressed [131] by the speaker, it has broad discretion to "preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976); see also Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 275, n. 6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A school's extracurricular activities constitute a part of the school's teaching mission, and the school accordingly must make `decisions concerning the content of those activities' " (quoting Widmar, 454 U. S., at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Accordingly, "control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985). The novel question that this case presents concerns the constitutionality of a public school's attempt to limit the scope of a public forum it has created. More specifically, the question is whether a school can, consistently with the First Amendment, create a limited public forum that admits the first type of religious speech without allowing the other two.

Distinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the one hand, from religious proselytizing, on the other, is comparable to distinguishing meetings to discuss political issues from meetings whose principal purpose is to recruit new members to join a political organization. If a school decides to authorize afterschool discussions of current events in its classrooms, it may not exclude people from expressing their views simply because it dislikes their particular political opinions. But must it therefore allow organized political groups—for example, the Democratic Party, the Libertarian Party, or the Ku Klux Klan—to hold meetings, the principal purpose of which is not to discuss the current-events topic from their own unique point of view but rather to recruit others to join their respective groups? I think not. Such recruiting meetings may introduce divisiveness and [132] tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine the school's educational mission. Cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (upholding a city's refusal to allow "political advertising" on public transportation).

School officials may reasonably believe that evangelical meetings designed to convert children to a particular religious faith pose the same risk. And, just as a school may allow meetings to discuss current events from a political perspective without also allowing organized political recruitment, so too can a school allow discussion of topics such as moral development from a religious (or nonreligious) perspective without thereby opening its forum to religious proselytizing or worship. See, e. g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 231 F. 3d 937, 942 (CA5 2000) ("Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a government entity such as a school board has the opportunity to open its facilities to activity protected by the First Amendment, without inviting political or religious activities presented in a form that would disserve its efforts to maintain neutrality"). Moreover, any doubt on a question such as this should be resolved in a way that minimizes "intrusion by the Federal Government into the operation of our public schools," Mergens, 496 U. S., at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities").

The particular limitation of the forum at issue in this case is one that prohibits the use of the school's facilities for "religious purposes." It is clear that, by "religious purposes," the school district did not intend to exclude all speech from a religious point of view. See App. N13—N15 (testimony of the superintendent for Milford schools indicating that the policy would permit people to teach "that man was created by God as described in the Book of Genesis" and that crime [133] was caused by society's "lack of faith in God"). Instead, it sought only to exclude religious speech whose principal goal is to "promote the gospel." Id., at N18. In other words, the school sought to allow the first type of religious speech while excluding the second and third types. As long as this is done in an evenhanded manner, I see no constitutional violation in such an effort.^[15] The line between the various categories of religious speech may be difficult to draw, but I think that the distinctions are valid, and that a school, particularly an elementary school, must be permitted to draw them.^[16] Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools . . .").

This case is undoubtedly close. Nonetheless, regardless of whether the Good News Club's activities amount to "worship," it does seem clear, based on the facts in the record, that the school district correctly classified those activities as falling within the third category of religious speech and therefore beyond the scope of the school's limited public forum.^[17] In short, I am persuaded that the school district [134] could (and did) permissibly exclude from its limited public forum proselytizing religious speech that does not rise to the level of actual worship. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Even if I agreed with Part II of the majority opinion, however, I would not reach out, as it does in Part IV, to decide a constitutional question that was not addressed by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.

The majority rules on two issues. First, it decides that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the rule in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), which held that the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in operating a limited public forum. The majority applies that rule and concludes that Milford violated Lamb's Chapel in denying Good News the use of the school. The majority then goes on to determine that it would not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for the Milford School District to allow the Good News Club to hold its intended gatherings of public school children in Milford's elementary school. [135] The majority is mistaken on both points. The Court of Appeals unmistakably distinguished this case from Lamb's Chapel, though not by name, and accordingly affirmed the application of a policy, unchallenged in the District Court, that Milford's public schools may not be used for religious purposes. As for the applicability of the Establishment Clause to the Good News Club's intended use of Milford's school, the majority commits error even in reaching the issue, which was addressed neither by the Court of Appeals nor by the District Court. I respectfully dissent.

I

Lamb's Chapel, a case that arose (as this one does) from application of N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000) and local policy implementing it, built on the accepted rule that a government body may designate a public forum subject to a reasonable limitation on the scope of permitted subject matter and activity, so long as the government does not use the forum-defining restrictions to deny expression to a particular viewpoint on subjects open to discussion. Specifically, Lamb's Chapel held that the government could not "permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint." 508 U. S., at 393-394.

This case, like Lamb's Chapel, properly raises no issue about the reasonableness of Milford's criteria for restricting the scope of its designated public forum. Milford has opened school property for, among other things, "instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts" and for "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public." App. to Pet. for Cert. D1—D3. But Milford has done this subject to the restriction that "[s]chool premises shall not be used . . . for [136] religious purposes." Id., at D2. As the District Court stated, Good News did "not object to the reasonableness of [Milford]'s policy that prohibits the use of [its] facilities for religious purposes." Id., at C14.

The sole question before the District Court was, therefore, whether, in refusing to allow Good News's intended use, Milford was misapplying its unchallenged restriction in a way that amounted to imposing a viewpoint-based restriction on what could be said or done by a group entitled to use the forum for an educational, civic, or other permitted purpose. The question was whether Good News was being disqualified when it merely sought to use the school property the same way that the Milford Boy and Girl Scouts and the 4—H Club did. The District Court held on the basis of undisputed facts that Good News's activity was essentially unlike the presentation of views on secular issues from a religious standpoint held to be protected in Lamb's Chapel, see App. to Pet. for Cert. C29—C31, and was instead activity precluded by Milford's unchallenged policy against religious use, even under the narrowest definition of that term.

The Court of Appeals understood the issue the same way. See 202 F. 3d 502, 508 (CA2 2000) (Good News argues that "to exclude the Club because it teaches morals and values from a Christian perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination"); id., at 509 ("The crux of the Good News Club's argument is that the Milford school's application of the Community Use Policy to exclude the Club from its facilities is not viewpoint neutral").^[18] The Court of Appeals [137] also realized that the Lamb's Chapel criterion was the appropriate measure: "The activities of the Good News Club do not involve merely a religious perspective on the secular subject of morality." 202 F. 3d, at 510. Cf. Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 393 (district could not exclude "religious standpoint" in discussion on child rearing and family values, an undisputed "use for social or civic purposes otherwise permitted" under the use policy).^[19] The appeals court agreed with the District Court that the undisputed facts in this case differ from those in Lamb's Chapel, as night from day. A sampling of those facts shows why both courts were correct.

Good News's classes open and close with prayer. In a sample lesson considered by the District Court, children are instructed that "[t]he Bible tells us how we can have our sins forgiven by receiving the Lord Jesus Christ. It tells us how to live to please Him. . . . If you have received the Lord Jesus as your Saviour from sin, you belong to God's special group—His family." App. to Pet. for Cert. C17—C18 (ellipsis in original). The lesson plan instructs the teacher to "lead a child to Christ," and, when reading a Bible verse, to "[e]mphasize that this verse is from the Bible, God's Word," and is "important—and true—because God said it." The lesson further exhorts the teacher to "[b]e sure to give an opportunity for the `unsaved' children in your class to respond to the Gospel" and cautions against "neglect[ing] this responsibility." Id., at C20.

While Good News's program utilizes songs and games, the heart of the meeting is the "challenge" and "invitation," which are repeated at various times throughout the lesson. [138] During the challenge, "saved" children who "already believe in the Lord Jesus as their Savior" are challenged to "`stop and ask God for the strength and the "want" . . . to obey Him.' " Ibid. They are instructed that

"[i]f you know Jesus as your Savior, you need to place God first in your life. And if you don't know Jesus as Savior and if you would like to, then we will—we will pray with you separately, individually. . . . And the challenge would be, those of you who know Jesus as Savior, you can rely on God's strength to obey Him." Ibid.

During the invitation, the teacher "invites" the "unsaved" children "`to trust the Lord Jesus to be your Savior from sin,' " and "`receiv[e] [him] as your Savior from sin.' " Id., at C21. The children are then instructed that

"[i]f you believe what God's Word says about your sin and how Jesus died and rose again for you, you can have His forever life today. Please bow your heads and close your eyes. If you have never believed on the Lord Jesus as your Savior and would like to do that, please show me by raising your hand. If you raised your hand to show me you want to believe on the Lord Jesus, please meet me so I can show you from God's Word how you can receive His everlasting life." Ibid.

It is beyond question that Good News intends to use the public school premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view, but for an evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian conversion.^[20] The majority [139] avoids this reality only by resorting to the bland and general characterization of Good News's activity as "teaching of morals and character, from a religious standpoint." Ante, at 109. If the majority's statement ignores reality, as it surely does, then today's holding may be understood only in equally generic terms. Otherwise, indeed, this case would stand for the remarkable proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque.

II

I also respectfully dissent from the majority's refusal to remand on all other issues, insisting instead on acting as a court of first instance in reviewing Milford's claim that it would violate the Establishment Clause to grant Good News's application. Milford raised this claim to demonstrate a compelling interest for saying no to Good News, even on the erroneous assumption that Lamb's Chapel `s public forum analysis would otherwise require Milford to say yes. Whereas the District Court and Court of Appeals resolved this case entirely on the ground that Milford's actions did not offend the First Amendment's Speech Clause, the majority now sees fit to rule on the application of the Establishment Clause, in derogation of this Court's proper role as a court of review. E. g., National Collegiate Athletic [140] Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 470 (1999) ("[W]e do not decide in the first instance issues not decided below").

The Court's usual insistence on resisting temptations to convert itself into a trial court and on remaining a court of review is not any mere procedural nicety, and my objection to turning us into a district court here does not hinge on a preference for immutable procedural rules. Respect for our role as a reviewing court rests, rather, on recognizing that this Court can often learn a good deal from considering how a district court and a court of appeals have worked their way through a difficult issue. It rests on recognizing that an issue as first conceived may come to be seen differently as a case moves through trial and appeal; we are most likely to contribute something of value if we act with the benefit of whatever refinement may come in the course of litigation. And our customary refusal to become a trialcourt reflects the simple fact that this Court cannot develop a record as well as a trial court can. If I were a trial judge, for example, I would balk at deciding on summary judgment whether an Establishment Clause violation would occur here without having statements of undisputed facts or uncontradicted affidavits showing, for example, whether Good News conducts its instruction at the same time as school-sponsored extracurricular and athletic activities conducted by school staff and volunteers, see Brief for Respondent 6; whether any other community groups use school facilities immediately after classes end and how many students participate in those groups; and the extent to which Good News, with 28 students in its membership, may "dominate the forum" in a way that heightens the perception of official endorsement, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 851 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981). We will never know these facts.

Of course, I am in no better position than the majority to perform an Establishment Clause analysis in the first [141] instance. Like the majority, I lack the benefit that development in the District Court and Court of Appeals might provide, and like the majority I cannot say for sure how complete the record may be. I can, however, speak to the doubtful underpinnings of the majority's conclusion.

This Court has accepted the independent obligation to obey the Establishment Clause as sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. See id., at 271 ("[T]he interest of the [government] in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling"); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S., at 394. Milford's actions would offend the Establishment Clause if they carried the message of endorsing religion under the circumstances, as viewed by a reasonable observer. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority concludes that such an endorsement effect is out of the question in Milford's case, because the context here is "materially indistinguishable" from the facts in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Ante, at 113. In fact, the majority is in no position to say that, for the principal grounds on which we based our Establishment Clause holdings in those cases are clearly absent here.

In Widmar, we held that the Establishment Clause did not bar a religious student group from using a public university's meeting space for worship as well as discussion. As for the reasonable observers who might perceive government endorsement of religion, we pointed out that the forum was used by university students, who "are, of course, young adults," and, as such, "are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." 454 U. S., at 274, n. 14. To the same effect, we remarked that the "large number of groups meeting on campus" negated "any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place." Ibid. Not only was the forum "available to a broad class of nonreligious as [142] well as religious speakers," but there were, in fact, over 100 recognized student groups at the University, and an "absence of empirical evidence that religious groups [would] dominate [the University's] open forum." Id., at 274-275; see also id., at 274 ("The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect"). And if all that had not been enough to show that the university-student use would probably create no impression of religious endorsement, we pointed out that the university in that case had issued a student handbook with the explicit disclaimer that "the University's name will not `be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members.' " Id., at 274, n. 14.

Lamb's Chapel involved an evening film series on child rearing open to the general public (and, given the subject matter, directed at an adult audience). See 508 U. S., at 387, 395. There, school property "had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations," and we could say with some assurance that "[u]nder these circumstances . . . there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed . . . ." Id., at 395.

What we know about this case looks very little like Widmar or Lamb's Chapel. The cohort addressed by Good News is not university students with relative maturity, or even high school pupils, but elementary school children as young as six.^[21] The Establishment Clause cases have [143] consistently recognized the particular impressionability of schoolchildren, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 583—584 (1987), and the special protection required for those in the elementary grades in the school forum, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 620, n. 69 (1989). We have held the difference between college students and grade school pupils to be a "distinction [that] warrants a difference in constitutional results," Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, at 584, n. 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nor is Milford's limited forum anything like the sites for wide-ranging intellectual exchange that were home to the challenged activities in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel. See also Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 850, 836-837. In Widmar, the nature of the university campus and the sheer number of activities offered precluded the reasonable college observer from seeing government endorsement in any one of them, and so did the time and variety of community use in the Lamb's Chapel case. See also Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 850 ("Given this wide array of nonreligious, antireligious and competing religious viewpoints in the forum supported by the University, any perception that the University endorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical"); id., at 836-837, 850 (emphasizing the array of university-funded magazines containing "widely divergent viewpoints" and the fact that believers in Christian evangelism competed on equal footing in the University forum with aficionados of "Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes," as well as "Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre"); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 [144] U. S. 226, 252 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("To the extent that a religious club is merely one of many different studentinitiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no message of government endorsement of religion").

The timing and format of Good News's gatherings, on the other hand, may well affirmatively suggest the imprimatur of officialdom in the minds of the young children. The club is open solely to elementary students (not the entire community, as in Lamb's Chapel ), only four outside groups have been identified as meeting in the school, and Good News is, seemingly, the only one whose instruction follows immediately on the conclusion of the official schoolday. See Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6. Although school is out at 2:56 p.m., Good News apparently requested use of the school beginning at 2:30 on Tuesdays "during the school year," so that instruction could begin promptly at 3:00, see Lodging, Exh. W-1, at which time children who are compelled by law to attend school surely remain in the building. Good News's religious meeting follows regular school activities so closely that the Good News instructor must wait to begin until "the room is clear," and "people are out of the room," App. P29, before starting proceedings in the classroom located next to the regular third- and fourth-grade rooms, id., at N12. In fact, the temporal and physical continuity of Good News's meetings with the regular school routine seems to be the whole point of using the school. When meetings were held in a community church, 8 or 10 children attended; after the school became the site, the number went up three-fold. Id., at P12; Lodging, Exh. AA2.

Even on the summary judgment record, then, a record lacking whatever supplementation the trial process might have led to, and devoid of such insight as the trial and appellate judges might have contributed in addressing the Establishment Clause, we can say this: there is a good case that Good News's exercises blur the line between public [145] classroom instruction and private religious indoctrination, leaving a reasonable elementary school pupil unable to appreciate that the former instruction is the business of the school while the latter evangelism is not. Thus, the facts we know (or think we know) point away from the majority's conclusion, and while the consolation may be that nothing really gets resolved when the judicial process is so truncated, that is not much to recommend today's result.

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[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, Margaret L. Fleming, John J. Park, Jr., and Charles B. Campbell, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia; for the American Center for Law & Justice et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Colby M. May, James M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, Paul D. Clement, and Jeffrey S. Bucholtz; for Child Evangelism Fellowship, Inc., et al. by Herbert G. Grey, Darren C. Walker, Gregory S. Baylor, and Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Carl H. Esbeck and Nathan J. Diament; for the Liberty Legal Institute by Viet D. Dinh, John L. Carter, and Kelly Shackelford; for the National Council of Churches et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, and Nicholas P. Miller; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, and David Zwiebel; for the Northstar Legal Center et al. by Jordan W. Lorence and Joseph Infranco; for the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, P. C., by James P. Kelly III; for Wallbuilders, Inc., by Barry C. Hodge; for Sally Campbell by Brett M. Kavanaugh and Stuart J. Roth; for Carol Hood by Kevin J. Hasson, Eric W. Treene, Roman P. Storzer, and Anthony R. Picarello, Jr.; for Douglas Laycock by Mr. Laycock, pro se; and for 20 Theologians and Scholars of Religion by Michael W. McConnell and Steffen N. Johnson.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Mark D. Stern; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. by Ayesha N. Khan, Steven K. Green, Steven R. Shapiro, Jerome J. Shestack, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Eddie Tabash, Arthur N. Eisenberg, and Judith E. Schaeffer; for the Anti-Defamation League et al. by Jeffrey R. Babbin, David B. Isbell, Martin E. Karlinsky, and Steven M. Freeman; for the National School Boards Association et al. by Julie K. Underwood; and for the New York State School Boards Association, Inc., by Jay Worona, Pilar Sokol, and John A. Miller.

[2] The District Court dismissed the Club's claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because we held the Act to be unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997). See 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150, n. 4 (NDNY 1998).

[3] [Reporter's Note: See post, p. 913.]

[4] Although Milford argued below that, under § 414, itcould not permit its property to be used for the purpose of religious activity,see Brief for Appellee in No. 98-9494 (CA2), p.12, here itmerely asserts in one sentence that it has, "in accordance with state law, closed [its]limited open forum to purely religious instruction and services," Brief for Respondent 27. Because Milford does not elaborate, it is difficult to discern whether it is arguing that it is required by state law to exclude the Club's activities.

Before the Court of Appeals, Milford cited Trietley v. Board of Ed. of Buffalo, 65 App. Div. 2d 1, 409 N. Y. S. 2d 912 (1978), in which a New York court held that a local school district could not permit a student Bible club to meet on school property because "[r]eligious purposes are not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414 of the Education Law." Id., at 5-6, 409 N. Y. S. 2d, at 915. Although the court conceded that the Bible clubs might provide incidental secular benefits, it nonetheless concluded that the school would have violated the Establishment Clause had it permitted the club's activities on campus. Because we hold that the exclusion of the Club on the basis of its religious perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, it is no defense for Milford that purely religious purposes can be excluded under state law.

[5] We find it remarkable that the Court of Appeals majority did not cite Lamb's Chapel, despite its obvious relevance to the case. We do not necessarily expect a court of appeals to catalog every opinion that reverses one of its precedents. Nonetheless, this oversight is particularly incredible because the majority's attention was directed to it at every turn. See, e. g., 202 F. 3d 502, 513 (CA2 2000) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("I cannot square the majority's analysis in this case with Lamb's Chapel "); 21 F. Supp. 2d, at 150; App. O9—O11 (District Court stating "that Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger pinpoint the critical issue in this case"); Brief for Appellee in No. 98-9494 (CA2), at 36-39; Brief for Appellants in No. 98-9494 (CA2), pp. 15, 36.

[6] Despite Milford's insistence that the Club's activities constitute "religious worship," the Court of Appeals made no such determination. It did compare the Club's activities to "religious worship," 202 F. 3d, at 510, but ultimately it concluded merely that the Club's activities "fall outside the bounds of pure `moral and character development,' " id.,at 511. In any event, we conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.

Justice Souter's recitation of the Club's activities is accurate. See post, at 137-138 (dissenting opinion). But in our view, religion is used by the Club in the same fashion that it was used by Lamb's Chapel and by the students in Rosenberger: Religion is the viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed. We did not find the Rosenberger students' attempt to cultivate a personal relationship with Christ to bar their claim that religion was a viewpoint. And we see no reason to treat the Club's use of religion as something other than a viewpoint merely because of any evangelical message it conveys. According to Justice Souter, the Club's activities constitute "an evangelical service of worship." Post, at 138. Regardless of the label Justice Souter wishes to use, what matters is the substance of the Club's activities, which we conclude are materially indistinguishable from the activities in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger.

[7] It is worth noting that, although Milford repeatedly has argued that the Club's meeting time directly after the schoolday is relevant to its Establishment Clause concerns, the record does not reflect any offer by the school district to permit the Club to use the facilities at a different time of day. The superintendent's stated reason for denying the applications was simply that the Club's activities were "religious instruction." 202 F. 3d, at 507. In any event, consistent with Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, the school could not deny equal access to the Club for any time that is generally available for public use.

[8] Milford also cites Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203 (1948), for its position that the Club's religious element would be advanced by the State through compulsory attendance laws. In McCollum, the school district excused students from their normal classroom study during the regular schoolday to attend classes taught by sectarian religious teachers, who were subject to approval by the school superintendent. Under these circumstances, this Court found it relevant that "[t]he operation of the State's compulsory education system .. . assist[ed] and [wa]s integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects." Id., at 209. In the present case, there is simply no integration and cooperation between the school district and the Club. The Club's activities take place after the time when the children are compelled by state law to be at the school.

[9] Milford also refers to Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990), to support its view that "assumptions about the ability of students to make . . . subtle distinctions [between schoolteachers during the schoolday and Reverend Fournier after school] are less valid for elementary age children who tend to be less informed, more impressionable, and more subject to peer pressure than average adults." Brief for Respondent 19. Four Justices in Mergens believed that high school students likely are capable of distinguishing between government and private endorsement of religion. See 496 U. S., at 250-251 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The opinion, however, made no statement about how capable of discerning endorsement elementary school children would have been in the context of Mergens, where the activity at issue was after school.In any event, even to the extent elementary school children are more prone to peer pressure than are older children, it simply is not clear what, in this case, they could be pressured to do.

In further support of the argument that the impressionability of elementary school children even after school is significant, Milford points to several cases in which we have found Establishment Clause violations in public schools. For example, Milford relies heavily on School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), in which we found unconstitutional Pennsylvania's practice of permitting public schools to read Bible verses at the opening of each schoolday. Schempp, however, is inapposite because this case does not involve activity by the school during the schoolday.

[10] Milford also relies on the Equal Access Act, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, as evidence that Congress has recognized the vulnerability of elementary school children to misperceiving endorsement of religion. The Act, however, makes no express recognition of the impressionability of elementary school children. It applies only to public secondary schools and makes no mention of elementary schools. § 4071(a). We can derive no meaning from the choice by Congress not to address elementary schools.

[11] Both parties have briefed the Establishment Clause issue extensively, and neither suggests that a remand would be of assistance on this issue. Although Justice Souter would prefer that a record be developed on several facts, see post, at 140, and Justice Breyer believes that development of those facts could yet be dispositive in this case, see post, at 128 (opinion concurring in part), none of these facts is relevant to the Establishment Clause inquiry. For example, Justice Souter suggests that we cannot determine whether there would be an Establishment Clause violation unless we know when, and to what extent, other groups use the facilities. When a limited public forum is available for use by groups presenting any viewpoint, however, we would not find an Establishment Clause violation simply because only groups presenting a religious viewpoint have opted to take advantage of the forum at a particular time.

[12] In this regard, I should note the inaccuracy of Justice Souter's claim that the reasonableness of the forum limitation is not properly before us, see post, at 136, and n. 1 (dissenting opinion). Petitioners argued, both in their papers filed in the District Court, Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 97—CV-0302 (NDNY), pp. 20-22, and in their brief filed on appeal, Brief for Appellants in No. 98-9494 (CA2), pp. 33-35, that respondent's exclusion of them from the forum was unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum. Although the District Court did say in passing that the reasonableness of respondent's general restriction on use of its facilities for religious purposes was not challenged, see 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154 (NDNY 1998), the Court of Appeals apparently decided that the particular reasonableness challenge brought by petitioners had been preserved, because it addressed the argument on the merits, see 202 F. 3d 502, 509 (CA2 2000) ("Taking first the reasonableness criterion, the Club argues that the restriction is unreasonable . . . .This argument is foreclosed by precedent").

[13] Neither does the disagreement center on the mode of the Club's speech—the fact that it sings songs and plays games. Although a forum could perhaps be opened to lectures but not plays, debates but not concerts, respondent has placed no such restrictions on the use of its facilities. See App. N8, N14, N19 (allowing seminars, concerts, and plays).

[14] We have drawn a different distinction—between religious speech generally and speech about religion—but only with regard to restrictions the State must place on its own speech, where pervasive state monitoring is unproblematic. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 225 (1963) (State schools in their official capacity may not teach religion but may teach about religion). Whatever the rule there, licensing and monitoring private religious speech is an entirely different matter, see, e. g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293-294 (1951), even in a limited public forum where the State has some authority to draw subject-matter distinctions.

[15] The school district, for example, could not, consistently with its present policy, allow school facilities to be used by a group that affirmatively attempted to inculcate nonbelief in God or in the view that morality is wholly unrelated to belief in God. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that any such group was allowed to use school facilities.

[16] "A perceptive observer sees a material difference between the light of day and the dark of night, and knows that difference to be a reality even though the two are separated not by a bright line but by a zone of twilight." Buirkle v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 832 F. Supp. 469, 483 (Mass. 1993).

[17] The majority elides the distinction between religious speech on a particular topic and religious speech that seeks primarily to inculcate belief. Thus, it relies on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), as if that case involved precisely the same type of speech that is at issue here. But, while both Wide Awake, the organization in Rosenberger, and the Good News Club engage in a mixture of different types of religious speech, the Rosenberger Court clearly believed that the first type of religious speech predominated in Wide Awake. It described that group's publications as follows: "The first issue had articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, prayer, C. S. Lewis' ideas about evil and free will, and reviews of religious music. In the next two issues, Wide Awake featured stories about homosexuality, Christian missionary work, and eating disorders, as well as music reviews and interviews with University professors." Id.,at 826.

In contrast to Wide Awake's emphasis on providing Christian commentary on such a diverse array of topics, Good News Club meetings are dominated by religious exhortation, see post, at 137-138 (Souter, J., dissenting). My position is therefore consistent with the Court's decision in Rosenberger.

[18] The Court of Appeals held that any challenge to the policy's reasonableness was foreclosed by its own precedent, 202 F. 3d, at 509, a holding the majority leaves untouched, see ante, at 107 ("[W]e need not decide whether it is unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum"); cf.ante, at 108, n. 2 ("Because we hold that the exclusion of the Club on the basis of its religious perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, it is no defense for Milford that purely religious purposes can be excluded under state law"). In any event, the reasonableness of the forum limitation was beyond the scope of the appeal from summary judgment sincethe District Court had said explicitlythat the religious use limitation was not challenged.

[19] It is true, as the majority notes, ante, at 109, n. 3, that the Court of Appeals did not cite Lamb's Chapel by name. But it followed it in substance, and it did cite an earlier opinion written by the author of the panel opinion here, Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School Dist. No. 10, 127 F. 3d 207 (CA2 1997), which discussed Lamb's Chapel at length.

[20] The majority rejects Milford's contention that Good News's activities fall outside the purview of the limited forum because they constitute "religious worship" on the ground that the Court of Appeals made no such determination regarding the character of the club's program, see ante,at 112, n. 4. This distinction is merely semantic, in lightof the Court of Appeals's conclusion that "[i]t is difficult to see how the Club's activities differ materially from the `religious worship' described" in other case law, 202 F. 3d 502, 510 (CA2 2000), and the record below.

Justice Stevens distinguishes between proselytizing and worship, ante, at 130 (dissenting opinion), and distinguishes each from discussion reflecting a religious point of view. I agree with Justice Stevens that Good News's activities may be characterized as proselytizing and therefore as outside the purpose of Milford's limited forum, ante, at 133. Like the Court of Appeals, I also believe Good News's meetings have elements of worship that put the club's activities further afield of Milford's limited forum policy, the legitimacy of which was unchallenged in the summary judgment proceeding.

[21] It is certainly correct that parents are required to give permission for their children to attend Good News's classes, see ante,at 115 (as parents are often required to do for a host of official school extracurricular activities), and correct that those parents would likely not be confused as to the sponsorship of Good News's classes. But the proper focus of concern in assessing effects includes the elementary school pupils who are invited to meetings, Lodging, Exh. X2, who see peers heading into classrooms for religious instruction as other classes end, and who are addressed by the "challenge" and "invitation."

The fact that there may be no evidence in the record that individual students were confused during the time the Good News Club met on school premises pursuant to the District Court's preliminary injunction is immaterial, cf. Brief for Petitioners 38. As Justice O'Connor explained in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753 (1995), the endorsement test does not focus "on the actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge," but on "the perspective of a hypothetical observer." Id., at 779-780 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

[2977] Michael W. McConnell, Stanford, CA, for petitioner.

Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for respondents.

Kimberlee Wood Colby, Christian Legal Society, Springfield, VA, Gregory S. Baylor, Timothy J. Tracey, M. Casey Mattox, Alliance Defense Fund, Washington, DC, Michael W. McConnell, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner.

[2978] Ethan P. Schulman, Crowell & Moring LLP, Elise K. Traynum, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA, Gregory G. Garre, Maureen E. Mahoney, J. Scott Ballenger, Lori Alvino McGill, Gabriel K. Bell Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Hastings College of the Law Respondents.

Shannon P. Minter, Christopher F. Stoll, San Francisco, CA, Paul M. Smith, Duane C. Pozza, Daniel I. Weiner, Anna M. Baldwin, Jennifer V. Yeh, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Intervenor.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a series of decisions, this Court has emphasized that the First Amendment generally precludes public universities from denying student organizations access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). This case concerns a novel question regarding student activities at public universities: May a public law school condition its official recognition of a student group—and the attendant use of school funds and facilities—on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students?

In the view of petitioner Christian Legal Society (CLS), an accept-all-comers policy impairs its First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion by prompting it, on pain of relinquishing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who do not share the organization's core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation. From the perspective of respondent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings or the Law School), CLS seeks special dispensation from an across-the-board open-access requirement designed to further the reasonable educational purposes underpinning the school's student-organization program.

In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject CLS's First Amendment challenge. Compliance with Hastings' all-comers policy, we conclude, is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS—in common with all other student organizations— to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings' policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.

I

Founded in 1878, Hastings was the first law school in the University of California public-school system. Like many institutions of higher education, Hastings encourages students to form extracurricular associations that "contribute to the Hastings community and experience." App. 349. These groups offer students "opportunities to pursue academic and social interests outside of the classroom [to] further their [2979] education" and to help them "develo[p] leadership skills." Ibid.

Through its "Registered Student Organization" (RSO) program, Hastings extends official recognition to student groups. Several benefits attend this school-approved status. RSOs are eligible to seek financial assistance from the Law School, which subsidizes their events using funds from a mandatory student-activity fee imposed on all students. Id., at 217. RSOs may also use Law-School channels to communicate with students: They may place announcements in a weekly Office-of-Student-Services newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards, send e-mails using a Hastings-organization address, and participate in an annual Student Organizations Fair designed to advance recruitment efforts. Id., at 216-219. In addition, RSOs may apply for permission to use the Law School's facilities for meetings and office space. Id., at 218-219. Finally, Hastings allows officially recognized groups to use its name and logo. Id., at 216.

In exchange for these benefits, RSOs must abide by certain conditions. Only a "non-commercial organization whose membership is limited to Hastings students may become [an RSO]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. A prospective RSO must submit its bylaws to Hastings for approval, id., at 83a-84a; and if it intends to use the Law School's name or logo, it must sign a license agreement, App. 219. Critical here, all RSOs must undertake to comply with Hastings' "Policies and Regulations Applying to College Activities, Organizations and Students." Ibid.^[1]

The Law School's Policy on Nondiscrimination (Nondiscrimination Policy), which binds RSOs, states:

"[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory practices. All groups, including administration, faculty, student governments, [Hastings]-owned student residence facilities and programs sponsored by [Hastings], are governed by this policy of nondiscrimination. [Hasting's] policy on nondiscrimination is to comply fully with applicable law.

"[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and activities." Id., at 220.

Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all comers: School-approved groups must "allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs." Id., at 221.^[2] Other law schools [2980] have adopted similar all-comers policies. See, e.g., Georgetown University Law Center, Office of Student Life: Student Organizations, available at http://www.law. georgetown.edu/ StudentLife/StudentOrgs/NewGroup.htm (All Internet materials as visited June 24, 2010, and included in Clerk of Court's case file) (Membership in registered groups must be "open to all students."); Hofstra Law School Student Handbook 2009-2010, p. 49, available at http:// law.hofstra.edu/pdf/StudentLife/StudentAffairs/Handbook/ stuhb_handbook.pdf ("[Student] organizations are open to all students."). From Hastings' adoption of its Nondiscrimination Policy in 1990 until the events stirring this litigation, "no student organization at Hastings... ever sought an exemption from the Policy." App. 221.

In 2004, CLS became the first student group to do so. At the beginning of the academic year, the leaders of a predecessor Christian organization—which had been an RSO at Hastings for a decade— formed CLS by affiliating with the national Christian Legal Society (CLS-National). Id., at 222-223, 225. CLS-National, an association of Christian lawyers and law students, charters student chapters at law schools throughout the country. Id., at 225. CLS chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia, require members and officers to sign a "Statement of Faith" and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles. Id., at 225-226; App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a.^[3] Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman; CLS thus interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in "unrepentant homosexual conduct." App. 226. CLS also excludes students who hold religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith. Id., at 227.

On September 17, 2004, CLS submitted to Hastings an application for RSO status, accompanied by all required documents, including the set of bylaws mandated by CLS-National. Id., at 227-228. Several days later, the Law School rejected the application; CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation. Id., at 228.

CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondiscrimination Policy, id., at 281, but Hastings declined to grant one. "[T]o be one of our student-recognized organizations," Hastings reiterated, "CLS must open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or [2981] sexual orientation." Id., at 294. If CLS instead chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings stated, the school "would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for its meetings and activities." Ibid. CLS would also have access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its events. Id., at 219, 233. In other words, Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS's endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them.

Refusing to alter its bylaws, CLS did not obtain RSO status. It did, however, operate independently during the 2004-2005 academic year. CLS held weekly Bible-study meetings and invited Hastings students to Good Friday and Easter Sunday church services. Id., at 229. It also hosted a beach barbeque, Thanksgiving dinner, campus lecture on the Christian faith and the legal practice, several fellowship dinners, an end-of-year banquet, and other informal social activities. Ibid.

On October 22, 2004, CLS filed suit against various Hastings officers and administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its complaint alleged that Hastings' refusal to grant the organization RSO status violated CLS's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion. The suit sought injunctive and declaratory relief.^[4]

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of Hastings. The Law School's all-comers condition on access to a limited public forum, the court held, was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and therefore did not violate CLS's right to free speech. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a-38a.

Nor, in the District Court's view, did the Law School impermissibly impair CLS's right to expressive association. "Hastings is not directly ordering CLS to admit [any] studen[t]," the court observed, id., at 42a; "[r]ather, Hastings has merely placed conditions on" the use of its facilities and funds, ibid. "Hastings' denial of official recognition," the court added, "was not a substantial impediment to CLS's ability to meet and communicate as a group." Id., at 49a.

The court also rejected CLS's Free Exercise Clause argument. "[T]he Non-discrimination Policy does not target or single out religious beliefs," the court noted; rather, the policy "is neutral and of general applicability." Id., at 63a. "CLS may be motivated by its religious beliefs to exclude students based on their religion or sexual orientation," the court explained, "but that does not convert the reason for Hastings' [Non-discrimination Policy] to be one that is religiously-based." Id., at 63a-64a.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion that stated, in full:

"The parties stipulate that Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups—all groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2008)." Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed.Appx. 645, 645-646 (C.A.9 2009).

[2982] We granted certiorari, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 795, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009), and now affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment.

II

Before considering the merits of CLS's constitutional arguments, we must resolve a preliminary issue: CLS urges us to review the Nondiscrimination Policy as written—prohibiting discrimination on several enumerated bases, including religion and sexual orientation—and not as a requirement that all RSOs accept all comers. The written terms of the Nondiscrimination Policy, CLS contends, "targe[t] solely those groups whose beliefs are based on religion or that disapprove of a particular kind of sexual behavior," and leave other associations free to limit membership and leadership to individuals committed to the group's ideology. Brief for Petitioner 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, "[a] political ... group can insist that its leaders support its purposes and beliefs," CLS alleges, but "a religious group cannot." Id., at 20.

CLS's assertion runs headlong into the stipulation of facts it jointly submitted with Hastings at the summary-judgment stage. In that filing, the parties specified:

"Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs. Thus, for example, the Hastings Democratic Caucus cannot bar students holding Republican political beliefs from becoming members or seeking leadership positions in the organization." App. 221 (Joint Stipulation ¶ 18) (emphasis added; citations omitted).^[5]

Under the District Court's local rules, stipulated facts are deemed "undisputed." Civil Local Rule 56-2 (ND Cal.2010). See also Pet. for Cert. 2 ("The material facts of this case are undisputed.").^[6]

[2983] Litigants, we have long recognized, "[a]re entitled to have [their] case tried upon the assumption that ... facts, stipulated into the record, were established." H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 447, 25 S.Ct. 456, 49 L.Ed. 826 (1905).^[7] This entitlement is the bookend to a party's undertaking to be bound by the factual stipulations it submits. See post, at 3005 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "the parties must be held to their Joint Stipulation"). As a leading legal reference summarizes:

"[Factual stipulations are] binding and conclusive ..., and the facts stated are not subject to subsequent variation. So, the parties will not be permitted to deny the truth of the facts stated, ... or to maintain a contention contrary to the agreed statement, ... or to suggest, on appeal, that the facts were other than as stipulated or that any material fact was omitted. The burden is on the party seeking to recover to show his or her right from the facts actually stated." 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 93 (2000) (footnotes omitted).

This Court has accordingly refused to consider a party's argument that contradicted a joint "stipulation [entered] at the outset of th[e] litigation." Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 226, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). Time and again, the dissent races away from the facts to which CLS stipulated. See, e.g., post, at 3001, 3002, 3003, 3005-3006, 3012-3013.^[8] But factual stipulations are "formal concessions... that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Thus, a judicial admission ... is conclusive in the case." 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 254, p. 181 (6th ed.2006) (footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263, 26 L.Ed. 539 (1881) ("The power of the court to act in the disposition of a trial upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power to act upon the evidence produced.").^[9]

[2984] In light of the joint stipulation, both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit trained their attention on the constitutionality of the all-comers requirement, as described in the parties' accord. See 319 Fed. Appx., at 645-646; App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a; id., at 36a. We reject CLS's unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to Hastings' policy as written. This opinion, therefore, considers only whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the Constitution.^[10]

III

A

In support of the argument that Hastings' all-comers policy treads on its First Amendment rights to free speech and expressive association, CLS draws on two lines of decisions. First, in a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.^[11] Recognizing a State's right "to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated," Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public forum, like the RSO program here, with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106-107, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-393, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).^[12]

Second, as evidenced by another set of decisions, this Court has rigorously [2985] reviewed laws and regulations that constrain associational freedom. In the context of public accommodations, we have subjected restrictions on that freedom to close scrutiny; such restrictions are permitted only if they serve "compelling state interests" that are "unrelated to the suppression of ideas"—interests that cannot be advanced "through ... significantly less restrictive [means]." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). See also, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). "Freedom of association," we have recognized, "plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate." Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244. Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members, we have therefore concluded, "directly and immediately affects associational rights." Dale, 530 U.S., at 659, 120 S.Ct. 2446.

CLS would have us engage each line of cases independently, but its expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge: Who speaks on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed. See Brief for Petitioner 35 (expressive association in this case is "the functional equivalent of speech itself"). It therefore makes little sense to treat CLS's speech and association claims as discrete. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Instead, three observations lead us to conclude that our limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS's speech and association rights.

First, the same considerations that have led us to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums as compared to other environments, see supra, at 2984-2985, and n. 11, apply with equal force to expressive association occurring in limited public forums. As just noted, speech and expressive-association rights are closely linked. See Roberts, 468 U.S., at 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (Associational freedom is "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment."). When these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association. Accord Brief for State Universities and State University Systems as Amici Curiae 37-38. That result would be all the more anomalous in this case, for CLS suggests that its expressive-association claim plays a part auxiliary to speech's starring role. See Brief for Petitioner 18.

Second, and closely related, the strict scrutiny we have applied in some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of limited public forums—the State may "reserv[e] [them] for certain groups." Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 49, 103 S.Ct. 948 ("Implicit in the concept" of a limited public forum is the State's "right to make distinctions in access on the basis of ... speaker identity."); Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439 ("[A] speaker may be excluded from" a limited public forum "if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created.").

An example sharpens the tip of this point: Schools, including Hastings, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, ordinarily, and without controversy, limit official student-group recognition to organizations comprising only students—even if those groups wish to associate with nonstudents. See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Expressive [2986] Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L.Rev.1919, 1940 (2006). The same ground rules must govern both speech and association challenges in the limited-public-forum context, lest strict scrutiny trump a public university's ability to "confin[e] a [speech] forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created." Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also Healy, 408 U.S., at 189, 92 S.Ct. 2338 ("Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules.").

Third, this case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recognition.^[13] The expressive-association precedents on which CLS relies, in contrast, involved regulations that compelled a group to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S., at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (regulation "forc[ed] [the Boy Scouts] to accept members it [did] not desire" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ("There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than" forced inclusion of unwelcome participants.).^[14]

In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-576, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). Application of the less-restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the fact that Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) ("That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.").

In sum, we are persuaded that our limited-public-forum precedents adequately respect both CLS's speech and expressive-association rights, and fairly balance those rights against Hastings' interests as property owner and educational institution. We turn to the merits of the instant dispute, therefore, with the limited-public-forum decisions as our guide.

[2987] B

As earlier pointed out, supra, at 2978, 2984-2985, we do not write on a blank slate; we have three times before considered clashes between public universities and student groups seeking official recognition or its attendant benefits. First, in Healy, a state college denied school affiliation to a student group that wished to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 408 U.S., at 170, 92 S.Ct. 2338. Characterizing SDS's mission as violent and disruptive, and finding the organization's philosophy repugnant, the college completely banned the SDS chapter from campus; in its effort to sever all channels of communication between students and the group, university officials went so far as to disband a meeting of SDS members in a campus coffee shop. Id., at 174-176, 92 S.Ct. 2338. The college, we noted, could require "that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law," including "reasonable standards respecting conduct." Id., at 193, 92 S.Ct. 2338. But a public educational institution exceeds constitutional bounds, we held, when it "restrict[s] speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent." Id., at 187-188, 92 S.Ct. 2338.^[15]

We later relied on Healy in Widmar. In that case, a public university, in an effort to avoid state support for religion, had closed its facilities to a registered student group that sought to use university space for religious worship and discussion. 454 U.S., at 264-265, 102 S.Ct. 269. "A university's mission is education," we observed, "and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities." Id., at 268, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269. But because the university singled out religious organizations for disadvantageous treatment, we subjected the university's regulation to strict scrutiny. Id., at 269-270, 102 S.Ct. 269. The school's interest "in maintaining strict separation of church and State," we held, was not "sufficiently compelling to justify ... [2988] [viewpoint] discrimination against ... religious speech." Id., at 270, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Most recently and comprehensively, in Rosenberger, we reiterated that a university generally may not withhold benefits from student groups because of their religious outlook. The officially recognized student group in Rosenberger was denied student-activity-fee funding to distribute a newspaper because the publication discussed issues from a Christian perspective. 515 U.S., at 825-827, 115 S.Ct. 2510. By "select[ing] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints," we held, the university had engaged in "viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations." Id., at 831, 830, 115 S.Ct. 2510.

In all three cases, we ruled that student groups had been unconstitutionally singled out because of their points of view. "Once it has opened a limited [public] forum," we emphasized, "the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set." Id., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The constitutional constraints on the boundaries the State may set bear repetition here: "The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,... nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of ... viewpoint." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

C

We first consider whether Hastings' policy is reasonable taking into account the RSO forum's function and "all the surrounding circumstances." Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439.

1

Our inquiry is shaped by the educational context in which it arises: "First Amendment rights," we have observed, "must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Widmar, 454 U.S., at 268, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court is the final arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we consider that question. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) ("Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties."). Cognizant that judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators, however, we have cautioned courts in various contexts to resist "substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). See also, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (noting our "oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges"); Healy, 408 U.S., at 180, 92 S.Ct. 2338 ("[T]his Court has long recognized `the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.'" (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969))).

A college's commission—and its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical [2989] approaches—is not confined to the classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process. See Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (involvement in student groups is "a significant contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Schools, we have emphasized, enjoy "a significant measure of authority over the type of officially recognized activities in which their students participate." Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist.66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990). We therefore "approach our task with special caution," Healy, 408 U.S., at 171, 92 S.Ct. 2338, mindful that Hastings' decisions about the character of its student-group program are due decent respect.^[16]

2

With appropriate regard for school administrators' judgment, we review the justifications Hastings offers in defense of its all-comers requirement.^[17] First, the open-access policy "ensures that the leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students." Brief for Hastings 32; see Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 11. Just as "Hastings does not allow its professors to host classes open only to those students with a certain status or belief," so the Law School may decide, reasonably in our view, "that the ... educational experience is best promoted when all participants in the forum must provide equal access to all students." Brief for Hastings 32. RSOs, we count it significant, are eligible for financial assistance drawn from mandatory student-activity fees, see supra, at 2979; the all-comers policy ensures that no Hastings student is forced to fund a group that would reject her as a member.^[18]

[2990] Second, the all-comers requirement helps Hastings police the written terms of its Nondiscrimination Policy without inquiring into an RSO's motivation for membership restrictions. To bring the RSO program within CLS's view of the Constitution's limits, CLS proposes that Hastings permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. But that proposal would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb? If a hypothetical Male-Superiority Club barred a female student from running for its presidency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether the group rejected her bid because of her sex or because, by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief in its fundamental philosophy?

This case itself is instructive in this regard. CLS contends that it does not exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather "on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong." Brief for Petitioner 35-36 (emphasis deleted). Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination." (emphasis added)); id., at 583, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class."); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) ("A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews."). See also Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 7-20.

Third, the Law School reasonably adheres to the view that an all-comers policy, to the extent it brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, "encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students." App. 349.^[19] And if the policy sometimes produces discord, Hastings can rationally rank among RSOprogram goals development of conflict-resolution skills, toleration, and readiness to find common ground.

Fourth, Hastings' policy, which incorporates—in fact, subsumes—state-law proscriptions on discrimination, conveys the Law School's decision "to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the people of California disapprove." Brief for Hastings 35; id., at 33-34 (citing Cal. Educ.Code § 66270 (prohibiting discrimination on various bases)). State law, of course, may not command [2991] that public universities take action impermissible under the First Amendment. But so long as a public university does not contravene constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-law goals through the school's educational endeavors stands on firm footing.

In sum, the several justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all-comers requirement are surely reasonable in light of the RSO forum's purposes.^[20]

3

The Law School's policy is all the more creditworthy in view of the "substantial alternative channels that remain open for [CLS-student] communication to take place." Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 53, 103 S.Ct. 948. If restrictions on access to a limited public forum are viewpoint discriminatory, the ability of a group to exist outside the forum would not cure the constitutional shortcoming. But when access barriers are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it significant that other available avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the burden created by those barriers. See ibid.; Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976); Pell, 417 U.S., at 827-828, 94 S.Ct. 2800.

In this case, Hastings offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards to advertise events. App. 232-233. Although CLS could not take advantage of RSO-specific methods of communication, see supra, at 2979, the advent of electronic media and social-networking sites reduces the importance of those channels. See App. 114-115 (CLS maintained a Yahoo! message group to disseminate information to students.); Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 874 (C.A.7 2006) (Wood, J., dissenting) ("Most universities and colleges, and most college-aged students, communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace .... If CLS had its own website, any student at the school with access to Google—that is, all of them— could easily have found it."). See also Brief for Associated Students of the University of California, Hastings College of Law as Amicus Curiae 14-18 (describing host of ways CLS could communicate with Hastings' students outside official channels).

Private groups, from fraternities and sororities to social clubs and secret societies, commonly maintain a presence at universities without official school affiliation.^[21] Based on the record before us, CLS was similarly situated: It hosted a variety of activities the year after Hastings denied it recognition, and the number of students attending those meetings and events doubled. App. 224, 229-230. "The variety and type of alternative modes of access present here," in short, "compare favorably with those in other [limited public] forum cases where we have upheld restrictions on access." Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 53-54, 103 S.Ct. 948. It is beyond dissenter's license, we note again, see supra, [2992] at 2989, n. 17, constantly to maintain that nonrecognition of a student organization is equivalent to prohibiting its members from speaking.

4

CLS nevertheless deems Hastings' all-comers policy "frankly absurd." Brief for Petitioner 49. "There can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum," it asserts, "if groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints." Id., at 50; accord post, at 3013 (ALITO, J., dissenting). This catchphrase confuses CLS's preferred policy with constitutional limitation—the advisability of Hastings' policy does not control its permissibility. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Instead, we have repeatedly stressed that a State's restriction on access to a limited public forum "need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation." Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 808, 105 S.Ct. 3439.^[22]

CLS also assails the reasonableness of the all-comers policy in light of the RSO forum's function by forecasting that the policy will facilitate hostile takeovers; if organizations must open their arms to all, CLS contends, saboteurs will infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and message. This supposition strikes us as more hypothetical than real. CLS points to no history or prospect of RSO-hijackings at Hastings. Cf. National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) ("[W]e are reluctant ... to invalidate legislation on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Students tend to self-sort and presumably will not endeavor en masse to join—let alone seek leadership positions in—groups pursuing missions wholly at odds with their personal beliefs. And if a rogue student intent on sabotaging an organization's objectives nevertheless attempted a takeover, the members of that group would not likely elect her as an officer.

RSOs, moreover, in harmony with the all-comers policy, may condition eligibility for membership and leadership on attendance, the payment of dues, or other neutral requirements designed to ensure that students join because of their commitment to a group's vitality, not its demise. See supra, at 2979, n. 2. Several RSOs at Hastings limit their membership rolls and officer slates in just this way. See, e.g., App. 192 (members must "[p]ay their dues on a timely basis" and "attend meetings regularly"); id., at 173 (members must complete an application and pay dues; "[a]ny active member who misses a semester of regularly scheduled meetings shall be dropped from rolls"); App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a ("Only Hastings students who have held membership in this organization for a minimum of one semester shall be eligible to be an officer.").^[23]

[2993] Hastings, furthermore, could reasonably expect more from its law students than the disruptive behavior CLS hypothesizes— and to build this expectation into its educational approach. A reasonable policy need not anticipate and preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance or manipulation. If students begin to exploit an all-comers policy by hijacking organizations to distort or destroy their missions, Hastings presumably would revisit and revise its policy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (counsel for Hastings); Brief for Hastings 38.

Finally, CLS asserts (and the dissent repeats, post, at 3015-3016) that the Law School lacks any legitimate interest—let alone one reasonably related to the RSO forum's purposes—in urging "religious groups not to favor co-religionists for purposes of their religious activities." Brief for Petitioner 43; id., at 50. CLS's analytical error lies in focusing on the benefits it must forgo while ignoring the interests of those it seeks to fence out: Exclusion, after all, has two sides. Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a group's desire to exclude and students' demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no group to discriminate in membership.^[24]

D

We next consider whether Hastings' all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral.

1

Although this aspect of limited-public-forum analysis has been the constitutional sticking point in our prior decisions, as earlier recounted, supra, at 2987-2988, we need not dwell on it here. It is, after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers. In contrast to Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which universities singled out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their points of view, Hastings' all-comers requirement draws no distinction between groups based on their message or perspective. An all-comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.^[25]

[2994] 2

Conceding that Hastings' all-comers policy is "nominally neutral," CLS attacks the regulation by pointing to its effect: The policy is vulnerable to constitutional assault, CLS contends, because "it systematically and predictably burdens most heavily those groups whose viewpoints are out of favor with the campus mainstream." Brief for Petitioner 51; cf. post, at 3000 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (charging that Hastings' policy favors "political[ly] correc[t]" student expression). This argument stumbles from its first step because "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). See also Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) ("[T]he fact that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint based.").

Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups wishing to enforce exclusionary membership policies, "[w]here the [State] does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). See also Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (State's non-discrimination law did not "distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint."); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987) (same).

Hastings' requirement that student groups accept all comers, we are satisfied, "is justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated speech." Ward, 491 U.S., at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The Law School's policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior: Hastings' "desire to redress th[e] perceived harms" of exclusionary membership policies "provides an adequate explanation for its [allcomers condition] over and above mere disagreement with [any student group's] beliefs or biases." Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993). CLS's conduct—not its Christian perspective—is, from Hastings' vantage point, what stands between the group and RSO status. "In the end," as Hastings observes, "CLS is simply confusing its own viewpoint-based objections to ... nondiscrimination laws (which it is entitled to have and [to] voice) with viewpoint discrimination." Brief for Hastings 31.^[26]

[2995] Finding Hastings' open-access condition on RSO status reasonable and viewpoint neutral, we reject CLS' freespeech and expressive-association claims.^[27]

IV

In its reply brief, CLS contends that "[t]he peculiarity, incoherence, and suspect history of the all-comers policy all point to pretext." Reply Brief 23. Neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this Court is not the proper forum to air the issue in the first instance.^[28] On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is preserved.^[29]

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that the all-comers policy is constitutional and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice STEVENS, concurring.

The Court correctly confines its discussion to the narrow issue presented by the record, see ante, at 2982-2984, and correctly upholds the all-comers policy. I join its opinion without reservation. Because the dissent has volunteered an argument that the school's general Nondiscrimination Policy would be "plainly" unconstitutional if applied to this case, post, at 2987-2988 (opinion of ALITO, J.), a brief response is appropriate. In my view, both policies are plainly legitimate.

The Hastings College of Law's (Hastings) Nondiscrimination Policy contains boilerplate language used by institutions and workplaces across the country: It prohibits "unlawfu[l]" discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation." App. 220. Petitioner, the Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society (CLS), refused to comply. As the Court explains, ante, at 3002-3003, CLS was unwilling to admit members unless [2996] they affirmed their belief in certain Christian doctrines and refrained from "participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle," App. 146. CLS, in short, wanted to receive the school's formal recognition—and the benefits that attend formal recognition—while continuing to exclude gay and non-Christian students (as well as, it seems, students who advocate for gay rights).

In the dissent's view, by refusing to grant CLS an exemption from the Nondiscrimination Policy, Hastings violated CLS's rights, for by proscribing unlawful discrimination on the basis of religion, the policy discriminates unlawfully on the basis of religion. There are numerous reasons why this counterintuitive theory is unsound. Although the First Amendment may protect CLS's discriminatory practices off campus, it does not require a public university to validate or support them.

As written, the Nondiscrimination Policy is content and viewpoint neutral. It does not reflect a judgment by school officials about the substance of any student group's speech. Nor does it exclude any would-be groups on the basis of their convictions. Indeed, it does not regulate expression or belief at all. The policy is "directed at the organization's activities rather than its philosophy," Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). Those who hold religious beliefs are not "singled out," post, at 3010 (ALITO, J., dissenting); those who engage in discriminatory conduct based on someone else's religious status and belief are singled out.^[30] Regardless of whether they are the product of secular or spiritual feeling, hateful or benign motives, all acts of religious discrimination are equally covered. The discriminator's beliefs are simply irrelevant. There is, moreover, no evidence that the policy was adopted because of any reason related to the particular views that religious individuals or groups might have, much less because of a desire to suppress or distort those views. The policy's religion clause was plainly meant to promote, not to undermine, religious freedom.

To be sure, the policy may end up having greater consequence for religious groups—whether and to what extent it will is far from clear ex ante—inasmuch as they are more likely than their secular counterparts to wish to exclude students of particular faiths. But there is likewise no evidence that the policy was intended to cause harm to religious groups, or that it has in practice caused significant harm to their operations. And it is a basic tenet of First Amendment law that disparate impact does not, in itself, constitute viewpoint discrimination.^[31] The dissent has thus given [2997] no reason to be skeptical of the basic design, function, or rationale of the Nondiscrimination Policy.

What the policy does reflect is a judgment that discrimination by school officials or organizations on the basis of certain factors, such as race and religion, is less tolerable than discrimination on the basis of other factors. This approach may or may not be the wisest choice in the context of a Registered Student Organization (RSO) program. But it is at least a reasonable choice. Academic administrators routinely employ antidiscrimination rules to promote tolerance, understanding, and respect, and to safeguard students from invidious forms of discrimination, including sexual orientation discrimination.^[32] Applied to the RSO context, these values can, in turn, advance numerous pedagogical objectives. See post, at 2999-3000 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).

It is critical, in evaluating CLS's challenge to the Nondiscrimination Policy, to keep in mind that an RSO program is a limited forum—the boundaries of which may be delimited by the proprietor. When a religious association, or a secular association, operates in a wholly public setting, it must be allowed broad freedom to control its membership and its message, even if its decisions cause offense to outsiders. Profound constitutional problems would arise if the State of California tried to "demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe that Jesus was merely human." Post, at 3000 (ALITO, J., dissenting). But the CLS chapter that brought this lawsuit does not want to be just a Christian group; it aspires to be a recognized student organization. The Hastings College of Law is not a legislature. And no state actor has demanded that anyone do anything outside the confines of a discrete, voluntary academic program. Although it may be the case that to some "university students, the campus is their world," post, at 3007 (internal quotation marks omitted), it does not follow that the campus ought to be equated with the public square.

The campus is, in fact, a world apart from the public square in numerous respects, and religious organizations, as well as all other organizations, must abide by certain norms of conduct when they enter an academic community. Public universities serve a distinctive role in a modern [2998] democratic society. Like all specialized government entities, they must make countless decisions about how to allocate resources in pursuit of their role. Some of those decisions will be controversial; many will have differential effects across populations; virtually all will entail value judgments of some kind. As a general matter, courts should respect universities' judgments and let them manage their own affairs.

The RSO forum is no different. It is not an open commons that Hastings happens to maintain. It is a mechanism through which Hastings confers certain benefits and pursues certain aspects of its educational mission. Having exercised its discretion to establish an RSO program, a university must treat all participants evenhandedly. But the university need not remain neutral—indeed it could not remain neutral—in determining which goals the program will serve and which rules are best suited to facilitate those goals. These are not legal questions but policy questions; they are not for the Court but for the university to make. When any given group refuses to comply with the rules, the RSO sponsor need not admit that group at the cost of undermining the program and the values reflected therein. On many levels, a university administrator has a "greater interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 280, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not sign its Statement of Faith or who engage in "unrepentant homosexual conduct," App. 226. The expressive association argument it presses, however, is hardly limited to these facts. Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews, blacks, and women—or those who do not share their contempt for Jews, blacks, and women. A free society must tolerate such groups. It need not subsidize them, give them its official imprimatur, or grant them equal access to law school facilities.

Justice KENNEDY, concurring.

To be effective, a limited forum often will exclude some speakers based on their affiliation (e.g., student versus nonstudent) or based on the content of their speech, interests, and expertise (e.g., art professor not chosen as speaker for conference on public transit). When the government does exclude from a limited forum, however, other content-based judgments may be impermissible. For instance, an otherwise qualified and relevant speaker may not be excluded because of hostility to his or her views or beliefs. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-188, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972).

In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995), the essential purpose of the limited forum was to facilitate the expression of differing views in the context of student publications. The forum was limited because it was confined: first, to student-run groups; and second, to publications. The forum was created in the long tradition of using newspapers and other publications to express differing views and also in the honored tradition of a university setting that stimulates the free exchange of ideas. See id., at 835, 115 S.Ct. 2510 ("[I]n the University setting,... the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition"). These considerations supported the Court's conclusion that, under the First Amendment, a limited forum for student-run publications did not permit the exclusion of a paper for the [2999] reason that it was devoted to expressing religious views.

Rosenberger is distinguishable from the instant case in various respects. Not least is that here the school policy in question is not content based either in its formulation or evident purpose; and were it shown to be otherwise, the case likely should have a different outcome. Here, the policy applies equally to all groups and views. And, given the stipulation of the parties, there is no basis for an allegation that the design or purpose of the rule was, by subterfuge, to discriminate based on viewpoint.

An objection might be that the all-comers policy, even if not so designed or intended, in fact makes it difficult for certain groups to express their views in a manner essential to their message. A group that can limit membership to those who agree in full with its aims and purposes may be more effective in delivering its message or furthering its expressive objectives; and the Court has recognized that this interest can be protected against governmental interference or regulation. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). By allowing like-minded students to form groups around shared identities, a school creates room for self-expression and personal development. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000) ("The University's whole justification for [its student activity program] is that it springs from the initiative of the students, who alone give it purpose and content in the course of their extracurricular endeavors").

In the instant case, however, if the membership qualification were enforced, it would contradict a legitimate purpose for having created the limited forum in the first place. Many educational institutions, including respondent Hastings College of Law, have recognized that the process of learning occurs both formally in a classroom setting and informally outside of it. See id., at 233, 120 S.Ct. 1346. Students may be shaped as profoundly by their peers as by their teachers. Extracurricular activities, such as those in the Hastings "Registered Student Organization" program, facilitate interactions between students, enabling them to explore new points of view, to develop interests and talents, and to nurture a growing sense of self. See Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (participation in extracurricular activities is "`a significant contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience'"). The Hasting program is designed to allow all students to interact with their colleagues across a broad, seemingly unlimited range of ideas, views, and activities. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 313, n. 48, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[A] great deal of learning ... occurs through interactions among students ... who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world" (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted)).

Law students come from many backgrounds and have but three years to meet each other and develop their skills. They do so by participating in a community that teaches them how to create arguments in a convincing, rational, and respectful manner and to express doubt and disagreement in a professional way. A law school furthers these objectives by allowing broad diversity in registered student organizations. [3000] But these objectives may be better achieved if students can act cooperatively to learn from and teach each other through interactions in social and intellectual contexts. A vibrant dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from opposing points of view.

The school's objectives thus might not be well served if, as a condition to membership or participation in a group, students were required to avow particular personal beliefs or to disclose private, off-campus behavior. Students whose views are in the minority at the school would likely fare worse in that regime. Indeed, were those sorts of requirements to become prevalent, it might undermine the principle that in a university community— and in a law school community specifically—speech is deemed persuasive based on its substance, not the identity of the speaker. The era of loyalty oaths is behind us. A school quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct requirement, could be divisive for student relations and inconsistent with the basic concept that a view's validity should be tested through free and open discussion. The school's policy therefore represents a permissible effort to preserve the value of its forum.

In addition to a circumstance, already noted, in which it could be demonstrated that a school has adopted or enforced its policy with the intent or purpose of discriminating or disadvantaging a group on account of its views, petitioner also would have a substantial case on the merits if it were shown that the all-comers policy was either designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its leadership in order to stifle its views. But that has not been shown to be so likely or self-evident as a matter of group dynamics in this setting that the Court can declare the school policy void without more facts; and if there were a showing that in a particular case the purpose or effect of the policy was to stifle speech or make it ineffective, that, too, would present a case different from the one before us.

These observations are offered to support the analysis set forth in the opinion of the Court, which I join.

Justice ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.

The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express "the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-655, 49 S.Ct. 448, 73 L.Ed. 889 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Today's decision rests on a very different principle: no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of higher learning.

The Hastings College of the Law, a state institution, permits student organizations to register with the law school and severely burdens speech by unregistered groups. Hastings currently has more than 60 registered groups and, in all its history, has denied registration to exactly one: the Christian Legal Society (CLS). CLS claims that Hastings refused to register the group because the law school administration disapproves of the group's viewpoint and thus violated the group's free speech rights.

Rejecting this argument, the Court finds that it has been Hastings' policy for 20 years that all registered organizations must admit any student who wishes to join. Deferring broadly to the law school's judgment about the permissible limits of student debate, the Court concludes that this "accept-all-comers" policy, ante, at 3000, is both viewpoint-neutral and consistent [3001] with Hastings' proclaimed policy of fostering a diversity of viewpoints among registered student groups.

The Court's treatment of this case is deeply disappointing. The Court does not address the constitutionality of the very different policy that Hastings invoked when it denied CLS's application for registration. Nor does the Court address the constitutionality of the policy that Hastings now purports to follow. And the Court ignores strong evidence that the accept-all-comers policy is not viewpoint neutral because it was announced as a pretext to justify viewpoint discrimination. Brushing aside inconvenient precedent, the Court arms public educational institutions with a handy weapon for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups—groups to which, as Hastings candidly puts it, these institutions "do not wish to ... lend their name[s]." Brief for Respondent Hastings College of Law 11; see also id., at 3019.

I

The Court provides a misleading portrayal of this case. As related by the Court, (1) Hastings, for the past 20 years, has required any student group seeking registration to admit any student who wishes to join, ante, at 3002; (2) the effects of Hastings' refusal to register CLS have been of questionable importance, see ante, at 2991-2992; and (3) this case is about CLS's desire to obtain "a state subsidy," ante, at 2985-2986. I begin by correcting the picture.

A

The Court bases all of its analysis on the proposition that the relevant Hastings' policy is the so-called accept-all-comers policy. This frees the Court from the difficult task of defending the constitutionality of either the policy that Hastings actually—and repeatedly—invoked when it denied registration, i.e., the school's written Nondiscrimination Policy, or the policy that Hastings belatedly unveiled when it filed its brief in this Court. Overwhelming evidence, however, shows that Hastings denied CLS's application pursuant to the Nondiscrimination Policy and that the accept-all-comers policy was nowhere to be found until it was mentioned by a former dean in a deposition taken well after this case began.

The events that gave rise to this litigation began in 2004, when a small group of Hastings students sought to register a Hastings chapter of CLS, a national organization of Christian lawyers and law students. All CLS members must sign a Statement of Faith affirming belief in fundamental Christian doctrines, including the belief that the Bible is "the inspired Word of God." App. 226. In early 2004, the national organization adopted a resolution stating that "[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS membership." Id., at 146. The resolution made it clear that "a sexually immoral lifestyle," in CLS's view, includes engaging in "acts of sexual conduct outside of God's design for marriage between one man and one woman." Ibid. It was shortly after this resolution was passed that the Hastings chapter of CLS applied to register with the law school.

Hastings sponsors an active program of "registered student organizations" (RSOs) pursuant to the law school's avowed responsibility to "ensure an opportunity for the expression of a variety of viewpoints" and promote "the highest standards of ... freedom of expression," App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a, 74a. During the 2004-2005 [3002] school year, Hastings had more than 60 registered groups, including political groups (e.g., the Hastings Democratic Caucus and the Hastings Republicans), religious groups (e.g., the Hastings Jewish Law Students Association and the Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students), groups that promote social causes (e.g., both pro-choice and pro-life groups), groups organized around racial or ethnic identity (e.g., the Black Law Students Association, the Korean American Law Society, La Raza Law Students Association, and the Middle Eastern Law Students Association), and groups that focus on gender or sexuality (e.g., the Clara Foltz Feminist Association and Students Raising Consciousness at Hastings). See App. 236-245; Brief for Petitioner 3-4.

Not surprisingly many of these registered groups were and are dedicated to expressing a message. For example, Silenced Right, a pro-life group, taught that "all human life from the moment of conception until natural death is sacred and has inherent dignity," id., at 244, while Law Students for Choice aimed to "defend and expand reproductive rights," id., at 243. The American Constitution Society sought "to counter ... a narrow conservative vision of American law," id., at 236, and the UC Hastings Student Animal Defense Fund aimed "at protecting the lives and advancing the interests of animals through the legal system," id., at 245.

Groups that are granted registration are entitled to meet on university grounds and to access multiple channels for communicating with students and faculty—including posting messages on designated bulletin boards, sending mass e-mails to the student body, distributing material through the Student Information Center, and participating in the annual student organizations fair. App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a, 85a. They may also apply for limited travel funds, id., at 7a, which appear to total about $4,000 to $5,000 per year, App. 217—or less than $85 per registered group. Most of the funds available to RSOs come from an annual student activity fee that every student must pay. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a-93a.

When CLS applied for registration, Judy Hansen Chapman, the Director of Hastings' Office of Student Services, sent an e-mail to an officer of the chapter informing him that "CLS's bylaws did not appear to be compliant" with the Hastings Nondiscrimination Policy, App. 228, 277, a written policy that provides in pertinent part that "[t]he University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation," id., at 220. As far as the record reflects, Ms. Chapman made no mention of an accept-all-applicants policy.

A few days later, three officers of the chapter met with Ms. Chapman, and she reiterated that the CLS bylaws did not comply with "the religion and sexual orientation provisions of the Nondiscrimination Policy and that they would need to be amended in order for CLS to become a registered student organization." Id., at 228. About a week later, Hastings sent CLS a letter to the same effect. Id., at 228-229, 293-295. On both of these occasions, it appears that not a word was said about an accept-all-comers policy.

When CLS refused to change its membership requirements, Hastings denied its request for registration—thus making CLS the only student group whose application for registration has ever been rejected. Brief in Opposition 4.

In October 2004, CLS brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the law school's dean and other school officials, claiming, among other things, that the law [3003] school, by enacting and enforcing the Nondiscrimination Policy, had violated CLS's First Amendment right to freedom of speech. App. 78.

In May 2005, Hastings filed an answer to CLS's first amended complaint and made an admission that is significant for present purposes. In its complaint, CLS had alleged that the Nondiscrimination Policy discriminates against religious groups because it prohibits those groups "from selecting officers and members dedicated to a particular set of religious ideals or beliefs" but "permits political, social and cultural student organizations to select officers and members dedicated to their organization's ideals and beliefs." Id., at 79. In response, Hastings admitted that its Nondiscrimination Policy "permits political, social, and cultural student organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs." Id., at 93. The Court states that "Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all comers." Ante, at 2979. But this admission in Hastings' answer shows that Hastings had not adopted this interpretation when its answer was filed.

Within a few months, however, Hastings' position changed. In July 2005, Mary Kay Kane, then the dean of the law school, was deposed, and she stated: "It is my view that in order to be a registered student organization you have to allow all of our students to be members and full participants if they want to." App. 343. In a declaration filed in October 2005, Ms. Chapman provided a more developed explanation, stating: "Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy as requiring that student organizations wishing to register with Hastings allow any Hastings student to become a member and/or seek a leadership position in the organization." Id., at 349.

Hastings claims that this accept-all-comers policy has existed since 1990 but points to no evidence that the policy was ever put in writing or brought to the attention of members of the law school community prior to the dean's deposition. Indeed, Hastings has adduced no evidence of the policy's existence before that date. And while Dean Kane and Ms. Chapman stated, well after this litigation had begun, that Hastings had such a policy, neither they nor any other Hastings official has ever stated in a deposition, affidavit, or declaration when this policy took effect.

Hastings' effort to portray the accept-all-comers policy as merely an interpretation of the Nondiscrimination Policy runs into obvious difficulties. First, the two policies are simply not the same: The Nondiscrimination Policy proscribes discrimination on a limited number of specified grounds, while the accept-all-comers policy outlaws all selectivity. Second, the Nondiscrimination Policy applies to everything that Hastings does, and the law school does not follow an accept-all-comers policy in activities such as admitting students and hiring faculty.

In an effort to circumvent this problem, the Court writes that "Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all comers." Ante, at 2979 (emphasis added). This puts Hastings in the implausible position of maintaining that the Nondiscrimination Policy means one thing as applied to the RSO program and something quite different as applied to all of Hastings' other activities. But the Nondiscrimination Policy by its terms applies fully to all components of the law school, "including administration [and] faculty." App. 220.

[3004] Third, the record is replete with evidence that, at least until Dean Kane unveiled the accept-all-comers policy in July 2005, Hastings routinely registered student groups with bylaws limiting membership and leadership positions to those who agreed with the groups' viewpoints. For example, the bylaws of the Hastings Democratic Caucus provided that "any full-time student at Hastings may become a member of HDC so long as they do not exhibit a consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of the organization as stated in Article 3, Section 1." App. to Pet. for Cert. 118a (emphasis added). The constitution of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings provided that every member must "adhere to the objectives of the Student Chapter as well as the mission of ATLA." Id., at 110a. A student could become a member of the Vietnamese American Law Society so long as the student did not "exhibit a consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of the organization," which centers on a "celebrat[ion][of] Vietnamese culture." Id., at 146a-147a. Silenced Right limited voting membership to students who "are committed" to the group's "mission" of "spread[ing] the pro-life message." Id., at 142a-143a. La Raza limited voting membership to "students of Raza background." App. 192. Since Hastings requires any student group applying for registration to submit a copy of its bylaws, see id., at 249-250, Hastings cannot claim that it was unaware of such provisions. And as noted, CLS was denied registration precisely because Ms. Chapman reviewed its bylaws and found them unacceptable.

We are told that, when CLS pointed out these discrepancies during this litigation, Hastings took action to ensure that student groups were in fact complying with the law school's newly disclosed accept-all-comers policy. For example, Hastings asked La Raza to revise its bylaws to allow all students to become voting members. App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. See also Brief for State of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae 2, n. 1 (relating anecdotally that Hastings recently notified the Hastings Democrats that "to maintain the Club's standing as a student organization," it must "open its membership to all students, regardless of party affiliation"). These belated remedial efforts suggest, if anything, that Hastings had no accept-all-comers policy until this litigation was well under way.

Finally, when Hastings filed its brief in this Court, its policy, which had already evolved from a policy prohibiting certain specified forms of discrimination into an accept-all-comers policy, underwent yet another transformation. Now, Hastings claims that it does not really have an accept-all-comers policy; it has an accept-some-comers policy. Hastings' current policy, we are told, "does not foreclose neutral and generally applicable membership requirements unrelated to `status or beliefs.'" Brief for Respondent Hastings College of Law 5. Hastings' brief goes on to note with seeming approval that some registered groups have imposed "even conduct requirements." Ibid. Hastings, however, has not told us which "conduct requirements" are allowed and which are not—although presumably requirements regarding sexual conduct fall into the latter category.

When this case was in the District Court, that court took care to address both the Nondiscrimination Policy and the accept-all-comers policy. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a-9a, 16a-17a, 21a-24a, 26a, 27a, 32a, 44a, 63a. On appeal, however, a panel of the Ninth Circuit, like the Court today, totally ignored the Nondiscrimination Policy. CLS's argument in the Ninth Circuit centered on the Nondiscrimination Policy, and CLS argued strenuously, as it had in the District Court, that prior to the [3005] former dean's deposition, numerous groups had been permitted to restrict membership to students who shared the groups' views.^[33] Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit disposed of CLS's appeal with a two-sentence, not-precedential opinion that solely addressed the accept-all-comers policy. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed.Appx. 645-646 (2009).

Like the majority of this Court, the Ninth Circuit relied on the following Joint Stipulation, which the parties filed in December 2005, well after Dean Kane's deposition:

"Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of their status or beliefs." App. 221.

Citing the binding effect of stipulations, the majority sternly rejects what it terms "CLS's unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to [the Nondiscrimination Policy]." Ante, at 2984.

I agree that the parties must be held to their Joint Stipulation, but the terms of the stipulation should be respected. What was admitted in the Joint Stipulation filed in December 2005 is that Hastings had an accept-all-comers policy. CLS did not stipulate that its application had been denied more than a year earlier pursuant to such a policy. On the contrary, the Joint Stipulation notes that the reason repeatedly given by Hasting at that time was that the CLS bylaws did not comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy. See App. 228-229. Indeed, the parties did not even stipulate that the accept-all-comers policy existed in the fall of 2004. In addition, Hastings itself is now attempting to walk away from this stipulation by disclosing that its real policy is an accept-some-comers policy.

The majority's insistence on the binding effect of stipulations contrasts sharply with its failure to recognize the binding effect of a party's admissions in an answer. See American Title Insurance Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (C.A.9 1988) ("Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them"); Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc. v. Community First Bank, 123 F.3d 1243, 1248 (C.A.9 1997) (quoting Lacelaw, supra). As noted above, Hastings admitted in its answer, which was filed prior to the former dean's deposition, that at least as of that time, the law school did not follow [3006] an accept-all-comers policy and instead allowed "political, social, and cultural student organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs." App. 93.

B

The Court also distorts the record with respect to the effect on CLS of Hastings' decision to deny registration. The Court quotes a letter written by Hastings' general counsel in which she stated that Hastings "`would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for its meetings and activities.'" Ante, at 2981 (quoting App. 294). Later in its opinion, the Court reiterates that "Hastings offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings," ante, at 2991, but the majority does not mention that this offer was subject to important qualifications. As Hastings' attorney put it in the District Court, Hastings told CLS: "`Hastings allows community groups to some degree to use its facilities, sometimes on a pay basis, I understand, if they're available after priority is given to registered organizations'. We offered that." App. 442.

The Court also fails to mention what happened when CLS attempted to take advantage of Hastings' offer. On August 19, 2005, the local CLS president sent an e-mail to Ms. Chapman requesting permission to set up an "advice table" on a campus patio on August 23 and 24 so that members of CLS could speak with students at the beginning of the fall semester. Id., at 298. This request—merely to set up a table on a patio—could hardly have interfered with any other use of the law school's premises or cost the school any money. But although the request was labeled "time sensitive," ibid., Ms. Chapman did not respond until the dates in question had passed, and she then advised the student that all further inquiries should be made through CLS's attorney. Id., at 297-298.

In September 2005, CLS tried again. Through counsel, CLS sought to reserve a room on campus for a guest speaker who was scheduled to appear on a specified date. Id., at 302-303. Noting Ms. Chapman's tardy response on the prior occasion, the attorney asked to receive a response before the scheduled date, but once again no answer was given until after the date had passed. Id., at 300.

Other statements in the majority opinion make it seem as if the denial of registration did not hurt CLS at all. The Court notes that CLS was able to hold Bible-study meetings and other events. Ante, at 3003. And "[a]lthough CLS could not take advantage of RSO-specific methods of communication," the Court states, "the advent of electronic media and social-networking sites reduces the importance of those channels." Ante, at 2991.

At the beginning of the 2005 school year, the Hastings CLS group had seven members, App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a, so there can be no suggestion that the group flourished. And since one of CLS's principal claims is that it was subjected to discrimination based on its viewpoint, the majority's emphasis on CLS's ability to endure that discrimination—by using private facilities and means of communication—is quite amazing.

This Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of unlawful discrimination with the observation that the effects of the discrimination were really not so bad. We have never before taken the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable. Nor have we taken this approach in other discrimination cases.

C

Finally, I must comment on the majority's emphasis on funding. According to [3007] the majority, CLS is "seeking what is effectively a state subsidy," ante, at 2985-2986, and the question presented in this case centers on the "use of school funds," ante, at 3000. In fact, funding plays a very small role in this case. Most of what CLS sought and was denied—such as permission to set up a table on the law school patio—would have been virtually cost free. If every such activity is regarded as a matter of funding, the First Amendment rights of students at public universities will be at the mercy of the administration. As CLS notes, "[t]o university students, the campus is their world. The right to meet on campus and use campus channels of communication is at least as important to university students as the right to gather on the town square and use local communication forums is to the citizen." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13.

II

To appreciate how far the Court has strayed, it is instructive to compare this case with Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972), our only First Amendment precedent involving a public college's refusal to recognize a student group. The group in Healy was a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). When the students who applied for recognition of the chapter were asked by a college committee whether they would "`respond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have,'" their answer was that their "`action would have to be dependent upon each issue.'" Id., at 172-173, 92 S.Ct. 2338. They similarly refused to provide a definitive answer when asked whether they would be willing to "use any means possible" to achieve their aims. Id., at 173, 92 S.Ct. 2338. The president of the college refused to allow the group to be recognized, concluding that the philosophy of the SDS was "antithetical to the school's policies" and that it was doubtful that the local chapter was independent of the national organization, the "`published aims and philosophy'" of which included "`disruption and violence.'" Id., at 174-175, and n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

The effects of nonrecognition in Healy were largely the same as those present here. The SDS was denied the use of campus facilities, as well as access to the customary means used for communication among the members of the college community. Id., at 176, 181-182, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

The lower federal courts held that the First Amendment rights of the SDS chapter had not been violated, and when the case reached this Court, the college, much like today's majority, sought to minimize the effects of nonrecognition, arguing that the SDS members "still may meet as a group off campus, that they still may distribute written material off campus, and that they still may meet together informally on campus ... as individuals." Id., at 182-183, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

This Court took a different view. The Court held that the denial of recognition substantially burdened the students' right to freedom of association. After observing that "[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes," id., at 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, the Court continued:

"Petitioners' associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, [3008] and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial." Id., at 181-182, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

It is striking that all of these same burdens are now borne by CLS. CLS is prevented from using campus facilities—unless at some future time Hastings chooses to provide a timely response to a CLS request and allow the group, as a favor or perhaps in exchange for a fee, to set up a table on the patio or to use a room that would otherwise be unoccupied. And CLS, like the SDS in Healy, has been cut off from "the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

It is also telling that the Healy Court, unlike today's majority, refused to defer to the college president's judgment regarding the compatibility of "sound educational policy" and free speech rights. The same deference arguments that the majority now accepts were made in defense of the college president's decision to deny recognition in Healy. Respondents in that case emphasized that the college president, not the courts, had the responsibility of administering the institution and that the courts should allow him "`wide discretion ... in determining what actions are most compatible with its educational objectives.'" Brief for Respondents in Healy v. James, O.T.1971, No. 71-452, pp. 7-8. A supporting amicus contended that college officials "must be allowed a very broad discretion in formulating and implementing policies." Brief for Board of Trustees, California State Colleges 6. Another argued that universities should be permitted to impose restrictions on speech that would not be tolerated elsewhere. Brief for American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities 11-12.

The Healy Court would have none of this. Unlike the Court today, the Healy Court emphatically rejected the proposition that "First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large." 408 U.S., at 180, 92 S.Ct. 2338. And on one key question after another—whether the local SDS chapter was independent of the national organization, whether the group posed a substantial threat of material disruption, and whether the students' responses to the committee's questions about violence and disruption signified a willingness to engage in such activities—the Court drew its own conclusions, which differed from the college president's.

The Healy Court was true to the principle that when it comes to the interpretation and application of the right to free speech, we exercise our own independent judgment. We do not defer to Congress on such matters, see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), and there is no reason why we should bow to university administrators.

In the end, I see only two possible distinctions between Healy and the present case. The first is that Healy did not involve any funding, but as I have noted, funding plays only a small part in this case. And if Healy would otherwise prevent Hastings from refusing to register CLS, I see no good reason why the potential availability of funding should enable Hastings to deny all of the other rights that go with registration.

This leaves just one way of distinguishing Healy: the identity of the student group. In Healy, the Court warned that the college president's views regarding the philosophy of the SDS could not "justify the denial of First Amendment rights." [3009] 408 U.S., at 187, 92 S.Ct. 2338. Here, too, disapproval of CLS cannot justify Hastings' actions.^[34]

III

The Court pays little attention to Healy and instead focuses solely on the question whether Hastings' registration policy represents a permissible regulation in a limited public forum. While I think that Healy is largely controlling, I am content to address the constitutionality of Hastings' actions under our limited public forum cases, which lead to exactly the same conclusion.

In this case, the forum consists of the RSO program. Once a public university opens a limited public forum, it "must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). The university "may not exclude speech where its distinction is not `reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.'" Ibid. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)). And the university must maintain strict viewpoint neutrality. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000); Rosenberger, supra, at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510.

This requirement of viewpoint neutrality extends to the expression of religious viewpoints. In an unbroken line of decisions analyzing private religious speech in limited public forums, we have made it perfectly clear that "[r]eligion is [a] viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed." Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 112, and n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001). See Rosenberger, supra, at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-394, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981).

We have applied this analysis in cases in which student speech was restricted because of the speaker's religious viewpoint, and we have consistently concluded that such restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination. E.g., Rosenberger, supra, at 845-846, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Widmar, supra, at 267, n. 5, 269, 277, 102 S.Ct. 269; see also Good News Club, supra, at 106-107, 109-110, 121 S.Ct. 2093; Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 392-393, 394, 113 S.Ct. 2141. We have also stressed that the rules applicable in a limited public forum are particularly important in the university setting, where "the State acts against a background of tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition." Rosenberger, supra, at 835, 115 S.Ct. 2510.

IV

Analyzed under this framework, Hastings' refusal to register CLS pursuant to its Nondiscrimination Policy plainly fails.^[35] [3010] As previously noted, when Hastings refused to register CLS, it claimed that the CLS bylaws impermissibly discriminated on the basis of religion and sexual orientation. As interpreted by Hastings and applied to CLS, both of these grounds constituted viewpoint discrimination.

Religion. The First Amendment protects the right of "`expressive association'"—that is, "the right to associate for the purpose of speaking." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000)). And the Court has recognized that "[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Dale, supra, at 648.

With one important exception, the Hastings Nondiscrimination Policy respected that right. As Hastings stated in its answer, the Nondiscrimination Policy "permit[ted] political, social, and cultural student organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs." App. 93. But the policy singled out one category of expressive associations for disfavored treatment: groups formed to express a religious message. Only religious groups were required to admit students who did not share their views. An environmentalist group was not required to admit students who rejected global warming. An animal rights group was not obligated to accept students who supported the use of animals to test cosmetics. But CLS was required to admit avowed atheists. This was patent viewpoint discrimination. "By the very terms of the [Nondiscrimination Policy], the University... select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student [groups] with religious... viewpoints." Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510. It is no wonder that the Court makes no attempt to defend the constitutionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy.

Unlike the Court, Justice STEVENS attempts a defense, contending that the Nondiscrimination Policy is viewpoint neutral. But his arguments are squarely contrary to established precedent.

Justice STEVENS first argues that the Nondiscrimination Policy is viewpoint neutral because it "does not regulate expression or belief at all" but instead regulates [3011] conduct. See ante, at 2996 (concurring opinion). This Court has held, however, that the particular conduct at issue here constitutes a form of expression that is protected by the First Amendment. It is now well established that the First Amendment shields the right of a group to engage in expressive association by limiting membership to persons whose admission does not significantly interfere with the group's ability to convey its views. See Dale, supra, at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); see also New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (acknowledging that an "association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion"); Widmar, supra, at 268-269, 102 S.Ct. 269 ("[T]he First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities"). Indeed, the opinion of the Court, which Justice STEVENS joins, acknowledges this rule. See ante, at 3006-3007.

Justice STEVENS also maintains that the Nondiscrimination Policy is viewpoint neutral because it prohibits all groups, both religious and secular, from engaging in religious speech. See ante, at 3001-3002. This argument is also contrary to established law. In Rosenberger, the dissent, which Justice STEVENS joined, made exactly this argument. See 515 U.S., at 895-896, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (opinion of Souter, J.). The Court disagreed, holding that a policy that treated secular speech more favorably than religious speech discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.^[36] 515 U.S., at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Good News Club, 533 U.S., at 112, and n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 2093.

Here, the Nondiscrimination Policy permitted membership requirements that expressed a secular viewpoint. See App. 93. (For example, the Hastings Democratic Caucus and the Hastings Republicans were allowed to exclude members who disagreed with their parties' platforms.) But religious groups were not permitted to express a religious viewpoint by limiting membership to students who shared their religious viewpoints. Under established precedent, this was viewpoint discrimination.^[37]

[3012] It bears emphasis that permitting religious groups to limit membership to those who share the groups' beliefs would not have the effect of allowing other groups to discriminate on the basis of religion. It would not mean, for example, that fraternities or sororities could exclude students on that basis. As our cases have recognized, the right of expressive association permits a group to exclude an applicant for membership only if the admission of that person would "affec[t] in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Dale, 530 U.S., at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. Groups that do not engage in expressive association have no such right. Similarly, groups that are dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular topic (for example, a political or ideological viewpoint) would have no basis for limiting membership based on religion because the presence of members with diverse religious beliefs would have no effect on the group's ability to express its views. But for religious groups, the situation is very different. This point was put well by a coalition of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Sikh groups: "Of course there is a strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimination where religion is irrelevant. But it is fundamentally confused to apply a rule against religious discrimination to a religious association." Brief for American Islamic Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 3.

Sexual orientation. The Hastings Nondiscrimination Policy, as interpreted by the law school, also discriminated on the basis of viewpoint regarding sexual morality. CLS has a particular viewpoint on this subject, namely, that sexual conduct outside marriage between a man and a woman is wrongful. Hastings would not allow CLS to express this viewpoint by limiting membership to persons willing to express a sincere agreement with CLS's views. By contrast, nothing in the Nondiscrimination Policy prohibited a group from expressing a contrary viewpoint by limiting membership to persons willing to endorse that group's beliefs. A Free Love Club could require members to affirm that they reject the traditional view of sexual morality to which CLS adheres. It is hard to see how this can be viewed as anything other than viewpoint discrimination.

V

Hastings' current policy, as announced for the first time in the brief filed in this Court, fares no better than the policy that the law school invoked when CLS's application was denied. According to Hastings' brief, its new policy, contrary to the position taken by Hastings officials at an earlier point in this litigation, really does not require a student group to accept all comers. Now, Hastings explains, its policy allows "neutral and generally applicable membership requirements unrelated to `status or beliefs.'" Brief for Respondent Hastings College of Law 5. As examples of permissible membership requirements, Hastings mentions academic standing, writing ability, "dues, attendance, and even conduct requirements." Ibid. (emphasis added).

It seems doubtful that Hastings' new policy permits registered groups to condition membership eligibility on whatever "conduct requirements" they may wish to impose. If that is the school's current policy, it is hard to see why CLS may not be registered, for what CLS demands is that members foreswear "unrepentant participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle." App. 146. That should qualify as a conduct requirement.

If it does not, then what Hastings' new policy must mean is that registered groups may impose some, but not all, conduct requirements. And if that is the case, it is incumbent on Hastings to explain which [3013] conduct requirements are acceptable, which are not, and why CLS's requirement is not allowed. Hastings has made no effort to provide such an explanation.^[38]

VI

I come now to the version of Hastings' policy that the Court has chosen to address. This is not the policy that Hastings invoked when CLS was denied registration. Nor is it the policy that Hastings now proclaims—and presumably implements. It is a policy that, as far as the record establishes, was in force only from the time when it was first disclosed by the former dean in July 2005 until Hastings filed its brief in this Court in March 2010. Why we should train our attention on this particular policy and not the other two is a puzzle. But in any event, it is clear that the accept-all-comers policy is not reasonable in light of the purpose of the RSO forum, and it is impossible to say on the present record that it is viewpoint neutral.

A

Once a state university opens a limited forum, it "must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set." Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Hastings' regulations on the registration of student groups impose only two substantive limitations: A group seeking registration must have student members and must be noncommercial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a-83a, Hastings Board of Directors, Policies and Regulations Applying to College Activities, Organizations and Students § 34.10 (June 22, 1990) (hereinafter Hastings Regulations). Access to the forum is not limited to groups devoted to particular purposes. The regulations provide that a group applying for registration must submit an official document including "a statement of its purpose," id., at 83a (Hastings Regulations § 34.10.A.1 (emphasis added)), but the regulations make no attempt to define the limits of acceptable purposes. The regulations do not require a group seeking registration to show that it has a certain number of members or that its program is of interest to any particular number of Hastings students. Nor do the regulations require that a group serve a need not met by existing groups.

The regulations also make it clear that the registration program is not meant to stifle unpopular speech. They proclaim that "[i]t is the responsibility of the Dean to ensure an ongoing opportunity for the expression of a variety of viewpoints." Id., at 82a (Hastings Regulations § 33.11). They also emphatically disclaim any endorsement of or responsibility for views that student groups may express. Id., at 85a (Hastings Regulations § 34.10.D).

Taken as a whole, the regulations plainly contemplate the creation of a forum within which Hastings students are free to form and obtain registration of essentially the same broad range of private groups that nonstudents may form off campus. That is precisely what the parties in this case stipulated: The RSO forum "seeks to promote a diversity of viewpoints among registered student organizations, including viewpoints on religion and human sexuality." App. 216 (emphasis added).

The way in which the RSO forum actually developed corroborates this design. As noted, Hastings had more than 60 RSOs in 2004-2005, each with its own independently devised purpose. Some addressed serious social issues; others—for example, the wine appreciation and ultimate Frisbee clubs—were simply recreational. Some organizations focused on a subject but did [3014] not claim to promote a particular viewpoint on that subject (for example, the Association of Communications, Sports & Entertainment Law); others were defined, not by subject, but by viewpoint. The forum did not have a single Party Politics Club; rather, it featured both the Hastings Democratic Caucus and the Hastings Republicans. There was no Reproductive Issues Club; the forum included separate pro-choice and pro-life organizations. Students did not see fit to create a Monotheistic Religions Club, but they have formed the Hastings Jewish Law Students Association and the Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students. In short, the RSO forum, true to its design, has allowed Hastings students to replicate on campus a broad array of private, independent, noncommercial organizations that is very similar to those that nonstudents have formed in the outside world.

The accept-all-comers policy is antithetical to the design of the RSO forum for the same reason that a state-imposed accept-all-comers policy would violate the First Amendment rights of private groups if applied off campus. As explained above, a group's First Amendment right of expressive association is burdened by the "forced inclusion" of members whose presence would "affec[t] in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Dale, 530 U.S., at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The Court has therefore held that the government may not compel a group that engages in "expressive association" to admit such a member unless the government has a compelling interest, "`unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.'" Ibid. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244).

There can be no dispute that this standard would not permit a generally applicable law mandating that private religious groups admit members who do not share the groups' beliefs. Religious groups like CLS obviously engage in expressive association, and no legitimate state interest could override the powerful effect that an accept-all-comers law would have on the ability of religious groups to express their views. The State of California surely could not demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe that Jesus was merely human. Jewish groups could not be required to admit anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers. Muslim groups could not be forced to admit persons who are viewed as slandering Islam.

While there can be no question that the State of California could not impose such restrictions on all religious groups in the State, the Court now holds that Hastings, a state institution, may impose these very same requirements on students who wish to participate in a forum that is designed to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints. The Court lists four justifications offered by Hastings in defense of the accept-all-comers policy and, deferring to the school's judgment, ante, at 2989, the Court finds all those justifications satisfactory, ante, at 2989-2991. If we carry out our responsibility to exercise our own independent judgment, however, we must conclude that the justifications offered by Hastings and accepted by the Court are insufficient.

The Court first says that the accept-all-comers policy is reasonable because it helps Hastings to ensure that "`leadership, educational, and social opportunities'" are afforded to all students. Ante, at 2989-2990 (quoting Brief for Respondent Hastings College of Law 32). The RSO forum, however, is designed to achieve these laudable ends in a very different way—by permitting groups of students, no matter how small, to form the groups they want. In this way, the forum multiplies the opportunity [3015] for students to serve in leadership positions; it allows students to decide which educational opportunities they wish to pursue through participation in extracurricular activities; and it permits them to create the "social opportunities" they desire by forming whatever groups they wish to create.

Second, the Court approves the accept-all-comers policy because it is easier to enforce than the Nondiscrimination Policy that it replaced. It would be "a daunting labor," the Court warns, for Hastings to try to determine whether a group excluded a member based on belief as opposed to status. Ante, at 2990; see also ante, at 2996, n. 1 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (referring to the "impossible task of separating out belief-based from status-based religious discrimination").

This is a strange argument, since the Nondiscrimination Policy prohibits discrimination on substantially the same grounds as the antidiscrimination provisions of many States,^[39] including California, and except for the inclusion of the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Nondiscrimination Policy also largely tracks federal antidiscrimination laws.^[40] Moreover, Hastings now willingly accepts greater burdens under its latest policy, which apparently requires the school to distinguish between certain "conduct requirements" that are allowed and others that are not. Nor is Hastings daunted by the labor of determining whether a club admissions exam legitimately tests knowledge or is a pretext for screening out students with disfavored beliefs. Asked at oral argument whether CLS could require applicants to pass a test on the Bible, Hastings' attorney responded: "If it were truly an objective knowledge test, it would be okay." Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. The long history of disputes about the meaning of Bible passages belies any suggestion that it would be an easy task to determine whether the grading of such a test was "objective."

Third, the Court argues that the accept-all-comers policy, by bringing together students with diverse views, encourages tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the development of conflict-resolution skills. Ante, at 2990. These are obviously commendable goals, but they are not undermined by permitting a religious group to restrict membership to persons who share the group's faith. Many religious groups impose such restrictions. See, e.g., Brief for Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae 3 ("[B]ased upon millennia-old Jewish laws and traditions, Orthodox Jewish institutions... regularly differentiate between Jews and non-Jews"). Such practices are not manifestations of "contempt" for members of other faiths. Cf. ante, at 2998 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (invoking groups that have "contempt for Jews, blacks, and women"). Nor do they thwart the objectives that Hastings endorses. Our country as a whole, no less than the Hastings College of Law, values tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the amicable [3016] resolution of conflicts. But we seek to achieve those goals through "[a] confident pluralism that conduces to civil peace and advances democratic consensus-building," not by abridging First Amendment rights. Brief for Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae 35.

Fourth, the Court observes that Hastings' policy "incorporates—in fact, subsumes—state-law proscriptions on discrimination." Ante, at 2990. Because the First Amendment obviously takes precedence over any state law, this would not justify the Hastings policy even if it were true—but it is not. The only Hastings policy considered by the Court—the accept-all-comers policy—goes far beyond any California antidiscrimination law. Neither Hastings nor the Court claims that California law demands that state entities must accept all comers. Hastings itself certainly does not follow this policy in hiring or student admissions.

Nor is it at all clear that California law requires Hastings to deny registration to a religious group that limits membership to students who share the group's religious beliefs. Hastings cites no California court decision or administrative authority addressing this question. Instead, Hastings points to a statute prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds, including religion or sexual orientation, "in any program or activity conducted by" certain postsecondary educational institutions. Cal. Educ.Code Ann. § 66270 (West Supp.2010) (emphasis added). Hastings, however, does not conduct the activities of the student groups it registers. Indeed, Hastings disclaims such responsibility, stating both in its regulations and its Handbook for Student Organizations that it "does not sponsor student organizations and therefore does not accept liability for activities of student organizations." App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a (Hastings Regulations § 34.10.-D); App. 250. In addition, as CLS notes, another provision of California law specifically exempts "any funds that are used directly or indirectly for the benefit of student organizations" from a ban on state funding of private groups that discriminate on any of the grounds listed in § 66270. See § 92150 (West Supp.2010).

The authority to decide whether § 66270 or any other provision of California law requires religious student groups at covered institutions to admit members who do not share the groups' religious views is of course a question of state law that we cannot resolve. The materials that have been brought to our attention, however, provide little support for the majority's suggested interpretation.

In sum, Hastings' accept-all-comers policy is not reasonable in light of the stipulated purpose of the RSO forum: to promote a diversity of viewpoints "among"—not within—"registered student organizations." App. 216 (emphasis added).^[41]

B

The Court is also wrong in holding that the accept-all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. The Court proclaims that it would be "hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy," ante, at 2993, but I would not be so quick to jump to this conclusion. Even if it is assumed that the policy is viewpoint neutral on its face,^[42] [3017] there is strong evidence in the record that the policy was announced as a pretext.

The adoption of a facially neutral policy for the purpose of suppressing the expression of a particular viewpoint is viewpoint discrimination. See Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 544, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982) ("[A] law neutral on its face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose"). A simple example illustrates this obvious point. Suppose that a hated student group at a state university has never been able to attract more than 10 members. Suppose that the university administration, for the purpose of preventing that group from using the school grounds for meetings, adopts a new rule under which the use of its facilities is restricted to groups with more than 25 members. Although this rule would be neutral on its face, its adoption for a discriminatory reason would be illegal.

Here, CLS has made a strong showing that Hastings' sudden adoption and selective application of its accept-all-comers policy was a pretext for the law school's unlawful denial of CLS's registration application under the Nondiscrimination Policy.

Shifting policies. When Hastings denied CLS's application in the fall of 2004, the only policy mentioned was the Nondiscrimination Policy. In July 2005, the former dean suggested in a deposition that the law school actually followed the very different accept-all-comers policy. In March of this year, Hastings' brief in this Court rolled out still a third policy. As is recognized in the employment discrimination context, where issues of pretext regularly arise, "[s]ubstantial changes over time in [an] employer's proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of pretext." Kobrin v. University of Minnesota, 34 F.3d 698, 703 (C.A.8 1994); see also, e.g., Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 661 (C.A.9 2002); Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (C.A.6 2001).

Timing. The timing of Hastings' revelation of its new policies closely tracks the law school's litigation posture. When Hastings denied CLS registration, it cited only the Nondiscrimination Policy. Later, after CLS alleged that the Nondiscrimination [3018] Policy discriminated against religious groups, Hastings unveiled its accept-all-comers policy. Then, after we granted certiorari and CLS's opening brief challenged the constitutionality—and the plausibility—of the accept-all-comers policy, Hastings disclosed a new policy. As is true in the employment context, "[w]hen the justification for an adverse ... action changes during litigation, that inconsistency raises an issue whether the proffered reason truly motivated the defendant's decision." Cicero, supra, at 592.

Lack of documentation. When an employer has a written policy and then relies on a rule for which there is no written documentation, that deviation may support an inference of pretext. See, e.g., Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Partnership, 521 F.3d 1201, 1214 (C.A.9 2008); Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712, 727 (C.A.7 2005); Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 354, n. 29 (C.A.5 2005); Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 746 (C.A.8 2003); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 399-400, 401 (C.A.10 1983).

Here, Hastings claims that it has had an accept-all-comers policy since 1990, but it has not produced a single written document memorializing that policy. Nor has it cited a single occasion prior to the dean's deposition when this putative policy was orally disclosed to either student groups interested in applying for registration or to the Office of Student Services, which was charged with reviewing the bylaws of applicant groups to ensure that they were in compliance with the law school's policies.

Nonenforcement. Since it appears that no one was told about the accept-all-comers policy before July 2005, it is not surprising that the policy was not enforced. The record is replete with evidence that Hastings made no effort to enforce the all-comers policy until after it was proclaimed by the former dean. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 118a (Hastings Democratic Caucus); id., at 110a (Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings); id., at 146a-147a (Vietnamese American Law Society); id., at 142a-143a (Silent Right); App. 192 (La Raza). See generally supra, at 3003-3004. If the record here is not sufficient to permit a finding of pretext, then the law of pretext is dead.

The Court—understandably—sidesteps this issue. The Court states that the lower courts did not address the "argument that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comer policy,"^[43] that "this Court is not the proper forum to air the issue in the first instance," and that "[o]n remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is preserved." Ante, at 2995.

Because the Court affirms the entry of summary judgment in favor of respondents, it is not clear how CLS will be able to ask the Ninth Circuit on remand to review its claim of pretext. And the argument that we should not address this issue of pretext because the Ninth Circuit did not do so is hard to take, given that the Ninth Circuit barely addressed anything, [3019] disposing of this case in precisely two sentences.

Neither of those two sentences addressed the "novel question," ante, at 2978, to which the bulk of this Court's opinion is devoted, i.e., whether the accept-all-comers policy is reasonable in light of the purposes of the RSO forum and is viewpoint neutral, see ante, at 3009-3016. If it is appropriate for us to consider that issue, then the Ninth Circuit's failure to address the issue of pretext should not stand in the way of review by this Court.

C

One final aspect of the Court's decision warrants comment. In response to the argument that the accept-all-comers-policy would permit a small and unpopular group to be taken over by students who wish to silence its message, the Court states that the policy would permit a registered group to impose membership requirements "designed to ensure that students join because of their commitment to a group's vitality, not its demise." Ante, at 2992. With this concession, the Court tacitly recognizes that Hastings does not really have an accept-all-comers policy—it has an accept-some-dissident-comers policy—and the line between members who merely seek to change a group's message (who apparently must be admitted) and those who seek a group's "demise" (who may be kept out) is hopelessly vague.

Here is an example. Not all Christian denominations agree with CLS's views on sexual morality and other matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven members. Suppose that 10 students who are members of denominations that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was misrepresenting true Christian doctrine. Suppose that these students joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views, ended the group's affiliation with the national organization, and changed the group's message. The new leadership would likely proclaim that the group was "vital" but rectified, while CLS, I assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered its "demise." Whether a change represents reform or transformation may depend very much on the eye of the beholder.

Justice KENNEDY takes a similarly mistaken tack. He contends that CLS "would have a substantial case on the merits if it were shown that the all-comers policy was ... used to infiltrate the group or challenge its leadership in order to stifle its views," ante, at 3000 (concurring opinion), but he does not explain on what ground such a claim could succeed. The Court holds that the accept-all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes of the RSO forum. How could those characteristics be altered by a change in the membership of one of the forum's registered groups? No explanation is apparent.

In the end, the Court refuses to acknowledge the consequences of its holding. A true accept-all-comers policy permits small unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to change the views that the group expresses. Rules requiring that members attend meetings, pay dues, and behave politely, see ante, at 2992, would not eliminate this threat.

The possibility of such takeovers, however, is by no means the most important effect of the Court's holding. There are religious groups that cannot in good conscience agree in their bylaws that they will admit persons who do not share their faith, and for these groups, the consequence of an accept-all-comers policy is marginalization. See Brief for Evangelical Scholars (Officers and 24 Former Presidents of the Evangelical Theological Society) et al. as Amici Curiae 19 (affirmance in this case "will allow every public college and university [3020] in the United States to exclude all evangelical Christian organizations"); Brief for Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae 3, 8 (affirmance would "point a judicial dagger at the heart of the Orthodox Jewish community in the United States" and permit that community to be relegated to the status of "a second-class group"); Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amicus Curiae 3 (affirmance "could significantly affect the ability of [affiliated] student clubs and youth movements ... to prescribe requirements for their membership and leaders based on religious beliefs and commitments"). This is where the Court's decision leads.

* * *

I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that today's decision is a serious setback for freedom of expression in this country. Our First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Even if the United States is the only Nation that shares this commitment to the same extent, I would not change our law to conform to the international norm. I fear that the Court's decision marks a turn in that direction. Even those who find CLS's views objectionable should be concerned about the way the group has been treated—by Hastings, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court. I can only hope that this decision will turn out to be an aberration.

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[1] These policies and regulations address a wide range of matters, for example, alcoholic beverages at campus events, bake sales, and blood drives. App. 246.

[2] "Th[is] policy," Hastings clarifies, "does not foreclose neutral and generally applicable membership requirements unrelated to `status or beliefs.'" Brief for Hastings 5. So long as all students have the opportunity to participate on equal terms, RSOs may require them, inter alia, to pay dues, maintain good attendance, refrain from gross misconduct, or pass a skill-based test, such as the writing competitions administered by law journals. See ibid. The dissent trumpets these neutral, generally applicable membership requirements, arguing that, in truth, Hastings has a "some-comers," not an all-comers, policy. Post, at 3001, 3004, 3005, 3012-3013, 3017-3018 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Hastings' open-access policy, however, requires only that student organizations open eligibility for membership and leadership regardless of a student's status or beliefs; dues, attendance, skill measurements, and comparable uniformly applied standards are fully compatible with the policy. The dissent makes much of Hastings' observation that groups have imposed "even conduct requirements." Post, at 3004, 3012. But the very example Hastings cites leaves no doubt that the Law School was referring to boilerplate good-behavior standards, e.g., "[m]embership may cease ... if the member is found to be involved in gross misconduct," App. 173 (cited in Brief for Hastings 5).

[3]The Statement of Faith provides:

"Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:

• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.

• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return.

• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.

• The Bible as the inspired Word of God." App. 226.

[4] The District Court allowed respondent Hastings Outlaw, an RSO committed to "combating discrimination based on sexual orientation," id., at 97, to intervene in the suit, id., at 104.

[5] In its briefs before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, CLS several times affirmed that Hastings imposes an all-comers rule on RSOs. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No. C 04 4484 JSW (ND Cal.), p. 4 ("Hastings interprets the [Nondiscrimination Policy] such that student organizations must allow any student, regardless of their status or beliefs, to participate in the group's activities and meetings and to become voting members and leaders of the group."); Brief for Appellant in No. 06-15956(CA9), pp. 29-30 ("Hastings illustrates the application of the Nondiscrimination Policy by explaining that for the Hastings Democratic Caucus to gain recognition, it must open its leadership and voting membership to Republicans."). In a hearing before the District Court, CLS's counsel reiterated that "it's important to understand what Hastings' policy is. According to... the stipulated facts, Hastings requires ... that registered student organizations allow any student to participate, become a member or seek leadership positions in the organization regardless of their status or beliefs." App. 438 (capitalization and internal quotation marks omitted). And at oral argument in this Court, counsel for CLS acknowledged that "the Court needs to reach the constitutionality of the all-comers policy as applied to CLS in this case." Tr. of Oral Arg. 59 (emphasis added). We repeat, in this regard, that Hastings' all-comers policy is hardly novel. Other law schools have adopted similar requirements. See supra, at 2979-2980; Brief for Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 5.

[6] The dissent spills considerable ink attempting to create uncertainty about when the all-comers policy was adopted. See post, at 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3005, 3006. What counts, however, is the parties' unqualified agreement that the all-comers policy currently governs. CLS's suit, after all, seeks only declaratory and injunctive—that is, prospective—relief. See App. 80 (First Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief).

[7] Record evidence, moreover, corroborates the joint stipulation concerning Hastings' all-comers policy. The Law School's then-Chancellor and Dean testified, for example, that "in order to be a registered student organization you have to allow all of our students to be members and full participants if they want to." App. 343. Hastings' Director of Student Services confirmed that RSOs must "be open to all students"—"even to students who may disagree with [an RSO's] purposes." Id., at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id., at 349 ("Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy as requiring that student organizations wishing to register with Hastings allow any Hastings student to become a member and/or seek a leadership position in the organization.").

[8] In an effort to undermine the stipulation, the dissent emphasizes a sentence in Hastings' answer to CLS's first amended complaint which, the dissent contends, casts doubt on Hastings' fidelity to its all-comers policy. See post, at 3002, 3005-3006. In context, Hastings' answer—which responded to CLS's allegation that the Law School singles out religious groups for discriminatory treatment—is sensibly read to convey that Hastings' policies and regulations apply to all groups equally. See App. 79 (denying that the Nondiscrimination Policy imposes on religious organizations restraints that are not applied to political, social, and cultural groups). In any event, the parties' joint stipulation supersedes the answer, to the extent of any conflict between the two filings. See Pepper & Tanner, Inc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc., 563 F.2d 391, 393 (C.A.9 1977) (Parties' "stipulation of facts .. . superseded all prior pleadings and controlled the subsequent course of the action.").

[9] The dissent indulges in make-believe when it suggests that we are making factual findings about Hastings' all-comers policy. Post, at 3000, 3001. As CLS's petition for certiorari stressed, "[t]he material facts of this case are undisputed." Pet. for Cert. 2 (emphasis added). We take the facts as the joint stipulation describes them, see supra, at 2982-2984; our decision respects, while the dissent ignores, the conclusive effect of the parties' accord.

[10] The dissent, in contrast, devotes considerable attention to CLS's arguments about the Nondiscrimination Policy as written. Post, at 3001, 3002, 3009-3012. We decline to address these arguments, not because we agree with the dissent that the Nondiscrimination Policy is "plainly" unconstitutional, post, at 3009, but because, as noted, supra, at 2982-2984, that constitutional question is not properly presented.

[11] In conducting forum analysis, our decisions have sorted government property into three categories. First, in traditional public forums, such as public streets and parks, "any restriction based on the content of ... speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1132, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). Second, governmental entities create designated public forums when "government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose"; speech restrictions in such a forum "are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum." Id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 1127. Third, governmental entities establish limited public forums by opening property "limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects." Ibid. As noted in text, "[i]n such a forum, a governmental entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral." Ibid.

[12] Our decisions make clear, and the parties agree, that Hastings, through its RSO program, established a limited public forum. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (counsel for CLS); Brief for Petitioner 25-26; Brief for Hastings 27-28; Brief for Hastings Outlaw 27.

[13] The fact that a university "expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers," this Court has held, does not justify it in "discriminat[ing] based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates." Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 834, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Applying limited-public-forum analysis (which itself prohibits viewpoint discrimination) to CLS's expressive association claim, we emphasize, does not upset this principle.

[14] CLS also brackets with expressive-association precedents our decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). There, a veterans group sponsoring a St. Patrick's Day parade challenged a state law requiring it to allow gay individuals to march in the parade behind a banner celebrating their Irish heritage and sexual orientation. Id., at 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338. In evaluating that challenge, the Hurley Court focused on the veterans group's interest in controlling the message conveyed by the organization. See id., at 573-581, 115 S.Ct. 2338. Whether Hurley is best conceptualized as a speech or association case (or both), however, that precedent is of little help to CLS. Hurley involved the application of a statewide public-accommodations law to the most traditional of public forums: the street. That context differs markedly from the limited public forum at issue here: a university's application of an all-comers policy to its student-organization program.

[15] The dissent relies heavily on Healy, post, at 3006-3009, but its otherwise exhaustive account of the case elides the very fact the Healy Court identified as dispositive: The president of the college explicitly denied the student group official recognition because of the group's viewpoint. See 408 U. S, at 187, 92 S.Ct. 2338 ("The mere disagreement of the President with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition."). In this case, in contrast, Hastings denied CLS recognition not because the school wanted to silence the "viewpoint that CLS sought to express through its membership requirements," post, at 3009, n. 2, but because CLS, insisting on preferential treatment, declined to comply with the open-access policy applicable to all RSOs, see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) ("Where the [State] does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory ... philosophy." (emphasis added)). As discussed infra, at 2993-2995, Hastings' all-comers policy is paradigmatically viewpoint neutral. The dissent's contention that "the identity of the student group" is the only "way of distinguishing Healy," post,at 3008, is thus untenable.

The dissent's description of Healy also omits the Healy Court's observation that "[a] college administration may ... requir[e] ... that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not impose an impermissible condition on the students' associational rights .... It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct....[T]he benefits of participation in the internal life of the college community may be denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus rules with which it disagrees." 408 U.S., at 193-194, 92 S.Ct. 2338.

[16] The dissent mischaracterizes the nature of the respect we accord to Hastings. See post, at 3000, 3008, 3014-3015. As noted supra, at ___ - ___, this Court, exercising its independent judgment, must "interpre[t] and appl[y] ... the right to free speech." Post, at 3008. But determinations of what constitutes sound educational policy or what goals a student-organization forum ought to serve fall within the discretion of school administrators and educators. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

[17] Although the dissent maintains it is "content to address the constitutionality of Hastings' actions under our limited public forum cases," post, at 3009, it resists the import of those cases at every turn. For example, although the dissent acknowledges that a university has the authority to set the boundaries of a limited public forum, post, at 3009, 3012-3013, the dissent refuses to credit Hastings' all-comers policy as one of those boundaries. See ibid. (insisting that "Hastings' regulations . . . impose only two substantive limitations: A group ... must have student members and must be non-commercial."). In short, "the design of the RSO forum," post, at 3014, which the dissent discusses at length, post,at 3013-3016, is of its own tailoring.

Another example: The dissent pointedly observes that "[w]hile there can be no question that the State of California could not impose [an all-comers] restrictio[n] on all religious groups in the State, the Court now holds that Hastings, a state institution, may impose these very same requirements on students who wish to participate in a forum that is designed to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints." Post, at 3014. As noted supra, at 2984-2985, and n. 11, this difference reflects the lesser standard of scrutiny applicable to limited public forums compared to other forums. The dissent fights the distinction between state prohibition and state support, but its real quarrel is with our limited public forum doctrine, which recognizes that distinction. CLS, it bears repetition, remains free to express whatever it will, but it cannot insist on an exemption from Hastings' embracive all-comers policy.

[18] CLS notes that its "activities—its Bible studies, speakers, and dinners—are open to all students," even if attendees are barred from membership and leadership. Reply Brief 20. Welcoming all comers as guests or auditors, however, is hardly equivalent to accepting all comers as full-fledged participants.

[19] CLS's predecessor organization, the Hastings Christian Fellowship (HCF), experienced these benefits first-hand when it welcomed an openly gay student as a member during the 2003-2004 academic year. That student, testified another HCF member, "was a joy to have" in the group and brought a unique perspective to Bible-study discussions. See App. 325, 327.

[20] Although the Law School has offered multiple justifications for its all-comers policy, we do not suggest that each of them is necessary for the policy to survive constitutional review.

[21] See, e.g., Baker, Despite Lack of University Recognition, Pi Kappa Theta Continues to Grow, The New Hampshire, Sept. 28, 2009, pp. 1, 5 (unrecognized fraternity able to grow despite severed ties with the University of New Hampshire); Battey, Final Clubs Provide Controversial Social Outlet, Yale Daily News, Apr. 5, 2006, pp. 1, 4 (Harvard social clubs, known as "final clubs," "play a large role in the experience of ... students" even though "they became completely disassociated from the university in 1984").

[22] CLS's concern, shared by the dissent, see post, at 25-26, that an all-comers policy will squelch diversity has not been borne out by Hastings' experience. In the 2004-2005 academic year, approximately 60 student organizations, representing a variety of interests, registered with Hastings, from the Clara Foltz Feminist Association, to the Environmental Law Society, to the Hastings Chinese Law and Culture Society. App. 215, 237-238. Three of these 60 registered groups had a religious orientation: Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students, Hastings Jewish Law Students Association, and Hastings Koinonia. Id., at 215-216.

[23] As Hastings notes, other "checks [are also] in place" to prevent RSO-sabotage. Brief for Hastings 43, n. 16. "The [Law] School's student code of conduct applies to RSO activities and, inter alia, prohibits obstruction or disruption, disorderly conduct, and threats." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[24] In arguing that the all-comers policy is not reasonable in light of the RSO forum's purposes, the dissent notes that Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion, among other categories, provides an exception for religious associations. Post, at 3015, n. 8. The question here, however, is not whether Hastings could, consistent with the Constitution, provide religious groups dispensation from the all-comers policy by permitting them to restrict membership to those who share their faith. It is instead whether Hastings must grant that exemption. This Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), unequivocally answers no to that latter question. See also infra, at 2995, n. 27.

[25] Relying exclusively on Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000), the dissent "would not be so quick to jump to th[e] conclusion" that the all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. Post, at 3016, and 3016-3017, n. 10. Careful consideration of Southworth, however, reveals how desperate the dissent's argument is. In Southworth, university students challenged a mandatory studentactivity fee used to fund student groups. Finding the political and ideological speech of certain groups offensive, the student-challengers argued that imposition of the fee violated their First Amendment rights. 529 U.S., at 221, 120 S.Ct. 1346. This Court upheld the university's choice to subsidize groups whose expression some students found distasteful, but we admonished that the university could not "prefer some viewpoints to others" in the distribution of funds. Id., at 233, 120 S.Ct. 1346. We cautioned that the university's referendum process, which allowed students to vote on whether a student organization would receive financial support, risked violation of this principle by allowing students to select groups to fund based on their viewpoints. Id., at 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346. In this case, in contrast, the all-comers policy governs all RSOs; Hastings does not pick and choose which organizations must comply with the policy on the basis of viewpoint. App. 221. Southworth accordingly provides no support for the dissent's warped analysis.

[26] Although registered student groups must conform their conduct to the Law School's regulation by dropping access barriers, they may express any viewpoint they wish—including a discriminatory one. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) ("As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do— afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say."). Today's decision thus continues this Court's tradition of "protect[ing] the freedom to express `the thought that we hate.'" Post, at 3000 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655, 49 S.Ct. 448, 73 L.Ed. 889 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

[27] CLS briefly argues that Hastings' all-comers condition violates the Free Exercise Clause. Brief for Petitioner 40-41. Our decision in Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, forecloses that argument. In Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid regulations of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. Id., at 878-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595. In seeking an exemption from Hastings' across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.

[28] Finding the Ninth Circuit's analysis cursory, the dissent repeatedly urges us to resolve the pretext question. See, e.g., post, at 3001, 3016-3019, and 3009, n. 2. In doing so, the dissent forgets that "we are a court of review, not of first view." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). When the lower courts have failed to address an argument that deserved their attention, our usual practice is to remand for further consideration, not to seize the opportunity to decide the question ourselves. That is especially true when we agree to review an issue on the understanding that "[t]he material facts ... are undisputed," as CLS's petition for certiorari emphasized was the case here. Pet. for Cert. 2.

[29] The dissent's pretext discussion presents a one-sided summary of the record evidence, post, at 3016-3018, an account depending in large part on impugning the veracity of a distinguished legal scholar and a well respected school administrator, post, at 3001-3002, 3002-3003, 3003, 3003-3004, 3004, 3004-3005, 3005, 3005-3006, 3012-3013, 3017, 3018. See also supra, at 2983, n. 7.

[30] The dissent appears to accept that Hastings may prohibit discrimination on the basis of religious status, though it rejects the notion that Hastings may do the same for religious belief. See, e.g., post, at 3012, n. 5, 3015. If CLS sought to exclude a Muslim student in virtue of the fact that he "is" Muslim, the dissent suggests, there would be no problem in Hastings forbidding that. But if CLS sought to exclude the same student in virtue of the fact that he subscribes to the Muslim faith, Hastings must stand idly by. This proposition is not only unworkable in practice but also flawed in conception. A person's religion often simultaneously constitutes or informs a status, an identity, a set of beliefs and practices, and much else besides. (So does sexual orientation for that matter, see ante, at 2989-2990, notwithstanding the dissent's view that a rule excluding those who engage in "unrepentant homosexual conduct," App. 226, does not discriminate on the basis of status or identity, post, at 3012.) Our First Amendment doctrine has never required university administrators to undertake the impossible task of separating out belief-based from status-based religious discrimination.

[31] See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); cf. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"). Courts and commentators have applied this insight to the exact situation posed by the Nondiscrimination Policy. See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (C.A.7 2006) (stating that "[t]here can be little doubt that" comparable nondiscrimination policy "is viewpoint neutral on its face"); Truth v. Kent School Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649-650 (C.A.9 2008) (similar); Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L.Rev.1919, 1930-1938 (2006).

[32] In a case about an antidiscrimination policy that, even if ill-advised, is explicitly directed at preventing religious discrimination, it is rather hard to swallow the dissent's ominous closing remarks. See post, at 3020 (suggesting that today's decision "point[s] a judicial dagger at the heart of" religious groups in the United States (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the dissent is willing to see pernicious antireligious motives and implications where there are none, it does not seem troubled by the fact that religious sects, unfortunately, are not the only social groups who have been persecuted throughout history simply for being who they are.

[33] CLS consistently argued in the courts below that Hastings had applied its registration policy in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No. C 04-4484-JSW (ND Cal.), pp. 6-7 ("Hastings allows other registered student organizations to require that their members and/or leaders agree with the organization's beliefs and purposes"). CLS took pains to bring forward evidence to substantiate this claim. See supra,at 3003-3004.

CLS's brief in the Court of Appeals reiterated its contention that Hastings had not required all RSOs to admit all student applicants. CLS's brief stated that "Hastings allows other registered student organizations to require that their leaders and/or members agree with the organization's beliefs and purposes." Brief for Appellant in No. 06-15956(CA9), pp. 14-15 (citing examples). See also id., at 54-55 ("Hastings routinely recognizes student groups that limit membership or leadership on the basis of belief.... Hastings' actual practice demonstrates that the forum is not reserved to student organizations that do not discriminate on the basis of belief"). Responding to these arguments, the law school remarked that CLS "repeatedly asserts that `Hastings routinely recognizes student groups that limit membership or leadership on the basis of belief.'" Brief for Appellees in No. 06-15956(CA9), p. 4.

[34] The Court attempts to distinguish Healy on the ground that there the college "explicitly denied the student group official recognition because of the group's viewpoint." Ante, at 2987, n. 15. The same, however, is true here. CLS was denied recognition under the Nondiscrimination Policy because of the viewpoint that CLS sought to express through its membership requirements. See supra, at 2980; infra, at 2987-3012. And there is strong evidence that Hastings abruptly shifted from the Nondiscrimination Policy to the accept-all-comers policy as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. See infra, at 3016-3019.

[35] CLS sought a declaratory judgment that this policy is unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. See App. 80. Particularly in light of Hastings' practice of changing its announced policies, these requests are not moot. It is well settled that the voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct does not moot a case in which the legality of that conduct is challenged. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982); see also Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810-811, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam). If the rule were otherwise, the courts would be compelled to leave "`[t]he defendant ... free to return to his old ways.'" United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)). Here, there is certainly a risk that Hastings will "return to [its] old ways," and therefore CLS's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Nondiscrimination Policy are not moot. If, as the Court assumes, the parties stipulated that the only relevant policy is the accept-all-comers policy, then the District Court should not have addressed the constitutionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy. But the District Court approved both policies, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. That judgment remains binding on CLS, so it is only appropriate that CLS be permitted to challenge that determination now. The question of the constitutionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy falls comfortably within the question presented, and CLS raised that issue in its brief. See Brief for Petitioner 41-46.

[36] In Rosenberger the university argued that the denial of student activity funding for all groups that sought to express a religious viewpoint was "facially neutral." See Brief for Respondents in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., O.T.1994, No. 94-329, p. 2; 515 U.S., at 824-825, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Rosenberger dissenters agreed that the university's policy did not constitute viewpoint discrimination because "it applie[d] to Muslim and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to Christian," and it "applie[d] to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists." Id., at 895-896, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (opinion of Souter, J.); cf. ante, at 2996 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (asserting that under Hastings' Nondiscrimination Policy "all acts of religious discrimination" are prohibited (emphasis added)). But the Court flatly rejected this argument. See 515 U.S., at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510 ("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered").

[37] It is not at all clear what JUSTICE STEVENS means when he refers to religious "status" as opposed to religious belief. See ante, at 2996, n. 1. But if by religious status he means such things as the religion into which a person was born or the religion of a person's ancestors, then prohibiting discrimination on such grounds would not involve viewpoint discrimination. Such immutable characteristics are quite different from viewpoint.

[38] Nor does the Court clarify this point. Suggesting that any conduct requirement must relate to "gross misconduct," ante, at 2979-2980, n. 2, is not helpful.

[39] See, e.g., Cal. Gov.Code Ann. § 12940(a) (West 2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2002); N.Y. Exec. Law Ann. § 296(1)(a) (West 2010).

[40] See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (Title VI); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 337, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. However, Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion, provides that religious associations and schools can hire on the basis of religion and that any employer can hire on the basis of religion if it is a bona fide occupational qualification. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e).

[41] Although we have held that the sponsor of a limited public forum "must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set," Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, the Court now says that, if the exclusion of a group is challenged, the sponsor can retroactively redraw the boundary lines in order to justify the exclusion. See ante, at 2989, n. 17. This approach does not respect our prior holding.

[42] In Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000), the Court considered a university rule permitting the "defund[ing]" of a registered student group through a student referendum. See id., at 224-225, 120 S.Ct. 1346. "To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality," the Court observed, "it would undermine the constitutional protection the [university's registered student organization] program requires." Id., at 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346. "The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views." Ibid.

Hastings' accept-all-comers policy bears a resemblance to the Southworth referendum process. Both permit the majority to silence a disfavored organization. There is force to CLS's argument that "[a]llowing all students to join and lead any group, even when they disagree with it, is tantamount to establishing a majoritarian heckler's veto" and "potentially turn[s] every group into an organ for the already-dominant opinion." Brief for Petitioner 51.

The Court attempts to distinguish Southworth as involving a funding mechanism for student groups that operated selectively, based on groups' viewpoints. Ante, at 2993-2994, n. 25. But that mechanism—a student referendum process—placed all students at risk of "being required to pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even offensive," solely upon a majority vote of the student body. See 529 U.S., at 230, 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346. That is no different in principle than an accept-all-comers policy that places all student organizations at risk of take-over by a majority that is hostile to a group's viewpoint.

[43] As previously noted, CLS consistently argued in the courts below that Hastings had applied its registration policy in a discriminatory manner. See supra, at 3005, n. 1. The Court would ignore these arguments because counsel for CLS acknowledged below that Hastings has an all-comers policy. See ante, at 2982, n. 5 (quoting examples). But as the Court itself acknowledges, counsel for CLS stated at oral argument in this Court that "the Court needs to ... reach the constitutionality of the all-comers policy as applied to CLS in this case." Tr. of Oral Arg. 59 (emphasis added); ante, at 2982, n. 5. And as the record shows, CLS has never ceded its argument that Hastings applies its accept-all-comers policy unequally.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[756] Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 770. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 772. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O'Connor and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 783. Stevens, J., post, p. 797, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 817, filed dissenting opinions.

Michael J. Renner argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, and Christopher S. Cook, Andrew S. Bergman, Simon B. Karas, and Andrew I. Sutter, Assistant Attorneys General.

Benson A. Wolman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David Goldberger, Barbara P. O'Toole, Steven R. Shapiro, and Peter Joy.^[1]

[757] Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made binding upon the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The question in this case is whether a State violates the Establishment Clause when, pursuant to a religiously neutral state policy, it permits a private party to display an unattended religious symbol in a traditional public forum located next to its seat of government.

I

Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio. For over a century the square has been used for public speeches, gatherings, and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety of causes, both secular and religious. Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4— 02(A) (1994) makes the square available "for use by the public . . . for free discussion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose," and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 105.41 (1994), gives the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board (Board) responsibility for regulating public access. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official application [758] form and meet several criteria, which concern primarily safety, sanitation, and noninterference with other uses of the square, and which are neutral as to the speech content of the proposed event. App. 107-110; Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4—02 (1994).

It has been the Board's policy "to allow a broad range of speakers and other gatherings of people to conduct events on the Capitol Square." Brief for Petitioners 3-4. Such diverse groups as homosexual rights organizations, the Ku Klux Klan, and the United Way have held rallies. The Board has also permitted a variety of unattended displays on Capitol Square: a state-sponsored lighted tree during the Christmas season, a privately sponsored menorah during Chanukah, a display showing the progress of a United Way fundraising campaign, and booths and exhibits during an arts festival. Although there was some dispute in this litigation regarding the frequency of unattended displays, the District Court found, with ample justification, that there was no policy against them. 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (SD Ohio 1993).

In November 1993, after reversing an initial decision to ban unattended holiday displays from the square during December 1993, the Board authorized the State to put up its annual Christmas tree. On November 29, 1993, the Board granted a rabbi's application to erect a menorah. That same day, the Board received an application from respondent Donnie Carr, an officer of the Ohio Ku Klux Klan, to place a cross on the square from December 8, 1993, to December 24, 1993. The Board denied that application on December 3, informing the Klan by letter that the decision to deny "was made upon the advice of counsel, in a good faith attempt to comply with the Ohio and United States Constitutions, as they have been interpreted in relevant decisions by the Federal and State Courts." App. 47.

Two weeks later, having been unsuccessful in its effort to obtain administrative relief from the Board's decision, the Ohio Klan, through its leader Vincent Pinette, filed the present [759] suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction requiring the Board to issue the requested permit. The Board defended on the ground that the permit would violate the Establishment Clause. The District Court determined that Capitol Square was a traditional public forum open to all without any policy against freestanding displays; that the Klan's cross was entirely private expression entitled to full First Amendment protection; and that the Board had failed to show that the display of the cross could reasonably be construed as endorsement of Christianity by the State. The District Court issued the injunction and, after the Board's application for an emergency stay was denied, 510 U. S. 1307 (1993) (Stevens, J., in chambers), the Board permitted the Klan to erect its cross. The Board then received, and granted, several additional applications to erect crosses on Capitol Square during December 1993 and January 1994.

On appeal by the Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. 30 F. 3d 675 (1994). That decision agrees with a ruling by the Eleventh Circuit, Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F. 3d 1383 (1993), but disagrees with decisions of the Second and Fourth Circuits, Chabad-Lubavitch v. Burlington, 936 F. 2d 109 (CA2 1991), cert. denied, 505 U. S. 1218 (1992), Kaplan v. Burlington, 891 F. 2d 1024 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 926 (1990), Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F. 2d 953 (CA4), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 823 (1990). We granted certiorari. 513 U. S. 1106 (1995).

II

First, a preliminary matter: Respondents contend that we should treat this as a case in which freedom of speech (the Klan's right to present the message of the cross display) was denied because of the State's disagreement with that message's political content, rather than because of the State's desire to distance itself from sectarian religion. They suggest [760] in their merits brief and in their oral argument that Ohio's genuine reason for disallowing the display was disapproval of the political views of the Ku Klux Klan. Whatever the fact may be, the case was not presented and decided that way. The record facts before us and the opinions below address only the Establishment Clause issue;^[2] that is the question upon which we granted certiorari; and that is the sole question before us to decide.

Respondents' religious display in Capitol Square was private expression. Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981). Indeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince. Accordingly, we have not excluded from freespeech protections religious proselytizing, Heffron, supra, at 647, or even acts of worship, Widmar, supra, at 269, n. 6. Petitioners do not dispute that respondents, in displaying their cross, were engaging in constitutionally protected expression. They do contend that the constitutional protection [761] does not extend to the length of permitting that expression to be made on Capitol Square.

It is undeniable, of course, that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983). The right to use government property for one's private expression depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 802-803 (1985). If the former, a State's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: It may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions (a ban on all unattended displays, which did not exist here, might be one such), but it may regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest. Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45. These strict standards apply here, since the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that Capitol Square was a traditional public forum. 844 F. Supp., at 1184; 30 F. 3d, at 678.

Petitioners do not claim that their denial of respondents' application was based upon a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. To the contrary, they concede—indeed it is the essence of their case—that the Board rejected the display precisely because its content was religious. Petitioners advance a single justification for closing Capitol Square to respondents' cross: the State's interest in avoiding official endorsement of Christianity, as required by the Establishment Clause.

III

There is no doubt that compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify [762] content-based restrictions on speech. See Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 394-395; Widmar, supra, at 271. Whether that interest is implicated here, however, is a different question. And we do not write on a blank slate in answering it. We have twice previously addressed the combination of private religious expression, a forum available for public use, content-based regulation, and a State's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause. Both times, we have struck down the restriction on religious content. Lamb's Chapel, supra; Widmar, supra.

In Lamb's Chapel, a school district allowed private groups to use school facilities during off-hours for a variety of civic, social, and recreational purposes, excluding, however, religious purposes. We held that even if school property during off-hours was not a public forum, the school district violated an applicant's free-speech rights by denying it use of the facilities solely because of the religious viewpoint of the program it wished to present. 508 U. S., at 390-395. We rejected the district's compelling-state-interest Establishment Clause defense (the same made here) because the school property was open to a wide variety of uses, the district was not directly sponsoring the religious group's activity, and "any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental." Id., at 395. The Lamb's Chapel reasoning applies a fortiori here, where the property at issue is not a school but a full-fledged public forum.

Lamb's Chapel followed naturally from our decision in Widmar, in which we examined a public university's exclusion of student religious groups from facilities available to other student groups. There also we addressed official discrimination against groups who wished to use a "generally open forum" for religious speech. 454 U. S., at 269. And there also the State claimed that its compelling interest in complying with the Establishment Clause justified the content-based restriction. We rejected the defense because [763] the forum created by the State was open to a broad spectrum of groups and would provide only incidental benefit to religion. Id., at 274. We stated categorically that "an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." Ibid.

Quite obviously, the factors that we considered determinative in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar exist here as well. The State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the expression was made on government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and permission was requested through the same application process and on the same terms required of other private groups.

IV

Petitioners argue that one feature of the present case distinguishes it from Lamb's Chapel and Widmar: the forum's proximity to the seat of government, which, they contend, may produce the perception that the cross bears the State's approval. They urge us to apply the so-called "endorsement test," see, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984), and to find that, because an observer might mistake private expression for officially endorsed religious expression, the State's content-based restriction is constitutional.

We must note, to begin with, that it is not really an "endorsement test" of any sort, much less the "endorsement test" which appears in our more recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, that petitioners urge upon us. "Endorsement" connotes an expression or demonstration of approval or support. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 818 (1993); Webster's New Dictionary 845 (2d ed. 1950). Our cases have accordingly equated "endorsement" with "promotion" or "favoritism." Allegheny, supra, at 593 (citing cases). We find it peculiar to say that government [764] "promotes" or "favors" a religious display by giving it the same access to a public forum that all other displays enjoy. And as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 608 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 486-489 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). Where we have tested for endorsement of religion, the subject of the test was either expression by the government itself, Lynch, supra, or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity, Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 708-710 (1994); Allegheny, supra. The test petitioners propose, which would attribute to a neutrally behaving government private religious expression, has no antecedent in our jurisprudence, and would better be called a "transferred endorsement" test.

Petitioners rely heavily on Allegheny and Lynch, but each is easily distinguished. In Allegheny we held that the display of a privately sponsored crèche on the "Grand Staircase" of the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. That staircase was not, however, open to all on an equal basis, so the county was favoring sectarian religious expression. 492 U. S., at 599-600, and n. 50 ("The Grand Staircase does not appear to be the kind of location in which all were free to place their displays"). We expressly distinguished that site from the kind of public forum at issue here, and made clear that if the staircase were available to all on the same terms, "the presence of the crèche in that location for over six weeks would then not serve to associate the government with the crèche." Ibid. (emphasis added). In Lynch we held that a city's display of a crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause because, in context, the [765] display did not endorse religion. 465 U. S., at 685-687. The opinion does assume, as petitioners contend, that the government's use of religious symbols is unconstitutional if it effectively endorses sectarian religious belief. But the case neither holds nor even remotely assumes that the government's neutral treatment of private religious expression can be unconstitutional.

Petitioners argue that absence of perceived endorsement was material in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. We did state in Lamb's Chapel that there was "no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed," 508 U. S., at 395. But that conclusion was not the result of empirical investigation; it followed directly, we thought, from the fact that the forum was open and the religious activity privately sponsored. See ibid. It is significant that we referred only to what would be thought by "the community"—not by outsiders or individual members of the community uninformed about the school's practice. Surely some of the latter, hearing of religious ceremonies on school premises, and not knowing of the premises' availability and use for all sorts of other private activities, might leap to the erroneous conclusion of state endorsement. But, we in effect said, given an open forum and private sponsorship, erroneous conclusions do not count. So also in Widmar. Once we determined that the benefit to religious groups from the public forum was incidental and shared by other groups, we categorically rejected the State's Establishment Clause defense. 454 U. S., at 274.

What distinguishes Allegheny and the dictum in Lynch from Widmar and Lamb's Chapel is the difference between government speech and private speech. "[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Mergens, 496 U. S., at 250 (opinion [766] of O'Connor, J.).^[3] Petitioners assert, in effect, that that distinction disappears when the private speech is conducted too close to the symbols of government. But that, of course, must be merely a subpart of a more general principle: that the distinction disappears whenever private speech can be mistaken for government speech. That proposition cannot be accepted, at least where, as here, the government has not fostered or encouraged the mistake.

Of course, giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it would involve content discrimination). And one can conceive of a case in which a governmental entity manipulates its administration of a public forum close to the seat of government (or within a government building) in such a manner that only certain religious groups take advantage of it, creating an impression of endorsement that is in fact accurate. But those situations, which involve governmental favoritism, do not exist here. Capitol Square is a genuinely public forum, is known to be a public forum, and has been widely used as a public forum for many, many years. Private religious speech cannot be subject to veto by those who see favoritism where there is none.

The contrary view, most strongly espoused by Justice Stevens, post, at 806-807, but endorsed by Justice Souter and Justice O'Connor as well, exiles private religious speech to a realm of less-protected expression heretofore [767] inhabited only by sexually explicit displays and commercial speech. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 61, 70-71 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980). It will be a sad day when this Court casts piety in with pornography, and finds the First Amendment more hospitable to private expletives, see Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971), than to private prayers. This would be merely bizarre were religious speech simply as protected by the Constitution as other forms of private speech; but it is outright perverse when one considers that private religious expression receives preferential treatment under the Free Exercise Clause. It is no answer to say that the Establishment Clause tempers religious speech. By its terms that Clause applies only to the words and acts of government. It was never meant, and has never been read by this Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech connected to the State only through it soccurrence in a public forum.

Since petitioners' "transferred endorsement" principle cannot possibly be restricted to squares in front of state capitols, the Establishment Clause regime that it would usher in is most unappealing. To require (and permit) access by a religious group in Lamb's Chapel, it was sufficient that the group's activity was not in fact government sponsored, that the event was open to the public, and that the benefit of the facilities was shared by various organizations. Petitioners' rule would require school districts adopting similar policies in the future to guess whether some undetermined critical mass of the community might nonetheless perceive the district to be advocating a religious viewpoint. Similarly, state universities would be forced to reassess our statement that "an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." Widmar, 454 U. S., at 274. Whether it does would henceforth depend upon immediate appearances. Policymakers [768] would find themselves in a vise between the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other. Every proposed act of private, religious expression in a public forum would force officials to weigh a host of imponderables. How close to government is too close? What kind of building, and in what context, symbolizes state authority? If the State guessed wrong in one direction, it would be guilty of an Establishment Clause violation; if in the other, it would be liable for suppressing free exercise or free speech (a risk not run when the State restrains only its own expression).

The "transferred endorsement" test would also disrupt the settled principle that policies providing incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establishment Clause. That principle is the basis for the constitutionality of a broad range of laws, not merely those that implicate free-speech issues, see, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983). It has radical implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid whenever hypothetical observers may—even reasonably—confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state endorsement.^[4]

[769] If Ohio is concerned about misperceptions, nothing prevents it from requiring all private displays in the square to be identified as such. That would be a content-neutral "manner" restriction that is assuredly constitutional. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984). But the State may not, on the claim of misperception of official endorsement, ban all private religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it by requiring religious speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship.^[5]

[770] * * * Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms. Those conditions are satisfied here, and therefore the State may not bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Thomas, concurring.

I join the Court's conclusion that petitioners' exclusion of the Ku Klux Klan's cross cannot be justified on Establishment Clause grounds. But the fact that the legal issue before us involves the Establishment Clause should not lead anyone to think that a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan is a purely religious symbol. The erection of such a cross is a political act, not a Christian one.

There is little doubt that the Klan's main objective is to establish a racist white government in the United States. In Klan ceremony, the cross is a symbol of white supremacy and a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan. The cross is associated with the Klan not because of religious worship, but because of the Klan's practice of cross burning. Cross burning was entirely unknown to the early Ku Klux Klan, which emerged in some Southern States during Reconstruction. W. Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America 146 (1987). The practice appears to have been the product of Thomas Dixon, whose book The Clansman formed the story for the movie, The Birth of a Nation. See M. Newton & J. Newton, The Ku Klux Klan: An Encyclopedia 145-146 (1991). In the book, cross burning is borrowed from an "old Scottish rite" (Dixon apparently believed that the members of the Reconstruction Ku Klux Klan were the "reincarnated souls of the [771] Clansmen of Old Scotland") that the Klan uses to celebrate the execution of a former slave. T. Dixon, The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan 324-326 (1905). Although the cross took on some religious significance in the 1920's when the Klan became connected with certain southern white clergy, by the postwar period it had reverted to its original function as an instrument of intimidation. Wade, supra, at 185, 279.

To be sure, the cross appears to serve as a religious symbol of Christianity for some Klan members. The hymn "The Old Rugged Cross" is sometimes played during cross burnings. See W. Moore, A Sheet and a Cross: A Symbolic Analysis of the Ku Klux Klan 287-288 (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1975). But to the extent that the Klan had a message to communicate in Capitol Square, it was primarily a political one. During his testimony before the District Court, the leader of the local Klan testified that the cross was seen "as a symbol of freedom, as a symbol of trying to unite our people." App. 150. The Klan chapter wished to erect the cross because it was also "a symbol of freedom from tyranny," and because it "was also incorporated in the confederate battle flag." Ibid. Of course, the cross also had some religious connotation; the Klan leader linked the cross to what he claimed was one of the central purposes of the Klan: "to establish a Christian government in America." Id., at 142-145. But surely this message was both political and religious in nature.

Although the Klan might have sought to convey a message with some religious component, I think that the Klan had a primarily nonreligious purpose in erecting the cross. The Klan simply has appropriated one of the most sacred of religious symbols as a symbol of hate. In my mind, this suggests that this case may not have truly involved the Establishment Clause, although I agree with the Court's disposition because of the manner in which the case has come [772] before us. In the end, there may be much less here than meets the eye.

Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. Despite the messages of bigotry and racism that may be conveyed along with religious connotations by the display of a Ku Klux Klan cross, see ante, at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring), at bottom this case must be understood as it has been presented to us—as a case about private religious expression and whether the State's relationship to it violates the Establishment Clause. In my view, "the endorsement test asks the right question about governmental practices challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the display of religious symbols," County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 628 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), even where a neutral state policy toward private religious speech in a public forum is at issue. Accordingly, I see no necessity to carve out, as the plurality opinion would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum context.

For the reasons given by Justice Souter, whose opinion I also join, I conclude on the facts of this case that there is "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed," Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 395 (1993), by granting respondents a permit to erect their temporary cross on Capitol Square. I write separately, however, to emphasize that, because it seeks to identify those situations in which government makes "`adherence to a religion relevant . . . to a person's standing in the political community,' " Allegheny, supra, at 594 (quoting [773] Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), the endorsement test necessarily focuses upon the perception of a reasonable, informed observer.

I

"In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention [in Establishment Clause cases] to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of `endorsing' religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Allegheny, supra, at 592. See also Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 395; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 390 (1985) (asking "whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices"). A government statement "`that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred,' " Allegheny, supra, at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), violates the prohibition against establishment of religion because such "[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community," Lynch, supra, at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Allegheny, supra, at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wallace, supra, at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Although "[e]xperience proves that the Establishment Clause . . . cannot easily be reduced to a single test," Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the endorsement inquiry captures the fundamental requirement of the Establishment Clause when courts are called upon to evaluate [774] the constitutionality of religious symbols on public property. See Allegheny, supra, at 593-594.

While the plurality would limit application of the endorsement test to "expression by the government itself, . . . or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity," ante, at 764, I believe that an impermissible message of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism. See infra, at 777— 778. It is true that neither Allegheny nor Lynch, our two prior religious display cases, involved the same combination of private religious speech and a public forum that we have before us today. Nonetheless, as Justice Souter aptly demonstrates, post, at 786-792, we have on several occasions employed an endorsement perspective in Establishment Clause cases where private religious conduct has intersected with a neutral governmental policy providing some benefit in a manner that parallels the instant case. Thus, while I join the discussion of Lamb's Chapel and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), in Part III of the Court's opinion, I do so with full recognition that the factors the Court properly identifies ultimately led in each case to the conclusion that there was no endorsement of religion by the State. Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 395; Widmar, supra, at 274. See also post, at 790-791 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

There is, as the plurality notes, ante, at 765, "a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion). But the quoted statement was made while applying the endorsement test itself; indeed, the sentence upon which the plurality relies was followed immediately by the conclusion that "secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not [775] endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Ibid. Thus, as I read the decisions Justice Souter carefully surveys, our prior cases do not imply that the endorsement test has no place where private religious speech in a public forum is at issue. Moreover, numerous lower courts (including the Court of Appeals in this case) have applied the endorsement test in precisely the context before us today. See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F. 3d 1383 (CA11 1993) (en banc); Kreisner v. San Diego, 1 F. 3d 775, 782-787 (CA9 1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1044 (1994); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Grand Rapids, 980 F. 2d 1538 (CA6 1992) (en banc); Doe v. Small, 964 F. 2d 611 (CA7 1992) (en banc); cf.Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F. 2d 953 (CA4), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 823 (1990); Kaplan v. Burlington, 891 F. 2d 1024 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 926 (1990). Given this background, I see no necessity to draw new lines where "[r]eligious expression . . . (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum," ante, at 770.

None of this is to suggest that I would be likely to come to a different result from the plurality where truly private speech is allowed on equal terms in a vigorous public forum that the government has administered properly. That the religious display at issue here was erected by a private group in a public square available "for use by the public . . . for free discussion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose," Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4— 02(A) (1994), certainly informs the Establishment Clause inquiry under the endorsement test. Indeed, many of the factors the plurality identifies are some of those I would consider important in deciding cases like this one where religious speakers seek access to public spaces: "The State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the expression was made on government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and permission was requested through the [776] same application process and on the same terms required of other private groups." Ante, at 763. And, as I read the plurality opinion, a case is not governed by its proposed per se rule where such circumstances are otherwise—that is, where preferential placement of a religious symbol in a public space or government manipulation of the forum is involved. See ante, at 766.

To the plurality's consideration of the open nature of the forum and the private ownership of the display, however, I would add the presence of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship or endorsement on the Klan cross, which would make the State's role clear to the community. This factor is important because, as Justice Souter makes clear, post, at 785-786, certain aspects of the cross display in this case arguably intimate government approval of respondents' private religious message—particularly that the cross is an especially potent sectarian symbol which stood unattended in close proximity to official government buildings. In context, a disclaimer helps remove doubt about state approval of respondents' religious message. Cf. Widmar, supra, at 274, n. 14 ("In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's student handbook already notes that the University's name will not `be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members' "). On these facts, then, "the message [of inclusion] is one of neutrality rather than endorsement." Mergens, supra, at 248 (plurality opinion).

Our agreement as to the outcome of this case, however, cannot mask the fact that I part company with the plurality on a fundamental point: I disagree that "[i]t has radical implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid whenever hypothetical observers may—even reasonably —confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state [777] endorsement." Ante, at 768. On the contrary, when the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid. The plurality today takes an exceedingly narrow view of the Establishment Clause that is out of step both with the Court's prior cases and with well-established notions of what the Constitution requires. The Clause is more than a negative prohibition against certain narrowly defined forms of government favoritism, see ante, at 766; it also imposes affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message. That is, the Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions. Governmental intent cannot control, and not all state policies are permissible under the Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form.

Where the government's operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively encourages that result, see Lynch, 465 U. S., at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring), the Establishment Clause is violated. This is so not because of "`transferred endorsement,' " ante, at 764, or mistaken attribution of private speech to the State, but because the State's own actions (operating the forum in a particular manner and permitting the religious expression to take place therein), and their relationship to the private speech at issue, actually convey a message of endorsement. At some point, for example, a private religious group may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval. Cf. Mergens, 454 U. S., at 275 (concluding that there was no danger of an Establishment Clause violation in a public university's allowing access by student religious groups to facilities available to others "[a]t least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious [778] groups will dominate [the school's] open forum"). Other circumstances may produce the same effect—whether because of the fortuity of geography, the nature of the particular public space, or the character of the religious speech at issue, among others. Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence should remain flexible enough to handle such situations when they arise.

In the end, I would recognize that the Establishment Clause inquiry cannot be distilled into a fixed, per se rule. Thus, "[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion." Lynch, 465 U. S., at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring). And this question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead requires courts to examine the history and administration of a particular practice to determine whether it operates as such an endorsement. I continue to believe that government practices relating to speech on religious topics "must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny," ibid., and that the endorsement test supplies an appropriate standard for that inquiry.

II

Conducting the review of government action required by the Establishment Clause is always a sensitive matter. Unfortunately, as I noted in Allegheny, "even the development of articulable standards and guidelines has not always resulted in agreement among the Members of this Court on the results in individual cases." 492 U. S., at 623. Today, Justice Stevens reaches a different conclusion regarding whether the Board's decision to allow respondents' display on Capitol Square constituted an impermissible endorsement of the cross' religious message. Yet I believe it is important to note that we have not simply arrived at divergent results after conducting the same analysis. Our fundamental point of departure, it appears, concerns the knowledge that is properly attributed to the test's "reasonable observer [who] [779] evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion." Id., at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In my view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable observer be deemed more informed than the casual passerby postulated by Justice Stevens.

Because an Establishment Clause violation must be moored in government action of some sort, and because our concern is with the political community writ large, see Allegheny, supra, at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Lynch, supra, at 690, the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe. Indeed, to avoid "entirely sweep[ing] away all government recognition and acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens," Allegheny, supra, at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), our Establishment Clause jurisprudence must seek to identify the point at which the government becomes responsible, whether due to favoritism toward or disregard for the evident effect of religious speech, for the injection of religion into the political life of the citizenry.

I therefore disagree that the endorsement test should focus on the actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge. Under such an approach, a religious display is necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a governmental endorsement thereof. In my view, however, the endorsement test creates a more collective standard to gauge "the `objective' meaning of the [government's] statement in the community," Lynch, supra, at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In this respect, the applicable observer is similar to the "reasonable person" in tort law, who "is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable [780] things," but is "rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 175 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, "we do not ask whether there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think [the State] endorses religion." Americans United, 980 F. 2d, at 1544. Saying that the endorsement inquiry should be conducted from the perspective of a hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens might not share neither chooses the perceptions of the majority over those of a "reasonable non-adherent," cf. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1293 (2d ed. 1988), nor invites disregard for the values the Establishment Clause was intended to protect. It simply recognizes the fundamental difficulty inherent in focusing on actual people: There is always someone who, with a particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of religion. A State has not made religion relevant to standing in the political community simply because a particular viewer of a display might feel uncomfortable.

It is for this reason that the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears. As I explained in Allegheny, "the `history and ubiquity' of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion." 492 U. S., at 630. Nor can the knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer be limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display. Today's proponents of the endorsement test all agree that we should attribute to the observer knowledge that the cross is a religious symbol, that [781] Capitol Square is owned by the State, and that the large building nearby is the seat of state government. See post, at 792-793 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); post, at 806 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In my view, our hypothetical observer also should know the general history of the place in which the cross is displayed. Indeed, the fact that Capitol Square is a public park that has been used over time by private speakers of various types is as much a part of the display's context as its proximity to the Ohio Statehouse. Cf. Allegheny, supra, at 600, n. 50 (noting that "[t]he Grand Staircase does not appear to be the kind of location in which all were free to place their displays for weeks at a time"). This approach does not require us to assume an "`ultrareasonable observer' who understands the vagaries of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence," post, at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting). An informed member of the community will know how the public space in question has been used in the past—and it is that fact, not that the space may meet the legal definition of a public forum, which is relevant to the endorsement inquiry.

Justice Stevens' property-based argument fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that the cross at issue here was displayed in a forum traditionally open to the public. "The very fact that a sign is installed on public property," his dissent suggests, "implies official recognition and reinforcement of its message." Post, at 801. While this may be the case where a government building and its immediate curtilage are involved, it is not necessarily so with respect to those "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, . . . [particularly] streets and parks which `have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' " Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 [782] U. S. 496, 515 (1939)). To the extent there is a presumption that "structures on government property—and, in particular, in front of buildings plainly identified with the State— imply state approval of their message," post, at 804 (Stevens, J., dissenting), that presumption can be rebutted where the property at issue is a forum historically available for private expression. The reasonable observer would recognize the distinction between speech the government supports and speech that it merely allows in a place that traditionally has been open to a range of private speakers accompanied, if necessary, by an appropriate disclaimer.

In this case, I believe, the reasonable observer would view the Klan's cross display fully aware that Capitol Square is a public space in which a multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, engage in expressive conduct. It is precisely this type of knowledge that we presumed in Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S., at 395, and in Mergens, 496 U. S., at 250 (plurality opinion). Moreover, this observer would certainly be able to read and understand an adequate disclaimer, which the Klan had informed the State it would include in the display at the time it applied for the permit, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A15—A16; post, at 793-794, n. 1 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and the content of which the Board could have defined as it deemed necessary as a condition of granting the Klan's application. Cf. American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkinson, 895 F. 2d 1098, 1104-1106 (CA6 1990). On the facts of this case, therefore, I conclude that the reasonable observer would not interpret the State's tolerance of the Klan's private religious display in Capitol Square as an endorsement of religion.

III

"To be sure, the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice and, like any test that is sensitive to context, [783] it may not always yield results with unanimous agreement at the margins." Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In my view, however, this flexibility is a virtue and not a vice; "courts must keep in mind both the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," Lynch, 465 U. S., at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

I agree that "compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify contentbased restrictions on speech." Ante, at 761-762. The Establishment Clause "prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from `making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' " Allegheny, supra, at 593-594 (quoting Lynch, supra, at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Because I believe that, under the circumstances at issue here, allowing the Klan cross, along with an adequate disclaimer, to be displayed on Capitol Square presents no danger of doing so, I conclude that the State has not presented a compelling justification for denying respondents their permit.

Justice Souter, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I concur in Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion. I also want to note specifically my agreement with the Court's suggestion that the State of Ohio could ban all unattended private displays in Capitol Square if it so desired. See ante, at 761; see also post, at 802-804 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The fact that the capitol lawn has been the site of public protests and gatherings, and is the location of any number of the government's own unattended displays, such as statues, does [784] not disable the State from closing the square to all privately owned, unattended structures. A government entity may ban posters on publicly owned utility poles to eliminate visual clutter, Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 808 (1984), and may bar camping as part of a demonstration in certain public parks, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984). It may similarly adopt a content-neutral policy prohibiting private individuals and groups from erecting unattended displays in forums around public buildings. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided [that] the restrictions `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information,' " quoting Clark, supra, at 293).

Otherwise, however, I limit my concurrence to the judgment. Although I agree in the end that, in the circumstances of this case, petitioners erred in denying the Klan's application for a permit to erect a cross on Capitol Square, my analysis of the Establishment Clause issue differs from Justice Scalia's, and I vote to affirm in large part because of the possibility of affixing a sign to the cross adequately disclaiming any government sponsorship or endorsement of it.

The plurality's opinion declines to apply the endorsement test to the Board's action, in favor of a per se rule: religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is private and (2) occurs in a public forum, even if a reasonable observer would see the expression as indicating state endorsement. Ante, at 770. This per se rule would be an exception to the endorsement test, not previously recognized and out of square with our precedents.

[785] I

My disagreement with the plurality on the law may receive some focus from attention to a matter of straight fact that we see alike: in some circumstances an intelligent observer may mistake private, unattended religious displays in a public forum for government speech endorsing religion. See ante, at 768 (acknowledging that "hypothetical observers may—even reasonably —confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state endorsement") (emphasis in original); see also ante, at 769, n. 4 (noting that an observer might be "misled" by the presence of the cross in Capitol Square if the disclaimer was of insufficient size or if the observer failed to enquire whether the State had sponsored the cross). The Klan concedes this possibility as well, saying that, in its view, "on a different set of facts, the government might be found guilty of violating the endorsement test by permitting a private religious display in a public forum." Brief for Respondents 43.

An observer need not be "obtuse," Doe v. Small, 964 F. 2d 611, 630 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), to presume that an unattended display on government land in a place of prominence in front of a government building either belongs to the government, represents government speech, or enjoys its location because of government endorsement of its message. Capitol Square, for example, is the site of a number of unattended displays owned or sponsored by the government, some permanent (statues), some temporary (such as the Christmas tree and a "Seasons Greetings" banner), and some in between (flags, which are, presumably, taken down and put up from time to time). See App. 59, 64-65 (photos); Appendices A and B to this opinion, infra. Given the domination of the square by the government's own displays, one would not be a dimwit as a matter of law to think that an unattended religious display there was endorsed by the government, even though the square has also been the site of three privately sponsored, unattended displays over the [786] years (a menorah, a United Way "thermometer," and some artisans' booths left overnight during an arts festival), ante, at 758, cf. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 600, n. 50 (1989) ("Even if the Grand Staircase occasionally was used for displays other than the crèche . .. , it remains true that any display located there fairly may be understood to express views that receive the support and endorsement of the government"), and even though the square meets the legal definition of a public forum and has been used "[f]or over a century" as the site of "speeches, gatherings, and festivals," ante, at 757. When an individual speaks in a public forum, it is reasonable for an observer to attribute the speech, first and foremost, to the speaker, while an unattended display (and any message it conveys) can naturally be viewed as belonging to the owner of the land on which it stands.

In sum, I do not understand that I am at odds with the plurality when I assume that in some circumstances an intelligent observer would reasonably perceive private religious expression in a public forum to imply the government's endorsement of religion. My disagreement with the plurality is simply that I would attribute these perceptions of the intelligent observer to the reasonable observer of Establishment Clause analysis under our precedents, where I believe that such reasonable perceptions matter.

II

In Allegheny, the Court alluded to two elements of the analytical framework supplied by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), by asking "whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of `endorsing' religion." 492 U. S., at 592. We said that "the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion `preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred,' " id., at 593, quoting Wallace v. Jaf- [787] free, 472 U. S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis deleted), and held that "[t]he Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief," 492 U. S., at 593-594.

Allegheny `s endorsement test cannot be dismissed, as Justice Scalia suggests, as applying only to situations in which there is an allegation that the Establishment Clause has been violated through "expression by the government itself" or "government action . . . discriminat[ing] in favor of private religious expression." Ante, at 764 (emphasis deleted). Such a distinction would, in all but a handful of cases, make meaningless the "effect-of-endorsing" part of Allegheny `s test. Effects matter to the Establishment Clause, and one, principal way that we assess them is by asking whether the practice in question creates the appearance of endorsement to the reasonable observer. See Allegheny, supra, at 630, 635— 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Allegheny, supra, at 593— 594, 599-600 (majority opinion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). If a reasonable observer would perceive a religious display in a government forum as government speech endorsing religion, then the display has made "religion relevant, in . . . public perception, to status in the political community." Id., at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Unless we are to retreat entirely to government intent and abandon consideration of effects, it makes no sense to recognize a public perception of endorsement as a harm only in that subclass of cases in which the government owns the display. Indeed, the Court stated in Allegheny that "once the judgment has been made that a particular proclamation of Christian belief, when disseminated from a particular location on government property, has the effect of demonstrating the government's endorsement [788] of Christian faith, then it necessarily follows that the practice must be enjoined." 492 U. S., at 612. Notably, we did not say that it was only a "particular government proclamation" that could have such an unconstitutional effect, nor does the passage imply anything of the kind.

The significance of the fact that the Court in Allegheny did not intend to lay down a per se rule in the way suggested by the plurality today has been confirmed by subsequent cases. In Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990), six Justices applied the endorsement test to decide whether the Establishment Clause would be violated by a public high school's application of the Equal Access Act, Pub. L. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C. §§ 4071-4074, to allow students to form a religious club having the same access to meeting facilities as other "noncurricular" groups organized by students. A plurality of four Justices concluded that such an equal access policy "does not convey a message of state approval or endorsement of the particular religion" espoused by the student religious group. 496 U. S., at 252 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.). Two others concurred in the judgment in order "to emphasize the steps [the school] must take to avoid appearing to endorse the [religious] club's goals." Id., at 263 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.); see also id., at 264 ("If public schools are perceived as conferring the imprimatur of the State on religious doctrine or practice as a result of such a policy, the nominally `neutral' character of the policy will not save it from running afoul of the Establishment Clause") (emphasis in original).

What is important is that, even though Mergens involved private religious speech in a nondiscriminatory "`limited open forum,' " id., at 233, 247, a majority of the Court reached the conclusion in the case not by applying an irrebuttable presumption, as the plurality does today, but by making a contextual judgment taking account of the circumstances [789] of the specific case. See id., at 250-252 (plurality opinion); id., at 264-270 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.); cf. Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[T]he endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice"); Lynch, supra, at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion"). The Mergens plurality considered the nature of the likely audience, 496 U. S., at 250 ("[S]econdary school students are mature enough . . . to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis"); the details of the particular forum, id., at 252 (noting "the broad spectrum of officially recognized student clubs" at the school, and the students' freedom "to initiate and organize additional student clubs"); the presumptively secular nature of most student organizations, ibid. ("`[I]n the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the]. . . open forum, . . . the advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect,"` " quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 275 (1981)); and the school's specific action or inaction that would disassociate itself from any religious message, 496 U. S., at 251 ("[N]o school officials actively participate" in the religious group's activities). The plurality, moreover, expressly relied on the fact that the school could issue a disclaimer specific to the religious group, concluding that "[t]o the extent a school makes clear that its recognition of [a religious student group] is not an endorsement . . . , students will reasonably understand that the . . . recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, religious speech." Ibid.; see also id., at 270 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (noting importance of schools "taking whatever further steps are necessary to make clear that their recognition of a religious club does [790] not reflect their endorsement of the views of the club's participants").

Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), we held that an evangelical church, wanting to use public school property to show a series of films about child rearing with a religious perspective, could not be refused access to the premises under a policy that would open the school to other groups showing similar films from a nonreligious perspective. In reaching this conclusion, we expressly concluded that the policy would "not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion." 508 U. S., at 395. Again we looked to the specific circumstances of the private religious speech and the public forum: the film would not be shown during school hours or be sponsored by the school, it would be open to the public, and the forum had been used "repeatedly" by "a wide variety" of other private speakers. Ibid. "Under these circumstances," we concluded, "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the [school] was endorsing religion." Ibid. We thus expressly looked to the endorsement effects of the private religious speech at issue, notwithstanding the fact that there was no allegation that the Establishment Clause had been violated through active "expression by the government itself" or affirmative "government action . . . discriminat[ing] in favor of private religious expression." Ante, at 764 (emphasis deleted). Indeed, the issue of whether the private religious speech in a government forum had the effect of advancing religion was central, rather than irrelevant, to our Establishment Clause enquiry. This is why I agree with the Court that "[t]he Lamb's Chapel reasoning applies a fortiori here," ante, at 762.

Widmar v. Vincent, supra, is not to the contrary. Although Widmar was decided before our adoption of the endorsement test in Allegheny, its reasoning fits with such a test and not with the per se rule announced today. There, in determining whether it would violate the Establishment [791] Clause to allow private religious speech in a "generally open forum" at a university, 454 U. S., at 269, the Court looked to the Lemon test, 454 U. S., at 271, and focused on the "effects" prong, id., at 272, in reaching a contextual judgment. It was relevant that university students "should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion," that students were unlikely, as a matter of fact, to "draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place," and that the University's student handbook carried a disclaimer that the University should not "`be identified in any way with the . . . opinions of any [student] organization.' " Id., at 274, n. 14. "In this context," id., at 273, and in the "absence of empirical evidence that religious groups [would] dominate [the] open forum," id., at 275, the Court found that the forum at issue did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices," id., at 274.

Even if precedent and practice were otherwise, however, and there were an open question about applying the endorsement test to private speech in public forums, I would apply it in preference to the plurality's view, which creates a serious loophole in the protection provided by the endorsement test. In Justice Scalia's view, as I understand it, the Establishment Clause is violated in a public forum only when the government itself intentionally endorses religion or willfully "foster[s]" a misperception of endorsement in the forum, ante, at 766, or when it "manipulates" the public forum "in such a manner that only certain religious groups take advantage of it," ibid. If the list of forbidden acts is truly this short, then governmental bodies and officials are left with generous scope to encourage a multiplicity of religious speakers to erect displays in public forums. As long as the governmental entity does not "manipulat[e]" the forum in such a way as to exclude all other speech, the plurality's opinion would seem to invite such government encouragement, even when the result will be the domination of the [792] forum by religious displays and religious speakers. By allowing government to encourage what it cannot do on its own, the proposed per se rule would tempt a public body to contract out its establishment of religion, by encouraging the private enterprise of the religious to exhibit what the government could not display itself.

Something of the sort, in fact, may have happened here. Immediately after the District Court issued the injunction ordering petitioners to grant the Klan's permit, a local church council applied for a permit, apparently for the purpose of overwhelming the Klan's cross with other crosses. The council proposed to invite all local churches to erect crosses, and the Board granted "blanket permission" for "all churches friendly to or affiliated with" the council to do so. See Brief in Opposition RA24—RA26. The end result was that a part of the square was strewn with crosses, see Appendices A and B to this opinion, infra, at 795-796, and while the effect in this case may have provided more embarrassment than suspicion of endorsement, the opportunity for the latter is clear.

III

As for the specifics of this case, one must admit that a number of facts known to the Board, or reasonably anticipated, weighed in favor of upholding its denial of the permit. For example, the Latin cross the Klan sought to erect is the principal symbol of Christianity around the world, and display of the cross alone could not reasonably be taken to have any secular point. It was displayed immediately in front of the Ohio Statehouse, with the government's flags flying nearby, and the government's statues close at hand. For much of the time the cross was supposed to stand on the square, it would have been the only private display on the public plot (the menorah's permit expired several days before the cross actually went up). See Pet. for Cert. A15—A16, A31; 30 F. 3d, at 677. There was nothing else on the statehouse [793] lawn that would have suggested a forum open to any and all private, unattended religious displays.

Based on these and other factors, the Board was understandably concerned about a possible Establishment Clause violation if it had granted the permit. But a flat denial of the Klan's application was not the Board's only option to protect against an appearance of endorsement, and the Board was required to find its most "narrowly drawn" alternative, Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); see also ante, at 761. Either of two possibilities would have been better suited to this situation. In support of the Klan's application, its representative stated in a letter to the Board that the cross would be accompanied by a disclaimer, legible "from a distance," explaining that the cross was erected by private individuals "`without government support.' " App. 118. The letter said that "the contents of the sign" were "open to negotiation." Ibid.^[6] The [794] Board, then, could have granted the application subject to the condition that the Klan attach a disclaimer sufficiently large and clear to preclude any reasonable inference that the cross was there to "demonstrat[e] the government's allegiance to, or endorsement of, the Christian faith." Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 612.^[7] In the alternative, the Board could have instituted a policy of restricting all private, unattended displays to one area of the square, with a permanent sign marking the area as a forum for private speech carrying no endorsement from the State.

With such alternatives available, the Board cannot claim that its flat denial was a narrowly tailored response to the Klan's permit application and thus cannot rely on that denial as necessary to ensure that the State did not "appea[r] to take a position on questions of religious belief." Id., at 594. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.

[795] APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF SOUTER, J.

[796] Appendix B to opinion of Souter, J. APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF SOUTER, J.

[797] Justice Stevens, dissenting.

The Establishment Clause should be construed to create a strong presumption against the installation of unattended religious symbols on public property. Although the State of Ohio has allowed Capitol Square, the area around the seat of its government, to be used as a public forum, and although it has occasionally allowed private groups to erect other sectarian displays there, neither fact provides a sufficient basis for rebutting that presumption. On the contrary, the sequence of sectarian displays disclosed by the record in this case illustrates the importance of rebuilding the "wall of separation between church and State" that Jefferson envisioned.^[8]

I

At issue in this case is an unadorned Latin cross, which the Ku Klux Klan placed, and left unattended, on the lawn in front of the Ohio State Capitol. The Court decides this case on the assumption that the cross was a religious symbol. I agree with that assumption notwithstanding the hybrid character of this particular object. The record indicates that the "Grand Titan of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan for the Realm of Ohio" applied for a permit to place a cross in front of the state capitol because "`the Jews' " were placing a "symbol for the Jewish belief" in the square. App. 173.^[9] Some observers, unaware of who had sponsored the cross, or unfamiliar with the history of the Klan and its reaction to the menorah, might interpret the Klan's cross as an inspirational symbol of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ. [798] More knowledgeable observers might regard it, given the context, as an antisemitic symbol of bigotry and disrespect for a particular religious sect. Under the first interpretation, the cross is plainly a religious symbol.^[10] Under the second, an icon of intolerance expressing an anticlerical message should also be treated as a religious symbol because the Establishment Clause must prohibit official sponsorship of irreligious as well as religious messages. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 52 (1985). This principle is no less binding if the antireligious message is also a bigoted message. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 86-89 (1944) (government lacks power to judge truth of religious beliefs); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728 (1872) ("The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect").

Thus, while this unattended, freestanding wooden cross was unquestionably a religious symbol, observers may well have received completely different messages from that symbol. Some might have perceived it as a message of love, others as a message of hate, still others as a message of exclusion—a statehouse sign calling powerfully to mind their outsider status. In any event, it was a message that the State of Ohio may not communicate to its citizens without violating the Establishment Clause.

[799] II

The plurality does not disagree with the proposition that the State may not espouse a religious message. Ante, at 765-766. It concludes, however, that the State has not sent such a message; it has merely allowed others to do so on its property. Thus, the State has provided an "incidental benefit" to religion by allowing private parties access to a traditional public forum. See ante, at 765. In my judgment, neither precedent nor respect for the values protected by the Establishment Clause justifies that conclusion.

The Establishment Clause, "at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from `making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' " County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593-594 (1989), quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). At least when religious symbols are involved, the question whether the State is "appearing to take a position" is best judged from the standpoint of a "reasonable observer."^[11] It is especially important to take account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief it expresses. A paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect such a person from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community. Ibid. If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that display. No less stringent rule can adequately [800] protect nonadherents from a well-grounded perception that their sovereign supports a faith to which they do not subscribe.^[12]

In determining whether the State's maintenance of the Klan's cross in front of the statehouse conveyed a forbidden message of endorsement, we should be mindful of the power of a symbol standing alone and unexplained. Even on private property, signs and symbols are generally understood to express the owner's views. The location of the sign is a significant component of the message it conveys.

"Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the `speaker.' As an early and eminent student of rhetoric observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade. A sign advocating [801] `Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window or the same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism may carry different implications when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 56-57 (1994) (footnote omitted).

Like other speakers, a person who places a sign on her own property has the autonomy to choose the content of her own message. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 341-342 (1995). Thus, the location of a stationary, unattended sign generally is both a component of its message and an implicit endorsement of that message by the party with the power to decide whether it may be conveyed from that location.^[13]

So it is with signs and symbols left to speak for themselves on public property. The very fact that a sign is installed on public property implies official recognition and reinforcement of its message. That implication is especially strong when the sign stands in front of the seat of the government itself. The "reasonable observer" of any symbol placed unattended in front of any capitol in the world will normally assume that the sovereign—which is not only the owner of that parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for [802] the surrounding territory—has sponsored and facilitated its message.

That the State may have granted a variety of groups permission to engage in uncensored expressive activities in front of the capitol building does not, in my opinion, qualify or contradict the normal inference of endorsement that the reasonable observer would draw from the unattended, freestanding sign or symbol. Indeed, parades and demonstrations at or near the seat of government are often exercises of the right of the people to petition their government for a redress of grievances—exercises in which the government is the recipient of the message rather than the messenger. Even when a demonstration or parade is not directed against government policy, but merely has made use of a particularly visible forum in order to reach as wide an audience as possible, there usually can be no mistake about the identity of the messengers as persons other than the State. But when a statue or some other freestanding, silent, unattended, immoveable structure—regardless of its particular message— appears on the lawn of the capitol building, the reasonable observer must identify the State either as the messenger, or, at the very least, as one who has endorsed the message. Contrast, in this light, the image of the cross standing alone and unattended, see infra, at 816, and the image the observer would take away were a hooded Klansman holding, or standing next to, the very same cross.

This Court has never held that a private party has a right to place an unattended object in a public forum.^[14] Today the [803] Court correctly recognizes that a State may impose a ban on all private unattended displays in such a forum, ante, at 761. This is true despite the fact that our cases have condemned a number of laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression, even in places where free speech is otherwise allowed.^[15] The First Amendment affords protection to a basic liberty: "the freedom of speech" that an individual may exercise when using the public streets and parks. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). The Amendment, however, does not destroy all property rights. In particular, it does not empower individuals to erect structures of any kind on public property. Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 814 (1984);^[16] see also [804] Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984). Thus, our cases protecting the individual's freedom to engage in communicative conduct on public property (whether by speaking, parading, handbilling, waving a flag, or carrying a banner), e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), or to send messages from her own property by placing a sign in the window of her home, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S., at 58-59, do not establish the right to implant a physical structure (whether a campaign poster, a burning cross, or a statue of Elvis Presley) on public property. I think the latter "right," which creates a far greater intrusion on government property and interferes with the government's ability to differentiate its own message from those of public individuals, does not exist.^[17]

Because structures on government property—and, in particular, in front of buildings plainly identified with the State—imply state approval of their message, the government must have considerable leeway, outside of the religious arena, to choose what kinds of displays it will allow and what kinds it will not. Although the First Amendment requires the government to allow leafletting or demonstrating outside its buildings, the State has greater power to exclude unattended symbols when they convey a type of message with which the State does not wish to be identified. I think it obvious, for example, that Ohio could prohibit certain categories of signs or symbols in Capitol Square—erotic exhibits, commercial advertising, and perhaps campaign posters as [805] well—without violating the Free Speech Clause.^[18] Moreover, our "public forum" cases do not foreclose public entities from enforcing prohibitions against all unattended displays in public parks, or possibly even limiting the use of such displays to the communication of noncontroversial messages.^[19] Such a limitation would not inhibit any of the traditional forms of expression that have been given full constitutional protection in public fora.

The State's general power to restrict the types of unattended displays does not alone suffice to decide this case, because Ohio did not profess to be exercising any such authority. Instead, the Capitol Square Review Board denied a permit for the cross because it believed the Establishment Clause required as much, and we cannot know whether the [806] Board would have denied the permit on other grounds. App. 91-92, 169. Accordingly, we must evaluate the State's rationale on its own terms. But in this case, the endorsement inquiry under the Establishment Clause follows from the State's power to exclude unattended private displays from public property. Just as the Constitution recognizes the State's interest in preventing its property from being used as a conduit for ideas it does not wish to give the appearance of ratifying, the Establishment Clause prohibits government from allowing, and thus endorsing, unattended displays that take a position on a religious issue. If the State allows such stationary displays in front of its seat of government, viewers will reasonably assume that it approves of them. As the picture appended to this opinion demonstrates, infra, at 816, a reasonable observer would likely infer endorsement from the location of the cross erected by the Klan in this case. Even if the disclaimer at the foot of the cross (which stated that the cross was placed there by a private organization) were legible, that inference would remain, because a property owner's decision to allow a third party to place a sign on her property conveys the same message of endorsement as if she had erected it herself.^[20]

When the message is religious in character, it is a message the State can neither send nor reinforce without violating the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, I would hold that the Constitution generally forbids the placement of a [807] symbol of a religious character in, on, or before a seat of government.

III

The Court correctly acknowledges that the State's duty to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause can justify a content-based restriction on speech or expression, even when that restriction would otherwise be prohibited by the Free Speech Clause. Ante, at 761-762; ante, at 783 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The plurality asserts, however, that government cannot be perceived to be endorsing a religious display when it merely accords that display "the same access to a public forum that all other displays enjoy." Ante, at 764. I find this argument unpersuasive.

The existence of a "public forum" in itself cannot dispel the message of endorsement. A contrary argument would assume an "ultrareasonable observer" who understands the vagaries of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. I think it presumptuous to consider such knowledge a precondition of Establishment Clause protection. Many (probably most) reasonable people do not know the difference between a "public forum," a "limited public forum," and a "nonpublic forum." They do know the difference between a state capitol and a church. Reasonable people have differing degrees of knowledge; that does not make them "`obtuse,' " see 30 F. 3d 675, 679 (CA6 1994) (quoting Doe v. Small, 964 F. 2d 611, 630 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)); nor does it make them unworthy of constitutional protection. It merely makes them human. For a religious display to violate the Establishment Clause, I think it is enough that some reasonable observers would attribute a religious message to the State.

The plurality appears to rely on the history of this particular public forum—specifically, it emphasizes that Ohio has in the past allowed three other private unattended displays. Even if the State could not reasonably have been understood to endorse the prior displays, I would not find this argument [808] convincing, because it assumes that all reasonable viewers know all about the history of Capitol Square—a highly unlikely supposition.^[21] But the plurality's argument fails on its own terms, because each of the three previous displays conveyed the same message of approval and endorsement that this one does.

Most significant, of course, is the menorah that stood in Capitol Square during Chanukah. The display of that religious symbol should be governed by the same rule as the display of the cross.^[22] In my opinion, both displays are [809] equally objectionable. Moreover, the fact that the State has placed its stamp of approval on two different religions instead of one only compounds the constitutional violation. The Establishment Clause does not merely prohibit the State from favoring one religious sect over others. It also proscribes state action supporting the establishment of a number of religions,^[23] as well as the official endorsement of religion in preference to nonreligion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 52-55. The State's prior approval of the proreligious message conveyed by the menorah is fully consistent with its endorsement of one of the messages conveyed by the cross: "The State of Ohio favors religion over irreligion." This message is incompatible with the principles embodied by our Establishment Clause.

The record identifies two other examples of freestanding displays that the State previously permitted in Capitol Square: a "United Way Campaign `thermometer,' " and "craftsmen's booths and displays erected during an Arts Festival." <sup>[24]</sup> App. to Pet. for Cert. A16. Both of those examples confirm the proposition that a reasonable observer should infer official approval of the message conveyed by a structure erected in front of the statehouse. Surely the thermometer suggested that the State was encouraging passersby to contribute to the United Way. It seems equally clear that the State was endorsing the creativity of artisans and craftsmen by permitting their booths to occupy a part of the square. Nothing about either of those freestanding displays contradicts the normal inference that the State has endorsed whatever message might be conveyed by permitting [810] an unattended symbol to adorn the capitol grounds.<sup>[25]</sup> Accordingly, the fact that the menorah, and later the cross, stood in an area available "`for free discussion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose,' " Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 105.41 (1994), quoted ante, at 757, is fully consistent with the conclusion that the State sponsored those religious symbols. They, like the thermometer and the booths, were displayed in a context that connotes state approval.

This case is therefore readily distinguishable from Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993). In both of those cases, as we made perfectly clear, there was no danger of incorrect identification of the speakers and no basis for inferring that their messages had been endorsed by any public entity. As we explained in the later case:

"Under these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. As in Widmar, supra, at 271-272, permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film involved in this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971): The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion." Id., at 395 (footnote omitted).

In contrast, the installation of the religious symbols in Capitol Square quite obviously did "have the principal or [811] primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion"; indeed, no other effect is even suggested by the record. The primary difference is that in this case we are dealing with a visual display —a symbol readily associated with a religion, in a venue readily associated with the State. This clear image of endorsement was lacking in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, in which the issue was access to government facilities. Moreover, there was no question in those cases of an unattended display; private speakers, who could be distinguished from the State, were present. See supra, at 801— 802. Endorsement might still be present in an access case if, for example, the religious group sought the use of the roof of a public building for an obviously religious ceremony, where many onlookers might witness that ceremony and connect it to the State. But no such facts were alleged in Widmar or Lamb's Chapel. The religious practices in those cases were simply less obtrusive, and less likely to send a message of endorsement, than the eye-catching symbolism at issue in this case.

The battle over the Klan cross underscores the power of such symbolism. The menorah prompted the Klan to seek permission to erect an antisemitic symbol, which in turn not only prompted vandalism but also motivated other sects to seek permission to place their own symbols in the square. These facts illustrate the potential for insidious entanglement that flows from state-endorsed proselytizing. There is no reason to believe that a menorah placed in front of a synagogue would have motivated any reaction from the Klan, or that a Klan cross placed on a Klansman's front lawn would have produced the same reaction as one that enjoyed the apparent imprimatur of the State of Ohio. Nor is there any reason to believe the placement of the displays in Capitol Square had any purpose other than to connect the State— though perhaps against its will—to the religious or antireligious beliefs of those who placed them there. The cause of the conflict is the State's apparent approval of a religious [812] or antireligious message.^[26] Our Constitution wisely seeks to minimize such strife by forbidding state-endorsed religious activity.

IV

Conspicuously absent from the plurality's opinion is any mention of the values served by the Establishment Clause. It therefore seems appropriate to repeat a portion of a Court opinion authored by Justice Black who, more than any other Justice in the Court's history, espoused a literal interpretation of constitutional text:

"A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches. The centuries immediately [813] before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established churches, non-attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support them.

"These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America. The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to erect religious establishments which all, whether believers or nonbelievers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a [814] minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.

. . . . .

"The `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect `a wall of separation between church and State.' " Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 8-10, 15, 16 (1947) (footnotes and citation omitted).

In his eloquent dissent in that same case, Justice Jackson succinctly explained—

"that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business . . . . It was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life. . . ." Id., at 26-27.

[815] The wrestling over the Klan cross in Capitol Square is far removed from the persecution that motivated William Penn to set sail for America, and the issue resolved in Everson is quite different from the controversy over symbols that gave rise to this litigation.^[27] Nevertheless, the views expressed by both the majority and the dissenters in that landmark case counsel caution before approving the order of a federal judge commanding a State to authorize the placement of freestanding religious symbols in front of the seat of its government. The Court's decision today is unprecedented. It entangles two sovereigns in the propagation of religion, and it disserves the principle of tolerance that underlies the prohibition against state action "respecting an establishment of religion."^[28]

I respectfully dissent.

[Appendix to opinion of Stevens, J., follows this page.]

[816] Appendix to opinion of Stevens, J. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF STEVENS, J.

[817] Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.

We confront here, as Justices O'Connor and Souter point out, a large Latin cross that stood alone and unattended in close proximity to Ohio's Statehouse. See ante, at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); ante, at 792-793 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Near the stationary cross were the government's flags and the government's statues. No human speaker was present to disassociate the religious symbol from the State. No other private display was in sight. No plainly visible sign informed the public that the cross belonged to the Klan and that Ohio's government did not endorse the display's message.

If the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from church, see Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 16 (1947), a State may not permit, and a court may not order, a display of this character. Cf. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 197-214 (1992) (negative bar against establishment of religion implies affirmative establishment of secular public order). Justice Souter, in the final paragraphs of his opinion, suggests two arrangements that might have distanced the State from "the principal symbol of Christianity around the world," see ante, at 792: a sufficiently large and clear disclaimer, ante, at 793-794;^[29] or an area reserved for unattended [818] displays carrying no endorsement from the State, a space plainly and permanently so marked, ante, at 794. Neither arrangement is even arguably present in this case. The District Court's order did not mandate a disclaimer. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A26 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction requiring the defendants to issue a permit to erect a cross on Capitol Square"). And the disclaimer the Klan appended to the foot of the cross^[30] was unsturdy: It did not identify the Klan as sponsor; it failed to state unequivocally that Ohio did not endorse the display's message; and it was not shown to be legible from a distance. The relief ordered by the District Court thus violated the Establishment Clause.

Whether a court order allowing display of a cross, but demanding a sturdier disclaimer, could withstand Establishment Clause analysis is a question more difficult than the one this case poses. I would reserve that question for another day and case. But I would not let the prospect of what might have been permissible control today's decision on the constitutionality of the display the District Court's order in fact authorized. See ante, at 816 (appendix to dissent of Stevens, J.) (photograph of display).

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[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Town of Trumbell, Connecticut, et al. by Arthur A. Hiller, Martin B. Margulies, and Emanuel Margolis; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. by Steven K. Green, Julie A. Segal, Norman Dorsen, Samuel Rabinove, Elliot M. Mincberg, David Saperstein, and Richard T. Cassidy; for the Council on Religious Freedom et al. by Lee Boothby, Wal- ter E. Carson, Robert W. Nixon, and Rolland Truman; for the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., by Robert R. Tiernan; and for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marvin E. Frankel, Alan R. Friedman, Richard K. Milin, Marc D. Stern, Lois C. Waldman, and Steve Freeman.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Center for Law & Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, James M. Henderson, Sr., and Keith A. Fournier; for the Chabad House of Western Michigan, Inc., et al. by Nathan Lewin; for the Christian Legal Society by Thomas C. Berg, Steven T. McFarland, Samuel B. Casey, Gregory S. Baylor, and Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Knights of Columbus Council 2961 et al. by Kevin J. Hasson; and for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver.

[2] Respondents claim that the Sixth Circuit's statement that "[z]ealots have First Amendment rights too," even if their views are unpopular, shows that the case is actually about discrimination against political speech. That conclusion is possible only if the statement is ripped from its context, which was this: "The potency of religious speech is not a constitutional infirmity; the most fervently devotional and blatantly sectarian speech is protected when it is private speech in a public forum. Zealots have First Amendment rights too." 30 F. 3d 675, 680 (1994). The court was obviously addressing zealous (and unpopular) religious speech.

[3] This statement in Justice O'Connor's Mergens opinion is followed by the observation: "We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." 496 U. S.,at 250. Justice O'Connor today says this observation means that, even when we recognize private speech to be at issue, we must apply the endorsement test. Post, at 774-775. But that would cause the second sentence to contradict the first, saying in effect that the "difference between government speech . . . and private speech" is not "crucial."

[4] If it is true, as Justice O'Connor suggests, post, at 775, that she would not "be likely to come to a different result from the plurality where truly private speech is allowed on equal terms in a vigorous public forum that the government has administered properly," then she is extending the "endorsement test" to private speech to cover an eventuality that is "not likely" to occur. Before doing that, it would seem desirable to explore the precise degree of the unlikelihood (is it perhaps 100%?)—for as we point out in text, the extension to private speech has considerable costs. Contrary to what Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Stevens argue, the endorsement test does not supply an appropriate standard for the inquiry before us. It supplies no standard whatsoever. The lower federal courts that Justice O'Connor's concurrence identifies as having "applied the endorsement test in precisely the context before us today," ibid., have reached precisely differing results—which is what led the Court to take this case. And if further proof of the invited chaos is required, one need only follow the debate between the concurrence and Justice Stevens' dissent as to whether the hypothetical beholder who will be the determinant of "endorsement" should be any beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average beholder, or (what Justice Stevens accuses the concurrence of favoring) the "ultrareasonable" beholder. See post, at 778-782 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); post, at 807-808 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And, of course, even when one achieves agreement upon that question, it will be unrealistic to expect different judges (or should it be juries?) to reach consistent answers as to what any beholder, the average beholder, or the ultrareasonable beholder (as the case may be) would think. It is irresponsible to make the Nation's legislators walk this minefield.

[5] For this reason, among others, we do not inquire into the adequacy of the identification that was attached to the cross ultimately erected in this case. The difficulties posed by such an inquiry, however, are yet another reason to reject the principle of "transferred endorsement." The only principled line for adequacy of identification would be identification that is legible at whatever distance the cross is visible. Otherwise, the uninformed viewer who does not have time or inclination to come closer to read the sign might be misled, just as (under current law) the uninformed viewer who does not have time or inclination to inquire whether speech in Capitol Square is publicly endorsed speech might be misled. Needless to say, such a rule would place considerable constraint upon religious speech, not to mention that it would be ridiculous. But if one rejects that criterion, courts would have to decide (on what basis we cannot imagine) how large an identifying sign is large enough. Our Religion Clause jurisprudence is complex enough without the addition of this highly litigable feature.

[6] This description of the disclaimer, as well as the agreement to negotiate, also appeared in the Klan's District Court complaint, App. 26, and in stipulations of fact jointly filed in the District Court by both parties, id., at 100, ¶ 32. The Klan conceded before the District Court that "the state could have required . . . a disclaimer" like the one proposed, Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in No. C2-93-1162 (SD Ohio), p. 5, and the State assumed throughout the litigation that the display would include the disclaimer, see, e.g., Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction in No. C2-93-1162 (SD Ohio), pp. 6, 21. Both parties considered the disclaimer as an integral part of the display that the Klan desired to place on Capitol Square. Thus the District Court's order, which did not expressly require the disclaimer in awarding the injunction, see Pet. for Cert. A26 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction requiring the defendants to issue a permit to erect a cross on Capitol Square"), cannot reasonably be read to mean that the disclaimer was unnecessary. Indeed, in both its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the District Court discussed the presence and importance of the disclaimer, see id., at A15—A16 (findings of fact), A20, A22—A23 (conclusions of law), and the Klan itself understood that the District Court's order was based on the assumption that a disclaimer would accompany the cross, since the cross the Klan put up on the basis of the District Court's command in fact carried a disclaimer, see App. 63 (photo); Appendix to opinion of Stevens, J., post, at 816. Since the litigation preceded the appearance of the cross and the sign, the adequacy of the sign actually produced was not considered. The adequacy of a disclaimer, in size as well as content, is, of course, a proper subject of judicial scrutiny when placed in issue. Whether the flimsy cardboard sign attached by the Klan to the base of the cross functioned as an adequate disclaimer in this case is a question not before us.

[7] Of course, the presence of a disclaimer does not always remove the possibility that a private religious display "convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred," Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 593 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), when other indicia of endorsement (e.g., objective indications that the government in fact invited the display or otherwise intended to further a religious purpose) outweigh the mitigating effect of the disclaimer, or when the disclaimer itself does not sufficiently disclaim government support. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980); Allegheny, supra, at 600-601; cf. ante, at 769, n. 4. In this case, however, there is no reason to presume that an adequate disclaimer could not have been drafted. Cf. Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253, 285-287 (1994).

[8] See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879).

[9] The "Grand Titan" apparently was referring to a menorah that a private group placed in the square during the season of Chanukah. App. 98; see infra, at 808-809. The Klan found the menorah offensive. The Klan's cross, in turn, offended a number of observers. It was vandalized the day after it was erected, and a local church group applied for, and was granted, permission to display its own crosses around the Klan's to protest the latter's presence. See Record 31.

[10] Indeed, the Latin cross is identifiable as a symbol of a particular religion, that of Christianity; and, further, as a symbol of particular denominations within Christianity. See American Civil Liberties Union v. St. Charles, 794 F. 2d 265, 271 (CA7 1986) ("Such a display is not only religious but also sectarian. This is not just because some religious Americans are not Christians. Some Protestant sects still do not display the cross . . . . The Greek Orthodox church uses as its symbol the Greek (equilateral) cross, not the Latin cross. . . . [T]he more sectarian the display, the closer it is to the original targets of the [establishment] clause, so the more strictly is the clause applied").

[11] In Allegheny, five Justices found the likely reaction of a "`reasonable observer' " relevant for purposes of determining whether an endorsement was present. 492 U. S., at 620 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 635-636 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id., at 642-643 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).

[12] Justice O'Connor agrees that an "endorsement test" is appropriate and that we should judge endorsement from the standpoint of a reasonable observer. Ante, at 779. But her reasonable observer is a legal fiction, "`a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment.' " Ante,at 780. The ideal human Justice O'Connor describes knows and understands much more than meets the eye. Her "reasonable person" comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model. With respect, I think this enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of place in the Establishment Clause context. It strips of constitutional protection every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some "`ideal' "standard. Instead of protecting only the "`ideal' " observer, then, I would extend protection to the universe of reasonable persons and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a government endorsement.

Justice O'Connor's argument that "[t]here is always someone " who will feel excluded by any particular governmental action, ibid., ignores the requirement that such an apprehension be objectively reasonable. A person who views an exotic cow at the zoo as a symbol of the government's approval of the Hindu religion cannot survive this test.

[13] I recognize there may be exceptions to this general rule. A commercial message displayed on a billboard, for example, usually will not be taken to represent the views of the billboard's owner because every reasonable observer is aware that billboards are rented as advertising space. On the other hand, the observer may reasonably infer that the owner of the billboard is not inalterably opposed to the message presented thereon; for the owner has the right to exclude messages with which he disagrees, and he might be expected to exercise that right if his disagreement is sufficiently profound.

[14] Despite the absence of any holding on this point, Justice O'Connor assumes that a reasonable observer would not impute the content of an unattended display to the government because that observer would know that the State is required to allow all such displayson Capitol Square. Ante, at 780-781. Justice O'Connor thus presumes a reasonable observer so prescient as to understand legal doctrines that this Court has not yet adopted.

[15] "Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets within the municipality, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938); handbills on the public streets, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943); the door-todoor distribution of literature, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 145-149 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164-165 (1939), and live entertainment, Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 75-76 (1981). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 486 (1988) (picketing focused upon individual residence is `fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas'). Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 55 (1994) (footnote omitted).

[16] In Vincent, we stated:

"Appellees' reliance on the public forum doctrine is misplaced. They fail to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles for purposes of their communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks, and it is clear that `the First Amendment does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.' United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981). Rather, the `existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.' Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983)." 466 U. S., at 814.

[17] At least, it does not exist as a general matter. I recognize there may be cases of viewpoint discrimination (say, if the State were to allow campaign signs supporting an incumbent governor but not signs supporting his opponent) in which access cannot be discriminatorily denied.

[18] The plurality incorrectly assumes that a decision to exclude a category of speech from an inappropriate forum must rest on a judgment about the value of that speech. See ante, at 766-767. Yet, we have upheld the exclusion of all political signs from public vehicles, Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), though political expression is at the heart of the protection afforded by the First Amendment. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 346-347 (1995). A view that "private prayers," ante, at 767, are most appropriate in private settings is neither novel nor disrespectful to religious speech.

[19] Several scholars have commented on the malleability of our public forum precedents.

"As [an] overview of the cases strongly suggests, whether or not a given place is deemed a `public forum' is ordinarily less significant than the nature of the speech restriction—despite the Court's rhetoric. Indeed, even the rhetoric at times reveals as much.

. . . . .

"Beyond confusing the issues, an excessive focus on the public character of some forums, coupled with inadequate attention to the precise details of the restrictions on expression, can leave speech inadequately protected in some cases, while unduly hampering state and local authorities in others." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 992-993 (2d ed. 1988) (footnotes omitted).

See also Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219, 1221-1222 (1984).

[20] Indeed, I do not think any disclaimer could dispel the message of endorsement in this case. Capitol Square's location in downtown Columbus, Ohio, makes it inevitable that countless motorists and pedestrians would immediately perceive the proximity of the cross to the capitol without necessarily noticing any disclaimer of public sponsorship. The plurality thus correctly abjures inquiry into the possible adequacy or significance of a legend identifying the owner of the cross. See ante, at 769, n. 4. Justice Souter is of the view that an adequate disclaimer is constitutionally required, ante, at 793-794, but he does not suggest that the attachment to the Klan's cross in this case was adequate.

[21] Justice O'Connor apparently would not extend Establishment Clause protection to passersby who are unaware of Capitol Square's history. See ante, at 780-782. Thus, she sees no reason to distinguish an intimate knowledge of the square's history from the knowledge that a cross is a religious symbol or that the statehouse is the statehouse. Ante, at 780-781. But passersby, including schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and tourists as much as those who live next to the statehouse, are members of the body politic, and they are equally entitled to be free from government endorsement of religion.

[22] A fragmented Court reached a different conclusion in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573 (1989). In that case, a majority of this Court decided that a crèche placed by a private group inside a public building violated the Establishment Clause, id., at 598-602, but that a menorah placed alongside a Christmas tree and a "sign saluting liberty" outside that same building did not. Id., at 613-621 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 632-637 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id., at 663-667 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ.). The two Justices who provided the decisive votes to distinguish these situations relied on the presence of the tree and the sign to find that the menorah, in context, was not a religious, but a secular, symbol of liberty. Id., at 613-621 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 632-637 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). It was apparently in reliance on the outcome of the Allegheny case that Ohio believed it could provide a forum for the menorah (which appeared in Capitol Square with a state-owned Christmas tree and a banner reading, "Season's Greetings") and yet could not provide one for the cross. See App. 169. Given the state of the law at the time, Ohio's decision was hardly unreasonable; but I cannot support a view of the Establishment Clause that permits a State effectively to endorse some kinds of religious symbols but not others. I would find that the State is powerless to place,or allow to be placed, any religious symbol—including a menorah or a cross—in front of its seat of government.

[23] See Allegheny , 492 U. S., at 647-649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

[24] The booths were attended during the festival itself, but were left standing overnight during the pendency of the event. App. 159.

[25] Of course, neither of these endorsements was religious in nature, and thus neither was forbidden by the Constitution.

[26] As I stated in Allegheny:

"There is always a risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful. Some devout Christians believe that the crèche should be placed only in reverential settings, such as a church or perhaps a private home; they do not countenance its use as an aid to commercialization of Christ's birthday. In this very suit, members of the Jewish faith firmly opposed the use to which the menorah was put by the particular sect that sponsored the display at Pittsburgh's City-County Building. Even though `[p]assersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs,' displays of this kind inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The Establishment Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such disagreement." 492 U. S., at 650-651 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted), quoting id., at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

In the words of Clarence Darrow:

"`The realm of religion . . . is where knowledge leaves off, and where faith begins, and it never has needed the arm of the State for support, and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the religion that it would pretend to serve.' " Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927), quoted in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 264 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.).

[27] Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), held that a school district could, as part of a larger program of reimbursing students for their transportation to and from school, also reimburse students attending Catholic schools.

[28] The words "respecting an establishment of religion" were selected to emphasize the breadth and richer meaning of this fundamental command. See Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 647-649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

[29] Cf. American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkinson, 895 F. 2d 1098, 1101, n. 2, 1106 (CA6 1990) (approving disclaimer ordered by District Court, which had to be "`prominently displayed immediately in front of' " the religious symbol and "`readable from an automobile passing on the street directly in front of the structure' "; the approved sign read: "`This display was not constructed with public funds and does not constitute an endorsement by the Commonwealth [of Kentucky] of any religion or religious doctrine.' ") (quoting District Court); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F. 2d 716, 728 (CA2 1984) (disclaimers must meet requirements of size, visibility, and message; disclaimer at issue was too small), aff'd, 471 U. S. 83 (1985) (per curiam); Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253, 285-286 (1994) (disclaimer must not only identify the sponsor, it must say "in no uncertain language" that the government's permit "in no way connotes [government] endorsement of the display's message"; the "disclaimer's adequacy should be measured by its visibility to the average person viewing the religious display").

[30] The disclaimerstated: "`[T]hiscross was erected by private individuals without government support for the purpose of expressing respect for the holiday season and to assert the right of all religious views to be expressed on an equal basis on public property.' " See App. to Pet. for Cert. A15—A16.