6 Interpretation 6 Interpretation

6.1 Mitchill v. Lath 6.1 Mitchill v. Lath

247 N. Y. 377
CATHERINE C. MITCHILL, Respondent,
v.
CHARLES LATH et al., Appellants.

[378] 

Mitchell v Lath, 220 App. Div. 776, reversed.

(Argued January 10, 1928; decided February 14, 1928.)

APPEAL, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered May 27, 1927, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term in an action to compel specific performance of an alleged contract to remove an ice house.

James G. Meyer, John T. Kelly and Daniel A. Dugan for appellants. The court erred in destroying the contract by receiving evidence of prior negotiations. (Newburger v. Am. Surety Co., 242 N. Y. 134; Filkins v. Whyland, 24 N. Y. 338; Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288; Emmett v. Penoyer, 151 N. Y. 564; Sturmdorf v. Saunders, 117 App. Div. 762; Marsh v. McNair, 99 N. Y. 174; Lossing v. Cushman, 123 App. Div. 693; 195 N. Y. 386.) The case at bar is not within the exceptions to the general rule that evidence of parol agreements may not be received to contradict or vary the terms of an instrument in writing. (Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133; House v. Walch, 144 N. Y. 418; Mead v. Dunleavy, 174 N. Y. 108; Studwell v. Bush Co., 206 N. Y. 416; Newburger v. American Surety Co., 242 N. Y. 134.)

Arthur H. Haaren for respondent. Specific performance of defendants' oral contract was properly granted below. (Rintelen v. Schaefer, 158 App. Div. 477.) The parol evidence rule has not been violated and no other ground for reversal has been shown. (Newburger v. [379] Am. Surety Co., 242 N. Y. 134; Indelli v. Lesster, 130 App. Div. 548; Finkle v. Lasher, 178 App. Div. 471; Brown v. De Graff, 183 App. Div. 177; Amer. Aniline Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 190 App. Div. 485; Taylor v. Hopper, 62 N. Y. 649; Lobel v. Van Hoose, 141 N. Y. Supp. 490; M'Crea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460; Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Barbour, 192 App. Div. 654; Post v. Thomas, 180 App. Div. 627.) The injunction prayed for was properly granted. (Musgrave v. Sherwood, 23 Hun, 669.)

ANDREWS, J. In the fall of 1923 the Laths owned a farm. This they wished to sell. Across the road, on land belonging to Lieutenant-Governor Lunn, they had an ice house which they might remove. Mrs. Mitchill looked over the land with a view to its purchase. She found the ice house objectionable. Thereupon "the defendants orally promised and agreed, for and in consideration of the purchase of their farm by the plaintiff, to remove the said ice house in the spring of 1924." Relying upon this promise, she made a written contract to buy the property for $8,400, for cash and a mortgage and containing various provisions usual in such papers. Later receiving a deed, she entered into possession and has spent considerable sums in improving the property for use as a summer residence. The defendants have not fulfilled their promise as to the ice house and do not intend to do so. We are not dealing, however, with their moral delinquencies. The question before us is whether their oral agreement may be enforced in a court of equity.

This requires a discussion of the parol evidence rule — a rule of law which defines the limits of the contract to be construed. (Glackin v. Bennett, 226 Mass. 316.) It is more than a rule of evidence and oral testimony even if admitted will not control the written contract (O'Malley v. Grady, 222 Mass. 202), unless admitted without objection. (Brady v. Nolly, 151 N. Y. 258.) It applies, however, to attempts to modify such a contract by parol. It does not [380] affect a parol collateral contract distinct from and independent of the written agreement. It is, at times, troublesome to draw the line. Williston, in his work on Contracts (sec. 637) points out the difficulty. "Two entirely distinct contracts," he says, 

“each for a separate consideration may be made at the same time and will be distinct legally. Where, however, one agreement is entered into wholly or partly in consideration of the simultaneous agreement to enter into another, the transactions are necessarily bound together. . . . Then if one of the agreements is oral and the other is written, the problem arises whether the bond is sufficiently close to prevent proof of the oral agreement."

That is the situation here. It is claimed that the defendants are called upon to do more than is required by their written contract in connection with the sale as to which it deals.

The principle may be clear, but it can be given effect by no mechanical rule. As so often happens, it is a matter of degree, for as Professor Williston also says where a contract contains several promises on each side it is not difficult to put any one of them in the form of a collateral agreement. If this were enough written contracts might always be modified by parol. Not form, but substance is the test.

In applying this test the policy of our courts is to be considered. We have believed that the purpose behind the rule was a wise one not easily to be abandoned. Notwithstanding injustice here and there, on the whole it works for good. Old precedents and principles are not to be lightly cast aside unless it is certain that they are an obstruction under present conditions. New York has been less open to arguments that would modify this particular rule, than some jurisdictions elsewhere. Thus in Eighmie v. Taylor (98 N. Y. 288) it was held that a parol warranty might not be shown although no warranties were contained in the writing.

Under our decisions before such an oral agreement [381] as the present is received to vary the written contract at least three conditions must exist, (1) the agreement must in form be a collateral one; (2) it must not contradict express or implied provisions of the written contract; (3) it must be one that parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing; or put in another way, an inspection of the written contract, read in the light of surrounding circumstances must not indicate that the writing appears "to contain the engagements of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of such engagement." Or again, it must not be so clearly connected with the principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it.

The respondent does not satisfy the third of these requirements. It may be, not the second. We have a written contract for the purchase and sale of land. The buyer is to pay $8,400 in the way described. She is also to pay her portion of any rents, interest on mortgages, insurance premiums and water meter charges. She may have a survey made of the premises. On their part the sellers are to give a full covenant deed of the premises as described, or as they may be described by the surveyor if the survey is had, executed and acknowledged at their own expense; they sell the personal property on the farm and represent they own it; they agree that all amounts paid them on the contract and the expense of examining the title shall be a lien on the property; they assume the risk of loss or damage by fire until the deed is delivered; and they agree to pay the broker his commissions. Are they to do more? Or is such a claim inconsistent with these precise provisions? It could not be shown that the plaintiff was to pay $500 additional. Is it also implied that the defendants are not to do anything unexpressed in the writing?

That we need not decide. At least, however, an inspection of this contract shows a full and complete agreement, setting forth in detail the obligations of each [382] party. On reading it one would conclude that the reciprocal obligations of the parties were fully detailed. Nor would his opinion alter if he knew the surrounding circumstances. The presence of the ice house, even the knowledge that Mrs. Mitchill thought it objectionable would not lead to the belief that a separate agreement existed with regard to it. Were such an agreement made it would seem most natural that the inquirer should find it in the contract. Collateral in form it is found to be, but it is closely related to the subject dealt with in the written agreement — so closely that we hold it may not be proved.

Where the line between the competent and the incompetent is narrow the citation of authorities is of slight use. Each represents the judgment of the court on the precise facts before it. How closely bound to the contract is the supposed collateral agreement is the decisive factor in each case. But reference may be made to Johnson v. Oppenheim (55 N. Y. 280, 292); Thomas v. Scutt (127 N. Y. 133); Eighmie v. Taylor (98 N. Y. 288); Stowell v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (163 N. Y. 298); Newburger v. American Surety Co. (242 N. Y. 134); Love v. Hamel (59 App. Div. 360); Daly v. Piza (105 App. Div. 496) ; Seitz v. Brewers Refrigerating Co. (141 U.S. 510); American Locomotive Co. v. Nat. Grocery Co. (226 Mass. 314); Doyle v. Dixon (12 Allen, 576). Of these citations, Johnson v. Oppenheim and the two in the Appellate Division relate to collateral contracts said to have been the inducing cause of the main contract. They refer to leases. A similar case is Wilson v. Deen (74 N. Y. 531). All hold that an oral stipulation, said to have been the inducing cause for the subsequent execution of the lease itself, concerning some act to be done by the landlord, or some condition as to the leased premises, might not be shown. In principle they are not unlike the case before us. Attention should be called also to Taylor v. Hopper (62 N. Y. 649), where it is assumed that evidence [383] of a parol agreement to remove a barn, which was an inducement to the sale of lots, was improper.

We do not ignore the fact that authorities may be found that would seem to support the contention of the appellant. Such are Erskine v. Adeane (L. R. 8 Ch. App. 756) and Morgan v. Griffith (L. R. 6 Exch. 70), where although there was a written lease a collateral agreement of the landlord to reduce the game was admitted. In this State Wilson v. Deen might lead to the contrary result. Neither are they approved in New Jersey (Naumberg v. Young, 15 Vroom, 331). Nor in view of later cases in this court can Batterman v. Pierce (3 Hill, 171) be considered an authority. A line of cases in Massachusetts, of which Durkin v. Cobleigh (156 Mass. 108) is an example, have to do with collateral contracts made before a deed is given. But the fixed form of a deed makes it inappropriate to insert collateral agreements, however closely connected with the sale. This may be cause for an exception. Here we deal with the contract on the basis of which the deed to Mrs. Mitchill was given subsequently, and we confine ourselves to the question whether its terms may be modified.

Finally there is the case of Chapin v. Dobson (78 N. Y. 74, 76). This is acknowledged to be on the border line and is rarely cited except to be distinguished. Assuming the premises, however, the court was clearly right. There was nothing on the face of the written contract, it said, to show that it intended to express the entire agreement. And there was a finding, sustained by evidence, that there was an entire contract, only part of which was reduced to writing. This being so, the contract as made might be proved.

It is argued that what we have said is not applicable to the case as presented. The collateral agreement was made with the plaintiff. The contract of sale was with her husband and no assignment of it from him appears. Yet the deed was given to her. It is evident that here [384] was a transaction in which she was the principal from beginning to end. We must treat the contract as if in form, as it was in fact, made by her.

Our conclusion is that the judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Special Term should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.

LEHMAN, J. (dissenting). I accept the general rule as formulated by Judge ANDREWS. I differ with him only as to its application to the facts shown in the record. The plaintiff contracted to purchase land from the defendants for an agreed price. A formal written agreement was made between the sellers and the plaintiff's husband. It is on its face a complete contract for the conveyance of the land. It describes the property to be conveyed. It sets forth the purchase price to be paid. All the conditions and terms of the conveyance to be made are clearly stated. I concede at the outset that parol evidence to show additional conditions and terms of the conveyance would be inadmissible. There is a conclusive presumption that the parties intended to integrate in that written contract every agreement relating to the nature or extent of the property to be conveyed, the contents of the deed to be delivered, the consideration to be paid as a condition precedent to the delivery of the deeds, and indeed all the rights of the parties in connection with the land. The conveyance of that land was the subject-matter of the written contract and the contract completely covers that subject.

The parol agreement which the court below found the parties had made was collateral to, yet connected with, the agreement of purchase and sale. It has been found that the defendants induced the plaintiff to agree to purchase the land by a promise to remove an ice house from land not covered by the agreement of purchase and sale. No independent consideration passed to the defendants for the parol promise. To that extent the written [385] contract and the alleged oral contract are bound together. The same bond usually exists wherever attempt is made to prove a parol agreement which is collateral to a written agreement. Hence "the problem arises whether the bond is sufficiently close to prevent proof of the oral agreement." See Judge ANDREWS’ citation from Williston on Contracts, section 637.

Judge ANDREWS has formulated a standard to measure the closeness of the bond. Three conditions, at least, must exist before an oral agreement may be proven to increase the obligation imposed by the written agreement. I think we agree that the first condition that the agreement "must in form be a collateral one" is met by the evidence. I concede that this condition is met in most cases where the courts have nevertheless excluded evidence of the collateral oral agreement. The difficulty here, as in most cases, arises in connection with the two other conditions. The second condition is that the "parol agreement must not contradict express or implied provisions of the written contract." Judge ANDREWS voices doubt whether this condition is satisfied. The written contract has been carried out. The purchase price has been paid; conveyance has been made, title has passed in accordance with the terms of the written contract. The mutual obligations expressed in the written contract are left unchanged by the alleged oral contract. When performance was required of the written contract, the obligations of the parties were measured solely by its terms. By the oral agreement the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendants to other obligations to be performed by them thereafter upon land which was not conveyed to the plaintiff. The assertion of such further obligation is not inconsistent with the written contract unless the written contract contains a provision, express or implied, that the defendants are not to do anything not expressed in the writing. Concededly there is no such express provision in the [386] contract, and such a provision may be implied, if at all, only if the asserted additional obligation is "so clearly connected with the principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it," and is not "one that the parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing." The hypothesis so formulated for a conclusion that the asserted additional obligation is inconsistent with an implied term of the contract is that the alleged oral agreement does not comply with the third condition as formulated by Judge ANDREWS. In this case, therefore, the problem reduces itself to the one question whether or not the oral agreement meets the third condition.

I have conceded that upon inspection the contract is complete. "It appears to contain the engagements of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of such engagement;" it constitutes the contract between them and is presumed to contain the whole of that contract. (Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 X. Y. 288.) That engagement was on the one side to convey land; on the other to pay the price. The plaintiff asserts further agreement based on the same consideration to be performed by the defendants after the conveyance was complete, and directly affecting only other land. It is true, as Judge ANDREWS points out, that "the presence of the ice house, even the knowledge that Mrs. Mitchill thought it objectionable, would not lead to the belief that a separate agreement existed with regard to it;" but the question we must decide is whether or not, assuming an agreement was made for the removal of an unsightly ice house from one parcel of land as an inducement for the purchase of another parcel, the parties would ordinarily or naturally be expected to embody the agreement for the removal of the ice house from one parcel in the written agreement to convey the other parcel. Exclusion of proof of the oral agreement on the ground that it varies the contract embodied in the [387] writing may be based only upon a finding or presumption that the written contract was intended to cover the oral negotiations for the removal of the ice house which lead up to the contract of purchase and sale. To determine what the writing was intended to cover

"the document alone will not suffice. What it was intended to cover cannot be known till we know what there was to cover. The question being whether certain subjects of negotiation were intended to be covered, we must compare the writing and the negotiations before we can determine whether they were in fact covered."

(Wigmore on Evidence [2d ed.], section 2430.)

The subject-matter of the written contract was the conveyance of land. The contract was so complete on its face that the conclusion is inevitable that the parties intended to embody in the writing all the negotiations covering at least the conveyance. The promise by the defendants to remove the ice house from other land was not connected with their obligation to convey, except that one agreement would not have been made unless the other was also made. The plaintiff's assertion of a parol agreement by the defendants to remove the ice house was completely established by the great weight of evidence. It must prevail unless that agreement was part of the agreement to convey and the entire agreement was embodied in the writing.

The fact that in this case the parol agreement is established by the overwhelming weight of evidence is, of course, not a factor which may be considered in determining the competency or legal effect of the evidence. Hardship in the particular case would not justify the court in disregarding or emasculating the general rule. It merely accentuates the outlines of our problem. The assumption that the parol agreement was made is no longer obscured by any doubts. The problem then is clearly whether the parties are presumed to have intended to render that parol agreement legally ineffective [388] and non-existent by failure to embody it in the writing. Though we are driven to say that nothing in the written contract which fixed the terms and conditions of the stipulated conveyance suggests the existence of any further parol agreement, an inspection of the contract, though it is complete on its face in regard to the subject of the conveyance, does not, I think, show that it was intended to embody negotiations or agreements, if any, in regard to a matter so loosely bound to the conveyance as the removal of an ice house from land not conveyed.

The rule of integration undoubtedly frequently prevents the assertion of fraudulent claims. Parties who take the precaution of embodying their oral agreements in a wilting should be protected against the assertion that other terms of the same agreement were not integrated in the writing. The limits of the integration are determined by the writing, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances. A written contract, however complete, yet covers only a limited field. I do not think that in the written contract for the conveyance of land here under consideration we can find an intention to cover a field so broad as to include prior agreements, if any such were made, to do other acts on other property after the stipulated conveyance was made.

In each case where such a problem is presented, varying factors enter into its solution. Citation of authority in this or other jurisdictions is useless, at least without minute analysis of the facts. The analysis I have made of the decisions in this State leads me to the view that the decision of the courts below is in accordance with our own authorities and should be affirmed.

CARDOZO, Ch. J., POUND, KELLOGG and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur with ANDREWS, J.; LEHMAN, J., dissents in opinion in which CRANE, J., concurs.

Judgment accordingly.

6.2 Hatley v. Stafford 6.2 Hatley v. Stafford

588 P.2d 603 (1978)
284 Or. 523

Michael R. HATLEY, Respondent,
v.
Margaret R. STAFFORD, Defendant, and
Robert R. Stafford and Staffordshire, Inc., a Corporation, Appellants.

No. 75-4433; SC 25168.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted April 5, 1978.
Decided December 19, 1978.

[604] Donald A. Gallagher, Jr., Eugene, argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Roy E. Adkins, and Jaqua & Wheatley, P.C., Eugene.

Stuart M. Brown of Young, Horn, Cass & Scott, Eugene, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

HOWELL, Justice.

Plaintiff, lessee, filed this action for trespass against defendants, lessors. The property involved is a 52-acre farm in Lane County. The defendants contended they were entitled under the lease agreement to terminate the lease and recover possession.

The following is the entire written agreement of the parties relating to the lease:

"Oct. 16, 1974
"Stafford Farm agrees to rent to Mike Hatley Rt. 1 Box 83, Halsey, Ore. approximately 52 acres till Sept. 1st 1975 for the purpose of growing wheat with the follow [sic] condition: — Stafford Farm shall have the right to buy out Mr. Mike Hatley at a figure of his cost per acre but not to exceed 70.00 per acre. This buy out is for the express purpose of developing a Mobile Home Park.
"Terms shall be $1800.00 paid on or before Jan. 20th 1975 balance due Sept. 20, 1975. The Rent figure shall be $50.00 per acre.

"Stafford Farm "By /s/ Robert R. Stafford Mgr. /s/ Mike Hatley"

Plaintiff Hatley alleged that between June 8 and June 11, 1975, defendants trespassed on the property by taking possession of the farm and cutting the immature wheat crop. The defendants alleged in their answer that they exercised their right to terminate the lease in order to build a mobile home park and that they offered to pay plaintiff his cost per acre but not to exceed $70 per acre. Plaintiff demanded $400 per acre, the fair market value of the wheat crop.

In plaintiff's reply, he alleged that the written agreement was not the entire integrated agreement of the parties, and that the parties orally agreed the buy out provision of the lease would apply only for a period of 30 to 60 days after the execution of the lease.

The trial court allowed plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning the alleged oral agreement limiting the time in which the buy out provision could be exercised. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. The only error asserted on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing admission of the parol evidence [605] relating to the time limit on the buy out agreement.

The parol evidence rule[1] applies only to those aspects of a bargain that the parties intend to memorialize in the writing. Caldwell et ux. v. Wells, 228 Or. 389, 395, 365 P.2d 505 (1961). The fact that a writing exists does not bring the rule into play if the parties do not intend the writing to embody their final agreement. National Cash Register Co. v. IMC, Inc., 260 Or. 504, 491 P.2d 211 (1971); Sternes v. Tucker, 239 Or. 105, 395 P.2d 881 (1964); Bouchet v. Oregon Motor Car Co., 78 Or. 230, 152 P. 888 (1915). Neither does the rule apply when the parties intended the writing to contain only part of their agreement. Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 264 Or. 200, 504 P.2d 749 (1972); Hirsch v. Salem Mills Co., 40 Or. 601, 67 P. 949, reh. denied 68 P. 733 (1902); Contract Co. v. Bridge Co., 29 Or. 549, 46 P. 138 (1896). See also 3A Corbin on Contracts § 581 (1960).

In the present case, plaintiff sought to show that the written lease was a "partial integration," i.e., that the written contract included some, but not all, of the terms of the actual agreement. Defendants contend that such a showing could be made only if the oral agreement was "not inconsistent" with the writing and was "an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement * * *." Caldwell et ux. v. Wells, supra, 228 Or. at 395, 365 P.2d at 508. Plaintiff argues that these limitations apply only after it has been demonstrated that the writing is a complete integration, that whether a writing was intended to be a complete integration is a question of fact, and that the jury may consider any relevant evidence in deciding this question of fact. Both parties find support for their positions in past opinions by this court. Compare [606] Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra, and Land Reclamation v. Riverside Corp., 261 Or. 180, 492 P.2d 263 (1972) (both supporting plaintiff's position) with Caldwell et ux. v. Wells, supra, and DeVore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 265 Or. 388, 508 P.2d 220 (1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 913, 94 S.Ct. 1408, 39 L.Ed.2d 467 (1974) (both supporting defendants' position). A brief review of these cases will illustrate the difficulty of the problem.

In Caldwell, defendant agreed to sell plaintiff a house and a lot and also promised that a well would be drilled on the lot. The parties executed a one-page "Earnest Money Receipt" that made no mention of the promise to drill the well. This court held that the parol evidence rule applied only to those aspects of the bargain that the parties intended to memorialize in the writing, and that whether or not the "Earnest Money Receipt" was intended to embody the entire agreement was a question of fact. Having done this, we then adopted the Restatement of Contracts position, which states:

"(1) An oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration relating to the same subject-matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated contract, and
"(a) is made for separate consideration, or
"(b) is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract." 1 Restatement of Contracts 335, § 240 (1932).

Because the promise to have the well drilled might naturally be made as an agreement separate from the promise to convey the land, we held that parol evidence was admissible to prove the former promise.

In Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra, defendant contended that evidence of an oral agreement should have been excluded under the parol evidence rule. We said:

"The complaint alleged that certain terms of the employment contract were memorialized in a collective bargaining agreement, but other terms were orally agreed upon between the parties to this proceeding. This is an allegation of an unintegrated agreement; therefore, the parol evidence rule does not apply." 264 Or. at 202, 504 P.2d at 750.

No mention was made of the Restatement test.

Land Reclamation v. Riverside Corporation, supra, involved a deed purporting to transfer real property without restriction and a prior land sale contract restricting the property to use as a sanitary landfill. We held that the land sale contract was an agreement that might naturally be made separately from the deed, and that parol evidence was therefore admissible to prove the restriction. In dicta, however, we stated that "§ 240 [of the Restatement] assumes that the adoption of the writing has been proved. * * * [I]f the previous agreement is not of the type which might naturally be made as a separate agreement, it will nevertheless control if it is shown that the parties intended that agreement, rather than the subsequent writing should control." 261 Or. at 183, n. 4, 492 P.2d at 264.

The dicta in Land Reclamation subsequently was contradicted by dicta in DeVore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., supra, although DeVore did not cite Land Reclamation by name. DeVore involved an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement that defendant employer sought to show was inapplicable to plaintiff employees. The employer alleged an oral agreement to exclude the employees from certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and the employees claimed that proof of the oral agreement was barred by the parol evidence rule. We stated the general rule that, "Whether the parties intended to integrate their agreement in the writing is a question of fact in each case," but then went on to note:

"If this were the correct rule, without any further limitations, evidence could always be offered of any prior or contemporaneous oral agreement and in all cases [607] the question whether the parties intended to supersede such an oral agreement by the integration of their entire agreement into the terms of the written contract would be a question of fact which must always be submitted to the trier of the facts, whether court or jury. It may be said, however, with some justification, that the adoption of such a rule, without any limitations, would emasculate, if not `repeal,' the parol evidence rule, which is a rule adopted by statute in Oregon, as in many other states." 265 Or. at 400-01, 508 P.2d at 225-226 (footnote omitted).

We then stated that the Restatement criteria imposed "limitations" on the evidence that can be considered in determining the intent of the parties. Nevertheless, we held the parol evidence admissible because representatives of the employees had admitted that the writing was not intended to be a complete integration.

The inconsistency in our prior decisions reflects a long-standing disagreement among courts and commentators generally as to the applicability of the parol evidence rule. Before examining the merits of the conflicting views, it is useful to consider the background and theory of the rule. The rule apparently was an outgrowth of the law governing contracts under seal. Because the King's word was indisputable, the King's seal on a document made the document uncontestable. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence 83, § 2426 (3d ed. 1940). The status of writings was further enhanced by the enactment of the Statute of Wills and the Statute of Frauds, both of which made certain transactions legally unenforceable unless they were in writing. This theory was gradually applied to contracts generally, until finally the writing came to be regarded as the agreement itself, rather than merely as evidence of the agreement. Id. at 91.

Modernly, the parol evidence rule has often been justified on grounds of commercial certainty. If parol evidence were allowed to be offered in contradiction of writings, it has been feared that the likelihood of perjury would increase. Calamari & Perillo, The Law of Contracts 109 (2d ed. 1977). It is also believed that the rule is needed to ensure that juries will not decide cases on the "equities," the theory being that the economic underdog will most often be the party seeking to vary the terms of the writing by parol evidence. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 Yale L.J. 365 (1932).

On the other hand, it has been observed that in a modern society where much of business is transacted over the telephone, contracts that are partly oral and partly written have become increasingly common. Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 972, 983 (1969). Moreover, in an era of adhesion contracts and unequal bargaining power, the extent to which many writings actually embody the agreement of the parties is debatable. Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 Cornell L.Rev. 1036, 1056 (1968). Finally, it is doubtful that the rule discourages perjury, since the rule can be avoided by fabricating an oral agreement subsequent to the execution of the writing. Cf., Allen v. Allen, 275 Or. 471, 551 P.2d 459 (1976).

The rule does, however, serve an important function. If the parties in fact have assented to the writing as the embodiment of their entire agreement, each should be able to rely on the terms of the writing as conclusive evidence of what they have agreed to. As Professor Corbin observes:

"No contract whether oral or written can be varied, contradicted or discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may control the effect of what happened yesterday; but what happened yesterday cannot change the effect of what happens today." 3A Corbin on Contracts 371-72, § 574 (1960); see also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939 (1967).

The difficulty arises when one of the parties asserts, as does the plaintiff in the present case, that the writing does not contain all the terms of the actual agreement. [608] Because the parol evidence rule applies only to complete and final integrations, and because the existence of an integration depends on the intent of the parties, it has been argued that any relevant evidence of the parties' intent should be admissible and that the actual intent of the parties should be a factual question for the jury. As we observed in DeVore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., supra, however, a rule allowing the jury to consider any relevant evidence in deciding whether the writing was intended to be a complete integration "without any limitations, would emasculate, if not `repeal,' the parol evidence rule, which is a rule adopted by statute in Oregon * * *." 265 Or. at 401, 508 P.2d at 226. Consequently, we have recognized the criteria of § 240 of the Restatement of Contracts as imposing limitations on the admissibility of evidence in cases involving the partial integration doctrine. We believe these limitations remain appropriate, despite our occasional statements to the contrary.

On the other hand, the Restatement criteria are not to be applied mechanically or formalistically. As noted above, the purpose of the parol evidence rule is to give special effect to writings only in those cases where the parties intended the writing to be a final and complete statement of their agreement. Insofar as possible, the Restatement criteria should be applied in a manner consistent with that purpose.

Before applying these principles to the facts of the present case, mention should be made of the functions of court and jury in cases involving the parol evidence rule. Both plaintiff and defendants appear to have assumed that the jury decides whether or not the parties intended their writing to be a final and complete integration. Such is not the law. As McCormick notes, "The question [of whether the parties intended the writing to be a complete integration] is one for the court, for it relates to the admission or rejection of evidence." McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 437, § 215 (1954), quoting Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331, 338 (1882). In deciding that the parties did not intend the writing to be an integration, however, the court does not decide that the alleged oral terms actually were agreed upon. That determination is left to the jury. The court's decision is one of admissibility, not probity.[2]

In the present case, the trial court decided that the written agreement of the parties was not a complete integration of their actual agreement, and permitted plaintiff to introduce evidence that the buy out provision in the written lease was subject to an oral time limitation. No contention is made that the oral agreement was supported by separate consideration, so the trial court's ruling can be upheld only if the agreement: (1) was "not inconsistent" with the written lease and (2) was "such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were parties to the written contract." DeVore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., supra; Caldwell et ux. v. Wells, supra (emphasis added).

Defendant argues that the oral time limitation is "clearly inconsistent" with the terms of the written lease, reasoning that a buy out provision with no time limitation on a lease for a fixed term must be read to run for the entire term of the lease. We do not define the term "inconsistent" so broadly. To be "inconsistent" within the meaning of the partial integration doctrine, the oral term must contradict an express provision [609] in the writing. As the court observed in Hunt Foods and Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App.Div.2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966):

"In a sense any oral provision which would prevent the ripening of the obligations of a writing is inconsistent with the writing. But that obviously is not the sense in which the word is used * * *. To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable." 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (emphasis added).

See also, Braund, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1971), and Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 App.Div.2d 395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1968), both following the Hunt court's definition of "inconsistent."

In the instant case, nothing is contained in the writing with respect to the duration of the buy out provision. Therefore, the oral time limitation is "not inconsistent" with the terms of the writing.

Defendants argue that even if the oral term is not inconsistent with the terms of the writing, the parol evidence should have been excluded because the oral term "naturally" would have been included in the writing. We disagree.

In determining whether or not an oral term is one that "naturally" would have been included in the writing, the trial court is not limited to a consideration of the face of the document. This court has recognized that "* * * the surrounding circumstances, as well as the written contract, may be considered." Blehm v. Ringering, 260 Or. 46, 50, 488 P.2d 798, 800 (1971). When considering the surrounding circumstances, the trial court should be aware of the fact that parties with business experience are more likely to reduce their entire agreement to writing than parties without such experience, TSS Sportswear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop, Inc., 380 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.1967), and that this is especially true when the parties are represented by counsel on both sides. Scott-Douglas Corp. v. Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309 (Del.Super. 1973). The relative bargaining strength of the parties also should be considered, since a transaction not negotiated at arm's length may result in a writing that omits essential terms. Cf., Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972). And, of course, the apparent completeness and detail of the writing itself may lead the court to conclude the parties intended the writing to be a complete integration of their agreement. Unique Watch Crystal Co. v. Kotler, 344 Ill. App. 54, 99 N.E.2d 728 (1951). See also, Sweet, supra at 1064-67.

This is not to say, however, that the trial court should readily admit parol evidence whenever one of the parties claims a writing does not include all the terms of an agreement. The court should presume that the writing was intended to be a complete integration, at least when the writing is complete on its face, and should admit evidence of consistent additional terms only if there is substantial evidence that the parties did not intend the writing to embody the entire agreement. Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 Or.L.Rev. 91 (1925).

In the present case, there are a number of facts that could have led the trial court to conclude that it was natural for the parties "situated as were parties to the written contract" to have omitted the time limitation on the buy out provision from the written lease. First, this was not a sophisticated business transaction in which the parties could be expected to include all the terms of their agreement in the writing. Cf., Deering v. Alexander, 281 Or. 607, 576 P.2d 8 (1978). The lease agreement was a handwritten document that hardly shows the kind of careful preparation that accompanies a formal integration. See Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts 102 (2d ed. 1977). Moreover, the agreement was concluded by the parties themselves, without counsel to advise them of the consequences of the writing. This case is therefore analogous to the leading case of Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968), where the court, per Chief Justice Traynor, stated:

"* * * There is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties to this [610] family transaction, through experience in land transactions or otherwise, had any warning of the disadvantages of failing to put the whole agreement in the deed. This case is one, therefore, in which it can be said that a collateral agreement such as that alleged `might naturally be made as a separate agreement.'" 65 Cal. Rptr. at 549, 436 P.2d at 565.

Finally, the trial court was entitled to consider the fact that a literal reading of the written contract would have led to an unreasonable result. Plaintiff was contending the wheat crop he had planted would be worth $400 per acre at harvest. The written agreement, standing alone, would have allowed the defendants to exercise the buy out provision the day before harvest and pay plaintiff $70 per acre for wheat worth $400 per acre. While the mere fact that a contract is one-sided does not by itself justify a conclusion that the writing does not embody the entire agreement of the parties, the trial court may consider that fact in deciding whether the parties intended additional provisions to be included in the agreement. TSS Sportswear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop, Inc., supra at 519.

For these reasons, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's decision to admit the parol evidence. The trial court was entitled to consider "the surrounding circumstances, as well as the written contract * * *." Blehm v. Ringering, supra. Under the circumstances of the present case, the parol evidence was properly admitted, and the question of whether the parties actually agreed to the time limitation was properly left to the jury.

Affirmed.

LENT, Justice, dissenting.

I must respectfully dissent. The majority opinion and the result thereby achieved in this case make the statute meaningless. The statute is clear:

"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives or successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement, other than the contents of the writing, * * *." ORS 41.740

It excludes any evidence of the terms of an agreement reduced to writing other than the agreement itself. The statute would have to read differently to permit legislatively what this court permits by "interpreting" or "construing" the statute. The effect of this court's decisions has been to revise the statutory language to provide somewhat as follows:

"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is not to be considered as containing all those terms if there is oral testimony or evidence other than the contents of the writing that the agreement is incomplete."

If that is what the legislature meant to say, it is surprising that they chose the language now found in ORS 41.740 (which is unchanged from Sec. 682 of the Act of October 11, 1862).

The majority says that the statute is a codification of the parol evidence rule known to the common law, and therefore, the exceptions to the common law rule are an existing but unwritten list of exceptions to the statute. Not only that, but the majority seems to say further that whenever a common law court constructs another exception, this court may, if it finds the exception seemly, adopt it as an implied amendment to the 1862 Act. Would the majority apply the statute as written if the next legislative assembly were to reenact the Act of October 11, 1862, and add: "And this time we mean it"?

Were the statute applied as written, those who take the trouble to reduce their agreement to writing should be reasonably certain as to their rights and obligations. Trials would be simpler and cheaper. If it be said that the statute is harsh, I know of no better way to demonstrate its harshness or unfairness than to apply it strictly. The legislature could then actually enact a statute which would read as the majority's version of the present statute.

[611] As to the case at bar the majority says that what the plaintiff contends was an unwritten part and parcel of the written agreement is not "inconsistent" with the part actually written. This will surely surprise the defendant who finds that by the opinion in this case "not to exceed 70 [dollars] per acre" is consistent with $400 per acre. Although he had no lawyer to advise him at the time of making his writing, this plaintiff farmer cannot be so lacking in sophistication as to know or realize that it's just as easy to write "400.00" as it is to write "70.00" if that is truly what the parties intended and agreed.

The majority says generally:

"This is not to say, however, that the trial court should readily admit parol evidence whenever one of the parties claims a writing does not include all the terms of an agreement. The court should presume that the writing was intended to be a complete integration, at least when the writing is complete on its face, and should admit evidence of consistent additional terms only if there is substantial evidence that the parties did not intend the writing to embody the entire agreement."

Whatever the majority may mean by "substantial evidence" the rule just set forth should defeat this plaintiff's claim, not vindicate it. The writing is complete on its face, the additional terms are not consistent, and the "substantial evidence" is the plaintiff's testimony.

I respectfully dissent.

[1]ORS 41.740 states, in pertinent part:

"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives or successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement, other than the contents of the writing, * * *."

Concededly, a literal reading of this statute would exclude any parol evidence of the terms of an agreement once that agreement had been reduced to writing by the parties. This court, however, has never read the statute in such a manner, but instead has treated the statute as a codification of the common law parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Blehm v. Ringering, 260 Or. 46, 488 P.2d 798 (1971) ("* * * ORS 41.740 is the parol evidence rule"). Consequently, we have recognized the various common law "exceptions" to the parol evidence rule in applying the statute, even though such exceptions do not appear in the statute. DeVore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 265 Or. 388, 508 P.2d 220 (1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 913, 94 S.Ct. 1408, 39 L.Ed.2d 467 (1974) (holding the rule inapplicable when the party objecting to the parol evidence admits the oral term was agreed to); Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 264 Or. 200, 504 P.2d 749 (1972) (recognizing the "partial integration" exception to the rule); National Cash Register Co. v. IMC, Inc., 260 Or. 504, 491 P.2d 211 (1971) (recognizing that the rule does not apply when the parties do not intend the writing to be a "final" statement of their agreement); Sternes v. Tucker, 239 Or. 105, 395 P.2d 881 (1964) (holding that the rule does not bar proof that the parties intended the writing to be subject to an oral condition).

Although these decisions may be inconsistent with a literal reading of the statute, which has been in effect since 1862, they can be justified under the general rule that statutes codifying the common law are to be construed in a manner consistent with the common law. See 2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 50.02 (Sands ed. 1973). Without undertaking a comprehensive study of the application of the parol evidence rule at common law, it is sufficient to note for purposes of this opinion that at the time ORS 41.740's original predecessor was enacted (see General Laws of Oregon § 682 (1874)), the "partial integration" doctrine discussed herein was recognized by both courts and commentators. See Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill 171 (N.Y. 1842) (note given for wood on plaintiff's land did not bar proof of oral agreement that plaintiff would bear risk of loss of fire); Jefferey v. Walton, 1 Starkie 267 (1816) (written contract to hire horse did not bar proof of oral agreement that hirer took risks of accidents from his shying); 1 G. Greenleaf, A Treatise of the Law of Evidence 331 (13th ed. 1876); T. Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence 724 (10th ed. 1876).

We note also that the Supreme Court of California, which operates under a statute identical to ORS 41.740, treats its statute as a codification of the common law and has recognized the partial integration doctrine as well. Cal. Code Civ.Pro. § 1856 (West 1955); Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968).

[2]Wigmore explains the procedure thusly:

"* * * There is a preliminary question for the judge to decide as to the intent of the parties, and upon this he hears evidence on both sides; his decision here, pro or con, concerns merely this question preliminary to the ruling of law. If he decides that the transaction was covered by the writing, he does not decide that the excluded negotiations did not take place, but merely that if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial. If he decides that the transaction was not intended to be covered by the writing, he does not decide that the negotiations did take place, but merely that if they did, they are legally effective, and he then leaves to the jury the determination of fact whether they did take place." 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence 98, § 2430 (3d ed. 1940) (footnotes omitted).

6.3 Robert Industries, Inc. v. Spence 6.3 Robert Industries, Inc. v. Spence

362 Mass. 751 (1973)
291 N.E.2d 407

ROBERT INDUSTRIES, INC.
vs.
WILLIAM J. SPENCE & others (and a companion case).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

October 4, 1972.
January 5, 1973.

Present: TAURO, C.J., REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, & KAPLAN, JJ.

Robert F. Sylvia for William J. Spence & others.

Leo Sontag (Raymond W. Rawlings with him) for Robert Industries, Inc.

BRAUCHER, J.

The plaintiff filed two bills in the Superior Court. The first sought an accounting for the interference by the defendant Spence, through the defendant corporations controlled by him, with a right granted to the plaintiff by the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC). The second sought a declaration that a lease from the MDC to the plaintiff gave the plaintiff an exclusive right to serve food for money on George's Island in Boston Harbor and also sought an [752] injunction against such activity on the part of Spence and his corporations. One of the defendant corporations in the first suit, Massachusetts Bay Lines, Inc., by counterclaim sought damages for unfair competition.

The judge made findings, rulings and an order for decree in each case, ruled that the plaintiff has the exclusive right it claims, and granted the declaratory relief and injunction prayed for in the second suit. In the first suit he found that the defendants acted in the honest belief, in accordance with an opinion of MDC counsel, that the lease did not grant the exclusive right claimed, and dismissed the bill. In view of his findings in the companion case he found no damage on the counterclaim. The defendants appeal from the final decrees in both suits. The evidence is reported.

We summarize the judge's findings. Before 1967 Spence or his corporation had a lease from the MDC as a concessionaire on George's Island, and ran clambakes. During 1967 and 1968 there was no concessionaire on the island, and the facilities fell into disrepair. During this period Spence or his corporations continued to run clambakes on the island, using some of the same facilities. On May 14, 1969, the MDC leased to the plaintiff for five years portions of three buildings and certain adjoining areas on the island for the purpose of running a food and beverage concession. The lease refers to use of one of the buildings as an "indoor picnic area," and the plaintiff serves clambakes there in inclement weather. The lease also refers to a "Regular Concession Stand," which it also calls a "Regular Snack Bar," and to the use of an adjacent area "for lobster and fish handling." The lease requires the plaintiff to renovate and repair the leased areas, and provides that the MDC shall receive ten per cent of the plaintiff's gross receipts.

The critical provision of the lease is paragraph 8: "The Commission agrees that during the time this concession lease is in force, it shall not grant a lease to any other person or company which shall in any way [753] compete with the concession herein granted. The Commission, however, reserves the right to permit patrons to bring their own food and beverages for their own personal use into and upon the Island." The judge found that provision ambiguous and that the MDC and the plaintiff intended that no other food be served on the island for money except that purchased through the plaintiff. The second sentence of paragraph 8 was intended to permit individuals or small groups of individuals to bring their own picnic lunches or food to the island for preparation in outdoor grills provided by the MDC and to consume it there. It was not the intent of the MDC or the plaintiff to permit the preparation and service of food on the island for profit by any individual or company other than the plaintiff.

Spence, through a corporation whose principal business is the operation of harbor boats on scheduled runs and sightseeing trips, has been advertising and running clambakes on the island during 1969, 1970 and 1971. It solicits the business of groups of individuals and charges a price which includes transportation to and from the island and a price for the clambake. The food is in part prepared on the mainland, taken to the island on small boats, and further prepared, cooked and served on the island in areas not covered by the plaintiff's lease. There is no lease to Spence or his corporations, and they pay no fee to the MDC.

1. Contrary to the defendants' contention, there was no error in the admission of evidence of the facts and circumstances of the transaction, including the situation and relations of the parties, for the purpose of applying the terms of the written contract to the subject matter and removing and explaining any uncertainty or ambiguity which arose from such application. Stoops v. Smith, 100 Mass. 63, 66. A lease is to be read in the light of the circumstances of its execution, which may enable the court to see that its words are really ambiguous. Sheff v. Candy Box Inc. 274 Mass. 402, 406. When the written agreement, as applied to the [754] subject matter, is in any respect uncertain or equivocal in meaning, all the circumstances of the parties leading to its execution may be shown for the purpose of elucidating, but not of contradicting or changing its terms. Smith v. Vose & Sons Piano Co. 194 Mass. 193, 200. Goldenberg v. Taglino, 218 Mass. 357, 359. See Restatement 2d: Contracts (Tent. draft No. 5, March 31, 1970), §§ 235, 236, (Tent. draft No. 6, March 31, 1971), §§ 240, 241. Compare Uniform Commercial Code, G.L.c. 106, § 2-202, inserted by St. 1957, c. 765, § 1. Expressions in our cases to the effect that evidence of circumstances can be admitted only after an ambiguity has been found on the face of the written instrument have reference to evidence offered to contradict the written terms. See Violette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 84; Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 61.

2. In view of its completeness and specificity, the lease reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, and it is therefore taken to be a complete agreement in the absence of contrary evidence. Compare Welch v. Bombardieri, 252 Mass. 84, 87; Caputo v. Continental Constr. Corp. 340 Mass. 15, 18; Carlo Bianchi & Co. Inc. v. Builders' Equip. & Supplies Co. 347 Mass. 636, 643-644; Restatement 2d: Contracts (Tent. draft No. 5, March 31, 1970), § 235 (3). In fact, the evidence confirmed the normal inference. The treasurer of the plaintiff, who runs its business, testified that after consulting with counsel he signed the lease at the MDC office. Before signing, he read the lease and told an MDC attorney that he was concerned about a typographical error as to the size of a room. He "was told that where the Commission had signed the lease, that they'd have to redo the whole thing." He also said that he wanted to "make darn sure there's no question that I have any competition.... I don't want any other commercial caterer." The MDC attorney said, "That is all taken care of in the lease," and the plaintiff's treasurer then signed the lease. This testimony shows quite clearly [755] that the parties thought their rights and duties with respect to competing caterers were to be governed by the terms of the written lease.

The interpretation of an integrated agreement is a matter of law on which we are not bound by the trial judge's conclusions unless the problem of interpretation is affected by findings of fact. Quintin Vespa Co. Inc. v. Construction Serv. Co. 343 Mass. 547, 551. Seward v. Weeks, 360 Mass. 410, 413. See Restatement 2d: Contracts (Tent. draft No. 5, March 31, 1970), § 238. Interpretation is directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing in the light of the circumstances, not to the meaning of the conversations of the parties in the course of their negotiations. Wentworth v. Manhattan Mkt. Co. 216 Mass. 374, 376-377. The plaintiff was not "precluded from showing forth the transaction in all its length and breadth." Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N.Y. 332, 336. "After interpretation has called to its help all those facts which make up the setting in which the words are used," however, "the words themselves remain the most important evidence of intention; to put them altogether aside may at times be necessary but it always somewhat savors of usurpation...." National City Bank v. Goess, 130 F.2d 376, 380.

The critical provision of the lease here in issue forbids the MDC to grant a competing "lease"; it also reserves to the MDC "the right to permit" certain activities by "patrons" not described as lessees. If the first part of the provision is limited to leases, the plaintiff argues, the second part has no effect, except perhaps as an unnecessary partial description of what is not a lease. Reading the provision as a whole and seeking to give meaning to each part, the argument continues, we must hold that all that is not permitted is forbidden and that "lease" includes any commercial competition with the plaintiff. But the lease nowhere says that activities not expressly permitted are forbidden. It simply does not deal with competition other [756] than competition by lessees. The plaintiff's reading places a strain on the word "lease" greater than it can bear.

The testimony of the plaintiff's treasurer does not help the plaintiff. That testimony strongly indicates that the witness understood, at the time he signed the lease, that the MDC attorney had no authority to vary the lease terms unless the Commissioners signed the lease again. The witness had consulted with counsel and had read the lease, and there is nothing to indicate that he thought the MDC attorney was giving or was authorized to give an official interpretation of the lease. If he had been authorized to vary or interpret the lease, parol evidence that before the lease was executed the parties had agreed to forbid competition by commercial caterers other than lessees could not be permitted to control the interpretation of the lease as finally drawn up and executed. Burns v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 312 Mass. 551, 553.

3. The counterclaim filed by one of the corporate defendants was dismissed solely on the ground that the plaintiff had an exclusive right to put on clambakes on George's Island, and that hence the defendant suffered no damage. Since the plaintiff, under a proper interpretation of the lease, had no such exclusive right, the counterclaim was improperly dismissed.

4. The final decree in each of the two cases is reserved. In the suit for declaratory relief a decree is to enter declaring that the conduct of clambakes on George's Island on premises not covered by the lease between the MDC and the plaintiff does not violate paragraph 8 of that lease. The suit for an accounting is remanded to the Superior Court for trial on the counterclaim of the defendant Massachusetts Bay Lines, Inc. The defendants are to have costs of appeal.

So ordered.

6.4 Restatement (2d) Effects of Writings 6.4 Restatement (2d) Effects of Writings

Restatement (Second) of Contracts – Effects of Writings

209 – Integrated Agreements

(1) An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.

(2) Whether there is an integrated agreement is to be determined by the court as a question preliminary to determination of a question of interpretation or to application of the parol evidence rule.

(3) Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression.

212 – Interpretation of Integrated Agreement

(1) The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing or writings in the light of the circumstances, in accordance with the rules stated in this Chapter.

(2) A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise a question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of law.

213 Effect of Integrated Agreement on Prior Agreements (Parol Evidence Rule)

(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.

(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.

(3) An integrated agreement that is not binding or that is voidable and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement. But an integrated agreement, even though not binding, may be effective to render inoperative a term which would have been part of the agreement if it had not been integrated.

214 Evidence of Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements and Negotiations

Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish:

(a) that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement;

(b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or partially integrated;

(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated;

(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other invalidating cause;

(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation, specific performance, or other remedy.

6.5 UCC 2-202 (Final Written Expression) 6.5 UCC 2-202 (Final Written Expression)

2-202 Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence.

Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented:

(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and

(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.

6.6 Federal Deposit Insurance v. W.R. Grace & Co. 6.6 Federal Deposit Insurance v. W.R. Grace & Co.

877 F.2d 614 (1989)

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
W.R. GRACE & CO. and Grace Petroleum Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 88-2275.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 23, 1989.
Decided June 21, 1989.
Rehearing and Rehearing Denied September 11, 1989.

[615] [616] Denis McInerney, Cahill Gordon & Reindel, Charles A. Gilman, New York City, W. Donald McSweeney, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Allan Horwich, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.

William E. Rattner, Hopkins & Sutter, Paul K. Vickrey, Thomas M. Dethlefs, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and POSNER and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 11, 1989.

POSNER, Circuit Judge.

This case began as a diversity suit (governed, the parties agree, by Illinois law) for fraud. The plaintiff was Continental Illinois National Bank, the defendants W.R. Grace & Co. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Grace Petroleum Corporation. The parties treat the two Graces as interchangeable; so shall we. The appeal presents questions of contract law and damages.

Continental had made a $75 million nonrecourse production payment loan to Grace to enable it to develop some natural-gas fields in Mississippi, and when one of the fields turned out to be worthless Continental contended that Grace had induced the loan by fraud. Shortly after filing the suit [617] Continental assigned the loan to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which had bailed out the failing Continental. The FDIC substituted itself for Continental as the plaintiff and switched the statutory basis of federal jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity) to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (suits "commenced by" the United States), 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction). After a four-week trial a jury awarded the FDIC $25 million in compensatory damages and $75 million in punitive damages. The district judge cut the award of punitive damages to $25 million.

Grace appeals, raising a variety of grounds of which the first and least is that there is no federal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of suits by and against the FDIC is specified in section 1819 Fourth of the Banking Code, which provides that all suits to which the FDIC is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States (thus bringing section 1331, the federal-question statute, into play), unless the FDIC is a party "in its capacity as receiver of a State bank." Since Continental is a national bank rather than a state bank, this exception to federal jurisdiction would not apply even if the FDIC had been suing as a receiver, which it was not; an assignee is not a receiver. See, e.g., FDIC v. Braemoor Associates, 686 F.2d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir.1982); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 665 (7th Cir.1986) (dictum). Elefant hints that substituting the FDIC for a state bank in a diversity suit that had already been filed would not destroy diversity jurisdiction, see id. at 666, unless the assignment was for the purpose of conferring federal jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377, 382 (7th Cir.1988). Jurisdiction normally depends on the facts when the case was brought rather than on what happens later. But no more than in Elefant need we resolve the issue in order to confirm the district court's jurisdiction; Continental was not a state bank.

Grace has not shown any error in the district judge's jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, so we take the facts to be as favorable to the FDIC as a reasonable jury could have found them to be. In 1980 Grace decided to bid for a 50 percent interest in three natural-gas fields owned by a subsidiary of Centex Corporation — the Thomasville, East Thomasville, and Southwest Piney Woods fields, all in the same part of Mississippi. Four wells had already been drilled in the first two fields and three were planned for Southwest Piney Woods, of which one had been drilled but was not yet producing. To finance the purchase, Grace went to its long-time banker, Continental, for a $75 million "nonrecourse production payments loan" — a loan repayable only out of the revenues from the gas fields and not out of Grace's other assets. If the fields proved to be nonproductive, the loan would not be repaid and Continental would have no remedy for the default.

Officers of Grace showed Continental a reserve report prepared by an independent engineering firm. The report showed Southwest Piney Woods with 42 percent of the total gas reserves in the fields, although none of the proven reserves because no producing wells had been drilled yet in that field. A petroleum engineer employed by Continental reviewed the reserve report and concluded that the proven reserves in the other two fields — all he considered — had a loan value of $75 million. This was exactly equal to the loan that Grace was seeking and so left no margin for error. Next to the Southwest Piney Woods estimates the engineer wrote, "all assumed Dry!" Apparently this was his way of saying that in order to be ultraconservative in his evaluation he had ignored Southwest Piney Woods because it had no producing wells as yet. (In other words, the emphasis falls on the word "assumed.") Despite his evaluation of the Thomasville and East Thomasville fields, he told his boss that he was uncomfortable about the loan, but his boss reassured him by pointing out that the Southwest Piney Woods field could be pledged to repay the loan too, and this would provide insurance in case the Thomasville fields turned out to be less [618] productive than expected or the price of gas fell. Consistent with this assurance, when Grace asked Continental to exclude Southwest Piney Woods from the properties dedicated to the repayment of the loan Continental refused.

On March 14, 1980, Continental wrote Grace that it was "pleased to commit to provide $75,000,000 in a production payment loan for the benefit of W.R. Grace & Co. The terms of the loan are summarized below." Provisions follow regarding interest rate (prime plus one percent), balances, maturity (December 31, 1987), security, etc., followed by the statement, "This commitment is, of course, subject to satisfactory documentation." Continental followed up with another letter to Grace on April 1, setting forth in five single-spaced pages "the principal terms and conditions of the financing" and stating at the end that "the above discussion does not constitute an exhaustive list of all the terms and conditions of the financing, but does cover those items of major importance." A virtually identical letter, differing only in being slightly longer, was sent on April 7. The final loan agreement, in which satisfactory final loan documentation is made a condition precedent to Continental's duty to perform, was signed on July 1, and disbursal of the $75 million to Grace followed shortly.

Centex had accepted Grace's $87 million bid for the Mississippi properties early in April, and the parties to that deal had agreed to close on May 23. On May 8, Grace, which pursuant to its still-executory contract with Centex was receiving frequent reports on the progress of the gas-exploration activities in the properties, learned that "Pursue Ridgeway," the well that had been drilled in the Southwest Piney Woods field, had struck water instead of gas. This was bad enough; but by May 18 Grace had discovered that the field would produce no gas, from any well. Grace was horrified. It had valued Pursue Ridgeway at $15.5 million even though the well had not yet started producing any gas. This was 17.1 percent of the entire deal. The well, along with the rest of the field, was now revealed to be worthless. Grace tried to back out of the deal with Centex, but when Centex threatened to sue, Grace decided to go ahead with the deal, which closed on May 27 with a covenant allowing Grace to sue Centex.

The next day Centex issued a press release announcing the sale to Grace and mentioning in passing that Pursue Ridgeway was "non-commercial." A news service to which Continental subscribed carried the release, but no one at Continental concerned with the Grace loan noticed it. Although Grace had issued its own press release on April 22 announcing the signing of the contract with Centex to buy the Mississippi properties, it issued no press release announcing the actual purchase. And it did not tell Continental about the problem with the Southwest Piney Woods field until, three years after the loan was closed, it sent Continental a copy of the complaint it had filed against Centex, alleging that Centex had defrauded Grace by failing to disclose the water problem in Southwest Piney Woods. That suit was later settled for $13 million. The present suit was filed in 1984 and came to trial in 1987, at which time the balance of the $75 million loan, consisting both of principal and of unpaid interest, exceeded $76 million, even though the loan was due to be repaid in only three months. The Thomasville fields were and are productive, but gas prices had tumbled, and the volume of production was not high enough to generate revenues sufficient to repay the loan — which to this day has not been repaid.

Several points raised by Grace are shallow:

1. The fact that Continental may have been deficient in alertness in failing to notice the item in the press release about Pursue Ridgeway might be relevant if this were a suit for negligence, but it is a suit for deliberate fraud, and contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. See, e.g., Tan v. Boyke, 156 Ill.App.3d 49, 57, 108 Ill.Dec. 229, 234, 508 N.E.2d 390, 395 (1987); Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill.App.3d 314, 319-20, 75 Ill.Dec. 776, 781, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1983); [619] Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 51-52, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 328-29, 390 N.E.2d 393, 405-06 (1979); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central National Bank, 773 F.2d 771, 782 (7th Cir.1985) (construing Illinois law); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir.1982) (same); Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 527-28 (7th Cir.1985); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 462 (5th ed. 1984).

2. That Continental's petroleum engineer, in assessing the loan value of the three fields, assumed the Southwest Piney Woods field to be nonproducing does not prove that the fraud was immaterial. Continental regarded the Southwest Piney Woods field as an important back-up to the Thomasville fields. The fact that this was a nonrecourse loan made Grace's failure to disclose the fate of that field particularly significant. Continental could not look to Grace for repayment of the loan but only to the revenues generated by the gas fields themselves, revenues dependent on production as well as on the price of gas. Any diminution in that revenue potential was ominous. Grace's own reaction when it heard that the Southwest Piney Woods field was worthless bears eloquent witness to the perceived value of that field.

3. Grace's complaints about the jury instructions, the admission of certain evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate its intention to conceal material information from Continental have no merit.

The difficult question on liability is whether Grace was required to volunteer to Continental, before the loan closed, the bad news about the Southwest Piney Woods field. An omission can of course be actionable as a fraud. See, e.g., Tan v. Boyke, supra, 156 Ill.App.3d at 54, 108 Ill.Dec. at 232, 508 N.E.2d at 393; Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 186-88, 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 384-85, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598-99 (1985); Central States Joint Board v. Continental Assurance Co., 117 Ill.App.3d 600, 604, 73 Ill.Dec. 107, 110, 453 N.E.2d 932, 935 (1983); Allensworth v. Ben Franklin Savings & Loan Ass'n, 71 Ill.App.3d 1041, 27 Ill.Dec. 620, 389 N.E.2d 684 (1979). But not every failure by a seller (or borrower, or employee, etc.) to disclose information to the buyer (or lender, or employer, etc.) that would cause the latter to reassess the deal is actionable. A general duty of disclosure would turn every bargaining relationship into a fiduciary one. There would no longer be such a thing as arm's-length bargaining, and enterprise and commerce would be impeded. The seller who deals at arm's length is entitled to "take advantage" of the buyer at least to the extent of exploiting information and expertise that the seller expended substantial resources of time or money on obtaining — otherwise what incentive would there be to incur such costs? See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, supra, 762 F.2d at 528; United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.Legal Stud. 1 (1978). But when the seller has without substantial investment on his part come upon material information which the buyer would find either impossible or very costly to discover himself, then the seller must disclose it — for example, must disclose that the house he is trying to sell is infested with termites. See, e.g., Posner v. Davis, 76 Ill.App.3d 638, 32 Ill.Dec. 186, 395 N.E.2d 133 (1979) (basement flooding). The distinction between the two classes of case is illustrated by Lenzi v. Morkin, 103 Ill.2d 290, 82 Ill.Dec. 644, 469 N.E.2d 178 (1984), where the failure to disclose an assessor's valuation was held not to be actionable, since the valuation was a matter of public record and therefore ascertainable by the buyer at reasonable cost. See also Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Department of Local Government Affairs, 169 Ill.App.3d 683, 120 Ill.Dec. 137, 523 N.E.2d 1048 (1988).

The situation of the would-be lender who discovers that his collateral (or a major part of it) is worthless because of circumstances that the borrower learned without effort or expertise but that the lender could not have learned without a substantial investment of time or effort seems [620] assimilable to that of the seller of the termite-infested house. But this we need not decide for certain, since we do not understand Grace to be contesting the issue of duty but only to be arguing that Continental had made a firm commitment by April 7 (if not earlier) — a commitment that it could not have backed out of even if Grace had come to it on May 8 and told it that the Loch Ness monster had swallowed the entire State of Mississippi so that Continental would not recoup a penny of the $75 million loan that it had not yet made but was committed to make. If the commitment was that firm, the fraud was immaterial. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 447 (7th Cir.1987) (dissenting opinion), and cases cited there. If not, then we do not (to repeat) understand Grace to be arguing that it was entitled to stand mute when the time came to make the final agreement. If you go to a bank for a loan on your house, and the bank tentatively agrees to make it, and on the day before the loan papers are to be signed the house is destroyed by a flood and you don't disclose the fact at the signing, then we suppose — and, more to the point, Grace appears to concede — that you are guilty of fraud even if you made no representation that the house was still in existence. This case is less dramatic inasmuch as the security for the loan was not rendered completely worthless by the Pursue Ridgeway disaster — but more dramatic in that the lender here, unlike the lender in the house example, could not sue the borrower if the assets pledged to repay the loan proved insufficient, because it was a nonrecourse loan.

So it is crucial to determine whether there was a commitment before May 8. The March and April letters were preliminary to a final agreement, but not necessarily on that account unenforceable. The question when a preliminary agreement is enforceable is a vexed one, as we noted recently in Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.1989); see also Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum.L.Rev. 217, 249-63 (1987). But Illinois law is reasonably clear in making the issue one of the parties' intentions as gleaned from the agreement itself if the agreement is unambiguous and, if it is ambiguous, from all pertinent evidence. See Anand v. Marple, 167 Ill.App.3d 918, 118 Ill.Dec. 826, 522 N.E.2d 281 (1988); Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 137 Ill.App.3d 550, 559, 92 Ill.Dec. 323, 330, 484 N.E.2d 1178, 1185 (1985); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Christoph, 107 Ill.App.3d 183, 185-86, 63 Ill.Dec. 9, 11, 437 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1981); Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 85 Ill.App.3d 1094, 41 Ill.Dec. 117, 407 N.E.2d 615 (1980). In cases where a preliminary agreement has been superseded by a final one, the parol evidence rule forbids the use in evidence of the preliminary agreement to alter the terms in the final one. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City of Sheboygan Falls, 713 F.2d 1261, 1271 (7th Cir.1983); Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.1988); Farnsworth, Contracts 451 (1982). But here we have no final integrated agreement — no agreement into which any preliminary agreements would merge and disappear — so the rule is inapplicable.

With the parol evidence rule out of the way, two types of ambiguity can usefully be distinguished. One is internal ("intrinsic"), and is present when the agreement itself is unclear. The other is external ("extrinsic") and is present when, although the agreement itself is a perfectly lucid and apparently complete specimen of English prose, anyone familiar with the real-world context of the agreement would wonder what it meant with reference to the particular question that has arisen. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., supra, 841 F.2d at 745; Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir.1986). So parol and other extrinsic evidence is admissible, even in a case involving a contract with an integration clause, to demonstrate that the contract is ambiguous. See, e.g., Stamatakis Industries, Inc. v. King, 165 Ill.App.3d 879, 887, 117 Ill.Dec. 419, 424, 520 N.E.2d 770, 775 (1987); [621] Zale Construction Co. v. Hoffman, 145 Ill.App.3d 235, 241, 98 Ill.Dec. 708, 712, 494 N.E.2d 830, 834 (1986); UIDC Management, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 141 Ill.App.3d 227, 230, 95 Ill.Dec. 691, 693, 490 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1986); Sunstream Jet Express, Inc. v. International Air Service Co., 734 F.2d 1258, 1268 (7th Cir.1984) (construing Illinois law); Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir.1987) (per curiam). Admissible, that is to say, even if the contract has no intrinsic ambiguity — even if it would seem perfectly clear to a normal reader of English, although to persons knowledgeable about the circumstances in which the contract had been intended to apply the "normal" reading might be nonsense. See Lucie v. Kleen-Leen, Inc., 499 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.1974) (per curiam); Isbrandtsen v. North Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81, 83-85 (Vt.1988); Farnsworth, supra, at 501. That is what it means to say that extrinsic evidence is admissible to demonstrate an ambiguity. There is no ambiguity on the surface of the document; the ambiguity appears only when extrinsic evidence is considered.

The Illinois cases provide firmer support for allowing extrinsic evidence when the contract is patently ambiguous than for allowing such evidence to establish that an otherwise clear contract is (to those in the know) ambiguous. See, e.g., LaSalle National Bank v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 854 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir.1988) (applying Illinois law). The Illinois Appellate Court is, as we noted in Metalex Corp. v. Uniden Corp., 863 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (7th Cir.1988), divided on the latter question. Compare, for example, URS Corp. v. Ash, 101 Ill.App.3d 229, 233-35, 56 Ill.Dec. 749, 753-54, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (1981), with United Equitable Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Co., 157 Ill.App.3d 724, 730-31, 109 Ill.Dec. 846, 810-11, 510 N.E.2d 914, 918-19 (1987). The Supreme Court of Illinois has not resolved the conflict. Although United Equitable opines that the supreme court did resolve it, against allowing extrinsic evidence to demonstrate an ambiguity, in Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill.2d 317, 323, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 657, 472 N.E.2d 791, 794 (1984), many of the cases that allow the admission of extrinsic evidence for such purpose were decided after Rakowski and find that decision distinguishable.

The older view, sometimes called the "four corners" rule, which excludes extrinsic evidence if the contract is clear "on its face," is not ridiculous. (There is ancient wisdom as well as ancient prejudice.) The rule tends to cut down on the amount of litigation, in part by reducing the role of the jury; for it is the jury that interprets contracts when interpretation requires consideration of extrinsic evidence. Parties to contracts may prefer, ex ante (that is, when negotiating the contract, and therefore before an interpretive dispute has arisen), to avoid the expense and uncertainty of having a jury resolve a dispute between them, even at the cost of some inflexibility in interpretation.

We suspect that the alleged conflict within the Illinois Appellate Court is a pseudo-conflict; one straw in the wind is that the author of United Equitable also wrote Zale. Most of the modern cases in the "four corners" line stand for the unexceptionable proposition that "language in a contract is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree upon its meaning." Reynolds v. Coleman, 173 Ill.App.3d 585, 593, 123 Ill.Dec. 259, 265, 527 N.E.2d 897, 903 (1988). In Rakowski itself the extrinsic evidence that Lucente sought to introduce was an affidavit that "contains only his unsubstantiated assertion that he did not intend to include his right to seek contribution in the matters released." 104 Ill.2d at 324, 84 Ill.Dec. at 657, 472 N.E.2d at 794; see also Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Acevedo, 140 Ill.App.3d 107, 113-14, 94 Ill.Dec. 329, 333, 487 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (1986). The fact that parties to a contract disagree about its meaning does not show that it is ambiguous, for if it did, then putting contracts into writing would provide parties with little or no protection. Several of the cases in the "four corners" line involve releases, and the courts stress the importance of encouraging settlements by enforcing releases according to their tenor. Rakowski was such a case; also [622] Kolar v. Ray, 142 Ill.App.3d 912, 97 Ill.Dec. 240, 492 N.E.2d 899 (1986). These cases stand for the proposition that the words of the contract are not lightly to be ignored. The nature of the offer of proof to show an ambiguity is therefore critical. Although a self-serving statement, a la Lucente, that a party did not understand the contract to mean what it says (or appears to say) will not suffice, an offer to show that anyone who understood the context of the contract would realize it couldn't mean what an untutored reader would suppose it meant will.

Both forms of ambiguity, the intrinsic (or internal) and the extrinsic (or external), are present here and made the meaning of the contract a question for the jury, whose answer we can disturb only if it is unreasonable. First, the term "subject to satisfactory documentation," which was implicit in the April 1 and April 7 letters even though not recited in them, is ambiguous. It could mean just proof of the assumptions underlying the terms and conditions set forth in the letters, assumptions such as that Grace would own the Mississippi properties by the time the loan was closed. Or it could entitle Continental to insist that Grace document any material assumptions on which Continental's willingness to commit $75 million to Grace was based. On this reading, if Continental had discovered before the closing that the reserve report on which it had relied in evaluating the loan was inaccurate, it could have required Grace to demonstrate that the loan was nevertheless as secure as Continental had originally believed. Cf. UCC § 2-609.

The external ambiguity lies in the fact that, to anyone cognizant of the commercial setting, the agreement was incomplete. It did not address a range of possible risks that might materialize between the commitment and the closing. Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City of Sheboygan Falls, supra, 713 F.2d at 1271. For example, it would have been odd if by virtue of making a loan commitment Continental had become in effect the fire insurer of the Mississippi properties on the theory that it would have owed Grace $75 million even if the properties had been destroyed by fire between April 7 and the July closing and, given the nonrecourse feature of the loan, could not have gotten the money back. It may be that the commitment was implicitly conditioned on the circumstances of the loan remaining materially unchanged between the commitment date and the closing. This is a possible, not a necessary, interpretation. Grace may have wanted a firmer commitment before agreeing to lay out $87 million to buy the properties from Centex. The only question for us is whether the agreement was so plainly a commitment by Continental to make a nonrecourse loan of $75 million to Grace come what may that the jury would have had to be irrational to find that Grace's failure to inform Continental about the disaster that befell the Southwest Piney Woods field was material. This we cannot say. The jury was entitled to conclude that the commitment fee (a modest one-half of one percent per annum on the unused portion of the loan, i.e., on any part of the $75 million that Grace decided not to take up) was to compensate Continental for agreeing to make the loan at the agreed interest rate, and other terms and conditions, provided nothing new and material came to light between the commitment and the closing. Perhaps the most telling piece of extrinsic evidence is Grace's own conduct in trying to conceal the bad news from Continental; it would have had no reason to do so under the interpretation of the contract that it is now pressing.

We turn to the issue of damages. Grace focuses most of its attack on the award of punitive damages, which it contends violates the excessive-fines clause of the Eighth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution. Twenty-five million dollars is of course a large amount, but its reasonableness must be assessed in relation to the amount of injury done by the tortfeasor. The concern in recent cases dealing with the constitutionality of punitive-damages awards has centered on awards that are huge multiples of the compensatory damages, as in Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, [623] 488 U.S. 980, 109 S.Ct. 527, 102 L.Ed.2d 559 (1988) (argued before the Supreme Court on April 18), where the punitive damages awarded were more than 100 times greater than the compensatory damages. Treble damages are a common form of punitive damages, and we do not understand their constitutionality to be in question. The FDIC received only double damages.

The most straightforward rationale for punitive damages, as for fines and other criminal punishments that exceed the actual injury done by (or profit obtained by) the tortfeasor or criminal, is that they are necessary to deter torts or crimes that are concealable. Suppose the average defrauder is brought to book only half the time. To confront him with a sanction that will make fraud worthless to him and thus deter him, it is necessary that when he is caught he be made to pay twice as much as his profits. In such a case double damages would certainly not be problematic. Fraud is a concealable tort, and indeed concealment was the essence of Grace's fraud. Only after Grace thought it was home free — in fact three years after it thought it was home free — did it reveal the fraud by sending Continental a copy of the complaint it had filed charging Centex with fraud.

Concealment is not the only rationale for punitive damages, although no other one is necessary to establish the propriety of an award of punitive damages in this case. Another rationale is that punitive damages provide surer deterrence than actual damages of conduct that we very much want to deter because it is highly anti-social. Fraud, a form of intentional wrongdoing, is in that category. Under this rationale, too, the ratio of punitive to actual damages is highly pertinent. A $100 fraud might be securely deterred by a $500 penalty on top of compensatory damages, making a total of $600; a $25 million fraud would not be securely deterred by a $500 penalty, making a total of $25,000,500. The common law of Illinois authorizes substantial awards of punitive damages in cases of fraud. See West v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 846 F.2d 387, 398-401 (7th Cir.1988). The award here was excessive neither by Illinois nor by federal constitutional standards.

The problem is with the award of compensatory damages. We have railed repeatedly against the extraordinary casualness that otherwise proficient trial lawyers display at the remedy stage in commercial litigation. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., supra, 841 F.2d at 748 (collecting cases). All their energies seem to be used up in proving (or disproving) liability. This case is no exception despite the huge stakes. It would have been easy to estimate the present value of the loan to Grace at the time of trial, to add the interest that Continental had already received on the loan, and to subtract the sum from the principal and interest that Continental would have obtained from an alternative use of the $75 million that it disbursed on the loan. For that is the measure of what Continental lost as a result of the fraud. One alternative, of course, is that Continental would have made a smaller loan to Grace, and placed the difference elsewhere; then the experience of the sum of these hypothetical loans, compared to the experience of the actual loan, would provide the measure of Continental's loss.

Suppose hypothetically that at the time of trial, the present value of the $75 million loan that Continental made to Grace was $30 million (representing a heavy discount from the face amount of the loan, in recognition of the unlikelihood that it will actually be repaid), and Continental had already received $65 million in interest. Then the total benefit to Continental from the loan (ignoring as we shall throughout this example, for simplicity's sake, adjustments necessary to reflect changes in the value of the dollar due to inflation) would be $95 million. Suppose further that if Grace had disclosed the Pursue Ridgeway disaster to Continental, then, instead of making the $75 million nonrecourse loan to Grace, Continental would have placed the $75 million in a loan or loans (perhaps including a smaller loan to Grace) that would have yielded Continental a benefit to the date of [624] trial of $130 million. Then its damages would be $35 million ($130 million minus $95 million).

No evidence enabling such a computation to be made was presented. The jury was allowed to pick a figure out of the air after hearing testimony that Grace's own projections of price and production from the producing fields showed that the loan would probably never be repaid. The underlying figures were not placed in evidence. Although Grace can be faulted for having failed to offer its own evidence of damages — a fault we have noted in recent cases, see, e.g., Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 823 (7th Cir.1985); see also Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motor Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1062 (1st Cir.1985), and cases cited there — the FDIC had the burden of proving what it lost, and it failed to carry the burden, resulting in a multi-million-dollar damages verdict that is pure guesswork. This is not a case where the defendant's wrongful conduct made it difficult to establish the plaintiff's damages, a situation where lenity in proof of damages is traditionally allowed. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580, 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946); Bob Willow Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 872 F.2d 788, 799 (7th Cir.1989); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 821 (1st Cir.1983).

Grace is entitled to a new trial, though one limited to damages. The amount of punitive damages, related as they are to compensatory damages, will have to be redetermined as well in the new trial that we are ordering. We could take the position that the first trial fixed the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages as one to one, so that whatever the next award of compensatory damages is it will just have to be doubled to yield the final judgment (before interest). But proportionality to actual damages is not the only consideration in determining how large the award of punitive damages should be, so the ratio will have to be redetermined in the new trial that we are ordering on damages.

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case remanded for a new trial limited to damages. There shall be no award of costs in this court.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

6.7 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. 6.7 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.

69 Cal.2d 33 (1968)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
G. W. THOMAS DRAYAGE & RIGGING COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

S. F. No. 22580.

Supreme Court of California. In Bank.

July 11, 1968.

Miller, Van Dorn, Hughes & O'Connor, Richard H. McConnell and Daniel C. Miller for Defendant and Appellant.

Richard H. Peterson, Gilbert L. Harrick and Donald Mitchell for Plaintiff and Respondent.

TRAYNOR, C. J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff in an action for damages for injury to property under an indemnity clause of a contract. [36]

In 1960 defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff to furnish the labor and equipment necessary to remove and replace the upper metal cover of plaintiff's steam turbine. Defendant agreed to perform the work "at [its] own risk and expense" and to "indemnify" plaintiff "against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting from ... injury to property, arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this contract." Defendant also agreed to procure not less than $50,000 insurance to cover liability for injury to property.plaintiff was to be an additional named insured, but the policy was to contain a cross-liability clause extending the coverage to plaintiff's property.

During the work the cover fell and injured the exposed rotor of the turbine.plaintiff brought this action to recover $25,144.51, the amount it subsequently spent on repairs. During the trial it dismissed a count based on negligence and thereafter secured judgment on the theory that the indemnity provision covered injury to all property regardless of ownership.

Defendant offered to prove by admissions of plaintiff's agents, by defendant's conduct under similar contracts entered into with plaintiff, and by other proof that in the indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to property of third parties only and not to plaintiff's property. [402] Although the trial court observed that the language used was "the classic language for a third party indemnity provision" and that "one could very easily conclude that ... its whole intendment is to indemnify third parties," it nevertheless held that the "plain language" of the agreement also required defendant to indemnify plaintiff for injuries to plaintiff's property. Having determined that the contract had a plain meaning, the court refused to admit any extrinsic evidence that would contradict its interpretation.

When the court interprets a contract on this basis, it determines [37] the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the "... extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." (3 Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) [1964 Supp. 579, p. 225, fn. 56].) The exclusion of testimony that might contradict the linguistic background of the judge reflects a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression. (9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 2461, p. 187.) This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency [403] and inherent meaning of words. [404]

[1] The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 520-521 [67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889]; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839]; Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 571, 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529, 394 P.2d 65]; Nofziger v. Holman (1964) 61 Cal.2d 526, 528 [39 Cal.Rptr. 384, 393 P.2d 696]; Coast Bank v. Minderhout (1964) 61 Cal.2d 311, 315 [38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265]; Imbach v. Schultz (1962) 58 Cal.2d 858, 860 [27 Cal.Rptr. 160, 377 P.2d 272]; Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 210 [10 Cal.Rptr. 819, 359 P.2d 251].)

A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained. [38]

Some courts have expressed the opinion that contractual obligations are created by the mere use of certain words, whether or not there was any intention to incur such obligations. [405] Under this view, contractual obligations flow, not from the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used certain magic words. Evidence of the parties' intention therefore becomes irrelevant.

[2] In this state, however, the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights and duties. [406] A court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by determining what the parties meant by the words they used. Accordingly, the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic, evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be justified only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the parties gave to the words from the instrument alone.

If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. [3] "A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry, ..." (Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 195 [5 Cal.Rptr. 553, 353 P.2d 33].) The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the "... verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). ... A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning." (Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187.) [4] Accordingly, the meaning of a writing "... can only be found by interpretation [39] in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended. [Citations omitted.]" (Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Cal.2d 751, 776 (concurring opinion); see also, e.g., Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1963) 78 N.J. Super. 485 [189 A.2d 448, 454]; Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co. (1932) 141 Ore. 306, 310 [16 P.2d 627, 629, 89 A.L.R. 1222]; 3 Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) 579, pp. 412-431; Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, op.cit supra 15; Ullmann, The Principles of Semantics, supra, 61; McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings (1943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 145.)

[5] Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these terms must first be determined before it can be decided whether or not extrinsic evidence is being offered for a prohibited purpose. The fact that the terms of an instrument appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different terms. That possibility is not limited to contracts whose terms have acquired a particular meaning by trade usage, [407] but exists whenever the parties' understanding of the words used may have differed from the judge's understanding.

Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to [40] prove the intention of the parties. [408] (Civ. Code, 1647; Code Civ. Proc., 1860; see also 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit. supra, 2470, fn. 11, p. 227.) Such evidence includes testimony as to the "circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement ... including the object, nature and subject matter of the writing ..." so that the court can "place itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting." (Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Cal.2d 751, 761; Lemm v. Stillwater Land & Cattle Co., supra, 217 Cal. 474, 480-481.) [6] If the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances, "is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended for ..." (Balfour v. Fresno C. & I. Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 221, 225 [41 P. 876]; see also, Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d 571, 573; Nofziger v. Holman, supra, 61 Cal.2d 526, 528; Reid v. Overland Machined Products, supra, 55 Cal.2d 203, 210; Barham v. Barham (1949) 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-423 [202 P.2d 289]; Kenney v. Los Feliz Investment Co. (1932) 121 Cal.App. 378, 386-387 [9 P.2d 225]), extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible. [409]

[7] In the present case the court erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence offered to show that the indemnity clause in the contract was not intended to cover injuries to plaintiff's property. Although that evidence was not necessary to show that the indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of the meaning contended for by defendant, it was nevertheless relevant and admissible on that issue. Moreover, since that clause was reasonably susceptible of that meaning, [41] the offered evidence was also admissible to prove that the clause had that meaning and did not cover injuries to plaintiff's property. [410] Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed.

[8] Two questions remain that may arise on retrial. On the theory that the indemnity clause covered plaintiff's property, the trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover unless all of "... the following conditions [were found] to exist:"

"1. That Pacific Gas and Electric Company continued to [42] maintain independent operation on the premises whereon the installation of the cover was in progress;"

"2. That the damage to the turbine was unrelated to the Defendant G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc.'s performance;"

"3. That the plaintiff was guilty of active, affirmative negligence; and"

"4. That such active negligence related to a matter over which the plaintiff exercised exclusive control."

The instruction was based on certain guidelines discussed in Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 40, 45-46 [41 Cal.Rptr. 73, 396 P.2d 377]; Harvey Machine Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 445, 448 [6 Cal.Rptr. 284, 353 P.2d 924]; and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 99, 112-113 [20 Cal.Rptr. 820]. Those cases do not hold, however, that all four conditions specified in the instruction must exist for the indemnitor to be relieved of liability. It is sufficient if the indemnitee's own active negligence is a cause of the harm. As stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 952 [59 Cal.Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129], "An indemnity clause phrased in general terms will not be interpreted ... to provide indemnity for consequences resulting from the indemnitee's own actively negligent acts."

To prove the amount of damages sustained, plaintiff presented invoices received from Ingersoll-Rand, the manufacturer and repairer of the turbine, the drafts by which plaintiff had remitted payment, and testimony that payment had been made. Defendant objected to the introduction of the invoices on the ground that they were hearsay. Subsequently, plaintiff called a mechanical engineer who qualified as an expert witness on the repair of turbines. On the basis of photographs of the damage after the accident, he testified that to repair the turbine it was reasonable and necessary to dismantle it completely, magnaflux all parts, replace all blades in wheels that had been damaged, reassemble the rotor, balance it, "indicate" it and centrifugate it. Similar repairs were listed in the invoices, and over objection the witness was allowed to testify that the amounts charged therefor were reasonable.

[9] Since invoices, bills, and receipts for repairs are hearsay, they are inadmissible independently to prove that liability for the repairs was incurred, that payment was made, or [43] that the charges were reasonable. (Plonley v. Reser (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 937-939 [3 Cal.Rptr. 551, 80 A.L.R.2d 911]; Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co. (1926) 78 Cal.App. 785, 789 [248 P. 1031].) If, however, a party testifies that he incurred or discharged a liability for repairs, any of these documents may be admitted for the limited purpose of corroborating his testimony (Bushnell v. Bushnell (1925) 103 Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436, 44 A.L.R. 788]; Cain v. Mead (1896) 66 Minn. 195 [68 N.W. 840, 841]), and if the charges were paid, the testimony and documents are evidence that the charges were reasonable. (Dewhirst v. Leopold (1924) 194 Cal. 424, 433 [229 P. 30]; Smith v. Hill (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 374, 388 [47 Cal.Rptr. 49]; Meier v. Paul X. Smith Corp. (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 207, 222 [22 Cal.Rptr. 758]; Malinson v. Black (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 375, 379 [188 P.2d 788]; Laubscher v. Blake (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 376, 383 [46 P.2d 836]. See also Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 77, 81 [5 Cal.Rptr. 88].) Since there was testimony in the present case that the invoices had been paid, the trial court did not err in admitting them.

[10] The individual items on the invoices, however, were read, not to corroborate payment or the reasonableness of the charges, but to prove that these specific repairs had actually been made. No qualified witness was called to testify that the invoices accurately recorded the work done by Ingersoll-Rand, and there was no other evidence as to what repairs were made. This use of the invoices was error. (California Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 749, 759 [51 Cal.Rptr. 797]. Accord, Bushnell v. Bushnell, supra, 103 Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436]; Ferraro v. Public Service Ry. Co. (1928) 6 N.J. Misc. 463 [141 A. 590]; Nock v. Lloyd (1911) 32 R.I. 313 [79 A. 832, 833].) An invoice submitted by a third party is not admissible evidence on this issue unless it can be admitted under some recognized exception to the hearsay rule. [411]

[11] Since plaintiff's expert's testimony as to the reasonableness of the charges was based on hearsay evidence inadmissible to prove that the repairs had been made, defendant's [44] objections to it should have been sustained. "[A]n expert must base his opinion either on facts personally observed or on hypotheses that find support in the evidence." (George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 834, 844 [205 P.2d 1037]. See also Kastner v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1965) 63 Cal.2d 52, 58 [45 Cal.Rptr. 129, 403 P.2d 385]; Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 515, 524 [31 P.2d 793]; Behr v. County of Santa Cruz (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 697, 709 [342 P.2d 987]; 2 Jones on Evidence (5th ed. 1958) 416, pp. 782-783.)

The judgment is reversed.

Peters, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and Peek, J., [412] concurred.

McComb, J., dissented.

Plaintiff's assertion that the use of the word "all" to modify "loss, damage, expense and liability" dictates an all inclusive interpretation is not persuasive. If the word "indemnify" encompasses only third-party claims, the word "all" simply refers to all such claims. The use of the words "loss," "damage," and "expense" in addition to the word "liability" is likewise inconclusive. These words do not imply an agreement to reimburse for injury to an indemnitee's property since they are commonly inserted in third-party indemnity clauses, to enable an indemnitee who settles a claim to recover from his indemnitor without proving his liability. (Carpenter Paper Co. v. Kellogg (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 640, 651 [251 P.2d 40]. Civ. Code, 2778, provides: "1. Upon an indemnity against liability ... the person indemnified is entitled to recover upon becoming liable; 2. Upon an indemnity against claims, or demands, or damages, or costs ... the person indemnified is not entitled to recover without payment thereof; ...")

The provision that defendant perform the work "at his own risk and expense" and the provisions relating to insurance are equally inconclusive. By agreeing to work at its own risk defendant may have released plaintiff from liability for any injuries to defendant's property arising out of the contract's performance, but this provision did not necessarily make defendant an insurer against injuries to plaintiff's property. Defendant's agreement to procure liability insurance to cover damages to plaintiff's property does not indicate whether the insurance was to cover all injuries or only injuries caused by defendant's negligence.

[402] 1. Although this offer of proof might ordinarily be regarded as too general to provide a ground for appeal (Evid. Code, 354, subd. (a); Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. v. Kurt Hitke & Co. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 517, 522 [297 P.2d 428]; Stickel v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157, 162-164 [195 P.2d 416]; Douillard v. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 670 [128 P.2d 6]), since the court repeatedly ruled that it would not admit extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract and sustained objections to all questions seeking to elicit such evidence, no formal offer of proof was required. (Evid. Code, 354, subd. (b); Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. v. Kurt Hitke & Co., supra, 46 Cal.2d 517, 522; Estate of Kearns (1950) 36 Cal.2d 531, 537 [225 P.2d 218].)

[403] 2. E.g., "The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in primitive groups; the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the apotheosis of the words, and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the Giver of Words and Script, the Master of Incantations; the avoidance of the name of God in Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and protective names in mediaeval Turkish and Finno-Ugrian languages; the misplaced verbal scruples of the 'Precieuses'; the Swedish peasant custom of curing sick cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page torn out of the psalter and put in dough. ...' from Ullman, The Principles of Semantics (1963 ed.) 43. (See also Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (rev. ed. 1956) pp. 24- 47.)

[404] 3. " 'Rerum enim vocabula immutabilia sunt, homines mutabilia,' " (Words are unchangeable, men changeable) from Dig. XXXIII, 10, 7, 2, de sup. leg. as quoted in 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit. supra, 2461, p. 187.

[405] 4. "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." (Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1911) 200 F. 287, 293. See also C. H. Pope & Co. v. Bibb Mfg. Co. (2d Cir. 1923) 290 F. 586, 587; see 4 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1961) 612, pp. 577-578, 613, p. 583.)

[406] 5. "A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, 1636; see also Code Civ. Proc., 1859; Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 760 [128 P.2d 665]; Lemm v. Stillwater Land & Cattle Co. (1933) 217 Cal. 474, 480 [19 P.2d 785].)

[407] 6. Extrinsic evidence of trade usage or custom has been admitted to show that the term "United Kingdom" in a motion picture distribution contract included Ireland (Ermolieff v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 543, 549-552 [122 P.2d 3]); that the word "ton" in a lease meant a long ton or 2,240 pounds and not the statutory ton of 2,000 pounds (Higgins v. California Petroleum etc. Co. (1898) 120 Cal. 629, 630-632 [52 P. 1080]); that the word "stubble" in a lease included not only stumps left in the ground but everything "left on the ground after the harvest time" (Callahan v. Stanley (1881) 57 Cal. 476, 477-479); that the term "north" in a contract dividing mining claims indicated a boundary line running along the "magnetic and not the true meridian" (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower (1858) 11 Cal. 194, 197-199) and that a form contract for purchase and sale was actually an agency contract. (Body-Steffner Co. v. Flotill Products (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 555, 558-562 [147 P.2d 84]). See also Code Civ. Proc., 1861; Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1228; Note (1942) 30 Cal.L.Rev. 679.)

[408] 7. When objection is made to any particular item of evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties, the trial court may not yet be in a position to determine whether in the light of all of the offered evidence, the item objected to will turn out to be admissible as tending to prove a meaning of which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible or inadmissible as tending to prove a meaning of which the language is not reasonably susceptible. In such case the court may admit the evidence conditionally by either reserving its ruling on the objection or by admitting the evidence subject to a motion to strike. (See Evid. Code, 403.)

[409] 8. Extrinsic evidence has often been admitted in such cases on the stated ground that the contract was ambiguous (e.g., Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Cal.2d 751, 761). This statement of the rule is harmless if it is kept in mind that the ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence that reveals more than one possible meaning.

[410] 9. The court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence in this case would be error even under a rule that excluded such evidence when the instrument appeared to the court to be clear and unambiguous on its face. The controversy centers on the meaning of the word "indemnify" and the phrase "all loss, damage, expense and liability." The trial court's recognition of the language as typical of a third party indemnity clause and the double sense in which the word "indemnify" is used in statutes and defined in dictionaries demonstrate the existence of an ambiguity. (Compare Civ. Code, 2772, "Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties, or of some other person," with Civ. Code, 2527, "Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability, arising from an unknown or contingent event." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines "indemnity" as "A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages to secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or of some third person." Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (2d ed. 1903) defines it as a "Contract ... to indemnify against a liability. ..." One of the definitions given to "indemnify" by Webster's Third New International Dict. (1961 ed.) is "to exempt from incurred liabilities.")

[411] 10. It might come in under the business records exception (Evid. Code, 1271) if "... supported by the testimony of a witness qualified to testify as to its identity and the mode of its preparation." (California Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 242 Cal.App.2d 749, 759.)

[412] *. Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

6.8 United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc. 6.8 United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.

UNITED RENTALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. RAM HOLDINGS, INC., and Ram Acquisition Corp., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3360-CC.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.

Submitted: Dec. 19, 2007.

Decided: Dec. 21, 2007.

*812Collins J. Seitz, Jr., Matthew F. Boyer, and Christos T. Adamopoulos, of Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; of Counsel: Richard D. Bernstein, Tariq Mundiya, and John R. Oiler, of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, New York; Leslie A. Lupert, Thomas A. Brown II, and Timothy D. Sini, of Orans, Elsen & Lupert LLP, New York, New York; Roger E. Schwed, of United Rentals, Inc., Greenwich, Connecticut, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Gregory P. Williams, Raymond J. DiCamillo, Richard P. Rollo, and John D. Hendershot, of RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Of *813Counsel: Michael L. Hirschfeld, Scott A. Edelman, and Daniel M. Perry, of Mil-bank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, New York, New York; Stuart L. Shapiro, of Shapiro, Forman, Allen, Sava & McPherson LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.

OPINION

CHANDLER, Chancellor.

In classical mythology, it took a demigod to subdue Cerberus, the beastly three-headed dog that guarded the gates of the underworld.1 In his twelfth and final labor, Heracles2 journeyed to Hades to battle, tame, and capture the monstrous creature. In this case, plaintiff United Rentals, Inc. journeyed to Delaware to conquer a more modern obstacle that, rather than guards the gates to the afterlife, stands in the way of the consummation of a merger. Nevertheless, like the three heads of the mythological Cerberus, the private equity firm of the same name presents three substantial challenges to plaintiffs case: (1) the language of the Merger Agreement, (2) evidence of the negotiations between the parties, and (3) a doctrine of contract interpretation known as the forthright negotiator principle. In this tale the three heads prove too much to overcome.

First, the language of the Merger Agreement presents a direct conflict between two provisions on remedies, rendering the Agreement ambiguous and de-fearing plaintifPs motion for summary judgment. Second, the extrinsic evidence of the negotiation process, though ultimately not conclusive, is too muddled to find that plaintiffs interpretation of the Agreement represents the common understanding of the parties. Third, under the forthright negotiator principle, the subjective understanding of one party to a contract may bind the other party when the other party knows or has reason to know of that understanding. Because the evidence in this case shows that defendants understood this Agreement to preclude the remedy of specific performance and that plaintiff knew or should have known of this understanding, I conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden and find in favor of defendants.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

On November 19, 2007, plaintiff United Rentals, Inc. (“URI” or the “Company”) filed its complaint in this action. Thereafter, on November 29, 2007, URI moved for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, URI sought an order from this Court specifically enforcing the terms of the July 22, 2007 “Agreement and Plan of Merger” (the “Merger Agreement” or the “Agreement”) among URI and defendants RAM Holdings, Inc. (“RAM Holdings”) and RAM Acquisition Corp. (“RAM Acquisition” and, together with RAM Holdings, “RAM” or the “RAM Entities”).4

*814On December 13, 2007, this Court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, finding that the question was exceedingly close.5 A trial was therefore necessary to ascertain the meaning of the Agreement.

A. The Parties

URI is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Greenwich, Connecticut. Founded in 1997, it is a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. URI is the largest equipment rental company in the world based on revenue, earning $3.64 billion in 2006. The Company consists of an integrated network of over 690 rental locations in forty-eight states, ten Canadian provinces, and one location in Mexico. The Company serves construction and industrial customers, utilities, municipalities, homeowners and others. On or about May 18, 2007, URI offered itself up for sale through a draft merger agreement sent to potential buyers, including Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. (“CCM”). As a result of the negotiation process (discussed below), URI entered into the Merger Agreement. URI is a signatory to both the Merger Agreement and the Limited Guarantee.

Defendants RAM Holdings and RAM Acquisition are shell entities with de min-imis assets that were formed solely to effectuate transactions contemplated under the Merger Agreement. Defendant RAM Holdings is a Delaware corporation. Defendant RAM Acquisition is also a Delaware corporation and is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant RAM Holdings. RAM Acquisition, identified as “Merger Sub” in the Merger Agreement, the Limited Guarantee, and the Equity Commitment Letter, is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of RAM Holdings, which is identified as “Parent” in the Agreements. The RAM Entities are controlled by funds and accounts affiliated with CCM, a major New York private equity buyout firm, which is not a party to the Merger Agreement or this lawsuit.

Cerberus Partners, L.P. (“Cerberus Partners”), an investment fund, is a limited partnership organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal offices in New York, New York. Cerberus Partners, identified as the “Guarantor” in the Limited Guarantee, is a signatory only to the Limited Guarantee, under which it is the guarantor of certain payment obligations of the RAM Entities up to a maximum amount of $100 million plus incidental solicitation costs. Cerberus Partners is not a party to the Merger Agreement or to the Equity Commitment Letter, and it is not a defendant in this action. Venue and jurisdiction for any claim under the Limited Guarantee are exclusively in New York.6

CCM is a limited partnership organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal offices in New York, New York. CCM is a management company that, together with other affiliated entities, manages investment funds, including Cerberus Partners (and, together with CCM, “Cerberus”). CCM, identified as the “Equity Sponsor” in the Equity Commitment Letter, is a signatory to only the Equity *815Commitment Letter, under which it agreed on behalf of one or more of its affiliated funds or managed accounts (which had not yet been designated) to purchase or cause to be purchased shares of capital stock of RAM Holdings for an aggregate purchase price of $1.5 billion (the “Equity Financing”), subject to the satisfaction of various conditions as more specifically set forth in the letter. CCM is not a party to the Merger Agreement or to the Limited Guarantee, and it is not a defendant in this action. The Equity Commitment Letter provides that venue and jurisdiction for any claim under the Limited Guarantee are exclusively in New York.

B. The Merger Agreement

In the spring of 2007, URI’s board of directors decided to explore strategic alternatives to maximize stockholder value, including by soliciting offers from third parties to buy the Company. After an exhaustive effort that lasted several months, the board of directors authorized URI to execute the Merger Agreement, which it did on July 22, 2007.7 Under the Merger Agreement, RAM committed to purchase all of the common shares of URI for $34.50 per share in cash, for a total transaction value of approximately $7 billion, which includes the repayment or refinance of URI’s existing debt. Under the Merger Agreement, RAM Acquisition is to be merged into URI, which will be the surviving corporation.

C. Relevant Provisions of the Agreements

The Merger Agreement contemplates that, in order to fund a portion of the Merger consideration, RAM Holdings will obtain financing through the sale of equity to CCM for an aggregate purchase price of not less than $1.5 billion under the Equity Commitment Letter. The signatories to the Equity Commitment Letter are CCM and RAM Holdings. The terms of the Equity Commitment Letter were negotiated with and accepted by URI, but URI is neither a party to nor a beneficiary of the Equity Commitment Letter.8

1. The Merger Agreement

The Merger Agreement contains two key provisions at issue in this case.9 Section 9.10, entitled “Specific Performance,” provides:

The parties agree that irreparable damage would occur in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed in accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached. Accordingly, (a) [RAM Holdings] and [RAM Acquisition] shall be entitled to seek an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this Agreement by the Company and to enforce specifically the terms and provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any other remedy to which such party is entitled at law or in equity and (b) the Company shall be entitled to seek an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this Agreement by [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] or to enforce specifically the *816terms and provisions of this Agreement and the Guarantee to prevent breaches of or enforce compliance with those covenants of [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] that require [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] to (i) use its reasonable best efforts to obtain the Financing and satisfy the conditions to closing set forth in Section 7.1 and Section 7.3, including the covenants set forth in Section 6.8 and Section 6.10 and (ii) consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, if in the case of this clause (ii), the Financing (or Aternative Financing obtained in accordance with Section 6.10(b)) is available to be drawn down by [RAM Holdings] pursuant to the terms of the applicable agreements but is not so drawn down solely as a result of [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] refusing to do so in breach of this Agreement. The provisions of this Section 9.10 shall be subject in all respects to Section 8.2(e) hereof, which Section shall govern the rights and obligations of the parties hereto (and of [Cerberus Partners], the Parent Related Parties, and the Company Related Parties) under the circumstances provided therein. 10

Section 8.2(e), referred to in the specific performance provision in section 9.10, is part of Article VIII, entitled “Termination, Amendment and Waiver.” Article VIII provides specific limited circumstances in which either RAM or URI can terminate the Merger Agreement and receive a $100 million termination fee.11 The relevant portion of section 8.2(e) of the Merger Agreement provides:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, including with respect to Sections 7.4 and 9. 10, (i) the Company’s right to terminate this Agreement in compliance with the provisions of Sections 8.1(d)(i) and (ii) and its right to receive the Parent Termination Fee pursuant to Section 8.2(c) or the guarantee thereof pursuant to the Guarantee, and (ii) [RAM Holdings]’s right to terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section 8.1(e)(i) and (ii) and its right to receive the Company Termination Fee pursuant to Section 8.2(b) shall, in each case, be the sole and exclusive remedy, including on account of punitive damages, of (in the case of clause (i)) the Company and its subsidiaries against [RAM Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or any of their respective affiliates, stockholders, general partners, limited partners, members, managers, directors, officers, employees or agents (collectively “Parent Related Parties ”) and (in the case of clause (ii)) [RAM Holdings] and [RAM Acquisition] against the Company or its subsidiaries, affiliates, stockholders, directors, officers, employees or agents (collectively “Company Related Parties"), for any and all loss or damage suffered as a result thereof, and upon any termination specified in clause (i) or (ii) of this Section 8.2(e) and payment of the Parent Termination Fee or Company Termination Fee, as the case may be, none of [RAM Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or any of their respective Parent Related Parties or the Company or any of the Company Related Parties shall have any further liability or obligation of any kind or nature relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated *817by this Agreement as a result of such termination.
In no event, whether or not this Agreement has been terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall [RAM Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or the Parent Related Parties, either individually or in the aggregate, be subject to any liability in excess of the Parent Termination Fee for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, including breaches by [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] of any representations, warranties, covenants or agreements contained in this Agreement, and in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from [RAM Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or any Parent Related Party or any of their respective Representatives,12

The parties dispute the effect of section 8.2(e) on section 9.10.

2. The Equity Commitment Letter and Limited Guarantee

The Equity Commitment Letter states that URI is not a third-party beneficiary:

There is no express or implied intention to benefit any third party including, without limitation, [URI] and nothing contained in this Equity Commitment Letter is intended, nor shall anything herein be construed, to confer any rights, legal or equitable, in any Person other than [RAM Holdings].13

The Equity Commitment Letter also provides that any claim against CCM with respect to the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement or the Equity Commitment Letter be made only pursuant to the Limited Guarantee:

Under no circumstances shall [CCM] be liable for any costs or damages including, without limitation, any special, incidental, consequential, exemplary or punitive damages, to any Person, including [RAM Holdings] and [URI], in respect of this Equity Commitment Letter; and any claims with respect to the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement or this Equity Commitment Letter shall be made only pursuant to the Guarantee to the extent applicable.14

In executing the Merger Agreement with the RAM Entities, URI was contracting with shell companies that effectively had no assets.15 Accordingly, to ensure that there would be some level of financial backing for the RAM Entities’ obligations under the Merger Agreement accessible to URI, URI entered into the Limited Guarantee with Cerberus Partners. The execution of such a guarantee is “market practice” in LBO transactions sponsored by private equity firms. The Limited Guarantee provides that Cerberus Partners will guarantee payment, up to a maximum amount of $100 million plus certain solicitation expenses, of the enumerated payment obligations of the RAM Entities under the Merger Agreement.16 Before accepting the Limited Guarantee, URI inquired into the financial resources of Cerberus Partners and satisfied itself that Cerberus Partners had the ability to make good on a claim thereunder. The Limited *818Guarantee contains a representation by Cerberus Partners to this effect. The Limited Guarantee provides, in relevant part:17

(a) ... The Company, by its acceptance of the benefits hereof, agrees that it has no right of recovery in respect of a claim arising under the Merger Agreement or in connection with any documents or instruments delivered in connection therewith, including this Limited Guarantee, against any former, current or future officer, agent, affiliate or employee of [Cerberus Partners] or [RAM Holdings] (or any of their successors’ or permitted assignees’), against any former, current or future general or limited partner, member or stockholder of the [Cerberus Partners] or [RAM Holdings] (or any of their successors’ or permitted assignees’), notwithstanding that Guarantor is or may be a partnership, or any affiliate thereof or against any former, current or future director, officer, agent, employee, affiliate, general or limited partner, stockholder, manager or member of any of the foregoing (collectively, “Guarantor/Parent Affiliates it being understood that the term Guarantor/Parent Affiliates shall not include [Cerberus Partners], [RAM Holdings], or [RAM Acquisition]), whether by or through attempted piercing of the corporate veil, by or through a claim by or on behalf of [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] against the Guarantor/Parent Affiliates, or otherwise, except for its rights under this Limited Guarantee and subject to the limits contained herein....
(b) Recourse against [Cerberus Partners] under this Limited Guarantee shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the Company and all of its affiliates against [Cerberus Partners] and any Guarantor/Parent Affiliates in respect of any liabilities or obligations arising under, or in connection with, the Merger Agreement or the transactions contemplated thereby including in the event [RAM Holdings] or [RAM Acquisition] breaches any covenant, representation or warranty under the Merger Agreement or [Cerberus Partners] breaches a covenant, representation or warranty hereunder.18

These provisions were the result of negotiations that began from a May 18 bid contract and culminated in the final, executed Merger Agreement of July 22.

3. Negotiation of the Merger Agreement 19

Throughout the course of negotiation of the Merger Agreement, URI contends that it communicated to RAM’s principal attorney contract negotiator, Peter Ehrenberg of Lowenstein Sandler PC (“Lowenstein”), that URI wanted to restrict RAM’s ability to breach the Merger Agreement and unilaterally refuse to close the transaction. URI further maintains that URI’s counsel, Eric Swedenburg of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LP (“Simpson”), made clear to Ehrenberg that it was very important to URI that there be “deal certainty” so that RAM could not simply refuse to close if debt financing was available.20

*819On the other side of the negotiation table, the RAM entities argue that Ehrenberg consistently communicated that Cerberus had a $100 million walkway right and that URI knowingly relinquished its right to specific performance under the Merger Agreement.

a. The Initial May 18, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

On May 18, 2007, UBS Investment Bank (“UBS”) provided bidders, including Cerberus Partners, with an initial draft of a Merger Agreement prepared by URI’s deal counsel, Simpson.21 Simpson’s initial draft contemplated that two corporations, referred to as “Parent” and “Merger Sub,” would be formed to effect a merger with URI, that a separate “Guarantor” would provide a guarantee “with respect to certain obligations of Parent and Merger Sub,” and that Parent would supply an “equity commitment letter” between it and a third party.22 The initial draft further provided that URI would be entitled “to enforce specifically the terms and provisions of this Agreement ... the Equity Commitment Letter and the Guarantee” that require Parent or Merger Sub to, inter alia, “pay the Equity Financing and consummate the transactions contemplated by this [Merger] Agreement ...”23 This draft also required Parent to “consummate the Financing at or prior to the Closing (including by taking enforcement actions against the lenders and other persons providing the Financing to fund such Financing)”24

As is typical when a private equity sponsor (like Cerberus Partners) makes an acquisition, the initial draft of the Merger Agreement contemplated that the buyer under the merger agreement would be one or more newly formed “shell acquisition entities” formed by the sponsor.25 The ability of these shell entities to consummate the transaction depends entirely upon their ability to obtain financing commitments — for both debt and equity — from other persons. The seller (here, URI) recognizes that its leverage to force a closing of the transaction depends entirely upon the rights it obtains under the equity commitment and/or guarantee. Simpson’s draft of the Merger Agreement proposed to accomplish this by giving URI the right to seek specific performance of the equity commitment letter and by requiring the guarantee, and by requiring Parent to do so with respect to all financing commitments.26

b. The June 18, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

On June 18, 2007, CCM’s counsel, Low-enstein, responded to URI, delivering to Simpson a mark-up of the initial draft Merger Agreement.27 In that mark-up, Lowenstein indicated, among other things, that CCM would not provide a guarantee 28 and removed all references to the proposed guarantee. Lowenstein also removed the provisions stating that URI would have the right to enforce the equity commitment letter, and that Parent would *820be required to take action against the Financing sources to compel them to fund.29

In the June 18, 2007 draft of the Merger Agreement proffered by RAM, Ehrenberg explicitly deleted the very detailed specific performance provisions of section 9.10 that ultimately appears in the final version.30

c. The June 25, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

On June 25, 2007, Simpson provided Lowenstein with a revised draft of the proposed form of Merger Agreement.31 In that revised draft, Simpson sought to-encourage COM to alter its position in one of two ways: (1) provide a guarantee of the obligations of Parent to pay a reverse break-up fee (defined in the Merger Agreement as the “Parent Termination Fee”) in the event that Parent or Merger Sub failed to close the transaction by the stated deadline (URI’s sole and exclusive remedy in such circumstances); or (2) provide an unconditional equity commitment letter in favor of URI. Footnote 1 of Simpson’s June 25, 2007 draft informed CCM as follows:

In the event that Parent’s obligations with respect to the Parent Termination Fee are not supported by a Guarantee from the prospective purchaser’s fund, the prospective purchaser’s bid will be significantly disadvantaged. This disadvantage would be less significant, however, if prospective purchaser’s equity commitment letter unconditionally obligates purchaser’s fund to fund any amount necessary to satisfy Parent’s obligations and provides third-party beneficiary rights to [URI] to enforce such letter.32

Simpson’s June 25 draft also restored URI’s ability to seek specific performance of the equity commitment letter and the obligation of Parent to take action against the Financing sources to compel them to fund.33

d. The July 1, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

On July 1, 2007, while waiting for a response to its June 25 draft, Simpson provided Lowenstein with a form of guarantee that it represented to be “consistent with what we have seen executed in a large number of recent sponsor-led deals.”34 Simpson’s cover email explained:

As discussed, in the event that Parent’s obligations with respect to the Parent Termination Fee are not supported by a Guarantee that will significantly disadvantage your client’s bid, although the disadvantage may be less significant if the equity commitment letter is along the fines discussed.35

The draft guarantee . provided by Simpson was limited to a fixed payment amount, with the amount to be determined in negotiation. It also provided that the Guarantor would deliver an Equity Commitment Letter to Parent, that URI would be “an express third party beneficiary un*821der the Guarantor’s Equity Commitment Letter,” and that URI, as “the express third party beneficiary under the Guarantor’s Equity Commitment Letter to Parent, may specifically enforce the terms of such letter agreement in connection with [URI’s] exercise of’ its specific performance rights under section 9.10 of the Merger Agreement.36

e. The July 2, 2007 and July 4, 2007 Drafts of the Merger Agreement

On July 2, 2007, Lowenstein sent a revised draft of the Merger Agreement to Simpson. In its covering email, Lowen-stein advised that CCM was reconsidering its prior unwillingness to provide a guarantee, although no final decision had been made.37 Accordingly, although Lowenstein did not provide comments to the form of Guarantee received from Simpson the previous day, its July 2 draft of the Merger Agreement bracketed for further attention the text indicating that a Guarantor would provide a guarantee “of certain obligations of Parent and Merger Sub.”38 Lowen-stein’s July 2 draft again deleted from the Merger Agreement language that would have permitted URI to seek specific performance of the equity commitment letter and that would have required Parent to take action against the Financing sources to compel them to fund.39

On July 4, 2007, Simpson sent a revised draft Merger Agreement to Lowenstein.40 Again, Simpson “reversed” Lowenstein’s deletion of the text allowing URI to enforce the equity commitment letter and requiring Parent to pursue action to compel the Financing sources to fund.41

In oral communications during this period between the two law firms, Simpson indicated to Lowenstein that URI wanted to make sure it could collect the full amount of the equity commitment letter in the event that Parent had its debt financing available but refused to close. Lowen-stein told Simpson that such an arrangement was not acceptable, and that the buyer was unwilling to accept any exposure in the event Parent did not close the transaction other than payment of a fee.42 With the negotiations thus stalled, on July 10, 2007, Lowenstein attorneys Ehrenberg and Jeffrey Shapiro met with Simpson lawyers, including Swedenburg, and Emily McNeal, an Executive Director at UBS. At that meeting, Lowenstein again made clear that the buyer and its affiliates were unwilling to have any exposure beyond the payment of a break-up fee in the event that Parent failed to close the transaction. Swedenburg was not willing to agree, and this fundamental issue remained open.43

f. The July 12,2007 Meeting at UBS

On the evening of July 12, 2007, Ehrenberg and representatives of the buyer met in person and telephonically with Sweden-burg, and McNeal and Cary Kochman, URI’s lead investment banker at UBS, at the UBS offices in New York City. During this meeting, Swedenburg and Kochman enumerated a number of open deal issues, including the impasse over the interrelated Guarantee, Equity Commitment Letter, *822and buyer’s exposure in the event buyer did not close the transaction. Though the parties agree that reverse break-up fees were discussed, they dispute whether this issue was resolved at the meeting. According to defendants, Swedenburg and Kochman indicated that URI would accept payment of a reverse break-up fee as its sole and exclusive remedy in the event the buyer did not proceed with the transaction.44 Plaintiff rejoins that Ehrenberg, who said he made notes of that meeting he has been unable to locate, now asserts that “URI’s representatives told us that they were in agreement to the receipt of that fee being URI’s sole and exclusive remedy in the event of breach of the merger agreement,” but does not recall any actual words used or who said them.45 Plaintiff further argues that, though Swedenburg acknowledged that the reverse break-up fee issues were discussed, there was certainty that no such “agreement” was reached and his notes of the July 12 meeting, which have been produced, do not reflect any such agreement.46

Following this July 12 meeting, Lowen-stein revised Simpson’s July 4 draft to reflect the understandings reached, including what Cerberus felt was an agreement that the buyer and all of its affiliates would have no obligation beyond payment of the reverse break-up fee in the event that they decided not to go forward with the merger transaction. On July 15, 2007, Lowenstein sent a full package of deal documents— including a revised draft of the Merger Agreement, a revised draft of the Guarantee, now identified as a “Limited Guarantee,” and a draft of the Equity Commitment Letter — to Simpson and UBS.47

g. The July 15, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement and the July 16, 2007 Conference Call

The July 15 draft of the Merger Agreement included, for the first time, the two key provisions that defendants say gave effect to the parties’ agreement on July 12 that URI’s sole and exclusive remedy against the buyer and all of its affiliates would, in all circumstances, be limited to payment of the reverse breakup fee. First, Lowenstein provided new language in the final sentence of section 8.2(e), which provided: *823filiates.48

*822In no event, whether or not this Agreement has been terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall Parent, Merger Sub, Guarantor or the Related Parties, either individually or in the aggregate, be subject to any liability in excess of the Parent Termination Fee for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, including breaches by Parent or Merger Sub of any representations, warranties, covenants or agreements contained in this Agreement, and in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from Parent, Merger Sub, Guarantor or any Related Party or any of their respective Representatives or Af-

*823Second, Lowenstein also added a sentence at the end of section 9.10 that expressly provided that section 8.2(e) sub-rogated section 9.10. Thus, the final sentence of section 9.10, as drafted by Lowenstein, provided as follows:

The provisions of this Section 9.10 shall be subject in all respects to Section 8(e) [sic] hereof, which Section shall govern the rights and obligations of the parties hereto (and of the Guarantor, the Related Parties, and the Company Related Parties) under the circumstances provided therein.49

Consistent with the text of the form of Equity Commitment Letter it transmitted on July 15, which specified that URI was not a third-party beneficiary thereunder, Lowenstein also deleted from the July 15 drafts of the Merger Agreement and the Guarantee all of Simpson’s language referring to URI’s rights under, and ability to obtain specific enforcement of, the Equity Commitment Letter.50 Because there had been no agreement regarding the amount of the reverse break-up fee, no figure was specified in the July 15 drafts of the Merger Agreement or the Limited Guarantee.

As noted, Lowenstein also supplied a draft of the Equity Commitment Letter on July 15, which made clear that URI would not be a third-party beneficiary:

There is no express or implied intention to benefit any third party including, without limitation, the Company and nothing contained in this Equity Commitment Letter is intended, nor shall anything herein be construed, to confer any rights, legal or equitable, in any Person other than Parent.51

This provision appears unchanged in the Equity Commitment Letter that ultimately was executed as part of the transaction.52 Lowenstein’s draft also provided that the party making the commitment would not be liable to any person, including the RAM Entities or URI, for costs or damages in the event that CCM breached the Equity Commitment Letter. The draft further provided that “any claims with respect to the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement or this Equity Commitment Letter shall be made only pursuant to the Guarantee to the extent applicable.”53 Again, these provisions were not disputed by URI and are included in the final version of the Equity Commitment Letter.

Following delivery of the July 15 Low-enstein drafts, lawyers from the two firms participated in a conference call to discuss what the parties perceived as “major issues” remaining to be resolved. During that call, defendants say Swedenburg again confirmed that URI was willing to agree that receipt of the break-up fee, from either the RAM Entities or the Guarantor, would be URI’s “sole and exclusive” remedy if the buyer failed to close. Contemporaneous notes of the call taken by Lowenstein attorney Ethan Skerry reflect *824Swedenburg’s purported confirmation.54 Contemporaneous notes of the call taken by Ehrenberg do so as well.55

URI argues that the July 15, 2007 drafts of the Merger Agreement, Limited Guarantee, and Equity Commitment Letter proffered by RAM’s lawyers provide the best evidence of what, if anything, the parties had agreed to on July 12, 2007. Late on the evening of July 15, 2007, Ehrenberg sent to Swedenburg drafts of the Merger Agreement, the Limited Guarantee, and the Equity Commitment Letter.56 The July 15 draft made numerous revisions to Swedenburg’s July 3 draft of the Merger Agreement.57

The words “sole and exclusive remedy” appear in the July 15 draft in only two parts of section 8.2(e).58 In the first sentence, the “sole and exclusive remedy” language (which was already in an earlier draft circulated by URI) applies only to “all loss or damage ... upon any termination in accordance with clause (i) or (ii) of this section 8.2(e).”59 And the second sentence — newly added by Ehrenberg in response to the July 12 meeting60 — makes clear that “[t]he parties acknowledge and agree that the Parent Termination Fee ... constitute liquidated damages and are not a penalty and shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for recovery by the Company ... in the event of termination of this Agreement by [URI] in compliance with the provisions of Section 8.1(d)(i) or (ii) ...”61

As demonstrated by Ehrenberg’s redline of section 9.10, he made one change — to delete URI’s right to itself obtain specific performance of the Equity Commitment Letter — but he left untouched URI’s express specific performance rights to compel RAM to make reasonable best efforts to obtain the Financing, and consummate the Merger if the Financing was available but was not drawn down by RAM. Most important, despite having stricken section 9.10(b) in previous drafts, he chose not to delete section 9.10(b) on July 15 but rather to edit it by deleting the words “the Equity Commitment Letter” and the “pay the Equity Financing” from section 9.10(b).62 He then added the last sentence, which he claims rendered section 9.10(b), with its detailed provisions of specific performance, a nullity.63 But Ehrenberg could provide no real explanation why he did not delete, but rather edited, section 9.10(b).64 Ehrenberg conceded that it might have been clearer to just delete it.65

On July 16, Ehrenberg (and his colleagues) and Swedenburg discussed Eh*825renberg’s July 15 draft.66 Swedenburg testified that he was generally agreeable with the draft “as written.”67

h. The July 18, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

On July 18, 2007, Simpson circulated a responsive draft of the Merger Agreement, marked to show changes from the Lowen-stein July 15 draft.68 Simpson deleted the phrase “equitable relief’ from the final sentence of Section 8.2(e).69 Simpson did not propose to restore in either the Merger Agreement or the Limited Guarantee, or to add to the Equity Commitment Letter, any reference to a specific performance right with respect to the equity financing.70

i. The July 19, 2007 Meeting

On July 19, 2007, representatives of the parties and their advisors met at Lowen-stein’s New York offices. Those in attendance included McNeal of UBS, Ehrenberg, Shapiro, and Skerry of Lowenstein, and Holt, a Cerberus in-house attorney. Steven Mayer, RAM’s President and Chief Executive Officer on behalf of the buyer, and Swedenburg, of Simpson, participated by telephone. Lowenstein had circulated to URI’s representatives in advance of the meeting an agenda based upon Simpson’s July 18 draft, listing what it saw as open issues.71 The agenda included, in pertinent part, items about “fee issues” (company termination; reverse termination; go shop; other fees payable at the time of termination) and “limitation of liability in 8.2(e).”72

A principal point of discussion at the meeting concerned the size of the break-up fee that the buyer would have to pay if it chose not to proceed with the merger. Swedenburg explained that URI would require a reverse break-up fee of sufficient size to ensure that it would be “scary” and “painful” for the RAM Entities to walk away from the transaction.73 Swedenburg noted that URI was not content merely to rely upon the reputational fallout that would ensue if the RAM entities and their affiliates failed to close. Swedenburg’s remarks are reflected in notes taken contemporaneously at the meeting by Holt.74

Testimony from McNeal, one of URI’s bankers at UBS, confirms that the parties discussed that URI wanted a large breakup fee in light of the buyer’s ability to walk away from the deal, and that URI was counting on the combination of that fee and the buyer’s concerns about its reputation as a basis for believing that the buyer would not elect to walk away from the transaction.75 McNeal recalled that UBS representatives stated, “We want a high break-up fee so you’ll feel a lot of pain if *826you walk from this deal.”76 Similarly, McNeal testified that there was also a discussion of reputational damage to the purchaser if it walked away from this transaction in breach of the merger agreement.77

As reflected in Holt’s notes, the parties then proceeded to debate the appropriate amount of the break-up fee, including a discussion of what would be a “market” fee, with the buyer offering $75 million (up from $50 million it had contemplated earlier), and URI demanding $110 million. There was also a discussion of expenses payable in the event either side chose not to complete the merger. Holt’s notes captured the discussion as follows: “If CCM stepping away, willing to pay expenses plus break-up fee at $75 MM.”78

Later during the night of July 19, attorneys from Lowenstein had a number of calls with Swedenburg to review specific language in the July 18 Simpson draft of the Merger Agreement, in an effort to come to agreement on text to reflect the various agreements reached during the broader discussion that had preceded. During a discussion of Simpson’s changes to section 8.2(e) — specifically, their removal of the phrase “equitable relief’ — Lowen-stein attorney Skerry recalls that it was reiterated to Swedenburg that the documents must reflect the agreement that URI’s only remedy in the event the buyer did not proceed would be payment of the so called Parent Termination Fee. In that context, the Lowenstein attorneys explained that the bar on “equitable relief’ had to be put back into section 8.2(e), and Swedenburg stated in response, “I get it.”79

j. The July 20, 2007 Draft of the Merger Agreement

Lowenstein then circulated a revised draft of the Merger Agreement on July 20, 2007. Among other things, that revised draft reinserted the language in section 8.2(e) barring URI from seeking “equitable relief.”80 The final sentence of section 8.2(e) thus read exactly as it does in the final Merger Agreement, and contains the admonition that “in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from Parent, Merger Sub, Guarantor or any Related Party or any of their respective Representatives or Affiliates.”81

k. The July 21, 2007 Conversation

On July 21, 2007, in a conversation between Mayer, Kochman, and McNeal, Mayer indicated that he thought RAM was purchasing an “option,” Kochman strongly disagreed with the contention. Kochman testified about that conversation:

A. He said, you know, “Gee, that’s a lot of money. You know, I view this as an option. And my LPs would be very unhappy if I, you know, burnt that 100 million plus dollars.” And I was taken aback by that.
Q. And what did you say to him?
A. I said, ‘You know, that’s crazy. That’s a nonstarter. This is not an option. That’s something I would never *827take back to the board.” And I laid into him fairly good and said that this is a board that has concerns about your ability to consummate transactions. They see what’s going on with Chrysler. They don’t view you in the same breaths as KKR or Blackstone. And, you know, it’s a complete nonstarter.
Q. Did he respond to that?
A. He backed away. He said, “Time out. You know, I’m 100 percent committed to this transaction. I’m going to take you — I’m going to tell you right now that the debt financing and the commitment letters we have in hand are designed exactly for difficult markets. We’II get this deal done. I’m going to take you under the tent.”82

4. RAM’s Repudiation and Breach of the Merger Agreement

On November 14, 2007, RAM Holdings notified URI that it would not proceed with the acquisition of URI on the terms stated in the Merger Agreement, but would be prepared to enter into discussions with URI about revised terms. RAM repudiated via letter, which stated, in part:

... this is to advise that Parent and Merger Sub [RAM] are not prepared to proceed with the acquisition of URI on the terms contemplated by the Agreement.
Given this position and the rights and obligations of the parties under the Agreement and the ancillary documentation, we see two paths forward. If URI is interested in exploring a transaction between our companies on revised terms, we would be happy to engage in a constructive dialogue with you and representatives of your choosing at your earliest convenience. We could be available to meet in person or telephonically with URI and its representatives for this purpose immediately. In order to pursue this path, we would need to reach resolution on revised terms within a matter of days.
If, however, you are not interested in pursuing such discussions, we are prepared to make arrangements, subject to appropriate documentation, for the payment of the $100 million Parent Termination Fee.
We look forward to your response.83

Citing sources “close to the deal,” several news stories beginning around 9:30 a.m. and published throughout the day on November 14, 2007 indicated that RAM was not intending to consummate the merger in accordance with the terms of the Merger Agreement. URI’s shares fell by more than 30% to $23.50 per share, $10.29 less than the opening price. URI’s stock was the NYSE’s largest decliner of the day.

URI argues that it is plain that RAM’s actions are directed at putting pressure on the board of directors of URI to renegotiate a price below $34.50 per share. Indeed, on the evening of November 14, the same day that RAM sent its letter, a senior executive of RAM initiated contact with URI’s investment banker, UBS, to offer a substantially reduced price. URI promptly rejected this “offer” and, on November 19, 2007, filed the present lawsuit seeking specific performance of the Merger Agreement.

II. RAM’S STANDING ARGUMENT

RAM has, both in its briefing and at trial, suggested that this case should be dismissed because URI lacks standing to *828assert its claims. Viewing this action as a mere pretense, RAM argues that URI, in reality, is attempting to compel performance by CCM of the Equity Commitment Letter. Specifically, RAM contends that URI cannot do this because (1) URI is not an intended third party beneficiary of the Equity Commitment Letter, and (2) URI agreed to refrain from bringing this action in the Limited Guarantee. Neither argument is successful.

A. That URI Is Not a Third Party Beneficiary Under the Equity Commitment Letter Is Irrelevant

The Equity Commitment Letter explicitly disclaims that it confers rights on any third parties. Indeed, under New York and Delaware law, persons who are neither parties nor intended third party beneficiaries of a contract may not sue to enforce the contract’s terms.84 Accordingly, URI probably lacks the ability to sue CCM under the Equity Commitment Letter. As is quite clear from the caption of this case, however, URI here brings an action against the RAM Entities; CCM is not a party. URI is unquestionably a party to the Merger Agreement, and it is the Merger Agreement that URI seeks to enforce in this action.

B. The Limited Guarantee Does Not Bar an Action Against RAM by URI

Defendants also rely on the Limited Guarantee to support their contention that URI may not bring this suit. In paragraph 4(a), URI agrees “that it has no right of recovery in respect of a claim arising under the Merger Agreement ... against any former, current, or future officer, agent, affiliate, or employee of [Cerberus Partners or RAM]...."85 That sub-paragraph further states that URI agrees it will not bring any such action “by or through attempted piercing of the corporate veil, by or through a claim by or on behalf of [RAM] against [Cerberus Partners], except for its rights under this Limited Guarantee....”86 Subparagraph (b) proclaims that

Recourse against [Cerberus Partners] under this limited guarantee shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the Company and all of its affiliates against [Cerberus Partners and RAM] in respect of any liabilities or obligations arising under, or in connection with, the Merger Agreement ... including in the event [RAM] breaches any covenant, representation or warranty under the Merger Agreement or [Cerberus Partners] breaches a covenant, representation or warranty hereunder.87

RAM suggests that URI is attempting to “pierce the corporate veil” or make a claim by or on behalf of RAM against Cerberus Partners in contravention of paragraph 4(a). The “corporate veil” is a legal term of art that stands for the proposition “that the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt from *829liability for the corporation’s actions.”88 To “pierce” the corporate veil is to disregard that legal assumption and to go directly after a corporation’s shareholders rather than the corporation itself.89 URI is doing no such thing in this case. On the contrary, it steadfastly clings to the legal fact that the RAM Entities are independent, legal “persons.” URI has brought this case against them — not against Cerberus Partners — and the RAM Entities are explicitly carved out in the Limited Guarantee.90 Additionally, URI is clearly not bringing a claim “by or on behalf’ of RAM; it is bringing a claim against RAM.

Finally, RAM’s reliance on the “sole and exclusive remedy” language of paragraph 4(b) is untenable. RAM’s reading of that paragraph omits a key sentence: “Nothing set forth in this Limited Guarantee shall affect or be construed to affect any liability of Parent or Merger Sub to the Company....” The Limited Guarantee — by its own explicit terms — does not affect the liability of RAM to URI; the Limited Guarantee cannot, then, be read to preclude this action.

RAM’s fundamental point is not lost on this Court: the evidence of these agreements and their negotiation does indeed suggest that RAM/Cerberus Partners worked mightily to limit drastically URI’s ability to seek recourse against Cerberus Partners. Those same agreements, however, repeatedly carve out exceptions that preserve URI’s ability to seek recourse against RAM. When something goes wrong in these sorts of transactions, lawsuits are sure to follow.91 Cerberus Partners availed itself of the protections of the corporate veil by creating the RAM Entities. The mere creation of a new corporate form does not, however, eviscerate liability, it merely shifts it. Though URI may harbor dreams of compelling performance by Cerberus Partners and CCM, that is not what they seek in this action, and the agreements at issue in this case in no way prevent URI from suing RAM directly for its admitted breach.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standards

A trial is merely a vehicle for the act of fact finding. To the extent this Court needs to resolve a legal question alone, no trial is necessary.92 Summary judgment under Rule 56 allows resolution of a legal issue without the “delay and expense of a trial.”93 Summary judgment *830is only granted, however, when the movant can demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact.94 Indeed, the burden is on the movant, and the Court reviews all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.95

When the issue before the Court involves the interpretation of a contract, summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract in question is unambiguous. Therefore, the threshold inquiry when presented with a contract dispute on a motion for summary judgment is whether the contract is ambiguous.96 Ambiguity does not exist simply because the parties disagree about what the contract means.97 Moreover, extrinsic, parol evidence cannot be used to manufacture an ambiguity in a contract that facially has only one reasonable meaning.98 Rather, contracts are ambiguous “when the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.”99 Stated differently, to succeed on its motion for summary judgment, URI must establish that its construction of the merger agreement is the only reasonable interpretation.100 Guided by “Delaware’s well-understood principles of contract interpretation,”101 this Court concludes that URI has not succeeded in establishing that its interpretation of the disputed provisions is the only reasonable one. Because the Court concludes that the provisions are fairly susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations, the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is inappropriate.

B. URI’s Interpretation of the Merger Agreement is Reasonable

URI argues that the plain and unambiguous language of the merger agreement allows for specific performance as a remedy for the Ram Entities’ breach. Section 9.10 expressly invests URI with a right to seek specific performance to enforce the Merger Agreement and to obtain an order *831enjoining RAM to (i) make reasonable best efforts to obtain financing and satisfy the Merger Agreement’s closing conditions, and (ii) consummate the transactions when financing is available and has not been drawn down by RAM as a result of its breach of the Merger Agreement.

Section 9.10, however, explicitly states that it is “subject in all respects to Section 8.2(e) hereof, which Section shall govern the rights and obligations of the parties ... under the circumstances provided therein.” Section 8.2(e) describes the $100 million Parent Termination Fee payable to URI as the “sole and exclusive” remedy against RAM under the Agreement when there has been a termination of the Merger Agreement by URI. Further, section 8.2(e) provides that

In no event, whether or not this Agreement has been terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall [RAM or Cerberus Partners] ... be subject to any liability in excess of the Parent Termination Fee for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, ... and in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from [RAM or Cerberus Partners]....

Relying heavily on the canon of construction that requires harmonization of seemingly conflicting contract provisions,102 URI contends that specific performance under section 9.10 remains a viable remedy despite the language of section 8.2(e). URI offers two chief reasons in support of this position. First, section 8.2(e)’s $100 million Parent Termination Fee operates as the “sole and exclusive” remedy only if one of the parties terminates the agreement. Termination is a defined term in the Agreement, however, and it is not equivalent to a breach. URI contends (and RAM does not dispute) that neither party has terminated the agreement pursuant to section 8. Thus, the Termination Fee is not necessarily the “sole and exclusive remedy” in this case. Second, URI submits that the outright prohibition of equitable remedies in the last sentence of section 8.2(e) is limited to equitable remedies that involve monetary compensation like restitution or rescission. The sentence commands that “in no event shall [URI] seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of [the $100 million Termination Fee] from [RAM or Cerberus].” URI argues that the prepositional phrase (“in excess of the” termination fee) modifies both “equitable relief’ and “money damages.” This reading is required, URI says, because otherwise this sentence would render section 9.10 “mere surplusage”103 devoid of any meaning in violation of longstanding principles of contractual interpretation. Moreover, URI points to the final sentence of section 8.2(a) as proof that the Agreement contemplates a right to specific performance; “The parties acknowledge and agree *832that, subject to Section 8.2(e), nothing in this Section 8.2 shall be deemed to affect their right to specific performance under Section 9.10.” According to URI, section 8.2(a) shows that the parties were aware of the “specific performance” remedy and could have expressly eliminated it. The Merger Agreement does not do so; instead, it explicitly provides that both specific performance and injunctive relief are available remedies.

The RAM Entities counter that URI’s interpretation is unreasonable. First, they argue, it is URI’s position that would render portions of the Agreement “mere sur-plusage.” If the operation of section 8.2(e) were in fact limited, as URI asserts, to circumstances in which the Merger Agreement had been properly terminated by either party, there would be no need to include a sentence in section 9.10 subjecting the specific performance provisions of section 9.10 to section 8.2(e) because specific performance, by law, would be unavailable in those circumstances; one cannot specifically perform an agreement that has been terminated. Thus, section 8.2(e) must have applicability outside the context of termination. Second, the RAM Entities argue that is unreasonable to limit the phrase “equitable relief’ to those equitable remedies that include monetary damages.

Reading the Agreement as a whole and with the aid of the fundamental canons of contract construction, I conclude that URI’s interpretation is reasonable. The parties explicitly agreed in section 9.10 that “irreparable damage would occur in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed in accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached.” They further agreed that “the Company shall be entitled to see an injunction or injunctions ... to enforce compliance.” Given this clarion language supporting the existence and availability of specific performance, it is reasonable to read the limitations of section 8.2(e) in the manner URI has championed. RAM’s arguments to the contrary are ultimately unpersuasive. Neither party has terminated the Agreement pursuant to the termination provisions of section 8.1, and the context of the final sentence of section 8.2(e) allows one to reasonably conclude that “equitable relief’ in that sentence means only equitable relief involving monetary damages. URI’s interpretation thus represents a reasonable harmonization of apparently conflicting provisions.

C. RAM’s Interpretation of the Merger Agreement Also Is Reasonable

Though defendants fail to demonstrate that plaintiffs interpretation of the Merger Agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law, defendants do succeed in offering a reasonable alternative interpretation.104 In opposing URI’s motion for summary judgment, defendants deny that the provisions of the Merger Agreement conflict so as to require harmonization. The relationship between sections 9.10 and 8.2(e), as set forth in section 9.10 is, defendants contend, clear: section 9.10 is “subject to” *833section 8.2(e).105 Section 8.2(e) then provides that “in no event shall [URI] seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount [i.e., the $100 million termination fee] from [RAM or Cerberus].” RAM argues that section 8.2(e) operates to prohibit URI from seeking any form of equitable relief (including specific performance) under all circumstances, relegating URI’s relief to only the $100 million termination fee. Relying on Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Oglesby106 and Supermex Trading Co., Ltd. v. Strategic Solutions Group, Inc., 107 defendants contend that Delaware law specifically permits the parties to establish supremacy and subservience between provisions such that, where the terms of one provision are expressly stated to be “subject to” the terms of a second provision, the terms of the second provision will control, even if the terms of the second provision conflict with or nullify the first provision. Additionally, RAM argues, unlike plaintiffs interpretation, RAM’s interpretation utilizes only the plain meaning of “equitable relief.” As described above, plaintiff, in proposing a reconciliation of the section 8.2(e) limitation on equitable relief with the right of specific performance in section 9.10, urges this Court to read the words “equitable relief’ and “money damages” as modified by the phrase “in excess of’ the termination fee. Defendants’ interpretation of this portion of the provision is, however, at least as reasonable as (if not more than) that of plaintiff. The phrase “in excess of’ appears, grammatically, to modify only “money damages.”108

Plaintiff argues that if RAM had wanted to eliminate URI’s rights to specific performance in all circumstances, it could have simply stricken out clause (b) of section 9.10. Though the Court has no doubt that this simple (and seemingly obvious) drafting approach would have been superi- or, on a motion for summary judgment, I cannot look beyond the text of the agreement to inquire into the motivations of the parties or to consider ways in which a particular end may have been more efficiently achieved and more clearly articulated. An interpretation of the Agreement that relies on the parties’ addition of hierarchical phrases, instead of the deletion of particular language altogether, is not unreasonable as a matter of law.

Having considered all of plaintiffs arguments, I must conclude that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ interpretation is unreasonable as a matter of law. The contracting parties here chose terms, such as “subject to,” that impose a hierarchy among provisions. Defendants’ interpretation of those terms and the provisions they affect is not, I conclude, unreasonable.

*834 D. Because Both Interpretations of the Merger Agreement are Reasonable, the Agreement is Ambiguous and Summary Judgment Is Inappropriate

It is probably unlikely that a single, unambiguous agreement can simultaneously affirm and deny the availability of a specific performance remedy. If there is such an unambiguous contract, it is certainly not the contract at issue in this case. Both URI and RAM have proffered reasonable readings of the Merger Agreement, and because “provisions in controversy are fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings, there is ambiguity.”109 Thus, plaintiffs and defendants’ arguments suffer the same flaw, which is fatal at this stage: each party is unable to demonstrate that its proposed interpretation of the Merger Agreement is the only interpretation of the Agreement that is reasonable as a matter of law. In such a case, summary judgment is inappropriate because the court is presented with a genuine issue of material fact: what was the intent of the parties?110 Therefore, I must consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the Merger Agreement.

IV. TRIAL

The Court heard testimony from seven witnesses over a two-day trial in order to resolve the factual issue of what was the common understanding of the parties with respect to remedies in the Merger Agreement. The Merger Agreement, of course, is a contract, and the Court’s goal when interpreting a contract “is to ascertain the shared intention of the parties.”111 Thus, URI, which seeks to specifically enforce the Merger Agreement, bore the burden of persuasion in demonstrating that the common understanding of the parties was that this contract allowed for the remedy of specific performance and that URI is entitled to such a remedy.112 URI has failed to meet its burden.

A. Legal Standards

Having determined that the contract is ambiguous on account of its conflicting provisions, the Court permitted the parties to introduce extrinsic evidence of the negotiation process.113 Such extrin*835sic evidence may include “overt statements and acts of the parties, the business context, prior dealings between the parties, [and] business custom and usage in the industry.”114 This evidence may lead to “a single ‘correct’ or single ‘objectively reasonable’ meaning.”115 Restated, the extrinsic evidence may render an ambiguous contract clear so that an “objectively reasonable party in the position of either bargainer would have understood the nature of the contractual rights and duties to be.”116 In such a case, the Court would enforce the objectively reasonable interpretation that emerges.

The Court must emphasize here that the introduction of extrinsic, parol evidence does not alter or deviate from Delaware’s adherence to the objective theory of contracts.117 As I recently explained to counsel in this case, the private, subjective feelings of the negotiators are irrelevant and unhelpful to the Court’s consideration of a contract’s meaning,118 because the meaning of a properly formed contract must be shared or common.119 That is not to say, however, that a party’s subjective understanding is never instructive. On the contrary, in cases where an examination of the extrinsic evidence does not lead to an obvious, objectively reasonable conclusion, the Court may apply the forthright negotiator principle.120 Under this principle, the Court considers the evidence of what one party subjectively “believed the obligation to be, coupled with evidence that the other party knew or should have known of such belief.”121 In *836other words, the forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract’s meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party.122 It is with these fundamental legal principles in mind that I consider the factual record developed at trial.

B. Analysis

The evidence presented at trial conveyed a deeply flawed negotiation in which both sides failed to clearly and consistently communicate their client’s positions. First, I find that the extrinsic evidence is not clear enough to conclude that there is a single, shared understanding with respect to the availability of specific performance under the Merger Agreement. Second, I employ the forthright negotiator principle to make two additional findings. With respect to URI, I find that even if the Company believed the Agreement preserved a right to specific performance, its attorney Eric Swedenburg categorically failed to communicate that understanding to the defendants during the latter part of the negotiations. Finally, with respect to RAM, although it could have easily avoided this entire dispute by striking section 9.10(b) from the Agreement, I find that its attorney did communicate to URI his understanding that the Agreement precluded any specific performance rights. Consequently, I conclude that URI has failed to meet its burden and determine that the Merger Agreement does not allow a specific performance remedy.

1. The Extrinsic Evidence Presented at Trial Does Not Lead to an Obvious, Reasonable Interpretation of This Hopelessly Conflicted Contract

As discussed above, this Merger Agreement simultaneously purports to provide and preclude the remedy of specific performance.123 Despite the plaintiffs well-argued motion for summary judgment, the conflicting provisions of this contract render it decidedly ambiguous. At trial, both sides attempted to show that the extrinsic evidence led ineluctably to that party’s respective interpretation. This was an exercise in futility.

The parties began their negotiations very far apart. URI circulated a draft that included numerous provisions favorable to their side, including several mechanisms by which URI could specifically enforce the merger against Cerberus.124 RAM responded with a “heavy-handed” mark-up.125 Early conversations led to no agreement, and URI simply ignored many *837of the proposed changes that RAM initially made.126 Although RAM ultimately succeeded in striking many of the provisions entitling URI to specific performance,127 and although RAM did modify section 8.2(e) to try to limit the availability of equitable relief, section 9.10 in the final agreement continued to speak of the Company’s right to specific performance. Testimony revealed that communications between the parties routinely skirted the issue of equitable relief and only addressed it tangentially or implicitly.128 The defendants put forth some evidence suggesting that by mid to late July Swe-denburg had agreed to give up specific performance,129 but it was not conclusive. Mr. Seitz, URI’s attorney, deftly questioned RAM’s chief negotiator Ehrenberg about the clarity and wisdom of his curious editing of section 9.10, a provision Ehrenberg also contends he nullified, but this did not uncover “a single ‘correct’ or single ‘objectively reasonable’ meaning’”130 for the Agreement. Indeed, because “a review of the extrinsic evidence does not lead the Court to an ‘obvious’ conclusion,”131 I must apply the forthright negotiator principle to determine the proper interpretation of this contract.

2. Even if URI Understood the Agreement to Provide a Specific Performance Remedy, Defendants Did Not Know and Had No reason to Know of This Understanding.

Swedenburg, the primary draftsman and contact at Simpson, drafted the initial bid contract as part of the auction process.132 Once the bid contract was drafted, Swedenburg sent it to Emily McNeal of UBS, who then circulated it to purchasers. This May 18 bid contract contained a specific performance provision.133 On June 18, Ehrenberg returned a “heavy handed” mark-up.134 After receiving Ehrenberg’s comments, Swedenburg spoke with Ehrenberg in what Swedenburg described as a “largely one way conversation” in which Swedenburg articulated what URI cared about the most.135 During this conversation, Swedenburg described to Ehrenberg the “construct” included in the draft.136 Acknowledging that the inclusion of the reverse break-up *838fee/specific performance construct in the draft was not “market” relative to other recent LBO transactions,137 Swedenburg explained to Ehrenberg that this construct made sense in terms of what URI wanted to accomplish: “the deal was supposed to be that if the financing was there, that the RAM entities should have to access the financing and close the transaction. And that’s why we have the specific performance the way we have it.”138 Swedenburg then told Ehrenberg that he did not expect to include “a lot” of Ehrenberg’s changes in Swedenburg’s revised version of the agreement.139 No one disputes that, as of this time, URI understood the agreement under negotiation to include a specific performance remedy, which was highly valued by URI, and that RAM knew of this. After the bid contract and throughout, Swe-denburg and Ehrenberg discussed changes to terms of the Agreement140 and exchanged revised drafts.141 No agreements were reached on these issues and the discussions continued. At this point, there is no dispute that the parties had not reached an agreement as to whether URI had a right of specific performance and that both Swedenburg and Ehrenberg were aware of each other’s position.142

On July 16, Swedenburg discussed the July 15 version of the contract.143 In this conversation, Swedenburg testified that the amount of the reverse break-up fee contemplated by the construct was not discussed and that he told Ehrenberg that, with respect to the rest of the construct, “we were okay with” the July 15 draft.144 At this point, the evidence begins to reveal that URI’s apparent belief that it had a specific performance right was not effectively communicated to defendants such that defendants either knew or should have known of URI’s understanding of the Merger Agreement. The July 15 draft, which contains Ehrenberg’s edits to Swe-denburg’s July 3 draft, is a pivotal moment in the drafting history of the Merger Agreement: Ehrenberg added both the “in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief’' to section 8.2(e) and the infamous “subject to” section 8.2(e) language to the end of section 9.10.145 Lest it be somehow lost in the details, it is worthwhile to highlight the potential effect of this additional language: section 8.2(e), to which URI’s *839section 9.10 right to specific performance is subject (under Ehrenberg’s revision), purports to specifically prohibit URI from seeking equitable relief. Yet, to such a substantive revision that attempts to eviscerate the right to specific performance (the importance of which Swedenburg understood and had previously communicated during negotiations),146 Swedenburg simply told Ehrenberg that “we were okay with the contract as written regarding those [specific performance] provisions.”147

In the next draft of the Agreement, despite this statement to Ehrenberg, Swe-denburg struck the words “equitable relief’ in section 8.2(e).148 Though this might indicate that Swedenburg had realized that Ehrenberg’s language could be interpreted to eliminate URI’s right to specific performance, the next conversation regarding the agreements shows this was not the case. For the July 19 conversation, “limitation of liability at 8.2(e)” is identified as an item on the agenda.149 Swedenburg testified that, regarding his striking “equitable relief’ from section 8.2(e), he told Ehrenberg that he “thought all of the changes were-that I had made to the last version of the contract in that section were technical and nonsubstan-tive,”150 Ehrenberg objected to this deletion and the language was reinserted.151

At this point, even if URI in fact believed that it had a right to specific performance or I could conclude that such a belief were reasonable, I find that defendants had no reason to know of this understanding.152 Though URI, through Swedenburg, had many opportunities throughout the negotiation process to clearly vocalize its understanding of its rights for specific performance under the Merger Agreement, URI consistently failed to communicate this to Cerberus representatives.153 Particularly damning *840is the Mayer conversation on July 19, 2007.

McNeal and Kochman testified that, on July 19, they had a conversation in which Mayer said Cerberus thought that it was buying an option in URI.154 McNeal and Kochman were taken aback by this assertion and immediately relayed this conversation to Horowitz, URI’s attorney at Simpson.155 Horowitz, however, did nothing to dissuade Ehrenberg that Mayer’s understanding of the transaction was erroneous. Horowitz stated that when he spoke with Ehrenberg, Horowitz made no reference to any of the following: the position that had been relayed to Horowitz that Cerberus could pay $100 million and walk away from the contract; Mayer’s position that Cerberus had the right to pay $100 million and walk away from the contract; whether or not Horowitz agreed with the position that Mayer had expressed to McNeal and Kochman; whether or not there was a specific performance right under the Merger Agreement; whether or not the parties disagreed about the interpretation of the contract.156 Horowitz also said that he did not recall that Ehrenberg said anything about these issues, except to state that Cerberus was not repudiating the contract.157 It is unclear what, if anything, was said during this conversation but it is clear that nothing was said or done to enable this Court to find that defendants should have known that URI believed it was entitled to specific performance. I therefore conclude that the evidence demonstrates that, even if URI did believe it had a right to specific performance, defendants did not know and had no reason to know of URI’s understanding of the Merger Agreement.158

3. Defendants Understood the Agreement to Bar Specific Performance and URI Either Knew or Should Have Known of This Understanding

Based on the evidence presented at trial, I find that the defendants understood the agreement to eliminate any right to specific performance and that URI either knew or should have known of defendants’ understanding. Cerberus seems to have *841come to this transaction halfheartedly and unenthusiastic about committing. It took issue with a great deal of the initial draft agreement URI circulated159 and failed to submit a bid by the proposed deadline.160 The defendants offered a go-shop period with a lower break fee to allow URI to shop itself to other bidders without the fear of paying a huge termination fee.161 Moreover, Cerberus lowered its bid significantly.162 Cerberus was not acting like an eager buyer and was not willing to do this deal on the terms initially proposed by URI.

Testimony from two of Cerberus’s leaders, CEO Stephen Feinberg and managing director Steven Mayer, demonstrated that the firm believed it had the ability to walk away from this agreement relatively unscathed. Indeed, Feinberg, though evidently unsure of what “specific performance” means,163 did think “very clearly that to the extent we didn’t complete the merger, that our — our liability and our — what we’d have to come up with was a hundred million and that we could not be forced to close the deal.”164 Mayer, who participated more directly in the negotiations and who reviewed the Merger Agreement both in drafts and in final form,165 testified that he “believe[s] there was an explicit understanding that Cerberus could choose not to close the transaction for any reason or no reason at all and pay a maximum amount of a hundred million dollars.”166 In addition to the Cerberus executives, lawyers for Cerberus testified to and produced contemporaneous notes corroborating their subjective understanding that the $100 million termination fee was the “sole and exclusive” recourse available to URI in the event of a failure to close.167

I also find that defendants communicated this understanding to URI in such a way that URI either knew or should have known of their understanding. Initially, Cerberus conveyed its position by means of the drafts and mark-ups it sent to Swe-denburg. For example, on June 18, 2007, Ehrenberg sent Simpson his initial markups to the draft circulated by URI. In that mark-up, Ehrenberg wrote, “OUR CLIENT WILL NOT AGREE TO A GUARANTEE.”168 Ehrenberg also removed a provision from section 6.10 “that would have required the buyer to take enforcement actions against the lenders *842and other persons providing the financing.”169 Finally, Ehrenberg struck portions of section 9.10(b) that would have allowed URI to specifically enforce the Equity Commitment Letter and the Guarantee and to specifically enforce the consummation of the transaction.170 While discussing these, Swedenburg told Ehrenberg that he would likely not incorporate many of the changes, would send it back, and would expect Cerberus’s next mark-up to be “less voluminous.”171

Nevertheless, Ehrenberg persisted. In a conversation that occurred sometime between June 25 and July 10, Ehrenberg and Swedenburg discussed the extent of the defendants’ potential liability. During this conversation, Swedenburg indicated “that it was important for his client to assure that ... Cerberus and the RAM entities showed up at the closing.”172 Ehrenberg “explained to Mr. Swedenburg that that was a significant problem.”173 At a July 10 meeting of the attorneys, it was decided that the issue of liability needed to be decided by the principals, but that Cerberus would be willing to enter a limited guarantee agreement.174

The next important meeting occurred on July 12, 2007. There, via telephone, Mayer represented to the URI team that “Cerberus would not proceed with the negotiations or with the deal unless there was an arrangement where, if the Cerberus parties, to include RAM, failed to close, the obligation would be to pay a fee.”175 Both Ehrenberg and Mayer testified that the URI team agreed to this point on the twelfth.176

After this meeting, Ehrenberg and his team returned to the Merger Agreement and made several important revisions. The draft they produced was circulated early in the morning on July 15, 2007 along with new versions of the Equity Commitment Letter and the Limited Guarantee.177 I find several edits significant in these documents:

1. the Equity Commitment Letter expressly disclaims any third-party beneficiaries and exceptions to allow for suit against the Cerberus entities were removed;178
2. the “no recourse” provisions of the Limited Guarantee were expanded to make them farther reaching;179
3. section 9.10 was edited to remove references to the Equity Commitment Letter and the final sentence was added to make the provision subservient to section 8.2(e);180 and
4. section 8.2(e) was substantially rewritten to include a limitation on liability and to provide explicitly that “in no event shall the Company seek equitable relief....”181

*843Although, as discussed above, these edits do not provide a perfectly clear expression of RAM’s position that the agreement bars specific performance, they are substantial enough that they should have at least put Swedenburg and URI on notice that RAM had a different understanding than URI did. Subsequent communications between the parties go substantively beyond this, and unquestionably convey RAM’s position.

Swedenburg made very few changes to this draft. He struck the provision about the Company’s ability to “seek equitable relief,”182 but he ultimately did not stand by this revision. When Ehrenberg received Swedenburg’s edits, he circulated an agenda for a meeting to discuss the Merger Agreement. On that agenda, Ehrenberg listed “limitation of liability in 8.2(e)” as a topic for discussion,183 and by this he “intended to address the deletion of the words equity relief.”184 At that meeting, Mr. Swedenburg spent his time lobbying for a higher break-up fee, one that would be “painful,” because the potential reputational harm Cerberus would suffer from walking away would not be enough to deter them from doing so.185 Perhaps more importantly, the RAM attorneys also explained to Swedenburg the importance of the words “equitable relief’ that Swe-denburg had stricken from the Merger Agreement: “it was important for us that the language that he struck be restored to reflect the agreement that the only remedy available to United Rentals, if Cerberus didn’t proceed with the closing, was the break-up fee — reverse break-up fee.”186 Testimony indicated that Swedenburg put up no fight on this issue. He tersely replied, “I get it.”187

I find this testimony to be credible and I find that it is supported by certain of defendants’ exhibits and by Swedenburg’s testimony. First, the agenda that Ehrenberg circulated specifically references section 8.2(e).188 Second, Holt’s notes from the July 19 meeting support the proposition that this conversation happened and that Swedenburg assented.189 Third, Swe-denburg essentially capitulated on this point during cross examination. Conceding that he quickly assented to the reinsertion of the language he had removed from section 8.2(e), Swedenburg then testified that he knew “equitable relief included specific performance,”190 that this was “probably why [he] did strike it,”191 admitted that Ehrenberg conveyed how impor*844tant that provision was to Cerberus,192 and then concluded by suggesting he knew it would have been a good idea to inquire further about why this provision was so important to Cerberus, but that he failed to so inquire because it “was at the end of an agenda, there was [sic] more negotiations to go, et cetera, et cetera.”193 I find it frankly incredible that Swedenburg could have recognized the import of the language he was striking and that Cerberus considered that language key but manifestly failed to make any further inquiry. Swedenburg, the original architect of this transaction, testified that one lynchpin of his “construct” was the seller’s ability to force the sale to close.194 By the end of this July 19 meeting, Swedenburg either knew or should have known that Cerberus’s understanding of the Agreement was fundamentally inconsistent with that construct.

If Swedenburg’s faltering on July 19 were not enough to put URI on notice of Cerberus’s understanding, the July 21 telephone conversation between the UBS representatives (McNeal and Kochman) and Mayer surely was. On that call, Mayer mentioned something about Cerberus’s ability to walk away from the deal.195 Kochman responded forcefully, declaring that his client, URI, would never agree to this deal if it were merely an option.196 Mayer reassured him that Cerberus was committed to the deal, but never conceded that the contract amounted to anything other than an option.197 McNeal and Koch-man reported this conversation to Horowitz, and Brad Jacobs, then-CEO/Chairman of URI.198 Horowitz, who evidently cannot remember much of this deal, failed to raise this issue with Swedenburg,199 the chief negotiator, or with Ehrenberg.200 On July 22, the very next day, the Agreement was executed. At that time, I conclude that URI had ample reason to know that Cerberus understood the Agreement to bar the remedy of specific performance.

Y. CONCLUSION

Although some in the media have discussed this case in the context of Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) clauses,201 the dispute between URI and Cerberus is a good, old-fashioned contract ease prompt*845ed by buyer’s remorse.202 As with many contract disputes, hindsight affords the Court a perspective from which it is clear that this case could have been avoided: if Cerberus had simply deleted section 9.10(b), the contract would not be ambiguous, and URI would not have filed this suit. The law of contracts, however, does not require parties to choose optimally clear language; in fact, parties often riddle their agreements with a certain amount of ambiguity in order to reach a compromise.203 Although the language in this Merger Agreement remains ambiguous, the understanding of the parties does not.

One may plausibly upbraid Cerberus for walking away from this deal, for favoring their lenders over their targets, or for suboptimal contract editing, but one cannot reasonably criticize the firm for a failure to represent its understanding of the limitations on remedies provided by this Merger Agreement. From the beginning of the process, Cerberus and its attorneys have aggressively negotiated this contract, and along the way they have communicated their intentions and understandings to URI. Despite the Herculean efforts of its litigation counsel at trial, URI could not overcome the apparent lack of communication of its intentions and understandings to defendants. Even if URI’s deal attorneys did not affirmatively and explicitly agree to the limitation on specific performance as several witnesses allege they did on multiple occasions, no testimony at trial rebutted the inference that I must reasonably draw from the evidence: by July 22, 2007, URI knew or should have known what Cerberus’s understanding of the Merger Agreement was, and if URI disagreed with that understanding, it had an affirmative duty to clarify its position in the face of an ambiguous contract with glaringly conflicting provisions. Because it has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the common understanding of the parties permitted specific performance of the Merger Agreement, URI’s petition for specific performance is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6.9 Restatement (2d) 201 Whose Meaning Prevails 6.9 Restatement (2d) 201 Whose Meaning Prevails

Restatement (Second) of Contracts – 201 – Whose Meaning Prevails

(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.

(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made

(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or

(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.

(3) Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.

6.10 Canons of Construction 6.10 Canons of Construction

20 Commonly Inconsistent Canons of Contract Construction


1. Give words their plain and ordinary meaning
2. Give words their dictionary meanings
3. Give trade usages meanings used in the trade
4. Give technical words their technical meanings
5. Assume a word or phrase means the same thing throughout contract
6. Construe words in the context of the entire contract
7. Noscitur A Sociis : construe in light of local context
8. Interpret to carry out contract purpose (as shown by contract, recitals)
9. Give all terms a meaning (construe against redundancy and conflict)
10. Construe for validity (construe against illegality or voidness)
11. Overlook / reform obvious mistakes
12. Let specific control the general
13. Ejusdem generis : in a list, construe general consistent with specific
14. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius : including one excludes others
15. Construe for balance (construe against forfeitures or one-way options)
16. Construe against eccentricity, impossibility, absurdity
17. Construe ambiguities against drafter
18. Favor handwriting over typewriting, and that over printing
19. Favor specifically negotiated terms over boilerplate
20. Favor later drafted terms over earlier drafted terms