4 Grounds II 4 Grounds II

4.1 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown 4.1 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown

246 N. Y. 369
ALLEGHENY COLLEGE, Appellant,
v.
THE NATIONAL CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY BANK OF JAMESTOWN, as Executor of MARY Y. JOHNSTON, Deceased, Respondent.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua County Bank, 219 App. Div. 852, reversed.

(Argued October 18, 1927; decided November 22, 1927.) 

APPEAL, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered April 13, 1927, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at an Equity Term. Clarence G. Pickard, C. A. Pickard and Arthur L. Bates for appellant. The subscription paper executed by Mary Yates Johnston was founded upon a legal consideration. (Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18; Matter of Conger, 113 Misc. Rep. 129; Eliassof v. DeWandelaer, 30 App. Div. 155; Coyne v. Weaver, 84 X. Y. 386; Ga Nun v. Palmer, 210 N. Y. 603; Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600; Mechanicville War Chest, Inc., v. Butterfield, 110 Misc. Hep. 257; Richmondville Union Seminary v. McDonald, 34 N. Y. 379; Genesee College v. Dodge, 26 N. Y. 213; Locke v. Taylor, 161 App. Div. 44.)

Robert H. Jackson, Harry R. Lewis and Benjamin S. Dean for respondent. The instrument is only a promise to make a gift or subscription and lacks consideration which the law of New York requires for actionability. (Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581; Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517; Twenty-third St. Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601; Holmes v. Roper, 141 N. Y. 64; Dougherty v. Salt, 227 N. Y. 202; Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N. Y. 430; Tucker v. Alexander off, 183 U. S. 424; Cottage Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528; Montpelier Seminary v. Smith, 69 Vt. 382; New Jersey Hospital v. Wright, 95 N. J. L. 462; U. of Penn. v. Coxe, 277 Penn. St. 512; Gait v. Swain, 9 Geattan [Va.], 633.)

CARDOZO, Ch. J. The plaintiff, Allegheny College, is an institution of liberal learning at Meadville, Pennsylvania. In June 1921, a "drive" was in progress to secure for it an additional endowment of $1,250,000. An appeal to contribute to this fund was made to Mary Yates Johnston of Jamestown, New York. In response thereto, she signed and delivered on June 15, 1921, the following writing:

"Estate Pledge,
“Allegheny College Second Century Endowment
"JAMESTOWN, N. Y., June 15, 1921."
“In consideration of my interest in Christian Education, and in consideration of others subscribing, I hereby subscribe and will pay to the order of the Treasurer of Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania, the sum of Five Thousand Dollars; $5,000.
"This obligation shall become due thirty days after my death, and I hereby instruct my Executor, or Administrator, to pay the same out of my estate. This pledge shall bear interest at the rate of . . . per cent per annum, payable annually, from . . . till paid. The proceeds of this obligation shall be added to the Endowment of said Institution, or expended in accordance with instructions on reverse side of this pledge."

“Name MARY YATES JOHNSTON,
“Address 306 East 6th Street,
“Jamestown, N. Y.
“DAYTON E. MCCLAIN Witness
"T. R. COURTIS Witness
to authentic signature."

On the reverse side of the writing is the following indorsement:

"In loving memory this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund, the proceeds from which shall be used to educate students preparing for the Ministry, either in the United States or in the Foreign Field.

"This pledge shall be valid only on the condition that the provisions of my Will, now extant, shall be first met.
"MARY YATES JOHNSTON."

The subscription was not payable by its terms until thirty days after the death of the promisor. The sum of $1,000 was paid, however, upon account in December, 1923, while the promisor was alive. The college set the money aside to be held as a scholarship fund for the benefit of students preparing for the ministry. Later, in July, 1924, the promisor gave notice to the college that she repudiated the promise. Upon the expiration of thirty days following her death, this action was brought against the executor of her will to recover the unpaid balance.

The law of charitable subscriptions has been a prolific source of controversy in this State and elsewhere. We have held that a promise of that order is unenforcible like any other if made without consideration (Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581; Presb. Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517; 23rd St. Bap. Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601). On the other hand, though professing to apply to such subscriptions the general law of contract, we have found consideration present where the general law of contract, at least as then declared, would have said that it was absent (Barnes v. Ferine, 12 N. Y. 18; Presb. Soc. v. Beach, 74 N. Y. 72; Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96; cf. Eastern States League v. Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 508, and cases cited; Y. M. C. A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291; Amherest Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427; Ladies Collegiate Inst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196; Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114; Robinson v. Nutt, 185 Mass. 345; U. of Pa. v. Coxe, 277 Penn. St. 512; Williston, Contracts, § 116).

A classic form of statement identifies consideration with detriment to the promisee sustained by virtue of the promise (Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538; Anson, Contracts [Corbin's ed.], p. 116; 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10). So compendious a formula is little more than a half truth. There is need of many a supplementary gloss before the outline can be so filled in as to depict the classic doctrine. "The promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting" (Wise. & Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386; McGovern v. City of N. Y., 234 N. Y. 377, 389; Walton Water Co. v. Village of Walton, 238 N. Y. 46, 51; 1 Williston, Contracts, §139; Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, pp. 82-88). If A promises B to make him a gift, consideration may be lacking, though B has renounced other opportunities for betterment in the faith that the promise will be kept.

The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten. The doctrine of consideration has not escaped the common lot. As far back as 1881, Judge HOLMES in his lectures on the Common Law (p. 292), separated the detriment which is merely a consequence of the promise from the detriment which is in truth the motive or inducement, and yet added that the courts "have gone far in obliterating this distinction." The tendency toward effacement has not lessened with the years. On the contrary, there has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled " a promissory estoppel " (Williston, Contracts, §§139, 116). Whether the exception has made its way in this State to such an extent as to permit us to say that the general law of consideration has been modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to say. Cases such as Siegel v. Spear & Co. (234 N. Y. 479) and DeCicco v. Schweizer (221 N. Y. 431) may be signposts on the road. Certain, at least, it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions. So long as those decisions stand, the question is not merely whether the enforcement of a charitable subscription can be squared with the doctrine of consideration in all its ancient rigor. The question may also be whether it can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

We have said that the cases in this State have recognized this exception, if exception it is thought to be. Thus, in Barnes v. Perine (12 N. Y. 18) the subscription was made without request, express or implied, that the church do anything on the faith of it. Later, the church did incur expense to the knowledge of the promisor, and in the reasonable belief that the promise would be kept. We held the promise binding, though consideration there was none except upon the theory of a promissory estoppel. In Presbyterian Society v. Beach (74 X. Y. 72) a situation substantially the same became the basis for a like ruling. So in Roberts v. Cobb (103 N. Y. 600) and Keuka College v. Ray (167 N. Y. 96) the moulds of consideration as fixed by the old doctrine were subjected to a like expansion. Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped, more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made. Judges have been affected by the thought that "defences of that character" are "breaches of faith toward the public, and especially toward those engaged in the same enterprise, and an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those interested" (W. F. ALLEN, J., in Barnes v. Perine, supra, page 24; and cf. Eastern States League v. Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 505, and cases there cited). The result speaks for itself irrespective of the motive. Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and procedure (8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 7 et seq.). The concept survives as one of the distinctive features of our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, however, the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.

It is in this background of precedent that we are to view the problem now before us. The background helps to an understanding of the implications inherent in subscription and acceptance. This is so though we may find in the end that without recourse to the innovation of promissory estoppel the transaction can be fitted within the mould of consideration as established by tradition. The promisor wished to have a memorial to perpetuate her name. She imposed a condition that the "gift" should "be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." The moment that the college accepted $1,000 as a payment on account, there was an assumption of a duty to do whatever acts were customary or reasonably necessary to maintain the memorial fairly and justly in the spirit of its creation. The college could not accept the money, and hold itself free thereafter from personal responsibility to give effect to the condition (Dinan v. Coneys, 143 N. Y. 544, 547; Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136; Gridley v. Gridley, 24 N. Y. 130; Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 469; 1 Williston, Contracts, §§90, 370). More is involved in the receipt of such a fund than a mere acceptance of money to be held to a corporate use  (cf. Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, citing Johnson v. Otterbein University, 41 Ohio St. 527, 531, and Presb. Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517). The purpose of the founder would be unfairly thwarted or at least inadequately served if the college failed to communicate to the world, or in any event to applicants for the scholarship, the title of the memorial. By implication it undertook, when it accepted a portion of the "gift," that in its circulars of information and in other customary ways, when making announcement of this scholarship, it would couple with the announcement the name of the donor. The donor was not at liberty to gain the benefit of such an undertaking upon the payment of a part and dis- appoint the expectation that there would be payment of the residue. If the college had stated after receiving $1,000 upon account of the subscription that it would apply the money to the prescribed use, but that in its circulars of information and when responding to prospective applicants it would deal with the fund as an anonymous donation, there is little doubt that the subscriber would have been at liberty to treat this statement as the repudiation of a duty impliedly assumed, a repudiation justifying a refusal to make payments in the future. Obligation in such circumstances is correlative and mutual. A case much in point is N. J. Hospital v. Wright (95 N. J. L. 402, 464), where a subscription for the maintenance of a bed in a hospital was held to be enforcible by virtue of an implied promise by the hospital that the bed should be maintained in the name of the subscriber (cf. Bd. of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 209 Tenn. St. 361). A parallel situation might arise upon the endowment of a chair or a fellowship in a university by the aid of annual payments with the condition that it should commemorate the name of the founder or that of a member of his family. The university would fail to live up to the fair meaning of its promise if it were to publish in its circulars of information and elsewhere the existence of a chair or a fellowship in the prescribed subject, and omit the benefactor's name. A duty to act in ways beneficial to the promisor and beyond the application of the fund to the mere uses of the trust would be cast upon the promisee by the acceptance of the money. We do not need to measure the extent either of benefit to the promisor or of detriment to the promisee implicit in this duty. "If a person chooses to make an extravagant promise for an inadequate consideration it is his own affair" (8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 17). It was long ago said that "when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action" (Sturlyn v. Albany, 1587, Cro. Eliz. 67, quoted by Holdsworth, supra; cf. Walton Water Co. v. Village of Walton, 238 N. Y. 46, 51). The longing for posthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratification is a negligible good.

We think the duty assumed by the plaintiff to perpetuate the name of the founder of the memorial is sufficient in itself to give validity to the subscription within the rules that define consideration for a promise of that order. When the promisee subjected itself to such a duty at the implied request of the promisor, the result was the creation of a bilateral agreement (Williston, Contracts, §§60-a, 68, 90, 370; Brown v. Knapp, supra; Grossman v. Schenker, supra; Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Pick. 541, 544; Ladies Collegiate Inst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196, 200). There was a promise on the one side and on the other a return promise, made, it is true, by implication, but expressing an obligation that had been exacted as a condition of the payment. A bilateral agreement may exist though one of the mutual promises be a promise "implied in fact," an inference from conduct as opposed to an inference from words (Williston, Contracts, §§90, 22-a; Pettibone v. Moore, 75 Hun, 461, 464). We think the fair inference to be drawn from the acceptance of a payment on account of the subscription is a promise by the college to do what may be necessary on its part to make the scholarship effective. The plan conceived by the subscriber will be mutilated and distorted unless the sum to be accepted is adequate to the end in view. Moreover, the time to affix her name to the memorial will not arrive until the entire fund has been collected. The college may thus thwart the purpose of the payment on account if at liberty to reject a tender of the residue. It is no answer to say that a duty would then arise to make restitution of the money. If such a duty may be imposed, the only reason for its existence must be that there is then a failure of "consideration." To say that there is a failure of consideration is to concede that a consideration has been promised since otherwise it could not fail. No doubt there are times and situations in which limitations laid upon a promisee in connection with the use of what is paid by a subscriber lack the quality of a consideration, and are to be classed merely as conditions (Williston, Contracts, §112; Page, Contracts, §523).

"It is often difficult to determine whether words of condition in a promise indicate a request for consideration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous promise. An aid, though not a conclusive test in determining which construction of the promise is more reasonable is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that the happening was requested as a consideration"

(Williston, supra, §112). Such must be the meaning of this transaction unless we are prepared to hold that the college may keep the payment on account, and thereafter nullify the scholarship which is to preserve the memory of the subscriber. The fair implication to be gathered from the whole transaction is assent to the condition and the assumption of a duty to "go forward with performance (DeWolf Co. v. Harvey, 161 Wis. 535; Pullman Co. v. Meyer, 195 Ala. 397, 401; Braniff v. Baier, 101 Kan. 117; cf. Corbin, Offer & Acceptance, 26 Yale L. J. 169, 177, 193; McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv. L. R. 644; Sir Frederick Pollock, 28 L. Q. R. 100, 101). The subscriber does not say: I hand you $1,000, and you may make up your mind later, after my death, whether you will undertake to commemorate my name. What she says in effect is this: I hand you $1,000, and if you are unwilling to commemorate me, the time to speak is now. The conclusion thus reached makes it needless to consider whether, aside from the feature of a memorial, a promissory estoppel may result from the assumption of a duty to apply the fund, so far as already paid, to special purposes not mandatory under the provisions of the college charter (the support and education of students preparing for the ministry), an assumption induced by the belief that other payments sufficient in amount to make the scholarship effective would be added to the fund thereafter upon the death of the subscriber (Ladies Collegiate Inst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196; Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18, and cases there cited).

The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint, with costs in all courts.

KELLOGG, J. (dissenting). The Chief Judge finds in the expression "In loving memory this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund” an offer on the part of Mary Yates Johnston to contract with Allegheny College. The expression makes no such appeal to me. Allegheny College was not requested to perform any act through which the sum offered might bear the title by which the offeror states that it shall be known. The sum offered was termed a "gift” by the offeror. Consequently, I can see no reason why we should strain ourselves to make it, not a gift, but a trade. Moreover, since the donor specified that the gift was made "In consideration of my interest in Christian education, and in consideration of others subscribing," considerations not adequate in law, I can see no excuse for asserting that it was otherwise made in consideration of an act or promise on the part of the donee, constituting a sufficient quid quo pro to convert the gift into a contract obligation. To me the words used merely expressed an expectation or wish on the part of the donor and failed to exact the return of an adequate consideration. But if an offer indeed was present, then clearly it was an offer to enter into a unilateral contract. The offeror was to be bound provided the offeree performed such acts as might be necessary to make the gift offered become known under the proposed name. This is evidently the thought of the Chief Judge, for he says: "She imposed a condition that the 'gift' should be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." In other words, she proposed to exchange her offer of a donation in return for acts to be performed. Even so there was never any acceptance of the offer and, therefore, no contract, for the acts requested have never been performed. The gift has never been made known as demanded. Indeed, the requested acts, under the very terms of the assumed offer, could never have been performed at a time to convert the offer into a promise. This is so for the reason that the donation was not to take effect until after the death of the donor, and by her death her offer was withdrawn. (Williston on Contracts, sec. 62.) Clearly, although a promise of the college to make the gift known, as requested, may be implied, that promise was not the acceptance of an offer which gave rise to a contract. The donor stipulated for acts, not promises.

"In order to make a bargain it is necessary that the acceptor shall give in return for the offer or the promise exactly the consideration which the offeror requests. If an act is requested, that very act and no other must be given. If a promise is requested, that promise must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly."

(Williston on Contracts, sec. 73.)

"It does not follow that an offer becomes a promise because it is accepted; it may be, and frequently is, conditional, and then it does not become a promise until the conditions are satisfied; and in case of offers for a consideration, the performance of the consideration is always deemed a condition."

(Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec. 4.) It seems clear to me that there was here no offer, no acceptance of an offer, and no contract. Neither do I agree with the Chief Judge that this court  “found consideration present where the general law of contract, at least as then declared, would have said that it was absent" in the cases of Barnes v. Ferine (12 N. Y. 18), Presbyterian Society v. Beach (74 N. Y. 72) and Keuka College v. Ray (167 N. Y. 96). In the Keuka College case an offer to contract, in consideration of the performance of certain acts by the offeree, was converted into a promise by the actual performance of those acts. This form of contract has been known to the law from time immemorial (Langdell, sec. 46) and for at least a century longer than the other type, a bilateral contract. (Williston, sec. 13.) It may be that the basis of the decisions in Barnes v. Perine and Presbyterian, Society v. Beach (supra) was the same as in the Keuka College case. (See Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517.) However, even if the basis of the decisions be a so-called " promissory estoppel," nevertheless they initiated no new doctrine. A so-called " promissory estoppel," although not so termed, was held sufficient by Lord MANSFIELD and his fellow judges as far back as the year 1765. (Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663.) Such a doctrine may be an anomaly; it is not a novelty. Therefore, I can see no ground for the suggestion that the ancient rule which makes consideration necessary to the formation of every contract is in danger of effacement through any decisions of this court. To me that is a cause for gratulation rather than regret. However, the discussion may be beside the mark, for I do not understand that the holding about to be made in this case is other than a holding that consideration Was given to convert the offer into a promise. With that result I cannot agree and, accordingly, must dissent.

POUND, CRANE, LEHMAN and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur with CARDOZO, Ch. J.; KELLOGG, J. dissents in opinion, in which ANDREWS, J., concurs.

Judgment accordingly.

4.2 Goodman v. Dicker 4.2 Goodman v. Dicker

169 F.2d 684 (1948)

GOODMAN et al.
v.
DICKER et al.

No. 9786.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.

Argued May 14, 1948.
Decided July 26, 1948.

 

Mr. Irving B. Yochelson, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Solomon Grossberg and Isadore Brill, both of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Harry Sylvester Wender, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. H. Nathaniel Blaustein, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellees.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, PROCTOR and GRONER, Associate Justices.

PROCTOR, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the District Court in a suit by appellees for breach of contract.

Appellants are local distributors for Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation in the District of Columbia. Appellees, with the knowledge and encouragement of appellants, applied for a "dealer franchise" to sell Emerson's products. The trial court found that appellants by their representations and conduct induced appellees to incur expenses in preparing to do business under the franchise, including employment of salesmen and solicitation of orders for radios. Among other things, appellants represented that the application had been accepted; that the franchise would be granted, and that appellees would receive an initial delivery of thirty to forty radios. Yet, no radios were delivered, and notice was finally given that the franchise would not be granted.

The case was tried without a jury. The court held that a contract had not been proven but that appellants were estopped from denying the same by reason of their statements and conduct upon which appellees relied to their detriment. Judgment was entered for $1500, covering cash outlays of $1150 and loss of $350, anticipated profits on sale of thirty radios.

The main contention of appellants is that no liability would have arisen under the dealer franchise had it been granted because, as understood by appellees, it would have been terminable at will and would have imposed no duty upon the manufacturer to sell or appellees to buy any fixed number of radios. From this it is argued that the franchise agreement would not have been enforceable (except as to acts performed thereunder) and cancellation by the manufacturer would have created no liability for expenses incurred by the dealer in preparing to do business. Further, it is argued that as the dealer franchise would have been unenforceable for failure of the [685] manufacturer to supply radios appellants would not be liable to fulfill their assurance that radios would be supplied.

We think these contentions miss the real point of this case. We are not concerned directly with the terms of the franchise. We are dealing with a promise by appellants that a franchise would be granted and radios supplied, on the faith of which appellees with the knowledge and encouragement of appellants incurred expenses in making preparations to do business. Under these circumstances we think that appellants cannot now advance any defense inconsistent with their assurance that the franchise would be granted. Justice and fair dealing require that one who acts to his detriment on the faith of conduct of the kind revealed here should be protected by estopping the party who has brought about the situation from alleging anything in opposition to the natural consequences of his own course of conduct. Dair v. United States, 1872, 16 Wall. 1, 4, 21 L.Ed. 491. In Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580, 25 L.Ed. 618, the Supreme Court, in speaking of equitable estoppel, said: "The law upon the subject is well settled. The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden. * * * This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of justice." See also Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 680, 24 L.Ed. 168; Arizona v. Copper Queen Mining Co., 233 U.S. 87, 95, 34 S.Ct. 546, 58 L.Ed. 863.

In our opinion the trial court was correct in holding defendants liable for moneys which appellees expended in preparing to do business under the promised dealer franchise. These items aggregated $1150. We think, though, the court erred in adding the item of $350 for loss of profits on radios promised under an initial order. The true measure of damage is the loss sustained by expenditures made in reliance upon the assurance of a dealer franchise. As thus modified, the judgment is

Affirmed.

4.3 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 4.3 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.

Hoffman and wife, Plaintiffs, v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., and another, Defendants. [Two appeals.]*

February 5

March 2, 1965.

*693For the defendants there was. a brief by Benton, Bosser, Fulton, Menn & Nehs of Appleton, and oral argument by David L. Fulton.

For the plaintiffs there was a brief by Van Hoof, Van Hoof & Wylie of Little Chute, and oral argument by Gerard H. Van Hoof.

CurRie, C. J.

The instant appeal and cross appeal present these questions:

(1) Whether this court should recognize causes of action grounded on promissory estoppel as exemplified by sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts ?
(2) Do the facts in this case make out a. cause of action for promissory estoppel ?
(3) Are the jury’s findings with respect to damages sustained by the evidence ?

*694 Recognition of a Cause of Action Grounded on Promissory Estoppel.

Sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts, provides (at p. 110) :

“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”

The Wisconsin Annotations to Restatement, Contracts, prepared under the direction of the late Professor William H. Page and issued in 1933, stated (at p. 53, sec. 90) :

“The Wisconsin cases do not seem to be in accord with this section of the Restatement. It is certain that no such proposition has ever been announced by the Wisconsin court and it is at least doubtful if it would be approved by the court.”

Since 1933, the closest approach this court has made to adopting the rule of the' Restatement occurred in the recent case of Lazarus v. American Motors Corp. (1963), 21 Wis. (2d) 76, 85, 123 N. W. (2d) 548, wherein the court stated:

“We recognize that upon different facts it would be possible for a seller of steel to have altered his position so as to effectuate the equitable considerations inherent in sec. 90 of the Restatement.”

While it was not necessary to the disposition of the Lazarus Case to adopt the promissory-estoppel rule of the Restatement, we are squarely faced in the instant case with that issue. Not only did the trial court frame the special verdict on the theory of sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts, but no other possible theory has been presented to or discovered by this court which would permit plaintiffs to recover. Of *695other remedies considered that of an action for fraud and deceit seemed to be the most comparable. An action at law for fraud, however, cannot be predicated on unfulfilled promises unless the promisor possessed the present intent not to perform. Suskey v. Davidoff (1958), 2 Wis. (2d) 503, 507, 87 N. W. (2d) 306, and cases cited. Here, there is no evidence that would support a finding that Lukowitz made any of the promises, upon which plaintiffs’ complaint is predicated, in bad faith with any present intent that they would not be fulfilled by Red Owl.

Many courts of other jurisdictions have seen fit over the years to adopt the principle of promissory estoppel, and the tendency in that direction continues.1 As Mr. Justice McFaddin, speaking in behalf of the Arkansas court, well stated, that the development of the law of promissory estoppel “is an attempt by the courts to keep remedies abreast of increased moral consciousness of honesty and fair representations in all business dealings.” Peoples National Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Construction Co. (1951), 219 Ark. 11, 17, 240 S. W. (2d) 12. For a further discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see 1A Corbin, Contracts, pp. 187 et seq., secs. 193-209; 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.), pp. 211 et seq., sec. 808b; 1 Williston, Contracts (Jaeger’s 3d ed.), pp. 607 et seq., *696sec. 140; Bayer, Promissory Estoppel:. Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1950), 459; Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 Harvard Law Review (1951), 913 ;Annos. 115 A. L. R. 152, and48 A. L. R. (2d) 1069.

The Restatement avoids use of the term “promissory estoppel,” and there has been criticism of it as an inaccurate term. See 1A Corbin, Contracts, p. 232 et seq., sec. 204. On the other hand, Williston advocated the use of this term or something equivalent. 1 Williston, Contracts (1st ed.), p. 308, sec. 139. Use of the word “estoppel” to describe a doctrine upon which a party to a lawsuit may obtain affirmative relief offends the traditional concept that estoppel merely serves as a shield and cannot serve as a sword to create a cause of action. See Utschig v. McClone (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 506, 509, 114 N. W. (2d) 854. “Attractive nuisance” is also a much-criticized term. See concurring opinion, Flamingo v. Waukesha (1952), 262 Wis. 219, 227, 55 N. W. (2d) 24. However, the latter term is still in almost universal use by the courts because of the. lack of a better substitute. The same is also true of the wide use of the term “promissory estoppel.” We have employed its use in, this opinion not only because of its extensive use by other courts but also since a more-accurate equivalent has not been devised.

Because we deem the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as stated in sec. 90 of Restatement,, 1 Contracts, is one which supplies a needed tool which courts may employ in a proper case to prevent injustice, we endorse and adopt it.

Applicability of Doctrine to Facts of this Case.

The record here discloses a number of promises and assurances given to Hoffman by Lukowitz in behalf of Red *697Owl upon which plaintiffs relied and acted upon to their detriment.

Foremost were the promises that for the sum of $18,00.0 Red Owl would establish Hoffman in a store. After Hoffman had sold his grocery store and paid the $1,000 on the Chilton lot, the $18,000 figure was changed to $24,100. Then in November, 1961, Hoffman was assured that if the $24,100 figure were increased by $2,000 the deal would go through. Hoffman was induced to sell his grocery store fixtures and inventory in June, 1961, on the promise that he would be in his new store by fall. In November, plaintiffs sold their bakery building on the urging of defendants and on the assurance that this was the last step necessary to have the deal with Red Owl go through.

We determine that there was ample evidence to sustain the answers of the jury to the questions of the verdict with respect to the promissory representations made by Red Owl, Hoffman’s reliance thereon in the exercise of ordinary care, and his fulfilment of the conditions required of him by the terms of the negotiations had with Red Owl.

There remains for consideration the question of law raised by defendants that agreement was never reached on essential factors necessary to establish a contract between Hoffman and Red Owl. Among these were the size, cost, design, and layout of the store building; and the terms of the lease with respect to rent, maintenance, renewal, and purchase options. This poses the question of whether the promise necessary to sustain a cause of action for promissory estoppel must embrace all essential details of a proposed transaction between promisor and promisee so as to be the equivalent of an offer that would result in a binding contract between the parties if the promisee were to accept the same.

Originally the doctrine of promissory estoppel was invoked as a substitute for consideration rendering a gratuitous *698promise enforceable as a contract. See Williston, Contracts (1st ed.), p. 307, sec. 139. In other words, the acts of reliance by the promisee to his detriment provided a substitute for consideration. If promissory estoppel were to be limited to only those situations where the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so definite with respect to all details that a contract would result were the promise supported by consideration, then the defendants’ instant promises to Hoffman would not meet this test. However, sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts, does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee. Rather the conditions imposed are:

(1) Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee ?
(2) Did the promise induce such action or forbearance?
(3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promise ? 2

We deem it would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action. As Dean Boyer points out, it is desirable that fluidity in the application of the concept be maintained. 98 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1950), 459, at page 497. While the first two of the above-listed three requirements of promissory estoppel present issues of fact which ordinarily will be resolved by a jury, the third requirement, that the remedy can only be invoked where necessary to avoid injustice, is one that involves a policy decision by the court. Such a policy decision necessarily embraces an element of discretion.

*699We conclude that injustice would result here if plaintiffs were not granted some relief because of the failure of defendants to keep their promises which induced plaintiffs to act to their detriment.

Damages.

Defendants attack all the items of damages awarded by the jury.

The bakery building at Wautoma was sold at defendants’ instigation in order that Hoffman might have the net proceeds available as part of the cash capital he was to invest in the Chilton store venture. The evidence clearly establishes that it was sold at a loss of $2,000. Defendants contend that half of this loss was sustained by Mrs. Hoffman because title stood in joint tenancy. They point out that no dealings took place between her and defendants as all negotiations were had with her husband. Ordinarily only the promisee and not third persons are entitled to enforce the remedy of promissory estoppel against the promisor. However, if the promisor actually foresees, or has reason to foresee, action by a third person in reliance on the promise, it may be quite unjust to refuse to perform the promise. 1A Corbin, Contracts, p. 220, sec. 200. Here not only did defendants foresee that it would be necessary for Mrs. Hoffman to sell'her joint interest in the bakery building, but defendants actually requested that this be done. We approve the jury’s award of $2,000 damages for the loss incurred by both plaintiffs in this sale.

Defendants attack on two grounds the $1,000 awarded because of Hoffman’s payment of that amount on the purchase price of the Chilton lot. The first is that this $1,000 had already been lost at the time the final negotiations with Red Owl fell through in January, 1962, because the remaining $5,000 of purchase price had been due on October 15, 1961. The record does not disclose that the lot owner had *700foreclosed Hoffman’s interest in the lot for failure to pay this $5,000. The $1,000 was not paid for the option, but had been paid as part of the purchase price at the time Hoffman elected to exercise the option. This gave him an equity in the lot which could not be legally foreclosed without affording Hoffman an opportunity to pay the balance. The second ground of attack is that the lot may have had a fair market value of $6,000, and Hoffman should have paid the remaining $5,000 of purchase price. We determine that it would be unreasonable to require Hoffman to have invested an additional $5,000 in order to protect the $1,000 he had paid. Therefore, we find no merit to defendants’ attack upon this item of damages.

We also determine it was reasonable for Hoffman to have paid $125 for one month’s rent of a home in Chilton after defendants assured him everything would be set when plaintiff sold the bakery building. This was a proper item of damage.

Plaintiffs never moved to Chilton because defendants suggested that Hoffman get some experience by working in a Red Owl store in the Fox River Valley. Plaintiffs, therefore, moved to Neenah instead of Chilton. After moving, Hoffman worked at night in an Appleton bakery but held himself available for work in a Red Owl store. The $140 moving expense would not have been incurred if plaintiffs had not sold their bakery building in Wautoma in reliance upon defendants’ promises. We consider the $140 moving expense to be a proper item of damage.

We turn now to the damage item with respect to which the,trial court granted a new trial, i.e., that arising from the sale of the Wautoma grocery-store fixtures and inventory for which the jury awarded $16,735. The trial court ruled that Hoffman could not recover for any loss of future profits for the summer months following the sale on June 6, 1961, but that damages would be limited to the difference between *701the sales price received and the fair market value of the assets sold, giving consideration to any goodwill attaching thereto by reason of the transfer of a going business. There was no direct evidence presented as to what this fair market value was on June 6, 1961. The evidence did disclose that Hoffman paid $9,000 for the inventory, added $1,500 to it and sold it for $10,000 or a loss of $500. His 1961 federal income-tax return showed that the grocery equipment had been purchased for $7,000 and sold for $7,955.96. Plaintiffs introduced evidence of the buyer that during the first eleven weeks of operation of the grocery store his gross sales were $44,000 and his profit was $6,000 or roughly 15 percent. On cross-examination he admitted that this was gross and not net profit. Plaintiffs contend that in a breach-of-contract action damages may include loss of profits. However, "this is not a breach-of-contract action.

The only relevancy of evidence relating to profits would be with respect to proving the element of goodwill in establishing the fair market value of the grocery inventory and fixtures sold. Therefore, evidence of profits would be admissible to afford a foundation for expert opinion as to fair market value.

Where damages are awarded in promissory estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise, they should be only such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice. Mechanical or rule-of-thumb approaches to the damage problem should be avoided. In discussing remedies to be applied by courts in promissory estoppel we quote the following views of writers on the subject:

“Enforcement of a promise does not necessarily mean Specific Performance. It does not necessarily mean Damages for breach. Moreover the amount allowed as Damages may be determined by the plaintiff’s ¡expenditures or change of position in reliance as well as by the value to him of the *702promised performance. Restitution is also an ‘enforcing’ remedy, although it is often said to be based upon some kind of a rescission. In determining what justice requires, the court must remember all of its powers, derived from equity, law merchant, and other sources, as well as the common law. Its decree should be molded accordingly.” 1A Corbin, Contracts, p. 221, sec. 200.
“The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment. It would follow that the damages should not exceed the loss caused by the change of position, which would never be more in amount, but might be less, than the promised reward.” Seavey, Reliance on Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 Harvard Law Review (1951), 913, 926.
“There likewise seems to be no positive legal requirement, and certainly no legal policy, which dictates the allowance of contract damages in every case where the defendant’s duty is consensual.” Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises — A New Writ?, 35 Michigan Law Review (1936), 908, 912.3

At the time Hoffman bought the equipment and inventory of the small grocery store at Wautoma he did so in order to gain experience in the grocery-store business. At that time discussion had already been had with Red Owl representatives that Wautoma might be too small for a Red Owl operation and that a larger city might be more desirable. Thus Hoffman made this purchase more or less as a temporary experiment. Justice does not require that the damages awarded him, because of selling these assets at the behest of defendants, should exceed any actual loss sustained measured by the difference between the sales price and the fair market value.

*703Since the evidence does not sustain the large award of damages arising from the sale of the Wautoma grocery business, the trial court properly ordered a new trial on this issue.

By the Court. — Order affirmed. Because of the cross appeal, plaintiffs shall be limited to taxing but two thirds of their costs.

4.4 Wheeler v. White 4.4 Wheeler v. White

398 S.W.2d 93 (1965)

Ellis D. WHEELER, Petitioner,


v.


S. E. WHITE, Respondent.

No. A-10598.
 
Supreme Court of Texas
November 10, 1965.
Rehearing Denied February 2, 1966.

 
Adams & Browne, Beaumont, for petitioner. Keith, Mehaffy & Weber, Beaumont, for respondent.
 

[94] SMITH, Justice.

 
This is a suit for damages brought by petitioner, Ellis D. Wheeler, against respondent, S. E. White. Wheeler alleged that White had breached a contract[1] to secure a loan or furnish the money to finance the construction of improvements upon land owned by Wheeler. Wheeler further pleaded, in the alternative, that if the contract itself was not sufficiently definite, then nevertheless White was estopped from asserting such insufficiency. White filed special exceptions to all of Wheeler's Third [95] Amended Original Petition. The special exceptions asserted that the pleaded contract did not contain essential elements to its enforceability in that it failed to provide the amount of monthly installments, the amount of interest due upon the obligation, how such interest would be computed, when such interest would be paid, and that the alternative plea of estoppel was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish any ground of recovery. All special exceptions were sustained, and upon Wheeler's declination to amend his pleadings, the trial court entered its judgment dismissing the case and ordered that Wheeler take nothing from White by reason of his suit. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 385 S.W. 2d 619. We have concluded that the trial court did not err in sustaining the special exceptions directed at the sufficiency of the contract itself, but that Wheeler's pleadings on the theory of estoppel state a cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause for trial.
 
Since the trial court sustained White's special exceptions to Wheeler's petition, we necessarily must assume that all the alleged material facts are true. Wheeler alleged that as the owner of a three-lot tract of land in Port Arthur, Texas, he desired to construct a commercial building or shopping center thereon. He and White entered into an agreement, embodied in the written contract involved here, whereby White was to obtain the necessary loan for Wheeler from a third party or provide it himself on or before six months from the date of the contract. The loan as described in the contract, was to be * * * in the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($70,000.00) DOLLARS and to be payable in monthly installments over a term of fifteen (15) years and bear interest at a rate of not more than six (6%) per cent per annum. Additionally, under the contract White was to be paid $5,000.00 for obtaining the loan and a five per cent commission on all rentals received from any tenants procured by White for the building. Wheeler alleged that he has been ready and willing to comply with his part of the agreement at all times since the contract was made.
 
After the contract had been signed by both parties, White assured Wheeler that the money would be available and urged him to proceed with the necessary task of demolishing the buildings presently on the site so as to make way for construction of the new building. The buildings on the site had a reasonable value of $58,500.00 and a rental value of $400.00 per month. By way of reassurance, White stressed the fact that in the event the money was unobtainable elsewhere, he would make the loan himself. Pursuant to such promises Wheeler proceeded to raze the old building and otherwise prepare the land for the new structure; thereafter, he was told by White that there would be no loan. After White's refusal to perform, Wheeler made reasonable efforts to obtain the loan himself but was unsuccessful. In the pleadings[2] Wheeler pleaded the necessary elements of inducement and reliance which entitle him to recover if he can prove the facts alleged.
 
[96] Where a promisee acts to his detriment in reasonable reliance upon an otherwise unenforceable promise, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that the disappointed party may have a substantial and compelling claim for relief. The Restatement, Contracts, § 90, says:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
According to Dean Hildebrand's Texas Annotation to the Restatement, Texas follows Section 90, supra. See Ferguson v. Getzendaner, 98 Tex. 310, 83 S.W. 374 (1904); Morris v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 255, 17 S.W. 538 (1891); and others. These early cases do not speak of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in specific terms since those cases were written before the compilation of the Restatement, but, while many of them dealt with subscription transactions or transactions within the statute of frauds, it is readily apparent that the equities involved in those cases are applicable to the instant case. See also: Rouff v. Washington & Lee University, 48 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Civ. App.1932, error ref.); Thompson v. McAllen Federated Woman's Bldg. Corp., 273 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex.Civ.App.1954, writ dis'm); Allegheny College v. National Chataqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 L.R.A. 980 (1927); Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365, 42 L.R.A. 794 (1898); 1 Corbin, Contracts, §§ 193-209 (1950); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 639, 874 (1952); and Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations, 98 U.Pa.L.Rev. 459 (1950).
 
The binding thread which runs through the cases applying promissory estoppel is the existence of promises designedly made to influence the conduct of the promisee, tacitly encouraging the conduct, which conduct, although not necessarily constituting any actual performance of the contract itself, is something that must be done by the promisee before he could begin to perform, and was a fact known to the promisor. As to the argument that no new cause of action may be created by such a promise regardless of its established applicability as a defense, it has been answered that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the party who gave the promise cannot afterward be allowed to revert to the previous relationship as if no such promise had been made. This does not create a contract where none existed before, but only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them. See 1 Williston, Contracts, §§ 139-40 (Rev.ed.1936); and 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956).
 
The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise. It was said in the case of Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580, 25 L.Ed. 618, that:
The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden * * *. This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of justice.
In the case of Goodman v. Dicker, 83 U.S. App.D.C. 353, 169 F.2d 684 (1948), the trial court held that a contract had not been proven but that * * * appellants were estopped from denying the same by reason of their statements and conduct upon which appellees relied to their detriment. In [97] that case, Dicker relied upon a promise by Goodman that a franchise to sell radios would be granted and radios would be supplied. In reliance upon the promise, Dicker incurred expenses in making preparations to engage in the business of selling radios. The franchise was not granted and Goodman failed to deliver the radios. The appellate court in holding that Dicker was entitled to damages for moneys expended in preparing to do business, said:
We are dealing with a promise by appellants that a franchise would be granted and radios supplied, on the faith of which appellees with the knowledge and encouragement of appellants incurred expenses in making preparations to do business. Under these circumstances we think that appellants cannot now advance any defense inconsistent with their assurance that the franchise would be granted. Justice and fair dealing require that one who acts to his detriment on the faith of conduct of the kind revealed here should be protected by estopping the party who has brought about the situation from alleging anything in opposition to the natural consequences of his own course of conduct. * * 

 
The Court, having so held, rendered its judgment that Goodman was liable for moneys expended in preparing to do business under the promised dealer franchise, but was not liable for loss of profits on the radios which were never delivered.
 
The Court in the Goodman case, in refusing to allow damages based on a loss of anticipated profits, apparently acted in harmony with the theory that promissory estoppel acts defensively so as to prevent an attack upon the enforceability of a contract. Under this theory, losses of expected profits will not be allowed even if expected profits are provable with certainty. The rule thus announced should be followed in the present case. We agree with the reasoning announced in those jurisdictions that, in cases such as we have before us, where there is actually no contract the promissory estoppel theory may be invoked, thereby supplying a remedy which will enable the injured party to be compensated for his foreseeable, definite and substantial reliance. Where the promisee has failed to bind the promisor to a legally sufficient contract, but where the promisee has acted in reliance upon a promise to his detriment, the promisee is to be allowed to recover no more than reliance damages measured by the detriment sustained. Since the promisee in such cases is partially responsible for his failure to bind the promisor to a legally sufficient contract, it is reasonable to conclude that all that is required to achieve justice is to put the promisee in the position he would have been in had he not acted in reliance upon the promise. See Goodman v. Dicker, supra; Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (C.C.A.8th, 1939); Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695, 59 A.L. R. 599 (1928); Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (Part I) and 373 (Part II) (1937); note 13 Vand.L.Rev. 705 (1960); and note 59 Dickinson L.Rev. 163 (1954).
 
The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are both reversed and judgment is here entered remanding the cause to the trial court for trial on its merits in accordance with this opinion.

GREENHILL, Justice (concurring).

The Court of Civil Appeals denied a recovery of damages here because the contract, it felt, was too indefinite in its provisions under Bryant v. Clark, 163 Tex. 596, 358 S.W.2d 614 (1962). The holding in Bryant v. Clark was that the contract was not sufficiently definite to be specifically enforceable. The contract here in question, viewed in context, is different in some respects from that in the Bryant case; and I would not extend Bryant v. Clark. See the criticism of that case in 5A Corbin, Contracts 283 (1964).
 
[98] But assuming that the contract here, under Bryant v. Clark, is not definite enough to be specifically enforced, it is sufficiently definite to support an action for damages. Restatement, Contracts § 370, comment b.
 
There are Texas cases in which damages have been denied after a holding that the contract was not specifically enforceable. See, e. g., Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945); Robertson v. Melton, 131 Tex. 325, 115 S.W.2d 624, 118 A. L.R. 1505 (1938); and Alworth v. Ellison, 27 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1930, writ refused). In each of these cases, however, the contracts were held to be within the Statute of Frauds and not enforceable for that reason in a suit for damages. 1 Williston, Contracts § 16 (Rev.ed. 1936). The contract here in question is not within the Statute of Frauds and will support an action for damages.
 
While I agree with the judgment entered by the Court, it seems to me that the above is a sounder ground upon which to rest our decision.
 
[1] Contract between Ellis D. Wheeler, Party of the First Part, and S. E. White, Party of the Second Part:
 
That said Party of the First Part is the owner of Lots Nine (9), Ten (10), and Eleven (11) (excepting the South one hundred ten (110') feet of Lot Nine (9), all of Block Number Seven (7), of BRINKMAN ADDITION to the City of Port Arthur, Jefferson County, Texas. Said Party of the First Part hereby employs Party of the Second Part for the purpose of securing a loan to finance the construction of improvements upon said property; said improvements to face on the Port Arthur-Orange Highway one hundred forty feet (140') and extend back a depth of eighty feet (80'); said building to be constructed according to plans and specifications heretofore agreed on by the parties hereto. The loan to be made by, or obtained by, Party of the Second Part for the Party of the First Part, and to be in the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($70,000.00) DOLLARS and to be payable in monthly installments over a term of fifteen (15) years and bear interest at a rate of not more than six (6%) per cent per annum.
 
Said loan is to be obtained on or before six (6) months from date of this contract, either from funds provided by Party of the Second Part or from third persons whom Party of the Second Part may negotiate with to provide such funds. In either event Party of the First Part agrees to sign all necessary papers required of Lendor to create proper liens.
 
Party of the First Part agrees to pay to Party of the Second Part the sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($5,000.00 DOLLARS for his services in making or securing said loan for Party of the First Part. Said FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($5,000.00) DOLLARS shall be due and payable to Party of the Second Part as soon as the SEVENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($70,000.00) DOLLARS loan is made available for construction of said premises; and should party of the First Part fail and refuse to pay said FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00) when due, Party of the Second Part shall have the right to enforce payment by filing suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and Party of the First Part hereby specifically agrees to pay ten (10%) per cent additional on said sum as Attorney Fees and all costs of Court in connection with said suit.
 
This agreement voids and takes precedence over previous agreements by and between Ellis D. Wheeler and S. E. White, concerning the hereinabove described property.
 
Party of the First Part agrees that when said loan has been obtained that he will proceed with all reasonable haste and diligence in having the improvements for which said loan is obtained constructed, and to execute all necessary agreements, liens, etc., that may be required in the process of, and consummating said loan. In the event that Party of the Second Part obtains said loan but Party of the First Part does not use the financing thus obtained by Party of the Second Part for any reason, then Party of the First Part will pay to Party of the Second Part the sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($5,000.00) DOLLARS for his services in obtaining said loan.
 
In addition to the above, Party of the First Part agrees to allow Party of the Second Part six (6) months exclusive right to secure reliable tenants to occupy seventy (70') feet frontage in the Commercial Building which he contemplates building, said seventy (70') feet fronting on the Port Arthur-Orange Highway; said rentals to be not less than ONE AND 60/100 ($1.60) DOLLARS per square foot per year. Should Party of the Second Part secure tenants to the remaining seventy (70') feet frontage before tenants are secured by Party of the First Part, or others, then Party of the Second Part may secure tenants for the remaining portion of said building. Party of the First Part agrees to pay Party of the Second Part, in addition to the payment of said FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($5,000.00) DOLLARS as above specified, a five (5%) per cent commission on all rentals paid by tenants obtained by Party of the Second Part; said five (5%) per cent commission to be paid for the life of the lease granted to said tenants.
 
[2] Pleading further plaintiff shows the Court that if for any reason said contract is not sufficiently specific and definite, then nevertheless defendant is estopped to so claim and to set up any insufficiency because of the defendant's act in entering into said contract and exhorting plaintiff to clear the premises to make ready for the construction and defendant's representations after the date of said contract to proceed with the demolition of said buildings and clearing the site and that the money would be forthcoming and that defendant would obtain said loan and if for any reason said money could not be obtained elsewhere then said defendant would himself loan the money and plaintiff in reliance on said contract and said exhortations and said representations, both in said contract and given verbally by the defendant after the date of said contract defendant is estopped to claim any deficiency of said contract.

4.5 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. 4.5 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.

 

64 F. 2d 344
JAMES BAIRD CO.
v.
GIMBEL BROS., INC.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
No. 330.
April 10, 1933

 


Campbell, Harding, Goodwin & Danforth, of New York City (Garrard Glenn and William L. Glenn, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Chadbourne, Stanchfield & Levy, of New York City (Leonard P. Moore and David S. Hecht, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before MANTON L. HAND, and SWAN, Circuit Judges.

L. HAND, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of a contract to deliver linoleum under a contract of sale; the defendant denied the making of the contract; the parties tried the case to the judge under a written stipulation and he directed judgment for the defendant. The facts as found, bearing on the making of the contract, the only issue necessary to discuss, were as follows: The defendant, a New York merchant, knew that the Department of Highways in Pennsylvania had asked for bids for the construction of a public building. It sent an employee to the office of a contractor in Philadelphia, who had possession of the specifications, and the employee there computed the amount of the linoleum which would be required on the job, underestimating the total yardage by about one-half the proper amount. In ignorance of this mistake, on December twenty-fourth the defendant sent to some twenty or thirty contractors, likely to bid on the job, an offer to supply all the linoleum required by the specifications at two different lump sums, depending upon the quality used. These offers concluded as follows: "If successful in being awarded this contract, it will be absolutely guaranteed, . . . and  . . . we are offering these prices for reasonable" (sic), "prompt acceptance after the general contract has been awarded." The plaintiff, a contractor in Washington, got one of these on the twenty-eighth, and on the same day the defendant learned its mistake and telegraphed all the contractors to whom it had sent the offer, that it withdrew it and would substitute a new one at about double the amount of the old. This withdrawal reached the plaintiff at Washington on the afternoon of the same day, but not until after it had put in a bid at Harrisburg at a lump sum, based as to linoleum upon the prices quoted by the defendant. The public authorities accepted the plaintiff's bid on December thirtieth, the defendant having meanwhile written a letter of confirmation of its withdrawal, received on the thirty-first. The plaintiff formally accepted the offer on January second, and, as the defendant persisted in declining to recognize the existence of a contract, sued it for damages on a breach.

Unless there are circumstances to take it out of the ordinary doctrine, since the offer was withdrawn before it was accepted, the acceptance was too late. Restatement of Contracts, §35. To meet this the plaintiff argues as follows: It was a reasonable implication from the defendant's offer that it should be irrevocable in case the plaintiff acted upon it, that is to say, used the prices quoted in making its bid, thus putting itself in a position from which it could not withdraw without great loss. While it might have withdrawn its bid after receiving the revocation, the time had passed to submit another, and as the item of linoleum was a very trifling part of the cost of the whole building, it would have been an unreasonable hardship to expect it to lose the contract on that account, and probably forfeit its deposit. While it is true that the plaintiff might in advance have secured a contract conditional upon the success of its bid, this was not what the defendant suggested. It understood that the contractors would use its offer in their bids, and would thus in fact commit themselves to supplying the linoleum at the proposed prices. The inevitable implication from all this was that when the contractors acted upon it, they accepted the offer and promised to pay for the linoleum, in case their bid were accepted. 

It was of course possible for the parties to make such a contract, and the question is merely as to what they meant; that is, what is to be imputed to the words they used. Whatever plausibility there is in the argument, is in the fact that the defendant must have known the predicament in which the contractors would be put if it withdrew its offer after the bids went in. However, it seems entirely clear that the contractors did not suppose that they accepted the offer merely by putting in their bids. If, for example, the successful one had repudiated the contract with the public authorities after it had been awarded to him, certainly the defendant could not have sued him for a breach. If he had become bankrupt, the defendant could not prove against his estate. It seems plain therefore that there was no contract between them. And if there be any doubt as to this, the language of the offer sets it at rest. The phrase, "if successful in being awarded this contract," is scarcely met by the mere use of the prices in the bids. Surely such a use was not an "award" of the contract to the defendant. Again, the phrase, "we are offering these prices for . . . prompt acceptance after the general contract has been awarded," looks to the usual communication of an acceptance, and precludes the idea that the use of the offer in the bidding shall be the equivalent. It may indeed be argued that this last language contemplated no more than an early notice that the offer had been accepted, the actual acceptance being the bid, but that would wrench its natural meaning too far, especially in the light of the preceding phrase. The contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting upon a contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves.

But the plaintiff says that even though no bilateral contract was made, the defendant should be held under the doctrine of "promissory estoppel." This is to be chiefly found in those cases where persons subscribe to a venture, usually charitable, and are held to their promises after it has been completed. It has been applied much more broadly, however, and has now been generalized in section 90, of the Restatement of Contracts. We may arguendo accept it as it there reads, for it does not apply to the case at bar. Offers are ordinarily made in exchange for a consideration, either a counter-promise or some other act which the promisor wishes to secure. In such cases they propose bargains; they presuppose that each promise or performance is an inducement to the other. Wisconsin, etc., Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386, 387, 24 S. Ct. 107, 48 L. Ed. 229; Banning Co. v. California, 240 U. S. 142, 152, 153, 36 S. Ct. 338, 60 L. Ed. 569. But a man may make a promise without expecting an equivalent; a donative promise, conditional or absolute. The common law provided for such by sealed instruments, and it is unfortunate that these are no longer generally available. The doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is to avoid the harsh results of allowing the promisor in such a case to repudiate, when the promisee has acted in reliance upon the promise. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414, 26 A. L.R. 1205. Cf. Allegheny College v. National Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 L.R.A. 980. But an offer for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a consideration has been received, either a counter-promise or whatever else is stipulated. To extend it would be to hold the offeror regardless of the stipulated condition of his offer. In the case at bar the defendant offered to deliver the linoleum in exchange for the plaintiff's acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter of indifference to it. That offer could become a promise to deliver only when the equivalent was received; that is, when the plaintiff promised to take and pay for it. There is no room in such a situation for the doctrine of "promissory estoppel."

Nor can the offer be regarded as of an option, giving the plaintiff the right seasonably to accept the linoleum at the quoted prices if its bid was accepted, but not binding it to take and pay, if it could get a better bargain elsewhere. There is not the least reason to suppose that the defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation. True, if so construed, the doctrine of "promissory estoppel" might apply, the plaintiff having acted in reliance upon it, though, so far as we have found, the decisions are otherwise. Ganss v. Guffey Petroleum Co., 125 App. Div. 760, 110 N.Y.S. 176; Comstock v. North, 88 Miss. 754, 41 So. 374. As to that, however, we need not declare ourselves.

Judgment affirmed.

4.6 Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 4.6 Drennan v. Star Paving Co.

51 Cal. 2d 409 (1958)

WILLIAM A. DRENNAN, Respondent,
v.
STAR PAVING COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.

L. A. No. 25024.
Supreme Court of California. In Bank.
Dec. 31, 1958.

Atus P. Reuther, Norman Soibelman, Obegi & High and Earl J. McDowell for Appellant.

S. B. Gill for Respondent.

TRAYNOR, J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff in an action to recover damages caused by defendant's refusal to perform certain paving work according to a bid it submitted to plaintiff.

On July 28, 1955, plaintiff, a licensed general contractor, was preparing a bid on the "Monte Vista School Job" in the Lancaster school district. Bids had to be submitted before 8 p.m. Plaintiff testified that it was customary in that area for general contractors to receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely on them in computing their own bids. Thus on that day plaintiff's secretary, Mrs. Johnson, received by telephone between 50 and 75 subcontractors' bids for various parts of the school job. As each bid came in, she wrote it on a special form, which she brought into plaintiff's office. He then posted it on a master cost sheet setting forth the names and bids of all subcontractors. His own bid had to include the names of subcontractors who were to perform one-half of one per cent or more of the construction work, and he had also to provide a bidder's bond of 10 per cent of his total bid of $317,385 as a guarantee that he would enter the contract if awarded the work.

Late in the afternoon, Mrs. Johnson had a telephone conversation with Kenneth R. Hoon, an estimator for defendant. He gave his name and telephone number and stated that he was bidding for defendant for the paving work at the Monte Vista School according to plans and specifications and that his bid was $7,131.60. At Mrs. Johnson's request he repeated his bid. Plaintiff listened to the bid over an extension telephone in his office and posted it on the master sheet after receiving the bid form from Mrs. Johnson. Defendant's was the lowest bid for the paving. Plaintiff computed his own bid accordingly and submitted it with the name of defendant as the subcontractor for the paving. When the bids were opened on July 28th, plaintiff's proved to be the lowest, and he was awarded the contract.

On his way to Los Angeles the next morning plaintiff stopped at defendant's office. The first person he met was defendant's construction engineer, Mr. Oppenheimer. Plaintiff testified: 

I introduced myself and he immediately told me that they had made a mistake in their bid to me the night before, they couldn't do it for the price they had bid, and I told him I would expect him to carry through with their original bid because I had used it in compiling my bid and the job was being awarded them. And I would have to go and do the job according to my bid and I would expect them to do the same.

Defendant refused to do the paving work for less than $15,000. Plaintiff testified that he "got figures from other people" and after trying for several months to get as low a bid as possible engaged L & H Paving Company, a firm in Lancaster, to do the work for $10,948.60.

The trial court found on substantial evidence that defendant made a definite offer to do the paving on the Monte Vista job according to the plans and specifications for $7,131.60, and that plaintiff relied on defendant's bid in computing his own bid for the school job and naming defendant therein as the subcontractor for the paving work. Accordingly, it entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,817 (the difference between defendant's bid and the cost of the paving to plaintiff) plus costs.

Defendant contends that there was no enforceable contract between the parties on the ground that it made a revocable offer and revoked it before plaintiff communicated his acceptance to defendant.

There is no evidence that defendant offered to make its bid irrevocable in exchange for plaintiff's use of its figures in computing his bid. Nor is there evidence that would warrant interpreting plaintiff's use of defendant's bid as the acceptance thereof, binding plaintiff, on condition he received the main contract, to award the subcontract to defendant. In sum, there was neither an option supported by consideration nor a bilateral contract binding on both parties.

Plaintiff contends, however, that he relied to his detriment on defendant's offer and that defendant must therefore answer in damages for its refusal to perform. Thus the question is squarely presented: Did plaintiff's reliance make defendant's offer irrevocable?

Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts states: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." This rule applies in this state. (Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 642 [255 P.2d 772]; Frebank Co. v. White, 152 Cal.App.2d 522 [313 P.2d 633]; Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 410 [258 P.2d 497, 37 A.L.R.2d 1363]; West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal.App.2d 597 [225 P.2d 978]; Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711 [197 P.2d 807]; see 18 Cal.Jur.2d 407-408; 5 Stan. L. Rev. 783.)

Defendant's offer constituted a promise to perform on such conditions as were stated expressly or by implication therein or annexed thereto by operation of law. (See 1 Williston, Contracts [3d ed.], §24A, p. 56, §61, p. 196.) Defendant had reason to expect that if its bid proved the lowest it would be used by plaintiff. It induced "action . . . of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee."

Had defendant's bid expressly stated or clearly implied that it was revocable at any time before acceptance we would treat it accordingly. It was silent on revocation, however, and we must therefore determine whether there are conditions to the right of revocation imposed by law or reasonably inferable in fact. In the analogous problem of an offer for a unilateral contract, the theory is now obsolete that the offer is revocable at any time before complete performance. Thus section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts provides:

If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time.

In explanation, comment b states that the

main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part performance or tender may thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary promise. Moreover, merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for making a promise binding (see §90).

Whether implied in fact or law, the subsidiary promise serves to preclude the injustice that would result if the offer could be revoked after the offeree had acted in detrimental reliance thereon. Reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer for a bilateral contract.

The absence of consideration is not fatal to the enforcement of such a promise. It is true that in the case of unilateral contracts the Restatement finds consideration for the implied subsidiary promise in the part performance of the bargained-for exchange, but its reference to section 90 makes clear that consideration for such a promise is not always necessary. The very purpose of section 90 is to make a promise binding even though there was no consideration "in the sense of something that is bargained for and given in exchange." (See 1 Corbin, Contracts 634 et seq.) Reasonable reliance serves to hold the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required to make the offer binding. In a case involving similar facts the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated that 

we believe that reason and justice demand that the doctrine [of section 90] be applied to the present facts. We cannot believe that by accepting this doctrine as controlling in the state of facts before us we will abolish the requirement of a consideration in contract cases, in any different sense than an ordinary estoppel abolishes some legal requirement in its application. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the defendants in executing the agreement [which was not supported by consideration] made a promise which they should have reasonably expected would induce the plaintiff to submit a bid based thereon to the Government, that such promise did induce this action, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

(Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 408 [10 N.W.2d 879]; see also Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 661; cf. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344.)

When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether it would be used or not. On the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract. It was bound to realize the substantial possibility that its bid would be the lowest, and that it would be included by plaintiff in his bid. It was to its own interest that the contractor be awarded the general contract; the lower the subcontract bid, the lower the general contractor's bid was likely to be and the greater its chance of acceptance and hence the greater defendant's chance of getting the paving subcontract. Defendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is bound by his own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at least an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to him.

It bears noting that a general contractor is not free to delay acceptance after he has been awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a better price. Nor can he reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the original offer. (See R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194 [247 P.2d 817, 823].) In the present case plaintiff promptly informed defendant that plaintiff was being awarded the job and that the subcontract was being awarded to defendant.

Defendant contends, however, that its bid was the result of mistake and that it was therefore entitled to revoke it. It relies on the rescission cases of M. F. Kemper Const. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal.2d 696 [235 P.2d 7], and Brunzell Const. Co. v. G. J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d 278 [285 P.2d 989]. (See also Lemoge Electric v. San Mateo County, 46 Cal.2d 659, 662 [297 P.2d 638].) In those cases, however, the bidder's mistake was known or should have been to the offeree, and the offeree could be placed in status quo. [7] Of course, if plaintiff had reason to believe that defendant's bid was in error, he could not justifiably rely on it, and section 90 would afford no basis for enforcing it. (Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 660.) Plaintiff, however, had no reason to know that defendant had made a mistake in submitting its bid, since there was usually a variance of 160 per cent between the highest and lowest bids for paving in the desert around Lancaster. He committed himself to performing the main contract in reliance on defendant's figures. Under these circumstances defendant's mistake, far from relieving it of its obligation, constitutes an additional reason for enforcing it, for it misled plaintiff as to the cost of doing the paving. Even had it been clearly understood that defendant's offer was revocable until accepted, it would not necessarily follow that defendant had no duty to exercise reasonable care in preparing its bid. It presented its bid with knowledge of the substantial possibility that it would be used by plaintiff; it could foresee the harm that would ensue from an erroneous underestimate of the cost. Moreover, it was motivated by its own business interest. Whether or not these considerations alone would justify recovery for negligence had the case been tried on that theory (see Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [320 P.2d 16]), they are persuasive that defendant's mistake should not defeat recovery under the rule of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts.

As between the subcontractor who made the bid and the general contractor who reasonably relied on it, the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who caused it.

Leo F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Bebek & Brkich, 141 Cal.App.2d 226 [296 P.2d 368], and Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal.2d 449 [122 P.2d 8, 139], are not to the contrary. In the Piazza case the court sustained a finding that defendants intended, not to make a firm bid, but only to give the plaintiff "some kind of an idea to use" in making its bid; there was evidence that the defendants had told plaintiff they were unsure of the significance of the specifications. There was thus no offer, promise, or representation on which the defendants should reasonably have expected the plaintiff to rely. The Bard case held that an option not supported by consideration was revoked by the death of the optioner. The issue of recovery under the rule of section 90 was not pleaded at the trial, and it does not appear that the offeree's reliance was "of a definite and substantial character" so that injustice could be avoided "only by the enforcement of the promise."

There is no merit in defendant's contention that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that plaintiff attempted to mitigate the damages or that they could not have been mitigated. Plaintiff alleged that after defendant's default, "plaintiff had to procure the services of the L & H Co. to perform said asphaltic paving for the sum of $10,948.60." Plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence showed that he spent several months trying to get bids from other subcontractors and that he took the lowest bid. Clearly he acted reasonably to mitigate damages. [10] In any event any uncertainty in plaintiff's allegation as to damages could have been raised by special demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430, subd. 9.) It was not so raised and was therefore waived. (Code Civ. Proc., §434.)

The judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

4.7 E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Construction Co. 4.7 E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Construction Co.

90 N.J. Super. 69 (1966)
216 A.2d 246

E.A. CORONIS ASSOCIATES, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v.
M. GORDON CONSTRUCTION CO., A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued November 15, 1965.
Decided January 12, 1966.

[71] Before Judges GOLDMANN, FOLEY and COLLESTER.

Mr. Sam J. Abraham argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Magner, Abraham & Kahn, attorneys).

Mr. Peter A. Adams argued the cause for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by COLLESTER, J.A.D.

Summary judgment on cross-motions therefor was entered in favor of plaintiff E.A. Coronis Associates (Coronis) on defendant M. Gordon Construction Company's (Gordon) counterclaim in the Superior Court, Law Division.

This litigation began when plaintiff brought suit on three contracts not here pertinent. Defendant admitted liability thereon, but counterclaimed for breach of a contract to supply and erect structural steel on one of its projects. Gordon is a general contractor. In anticipation of making a bid to construct two buildings at the Port of New York Authority's Elizabeth Piers it sought bids from subcontractors. Coronis designs, fabricates, supplies and erects structural steel. On April 22, 1963 it sent the following letter to Gordon:

[72] "April 22, 1963 Mr. David BenZvi Gordon Construction Co. Elizabeth Avenue Linden, N.J. Subject: Bldgs. 131 & 132 Elizabeth Port Authority Piers Structural Steel

Dear Mr. BenZvi:

We regret very much that this estimate was so delayed. Be assured that the time consumed was due to routing of the plans through our regular sources of fabrication.

We are pleased to offer:

All structural steel including steel girts and purlins Both Buildings delivered and erected ................... $155,413.50 All structural steel equipped with clips for wood girts & purlins Both Buildings delivered and erected ................... 98,937.50

NOTE: This price is predicated on an erected price of .1175 per Lb. of steel and we would expect to adjust the price on this basis to conform to actual tonnage of steel used in the project.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to quote.

Very truly yours, E.A. CORONIS ASSOCIATES /s/ Arthur C. Pease Arthur C. Pease"

Gordon contends that at some date prior to April 22 the parties reached an oral agreement and that the above letter was sent in confirmation.

Bids were opened by the Port Authority on April 19, 1963, and Gordon's bid was the lowest. He alleges that Coronis was informed the same day. The Port Authority contract was officially awarded to Gordon on May 27, 1963 and executed about two weeks later. During this period Gordon never accepted the alleged offer of Coronis. Meanwhile, on June 1, 1963, Coronis sent a telegram, in pertinent part reading:

"Due to conditions beyond our control, we must withdraw our proposal of April 22nd 1963 for structural steel Dor Buildings 131 and 132 at the Elizabeth-Port Piers at the earliest possible we will resubmit our proposal."

[73] Two days later, on June 3, 1963, Gordon replied by telegram as follows:

"Ref your tel. 6-3 and for the record be advised that we are holding you to your bid of April 22, 1963 for the structural steel of carge bldgs 131 and 132."

Coronis never performed. Gordon employed the Elizabeth Iron Works to perform the work and claims as damages the difference between Coronis' proposal of $155,413.50 and Elizabeth Iron Works' charge of $208,000.

Gordon contends that the April 22 letter was an offer and that Coronis had no right to withdraw it. Two grounds are advanced in support. First, Gordon contends that the Uniform Commercial Code firm offer section, N.J.S. 12A:2-205, precludes withdrawal and, second, it contends that withdrawal is prevented by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

I.

Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code an offer not supported by consideration could be revoked at any time prior to acceptance. American Handkerchief Corp. v. Frannat Realty Co., 17 N.J. 12 (1954). The drafters of the Code recognized that the common law rule was contrary to modern business practice and possessed the capability to produce unjust results. See Corbin, "The Uniform Commercial Code — Sales, Should it be Enacted," 59 Yale L.J. 821, 827 (1950). The response was section 2-205 (N.J.S. 12A:2-205) which reverses the common law rule and states:

"An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time it stated for a reasonable time. * * *" (Emphasis added)

Coronis' letter contains no terms giving assurance it will be held open. We recognize that just as an offeree runs a risk in acting on an offer before accepting it, the offeror runs a risk [74] if his offer in considered irrevocable. Cf., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2 Cir. 1933). In their comments to section 2-205 of the Code the drafters anticipated these risks and stated:

"However, despite settled courses of dealing or usages of the trade whereby firm offers are made by oral communication and relied upon without more evidence, such offers remain revocable under this Article since authentication by a writing is the essence of this section." Uniform Commercial Code (N.J.S. 12A:2-205), comment, par. 2.

We think it clear that plaintiff's writing does not come within the provision of section 2-205 of a "signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open." See Wilmington Trust Company v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964).

Having so concluded, we need not consider the question of whether the Coronis letter was an offer or whether the letter dealt with "goods." We note in this connection that Coronis quoted the price for structural steel delivered and erected.

II.

Defendant also argues that even if plaintiff's writing of April 22 is not a firm offer within the meaning of section 2-205, justice requires that we apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel to preclude its revocation. Restatement, Contracts, § 90 provides:

"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."[1]

[75] Defendant argues that it relied on plaintiff's bid in making its own bid and that injustice would result if plaintiff could now revoke. Thus, defendant contends that plaintiff's bid is made irrevocable by application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

No New Jersey case has applied the rule in our State. But our highest court has twice implied that in appropriate circumstances it would. Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523 (1956); American Handkerchief Corp. v. Frannat Realty Co., supra. The general rule is that estoppel only applies to representations of facts past or present. Berman v. One Forty-Five Belmont Ave. Corp., 109 N.J. Eq. 256, 261 (Ch. 1931). The significant function of promissory estoppel is to apply an estoppel to representations or promises as to future events. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 80, pp. 466, 467 (1964). Writing for the court in Friedman, Justice Heher recognized that the doctrine was not truly an estoppel in the historical sense. He described the doctrine by stating:

"The term `promissory estoppel' is of comparatively recent origin in our jurisprudence, not altogether clear in its quality and import. It is not a true estoppel, but a departure from the classic doctrine of consideration that the promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part, and it is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting, Wisconsin & Michigan R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386, 24 S.Ct. 107, 48 L.Ed. 229 (1903), Holmes, C.J.; Coast National Bank v. Bloom, supra [113 N.J.L. 597, 602 (E. & A. 1934)], a professed adaptation of the principle of estoppel to the formation of contracts where, relying on a gratuitous promise, the promisee has suffered detriment. Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1901), Holmes, C.J. There is in such circumstances no representation of an existing fact, but merely that the promisor at the time of making the promise intends to fulfill it. The reliance is on a promise, and not on a misstatement of fact, and so the estoppel is termed `promissory' to mark the distinction. Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), section 139." (22 N.J., at pp. 535, 536)

The evolving nature of the doctrine under examination is illustrated by the variation in the expressions of the authorities in its characterization. Thus it has been called a "species [76] of consideration," Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2 Cir. 1932), affirmed 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 451, 77 L.Ed. 880 (1933); and the "equivalent of" or a "substitute for" consideration. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 175, 57 A.L.R. 980 (Ct. App. 1927). The doctrine has found basic acceptance throughout the country. However, the courts have not agreed on where the doctrine is to be applied. They frequently state that in this country promissory estoppel "has been generally confined to charitable subscriptions, where difficulty has been encountered in sustaining the promise under the conventional theories of consideration, and to certain promises between individuals for the payment of money, enforced as informal contracts." Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., supra, at p. 536; 1 Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1957), § 140, pp. 611, 612. While the doctrine is now recognized "almost universally" in the charitable subscription cases, 1A Corbin, op. cit., § 198, p. 204; 1 Williston, op. cit., p. 609, § 140, it also enjoys a much wider application. Annotation 48 A.L.R.2d 1069, 1079-1087 (1950); Annotation 115 A.L.R. 152, 156 (1938); 1A Corbin, op. cit., §§ 193-209. For example, promissory estoppel has been applied to preclude reliance on the statute of limitations, Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. 1949); to avoid the statute of frauds, Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295, 15 Alaska 272 (9 Cir. 1954); to prevent foreclosure of a mortgage, Bank of Fairbanks v. Kaye, 227 F.2d 566, 16 Alaska 23 (9 Cir. 1955); to enforce a pension plan, West v. Hunt Foods, 101 Cal. App.2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (D. Ct. App. 1951); to require the granting of a franchise, Chrysler Corporation v. Quimby, 1 Storey 264, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1958); to protect creditors by requiring directors of a corporation to convey land to it, Berman v. Griggs, 145 Me. 258, 75 A.2d 365 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1950); to enforce a release given without consideration, Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39, 115 A.L.R. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1938); and to enforce an easement [77] granted without consideration or a writing, Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267, 48 A.L.R.2d 1058 (Sup. Ct. 1954).

We see no reason why, given an appropriate factual situation, the doctrine would not apply in this State. Our view is reinforced by the ever expanding scope of liability designed to compensate those injured by wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corporation of America, 46 N.J. 82 (1965); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559 (1965); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70 (1965). As Justice Jacobs said in Schipper:

"The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected. * * *" (at p. 90)

We see no difference between substantial reliance on a representation or promise as to current or past facts and as to future facts. It is only right and just that a promise a promisor knows will induce action of a substantial character be enforced if it is in fact relied on.

The authorities are not uniform in applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel to situations comparable to that before us. We believe the better line of authority applies the doctrine. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 115 U.S. App. D.C. 335, 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Air Conditioning Co. of Hawaii v. Richards Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 167 (D. Hawaii 1963), affirmed on other grounds 318 F.2d 410 (9 Cir. 1963); Reynolds v. Texarkana Construction Company, 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Norcross v. Winters, 209 Cal. App.2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (D. Ct. App. 1962); Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Union Tank Car Company v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Cf., R.P. [78] Farnsworth & Co. v. Albert, 79 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. La. 1948), reversed 176 F.2d 198 (5 Cir. 1949); Harris v. Lillis, 24 So.2d 689 (La. Ct. App. 1946). Contra, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2 Cir. 1933); Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T.T. Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 239 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1965).

The Drennan case involved an oral bid by a subcontractor for paving work at a school project on which plaintiff general contractor was about to bid. Defendant's paving bid was the lowest, and the general contractor computed his own bid accordingly. Plaintiff was the successful bidder but the following day was informed by defendant it would not do the work at its bid price. The California Supreme Court, per Justice Traynor, applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent defendant's revocation of its bid, stating:

"When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether it would be used or not. On the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract. It was bound to realize the substantial possibility that its bid would be the lowest, and that it would be included by plaintiff in his bid. It was to its own interest that the contractor be awarded the general contract; the lower the subcontract bid, the lower the general contractor's bid was likely to be and the greater its chance of acceptance and hence the greater defendant's chance of getting the paving subcontract. Defendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on his bid but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is bound by his own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at least an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to him." (333 P.2d, at p. 760)

The South Dakota Supreme Court was confronted with a virtually identical set of facts in the Northwestern Engineering case. In applying promissory estoppel it stated,

"Obviously it would seem unjust and unfair, after appellant was declared the successful bidder and imposed with all the obligations of such, to allow respondents to then retract their promise and permit the effect of such retraction to fall upon the appellant." (10 N.W.2d, at p. 883)

[79] Similarly, in the Reynolds case a subcontractor submitted a bid for the electrical work for a school project on which the general contractor was about to bid. The general contractor relied on the subcontractor's bid. In applying promissory estoppel to prevent revocation the court held that,

"Justice demands that the loss resulting from the subcontractor's carelessness should fall upon him who was guilty of the error rather than upon the principal contractor who relied in good faith upon the offer that he received." (374 S.W.2d, at p. 820)

We agree.

III.

To successfully establish a cause of action based on promissory estoppel Gordon must prove that (1) it received a clear and definite offer from Coronis; (2) Coronis could expect reliance of a substantial nature; (3) actual reasonable reliance on Gordon's part, and (4) detriment. Restatement, Contracts, § 90; N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., supra, 319 F.2d, at p. 739.

The Law Division did not think promissory estoppel would apply in the situation sub judice. Therefore we reverse. We also remand since it is necessary to determine if the elements of a promissory estoppel case are present. They are essentially factual and inappropriate to a summary judgment. R.R. 4:58-3; Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1957). Gordon must show the existence of an offer. The April 22 letter is subsequent in time to Gordon's bid to the Port Authority. It cannot furnish the basis for this suit since it would have been impossible for Gordon to have relied on it when making its bid. However, it is alleged that the letter merely confirmed prior oral agreements. The true facts must await a full hearing.

Similarly, Gordon must show that Coronis could reasonably expect Gordon to rely on the bid. This will depend on Coronis' actual knowledge or the custom and usage in the trade. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., supra; [80] Hedden v. Lupinsky, 405 Pa. 609, 176 A.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Gordon must also show actual reliance.[2]Norcross v. Winters, supra. And we note that if Coronis' bid was so low as to put Gordon on notice that it was erroneous it cannot claim reliance. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra; MacIsaac & Menke Co. v. Freeman, 194 Cal. App.2d 327, 15 Cal. Rptr. 48 (D. Ct. App. 1961); cf., Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 463 (Ch. Div. 1961). Finally, of course, detriment must be shown.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] The Restatement does not use the term "promissory estoppel." It has been criticized as too broad. Professor Corbin approves of the Restatement's stating of the rule "in terms of action or forbearance in reliance on a promise." 1A Corbin, Contracts, § 204 (1963), cited with approval in Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 538 (1956). We use the term "promissory estoppel" for convenience.

[2] We do not consider whether the existence of section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code precludes reliance on an offer not conforming to its provisions.

4.8 UCC 2-205 (Firm Offers) 4.8 UCC 2-205 (Firm Offers)

2-205. Firm Offers.

An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.

4.9 Craswell & Schwartz Excerpts 1.1 4.9 Craswell & Schwartz Excerpts 1.1

1.1 Enforcing Promises

P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract

It is necessary at the outset to distinguish three situations in which contracts may be held legally binding, or promises may be found morally binding:

1.  In the first situation a contract or a promise may be found binding after a price has been paid for it.

For example, a person may borrow £ 100 from a friend and may simultaneously promise to repay it. In this situation there would, both legally and morally, be a liability to repay even if there were no promise. The promise may, indeed, be said to be “implied” but my contention is that in this situation the primary justification for imposing a legal or moral obligation on the party borrowing the money is that he has received a benefit at the expense of the other party, and that is, in a property-owning society, usually sufficient to establish a liability. I express this conclusion by saying that the liability is benefit-based in this type of case; it could also be said to arise from broad notions of unjust enrichment.

If it should be asked what is the function of the promise in such circumstances, one answer might be that the promise has evidentiary value. It is evidence that the promisor has received a benefit (for if it was not a benefit would he have promised to pay for it?) and it may be evidence of many ancillary matters such as the precise terms of the arrangement, the date of repayment and so on.

2.  In the second situation, a contract or promise may be enforced where the promisee has acted in reliance on the promise, or on the promisor’s conduct, and would in consequence be in a worse situation than if no promise had ever been made.

The case of a simple loan discussed above may, of course, also be a case of such action in reliance, for the lender may only have lent his money in reliance on the borrower’s promise to repay. But cases of action in reliance may arise without any element of benefit or unjust enrichment.

In the law, a common example is to be found in the typical contract of guarantee, as where A promises to guarantee repayment of a loan to be made by B to C. In this situation if B acts in reliance on the guarantee, he will lend money to C and may (if C is himself not good for the money) thus make his position worse than it would be if there had been no promise. In my terminology I would refer to liability in such a case as reliance-based.

As in the previous case, I suggest that many forms of reliance-based liability arise, or would arise even in the absence of a promise. The party relying may be relying, not on a promise, but on other words, or mere conduct. Such reliance is a commonplace in modern societies and often gives rise to liabilities even in the absence of a promise. For instance, a person who buys a new house, in reliance on the proper performance by the local authority of its duties of ensuring compliance with the Building Regulations, may have a remedy against the authority for malperformance even though they give no promise.

Here again, as with benefit-based liability, the result may be justified or explained by saying that there is an “implied” promise. But it will be observed that in such circumstances the liability comes first, and the implication is made subsequently to justify the decision already arrived at. Once the liability itself is well established (whether in law or in social custom) it is easy to make the implication.

But in the first instance, it is the conduct of one party, followed by the action in reliance of the other, which creates the liability. As with the case of benefit-based liability, it is likely that an actual, express promise, will serve a useful evidentiary role in reliance-based liability. Whether the party acting did in fact rely on the other (or, for example, on his own judgment) and if so, whether in so acting, he acted reasonably by the standards of the society in question, are questions whose answer may be greatly assisted by the presence of an express promise. But again, it does not follow that it is the promise which creates the liability.

3.  The third situation concerns a promise or a contract which has not been paid for, and which has not yet been relied upon. In the law such a contract or promise would be called “wholly executory.”

If such a promise or contract generates any liability, the liability must be promise-based, since it cannot be benefit-based or reliance-based. In the first two cases, distinct grounds exist for imposing the liability, apart altogether from the promise. In this case, no such distinct grounds exist. If the promise is held to be “binding” or to create some liability, it must be for some reason which is inherent in the promise itself. The principal grounds which (it is suggested) can be found for imposing such liability in this case are these.

First, it may be said that a promise, even while executory, creates expectations, and that these expectations will be disappointed if the promise is not performed. In this sense, there is a similarity between a promise-based and a reliance-based liability. The promisee whose expectations are disappointed may feel he is worse off than he would have been if no promise had been made at all. Psychologically this may be true; but in a pecuniary sense, it is not. The party who acts in reliance may spend money which he would lose if he could not claim recompense from the party on whose conduct he relied. But the promisee who has not yet acted in reliance on a promise, and not yet paid any price for it, will not be worse off in a pecuniary sense merely because his expectations are disappointed.

Secondly, it may be said that contracts and promises are essentially risk-allocation devices, like simple bets. The nature of this device is such that the transaction must generally remain executory prior to the occurrence of the risk, and the whole point of the transaction would be lost if the arrangement could not be made binding for the future.

The third possible ground for the enforcement of executory promises or contracts is that it may be desirable to uphold the principle of promissory liability, even in cases where the non-performance of the promise has little practical effect. The argument here comes to this, that if executory promises are held binding (whether in law or in social custom and morality) then people are more likely to perform promises which have been paid for, or relied upon.

Now it will be seen that many promises and contracts are likely to be wholly executory at the outset, but may quickly pass into one or other of the first two situations discussed above. A promise may be given which is at first executory, and only subsequently is it acted upon by the promisee, or paid for by the promisee. In this book I suggest that once this happens, the ground for imposing a liability shifts. The liability becomes benefit-based or reliance-based, where it was previously promise-based. This may seem strange, and indeed, it is precisely because this seems so strange that it has not generally been recognized, either in law or in general discussion of the nature of promissory liability. This, I suggest, is because promise-based liability is seen as the paradigm case for discussion both in law and among philosophers, and perhaps in ordinary discourse.

One of the purposes of this book is to suggest that this is itself part of our cultural and legal heritage, and that an alternative perspective may be possible and even preferable. If benefit-based and reliance-based liabilities are taken as the paradigm cases of obligation, whether legal or moral, it may be suggested that promise-based liabilities are neither paradigmatic nor of central importance. Far from being the typical case of obligation, a promise-based liability may be a projection of liabilities normally based on benefit or reliance. Because these are normally found such powerful grounds for imposing obligations, it has been thought that the element of promise (express or implied) which is often combined with benefit-based and reliance-based liability, is itself the ground for the obligation. And from this, it has been an easy move to the inference that promise-based liability, even without any element of benefit or reliance, carries its own justification.

Much of this book is based on the conviction that this traditional attitude to promise-based obligations is misconceived, and that the grounds for the imposition of such liabilities are, by the standards of modern values, very weak compared with the grounds for the creation of benefit-based and reliance-based obligations. The protection of mere expectations cannot (it is suggested) rank equally with the protection of restitution interests (arising from benefit-based liability) or reliance interests (arising from reliance-based liability). A person whose expectations are disappointed, but who suffers no pecuniary or other loss from the failure to perform a promise, has surely a relatively weak claim for complaint or redress.

No doubt if there is no excuse or justification at all for the failure to perform the promise or contract, the promisee may be felt entitled to some redress, but even then it does not follow that he should be entitled to demand full performance of the promise, or redress based on such an entitlement. Frequently, a promise-based claim is based on relatively short-lived expectations; for it is where the promisor has (for instance) made some mistake, or overlooked some fact, that he is most likely to attempt to withdraw a promise. Where the promisor does not do this, the probability is that some action in reliance (or some payment) will soon be performed by the promisee, and he can then claim the much greater protection due to reliance interests or restitution interests.

Adoption of this alternative approach would, of course, have a profound effect on the conceptual pattern of moral and legal obligation, but to argue, as I do, that the justification for creating promise-based obligations is usually weak, does not mean that this approach would involve a serious undercutting of typical moral or legal obligations. For in practice, even liabilities which are usually perceived as promise-based in law or social custom, are, in my terminology not exclusively promise-based at all. In fact most such liabilities are, or rapidly become, reliance-based or benefit-based, and the period during which they remain promise-based is usually relatively short. Indeed, in practical terms, the approach I advocate would tend chiefly to affect those relatively marginal cases in which promises are revoked shortly after they are given, and before they have been paid for or relied upon.

The second ground for maintaining the binding force of an executory contract is, as I have suggested, that such a contract is essentially a way of allocating a risk, or perhaps of transferring a risk from one party to another in advance. Where this is indeed the case (as for example, with bets, or some forms of insurance) it seems that the arrangement must, if it is to have any point at all, be binding on the parties at the outset. But this argument is open to two possible answers.

One is that most contracts are not in fact entered into for the purpose of transferring or allocating risks. If contracts are construed as being risk-allocation mechanisms, this is because they are often seen as such in the eye of the beholder. Pure risk-allocation contracts are relatively rare, and it may be that special considerations do apply to them.

The second possible answer is that even in contracts of this nature an element of reliance is still needed before it becomes essential to maintain the integrity of the transaction. Even an executory insurance arrangement, for instance, could be made cancellable so long as the insured still has time to find alternative cover. A person might, in principle, be given the right to withdraw from a bet on a race before the race is run, so long as the other party has time to place his own bet elsewhere at similar odds. There would be nothing logically impossible about such a possibility though it might be inconvenient.

The third ground for the creation of promise-based liabilities is also, I suggest, very weak in comparison with the grounds for the creation of benefit-based and reliance-based obligations. For this ground is, in effect, nothing more than an argument for the use of promise-based liability as a subsidiary method of ensuring compliance with benefit-based and reliance-based obligations.

There are, of course, great difficulties in arguing that promise-based liabilities should be observed even though there is no independent justification for their observance, in order that reliance-based and benefit-based obligations should be better observed. Now it cannot be claimed that the case for the enforcement of promise-based liabilities is entirely vitiated by these difficulties, because the fact that my approach is so unorthodox itself testifies to the practical strength of this argument. Both morally and legally, promise-based liabilities have traditionally been thought worthy of protection, even where there has been no element of reliance or reciprocal benefit. It seems certain, therefore, that where there is some element of reliance or benefit, the case for redress has been felt a fortiori to be the more powerful.

This too, I suggest, is part of the cultural heritage which I explore further in this book, and it is enough to say here that the whole trend of modern times is against arguments of principle of this character. It appears more in accord with contemporary beliefs to reject the argument of principle, and to insist upon the difference (for example) between maintaining the sanctity of a promise or contract because it has been relied upon, and because it might have been (but was not) relied upon. What is lacking is a theoretical or conceptual (and perhaps even linguistic) recognition of these differences.

In suggesting that these ideas are, at least intuitively or implicitly, gaining much ground today, and in advocating open recognition of these facts, it does not follow that I approve or disapprove of them. The nature of the conflict of values which underlies this question will become clear during the course of this book, but in its essentials the conflict is perfectly plain. Promise-based liability rests upon a belief in the traditional liberal values of free choice. Many still admire these values but they bring with them, inescapably, many other consequences which are today less admired, especially in England. They bring, in particular, the recognition that some individuals are better equipped to exercise free choice than others, through natural aptitude, education, or the possession of wealth. And the greater is the need for the exercise of free choice, the stronger is the tendency for these original inequalities to perpetuate themselves by maintaining or even increasing economic inequalities. For example, in contracts which really are risk-allocation arrangements, to hold the contract binding must, in general, favour the party who has the better skill and knowledge for assessing future risks.

By contrast, other forms of liability rest on different values. Even benefit-based liability, though it may tend to perpetuate existing inequalities of wealth, does at least militate against increasing those inequalities in the way in which promise-based liabilities may do. For where liabilities are benefit-based, the law (or the moral norms) strive for a reasonable or just balance in the reciprocity of benefit; where liabilities are promise-based the free choice of the parties determines this balance, and it is inevitable that this will tend to favour those better able to exercise free choice.

Reliance-based liabilities are still more hostile to the values of free choice. As soon as liabilities come to be placed upon a person in whom another has reposed trust or reliance, even though there is no explicit promise or agreement to bear that liability, the door is opened to a species of liability which does not depend upon a belief in individual responsibility and free choice. Not only is the party relied upon held liable without his promise, but the party relying is relieved from the consequences of his own actions. The values involved in this type of liability are therefore closely associated with a paternalist social philosophy, and a redistributive economic system.


Charles Fried, Contract as Promise

What is a promise, that by my words I should make wrong what before was morally indifferent? A promise is a communication—usually verbal; it says something. But how can my saying something put a moral charge on a choice that before was morally neutral? Well, by my misleading you, or by lying. Is lying not the very paradigm of doing wrong by speaking?

But this won’t do, for a promise puts the moral charge on a potential act—the wrong is done later, when the promise is not kept—while a lie is a wrong committed at the time of its utterance. Both wrongs abuse trust, but in different ways. When I speak I commit myself to the truth of my utterance, but when I promise I commit myself to act, later. Though these two wrongs are thus quite distinct there has been a persistent tendency to run them together by treating a promise as a lie after all, but a particular kind of lie: a lie about one’s intentions. Consider this case:

I offer to sell you a house, retaining an adjacent vacant lot. At the time of our negotiations, I state that I intend to build a home for myself on that lot. What if several years later I sell the lot to a person who builds a gas station on it? What if I sell it only one month later? What if I am already negotiating for its sale as a gas station at the time I sell the house to you?

If I was already negotiating to sell the lot for a gas station at the time of my statement to you, I have wronged you. I have lied to you about the state of my intentions, and this is as much a lie as a lie about the state of the plumbing.

If, however, I sell the lot many years later, I do you no wrong. There are no grounds for saying I lied about my intentions; I have just changed my mind. Now if I had promised to use the lot only as a residence, the situation would be different. Promising is more than just truthfully reporting my present intentions, for I may be free to change my mind, as I am not free to break my promise.

Let us take it as given here that lying is wrong and so that it is wrong to obtain benefits or cause harm by lying (including lying about one’s intentions). It does not at all follow that to obtain a benefit or cause harm by breaking a promise is also wrong. That my act procures me a benefit or causes harm all by itself proves nothing. If I open a restaurant near your hotel and prosper as I draw your guests away from the standard hotel fare you offer, this benefit I draw from you places me under no obligation to you. I should make restitution only if I benefit unjustly, which I do if I deceive you—as when I lie to you about my intentions in [the] example [above].

But where is the injustice if I honestly intend to keep my promise at the time of making it, and later change my mind? If we feel I owe you recompense in that case too, it cannot be because of the benefit I have obtained through my promise: We have seen that benefit even at another’s expense is not alone sufficient to require compensation. If I owe you a duty to return that benefit it must be because of the promise. It is the promise that makes my enrichment at your expense unjust, and not the enrichment that makes the promise binding. And thus neither the statement of intention nor the benefit explains why, if at all, a promise does any moral work.

A more common attempt to reduce the force of a promise to some other moral category invokes the harm you suffer in relying on my promise. My statement is like a pit I have dug in the road, into which you fall. I have harmed you and should make you whole. Thus the tort principle might be urged to bridge the gap in the argument between a statement of intention and a promise: I have a duty just because I could have foreseen (indeed it was my intention) that you would rely on my promise and that you would suffer harm when I broke it. And this wrong then not only sets the stage for compensation of the harm caused by the misplaced reliance, but also supplies the moral predicate for restitution of any benefits I may have extracted from you on the strength of my promise.

But we still beg the question. If the promise is no more than a truthful statement of my intention, why am I responsible for harm that befalls you as a result of my change of heart? To be sure, it is not like a change in the weather—I might have kept to my original intention—but how does this distinguish the broken promise from any other statement of intention (or habit or prediction of future conduct) of mine of which you know and on which you choose to rely? Should your expectations of me limit my freedom of choice? If you rent the apartment next to mine because I play chamber music there, do I owe you more than an expression of regret when my friends and I decide to meet instead at the cellist’s home? And in general, why should my liberty be constrained by the harm you would suffer from the disappointment of the expectations you choose to entertain about my choices?

Does it make a difference that when I promise you do not just happen to rely on me, that I communicate my intention to you and therefore can be taken to know that changing my mind may put you at risk? But then I might be aware that you would count on my keeping to my intentions even if I myself had not communicated those intentions to you. (You might have told me you were relying on me, or you might have overheard me telling some third person of my intentions.) It might be said that I become the agent of your reliance by telling you, and that this makes my responsibility clearer: After all, I can scarcely control all the ways in which you might learn of my intentions, but I can control whether or not I tell you of them. But we are still begging the question. If promising is no more than my telling you of my intentions, why do we both not know that I may yet change my mind? Perhaps, then, promising is like telling you of my intention and telling you that I don’t intend to change my mind. But why can’t I change my mind about the latter intention?

Perhaps the statement of intention in promising is binding because we not only foresee reliance, we invite it: We intend the promisee to rely on the promise. Yet even this will not do. If I invite reliance on my stated intention, then that is all I invite. Certainly I may hope and intend, in example I, that you buy my house on the basis of what I have told you, but why does that hope bind me to do more than state my intention honestly? And that intention and invitation are quite compatible with my later changing my mind. In every case, of course, I should weigh the harm I will do if I do change my mind. If I am a doctor and I know you will rely on me to be part of an outing on which someone may fall ill, I should certainly weigh the harm that may come about if that reliance is disappointed. Indeed I should weigh that harm even if you do not rely on me, but are foolish enough not to have made a provision for a doctor. Yet in none of these instances am I bound as I would be had I promised.

A promise invokes trust in my future actions, not merely in my present sincerity. We need to isolate an additional element, over and above benefit, reliance, and the communication of intention. That additional element must commit me, and commit me to more than the truth of some statement. That additional element has so far eluded our analysis.

It has eluded us, I believe, because there is a real puzzle about how we can commit ourselves to a course of conduct that absent our commitment is morally neutral. The invocation of benefit and reliance are attempts to explain the force of a promise in terms of two of its most usual effects, but the attempts fail because these effects depend on the prior assumption of the force of the commitment. The way out of the puzzle is to recognize the bootstrap quality of the argument: To have force in a particular case promises must be assumed to have force generally. Once that general assumption is made, the effects we intentionally produce by a particular promise may be morally attributed to us. This recognition is not as paradoxical as its abstract statement here may make it seem. It lies, after all, behind every conventional structure: games, institutions and practices, and most important, language....

... The conventional nature of language is too obvious to belabor. It is worth pointing out, however, that the various things we do with language—informing, reporting, promising, insulting, cheating, lying—all depend on the conventional structure’s being firmly in place. You could not lie if there were not both understanding of the language you lied in and a general convention of using that language truthfully. This point holds irrespective of whether the institution of language has advanced the situation of mankind and of whether lying is sometimes, always, or never wrong.

Promising too is a very general convention—though less general than language, of course, since promising is itself a use of language. The convention of promising (like that of language) has a very general purpose under which we may bring an infinite set of particular purposes. In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is necessary that there be a way in which I may commit myself. It is necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of conduct that would otherwise be optional for me.

By doing this I can facilitate the projects of others, because I can make it possible for those others to count on my future conduct, and thus those others can pursue more intricate, more far-reaching projects. If it is my purpose, my will that others be able to count on me in the pursuit of their endeavor, it is essential that I be able to deliver myself into their hands more firmly than where they simply predict my future course. Thus the possibility of commitment permits an act of generosity on my part, permits me to pursue a project whose content is that you be permitted to pursue your project. But of course this purely altruistic motive is not the only motive worth facilitating. More central to our concern is the situation where we facilitate each other’s projects, where the gain is reciprocal. Schematically the situation looks like this:

You want to accomplish purpose A and I want to accomplish purpose B. Neither of us can succeed without the cooperation of the other. Thus I want to be able to commit myself to help you achieve A so that you will commit yourself to help me achieve B.

Now if A and B are objects or actions that can be transferred simultaneously there is no need for commitment. As I hand over A you hand over B, and we are both satisfied. But very few things are like that. We need a device to permit a trade over time: to allow me to do A for you when you need it, in the confident belief that you will do B for me when I need it. Your commitment puts your future performance into my hands in the present just as my commitment puts my future performance into your hands. A future exchange is transformed into a present exchange. And in order to accomplish this all we need is a conventional device which we both invoke, which you know I am invoking when I invoke it, which I know that you know I am invoking, and so on....

The Moral Obligation of Promise

Once I have invoked the institution of promising, why exactly is it wrong for me then to break my promise?

My argument so far does not answer that question. The institution of promising is a way for me to bind myself to another so that the other may expect a future performance, and binding myself in this way is something that I may want to be able to do. But this by itself does not show that I am morally obligated to perform my promise at a later time if to do so proves inconvenient or costly. That there should be a system of currency also increases my options and is useful to me, but this does not show why I should not use counterfeit money if I can get away with it. In just the same way the usefulness of promising in general does not show why I should not take advantage of it in a particular case and yet fail to keep my promise. That the convention would cease to function in the long run, would cease to provide benefits if everyone felt free to violate it, is hardly an answer to the question of why I should keep a particular promise on a particular occasion....

Considerations of self-interest cannot supply the moral basis of my obligation to keep a promise. By an analogous argument neither can considerations of utility. For however sincerely and impartially I may apply the utilitarian injunction to consider at each step how I might increase the sum of happiness or utility in the world, it will allow me to break my promise whenever the balance of advantage (including, of course, my own advantage) tips in that direction. The possible damage to the institution of promising is only one factor in the calculation. Other factors are the alternative good I might do by breaking my promise, whether and by how many people the breach might be discovered, what the actual effect on confidence of such a breach would be. There is no a priori reason for believing that an individual’s calculations will come out in favor of keeping the promise always, sometimes, or most of the time.

Rule-utilitarianism seeks to offer a way out of this conundrum. The individual’s moral obligation is determined not by what the best action at a particular moment would be, but by the rule it would be best for him to follow. It has, I believe, been demonstrated that this position is incoherent: Either rule-utilitarianism requires that rules be followed in a particular case even where the result would not be best all things considered, and so the utilitarian aspect of rule-utilitarianism is abandoned; or the obligation to follow the rule is so qualified as to collapse into act-utilitarianism after all. There is, however, a version of rule-utilitarianism that makes a great deal of sense. In this version the utilitarian does not instruct us what our individual moral obligations are but rather instructs legislators what the best rules are. If legislation is our focus, then the contradictions of rule-utilitarianism do not arise, since we are instructing those whose decisions can only take the form of issuing rules. From that perspective there is obvious utility to rules establishing and enforcing promissory obligations. Since I am concerned now with the question of individual obligation, that is, moral obligation, this legislative perspective on the argument is not available to me.

The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust. Autonomy and trust are grounds for the institution of promising as well, but the argument for individual obligation is not the same. Individual obligation is only a step away, but that step must be taken. An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.

A liar and a promise-breaker each use another person. In both speech and promising there is an invitation to the other to trust, to make himself vulnerable; the liar and the promise-breaker then abuse that trust. The obligation to keep a promise is thus similar to but more constraining than the obligation to tell the truth. To avoid lying you need only believe in the truth of what you say when you say it, but a promise binds into the future, well past the moment when the promise is made. There will, of course, be great social utility to a general regime of trust and confidence in promises and truthfulness. But this just shows that a regime of mutual respect allows men and women to accomplish what in a jungle of unrestrained self-interest could not be accomplished. If this advantage is to be firmly established, there must exist a ground for mutual confidence deeper than and independent of the social utility it permits.

The utilitarian counting the advantages affirms the general importance of enforcing contracts. The moralist of duty, however, sees promising as a device that free, moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which gathers its moral force from that premise. The moralist of duty thus posits a general obligation to keep promises, of which the obligation of contract will be only a special case—that special case in which certain promises have attained legal as well as moral force. But since a contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.

To summarize: There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and its entailments. This convention provides a way that a person may create expectations in others. By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and respect, it is wrong to invoke that convention in order to make a promise, and then to break it.

4.10 Pargendler Excerpt 4.10 Pargendler Excerpt

Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Common-Civil Law Divide, 43 Yale J. Int'l L. 143 (2018)

This Article undertakes to examine in a coordinated manner some of the central-and persisting -- doctrinal distinctions in the laws of contract of common and civil law jurisdictions. The classification of legal systems into the legal families of common law and civil law has long played a central role in comparative law scholarship and, more recently, also in the economic literature, which has posited a strong connection between legal traditions and various economic outcomes. While the importance and continued vitality of legal family categorizations have come under attack, they continue to play a useful descriptive and didactic role in broadly mapping the legal regimes of multiple jurisdictions.

The analysis here will simultaneously examine the distinctions between the common and civil law of contracts that have received the lion's share of attention in both scholarly and practical commentary. These are:

(i) The stronger duty of good faith in the civil law;
(ii) The greater number of mandatory contract rules in the civil law;
(iii) The greater intervention in the interpretation and revision of contract terms in the civil law;
(iv) The greater enforcement of penalty clauses in the civil law;
(v) The greater availability of specific performance in the civil law; and
(vi) The greater availability of contract discharge through a "fresh start" in bankruptcy in the common law.

At first sight, it is hard to make sense of these distinctions. The presence of (i) a broader duty of good faith, (ii) more mandatory rules, and (iii) the greater judicial rewriting of contract terms in civil law jurisdictions may lead one to conclude that common law systems provide a stronger role for freedom of contract than do civil law systems -- which is indeed a common stereotype in business practice.

Yet this view is not without difficulties. If the common law is truly devoted to sanctity of contract, why does it (iv) deny enforcement to penalty clauses freely agreed by the parties, (v) refuse to grant specific performance as a matter of right (even if the parties specifically choose this remedy), and (vi) more easily discharge contracts in bankruptcy proceedings? 

This Article suggests that these differences can be explained by the distinct roles of the State in shaping contract law in common and civil law systems. In civil law systems, the State tends to play a stronger part in all respects.

On the one hand, the State, through legislatures and courts, goes further in providing and policing the substantive terms of the agreement to ensure compliance with broader social values and objectives.

On the other hand, once the contract passes muster under this test, the State is also willing to sanction breaches with more severe consequences: namely, by permitting the enforcement of penalty clauses, granting specific performance, and making it more difficult to discharge contractual obligations in bankruptcy proceedings. 

Common law systems, by contrast, embrace the opposite approach: legislatures and courts are less willing both to meddle with the terms of the contract and to offer relief to the aggrieved party if voluntary performance is not forthcoming. Under Ian Macneil's conceptualization of the two dimensions of freedom of contract, the common law favors only a narrow version of it, in the sense of "freedom from restraint" in "making or receiving promises." It is the civil law that embraces a stronger version of the other side of freedom of contract, the "power of contract," which consists in the ability to secure legal sanctions for non-performance.

So how does this overarching pattern relate to prevailing conceptions about common and civil law systems more generally?

The character of contract law appears to map the findings of the burgeoning literature on the role of the State across legal traditions, with common law systems boasting more liberal, and civil law systems more interventionist, arrangements of contract law and enforcement. It is, however, partly in tension with the prevailing notion that the common law necessarily places greater value on -- and provides stronger enforcement to -- private contracting schemes. 

Indeed, once the more modest remedies for breach of contract are taken into account, State support to private contracts in common law jurisdictions looks far more fragile. In other words, the common law's apparent intervention to restrict the remedies available for breach of contract effectively results in a more limited use of the State's coercive powers in contract enforcement.

To put it differently, the common law is not so much supportive of private contracts as it is conducive to private ordering, including with respect to mechanisms for the enforcement of contractual obligations.  At a high level of generality, the different roles of the State in (i) policing the terms of the contract and (ii) calibrating the remedies for non-performance can be viewed as alternative mechanisms to mitigate the effects of harsh contractual commitments.

These different approaches are unlikely to guarantee identical results. Yet the analysis offered here highlights how substantive control of contract terms and discharge in bankruptcy can serve as alternative mechanisms for allocating contract risk and mitigating the effects of harsh bargains-a crucial relationship that has been largely overlooked by the existing literature. In this context, the ultimate outcomes in both systems are closer than one would anticipate by focusing on individual rules or styles of State intervention in isolation.