*403Roberts, C. J.

These are two indictments, one (No. 70-573) charging the defendant, Henry Rose, with leaving the scene of an accident, death resulting, in violation of *404G. L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-26-l1 and the other (No. 70-572) charging the defendant with manslaughter. The defendant was tried on both indictments to a jury in the Superior Court, and a verdict of guilty was returned in each case. Thereafter the defendant’s motions for a new trial were denied, and he is now prosecuting a bill of exceptions in each case in this court.

These indictments followed the death of David J. Mc-Enery, who was struck by defendant’s motor vehicle at the intersection of Broad and Summer Streets in Providence at about 6:30 p.m. on April 1, 1970. According to the testimony of a bus driver, he had been operating his vehicle north on Broad Street and had stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Summer Street. While the bus was standing there, he observed a pedestrian starting to cross Broad Street, and as the pedestrian reached the middle of the southbound lane he was struck by a “dirty, white station wagon” that was proceeding southerly on Broad Street. The pedestrian’s body was thrown up on the hood of the car. The bus driver further testified that the station wagon stopped momentarily, the body of the pedestrian rolled off the hood, and the car immediately drove off along Broad Street in a southerly direction. The bus operator testified that he had alighted from his bus, intending to attempt to assist the victim, but was unable to locate the body.

Subsequently, it appears from the testimony of a police *405■officer, about 6:40 p.m. the police located a white station wagon on Haskins Street, a distance of some 610 feet from the scene of the accident. The police further testified that a body later identified as that of David J. McEnery was wedged beneath the vehicle when it was found and that the vehicle had been registered to defendant.

Testifying on behalf of the state was a Robert Buckley, who stated that he had worked with defendant and that about 5 p.m. on the day of the accident he had gone to a place located in Central Falls that he identified as The Palms where he met defendant about 5:15 p.m. Buckley further testified that about 7 p.m. that evening defendant phoned him, told him that he had been involved in an accident, and asked Buckley to help him look for his car. According to Buckley, he picked up defendant’s girl friend, identified as Pat, and went to the vicinity of the accident and drove around for some time but was unable to locate the car.

Buckley testified that later he picked up defendant, who asked him to take him to a cafe in Central Falls known as The Well, where he would attempt to establish an alibi. After arriving at The Well, defendant asked Buckley to take him to the Central Falls police station, where defendant reported that his car had been stolen from in front of The Well sometime between 5:30 p.m. and 9 p.m. on that day. Buckley later drove defendant to Pat’s home, and while there defendant answered a telephone call. After the telephone call had been completed, defendant told Buckley that “a guy had been killed.” According to Buckley, defendant “was denying it on the ’phone” during the conversation.

We turn, first, to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in each case. It is settled that such a motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the *406state to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence so adduced is insufficient to meet such burden of proof, it is error to submit the case to a jury. State v. Lisi, 105 R.I. 516, 253 A.2d 239 (1969). In a criminal case the trial justice, in passing on such a motion, is required to give full credibility to the state’s evidence, view it in a light most favorable to the state, and draw therefrom every reasonable inference consistent with guilt. However, where the evidence adduced by the state and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, are insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must grant the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 280 A.2d 85 (1971).

The defendant, contending that the evidence adduced in these cases is entirely circumstantial, urges that to warrant a jury in finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is necessary not only that the evidence be consistent with a conclusion of guilt but must also at the same time be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This, the circumstantial evidence rule, so called, is followed in this state. State v. Franklin, 103 R.I. 715, 241 A.2d 219 (1968); State v. Montella, 88 R.I. 469, 149 A.2d 919 (1959).

While we do not agree as to the character of the evidence, we are unable to perceive that the test of the sufficiency of a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence to determine its adequacy to warrant a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would differ materially from that set out in the circumstantial evidence rule. That rule obviously derives from the fundamental rule applied in all criminal cases to test the sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is resorted to, in our opinion, to overcome *407a misconception of the probative thrust of circumstantial evidence, particularly with reference to cases where the findings must rest either entirely or in major part on circumstantial evidence.

It is well settled that there is no valid distinction between the probative force of direct and of circumstantial evidence. Any fact may be established by circumstantial evidence as sufficiently and completely as by positive, direct evidence. State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 226 A.2d 873 (1967); State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76, 148 A.2d 155 (1959); State v. Goodhart, 112 Vt. 154, 22 A.2d 151 (1941); 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed. 1955) §980 at 472-73.

Testing the sufficiency of mixed evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires the making of no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the exist-1 ence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Nichols v. State, 5 Md. App. 340, 247 A.2d 722 (1968). “ ‘A conclusion of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to that extent is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support, and is consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.’ ” State v. Reid, 154 Conn. 37, 40, 221 A.2d 258, 259 (1966), quoting State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 295, 113 A.2d 591, 596 (1955).

We are persuaded, then, that to test the sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires that such evidence be consistent only with a reasonable theory of guilt. Where that evidence is consistent with any other reasonable conclusion, *408the guilt of the accused cannot be considered as having been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant here argues that in neither ease did the evidence exclude any reasonable hypothesis or theory of the innocence of defendant. In so arguing in case No. 70-572, charging defendant with manslaughter, defendant directs our attention to the fact that the court charged the jury that there was no evidence in the case of culpable negligence on the part of defendant up to and including the time at which Mr. McEnery was struck by the station wagon. He further charged the jury that, in order to find defendant guilty of manslaughter, it would be necessary to find that McEnery was alive immediately after the impact and that the conduct of defendant following the impact constituted culpable negligence.

The defendant is contending that if the evidence is susceptible of a finding that McEnery was killed upon impact, he was not alive at the time he was being dragged under defendant’s vehicle and defendant could not be found guilty of manslaughter. An examination of the testimony of the only medical witness makes it clear that, in his opinion, death could have resulted immediately upon impact by reason of a massive fracture of the skull. The medical witness also testified that death could have resulted a few minutes after the impact but conceded that he was not sure when it did occur.

We are inclined to agree with defendant’s contention in this respect. Obviously, the evidence is such that death could have occurred after defendant had driven away with McEnery’s body lodged under his car and, therefore, be consistent with guilt. On the other hand, the medical testimony is equally consistent with a finding that McEnery could have died instantly upon impact and, therefore, be consistent with a reasonable conclusion other than the guilt of defendant. It is clear, then, that, the testimony *409of the medical examiner lacking any reasonable medical certainty as to the time of the death of McEnery, we are unable to conclude that on such evidence defendant was guilty of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we conclude, with respect to Indictment No. 70-572, that it was error to deny defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. See State v. Dancyger, supra.

We are unable, however, to reach the same conclusion concerning the denial of the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal with respect to Indictment No. 70-573, in which defendant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident. The testimony adduced through the bus driver clearly establishes that at the time McEnery was struck his body was thrown up on the hood of the car and that while the car was standing still the body rolled off the hood and thereupon defendant drove off in a southerly direction. Later, the police found defendant’s station wagon on a side street some 610 feet from the point of impact with McEnery’s body wedged under the front of the car. The circumstances here are clearly consistent with a hypothesis of guilt, but it is clear that they are not consistent with any other reasonable hypothesis. We conclude, therefore, with respect to Indictment No. 70-573, that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict.

Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in the case charging him with manslaughter, it is unnecessary for us to consider his contentions of error concerning his motion for a new trial in that case.

Therefore, we turn to consider his contention that it was error to deny his motion for a new trial in the case charging him with knowingly leaving the scene of an accident. One seeking to set aside a decision of a trial justice on a motion for a new trial has the burden of showing that *410the trial justice was either clearly wrong or that, in reviewing the evidence and the credibility and weight thereof, he misconceived or overlooked some relevant or material evidence on a controlling issue. State v. Correia, 106 R.I. 655, 262 A.2d 619 (1970); State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 253 A.2d 612 (1969).

In this case we have closely scrutinized the trial justice’s decision on the motion and are persuaded that he exhaustively examined the evidence and, in an exercise of his own independent judgment, passed upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. He makes it clear in his decision that he found the bus operator, who witnessed the impact, to be entirely credible and that the witness Buckley, who testified as to assisting the defendant to look for his car after the accident, was equally credible. He concluded that their testimony was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge that he had struck McEnery and that McEnery had sustained injuries and that the defendant had, with such knowledge, left the scene. In such circumstances we conclude that it was not error to deny the defendant’s motion for a new trial in this case.

The exception of the defendant to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict in the manslaughter case, Indictment No. 70-572, is sustained, and the judgment of conviction is reversed; all of the defendant’s exceptions to rulings in the case charging him with leaving the scene of an accident, Indictment No. 70-573, are overruled; and both cases are remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

*411Richard J. Israel, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, R. Raymond Greco, Special Asst. Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Bevilacqua & Cicilline, Anthony S. DelGiudice, for defendant. '

HUBBART, Judge.

This is an appeal by the defendant Isaac Alejandro Velazquez from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide which was entered below upon a nolo contendere plea. The defendant, upon entry of such plea, specifically reserved for appeal the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the information herein under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). The sole issue presented for review is whether a defendant driver of a motor vehicle who participates in a reckless and illegal “drag race” on a public road may be properly convicted of vehicular homicide [§ 782.071, Fla.Stat. (1987)] for the death of one of the co-participant drivers suffered in the course of the “drag race” — when the sole basis for imposing liability is the defendant’s participation in said race. We hold that the defendant may not be held criminally liable under the above statute in such case because the co-participant driver, in effect, killed himself by his voluntary and reckless driving in the subject “drag race” and thus the defendant’s actions in engaging in the said race was not a proximate cause of the co-participant’s death.

I

The defendant Velazquez was charged by information with the crime of vehicular homicide. Specifically, the information alleged that on April 23, 1988, the defendant

“did unlawfully and feloniously operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, to wit: Participated in a DRAG RACE, RAN A STOP SIGN and EXCEEDED the SPEED LIMIT with his VEHICLE, and thereby cause the death of ADAL-BERTO ALVAREZ, in violation of 782.-071 Florida Statutes.”

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss this information under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that the undisputed material facts in the case demonstrated that the state did not, as a matter of law, have a prima facie case of vehicular homicide against the defendant. The defendant set forth in the motion to dismiss certain facts which he swore to be true in open court at the hearing on the subject motion.1 The *349state filed a traverse in which it altered one non-material fact stated in the motion to dismiss and added an additional set of facts based on sworn depositions taken in the case. Accepting the sworn facts stated in the motion to dismiss, as supplemented and altered by the traverse, the material undisputed facts in the case are as follows.

On April 23, 1988, at approximately 2:30 A.M., the defendant Velazquez met the deceased Adalberto Alvarez at a Hardee’s restaurant in Hialeah, Florida. The two had never previously met, but in the course of their conversation agreed to race each other in a “drag race” with their respective automobiles. They, accordingly, left the restaurant and proceeded to set up a quarter-mile “drag race” course on a nearby public road which ran perpendicular to a canal alongside the Palmetto Expressway in Hialeah; a guardrail and a visible stop sign2 stood between the end of this road and the canal. The two men began their “drag race” at the end of this road and proceeded away from the canal in a westerly direction for one-quarter mile. Upon completing the course without incident, the deceased Alvarez suddenly turned his automobile 180 degrees around and proceeded east toward the starting line and the canal; the defendant Velazquez did the same and followed behind Alvarez. Alvarez proceeded in the lead and attained an estimated speed of 123 m.p.h.; he was not wearing a seat belt and subsequent investigation revealed that he had a blood alcohol level between .11 and .12. The defendant Velazquez, who had not been drinking, trailed Alvarez the entire distance back to the starting line and attained an estimated speed of 98 m.p.h. As both drivers approached the end of the road, they applied their brakes, but neither could stop. Alvarez, who was about a car length ahead of the defendant Velazquez, crashed through the guardrail first and was propelled over the entire canal, landing on its far bank; he was thrown from his car upon impact, was pinned under his vehicle when it landed on him, and died instantly from the resulting injuries. The defendant also crashed through the guardrail, but landed in the canal where he was able to escape from his vehicle and swim to safety uninjured.

Based on these facts, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that it was a question of fact for the jury as to whether the defendant’s participation in the “drag race” was a sufficient legal cause of the deceased’s death so as to support a conviction for vehicular homicide. The defendant subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere and reserved for appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss; the trial court then placed the defendant on four years probation. This appeal follows.

II

The vehicular homicide statute, under which the defendant was charged and convicted, provides as follows:

“ ‘Vehicular homicide’ is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.-083, or s. 775.084.”

§ 782.071(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). There are two statutory elements to vehicular homi-cide: (1) the defendant must operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another, and (2) this reckless operation of a *350motor vehicle must be the proximate cause of the death of a human being. Byrd v. State, 531 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); M.C.J. v. State, 444 So.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 849 (Fla.1984); J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), rev. denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla.1980); compare Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 72 (1989) (vehicular homicide).

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, we have no trouble in concluding that the first element of this offense is clearly established on this record. Plainly, the defendant operated a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another, in that (a) he participated in a highly dangerous “drag race” with the deceased on a public road in which both lanes were used as a speedway, and (b) he drove his vehicle at the excessive speed of 98 m.p.h. during the “drag race.” Without question, the defendant’s motor vehicle operation endangered the lives of all persons in the vicinity of the “drag race,” namely, people in other motor vehicles and nearby pedestrians. See McCreary v. State, 371 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1979).

The second element of this offense, however, has given us considerable pause, as no doubt it did the trial court, because no endangered third party in the vicinity of the “drag race” was killed in this case; moreover, it is here that the parties to this appeal marshal their primary authorities and argument. It is therefore necessary that we consult the Florida law on this subject, and survey as well the relevant law thereon throughout the country. Nonetheless, we approach this subject with a certain degree of caution, mindful that the problems raised by the element of “proximate cause” in cases of this nature “present enormous difficulty (especially in homicide [cases]) because of the obscurity of that concept,” an obscurity which has resulted in the announcement of “varying and sometimes inconsistent rules in the numerous areas in which the problem has arisen.” Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.03 comment 1, at 255-56 (1985).

A

At the outset, it seems clear that the proximate cause element of vehicular homicide in Florida embraces, at the very least, a causation-in-fact test; that is, the defendant’s reckless operation of a motor vehicle must be a cause-in-fact of the death of a human being. In this respect, vehicular homicide is no different than any other criminal offense in which the occurrence of a specified result, caused by a defendant’s conduct, is an essential element of the offense — such as murder, [§ 782.04, Fla.Stat. (1989)], manslaughter [§ 782.07, Fla.Stat. (1989)], aggravated battery [§ 784.045, Fla.Stat. (1989) ], and arson [§ 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1989) ]. Clearly there can be no criminal liability for such result-type offenses unless it can be shown that the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the prohibited result, whether the result be the death of a human being, personal injury to another, or injury to another’s property. To be sure, this cause-in-fact showing is insufficient in itself to establish the aforesaid “proximate cause” element in a vehicular homicide case, but it is clearly a sine qua non ingredient thereof. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12(a),(b), at 390-96 (1986); Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.03 explanatory note, at 254 (1985).

Courts throughout the country have uniformly followed the traditional “but for” test in determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of a prohibited consequence in result-type offenses such as vehicular homicide. Under this test, a defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of the prohibited result if the said result would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct; stated differently, the defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a particular result if the result would not have happened in the absence of the defendant’s conduct. Thus, a defendant’s reckless operation of a motor vehicle is a cause-in-fact of the death of a human being under Florida’s vehicular homicide statute [§ 782.071(1), Fla.Stat. (1987)] if the subject death would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s reckless driving or *351would not have happened in the absence of such driving. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12(b), at 393-94 (1986); Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.03 and comment 2, at 257-58 (1985); compare Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So.2d 14, 17-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

In relatively rare cases, however, the “but for” test for causation-in-fact fails and has been abandoned in favor of the “substantial factor” test. This anomaly occurs when two defendants, acting independently and not in concert with one another, commit two separate acts, each of which alone is sufficient to bring about the prohibited result — as when two defendants concurrently inflict mortal wounds upon a human being, each of which is sufficient to cause death. In such case, each defendant’s action was not a “but for” cause of death because the deceased would have died even in the absence of each defendant’s conduct — although obviously not in the absence of both defendants’ conduct considered together. In these rare cases, the courts have followed a “substantial factor” test, namely, the defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result if the subject conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the said result. Thus, each defendant’s conduct in independently and concurrently inflicting mortal wounds on a deceased clearly constitutes a “substantial factor” in bringing about the deceased’s death, and, consequently, is a cause-in-fact of the deceased’s death. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12(b), at 394-95 (1986); compare Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So.2d 14, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

B

The “proximate cause” element of vehicular homicide in Florida embraces more, however, than the aforesaid “but for” causation-in-fact test as modified by the “substantial factor” exception. Even where a defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result, as where a defendant’s reckless operation of a motor vehicle is a cause-in-fact of the death of a human being, Florida and other courts throughout the country have for good reason declined to impose criminal liability (1) where the prohibited result of the defendant’s conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger created by the defendant’s conduct, or (b) where it would otherwise be unjust, based on fairness and policy considerations, to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the prohibited result. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12(c)-(h), at 396-421 (1986), and cases collected; compare M.C.J. v. State, 444 So.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 849 (Fla.1984); Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So.2d 14, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

In deaths resulting from illegal “drag racing” on a public road, as here, it has been held in Florida that the driver of one of the racing vehicles was properly convicted of manslaughter when the driver of another vehicle in the race collided head on with a non-participant motor vehicle which was lawfully using the subject highway, killing the driver of same. Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). The court reasoned that the defendant, by participating in the “drag race,” was aiding and abetting each of the other participant drivers in the race in committing reckless driving — so that when one of the participants committed a manslaughter in the course of the race against a third party, the defendant was also guilty of manslaughter. In reaching this result, the court relied on the following rules of law stated by Wharton and Clark & Marshall:

“ ‘ * * * If each of two persons jointly engage in the commission of acts which amount to criminal negligence, and as a result of which a third person is killed, each may be found guilty of manslaughter even though it may be impossible to say whose act actually caused the death.’

‘There may be principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact to involuntary manslaughter. Thus, if two men drive separate vehicles at a furious and dangerous speed along the *352highway, each inciting and abetting the other, and one of them drives over and kills a person, the one thus causing the death is guilty of manslaughter as principal in the first degree, and the other is guilty as principal in the second degree. * * *

Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d at 716 (quoting 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 290 (Anderson 1957) and Clark & Marshall, Crimes, 3d ed. § 164) (emphasis added).

Where, however, a participant passenger in such an illegal “drag race,” accidently grabs the steering wheel of a vehicle involved in the race, instead of the gear shift he was assigned to operate, causing the vehicle to go out of control, crash, and kill the passenger — this court has held that the defendant driver of the subject motor vehicle was improperly convicted of vehicular homicide. J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), rev. denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla.1980). The court reasoned that the passenger’s reckless act of grabbing the steering wheel was an independent intervening act which superseded the respondent’s wrongful conduct in participating in the “drag race.” Id. at 607. Although, obviously, the respondent’s participation in the subject race was a “but for” cause-in-fact of the passenger’s death and such death was plainly within the scope of the danger created by the defendant’s conduct in participating in the race — this court nonetheless implicitly concluded that it would be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the passenger’s death because the passenger, in effect, killed himself by his own reckless conduct.

The result reached in J.A.C. is in accord with the weight of better-reasoned decisions on this subject throughout the country. These courts have uniformly concluded that a driver-participant in an illegal “drag race” on a public road cannot be held criminally responsible for the death of another driver participant when (a) the deceased, in effect, kills himself by his own reckless driving during the race, and (b) the sole basis for attaching criminal liability for his death is the defendant’s participation in the “drag race.” 3 The policy reasons for reaching this result are best expressed in State v. Petersen, 17 Or.App. 478, 495, 522 P.2d 912, 920 (1974) (Schwab, C.J., dissenting) (dissent adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Petersen, 270 Or. 166, 526 P.2d 1008 (1974)):

“[T]he question is whether defendant’s reckless conduct ‘caused’ the death of the victim. The problem here is not ‘causation in fact,’ it is ‘legal causation.’ In unusual cases like this one, whether certain conduct is deemed to be the legal cause of a certain result is ultimately a policy question. The question of legal causation thus blends into the question of whether we are willing to hold a defendant responsible for a prohibited result. Or, stated differently, the issue is not causation, it is responsibility. In my opinion, policy considerations are against imposing responsibility for the death of a participant in a race on the surviving racer when his sole contribution to the death is the participation in the activity mutually agreed upon.

It is not unheard of for people to engage in hazardous vocations and avocations. It could be said, for example, that professional racetrack drivers earn their living by consciously disregarding a substantial risk that death will occur on the racetrack. Yet, it would probably strike most people as strange if the surviving drivers were prosecuted for manslaughter following a fatal racetrack acci-' dent....

My point is that people frequently join together in reckless conduct. As long as all participants do so knowingly and voluntarily, I see no point in holding the survivor(s) guilty of manslaughter if the reckless conduct results in death.... ”

*353522 P.2d at 920-21 (citations and footnote omitted). LaFave and Scott also summarize the legal basis for these decisions:

“It is submitted that the true reason for the holding [in these cases] is the court’s feeling ... that A should not, in all justice, be held for the death of B who was an equally willing and foolhardy participant in the bad conduct which caused his death.”

1 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 418 (1986).

Ill

Turning now to the instant case, it is clear that the defendant’s reckless operation of a motor vehicle in participating in the “drag race” with the deceased was, technically speaking, a cause-in-fact of the deceased’s death under the “but for” test. But for the defendant’s participation in the subject race, the deceased would not have recklessly raced his vehicle at all and thus would not have been killed. However, under the authority of J.A.C. and the better reasoned decisions throughout the country, the defendant’s participation in the subject “drag race” was not a proximate cause of the deceased’s death because, simply put, the deceased, in effect, killed himself by his own volitional reckless driving—and, consequently, it would be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for this death.

The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that the “drag race” was, in effect, over when the defendant and the deceased had completed the agreed-upon one-quarter mile course and had crossed the finish line. Unexpectedly, however, the deceased suddenly whirled his vehicle around and headed back toward the starting line and the canal which ran perpendicular to the road on which he was travelling; although the defendant then followed, it is plain that it was the deceased's sole decision to return to the starting line, as apparently this had not previously been agreed upon. At any rate, the deceased, who had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol and was wearing no seat belt, attained an estimated speed of 123 m.p.h. on his return trip; applied the brakes as he approached the end of the road but was unable to stop; crashed through a protective guard rail; and incredibly vaulted the entire canal, landing on the far bank. He was thrown from his vehicle upon impact, was pinned under the vehicle when it landed on him, and died instantly from the resulting injuries. Although the defendant was about one-car length in back of the deceased during the deceased’s fatal return to the starting line, the defendant at no time struck the deceased's vehicle and did not physically propel it in any way across the canal. Clearly, the deceased was on a near-suicide mission when, on his own hook, he returned to the starting line of the race after the race was apparently over, attaining a murderous speed of 123 m.p.h., vaulted a canal, and killed himself. This being so, it would be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the deceased’s unexpected and near-suicidal conduct.

We agree that if the deceased had collided with an oncoming motorist who happened to be in the vicinity lawfully using the subject road resulting in the said motorist’s death, the defendant would be criminally liable for this death on an aiding- and-abetting theory; clearly, the deceased would be guilty of vehicular homicide in killing the oncoming motorist, and the defendant, in participating in the illegal “drag race,” would be aiding and abetting the deceased in the latter’s reckless driving and ultimate negligent homicide. Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). In such a case, however, the oncoming motorist could in no way be said to be responsible for his own death and, consequently, no policy or fairness reason would exist for finding no proximate cause. Clearly, this cannot be said in the instant case.

The state nonetheless relies on cases from other jurisdictions which have reached a contrary result to the one we reach herein.4 We have reviewed these cases, but are not persuaded by their rea-*354soiling because we think they lead to an unjust result. In our judgment, it is simply unfair, unjust, and just plain wrong to say that the defendant in the instant case is criminally responsible for the death of the deceased when it is undisputed that the deceased, in effect, killed himself. No one forced this young man to participate in the subject “drag race”; no one forced him to whirl around and proceed back toward the canal after the race was apparently over; no one forced him to travel 123 m.p.h., vault a canal, and kill himself upon impact. He did all these things himself, and was, accordingly, the major cause of his own death. We are constrained by law to construe criminal statutes strictly in favor of the accused, § 775.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1989), and, given this salutary principle of statutory construction, we are unwilling to construe our vehicular homicide statute to impose criminal liability on the defendant under the circumstances of this case.

The final judgment of conviction and sentence under review is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Reversed and remanded.

SAWYER, P.J.

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) or while visibly impaired (OWVD and thereby causing death.1 He was sentenced to serve 3 to 15 years in prison. He now appeals and we reverse and remand.

At 2:00 a.m. on November 23, 2003, defendant was driving his sport utility vehicle (SUV) east on 17 Mile Road in northern Kent County. He attempted to turn north onto Edgerton Avenue and drove into the path of an oncoming car driven by Jason Reichelt. Reichelt’s car hit defendant’s SUV and spun 180 degrees, coming to rest on the centerline of 17 Mile Road. The SUV came *604to rest on the side of the road. It was later determined that defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16, which is twice the legal limit.2

Reichelt and his passenger, Jonathan Keiser, were not seriously injured, but Reichelt’s car was severely damaged and the headlights stopped working. Both men left the car and walked to the SUV to determine if anyone was injured. After speaking briefly with defendant, the two men walked back to Reichelt’s car. Reichelt indicated that he was aware that oncoming cars could hit his darkened car and that he wanted to determine if he could turn on the flashers. As Reichelt and Keiser stood by the car, an oncoming car driven by Tonya Welch hit Keiser, killing him.

At the center of this appeal is the issue of causation. Defendant argues that not only did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on causation, there was also insufficient evidence of causation to establish defendant’s guilt. Because the two issues are intertwined with the question of what must be proven to establish causation in such a case, we shall analyze both issues together beginning with a determination of what the prosecutor must show to establish causation.

As the Supreme Court discussed in People v Schaefer,3 causation consists of two components:

In criminal jurisprudence, the causation element of an offense is generally comprised of two components: factual cause and proximate cause. The concept of factual causation is relatively straightforward. In determining whether a defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the result, one must ask, “but for” the defendant’s conduct, would the result have occurred? If the result would not have occurred absent the defendant’s conduct, then factual causation exists.

*605The existence of factual causation alone, however, will not support the imposition of criminal liability. Proximate causation must also be established. As we noted in [People v] Tims[, 449 Mich 83, 96; 534 NW2d 675 (1995)], proximate causation is a “legal colloquialism.” It is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural. Thus, a proximate cause is simply a factual cause “of which the law will take cognizance.”[4]

We initially note that there is no dispute at this point that defendant was intoxicated and that his driving was the cause of the initial accident.4 5 Furthermore, there is no argument that defendant’s driving was the factual or “but-for” cause of the second accident. This analysis is relatively straightforward: but for defendant causing the initial accident, the subsequent accident would not have occurred.

Of course, factual causation is relatively easy to establish. As the court in Welch v State observed, “[m]ankind might still be in Eden, but for Adam’s biting an apple.”6 But the question whether defendant is the proximate cause of the subsequent accident, and thus of the victim’s death, is not so easily resolved. Schaefer discussed this requirement in further detail:

For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a “direct and natural result” of the defendant’s actions. In making this determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an *606intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. If an intervening cause did indeed supersede the defendant’s act as a legally significant causal factor, then the defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of the victim’s injury.

The standard by which to gauge whether an intervening cause supersedes, and thus severs the causal link, is generally one of reasonable foreseeability. For example, suppose that a defendant stabs a victim and the victim is then taken to a nearby hospital for treatment. If the physician is negligent in providing medical care to the victim and the victim later dies, the defendant is still considered to have proximately caused the victim’s death because it is reasonably foreseeable that negligent medical care might be provided. At the same time, gross negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating physician is not reasonably foreseeable, and would thus break the causal chain between the defendant and the victim.

The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis, therefore, is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct will be considered a proximate cause. If, however, the intervening act by the victim or a third party was not reasonably foreseeable — e.g., gross negligence or intentional misconduct — then generally the causal link is severed and the defendant’s conduct is not regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s injury or death.[7]

With these basic principles in mind, we conclude that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the issue of proximate cause. We review claims of instructional error de novo.8 The trial court is required to instruct jurors on “all elements of the crime charged and must not exclude consideration of material issues, *607defenses, and theories for which there is supporting evidence.”9 Instructions are to be read as a whole and not piecemeal to determine if error requiring reversal occurred.10 “It is error for the trial court to give an erroneous or misleading jury instruction on an essential element of the offense.”11

The trial court gave detailed and extensive instructions on factual causation, including reinforcement of the concept that defendant had to he “a” cause of the accident, but not necessarily “the” cause of the accident. But the trial court’s instructions on proximate cause and superseding intervening causes were virtually nonexistent. The trial court did implicitly touch on the issue of proximate cause when it instructed the jury that one of several causes “is a substantial factor in causing a death if, but for that cause’s contribution, the death would not have occurred, unless the death was an utterly unnatural result of whatever happened.” But the instructions also told the jury that another cause could be a superseding cause only if it was the sole cause:

Now it also necessarily follows that somebody else’s conduct, for example, by Mr. Keiser, or by some third party, even if that other conduct was wrong or itself negligent, does not cut off criminal liability unless the other cause was the only cause. Obviously, if somebody else’s conduct was the only reason Mr. Keiser died, then it can’t possibly be something to which Mr. Rideout contributed.

This is not a correct statement of the law. A superseding intervening cause does not need to be the only cause. Indeed, as the Court noted in Schaefer, while the defendant’s conduct in that cause was a factual cause of *608the accident, the victim’s conduct may also have been a cause and, more to the point, potentially a superseding cause.12 The effect of the trial court’s instructions was that the jury could convict defendant if they found him to be a factual cause of the accident and that the jury could find the existence of a superseding intervening cause only if that superseding intervening cause was the only cause of the second accident. The jury was not adequately instructed on the issues of proximate and intervening causes.13

This conclusion is enough to set aside defendant’s conviction, with directions to the trial court to properly instruct the jury on the causation issue. But we agree with defendant that the problem in this case goes even deeper, because there was insufficient evidence to establish proximate cause at all. We review a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal trial de novo.14 We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the crime were established.15

The troubling aspect of this case is that the second accident only occurred after Keiser had reached a position of safety (the side of the road) and then chose to reenter the roadway with Reichelt to check on the car. While foreseeability is the “linchpin” of the superseding causation analysis,16 and it is at least arguably foreseeable that a person involved in an accident would *609check on his or her vehicle even if it remains on the road, the analysis does not end there. As Professor Dressier discusses in Understanding Criminal Law (3d ed),17 there is no universal test for determining if an intervening cause is also a superseding cause:

One early twentieth century scholar observed that all efforts to set down universal tests that explain the law of causation are “demonstrably erroneous.” [Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv L R 223, 317 (1912).] There are no hard-and-fast rules for determining when an intervening cause supersedes the defendant’s conduct. However, there are various factors that assist the factfinder in the evaluative process.

Indeed, Dressier18 points out that to say that foreseeability is the “linchpin” is “a slight overstatement,” though it is of great significance. Rather, Dressier19 discusses six factors to be considered in determining if an intervening cause is a superseding cause.

Of the six factors discussed by Dressier, three are not relevant here. They are the (1) de minimis contribution to social harm factor, (2) the intended-consequences doctrine, and (3) the omissions factor.20 The foreseeability factor is relevant here, but its application is less than clear. As Dressier points out, a responsive intervening cause will establish proximate cause, while a coincidental intervening cause will not unless it was foreseeable.21 In discussing responsive intervening causes, Dressier points to the examples of a passenger in a capsized boat drowning while attempting to swim to shore and a wounded victim being negligently treated *610and dying. That is, the harm results from actions taken in response to the defendant’s conduct. A coincidental intervening cause would exist, for example, where the defendant’s conduct put the victim in the “wrong place at the wrong time,” such as an assault victim who is attacked by a “knife-wielding maniac” while waiting in the emergency room for treatment of the initial wounds.22

Whether the intervening cause is responsive or coincidental in the case at bar is arguable at best. On the one hand, the victim reentering the roadway to check on the vehicle was in direct response to the accident, though not in direct response to defendant’s having driven. On the other hand, Welch’s driving down the road when she did was entirely coincidental.

In our view, Reiser’s decision to reenter the roadway renders the foreseeability factor of little value to the analysis. Rather, that decision directly involves the two remaining factors identified by Dressier that are present here. Those two factors, we believe, compel the conclusion that the intervening cause of the second accident was also a superseding cause.

First, there is the apparent-safety doctrine, which Dressier describes as follows:

One scholar has observed that when a “defendant’s active force has come to rest in a position of apparent safety, the court will follow it no longer.” [Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv L R 633, 651 (1920).] For example, consider a somewhat simplified version of the facts in State v Preslar [48 NC 421 (1856)]: D threatened the life of V, his spouse. As a consequence, V was forced to leave the house on a freezing night in order to protect herself. V walked to within 200 yards of her father’s home, where she would have been welcome, but she chose *611to spend the night in the extreme cold, rather than bother her father by entering the house. V froze to death during the night. Clearly, D was an actual cause of V’s death: but for D’s threatening conduct, V would not have gone out into the cold. But, V’s decision to sleep outside was also a but-for cause of her own death. Is D the proximate cause of V’s death? The court in Preslar answered this question in the negative.

The result may be explained in terms of the apparent-safety doctrine. D did not follow V from their home. When V reached the vicinity of her father’s house, she knew that she could enter and be free from immediate harm. Therefore, her decision to sleep outside constituted a superseding intervening cause.[23]

Similarly, in the case at bar, Reiser had reached a position of apparent safety: he had gotten out of the vehicle and was alongside the road, off the pavement. Had the second accident occurred before Reiser could extricate himself from the Reichelt vehicle and get to the side of the road, then the causal chain would have been intact. But he was able to get out of harm’s way and to a relatively safe position at the side of the road. He then made the choice to return to the roadway and place himself in a more dangerous position. Like the victim in Preslar, Reiser made a decision regarding his actions after the immediate danger was over. And that decision, like the decision in Preslar, ended the initial causal chain and started a new one, one for which defendant was not responsible.

The point of a person making a decision brings us to the remaining factor discussed in Dressier, that of voluntary human intervention:

A defendant is far more apt to be relieved of criminal responsibility in the case of a “free, deliberate, and informed” [Hart & Honoré, Causation in the Law (2d ed *6121985), p 326] — a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent— human agent than in the case of an intervention of a natural force or the actions of a person whose conduct is not fully free. The result in the Preslar case, described [above], can be explained in terms of this factor. V chose to sleep in the cold rather than to enter her father’s home. Her decision was free, deliberate, and with full knowledge of the fact that it was exceedingly cold outside. Under these circumstances, the responsibility for her death is shifted from D to V. This outcome is consistent with the retributive principle that accords special significance to the freewill actions of human agents.[24]

Similarly, in the case at bar, Reiser made the voluntary decision to return to the vehicle on the roadway, despite the danger that it posed. He could have chosen to remain on the side of the road. He chose instead to reenter the roadway, with the danger of standing in the roadway next to an unlit vehicle in the middle of the night being readily apparent.

In sum, we conclude that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of Reiser’s death. Therefore, we vacate defendant’s conviction for OWI/OWVT causing death.

There remains the problem of the remedy. Under People v Randolph,25 while defendant cannot be retried on the charge for which we found insufficient evidence, we can direct the entry of a conviction for a necessarily included lesser offense on which the jury was instructed. In this case, the jury was instructed on two lesser offenses: operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor26 and operating a *613motor vehicle while visibly impaired (OWVI).27 A charge of OWI/OWVI causing death may be based on the commission of either of those offenses. MCL 257.625(4). Therefore, in convicting defendant of OWI/OWVI causing death, the jury of necessity had to find that defendant was either operating while intoxicated or operating while visibly impaired. But the nature of the verdict form renders it impossible to determine which of the two the jury found to be the case. Accordingly, we believe that the appropriate remedy is to direct the trial court to enter a conviction for the lesser offense, OWVI, and to sentence defendant for that offense. If the prosecutor believes that a conviction on the greater offense of OWI28 would better serve the interests of justice, he may, at any time before sentencing, inform the trial court that he wishes to try defendant on a charge of OWI instead of a conviction being entered under MCL 257.625(3).

In light of our resolution of the above issues, we need not decide defendant’s remaining issue.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.