8 Raising Money 8 Raising Money
Updated 2/15/2024 PGD
You and Biker Bob have finally mustered the courage to ditch your day jobs and start a company that will serve the biking needs of your local community. You name this corporation Best Bikes, Inc. You and Biker Bob are elated and cannot wait to get started so you rush to the nearest realtor’s office to lease a commercial building for your Best Bike, Inc.’s retail shop. But, as you pull into the parking lot a realization dawns on you: you and Biker Bob need money for a lease! In fact, you and Biker Bob need money to carry out almost any activity relevant to your company. It is unlikely that the balance on Biker Bob’s debit card will cover the company expenses and maxing out your credit cards hardly seems like a wise financial decision.
How do you get money? How does any company get money? How do you keep track of and report this money? This lesson will review the different ways corporations raise funds and how we account for those funds.
8.1 Capital Structure 8.1 Capital Structure
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It often takes money to make money. You can't stock a bakery, hire workers or lease a location without money. This section covers the two major categories of financing: equity financing and debt financing. Capital structure refers to how a company finances its business with equity and debt.
8.1.1 Priority 8.1.1 Priority
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Companies fail. An insolvent company is a company that doesn't have enough assets to pay its debts. When an insolvent company goes bankrupt, the bankruptcy court has to determine how to divide up the assets, knowing that not everyone can be paid in full.
Priority in Debt
There are a few ways we might decide who gets paid and how much. We might allocate the remaining assets through live wrestling matches, rewarding the winner with the company's assets and perhaps a stylish commemorative plaque. Lenders, known for their scrawny arms and weak constitutions, are unlikely to participate in this system. If they withdraw from the system the total amount of available financing would decrease, so this strategy has not been implemented.
Instead, we might have a system where each creditor receives assets proportionate to their claims. So if the company has $1,000 of assets and the total claims amount to $2,000, then each claimant would be paid fifty percent of the claim. This system seems fair and efficient at the end stage but may not be fair or efficient before that.
To illustrate, imagine a year before the company runs into trouble that it is turning small profits and may still survive. Then the delivery van breaks down. A bank is willing to loan the company money to buy a new van, but the bank knows that if the company fails, it will only recover a fraction of the money lent. The bank is willing to take this risk, but only if the company compensates the bank for this risk by paying a high interest rate.
Suppose instead the company and the bank agree that if the company fails, the bank will get the van. While the van will have lost some value, the bank won't be lumped in with the other creditors. It can sell the van and recover more of the unpaid debt. This lowers the risk for the bank, and so the bank is willing to accept a lower interest rate. Both the bank and the company are better off; the bank faces less risk, and the company pays a lower interest rate.
A loan with collateral, also called a secured loan, is a loan that has first claim on specific assets. In this case, the bank has a secured loan with the delivery van serving as the collateral. Lots of assets can serve as collateral, including intangible assets like accounts receivables. If this interests you, you might take a class on secured transactions, which deals primarily with transactions secured by collateral.
Note that by collateralizing the loan, we lowered the bank's risk and lowered the bank's interest rate. But some lenders may prefer higher risk if it means they can earn a higher interest rate. Others may prefer lower risk and lower interest rates.
The trade-off between risk and return may not be intuitive for you. Think of the lottery. There is a miniscule chance of winning. No one would play if the highest jackpot were $5. But when the jackpot reaches hundreds of millions, more people play. People will accept high risk in exchange for higher potential returns.
Similarly, if lenders have different risk preferences, a firm can adjust the potential returns to meet these preferences. Specifically, the business can set an order of who gets paid first if the company becomes insolvent. Priority refers to the order in which claimants have a right to be paid in liquidation.
For example, suppose Watson wants low risk and is willing to take a lower interest rate to get it. Suppose Sherlock is comfortable with more risk, but demands a somewhat higher interest rate. And suppose Moriarty is willing to accept high risk in exchange for a much higher interest rate.
We can contractually agree to give Watson collateral to some specific assets. This lowers Watson's risk and we can pay him a lower interest rate, say 2%. We then contractually agree that after Watson takes his collateral, anything that is left is first used to pay off Sherlock. Sherlock has more risk than Watson, but has the first claim on the remaining assets, so he is willing to take 5%. Finally, Moriarty agrees that he will be paid only after Sherlock and Watson are fully paid. For this higher risk, we have to pay him 7%. It's likely that if the company fails, Moriarty will not be paid in full. But Moriarty is comfortable with this because he's receiving high interest rates in the meantime, and if the company never fails, he makes out like a criminal.
This structuring is how debt financing works. Collateralized debt is paid first with the proceeds from the collateral. Senior debt is debt that is paid after removing any collaterallized assets and before junior debt. Junior debt is paid only after all other debt is paid. The absolute priority rule means that senior debt is paid in full before junior debt is paid at all.
Priority in Equity
Where do the equity holders fit into all this? In liquidation, equity holders are paid only after all creditors are paid. In priority, equity is junior to debt. That's why in bankruptcy for insolvent companies, the stock price usually drops to zero.
Equity holders may contractually agree to change the order they are paid. For example, some equity, like preferred stock, often has a contractual right to be paid before the common stock. So if any assets are left after paying the creditors, the preferred will be paid its contractual claims, then the remainder will be paid to the common stock.
Priority All Together
We've talked about these distributions in terms of bankruptcy, but the same priority applies if the company decides to shut down for other reasons. It also applies to each of the entity types we've discussed, not just corporations.
So when a company liquidates, its assets are paid out as follows:
- Secured creditors receive the collateral they negotiated for;
- If there's anything left, the secured creditors are paid with the proceeds of the remaining assets;
- If there's anything left after that, the junior creditors are paid with the proceeds of the remaining assets;
- If there's still anything left, the preferred equity holders are paid the amount they negotiated, but only if they negotiated for this specifically when they bought the preferred shares;
- If after all that there's anything left, the common equity holders are paid the remainder
You never move to the next step until the current step is paid in full. This feature is sometimes called a waterfall because just like a waterfall, nothing spills over until the current pool is full.
8.1.2 Debt Financing 8.1.2 Debt Financing
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Terms of Debt Financing
Debt financing is when companies raise capital by borrowing funds from lenders. In exchange, the borrowers agree to repay the amount borrowed (called the principle) plus interest. Because debt is created by contract, and because humans are clever when they're hungry, there are countless variations of debt. Here are a few key features.
- Lenders: Lenders include anyone willing to give you money. Entrepreneurs may borrow from individuals. Small businesses may take loans from a local bank. And large companies may seek debt from major financial institutions.
- Maturity: The maturity date is the date when the remaining balance of a debt is due. It is the lifespan of the loan.
- Interest: Interest is the price a borrower pays in the future to receive money today. You might think of interest as the price of money. A high interest rate is good for the lender; it's the source of the lender's profit.
- A fixed interest rate is set at the time of borrowing and remains constant throughout the life of the loan. Most home mortgages in the United States have fixed interest rates. Fixed interest rates are risky for the lender because interest rates in the market fluctuate. The fair market value of a loan today may be 5% and in a year the fair market value may be 10% or 2%. So suppose you lend me $100 at 5% interest per year for 10 years. If next year the interest rate market shifts to, say, 10%, then you are missing out. You'll only receive 5% interest from me, but you could have lent it to someone else today for 10% and would have been paid more. So if the interest rate goes up, you lose the opportunity to benefit from the higher market rate because the lender is locked in to a lower rate. But if the interest rate goes down, you also lose. Suppose instead that after a year the market interest rate goes to 2%. You might feel good that you locked me in a 5%, beating the market. But I'll just go borrow $100 from someone else today at 2% and pay you back early. Now you have your $100 (plus $5 for one year of interest), but you can lend it out again at only 2%. If a borrower is permitted to repay early, a fixed interest rate is risky for the lender no matter which way the market moves.
- Lenders try to avoid this with floating interest rates. A floating interest rate, sometimes called a variable interest rate or an adjustible interest rate, means the interest rate charged may change throughout the life of the debt based on some market benchmark. Using our example above, we may set the interest rate at whatever the market rate is, plus 2%. So if the market rate is 5%, I owe you 7%. If the market rate goes up to 10%, I owe you 12%. If it the market rate goes down to 2%, I owe you 4%. The lender isn't locked in to a below-market interest rate, and the borrower can't take advantage of a lower market rate by repaying early.
- Tradeable Debt: Some debt is designed to be traded by the lender. This allows the lender flexibility because if the lender needs cash before the maturity date, the lender can sell the right to repayment to someone else. This doesn't change the debtors obligations. The terms of the debt are typically written down in a document called an indenture, and the indenture is enforced by a trustee on behalf of whoever holds the debt at the moment. So the debtor continues to make payments as required, and whoever bought the debt receives any payments made. Prior to the 1970s, most tradeable debt was evidenced by a physical certificate. Now most debt is uncertificated, meaning it is not issued on a physical certificate and is managed digitally. Tradeable debt is typically categorized by its length of maturity.
- Bonds: Bonds are tradeable debt with a maturity of 20 - 30 years.
- Notes: Notes are tradeable debt with a maturity between two years and ten years (the most common maturity dates are two years, three years, five years, seven years and ten years).
- Bills: Bills are tradeable debt with a maturity less than two years. The term is used most frequently to refer to treasury bills. Treasury bills, often called T-bills, are tradeable debt issued by the U.S. treasury with a maturity date less than two years.
- Commercial Paper: Commercial paper is tradeable debt that matures within nine months.
- Calls and Redemption: A related concept to tradeable debt is callable or redeemable debt. Callable debt is debt that must be repaid immediately at the option of the lender if certain conditions are met. Redeemable debt is debt that can be repaid early at the option of the borrower if certain conditions are met. For example, a change in control may trigger a call on the debt. Redemption often requires the borrower to also pay a make-whole payment to the lender to compensate the lender for losing out on the future stream of interest payments. In commercial loans, this is sometimes referred to as a prepayment penalty. You may find one on your student loan documents.
- Payment Structure: The parties can determine when payments are due. Bank loans are typically repaid monthly in equal payments. Bonds and notes typically make interest payments twice a year and then repay the principle at the maturity date. These semiannual payments are called "coupon payments" because bonds used to have physical coupons attached to the boarder of the certificates that the bondholder would clip off and deliver to the borrower in exchange for payment. To default on a debt means that one of the parties failed to meet an obligation and that failure was designated a default under the terms of the lending agreement, but more colloquially default means that the borrower failed to make a payment when due.
- Debt Amount: The amount borrowed may be fixed or variable. A revolving credit facility, often called a revolver or line of credit, allows a borrower to borrow and repay as needed within a certain range. It works much like a credit card, and is typically used for regular business expenses like making payroll.
- Priority: The terms of the debt will state the collateral (if any) and whether the debt is senior or junior in the company's debt structure.
- Other Covenants: Debt agreements typically include other covenants, which are conditions or restrictions that the borrower must adhere to. For example, a common covenant prohibits the borrower from incurring liens on its assets. Another common covenant is that the total amount of debt cannot be larger than some multiple of the value of the company's assets.
- Credit Rating: You would probably feel more secure lending $1,000 to Jeff Bezos than to me. He's more likely to pay you back. Similarly, lenders consider the financial health of potential borrowers before making loans and setting interest rates. Creditworthiness refers to how likely a borrower is to pay its debts as they come due. Companies with strong credit are likely to secure debt at more favorable interest rates. Companies with poor credit are less likely to make their payments, so they must pay higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the risk. Three private companies (Moody's, Fitch, S&P) track the creditworthiness of public companies and rate public company debt. The credit rating depends on the creditworthiness of the issuer and the seniority of the debt (more senior debt will have a higher rating). AAA debt is the highest rating, meaning it is most likely to be repaid. Highly rated debt (specifically, rated BBB- or better) is considered "investment grade". Debt below that level is called non-investment grade, "high yield" or simply "junk." These ratings matter because some industries (like the insurance industry) are only allowed to invest in investment grade debt.
You may have noticed that we tinker with every term of debt. This allows the debt to be customized to the concerns and risk preferences of the lender and the borrower. If a minor tweak to a term can make a party 1% happier on a $100 million bond, that's real money worth exploring.
Pros and Cons of Debt Financing
Debt financing offers several advantages, including:
- Flexibility: Debt financing allows companies to retain control over their operations while accessing funds to finance growth, investments, or working capital. They sacrifice some control by agreeing to debt covenants, but the lenders do not have voting rights, so they cannot replace the board.
- Tax Benefits: Interest payments on debt are typically tax-deductible, meaning it lowers the borrower's tax bill.
- Fixed Obligations: Debt obligations have predetermined interest and principal repayment terms, providing predictability in financial planning.
- Leverage: Debt can be used to increase the returns you get for your equity. This may not be intuitive. Imagine you could buy a machine for $100 that will create $110 in value. If you purchased the machine with your cash, then each dollar spent generates a 10% return ($110 - $100 = $10 and $10 / $100 = 10%). But suppose instead you borrow $90 from the bank at 5% interest and then you $10 of your own money to buy the machine. The machine still generates $110. You repay the bank $90 in principal and $4.50 in interest. That leaves you $15.50 in profit ($110 - $90 - $4.50 = $15.50). So you invested $10 and received $15.50. The $10 investment earned a 55% return ($15.50 - $10 = $5.50 and $5.50 / $10 = 55%). So by borrowing, you improved your return from 10% to 55%. And you left yourself with $90 to spend on other revenue generating projects.
The downsides to debt financings are:
- Interest Payments: Companies must have sufficient cash flow to make interest payments on time. Failure to make timely payments can result in penalties, damage the company's creditworthiness or push it into bankruptcy.
- Financial Vulnerability: High levels of debt make a company financially vulnerable. Because they do not have the option of skipping a payment, as they do with dividend payments on equity, borrowers with high debt are vulnerable to economic downturns or market swings. Taking our leverage example above, suppose we borrowed the $90 but the machine is defective and generates only $50. We may be pushed into bankruptcy. If we had bought the machine with our savings, we would have less risk of bankruptcy.
- Covenants and Collateral: Debt agreements may impose certain restrictions or requirements on the borrowing company, limiting its financial flexibility.
8.1.3 Equity Financing 8.1.3 Equity Financing
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Stock, sometimes called a share or a share of stock, represents an equity interest in a corporation. A company issues stock to investors in exchange for contributions by the investors.
Understanding Stock and Ownership
Stockholders are sometimes referred to as the owners of the company. This is metaphorical at best. Owning shares in Chipotle doesn't give you the right to enter Chipotle's kitchen or help yourself to free guac. What it means is that you have some claim on the residual assets of the company. By residual, we mean the assets that remain after all other creditors have been paid, as noted in the section on priority above. Once you contribute money to the corporation, it belongs to the corporation and can only be withdrawn at the authorization of the corporation.
Let's test drive some of these concepts.
7.1.3.1 I form a corporation, The Bucket, Inc. In exchange for $100 The Bucket issues me 1 share. Who owns the $100 in The Bucket? How can I get the $100?
7.1.3.2. The Bucket has no other assets. What's a rough value of one share of The Bucket? How much would you be willing to pay for one share?
7.1.3.3 Suppose instead The Bucket had issued me 10 shares for my $100 contribution. How much would you pay for all 10 shares? How much would you pay for just 1 share? If you have 1 share, how would you get that value? What if I hold the other 9 shares and I disagree? Would that affect the value of your share?
Accretion, Dilution and Par Value
The questions above should give you some intuition that the value of a share is, quite roughly, the value of the company's assets divided by the number of shares outstanding. (For this section, we'll ignore the challenges and costs of other shareholders blocking your ability to get the assets.)
Let's assume Best Bikes has store inventory worth $770,000 and $30,000 in cash. Assume for simplicity that it has no debt. The company would be worth $800,000 ($770,000 + $30,000 = $800,000). Assume there are three shares outstanding. Ignoring the effects of control, each share would be worth, roughly, $266,666.
Let's mess with the top half of the equation by adjusting the company's assets.
Now, assume we have a profitable quarter and increase our cash by $100,000, after replacing inventory. The company is now worth $900,000 ($800,000 + $100,000 = $900,000). Each share of stock is worth $300,000.
Suppose instead that someone breaks in and steals $70,000 worth of inventory. The company is now worth $630,000 ($800,000 - $70,000 = $630,000), and each share of stock is worth $210,000 ($630,000 / 3).
Now let's mess with the bottom half of the equation by adjusting the number of shares.
Returning to our original example, suppose we have $800,000 in assets and 3 shares outstanding, meaning each share is worth roughly $266,666. Suppose an investor offers to purchase a share for $100,000. If we accept, the company's assets are $900,000, and there are 4 shares outstanding so each share is worth $225,000. Notice that the value of the company went up, but the value of a share went down. Dilution is when the value of an equity interest decreases because the company has issued more equity interests.
We can also go the other way. Suppose instead that the investor offered to purchase 1 share for $400,000. The total value of the company would then be $1,200,000, with four shares outstanding for a rough value of $300,000 per share. Accretion is when the value of an equity increases because of growth in the corporation's assets.
So the price at which you sell a share can affect the value of the shares. Last century, investors worried that the corporation would sell stock too cheaply and devalue their stock. To prevent this they relied on the concept of par value. Par value is the minimum value at which a corporation can sell a share of stock. The corporation could (and typically would) sell stock for more than par value, but never less. Par value is set in the certificate of incorporation, so it cannot be changed without the shareholders' approval.
Par value also ensured that the corporation was sufficiently capitalized to pay its creditors. The idea is that by setting some minimum amount for each share sale, the corporation would be more likely to be able to pay its creditors.
Over time, par value fell out of favor. Sometimes a company needs money desparately, and a dilutive transaction may be the only way to keep it afloat. Par value became a trap for the unweary more than a protection against dilution or a source of value for potential creditors. Most new corporations set par value at a penny or less. For example, at the time of writing Meta Platforms, Inc., which runs Facebook, sets its par value at $0.000006 per share. Both the MBCA and Delaware permit corporations to eliminate par value altogether. MBCA 2.02(b)(2)(iv); DGCL 151.
Classes of Stock
The certificate of incorporation may designate different classes of stock. For example, a young corporation may have only common stock. A growing corporation may have common stock and Class A preferred stock. A mature, non-public company may have common stock, Class A preferred stock, Class B preferred stock and Class C preferred stock.
These "class" designators refer to preferred stock, and they are custom to each corporation; Class A stock at one company could be very different from Class A stock at another company. That's because the rights of preferred stock are negotiated when the stock is issued, so the rights will vary depending on the bargaining power and preferences of the parties. This also means that the Class A preferred stock will have different rights than the Class B preferred. Each class is separately negotiated when the stock is authorized.
Companies usually label their preferred stock alphabetically by when the stock is issued (Class A is issued first, then Class B, etc.), but there's no legal requirement to do so. But following that convention makes it easier for investors to quickly understand your capital structure.
Common stock does not have designators, it is not negotiated, and it is the default stock with rights defined by the statutes and caselaw.
8.1.3.1 Common Stock 8.1.3.1 Common Stock
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Here are some key characteristics of common stock:
- Voting Rights: Holders of common stock have the right to vote in corporate elections and decisions, such as appointing directors, mergers or other major changes. Directors that are not responsive to shareholder concerns may get fired. We'll spend more time on voting mechanics later, but at a high level the number of votes typically corresponds to the number of shares owned.
- Fiduciary Duties: Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. We'll explore these duties in depth in a later chapter, but at a high level if the board acts in a way that is disloyal to the shareholders, the shareholders can sue.
- Residual Claims: Common stockholders have residual claims on the company's assets and earnings. This means that after satisfying the claims of debt holders and preferred stockholders, common stockholders are entitled to the remaining assets and earnings in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy. However, they have the lowest priority in claiming these assets.
- Dividends: Dividends are payments made by a corporation to its shareholders when declared by the board of directors. While common stockholders have the right to receive dividends when declared, the board of directors decides when to declare dividends. If the board doesn't declare a dividend, the shareholders do not have a claim upon them. The board of directors decides whether to distribute dividends based on profitability, cash flow and future investment opportunities. Dividends are typically paid in the form of cash, but may take the form of additional shares of stock (stock dividends) or other assets.
- Buybacks: A stock buyback is when a corporation purchases shares from its shareholders. Like dividends, this is a way to return money to shareholders. Buying shares reduces the number of shares outstanding. Recall that the value of a share is (roughly) the value of the company divided by the number of shares. With fewer outstanding shares, the denominator is reduced so the share price should rise. Also, shareholders value the company differently. The shareholders most likely to sell in a share buyback are those who value the shares the least. If I think a Tesla share is worth $500 per share, I'm not going to sell my share in a buyback for $300. But if you think it's overvalued at $250, you will. This means that the shareholders that remain may be more optimistic about the company. This also results in a higher share price. Buybacks benefit shareholders because, unlike dividends, they do not create any taxable income until the shareholder decides to sell. This provides shareholders flexibility in their tax strategies. Many criticize stock buybacks, arguing that the money should be reinvested in the business for research or to increase employee wages. In this way, are dividends any better?
- Capital Appreciation: One of the primary motivations for investing in common stock is the potential for capital appreciation. As the company grows and generates profits, the value of its common stock may increase. This allows shareholders to sell their shares at a higher price than their initial investment, resulting in capital gains.
- Nonassessable: Nonassessable means that the corporation cannot require the stockholder to pay additional amounts. Modern stock is nonassessable, meaning that the stockholder cannot lose more than the value paid for the share.
- Risk and Volatility: Investing in common stock carries a certain level of risk and volatility. Stock prices fluctuate almost constantly. Some of this fluctuation may be explained by market conditions, industry trends, economic indicators and company-specific events. Shareholders bear the risk of potential losses if the stock price declines, and the value of their investment may be influenced by factors beyond their control.
- Information Transparency: Companies that issue common stock to the public are typically required to provide disclose their finances and other sensitive information to the public. This includes hiring an external auditor and lawyers to draft these disclosures.
8.1.3.2 Preferred Stock 8.1.3.2 Preferred Stock
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Preferred stock is a class of equity ownership in a corporation that possesses aspects of both common stock and debt. Preferred stock investors negotiate their rights with the board, and then the terms are detailed in the corporation's charter. Because these rights are negotiated, the precise terms of preferred stock (like debt) are unique for each corporation. This section provides some of the more common terms.
- Liquidation Preference: Preferred stockholders typically negotiate for a liquidation preference. A liquidation preference is a right to a certain payment upon liquidation or an acquisition of the corporaiton, and that claim is junior in priority to debt, but higher in priority to common equity.
- Dividend Payments: Preferred stockholders generally negotiate for a fixed dividend payment, though this "fixed" dividend is still subject to the board's discretion. To encourage the board to pay this dividend, the preferred stock's terms will typically prohibit a dividend to the common stock until the preferred dividend has been paid. The dividend will also typically be cumulative, meaning if the board skips a dividend payment, that payment amount is added to the dividend due for the next period. Unpaid dividends are part of the liquidation preference discussed above, so they are paid out before the common stock in the event of dissolution or an acquisition of the corporation.
- Voting Rights: Preferred stockholders usually have limited voting rights in general corporate matters, like electing directors or approving major corporate actions. In this sense they are treated like debt holders. However, preferred investors often negotiate for exclusive voting rights for one or more director seats. So in a board of five directors, four might be elected by the common stockholders and one might be elected by the preferred stockholders. If there are multiple classes of preferred stock, each may elect one director seat. In addition, the preferred stock may gain full voting rights if the company fails to pay dividends for a specified period.
- Convertibility: Preferred stock is typically convertible into common stock if the preferred stockholder chooses, meaning the preferred shares can be exchanged for a predetermined number of common shares. A preferred stockholder may convert for a number of reasons, including voting, transferability or higher (non-fixed) dividends.
- Callability and Redemption: Preferred stock is sometimes callable by the issuing company. This means that the company has the right to repurchase the preferred shares from the stockholders at a specified price, usually after a predetermined period or trigger condition. Callable preferred stock allows the company to adjust its capital structure or financing costs based on changing circumstances. Additionally, some preferred stock may have a redemption feature, allowing the preferred shareholder to force the company to repurchase the shares based on some set criteria.
8.1.3.3 Capital Stock Transactions: Splits, Stock Dividends and Blank Checks 8.1.3.3 Capital Stock Transactions: Splits, Stock Dividends and Blank Checks
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Authorized, Issued and Outstanding
Stock must be authorized by the charter, and the rights of each class of stock must be described in the charter. Each charter includes the specific number of common shares that are authorized. Recall that the charter cannot be amended without shareholder approval. This means the board cannot modify the rights of stock or increase the amount of authorized stock without shareholder approval.
This is a pain because corporations often issue stock to employees as bonuses to keep them motivated. If the board had to amend the charter every time it issued stock, employee stock options would be unworkable. Fortunately, stock can be authorized before it is issued. Authorized shares are shares that are permitted to be issued by the corporation's charter. Issued shares are shares that have been sold or awarded.
Corporations will typically amend the charter to authorize more shares than are currently needed. The board then has authority to shares that are authorized but unissued. DGCL 161. Shareholders might authorize a few years' worth of employee stock options, so that the board must return in a few years to ask for more.
Treasury Shares
A corporation may repurchase its shares after they are issued. Treasury shares are shares that the corporation has repurchased or redeemed after they were issued, but more informally, folks sometimes use the term treasury shares to refer to any shares that are authorized but unissued. Treasury shares operate as though they were never issued; they do not receive dividends and do not have voting rights. DGCL 160.
Blank Check Preferred
Like common stock, preferred stock must be authorized by the charter. But corporations sometimes permit the board of directors to set the terms of the preferred stock when it is issued. Blank check preferred stock is stock that is authorized by the charter, but the terms of which are set by the board. This has been a common feature of corporations for many years, but recently it has been used for shennanigans in the AMC case study that follows.
Stock Splits, Reverse Stock Splits and Dividends
A stock split is a transaction in which a corporation exchanges one share of stock for some higher number of shares of stock. For example, a two for one stock split would exchange one share of stock for two shares of stock, effectively doubling the number of shares held by each stockholder. Stock splits can two for one, three for one, or any other combination.
A reverse stock split is a transaction in which a corporation exchanges one share of stock for some lower number of shares of stock. It's kind of the opposite of the stock split. For example, instead of doubling the number of shares owned, a reverse split may halve the amount. Like stock splits, reverse stock splits one for two, one for three or any other combination. If a stockholder's holdings don't divide evenly, fractional shares that would remain are typically paid out in cash.
Splits and reverse splits are done by amending charter. The par value of the stock is adjusted proportionately to the split.
Similar to a stock split is a stock dividend. A stock dividend is a dividend paid in stock. So a board may authorize one share to be issued for every share outstanding. This requires that the shares already by authorized in the charter and it does not affect the par value.
7.1.4.1 How is a two for one stock split likely to affect the price of the stock? How will it affect par value?
7.1.4.2 How is a one for two reverse stock split likely to affect the price of the stock? How will it affect par value?
7.1.4.3 How is a one for one stock dividend likely to affect the price of the stock? How will it affect par value?
7.1.4.4 If you own three shares and the corporation authorizes a two for one reverse stock split, how many shares are you likely to own after the transaction?
8.1.3.4. AMC's Shenanigans
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Read the following case study on how blank check stock has recently been abused.
8.1.4 Convertible Notes 8.1.4 Convertible Notes
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A theme in this section is that clever financiers will find a way to splice and resplice every instrument to meet investor demand. One of their more interesting Frankenstein monsters is the convertible note.
Convertible notes are debt that can be converted into equity at the holder's option. This has a few advantages. If the company is doing poorly, the convertible note continues to be debt, staying higher in priority and receiving fixed payments. But if the company does extremely well, the note holders can convert their notes into common stock to benefit from the dividends and capital appreciation. In other words, they have the advantages of debt in bad times and the advantages of equity in good times.
The company also benefits from convertible debt. Because the debt is less risky, lenders typically offer lower interest rates, making it a cheaper option for the company.
The downside of convertible notes is that it can put downward pressure on the stock price. One reason for this is because if the notes are converted, it will dilute the current shareholders as new shares are issued.
8.2 Accounting 101 8.2 Accounting 101
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You're taking out a loan to expand Best Bikes, and before they give you the money the bank would like to understand Best Bikes' financial health. They ask questions that seem simple, like "what are your assets?" but you're not sure how to respond.
You see last week you had 20 new bikes delivered, but you haven't paid the manufacturer yet. Should you count the bikes in your assets even though you haven't paid for them yet? They are in your stockroom right now. If you do count them, can you also count the money that's still in the safe but that you owe to the bike manufacturer?
You've also rented out five bikes to a tech startup across town. They agreed to pay $50 per month for the next six months. When you're adding up your assets should you count the bikes, the $50 you'll earn this month, the $300 you'll earn over the life of the contract or all of it? You'd like to put a big number because then the bank will think you're doing better and give you a better deal on the loan.
The bank asks, "What are your liabilities?" Again, not so simple.
You've issued five year warranties on about a thousand bikes this year. Given past history, you'll probably have to replace five or ten bikes. That's going to cost real money. Should you tell the banker that you owe five to ten bikes to someone at sometime over then five years? That may seem ridiculous if you don't know to whom, how many or when. But would it be fair to not even mention these expected costs?
You've also sold about $2,000 worth gift cards. Most folks will use or resell the gift cards, but about 1% of those gift cards will be misplaced or never used. Can you count unused gift cards that as revenue? How long do you have to wait before you do? How do you count the gift cards that you expect will be used? Are they a liability? You'd like your liabilities to look small, but you also have a preference for not going to jail for fraud.
Accounting is beautiful. It is more than going to a warehouse and counting all the widgets or adding up numbers in a spreadsheet. High level accounting is nuanced, requiring judgment calls, with the ultimate goal of presenting fairly the finanical health of a company. This lesson will introduce basic accounting concepts and make you regret coming to law school rather than getting that masters in accounting your aunt was pushing for.
8.2.1 Why Should Attorneys Care About Financial Statements? 8.2.1 Why Should Attorneys Care About Financial Statements?
2/21/2024 pdw
Most businesses are organized to make profits, and the financial statements show whether they succeed at this and how. The financial statements will tell you whether they are a high margin business or a volume business. They will show which segments of the business are doing well and which are struggling. They show whether the company is able to make its payroll and for how long. Your clients won't be interested in a legal strategy that doesn't account for the company's financial realities.
Here are some other ways you may use the financial statements:
- Litigation Support: Financial statements are crucial in business litigation, divorce proceedings or settlement negotiations. Attorneys use financial statements to assess the financial standing of their clients or opposing parties, determine damages and present evidence in court.
- Asset Valuation: Attorneys use financial statements in estate planning, bankruptcy and other areas where assets are distributed to properly value the assets. Financial statements provide a comprehensive view of a person's or business's assets, including real estate, investments and tangible assets, which can aid in valuation.
- Contractual and Transactional Matters: When negotiating contracts, mergers, acquisitions or other business transactions, attorneys often review financial statements to evaluate the financial health and stability of the parties involved. Knowing your counterparties' financial health helps you assessing the risks of the deal. You'll also create financial plans for new joint ventures, which typically requires an understanding of financial statements.
- Compliance and Regulatory Requirements: Some regulatory requirements turn on a company's financial status. In these cases, understanding the company's financial situation is a prerequisite to giving regulatory advice.
- Taxation: Attorneys specializing in tax law may use financial statements to determine a client's tax liability, identify tax-saving opportunities and ensure compliance with tax laws.
- Investigations and Fraud Cases: Fraud often leaves traces in the financial statements. For example, if a company's revenue is increasing steeply, but it's supply costs remain constant, it's a red flag that they may be cooking the books. Attorneys use financial statements to uncover irregularities, trace financial transactions and build a case against fraudsters.
8.2.2 Financial Statements 8.2.2 Financial Statements
2/26/2024 pdw
Financial statements are the formal summaries of the financial activities or financial position of a business.
Tips for Reading Financial Statements
Financial statements use many words you've never heard or that are used more precisely than you're accustomed to. The FASB provides an authoritative glossary that you may find helpful.
You'll often hear the terms gross and net applied in front of other terms. Gross means the amount before deducitons. Net means the amount after deductions. Which deductions apply will depend on the context, but it usually refers to the costs associated with the item.
"Current," when used in financial statements, refers to things that will happen in the next year. So current liabilities means liabilities that the company will face in the next year. Current assets are assets that will be converted into cash in the next year. For example, the bikes in a bike store are current assets. We expect to sell them for cash in the next year. The building isn't a current asset. This time next year, we'll still own the building.
You'll also notice financial statements include some numbers in parentheses. Parentheses indicate negative numbers. So the ($40) below means negative forty dollars.
Sample Financial Statements
There are three primary financial statements:
1. Balance Sheet (Statement of Financial Position): The balance sheet provides a snapshot of a company's financial position at a specific point in time, often the end of a fiscal year. It presents a company's assets (what it owns), liabilities (what it owes), and stockholders' equity (the value of the assets after deducting liabilities).
Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2023
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | $100 | Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Car | $300 | Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Stockholders' Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 | Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
2. Income Statement (Profit and Loss Statement): This statement summarizes a company's revenues, expenses, gains, and losses over a specific period, typically a fiscal quarter or year. It shows whether the company's operations are profitable. The table below shows a sample a simplified income statement:
Income Statement for the Year Ended 2023
| Revenue | $100 |
| Spent on Parts | ($10) |
| Paid to Employees | ($40) |
| Paid in Taxes | ($20) |
| Paid for Rent | ($10) |
| Income | $20 |
3. Cash Flow Statement: This statement details the inflows and outflows of cash and cash equivalents over a specified period. It categorizes these flows into operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities. This serves a different purpose than the income statement, driving largely by accrual accounting. The income statement will reflect many of our sales as though we've already collected the money. But if we haven't collected, we may not have enough cash to pay our employees. So a business may be profitable on the income statement, but fail if it doesn't receive the cash in time to pay its debts. You might think of the statement of cash flows as a reflection of the company's short term health---do you have enough cash to pay your debts until the income you've recognized in the income statement actually arrives.
Cash Flow Statement for the Year Ended 2023
| Beginning Cash Balance | $1,000 |
| Cash from Operating Activities | $100 |
| Cash from Investing Activities | $500 |
| Cash to Financing Activities | ($500) |
| Ending Cash Balance | $1,100 |
The specific lines on these statements, like "Car," "Mortgage Debt" or "Paid for Rent" are called line items.
8.2.3 Financial Statements Questions 8.2.3 Financial Statements Questions
2/26/2024 pdw
Test your basic understanding of these statements using the following questions:
7.2.3.1. The bank asks you to provide a summary of Best Bikes' assets and liabilities. In which financial statement might you find this?
7.2.3.2. The bank would also like to know how much money Best Bikes made last year. In which financial statement might you find this?
7.2.3.3. Finally, the bank asks whether Best Bikes where it expects to use the funds. It would like to know whether the company has trouble making payroll or whether the funds would be used for expansion. In which financial statement might you find the company's ability to pay its bills as they come due?
8.2.4 The Accounting Equation 8.2.4 The Accounting Equation
2/26/2024 pdw
The accounting equation is one of the most influential innovations of the last millennium. Among other things, it allows auditors to check that the accounts have been properly recorded. This has increased trust and accountability, which increased investment which helped create our modern society. This section will explain how it works.
The Accounting Equation
The accounting equation, also known as the balance sheet equation, is the core equation of accounting and represents the relationship between a company's assets, liabilities, and shareholders' equity. It is expressed as:
Assets = Liabilities + Shareholders' Equity
Let’s review these elements:
- Assets: Assets are the economic resources that a company owns or controls. Assets can be tangible, such as cash, inventory, buildings and equipment, or intangible, such as patents, trademarks and goodwill. In the accounting equation, assets represent what the company owns or has a claim to.
- Liabilities: Liabilities are the financial obligations or debts that a company owes to external parties, such as suppliers, lenders or creditors. These are obligations that the company must fulfill in the future, typically by paying cash or providing goods or services. Liabilities can include loans, accounts payable, bonds and other forms of debt.
- Shareholders' Equity: Shareholders' equity, also known as owner's equity or stockholders' equity, represents the residual interest in the assets of the company after deducting its liabilities. It is the portion of the company's assets that could be allocated to the shareholders of the company as dividends. We've talked before about the shareholders being paid only after all other claimants are paid; this is the mathematical representation of that. It's what's leftover from our assets after we pay our debts. The specific line items are a little artificial. Shareholders' equity can consist of various components, including common stock, retained earnings, additional paid-in capital and other equity accounts. The line item for common stock reflects the par value of the stock multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The line item for additional paid-in capital represents the price that people paid the company to buy the stock minus the par value. Retained earnings represents the company's earnings that haven't been paid out to either creditors or shareholders. At a high level, it's the amount that could be paid to shareholders as dividends.
You can see this equation in the balance sheet. The balance sheet is organized around these three categories. And note the total assets on the left equal the liabilities and shareholders' equity on the right. $2,100 in assets = $600 liabilities + $1,500 shareholders' equity.
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | $100 | Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Car | $300 | Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Shareholders' Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 | Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
The accounting equation is implemented through double entry bookkeeping.
Double Entry Bookkeeping
Double entry bookkeeping is a bookkeeping method where each entry is recorded in two places to balance the accounting equation. Each entry is called a journal entry, because old timey accountants would mark these changes in large journals while pleading with their bosses for one more lump of coal (Good afternoon!). This will be clear from some examples.
Let's start with our balance sheet for Best Bike, Inc.’s 2023 fiscal year above. How will the balance sheet change if Best Bikes uses $50 in cash to pay off a portion of its credit card liability? Well, Best Bikes will have $50 less in cash and $50 less in credit card debt.
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash |
$100 |
Credit Card Debt |
$100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Car | $300 | Total |
$600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Stockholders' Equity | |
| Total |
$2,100 |
Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
Assets now equal $2,050. And liabilities ($550) plus stockholders' equity ($1,500) now equal $2,050. Everything balances.
If you've kept the books correctly, you'll always have this balance. Recall that the accounting equation says,
Assets = Liabilities + Shareholders' Equity
So if we change any of those three categories (assets, liabilities or shareholders' equity), one of the other categories must also change to keep the equation in balance. If assets increase, then either liabilities or shareholders' equity must increase. If liabilities decrease, then we must either decrease assets or increase shareholders equity.
Let's say instead that we sold the company car for $1,000 in cash. Our cash would go up $1,000. Our line item for the car would go to $0. This would change our total assets to $2,800. To balance the accounting equation there must be a change on the other side. This isn't intuitive, so we'll get there by elimination.
Our liabilities wouldn't change because we didn't take on new debt or pay off old debt. So the change must be to shareholders' equity. Recall that the line item for "Common stock" includes only the par value of the shares multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. We didn't issue any new shares or change the par value, so that line item won't change. That leaves us with "Retained earnings." Recall that retained earnings is the amount that's available to pay out as dividends. That makes sense here. We sold the car for a $700 profit. So if we wanted, we could pay that $700 out as a dividend. Retained earnings increase by $700.
Here's the new balance sheet if we sold the car.
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash |
$100 |
Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Car |
$300 $0 |
Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Shareholders' Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 $2,800 |
Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings |
$700 |
||
| Total |
$1,500 |
Note once again that the assets ($2,800) equal the liabilities ($600) plus the shareholders' equity ($2,200). Note also that while we call it double entry bookkeeping, sometimes we have to make more than two journal entries. Here we made three.
Debits and Credits
Each transaction generates at least two journal entries. These journal entries are called either debits and credits, depending on what they are moving and in which direction. At a high level, journal entries that increase the company's income are usually called debits, and those that decrease the company's income are usually credits.
Here's a quick chart to know whether something is a credit or a debit. If you are increasing your assets, that would be a debit. If you are decreasing your liabilities, that would also be a debit. If you are increasing your liabilities, that's a credit. If you're decreasing your assets, that's also a credit.
| Assets | Liabilities | Shareholders Equity | |
| Increase | Debit | Credit | Credit |
| Decrease | Credit | Debit | Debit |
The magic is that you always get at least one credit and at least one debit. If you don't, you know you've made a mistake, so you can go back and check your work.
Debits are entered on the left hand side of journal entires, and credits are entered on the right hand side of journal entries. To ensure compliance with the accounting equation, the sum of all debits and the sum of all credits in a journal entry must be equal. That's where the concept of balancing the books comes from.
Let's see how this would work with the example above, where we paid down $50 worth of credit card debt. This transaction creates the following journal entry:
| Debit | Credit | |
| Credit Card Liability | $50 | |
| Cash | $50 |
Because the $50 affecting the credit card liability is listed in the debit column, we know that the credit card liability account is decreased by $50. Similarly, because the $50 affecting the cash account is listed in the credit column, we know that the cash account is also decreased by $50. Also important to note is the fact that the total sum of the debit entries ($50) equals the total sum of the credit entries ($50). We've balanced the books.
8.2.5 The Accounting Equation Questions 8.2.5 The Accounting Equation Questions
2/26/2024 pdw
Test your understanding of these concepts using the following questions and reproduced financial statements.
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | $100 | Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Car | $300 | Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Shareholders' Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 | Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
7.1.5.1. Assume Best Bikes, Inc. uses cash to purchase equipment that costs $100. Create the appropriate journal entries and update the balance sheet.
7.1.5.2. Assume instead (that is, start fresh) that Best Bikes, Inc. sells the building and land for $1,500, what line items are affected? Create the appropriate journal entries and update the balance sheet.
7.1.5.3. Assume instead (that is, start fresh) that Best Bikes, Inc. pays a $100 cash dividend to shareholders. Create the appropriate journal entries and update the balance sheet.
8.2.6 Financial Metrics 8.2.6 Financial Metrics
2/26/2024 pdw
As you may have noticed financial statements are packed with information. This section discusses how investors and analysts boil down that information into a few metrics to get a rough gauge of the company's financial health and make it quickly comparable with other companies.
They are all made up. EBIT and current ratios aren't assets, and you won't find them in the financial statements. Financial metrics are more like a check engine light to give you a rough sense of what's going on with the company. Like the financial statements more generally, the role of financial metrics is to help you understand how the company makes money, what risks it faces and what opportunities it has for growth.
EBIT and EBITDA
EBIT (pronounced "e-bit") stands for earnings before interest and taxes. To calculate this you take the earnings and add back in the interest and taxes the company paid. It's a rough tool to isolate the company's operations from mere financing issues so that you can see if the company's operations are working.
For example, imagine you took out a loan to develop a machine that would tune up a bicycle quickly. Suppose the machine costs $1 per month to run and earns you $1,000 per month. It's a great machine. But you're still paying off that research debt, which costs $2,000 per month. Each month your financial statements show a loss. Investors might look at EBIT to see that your product is good, it's just your financing that's in trouble.
More commonly used is EBITDA (pronounced "e-bit-dah"). EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. It's calculated by adding back into your earnings the cost the company paid in interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Depreciation and amortization are beyond the scope of this course, but at a high level they are a line item that reduces your asset values over time. Like EBIT, EBITDA is used to isolate the operational earnings from the financial results.
Financial Ratios
Financial ratios are rough, quantitative metrics that provide insight into a company's financial performance and health. They are calculated by comparing two or more financial numbers from a company's financial statements, such as the income statement, balance sheet or cash flow statement. Financial ratios help analysts, investors and stakeholders assess various aspects of a company's operations, profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency. Here are some common categories of financial ratios and their explanations:
| Ratio | Formula | Use/Explanation |
| Earnings Per Share (EPS) | (Net Income) / (Number of shares outstanding) |
Provides a sense of how expensive the stock is relative to its earnings. A high EPS suggests the company can afford to pay high dividends. |
| Price-to-Earnings | (Share Price in the Market) / (Earnings per Share) |
Compares a company's stock price to its earnings per share (EPS). A high price-to-earnings ratio suggests the market thinks the company has high growth potential or that the stock is overpriced. |
| Debt-to-Equity | (Liabilities) / (Shareholders’ Equity) |
This ratio compares a company's total debt to its shareholders' equity, reflecting its leverage and financial risk. A high ratio shows the company has funded itself primarily with debt. Because debt must be paid even when profits are low, a high debt-to-equity ratio indicates that the company's financial health will be sensitive to the market, small profits may be leveraged into large profits and small losses may mean bankruptcy. |
| Current Ratio |
(Current Assets) / |
This ratio measures a company's short-term liquidity by comparing its current assets to its current liabilities. A higher current ratio indicates a better ability to cover short-term obligations. |
| Quick Ratio | (Current Assets - Inventory) / (Current Liabilities) |
Similar to the current ratio, but it excludes inventory from current assets, providing a more conservative measure of liquidity. |
| Return on Assets | (Net Income) / (Average Total Assets) |
Return on equity measures a company's ability to generate profits from its total assets, indicating efficiency in asset utilization. A high ratio shows that the company generates a lot of income with fewer assets. |
| Return on Equity | (Net Income) / (Shareholders’ Equity) |
This ratio assesses how well a company uses shareholders' equity to generate returns. A high ratio shows that the company generates a lot of income with little investment from shareholders. |
| Interest Coverage | (EBIT) / (Interest Expense) |
It measures a company's ability to cover its interest expenses using its earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). A high ratio suggests the company's earnings will be enough to service its debt. |
| Debt Ratio | (Liabilities) / (Assets) |
This ratio shows the proportion of a company's assets financed by debt. A high ratio suggests a company is worth less than it owes. |
Different industries focus on different ratios, and analysts often use a combination of these ratios to assess a company's financial health. Keep in mind that these are all made up and subject to interpretation. So if someone on Reddit is trying to convince you to buy anything, think through holistically what the metrics mean and what it tells you about this specific company.
8.2.7 Financial Metrics Questions 8.2.7 Financial Metrics Questions
2/26/2024 pdw
Test your understanding of these concepts using the following questions:
7.1.7.1. Best Bikes has $500 in current assets and $1,000 in current liabilities. What is Best Bikes, Inc.’s current ratio? Is Best Bikes, Inc. able to cover its short-term obligations?
7.1.7.2. Best Bikes has a price-to-earnings ratio of $20. The donut shop across the street has a price-to-earnings ratio of $10. If this difference is due to the growth potential, which business has greater growth potential?
7.1.7.3. Best Bikes has debt-to-equity ratio of 0.70. The donut shop across the street has a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.20. Which is a better investment?*
7.1.7.4. Using the income statement below, what is Best Bikes' EBIT?
Income Statement for the Year Ended 2023
| Revenue | $100 |
| Spent on Parts | ($10) |
| Paid to Employees | ($40) |
| Paid in Taxes | ($20) |
| Paid for Rent | ($10) |
| Income | $20 |
* These debt-to-equity ratios are taken from Tesla and Exxon, respectively. Does that change your mind? Is one metric enough to make an investment decision?
8.2.8 Accounting 101 Problem Set 8.2.8 Accounting 101 Problem Set
2/28/2024 pdw
Problem 1: Michael, Jim, and Dwight are each shareholders and board members of Paper Company, Inc. They have contacted you and asked you to represent their company in all transactional and litigation matters. To familiarize yourself with their business, you request all corporate documents and the most recent copy of their financial statements. On which statement would you find each of the following items?
- How much inventory the Paper Company, Inc. currently holds;
- What type of investments the Paper Company, Inc. currently holds;
- Whether the Paper Company, Inc. owns or leases the building that houses its offices and warehouse;
- How much the Paper Company, Inc. paid in legal fees last period; and
- Whether the Paper Company, Inc. holds any bank loans or credit card debts.
Problem 2: Assume the same general facts as above. Now assume the business purchases a brand new PT Cruiser. The company pays $30 in cash up-front. What journal entries would Paper Company, Inc. make to record this transaction? How would your answer change if Michael pays $10 in cash and the dealership issues a loan for the remaining $20 balance? Refer to the following journal entry templates to note your answers (**hint: each row should be used in your answer, meaning that two accounts are affected in Journal Entry #1 and three accounts are affected in Journal Entry #2).
Journal Entry #1:
| Account | Debit | Credit |
Journal Entry #2:
| Account | Debit | Credit |
Problem 3: Assume the same facts above. Now assume the Paper Company, Inc.'s balance sheet read as follows:
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | $100 | Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Inventory | $300 | Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 | Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
Using the journal entries you made in Problem 2, update the balance sheet to account for the PT Cruiser purchase:
Journal Entry #1:
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | Credit Card Debt | ||
| Investments | Mortgage Debt | ||
| Car | Total | ||
| Building | |||
| Land | Equity | ||
| Total | Common Stock | ||
| Retained Earnings | |||
| Total |
Journal Entry #2:
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | Credit Card Debt | ||
| Investments | Mortgage Debt | ||
| Car | Total | ||
| Building | |||
| Land | Equity | ||
| Total | Common Stock | ||
| Retained Earnings | |||
| Total |
Problem 4: Assume the facts above. For each of the following Paper Company, Inc. transactions, record the appropriate journal entry:
(a) The company orders $500 worth of paper inventory and agrees to pay in 90 days.
| Account | Debit | Credit |
(b) The company sends Dwight to install a laser jet printer for a client, and in exchange the client pays the company $100 in cash.
| Account | Debit | Credit |
Problem 5: The bank is considering lending $1,000,000 to Best Bikes, Inc., which has the following balance sheet:
| Assets | Liabilities | ||
| Cash | $100 | Credit Card Debt | $100 |
| Investments | $200 | Mortgage Debt | $500 |
| Inventory | $300 | Total | $600 |
| Building | $500 | ||
| Land | $1,000 | Equity | |
| Total | $2,100 | Common Stock | $800 |
| Retained Earnings | $700 | ||
| Total | $1,500 |
The bank's typical policy is to only lend to company's who have a debt ratio that is less than 1.5. Based solely on this criteria, will the bank make the loan to Best Bikes, Inc.?
Problem 6: Same facts as Problem 5. What other ratio(s) might be appropriate for the bank to refer to? (**hint: think about what risks your client is exposed to and which financial ratio(s) can help predict how likely said risks are to occur). Provide at least two, explain why they are relevant and say whether the bank would prefer the ratio to be high or low.
8.3 The Stock Market 8.3 The Stock Market
6/7/2024 pdw
One way to raise money is to go where the money is. A stock exchange is a market where investors meet to sell securities, like stocks and bonds. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, is a physical building at 11 Wall St. in New York City, which is why financial markets are colloquially refered to as Wall Street. For over two hundred years investors and speculators have met there to shout bids and offers at each other.
The scenes are iconic but largely outdated. Most bids and offers are made by algorithms and transmitted electronically to the exchange where an algorithm on the other side accepts the trade.
This section will discuss how these markets work and how we regulate them.
8.3.1 Stock Market Vocabulary 8.3.1 Stock Market Vocabulary
6/7/2024 pdw
This section is to help you feel less intimidated by the terms thrown around in financial discussions.
A security is a financial instrument like stocks or bonds, but legally the term includes any investment of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. That legal definition will take a couple weeks' of study in your securities regulation class, but intuitively you can think of securities as any machine where you expect to put money in and receive more money out.
You can build that machine in a number of clever ways that look nothing like a share of stock. In one famous example, a resort sold small portions of an orange grove to visitors along with a separate service contract that would tend the grove, collect and sell the oranges (grouping the oranges together with neighboring mini-groves) and return profits to the land owners. This sounds like a real estate purchase, but in substance the buyers would put money in, do nothing, and then expect money out. It was a security.
Price refers to the last price at which a security was sold. Closing price refers to the last price that the security traded on a certain day. Because prices can fluctuate constantly, when drafting contracts around this term attorneys often use the closing price averaged over multiple days.
Market capitalization is a rough value of the company equal to the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The idea makes loose sense; if you can buy one share for $10 and there are 5 shares outstanding, you might loosely estimate that the company is worth $50. When you hear that Apple is valued at $2 trillion that refers to Apple's market capitalization.
Capital gains refers to the increase in price of an asset. So if you buy Amazon at $5 and then sell at $15, you've earned $10 in capital gains. Your capital investment gained $10.
Volatility refers to how prices fluctuates over time. Securities with high volatility have prices that swing more than those with low volatility.
Volume refers to how many shares of a security sold in a given period. Stocks typically see high volume when there are major announcments in the business. Stocks with negligible volume are said to lack liquidity. Liquidity refers to how easily an asset is converted into cash. Low volume suggests there are few buyers and sellers in the security, which suggests it will be harder for a security holder to sell the security. If you buy an illiquid security, you may be stuck with it for a while or have to sell for a loss.
A bull market is a market that is increasing in value. Similarly, bullish investors are those that expect the value of a security or market will increase. A bear market is a market that is decreasing in value. Bearish investors think the security or market will decline.
A broker is someone that executes securities transactions for someone else. If you open your app and trade stock, the app manager is working as a broker for you.
A portfolio is the collection of securities owned by an investor. Financial advisors often recommend keeping your portfolio diversified. A portfolio is diversified if it contains securities whose price movements are not correlated (or at least, not completely correlated). So if you invest all of your money in hotel stocks, then if there's a pandemic that stops global travel, you're going to lose a lot of money. If instead you invest half in hotel stocks and half in drug manufacturers, then your portfolio will not be as affected by a pandemic.
One way to diversify is through mutual funds. Mutual funds are investment funds where investors purchase shares in the fund and the fund manager uses those funds to purchase securities. This allows investors to delegate investment decisions to an expert and allows them to purchase a wider range of stocks than they could otherwise afford. For example, one share of Berkshire Hathaway class A stock costs over $600,000 (as of Feb. 2024). This is out of the range for most investors, but if they pool their funds they can buy a few shares and receive the benefits. Mutual funds can be used to by a broad variety of stocks into a single fund, allowing a shareholder to diversify through a single fund.
A specific type of mutual fund is the index fund. An index fund is an investment fund that buys a list of stocks and holds them, rather than trading. An index is a list of stocks, and it is often used as a benchmark to compare performance. For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, often called just the Dow, is an index of the stock of 30 companies that someone put together as a rough, quick way to see how the market as a whole is moving. It's difficult to understand the entire market by seeing how stock moved for 30 companies, so wider indexes are more common. The S&P 500 is an index of the stock of 500 companies. The Russell 3000 is an index of 3000 companies' stock. If you wanted to see how technology stocks are doing, you might look at a tech stock index.
Passive managers are fund managers that mostly just invest in an index. For example, they may buy any company listed on the S&P 500, whether or not they think it's a good deal. These funds typically charge lower fees (because they do less work) and the returns are typically average. Active managers are fund managers who analyze the market and try to pick stocks that are good deals. These funds typically charge higher fees (because the manager has to think) and the returns can be great or terrible. On average, they are slightly less successful than passive managers because, on average their returns will also be average. That's just how averages work. But you'll pay a higher fee to get that average, so most investment advisors recommend passive funds (this is not investment advice, you do you).
Typically, public companies are required to file 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K documents with the Securities Exchange Commission. These are publicly available reports that provide investors with information. A 10-K is an annual statement and filing that is audited by accountants. A 10-Q is a quarterly filing that gives an update on the company's performance for that quarter, though it is not audited. Finally, an 8-K is a current report that is filed promptly after a significant event or change occurs.
8.3.2 Types of Trades 8.3.2 Types of Trades
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Suppose you think Best Bikes is going to increase in price. The most simple trade is to buy the shares, wait and hope. If the price goes up, you can sell. "Buy low and sell high" is how you make money trading securities.
But what if you think the price is going to go down? If you already have shares, you can sell them before the price falls. But if you don't already own the shares, it wouldn't make sense to buy them just to immediately sell them. So instead you might do a short sale.
A short sale is where you borrow a security, sell it, then hope the price drops so that you can repurchase the security to return the share you borrowed. Short sells let you make money off of a security that is declining in value.
For example, suppose the price of Best Bikes stock is $100 and you think it will fall. You don't own any stock, so you pay me $1 to let you borrow my share of Best Bikes stock. You then sell the share I loaned you for $100. You have $100 in your pocket, but you owe me a share of stock. A month later the stock price has dropped to $75. You spend $75 to buy the stock in the market and return it to me. You've made $24 ($100 sale price - $75 buying price - $1 borrowing cost). Instead of buying low and selling high, you sold high and then bought low.
What if the stock price had gone up instead? Well, you'd still have to return the share of stock you owe me. So you'd spend the $100 you earned by selling the share plus some of your own money to repurchase a share of stock and return it to me. This makes short sales useful but risky.
To avoid that risk, you could instead use a put. A put option, often called just a put, is a contract that allows you to force someone else to buy your shares in the future at a determinable price. For example, suppose you believe the price of Best Bikes stock will decrease, but I disagree. We might enter into a contract where in one month you can make me buy a share of Best Bikes stock from you for $100. In exchange, you give me $1 today. If Best Bikes stock drops to $75, you can buy a share in the market and force me to buy it from you for $100. You've made $24 ($100 sales price - $75 buy price - $1 price of the put).
The put has some advantages and disadvantages compared to the short sale. With a put, if the price stays at $100 or goes up to $120, nothing happens. You wouldn't benefit by making me purchase a share from you at $100, so you don't exercise your right to make me buy it. In contrast with a short sale, if the price goes up, you still need to repay the share you borrowed. So if you're wrong with a put, you lose the price you paid for the contract ($1 in our example). But if you're wrong with a short sale, you lose however much the stock went up. There's potentially no limit.
A "call" is similar to a put. A call option, often just called a call, is a contract that allows you to purchase shares in the future at a determinable price. Suppose you think Best Bikes stock will increase, and I disagree. Suppose the current price of a Best Bikes share is $100. You and I enter into a contract where I agree to sell you a share of Best Bikes for $100, but we won't actually trade the share or cash until next week. If the price goes up to $120, you can force me to sell to you for $100, making $20. If the price goes down, you wouldn't exercise your right to force me to sell to you, so nothing happens.
But why not just buy the share at $100 and then sell it if it goes up? One advantage of a call over just buying the share directly is the cost. If I only have $100, I can only afford one share. So if the price goes up to $120, I can make $20. But suppose I only have to pay you $1 per share for a call. I can enter a call for 100 shares (I pay you $1 for each call), then if the price goes up to $120, I make $20 on each of those 100 shares, for a total of $2,000. Puts and calls leverage your bet.
Puts and calls are collectively called options. The price we agree to do the sale in the future is called the strike price.
A derivative is a contract whose value derives from the value of some other security. In our example, the value of my put contract would depend on the value of the Best Bike shares. If the best bike shares go up, my put is less valuable. If the Best Bike shares decline, my put is more valuable. So the put is a derivative. It derives its value from the value of the Best Bike shares. Puts, calls and short sales are all examples of derivative trades.
Because there are so many ways to write these contracts we use a shorthand to designate whether you want the security to go up or down. To be long in a security means if the security increases in value, your position improves. To be short in a security means if the security decreases in value, your position improves. So if you're long, you want it to go up. If you're short you want it to go down.
Returning to our example, if you own a share of Best Bikes or you have a call option on Best Bikes, you are long Best Bikes. You want the price to go up. If you have a put option on Best Bikes or you have short sold Best Bikes, you are short Best Bikes. You want the price to go down.
8.4 Securities Regulation 8.4 Securities Regulation
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Securities regulation is complex, often non-intuitive and filled with traps and exceptions. The goal of this section isn't to teach you securities regulation; it's to help you avoid prison for things you may not have realized were securities regulation. So we'll focus on red flags that signal it's time to call a specialist. That said, securities regulation is fun, so you may consider taking a securities regulation course and becoming that specialist.
8.4.1 Overview of the Registration Process 8.4.1 Overview of the Registration Process
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Imagine Best Bikes decides to sell stock to the public. An initial public offering (IPO) is a company's first sale of shares to the general public. This process is also called "going public" because once the sale is complete it will be a public company. The process is complicated and takes several weeks of a securities regulation course, so we'll cover it here at a high level.
A lot of the process is analogous to selling a truck. The first thing you do to sell your truck is clean it up, maybe polish the rims and vacuum out the bed. Same thing for a company. Before you take it to the stock market you make some internal changes to make it more appealing to buyers. This typically includes cleaning up the internal governance, adding board committees and replacing some executives. You want a company that looks good to potential investors.
Next, you begin the sales process. For your truck, you might put out an advertisement online or post flyers around town. For a company, you are required to create a sales brochure that describes your company in detail. This brochure is called a prospectus.
Calling it a brochure understates things a bit. The Securities Act of 1933, commonly called the '33 Act, governs how securities are offered to the public. The act requires that you provide a copy of the prospectus to anyone you offer securities to. It prohibits material mistatements and omissions in the prospectus. And it mandates a hefty set of disclosures.
Specifically, the '33 Act requires companies selling securities to describe in the prospectus their business, their financial results and the securities they are offering. It also requires that the prospectus include many things the companies would rather not publicly disclose, like which risks could sink the company, how much they pay managers and their audited financial statements. If there are any material misstatements or omissions, buyers will sue for fraud. This means the prospectus is going to be about 200-500 pages, and you'll pay a lawyer or an auditor to confirm every word in it.
The prospectus is publicly filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission within a larger document called the registration statement. A registration statement is the filing made with the SEC to register an offering of securities; it includes the statutory prospectus and other legal information.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the primary regulator of the U.S. capital markets. The SEC reviews the registration statement and submits comments to the company if it believes the company's disclosures have any material misstatements or omissions. With a few exceptions, you cannot offer to sell your securities to anyone until you've filed the prospectus with the SEC. And you cannot actually sell the securities until the SEC declares the registration statement is effective.
Selling securities is a complicated process. You may be able to find a buyer willing and able to pay $5,000 for your truck. But if you're trying to sell something worth a hundred million dollars, not a lot of people can write that check. Underwriters (these are investment banks like Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan) are transaction specialists who will market your offering to their wealthy contacts. They also know the market, so they will help you craft your company's story in the prospectus in a way that appeals to investors. In our truck analogy, these are the dealers.
Once you've sold you're truck, you're done with it. This makes sense. You no longer have control of the truck and the buyer can inspect it as they please. Not so for securities. An investor that buys shares cannot fully control the company and will need regular access to information to understand how the business is running. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs what companies must disclose after they have sold shares. This will include quarterly and annual reports, as well as "current reports" in which you'll disclose material changes.
8.4.2 Registration Requirements 8.4.2 Registration Requirements
8.4.2.1. Let's Browse a Registration Statement
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As mentioned above, the heart of the Securities Act of 1933 is the requirement that every sale of securities be either registered with the SEC or exempt from registration. Let's look at what registration entails.
Linked below is the registration statement for DoorDash's initial public offering. This will give you a sense of why registration is such a costly and burdensome process. As you read, consider how long this took to draft and how many billable hours that cost the company.
- Note how ugly the first page is compared to the second page. This full document is the registration statement. Beginning on the second page is the prospectus. Both are heavily regulated, but the prospectus is where investors typically turn to evaluate the company, so it has a stronger marketing focus. Now hit CTRL-F and search for "Part ii". That will take you to the end of the prospectus. Note that the pretty pictures end and we get back to bland legal disclosures. This is the back end of the registration statement and there are only a few pages. You'll note that most of the registration statement is the prospectus. The few items required to be in the registration statement that aren't required to be in the prospectus tend to be dry, legal-ish disclosures.
- Scroll back to the beginning of the prospectus. Note the price and description of the offering on the front page.
- Note the prominent way the underwriter's names are displayed.
- Scroll to the table of contents. What sections jump out at you?
- Browse through the risk factors. These are typically organized by the most serious risks first. Which risks jump out at you? How do you think the managers feel about disclosing these to the public (including their competitors)?
- Scroll to the business section. This is where the company tells its story. The company and underwriters spend weeks drafting this to paint the company in the best light for investors. The first sentence is always carefully crafted by the executives, lawyers and bankers. Why do you think they chose this one?
- Scroll to the executive compensation section. How would you feel if your compensation was disclosed like this to the general public? Would $6 million help you get over that? How might disclosing this information cause other executives to renegotiate their salaries? How might this dynamic affect executive compensation?
- Scroll to the financial statements. How would you feel disclosing your margins to your customers, suppliers and competitors? How might that affect your future negotiations?
8.4.2.2 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 8.4.2.2 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933
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Let's look at when we use the prospectus and registration statement in the sales process, which consists of an offer, an agreement to sell and then delivery. This is governed by Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.
The Offer
Pause for a moment to read § 5(c) below. The rule for offers is that you can't offer to buy or sell securities until the issuer has filed a registration statement with the SEC.
"Offer" is broadly defined to include anything that conditions the market. We'll discuss this further in the next section on gun jumping.
The Sale
Next is the sale. Pause and read § 5(a)(1) below. This subsection says you can't sell a security unless the registration statement is effective. So combining it with the paragraph above, you can't make an offer until the registration statement is filed, and you can't make a sale until the registration statement is effective.
Once an issuer files a registration statement with the SEC, the SEC staff reviews the registration statement and comments on deficiencies. The issuer will make revisions (or argue that the disclosure is fine) and file an updated version of the registration statement. Then the SEC staff will provide new comments and the process will go on like this until the SEC and the issuer are comfortable with the registration statement. Only after that review process will the SEC declare the registration statement effective.
Once the registration statement is effective the issuer can make sales.
The contents of the registration statement are addressed in § 5(b)(1). Pause and read it below.
Each registration statement includes a prospectus, and § 5(b)(1) says you can't use a prospectus unless the prospectus has everything required by § 10. This is a complex area with many exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions. Just know that for the sale, you need an effective registration statement and preparing one is a massive task.
The Delivery
Finally, § 5(a)(2) says that you can't deliver the securities until the registration statement is effective. This makes sense, because you shouldn't have even sold them without an effective registration statement. § 5(b)(2) says that when you do deliver the securities, you also need to deliver the prospectus. There are exceptions to this, which most offerings will rely on.
Summary
| Offer | Sale | Deliver | |
| Pre-filing | Not allowed | Not allowed | Definitely not |
| Filed, not effective | Allowed | Still no | Are you trying to go to prison? |
| Effective | Allowed | Allowed | Allowed |
§ 5. Prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and the mails
(a) Sale or delivery after sale of unregistered securities
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly--
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) Necessity of prospectus meeting requirements of section 10 of this title
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly--
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10 of this title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10 of this title.
(c) Necessity of filing registration statement
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under section 8 of this title.
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8.4.2.3 Gun Jumping: What's an Offer? 8.4.2.3 Gun Jumping: What's an Offer?
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In the last section we learned that you can't offer to sell or offer to buy securities unless the issuer has filed a registration statement. But what constitutes an offer? Obviously, if I say, "Would you like to buy my truck?" that's an offer. But when millions of dollars are at stake, folks tend to get creative, so let's think about how folks might circumvent a rule that says you need to ask someone to buy.
Suppose I tell you, "Hey, that truck over there? It can tow an aircraft carrier. Most truck enthusiasts would give up an arm and a leg to have it." Have I made an offer? I haven't exactly asked you to buy it, but I'm certainly trying to raise your interest.
The SEC takes a broad view of offers. The idea is that an offer is really two parts. First, I give you reasons to buy the truck. Second, I ask if you want to buy the truck. That first part, which the SEC calls "conditioning the market" is sufficient to constitute an offer even if I never directly ask if you want to buy the truck. It's considered part of the marketing effort.
Recall that offers are prohibited before a registration statement is filed with the SEC. Gun jumping is a violation of Section 5 by making an offer before a registration statement is filed or making a sale before the registration statement is effective. Folks involved in gun jumping can be sued by the SEC or be forced by the buyer to rescind the sale.
The release below explains the reasoning and gives an example that may not immediately strike you as violating the rules against offers.
Securities Act Release No. 3844
Oct. 8, 1957
Statement of the Commission relating to publlication of information prior to or after the effective date of a registration statement
Questions frequently are presented to the Securities and Exchange Commission and its staff with respect to the impact of the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 on publication and information concerning an issuer and its affairs by the issuer, its management, underwriters and dealers. Some of the more common problems which have arisen in this connection and the nature of the advice given by the Commission and its staff are outlined herein for the guidance of industry, underwriters, dealers and counsel.
A basic purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 is to require the dissemination of adequate and accurate information concerning issuers and their securities in connection with the offer and sale of securities to the public, and the publication periodically of material business and financial facts, knowledge of which is essential to an informed trading market in such securities.
There has been an increasing tendency, particularly in the period since World War II, to give publicity through many media concerning corporate affairs which goes beyond the statutory requirements. This practice reflects a commendable and growing recognition on the part of industry and the investment community of the importance of informing security holders and the public generally with respect to important business and financial developments.
This trend should be encouraged. It is necessary, however, that corporate management, counsel, underwriters, dealers and public relations firms recognize that the Securities Acts impose certain responsibilities and limitations upon persons engaged in the sale of securities and that publicity and public relations activities under certain circumstances may involve violations of the securities laws and cause serious embarrassment to issuers and underwriters in connection with the timing and marketing of an issue of securities. These violations not only pose enforcement and administrative problems for the Commission, they may also give rise to civil liabilities by the seller of securities to the purchaser.
Absent some exemption, section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes it unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to make use of any means or instruments of interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell a security unless a registration statement has been filed with the Commission as to such security.
Section 5(a) of the act makes it unlawful to sell a security unless a registration statement with respect to such security has become effective. Section 5(b) makes it unlawful to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to transmit a prospectus with respect to any security as to which a registration statement has been filed unless such prospectus contains the information specified by section 10 of the act.
A prospectus is defined to Include any notice, circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale except that any communication sent after the effective date of a registration statement shall not be deemed a prospectus if, prior to or at the same time with such a communication, a written prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10 of the act was sent or given.
Stated otherwise, it is illegal to offer a security prior to the filing of a registration statement. A security may be offered legally after filing and before the effective date of a registration statement, provided that any prospectus employed for this purpose meets the standards of section 10 of the act. Thus, in general during this period (after the filing and before the effective date), no written communication offering a security may be transmitted through the mails or in interstate commerce other than a prospectus authorized or permitted by the statute or relevant rules thereunder. After the effective date, sales literature in addition to the prospectus may be employed legally, provided the section 10(a) prospectus precedes or accompanies the supplemental literature.
These provisions with respect to the time and manner of offering and selling securities apply during the period of distribution of the security, i.e. the statutory prospectus must be employed by an underwriter or a dealer participating in the distribution so long as he is offerring an unsold allotment. All underwriters and dealers must use the prospectus during the 40-day period following the effective date of a registration statement or the commencement of the public offering, whichever later occurs.
The terms "sale," "sell," "offer to sell" and "offer for sale" are broadly defined in section 2(3) of the act and these definitions have been liberally construed by the Commission and the courts.
It fellows from the express language and the legislative history of the Securities Act that an issuer, underwriter or dealer may not legally begin a public offering or initiate a public sales campaign prior to the filing of a registration statement. It apparently is not generally understood, however, that the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort.
Nor is it generally understood that the release of publicity and the publication of information between the filing date and the effective date of a registration statement may similarly raise a question whether the publicity is not in fact a selling effort by an illegal means; i.e.. other than by means of the statutory prospectus. Similar problems will arise from publicity and the release of information after the effective date, but before a distribution is completed.
Apart from the impropriety of such publicity under the Securities Act, a collateral problem is presented by reason of the fact that the dissemination of information, other than that contained in a prospectus, prior to or during a distribution may tend to affect the market price of the issuer's securities artificially.
Instances have come to the attention of the Commission in which information of a misleading character, gross exaggeration and outright falsehood have been published by various means for the purpose of conveying to the public a message designed to stimulate an appetite for securities—a message which could not properly have been included in a statutory prospectus in conformity with the standards of integrity demanded by the statute.
Many of the cases have reflected a deliberate disregard of the provisions and purpose of the law. Others have reflected an unawareness of the problems involved or a failure to exercise a proper control over research and public relations activities in relation to the distribution of an issue of securities.
Example 1. An underwriter-promoter is engaged in arranging for the public financing of a mining venture to explore for a mineral which has certain possible potentialities for use in atomic research and power. While preparing a registration statement for a public offering, the underwriter-promoter distributed several thousand copies of a brochure which described in glowing generalities the future possibilities for use of the mineral and the profit potential to investors who would share in the growth prospects of a new industry. The brochure made no reference to any issuer or any security nor to any particular financing. It was sent out, however, bearing the name of the underwriting firm and obviously was designed to awaken an interest which later would be focused on the specific financing to be presented in the prospectus shortly to be sent to the same mailing list.
The distribution of the brochure under these circumstances clearly was the first step in a sales campaign to effect a public sale of the securities and as such, in the view of the Commission, violated section 5 of the Securities Act.
Example 2. An issuer in the promotional stage intended to offer for public sale in issue of securities the proceeds of which were to be employed to explore for and develop a mineralized area. The promoters and prospective underwriter prior to the filing of the required registration statement or notification under Regulation A arranged for a series of press releases describing the activities of the company, its proposed program of development of its properties, estimates of ore reserves and plans for a processing plant. This publicity campaign continued after the filing of a registration statement and during the period of the offering. The press releases, which could be easily reproduced and employed by dealers and salesmen engaged in the sales effort, contained representations, forecasts and quotations which could not have been supported as reliable data for inclusion in a prospectus or offering circular under the sanctions of the act.
It is the Commission's view that issuing information of this character to the public by an issuer or underwriter through the device of the press release and the press interview is an evasion of the requirements of the act governing selling procedures, a violation of sections 5 and 17 (a) of the act, and that such activity subjects the seller to the risk of civil and penal sanctions and liabilities of the act.
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8.4.2.4 Exempt Transactions and Private Offerings 8.4.2.4 Exempt Transactions and Private Offerings
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Section 4 exempts a variety of transactions from the registration requirements of Section 5. We'll focus only on the first two, which exempt from registration:
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
4(a)(1): Not an Issuer, Underwriter or Dealer
So if you aren't an issuer, underwriter or dealer, you aren't required to register the sale. This is why folks like you and me can trade on Robinhood without drafting a prospectus. There's some traps around what it means to be an "underwriter," so if your client is buying from an issuer and reselling in a short period, consider talking with a specialist.
4(a)(2): Private Offerings by Issuers
The second exemption may be less intuitive. The idea is that the securities laws are designed to protect retail investors doing deals where they have no leverage over the company. No one at Exxon cares if I buy their shares or not; I'm not a big deal. If I asked Exxon for disclosures before investing, they probably wouldn't even respond to the email. The power diferential is too great.
So the securities laws step in to make sure the transaction is a bit more transparent and fair. This encourages regular folks like me to enter the market, and since there are so many regular folks, this increases the total amount of money available for investment.
In contrast, if Warren Buffett called Exxon and said he wanted to invest, Exxon would probably be happy to arrange a private meeting with him and the CEO. Warren doesn't need the protections that regular investors do.
The second exemption above reflects that in private offerings the buyer is already being invited into a private deal, so the buyer presummably isn't as in need of the protections of the securities acts.
Reg D Offerings
With that in mind, the SEC has created rules allowing private offerings under certain circumstances. These rules, found in Regulation D (called "Reg D"), allow issuers to avoid registration for sales that are less than $10 million, where the purchasers are either wealthy or sophisticated or where there is no general solicitation.
Why make it easier to offer securities to wealthy and sophisticated investors? The idea is that the sophisticated investors can protect themselves, and the wealthy investors can afford to lose a little. There are lengthy regulations defining what types of investors are permitted. But the concept these regulations are shooting for is wealth and sophistication.
Private offerings under Reg D are a major source of funding. In 2021 and 2022, issuers raised $4.4 trillion through Reg D offerings. In contrast, registered offerings raised only $3.9 trillion. SEC Investor Advisory Committee, Regulation D: Issuers, Investors and Intermediaries 2 (Sep. 21, 2023).
8.4.3 Defining "Security" 8.4.3 Defining "Security"
8.4.3.1 What Is a Security? 8.4.3.1 What Is a Security?
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At a high level, a security is a money machine. You put money in one side, and you hope more money comes out the other. This distinguishes it from, say, a vending machine. There you put money in and hope for an egg salad sandwich, though this example may stretch the definition of "hope."
The quintessential security is a share of stock. An investor gives the company money hoping that the company will pay dividends. Money in, more money out.
A bond is also a security. Investors loan money to the company in exchange for contractual rights to interest payments. Money in, more money out.
That's the intuition, but as we said before the financial markets offer huge pay days for parsing words cleverly, and clever folks have created structures that operate like our money machine but are dressed to look like cryptocurrencies, chincilla farms or an orange grove. So we need a more technical definition.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "security" as follows (emphasis added). The '33 Act's definition is functionally equivalent.
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a “security”; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
The definition includes items you'd expect, like stock, notes and bonds. But it also includes the term "investment contract," which we'll analyze in the next case.
8.4.3.2 Securities & Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co. 8.4.3.2 Securities & Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. W. J. HOWEY CO. et al.
No. 843.
Argued May 2, 1946.
Decided May 27, 1946.
*294 Roger 8. Foster argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Robert 8. Rubin and Alexander Cohen.
C. E. Duncan and George C. Bedell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the application of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act of 19331 to an offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and remitting the net proceeds to the investor.
The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted this action to restrain the respondents from using the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered and non-exempt securities in violation of § 5 (a) of the Act. The District Court denied the injunction, 60 F. Supp. 440, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 151 F. 2d 714. We granted certiorari on a petition alleging that the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals conflicted with other federal and state decisions and that it introduced a novel and unwarranted test under the statute which the Commission regarded as administratively impractical.
Most of the facts are stipulated. The respondents, W. J. Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, *295Inc., are Florida corporations under direct common control and management. The Howey Company owns large tracts of citrus acreage in Lake County, Florida. During the past several years it has planted about 500 acres annually, keeping half of the groves itself and offering the other half to the public “to help us finance additional development.” Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., is a service company engaged in cultivating and developing many of these groves, including the harvesting and marketing of the crops.
Each prospective customer is offered both a land sales contract and a service contract, after having been told that it is not feasible to invest in a grove unless service arrangements are made. While the purchaser is free to make arrangements with other service companies, the superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., is stressed. Indeed, 85% of the acreage sold during the 3-year period ending May 31, 1943, was covered by service contracts with Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
The land sales contract with the Howey Company provides for a uniform purchase price per acre or fraction thereof, varying in amount only in accordance with the number of years the particular plot has been planted with citrus trees. Upon full payment of the purchase price the land is conveyed to the purchaser by warranty deed. Purchases are usually made in narrow strips of land arranged so that an acre consists of a row of 48 trees. During the period between February 1, 1941, and May 31, 1943, 31 of the 42 persons making purchases bought less than 5 acres each. The average holding of these 31 persons was 1.33 acres and sales of as little as 0.65, 0.7 and 0.73 of an acre were made. These tracts are not separately fenced and the sole indication of several ownership is found in small land marks intelligible only through a plat book record.
*296The service contract, generally of a 10-year duration without option of cancellation, gives Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., a leasehold interest and “full and complete” possession of the acreage. For a specified fee plus the cost of labor and materials, the company is given full discretion and authority over the cultivation of the groves and the harvest and marketing of the crops. The company is well established in the citrus business and maintains a large force of skilled personnel and a great deal of equipment, including 75 tractors, sprayer wagons, fertilizer trucks and the like. Without the consent of the company, the land owner or purchaser has no right of entry to market the crop;2 thus there is ordinarily no right to specific fruit. The company is accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based upon a check made at the time of picking. All the produce is pooled by the respondent companies, which do business under their own names.
The purchasers for the most part are non-residents of Florida. They are predominantly business and professional people who lack the knowledge, skill and equipment necessary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees. They are attracted by the expectation of substantial profits. It was represented, for example, that profits during the 1943-1944 season amounted to 20% and that even greater profits might be expected during the 1944-1945 season, although only a 10% annual return was to be expected over a 10-year period. Many of these purchasers are patrons of a resort hotel owned and operated by the Howey Company in a scenic section adjacent to the groves. The hotel’s advertising mentions the fine groves in the vicinity and the attention of the patrons is drawn to the *297groves as they are being escorted about the surrounding countryside. They are told that the groves are for sale; if they indicate an interest in the matter they are then given a sales talk.
It is admitted that the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used in the sale of the land and service contracts and that no registration statement or letter of notification has ever been filed with the Commission in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations thereunder.
Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term “security” to include the commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment.3 This definition also includes “securities” of a more variable character, designated by such descriptive terms as “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,” “investment contract” and “in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’ ” The legal issue in this case turns upon a determination of whether, under the circumstances, the land sales contract, the warranty deed and the service contract together constitute an “investment contract” within the meaning of § 2 (1). An affirmative answer brings into operation the registration requirements of § 5 (a), unless the security is granted an exemption under § 3 (b). The lower courts, in reaching a negative answer to this problem, treated the contracts and deeds *298as separate transactions involving no more than an ordinary real estate sale and an agreement by the seller to manage the property for the buyer.
The term “investment contract”’ is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports. But the term was common in many state “blue sky” laws in existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also undefined by the state laws, it had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract or scheme for “the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.” State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N. W. 937, 938. This definition was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.4
By including an investment contract within the scope of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of which had been crystallized by this prior judicial interpretation. It is therefore reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used by Congress, especially since such a definition is consistent with the statutory aims. In other words, an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, trans*299action or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise. Such a definition necessarily underlies this Court's decision in S. E. C. v. Joiner Corp., 320 U. S. 344, and has been enunciated and applied many times by lower federal courts.5 It permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of “the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.” H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.
The transactions in this case clearly involve investment contracts as so defined. The respondent companies are offering something more than fee simple interests in land, something different from a farm or orchard coupled with management services. They are offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by respondents. They are offering this opportunity to persons who reside in distant localities and who lack the equip*300ment and experience requisite to the cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the citrus products. Such persons have no desire to occupy the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment. Indeed, individual development of the plots of land that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size. Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as component parts of a larger area. A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments. Their respective shares in this enterprise are evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a convenient method of determining the investors’ allocable shares of the profits. The resulting transfer of rights in land is purely incidental.
Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors’ interests are made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed. The investment contracts in this instance take the form of land sales contracts, warranty deeds and service contracts which respondents offer to prospective investors. And respondents’ failure to abide by the statutory and administrative rules in making such offerings, even though the failure result from a bona fide mistake as to the law, cannot be sanctioned under the Act.
This conclusion is unaffected by the fact that some purchasers choose not to accept the full offer of an investment contract by declining to enter into a service contract with *301the respondents. The Securities Act prohibits the offer as well as the sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities.6 Hence it is enough that the respondents merely offer the essential ingredients of an investment contract.
We reject the suggestion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 151 F. 2d at 717, that an investment contract is necessarily missing where the enterprise is not speculative or promotional in character and where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value independent of the success of the enterprise as a whole. The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value. See S. E. C. v. Joiner Corp., supra, 352. The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
dissenting.
“Investment contract” is not a term of art; it is a conception dependent upon the circumstances of a particular situation. If this case came before us on a finding authorized by Congress that the facts disclosed an “investment contract” within the general scope of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74,15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), the Securities and.Exchange Commission’s finding would govern, unless, on the record, it was wholly unsupported. But *302that is not the case before us. Here the ascertainment of the existence of an “investment contract” had to be made independently by the District Court and it found against its existence. 60 F. Supp. 440. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustained that finding. 151 F. 2d 714. If respect is to be paid to the wise rule of judicial administration under which this Court does not upset concurrent findings of two lower courts in the ascertainment of facts and the relevant inferences to be drawn from them, this case clearly calls for its application. See Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 326 U. S. 630. For the crucial issue in this case turns on whether the contracts for the land and the contracts for the management of the property were in reality separate agreements or merely parts of a single transaction. It is clear from its opinion that the District Court was warranted in its conclusion that the record does not establish the existence of an investment contract:
“. . . the record in this case shows that not a single sale of citrus grove property was made by the Howey Company during the period involved in this suit, except to purchasers who actually inspected the property before purchasing the same. The record further discloses that no purchaser is required to engage the Service Company to care for his property and that of the fifty-one purchasers acquiring property during this period, only forty-two entered into contracts with the Service Company for the care of the property.” 60 F. Supp. at 442.
Simply because other arrangements may have the appearances of this transaction but are employed as an evasion of the Securities Act does not mean that the present contracts were evasive. I find nothing in the Securities Act to indicate that Congress meant to bring every innocent transaction within the scope of the Act simply because a perversion of them is covered by the Act.
8.4.3.3 Exempt and Excluded Securities 8.4.3.3 Exempt and Excluded Securities
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Some things that seem like securities are expressly exempt or excluded either by statute or caselaw.
Section 3 Exemptions
Section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts a variety of securities from registration.
Some are exempt because the protections of the Securities Act seem unnecessary or problematic. For example, securites issued by federal, state and city governments are exempt from registration. Likewise, securities issued by churches and charities are exempt.
Other securities are exempt because there are separate regulatory regimes that handle them. For example, securities issued or guaranteed by banks are exempt from registration, as are some trusts and some insurance contracts.
Commercial Paper Exclusion
The definitions of "security" in both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have an express carve out for commercial paper, which is tradeable debt that is due within nine months. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
Caselaw Exclusions
The statutory definition of "security" might be read literally to include a home mortgage, purchases on layaway or a student loan. But it would be absurd to require a home buyer or a college student to draft and distribute a prospectus prior to taking out a loan. The Supreme Court has held that certain types of debt aren't covered by the securities laws. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). Specifically, the Court has excluded:
- Consumer financing
- Home mortgages
- Secured business liens
- Personal loans to a bank customer
- Short term loans collateralized by accounts receivable
- Shareholder loans
- Commercial bank loans for current operations
There is a rich body of cases on what is or is not a security that is beyond the scope of this introductory course. Our goal here is only that if you spot red flags around anything that looks like a money machine and call an expert to keep you out of jail.
8.4.3.4 Security Definition Problem Set 8.4.3.4 Security Definition Problem Set
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Problems
- Which of the following is a security?
- An investment contract
- Treasury bills
- A call option
- All of the above
- How do you short a stock?
- California Co. marketed parcels of land in an apple farm. When the farm sold land, it would also offer to handle all the cultivation and marketing. The owner wouldn't have to manage anything. Most, but not all, purchasers used these services. Is this land sale a security? See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
- Kitty and Red want to move to a newly built senior retirement community with their friends so she can play shuffleboard and bridge everyday. To create a community feel, residents don't own the condos. Instead, they purchase "shares" in the condo corporation. Each share gives its holder the right to live in one of the condos. Shares can be sold only by and to the condo corporation, and the sales price is set at the initial cost, plus an annual adjustment for inflation. Are these shares securities? See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
- Suppose that the ground floor of the condo building has a few shop spaces that they rent to local businesses. The rents collected from these stores are distributed to the shareholders. Are the shares now securities? What if instead, the rent was used to offset maintenance costs and never distributed to the "shareholders." Does it matter how much these rents are? Does it matter how they are marketed?
Answers
- (4) All of the above. Note: Treasury bills are an exempt security under '33 Act § 3(a)(2) and a call option is a contractual right to make someone else sell you stock (compare with a put option, which gives you the contractual right to make someone else buy your stock).
- You borrow a share of stock, then sell it. When the time comes to return the borrowed share, you purchase it in the market, hoping the price is lower than when you sold it.
- Yes, these facts are similar to SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. The investors invested their money into a common enterprise expecting profits solely from the efforts of California Co.
- No, these facts are similar to United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. Although they used the word "stock," this doesn't meet the Howey test. There was an investment of money in a common enterprise, but there was no expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. That's because the stock could be used only for housing and didn't appreciate, pay dividends, or otherwise distribute profits. Calling something a "stock" does not make it stock. This wasn't a machine where you put money in and hope more money comes out. It was a way to rent a condo. Where the primary purpose of the investment is personal consumption, it isn't a security.
- Profits from the rent downstairs make it more likely that a court will find these to be a security. Recall that the Howey test asks whether there is an investment of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits from the efforts of others. If the rent provides millions of dollars to the shareholders, you might think getting that money is the reason people buy the condo shares. If the rent provides twenty cents per year to shareholders, you might think it is not the reason people are buying the shares, and instead they buy them to get access to the condos.
8.4.4 Securities Litigation 8.4.4 Securities Litigation
8.4.4.1 Securities Litigation: How to Get to Prison 8.4.4.1 Securities Litigation: How to Get to Prison
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This is an incomplete list of ways to get to prison through the securities laws, but these are the ones most likely to trap you by surprise.
Gun jumping enforcement
Gun jumping violations have a private right of action under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. This section allows a buyer to rescind a purchase from a seller that violated Section 5. The buyer doesn't need to show scienter, reliance, causation or injury--only that the buyer purchased directly from the defendant and the defendant violated Section 5.
This is draconian. Imagine that the day before filing a registration statement Best Bikes makes an offer to sell. No one accepts the offer. The company does everything else by the book. Six months later a massive recession crushes the stock market, and Best Bikes' stock price falls from $10 per share to $1 per share. Section 12(a)(1) allows the buyers that purchased directly from Best Bikes to rescind the sale, trading their share back for the original sale price. Effectively, because Best Bikes jumped the gun, Best Bikes is on the hook if the stock price falls for any reason.
This isn't fair, but it's not designed to be. The strict remedy is about deterrence, and you'll find in practice that issuers are vigilant about complying with Section 5.
Fraud & False or Misleading Statements
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 allows a purchaser to sue for false or misleading statements in a registration statement. Section 11 is great for plaintiffs because it doesn't require the plaintiff to show scienter, reliance or causation. It's also terrible for plaintiffs because they have to show they purchased the shares under the registration statement that's faulty.
This can be tricky. Imagine Amazon issues a million new shares next week. That day you purchase a share of Amazon using an online app. You later find out the new shares were issued under a registration statement full of lies. How can you prove the share you bought was issued under the faulty registration statement? Most shares of Amazon have been floating around in the market for years. Because tracing is so difficult, Section 11 isn't the preferred choice for securities plaintiffs.
Instead, the action of choice is Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10b-5 creates a private right of action for anyone that bought or sold during the period between when the fraud started to when it was revealed. It also isn't limited to the registration statement; you can bring a 10b-5 claim based on a press release, an MSNBC interview or any other disclosure that was reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.
The downsides of Rule 10b-5 actions are that the plaintiff must show the statement was knowingly, intentionally or reckless false or misleading. The plaintiff must also show reliance and causation.
8.4.4.2 Basic Inc. v. Levinson 8.4.4.2 Basic Inc. v. Levinson
Updated 11/9/2023
In the following case, plaintiffs, Max Levinson et al., held shares in the defendant's, Basic Inc., corporation. The plaintiffs brought this action after misleading statements made by Basic Inc. about a potential merger prompted them to sell their shares at a decreased price. The issue here is whether these misleading statements actually constitute "material information." What does constitute material information, also termed materiality? Consider the various tests the Court discusses, and of course the one it chose. How do they compare?
BASIC INC. ET AL.
v.
LEVINSON ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[225] Joel W. Sternman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were H. Stephen Madsen, Norman S. Jeavons, William W. Golub, Ambrose Doskow, Arnold I. Roth, and Katherine M. Blakeley.
[226] Wayne A. Cross argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David S. Elkind and Lee A. Pickard.[*]
Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Daniel L. Goelzer, Paul Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, Eric Summergrad, Katharine B. Gresham, and Max Berueffy filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to apply the materiality requirement of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1987), promulgated thereunder, in the context of preliminary corporate merger discussions. We must also determine whether a person who traded a corporation's shares on a securities exchange after the issuance of a materially misleading statement by the corporation may invoke a rebuttable presumption that, in trading, he relied on the integrity of the price set by the market.
I
Prior to December 20, 1978, Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in the business of manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966, Combustion Engineering, Inc., a company producing mostly alumina-based refractories, expressed some interest in acquiring Basic, but was deterred from pursuing this inclination seriously because of antitrust concerns it then entertained. See App. 81-83. In 1976, however, regulatory action opened the way to a renewal of [227] Combustion's interest.[1] The "Strategic Plan," dated October 25, 1976, for Combustion's Industrial Products Group included the objective: "Acquire Basic Inc. $30 million." App. 337.
Beginning in September 1976, Combustion representatives had meetings and telephone conversations with Basic officers and directors, including petitioners here,[2] concerning the possibility of a merger.[3] During 1977 and 1978, Basic made three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations.[4] On December 18, 1978, Basic asked [228] the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and issued a release stating that it had been "approached" by another company concerning a merger. Id., at 413. On December 19, Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of $46 per share for its common stock, id., at 335, 414-416, and on the following day publicly announced its approval of Combustion's tender offer for all outstanding shares.
Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's first public statement of October 21, 1977, and before the suspension of trading in December 1978. Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors, asserting that the defendants issued three false or misleading public statements and thereby were in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule 10b-5. Respondents alleged that they were injured by selling Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by petitioners' misleading statements and in reliance thereon.
The District Court adopted a presumption of reliance by members of the plaintiff class upon petitioners' public statements that enabled the court to conclude that common questions of fact or law predominated over particular questions pertaining to individual plaintiffs. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3). The District Court therefore certified respondents' class.[5] On the merits, however, the District Court granted [229] summary judgment for the defendants. It held that, as a matter of law, any misstatements were immaterial: there were no negotiations ongoing at the time of the first statement, and although negotiations were taking place when the second and third statements were issued, those negotiations were not "destined, with reasonable certainty, to become a merger agreement in principle." App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the class certification, but reversed the District Court's summary judgment, and remanded the case. 786 F. 2d 741 (1986). The court reasoned that while petitioners were under no general duty to disclose their discussions with Combustion, any statement the company voluntarily released could not be " `so incomplete as to mislead.' " Id., at 746, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 862 (CA2 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969). In the Court of Appeals' view, Basic's statements that no negotiations were taking place, and that it knew of no corporate developments to account for the heavy trading activity, were misleading. With respect to materiality, the court rejected the argument that preliminary merger discussions are immaterial as a matter of law, and held that "once a statement is made denying the existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material because they make the statement made untrue." 786 F. 2d, at 749.
The Court of Appeals joined a number of other Circuits in accepting the "fraud-on-the-market theory" to create a rebuttable presumption that respondents relied on petitioners' material [230] misrepresentations, noting that without the presumption it would be impractical to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See 786 F. 2d, at 750-751.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), to resolve the split, see Part III, infra, among the Courts of Appeals as to the standard of materiality applicable to preliminary merger discussions, and to determine whether the courts below properly applied a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requiring each class member to show direct reliance on Basic's statements.
II
The 1934 Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Underlying the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: "There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy." H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934). This Court "repeatedly has described the `fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a `philosophy of full disclosure.' " Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 477-478 (1977), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963).
Pursuant to its authority under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5.[6] Judicial interpretation and application, [231] legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975).
The Court previously has addressed various positive and common-law requirements for a violation of § 10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, supra ("manipulative or deceptive" requirement of the statute); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, supra ("in connection with the purchase or sale" requirement of the Rule); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983) (duty to disclose); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222 (1980) (same); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra (scienter). See also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987) (confidentiality). The Court also explicitly has defined a standard of materiality under the securities laws, see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438 (1976), concluding in the proxy-solicitation context that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id., at 449.[7] Acknowledging that certain information concerning corporate developments could well be of "dubious significance," id., at 448, the Court was careful not to set too low a standard of materiality; it was concerned that a minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and lead management "simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information — a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking." Id., at 448-449. It further explained that to fulfill the materiality requirement "there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the [232] reasonable investor as having significantly altered the `total mix' of information made available." Id., at 449. We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.[8]
III
The application of this materiality standard to preliminary merger discussions is not self-evident. Where the impact of the corporate development on the target's fortune is certain and clear, the TSC Industries materiality definition admits straightforward application. Where, on the other hand, the event is contingent or speculative in nature, it is difficult to ascertain whether the "reasonable investor" would have considered the omitted information significant at the time. Merger negotiations, because of the ever-present possibility that the contemplated transaction will not be effectuated, fall into the latter category.[9]
A
Petitioners urge upon us a Third Circuit test for resolving this difficulty.[10] See Brief for Petitioners 20-22. Under this [233] approach, preliminary merger discussions do not become material until "agreement-in-principle" as to the price and structure of the transaction has been reached between the would-be merger partners. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d 751, 757 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1215 (1985). By definition, then, information concerning any negotiations not yet at the agreement-in-principle stage could be withheld or even misrepresented without a violation of Rule 10b-5.
Three rationales have been offered in support of the "agreement-in-principle" test. The first derives from the concern expressed in TSC Industries that an investor not be overwhelmed by excessively detailed and trivial information, and focuses on the substantial risk that preliminary merger discussions may collapse: because such discussions are inherently tentative, disclosure of their existence itself could mislead investors and foster false optimism. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d, at 756; Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F. 2d 11, 14 (CA2 1983). The other two justifications for the agreement-in-principle standard are based on management concerns: because the requirement of "agreement-in-principle" limits the scope of disclosure obligations, it helps preserve the confidentiality of merger discussions where earlier disclosure might prejudice the negotiations; and the test also provides a usable, bright-line rule for determining when disclosure must be made. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d, at 757; Flamm [234] v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d 1169, 1176-1178 (CA7), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987).
None of these policy-based rationales, however, purports to explain why drawing the line at agreement-in-principle reflects the significance of the information upon the investor's decision. The first rationale, and the only one connected to the concerns expressed in TSC Industries, stands soundly rejected, even by a Court of Appeals that otherwise has accepted the wisdom of the agreement-in-principle test. "It assumes that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate — even when told — that mergers are risky propositions up until the closing." Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1175. Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress. We have recognized time and again, a "fundamental purpose" of the various Securities Acts, "was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S., at 186. Accord, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S., at 477. The role of the materiality requirement is not to "attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, and inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations," Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1175, but to filter out essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger "mix" of factors to consider in making his investment decision. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S., at 448-449.
The second rationale, the importance of secrecy during the early stages of merger discussions, also seems irrelevant to an assessment whether their existence is significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor. To avoid a "bidding war" over its target, an acquiring firm often will insist that negotiations remain confidential, see, e. g., In re Carnation [235] Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 S. E. C. Docket 1025 (1985), and at least one Court of Appeals has stated that "silence pending settlement of the price and structure of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time." Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1177.[11]
We need not ascertain, however, whether secrecy necessarily maximizes shareholder wealth — although we note that the proposition is at least disputed as a matter of theory and empirical research[12] — for this case does not concern the timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness.[13] We face here the narrow question whether information concerning the existence and status of preliminary merger discussions is significant to the reasonable investor's trading decision. Arguments based on the premise that some disclosure would be "premature" in a sense are more properly considered under the rubric of an issuer's duty to disclose. The "secrecy" rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality.
[236] The final justification offered in support of the agreement-in-principle test seems to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate managers. A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive. In TSC Industries this Court explained: "The determination [of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the inferences a `reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him . . . ." 426 U. S., at 450. After much study, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure cautioned the SEC against administratively confining materiality to a rigid formula.[14] Courts also would do well to heed this advice.
We therefore find no valid justification for artificially excluding from the definition of materiality information concerning merger discussions, which would otherwise be considered significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor, merely because agreement-in-principle as to price and structure has not yet been reached by the parties or their representatives.
B
[237] The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the agreement-in-principle test, as we do today, but in its place adopted a rule that, if taken literally, would be equally insensitive, in our view, to the distinction between materiality and the other elements of an action under Rule 10b-5:
"When a company whose stock is publicly traded makes a statement, as Basic did, that `no negotiations' are underway, and that the corporation knows of `no reason for the stock's activity,' and that `management is unaware of any present or pending corporate development that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity,' information concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes material by virtue of the statement denying their existence. . . .
.....
". . . In analyzing whether information regarding merger discussions is material such that it must be affirmatively disclosed to avoid a violation of Rule 10b-5, the discussions and their progress are the primary considerations. However, once a statement is made denying the existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material because they make the statement made untrue." 786 F. 2d, at 748-749 (emphasis in original).[15]
[238] This approach, however, fails to recognize that, in order to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant.
C
Even before this Court's decision in TSC Industries, the Second Circuit had explained the role of the materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5, with respect to contingent or speculative information or events, in a manner that gave that term meaning that is independent of the other provisions of the Rule. Under such circumstances, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 849. Interestingly, neither the Third Circuit decision adopting the agreement-in-principle test nor petitioners here take issue with this general standard. Rather, they suggest that with respect to preliminary merger discussions, there are good reasons to draw a line at agreement on price and structure.
In a subsequent decision, the late Judge Friendly, writing for a Second Circuit panel, applied the Texas Gulf Sulphur probability/magnitude approach in the specific context of preliminary merger negotiations. After acknowledging that materiality is something to be determined on the basis of the particular facts of each case, he stated:
"Since a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death, we think that inside information, as regards a merger of this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser transactions — and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high." SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F. 2d 39, 47-48 (1976).
[239] We agree with that analysis.[16]
Whether merger discussions in any particular case are material therefore depends on the facts. Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will occur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate levels. Without attempting to catalog all such possible factors, we note by way of example that board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or their intermediaries may serve as indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the securities allegedly manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider such facts as the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value. No particular event or factor short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material.[17]
[240] As we clarify today, materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.[18] The fact-specific inquiry we endorse here is consistent with the approach a number of courts have taken in assessing the materiality of merger negotiations.[19] Because the standard of materiality we have [241] adopted differs from that used by both courts below, we remand the case for reconsideration of the question whether a grant of summary judgment is appropriate on this record.[20]
IV
A
We turn to the question of reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory. Succinctly put:
"The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore [242] defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations." Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1160-1161 (CA3 1986).
Our task, of course, is not to assess the general validity of the theory, but to consider whether it was proper for the courts below to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in part by the fraud-on-the-market theory. Cf. the comments of the dissent, post, at 252-255.
This case required resolution of several common questions of law and fact concerning the falsity or misleading nature of the three public statements made by Basic, the presence or absence of scienter, and the materiality of the misrepresentations, if any. In their amended complaint, the named plaintiffs alleged that in reliance on Basic's statements they sold their shares of Basic stock in the depressed market created by petitioners. See Amended Complaint in No. C79-1220 (ND Ohio), ¶¶ 27, 29, 35, 40; see also id., ¶ 33 (alleging effect on market price of Basic's statements). Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones. The District Court found that the presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory provided "a practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23." The District Court thus concluded that with reference to each public statement and its impact upon the open market for Basic shares, common questions predominated over individual questions, as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and (b)(3).
[243] Petitioners and their amici complain that the fraud-on-the-market theory effectively eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff asserting a claim under Rule 10b-5 prove reliance. They note that reliance is and long has been an element of common-law fraud, see, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 108 (5th ed. 1984), and argue that because the analogous express right of action includes a reliance requirement, see, e. g., § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78r(a), so too must an action implied under § 10(b).
We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 206 (quoting Senate Report). Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury. See, e. g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F. 2d 88, 92 (CA2 1981); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F. 2d 457, 462 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U. S. 811 (1965). There is, however, more than one way to demonstrate the causal connection. Indeed, we previously have dispensed with a requirement of positive proof of reliance, where a duty to disclose material information had been breached, concluding that the necessary nexus between the plaintiffs' injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct had been established. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 153-154. Similarly, we did not require proof that material omissions or misstatements in a proxy statement decisively affected voting, because the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the defect in the solicitation materials, served as an essential link in the transaction. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 384-385 (1970).
The modern securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face [244] transactions contemplated by early fraud cases,[21] and our understanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must encompass these differences.[22]
"In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price." In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F. R. D. 134, 143 (ND Tex. 1980).
Accord, e. g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d, at 1161 ("In an open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding of material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value"); Blackie [245] v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 891, 908 (CA9 1975) ("[T]he same causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock"), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 816 (1976).
B
Presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult. See, e. g., 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 541-542 (1977). The courts below accepted a presumption, created by the fraud-on-the-market theory and subject to rebuttal by petitioners, that persons who had traded Basic shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market, but because of petitioners' material misrepresentations that price had been fraudulently depressed. Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, i. e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 153-154, or if the misrepresentation had not been made, see Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F. 2d 175, 188 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 938 (1982), would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market. Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S., at 385.
Arising out of considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy, presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 968-969 (3d ed. 1984); see also Fed. Rule Evid. 301 and Advisory Committee Notes, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 685. The presumption of reliance employed in this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional policy embodied in the 1934 Act. In drafting that Act, [246] Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's reliance on the integrity of those markets:
"No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value." H. R. Rep. No. 1383, at 11.
See Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F. 2d 740, 748 (CA11 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1132 (1985).[23]
The presumption is also supported by common sense and probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.[24] It has been noted that "it is hard to imagine that [247] there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (SDNY 1982). Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.[25] Commentators generally have applauded the adoption of one variation or another of the fraud-on-the-market theory.[26] An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
C
[248] The Court of Appeals found that petitioners "made public, material misrepresentations and [respondents] sold Basic stock in an impersonal, efficient market. Thus the class, as defined by the district court, has established the threshold facts for proving their loss." 786 F. 2d, at 751.[27] The court acknowledged that petitioners may rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price or that an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowing the statement was false. Id., at 750, n. 6.
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. For example, if petitioners could show that the "market makers" were privy to the truth about the merger discussions here with Combustion, and thus that the market price would not have been affected by their misrepresentation, the causal connection could be broken: the basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted through market price would be gone.[28] Similarly, if, despite petitioners' allegedly fraudulent attempt [249] to manipulate market price, news of the merger discussions credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would have no direct or indirect connection with the fraud.[29] Petitioners also could rebut the presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the integrity of the market. For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic's statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e. g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.
V
In summary:
1. We specifically adopt, for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context, the standard of materiality set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S., at 449.
2. We reject "agreement-in-principle as to price and structure" as the bright-line rule for materiality.
3. We also reject the proposition that "information becomes material by virtue of a public statement denying it."
[250] 4. Materiality in the merger context depends on the probability that the transaction will be consummated, and its significance to the issuer of the securities. Materiality depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
5. It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.
6. That presumption, however, is rebuttable.
7. The District Court's certification of the class here was appropriate when made but is subject on remand to such adjustment, if any, as developing circumstances demand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I-III of the Court's opinion, as I agree that the standard of materiality we set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 449 (1976), should be applied to actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. But I dissent from the remainder of the Court's holding because I do not agree that the "fraud-on-the-market" theory should be applied in this case.
I
Even when compared to the relatively youthful private cause-of-action under § 10(b), see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 1946), the fraud-on-the-market theory is a mere babe.[1] Yet today, the Court embraces [251] this theory with the sweeping confidence usually reserved for more mature legal doctrines. In so doing, I fear that the Court's decision may have many adverse, unintended effects as it is applied and interpreted in the years to come.
A
At the outset, I note that there are portions of the Court's fraud-on-the-market holding with which I am in agreement. Most importantly, the Court rejects the version of that theory, heretofore adopted by some courts,[2] which equates "causation" with "reliance," and permits recovery by a plaintiff who claims merely to have been harmed by a material misrepresentation which altered a market price, notwithstanding proof that the plaintiff did not in any way rely on that price. Ante, at 248. I agree with the Court that if Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement is to be left with any content at all, the fraud-on-the-market presumption must be capable of being rebutted by a showing that a plaintiff did not "rely" on the market price. For example, a plaintiff who decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, to purchase a stock; one who buys or sells a stock for reasons unrelated to its price; one who actually sells a stock "short" days before the misrepresentation is made — surely none of these people can state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5. Yet, some federal courts have allowed such claims to stand under one variety or another of the fraud-on-the-market theory.[3]
[252] Happily, the majority puts to rest the prospect of recovery under such circumstances. A nonrebuttable presumption of reliance — or even worse, allowing recovery in the face of "affirmative evidence of nonreliance," Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F. 2d 1261, 1272 (CA9 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting) — would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into "a scheme of investor's insurance." Shores v. Sklar, 647 F. 2d 462, 469, n. 5 (CA5 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1102 (1983). There is no support in the Securities Exchange Act, the Rule, or our cases for such a result.
B
But even as the Court attempts to limit the fraud-on-the-market theory it endorses today, the pitfalls in its approach are revealed by previous uses by the lower courts of the broader versions of the theory. Confusion and contradiction in court rulings are inevitable when traditional legal analysis is replaced with economic theorization by the federal courts.
[253] In general, the case law developed in this Court with respect to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doctrines of fraud and deceit. See, e. g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 471-477 (1977). Even when we have extended civil liability under Rule 10b-5 to a broader reach than the common law had previously permitted, see ante, at 244, n. 22, we have retained familiar legal principles as our guideposts. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 389-390 (1983). The federal courts have proved adept at developing an evolving jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 in such a manner. But with no staff economists, no experts schooled in the "efficient-capital-market hypothesis," no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.[4]
The "wrong turns" in those Court of Appeals and District Court fraud-on-the-market decisions which the Court implicitly rejects as going too far should be ample illustration of the dangers when economic theories replace legal rules as the basis for recovery. Yet the Court today ventures into this area beyond its expertise, beyond — by its own admission — the confines of our previous fraud cases. See ante, at 243-244. Even if I agreed with the Court that "modern securities [254] markets . . . involving millions of shares changing hands daily" require that the "understanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement" be changed, ibid., I prefer that such changes come from Congress in amending § 10(b). The Congress, with its superior resources and expertise, is far better equipped than the federal courts for the task of determining how modern economic theory and global financial markets require that established legal notions of fraud be modified. In choosing to make these decisions itself, the Court, I fear, embarks on a course that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences it cannot foresee.[5]
For while the economists' theories which underpin the fraud-on-the-market presumption may have the appeal of mathematical exactitude and scientific certainty, they are — in the end — nothing more than theories which may or may not prove accurate upon further consideration. Even the most earnest advocates of economic analysis of the law recognize this. See, e. g., Easterbrook, Afterword: Knowledge and Answers, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1117, 1118 (1985). Thus, while the majority states that, for purposes of reaching its result it need only make modest assumptions about the way in which "market professionals generally" do their jobs, and how the conduct of market professionals affects stock prices, ante, at 246, n. 23, I doubt that we are in much of a position [255] to assess which theories aptly describe the functioning of the securities industry.
Consequently, I cannot join the Court in its effort to reconfigure the securities laws, based on recent economic theories, to better fit what it perceives to be the new realities of financial markets. I would leave this task to others more equipped for the job than we.
C
At the bottom of the Court's conclusion that the fraud-on-the-market theory sustains a presumption of reliance is the assumption that individuals rely "on the integrity of the market price" when buying or selling stock in "impersonal, well-developed market[s] for securities." Ante, at 247. Even if I was prepared to accept (as a matter of common sense or general understanding) the assumption that most persons buying or selling stock do so in response to the market price, the fraud-on-the-market theory goes further. For in adopting a "presumption of reliance," the Court also assumes that buyers and sellers rely — not just on the market price — but on the "integrity" of that price. It is this aspect of the fraud-on-the-market hypothesis which most mystifies me.
To define the term "integrity of the market price," the majority quotes approvingly from cases which suggest that investors are entitled to " `rely on the price of a stock as a reflection of its value.' " Ante, at 244 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1161 (CA3 1986)). But the meaning of this phrase eludes me, for it implicitly suggests that stocks have some "true value" that is measurable by a standard other than their market price. While the scholastics of medieval times professed a means to make such a valuation of a commodity's "worth,"[6] I doubt that the federal courts of our day are similarly equipped.
[256] Even if securities had some "value" — knowable and distinct from the market price of a stock — investors do not always share the Court's presumption that a stock's price is a "reflection of [this] value." Indeed, "many investors purchase or sell stock because they believe the price inaccurately reflects the corporation's worth." See Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N. C. L. Rev. 435, 455 (1984) (emphasis added). If investors really believed that stock prices reflected a stock's "value," many sellers would never sell, and many buyers never buy (given the time and cost associated with executing a stock transaction). As we recognized just a few years ago: "[I]nvestors act on inevitably incomplete or inaccurate information, [consequently] there are always winners and losers; but those who have `lost' have not necessarily been defrauded." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 667, n. 27 (1983). Yet today, the Court allows investors to recover who can show little more than that they sold stock at a lower price than what might have been.[7]
I do not propose that the law retreat from the many protections that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as interpreted in our prior cases, provide to investors. But any extension of these laws, to approach something closer to an investor insurance [257] scheme, should come from Congress, and not from the courts.
II
Congress has not passed on the fraud-on-the-market theory the Court embraces today. That is reason enough for us to abstain from doing so. But it is even more troubling that, to the extent that any view of Congress on this question can be inferred indirectly, it is contrary to the result the majority reaches.
A
In the past, the scant legislative history of § 10(b) has led us to look at Congress' intent in adopting other portions of the Securities Exchange Act when we endeavor to discern the limits of private causes of action under Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 204-206 (1976). A similar undertaking here reveals that Congress flatly rejected a proposition analogous to the fraud-on-the-market theory in adopting a civil liability provision of the 1934 Act.
Section 18 of the Act expressly provides for civil liability for certain misleading statements concerning securities. See 15 U. S. C. § 78r(a). When the predecessor of this section was first being considered by Congress, the initial draft of the provision allowed recovery by any plaintiff "who shall have purchased or sold a security the price of which may have been affected by such [misleading] statement." See S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 17(a) (1934). Thus, as initially drafted, the precursor to the express civil liability provision of the 1934 Act would have permitted suits by plaintiffs based solely on the fact that the price of the securities they bought or sold was affected by a misrepresentation: a theory closely akin to the Court's holding today.
Yet this provision was roundly criticized in congressional hearings on the proposed Securities Exchange Act, because it failed to include a more substantial "reliance" requirement.[8] [258] Subsequent drafts modified the original proposal, and included an express reliance requirement in the final version of the Act. In congressional debates over the redrafted version of this bill, the then-Chairman of the House Committee, Representative Sam Rayburn, explained that the "bill as originally written was very much challenged on the ground that reliance should be required. This objection has been met." 78 Cong. Rec. 7701 (1934). Moreover, in a previous case concerning the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we quoted approvingly from the legislative history of this revised provision, which emphasized the presence of a strict reliance requirement as a prerequisite for recovery. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 206 (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1934)).
Congress thus anticipated meaningful proof of "reliance" before civil recovery can be had under the Securities Exchange Act. The majority's adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory effectively eviscerates the reliance rule in actions brought under Rule 10b-5, and negates congressional intent to the contrary expressed during adoption of the 1934 Act.
B
A second congressional policy that the majority's opinion ignores is the strong preference the securities laws display for widespread public disclosure and distribution to investors of material information concerning securities. This congressionally adopted policy is expressed in the numerous and varied disclosure requirements found in the federal securities [259] law scheme. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).
Yet observers in this field have acknowledged that the fraud-on-the-market theory is at odds with the federal policy favoring disclosure. See, e. g., Black, 62 N. C. L. Rev., at 457-459. The conflict between Congress' preference for disclosure and the fraud-on-the-market theory was well expressed by a jurist who rejected the latter in order to give force to the former:
"[D]isclosure . . . is crucial to the way in which the federal securities laws function. . . . [T]he federal securities laws are intended to put investors into a position from which they can help themselves by relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to make. This system is not furthered by allowing monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for themselves. If we say that a plaintiff may recover in some circumstances even though he did not read and rely on the defendants' public disclosures, then no one need pay attention to those disclosures and the method employed by Congress to achieve the objective of the 1934 Act is defeated." Shores v. Sklar, 647 F. 2d, at 483 (Randall, J., dissenting).
It is no surprise, then, that some of the same voices calling for acceptance of the fraud-on-the-market theory also favor dismantling the federal scheme which mandates disclosure. But to the extent that the federal courts must make a choice between preserving effective disclosure and trumpeting the new fraud-on-the-market hypothesis, I think Congress has spoken clearly — favoring the current prodisclosure policy. We should limit our role in interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to one of giving effect to such policy decisions by Congress.
III
Finally, the particular facts of this case make it an exceedingly poor candidate for the Court's fraud-on-the-market theory, [260] and illustrate the illogic achieved by that theory's application in many cases.
Respondents here are a class of sellers who sold Basic stock between October 1977 and December 1978, a 14-month period. At the time the class period began, Basic's stock was trading at $20 a share (at the time, an all-time high); the last members of the class to sell their Basic stock got a price of just over $30 a share. App. 363, 423. It is indisputable that virtually every member of the class made money from his or her sale of Basic stock.
The oddities of applying the fraud-on-the-market theory in this case are manifest. First, there are the facts that the plaintiffs are sellers and the class period is so lengthy — both are virtually without precedent in prior fraud-on-the-market cases.[9] For reasons I discuss in the margin, I think these two facts render this case less apt to application of the fraud-on-the-market hypothesis.
Second, there is the fact that in this case, there is no evidence that petitioner Basic's officials made the troublesome misstatements for the purpose of manipulating stock prices, or with any intent to engage in underhanded trading of Basic stock. Indeed, during the class period, petitioners do not [261] appear to have purchased or sold any Basic stock whatsoever. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. I agree with amicus who argues that "[i]mposition of damages liability under Rule 10b-5 makes little sense . . . where a defendant is neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities." See Brief for American Corporate Counsel Association as Amicus Curiae 13. In fact, in previous cases, we had recognized that Rule 10b-5 is concerned primarily with cases where the fraud is committed by one trading the security at issue. See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 736, n. 8 (1975). And it is difficult to square liability in this case with § 10(b)'s express provision that it prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." See 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).
Third, there are the peculiarities of what kinds of investors will be able to recover in this case. As I read the District Court's class certification order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a-126a; ante, at 228-229, n. 5, there are potentially many persons who did not purchase Basic stock until after the first false statement (October 1977), but who nonetheless will be able to recover under the Court's fraud-on-the-market theory. Thus, it is possible that a person who heard the first corporate misstatement and disbelieved it — i. e., someone who purchased Basic stock thinking that petitioners' statement was false — may still be included in the plaintiff-class on remand. How a person who undertook such a speculative stock-investing strategy — and made $10 a share doing so (if he bought on October 22, 1977, and sold on December 15, 1978) — can say that he was "defrauded" by virtue of his reliance on the "integrity" of the market price is beyond me.[10] [262] And such speculators may not be uncommon, at least in this case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a.
Indeed, the facts of this case lead a casual observer to the almost inescapable conclusion that many of those who bought or sold Basic stock during the period in question flatly disbelieved the statements which are alleged to have been "materially misleading." Despite three statements denying that merger negotiations were underway, Basic stock hit record-high after record-high during the 14-month class period. It seems quite possible that, like Casca's knowing disbelief of Caesar's "thrice refusal" of the Crown,[11] clever investors were skeptical of petitioners' three denials that merger talks were going on. Yet such investors, the saviest of the savvy, will be able to recover under the Court's opinion, as long as they now claim that they believed in the "integrity of the market price" when they sold their stock (between September and December 1978).[12] Thus, persons who bought after hearing and relying on the falsity of petitioners' statements may be able to prevail and recover money damages on remand.
And who will pay the judgments won in such actions? I suspect that all too often the majority's rule will "lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers." Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 867 (CA2 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 976 (1969). This Court and others have previously recognized that "inexorably broadening . . . the class of plaintiff[s] who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, supra, at 747-748. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 214; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, [263] 255 N. Y. 170, 179-180, 174 N. E. 441, 444-445 (1931) (Cardozo, C. J.). Yet such a bitter harvest is likely to be the reaped from the seeds sewn by the Court's decision today.
IV
In sum, I think the Court's embracement of the fraud-on-the-market theory represents a departure in securities law that we are ill suited to commence — and even less equipped to control as it proceeds. As a result, I must respectfully dissent.
----------
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Corporate Counsel Association by Stephen M. Shapiro, Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Daniel Harris, and Mark I. Levy; for Arthur Andersen & Co. et al. by Victor M. Earle III, Carl D. Liggio, Donald Dreyfus, Harris J. Amhowitz, Kenneth H. Lang, Richard H. Murray, Leonard P. Novello, and Eldon Olson; and for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Louis A. Craco.
[1] In what are known as the Kaiser-Lavino proceedings, the Federal Trade Commission took the position in 1976 that basic or chemical refractories were in a market separate from nonbasic or acidic or alumina refractories; this would remove the antitrust barrier to a merger between Basic and Combustion's refractories subsidiary. On October 12, 1978, the Initial Decision of the Administrative law Judge confirmed that position. See In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F. T. C. 764, 771, 809-810 (1979). See also the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case, 786 F. 2d 741, 745 (CA6 1986).
[2] In addition to Basic itself, petitioners are individuals who had been members of its board of directors prior to 1979: Anthony M. Caito, Samuel Eels, Jr., John A. Gelbach, Harley C. Lee, Max Muller, H. Chapman Rose, Edmund G. Sylvester, and John C. Wilson, Jr. Another former director, Mathew J. Ludwig, was a party to the proceedings below but died on July 17, 1986, and is not a petitioner here. See Brief for Petitioners ii.
[3] In light of our disposition of this case, any further characterization of these discussions must await application, on remand, of the materiality standard adopted today.
[4] On October 21, 1977, after heavy trading and a new high in Basic stock, the following news item appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"[Basic] President Max Muller said the company knew no reason for the stock's activity and that no negotiations were under way with any company for a merger. He said Flintkote recently denied Wall Street rumors that it would make a tender offer of $25 a share for control of the Cleveland-based maker of refractories for the steel industry." App. 363.
On September 25, 1978, in reply to an inquiry from the New York Stock Exchange, Basic issued a release concerning increased activity in its stock and stated that
"management is unaware of any present or pending company development that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity and price fluctuation in company shares that have been experienced in the past few days." Id., at 401.
On November 6, 1978, Basic issued to its shareholders a "Nine Months Report 1978." This Report stated:
"With regard to the stock market activity in the Company's shares we remain unaware of any present or pending developments which would account for the high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent months." Id., at 403.
[5] Respondents initially sought to represent all those who sold Basic shares between October 1, 1976, and December 20, 1978. See Amended Complaint in No. C79-1220 (ND Ohio), ¶ 5. The District Court, however, recognized a class period extending only from October 21, 1977, the date of the first public statement, rather than from the date negotiations allegedly commenced. In its certification decision, as subsequently amended, the District Court also excluded from the class those who had purchased Basic shares after the October 1977 statement but sold them before the September 1978 statement, App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a-124a, and those who sold their shares after the close of the market on Friday, December 15, 1978. Id., at 137a.
[6] In relevant part, Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
.....
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . ,
.....
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
[7] TSC Industries arose under § 14(a), as amended, of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(a), and Rule 14a-9, 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1975).
[8] This application of the § 14(a) definition of materiality to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not disputed. See Brief for Petitioners 17, n. 12; Brief for Respondents 30, n. 10; Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 8, n. 4. See also McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F. 2d 458, 466, n. 4 (CA7), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981), and Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F. 2d 209, 218-219 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1069 (1978).
[9] We do not address here any other kinds of contingent or speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections. See generally Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1114 (1987).
[10] See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F. 2d 1196, 1207 (CA3 1982) (defining duty to disclose existence of ongoing merger negotiations as triggered when agreement-in-principle is reached); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d 751 (CA3 1984) (applying agreement-in-principle test to materiality inquiry), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1215 (1985). Citing Staffin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has rejected a claim that defendant was under an obligation to disclose various events related to merger negotiations. Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F. 2d 11, 13-14 (1983). The Seventh Circuit recently endorsed the agreement-in-principle test of materiality. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d 1169, 1174-1179 (describing agreement-in-principle as an agreement on price and structure), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987). In some of these cases it is unclear whether the court based its decision on a finding that no duty arose to reveal the existence of negotiations, or whether it concluded that the negotiations were immaterial under an interpretation of the opinion in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438 (1976).
[11] Reasoning backwards from a goal of economic efficiency, that Court of Appeals stated: "Rule 10b-5 is about fraud, after all, and it is not fraudulent to conduct business in a way that makes investors better off . . . ." 814 F. 2d, at 1177.
[12] See, e. g., Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 93, 145-155 (1986); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1177, n. 2 (citing scholarly debate). See also In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 S. E. C. Docket 1025, 1030 (1985) ("The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to the integrity of the securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot rely upon the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely to invest, thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detriment of investors and issuers alike").
[13] See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 862 (CA2 1968) (en banc) ("Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public . . . if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead . . ."), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969).
[14] "Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The Committee's advice to the [SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue consideration of materiality on a case-by-case basis as disclosure problems are identified." House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (Comm. Print 1977).
[15] Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc in this case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a. Concurring separately, Judge Wellford, one of the original panel members, then explained that he did not read the panel's opinion to create a "conclusive presumption of materiality for any undisclosed information claimed to render inaccurate statements denying the existence of alleged preliminary merger discussions." Id., at 145a. In his view, the decision merely reversed the District Court's judgment, which had been based on the agreement-in-principle standard. Ibid.
[16] The SEC in the present case endorses the highly fact-dependent probability/magnitude balancing approach of Texas Gulf Sulphur. It explains: "The possibility of a merger may have an immediate importance to investors in the company's securities even if no merger ultimately takes place." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 10. The SEC's insights are helpful, and we accord them due deference. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S., at 449, n. 10.
[17] To be actionable, of course, a statement must also be misleading. Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. "No comment" statements are generally the functional equivalent of silence. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 S. E. C. Docket 1025 (1985). See also New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 202.01, reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 23,515 (1987) (premature public announcement may properly be delayed for valid business purpose and where adequate security can be maintained); American Stock Exchange Company Guide §§ 401-405, reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶¶ 23,124A-23, 124E (1985) (similar provisions).
It has been suggested that given current market practices, a "no comment" statement is tantamount to an admission that merger discussions are underway. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1178. That may well hold true to the extent that issuers adopt a policy of truthfully denying merger rumors when no discussions are underway, and of issuing "no comment" statements when they are in the midst of negotiations. There are, of course, other statement policies firms could adopt; we need not now advise issuers as to what kind of practice to follow, within the range permitted by law. Perhaps more importantly, we think that creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because complying with the regulation might be "bad for business," is a role for Congress, not this Court. See also id., at 1182 (opinion concurring in judgment and concurring in part).
[18] We find no authority in the statute, the legislative history, or our previous decisions for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings the action or whether insiders are alleged to have profited. See, e. g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F. 2d 1227, 1231 (CA1 1984) ("A fact does not become more material to the shareholder's decision because it is withheld by an insider, or because the insider might profit by withholding it"); cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 691 (1980) ("[S]cienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought").
We recognize that trading (and profit making) by insiders can serve as an indication of materiality, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 851; General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S. A., [1982-1983] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 99,148, p. 95,544 (ND Tex. 1981). We are not prepared to agree, however, that "[i]n cases of the disclosure of inside information to a favored few, determination of materiality has a different aspect than when the issue is, for example, an inaccuracy in a publicly disseminated press release." SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F. 2d 39, 48 (CA2 1976). Devising two different standards of materiality, one for situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain (or for that matter when any disclosure duty has been breached), and another covering affirmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose (but under the ever-present duty not to mislead), would effectively collapse the materiality requirement into the analysis of defendant's disclosure duties.
[19] See, e. g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F. 2d 1301, 1306-1307 (CA2 1974) (in light of projected very substantial increase in earnings per share, negotiations material, although merger still less than probable); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F. 2d 542, 558 (CA1 1978) (merger negotiations material although they had not yet reached point of discussing terms); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,004, pp. 90,977-90,978 (SDNY 1985) (merger negotiations material although they did not proceed to actual tender offer); Dungan v. Colt Industries, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 832, 837 (ND Ill. 1982) (fact that defendants were seriously exploring the sale of their company was material); American General Ins. Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 744-745 (ED Va. 1980) (merger negotiations material four months before agreement-in-principle reached). Cf. Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F. 2d 1075, 1084-1085 (CA5 1970) (holding immaterial "unilateral offer to negotiate" never acknowledged by target and repudiated two days later); Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1316, 1318 (WD Mich. 1978) (mere "overtures" immaterial).
[20] The Sixth Circuit rejected the District Court's narrow reading of Basic's "no developments" statement, see n. 4, supra, which focused on whether petitioners knew of any reason for the activity in Basic stock, that is, whether petitioners were aware of leaks concerning ongoing discussions. 786 F. 2d, at 747. See also Comment, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 81, 82-84 (1987) (noting prevalence of leaks and studies demonstrating that substantial trading activity immediately preceding merger announcements is the "rule, not the exception"). We accept the Court of Appeals' reading of the statement as the more natural one, emphasizing management's knowledge of developments (as opposed to leaks) that would explain unusual trading activity. See id., at 92-93; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 862-863.
[21] W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 726 (5th ed. 1984) ("The reasons for the separate development of [the tort action for misrepresentation and nondisclosure], and for its peculiar limitations, are in part historical, and in part connected with the fact that in the great majority of the cases which have come before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course of a bargaining transaction between the parties. Consequently the action has been colored to a considerable extent by the ethics of bargaining between distrustful adversaries") (footnote omitted).
[22] Actions under Rule 10b-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 744-745 (1975), and are in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law, see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388-389 (1983).
[23] Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the incentive for investors to "pay attention" to issuers' disclosures comes from their motivation to make a profit, not their attempt to preserve a cause of action under Rule 10b-5. Facilitating an investor's reliance on the market, consistently with Congress' expectations, hardly calls for "dismantling the federal scheme which mandates disclosure." See post, at 259.
[24] See In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F. R. D. 134, 144 (ND Tex. 1980) (citing studies); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 4, n. 9 (1982) (citing literature on efficient-capital-market theory); Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix. 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 373, 374-381, and n. 1 (1984). We need not determine by adjudication what economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.
[25] See, e. g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1161 (CA3 1986); Harris v. Union Electric Co., 787 F. 2d 355, 367, and n. 9 (CA8), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F. 2d 740 (CA11 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1132 (1985); T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority, 717 F. 2d 1330, 1332-1333 (CA10 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thomson, Fairchild, Langworthy, Kohn & Van Dyke v. T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc., 465 U. S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F. 2d 365, 367-368 (CA2 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U. S. 1027 (1982); Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F. 2d 545, 553 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 891, 905-908 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 816 (1976).
[26] See, e. g., Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N. C. L. Rev. 435 (1984); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627 (1982).
[27] The Court of Appeals held that in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed. See 786 F. 2d, at 750.
Given today's decision regarding the definition of materiality as to preliminary merger discussions, elements (2) and (4) may collapse into one.
[28] By accepting this rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in market price. Furthermore, our decision today is not to be interpreted as addressing the proper measure of damages in litigation of this kind.
[29] We note there may be a certain incongruity between the assumption that Basic shares are traded on a well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry market, and the allegation that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic shares depressed, for 14 months, on the basis of the three public statements. Proof of that sort is a matter for trial, throughout which the District Court retains the authority to amend the certification order as may be appropriate. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(c)(1) and (c)(4). See 7B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 128-132 (1986). Thus, we see no need to engage in the kind of factual analysis the dissent suggests that manifests the "oddities" of applying a rebuttable presumption of reliance in this case. See post, at 259-263.
----------
[1] The earliest Court of Appeals case adopting this theory cited by the Court is Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 891 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 816 (1976). Moreover, widespread acceptance of the fraud-on-the-market theory in the Courts of Appeals cannot be placed any earlier than five or six years ago. See ante, at 246-247, n. 24; Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae 21, n. 24.
[2] See, e. g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F. 2d 1261, 1268-1271 (CA9 1979); Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F. 2d 686, 694-695 (CA9), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 829 (1977); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F. R. D. 386, 388 (SDNY 1981).
[3] Cases illustrating these factual situations are, respectively, Zweig v. Hearst Corp., supra, at 1271 (Ely, J., dissenting); Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp., [1981-1982] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 98,348, p. 92,157 (SDNY 1981); Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-1239 (Utah 1982).
The Abrams decision illustrates the particular pliability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. In Abrams, the plaintiff represented a class of purchasers of defendant's stock who were allegedly misled by defendant's misrepresentations in annual reports. But in a deposition taken shortly after the plaintiff filed suit, she testified that she had bought defendant's stock primarily because she thought that favorable changes in the Federal Tax Code would boost sales of its product (insulation).
Two years later, after the defendant moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, the plaintiff resuscitated her case by executing an affidavit which stated that she "certainly [had] assumed that the market price of Johns-Manville stock was an accurate reflection of the worth of the company" and would not have paid the then-going price if she had known otherwise. Abrams, supra, at 92,157. Based on this affidavit, the District Court permitted the plaintiff to proceed on her fraud-on-the-market theory.
Thus, Abrams demonstrates how easily a post hoc statement will enable a plaintiff to bring a fraud-on-the-market action — even in the rare case where a plaintiff is frank or foolhardy enough to admit initially that a factor other than price led her to the decision to purchase a particular stock.
[4] This view was put well by two commentators who wrote a few years ago:
"Of all recent developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market hypothesis (`ECMH') has achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture. . . .
"Yet the legal culture's remarkably rapid and broad acceptance of an economic concept that did not exist twenty years ago is not matched by an equivalent degree of understanding." Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 549-550 (1984) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
While the fraud-on-the-market theory has gained even broader acceptance since 1984, I doubt that it has achieved any greater understanding.
[5] For example, Judge Posner in his Economic Analysis of Law § 15.8, pp. 423-424 (3d ed. 1986), submits that the fraud-on-the-market theory produces the "economically correct result" in Rule 10b-5 cases but observes that the question of damages under the theory is quite problematic. Not withstanding the fact that "[a]t first blush it might seem obvious," the proper calculation of damages when the fraud-on-the-market theory is applied must rest on several "assumptions" about "social costs" which are "difficult to quantify." Ibid. Of course, answers to the question of the proper measure of damages in a fraud-on-the-market case are essential for proper implementation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Not surprisingly, the difficult damages question is one the Court expressly declines to address today. Ante, at 248, n. 27.
[6] See E. Salin, Just Price, 8 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 504-506 (1932); see also R. de Roover, Economic Thought: Ancient and Medieval Thought, 4 International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 433-435 (1968).
[7] This is what the Court's rule boils down to in practical terms. For while, in theory, the Court allows for rebuttal of its "presumption of reliance" — a proviso with which I agree, see supra, at 251 — in practice the Court must realize, as other courts applying the fraud-on-the-market theory have, that such rebuttal is virtually impossible in all but the most extraordinary case. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d, at 906-907, n. 22; In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F. R. D. 134, 143, n. 4 (ND Tex. 1980).
Consequently, while the Court considers it significant that the fraud-on-the-market presumption it endorses is a rebuttable one, ante, at 242, 248, the majority's implicit rejection of the "pure causation" fraud-on-the-market theory rings hollow. In most cases, the Court's theory will operate just as the causation theory would, creating a nonrebuttable presumption of "reliance" in future Rule 10b-5 actions.
[8] See Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. Res. 84, 56, and 97 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, p. 6638 (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange); Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearing on H. R. 7852 and 8720, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 226 (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney).
[9] None of the Court of Appeals cases the Court cites as endorsing the fraud-on-the-market theory, ante, at 246-247, n. 24, involved seller-plaintiffs. Rather, all of these cases were brought by purchasers who bought securities in a short period following some material misstatement (or similar act) by an issuer, which was alleged to have falsely inflated a stock's price.
Even if the fraud-on-the-market theory provides a permissible link between such a misstatement and a decision to purchase a security shortly thereafter, surely that link is far more attenuated between misstatements made in October 1977, and a decision to sell a stock the following September, 11 months later. The fact that the plaintiff-class is one of sellers, and that the class period so long, distinguish this case from any other cited in the Court's opinion, and make it an even poorer candidate for the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Cf., e. g., Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535 (SDNY 1982) (permitting class of sellers to use fraud-on-the-market theory where the class period was eight days long).
[10] The Court recognizes that a person who sold his Basic shares believing petitioners' statements to be false may not be entitled to recovery. Ante, at 249. Yet it seems just as clear to me that one who bought Basic stock under this same belief — hoping to profit from the uncertainty over Basic's merger plans — should not be permitted to recover either.
[11] See W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene II.
[12] The ease with which such a post hoc claim of "reliance on the integrity of the market price" can be made, and gain acceptance by a trial court, is illustrated by Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp., discussed in n. 3, supra.
8.4.5 Securities Regulation Problem Set 8.4.5 Securities Regulation Problem Set
WLD 10/2024
Questions
Claude Shannon: "The measure of the information content is the measure of the degree of uncertainty or, in another sense, of the degree of surprise." Now why am I quoting the ‘father’ of the Information Age? Because if a statement contains no surprise, it contains no information!
- Underwriter for a uranium miner distributes brochures describing uranium in “glowing” generalities. It mentioned the underwriter, but not the issuer or any offering. A registration statement has not been filed. Is this a violation of § 5?
- In August, the issuer’s president agreed to speak to analysts about the company, its plans, its record and problems. In January the talk was finalized and the materials were printed. After that, in January, the board authorized an offering. What do you advise your client?
- WeBuild issued debentures (notes/bonds) which overstatd receivables, understated liabilities, and failed to mention owning $175,000 to the director/CEO. Investors brought a Section 11 claim on the debentures, what result?
- National acquired 34% of the voting stock of XYZ Inc. National placed several of its executives on XYZ’s board of directors, including the board’s chairman and executive committee chairman. National acquired the remaining stock from XYZ, disclosing its ownership share and boardmembers (who abstained from the vote), but not the chairman roles. Was this omission material?
- We Make Alcohol Inc. changed its bottle size from 64 ounces to 51.4 ounces without informing investors. Plaintiff brings a Rule 10b-5 claim claiming the company knowingly materially mislead them (omitted to inform). The company moves for a motion to dismiss the silly claim. Result?
- Telephone Corp is in an auction process to sell the company between $37 - $48 per share. However, interest was weak, and the company eventually sold for $33.50 in a separate process. Further, during the auction process the CEO stated that the merger search was “going smoothly”. Plaintiffs brought suit after the low price acquisition. What claim should the plaintiff bring and what is the result?
- Adam Sandberg sues sues TimberBank Inc. after the company forces him to sell his untraceable shares along with the other remaining 15% of shareholders to the 85% controlling investor of TimberBank. The controlling investor provided TimberBank with a report that claimed the shares were worth $42 a share, which is what the shares were then sold for. However, a non-affiliated investment banker had previously provided TimberBank’s board that valued the shares at $60 or more. Further, the bank stated the deal was “in the stockholder’s best interest”. What will Adam sue under and what is the likely outcome?
- Omicron Inc. is developing a Covid vaccine and its its registration statement stated that it believed it’s contracts with healthcare providers, pharmaceutical supplierrs and pharmaceutical manufacturers were in compliance with applicable laws or legally and economically valid arrangements bringing value to the patients we serve. The government sued Omicron for violating applicable laws. Can an investor bring forth a 10b-5 claim, if so, is Omission or Misstatement more likely to win?
- Rose Bukater is the CEO of Boat Doors, Inc., a publicly traded company. Jack Dawson owns 1 share of Boat Doors, Inc. Jack is suing under 10b-5 for misstatements and omissions based on new research showing the doors do not float.
- Rose says, “We are pleased with the progress of our research on getting all doors to float.”
- What if Rose had already fired the last researcher?
- How about, “I really think the next batch of doors should float”
Answers
- It was “clearly the first step in a sales campaign” to affect the public sale of securities.
- Allowed to give the speech, but recommended they not distribute the materials (to prevent broader distribution).
- The issuer is liable under Section 11 strict liability, and the CEO was also personally liable under Section 11, and the (not discussed) Section 11(b)(3) ‘due diligence defenses’ did not save him because it was not reasonable for him to believe the statements were accurate, especially considering he must have known the company still owed him $175,000. Note, the CFO, in-house counsel, and two other directors were also found personally liable to varying degrees. (see Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. 283 F.Supp. 643 (1968)).
- In the related case (as cited by Basic v. Levinson), the current standard for materiality was promulgated as whether or no the reasonable investor viewed the information as having significantly altered the total mix of information avaiable to her? The chairman roles were not deemed to be material as a matter of law in summary judgment (note: not disclosing ownership or board seats would probably be material). (see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
- In the related case, the motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded, holding that a court could not as a matter of law determine that changing the bottle size was immaterial. The parties settled for $750,000 (over $3 million today after inflation). (see Jones v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979))
- Think: When do we cross the line from overly protecting investors to hurting consumers (assuming increased litigation and settlements increases consumer prices)?
- Plaintiffs will need to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim because there is no evidence of tracing or registration statement here. In the related case, the plaintiffs lost on summary judgment because the statement was not deemed to be material. Rather, the statement was mere “puffery”. "It is unreasonable for an investor to attach significance to a general expressions of satisfaction with the progress of the seller's efforts to sale." (see Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp. 113 F.3d 738 (1997))
- Think: Would it of been beneficial for the company or the shareholder’s for the CEO to inform the world (including prospective buyers) that interest was weak?
- Adam will sue under Rule 10b-5 since his shares are not traceable. In the related case, the plaintiff won, largely thanks to the objective evidence of the $60 per share, however, the law has been better defined by the Omnicare case since then (see Omnicare in next question). Today, this case most certainly is liable under omissions theory, and possibly misttatement. (see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg 501 U.S. 1083 (1991)
- A 10b-5 claim is valid because it is related to the registration statement which was widely disseminated. In the related case case, the misstatement claim failed because there was sincerity to the statements (they believed they were in compliance). However, the case was remanded to determine liability for omission, based on whether there were identifiable facts to make such statements misleading to a reasonable person. The case settled. (see Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund 576 U.S. 175 (2015)).
- The purpose here is to differentiate misstatements, omissions, and mere puffery (vague-optimism is not actionable) or half-truths (reasonable basis in context; not subjective falsehoods).
- Puffery probably suffices
- This may fail as an omission; firing the last researcher is a verifiable fact.
- This may be an omission or even a misstatement.
8.5 Insider Trading 8.5 Insider Trading
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Insider trading is buying or selling securities based on material non-public information.
Why Is Insider Trading Illegal?
If you know where the price of a share of stock is moving, you can make a trade in advance and capture some of that value. This is good. It provides an incentive for people to do research and work hard to find companies that deserve funding and companies that are frauds.
But sometimes your ability to predict a stock's movement isn't based on research and ingenuity, it's based on theft. Insiders, such as corporate executives, directors, or employees, have access to confidential information that can impact the value or price of securities. That information doesn't belong to them; it belongs to the company. When they trade on material, nonpublic information they harm the company, who owns the information, and they harm the markets more generally.
That's because investors are more likely to invest in the stock market if they believe it is a level playing field. If an insider is trading based on material, nonpublic information, there is someone on the other side of that trade. That person is trading shares with the insider at an unfair price, because the insider has access to information that the counterparty does not. This may make investors more weary to invest, harming the market as a whole.
Or maybe not? If the goal is for the markets to accurately reflect the value of a company, what better way to do that than to allow those that know the company best to trade. How long would fraudulent companies survive if their employees could trade on the knowledge that it is a scam? Insider trading might make prices more accurate, benefiting everyone. It's not clear, and plenty of financial scholars have taken each side.
How Does Insider Trading Work?
Insider trading involves trading based on material, nonpublic information. Information is material if it would be significant to a person's decision to buy, sell or vote the shares. It is nonpublic if the market has not digested the information.
Insider trading can take different forms, including trading securities based on material, non-public information or tipping others about such information.
Most of the theories we'll study are enforceable by the SEC, the Department of Justice or by the counterpart to the trade. Two of the topics, Brophy insider trading claims and Section 16 short-swing profits claims, are enforced by shareholders of the corporation whose information was used.
Securities regulatory bodies and exchanges actively monitor and investigate potential instances of insider trading. They analyze trading activities, identify suspicious transactions and encourage individuals to report insider trading activities through whistleblower programs. The federal reporters are full of cases of brilliant CEOs throwing away a lifetime of hard work and sacrifice because just after a winning trade the SEC discovered in their search history, "How to not get caught insider trading."
What Are the Elements of Insider Trading?
Insider trading is a constellation of claims, rather than a single test. That's because the statutes never directly address it, so much of the law in this area is derived from cases squeezing insider trading into other violations, like the statutory prohibition on market manipulation or common law principles of fraud or fiduciary duties. We'll discuss several theories used to prosecute insider trading, which each have their own elements, potential parties and enforcement mechanisms.
First, Dirks explains the classical theory, which is based on duties the insider owes to the persons with whom the insider transacts. O'Hagan compares the classical theory and the misappropriation theory, which bases insider trading claims on the misuse of information in violation of a duty of confidentiality. Salman applies those theories to tippers and tippees, and clarifies the need for some personal benefit to the tipper. Then we'll learn Brophy insider trading claims, which don't rely on the securities acts at all, but instead derive from fiduciary duties. Finally, we'll consider a few legislative and regulatory fixes designed to reduce insider trading. Regulation FD, which is designed to prevent selective disclosure of material, nonpublic information. And Section 16, which is designed to prevent insiders from frequently buying and selling.
Further, the SEC recently successfully brought an insider trading case against an executive for trading on material nonpublic information about his company (Pfizer acquiring his biotech employer), and used such information to trade the stock of another similarly situated company (another biotech company in the same space), whereby he turned a quick profit of more than $100,000. This novel theory (although the SEC argues there is nothing novel about it), is known as "Shadow Trading". At the time of writing, potential appeals and additional litigation may overturn or expand on this idea, but for now, it is important to know that one may be liable under these circumstances. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Matthew Panuwat, Case No. 3:21-cv-06322 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2021). We do not expand on Shadow Trading further in this book.
8.5.1 Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission 8.5.1 Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission
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Raymond Dirks received a tip from an employee at Equity Funding that Equity Funding was committing fraud. The employee asked Dirks to investigate and report the fraud. Dirks investigated, and told others what he had heard. He never traded on the information, but those he discussed it with did. Did Dirks violate the securities laws by telling others about the tip?
DIRKS v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
No. 82-276.
Argued March 21, 1983 —
Decided July 1, 1983
*648 David Bonderman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lawrence A. Schneider and Eric Summergrad.
Paul Gonson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Daniel L. Goelzer, Jacob H. Stillman, and Whitney Adams. *
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic information from “insiders” of a corporation with which he had no connection. He disclosed this information to investors who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure.
I
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors.1 On *649March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regulatory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it publicly.
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited Equity Funding’s headquarters in Los Angeles and interviewed several officers and employees of the corporation. The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly discussed the information he had obtained with a number of clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million.2
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to *650write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging hearsay might be libelous.
During the 2-week period in which Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist’s charges, the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insurance authorities impounded Equity Funding’s records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immediately went into receivership.4
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks’ role in the exposure of the fraud. After a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77q(a),5 § 10(b) of the Securities
*651Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b),6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1983),7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of the investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: “Where ‘tippees’ — regardless of their motivation or occupation — come into possession of material ‘corporate information that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,’ they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading.” 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks “played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding’s] massive fraud *652to light,” 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412,8 the SEC only censured him.9
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment against Dirks “for the reasons stated by the Commission in its opinion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that “the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at large.” 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had violated “obligations to the SEC and to the public completely independent of any obligations he acquired” as a result of receiving the information. Id., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840.
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a writ of certiorari. 459 U. S. 1014 (1982). We now reverse.
*653H-H I — I
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law in some jurisdictions imposes on “corporate ‘insiders,’ particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders” an “affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securities.” Id., at 911, and n. 13.10 The SEC found that not only did breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation,11 but that individuals other than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose material nonpublic information12 before trading or to abstain from trading altogether. Id., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady, Roberts for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: “(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in*654formation by trading without disclosure.” 445 U. S., at 227. In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic information,13 and held that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.” Id., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235.
Not “all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection -with a securities transaction,” however, come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472 (1977). There must also be “manipulation or deception.” Id., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from the “inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage” of “information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes “secret profits.” Cady, Roberts, supra, at 916, n. 31.
Ill
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside information “was not [the corporation’s] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.” 445 U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, we recognized, would “depar[t] radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between *655two parties” and would amount to “recognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.” Id., at 232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such relationships.14 In view of this absence, it has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from trading on inside information.
A
The SEC’s position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is that a tippee “inherits” the Cady, Roberts obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an insider:
“In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving *656confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material information from insiders become ‘subject to the same duty as [the] insiders. ’ Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone who will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presumably, Dirks’ informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks — standing in their shoes — committed a breach of the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he passed the information on to traders.” 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42.
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed Chiarella’s conviction, holding that “[ajnyone — corporate insider or not — who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.” United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.15
*657In effect, the SEC’s theory of tippee liability in both cases appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. This conflicts with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information.16 Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading: “[T]he ‘information’ theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws.” 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that “[a] duty [to disclose] *658arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the market.” Id., at 231-232, n. 14.
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.17 It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1406,18 and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts *659obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.
B
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly “by means of any other person” any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are “as forbidden” as transactions “on behalf of the trustee himself.” Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule “would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not conduct in his own.” 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s duty. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As we noted in Chiarella, “[t]he tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” Id., at 230, n. 12.
*660Thus, some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly. 19 And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider’s disclosure is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob*661served in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633 (1971): “[TJippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . Id., at 651 (concurring in result). Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule.21
C
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa*662tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, the more typical situation in which there will be a question whether disclosure violates the insider’s Cady, Roberts duty is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For example, it may not be clear — either to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst — whether the information will be viewed as material nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate “use of inside information for personal advantage.” 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10, supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.22 As Commissioner Smith stated in Investors Management Co.: “It is important in this type of *663case to focus on policing insiders and what they do . . . rather than on policing information per se and its possession. . . 44 S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in result).
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for transmitting the information. We think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether the insider’s purpose in making a particular disclosure is fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read the parties’ minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty.23 But to determine whether the disclosure itself “deceive[s], manipulate^], or defraud[s]” shareholders, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities *664Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 (1979) (“The theory ... is that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself . . .”)• There are objective facts and circumstances that often justify such an inference. For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle.24
*665h-H
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks.25 It is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders.26 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation by Dirks’ sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street Journal.
*666It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the corporation’s shareholders by providing information to Dirks.27 *667The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 648-649. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. 20, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been “a participant after the fact in [an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.” Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
V
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Reversed.
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protections provided investors by § 10(b) of the Securities Ex*668change Act of 1934.1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 246 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The device employed in this case engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider’s duty to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of personal gain. Even on the extraordinary facts of this case, such an innovation is not justified.
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 658, n. 18, the facts here are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former Equity Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, petitioner Raymond Dirks found himself in possession of material nonpublic information of massive fraud within the company.2 In the Court’s words, “[h]e uncovered . . . startling information that required no analysis or exercise of judgment as to *669its market relevance.” Ibid. In disclosing that information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients would unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and the price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 27.
Dirks complied with his informant’s wishes. Instead of reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory agencies, Dirks began to disseminate the information to his clients and undertook his own investigation.3 One of his first steps was to direct his associates at Delafield Childs to draw up a list of Delafield clients holding Equity Funding securities. On March 12, eight days before Dirks flew to Los Angeles to investigate Secrist’s story, he reported the full allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of Equity securities.4 See id., at 199. As he gathered more *670information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients. To those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the “hard” story — all the allegations; others received the “soft” story — a recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on Equity Funding’s management. See id., at 211, n. 24.
Dirks’ attempts to disseminate the information to non-clients were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a message for Herbert Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he call Lawson again, and outline the situation. William Blundell, a Journal investigative reporter based in Los Angeles, got in touch with Dirks about his March 20 telephone call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in Los Angeles. Blun-dell began his own investigation, relying in part on Dirks’ contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin, the SEC’s Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26, the next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed Blundell and asked to see Dirks the following morning. Trading was halted by the New York Stock Exchange at about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC personnel. The next day, March 28, the SEC suspended trading in Equity Funding securities. By that time, Dirks’ clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The effect of Dirks’ selective dissemination of Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to uninformed market participants.
I — I 1 — 1
A
No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade on his inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed shareholders and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike the printer in Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relation*671ship with these shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at 653, corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure when trading with shareholders of the corporation. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 227. This duty extends as well to purchasers of the corporation’s securities. Id., at 227, n. 8, citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 920 (1951).
The Court also acknowledges that Secrist could not do by proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante, at 659; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). But this is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate information to Dirks’ clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to disclose. Accepting the Court’s view of tippee liability,5 it appears that Dirks’ knowledge of this breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after the fact. Ante, at 659, 667; Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12.
B
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of personal gain. Ante, at 662-663,666-667. In so doing, the Court imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is reflected in the Court’s lack of support for it.6
*672The insider’s duty is owed directly to the corporation’s shareholders.7 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post -Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §1168.2, pp. 288-289 (rev. ed. 1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is based on the relationship of trust and confidence between the insider and the shareholder. 445 U. S., at 228. That relationship assures the shareholder that the insider may not take actions that will harm him unfairly.8 The affirmative duty of disclosure pro*673tects against this injury. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 431-434 (1909); see also Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 U. S., at 307 (fiduciary obligation to corporation exists for corporation’s protection).
C
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not eradicate the shareholder’s injury.9 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comments c and d (1959) (trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3 *674A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 205, p. 1665 (3d ed. 1967) (trustee liable for any losses to trust caused by his breach). It makes no difference to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider’s motives,10 but to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty.11
*675This conclusion is borne out by the Court’s decision in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267 (1951). There, the Court faced an analogous situation: a reorganization trustee engaged two employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the companies being reorganized to provide services that the trustee considered to be essential to the successful operation of the trust. In order to secure their services, the trustee expressly agreed with the employees that they could continue to trade in the securities of the subsidiaries. The employees then turned their inside position into substantial profits at the expense both of the trust and of other holders of the companies’ securities.
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended to nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his motives were completely selfless and devoted to the companies. Id., at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the trustee liable to the estate for the activities of the employees he authorized.12 The Court described the trustee’s defalcation as “a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that of the trust.” Id., at 272. The breach did not depend on the trustee’s personal gain, and his motives in violating his duty were irrelevant; like Secrist, the trustee intended that others would abuse the inside information for their personal gain. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 506-509, 170 N. W. 668, 684-685 (1919) (Henry Ford’s philanthropic motives did not permit him to *676set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public at expense of shareholders).
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking action disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty. In this case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity Funding shares. The Court’s addition of the bad-purpose element to a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim is flatly inconsistent with the principle of Mosser. I do not join this limitation of the scope of an insider’s fiduciary duty to shareholders.13
HH HH
The improper-purpose requirement not only has no basis in law, but it also rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept. The Court justifies Seerist’s and Dirks’ action because the general benefit derived from the violation of Secrist’s duty to shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those *677shareholders, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: “Fairness” versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517, 550 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 338 — in other words, because the end justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred on society by Secrist’s and Dirks’ activities may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks’ clients.14
Although Secrist’s general motive to expose the Equity Funding fraud was laudable, the means he chose were not. Moreover, even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role in exposing the fraud,15 he and his clients should not profit from the information they obtained from Secrist. Misprision of a felony long has been against public policy. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696-697 (1972); see 18 U. S. C. §4. A person cannot condition his transmission of information of a crime on a financial award. As a citizen, Dirks had at least an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper authorities. See ante, at 661, n. 21. The Court’s holding is deficient in policy terms not because it fails to create a legal *678norm out of that ethical norm, see ibid., but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting.
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the information or to refrain from trading on it.16 I agree that disclosure in this case would have been difficult. Ibid. I also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less than helpful in its view of the nature of disclosure necessary to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade on that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them how to disclose.17 See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973) (disclosure requires public release through public media designed to reach investing public generally). This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it is incumbent on the Commission to correct. The Court, however, has no authority to remedy the problem by opening a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on insider trading, thus rewarding such trading.
H <
In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information *679to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain from actions that he knew would lead to trading. Because Dirks caused his clients to trade, he violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Any other result is a disservice to this country’s attempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets. I dissent.
8.5.2 United States v. O'Hagan 8.5.2 United States v. O'Hagan
2/20/2024 pdw
Misappropriation is a fancy word for theft. Misappropriation Theory holds that "a person commits fraud in connection with a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." O'Hagan at 652. In other words, the person committed fraud by stealing information that the person had a duty to keep secret. Because it is tied to a duty of confidentiality, rather than the person's position, misappropriation theory can be used against individuals who are not traditional insiders.
Because it is a breach of the securities laws, misappropriation theory claims are available to be brought by the SEC, the Department of Justice or the counterparty to the security trade. Penalties include disgorgement, fines or imprisonment. This case introduces misappropriation theory. In it, a law firm partner is prosecuted for trading on information he overheard in the office.
UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN
No. 96-842.
Argued April 16, 1997
Decided June 25, 1997
*646Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 679. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 680.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Joseph C. Wyderko, Richard H. Walker, Paul Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, Eric Summergrad, and Randall W. Quinn.
John D. French argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Elizabeth L. Taylor. *
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the interpretation and enforcement of § 10(b) and § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rules made by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to these provisions, Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3(a). *647Two prime questions are presented. The first relates to the misappropriation of material, nonpublic information for securities trading; the second concerns fraudulent practices in the tender offer setting. In particular, we address and resolve these issues: (1) Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? (2) Did the Commission exceed its rulemaking authority by adopting Rule 14e-3(a), which proscribes trading on undisclosed information in the tender offer setting, even in the absence of a duty to disclose? Our answer to the first question is yes, and to the second question, viewed in the context of this case, no.
I
Respondent James Herman O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a company based in London, England, retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent Grand Met regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company, headquartered in Minneapolis. Both Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney took precautions to protect the confidentiality of Grand Met’s tender offer plans. O’Hagan did no work on the Grand Met representation. Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from representing Grand Met on September 9, 1988. Less than a month later, on October 4,1988, Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock.
On August 18, 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney was still representing Grand Met, O’Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock. Each option gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock by a specified date in September 1988. Later.in August and in September, O’Hagan made additional purchases of Pillsbury call options. By the end of September, he owned 2,500 unexpired Pillsbury options, apparently more than any other individual in*648vestor. See App. 85,148. O’Hagan also purchased, in September 1988, some 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock, at a price just under $39 per share. When Grand Met announced its tender offer in October, the price of Pillsbury stock rose to nearly $60 per share. O’Hagan then sold his Pillsbury call options and common stock, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) initiated an investigation into O’Hagan’s transactions, culminating in a 57-count indictment. The indictment alleged that O’Hagan defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by using for his own trading purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer. Id., at 8.1 According to the indictment, O’Hagan used the profits he gained through this trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust funds. Id., at 10.2 O’Hagan was charged with 20 counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341; 17 counts of securities fraud, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-6, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 *649(1996); 17 counts of fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer, in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), and SEC Rule 14e-3(a), 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996); and 3 counts of violating federal money laundering statutes, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1957. See App. 13-24. A jury convicted O’Hagan on all 57 counts, and he was sentenced to a 41-month term of imprisonment.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed all of O’Hagan’s convictions. 92 F. 3d 612 (1996). Liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Eighth Circuit held, may not be grounded on the “misappropriation theory” of securities fraud on which the prosecution relied. Id., at 622. The Court of Appeals also held that Rule 14e-3(a) — which prohibits trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer — exceeds the SEC’s § 14(e) rulemaking authority because the Rule contains no breach of fiduciary duty requirement. Id., at 627. The Eighth Circuit further concluded that O’Hagan’s mail fraud and money laundering convictions rested on violations of the securities laws, and therefore could not stand once the securities fraud convictions were reversed. Id., at 627-628. Judge Fagg, dissenting, stated that he would recognize and enforce the misappropriation theory, and would hold that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking authority when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring proof of a breach of fiduciary duty. Id., at 628.
Decisions of the Courts of Appeals are in conflict on the propriety of the misappropriation theory under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see infra this page and 650, and n. 3, and on the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3(a) under § 14(e), see infra, at 669-670. We granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 1087 (1997), and now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.
II
We address first the Court of Appeals reversal of 0 Ha-gan’s convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Following *650the Fourth Circuit’s lead, see United States v. Bryan, 58 F. 3d 933, 943-959 (1995), the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory as a basis for § 10(b) liability. We hold, in accord with several other Courts of Appeals,3 that criminal liability under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.4
A
In pertinent part, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
“(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b).
*651The statute thus proscribes (1) using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission. The provision, as written, does not confine its coverage to deception of a purchaser or seller of securities, see United States v. Newman, 664 F. 2d 12, 17 (CA2 1981); rather, the statute reaches any deceptive device used “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission has adopted Rule 10b-5, which, as relevant here, provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
“(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1996).
Liability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214 (1976) (scope of Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed power Congress granted Commission under § 10(b)); see also Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994) (“We have refused to allow [private] 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.”).
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation *652on the basis of material, nonpublic information. Trading on such information qualifies as a “deceptive device” under § 10(b), we have affirmed, because “a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 228 (1980). That relationship, we recognized, “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . . tak[ing] unfair advantage of. . . uninformed . . . stockholders.’” Id., at 228-229 (citation omitted). The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 655, n. 14 (1983).
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. See Brief for United States 14. Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws *653trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information. The misappropriation theory is thus designed to “protec[t] the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders’ to a corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s shareholders.” Ibid.
In this case, the indictment alleged that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer for Pillsbury common stock. App. 16. This conduct, the Government charged, constituted a fraudulent device in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.5
B
We agree with the Government that misappropriation, as just defined, satisfies §10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a “deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. We observe, first, that misappropriators, as the Government describes them, deal in deception. A fiduciary who “[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain,” Brief for United States *65417, “dupes” or defrauds the principal. See Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 119 (1984).
We addressed fraud of the same species in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987), which involved the mail fraud statute’s proscription of “any scheme or artifice to defraud,” 18 U. S. C. § 1341. Affirming convictions under that statute, we said in Carpenter that an employee’s undertaking not to reveal his employer’s confidential information “became a sham” when the employee provided the information to his co-conspirators in a scheme to obtain trading profits. 484 U. S., at 27. A company’s confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use. Id., at 25-27. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the Court said in Carpenter, constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement — “‘the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.’ ” Id., at 27 (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 189 (1902)); see Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 119. Carpenter’s discussion of the fraudulent misuse of confidential information, the Government notes, “is a particularly apt source of guidance here, because [the mail fraud statute] (like Section 10(b)) has long been held to require deception, not merely the breach of a fiduciary duty.” Brief for United States 18, n. 9 (citation omitted).
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition. As counsel for the Government stated in explanation of the theory at oral argument: “To satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be consent. To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no deception, there would only have to be disclosure.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 12; see generally Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 390, 395 *655(1958) (agent’s disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential information).6
The misappropriation theory advanced by the Government is consistent with Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462 (1977), a decision underscoring that § 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or deception. See id., at 473-476. In contrast to the Government’s allegations in this case, in Santa Fe Industries, all pertinent facts were disclosed by the persons charged with violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see id., at 474; therefore, there was no deception through nondisclosure to which liability under those provisions could attach, see id., at 476. Similarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no “deceptive device” and thus no § 10(b) violation — although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.7
We turn next to the § 10(b) requirement that the misappro-priator’s deceptive use of information be “in connection with *656the purchase or sale of [a] security.” This element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information. See Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 120 (“a fraud or deceit can be practiced on one person, with resultant harm to another person or group of persons”). A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public. See id., at 120-121, and n. 107.
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities. Should a misappropriator put such information to other use, the statute’s prohibition would not be implicated. The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information through securities transactions.
The Government notes another limitation on the forms of fraud § 10(b) reaches: “The misappropriation theory would not. . . apply to a case in which a person defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used the proceeds of the misdeed to purchase securities.” Brief for United States 24, n. 13. In such a case, the Government states, “the proceeds would have value to the malefactor apart from their use in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon as the money was obtained.” Ibid. In other words, money can buy, if not anything, then at least many things; its misappropriation *657may thus be viewed as sufficiently detached from a subsequent securities transaction that § 10(b)’s "in connection with” requirement would not be met. Ibid.
Justice Thomas’ charge that the misappropriation theory is incoherent because information, like funds, can be put to multiple uses, see post, at 681-686 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), misses the point. The Exchange Act was enacted in part “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets,” 15 U. S. C. § 78b, and there is no question that fraudulent uses of confidential information fall within § 10(b)’s prohibition if the fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction. It is hardly remarkable that a rule suitably applied to the fraudulent uses of certain kinds of information would be stretched beyond reason were it applied to the fraudulent use of money.
Justice Thomas does catch the Government in overstatement. Observing that money can be used for all manner of purposes and purchases, the Government urges that confidential information of the kind at issue derives its value only from its utility in securities trading. See Brief for United States 10, 21; post, at 683-684 (several times emphasizing the word “only”). Substitute “ordinarily” for “only,” and the Government is on the mark.8
*658Our recognition that the Government’s “only” is an overstatement has provoked the dissent to cry “new theory.” See post, at 687-689. But the very case on which Justice Thomas relies, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983), shows the extremity of that charge. In State Farm, we reviewed an agency’s rescission of a rule under the same “arbitrary and capricious” standard by which the promulgation of a rule under the relevant statute was to be judged, see id., at 41-42; in our decision concluding that the agency had not adequately explained its regulatory action, see id., at 57, we cautioned that a “reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies,” id., at 43. Here, by contrast, Rule 10b-5’s promulgation has not been challenged; we consider only the Government’s charge that O’Hagan’s alleged fraudulent conduct falls within the prohibitions of the Rule and § 10(b). In this context, we acknowledge simply that, in defending the Government’s interpretation of the Rule and statute in this Court, the Government’s lawyers have pressed a solid point too far, something lawyers, occasionally even judges, are wont to do.
The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller. The theory is also well tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence. See 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980) (trading on misappropriated information “undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities markets”). Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-á-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic in*659formation stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 356 (1979) (“If the market is thought to be systematically populated with . . . transactors [trading on the basis of misappropriated information] some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages.”); Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 122-123.
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O’Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder. The text of the statute requires no such result.9 The misappropriation at issue here was properly made the subject of a.§ 10(b) charge because it meets the statutory requirement that there be “deceptive” conduct “in connection with” securities transactions.
*660c
The Court of Appeals rejected the misappropriation theory primarily on two grounds. First, as the Eighth Circuit comprehended the theory, it requires neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure. See 92 F. 3d, at 618. As we just explained, however, see supra, at 654-665, deceptive nondisclosure is essential to the § 10(b) liability at issue. Concretely, in this case, “it [was O’Hagan’s] failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do so, that ma[de] his conduct ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of [§]10(b).” Reply Brief 7.
Second and “more obvious,” the Court of Appeals said, the misappropriation theory is not moored to § 10(b)’s requirement that “the fraud be ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’” 92 F. 3d, at 618 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b)). According to the Eighth Circuit, three of our decisions reveal that § 10(b) liability cannot be predicated on a duty owed to the source of nonpublic information: Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983); and Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A, 511 U. S. 164 (1994). “[Ojnly a breach of a duty to parties to the securities transaction,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “or, at the most, to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give rise to § 10(b) liability.” 92 F. 3d, at 618. We read the statute and our precedent differently, and note again that § 10(b) refers to “the purchase or sale of any security,” not.to identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities.
Chiarella involved securities trades by a printer employed at a shop that printed documents announcing corporate takeover bids. See 445 U. S., at 224. Deducing the names of target companies from documents he handled, the printer bought shares of the targets before takeover bids were announced, expecting (correctly) that the share prices would rise upon announcement. In these transactions, the printer did not disclose to the sellers of the securities (the target *661companies’ shareholders) the nonpublic information on which he traded. See ibid. For that trading, the printer was convicted of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that had affirmed the conviction. See id., at 225.
The jury in Chiarella had been instructed that it could convict the defendant if he willfully failed to inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a takeover bid that would increase the value of their shares. See id., at 226. Emphasizing that the printer had no agency or other fiduciary relationship with the sellers, we held that liability could not be imposed on so broad a theory. See id., at 235. There is under § 10(b), we explained, no “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.” Id., at 233. Under established doctrine, we said, a duty to disclose or abstain from trading “arises from a specific relationship between two parties.” Ibid.
The Court did not hold in Chiarella that the only relationship prompting liability for trading on undisclosed information is the relationship between a corporation’s insiders and shareholders. That is evident from our response to the Government’s argument before this Court that the printer’s misappropriation of information from his employer for purposes of securities trading — in violation of a duty of confidentiality owed to the acquiring companies — constituted fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and thereby satisfied the terms of § 10(b). Id., at 235-236. The Court declined to reach that potential basis for the printer’s liability, because the theory had not been submitted to the jury. See id., at 236-237. But four Justices found merit in it. See id., at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 240-243 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 245 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). And a fifth Justice stated that the Court “wisely le[ft] the resolution of this issue for another day.” Id., at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). *662 Chiarella thus expressly left open the misappropriation theory before us today. Certain statements in Chiarella, however, led the Eighth Circuit in the instant case to conclude that § 10(b) liability hinges exclusively on a breach of duty owed to a purchaser or seller of securities. See 92 F. 3d, at 618. The Court said in Chiarella that § 10(b) liability “is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac- . tion,” 445 U. S., at 230 (emphasis added), and observed that the printshop employee defendant in that case “was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence,” see id., at 232. These statements rejected the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information,” id., at 233, and we confine them to that context. The statements highlighted by the Eighth Circuit, in short, appear in an opinion carefully leaving for future resolution the validity of the misappropriation theory, and therefore cannot be read to foreclose that theory.
Dirks, too, left room for application of the misappropriation theory in cases like the one we confront.10 Dirks involved an investment analyst who had received information from a former insider of a corporation with which the analyst had no connection. See 463 U. S., at 648-649. The information indicated that the corporation had engaged in a massive fraud. The analyst investigated the fraud, obtaining corroborating information from employees of the corporation. During his investigation, the analyst discussed his findings with clients and investors, some of whom sold their holdings in the company the analyst suspected of gross wrongdoing. See id., at 649.
*663The SEC censured the analyst for, inter alia, aiding and abetting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations by clients and investors who sold their holdings based on the nonpublic information the analyst passed on. See id., at 650-652. In the SEC’s view, the analyst, as a “tippee” of corporation insiders, had a duty under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to refrain from communicating the nonpublic information to persons likely to trade on the basis of it. See id., at 651, 655-656. This Court found no such obligation, see id., at 665-667, and repeated the key point made in Chiarella: There is no “ ‘general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.’” 463 U. S., at 655 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 233); see Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 122 (misappropriation theory bars only “trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor of the information”).
No showing had been made in Dirks that the “tippers” had violated any duty by disclosing to the analyst nonpublic information about their former employer. The insiders had acted not for personal profit, but to expose a massive fraud within the corporation. See 463 U. S., at 666-667. Absent any violation by the tippers, there could be no derivative liability for the tippee. See id., at 667. Most important for purposes of the instant case, the Court observed in Dirks: “There was no expectation by [the analyst’s] sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did [the analyst] misappropriate or illegally obtain the information . . . .” Id., at 665. Dirks thus presents no suggestion that a person who gains nonpublic information through misappropriation in breach of a fiduciary duty escapes § 10(b) liability when, without alerting the source, he trades on the information.
Last of the three cases the Eighth Circuit regarded as warranting disapproval of the misappropriation theory, Cen *664 tral Bank held that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).” 511 U. S., at 191. We immediately cautioned in Central Bank that secondary actors in the securities markets may sometimes be chargeable under the securities Acts: “Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b—5, assuming . . . the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit isolated the statement just quoted and drew from it the conclusion that § 10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely. See 92 F. 3d, at 619. It is evident from the question presented in Central Bank, however, that this Court, in the quoted passage, sought only to clarify that secondary actors, although not subject to aiding and abetting liability, remain subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain conduct.
Furthermore, Central Bank’s discussion concerned only private civil litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, not-criminal liability. Central Bank’s reference to purchasers or sellers of securities must be read in light of a longstanding limitation on private § 10(b) suits. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), we held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities may maintain a private civil action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We so confined the § 10(b) private right of action because of “policy considerations.” Id., at 737. In particular, Blue Chip Stamps recognized the abuse potential and proof problems inherent in suits by investors who neither bought nor sold, but asserted they would have traded absent fraudulent conduct by others. See id., at 739-747; see also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 285 *665(1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 289-290 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Criminal prosecutions do not present the dangers the Court addressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision is “inapplicable” to indictments for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, n. 6 (1979); see also Holmes, 503 U. S., at 281 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he purchaser/seller standing requirement for private civil actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is of no import in criminal prosecutions for willful violations of those provisions.”).
In sum, the misappropriation theory, as we have examined and explained it in this opinion, is both consistent with the statute and with our precedent.11 Vital to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained under the misappropriation theory, we emphasize, are two sturdy safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter. To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove that a person “willfully” violated the provision. See 15 U. S. C. *666§78ff(a).12 Furthermore, a defendant may not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the Rule. See ibid. 13 O’Hagan’s charge that the misappropriation theory is too indefinite to permit the imposition of criminal liability, see Brief for Respondent 30-33, thus fails not only because the theory is limited to those who breach a recognized duty. In addition, the statute’s “requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the [statute]” in circumstances such as O’Hagan’s is unjust. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 342 (1952).
The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with § 10(b). The Court of Appeals may address on remand O’Hagan’s other challenges to his convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
H-H HH HH
We consider next the ground on which the Court of Appeals reversed O’Hagan’s convictions for fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer, in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14e-3(a). A sole question is before us as to these convictions: Did the Commission, as the Court of Appeals held, exceed its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of *667fiduciary duty? We hold that the Commission, in this regard and to the extent relevant to this case, did not exceed its authority.
The governing statutory provision, § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, reads in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer.... The [SEC] shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” 15 U. S. C. §78n(e).
Section 14(e)’s first sentence prohibits fraudulent acts in connection with a tender offer. This self-operating proscription was one of several provisions added to the Exchange Act in 1968 by the Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454. The section’s second sentence delegates definitional and prophylactic rulemaking authority to the Commission. Congress added this rule-making delegation to § 14(e) in 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. See § 5, 84 Stat. 1497.
Through § 14(e) and other provisions on disclosure in the Williams Act,14 Congress sought to ensure that shareholders “confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock [would] not be required to respond without adequate information.” Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); see Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F. 2d 192, 195 (CA2 1980) (per curiam) *668(“very purpose” of Williams Act was “informed decision-making by shareholders”). As we recognized in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U. S. 1 (1985), Congress designed the Williams Act to make “disclosure, rather than court-imposed principles of ‘fairness’ or ‘artificiality,’ . . . the preferred method of market regulation.” Id., at 9, n. 8. Section 14(e), we explained, “supplements the more precise disclosure provisions found elsewhere in the Williams Act, while requiring disclosure more explicitly addressed to the tender offer context than that required by § 10(b).” Id., at 10-11.
Relying on § 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization, the Commission, in 1980, promulgated Rule 14e-3(a). That measure provides:
“(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the [Exchange] Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
“(1) The offering person,
“(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
“(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source *669are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.” 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996).
As characterized by the Commission, Rule 14e-3(a) is a "disclose or abstain from trading” requirement. 45 Fed. Reg. 60410 (1980).15 The Second Circuit concisely described the Rule’s thrust:
“One violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades on the basis, of material nonpublic information concerning a pending tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been acquired ‘directly or indirectly’ from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working on their behalf. Rule 14e-3(a) is a disclosure provision. It creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.” United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d 551, 557 (1991) (en banc) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1004 (1992).
See also SEC v. Maio, 51 F. 3d 623, 635 (CA7 1995) (“Rule 14e-3 creates a duty to disclose material non-public information, or abstain from trading in stocks implicated by an impending tender offer, regardless of whether such information was obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty.” (emphasis added)); SEC v. Peters, 978 F. 2d 1162, 1165 (CA10 1992) (as written, Rule 14e-3(a) has no fiduciary duty requirement).
In the Eighth Circuit’s view, because Rule 14e-3(a) applies whether or not the trading in question breaches a fiduciary duty, the regulation exceeds the SEC’s § 14(e) rulemaking authority. See 92 F. 3d, at 624, 627. Contra, Maio, 51 F. 3d, at 634-635 (CA7); Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1165-1167 (CA10); *670 Chestman, 947 F. 2d, at 556-563 (CA2) (all holding Rule 14e-3(a) a proper exercise of SEC’s statutory authority). In support of its holding, the Eighth Circuit relied on the text of § 14(e) and our decisions in Schreiber and Chiarella. See 92 F. 3d, at 624-627.
The Eighth Circuit homed in on the essence of §14(e)’s rulemaking authorization: “[T]he statute empowers the SEC to 'define* and ‘prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent’ ‘acts and practices’ which are ‘fraudulent.’” Id., at 624. All that means, the Eighth Circuit found plain, is that the SEC may “identify and regulate,” in the tender offer context, “acts and practices” the law already defines as “fraudulent”; but, the Eighth Circuit maintained, the SEC may not “create its own definition of fraud.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court, the Eighth Circuit pointed out, held in Schrei-ber that the word “manipulative” in the § 14(e) phrase “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices” means just what the word means in § 10(b): Absent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, an act cannot be indicted as manipulative. See 92 F. 3d, at 625 (citing Schreiber, 472 U. S., at 7-8, and n. 6). Section 10(b) interpretations guide construction of § 14(e), the Eighth Circuit added, see 92 F. 3d, at 625, citing this Court’s acknowledgment in Schreiber that §14(e)’s “ ‘broad antifraud prohibition’ . . . [is] modeled on the anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b). .. and Rule 10b-5,” 472 U. S., at 10 (citation omitted); see id., at 10-11, n. 10.
For the meaning of “fraudulent” under § 10(b), the Eighth Circuit looked to Chiarella. See 92 F. 3d, at 625. In that case, the Eighth Circuit recounted, this Court held that a failure to disclose information could be “fraudulent” under § 10(b) only when there was a duty to speak arising out of “ ‘a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence.’ ” Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 228 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)). Just as § 10(b) demands a showing *671of a breach of fiduciary duty, so such a breach is necessary to make out a § 14(e) violation, the Eighth Circuit concluded.
As to the Commission’s § 14(e) authority to “prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent acts, the Eighth Circuit stated: “Properly read, this provision means simply that the SEC has broad regulatory powers in the field of tender offers, but the statutory terms have a fixed meaning which the SEC cannot alter by way of an administrative rule.” 92 F. 3d, at 627.
The United States urges that the Eighth Circuit’s reading of § 14(e) misapprehends both the Commission’s authority to define fraudulent acts and the Commission’s power to prevent them. “The ‘defining’ power,” the United States submits, “would be a virtual nullity were the SEC not permitted to go beyond common law fraud (which is separately prohibited in the first [self-operative] sentence of Section 14(e)).” Brief for United States 11; see id., at 37.
In maintaining that the Commission’s power to define fraudulent acts under § 14(e) is broader than its rulemaking power under § 10(b), the United States questions the Court of Appeals’ reading of Schreiber. See Brief for United States 38-40. Parenthetically, the United States notes that the word before the Schreiber Court was “manipulative”; unlike “fraudulent,” the United States observes, “‘manipulative’ ... is ‘virtually a term of art when used in connection with the securities markets.’ ” Brief for United States 38, n. 20 (quoting Schreiber, 472 U. S., at 6). Most tellingly, the United States submits, Schreiber involved acts alleged to violate the self-operative provision in § 14(e)’s first sentence, a sentence containing language similar to § 10(b). But § 14(e)’s second sentence, containing the rulemaking authorization, the United States points out, does not track § 10(b), which simply authorizes the SEC to proscribe “manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s].” Brief for United States 38. Instead, § 14(e)’s rulemaking prescription tracks § 15(c)(2)(D) of the Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(c)(2)(D), *672which concerns the conduct of broker-dealers in over-the-counter markets. See Brief for United States 38-39. Since 1938, see 52 Stat. 1075, § 15(c)(2) has given the Commission authority to “define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such [broker-dealer] acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” 15 U. S. C. § 78o(c)(2)(D). When Congress added this same rulemaking language to § 14(e) in 1970, the Government states, the Commission had already used its § 15(c)(2) authority to reach beyond common-law fraud. See Brief for United States 39, n. 22.16
We need not resolve in this case whether the Commission’s authority under § 14(e) to “define . .. such acts and practices as are fraudulent” is broader than the Commission’s fraud-defining authority under § 10(b), for we agree with the United States that Rule 14e-3(a), as applied to cases of this genre, qualifies under § 14(e) as a “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer context.17 A prophylactic *673measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited. As we noted in Schreiber, § 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization gives the Commission “latitude,” even in the context of a term of art like “manipulative,” “to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed’ means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term ‘manipulative’ itself.” 472 U. S., at 11, n. 11. We hold, accordingly, that under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is “reasonably designed to prevent . . . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.” 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e).18
Because Congress has authorized the Commission, in § 14(e), to prescribe legislative rules, we owe the Commission’s judgment “more than mere deference or weight.” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424-426 (1977). Therefore, in determining whether Rule 14e-3(a)’s “disclose or abstain from trading” requirement is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts, we must accord the Commission’s assessment “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). In this case, we conclude, the Commission’s assessment is none of these.19
*674In adopting the “disclose or abstain” rule, the SEC explained:
“The Commission has previously expressed and continues to have serious concerns about trading by persons in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. This practice results in unfair disparities in market information and market disruption. Security holders who purchase from or sell to such persons are effectively denied the benefits of disclosure and the substantive protections of the Williams Act. If furnished with the information, these security holders would be able to make an informed investment decision, which could involve deferring the purchase or sale of the securities until the material information had been disseminated or until the tender offer had been commenced or terminated.” 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
The Commission thus justified Rule 14e-3(a) as a means necessary and proper to assure the efficacy of Williams Act protections.
The United States emphasizes that Rule 14e-3(a) reaches trading in which “a breach of duty is likely but difficult to prove.” Reply Brief 16. “Particularly in the context of a tender offer,” as the Tenth Circuit recognized, “there is a fairly wide circle of people with confidential information,” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167, notably, the attorneys, investment *675bankers, and accountants involved in structuring the transaction. The availability of that information may lead to abuse, for “even a hint of an upcoming tender offer may send the price of the target company’s stock soaring.” SEC v. Materia, 745 F. 2d 197, 199 (CA2 1984). Individuals entrusted with nonpublic information, particularly if they have no long-term loyalty to the issuer, may find the temptation to trade on that information hard to resist in view of “the very large short-term profits potentially available [to them].” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167.
“[I]t may be possible to prove circumstantially that a person [traded on the basis of material, nonpublic information], but almost impossible to prove that the trader obtained such information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed either by the trader or by the ultimate insider source of the information.” Ibid. The example of a “tippee” who trades on information received from an insider illustrates the problem. Under Rule 10b-5, “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.” Dirks, 463 U. S., at 660. To show that a tippee who traded on nonpublic information about a tender offer had breached a fiduciary duty would require proof not only that the insider source breached a fiduciary duty, but that the tippee knew or should have known of that breach. “Yet, in most cases, the only parties to the [information transfer] will be the insider and the alleged tippee.” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167.20
*676In sum, it is a fair assumption that trading on the basis of material, nonpublic'information will often involve a breach of a duty of confidentiality to the bidder or target company or their representatives. The SEC, cognizant of the proof problem that could enable sophisticated traders to escape responsibility, placed in Rule 14e-3(a) a “disclose or abstain from trading” command that does not require specific proof of a breach of fiduciary duty. That prescription, we are satisfied, applied to this case, is a “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer context. See Chestman, 947 F. 2d, at 560 (“While dispensing with the subtle problems of proof associated with demonstrating fiduciary breach in the problematic area of tender offer insider trading, [Rule 14e-3(a)] retains a close nexus between the prohibited conduct and the statutory aims.”); accord, Maio, 51 F. 3d, at 635, and n. 14; Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167.21 Therefore, insofar as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation charged against O’Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper exercise of the Commission’s prophylactic power under § 14(e).22
As an alternate ground for affirming the Eighth Circuit’s judgment, O’Hagan urges that Rule 14e-3(a) is invalid be*677cause it prohibits trading in advance of a tender offer — when “a substantial step ... to commence” such an offer has been taken — while § 14(e) prohibits fraudulent acts “in connection with any tender offer.” See Brief for Respondent 41-42. O’Hagan further contends that, by covering pre-offer conduct, Rule 14e-3(a) “fails to comport with due process on two levels”: The Rule does not “give fair notice as to when, in advance of a tender offer, a violation of § 14(e) occurs,” id., at 42; and it “disposes of any scienter requirement,” id., at 43. The Court of Appeals did not address these arguments, and O’Hagan did not raise the due process points in his briefs before that court. We decline to consider these contentions in the first instance.23 The Court of Appeals may address on remand any arguments O’Hagan has preserved.
HH
>
Based on its dispositions of the securities fraud convictions, the Court of Appeals also reversed O’Hagan’s convictions, under 18 U. S. C. § 1341, for mail fraud. See 92 F. 3d, at 627-628. Reversal of the securities convictions, the Court of Appeals recognized, “d[id] not as a matter of law require that the mail fraud convictions likewise be reversed.” Id., at 627 (citing Carpenter, 484 U. S., at 24, in which this Court unanimously affirmed mail and wire fraud convictions based on the same conduct that evenly divided the Court on the defendants’ securities fraud convictions). But in this case, the Court of Appeals said, the indictment was so structured that the mail fraud charges could not be disassociated from the securities fraud charges, and absent any securities *678fraud, “there was no fraud upon which to base the mail fraud charges.” 92 F. 3d, at 627-628.24
The United States urges that the Court of Appeals’ position is irreconcilable with Carpenter: Just as in Carpenter, so here, the “mail fraud charges are independent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same set of facts.” Brief for United States 46-47. We need not linger over this matter, for our rulings on the securities fraud issues require that we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the mail fraud counts as well.25
O’Hagan, we note, attacked the mail fraud convictions in the Court of Appeals on alternate grounds; his other arguments, not yet addressed by the Eighth Circuit, remain open for consideration on remand.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion. I do not agree, however, with Part II of the Court’s opinion, containing its analysis of respondent’s convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
I do not entirely agree with Justice Thomas’s analysis of those convictions either, principally because it seems to me irrelevant whether the Government’s theory of why respondent’s acts were covered is “coherent and consistent,” post, at 691. It is true that with respect to matters over which an agency has been accorded adjudicative authority or policy-making discretion, the agency’s action must be supported by the reasons that the agency sets forth, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 94 (1943); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947), but I do not think an agency’s unadorned application of the law need be, at least where (as here) no Chevron deference is being given to the agency’s interpretation, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). In point of fact, respondent’s actions either violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, or they did not — regardless of the reasons the Government gave. And it is for us to decide.
While the Court’s explanation of the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be entirely reasonable in some other context, it does not seem to accord with the principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes (which cannot be mitigated here by the Rule, which is no less ambiguous than the statute). See Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 64-65 (1995) (explaining circumstances in which rule of lenity applies); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348 (1971) (discussing policies underlying rule of lenity). In light of that principle, it seems to me that the unelaborated statutory language: “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,” § 10(b), must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction.
with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Today the majority upholds respondent’s convictions for violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, based upon the Securities and Exchange Commission’s “misappropriation theory.” Central to the majority’s holding is the need to interpret §10(b)’s requirement that a deceptive device be “use[d] or employed], in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). Because the Commission’s misappropriation theory fails to provide a coherent and consistent interpretation of this essential requirement for liability under § 10(b), I dissent.
The majority also sustains respondent’s convictions under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 14e-3(a) promulgated thereunder, regardless of whether respondent violated a fiduciary duty to anybody. I dissent too from that holding because, while § 14(e) does allow regulations prohibiting nonfraudulent acts as a prophylactic against certain fraudulent acts, neither the majority nor the Commission identifies any relevant underlying fraud against which Rule 14e-3(a) reasonably provides prophylaxis. With regard to respondent’s mail fraud convictions, however, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
I
I do not take issue with the majority’s determination that the undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary can constitute a “deceptive device” within the meaning of § 10(b). Nondisclosure where there is a preexisting duty to disclose satisfies our definitions of fraud and deceit for purposes of the securities laws. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 (1980).
Unlike the majority, however, I cannot accept the Commission’s interpretation of when a deceptive device is “use[d]... in connection with” a securities transaction. Although the Commission and the majority at points seem to suggest that *681 any relation to a securities transaction satisfies the “in connection with” requirement of § 10(b), both ultimately reject such an overly expansive construction and require a more integral connection between the fraud and the securities transaction. The majority states, for example, that the misappropriation theory applies to undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information “for securities trading purposes,” ante, at 652, thus seeming to require a particular intent by the misappropriator in order to satisfy the “in connection with” language. See also ante, at 656 (the “misappropriation theory targets information of a sort that misap-propriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities” (emphasis added)); ante, at 656-657 (distinguishing embezzlement of money used to buy securities as lacking the requisite connection). The Commission goes further, and argues that the misappropriation theory satisfies the “in connection with” requirement because it “depends on an inherent connection between the deceptive conduct and the purchase or sale of a security.” Brief for United States 21 (emphasis added); see also ibid, (the “misappropriated information had personal value to respondent only because of its utility in securities trading” (emphasis added)).
The Commission’s construction of the relevant language in § 10(b), and the incoherence of that construction, become evident as the majority attempts to describe why the fraudulent theft of information falls under the Commission’s misappropriation theory, but the fraudulent theft of money does not. The majority correctly notes that confidential information “qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.” Ante, at 654. It then observes that the “undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty,.. . constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement — the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.” *682 Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).1 So far the majority’s analogy to embezzlement is well taken, and adequately demonstrates that undisclosed misappropriation can be a fraud on the source of the information.
What the embezzlement analogy does not do, however, is explain how the relevant fraud is “use[d] or employ[ed], in connection with” a securities transaction. And when the majority seeks to distinguish the embezzlement of funds from the embezzlement of information, it becomes clear that neither the Commission nor the majority has a coherent theory regarding § 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement.
Turning first to why embezzlement of information supposedly meets the “in connection with” requirement, the majority asserts that the requirement
“is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.” Ante, at 656.
The majority later notes, with apparent approval, the Government’s contention that the embezzlement of funds used to purchase securities would not fall within the misappropriation theory. Ante, at 656-657 (citing Brief for United States 24, n. 13). The misappropriation of funds used for a securities transaction is not covered by its theory, the Government explains, because “the proceeds would have value to the malefactor apart from their use in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete ás soon as the money was *683obtained.” Brief for United States 24, n. 13; see ante, at 656 (quoting Government’s explanation).
Accepting the Government’s description of the scope of its own theory, it becomes plain that the majority’s explanation of how the misappropriation theory supposedly satisfies the “in connection with” requirement is incomplete. The touchstone required for an embezzlement to be “use[d] or employed], in connection with” a securities transaction is not merely that it “coincide” with, or be consummated by, the transaction, but that it is necessarily and only consummated by the transaction. Where the property being embezzled has value “apart from [its] use in a securities transaction”— even though it is in fact being used in a securities transaction — the Government contends that there is no violation under the misappropriation theory.
My understanding of the Government’s proffered theory of liability, and its construction of the “in connection with” requirement, is confirmed by the Government’s explanation during oral argument:
“[Court]: What if I appropriate some of my client’s money in order to buy stock?
“[Court]: Have I violated the securities laws?
“[Counsel]: I do not think that you have.
“[Court]: Why not? Isn’t that in connection with the purchase of securities] just as much as this one is?
“[Counsel]: It’s not just as much as this one is, because in this case it is the use of the information that enables the profits, pure and simple. There would be no opportunity to engage in profit—
“[Court]: Same here. I didn’t have the money. The only way I could buy this stock was to get the money.
“[Counsel]: The difference ... is that once you have the money you can do anything you want with it. In a sense, the fraud is complete at that point, and then you *684go on and you can use the money to finance any number of other activities, but the connection is far less close than in this case, where the only value of this information for personal profit for respondent was to take it and profit in the securities markets by trading on it.
“[Court]: So what you’re saying is, is in this case the misappropriation can only be of relevance, or is of substantial relevance, is with reference to the purchase of securities.
“[Counsel]: Exactly.
“[Court]: When you take the money out of the accounts you can go to the racetrack, or whatever.
“[Counsel]: That’s exactly right, and because of that difference, [there] can be no doubt that this kind of misappropriation of property is in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
“Other kinds of misappropriation of property may or may not, but this is a unique form of fraud, unique to the securities markets, in fact, because the only way in which respondent could have profited through this information is by either trading on it or by tipping somebody else to enable their trades.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-19 (emphases added).
As the above exchange demonstrates, the relevant distinction is not that the misappropriated information was used for a securities transaction (the money example met that test), but rather that it could only be used for such a transaction. See also id., at 6-7 (Government contention that the misappropriation theory satisfies “the requisite connection between the fraud and the securities trading, because it is only in the trading that the fraud is consummated” (emphasis added)); id., at 8 (same).
The Government’s construction of the “in connection with” requirement — and its claim that such requirement precludes coverage of financial embezzlement — also demonstrates how *685the majority’s described distinction of financial embezzlement is incomplete. Although the majority claims that the fraud in a financial embezzlement case is complete as soon as the money is obtained, and before the securities transaction is consummated, that is not uniformly true, and thus cannot be the Government’s basis for claiming that such embezzlement does not violate the securities laws. It is not difficult to imagine an embezzlement of money that takes place via the mechanism of a securities transaction — for example where a broker is directed to purchase stock for a client and instead purchases such stock — using client funds — for his own account. The unauthorized (and presumably undisclosed) transaction is the very act that constitutes the embezzlement and the “securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.” What presumably distinguishes monetary embezzlement for the Government is thus that it is not necessarily coincident with a securities transaction, not that it never lacks such a “connection.”
Once the Government’s construction of the misappropriation theory is accurately described and accepted — along with its implied construction of § 10(b)’s “in connection with” language — that theory should no longer cover cases, such as this one, involving fraud on the source of information where the source has no connection with the other participant in a securities transaction. It seems obvious that the undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information is not necessarily consummated by a securities transaction. In this case, for example, upon learning of Grand Met’s confidential takeover plans, O’Hagan could have done any number of things with the information: He could have sold it to a newspaper for publication, see id., at 36; he could have given or sold the information to Pillsbury itself, see id., at 37; or he could even have kept the information and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in a fantasy stock trading game.
Any of these activities would have deprived Grand Met of its right to “exclusive use,” ante, at 654, of the information *686and, if undisclosed, would constitute “embezzlement” of Grand Met’s informational property. Under any theory of liability, however, these activities would not violate § 10(b) and, according to the Commission’s monetary embezzlement analogy, these possibilities are sufficient to preclude a violation under the misappropriation theory even where the informational property was used for securities trading. That O’Hagan actually did use the information to purchase securities is thus no more significant here than it is in the case of embezzling money used to purchase securities. In both cases the embezzler could have done something else with the property, and hence the Commission’s necessary “connection” under the securities laws would not be met.2 If the relevant test under the “in connection with” language is whether the fraudulent act is necessarily tied to a securities transaction, then the misappropriation of confidential information used to trade no more violates § 10(b) than does the misappropriation of funds used to trade. As the Commission concedes that the latter is not covered under its theory, I am at a loss to see how the same theory can coherently be applied to the former.3
*687The majority makes no attempt to defend the misappropriation theory as set forth by the Commission. Indeed, the majority implicitly concedes the indefensibility of the Commission’s theory by acknowledging that alternative uses of misappropriated information exist that do not violate the securities laws and then dismissing the Government’s repeated explanations of its misappropriation theory as mere “overstatement.” Ante, at 657. Having rejected the Government’s description of its theory, the majority then engages in the “imaginative” exercise of constructing its own misappropriation theory from whole cloth. Thus, we are told, if we merely “ [substitute ‘ordinarily’ for ‘only’ ” when describing the degree of connectedness between a misappropriation and a securities transaction, the Government would have a winner. Ibid. Presumably, the majority would similarly edit the Government’s brief to this Court to argue for only an “ordinary,” rather than an “inherent connection between the deceptive conduct and the purchase or sale of a security.” Brief for United States 21 (emphasis added).
I need not address the coherence, or lack thereof, of the majority’s new theory, for it suffers from a far greater, and dispositive, flaw: It is not the theory offered by the Commission. Indeed, as far as we know from the majority’s opinion, this new theory has never been proposed by the Commission, much less adopted by rule or otherwise. It is a fundamental proposition of law that this Court “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). We do not even credit a “post hoc rationalization]” of counsel for the agency, id., at 50, so one is left to wonder how we could possibly rely on a post hoc rationaliza*688tion invented by this Court and never even presented by the Commission for our consideration.
Whether the majority’s new theory has merit, we cannot possibly tell on the record before us. There are no findings regarding the “ordinary” use of misappropriated information, much less regarding the “ordinary” use of other forms of embezzled property. The Commission has not opined on the scope of the new requirement that property must “ordinarily” be used for securities trading in order for its misappropriation to be “in connection with” a securities transaction. We simply do not know what would or would not be covered by such a requirement, and hence cannot evaluate whether the requirement embodies a consistent and coherent interpretation of the statute.4 Moreover, persons subject to *689this new theory, such as respondent here, surely could not and cannot regulate their behavior to comply with the new theory because, until today, the theory has never existed. In short, the majority’s new theory is simply not presented by this case, and cannot form the basis for upholding respondent’s convictions.
In upholding respondent’s convictions under the new and improved misappropriation theory, the majority also points to various policy considerations underlying the securities laws, such as maintaining fair and honest markets, promoting investor confidence, and protecting the integrity of the securities markets. Ante, at 657, 658-659. But the repeated reliance on such broad-sweeping legislative purposes reaches too far and is misleading in the context of the misappropriation theory. It reaches too far in that, regardless of the overarching purpose of the securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the “purpose” of a statute, only its letter. The majority’s approach is misleading in this case because it glosses over the fact that the supposed threat to fair and honest markets, investor confidence, and market integrity comes not from the supposed fraud in this case, but from the mere fact that the information used by O’Hagan was nonpublic.
As the majority concedes, because “the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation.” Ante, at 655 (emphasis added). Indeed, were the source expressly to authorize its agents to trade on the confidential information — as a perk or bonus, perhaps — there would likewise be no § 10(b) violation.5 Yet in either case — disclosed *690misuse or authorized use — the hypothesized “inhibiting impact on market participation,” ante, at 659, would be identical to that from behavior violating the misappropriation theory: “Outsiders” would still be trading based on nonpublic information that the average investor has no hope of obtaining through his own diligence.6
The majority’s statement that a “misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public,” ante, at 656 (emphasis added), thus focuses on the wrong point. Even if it is true that trading on nonpublic information hurts the public, it is true whether or not there is any deception of the source of the information.7 Moreover, as *691we have repeatedly held, use of nonpublic information to trade is not itself a violation of § 10(b). E. g., Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 232-233. Rather, it is the use of fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction that is forbidden. Where the relevant element of fraud has no impact on the integrity of the subsequent transactions as distinct from the nonfraud-ulent element of using nonpublic information, one can reasonably question whether the fraud was used in connection with a securities transaction. And one can likewise question whether removing that aspect of fraud, though perhaps laudable, has anything to do with the confidence or integrity of the market.
The absence of a coherent and consistent misappropriation theory and, by necessary implication, a coherent and consistent application of the statutory “use or employ, in connection with” language, is particularly problematic in the context of this case. The Government claims a remarkable breadth to the delegation of authority in § 10(b), arguing that “the very aim of this section was to pick up unforeseen, cunning, deceptive devices that people might cleverly use in the securities markets.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. As the Court aptly queried, “[t]hat’s rather unusual, for a criminal statute to be that open-ended, isn’t it?” Ibid. Unusual indeed. Putting aside the dubious validity of an open-ended delegation to an independent agency to go forth and create regulations criminalizing “fraud,” in this case we do not even have a formal regulation embodying the agency’s misappropriation theory. Certainly Rule 10b-5 cannot be said to embody the theory— although it deviates from the statutory language by the addition of the words “any person,” it merely repeats, unchanged, § 10(b)’s “in connection with” language. Given that the validity of the misappropriation theory turns on the construc*692tion of that language in § 10(b), the regulatory language is singularly uninformative.8
Because we have no regulation squarely setting forth some version of the misappropriation theory as the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory language, we are left with little more than the Commission’s litigating position or the majority’s completely novel theory that is not even acknowledged, much less adopted, by the Commission. As we have noted before, such positions are not entitled to deference and, at most, get such weight as their persuasiveness warrants. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, ante, at 138, n. 9, 140, n. 10. Yet I find wholly unpersuasive a litigating position by the Commission that, at best, embodies an inconsistent and incoherent interpretation of the relevant statutory language and that does not provide any predictable guidance as to what behavior contravenes the statute. That position is no better than an ad hoc interpretation of statutory language and in my view can provide no basis for liability.
II
I am also of the view that O’Hagan’s conviction for violating Rule 14e-3(a) cannot stand. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act provides, in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer .... The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means *693reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e).
Pursuant to the rulemaking authority conferred by this section, the Commission has promulgated Rule 14e-3(a), which provides, in relevant part:
“(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the [Securities Exchange] Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
“(1) The offering person,
“(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
“(3) [Any person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer], to purchase or sell [any such securities or various instruments related to such securities], unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.” 17 CFR § 240.14e-3(a) (1996).
As the majority acknowledges, Rule 14e-3(a) prohibits a broad range of behavior regardless of whether such behavior is fraudulent under our precedents. See ante, at 669 (Rule applies “ ‘without regard to whether the trader owes a preexisting fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information’” (emphasis deleted)) (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d 551, 557 (CA2 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1004 (1992)).
*694The Commission offers two grounds in defense of Rule 14e-3(a). First, it argues that § 14(e) delegates to the Commission the authority to “define” fraud differently than that concept has been defined by this Court, and that Rule 14e-3(a) is a valid exercise of that “defining” power. Second, it argues that § 14(e) authorizes the Commission to “prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent acts, and that Rule 14e-3(a) is a prophylactic rule that may prohibit nonfraudulent acts as a means of preventing fraudulent acts that are difficult to detect or prove.
The majority declines to reach the Commission’s first justification, instead sustaining Rule 14e-3(a) on the ground that
“under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is ‘reasonably designed to prevent.. . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.’” Ante, at 673 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e)).
According to the majority, prohibiting trading on nonpublic information is necessary to prevent such supposedly hard-to-prove fraudulent acts and practices as trading on information obtained from the buyer in breach of a fiduciary duty, ante, at 675, and possibly “warehousing,” whereby the buyer tips allies prior to announcing the tender offer and encourages them to purchase the target company’s stock, ante, at 672-673, n. 17.9
I find neither of the Commission’s justifications for Rule 14e-3(a) acceptable in misappropriation cases. With regard to the Commission’s claim of authority to redefine the concept of fraud, I agree with the Eighth Circuit that the Commission misreads the relevant provision of § 14(e).
*695“Simply put, the enabling provision of § 14(e) permits the SEC to identify and regulate those ‘acts and practices’ which fall within the § 14(e) legal definition of ‘fraudulent,’ but it does not grant the SEC a license to redefine the term.” 92 F. 3d 612, 624 (1996).
This conclusion follows easily from our similar statement in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U. S. 1, 11, n. 11 (1985), that § 14(e) gives the “Commission latitude to regulate nondeceptive activities as a ‘reasonably designed’ means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term ‘manipulative’ itself.”
Insofar as the Rule 14e-3(a) purports to “define” acts and practices that “are fraudulent,” it must be measured against our precedents interpreting the scope of fraud. The majority concedes, however, that Rule 14e-3(a) does not prohibit merely trading in connection with fraudulent nondisclosure, but rather it prohibits trading in connection with any nondisclosure, regardless of the presence of a pre-existing duty to disclose. Ante, at 669. The Rule thus exceeds the scope of the Commission’s authority to define such acts and practices as “are fraudulent.”10
*696Turning to the Commission’s second justification for Rule 14e-3(a), although I can agree with the majority that § 14(e) authorizes the Commission to prohibit nonfraudulent acts as a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent ones, I cannot agree that Rule 14e-3(a) satisfies this standard. As an initial matter, the Rule, on its face, does not purport to be an exercise of the Commission’s prophylactic power, but rather a redefinition of what “constitute[s] a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of § 14(e).” That Rule 14e-3(a) could have been “conceived and defended, alternatively, as definitional or preventive,” ante, at 674, n. 19, misses the point. We evaluate regulations not based on the myriad of explanations that could have been given by the relevant agency, but on those explanations and justifications that were, in fact, given. See State Farm, 463 U. S., at 43, 50. Rule 14e-3(a) may not be “[s]ensibly read” as an exercise of “preventive” authority, ante, at 674, n. 19; it can only be differently so read, contrary to its own terms.
Having already concluded that the Commission lacks the power to redefine fraud, the regulation cannot be sustained on its own reasoning. This would seem a complete answer to whether the Rule is valid because, while we might give deference to the Commission’s regúlatory constructions of § 14(e), the reasoning used by the regulation itself is in this instance contrary to law and we need give no deference to the Commission’s post hoc litigating justifications not reflected in the regulation.
Even on its own merits, the Commission’s prophylactic justification fails. In order to be a valid prophylactic regulation, Rule 14e-3(a) must be reasonably designed not merely to prevent any fraud, but to prevent persons from engaging in “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer.” 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e) (emphasis added). Insofar as Rule 14e-3(a) is designed to prevent the type of misappropriation at issue in this case, such acts are not legitimate objects of prevention because *697the Commission’s misappropriation theory does not represent a coherent interpretation of the statutory “in connection with” requirement, as explained in Part I, supra. Even assuming that a person misappropriating information from the bidder commits fraud on the bidder, the Commission has provided no coherent or consistent explanation as to why such fraud is “in connection with” a tender offer, and thus the Commission may not seek to prevent indirectly conduct which it could not, under its current theory, prohibit directly.11
Finally, even further assuming that the Commission’s misappropriation theory is a valid basis for direct liability, I fail to see how Rule 14e-3(a)’s elimination of the requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty is “reasonably designed” to prevent the underlying “fraudulent” acts. The majority’s primary argument on this score is that in many cases “ ‘a breach of duty is likely but difficult to prove.’ ” Ante, at 674 (quoting Reply Brief for United States 16). Although the majority’s hypothetical difficulties involved in a tipper-tippee situation might have some merit in the context of “classical” insider trading, there is no reason to suspect similar difficulties in “misappropriation” cases. In such cases, Rule 14e-3(a) requires the Commission to prove that the defendant “knows or has reason to know” that the nonpublic information upon which trading occurred came from the bidder or an agent of the bidder. Once the source of the information has been identified, it should be a simple task to obtain proof of any breach of duty. After all, it is the bidder itself that was defrauded in misappropriation cases, and there is no rea*698son to suspect that the victim of the fraud would be reluctant to provide evidence against the perpetrator of the fraud.12 There being no particular difficulties in proving a breach of duty in such circumstances, a rule removing the requirement of such a breach cannot be said to be “reasonably designed” to prevent underlying violations of the misappropriation theory.
What Rule 14e-3(a) was in fact “designed” to do can be seen from the remainder of the majority’s discussion of the Rule. Quoting at length from the Commission’s explanation of the Rule in the Federal Register, the majority notes the Commission’s concern with “ ‘unfair disparities in market information and market disruption.’” Ante, at 674 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980)). In the Commission’s further explanation of Rule 14e-3(a)’s purpose — continuing the paragraph partially quoted by the majority — an example of the problem to be addressed is the so-called “stampede effect” *699based on leaks and rumors that may result from trading on material, nonpublic information. Id., at 60413. The majority also notes (but does not rely on) the Government’s contention that it would not be able to prohibit the supposedly problematic practice of “warehousing” — a bidder intentionally tipping allies to buy stock in advance of a bid announcement — if a breach of fiduciary duty were required. Ante, at 672-673, n. 17 (citing Reply Brief for United States 17). Given these policy concerns, the majority notes with seeming approval the Commission’s justification of Rule 14e-3(a) “as a means necessary and proper to assure the efficacy of Williams Act protections.” Ante, at 674.
Although this reasoning no doubt accurately reflects the Commission’s purposes in adopting Rule 14e-3(a), it does little to support the validity of that Rule as a means designed to prevent such behavior: None of the above-described acts involve breaches of fiduciary duties, hence a Rule designed to prevent them does not satisfy § 14(e)’s requirement that the Commission’s Rules promulgated under that section be “reasonably designed to prevent” acts and practices that “are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” As the majority itself recognizes, there is no “ ‘general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information,’” and such duty only “‘arises from a specific relationship between two parties.’” Ante, at 661 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 233). Unfair disparities in market information, and the potential “stampede effect” of leaks, do not necessarily involve a breach of any duty to anyone, and thus are not proper objects for regulation in the name of “fraud” under § 14(e). Likewise (as the Government concedes, Reply Brief for United States 17), “warehousing” is not fraudulent given that the tippees are using the information with the express knowledge and approval of the source of the information. There simply would be no deception in violation of a duty to disclose under such circumstances. Cf. ante, at 654-655 (noting Government’s conces*700sion that use of bidder’s information with bidder’s knowledge is not fraudulent under misappropriation theory).
While enhancing the overall efficacy of the Williams Act may be a reasonable goal, it is not one that may be pursued through § 14(e), which limits its grant of rulemaking authority to the prevention of fraud, deceit, and manipulation. As we have held in the context of § 10(b), “not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity.” Chiarella, supra, at 232. Because, in the context of misappropriation cases, Rule 14e-3(a) is not a means “reasonably designed” to prevent persons from engaging in fraud “in connection with” a tender offer, it exceeds the Commission’s authority under § 14(e), and respondent’s conviction for violation of that Rule cannot be sustained.
III
With regard to respondent’s convictions on the mail fraud counts, my view is that they may be sustained regardless of whether respondent may be convicted of the securities fraud counts. Although the issue is highly fact bound, and not independently worthy of plenary consideration by this Court, we have nonetheless accepted the issue for review and therefore I will endeavor to resolve it.
As I read the indictment, it does not materially differ from the indictment in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987). There, the Court was unanimous in upholding the mail fraud conviction, id., at 28, despite being evenly divided on the securities fraud counts, id., at 24. I do not think the wording of the indictment in the current case requires a finding of securities fraud in order to find mail fraud. Certainly the jury instructions do not make the mail fraud count dependent on the securities fraud counts. Rather, the counts were simply predicated on the same factual basis, and just because those facts are legally insufficient to constitute securities fraud does not make them legally insufficient *701to constitute mail fraud.13 I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court as it relates to respondent’s mail fraud convictions.
8.5.3 Salman v. United States 8.5.3 Salman v. United States
Updated 2/20/2024
Maher worked for a firm that did mergers. Mergers typically cause large, predictable stock price movements, so advance information about mergers can be profitable if you are able to trade on it.
Michael was Maher's brother. He regularly pushed Maher to give him information. Maher knew it was wrong but did it anyway because he loved his brother. Michael shared some of these hot tips with Salman. Salman was Michael's friend and Maher's wife's brother. Salman made about $1.5 million trading on these tips before the SEC caught them all.
Think through the insider trading theories we've discussed. Which might apply to Salman? Did Salman owe a duty of confidentiality? Was Salman an insider? Would it have made a difference if Salman paid for the tips?
The terms "tipper" and "tippee" refer to individuals involved in the communication or exchange of material non-public information. The tipper is the person who provides or shares the confidential information, while the tippee is the recipient of that information. The tippee may engage in insider trading by trading on the information or by passing it on to others for trading purposes in exchange for a personal benefit.
Tipper and tippee claims are based on violations of Section 10 of the '34 Act, so enforcement can be brought by the SEC, the Department of Justice of the counterparties to the trade. The SEC actively examines unusually timed trades. Penalties include disgorgement, fines and imprisonment
Bassam Yacoub SALMAN, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 15-628.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Oct. 5, 2016.
Decided Dec. 6, 2016.
Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, New York, NY, for petitioner.
*423Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for the respondent.
Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Daniel J. O'Neill, Shapiro Arato LLP, New York, NY, John D. Cline, Law Office of John D. Cline, San Francisco, CA, for petitioner.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Ross C. Goldman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States in Opposition.
Anne K. Small, General Counsel, Sanket J. Bulsara, Deputy General Counsel, Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, Jacob H. Stillman, Senior Advisor to the Solicitor, David D. Lisitza, Senior Litigation Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Ross B. Goldman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the Respondent.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal advantage. 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (prohibiting the use, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (forbidding the use, "in connection with the sale or purchase of any security," of "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud," or any "act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit"); see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650-652, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997). Individuals under this duty may face criminal and civil liability for trading on inside information (unless they make appropriate disclosures ahead of time).
These persons also may not tip inside information to others for trading. The tippee acquires the tipper's duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information was disclosed in breach of the tipper's duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in disregard of that knowledge. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), this Court explained that a tippee's liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer a personal benefit-and thus a breach of the tipper's duty-where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or "makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." Id., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255.
Petitioner Bassam Salman challenges his convictions for conspiracy and insider trading. Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended family member, who had received the information from *424Salman's brother-in-law. Salman then traded on the information. He argues that he cannot be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law) did not personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus did not personally benefit from them. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the tipper here breached a duty because he made a " 'gift of confidential information to a trading relative.' " 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (C.A.9 2015) (quoting Dirks, supra, at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ). Because the Court of Appeals properly applied Dirks, we affirm the judgment below.
I
Maher Kara was an investment banker in Citigroup's healthcare investment banking group. He dealt with highly confidential information about mergers and acquisitions involving Citigroup's clients. Maher enjoyed a close relationship with his older brother, Mounir Kara (known as Michael). After Maher started at Citigroup, he began discussing aspects of his job with Michael. At first he relied on Michael's chemistry background to help him grasp scientific concepts relevant to his new job. Then, while their father was battling cancer, the brothers discussed companies that dealt with innovative cancer treatment and pain management techniques. Michael began to trade on the information Maher shared with him. At first, Maher was unaware of his brother's trading activity, but eventually he began to suspect that it was taking place.
Ultimately, Maher began to assist Michael's trading by sharing inside information with his brother about pending mergers and acquisitions. Maher sometimes used code words to communicate corporate information to his brother. Other times, he shared inside information about deals he was not working on in order to avoid detection. See, e.g., App. 118, 124-125. Without his younger brother's knowledge, Michael fed the information to others-including Salman, Michael's friend and Maher's brother-in-law. By the time the authorities caught on, Salman had made over $1.5 million in profits that he split with another relative who executed trades via a brokerage account on Salman's behalf.
Salman was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, and four counts of securities fraud, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff ; 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Facing charges of their own, both Maher and Michael pleaded guilty and testified at Salman's trial.
The evidence at trial established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a "very close relationship." App. 215. Maher "love[d] [his] brother very much," Michael was like "a second father to Maher," and Michael was the best man at Maher's wedding to Salman's sister. Id ., at 158, 195, 104-107. Maher testified that he shared inside information with his brother to benefit him and with the expectation that his brother would trade on it. While Maher explained that he disclosed the information in large part to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for it), he also testified that he tipped his brother to "help him" and to "fulfil[l] whatever needs he had." Id ., at 118, 82. For instance, Michael once called Maher and told him that "he needed a favor." Id., at 124. Maher offered his brother money but Michael asked for information instead. Maher then disclosed an upcoming acquisition. Ibid. Although he instantly regretted the tip and called his brother back to implore him not to trade, Maher expected his brother to do so anyway. Id., at 125.
*425For his part, Michael told the jury that his brother's tips gave him "timely information that the average person does not have access to" and "access to stocks, options, and what have you, that I can capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of." Id., at 251. Michael testified that he became friends with Salman when Maher was courting Salman's sister and later began sharing Maher's tips with Salman. As he explained at trial, "any time a major deal came in, [Salman] was the first on my phone list." Id ., at 258. Michael also testified that he told Salman that the information was coming from Maher. See, e.g., id ., at 286 (" 'Maher is the source of all this information' ").
After a jury trial in the Northern District of California, Salman was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and over $730,000 in restitution. After his motion for a new trial was denied, Salman appealed to the Ninth Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 242, 193 L.Ed.2d 133 (2015). There, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions of two portfolio managers who traded on inside information. The Newman defendants were "several steps removed from the corporate insiders" and the court found that "there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information." 773 F.3d, at 443. The court acknowledged that Dirks and Second Circuit case law allow a factfinder to infer a personal benefit to the tipper from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 773 F.3d, at 452. But the court concluded that, "[t]o the extent" Dirks permits "such an inference," the inference "is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature." 773 F.3d, at 452.1
Pointing to Newman, Salman argued that his conviction should be reversed. While the evidence established that Maher made a gift of trading information to Michael and that Salman knew it, there was no evidence that Maher received anything of "a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature" in exchange-or that Salman knew of any such benefit. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed Salman's conviction. 792 F.3d 1087. The court reasoned that the case was governed by Dirks 's holding that a tipper benefits personally by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. Indeed, Maher's disclosures to Michael were "precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative that Dirks envisioned." 792 F.3d, at 1092 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent Newman went further and required additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts of confidential information to family and friends, the Ninth Circuit "decline [d] to follow it." 792 F.3d, at 1093.
We granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the Second Circuit's Newman decision and the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case.2 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 899, 193 L.Ed.2d 788 (2016).
*426II
A
In this case, Salman contends that an insider's "gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend," Dirks, 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 is not enough to establish securities fraud. Instead, Salman argues, a tipper does not personally benefit unless the tipper's goal in disclosing inside information is to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value. He claims that our insider-trading precedents, and the cases those precedents cite, involve situations in which the insider exploited confidential information for the insider's own "tangible monetary profit." Brief for Petitioner 31. He suggests that his position is reinforced by our criminal-fraud precedents outside of the insider-trading context, because those cases confirm that a fraudster must personally obtain money or property. Id ., at 33-34. More broadly, Salman urges that defining a gift as a personal benefit renders the insider-trading offense indeterminate and overbroad: indeterminate, because liability may turn on facts such as the closeness of the relationship between tipper and tippee and the tipper's purpose for disclosure; and overbroad, because the Government may avoid having to prove a concrete personal benefit by simply arguing that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee. He also argues that we should interpret Dirks 's standard narrowly so as to avoid constitutional concerns. Brief for Petitioner 36-37. Finally, Salman contends that gift situations create especially troubling problems for remote tippees-that is, tippees who receive inside information from another tippee, rather than the tipper-who may have no knowledge of the relationship between the original tipper and tippee and thus may not know why the tipper made the disclosure. Id ., at 43, 48, 50.
The Government disagrees and argues that a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just a "trading relative or friend," is enough to prove securities fraud. See Brief for United States 27 ("Dirks 's personal-benefit test encompasses a gift to any person with the expectation that the information will be used for trading, not just to 'a trading relative or friend' " (quoting 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ; emphasis in original)). Under the Government's view, a tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading information for a noncorporate purpose. Accordingly, a gift to a friend, a family member, or anyone else would support the inference that the tipper exploited the trading value of inside information for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from the disclosure. The *427Government claims to find support for this reading in Dirks and the precedents on which Dirks relied. See, e.g., id., at 654, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ("fraud" in an insider-trading case "derives 'from the inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' " (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968) )).
The Government also argues that Salman's concerns about unlimited and indeterminate liability for remote tippees are significantly alleviated by other statutory elements that prosecutors must satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading. The Government observes that, in order to establish a defendant's criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information being disclosed would be used in securities trading. Brief for United States 23-24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Government also notes that, to establish a defendant's criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty-in other words, that the tippee knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected trading to ensue. Brief for United States 43; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37, 39.
B
We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow issue presented here.
In Dirks, we explained that a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside information only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty. Whether the tipper breached that duty depends "in large part on the purpose of the disclosure" to the tippee. 463 U.S., at 662, 103 S.Ct. 3255. "[T]he test," we explained, "is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Ibid. Thus, the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is not enough. In determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, we instructed courts to "focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id., at 663, 103 S.Ct. 3255. This personal benefit can "often" be inferred "from objective facts and circumstances," we explained, such as "a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient." Id., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. In particular, we held that "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend ." Ibid. (emphasis added). In such cases, "[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient." Ibid. We then applied this gift-giving principle to resolve Dirks itself, finding it dispositive that the tippers "received no monetary or personal benefit" from their tips to Dirks, "nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks ." Id., at 667, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (emphasis added).
Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case. Maher, the tipper, provided inside information to a close relative, his brother Michael. Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to "a trading relative," and that rule is sufficient to resolve the case at hand. As Salman's counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Maher would have breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then given the proceeds *428as a gift to his brother. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-4. It is obvious that Maher would personally benefit in that situation. But Maher effectively achieved the same result by disclosing the information to Michael, and allowing him to trade on it. Dirks appropriately prohibits that approach, as well. Cf. 463 U.S., at 659, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (holding that "insiders [are] forbidden" both "from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage" and from "giv[ing] such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain"). Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to "a trading relative or friend," the jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift. In such situations, the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients-a duty Salman acquired, and breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed.
To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a "pecuniary or similarly valuable nature" in exchange for a gift to family or friends, Newman, 773 F.3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks .
C
Salman points out that many insider-trading cases-including several that Dirks cited-involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading information. But this observation does not undermine the test Dirks articulated and applied. Salman also cites a sampling of our criminal-fraud decisions construing other federal fraud statutes, suggesting that they stand for the proposition that fraud is not consummated unless the defendant obtains money or property. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013) (Hobbs Act); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (honest-services mail and wire fraud); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000) (wire fraud); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) (mail fraud). Assuming that these cases are relevant to our construction of § 10(b) (a proposition the Government forcefully disputes), nothing in them undermines the commonsense point we made in Dirks. Making a gift of inside information to a relative like Michael is little different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading relative. The tipper benefits either way. The facts of this case illustrate the point: In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher's offer of money, and instead requested and received lucrative trading information.
We reject Salman's argument that Dirks 's gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. Dirks created a simple and clear "guiding principle" for determining tippee liability, 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 and Salman has not demonstrated that either § 10(b) itself or the Dirks gift-giving standard "leav[e] grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime" or are plagued by "hopeless indeterminacy," Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ----, ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). At most, Salman shows that in some factual circumstances *429assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult. That alone cannot render "shapeless" a federal criminal prohibition, for even clear rules "produce close cases." Id., at ----, ----, 135 S.Ct., at 2560. We also reject Salman's appeal to the rule of lenity, as he has shown "no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty that would trigger the rule's application." Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 492, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, Salman's conduct is in the heartland of Dirks 's rule concerning gifts. It remains the case that "[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts." 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. But there is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, because this case involves "precisely the 'gift of confidential information to a trading relative' that Dirks envisioned." 792 F.3d, at 1092 (quoting 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255 ).
III
Salman's jury was properly instructed that a personal benefit includes "the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative." App. 398-399. As the Court of Appeals noted, "the Government presented direct evidence that the disclosure was intended as a gift of market-sensitive information." 792 F.3d, at 1094. And, as Salman conceded below, this evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction under our reading of Dirks . Appellant's Supplemental Brief in No. 14-10204(CA9), p. 6 ("Maher made a gift of confidential information to a trading relative [Michael] ... and, if [Michael's] testimony is accepted as true (as it must be for purposes of sufficiency review), Salman knew that Maher had made such a gift" (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
8.5.4 Brophy Insider Trading Claims 8.5.4 Brophy Insider Trading Claims
2/20/2024 pdw
Directors, officers and some controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders and to the corporation. Chapter 9 details these fiduciary duties, but for now it's sufficient to know that they prohibit theft.
A Brophy claim is an insider trading claim based on the fiduciary duty of loyalty. There are two elements: First, the corporate fiduciary must possess material, nonpublic company information, and (2) the corporate fiduciary must use that information improperly by making trades because he was motivated, in whole or in part, by the substance of that information. The motivation requirement in the second element requires intentional misconduct. Goldstein v. Denner, No. CV 2020-1061-JTL, 2022 WL 1797224 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2022); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2003).
The underlying rationale for the prohibition of this behavior is that the information belongs to the corporation, so by using it for personal gain, the insider benefits at the corporation's expense. This is disloyal, so it breaches the duty of loyalty.
This may sound similar to the misappropriation theories in the previous cases but there are some key differences.
A misappropriation claim can be brought against anyone that owes a duty of confidentiality. In contrast, a Brophy insider trading claim can be brought only against a director, officer or controlling shareholder.
Misappropriation claims a violation of Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Brophy insider trading claims a breach of fiduciary duties.
A misappropriation claim can be brought by the SEC, the Department of Justice, or the counterparty in a trade. A Brophy claim can be brought by shareholders, regardless of whether or not they were trading.
8.5.5. Regulation FD: Fair Disclosure
Updated 2/20/2024
Sometimes CEOs, directors, or officers of a corporation accidentally disclose material, nonpublic information. Regulation FD is designed to keep the playing field level when these mistakes occur.
Regulation FD prohibits companies (and those acting on their behalf) from selectively disclosing material, nonpublic information to financial analysts, brokers and others in the financial industry. If they intentionally do so, the information must be simultaneously disclosed to the public. If the material nonpublic information is inadvertently disclosed, the company must publicly disclose the information within 24 hours.
The link below offers further details and is provided solely as an optional supplement.
8.5.6 Section 16: Short Swing Profits 8.5.6 Section 16: Short Swing Profits
2/20/2024 pdw
One of the challenges of preventing insider trading is determining whether a given trade was based on material, nonpublic information. Section 16 of the Exchange Act addresses this challenge with a blunt approach that does not attempt to be fair.
Section 16 requires certain insiders to disgorge "short-swing profits." The disgorgement does not require any showing that the insider had material, nonpublic information. It is strict liability. Here, "insiders" is limited to directors, officers and people who own 10% or more of a company's shares (not other employees). "Short-swing profits" are profits that could have been made by buying and selling within a six month period. The reason the standard is "could have been made" is because it's not necessary to show that the profits were actually made. Instead, enforcers check whether there are any short swing profits by comparing the highest price at which the insider sold shares during the period against the lowest price at which the insider bought shares during the period, regardless of which came first. In other words, the enforcer rearranges any sales within a six-month period to see if he can match up a sale at a higher price than a purchase. It's somewhat contrived, but the forfeit of actual profit is not the point.
A few examples may clarify. The table below shows the dates and quantities that Paul transacted in his company's stock.
| Date | Buy or Sell? | Amount | Price |
| January 1 | Buy | 100 | $50 |
| Februry 1 | Sell | 100 | $100 |
In this simple example, Paul would have to disgorge his profits for the 100 shares. So he would disgorge $50 * 100 shares = $5,000.
Here's a less intuitive example.
| Date | Buy or Sell? | Amount | Price |
| January 1 | Buy | 100 | $50 |
| February 1 | Sell | 100 | $40 |
| March 1 | Buy | 100 | $30 |
| April 1 | Sell | 100 | $20 |
In this case, Paul twice bought shares and then sold them at a loss. But to calculate short-swing profits enforcers do not look at the actual profits (Section 16 is not concerned with "being fair"), instead enforcers look at the highest priced sale and compare it to the lowest priced buy. In this case, the highest priced sale is $40 for 100 shares. Enforcers compare this to the lowest priced buy, 100 shares for $30. So Paul's short-swing profits in this example is $10 for 100 shares, or $1,000. Even though Paul lost $2,000 trading, he must disgorge $1,000 in short-swing profits (a $3,000 total loss).
Here is one more example to show how to deal with varying quantities.
| Date | Buy or Sell? | Amount | Price |
| January 1 | Buy | 100 | $50 |
| February 1 | Buy | 100 | $40 |
| March 1 | Sell | 100 | $30 |
| April 1 | Buy | 50 | $20 |
| May 1 | Buy | 25 | $10 |
| June 1 | Sell | 175 | $5 |
Again, enforcers start by finding the highest sale price. In this case, it is the March 1 transaction selling 100 shares for $30 each. Next, find the lowest buy price in the period. That's the May 1 transaction buying 25 shares for $10 each. The price difference is $20, but enforcers apply it only to 25 shares because that is all that was sold on May 1. So for the first 25 shares Paul owes disgorgement of $20 * 25 share = $500. There are still 75 shares in the sale to account for. The next lowest buy is on April 1, in which Paul bought 50 shares for $20 each. The price difference from the March 1 sale is $10. Applying that to the 50 shares bought on April 1, disgorgement for the April 1 purchase is $10 * 50 shares = $500. 75 shares (25 from May 1 and 50 from April 1) of the 100 shares in the March 1 sale have now been accounted for. But there are no more buys with a price lower than the $30, so the remaining 25 shares are not subject to disgorgement. In total, Paul owes $1,000 in disgorgement ($500 from May sale and $500 from April sale). Again, Paul owes disgorgement of short-swing profits even though Paul's trading was unprofitable.
This rule is not designed to be fair. It is designed to discourage insiders from buying and selling within a six-month window. If they do, they face potential disgorgement even if they traded at a loss.
8.5.7 The 10 Laws of Insider Trading 8.5.7 The 10 Laws of Insider Trading
2/16/2023 pdw
Insider trading is the funniest area in corporate law because of the bizarre things people do and the impossibly unlikely ways they get caught. Bloomberg columnist Matt Levine regularly reports on insider trading. If you are interested in business or law, subscribe to his free, daily newsletter titled Money Stuff. It is the most insightful and hilarious thing I read most days.
Among his recurring bits is a collection of the Laws of Insider Trading. Each reflects some incredibly dumb way that someone has attempted insider trading. The first ten are below for your amusement.
Matt Levine's 10 Laws of Insider Trading:
- Don’t do it.
- Don’t do it by buying short-dated out-of-the-money call options on merger targets.
- Don’t text or email about it.
- Don’t do it in your mother’s account.
- Don’t do it by planting bombs at a company and shorting its stock.
- Don’t do it while employed at the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- Don’t Google “how to insider trade without getting caught” before doing it.
- If you didn’t insider trade, don’t forget and accidentally confess to insider trading.
- If you are going to insider trade, do it in a company that is far away from a Securities and Exchange Commission office. Like, physically.
- If you are already under a federal ethics investigation about your ownership or promotion of a stock, don’t insider trade that stock.
Mike Peattie’s "bonus" 11th law: If you are planning to insider trade, probably don’t keep a Google Doc spreadsheet of the Money Stuff Laws of Insider Trading. That will definitely show up in the SEC’s complaint against you. If you’re going to insider trade, you have to keep track of these rules in your head, even at the risk of forgetting a few now and then.
8.5.8 Insider Trading Questions 8.5.8 Insider Trading Questions
WLD 8/2024
8.5.8.1 While serving on the board of Muffin Records, Jenna learns about the company's research into new audio compression software. The software is likely to revolutionize content streaming and have massive licensing potential. Jenna buys shares of Muffin Records based on this information. How likely is a shareholder suit to succeed?
8.5.8.2 Jenna brags about the new software to Tracy as a way of showing her importance. She does not expect Tracy to trade on the information, but he does. Is Jenna liable as a tipper? Is Tracy liable?
8.5.8.3 Kenneth is on the board of a book publisher. The company hasn't disclosed it publicly, but it recently secured the rights to a book that is sure to be a blockbuster. While reviewing the book, Kenneth discovers several swear words, and worries it will damage the publisher’s reputation. Kenneth phones Jack for advice. Jack uses the information to trade. Is Kenneth liable as a tipper? Is Jack liable as a tippee?
8.5.8.4 How would your answer change if instead Kenneth was asking Jack's advice on a massive accounting fraud he had discovered?
8.5.8.5 Dennis works at a manual sewer dredging company that does periodic cleaning for the city. While dredging, he uncovers notes about an upcoming merger. He decides to put his life savings into short-dated out-of-the-money call options. Is he liable?
8.5.8.6 Frank is a creative writer and is hired by a large company to draft marketing materials. As he is researching new products he discovers one that is a blockbuster. He trades on the information. Is he liable?
8.5.8.7 Jonathan is an administrative assistant at a major television studio. He chats with an analyst in the elevator and accidentally mentions that the studio has won the bid for coverage of the Olympics. If the analyst trades, any liability? Jonathan asks you (the general counsel) what he should do. What do you advise?
8.5.8.8 Avery is the CEO of a publicly traded news corporation. She purchased 100 company shares for $50 in December. In January she purchased another 100 shares for $70. In February she sold 100 shares for $55. Is she subject to Section 16 disgorgement and if so, how much?
8.5.8.9 Rapunzel works as an investment banker. Gothel tells Rapunzel, “Look, I know you know about some upcoming mergers, and I’m insulted that you are hiding them from me. You don’t trust me! If you want this relationship to last and not be built on lies, you need to tell me about them. I promise I’d never trade.” Gothel trades. Are either liable?
8.5.8.10 Denner was a director of Bioverativ but ran an activist hedge fund on the side. Sanofi approached Denner and another director about purchasing Bioverativ at a 64% premium. Neither director discussed the offer with Bioverativ’s board. Denner had his hedge fund buy a million shares of Bioverativ, octupling its holdings. Any liability?
8.5.8.11 Brooke works as a freelance journalist and writes a piece about UWM Inc. alleging fraud. Brooke received material nonpublic information from an insider at UWM, but did not publish this information.
- Any liability for Brooke?
- What if Brooke worked for Hunter, the CEO And Owner of both a media company and a hedge fund, and Hunter's hedge fund traded after reviewing all of Brooke's information before publishing Brooke's piece. Any liability for Hunter or his companies?
- If you were counsel to Hunter, what would you have advised prior to the trade?
- Does it matter that the stock has only increased since the news was released?