THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE. CHAE CHAN PING v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 1446.

Argued March 28, 29,1889.

Decided May 13, 1889.

In their relations with foreign governments and their subjects or citizens, the United States are a nation, invested with the powers which belong to Independent nations.

So far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign power can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is- subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modiflcation or appeal. The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, followed.

The abrogation of a treaty, like the repeal of a law, operates only on future transactions, leaving unaffected those, executed under it previous to the abrogation.

The rights and interests created by a.treaty,' which have become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will .not destroy or impair them, aré such as are connected with and lie in property, capable of sale and transfer or other disposition, and not such as are personal and untransferable in their character.

The power of the legislative department of the government to exclude aliens from the United States is an incident of sovereignty, which cannot be ■ surrendered by the treaty making power'.

The act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064, excluding Chinese laborers from the United States, was a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and, so far as it conflicted with existing treaties between the United States and China, it operated to that' extent to abrogate them as part of the municipal law of the United States.

•A certificate issued to a Chinese laborer under the fourth and fifth sections of the act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58, c. 126, as amended July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115, c: 220, conferred upon him no. right to return to the United States of which he could not be deprived by a subsequent act of Congress.

The history of Chinese immigration into the .United States stated, together with a review of the treaties and legislation affecting it.

The court stated the case as follows in its opinion:

This case comes, before us on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California refusing to release the appellant, on a writ of habeas corpus., from his alleged unlawful detention by «Captain Walker, *582master of the steamship Belgic, lying witliin the harbor of. San Francisco. The appellant is a subject of the Emperor of China and a laborer by occupation. He resided at San Francisco, California, following his occupation, from some- time in 1875 until June 2,1887, when he left for China on the steamship Gaelic, having in his possession a certificate, in terms entitling him to return to the United States; bearing date on that day,duly issued to him by the collector of customs of the' port of Safi Francisco, pursuant to the provisions of section four of the restriction act of May 6; 1882, as amended by the act of July 5,-1884. 22 Stat. 58, c. .126; 23 Stat. 115, c. 220.

On the 7th of September, 1888, the appellant, on his return to California, sailed from Hong Kong in the steamship Belgic, which arrived within the port of San Francisco on the 8th of October following. On his arrival he presented to the proper-custom-house officers -his certificate, and demanded permission to iand. The collector of the port refused the permit, solely on the ground that under the act of Congress, approved October 1, 1888, supplementary.to the restriction acts of 1882 and 1884, the certificate had been - annulled and his right to land abrogated, and he had been thereby forbidden again to enter the United States. 25 Stat: 504, c. 1064. The captain of the steamship, therefore, detained the appellant on board the steamer. Thereupon a petitipn on his behalf was presented to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and praying that a writ.of habeas corpus might be issued directed to the master of the steamship, commanding him to have the. body of the appellant, with the cause of his detention, before the court at a time and place designated, to do and receive what might there be considered in the premises. A writ was accordingly issued, and in obedience to it the body of the appellant was produced befpre the court. Upon the/ hearing which followed, the court, after finding the facts sub-' •stantially as stated, held as conclusions of law that the appellant was not entitled .to enter the United States, and was not unlawfully restrained of'his liberty, and ordered.that he be' remanded to the custody of the master of the steamship from *583which he had been taken under the writ. From this order an ■ appeal was taken to this court.

Mr. George Hoadly and Mr. James C. Camier argued the case orally for appellant.

They also filed a brief, prepared by Mr. Hoadly, citing: Woolsey, Internat. Law, 5th ed. § 63; Field, Code of Internat. Law, § 318; Bluntschli, Das Moderne Voelkerrecht der Civiliserten Staaten, § 381; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 598; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 592; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 493; McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 206; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182; Langdell on Contracts, 2d ed. 62; Poste’s Gaius, Lib. 3, 372; Dig. 9, 5, 15, 22, 25; Sandar’s Justinian, Lib. 3, Tit. 14, 2d ed. p. 419; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 429; Thomas v. Thomas, 202 Q. B. (N. S.) 851; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 655; Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73; Loring v. Boston, 7 Met. 409 ; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83; 2 Bl. Com. 37; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 595; 4 Madison’s Writings, 478-480, 526; Virginia Report of 1799-1800, 204—205, Richmond, 1850; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 381; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 450; Von Holst on Const. 40; 9 Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson’s Writings, 466, Riker’s ed. 1853-6; Virginia Resolutions of 1798, 4 Elliot’s Debates, 528, 531; Mass. Resolutions, Feb. 30, 1799; N. H. Resolutions, June 15,1799; The Debates on the Virginia Resolutions in the Virginia Legislature; The Debates on the Alien and Sedition Law in Congress; Story, Conflict Laws, §§ 41, 46; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 661; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 31; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266 ; Magna Charta; Dauphin v. Key, McArthur & Mackay, 203 ; 1 Hare Const. Law, 550; Cummings v. State, 4 Wall. 277 ; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 377; Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234; Blair v. Ridgly, 41 Missouri, 63; S. C. 97 Am. Dec. 248; In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, 910; In re Wy Shing, 36 Fed. Rep. 553; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236.

*584Mr. Carter also filed a brief “ designed to present in a short compass the main propositions elaborated and illustrated in the more copious brief prepared by Mr. Hoadly.”

I. It appears by the record that the appellant when brought before the court below in pursuance of the writ of habeas corpus was restrained of his liberty in not being allowed to land from the steamer Belgic — in other words, that he was imprisoned upon that vessel. The judgment of the court was that he had no right to land, and was therefore not unlawfully •restrained of his liberty. If he had such right, it will not be denied that the judgment was erroneous and should be reversed.

II. Inasmuch as it did not appear to the court below that the petitioner was held, under any sentence, judgment, writ or other judicial process of any court, it became' instantly manifest that he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, unless some other matter appeared showing that he was not entitled to the protection of the common constitutional safeguard to personal liberty.

(1) It is, at least, in general true that whenever upon- the hearing, upon a return to a writ of habeas corpus any man is held a prisoner upon any other ground or pretence than the command of some writ or other judicial process, order, or judgment, he must instantly be discharged. It is only by the authority of lorn manifested through the mandate of some court or judicial officer that one man can be held a prisoner by another.

(2) There is no distinction in this respect, between citizens and the subjects of other nations. Liberty is the birthright and inalienable possession of all men, as men. For this proposition an American lawyer disdains to cite authority. Neither the fundamental law of the United States, nor of any one of the States, recognizes any such distinction.

III. The special matter which" the judgment of the court below determined as sufficient to take the case of the appellant- out of the operation of the principles above mentioned, was, that the appellant was a Chinese laborer who had been a resident of the United States, but who had departed there*585from, and was, under, the provisions óf the act of Congress, approved October 1st, 1888, forbidden to return to the United States. This matter was wholly insufficient to justify the detention of the appellant.

(1) The inherent right of a sovereign power to prohibit, even in time of peace, the entry into its territories of the subjects of a foreign state will not be denied. But the United States, while a sovereign government, is yet one which can exercise only those powers of sovereignty which are enumer.ated in and delegated by the instrument which created it, and .such other incidental powers as are necessary and proper in order do carry into execution those thus enumerated. That the power of prohibition above mentioned is one, in terms, delegated, will not'be asserted. That it is necessary or proper in order to .carry into execution some power expressly delegated may be asserted, but is by no means conceded. Such a proposition, may well await the solemn determination of this .court when some ease arises which depends solely upon it. Its establishment is not necessary in order to maintain the case of the appellant..

(2) Whatever power Congress may have to prohibit the immigration of other foreign citizens or subjects, it had none to prohibit the return to this country of the appellant. He had a vested right to return, which could not be taken from him by any exercise of mere legislative power.

(a) That he had a lawful right to he in the United States • when the writ issued cannot be denied. He had.been a peaceable resident of California for twelve years preceding June 2d, 1887. He had come here, under a treaty between., the ■United States and his own nation, which declared “the inherent and inalienable right of man to change • his home and allegiance, and also the .mutual advantage of the free migration and immigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as jpermcment. residents.” Burlingame Treaty, Art. V: . He could not havé been ejected from the United States by any mere legislation. However the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations ” may authorize congressional *586legislation to prevent the entry of foreign subjects, no one, it is believed, will assert that any power is conferred upon Congress to command them to surrender any residence they may have acquired under such invitations and guaranties, and depart from the country. The. “A-lien Law” of 1798 has been feebly sustained as an exercise of lawful power; but that did not assert the right of compelling an alien friend to leave-the country, and the only defence of it which has been allowed as plausible was that it was a measure in preparation for anticipated war, and, therefore, an exercise of the war power.

(b) If,- therefore, the appellant had a right of residence here, it is extremely clear that it is a right which could not be taken ■away by mere legislation. Such taking away could not be effected without first, taking away his liberty. It is very certain that he never himself surrendered the right, unless his departure from the country under all the guaranties supplied by the acts of 1882 and 1884 is to be deemed such a surrender; and such an assertion may safely be left unanswered. It follows, therefore, that the appellant had the right to land when the writ issued.

(c) It will be observed that the right of the appellant to return to the United States is based, so far as above insisted upon, not upon any contract between him and that government, but upon a title or right to be in that country when the writ issued — a title or right fully acquired by, and vested in him by his coming here under the permission of the laws and treaties under which he came. It was granted to him.by law; but, when once granted, could not be taken away by mere law, for two reasons: (1), because it was a valuable right like an estate in lands, and the taking of it away would necessarily involve-the taking away of his liberty; and (2), because, whatever sovereign powers may, in general,. do in the way of banishing aliens, no power to. do that has been delegated to. the Congress of the United States. . .

(3) But another, and perhaps more clearly demonstrable basis for the asserted right of the appellant to return, is that which refers the acquisition of it to a contract.

That there was a contract between the appellant and the *587United, States by which the latter became bound to permit his ■return is very clear.

The provisions of acts of 1882 and 1884 (22 Stat.' 58; 1.884, 23 Stat. 115) contained an offer on the part of the United States to every Chinese laborer then in this country, if he should leave the country and comply with the conditions therein for such case specified, to permit him to return. That offer was accepted and the conditions were fully complied with by the appellant. This created a perfect contract, binding upon the United States.

(a) The- consideration was perfect. It was that the appellant would give up his actual residence in the United States, with all the rights and benefits which such residence conferred upon him, undertake the expense and hazard of a journey abroad, and procure certain documentary evidence. The circumstance that these things were of no benefit to the United , States is wholly immaterial. , The sacrifice by the appellant completely answers the conception of consideration.

Q>) As it was not a case of mutual promises, but the promise was only on the side of the United States, it was a unilateral contract, and the promise was one which would not become binding until the full performance of the consideration. It was fully performed.

(4) The contract being thus fully executed by the appellant, he completely acquired the right which it was agreed he should have upon its execution. No muniment of title was necessary in order to complete the investiture. It was as perfectly vested as the title to real property is vested by the execution and delivery of a deed.

(5) It may possibly be urged that the making of contracts are executive acts, no.t within the ordinary contemplation of legislation, and, that the laws in question should not be deemed as containing offers, but as being pieces of simple legislation, subject to repeal at any time, and that all persons should take notice of this fact and consider that they acted at their peril; and that, in the present case the Chinese laborers were bound to know that in leaving the country they took the peril of a repeal of the laws. Such a suggestion would be an entire perversion of the real fact. ‘ •

*588(a) The making through the instrumentality' of laws of offers for contracts is perfectly familiar. Laws making provision for sales of public lands, for giving rewards for the apprehension of criminals, for the furnishing of supplies to -the public, and for the construction of public works, are common instances. That offers may be thus made is plain; the only question in a particular case is whether an' offer was intended.-

(b) States, as well as individuals, are moral agents, and the common rules of morality and good faith are as binding upon them as upon individuals; and when ones man declares to another thaf he will, in case such other will do or suffer a certain thing, bestow upon the latter -an advantage, and thus' tempt him to act or suffer upon the faith of the promise, he will not be heard to say that he did not -intend to make an' offer.-

- (c) The question is, was it contemplated by the acts of Congress of 1882 and 188k that the Chinese laborers would, act upon the assurance therein contained ? If it was, those acts must be deemed to have intended the making of offers. The contrary supposal would impute to Congress- the deliberate intention of holding out expectations which it knew would be acted upon without meaning to make them good.

' (d) -The' answer to the above question cannot be doubtful It declares that the exclusion-from the country .shall not apply to Chinese laborers now resident in it and who may wish to go. away with intent to return; provides documentary evidence establishing their indentity in the shape of a formal certificate-; and declares tfyat such' certificate “ shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to, and -re-enter ’the United States.” It is not in this court’that any argument is necessary to -show that these statutes contemplóte that individuals affected by them will act upon the faith .of the. assurance which they contain.

(6) if we have succeeded in establishing that the.appellant had a vested right to return, .acquired by contract, we need spend ijo time in asserting that it-,could not be taken away by á mere exercise of legislative power. The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700.

*589(7) There are, indeed, exceptions to the doctrines above mentioned. The existence of war; or pestilence, might have justified- the refusal of permission ter land. ■ Anything which, by the rules of law, destroys or suspends the operations of a contract, would have been effective upon the one in question. .But no such ground is suggested in the present case. The exclusion act of 1888, and that alone, was invoked by way of justification.

IY. The act of 1888, so far as respects Chinese laborers of the class of which the appellant' is one,, is unconstitutional, as being a bill of attainder, or ex post facto law. If. the appellant had a right to return, -the depriving him of such right is punishment, and this cannot be -inflicted except by -judicial sentence.

Mr. Harvey & Brown and 'Mr. Thomas D, Biordcm also . filed a brief for appellant.

' Mr. Solicitor General, Mr. G. A. Johnson, Attorney General of California, Mr. Stephen M. White and Mr. John F. Swift for appellees.

Mr. Justice Field

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appeal involyes a consideration of the validity of the act of Congress of October 1, 1888, prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States who had departed before its passage, having a certificate issued’ under the act of 1882 as' amended by the act of 1884, granting them permission to return. The validity of the act is assailed as being in effect. an - expulsion from the' country of Chinese' laborers, in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of Congress.

It will serve to present with greater, clearness the .nature and force of the objections to the act, if a brief -statement be made of the general character of the treaties between the two' countries and of the legislation of Congress to carry them into execution.

*590The first treaty between the UnitechStates and the Empire of China was concluded on the 3d of July, 1844, and ratified in December of the following year. 8 Stat. 592. Previous to that time there had been an extensive commerce between the two nations, that to China being confined to a single port. It was not, however, attended by any serious disturbances between our people there and the Chinese. In August, .1842, as the result of a war between England and China, a treaty was concluded stipulating for peace and friendship between them, and, among other things, that British subjects, with thpir. families and establishments, should be allowed to reside for the pulpóse of carrying on mercantile pursuits at the five principal ports of the empire. 6 Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties, 221; 3 Nouveau Kecueil Général de Traités (1842), 484. Actuated by a desire to establish by treaty friendly relations between the United States and the Chinese Empire, and to secure to our people the same commercial privileges which had been thus conceded to British. subjects, Congress placed at the disposal of the President the means to enable him to establish future commercial relations between the two countries “ on terms of national equal reciprocity.” Act of March, 1843Vc. 90, 5 Stat. 624. \A mission was accordingly sent by him to China, at the head of which-was.placed Mr. Caleb Cushing, a gentleman of large experience in public affairs. He found the Chinese government ready to concede by treaty to the United States all that had- been reluctantly, yielded to England through compulsion. As the result of his negotiations the treaty of 1844 was concluded- It stipulated, among other things, that there should be a. “perfect, permanent and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity ” between the two nations; that the five principal ports of the empire should be opened' to the citizens-of-the United States, who should be permitted to reside with their families and trade there, and to proceed with their vessels and merchandise to and from any foreign port and either of said five ports; and while peaceably attending to their affairs should receive the protection of the Chinese authorities. Senate Document No. 138, 28th Cong.' 2d Sess.

*591The treaty between England and China did not have the effect of securing permanent peace and friendship between those countries. British subjects in China were often subjected not only to the violence of mobs, but to insults and outrages from local authorities of the country, which led to. retaliatory measures for the punishment of the aggressors. To such an extent were these measures carried,- ,and such resistance offered to them, that in 1856 the two countries were in open war. England then, determined, with the cooperation of France, between which countries there seemed to be perfect accord, to secure from the government of ‘China, among other things, a recognition of the right of other powers to be represented there by accredited ministers, an extension of commercial intercourse with that country, and stipulations fpr religious freedom to all foreigners there, and for the suppression of piracy. England requested of -the President the concurrence and active co-operation of the United States similar to that which France had accorded, and to authorize our naval and political authorities to act in concert with the allied forces. ■ As this proposition involved a participation in existing hostilities, the request could not be acceded to, and the Secretary of State in his communication to the English government explained, that the war-making power of the United States was not vested in the President but in Congress, and that he had no authority, therefore, to order aggressive hostilities to be undertaken; But as the rights of citizens of the United States might be seriously' affected by the results of existing hostilities, and commercial intercourse between the United States and China be disturbed, it was deemed advisable to. send to China a minister plenipotentiary to represent our government and watch our interests there. Accordingly, Mr. William B. Keed, of. Philadelphia, was appointed such minister, and instructed, whilst abstaining from any direct interference, to aid by peaceful cooperation the objects the allied forces were seeking to accomplish. Senate Document No. 47, 35th Cong. 1st Sess. Through him a new treaty was negotiated with the Chinese government. It was concluded in June, 1858, and ratified in. August of the following year. *59212 Stat. 1023. It reiterated'the pledges of peace and friendship between the two nations, renewed the promise of protection to all citizens of the United States in China peaceably-attending to their affairs, and stipulated for security- to Christlan§¡ in the profession of their religion. Neither the treaty of 1844, nor that .of 1858, touched upon the migration and emigration of the citizens and subjects of the two'nations respectively from one country to the other. But in 1868 a great change in the relations-of the two nations was made in that respect. In that year a-mission from China, composed.of dis-' tinguished functionaries ■ pf that empire, came tq the United States witjh. the professed object of establishing closer relations between the two countries and their peoples. At its head Was placed Mr. Anson Burlingame,, an eminent citizen of-the United States, who had at one time represented this country as commissioner to China. He resigned : his office under our government to accept the position tendered to him by the Chinese government. ’ The mission was hailed in -the United States as the harbinger of a new era in the history of China. — as the opening up to . free intercourse with 'other, nations and peoples a country that for ages had been isolated and closed against foreigners, who were allowed to have intercourse and to trade with the Chinese only at a few designated places; and the belief was general, and confidently expressed, that great benefits would follow, to the world generally and especially to the United States! On' its arrival in Washington, additional articles to the treaty of 1858 were agreed-upon, which gave expression to the general desire that the two nations and • their peoples should be drawn closer .together. The new articles, eight in number,, were agreed to on- the 28th of . July, 1868, and ratifications of them .were exchanged at Pekin in November of the following year. 16 Stat. .739. Of these articles the 5th, 6th 'and 7th are as follows: •

• “ Article V. The United States of America anfl the Emperqr of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of inaij. ‘to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual.i advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the One country *593to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The high contracting parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these purposes. They consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offence for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any other foreign' country, or for a Chinese- subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of the United States to China or to any other foreign country without their free and voluntary consent, respectively.

“Article YI. Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities or éxemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. And, reciprocally, Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions ’ in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. But nothing herein contained shall be' held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.

“Article YII. Citizens of the United States shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational' institutions under the control of the government of China; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjects shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational institutions under the control of the government of the United States, which • are enjoyed in the respective countries by the' citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. The citizens of the United States may freely establish and maintain schools within the Empire of China at those places where foreigners are by treaty permitted to reside; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjécts may enjoy the same privileges and immunities in the United States.”

But notwithstanding these strong expressions of friendship and good will, and the desire they evince for free intercourse, events were transpiring oh the Pacific Coast which soon dissipated the anticipations indulged as to the benefits to follow the immigration of Chinese to this country. The previous *594treaties of 1844 and 1858 were confined principally to mutual declarations of peace and friendship and to stipulations for commercial intercourse at certain ports in China and for protection to our citizens whilst peaceably attending to their affairs. It was not until the additional articles of. 1868 were adopted that any public declaration was made by the two nations that there were-advantages in the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from one country to the other; and stipulations given that each should enjoy in the country of the other, with respect to travel or residence, the “ privileges, immunities, and exemptions ” enjoyed - Tty- citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. Whatever modifications have since been made to these general provisions have been caused by a well-founded apprehension — from the experience of years — that a limitation to the immigration of certain classes from China was essential to the peace of the community on the Pacific Coast, and possibly to the preservation of our civilization there. A few words on this point may not be deenied inappropriate here, they being confined to matters of public notoriety,- which have frequently been brought to the. attention of Congress. Report of Committee.of H. R. No, 872, 46th. Cong. 2d Sess.

The discovery of gold in California in 1848, as is well known, was followed by a large immigration thither from all parts of the world, attracted not only by the hope of gain from the mines, but from the great prices paid for all kinds of labor. The news of the discovery penetrated China, and laborers came from there in great numbers, a few with' their own means, but by far the greater number under contract with employers, for whose benefit they worked. These laborers readily secured employment, and, as domestic servants, and in various kinds of out-door work, proved to be exceedingly useful. For some years little opposition was made to them except when they sought to work in the mines, but, as their numbers increased, they began to engage in various mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came iff competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.

The competition steadily increased as the laborers came in *595crowds- on each steamer that arrived from China, or. Hong Kong, an adjacent English port. They were generally industrious and frugal. Not being accompanied by families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and they were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans. The competition between them and our people was for this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many- cases, by open -conflicts, to' the great disturbance'of the public peace.

The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation. Notwithstanding the favorable provisions of. the'new articles of the treaty of 1868, by which all the privileges, immunities, and exemptions were extended to subjects of China in the United States which were accorded,to citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, they remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year the people of the coast saw-, or believed they saw, in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by them unless prompt action Was taken to restrict their immigration. The people there accordingly petitioned earnestly for protective legislation.

In December, 1878, the convention which framed the present constitution of California, being , in session, took this subject up, and memorialized Congress upon it, setting forth, in substance, that the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the State, and upon public, morals; that their immigration'was in numbers approaching the- character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to' our civilization; that .the discontent from this cause was not confined to any political party, or to any class or nationality, but was well-nigh universal; that they retained the habits and customs of their own country, and in fact constituted a *596Chinese settlement within the State, without; any interest in our country or its institutions; and praying Congress to. take measures to prevent their further immigration. , This memorial was presented to Congress in February, 1879.

So urgent and constant were the prayers for relief' against existing, and anticipated evils, both from the public authorities of the Pacific Coast and from private individuals, that Congress was- impelled to act on the subject. Many persons, however, both in and out of Congress, were of opinion that so long as the treaty remained unmodified, legislation restricting immigration would be a breach of faith with China. A statute was accordingly passed appropriating money to send commissioners to Chipa to act with our minister there in negotiating and concluding by treaty a settlement of such matters of interest between the two governments as might be confided to them. 21 Stat. 133, c. 88. Such commissioners were appointed, and as the result of their negotiations the supplementary treaty of November 17, 1880, was concluded and ratified in May of the following year. 22 Stat. 826.. It declares in its first article that “ Whenever, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests- of that country, or to endanger the good order of the said country or of any locality within the territory thereof, the Government of China agrees that the Government of the United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it. The limitation or suspension shall ", be reasonable and shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the United States as laborers, other classes not being included ip the limitations. Legislation taken in regard to Chinese laborers will be of such a character only as is necessary to enforce, the regulation, limitation, or suspension of immigration, and immigrants shall not be subject to personal maltreatment or abuse.” In its second article' it' declares that “ Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now in the United States shall *597be allowed to go and come of tbeir own free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation.”'

The government of China thus agreed that notwithstanding the stipulations of former treaties, the United States might regulate, limit, or suspend the coming of Chinese laborers, or their residence therein, without absolutely forbidding it, whenever in their opinion the interests of the. country, or of any part of it, might require such action. Legislation for such regulation, limitation, or suspension was entrusted to the discretion of our government, with the condition that it should only be such as might be necessary for that purpose, and that the immigrants should not be maltreated or abused. On the 6th of May, 1882,.an act of Congress was approved, to carry this supplementary treaty into effect. 22 Stat. 58, c. 126. It is entitled “ An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese.” Its first section declares that after ninety days from the .passage of .the act, and for the period of ten years from its date, the coming, of Chinese laborers to the United States is suspended, and that it shall be unlawful for any such laborer to come, or, having come, to remain within the United States. The second makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, to which imprisonment may be added, for the master of any vessel knowingly to bring within. the United States from a foreign- country, and land, any such Chinese laborer. The third provides that those two sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United. States November 17, 1880, or who should come within ninety days-after the passage of the act. The fourth declares that, for the purpose of identifying the laborers who were here 'on the 17th of November, 1880, or who should come within the ninety days mentioned, and to-furnish them with “the proper evidence” of their right to go from and come to the United States, the “ collector of customs of the district from which any such Chinese laborer shall depart from the United States shall, in person or by deputy, go-on* board each, vessel having on board any such Chinese laborer and cleared or about to sail *598from his district for a foreign port, and on suoh vessel make a. list of all such Chinese laborers, which shall be entered in reg-' istry books to be kept for that purpose, in which shall be stated the name, age, Occupation, last place of residence, physical marks or peculiarities and all facts necessary for the identification of each of suck Chinese laborers, which books shall be safely kept in the custom-house;’” and each laborer thus departing shall be entitled to receive, from the collector or his deputy, a certificate containing such particulars, corresponding with the registry, as may serve to identify him. The. certificate herein provided for,” says the section, “ shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the United States upon producing and delivering th'e same to the collector of customs of the district at which such Chinese laborer shall se,ek to re-enter.”

The enforcement of this act with respect to laborers who were in the United States on November 17, 1880, was attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious, nature, in many instances, of the testimony offered to establish the residence of the parties, arising from the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath. This fact led to a desire for further legislation restricting the evidence receivable, and the amendatory act of July 5, 1884, was accordingly passed. 23 Stat. 115, c. 220. The committee of the House of Representatives on foreign affairs, to whom the original bill was referred, in reporting it back, recommending its passage, stated that there had been such manifold evasions, as well as attempted evasions, of the act of 1882, that it had failed to meet the demands which called it into existence.Report in H. R. No. 614, 48th Cong. 1st -Sess. To obviate the difficulties attending its enforcement the amendatory act of 1884 declared that the certificate which the laborer must obtain “ shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his right of re-entry” into the..United States.

This act was held by this court not to require the certificate from laborers who were in the United States on- the 17th of November, 1880, who had departed out of the country before May 6, 1882, and remained out until after July 5, 1884. *599Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536. The same difficulties and embarrassments continued with respect to the proof of their former residence. Parties were able to pass successfully the required examination as to their residence before November 17; 1880, who, it was generally believed, had never visited our shores. To prevent the possibility of the policy of excluding Chinese laborers being evaded, the act of October 1, 1888, the validity of which is the subject, of consideration in this case, was passed. It is entitled “An. acta supplement to an act entitled ‘ An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,’ approved the sixth day,of May, eighteen hundred and eighty-two.” 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064: It is as follows:.

“ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresentatmes of the United States of America in Congress assembled,' That from and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful' for any Chinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now. or hereafter be, a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or remain in, the United States.

“ Sec. 2. That no certificates of identity provided for in the fourth and fifth sections of the act to which this is- a supplement shall hereafter be issued; and every certificate heretofore issued in pursuance thereof is-hereby declared void .and of no effect, and the Chinese laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the United States.

“ Sec. 3. That all the duties prescribed, liabilities, penalties, and forfeitures imposed, and the powers -conferred bv the second, tenth, eleventh and twelfth sections of the act (to which this is a supplement,- are hereby extended and made applicable to the provisions of this act. '

“ Sec. 4. That all such part or parts -of the act to which' this is a supplement as are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

“ Approved October 1, 1888.”

The validity of this act, as already mentioned, is assailed, as being in effect an expulsion from the country of Chinese *600laborers in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of Congress. The objection that the act is in conflict with the treaties was earnestly pressed in the court below, and the answer to it constitutes the principal part of its opinion. 36 Fed. Kep. 431. Here the objection made is, that the act of 1888 impairs a right vested under the treaty of 1880, as a law of the United States, and the statutes of 1882 and of 1884 passed in execution of it. It must be conceded that the act of 1888 is in contravention of express stipulations of the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 1880, but it is not on that account invalid or to be restricted in its enforcement. The treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of Congress. By the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the United States are both declared to be the supreme-law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a contract between nations and is often merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of .Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control.

The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately considered in The Head Money Cases, and it was there adjudged' “ that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial -cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.” 112 U. S. 580, 599. This doctrine was affirmed and followed in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country; but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the government in disre*601gárding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there' can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country. Neglect or violation of stipulations. on the part, of the other contracting.party may require corresponding^ action on our part. When a reciprocal engagement is not carried out by one of the contracting -parties, the other may also decline to keep the corresponding engagement. In 1798 the conduct towards this country of the government of France was of such a character that Congress declared that the United States were freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties with that country.. Its act on the subject was as follows:

“An Act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France, no longer obligatory on the United States.

“ Whereas the treaties concluded between the United .States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused; and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all-complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity; And whereas, under authority of the French government, there is yet pursued against the United States a. system of predatory violence,- infracting the said treaties, and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation:

“ Be~it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of. the consular convention, heretofore-concluded between the United States and Frapce; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally, •obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States.” 1 Stat. 578, c. 67.

This act, as seen, applied in terms only to the future. Of course, whatever of a permanent character had been executed or vested under the treaties was not affected by it. . In that respect the abrogation of the obligations of a treaty operates, *602like the repeal of a. law, only upon the future, leaving transactions executed under it to stand unaffected. The validity of this legislative release from the stipulations of the treaties was of course not a matter for judicial cognizance. The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of the courts. ' This subject was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, whilst sitting at the circuit, in Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis, 454, 459, and he held that whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was prerogative, of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence ; but whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign had been violated by him, whether the consideration of a particular stipulation of a treaty had been voluntarily withdrawn by one party so as to no longer be obligatory upon the other, and whether the views, and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative, had given just occasion to the political departments of our government to withhc d the execution of a promise contained in a treaty or to act in direct contravention of such promise, were not judicial, questions ; that the power to determine them has not been confided to' the judiciairy, which has no suitable means to execute it, but to the executive, and legislative departments of the government ; and that it belongs to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the administration of existing laws. And the learned justice, added,, as a necessary consequence of these conclusions, . that if Congress .has this power, it is wholly immaterial to inquire whether it has, by the statute complained of, departed from the treaty or not; or, if it has, whether- such departure was accidental or designed; -and if. the latter, whether the reasons therefor were good or bad. These views were reasserted and fully adopted by this court in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 195. And may add to the concluding observation of the learned justice, that if the power mentioned is vested in Congress, any reflection upon its motives, or the motives of any of its members- in exercising it, would be entirely uncalled for.- This court is not a censor of the morals *603of other departments of the government.; it is not invested with any authority to pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct. "When once it is established that Congress, possesses the power, to pass an act, our province ends with its construction, and its application to cases as they are presented- fiar determination. Congress has the power under the Constitution to declare war, and in two instances where the power has been exercised — in the war of 1812 against Great Britain, and in 1846 against Mexico — the propriety and-wisdom and justice of its action were vehemently assailed by some of the ablest and best men in the country, but no one doubted the legality of the proceeding, and any imputation by this or any other court of the United States upon the motives of the members of Congress who in either case voted for the declaration, would have been justly the cause of animadversion. We do not mean to intimate that the moral aspects of'legislative acts may hot be proper subjects of consideration. Undoubtedly they may be, at proper times and places, before, the public, in the halls of Congress, and in. all the modes by which the public mind can be influenced. Public opinion thus enlightened, brought to bear upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent abuses; but the province of the courts is to pass upon the validity of laws, not to make them, and when their validity is established, to declare their meaning and apply their provisions. All else lies beyond their domain.

. There being nothing in the treaties between China and the United States to impair the validity, of the act of Congress of-October 1, 1888, was it on any other ground beyond the competency of Congress to pass it ? If so, it must be because it was not within the power of Congress to prohibit Chinese laborers who had at the time departed from the United States, or should subsequently depart, from returning to the United States.' Those laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens "from its territory, is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.’ It is a part. of its in*604dependence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to. that. extent subject to the control of another power. As said by this court in the. case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 136, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall:. “The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity.from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.-. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be'traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source;”

While under our. Constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the, United States; in their relation to foreign countries and their- subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion,, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations .to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations. As said by this court in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413, speaking by the sainé great Chief Justice: “ That the United States'form, for many, and for most important purposes,-a single nation, has not yet been , denied, in war, .wé are . one people. In making peace /we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one land the same people. In many other respects, the American-people are one; and the government winch is alone capable* of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that characterthey have no other. America has chosen to *605be in many respects, and to many purposes, a. nation; and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can then in affecting these objects legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States.' They are members of one great empire — for some-.purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.” The same view is expressed in a different form by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 555, where he-observes that “the United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all. which are forbidden to the state governments. It has jurisdiction, over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulations and laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies, the postal system, patent and copyright laws, the public lands and interstate commerce, all which subjects are expressly or impliedly 'prohibited to the state governments. It has power to suppress insurrections, as well as to repel invasions, and to organize, arm, discipline and call into service the militia of the whole country; The President is charged with the. duty and invested with the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The judiciary has jurisdiction to decide controversies between the States, and, between, their respective citizens, as well as questions of national concern; and the government is clothed with power to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, and to protect each of them against invasion and domestic violence.”

The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters being entrusted to the government of the *606Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates and varied interests, has been happily solved'.' For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.

To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes, of its people crowding in upon us. ' The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with- the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does, not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also” determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. If the government of the country of which the foreigners .excluded are subjects is dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our government, or resort to any other measure which, in its-judgment, its interests or dignity may demand; and there lies its only remedy.

The'power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in. its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, *607and never denied by the executive or legislative departments. In a communication made in December, 1852, to M^. A. Dudley Mann, at one time a special agent of the Department of State in Europe, Mr. Everett, then Secretary of State under President Eillmore, writes: “ This government could never give up the right of excluding foreigners whose presence it might deem a source of danger to the United States.” “ Nor will this government consider such exclusion of American citizens from Bussia necessarily a matter of- diplomatic complaint to' that country.” In a dispatch to Mr. Fay, our minister to Switzerland, in March, 1856, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State under President Pierce, writes: “Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall compose its members, - and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war.” “ It may always be questionable whether a resort to this power is warranted by the circumstances, or what department of the government is empowered to -exert it; but there can be no doubt that it is possessed by all nations, and that each may decide for itself when the occasion arises demanding its exercise.” In a communication in September, 1869, to Mr. Washburné, our minister to France, Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President Grant, uses this language: “ The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are dangerous to the peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested. Strangers visiting or sojourning in a foreign country voluntarily submit themselves to its laws and customs, and the municipal laws of France, authorizing the expulsion of strangers, are not of such recent date, nor has the exercise of the power by the government of France been so infrequent, that sojourners within her territory can claim surprise when the power is put in force.” In a communication to Mr. Foster, our minister to Mexico, in July, 1819, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State under President Hayes, referring to the power vested in the constitution of Mexico to expel objectionable foreigners, says: “ The admission that, as that constitution now stands and is interpreted, foreigners who render themselves harmful or objectionable to the general govern*608ment must expect to be liable to the exercise of the power adverted Ijo, even in time of peace, remains, and no good reason is. seen for departing from that conclusion now. But, while there may be no expedient basis on which to found objection, on principle and in advance of a special case thereunder, to the' constitutional right thus asserted by Mexico, yet the manner of carrying out such asserted right may be' highly objectionable. You would be fully justified in making earnest remonstrances should a citizen of the United States be expelled' from Mexican territory without just steps to assure the grounds of such expulsion, and in bringing the fact to the immediate knowledge of the Department.” In a communication to Mr. W. J: Stillman, under date of August'3, 1882,. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary • of State under President Arthur, writes •: “ This government cannot contest the right of foreign governments to exclude, on police or other grounds, American citizens' from their shores.” "Wharton’s International' Law Digest,. § 206. ' .

The exclusion of -paupers, criminals-and persons afflicted with incurable diseases, for which statutes have been passed, is only an application of the same power to particular classes of persons, whose'presence is deemed injurious or q source of danger -to the country. As applied to them; there) has never been any question as to the power to exclude them. The power is constantly exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation. -As to paupers, itT makes no difference by whose aid they are brought to the country. As Mr. Fish, when Secretary, of v State, wrote, in a communication under date of December 26, 1812, to Mr. James Moulding, of Liverpool, the government of the United States “is' not willing and will not consent to receive the pauper class of any. community who may. be sent or may be assisted in their immigration at the expense of government or of municipal authorities.”- As to criminals, the power of exclusion has always been exercised, even in the absence of any statute on the subject. In a despatch to Mr. Cramer, our minister to Switzerland, in December, 1881, Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Arthur,- writes: “While, under the Constitution and *609the laws, this country is open to the honest and industrious immigrant, it has no room outside-of its prisons or almshouses for depraved and incorrigible criminals or hopelessly dependent paupers who may have become a pest or burden, or both, to their own country.” Wharton’s Int. Law Dig., supra.

The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf Of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public good, by any considerations of private interest.' The exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter or contract. Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers, may have obtained, previous to the áct of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States áfter their departure, is held at the will of the government, revocable -at any time, at its pleasure. Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its, inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the' part of China, it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject. The rights and interests created by a treaty, which hfyve become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will fipt destroy or impair them, are such as are connected- with -and lie in property, capable of sale and transfer, or other disposition, not such as are personal and untransferable in their char-: acter. Thus'in, The Head Money Cases, the court speaks of certain rights being in some instances conferred upon the citizens or subjects of one nation residing in the territorial limits of the other, .which are “capable of enforcement as *610between private parties in the courts of the country.” “ An illustration of this character,” it adds, “ is found in treaties which regulate the mutual fights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when, the individuals concerned are aliens.” 112 U. S. 580, 598. The passage cited by counsel from the language of Mr. Justice Washington in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 493, also illustrates this doctrine. There the learned justice observes that “ if real estate be purchased or' secured under a treaty, it would be most mischievous to admit that the extinguishment of the treaty extinguished the right to such estate. In truth, it no more affects such han the repeal of a municipal law affects rights acquired under it.” Of this doctrine there can be no question in this court; but far different is this case, where a continued suspension of the exercise of a governmental power is insisted upon as a right, because, by the favor and consent of the government, it has not heretofore been exerted with respect to the appellant or to the class to which he belongs.’ Between, property rights not affected by the termination or abrogation of a treaty, and expectations of benefits from the continuance of existing legislation, there is as wide a difference- as between realization and hopes.

During the argument reference was made by counsel to the alien law of June 25, 1798, and to- opinions expressed at the time by men of great ability and learning against its constitutionality. 1 Stat. 570, c. 58. We do not attach importance-to those .opinions in their bearing upon this case. The act vested in the President power to order all such aliens as he should judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or'should have reasonable grounds to suspect were concerned in -any treasonable or secret machination against the government,, to depart out of the territory of the United States within such time as should be expressed in his order. There were other'provisions also distinguishing it. from the act under -consideration. The act was passed during a period of great political excitement, and it was attacked and .defended with great *611zeal and ability. It. is enough, however, to say that it is entirely different from the- act before us, and the validity of its provisions was never brought to the test of judicial decision in the courts of the United States.

Order affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM ARK.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 182.

Argued March 5, 8, 1897.

Decided March 28, 1898.

A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are .there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

This was a writ of habeas corpus, issued October 2, 1895, by tbe District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, to tbe collector of customs at the port of San Francisco, in behalf of Wong Kim Ark, who alleged that be was a citizen of tbe United States, of more than twenty-one years of age, and was born at San Francisco in 1873 of parents of Chinese descent and subjects of tbe Emperor of China, but domiciled residents at San Francisco; and that, on his return to the United States on the steamship Coptic in August, 1895, from a temporary visit to China, he applied to said collector of customs for permission to-land, and was by the collector refused such permission, and was restrained of his liberty by the collector, and by the general manager of the steamship company acting under his direction, in violation of the Constitution* and laws of the United States, not by virtue of any judicial order or proceeding, but solely upon the pretence that he was not a citizen' of the United States.

At the hearing, the District Attorney of the United States was permitted to intervene in behalf of the United States in opposition to the writ, and stated the grounds of his intervention in writing as follows:

“That, as he is informed and believes, the said person in *650whose behalf said application was made is not entitled to land in the United States, or to be or remain therein, as is alleged in said application, or otherwise.

“ Because the said Wong Kim Ark, although born in the city and county of San Francisco, State of California, United States of America, is not, under the laws of the State of California and of the United States, a citizen thereof, the mother and father of the said Wong Kira Ark being Chinese persons and subjects of the Emperor of China, and the said Wong Kim Ark being also a Chinese person and a subject of the Emperor of China.

“Because the said Wong Kim Ark has been at all times, by reason of his race, language, color and dress, a Chinese person, and now is, and for some time last past has been, a laborer by occupation.

“ That the said Wong Kim Ark is not entitled to land in the United States, or to be or remain therein, because he does not belong to any of the privileged classes enumerated in any of the acts of Congress, known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts,1 which would exempt him from the class .or classes which are especially excluded from the United States by the provisions of the said acts.

“ Wherefore the said United States Attorney asks that a judgment and order of this honorable court be made and entered in accordance with the allegations herein contained, and that the said Wong Kim Ark be detained on board of said vessel until released as provided by law, or otherwise to be returned to the country from whence he came, and that such further order be made as to the court may seem proper and legal in the premises.”

The case was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts agreed by the parties:

“ That the said Wong Kim Ark was born in the year 1873, at No. 751 Sacramento Street; in the city and county of San Francisco, State of California, United States of America, and *651that his mother and father were persons of Chinese descent and subjects of the Emperor of China, and that said Wong Kim Ark was and is a laborer.

“ That at the time of his said birth his mother and father were domiciled residents of the United States, and had established and enjoyed a permanent domicil and residence therein at said city and county of San Francisco, State aforesaid.

“That said mother and father of said Wong Kim Ark continued to reside and remain in the United States until the year 1890, when they departed for China.

“That during all the time of their said residence in the United States as domiciled residents therein the said mother and father of said Wong Kim Ark were engaged in the prosecution of business, and were never engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China.

“That ever since the birth of said Wong Kim Ark, at the time and place hereinbefore stated and stipulated, he has had but one residence, to wit, a residence in said State of California, in the United States of America, and that he has never changed or lost said residence or gained or acquired another residence, and there resided claiming to be a citizen of the United States.

“That in the year 1890 the said Wong Kim Ark departed for China upon a temporary visit and with the intention of returning to the United States, and did return thereto on July 26, 1890, on the steamship Gaelic, and was* permitted to enter the United States by the collector of customs upon the sole ground that he was a native-born citizen of the United States.

“That after his said return the said Wong Kim Ark remained in the United States, claiming to be a citizen thei’eof, until the year 1894, when he again departed for China upon a temporary visit, and with the intention of returning to the United States, and did return thereto in the month of August, 1S95, and applied to the collector of customs to be permitted to land; and that such application was denied upon the sole ground that said Wong Kim Ark was not a citizen of the United States.-

*652“That said Wong Kira Ark has not, either by himself or his parents acting for him, ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, and that he has never done or committed any act or thing to exclude him therefrom.”

The court ordered Wong Kim Ark to be discharged, upon the ground that he was a citizen of the United States. 71 Fed. Rep. 382. The United States appealed to this court, and the appellee was admitted to bail pending the appeal.

Mr. Solicitor General Conrad, with whom was Mr. George D. Collins on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Maxwell Evarts and Mr. J. Ruhley Ashton, for appellee. Mr. Thomas D. Biordan filed a brief for same.

1

Acts of May 6,1882, o. 126, 22 Stat. 68; July 5,1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 115; September 13, 1888, c. 1015, and October 1, 1888, c. 1064, 25 Stat. 476, 504; May 5, 1892, c. 60, 27-Stat. 25; August 18, 1894, c. 301, 28 Stat. 390.

Mr. Justice Gray,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The facts of this case, as agreed by the parties, are as follows : Wong Kim Ark was born in 1873 in the city of San Francisco, in the State of California and United States of America, and was and is a laborer. His father and mother were persons of Chinese descent, and subjects of the Emperor of China; they were at the time of his birth domiciled residents of the United States, having previously established and still enjoying a permanent domicil and residence therein at. San Francisco; they continued to reside and remain in the United States until 1890, when they departed for China; and during all the time of their residence ^in the United States they were engaged in business, and were never employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China. Wong Kim Ark, ever since his birth, has had but one residence, to wit, in California, within the United States, and has there resided, .claiming to be a citizen of the United States, and has never lost or changed that residence, or gained or acquired another residence; and neither he, nor his parents acting for him, ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, or did or committed any act or thing to exclude him *653therefrom. In 1890 (when be must have been about seventeen years of age) he departed for China on a temporary visit and with the intention of returning to the United States, and did return thereto by sea in the same year, and was permitted by the collector of customs to enter, the United States, upon the sole ground that he was a native-born citizen of the United States. After such return, he remained in the United States, claiming to be a citizen thereof, until 1894, when he (being about twenty-one years óf age, but whether a little above or a little under that age does not appear) again departed for China on a temporary visit and with the intention of returning to the United States; and he did return thereto by sea in August, 1895, and applied to the collector of customs for permission to land; and was denied such permission, upon the sole ground that he was not a citizen of the United States/

It is conceded that, if he is a citizen of the United States, thé acts of Congress, known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, prohibiting persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers, from coming into the United States, do not and cannot apply to him.

The question presented by the record is whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at ■ the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a, permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying bn business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, “ All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

I. In construing any act of legislation, whether a statute enacted by the legislature, or a constitution established by the people as the supreme law of the land, regard is to be had, not only to all parts of the act itself, and of any former act of the same law-making power, of which the act in question is an amendment; but also to the condition, and to the history, *654of the law as previously existing, and in the light of which the new act must be read and interpreted.

The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the words “citizen of the United States,” and “natural-born citizen of the United States.” By the original Constitu tion, every representative in Congress is required to have been “seven years a citizen of the United States,” and every Senator to have been “nine years a citizen of the United States;” and “ no person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of. the United States at the timé of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President.” The Fourteenth Article of Amendment, besides declaring that- “ all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” also declares that “ no' State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or propert3r, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” And the Fifteenth Article of Amendment declares that- “ the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.”

The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by the affirmative declaration that “ all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. The language of the-Constitution, as has been well Said, could not be understood without reference to the common lav/. 1 Kent Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 274.

*655In Minor v. Happersett, Chief Justice Waite' when construing, in behalf of the court, the very provision of the Fourteenth Amendment now in question, said: “The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Eesort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.” And he proceeded to resort to the common law as an aid in the construction of this provision. 21 Wall. 167.

In Smith v. Alabama, Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering-the judgment of the court, said “ There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted-by the several States each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes.” “ There is, however, one clear exception to the stateinent that there is no national common law. The interpretation of 'the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” 124 U. S. 478!

II. The fundamental principle of .the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called “ ligealty,” “ obedience,” “ faith ” or “ power,” of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual — as expressed in the maxim, proteoiio trahit subjectionem, et subjeotio protectionem — and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance ; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born iri England, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King’s dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction of the King.

This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or *656explanations of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case, known as Calvin's Case, or the Case of the Postnati, decided in 1608, after a hearing in the Exchequer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor and all the Judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere. Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1, 45-6#, 18#, 185; Ellesmere on Postnati, 62-64; 8. C, 2 Howell’s State Trials, 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679.

The English authorities ever, since are to the like effect. Co. Lit. 8a, 1285; Lord Hale, in Hargrave’s Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale P. C. 61, 62; 1 Bl. Com. 366, 369, 370, 374; .4 Bl. Com. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300, 308; Cockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.

In Udny v. Udny, (1869) L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question' whether the domicil of the father was in England or in Scotland, he. being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: “The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicil.” p. 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: “The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries; ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the; tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another, by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.” And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of'domicil, domiciliwn, the criterion' established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which “ the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law. which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or in*657testacy, must depend;” he yet distinctly recognized that a mán’s political status, his country, patria, and his “ nationality, that is, natural allegiance,” “ may depend on different laws in different countries.” pp. 457, 460. He evidently used the word “ citizen,” not as equivalent to “ subject,” but rather to “inhabitant;” and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that ail persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.

Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the same year, reviewing the whole matter, said: “ By the common law of England,', every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject; save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner- during the hostile occupation of any part of the 'territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.” Cockburn on.Nationality, 7.

Mr: Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics: British subject' means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the Grown. ‘Permanent ’ allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is within the British dominions, owes ‘ temporary ’ allegiance to the Crown. 1 Natural-born British subject' means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.” “ Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who {whatever the nationality of his parents') is born within the British dominions is a natu/ral-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.” The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two: “ 1. Any person who (his father being an alien enemv.) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such *658person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.” “ 2. Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.” And he adds: “ The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person’s birth, it in theory at least depended, not upon the locality of a man’s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the King of England; and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or; in .other words, under the protection and control of' the Crown.” Dicey Conflict of Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.

It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three .centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing' in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction, of the English Sov: ereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.

III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.

In the early case of The Charming Betsy, (1804) it appears to have been assumed by this court that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States; Chief Justice Marshall saying: “ "Whether a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen according to the established laws of the country, can divest himself absolutely of *659that eiiaracter otherwise than in such manner as may be prescribed by law, is a question which it is not necessary at present to decide.” 2 Cranch, 64, 119.

In Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, (1830) 3 Pet. 99, in which the plaintiff was born in the city of New York, about the time of the Declaration of Independence, the justices of this court (while differing in opinion upon other points) all agreed that the law of England as to citizenship by birth was the law of the English Colonies in America. Mr. Justice Thompson, speaking for the majority of the court, said: “ It is universally admitted, both in the English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the Colonies of North America, whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain, were natural-born British subjects.” 3 Pet. 120. Mr. Justice Johnson said : “ lie was entitled to inherit as a citizen born of the State of New York.”' 3 Pet. 136. Mr. Justice Story stated the reasons upon this point more at large, referring to Galvin’s Gase, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, above cited, and saying: “ Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is; and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: First, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign; and, secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the ligeance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born ■within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also at his birth derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, defaeto. There are some exceptions which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which, indeed, illustrate and confirm the general doctrine. Thus, a person who is born on the ocean is a subject of the prince to whom his parents then owe allegiance; for he is still deemed under the protection of his sovereign, and born in a place where he has dominion in common with all other sovereigns. So the children of an ambassador are held to bo *660subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince.” 3 Pet. 155. “ The children of .enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.” 3 Pet. 1-56. “ Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while ,the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.” 3 Pet. 164.

In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, decided (a appears by the records of this court) on the same day as the ast case, it was held that a woman born in South Carolina before the Declaration of Independence, married ■ to an English officer in Charleston during its occupation by the British forces in the Revolutionary War, and accompanying her husband on his return to England, and there remaining until her death, was a British subject, within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, so that her title to land in South Carolina, by descent cast before that treaty, was protected thereby. It was of such a case, that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ The incapacities of femes covert, provided' by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.” 3 Pet. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for.the United States, as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined, not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story certainly did not mean to suggest that, independently of treaty, there was any principle of international law which could defeat the operation of the established rule of citizenship by birth within the United States; for he referred (p. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, *661above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 162) that “ each government had a'right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens; ” and in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, “ there are certain principles which have been generally recognized, by tribunals administering public law, [adding, in later editions, “ or the law of nations,”] as of unquestionable authority,” and stated, as the first of those principles, “Persons who are born in a country are generally .deemed citizens and subjects of that country.” Story Conflict of Laws, § 48.

The English statute of 11 & 12 Will. Ill, (1700) c. 6, entitled “ An act to enable His Majesty’s natural-born subjects to inherit the estate of their ancestors, either lineal or collateral, notwithstanding their father or mother were aliens,” enacted that “all and every person or persons, being the King’s natural-born subject or subjects, within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” might and should thereafter lawfully inherit and make their titles by descent to any lands “from any of their ancestors, lineal or collateral, although the father and mother, or father or mother, or other ancestor, of such person or persons, by, from, through or under whom ” title should be made or derived, had been or should be “ born out of the King’s allegiance, and out of His Majesty’s realms and dominions,” as fully and effectually, as if such parents or ancestors “ had been naturalized or natural-born subject or subjects within the King’s dominions.” 7 Statutes of the Eealm, 590. It may be observed that, throughout that statute, persons born within the realm, although children of alien parents, were called “ natural-born subjects.” As that statute included persons born “ within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” it of course extended to the Colonies, and, not having been .repealed in Maryland, was in force there. In McCreery v. Somerville, (1824) 9 Wheat. 354, which concerned the title to land in the State of Maryland, it was assumed that children born in that State of an alien who was still living, and who had not been naturalized, were “native-born citizens of the *662United States and without such assumption the case would not have presented the question decided by the court, which, as stated by Mr., Justice Story in delivering the opinion, was “ whether the statute applies to the case of a living alien ancestor, so as to create a title by heirship, where none would exist by the common law, if the ancestor were a natural-born subject.” 9 Wheat. 356.

Again, in Levy v. McCartee, (1832) 6 Pet. 102, 112, 113, 115, which concerned a descent cast since the American Revolution, in the State of New York, where the statute of 11 & 12 Will. Ill had been repealed, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, held that the case must rest for its decision exclusively upon the principles of the common law; and treated it as unquestionable that by that law a child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject; quoting the statement óf Lord Coke in Co. Lit. 8a, that “ if. an alien cometh into England and hath issue two sons, these two sons are indígenos, subjects born, because they are born within the realm; ” and saying that such a child “ was a native-born subject, according to the principles of the common law, stated by this court in McCreery v. Somerville, 9 Wheat. 354.”

In Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, Mr. Justice Curtis said: “ The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, ‘a naturaL-born• citizen.’ It' thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in refer'enceto that principle .of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.” 19 How. 576. And to this extent no different opinion was expressed or intimated by any of the other judges.

In United States v. Rhodes, (1866) Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said : “ All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England.” “ We find no' warrant for the opinion *663that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.” 1 Abbott (U. S.) 28, 40, 41.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the question whether a man was, a citizen or an alien was “ to be governed altogether by the principles of the common law,” and that it was established, with few exceptions, “ that a man, born within the jurisdiction of thé common law, is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land ; and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are included in the term ‘citizenship.’ ” Gardner v. Ward, (1805) 2 Mass. 244, note. And again : “ The doctrine of the common law is, that every man born within its'jurisdiction is a subject of the sovereign of the country where he is born ; and allegiance is not personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for; it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory where the person owing the allegiance was born.” Kilham v. Ward, (1806) 2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that in a recent English case Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division that the statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, and 13 Geo. Ill, (1773) c. 21, (hereinafter referred to,) “ clearly recognize that to the King in his. politic, and not in his personal capacity, is the allegiance of his. subjects due.” Isaacson v. Durant, 17 Q. B. D. 54, 65.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr. Justice Gaston, said : “ Before our Revolution, all free persons, born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain,, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens.” . “ Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina, than was consequent upon the transition from •?,, colony dependent on an European King to a free and. sov- - *664ereign State;” “British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; ” “ and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State.” “ The term ‘ citizen,’ as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term ‘ subject ’ in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people; and he who before was a ‘ subject of the king’ is now ‘a citizen of the- State.’” State v. Manuel, (1838) 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26.

That all children, born within the dominion of the United States, of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office, became citizens at the time of their birth, does not appear to have been contested or doubted until .more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of. Chancery of New York, and decided upon full consideration by Yice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clarke, (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.

The same doctrine was repeatedly affirmed in the executive departments, as, for instance, by Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, in 1854, 2 Whart. Int. Dig. (2d ed.) p. 394; by Attorney General Black in 1859, 9 Opinions, 373 ; and by Attorney General Bates in 1862, 10 Opinions, 328, 382, 394, 396.

Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, speaking of the “ general division of the inhabitants of every country, under the comprehensive title of.aliens and natives,” says: “Nativesare all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States. This is .the rule of the common law, without any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are in theory born within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent.” “ To create allegiance by birth, the party must be born, not only within the territorjr, but within the ligeance of the government. If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a State, while *665abroad and occupying a foreign country, are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs. Itr is equally the doctrine of the English common law, that during such hostile occupation of a territory, and the parents be adhering to the enemy as subjects de facto, their children, born under such a temporary dominion, are not born under the ligeance of the conquered.” 2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 39, 42. And he elsewhere says: “ And if, at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the King, and under the King’s obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, 1 do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States, in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the- contrary.” “ Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives ; and though the term citizen seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.” 2 Kent Com. 258, note.

Mr. Binney, in the second edition of a paper on the Alienígenas of the United States, printed in pamphlet at Philadelphia, with a-preface bearing his signature and the date of December 1, 1853, said: “ The common law principle of allegiance was the law of all the States at the time of the Revolution, and at the adoption of the Constitution; and by that principle the citizens of the United States are, with the exceptions before mentioned,” (namely, foreign-born children of citizens, under statutes to be presently referred to,) “ such only as are either born or made so, born within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or naturalized by the authority of law, either in one of the States before the Constitution, or since that time, by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States.” p. 20. “The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute. The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.” *666p. 22, note. .. This paper, without Mr. Binney’s name, and with the note in a less complete form and not containing the passage last" cited, -was published (perhaps from the first edition) in the American Law Register for February, 1854. 2 Amer. Law Reg. 193, 203, 204.

IV. It was contended by one of the learned Counsel for the United States that the rule of the Roman law, by which the citizenship of the child followed that of the parent, was the true rule of international law, as now recognized in most civilized countries, and had-superseded the rule of the common law, depending- on birth.within the realm, originally founded on feudal-considerations. '

But at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in 1789, and long before, it would seem to have been the rule in' Europe generally, as it' certainly was in France, that, as said-by Pothier, “citizens, true and native-born citizens, are those who are born within the extent of the dominion of France,” and “ mere birth within the realm gives the rights of a native-born citizen, independently of the origin of the father or mother, and of their domicil; ” and children born in a foreign country, of a French father who had not established his domicil there nor given up the intention of returning, were also deemed Frenchmen, as Laurent says, by “ a favor, a sort of fiction,” and Calvo, “ by a sort of fiction of exterritoriality, considered as born in France, and therefore invested with French nationality.” Pothier Traité des Personnes, pt. 1, tit. 2, sect. 1, nos. 43, 45; Walsh-Serrant v. Walsh-Serrant, (1802) 3 Journal du Palais, 384; S. C., 8 Merlin, Jurisprudence, (5th ed.) Domicile, § 13; Préfet du Nord v. Lebeau, (1862) Journal du Palais, 1863, 312 and note; 1 Laurent Droit Civil, no. 321; 2 Calvo Droit International, (5th ed.) § 542; Cockburn on Nationality, 13, 14 ; Hall’s International Law, (4th ed.) § 68. The general principle of citizenship by birth within French territory prevailed until after the French Revolution, and was affirmed in successive constitutions, from the one adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1791 to that oí the French Republic in 1799. Constitutions efe Charters, (e.d« 1830) pp. 100, 136, 148, 186. *667The Code Napoleon of 1807 changed the law of France, and adopted, instead of the rule of country of birth, jus soli, the rule of descent or blood, jus sanguinis, as the leading principle; but an eminent commentator has observed that the framers of tha,t code “appear not to have wholly.freed themselves from the ancient rule of France, or rather, indeed, ancient rule of Europe — do la meille regie frangaise, on plutót írteme de la meille regle européenne — according to which, nationality had always been, in former, times, determined by the place of «birth.” 1 Demolombe Cours de Code Napoleon, (4th ed.) no. 146.

The later modifications of the rule in Europe rest upon the constitutions, laws or ordinances of the various countries, and have no important bearing upon the interpretation and effect of the Constitution of the United States. The English Naturalization Act of 33 Yict. (1870) c. 14, and the Commissioners’ Report of 1869 out of which it grew, both bear date since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and, as observed by Mr. Dicey, that act has not affected the principle by which any person who, whatever the nationality of his parents, is born within the British dominions, acquires British nationality at birth, and is a natural-born British subject. Dicey Conflict of Laws, 741. At the time of the passage of that act, although, the tendency on the continent of Europe was to make parentage, rather than birthplace, the criterion of nationality, and citizenship was denied to the naoive-born children of foreign parents in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, yet it appears still to have been conferred upon such children in Holland, Denmark and Portugal, and, when claimed under certain specified conditions, in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece and Russia. Cock-burn on Nationality, 14-21.

There is, therefore, little ground for the theory that, at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, there wras any settled and definite rule of international law, generally recognized by civilized nations, inconsistent with the ancient rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion.

*668Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.

Both in England and in the United States, indeed, statutes have been passed, at various times, enacting that certain issue born abroad of English subjects, or of American citizens, respectively, should inherit, to some extent at least, the rights of their parents. But those statutes applied only to cases coming within their purport; and they have never been considered, in either country, as affecting the citizenship of persons born within its dominion.

The earliest statute was passed in the reign of Edward III. In the Rolls of Parliament of 17 Edw. HI, (1343) it is stated that “before these times there have been' great'doubt and difficulty among the Lords of this realm, and the Commons, as well men of the law as others, whether children who are born in parts beyond sea ought to bear inheritance after the death of their ancestors in England, because no certain law has been thereon ordained; ” and by the King, Lords and Commons, it was unanimously agreed that “there was no manner of doubt that the children of our Lord the King, whether they were born on this side the sea or beyond the sea, should bear the inheritance of their ancestors ; ” “ and in regard to other children, it was agreed in this Parliament, that they also should inherit wherever they might be born in the service of the King; ” but, because the Parliament was about to depart, and the business demanded great advisement and good deliberation how it should be best and most surely done, the making of a statute was put off to the next Parliament. 2 Rot. Pari. 139. By reason, apparently, of the prevalence of the plague in England, no act upon the subject was passed until 25 Edw. Ill, (1350) when Parliament passed an act, entitled “ A statute for those who are born in parts beyond sea,” by which — after reciting that “ some people be in doubt if the children born in the parts beyond the sea, out of- the ligeanceof England, should be able to demand any inheritance within the same ligeance, or not, whereof a petition was put *669in the Parliament ” of 17 Edw. Ill, “ and was not at the same time wholly assented ” — it was (1) agreed and affirmed, “ that the law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been such, that the children of the Kings of England, in whatsoever parts they be born, in England or elsewhere, be able and ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their ancestors ; ” (2) also agreed that certain persons named, “ which were born beyond the sea, out of the ligeance of England, shall be from henceforth able to hav,e and enjoy their inheritance after the death of their ancestors, in all parts within the ligeance of England, as well'as those that should be born within the same ligeance: ” (3) and further agreed “ that all children inheritors, which from henceforth shall be bom without the ligeance of the King, whose fathers and mothers at the time of their birth be and shall be at the faith and ligeance of the King of England, shall have and enjoy the same benefits and advantages to have and bear the inheritance within the same ligeance, as the other inheritors aforesaid, in time to come; so always, that the mothers of such children do pass the sea by the licence and wills of their husbands.” 2 Rot. Pari. 231; 1 Statutes of the Reálm, 310.

It has sometimes been suggested that this general provision of the statute of 25 Edw. Ill was declaratory of the common law. See Bacon, arguendo, in Calvin's Case, 2 Howell’s State Trials, 585; Westlake and Pollock, arguendo, in De Geer v. Stone, 22 Ch. D. 243, 247; 2 Kent Com. 50, 53; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 659, 660; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356. But all suggestions to that effect seem to have been derived, immediately or ultimately, from one or the other of these two sources : The one, the Year Book of 1 Ric. Ill, (1483) fol. 4, pi. 7, reporting a saying of Hussey, C. J., “ that he who is born beyond sea, and his father and mother are English, their issue inherit by the common law, but the statute makes clear, &e," — which, at best, was but obiter dictum, for the Chief Justice appears to have finally rested his opinion on the statute. The other, a note added to the edition of 1688 of Dyer’s Reports, 224a, stating that at Trinity Term 7 Edw. Ill, Rot. 2 B. R., it was adjudged that children of subjects born *670beyond the sea in the service of the King were inheritable — which has been shown, by a search of the roll in the Xing’s Bench so referred to, to be a mistake, inasmuch as the child there in question did not appear to have been born beyond sea, but only to be living abroad. "Westlake’s Private International Law, (3d ed.) 324.

The statute of 25'Edw. Ill .recites the existence of doubts as to the right of foreign-born children to inherit in England $ and, while it is declaratory of the rights of children of the King, and is retrospective as to the persons specifically named, yet as to all others it is, in terms, merely prospective, applying to those only “who shall be born henceforth.” Mr, Binney, in his paper above cited, after a critical examination of the statute, and of the early English cases, concluded: “ There is nothing in the statute which would justify the conclusion that it is declaratory of the common law in any but a single particular, namely, in regard to the children of the King; nor has it at any time been judicially held to be so.” “ The notion that there is any common law principle to naturalize the children born in foreign countries, of native-born American father and mother, father or mother, must be discarded. There is not, and never was, any such common law principle.” Binney on Alienígena}, 14, 20; 2 Amer. Law. Reg. 199, 203. And the great weight of the English authorities, before and since he wrote, appears to support his conclusion. Galvin's Case, 7 Rep. 17a, 18a-; Co. Lit. 8a, and. Hargrave’s note 36; 1 Bl. Com. 373; Barrington on Statutes, (5th ed.) 268; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300, 308; Lord Chancellor Cranworth, in Shedden v. Patrick, 1 Macq. 535, 611; Cockburn on Nationality, 7, 9; De Geer v. Stone, 22 Ch. D. 243, 252; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 178, 741. . “The acquisition,” says Mr. Dicey, (p. 741) “ of nationality by descent, is foreign to the principles of the common law, and is based wholly upon statutory enactments.”

It has been pertinently observed that if the statute of Edward III had only been declaratory of the common law, the subsequent legislation on the subject would have been wholly unnecessary. Cockburn on Nationality, 9. By the *671statute of 29 Car. II, (1677) c. 6, § 1, entitled “ An act for the naturalization of children of His Majesty’s subjects born in foreign countries during the late troubles,” all persons who, at any time between June 14, 1641, and March 24, 1660, “ were born out of His Majesty’s dominions, and whose fathers or mothers were natural-born subjects of this realm,” were declared to be natural-born subjects. By the statute of 7 Anne, (1708) c. 5, § 3, “ the children of all natural-born subjects, born out of the ligeance of Her Majesty,,her heirs and successors” — explained by the statute of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, to mean all children born out of the ligeance of the Crown of England, “ whose fathers were or shall be natural-born subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the time of the birth of such children respectively ” — “ shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be natural-born subjects of this kingdom, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever.” That statute was limited to foreign-born children of natural-born subjects ; and was extended by the statute of 13 Geo. Ill, (1773) c. 21, to foreign-born grandchildren of natural-born subjects, but not to the issue of such grandchildren; or, as put by Mr. Dicey, “ British nationality does not pass by descent or' inheritance ■ beyond the second generation.” See De Geer v. Stone, above cited; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 742.

• Moreover, under those statutes, as is stated in the Eeport in 1869 of the Commissioners for inquiring into the Laws of Naturalization and Allegiance, “no attempt has ever been made on the part of the British Government, (unless in Eastern countries where special jurisdiction is conceded by treaty,) to enforce claims upon, or to assert rights in respect of, persons born abroad, as against the country of their birth whilst they were resident therein, and when-by its law they were invested with its nationality.” In the appendix to their report are collected many such cases in which the British Government declined to interpose, the reasons being most clearly brought out in a dispatch of March 13, 1858, from Lord Malmesbury, the foreign Secretary, to the British Ambassador at Paris, saying: “ It is competent to any country to confer by general or special legislation the privileges of nationality upon those *672who are born out of' its own territory; b.ut it cannot confer such privileges upon such persons as against the country of their birth, when they voluntarily return to and reside therein. Those born in the territory of a nation are (as a general principle) liable when actually therein to the obligations incident to their status by birth. Great Britain considers and treats such persons as natural-born subjects, and cannot therefore deny the right of other nations to do the same. But Great Britain cannot permit the nationality of the children of foreign parents born within her territory to be questioned.3’ Naturalization Commission Report, pp. viii, 67; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1873-1874, pp. 1237, 1337. See also Drummond's Case, (1834) 2 Knapp, 295.

By the Constitution of the United States, Congress was empowered “ to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.” In the exercise of this power, Congress, by successive acts, beginning with the act entitled “An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization',” passed at the second session of the First Congress under the Constitution, has made provision for the admission to citizenship of three principal classes of persons: First. Aliens, having resided for a certain time “within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States,” and naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record. Second. Children of persons so naturalized, “dwelling within the United States, and being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization.” Third. Foreign-born children of American citizens, coming within the definitions prescribed by Congress. Acts of March 26, 1790, c. 3; January 29, 1795, c. 20; . June 18, 1798, c. 54; 1 Stat. 103, 414, 566; April 14, 1802, c. 28; March 26, 1804, c. 47; 2 Stat. 153, 292 ; February 10, 1855, c. 71; 10 Stat. 604; Rev. Stat. §§ 2165, 2172, 1993.

In the act of 1790, the provision as to foreign-born children of American citizens was as follows: “ The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural-born citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been *673resident in the United States.” 1 Stat. 104. *-In 1795, this was reenacted, in the same words, except in substituting, for the words “beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States,” the words “ out of the limits and ‘jurisdiction of the United States.” 1 Stat. 415.

In Í802, all former acts were repealed, and the provisions concerning children of citizens were reenacted in this form: “ The children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject by the Government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States; and the children of persons who now are,'or have been citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States : Provided, that the right of citizenship shall'not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States.” Act of April 14, 1802, c. 28, § 4; 2 Stat. 155.

The provision of that act, concerning “ the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States,” not being restricted to the children of persons already naturalized, might well be held to include children of persons thereafter to be naturalized. 2 Kent Com. 51, 52; West v. West, 8 Paige, 433; United States v. Kellar, 11 Bissell, 314; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 177.

But the provision concerning foreign-born children, being expressly limited to the children of persons who then were or had been citizens, clearly did not include foreign-born children of any person who became a citizen since its enactment. 2 Kent Com. 52, 53; Binney on Alienigense, 20, 25 ; 2 Amer. Law Beg. 203, 205. Mr. Binney’s paper, as he states in his preface, was printed by him in the hope that Congress might supply this defect in our law.

In accordance with his suggestions, it was enacted by the *674statute of February 10, 1855, c. 71, that “persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States : Provided, however, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided'in the United States.” 10 Stat. 604; Bev. Stat. § 1993.

It thus clearly appeal’s that, during the half century intervening between 1802 and 1855, there was no legislation whatever for the citizenship of children born abroad, during that period, of American parents who had not become citizens of the United States before the act of 1802 ; and that the act of 1855, like every other act of Congress upon the subject, has, by express proviso, restricted the right of citizenship, thereby conferred upon foreign-born children of American citizens, to those children themselves, unless they became residents of the United States. Here is nothing to countenance the theory that a general rule of citizenship by blood or descent has displaced in this country the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within its sovereignty.

So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory, or as merely prospective,) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens, have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law, have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents. 2 Kent Com. 39, 50, 53, 258 note; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 659; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356, 371.

Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Bights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional *675Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.

Y. In the fore front, both of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the fundamental principle of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed in the most explicit and comprehensive terms.

The Civil Rights Act, passed at the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, began by enacting that “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly Convicted, shall have thesame right,in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.” Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1; 14 Stat. 27.

The same Congress, shortly afterwards, evidently thinking it unwise, and perhaps unsafe, to leave so. important a declaration of rights to depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which might be repealed by any subsequent Congress, framed the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and on June 16, 1866; by joint resolution proposed it to the legislatures of the several States; and on July 28, 1868, the Secretary of State issued a proclamation showing it to have been ratified by the legislatures of the requisite number of States. 14 Stat. 358; 15 Stat. 708.

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con*676stitution begins with the words, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” As appears upon the face of the amendment, as well as from the history of the times, this was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any persons from becoming citizens by the fact of birth within the United States, who would thereby have become citizens according to the law existing before its adoption. It is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in effect. Its main purpose doubtless' was; as has been often recognized by this court, to establish the citizenship of. free negroes, which had been denied in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393; and to put it beyond doubt that all,.blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United Spates, are citizens of the United States. The Slaughterhouse Gases, (1873) 16 Wall. 36, 73; Strauder v. West Virginia, (1879) 100 U. S. 303, 306; Ex parte Virginia, (1879) 100 U. S. 339, 345; Neal v. Delaware, (1880) 103 U. S. 370, 386; Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U. S. 94, 101. But the opening words, “ All persons born,” are general, not to say universal, restricted only by place and jurisdiction, and not by color or race — as was clearly recognized in all the opinions delivered in The Slaughterhouse Gases, above cited.

In those cases, the point- adjudged was that a statute of Louisiana, granting to á particular corporation the exclusive right for twenty-five years to have and maintain slaughterhouses within a certain district including the city of New Orleans, requiring all cattle intended for sale or slaughter in that district to be brought to the yards and slaughterhouses of the grantee, authorizing all butchers to slaughter their cattle there, and empowering the grantee to exact a reasonable fee for each animal-slaughtered, was within the police powers of the State, and not in conflict with the Thirteenth ■Amendment of. .the Constitution as creating an involuntary, servitude, nor with the Fourteenth Amendment as-abridging the-privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, *677or as depriving persons of tiieir liberty or property without due process of law, or as denying to them the equal protection of the laws.

Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, after observing that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Articles of Amendment of the Constitution were all addressed to the grievances of the negro race, and were designed to remedy them, continued as follows: “We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language and spirit of these Articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly, while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress- which proposed the Thirteenth Article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavey of the Mexican or Chinese race within our .territory, this Amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States, which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these Articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent.” 16 Wall. 72. Andin treating of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, h& said: “The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized an4. established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter, lie must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.” 16 Wall. 73, 74.

Mr. Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Chase arid Justices S wayne and Bradley concurred, said of the same clause: “ It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their-citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry.” 16 Wall. *67895, 111. ■ Mr. Justice Bradley also said: “ The question is now settled by the Fourteenth Amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country; and that state citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending, upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen’s place of residence. The States.have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons.” 16 Wall. 112. And .Mr. Justice Swayne added: “ The language employed is unqualified in its scope. There is no exception in its terms, and there can be properly none in their application. By the language ‘ citizens of the United States’ was meant all such citizens ; and by ‘any person-’ was meant all persons within the jurisdiction of the State. No distinction is intimated on account of race or color. This court has no authority to interpolate a limitation that is neither expressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the law, not to make it. The protection provided was not intended to be confined to those of any particular race or class, but to embrace equally all races, classes and conditions of men.” 16 Wall. 128, 129.

Mr. Justice Miller, indeed, while discussing the causes which led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, made this remark: “ The phrase, ‘ subject to its jurisdiction,’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or 'subjects of foreign States, born within the United States.” ' 16 Wall. 73. This was wholly aside from the question in judgment, and from the course of reasoning bearing- upon that question. It was unsupported by any argument, or by any reference to authorities; and that it was not formulated with the same care and exactness, as if the case before the court had called for an exact definition of the phrase, is apparent from its classing foreign ministers and consuls together — whereas it was then well settled law, as has since been recognized in a judgment of this court in which Mr. Justice Miller concurred, that consuls, as such, :and unless expressly invested with a diplomatic character in ■addition to their ordinary powers, are not considered as entrusted with authority to represent their sovereign in his in*679tefoourse with foreign States or to vindicate his prerogatives, or entitled by the law of nations to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or public ministers, but are subject to the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, of the courts of the country in which they reside. 1 Kent Com. 44 ; Story Conflict of Laws, § 48; Wheaton International Law, (8th ed.) § 249; The Anne, (1818) 3 Wheat. 435, 445, 446; Gittings v. Crawford, (1838) Taney, 1, 10; In re Baiz, (1890) 135 U. S. 403, 424.

In weighing a remark uttered under such circumstances, it is well to bear in mind the often quoted words of Chief Justice Marshall: “ It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the Very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.” Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. 264, 399.

That neither Mr. Justice Miller, nor any of the justices who took part in the decision of The Slaughterhouse Cases, understood the court to be committed to the view that all children born in the United Statss of citizens or subjects of foreign States were excluded from the operation of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, is manifest from a unanimous judgment of the- court, delivered but two years later, while all those judges but Chief Justice Chase were still on the bench, in which Chief Justice Waite said: “ Allegiance and protection are, in this connection” (that is, in relation to citizenship,) “ reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other: allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance.” “At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, horn in a country, of *680parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient, for everything we .have now to consider, that all children, born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens.” Minor v. Happersett, (1874) 21 Wall. 162, 166-168. The decision in that case was that a woman born of citizen parents within the United States was a citizen of the United States, although not entitled to vote, the right to the elective franchise not being essential to citizenship.

The only adjudication that has been made by this court upon the meaning of the clause, “ and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” in the leading provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, is Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, in which it was decided that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States, which still existed and was recognized as an Indian tribe by the United States, who had voluntarily separated himself from his tribe, and taken up his residence among the white citizens of a State, but who did not appear to have been naturalized, or taxed, or in any way recognized or treated as a; citizen, either by the United States or by the State, was not a citizen of the United States, as a person born in the United States, “ and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” within the meaning of the clause in question.

That decision was placed upon the grounds, that the meaning of those words was, “ not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and- owing them direct and immediate allegiance;” that by the Constitution, as originally established, “Indians not taxed” were excluded from the persons according to whose numbers representatives in Congress and direct taxes were apportioned among the *681several States, and Congress was empowered to regulate commerce, not only “ with foreign nations,” and among the several States, but “with the Indian tribesthat the Indian tribes,- being within the territorial limits of the United States, • were not, strictly speaking, foreign States, but were alien nations, distinct political'communities, the members of which owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes, and were not part of'the people of the United States; that the alien and dependent condition of the members of one of those tribes could not be put oflf at their own will, without the action or assent of the United. States; and'that they were never deemed citizens, except when naturalized, collectively or individually, under explicit provisions of a treaty, or of an act of Congress; and, therefore, that “ Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, membei’S of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more ‘ born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.” And it was observed that the language used, in defining citizenship, in the first section of the Civil Eights Act of 1866, by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, was “ all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.” 112 U. S. 99-103.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Woods, dissenting, were of opinion that the Indian in question, having severed himself from his tribe and become a Iona fide resident of a State, had thereby become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in reference to the Civil Eights Act of 1866, said: “ Beyond question, by that act, national citizenship was conferred directly upon all persons in this country, of whatever race (excluding only ‘ Indians not taxed ’), who were born within *682the territorial limits of the United States, and were not subject to any foreign power.” And that view was supported by reference to the debates in the Senate upon that act, and to the ineffectual veto thereof by President Johnson, in which he said : “ By the first section of the bill, all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood. Every individual of those races, born in the United' States, is, by the bill, made a citizen of the United' States.” 112 U. S. 112-114.

The decision in Elk v. Wilkins concerned only members of the Indian tribes within the United States, and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children born in the United States of foreign parents of Caucasian, African or Mongolian descent, not in the diplomatic service of a foreign country.

The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, “All persons born in the United States,” by the addition, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words, (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law,) the two classes of cases — children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State — both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England, and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Galvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1, 385; Oockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155; 2 Kent Com. 39, 42.

The principles upon which each of those exceptions rests were long ago distinctly stated by this court.

*683In United States v. Rice, (1819) 4 Wheat. 246, goods imported into Castine, in the State of Maine while it was in the exclusive possession of the British authorities during the last war with England, were held not to be subject to duties under the revenue laws of the United States, because, as was said by Mr. Justice Story in delivering judgment: “By the conquest and military occupation of Castine, the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place. The. sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon- the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case, no other laws could be' obligatory upon them, for, where' there is> no protection or allegiance or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obedience.” 4 Wheat. 254.

In the great case of The Exchange, (1812) 7 Cranch, 116, the grounds upon which foreign ministers are, and other aliens are not, exempt from the jurisdiction of this country, were set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in a clear and powerful train of reasoning, of which it will be sufficient, for our present purpose, to give little more than the outlines. The opinion did not touch upon the anomalous, case of the Indian tribes, the ' true relation of which to the United States was not directly brought before this court until some years' afterwards in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, (1831) 5 Pet. 1; nor upon the case of a suspension of the sovereignty of the United States over part of their territory by reason of a hostile occupation, such as was also afterwards presented in United States v. Rice, above cited. But in all other respects it covered the whole question of what persons within the territory of the United States are subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

The Chief Justice first laid down the general principle: “ The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is *684necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not. imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more-to the uncertainties of construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory.” 7 Cranch, 136.

He then stated, and supported by argument and illustration, the propositions, that “ this full and absolute territorial jurisdiction, being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power,” has “ given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation” — the first of which is the exemption from arrest or detention of the person of a foreign sovereign entering its territory with its licensé, because “ a foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a juris.diction incompatible with his dignity and the dignity- of his nation ;” “a second case, standing on the same principles with the first, is the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers;” “a third case, in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction, is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions;” and,in conclusion, that “a publicarmecbship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, with whom the Government of the United States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly *685manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.” 7 Cranch, 137-139, 147.

As to the immunity of a foreign minister, he said : “ Whatever may be the principle on which this immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the sovereign he represents ; or by a political fiction suppose him to be extra-territorial, and therefore, in point of law, not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court lie resides; still the immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction of exterritoriality could not be erected and supported against the will of the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to assent to it.” “ The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is implied from the considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad. His minister would owe temporary and local allegiance to a- foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects of his mission. A sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power, to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose, cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and, therefore, a consent to receive him, implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal intended he should retain —privileges which are essential to the dignity of his sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform.” 7 Cranch, 13S, 139.

The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption'. “ from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found ” were stated as follows: “ When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would'subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local a Legiance, and were *686not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption.” 7 Cranch, 144.

In short, the judgment in the case of The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles, that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction, rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war; and that the implied license, under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle, indiscriminately with its inhabitants, for purposes of business or pleasure, can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found. See also Carlisle v. United States, (1872) 16 Wall. 147, 155; Radich v. Hutchins, (1877) 95 U. S. 210; Wildenhus's Case, (1887) 120 U. S. 1; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, (1889) 130 U. S. 581, 603, 604.

From the first organization of the National Government under the Constitution, the naturalization acts of the United States, in providing for the admission of aliens to citizenship by judicial proceedings, uniformly required every applicant to have resided for a certain time “ within' the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States; ” and thus applied the ■words “under the jurisdiction of the United States” to aliens residing here before they had taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, or had renounced allegiance *687to a foreign government. Acts of March 26,1790, c. 3; Janu-' ary. 29, 1795, c. 20, § 1; June 18,1798, c. 54, §§ 1, 6; 1 Stat. 103, 414, 566, 568; April 14, 1802, c. 28, § 1; 2 Stat. 153; March 22,! 1816, c. 32, § 1; 3 Stat. 258; May 24, 1828, c. 116, § 2; 4 Stat. 310; Rev. Stat. § 2165. And, from 1795, the provisionsof those acts, which granted citizenship to foreign-born children of American parents, described such children as “ born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” Acts of January 29, 1795, c. 20, § 3; 1 Stat. 415; April 14, 1802, ,c. 28, § 4; 2 Stat. 155 ; February 10,1855, c. 71; 10 Stat. 604; Rev. Stat. §§ 1993, 2172. Thus Congress, when dealing with the question of citizenship in that aspect, treated aliens residing in this country as “ under the jurisdiction of the United States,” and American parents residing abroad as “ out of the jurisdiction of the United States.”

The words “in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, must'be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress -which proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known case of The Exchange; and as the equivalent of the words “within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States,” and the converse of the words, “ out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,” as habitually used in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word “jurisdiction” in the last clause of the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to “ deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is impossible to construe the words “ subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words “ within its jurisdiction,” in the concluding sentence of the same section ; or to hold that persons “ within the jurisdiction” of oneof the States of the Union are not “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”

These considerations confirm the view, already expressed in this opinion, that the opening sentence of the Fourteenth *688Amendment is throughout affirmative and declaratory, intended to allay doubts and to settle controversies which had arisen, and not to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship.

By the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed,” were declared to be citizens of the United States. In the light of the law as previously established, and of the history of the times, it can hardly be doubted that the words of that act, “ not subject to any foreign power,” were not intended to exclude any children born in this country from the citizenship which would theretofore have been their birthright; or, for instance, for- the first time in our history, to deny the right of citizenship to native-born children of foreign white parents-not in the diplomatic service of their own country, nor in hostile occupation of part of our territory.. But any possible doubt in this regard was removed when the negative words of the Civil Rights Act, “ not subject to any foreign power,” gave way, in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, to the affirmative words, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”

This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is declaratory of existing rights, and affirmative of existing law, as to each-of the qualifications therein expressed — “born in the United States,” “ naturalized in the United States,” and “ subject to the jurisdiction thereof ” — in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship by facts occurring within the limits of the United States. But it has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents ; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.

The effect of the enactments conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of American parents has been defined, and. the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion of the United States, notwithstanding alienage of parents, has been affirmed, in well considered opinions of the executive departments of the Government, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of ■ the Constitution.

*689In 1869, Attorney General Hoar gave to Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, an opinion that children born and, domiciled abroad, whóse fathers were native-born citizens of the United States and had at some time resided therein, were, under the statute of February 10, 1855, c. 71, citizens of the United States, and “ entitled to all the privileges of citizenship which it is in the power of the United States Government to confer. Within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of this nation, they are undoubtedly entitled to all the privileges of citizens.” “But,” the Attorney General added, “while the United States may, by law, fix or declare the conditions constituting citizens of the country within its own territorial jurisdiction, and may confer the rights of American citizens everywhere upon persons who are not rightfully subject to the authority of any foreign country or government, it is clear that the United States cannot, by undertaking to confer the rights of citizenship upon the subjects of a-foreign nation, who have not come within our territory, interfere with the just rights of such nation to the government and control of its own subjects. If, therefore, by the laws of the country of their birth, children of American citizens, born in that country, are subjects of its government, I do not think that it is competent to the United States, by any legislation, to interfere with that relation, or, by undertaking to extend to them the rights of citizens of this country, to interfere with the allegiance which they may owe to the country of their birth while'they continue within its tenitory, or to change the relation to other foreign nations which, by reason of their place of birth, may at anytime exist. The rule of the common law I understand to be, that a person ‘ born in a strange country, under the obedience of a strange prince or country, is an alien ’ (Co. Lit. 1285,) and that every person owes allegiance to the country of his birth.” 13 Opinions of Attorneys General, 89-91.

In 1871, Mr. Fish, -writing to Mr. Marsh, the American Minister to Italy, said: “ The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declares that ‘ all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.’ This, is, simply an affirm*690anee of the common law of England and of this country, so far as it asserts the status of citizenship to be fixed by the place of nativity, irrespective of parentage. The qualification, ‘ and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ was probably intended to exclude the children of foreign ministers, and of other persons who may be within our territory with rights of extraterritoriality,” 2 Whart. Int. Dig. p. 394.

In August, 1873, President Grant, in the exercise of the authority expressly conferred upon the President by art. 2, sect. 2, of the Constitution, to “require .the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,” required the opinions of the. members of his cabinet upon several questions of allegiance, naturalization and expatriation. Mr. Fish, in his opinion, which is entitled to much weight, as well from the circumstances under which it was rendered, as from its masterly treatment of the subject, said:

“ Every independent State has as one of the incidents of its sovereignty the right of municipal legislation and jurisdiction over all persons within its territory, and may therefore change their nationality by naturalization, and this, without regard to the municipal laws of the country whose subjects are so naturalized, as long as they remain, or exercise the rights conferred by naturalization, within the territory and jurisdiction of the State which grants it.

“It may also endow with the rights and privileges of its citizenship persons residing in other countries, so as to entitle them to all rights of property and of succession within its limits, and also with political privileges and civil rights to be enjoyed or exercised within the territory and jurisdiction of the State thus conferring its citizenship.

“ But no sovereignty can extend its jurisdiction beyond its own territorial limits so as to relieve those born under and subject to another jurisdiction, from their obligations or duties thereto; nor can the municipal law of one State interfere with the duties or obligations which its citizens incur, while voluntarily resident in such foreign State and without the jurisdiction of their own country.

*691“ It is evident from the proviso in the act of 10th February, 1855, viz., ‘ that the rights of citizénship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States,’ that the law-making power not only had in view this limit to the efficiency of its own municipal enactments in foreign jurisdiction ; but that it has conferred only a qualified citizenship upon the children of American fathers born without the jurisdiction of the United States, and has denied to them, what pertains to other American citizens, the right of transmitting citizenship to their children, unless they shall have made themselves residents of the United States, or, in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, have made themselves ‘ subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’

“The child born of alien parents in the United States is held to be a citizen thereof, and to be subject to duties with regard to this country which do not attach to the father.

“ The same principle on which such children are held by us to be citizens of the United States, and to be subject to duties to this country, applies to the children of American fathers born -without the jurisdiction of the United States, and entitles the country within whose jurisdiction they are born to claim them as citizens and to subject them to duties to it.

“ Such children are born to' a double character: the citizenship of the father is that of the child, so far as the laws of the country of rvhich the father is a citizen are concerned, and within, the jurisdiction of that country; but the child, from the circumstances of his birth, may acquire rights and owes another fealty besides that which attaches to the father.” Opinions of the Executive Departments on Expatriation, Naturalization and Allegiance, (1873) 17, 18; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1873-74, pp. 1191, 1192.

In 1886, upon the application of a son born in France of an American citizen, and residing in France, for a passport, Mr. Bayard, the Secretary of State, as appears by letters from him to the Secretary of Legation in Paris, and from the latter to the applicant, quoted and adopted the conclusions of Attorney General Hoar in his opinion above cited. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1886, p. 303; 2 Calvo Droit International, § 546.

*692These opinions go to show that, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the executive branch of the Government, the one charged with the duty of protecting American citizens abroad against unjust treatment by other nations, has taken the same view of the act of Congress of 1855, declaring children born abroad of American citizens to be themselves citizens, which, as mentioned in a former part of this opinion, the British Foreign Office has taken of similar acts of Parliament— holding that such statutes cannot, consistently with' our own established rule of citizenship by birth in this country, operate extra-territorially so far as to relieve any person born and residing in a foreign country, and subject to its government, from his allegiance to that country.

In a very recent case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a person, born in this country of Scotch parents who were domiciled but had not been naturalized here, was “ subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was “ not subject to any foreign power,” within the meaning of the Civil '.Rights Act of 1S66 ; and, in an opinion delivered .by Justice Yan Syckel, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Beasley, said: “The object of the Fourteenth Amendment, as is well known, was to confer upon the colored race the right of citizenship. It, however, gave to the colored people no right. superior to that granted to the white race. The ancestors of all the colored people then in the United States were of foreign birth, and could not have been naturalized, or in any way have become entitled to the right of citizenship. The colored people were no more subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, by reason of their birth here, than were the white children born in this country of parents who were not citizens. The same rule must be applied to both races; and unless the general rule, that when the parents are domiciled here birth establishes the right to citizenship, is accepted, the Fourteenth Amendment has failed' to accomplish its purpose, and the colored people are not citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment, by the language, £all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ was intended *693to bring all races, without distinction of color, within the rule which prior to that time pertained to the white race.” Benny v. O'Brien, (1895) 29 Vroom (58 N. J. Law), 36, 39, 40.

The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, im eludes the children' born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race- or color, domiciled within the United States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. His allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke, in Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 6a, “ strong enough to make a natural subject, for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject;" and his child, as said by Mr. Binney in his essay before quoted, “if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the'natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.”. It can hardly be denied that an alien is completely subject to ' the political jurisdiction of the country in which he resides — seeing that, as said by Mr. Webster, when Secretary of State, in his Report to the President on Thrasher's Case in 1851, and since repeated by this court, “independently of a residence with intention to continue such residence; independently' of any domiciliation; independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance or .of renouncing any former allegiance, it is well known that, by the public law, an alien, or a stranger *694born, for sodeng a time as he continues within the'dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason, or other crimes, as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulations.” Ex. Doc. EL R. No. 10, 1st sess. 32d Congress, p. 4; 6 "Webster’s Works, 526; United States v. Carlisle, 16 Wall. 147, 155; Galvin's Case, 7 Rep. 6a; Ellesmere on Postnati, 63; 1 Hale P. C. 62; 4 Bl. Com. .74, 92^

To hold that.the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German or,other European parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.

VI. Whatever considerations, in the absence of a controlling provision of the Constitution, might influence the legislative or the executive branch of the Government to decline to admit persons of the Chinese race to the status of citizens of the United States, there are none that can constrain or permit the judiciary to refuse to give full effect to the peremptory and explicit language of the Fourteenth Amendment, whicli declares and ordains that “All person's born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”

Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and hot having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of . and owe allegiance to the United States, so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here ; and are “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356; Law Ow Bew v. United States, (1892) 144 U. S. 47, 61, 62; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1893) 149 U. S. 698, 724; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, (1895) 158 U. S. 538, 547; Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S. 228, 238.

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the decision was that an ordinance *695of the city of San Francisco, regulating a certain business, and which, as executed by the board of supervisors, made an arbitrary discrimination between natives of China, still subjects of the Emperor of China, but domiciled in the United States, and all other persons, was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Matthews, in delivering the opinion of the court, said : “ The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not less, because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.” “ The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says, £ Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. It is accordingly enacted, by § 1977 of the Revised Statutes, that £ all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall .have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other.’ The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of every, citizen of the United-States, equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of this court.” 118 IT. S. 368, 369.

The manner in which reference was made, in the passage above quoted, to § 1977 of the Revised Statutes, shows that the change of phrase in that section, reenacting § 16 of the statute of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 144, as compared with § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of' 1866 — by substituting, for the words in that act, “ of every race and color,” the words, “within the jurisdiction of the United States” — was not *696considered as making the section, as it now stands, less applicable to persons of every race and color and nationality, than it was in its original form; and is hardly consistent with attributing any narrower meaning to the words “ subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which may itself have been the cause of the change in the phraseology of that provision of the Civil Eights Act.

The decision in Yich Wo v. Hopkins, indeed, did not directly pass upon the effect of these words in the Fourteenth Amendment, but turned upon subsequent provisions of the same section. But, as. already observed, it is impossible to attribute to the words, “ subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” that is to say, of the United States, at the beginning, a less comprehensive meaning than to the words “ within its jurisdiction,” that is, of the State, at the end of the same section; or to hold that persons, who are indisputably “ within the jurisdiction ” of the State, are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the Nation.

It necessárily follows that persons born in China, subjects of the Emperor of China, but domiciled in the United States, having been adjudged, in Yich Wo v. Hopkins, to be within the jurisdiction of the State, within the meaning of the concluding sentence, must be held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United. States, within the meaning of the first sentence of this section of the Constitution ; and their children,, “ born in the United States,” cannot be less “ subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”

Accordingly, in Quock Ting v. United States, (1891) 140 U. S. 417, which, like the case at bar, was a writ of habeas corpus to test the lawfulness of the exclusion of a Chinese person who alleged that he was a citizen of the United States by birth, it was assumed on all hands that a person of the Chinese race, born in the United States, was a citizen of the United States. The decision turned upon the failure of the petitioner to.prove that he was born in this country; and the question at issue was, as stated in the opinion of the majority of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Field, “whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the petitioner was a citizen of the *697United States,” or, as stated by Mr. Justice Brewer in his dissenting opinion, “ whether the petitioner was born in this country or not.” 140 U. S. 419, 423.

In State v. Ah Chew, (1881) 16 Nevada, 50, 58, the Supreme Court of.Nevada said: “ The Amendments did not confer the right of citizenship upon the Mongolian race, except such as are born within the United States.” In the courts of the United States in the Ninth Circuit, it has been uniformly held, in a series of opinions delivered by Mr. Justice Field,. Judge Sawyer, Judge Deady, Judge Hanford and Judge Morrow, that a child born in the United States of Chinese parents, subjects of the Emperor of China, is a native-born citizen of the United States. In re Look Tin Sing, (1884) 10 Sawyer, 353 ; Ex parte Chin King, (1888) 13 Sawyer, 333; In re Yung Sing Hee, (1888) 13 Sawyer, 482; In re Wy Shing, (1888) 13 Sawyer, 530 ; Gee Fook Sing v. United States, (1892) 7 U. S. App. 27; In re Wong Kim Ark, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 382. And we are not aware of any judicial decision to the contrary.

During the debates in the Senate in January and February, 1866, upon the Civil Rights Bill, Mr. Trumbull, the chairman of the committee which reported the bill, moved to amend the first sentence thereof so as to read, “All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, are hereby declared to be-citizens of the United States, without distinction of color.” Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, asked, “Whether it will not have the effect of naturalizing the children of Chinese and Gypsies, born in this country ? ” Mr. Trumbull answered, “ Undoubtedly; ” and asked, “ Is not the child born in this country of German parents a citizen ? ” Mr. Cowan replied, ’“ The children of- German parents are citizens; but Germans are not Chinese.” Mr. Trumbull rejoined : “ The law makes no such distinction ; and the child of an Asiatic is just as much a citizen as the child of a European.” Mr. Reverdy Johnson suggested that the words, “ without distinction of color,” should be omitted as unnecessary; and said : “ The amendment, as it stands, is that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to a foreign power, shall, by virtue of birth, be citizens. To that I am willing to -con*698sent; and that comprehends all persons, without any reference to race or color, who may be so born.” And Mr. Trumbull agreed that striking out those words would make no difference in the meaning, but thought it better that they should be retained, to remove all possible doubt.. Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st sess. pt. 1, pp. 498, 573, 574.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, as originally framed by the House of Representatives, lacked the opening sentence. When it came before the Senate in May, 1866, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, moved to amend by prefixing the sentence in its present form, (less the words “ or naturalized,”) and reading, “All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Mr. Cowan objected, upon the ground that the Mongolian race ought to be excluded; and said: “ Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in California a citizen % ” “I do not know how my honorable friend from California looks upon Chinese, but I do know how some of his fellow-citizens regard them. I have no doubt that now they are useful, and I have no doubt that within proper restraints, allowing that State and the other Pacific States to manage them as they may see fit, they may be useful; büt I would not tie their hands by the Constitution of the United States so as to prevent them hereafter from dealing with them as in their wisdom they see fit.” Mr. Conness, of California, replied: “ The proposition before us relates simply, in that respect, to the children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to declare that they shall be citizens. We have declared that by law; now it is proposed to incorporate the same provision in the fundamental instrument of the Nation. I am in favor of doing so. I voted for the proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States.” “We are entirely ready to accept the provision proposed in this Constitutional Amendment, that the children born here of Mongolian parents shall be declared by the Constitution of *699the United States to be entitled to civil rights and to equal protection before the law with others.” Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st sess. pt. 4, pp. 2890-2892.. It does not appear to have been suggested, in either House of Congress, that children born in the United States of Chinese parents would not come within the terms and effect of the leading sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Doubtless, the intention of the Congress which framed and of the States which adopted this Amendment of the Constitution must be sought in the words of the Amendment; and the debates in Congress are not admissible as evidence to control the meaning of those words. But the statements above quoted are valuable as contemporaneous opinions of jurists and statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words themselves ; and are, at the least, interesting as showing that the application of the Amendment to the Chinese race was considered and not overlooked.

The acts of Congress, known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, the earliest of which was passed some fourteen years after the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, cannot control its meaning, or impair its effect, but must be construed and executed in subordination to its provisions. And the right of the United States, as exercised by and under those acts, to exclude or to expel from the country persons of the Chinese race, born in China, anil continuing to be subjects of the Emperor of China, though having acquired a commercial domicil in the United States, has been upheld by this court, for reasons applicable to all aliens alike, and inapplicable to citizens, of whatever race or color. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228.

In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the right of the United States to expel such Chinese persons was placed upon the grounds, that the right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and indepen*700dent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare ; that the power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the Government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the'Constitution, to intervene; that'the power to exclude and the power to expel aliens rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power; and, therefore, that the power of Congress to expel, like the power to. exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien’s right to be in the country has been made by Congress to depend. 149 ti. S. 711, 713, 714.

In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, the same principles were reaffirmed, and were applied to a Chinese person, born 'in China, who had acquired a commercial domicil in the United States, and who, having voluntarily left the country on a temporary visit to China, and with the intention of returning to and continuing his . residence in this country, claimed the right under a statute or treaty to réenter it; and the distinction between the right of an alien to the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States for his person and property while within the jurisdiction thereof, and his claim of a right to reenter the United States after a visit to his native land, was expressed by the court as follows: “He is none the less an alien, because of his having a commercial domicil in this country. While he lawfully remains here, he is entitled to the benefit of the guaranties of life, liberty and property, secured by the Constitution to all persons, of whatever race, within the jurisdiction of the United States. Iiis personal rights when he is in this country, and such of his property as is here during his absence, are as fully protected by th.e supreme law of the land, as if he were a native or *701naturalized citizen of the United States. But when he has voluntarily gone from the country, and is beyond its jurisdiction, being an alien, he cannot reenter the United States in violation of the will of the Government as expressed in enactments of the law-making power.” 158 U. S. 547, 548.

It is true that Chinese persons born in China cannot be naturalized, like other aliens, by proceedings under the naturalization laws. But this is for want of any statute or treaty authorizing or permitting such naturalization, as will appear by tracing the history of the statutes, treaties and decisions upon that subject — always bearing in mind that statutes enacted by Congress, as well as treaties made by the President and Senate, must jdeld to the paramount and supreme law of the Constitution.

The power, granted to Congress by the Constitution, “ to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,” was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac, (1817) 2 Wheat. 259. For many years after the establishment of the original Constitution, and until two years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress never authorized the naturalization of any but “free white persons.” Acts of March 26, 1790, c. 3, and January 29, 1795, c. 20; 1 Stat. 103, 414; April 14,. 1802, c. 28, and March 26, 1804, c. 47; 2 Stat. 153, 292; March 22, 1816, c. 32; 3 Stat. 258; May 26, 1824, c. 186, and May 24, 1828, c. 116; 4 Stat. 69, 310. By the treaty between the United States and China, made July 28, 1868, and promulgated February 5, 1870, it was provided that “ nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.” 16 Stat. 740. By the act of July 14, 1870, c. 254, § 7, for the first time, the naturalization laws were “ extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” 16 Stat. 256. This extension, as embodied in the Revised Statutes, took the form of providing that those laws should “ apply to aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of African nativity and to persons of African descent;” and it was amended by the act of February *70218,1875, c. 80, by inserting the words above printed in brackets. Rev. Stat. (2d ed-.) § 2169; 18 Stat. 318. Those statutes were held, by the Circuit Court of the United States in California, not to embrace Chinese aliens. In re Ah Yujp, (1878) 5 Sawyer, 155. And by the act of May 6, 1882, c. 126, § 14, it was expressly enacted that “ hereafter no state court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship.” 22 Stat. 61.

In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1893) above cited, this court said: “Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws.” 149 U. S. 716.

The Convention between the United States and China of 1894 provided that “ Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens.” 28 Stat. 1211. And it has since been decided, by the same judge who held this appellee to be a citizen of the United States by virtue of his birth therein, that a native of China of the Mongolian race could not be admitted to citizenship under the naturalization laws. In re Gee Hop, (1895) 71 Fed. Rep. 274.

The Fourteenth-Amendment of the Constitution, in the dec-, laration that “ all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only : birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case *703of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.

The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. “ A naturalized citizen,” said Chief J ustice Marshall, “becomes-a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the National Legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual. The Constitution then takes him up, and, among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native might sue.” Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827. Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no act or omission of Congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or children of a particular race, can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself, without any aid of legislation. The Fourteenth' Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.

No one doubts that the Amendment, as soon as it was promulgated, applied to persons of African descent born in the United States, wherever the birthplace of their parents might have been; and yet, for two years afterwards, there was no statute authorizing persons of that race to be naturalized. If the omission or the refusal of Congress to permit certain *704classes of persons to be made citizens by naturalization could be allowed the effect of correspondingly restricting the classes of persons who should become citizens by birth, it would be in the power of Congress, at any time, by striking negroes out of the naturalization laws, and limiting those laws, as they were formerly limited, to white persons only, to defeat the main purpose of the Constitutional Amendment.

The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, “All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”

YII. Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth. No doubt he might himself, after coming of age, renounce this citizenship, and become a citizen of the country of his parents, or of any other country; for by our law, as solemnly declared by Congress, “ the right of expatriation is a,natural and inherent right of all people,” and “any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or direction of any officer of the United States, which denies, restricts, impairs or questions the right of expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic.” Rev. Stat. § 1999, reenacting act of July 27, 1868, c. 249, § 1; 15 Stat. 223, 224. Whether any act of himself, or of his parents, during his minority, could have the same effect, is at least doubtful. But it would be out of place to pursue that inquiry ; inasmuch as it is expressly agreed that his residence has always been in the United States, and not elsewhere; that each of his temporary visits to China, the one for some months when he was about seventeen years old, and the other for something like a year about the time of his coming of age, was made with the intention of returning, and was followed by his actual return, to the United States; and “that said Wong Kim Ark has not, either by himself or his parents act*705ing for him, ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, and that he has never done' or committed any act or thing to exclude him therefrom.”

The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties, were to present for determination the single question, stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time, of his birth, are subject’s of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered .in the affirmative.

Order affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting.

I cannot concur in the opinion and judgment of the court in this case.

The proposition is that a child born in this country of parents who were not citizens of the United States, and under the laws of their own country and of the United States could not become such — as was the fact from the beginning of the Government in respect of the class of aliens to which the parents in this instance belonged — is, from the moment of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, any act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding.

The argument is, that although the Constitution prior to that amendment nowhere attempted to define the words “ citizens of the United States ” and “ natural-born citizen ” as used therein, yet that it must be interpreted in the light of the English common law rule which made the place of birth the criterion of nationality; that that rule “ was in force in all *706the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwai’ds, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established ; ” and “ that before tlje enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign Government, Avere-native-born citizens of the United States.”

Thus the Fourteenth Amendment is held to be merely declaratory except that it brings all persons, irrespective of color, Avithin the scope of the alleged rule, and puts that rule beyond the control of the legislative power.

If the conclusion of the majority opinion is correct, them the children of citizens of the United States, who have been born abroad since July 28, 1868, when the amendment was declared ratified, Avere, and are, aliens, unless they have, or shall o.n attaining majority, become citizens by naturalization in the United States; and no statutory provision to the contrary is of any force or effect. And children Avho are aliens by descent, but born on our soil, are exempted from the exercise of the poAver to exclude or to expel aliens, or any class of aliens, so often maintained by this court, an exemption apparently disregarded by the acts in respect of the exclusion of persons of Chinese descent.

The English common law rule, which it is insisted was in force after the Declaration of Independence, was that “ every person born Avithin the dominions of the CroAvn, no matter Avhether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, Avhether the parents Avere settled or merely temporarily sojourning in the country, aauis an English subject; saArn only the children of foreign ambassadors, (who Avere excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality Avith them,) or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England.” Cockburn on Nationality, 7.

The tie which bound the child to the Crown Avas indissolu*707ble. The nationality of his parents had no bearing on his nationality. Though born during a temporary stay of a few days, the child was irretrievably a British subject. Hall on Foreign Jurisdiction, etc., § 15.

The rule was the outcome of the connection in feudalism between the individual and the soil on which he lived, and the allegiance due was that of liegemen to their liege lord. It was not local and temporary as was the obedience to the laws owed by aliens within the dominions of the Crown, but permanent and indissoluble, and not to be cancelled by any change of time or place or circumstances.

And it is this rule, pure and simple, which it is asserted determined citizenship of the United States during the entire period prior to the passage of the act of April 9, 1866, and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and governed the meaning of the words'“ citizen of the United States” and “ natural-born citizen ” used in the Constitution as originally framed and adopted. I submit that no such rule obtained during the period referred to, and that those words bore no such construction; that the act of April 9, 1866, expressed the contrary rule; that the Fourteenth Amendment prescribed the same rule as the act; and that if that amendment bears the construction now put upon it, it imposed the English common law rule on this country for the first time and made it “absolute and unbending,” just as Great Britain was being relieved from its inconveniences.

Obviously, where the Constitution deals with common law rights and uses common law phraseology, its language should be read in the light of the common law ; but when the question arises as to what constitutes citizenship' of the nation, involving as it does international relations, and political as contradistinguished from civil status, international principles must be considered, and, unless the municipal law of England appears to have been affirmatively accepted, it cannot be allowed to control in the matter of construction.

Nationality is essentially a political idea, and belongs to the sphere of public law. Hence Mr. Justice Story, in Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 248, said that the incapacities of femes *708covert, at common law, “do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.”

Twissin his-work on the Law of Nations says that “natural allegiance, or the obligation of perpetual obedience to the government of a country, wherein a man may happen to have been born, which he cannot forfeit, or cancel, or vary by any change of time, or place, or circumstance, is the creature of civil law, and finds no countenance in the law of nations, as it is in direct conflict with the incontestable rule of that law.” Yol. 1, p. 231.

Before the Revolution, the views of the publicists had been thus put by Yattel'; “ The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children ;. and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.” Book I, c. 19, § 212. “The true bond which connects the. child Avith the body politic is not the matter of an inanimate piece of land, but the moral relations of his parentage. . . . ■ The place of birth produces no change in the rule that children ■ folio av the condition of their fathers, for it is not naturally the place of birth that giA7es rights, but extraction.”

• And to the same effect are the modern Avriters, as for in*709stance, Bar, who says: “ To what nation a person belongs is by the laws of all nation's closely dependent on descent; it is almost an universal rule that the citizenship of the parents determines it — that of the father where children are lawful, and where- they are bastards that of their mother, without regard to the place of their birth ; and that must necessarily be recognized as the correct -canon, since nationality is in its essence dependent on descent.” Int. Law, § 31..

The framers of the Constitution were familiar with the distinctions between the Roman law and the feudal law, between obligations based on territoriality and those based on the personal and invisible character of origin, and there is nothing to show that in the matter of nationality they intended to adhere to principles derived from regal government, which they had just assisted in overthrowing.

Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the Crown was thrown off and an independent government established, every rule of the common law and every statute of England obtaining in the Colonies, in derogation of the principles on which the new government was founded, was abrogated.

The States, for all national purposes embraced in the Constitution, became one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws, but they retained their jurisdiction over all persons and things within their territorial limits, except where surrendered to the General Government or restrained by the Constitution, and protection to life, liberty and property rested primarily with them. So far as the jus commune, or folk-right, relating to the rights of persons, was concerned, the Colonies regarded it as their birthright, and adopted such parts of it as they found applicable to their condition. Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137.

They became sovereign and independent States, and when the Republic was created each of the .thirteen States had its own local usages, customs and common law, while in respect of the National Government there necessarily was no general, independent and separate common law of the United States, nor has there ever been. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 658.

*710As to the jura coronas, including therein the obligation of allegiance, the extent to which these ever were applicable in this country depended on circumstances, and it would seem ' quite clear that the rule making locality of birth the criterion of citizenship because creating a permanent tie of allegiance, no more survived the American Revolution than the same rule survived the French Revolution.

Doubtless, before the latter event, in the progress of monarchical power, the rule which involved the principle of liege homage may have become the rule of Europe; but ■that idea never had any basis in the United States.

As Chief Justice Taney observed in Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 618, though in a different connection: “ It is true that most of the States have adopted the principles of English jurisprudence, so far as it concerns private and individual rights. And when such rights are in question, we habitually refer to the English decisions, not only with respect, but in many cases as authoritative. But in the distribution of political power between the great departments of’ government, there is such a wide difference between the power conferred on the President of the United States and the authority and sovereignty which belong to the English Crown, that it would be altogether unsafe to reason from any supposed resemblance between them, either as regards conquest in war, or,any other subject where the rights and powers of the executive arm of the government are brought into question. Our own Constitution and form of government must be our only guide.”

And Mr. Lawrence, in his edition of Wheaton (Lawrence’s Wheaton, p. 920), makes this comment: “ There is, it is believed, as great a difference between the territorial allegiance claimed by an hereditary sovereign on feudal principles, and the personal right of citizenship participated in by all the members of the political community, according to American institutions, as there is between the authority and sovereignty of the Queen of England, and the power of the American ■President; and the inapplicability of English precedents is as clear in the one case as in the other. The same view, with particular application to naturalization, was early taken by *711the American commentator on Blackstone. Tucker’s Blackstone, Yol. 1, Pt. 2, Appx. p. 96.”

Blackstone distinguished allegiance into two sorts, the one . natural and perpetual; the other local and temporary. Natural allegiance, so-called, was allegiance resulting from birth in subjection to the Crown, and indelibility was an essential, vital and necessary characteristic.

The Royal Commission to inquire into the Laws of Naturalization and Allegiance was created May 21,1868 ; and, in their report, the Commissioners, among other things, say: “ The allegiance of a natural-born British subject is regarded by the Common Law as indelible. We are of opinion that this doctrine of the Common Law is neither reasonable nor convenient. It is at variance with those principles on which the rights and duties of a subject should be deemed to rest; it conflicts with that freedom of action which is now recognized as most com ducive to the general good as well as to individual happiness' and prosperity; and it is especially inconsistent with the practice of a State which allows to its subjects absolute freedom of emigration.”

However, the Commission by a majority declined to recommend the abandonment of the rule altogether though “ clearly - of opinion that it ought not to be, as it now is, absolute and unbending;” but recommended certain modifications which were carried out in subsequent legislation.

' But from the Declaration of Independence to this day, the United States have rejected the doctrine of indissoluble allegiance and maintained the general right of expatriation, to be exercised in subordination to the public interests and subject to regulation.

As early as the act of January 29, 1795, c. 20, 1 Stat. 414, applicants for naturalization were required to take not simply an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, but of absolute renunciation and abjuration of all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince or State, and particularly to the prince or State of which they were before the citizens or subjects.

The statute 3 Jac. 1, c. 4, provided that promising obedience *712to any other prince, State or potentate subjected the person so doing to be adjudged a traitor, and to suffer the penalty of high treason; and in respect of the act of 1795 Lord Grenville wrote to our minister, Rufus King : “ No British subject can, by such a form of renunciation as that which is prescribed in the American law of naturalization, divest himself of his allegiance to his sovereign.' Such a declaration of renunciation made by any of the King’s subjects would, instead of operating as a protection $o them, be considered an act highly criminal on their part.” 2 Amer. St. Pap. 119. And see Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 51.

Nevertheless, Congress has persisted from 1795 in rejecting the English rule and in requiring the alien, who would become a citizen of the United States, in taking on himself the ties binding him to our Government, to' affirmatively sever the ties that bound him to any other.

The subject was examined at length in 1856, in an opinion given the Secretary of State by Attorney General Cushing, 8 Opins. Attys. Gen. 139, where the views of the writers on international law and those expressed in cases in the Federal and state courts are largely set forth, and the Attorney General says : “ The doctrine of absolute and perpetual allegiance, the root of the denial of any right of emigration, is inadmissible in the United States. It was a matter involved in, and settled for us by the Revolution, which founded the American Union.

“Moreover, the right of expatriation, under fixed circumstances of time and of manner, being expressly asserted in the legislatures of several of the States, and confirmed by decisions of their courts, must be considered as thus made a part of the fundamental law of the United States.”

Expatriation included not simply the leaving of one’s native country, but the becoming naturalized in the country adopted as a future residence. The emigration which the United States encouraged was that of those who could become incorporate with its people; make its flag their own; and aid in ■the accomplishment of a common destiny; and it was obstruction to such emigration that made one of the charges against the Crown in the Declaration.

*713Ainslie v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454, 460, (1813); Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393, (1811); Alsberry v. Hawkins, 9 Dana, 177, (1839) are among the cases cited. . In Ainslie v. Martin, the indelibility of allegiance according to the common law rule was maintained; Avhile in Murray v. McCarty and Alsberry v. Hawkins, the right of expatriation vvas recognized as a'practical and fundamental doctrine of America. There Avas no uniform rule so far as the States were severally concerned, and none such assumed in respect of the United States.'

In 1859, Attorney General Black thus advised the President (9 Op. 356): “ The natural right of every free person, Avho owes no debts and is not guilty of any crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an honest purpose, the privilege of throiving off his natural allegiance and substituting another allegiance in its place — the general right, in one word, of expatriation, is incontestable. I know that the common law of England denies it; that the judicial decisions of that country are opposed to it; and that some of our own courts, misled by British authority, have expressed, though not very decisively, the same opinion. But all this is very far from settling the question. The municipal code of England is not one of the .sources from Avhiph we derive our knowledge of international law. We take it from natural reason and justice, from writers of known AA’isdom, and from the practice of civilized nations. All these are opposed to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance.”

In the opinion of the Attorney General, the United States, in recognizing the right of expatriation, declined, from the beginning, to accept the view that rested the obligation of the citizen on feudal principles, and proceeded on the kiAv of nations, Avhich Avas in direct conflict thereAvith.

And the correctness of this conclusion Avas specifically affirmed not many years after, when the right as the natural and inherent right of all people and fundamental in this country1', was declared by Congress in the act of July 27,1868, 15 Stat. 223, c. 249, carried forward into sections 1999 and 2000 of the Bevised Statutes, in 1874.

*714It is beyond dispute that the most vita! constituent of the English common law rule has always been rejected in respect of citizenship of the United States.

Whether it was also the rule at common law that the children of British subjects born abroad were themselves British subjects — nationality being attributed to parentage instead of locality — has been variously determined. If this were so, of course the statute of Edw. Ill was declaratory, as was the subsequent legislation. But if not, then such children were aliens, and the statute of 7 Anne and subsequent statutes must be regarded as in some sort acts of naturalization. On the other hand, it seems to me that the rule partus sequitur patrem has always applied to children of our citizens born abroad and that the acts of Congress on this subject are clearly declaratory, passed out of abundant caution to obviate misunderstandings which might arise from the prevalence of the contrary rule elsewhere.

Section 1993 of the Bevised Statutes provides that children so born “are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.” Thus a limitation is prescribed on the passage of citizenship by descent beyond the second generation if then surrendered by permanent non-residence, and this limitation was contained in all'the acts from 1790 down. Section 2172 provides that such children shall “be considered as citizens thereof.”

The language of the statute of 7 Ánne, c. 5, is quite different in providing that, “the children of all natural-born subjects born out of the ligeance of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be natural-born subjects of this kingdom, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever.”

In my judgment, the children of our citizens born abroad were always natural-born citizens from the standpoint of this Government. If not, and if the correct view is that they •were 'aliens but collectively naturalized under the acts of Congress which recognized them as natural-born, then those born since the Fourteenth Amendment are not citizens at all, *715unless they have become such by individual compliance with the general laws for the naturalization of aliens, because they are not naturalized “ in the United States.”

By the fifth clause of the first- section of article two of the Constitution it is provided that: “No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at-the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the office, of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that- office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.”

In the convention it was, says Mr. Bancroft, “ objected that no number of years could properly prepare a foreigner for that place; but as men of other lands had spilled their blood in the cause of the United States, and had assisted at every stage of the formation of their institutions, on the seventh o£ September, it was unanimously settled that foreign-born residents of fourteen years who should be citizens at' the time of the formation of the Constitution, are eligible to the office of President.” 2 Bancroft Hist. U. S. Const. 193.

Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution, I submit that it is-unreasonablerto conclude that “ natural-born citizen ” applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United States, irrespective of circumstances; and that the children of foreigners, happening to be born to them while passing through the country, whether of royal parentage or not, or whether of the Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presi-' dency, while children of our citizens, born- abroad, were not.

. By the second clause of the second section of article one it is provided that: “No person shall be a-representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State of which he shall be chosen; ” and by the third clause of section three, • that : “No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United- States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”

*716At that time the theory largely obtained, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, “ that every citizen of a State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States.”- § 1693.

Mr. Justice Curtis, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 396, 576, expressed the opinion that under the Constitution of the United States “ every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of -that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States.” Arid he said: “ Among the powers unquestionably possessed by the several States was that of determining what persons should and what persons should not be citizens. It was practicable to confer on the Government of the Union thjs entire power. It embraced what may, well enough for the purpose now in view, be divided into three parts. First: The power to remove the disabilities of alienage, either by special acts in reference to each individual case, or by establishing a rule of naturalization to be administered and applied by the courts. Second: Determining what persons should enjoy the privileges of citizenship, in respect to the internal affairs of the several States. Third: What native-born persons should be citizens of the United States.

“ The first-named power, that of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, was granted; and' here the grant, according to its terms, stopped. Construing a Constitution containing only limited and defined powers of government, the argument derived from this definite and restricted power to establish a rule of naturalization must be admitted to be exceedingly strong. I do not say it is necessarily decisive. It might be controlled by other parts of the Constitution. But when this particular subject of citizenship was under consideration, and, in the clause specially intended to define the.extent of power concerning it, we find a particular part of this entire power separated from the residue, and conferred on the General Government, there arises a strong presumption that this is all which is granted, and that- the residue is left to the States and to the people. And this presumption, is, in my opinion, converted into a certainty, by an examination of'all such other clauses of the Constitution as touch this subject.”

*717But in that case Mr; Chief Justice Taney sg.id: “ The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘ sovereign people ’ and every citizen is one of this people and a constituent member of this. sovereignty. . . . In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the'Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights' and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges .of a citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen and to endow him with all its rights. But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to. him by the laws of nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, ór upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be' a citizen in the sense in which that word is. used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts, nor-to;the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States. The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State ’which gave .them. The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so. Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution; can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal *718Government, although, sp far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and. clothed with all the rights and immunities which, the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.” .

Plainly the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State thus pointed out, involved then, as now, the complete rights of the citizen internationally as contradistinguished from those of persons not citizens of the United States.

The English common law rule recognized no exception in the instance of birth during the mere temporary or accidental sojourn of the parents. As allegiance sprang from the place of birth regardless of parentage and supervened at the moment of birth, the inquiry whether the parents Were permanently or only temporarily within the realm was wholly immaterial.. And it is settled in England that the question of domicil is entirely distinct from that of allegiance. The one relates to the civil, and the other to the political status. Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441, 457.

But a different view as to the effect-of permanent abode on •nationality has been expressed in this country.

In his work on Conflict of Laws, § 48, Mr. Justice Story, treating the subject as one of public law, said: “ Persons who are born in a country, are generally deemed to be citizens of that country. A reasonable qualification of the rule would seem to be that it should not apply to the children of parents Who were in itinere in the country, or who were abiding there for temporary purposes, as for health or curiosity, or occasional business. It would be difficult, however, to assert that in the present state of public law such a qualification is universally established.”

Undoubtedly all persons born in a country are presumptively citizens thereof, but the presumption is not irrebutable.

In his Lectures on Constitutional Law, p. 279, Mr. Justice Miller remarked : “If a stranger or traveller passing through,, or temporarily residing in this country, wrbo has not himself been naturalized, and who claims to owe no allegiance to our-Government, has a child born here which goes out of the coun*719try with its father, such child is not a citizen of the United States, because it was not subject to its jurisdiction.”

And to the same effect are the rulings of Mr. Secretary Frelinghuysen in the matter of Hausding, and Mr. Secretary Bayard in the matter of Greisser.

Hausding was born in the United States, went to Europe, and, desiring to return, applied to the minister of the United States for a passport, which was refused on the ground that the applicant was born of Saxon subjects temporarily in the United States. Mr. Secretary Frelinghuysen wrote to Mr. Kasson, our minister: “You ask ‘Can one born a foreign subject, but within the United States, make the option after his majority, and while still living abroad, to adopt the citizenship of his birthplace? It seems not,' and that he must change his allegiance by emigration and legal process of naturalization.’ Sections 1992 and . 1993 of the Revised Statutes clearly show the extent of existing legislation; that the fact of birth, under circumstances implying alien subjection, establishes of itself no right of citizenship; and that the citizenship of a person .so born is to be acquired in some legitimate manner through the operation of statute. No statute contemplates the acquisition of the declared character of an American citizen by a person not at the time within the jurisdiction of the tribunal of record- which confers that character.”

Greisser was born in the State of Ohio in 186ÍT, his father being a German subject and domiciled in Germany, to'which country the child returned. After quoting the act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Secretary Bayard said: “ Richard Greisser was no doubt born in the United States, but he was on his birth ‘subject to a foreign power,’ and ‘not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’ He was not, therefore, under the statute and the Constitution a citizen of the United States by birth; and it is not pretended that he has any other title to citizenship.” 2 Whart. Int. Dig. 399.

The Civil Rights Act became a law April 9,1866 (14 Stat. 27, c. 31), and provided : “That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians *720not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” And this was reenacted June 22, 1874, in the Revised Statutes, section 1992.

The words “ not subject to any foreign power ” do not- in themselves refer to mere territorial jurisdiction, for the persons referred to are persons born in the United States. All such persons are undoubtedly subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and yet the-act concedes that nevertheless they may be subject to the political jurisdiction of a foreign government. In other words, by the terms of the act all persons born in the United States, and not owing allegiance to any foreign power, are citizens.

The allegiance of children so born is not the local allegiance arising from their parents merely being domiciled in the country, and it is single and not double allegiance. Indeed double allegiance in the sense of double nationality has no place in our law, and the existence of a man without a country is not recognized.

But it is argued that the words “and not subject to any foreign power” should be construed as excepting from the operation of the statute only the children of public ministers and of aliens born during hostile occupation.

Was there any necessity of excepting them? And if there were others described by the words, wby should-the language be construed to exclude them ?

Whether'the immunity of foreign ministers from local allegiance rests on the fiction of extra-territoriality or on the waiver of territorial jurisdiction by receiving them as representatives of. other sovereignties, the result is the same.

They do not owe allegiance otherwise than to their own . governments, and their children cannot be regarded as born within any other.

And.this is true as to the children of aliens within territory in hostile occupation, who necessarily are not under the protection of, nor bound to render obedience to, the sovereign whose domains are invaded; but it is not pretended that the children of citizens of a government so situated would not become its citizens-at their birth, as the permanent allegiance *721of their parents would not be severed by the mere fact of the' enemy’s possession.

If the act of 1866 had not contained the words, “ and not subject to any foreign power,” the children neither of public ministers nor of aliens in territory in hostile occupation would have been included within its terms on any proper construction, for their birth would not have subjected them to ties of allegiance,.whether local and temporary, or general and permanent.

There was no necessity as to them for the insertion of the words although they were embraced by them.

But there were others in respect of whom .the exception was needed, namely, the children of aliens, whose parents owed local and temporary allegiance merely, remaining subject to a foreign power by virtue of the tie of permanent allegiance, which they had not severed by formal abjuration or equivalent conduct, and some of whom were not permitted to do so if they,would.

And it was to prevent the acquisition of citizenship by the children of such aliens merely by birth within the geographical limits of the United States that the words were inserted.

Two months after the statute was enacted, on June 16,1866, the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, and declared ratified July 28, 1868. The first clause of the first section reads: “All persons'born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The act was passed and the amendment proposed by the same Congress, and it is not open to reasonable doubt that the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the amendment were used as synonymous with the words “ and not subject to any foreign power ” of the act.

The jurists and statesmen referred to in the majority opinion, notably Senator's. Trumbull and Beverdy Johnson, concurred in that view, Senator Trumbull saying: “ What do we "mean by ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ ? Not owing allegiance to anybody else; that is what it means.” And Senator Johnson: “Now, all that this amendment pro*722vides is that all persons borrj, within the United States and not subject to some foreign power — for that no doubt is the meaning of the' committee who have brought the matter before us — shall be considered as citizens of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 1st Sess. 39th Cong., 2893 et seq.

' , This was distinctly- so ruled in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94; and no reason is perceived why the words, were used if they apply only to that obedience which all persons,, not possessing immunity therefrom, must pay the laws of the country in which they happen to be:

Dr. Wharton says that the words “subject to the jurisdiction ” must be construed in the sense which international law-attributes to them, but that the children of our citizens - born abroad, and of foreigners born in the United States have the right on arriving at full age to elect one allegiance and repudiate the other. Whart. Conflict of Laws, §§ 10, 11, 12.

The Constitution and statutes do not contemplate double allegiance, and how can such election be determined? By section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, the citizenship of the children of our citizens born abroad may be terminated in that generation by their persistent abandonment of their country ; while by sections 2167 and 2168, special provision is -made for the naturalization of alien minor residents, on attaining majority, by dispensing with the previous declaration of intention and allowing three years of minority on the five. years’ residence required; and also for the naturalization of children of aliens whose parents have died after making declaration of intention. By section 2172 children of naturalized citizens are to be considered citizens.

While then the naturalization of. the father carries with it that of his minor children, and his declaration of intention relieves them from the preliminary steps for naturalization, and minors are allowed to. count part, of the residence of their minority on the whole term required and are relieved from the declaration of intention, the statutes make no provision for formal declaration of election by children born in this country of alien parents on attaining majority.

The point, however, before- us, is whether permanent alie*723giance is imposed at birth without regard to circumstances — permanent'until thrown off and another allegiance acquired by formal acts — not local and determined by a mere change of domicil.

The Fourteenth Amendment came before the court in The Slaughterhouse Oases, 16 Wall. 36, 73, at December term, 1872 (the cases having been brought up by writ of error in May, 1870, 10 Wall. 273), and it was held that the first clause was intended to define citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State, which definitions recognized the distinction between the one and the other ; that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States embrace generally those fundamental civil rights for the security of which organized society was instituted, and which remain, with certain exceptions mentioned in the Federal Constitution, under the care of the state governments; while the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are those which arise out of the nature and essential character of the National Government, the provisions of its Constitution, or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and that it is the latter which are placed under the protection of Congress by the second cladse.

And Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, in analyzing the first' clause, observed.that “the phrase ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls and citizens or subjects of foreign States, born within the United States.”

That eminent judge did not have in mind the distinction between persons charged with diplomatic functions and those who were not, but was well aware that consuls are usually the citizens or subjects of the foreign States from which they come, and that, indeed, the appointment of natives of the places where the consular service is required, though permissible, has been pronounced objectionable- in principle.

His view was that the children of “ citizens or subjects of foreign States,” owing permanent allegiance elsewhere and only local obedience here, are not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States than are their parents.

*724' Mr. Justice Field dissented from the judgment of the court, and subsequently in the case of Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawyer, 353, in the Circuit Court for the District of California, held children born of Chinese parents in the United States to be citizens, and the cases subsequently decided in the Ninth Circuit followed that ruling. Hence the conclusion in this case which the able opinion of the District Judge shows might well have been otherwise.

I do not insist that, although what was said was deemed essential to the argument and a necessary part of it, the point was definitively disposed of in the Slaughterhouse Cases, particularly as Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167, remarked that there were doubts, which for the purposes of the case then in hand it was not necessary to solve. But that solution is furnished in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 101, where the subject received great consideration and it was said :■

“ By the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution slavery was prohibited. The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this court, as to the citizenship of free negroes, Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United.States, and of the State in which they reside. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306.

“ This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only : birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are ‘ all persons born or naturalized in thé United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof-.’ The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do *725to the time of. naturalization in the other. ' Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the Ume of birth cannot becoule so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.”

To be “ completely subject ” to the political jurisdiction of the United States is to be in no respect or degree subject-to the political jurisdiction of any other government.

Now I take it that the children of aliens, whose parents have not only not renounced their allegiance to their native country, but are forbidden by its system of government, as well as by its positive laws, from doing so, and are not permitted to acquire another citizenship by the laws of the country into which they come, must necessarily remain themselves' subject to the same sovereignty as their parents, and cannot, in the nature of things, be, any more than their parents, completely subject to the jurisdiction of such other country.

Generally speaking, I understand the subjects of the Emperor of China — that ancient Empire, with its history-of thousands of years and its unbroken continuity in belief, traditions and government, in spite of revolutions and changes of dynasty — to be bound to him by every conception of duty and by every principle of their religion, of which filial piety is the first and greatest commandment; and formerly, perhaps still, their penal laws denounced the severest penalties on those who renounced their country and allegiance, and their abettors; and, in effect, held the relatives at home of Chinese in foreign lands as hostages for their loyalty.1 And *726whatever concession may have been made by treaty in the direction of admitting the right of expatriation in some sense, they seem in the United States to have remained pilgrims and sojourners as all their fathers were. 149 U. S. 717. At all events, they have never been allowed by our laws to acquire our nationality, and,' except in sporadic instances, do not appear ever to have desired to do so.

The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to accord citizenship to persons so situated and to cut off the legislative power from dealing with the subject.

The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken any steps toward becoming citizens of a country, is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country. 149 U. S. 707.

But can the.persons expelled be subjected to “cruel and unusual ^punishments ” in the process of expulsion, as -would be the case if children born to them in this country were separated from them on their departure, because citizens of the United States? Was it intended by this amendment to tear up parental relations by the roets ?

The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “ the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” Was it intended thereby, that children of aliens should, by virtue of being bom in the *727United States, be entitled on attaining' majority to vote irrespective of the treaties and laws of the U nited States in regard to such aliens ?

In providing that persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly had particular reference to securing citizenship to the members of the colored race, avhose servile status had been obliterated by the Thirteenth Amendment, and Avho' had been born in the United States, but were not and never had been subject to any foreign poAver. They were not aliens, (and even if they could be so regarded, this operated as a collective naturalization,) and their political status could not be affected by any change of the laws for the naturalization of individuals.

Nobody can deny that the question of citizenship in a nation is of the most vital importance. It is a precious heritage, as Avell as an inestimable-acquisition ; and I cannot think that any safeguard surrounding it Avas intended to be throAvn down by the amendment.

In suggesting some of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, in the Slmighterñouse. Cases Mr. Justice Miller said: “ Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty and property Avhen on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor. that the right depends, upon his character as a citizen of the United States.”

Mr. Hall says in his work on Foreign Jurisdiction, etc.,. §§ 2, 5, the principle is that'“ the legal relations by Avhich a person is encompassed in his country of birth and residence cannot be wholly put aside Avhen he goes abroad for a time : many of the acts which he may do outside his native state have inevitable consequences Avithin it. He may for many purposes be temporarily under the control of another sovereign than his own, and he may be bound to yield to a foreign gcwernment a large measure of obedience; but his oAvn State still possesses a right to his allegiance ; he is still an integral part of the national community. A State therefore can enact laws,. *728enjoining or forbidding acts, and defining legal relations, which apply to its subjects abroad in common with those within its dominions. It can declare under what conditions it will regard as valid, acts done in foreign countries, which profess to have legal effect; it can visit others with penalties; it can estimate circumstances and facts as it chooses.” On the other hand, the •“ duty of protection is correlative to the rights of a sQvereign over his subjects; the maintenance of a bond between a State and its subjects while they are abroad implies that the former must watch over and protect them within the duo limit of the rights of other States. . . . It- enables' governments to exact reparation for oppression from which their subjects have suffered, or for injuries done to them otherwise than by process of law; and it gives the means of guarding them against the effect of unreasonable laws, of laws totally out of harmony with the nature or degree of civilization by which a foreign power affects to be characterized, and finally of an. administration of the laws had beyond a certain point. "When in these directions a State grossly fails in its duties; when it is either incapable of ruling, or rules with patent injustice, the right of protection emerges in the form of diplomatic remonstrance, and in extreme cases of ulterior measures. It provides a material sanction for rights; it does not offer a theoretic foundation. It does not act within a foreign territoiy. with the consent of the sovereign; it acts against him contentiously from without.”

The privileges or immunities which, by the second clause of the amendment, the States are forbidden to abridge are the privileges or immunities pertaining to citizenship of the United States, but that clause also places an inhibition on the States from depriving any person of life, liberty or property, and from denying “ to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws,” that is, of its own laws — the laws to which its own citizens are subjected.

The jurisdiction of the State is necessarily local, and the limitation relates to rights primarily secured by the States and not by the United States. Jurisdiction as applied to, the General Government embraces international relations; as ap*729plied to the State, it ¡refers simply to its power over persons . and things within its particular limits.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the rule in respect of citizenship of the United States prior to the Fourteenth Amendment differed from the English common law rule in vital particulars, and, among others, in that it did not recognize allegiance as indelible, and in that it did recognize an essential difference between birth during temporary, and birth during permanent, residence. If children born in the-United States were deemed presumptively and generally citizens, this was not so when they were born of aliens whose residence was merely temporary, either in fact, or in point of law.

Did the Fourteenth Amendment impose .the original English common law rule as a rigid rule on this country ?.

Did the amendment operate to abridge the treaty-making power, or the power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization?

I insist that it cannot be maintained that this- Government is unable through the action of the President, concurred in by the Senate, to make a treaty with a foreign- government providing'that the subjects of that government^ although allowed to enter the United States, shall not be made citizens thereof, and that their children shall not become such citizens by rea- - son of being born therein.

A treaty couched in those precise terms would not be incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment, unless it be held ■that that amendment has abridged the treaty-making power.

Nor would a naturalization law excepting persons of a cer- ■ tain race and their children be. invalid, unless the amendment has abridged the power of naturalization. This cannot apply to our colored fellow-citizens, who never were aliens — were never" beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

“Born in.the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,”-and “naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” mean born or naturalized under such circumstances as to be completely subject to that jurisdiction, that is,«as completely as citizens of the United States, *730who are of course not subject to any foreign power, and can of right claim the exercise of the power of the United States on their behalf wherever they may be. When, then, children are born in the United States to the subjects of a foreign power, with which it is agreed by treaty that they shall not be naturalized thereby, and as to whom our own law forbids them to be naturalized, such children are not born so subject to the jurisdiction as to become citizens, and entitled on that ground to the interposition of our Government, if they happen to be found in the country of their parents’ origin and allegiance, or any other.

Turning to the treaty between the United States and China, concluded July 28, 1868, the ratifications of which were exchanged November 23, 1869, and the proclamation made February 5,1870, we find that, by its sixth article, it was provided: “Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities or exemptions in respect of travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. 'And, reciprocally, Chinese subjects residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. But nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization on the citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.”

It is true that in the fifth article, the inherent right of man to change his home or allegiance was recognized, as well as “ the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other, for the purposes of curiosity, of traffic, or as permanent residents.”

All this, however, had reference to an entirely voluntary emigration for these purposes, and did not involve an admission of change of allegiance unless both countries assented, but the contrary according to the sixth article.

By the convention of March 17, 1894-, it was agreed “ that • Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either perma*731nently or temporarily residing within the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens.”

These treaties show that neither Government desired such change nor assented thereto. Indeed, if the naturalization laws of the United States had provided for the naturalization of Chinese persons, China manifestly would not have been obliged to recognize that her subjects had changed their allegiance thereby. But our laws do not so provide, and, on the contrary, are in entire harmony with the treaties.

I think it follows that the children of Chinese born in this country do not, ipso facto, become citizens of the United States unless the Fourteenth Amendment overrides both treaty and statute. Does it bear that construction; or rather is it not the proper construction that all persons born in the United States of parents permanently residing here and susceptible of becoming citizens, and not prevented therefrom by treaty or statute, are citizens, and not otherwise ?

But the Chinese under their form of government, the treaties and statutes, cannot become citizens nor acquire a permanent home here, no matter what the length of their stay may be. Wharton Confl. Laws, § 12.

In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 717, it was said in respect of the treaty of 1868: “After some years’ ■experience under that treaty, the Government of the United States was'brought to the opinion that the presence within our territory of large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people, might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests; and therefore requested and obtained from China a modification of the treaty.”

It is not to be admitted that the children of persons so situated become citizens by the accident of birth. On the con*732trary, I am of opinion that the President and Senate by treaty, and the Congress by naturalization, have the power, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, to prescribe that all persons of a particular race, o.r their children, cannot become citizens, and that it results that the consent to allow such persons to come into and reside within our geographical limits does not carry with it the imposition of citizenship upon children born to them while in this country under such consent, in spite of treaty and statute.

In other- words, the Fourteenth Amendment does not exclude from citizenship by birth children born in the United States of parents permanently located therein, and who might themselves become citizens; nor, on the other hand, does it arbitrarily make citizens of children born in the United States of parents who, according to the will of their. native government and of this Government, are and must remain aliens. •

Tested by this rule, Wong Kim Ark. never became and is not a citizen of the United States,'and the order of the District Court should be reversed.

I am authorized to sa)y that Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in this dissent.

Mr. Justice McKenna, not having been a member of the court when this case was argued, took no part in the decision.

1

The fundamental laws of China have remained practically unchanged since the second century before Christ. The statutes have from time to time undergone modifications, but there does not seem to be any English or French translation of the Chinese Penal Code later than that by Staunton, published in 1810. That code provided: “ All persons renouncing their country and allegiance, or devising the means thereof, shall be beheaded; and in the punishment of this offence, no distinction shall be made between principals and accessories. The property of all such criminals shall be confiscated, and their wives and children distributed as slaves to the great officers of State. . . . The parents, grandparents, brothers and grand*726children of such criminals, whether habitually living with them under the same roof or not, shall be perpetually banished to the distance of 2000 lee.

“All those who purposely conceal and connive at the perpetration of this crime, shall be strangled. Thdse who inform against, and bring to justice, criminals' of this description, shall be rewarded with the whole of their property.

“ Those who are privy to the perpetration of this crime, and y‘et omit to give any notice or information thereof to the magistrates, shall be punished with 100 blows and banished perpetually to the distance of 3000 lee.

“ If the prime is contrived, but not executed, the principal shall be strangled, and'all the accessories shall, eacfcof them, be punished with 100 blows, and perpetual banishment to the distance of 3000 lee. . . .” Staunton’s. Penal Code of China, 272, § 255.

PLYLER, SUPERINTENDENT, TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. v. DOE, GUARDIAN, et al.

No. 80-1538.

Argued December 1, 1981

Decided June 15, 1982*

*203BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., post, p. 230, Blackmun, J., post, p. 231, and Powell, J., post, p. 236, filed concurring opinions. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 242.

*204John C. Hardy argued the cause for appellants in No. 80-1538. Richard Arnett, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants in No. 80-1934. With them on the briefs were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, and Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General.

Peter D. Roos argued the cause for appellees in No. 80-1538. With him on the brief were Larry Daves and Vilma S. Martinez. Peter A. Schey argued the cause for appellees in No. 80-1934. With him on the briefs were Al Campos, Larry Mealer, and Jane Swanson.

Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, and Edwin S. Kneedler filed a brief for the United States in No. 80-1934 and for the United States as amicus curiae in No. 80~1538.†

*

Together with No. 80-1934, Texas et al. v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children et al., also on appeal from the same court.

†

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both bases were filed by Travis Hiester, Orrin W. Johnson, Neal King, and Tony Martinez for the Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District et al.; and by John S. Aldridge for the Texas Association of School Boards. Ronald A. Zum-brun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 80-1538.

Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed by James J. Orlow for the American Immigration Lawyers Association; by Samuel Rabinove for the American Jewish Committee; by Bill Lann Lee for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund; by the Edgewood Independent School District; by Peter B. Sandmann for the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco; by Michael K. Suarez for the Mexican American Bar Association of Houston; by Robert J. Kenney, Jr., for the National Education Association et al.; by Fred Fuchs for Texas Impact; and by Daniel Marcus and John F. Cooney for the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. Thomas M. Griffin filed a brief for the California State Board of Education as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 80-1538.

Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed by Joseph C. Zengerle for the Federation for American Immigration Reform; by David Crump for the Legal Foundation of America; and by Roger J. Marzulla and Maxwell A. Miller for the Mountain States Legal Foundation.

Briefs of amici curiae in No. 80-1934 were filed by Joyce D. Miller for the American Friends Service Committee et al.; and by Gwendolyn H. *205Gregory, Thomas A. Shannon, and August W. Steinhilber for the National School Boards Association.

*205Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.

I

Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime, 8 U. S. C. § 1325, and those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251,1252 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). But despite the existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now live within various States, including the State of Texas.

In May 1975, the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not “legally admitted” into the United States. The 1975 revision also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not “legally admitted” to the country. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981).1 These cases involve constitutional challenges to those provisions.

*206 No. 80-1538

Plyler v. Doe

This is a class action, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, on behalf of certain school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County, Tex., who could not establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States. The action complained of the exclusion of plaintiff children from the public schools of the Tyler Independent School District.2 The Superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees of the School District were named as defendants; the State of Texas intervened as a party-defendant. After certifying a class consisting of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin residing within the School District, the District Court preliminarily enjoined defendants from denying a free education to members of the plaintiff class. In December 1977, the court conducted an extensive hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunctive relief.

*207In considering this motion, the District Court made extensive findings of fact. The court found that neither §21.031 nor the School District policy implementing it had “either the purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas.” 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (1978). Respecting defendants’ further claim that §21.031 was simply a financial measure designed to avoid a drain on the State’s fisc, the court recognized that the increases in population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals into the United States had created problems for the public schools of the State, and that these problems were exacerbated by the special educational needs of immigrant Mexican children. The court noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was primarily attributable to the admission of children who were legal residents. Id., at 575-576. It also found that while the “exclusion of all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would eventually result in economies at some level,” id., at 576, funding from both the State and Federal Governments was based primarily on the number of children enrolled. In net effect then, barring undocumented children from the schools would save money, but it would “not necessarily” improve “the quality of education.” Id., at 577- The court further observed that the impact of §21.031 was borne primarily by a very small subclass of illegal aliens, “entire families who have migrated illegally and — for all practical purposes — permanently to the United States.” Id., at 578.3 Finally, the court noted that under current laws and practices “the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow,”4 and that without an education, these undocu*208mented children, “[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices,. . . will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class.” Id., at 577.

The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that §21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting that “the state’s exclusion of undocumented children from its public schools . . . may well be the type of invidiously motivated state action for which the suspect classification doctrine was designed,” the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the statute would survive a “strict scrutiny” analysis because, in any event, the discrimination embodied in the statute was not supported by a rational basis. Id., at 585. The District Court also concluded that the Texas statute violated the Supremacy Clause.5 Id., at590-592.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court’s injunction. 628 F. 2d 448 (1980). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute pre-empted by federal law.6 With respect to *209equal protection, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all essential respects the analysis of the District Court, id., at 454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test,” id., at 458. We noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U. S. 968 (1981).

No. 80-1934

In re Alien Children Education Litigation

During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutionality of §21.031 and various local practices undertaken on the authority of that provision were filed in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas. Each suit named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local officials. In November 1979, the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation, on motion of the State, consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single action to be heard in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March 1980. In July 1980, the court entered an opinion and order holding that §21.031 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544.7 The court held that “the absolute deprivation of education should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit.” Id., at 582. The court determined that the State’s concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id., at 582-583; that exclusion of these children had not been shown to be necessary to improve education within the State, id., at 583; and that the educational needs of the children statutorily excluded were not different from the needs of children not excluded, ibid. The court therefore concluded that *210§21.031 was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner. Id., at 583-584. While appeal of the District Court’s decision was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No. 80-1538. Apparently on the strength of that opinion, the Court of Appeals, on February 23,1981, summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District. We noted probable jurisdiction, 452 U. S. 937 (1981), and consolidated this case with No. 80-1538 for briefing and argument.8

H-Í HH

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[njo State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person mthin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not “persons within the jurisdiction” of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law. We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a “person” in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as “persons” guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, we have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976).9

*211Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants’ view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not “within the jurisdiction” of a State even if they are present within a State’s boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase “within its jurisdiction.”10 We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized *212that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” Yick Wo, supra, at 369 (emphasis added).

In concluding that “all persons within the territory of the United States,” including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, at 238.11 Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme:12

*213“Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities, — each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within its borders,” Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 350 (1938).

There is simply no support for appellants’ suggestion that “due process” is somehow, of greater stature than “equal protection” and therefore available to a larger class of persons. To the contrary , each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary limitation on state power. To permit a State to employ the phrase “within its jurisdiction” in order to identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition, of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection.

*214Although the congressional debate concerning §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly confirms the understanding that the phrase “within its jurisdiction” was intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of equal protection to all within a State’s boundaries, and to all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its laws. Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase “person within its jurisdiction,” sought expressly to ensure that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien population. Representative Bingham reported to the House the draft resolution of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (H. R. 63) that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Cong. Globe, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866). Two days later, Bingham posed the following question in support of the resolution:

“Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?” Id., at 1090.

Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who “may happen to be” within the jurisdiction of a State:

*215“The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. . . . It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction” Id., at 2766 (emphasis added).

Use of the phrase “within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory. That a person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State’s civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction — either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States — he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.

Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection only begins the inquiry. The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State of Texas to reimburse local school boards for the education of children who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the *216United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school boards of the burden of tuition on. those children. It is to this question that we now turn.

HH HH

The Equal Protection Clause directs that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). But so too, “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the.same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). The initial discretion to determine what is “different” and what is “the same” resides in the legislatures of the States. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a “suspect class,”14 or that impinge upon *217the exercise of a “fundamental right.”15 With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a *218substantial interest of the State.16 We turn to a consideration of the standard appropriate for the evaluation of §21.031.

A

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial “shadow population” of illegal migrants — numbering in the millions —within our borders.17 This situation raises the specter of a perma*219nent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.18 The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.19

The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not ap*220ply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their “parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,” and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State’s jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977). Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

“[V]isiting. . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual — as well as unjust — way of deterring the parent.” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted).

Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But §21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of § 21.031.

*221Public education is not a “right” granted to individuals by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973). But neither is it merely some governmental “benefit” indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The “American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 400 (1923). We have recognized “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government,” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring), and as the primary vehicle for transmitting “the values on which our society rests.” Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979). “[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history,. . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 221 (1972). And these historic “perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.” Ambach v. Norwich, supra, at 77. In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.

In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals *222of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority. But more directly, “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, at 221. Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.20 What we said 28 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), still holds true:

“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school *223attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Id., at 493.

B

These well-settled principles allow us to determine the proper level of deference to be afforded §21.031. Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a “constitutional irrelevancy.” Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, at 28-39. But more is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether §21.031 discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. In determining *224the rationality of § 21.031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in §21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.

t — < C

It is the State’s principal argument, and apparently the view of the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents. The State notes that while other aliens are admitted “on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws,” Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 420 (1948), the asserted right of these children to an education can claim no implicit congressional imprimatur.21 Indeed, in the State’s view, Congress’ apparent disapproval of the presence of these children within the United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the mark of undocumented status, provides authority for its decision to impose upon them special disabilities. Faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the courts must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the State’s prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens. But we are unable to find in the congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might weigh signifi*225cantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the State’s authority to deprive these children of an education.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Art. I., § 8, cl. 4. Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588-589 (1952). The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field. Mathews, supra, at 81. But this traditional caution does not persuade us that unusual deference must be shown the classification embodied in §21.031. The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). This power is “committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.” Mathews, 426 U. S., at 81. Although it is “a routine and normally legitimate part” of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, id., at 85, and to “take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country,” id., at 80, only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State. See Id., at 84-85; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1, 7, n. 8 (1977).

As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), the States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. In De Canos, the State’s program reflected Congress’ intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this country. Id., at 361. In contrast, there is no indication that the disability imposed by §21.031 corresponds to any identifiable congressional policy. The *226State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration. More importantly, the classification reflected in §21.031 does not operate harmoniously within the federal program.

To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. §§1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed. It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.

We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children, for so long as they are present in this country through no fault of their own, access to a basic education. In other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens. But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these children an elementary education. The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to “the purposes for which the state desires to use it.” Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 664-665 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). We therefore turn to the state objectives that are said to support § 21.031.

*227V

Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an interest in the “preservation of the state’s limited resources for the education of its lawful residents.”22 Brief for Appellants 26. Of course, a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374-375 (1971). The State must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 605 (1976). Apart from the asserted state prerogative to act against undocumented children solely on the basis of their undocumented status — an asserted prerogative that carries only minimal force in the circumstances of these cases — we discern three colorable state interests that might support §21.031.

*228First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants. While a State might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in population,23 §21.031 hardly offers an effective method of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State’s economy. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc. 458 F. Supp., at 578; 501 F. Supp., at 570-571. The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education.24 Thus, even making the doubtful assumption that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy of the State is negative, we think it clear that “[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration,” at least when compared with the alternative of *229prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens. 458 F. Supp., at 585. See 628 F. 2d, at 461; 501 F. Supp., at 579, and n. 88.

Second, while it is apparent that a State may “not... reduce expenditures for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its schools,” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 633 (1969), appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the State’s ability to provide high-quality public education. But the record in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.25 As the District Court in No. 80-1934 noted, the State failed to offer any “credible supporting evidence that a proportionately small diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might result from devoting some state funds to the education of the excluded group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education.” 501 F. Supp., at 583. And, after reviewing the State’s school financing mechanism, the District Court in No. 80-1538 concluded that barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those schools. 458 F. Supp., at 577. Of course, even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are “basically indistinguishable” from legally resident alien children. Id., at 589; 501 F. Supp., at 583, and n. 104.

Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence *230within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State. Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided by the State within the confines of the State’s borders. In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.

VI

If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is

Affirmed.

1

That section provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year.

“(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district *206in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission.

“(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.”

2 Despite the enactment of § 21.031 in 1975, the School District had continued to enroll undocumented children free of charge until the 1977-1978 school year. In July 1977, it adopted a policy requiring undocumented children to pay a “full tuition fee” in order to enroll. Section 21.031 had not provided a definition of “a legally admitted alien.” Tyler offered the following clarification:

“A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United States, or a person who is in the process of securing documentation from the United States Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is being processed and will be admitted with proper documentation.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 80-1538, p. A-38.

3

The court contrasted this group with those illegal aliens who entered the country alone in order to earn money to send to their dependents in Mexico, and who in many instances remained in this country for only a short period of time. 458 F. Supp., at 578.

4

Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Gilbert Cardenas, testified that “fifty to sixty per cent... of current legal alien workers were formerly illegal aliens.” Id., at 577. A defense witness, Rolan Heston, District Director of the Hous*208ton District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, testified that “undocumented children can and do live in the United States for years, and adjust their status through marriage to a citizen or permanent resident.” Ibid. The court also took notice of congressional proposals to “legalize” the status of many unlawful entrants. Id., at 577-578. See also n. 17, infra.

5

The court found § 21.031 inconsistent with the scheme of national regulation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and with federal laws pertaining to funding and discrimination in education. The court distinguished De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), by emphasizing that the state bar on employment of illegal aliens involved in that case mirrored precisely the federal policy, of protecting the domestic labor market, underlying the immigration laws. The court discerned no express federal policy to bar illegal immigrants from education. 458 F. Supp., at 590-592.

6

The Court of Appeals noted that De Canas v. Bica, supra, had not foreclosed all state regulation with respect to illegal aliens, and found no express or implied congressional policy favoring the education of illegal aliens. The court therefore concluded that there was no pre-emptive conflict between state and federal law. 628 F. 2d, at 451-454.

7

The court concluded that §21.031 was not pre-empted by federal laws or international agreements. 501 F. Supp., at 584-596.

8

Appellees in both cases continue to press the argument that § 21.031 is pre-empted by federal law and policy. In light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no occasion to reach this claim.

9

It would be incongruous to hold that the United States, to which the Constitution assigns a broad authority over both naturalization and foreign affairs, is barred from invidious discrimination with respect to unlawful *211aliens, while exempting the States from a similar limitation. See 426 U. S., at 84-86.

10

Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term “jurisdiction” was used. He further noted that it was “impossible to construe the words ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words ‘within its jurisdiction,’ in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons ‘within the jurisdiction’ of one of the States of the Union are not ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’ ” Id., at 687.

Justice Gray concluded that “[ejvery citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States.” Id., at 693. As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment “jurisdiction” can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouvé, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 426-427 (1912).

11

In his separate opinion, Justice Field addressed the relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:

“The term ‘person,’ used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws. . . . The contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar — in face of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S., at 242-243 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

12

Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185 (1958), relied on by appellants, is not to the contrary. In that case the Court held, as a matter of status *213tory construction, that an alien paroled into the United States pursuant to § 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952 ed.), was not “within the United States” for the purpose of availing herself of § 243(h), which authorized the withholding of deportation in certain circumstances. The conclusion reflected the longstanding distinction between exclusion proceedings, involving the determination of admissibility, and deportation proceedings. The undocumented children who are ap-pellees here, Unlike the parolee in Leng May Ma, supra, could apparently be removed from the country only pursuant to deportation proceedings. 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(2). See 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §3.16b, p. 3-161 (1981).

13

Representative Bingham’s views are also reflected in his comments on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. He repeatedly referred to the need to provide protection, not only to the freedmen, but to “the alien and stranger,” and to “refugees . . . and all men.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1292 (1866).

14

Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as “suspect.” Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice *217under the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically been “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971); see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938). The experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of “class or caste” treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.

15

In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein. But we have also recognized the fundamentally of participation in state “elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction,” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972), even though “the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right." San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, at 35, n. 78. With respect to suffrage, we have explained the need for strict scrutiny as arising from the significance of the franchise as the guardian of all other rights. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886).

16

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259 (1978). This technique of “intermediate” scrutiny permits us to evaluate the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference to well-settled constitutional principles. “In expounding the Constitution, the Court’s role is to discern ‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.’ ” University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.), quoting A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 114 (1976). Only when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained from the Constitution and our cases do we employ this standard to aid us in determining the rationality of the legislative choice.

17

The Attorney General recently estimated the number of illegal aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6 million. In presenting to both the Senate and House of Representatives several Presidential proposals for reform of the immigration laws — including one to “legalize” many of the illegal entrants currently residing in the United States by creating for them a special status under the immigration laws — the Attorney General noted that this subclass is largely composed of persons with a permanent attachment to the Nation, and that they are unlikely to be displaced from our territory:

“We have neither the resources, the capability, nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in effect, members of the community. By granting limited legal status to the productive and law-abiding members of this shadow population, we will recognize reality and devote our enforcement resources to deterring future illegal arrivals.” Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary *219and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981) (testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General).

18

As the District Court observed in No. 80-1538, the confluence of Government policies has resulted in “the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens, such as the parents of plaintiffs in this case, whose presence is tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are virtually defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the state’s natural citizens and business organizations may wish to subject them.” 458 F. Supp., at 585.

19

We reject the claim that “illegal aliens” are a “suspect class.” No case in which we have attempted to define a suspect class, see, e. g., n. 14, supra, has addressed the status of persons unlawfully in our country. Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime. In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented status is a “constitutional irrelevancy.” With respect to the actions of the Federal Government, alien-age classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation. No State may independently exercise a like power. But if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976).

20

Because the State does not afford noncitizens the right to vote, and may bar noncitizens from participating in activities at the heart of its political community, appellants argue that denial of a basic education to these children is of less significance than the denial to some other group. Whatever the current status of these children, the courts below concluded that many will remain here permanently and that some indeterminate number will eventually become citizens. The fact that many will not is not decisive, even with respect to the importance of education to participation in core political institutions. “[T]he benefits of education are not reserved to those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty . . . .” 458 F. Supp., at 581, n. 14. In addition, although a noncitizen “may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role — perhaps even a leadership role — in other areas of import to the community.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1, 12 (1977). Moreover, the significance of education to our society is not limited to its political and cultural fruits. The public schools are an important socializing institution, imparting those shared values thróugh which social order and stability are maintained.

21

If the constitutional guarantee of equal protection was available only to those upon whom Congress affirmatively granted its benefit, the State’s argument would be virtually unanswerable. But the Equal Protection Clause operates of its own force to protect anyone “within [the State’s] jurisdiction” from the State’s arbitrary action. See Part II, supra. The question we examine in text is whether the federal disapproval of the presence of these children assists the State in overcoming the presumption that denial of education to innocent children is not a rational response to legitimate state concerns.

22

Appellant School District sought at oral argument to characterize the alienage classification contained in §21.031 as simply a test of residence. We are unable to uphold § 21.031 on that basis. Appellants conceded that if, for example, a Virginian or a legally admitted Mexican citizen entered Tyler with his school-age children, intending to remain only six months, those children would be viewed as residents entitled to attend Tyler schools. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. It is thus clear that Tyler’s residence argument amounts to nothing more than the assertion that illegal entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a resident for purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools. A State may not, however, accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited by the Equál Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as nonresident. And illegal entry into the country would not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile within a State. C. Bouvé, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 340 (1912). Appellants have not shown that the families of undocumented children do not comply with the established standards by which the State historically tests residence. Apart from the alienage limitation, § 21.031(b) requires a school district to provide education only to resident children. The school districts of the State are as free to apply to undocumented children established criteria for determining residence as they are to apply those criteria to any other child who seeks admission.

23

Although the State has no direct interest in controlling entry into this country, that interest being one reserved by the Constitution to the Federal Government, unchecked unlawful migration might impair the State’s economy generally, or the State’s ability to provide some important service. Despite the exclusive federal control of this Nation’s borders, we cannot conclude that the States are without any power to deter the influx of persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S., at 354-356.

24

The courts below noted the ineffectiveness of the Texas provision as a means of controlling the influx of illegal entrants into the State. See 628 F. 2d, at 460-461; 458 F. Supp., at 585; 501 F. Supp., at 578 (“The evidence demonstrates that undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free public education. Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come into this country seek employment opportunities and not educational benefits. . . . There was overwhelming evidence ... of the unimportance of public education as a stimulus for immigration”) (footnote omitted).

25

Nor does the record support the claim that the educational resources of the State are so direly limited that some form of “educational triage” might be deemed a reasonable (assuming that it were a permissible) response to the State’s problems. Id., at 579-581.

2

I use the term “citizen” advisedly. The right to vote, of course, is a political interest of concern to citizens. The right to an education, in contrast, is a social benefit of relevance to a substantial number of those affected by Texas’ statutory scheme, as is discussed below.

Justice Marshall,

concurring.

While I join the Court opinion, I do so without in any way retreating from my opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (dissenting opinion). I continue to believe that an individual’s interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported “by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values.” *231Id., at 111. Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon “the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.” Id., at 99. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 519-521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It continues to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring.

I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

Like Justice Powell, I believe that the children involved in this litigation “should not be left on the streets uneducated.” Post, at 238. I write separately, however, because in my view the nature of the interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution of these cases.

The “fundamental rights” aspect of the Court’s equal protection analysis — the now-familiar concept that governmental classifications bearing on certain interests must be closely scrutinized — has been the subject of some controversy. Justice Harlan, for example, warned that “[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. . . . [T]o extend the ‘compelling interest’ rule to all cases in which such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a ‘super-legislature.’ ” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 661 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Others have noted that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is unnecessary when classifications infringing enumerated constitutional rights are involved, for “a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law’s purpose or effect is to create any classifications.” San Antonio *232Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Still others have suggested that fundamental rights are not properly a part of equal protection analysis at all, because they are unrelated to any defined principle of equality.1

These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary’s ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that “explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution.” 411 U. S., at 33-34. It therefore squarely rejected the notion that “an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance” of a given interest is relevant to the level of scrutiny accorded classifications involving that interest; id., at 32, and made clear that “[i]t is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.” Id., at 33.

I joined Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in Rodriguez, and I continue to believe that it provides the appropriate model for resolving most equal protection disputes. Classifications infringing substantive constitutional rights necessarily will be invalid, if not by force of the Equal Protection Clause, then through operation of other provisions of the Constitution. Conversely, classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests — even those involving “the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970) — generally are not subject to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, because they are not distinguishable in any relevant way from other regulations in “the area of economics and social welfare.” Ibid.

With all this said, however, I believe the Court’s experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation does *233not settle every issue of “fundamental rights” arising under the Equal Protection Clause. Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States, and Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition. To the contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis. Thus, the Court’s decisions long have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections, and Rodriguez confirmed the “constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process.” 411 U. S., at 34, n. 74. Yet “the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right,” id., at 35, n. 78. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966); Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 59, n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, regulation of the electoral process receives unusual scrutiny because “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972). In other words, the right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen2 cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right of participation in the political process. Those denied the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to second-class status.

It is arguable, of course, that the Court never should have applied fundamental rights doctrine in the fashion outlined above. Justice Harlan, for one, maintained that strict equal protection scrutiny was appropriate only when racial or anal*234ogous classifications were at issue. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 658-663 (dissenting opinion). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 590-591 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But it is too late to debate that point, and I believe that accepting the principle of the voting cases — the idea that state classifications bearing on certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion inherently contrary to any notion of “equality” — dictates the outcome here. As both Justice Powell and The Chief Justice observe, the Texas scheme inevitably will create “a subclass of illiterate persons,” post, at 241 (Powell, J., concurring); see post, at 242, 254 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); where I differ with The Chief Justice is in my conclusion that this makes the statutory scheme unconstitutional as well as unwise.

In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with those purposes, mentioned above, of the Equal Protection Clause. Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve. And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group — through the State’s action — will have been converted into a discrete underclass. Other benefits provided by the State, such as housing and public assistance, are of course important; to an individual in immediate need, they may be more desirable than the right to be educated. But classifications involving the complete denial of education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions. Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 115, n. 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage.

*235This conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that “occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children,” noting that “no charge fairly could be made that the system [at issue in Rodriguez] fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire . . . basic minimal skills.” Id., at 37. And it cautioned that in a case “involving] the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,. . . [the] Court’s lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels.” Id., at 42. Thus Rodriguez held, and the Court now reaffirms, that “a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population.” Ante, at 223. Similarly, it is undeniable that education is not a “fundamental right” in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed. Here, however, the State has undertaken to provide an education to most of the children residing within its borders. And, in contrast to the situation in Rodriguez, it does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of a complete denial of education upon those children targeted by the State’s classification. In such circumstances, the voting decisions suggest that the State must offer something more than a rational basis for its classification.3

Concededly, it would seem ironic to discuss the social necessity of an education in a case that concerned only undocumented aliens “whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal.” Post, at 250 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). But because of the nature of the federal immigration laws and the pre-eminent role of the Federal Government in *236regulating immigration, the class of children here is not a monolithic one. Thus, the District Court in the Alien Children Education case found as a factual matter that a significant number of illegal aliens will remain in this country permanently, 501 F. Supp. 544, 558-559 (SD Tex. 1980); that some of the children involved in this litigation are “document-able,” id., at 573; and that “[m]any of the undocumented children are not deportable. None of the named plaintiffs is under an order of deportation.” Id., at 583, n. 103. As the Court’s alienage cases demonstrate, these children may not be denied rights that are granted to citizens, excepting only those rights bearing on political interests. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977). And, as Justice Powell notes, the structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported. Post, at 240-241, n. 6. Indeed, any attempt to do so would involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws. Whatever the State's power to classify deportable aliens, then — and whatever the Federal Government’s ability to draw more precise and more acceptable alienage classifications — the statute at issue here sweeps within it a substantial number of children who will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States. Given the extraordinary nature of the interest involved, this makes the classification here fatally imprecise. And, as the Court demonstrates, the Texas legislation is not otherwise supported by any substantial interests.

Because I believe that the Court’s carefully worded analysis recognizes the importance of the equal protection and preemption interests I consider crucial, I join its opinion as well as its judgment.

Justice Powell,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to emphasize the unique character of the cases before us.

*237The classification in question severely disadvantages children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps by other benefits as well. This is a problem of serious national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has recognized. See ante, at 218-219, n. 17. Perhaps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress— vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens — has not provided effective leadership in dealing with this prob^ lem.1 It therefore is certain that illegal aliens will continue *238to enter the United States and, as the record makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will remain here. I agree with the Court that their children should not be left on the streets uneducated.

Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of illegitimates. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972), we said: “[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant” for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and “contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”

In these cases, the State of Texas effectively denies to the school-age children of illegal aliens the opportunity to attend the free public schools that the State makes available to all residents. They are excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully. The appellee children are innocent in this respect. They can “affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977).

Our review in a case such as these is properly heightened.2 See id., at 767. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976). The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their parents. These children thus have been *239singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State’s interests be substantial and that the means bear a “fair and substantial relation” to these interests.3 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 265 (1978) (“classifications based on illegitimacy . . . are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests”); id., at 271 (“[a]s the State’s interests are substantial, we now consider the means adopted”).

In my view, the State’s denial of education to these children bears no substantial relation to any substantial state interest. Both of the District Courts found that an uncertain but significant percentage of illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents and many eventually will become citizens. The discussion by the Court, ante, at Part V, of the State’s purported interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the educational exclusion. Indeed, the interests relied upon by the State would seem to be insubstantial in view of the consequences to the State itself of wholly uneducated persons living indefinitely within its borders. By contrast, access to the public schools is made available to the children of lawful residents without regard to the tempo*240rary nature of their residency in the particular Texas school district.4 The Court of Appeals and the District Courts that addressed these cases concluded that the classification could not satisfy even the bare requirements of rationality. One need not go so far to conclude that the exclusion of appellees’ class5 of children from state-provided education is a type of punitive discrimination based on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.

In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens and government authorities in Texas and other States similarly situated. Their responsibility, if any, for the influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the Constitution on the Federal Government.6 So long as the ease of entry remains inviting, *241and the power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal Government, the additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be shared by the Federal and State Governments. But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime.

1

See, e. g., Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1075-1083 (1979).

3

The Court concludes that the provision at issue must be invalidated “unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.’’ Ante, at 224. Since the statute fails to survive this level of scrutiny, as the Court demonstrates, there is no need to determine whether a more probing level of review would be appropriate.

1

Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have Power... To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” The Federal Government has “broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.” Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 378 (1971) (regulation of aliens is “constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government”). The Court has traditionally shown great deference to federal authority over immigration and to federal classifications based upon alienage. See, e. g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977) (“it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588-589 (1952) (“It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference”). Indeed, even equal protection analysis in this area is based to a large extent on an underlying theme of pre-emption and exclusive federal power over immigration. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra, at 420 (the Federal Government has admitted resident aliens to the country “on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws” and the States may not alter the terms of this admission). Compare Graham v. Richardson, supra, and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976), *238and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976). Given that the States’ power to regulate in this area is so limited, and that this is an area of such peculiarly strong federal authority, the necessity of federal leadership seems evident.

2

I emphasize the Court’s conclusion that strict scrutiny is not appropriately applied to this classification. This exacting standard of review has been reserved for instances in which a “fundamental” constitutional right or a “suspect” classification is present. Neither is present in these cases, as the Court holds.

3

The Chief Justice argues in his dissenting opinion that this heightened standard of review is inconsistent with the Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). But in Rodriguez no group of children was singled out by the State and then penalized because of their parents’ status. Rather, funding for education varied across the State because of the tradition of local control. Nor, in that case, was any group of children totally deprived of all education as in these cases. If the resident children of illegal aliens were denied welfare assistance, made available by government to all other children who qualify, this also — in my opinion — would be an impermissible penalizing of children because of their parents’ status.

4

The State provides free public education to all lawful residents whether they intend to reside permanently in the State or only reside in the State temporarily. See ante, at 227, n. 22. Of course a school district may require that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually reside in the school district before admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any principle of equal protection.

5

The classes certified in these cases included all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin residing in the school district, see ante, at 206, or the State. See In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 553 (SD Tex. 1980). Even so, it is clear that neither class was thought to include mature Mexican minors who were solely responsible for violating the immigration laws. In 458 F. Supp. 569 (ED Tex. 1978), the court characterized plaintiffs as “entire families who have migrated illegally.” Id., at 578. Each of the plaintiff children in that case was represented by a parent or guardian. Similarly the court in In re Alien Children Education Litigation found that “Undocumented children do not enter the United States unaccompanied by their parents.” 501 F. Supp., at 573. A different case would be presented in the unlikely event that a minor, old enough to be responsible for illegal entry and yet still of school age, entered this country illegally on his own volition.

6

In addition, the States’ ability to respond on their own to the problems caused by this migration may be limited by the principles of pre-emption that apply in this area. See, e. g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 *241(1941). In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), the Court found that a state law making it a criminal offense to employ illegal aliens was not preempted by federal authority over aliens and immigration. The Court found evidence that Congress intended state regulation in this area. Id., at 361 (“there is evidence . . . that Congress intends that States may, to the extent consistent with federal law, regulate the employment of illegal aliens”). Moreover, under federal immigration law, only immigrant aliens and nonimmigrant aliens with special permission are entitled to work. See 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, §§ 1.34a, 1.36, 2.6b (1981). Because federal law clearly indicates that only certain specified aliens may lawfully work in the country and because these aliens have documentation establishing this right, the State in De Canos was able to identify with certainty which aliens had a federal permission to work in this country. The State did not need to concern itself with an alien’s current or future deportability. By contrast, there is no comparable federal guidance in the area of education. No federal law invites state regulation; no federal regulations identify those aliens who have a right to attend public schools. In addition, the Texas educational exclusion requires the State to make predictions as to whether individual aliens eventually will be found to be deportable. But it is impossible for a State to determine which aliens the Federal Government will eventually deport, which the Federal Government will permit to stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize. Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be found to have a federal permission to reside in the country, perhaps even as a citizen. Indeed, even the Immigration and Naturalization Service cannot predict with certainty whether any individual alien has a right to reside in the country until deportation proceedings have run their course. See, e. g., 8 U. S, C. §§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).

*242Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

Were it our business to set the Nation’s social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children — including illegal aliens — of an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly — and wrong — to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language.1 However, the Constitution does not constitute us as “Platonic Guardians” nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, “wisdom,” or “common sense.” See TV A v. Hill, 487 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978). We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.

The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress’ lack of “effective leadership” in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders.2 *243See ante, at 237-238 (Powell, J., concurring). The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide “effective leadership” simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.

The Court’s holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of “remedies” for the failures — or simply the laggard pace — of the political processes of our system of government. The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of others.

I

In a sense, the Court’s opinion rests on such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the results in these particular cases. Yet the extent to which the Court departs from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.

I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically “within the jurisdiction” of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this “only begins the inquiry.” Ante, at 215. The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 549 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75 (1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147-148 (1940).

The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a legitimate reason to differentiate between persons *244who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully there. The distinction the State of Texas has drawn— based not only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and policies — is not unconstitutional.

A

The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state classifications disadvantage a “suspect class” or impinge upon a “fundamental right,” the Equal Protection Clause permits a state “substantial latitude” in distinguishing between different groups of persons. Ante, at 216-217. Moreover, the Court expressly — and correctly — rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class, ante, at 219, n. 19, or that education is a fundamental right, ante, at 221, 223. Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.

In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see ante, at 223-224.3 If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.

(1)

The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children, although not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack “control” over or “responsibility” for their unlawful entry into this country. Ante, at 220, 223-224. Similarly, the Court appears to take the position that §21.031 is presumptively “irrational” because it has the effect of imposing “penalties” *245on “innocent” children. Ibid. See also ante, at 238-239 (Powell, J., concurring).4 However, the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over which individuals may be said to lack “control.” Indeed, in some circumstances persons generally, and children in particular, may have little control over or responsibility for such things as their ill health, need for public assistance, or place of residence. Yet a state legislature is not barred from considering, for example, relevant differences between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties,5 simply because these may be factors unrelated to individual choice or to any “wrongdoing.” The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility; it is not an all-encompassing “equalizer” designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not “responsible.”

*246The Court does not presume to suggest that appellees’ purported lack of culpability for their illegal status prevents them from being deported or otherwise “penalized” under federal law. Yet would deportation be any less a “penalty” than denial of privileges provided to legal residents?6 Illegality of presence in the United States does not — and need not — depend on some amorphous concept of “guilt” or “innocence” concerning an alien’s entry. Similarly, a state’s use of federal immigration status as a basis for legislative classification is not necessarily rendered suspect for its failure to take such factors into account.

The Court’s analogy to cases involving discrimination against illegitimate children — see ante, at 220; ante, at 238-239 (Powell, J., concurring) — is grossly misleading. The State has not thrust any disabilities upon appellees due to their “status of birth.” Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 176 (1972). Rather, appellees’ status is predicated upon the circumstances of their conced-edly illegal presence in this country, and is a direct result of Congress’ obviously valid exercise of its “broad constitutional powers” in the field of immigration and naturalization. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). This Court has recognized that in allocating governmental benefits to a given class of aliens, one “may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 80 (1976). When that “relationship” is a federally prohibited one, there can, of course, be no presumption that a state has a constitutional duty to include illegal aliens among the recipients of its governmental benefits.7

*247(2)

The second strand of the Court’s analysis rests on the premise that, although public education is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, “neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.” Ante, at 221. Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation might have in some other context,8 it simply has no bearing on the issues at hand. Indeed, it is never made clear what the Court’s opinion means on this score.

The importance of education is beyond dispute. Yet we have held repeatedly that the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a “fundamental right” for purposes of equal protection analysis. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30-31 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 73-74 (1972). In San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, JUSTICE Powell, speaking for the Court, expressly rejected the proposition that state laws dealing with public education are subject to special scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between education and other governmental bene*248fits in this context. Is the Court suggesting that education is more “fundamental” than food, shelter, or medical care?

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of governmental services. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, at 31, put it well in stating that to the extent this Court raises or lowers the degree of “judicial scrutiny” in equal protection cases according to a transient Court majority’s view of the societal importance of the interest affected, we “assumfe] a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence.” Yet that is precisely what the Court does today. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 655-661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

The central question in these cases, as in every equal protection case not involving truly fundamental rights “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,” San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, at 33-34, is whether there is some legitimate basis for a legislative distinction between different classes of persons. The fact that the distinction is drawn in legislation affecting access to public education — as opposed to legislation allocating other important governmental benefits, such as public assistance, health care, or housing — cannot make a difference in the level of scrutiny applied.

B

Once it is conceded — as the Court does — that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485-487 (1970); see ante, at 216.9

*249The State contends primarily that §21.031 serves to prevent undue depletion of its limited revenues available for education, and to preserve the fiscal integrity of the State’s school-financing system against an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens — aliens over whose entry or continued presence it has no control. Of course such fiscal concerns alone could not justify discrimination against a suspect class or an arbitrary and irrational denial of benefits to a particular group of persons. Yet I assume no Member of this Court would argue that prudent conservation of finite state revenues is per se an illegitimate goal. Indeed, the numerous classifications this Court has sustained in social welfare legislation were invariably related to the limited amount of revenues available to spend on any given program or set of programs. See, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S., at 549-551; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 487. The significant question here is whether the requirement of tuition from illegal aliens who attend the public schools — as well as from residents of other states, for example — is a rational and reasonable means of furthering the State’s legitimate fiscal ends.10

*250Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not “irrational” for a state to conclude that it does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present. By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the state.11 In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 357 (1976), we held that a State may protect its “fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens.” And only recently this Court made clear that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its schools and “the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.” Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 453 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 663-668 (1978). The Court has failed to offer even a plausible explanation why illegality of residence *251in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon the bona tides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful residence.12

It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to exclude illegal aliens from numerous social welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, 7 U. S. C. § 2015(f) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) and 7 CFR §273.4 (1981), the old-age assistance, aid to families with dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, and supplemental security income programs, 45 CFR §233.50 (1981), the Medicare hospital insurance benefits program, 42 U. S. C. § 1395Í-2 and 42 CFR § 405.205(b) (1981), and the Medicaid hospital insurance benefits for the aged and disabled program, 42 U. S. C. §1395o and 42 CFR §405.103 (a)(4) (1981). Although these exclusions do not conclusively demonstrate the constitutionality of the State’s use of the same classification for comparable purposes, at the very least they tend to support the rationality of excluding illegal alien residents of a state from such programs so as to preserve the state’s, finite revenues for the benefit of lawful residents. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S, at 80; see also n. 7, supra.

The Court maintains — as if this were the issue — that “barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those *252schools.” Ante, at 229. See 458 F. Supp. 569, 577 (ED Tex. 1978).13 However, the legitimacy of barring illegal aliens from programs such as Medicare or Medicaid does not depend on a showing that the barrier would “improve the quality” of medical care given to persons lawfully entitled to participate in such programs. Modem education, like medical care, is enormously expensive, and there can be no doubt that very large added costs will fall on the State or its local school districts as a result of the inclusion of illegal aliens in the tuition-free public schools. The State may, in its discretion, use any savings resulting from its tuition requirement to “improve the quality of education” in the public school system, or to enhance the funds available for other social programs, or to reduce the tax burden placed on its residents; each of these ends is “legitimate.” The State need not show, as the Court implies, that the incremental cost of educating illegal aliens will send it into bankruptcy, or have a “‘grave impact on the quality of education/” ante, at 229; that is not dispositive under a “rational basis” scrutiny. In the absence of a constitutional imperative to provide for the education of illegal aliens, the State may “rationally” choose to take advantage of whatever savings will accrue from limiting access to the tuition-free public schools to its own lawful residents, excluding even citizens of neighboring States.14

Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I would make were I a legislator. Apart from compassionate considerations, the long-range costs of excluding any children from the public schools may well outweigh the costs of educating them. But that is not the issue; the fact *253that there are sound policy arguments against the Texas Legislature’s choice does not render that choice an unconstitutional one.

I

The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 74. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 624-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, when this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today’s cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.15

Congress, “vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens,” ante, at 237 (Powell, J., concurring), bears primary responsibility for addressing the problems occasioned by the millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern border. Similarly, it is for Congress, and not this Court, to *254assess the “social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” Ante, at 221; see ante, at 223-224. While the “specter of a permanent caste” of illegal Mexican residents of the United States is indeed a disturbing one, see ante, at 218-219, it is but one segment of a larger problem, which is for the political branches to solve. I find it difficult to believe that Congress would long tolerate such a self-destructive result — that it would fail to deport these illegal alien families or to provide for the education of their children. Yet instead of allowing the political processes to run their course — albeit with some delay — the Court seeks to do Congress' job for it, compensating for congressional inaction. It is not unreasonable to think that this encourages the political branches to pass their problems to the Judiciary.

The solution to this seemingly intractable problem is to defer to the political processes, unpalatable as that may be to some.

1

It does not follow, however, that a state should bear the costs of educating children whose illegal presence in this country results from the default of the political branches of the Federal Government. A state has no power to prevent unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are reserved exclusively to Congress and the Executive. If the Federal Government, properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens, fails to do so, it should bear the burdens of their presence here. Surely if illegal alien children can be identified for purposes of this litigation, their parents can be identified for purposes of prompt deportation.

2

The Department of Justice recently estimated the number of illegal aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6 million. Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1981) (testimony of Attorney General Smith). Other estimates run as high as 12 million. See Strout, Closing the Door on Immigration, Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1982, p. 22, col. 4.

3

The Court implies, for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment would not require a state to provide welfare benefits to illegal aliens.

4

Both the opinion of the Court and Justice Powell’s concurrence imply that appellees are being “penalized” because their parents are illegal entrants. Ante, at 220; ante, at 238-239, and 239, n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring). However, Texas has classified appellees on the basis of their own illegal status, not that of their parents. Children bom in this country to illegal alien parents, including some of appellees’ siblings, are not excluded from the Texas schools. Nor does Texas discriminate against appellees because of their Mexican origin or citizenship. Texas provides a free public education to countless thousands of Mexican immigrants who are lawfully in this country.

5

Appellees “lack control” over their illegal residence in this country in the same sense as lawfully resident children lack control over the school district in which their parents reside. Yet in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), we declined to review under “heightened scrutiny” a claim that a State discriminated against residents of less wealthy school districts in its provision of educational benefits. There was no suggestion in that case that a child’s “lack of responsibility” for his residence in a particular school district had any relevance to the proper standard of review of his claims. The result was that children lawfully here but residing in different counties received different treatment.

6

Indeed, even children of illegal alien parents bom in the United States can be said to be “penalized” when their parents are deported.

7

It is true that the Constitution imposes lesser constraints on the Federal Government than on the states with regard to discrimination against lawfully admitted aliens. E. g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976). This is because “Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and natural*247ization which the States do not possess,” Hampton, supra, at 95, and because state discrimination against legally resident aliens conflicts with and alters “the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.” Takakashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). However, the same cannot be said when Congress has decreed that certain aliens should not be admitted to the United States at all.

8

In support of this conclusion, the Court’s opinion strings together quotations drawn from cases addressing such diverse matters as the right of individuals under the Due Process Clause to learn a foreign language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); the First Amendment prohibition against state-mandated religious exercises in the public schools, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); and state impingements upon the free exercise of religion, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972). However, not every isolated utterance of this Court retains force when wrested from the context in which it was made.

9

This “rational basis standard” was applied by the Court of Appeals. 628 F. 2d 448, 458-461 (1980).

10

The Texas law might also be justified as a means of deterring unlawful immigration. While regulation of immigration is an exclusively federal function, a state may take steps, consistent with federal immigration policy, to protect its economy and ability to provide governmental services from the “deleterious effects” of a massive influx of illegal immigrants. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976); ante, at 228, n. 23. The Court maintains that denying illegal aliens a free public education is an “ineffectual” means of deterring unlawful immigration, at least when compared to a prohibition against the employment of illegal aliens. Ante, at 228-229. Perhaps that is correct, but it is not dispositive; the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate that a state choose either the most effective and all-encompassing means of addressing a problem or none at all. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486-487 (1970). Texas might rationally conclude that more significant “demographic or economic problem[s],” ante, at 228, are engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire families of aliens for indefinite periods than by the periodic sojourns of single adults who intend to leave the State after short-term or seasonal employment. It blinks reality to maintain that the availability of governmental services such as education plays no role in an alien family’s decision to enter, or re*250main in, this country; certainly, the availability of a free bilingual public education might well influence an alien to bring his children rather than travel alone for better job opportunities.

11

The Court suggests that the State’s classification is improper because “[a]n illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen." Ante, at 226. However, once an illegal alien is given federal permission to remain, he is no longer subject to exclusion from the tuition-free public schools under § 21.031. The Court acknowledges that the Tyler Independent School District provides a free public education to any alien who has obtained, or is in the process of obtaining, documentation from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. See ante, at 206, n. 2. Thus, Texas has not taken it upon itself to determine which aliens are or are not entitled to United States residence. Justice Blackmun’s assertion that the Texas statute will be applied to aliens “who may well be entitled to . . . remain in the United States,” ante, at 236 (concurring opinion), is wholly without foundation.

12

The Court’s opinion is disingenuous when it suggests that the State has merely picked a “disfavored group” and arbitrarily defined its members as nonresidents. Ante, at 227, n. 22. Appellees’ “disfavored status” stems from the very fact that federal law explicitly prohibits them from being in this country. Moreover, the analogies to Virginians or legally admitted Mexican citizens entering Texas, ibid., are spurious. A Virginian’s right to migrate to Texas, without penalty, is protected by the Constitution, see, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); and a lawfully admitted alien’s right to enter the State is likewise protected by federal law. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). Cf. Zobel v. Williams, ante, p. 55.

13

The District Court so concluded primarily because the State would decrease its funding to local school districts in proportion to the exclusion of illegal alien children. 458 F. Supp., at 577.

14

I assume no Member of the Court would challenge Texas’ right to charge tuition to students residing across the border in Louisiana who seek to attend the nearest school in Texas.

15

Professor Bickel noted that judicial review can have a “tendency over time seriously to weaken the democratic process.” A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 21 (1962). He reiterated James Bradley Thayer’s observation that

“ the exercise of [the power of judicial review], even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.”' Id., at 22 (quoting J. Thayer, John Marshall 106-107 (1901)).

KLEINDIENST, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. MANDEL et al.

No. 71-16.

Argued April 18, 1972

Decided June 29, 1972

Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and RehNqtjist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 770. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, J., joined, post, p. 774.

*754Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Mardian, A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., Robert L. Keuch, Edward S. Christen-bury, and Lee B. Anderson.

Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Victor Rabinowitz and David Rosenberg.

David Carliner and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellees have framed the issue here as follows:

“Does appellants’ action in refusing to allow an alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings violate the First Amendment rights of American scholars and students who had invited him?” 1

Expressed in statutory terms, the question is whether §§212 (a) (28) (D) and (G)(v) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182 (a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) and § 1182 (d) (3) (A), providing that certain aliens “shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States” unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, upon recommendation by the Secretary of State or a consular officer, waives inadmissibility and approves temporary admission, are unconstitutional as applied here in that they deprive American citizens of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

*755The challenged provisions of the statute are:

“Section 212(a). Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:

“(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following classes:

“(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship ....

“(G) Aliens who write or publish . . . (v) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship; . . .

“(d)

“(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) . . . may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .”

Section 212 (d) (6) provides that the Attorney General “shall make a detailed report to the Congress in any *756case in which he exercises his authority under paragraph (3) of this subsection on behalf of any alien excludable under paragraphs (9), (10), and (28) . . .

I

Ernest E. Mandel resides in Brussels, Belgium, and is a Belgian citizen. He is a professional journalist and is editor-in-chief of the Belgian Left Socialist weekly La Gauche. He is author of a two-volume work entitled Marxist Economic Theory published in 1969. He asserted in his visa applications that he is not a member of the Communist Party. He has described himself, however, as “a revolutionary Marxist.”2 He does not dispute, see 325 F. Supp. 620, 624, that he advocates the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world communism.3

Mandel was admitted to the United States temporarily in 1962 and again in 1968. On the first visit he came as a working journalist. On the second he accepted invitations to speak at a number of universities and colleges. On each occasion, although apparently he was not then aware of it, his admission followed a finding of ineligibility under § 212 (a) (28), and the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion to admit him temporarily, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) permits.

On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Consul in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States in October for a six-day period, during which he would participate in a conference on *757Technology and the Third World at Stanford University.4 He had been invited to Stanford by the Graduate Student Association there. The invitation stated that John Kenneth Galbraith would present the keynote address and that Mandel would be expected to participate in an ensuing panel discussion and to give a major address the following day. The University, through the office of its president, “heartily endorse [d]” the invitation. When Mandel’s intended visit became known, additional invitations for lectures and conference participations came to him from members of the faculties at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Yassar, from groups in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New York City, and from others. One conference, to be in New York City, was sponsored jointly by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars Conference; Mandel’s assigned subject there was “Revolutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries.” Mandel then filed a second visa application proposing a more extensive itinerary and a stay of greater duration.

On October 23 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel orally that his application of September 8 had been refused. This was confirmed in writing on October 30. The Consul’s letter advised him of the finding of inadmissibility under § 212 (a) (28) in 1962, the waivers in that year and in 1968, and the current denial of a waiver. It said, however, that another request for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in connection with Mandel’s second application for a visa. The Department of State, by a letter dated November 6 *758from its Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to Mandel’s New York attorney, asserted that the earlier waivers had been granted on condition that Mandel conform to his itinerary and limit his activities to the stated purposes of his trip, but that on his 1968 visit he had engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes.5 For this reason, it was said, a waiver “was *759not sought in connection with his September visa application.” The Department went on to say, however, that it had now learned that Mandel might not have been • aware in 1968 of the conditions and limitations attached to his visa issuance, and that, in view of this and upon his assurances that he would conform to his stated itinerary and purposes, the Department was reconsidering his case. On December 1 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that his visa had been refused.

The Department of State in fact had recommended to the Attorney General that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October visa application. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, see 28 U. S. C. § 510, in a letter dated February 13, 1970, to New York counsel stated that it had determined that Mandel’s 1968 activities while in the United States “went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of which his admission had been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.” The letter concluded that favorable exercise of discretion, provided for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel’s temporary admission was not authorized.

Mandel’s address to the New York meeting was then delivered by transatlantic telephone.

In March Mandel and six of the other appellees instituted the present action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. The two remaining appellees soon came into the lawsuit by an amendment to the complaint. All the appellees who joined Mandel in this action are United States citizens and are university professors in various fields of the social sciences. They are persons who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other forums in the United States or who expected to participate in colloquia with him so that, *760as the complaint alleged, “they may hear his views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.”

Plaintiff-appellees claim that the statutes are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in that they deprive the American plaintiffs of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, these plaintiffs claim that the statutes prevent them from hearing and meeting with Mandel in person for discussions, in contravention of the First Amendment; that §212 (a) (28) denies them equal protection by permitting entry of “rightists” but not “leftists” and that the same section deprives them of procedural due process; that § 212 (d) (3) (A) is an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the Attorney General because of its broad terms, lack of standards, and lack of prescribed procedures; and that application of the statutes to Mandel was “arbitrary and capricious” because there was no basis in fact for concluding that he was ineligible, and no rational reason or basis in fact for denying him a waiver once he was determined ineligible. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought.

A three-judge district court was duly convened. The case was tried on the pleadings and affidavits with exhibits. Two judges held that, although Mandel had no personal right to enter the United States, citizens of this country have a First Amendment right to have him enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views. The court then entered a declaratory judgment that § 212 (a) (28) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) were invalid and void insofar as they had been or might be invoked by the defendants to find Mandel ineligible for admission. The defendants were enjoined from implementing and enforcing those statutes so as to deny Mandel admission as a nonimmigrant visitor. 325 F. Supp. 620 (EDNY 1971). Judge Bartels dissented. Id., at 637. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 404 U. S. 1013 (1972).

*761II

Until 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted. The Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, barred convicts and prostitutes. Seven years later Congress passed the first general immigration statute. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. Other legislation followed. A general revision of the immigration laws was effected by the Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213. Section 2 of that Act made ineligible for admission “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all government or of all forms of law.” By the Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, Congress expanded the provisions for the exclusion of subversive aliens. Title II of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671, amended the 1918 Act to bar aliens who, at any time, had advocated or were members of or affiliated with organizations that advocated violent overthrow of the United States Government.

In the years that followed, after extensive investigation and numerous reports by congressional committees, see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 94 n. 37 (1961), Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. This Act dispensed with the requirement of the 1940 Act of a finding in each case, with respect to members of the Communist Party, that the party did in fact advocate violent overthrow of the Government. These provisions were carried forwrard into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.

We thus have almost continuous attention on the part of Congress since 1875 to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of in*762creasing control with particular attention, for almost 70 years now, first to anarchists and then to those with communist affiliation or views.

III

It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 530-532 (1954); see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 592 (1952).

The appellees concede this. Brief for Appellees 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Indeed, the American appellees assert that “they sue to enforce their rights, individually and as members of the American public, and assert none on the part of the invited alien.” Brief for Appellees 14. “Dr. Mandel is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of the problem.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.

The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, in other words, to compel the Attorney General to allow Mandel’s admission.

IV

In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to “receive information and ideas”:

“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily *763protects the right to receive . . . Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943) . . . .” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969).

This was one basis for the decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The Court there held that a labor organizer’s right to speak and the rights of workers “to hear what he had to say,” id., at 534, were both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership. In a very different situation, Me. Justice White, speaking for a unanimous Court upholding the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-390 (1969), said:

“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.” Id., at 390.

And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), the Court held that a statute permitting the Government to hold “communist political propaganda” arriving in the mails from abroad unless the addressee affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered to him placed an unjustifiable burden on the addressee’s First Amendment right. This Court has recognized that this right is “nowhere more vital” than in our schools and universities. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968).

*764In the present case, the District Court majority held:

“The concern of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien’s individual and personal interest in entering and being heard, but with .the rights , of the citizens of the country to have the alien enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views; that, as Garrison [v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964)] and Red Lion observe, is of the essence of self-government.” 325 F. Supp., at 631.

The Government disputes this conclusion on two grounds. First, it argues that exclusion of Mandel, involves no restriction on First Amendment rights at all since what is restricted is “only action — the action of the alien in coming into this country.” Brief for Appellants 29. Principal reliance is placed on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), where the Government’s refusal to validate an American passport for travel to Cuba was upheld. The rights asserted there were those of the passport applicant himself. The Court held that his right to travel and his asserted ancillary right to inform himself about Cuba did not outweigh substantial “foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens” that, with the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis, were characterized as the “weightiest considerations of national security.” Id., at 13, 16. The rights asserted here, in some contrast, are those of American academics who have invited Man-del to participate with them in colloquia, debates, and discussion in the United States. In light of the Court’s previous decisions concerning the “right to receive information,” we cannot realistically say that the problem facing us disappears entirely or is nonexistent because the mode of regulation bears directly on physical movement. In Thomas the registration requirement on its *765face concerned only action. In Lamont, too, the face of the regulation dealt only with the Government’s undisputed power to control physical entry of mail into the country. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 263 (1967).

The Government also suggests that the First Amendment is inapplicable because appellees have free access to Mandel’s ideas through his books and speeches, and because “technological developments,” such as tapes or telephone hook-ups, readily supplant his physical presence. This argument overlooks what may be particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning. While alternative means of access to Mandel’s ideas might be a relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against governmental regulatory interests — a balance we find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in Part Y — we are loath to hold on this record that existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of access.

V

Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here. In accord with ancient principles of the international law of nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893), held broadly, as the Government describes it, Brief for Appellants 20, that the power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers — a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government . . . Since that time, the Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have *766been legion.6 The Court without exception has sustained Congress’ “plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 (1967). “[O] ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895), the first Mr. Justice Harlan said:

“The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.”

Mr. Justice Frankfurter ably articulated this history in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), a deportation case, and we can do no better. After suggesting, at 530, that “much could be said for the view” that due process places some limitations on congresssional power in this area “were we writing on a clean slate,” he continued:

“But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history’. . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with *767the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . .

“We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens ....” Id., at 531-532.

We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider this line of cases. Indeed, the appellees, in contrast to the amicus, do not ask that we do so. The appellees recognize the force of these many precedents. In seeking to sustain the decision below, they concede that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by §§ 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v), and that First Amendment rights could not override that decision. Brief for Appellees 16. But they contend that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly intended that persons ineligible under the broad provision of the section would be temporarily admitted when appropriate “for humane reasons and for reasons of public interest.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1952). They argue that the Executive’s implementation of this congressional mandate through decision whether to grant a waiver in each individual case must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like appellees. Specifically, their position is that the First Amendment rights must prevail, at least where the Gov-*768eminent advances no justification for failing to grant a waiver. They point to the fact that waivers have been granted in the vast majority of cases.7

Appellees’ First Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every instance of an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), there are probably those who would wish to meet and speak with him. The ideas of most such aliens might not be so influential as those of Mandel, nor his American audience so numerous, nor the planned discussion forums so impressive. But the First Amendment does not protect only the articulate, the well known, and the popular. Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), one of two unsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or *769courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability of making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of the audience or the probity of the speaker’s ideas are obvious. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the Executive.

Appellees seek to soften the impact of this analysis by arguing, as has been noted, that the First Amendment claim should prevail, at least where no justification is advanced for denial of a waiver. Brief for Appellees 26. The Government would have us reach this question, urging a broad decision that Congress has delegated the waiver decision to the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason may be given. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357-358 (1956) ; Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U. S. 405, 408 (1960). This record, however, does not require that we do so, for the Attorney General did inform Mandel’s counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver. And that reason was facially legitimate and bona fide.

The Government has chosen not to rely on the letter to counsel either in the District Court or here. The fact remains, however, that the official empowered to make the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he concluded that previous abuses by Mandel made it inappropriate to grant a waiver again. With this, we think the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power that Congress delegated to the Executive by §§ 212 (a) (28) and (d)(3).

In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been *770firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address nor_ decide in this case.

Reversed.

1

Brief for Appellees 1.

2

E. Mandel, Revolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Countries (1969), reprinted in App. 54r-66.

3

Appellees, while suggesting that §101 (a) (40), defining “world communism,” and § 212 (a) (28) (D) are unacceptably vague, “do not contest the fact that appellants can and do conclude that Dr. Mandel’s Marxist economic philosophy falls within the scope of these vague provisions.” Brief for Appellees 10 n. 8.

4

Entry presumably was claimed as a nonimmigrant alien under § 101 (a) (15) (H) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (H), namely, “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning (i) who is of distinguished merit and ability and who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability . . .

5

Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent, post, at 773 n. 4, states that Mandel's noncompliance with the conditions imposed for his 1968 visit “appear merely to have been his speaking at more universities than his visa application indicated.” The letter dated November 6, 1969, from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State to Mandel’s New York counsel observed: “On his 1968 visit, Mr. Mandel engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes of his trip. For this reason, a waiver of ineligibility was not sought in connection with his September visa application.”

Counsel’s affidavit in support of appellees’ motion for the convening of a three-judge court and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction stated:

“Mr. Mandel further assured the Consul by letter on November 10, 1969 that he would not appear at any assembly in the United States at which money was solicited for any political cause. This was apparently in response to a charge that he had been present at such a solicitation during his 1968 tour. (See also Exhibit L.)

“Of course, just as Mr. Mandel had no prior notice that he was required to adhere to a stated itinerary in 1968, so Mr. Mandel was not aware that he was forbidden from appearing where contributions [were] solicited for political causes. I have been advised by Mr. George Novaek, an American citizen, who coordinated Mr. Mandel’s 1968 tour, that in fact the event in question was a cocktail reception held at the Gotham Art Theatre in New York City on October 19, 1968. Mr. Mandel addressed the gathering on the events in France during May and June. Later that evening posters by French students were auctioned. The money was sent to aid the legal defense of students who had taken part in the spring demonstrations. Mr. Mandel did not participate in the fund raising. (See Ex. L, Oct. 30, 1969 letter.)”

The asserted noncompliance by Mandel is therefore broader than mere acceptance of more speaking engagements than his visa application indicated.

6

See, for example, Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302 (1902); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 294 (1904); Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1909); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953) ; cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 377 (1971).

7

The Government’s brief states :

“The Immigration and Naturalization Service reports the following with respect to applications to the Attorney General for waiver of an alien’s ineligibility for admission under Section 212 (a) (28):

Total Number of Number Applications for of Waiver of Waivers “Year Section 212 (a) (28) Granted Number of Waivers Denied

1971 6210 6196 14

1970 6193 6189 4

1969 4993 4984 9

1968 4184 4176 8

1967 3860 3852 8”

Brief for Appellants 18 n. 24. These cases, however, are only those that, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) provides, come to the Attorney General with a positive recommendation from the Secretary of State or the consular officer. The figures do not include those cases where these officials had refrained from making a positive recommendation.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Under The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, rendered in 1889, there could be no doubt but that Congress would have the power to exclude any class of aliens from these shores. The accent at the time was on race. Mr. Justice Field, writing for the Court, said: “If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.” Id., at 606.

An ideological test, not a racial one, is used here. But neither, in my view, is permissible, as I have indicated on other occasions.1 Yet a narrower question is raised here. Under the present Act aliens who advocate or teach “the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism” are ineligible to receive *771visas “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act.”2 The “except” provision is contained in another part of the same section3 and states that an inadmissible alien “may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer” be admitted “temporarily despite his inadmissibility.”

Dr. Ernest Mandel, who is described as “an orthodox Marxist of the Trotskyist school,” has been admitted to this country twice before — once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. The present case involves his third application, made in 1969, to attend a conference at Stanford University on Technology and the Third World. He was also invited to attend other conferences, one at MIT, and to address several universities, Princeton, Amherst, the New School, Columbia, and Yassar. This time the Department of Justice refused to grant a waiver recommended by the State Department; and it claims that it need not state its reasons, that the power of the Attorney General is unfettered.

Dr. Mandel is not the sole complainant. Joining him are the other appellees who represent the various audiences which Dr. Mandel would be meeting were a visa to issue. While Dr. Mandel, an alien who seeks admission, has no First Amendment rights while outside the Nation, the other appellees are on a different footing. The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and publish but also the right to hear, to learn, to know. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564.

Can the Attorney General under the broad discretion entrusted in him decide

*772that one who maintains that the earth is round can be excluded?

that no one who believes in the Darwinian theory shall be admitted?

that those who promote a Rule of Law to settle international differences rather than a Rule of Force may be barred?

that a genetic biologist who lectures on the way to create life by one sex alone is beyond the pale?

that an exponent of plate tectonics can be barred?

that one should be excluded who taught that Jesus when he arose from the Sepulcher, went east (not up) and became a teacher at Hemis Monastery in the Himalayas?

I put the issue that bluntly because national security is not involved. Nor is the infiltration of saboteurs. The Attorney General stands astride our international terminals that bring people here to bar those whose ideas are not acceptable to him. Even assuming, arguendo, that those on the outside seeking admission have no standing to complain, those who hope to benefit from the traveler's lectures do.

Thought control is not within the competence of any branch of government. Those who live here may need exposure to the ideas of people of many faiths and many creeds to further their education. We should construe .the Act generously by that First Amendment standard, saying that once the State Department has concluded that our foreign relations permit or require the admission of a foreign traveler, the Attorney General is left only problems of national security, importation of heroin, or other like matters within his competence.

We should assume that where propagation of ideas is permissible as being within our constitutional framework, the Congress did not undertake to make the Attorney General a censor. For as stated by Justice *773Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 545 (concurring), “[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.”

In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (which overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357), we held that the First Amendment does not permit a State “to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id., at 447. That case involved propagation of the views of the Ku Klux Klan. The present case involves teaching the communist creed.4 But, as we held in Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 297-298:

“[T]he mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral pro*774priety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”

As a matter of statutory construction, I conclude that Congress never undertook to entrust the Attorney General with the discretion to pick and choose among the ideological offerings which alien lecturers tender from our platforms, allowing those palatable to him and disallowing others.5 The discretion entrusted to him concerns matters commonly within the competence of the Department of Justice — national security, importation of drugs, and the like.

I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge District Court.

1

See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 598 (dissenting opinion); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 533 (dissenting opinion).

2

§ 212 (a) (28) (G) (v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 185, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (28) (G) (v).

3

§ 212 (d) (3) (A), 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (d) (3) (A).

4

The Court recognizes the legitimacy of appellees’ First Amendment claim, ante, at 762-765. It argues, however, that inasmuch as the Attorney General gave a “facially legitimate añd bona fide” reason to refuse Dr. Mandel a waiver of ineligibility, the Court should not “look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against [appellees’] First Amendment interests . . . .” First, so far as the record reveals, there is absolutely no support for the Attorney General’s claim that Dr. Mandel consciously abused his visa privileges in 1968. Indeed, the State Department itself concedes that he “ivas apparently not informed [in 1962 and 1968'] that a visa was issued only after obtaining a waiver of ineligibility and therefore may not have been aware of the conditions and limitations attached to the visa issuance.” (Emphasis supplied.) App. 22. Second, the activities which the Attorney General labeled “flagrant abuses” of Dr. Mandel’s opportunity to speak in the United States appear merely to have been his speaking at more universities than his visa application indicated. Indeed, he spoke at more than *77430 universities in the United States and Canada, including Harvard, the University of California at Berkeley, Swarthmore, Notre Dame, Antioch, Michigan, three appearances at Columbia, two at the University of Pennsylvania, and the keynote address at the 1968 Socialist Scholars Conference held at Rutgers. App. 25. It would be difficult to invent a more trivial reason for denying the academic community the chance to exchange views with an internationally respected scholar.

5

As indicated in S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12, the discretion vested in the Attorney General was to be exercised “for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.” Ideological controls are not congenial to our First Amendent traditions and therefore should not be inferred.

Me. Justice Mabshall,

with whom Me. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

Dr. Ernest Mandel, a citizen of Belgium, is an internationally famous Marxist scholar and journalist. He was invited to our country by a group of American scholars who wished to meet him for discussion and debate. With firm plans for conferences, colloquia and lectures, the American hosts were stunned to learn that Mandel had been refused permission to enter our country. American consular officials had found Mandel “in*775eligible” to receive a visa under §§212 (a)(28)(D) and (G) (v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 185, which bars even temporary visits to the United States by aliens who “advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism” or “who write or publish . . . any written or printed matter . . . advocating or teaching” such doctrines. Under §212 (d)(3), the Attorney General refused to waive inadmissibility.

I, too, am stunned to learn that a country with our proud heritage has refused Dr. Mandel temporary admission. I am convinced that Americans cannot be denied the opportunity to hear Dr. Mandel’s views in person because their Government disapproves of his ideas. Therefore, I dissent from today’s decision and would affirm the judgment of the court below.

I

As the majority correctly demonstrates, in a variety of contexts this Court has held that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, the freedom to hear as well as the freedom to speak. The reason for this is that the First Amendment protects a process, in Justice Brandéis’ words, “reason as applied through public discussion,” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion); and the right to speak and hear — including the right to inform others and to be informed about public issues — are inextricably part of that process. The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin. But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion. The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is the “means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” Ibid.; see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). Its *776protection is “a fundamental principle of the American government.” Whitney v. California, supra, at 375. The First Amendment means that Government has no power to thwart the process of free discussion, to “abridge” the freedoms necessary to make that process work. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring, with whom Goldberg and Harlan, JJ., joined).

There can be no doubt that by denying the American appellees access to Dr. Mandel, the Government has directly prevented the free interchange of ideas guaranteed by the First Amendment.1 It has, of course, interfered with appellees’ personal rights both to hear Mandel’s views and to develop and articulate their own views through interaction with Mandel. But as the court below recognized, apart from appellees’ interests, there is also a “general public interest in the prevention of any stifling of political utterance.” 325 F. Supp. 620, 632 (1971). And the Government has interfered with this as well.2

*777II

What is the justification for this extraordinary governmental interference with the liberty of American citizens? And by what reasoning does the Court uphold Mandéis exclusion? It is established constitutional doctrine, after all, that government may restrict First Amendment rights only if the restriction is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest; E. g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra, at 308; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539, 546 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960).

A. Today’s majority apparently holds that Mandel may be excluded and Americans’ First Amendment rights restricted because the Attorney General has given a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for refusing to waive Mandéis visa ineligibility. I do not understand the source of this unusual standard. Merely “legitimate” governmental interests cannot override constitutional rights. Moreover, the majority demands only “facial” legitimacy and good faith, by which it means that this Court will never “look behind” any reason the Attorney General gives. No citation is given for this kind of unprecedented deference to the Executive, *778nor can I imagine (nor am I told) the slightest justification for such a rule.3

Even the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a waiver in this case would reveal that it is a sham. The Attorney General informed ap-pellees’ counsel that the waiver was refused because Mandel’s activities on a previous American visit “went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip . . . and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.” App. 68. But, as the Department of State had already conceded to appellees’ counsel, Dr. Mandel “was apparently not informed that [his previous] visa was issued only after obtaining a waiver of ineligibility and therefore [Mandel] may not have been aware of the conditions and limitations attached to the [previous] visa issuance.” App. 22. There is no basis in the present record for concluding that Mandel’s behavior on his previous visit was a “flagrant abuse” — or even willful or knowing departure — from visa restrictions. For good reason, the Government in this litigation has never relied on the Attorney General’s reason to justify Mandel’s exclusion. In these circumstances, the Attorney General’s reason cannot possibly support a decision for the Government in this case. But without even remanding for a factual hearing to see if there is any support for the Attorney General’s determination, the majority declares that his reason is sufficient to override appellees’ First Amendment interests.

B. Even if the Attorney General had given a com-*779pelting reason for declining to grant a waiver under §212 (d)(3)(A), this would not, for me, end the case. As I understand the statutory scheme, Mandel is “ineligible” for a visa, and therefore inadmissible, solely because, within the terms of § 212 (a) (28), he has advocated communist doctrine and has published writings advocating that doctrine. The waiver question under § 212 (d) (3) (A) is totally secondary and dependent, since it is triggered here only by a determination of (a) (28) ineligibility. The Attorney General’s refusal to grant a waiver does not itself generate a new statutory basis for exclusion; he has no roving power to set new ad hoc standards for visa ineligibility. Rather, the Attorney General’s refusal to waive ineligibility simply has the same effect as if no waiver provision existed; inadmissibility still rests on the (a) (28) determination. Thus, whether or not the Attorney General had a good reason for refusing a waiver, this Court, I think, must still face the question it tries to avoid: under our Constitution, may Mandel be declared ineligible under (a) (28)?

C. Accordingly, I turn to consider the constitutionality of the sole justification given by the Government here and below for excluding Mandel — that he “advocates and “publish [es] . . . printed matter . . . advocating . . . doctrines of world communism” within the terms of §212 (a) (28).

Still adhering to standard First Amendment doctrine, I do not see how (a) (28) can possibly represent a compelling governmental interest that overrides appellees’ interests in hearing Mandel.4 Unlike (a) (27) or (a) (29), *780(a) (28) does not claim to exclude aliens who are likely to engage in subversive activity or who represent an active and present threat to the “welfare, safety, or security of the United States.” Rather, (a) (28) excludes aliens solely because they have advocated communist doctrine. Our cases make clear, however, that government has no legitimate interest in stopping the flow of ideas. It has no power to restrict the mere advocacy of communist doctrine, divorced from incitement to imminent lawless action. Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 297-298 (1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447-449 (1969). For those who are not sure that they have attained the final and absolute truth, all ideas, even those forcefully urged, are a contribution to the ongoing political dialogue. The First Amendment represents the view of the Framers that “the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones” — “more speech.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S., at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) . If Americans want to hear about Marxist doctrine, even from advocates, government cannot intervene simply because it does not approve of the ideas. It certainly may not selectively pick and choose which ideas it will let into the country. But, as the court below put it, § 212 (a) (28) is nothing more than “a means of restraining the entry of disfavored political doctrine,” 325 F. Supp., at 626, and such an enactment cannot justify the abridgment of appellees' First Amendment rights.

*781In saying these things, I am merely repeating established First Amendment law. Indeed, this Court has already applied that law in a case concerning the entry of communist doctrine from foreign lands. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), this Court held that the right of an American addressee to receive communist political propaganda from abroad could not be fettered by requiring the addressee to request in writing its delivery from the Post Office. See id., at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). The burden imposed on the right to receive information in our case is far greater than in Lamont, with far less justification. In Lamont, the challenged law merely regulated the flow of mail, and required the Postmaster General to forward detained mail immediately upon request by the addressee. By contrast, through §212 (a) (28), the Government claims absolute power to bar Mandel permanently from academic meetings in this country. Moreover, in Lamont, the Government argued that its interest was not to censor content but rather to protect Americans from receiving unwanted mail. Here, Mandel’s exclusion is not incident to a legitimate regulatory objective, but is based directly on the subject matter of his beliefs.

D. The heart of appellants’ position in this case, and the basis for their distinguishing Lamont, is that the Government’s power is distinctively broad and unreviewable because “[tjhe regulation in question is directed at the admission of aliens.” Brief for Appellants 33. Thus, in the appellants’ view, this case is no different from a long line of cases holding that the power to exclude aliens is left exclusively to the "political” branches of Government, Congress, and the Executive.

These cases are not the strongest precedents in the United States Reports, and the majority’s baroque approach reveals its reluctance to rely on them completely. *782They include such milestones as The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893), in which this Court upheld the Government’s power to exclude and expel Chinese aliens from our midst.

But none of these old cases must be “reconsidered” or overruled to strike down Dr. Mandel’s exclusion, for none of them was concerned with the rights of American citizens. All of them involved only rights of the excluded aliens themselves. At least when the rights of Americans are involved, there is no basis for concluding that the power to exclude aliens is absolute. “When Congress’ exercise of one of its enumerated powers clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our ‘delicate and difficult task’ to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated.” United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 264 (1967). As Robel and many other cases5 show, all governmental *783power- — even the war power, the power to maintain national security, or the power to conduct foreign affairs — is limited by the Bill of Rights. When individual freedoms of Americans are at stake, we do not blindly defer to broad claims of the Legislative Branch or Executive Branch, but rather we consider those claims in light of the individual freedoms. This should be our approach in the present case, even though the Government urges that the question of admitting aliens may involve foreign relations and national defense policies.

The majority recognizes that the right of American citizens to hear Mandel is “implicated” in our case. There were no rights of Americans involved in any of the old alien exclusion cases, and therefore their broad counsel about deference to the political branches is inapplicable. Surely a Court that can distinguish between preñndictment and post-indictment lineups, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972), can distinguish between our. case and cases which involve only the rights of aliens.

I do not mean to suggest that simply because some Americans wish to hear an alien speak, they can automatically compel even his temporary admission to our country. Government may prohibit aliens from even temporary admission if exclusion is necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest.6 Actual threats to the national security, public health needs, and genuine requirements of law enforcement are the most apparent *784interests that would surely be compelling.7 But in Dr. Mandel’s case, the Government has, and claims, no such compelling interest. Mandel’s visit was to be temporary.8 His “ineligibility” for a visa was based solely on § 212 (a) (28). The only governmental interest embodied in that section is the Government’s desire to keep certain ideas out of circulation in this country. This is hardly a compelling governmental interest. Section (a) (28) may not be the basis for excluding an alien when Americans wish to hear him. Without any claim that Mandel “live” is an actual threat to this country, there is no difference between excluding Mandel because of his ideas and keeping his books out because of their ideas. Neither is permitted. Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra.

Ill

Dr. Mandel has written about his exclusion, concluding that “[i]t demonstrates a lack of confidence” on the part of our Government “in the capacity of its supporters to combat Marxism on the battleground of ideas.” He observes that he “would not be carrying any high explosives, if I had come, but only, as I did before, my revolutionary views which are well known to the public.” And he wryly notes that “[i]n the nineteenth century the British ruling class, which was sure of itself, permitted Karl Marx to live as an exile in England for almost forty years.” App. 54.

It is undisputed that Dr. Mandel’s brief trip would involve nothing but a series of scholarly conferences and lectures. The progress of knowledge is an inter*785national venture. As Mandel’s invitation demonstrates, individuals of differing world views have learned the ways of cooperation where governments have thus far failed. Nothing is served — least of all our standing in the international community — by Mandel’s exclusion. In blocking his admission, the Government has departed from the basic traditions of our country, its fearless acceptance of free discussion. By now deferring to the Executive, this Court departs from its own best role as the guardian of individual liberty in the face of governmental overreaching. Principles of judicial restraint designed to allow the political branches to protect national security have no place in this case. Dr. Mandel should be permitted to make his brief visit.

I dissent.

1

Twenty years ago, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists devoted an entire issue to the problem of American visa policy and its effect on the interchange of ideas between American scholars and scientists and their foreign counterparts. The general conclusion of the editors — supported by printed statements of such men as Albert Einstein, Hans Bethe, Harold Urey, Arthur Compton, Michael Polanyi, and Raymond Aron — was that American visa policy was hurting the continuing advance of American science and learning, and harmful to our prestige abroad. Vol. 8, No. 7, Oct. 1952, pp. 210-217 (statement of Special Editor Edward Shils). The detrimental effect of American visa policy on the free exchange of ideas continues to be reported. See Comment, Opening the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 141, 143-149 (1970); 11 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dec. 1955, pp. 367-373.

2

The availability to appellees of Mandel’s books and taped lectures is no substitute for live, face-to-face discussion and debate, just *777as the availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not supplant the essential place of oral argument in this Court’s work. Lengthy citations for this proposition, which the majority apparently concedes, are unnecessary. I simply note that in a letter to Henrik Lorenz, accepting an invitation to lecture at the University of Leiden and to discuss “the radiation problem,” Albert Einstein observed that “[i]n these unfinished things, people understand one another with difficulty unless talking face to face.” Quoted in Developments in the Law — The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Eev. 1130, 1154 (1972).

3

As Judge Frankel has taught us, even the limited requirement of facially sufficient reasons for governmental action may be significant in some contexts; but it can hardly insulate the government from subsequent challenges to the actual good faith and sufficiency of the reasons. Frankel, Bench Warrants Upon the Prosecutor’s Demand: A View From the Bench, 71 Col. L. Rev. 403, 414 (1971).

4

The majority suggests that appellees “concede that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by §§ 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v) and that First Amendment rights could not override that decision.” This was certainly not the view of the court below, whose judgment the appellants alone have challenged here and appellees have moved to *780affirm. It is true that appellees have argued to this Court a ground of decision alternative to that argued and adopted below; but they have hardly conceded the incorrectness of what they successfully argued below. They have simply noted, at 16-17 of their brief, that even if this Court rejects the broad decision below, there would nevertheless be a separate and narrower basis for affirmance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 25-26, 41-42.

5

In United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967), this Court struck down a statute making it a criminal offense for any employee of a “defense facility” to remain a member of the Communist Party, in spite of Government claims that the enactment came within the “war power.” In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964), the Government unsuccessfully sought to defend the denial of passports to American members of the Communist Party, in spite of claimed threats to the national security. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), the passport restriction on travel to Cuba was upheld because individual constitutional rights were overridden by the “weightiest considerations of national security”; but the Court rejected any assumption “that simply because a statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice.” Id., at 16, 17. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163 (1964), the Government unsuccessfully attempted to justify a statutory inequality between naturalized and native-born citizens under the foreign relations power. And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), itself, as Mr. Justice BreNNAN noted, the Government urged that the statute was “justified by the object of avoiding *783the subsidization of propaganda of foreign governments which bar American propaganda”; Mr. Justice BrennaN answered that the Government must act “by means and on terms which do not endanger First Amendment rights.” Id., at 310.

6

1 agree with the majority that courts should not inquire into such things as the “probity of the speaker’s ideas.” Neither should the Executive, however. Where Americans wish to hear an alien, and their claim is not a demonstrated sham, the crucial question is whether the Government’s interest in excluding the alien is compelling.

7

It goes without saying, of course, that, once he has been admitted, any alien (like any citizen) can be punished if he incites lawless acts or commits other crimes.

8

Such “nonimmigrants” are not covered by quotas. C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §2.6 (1971).