Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

I

Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com*324pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources, including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.

In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability.2 The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months.

Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional valid*325ity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his disability.3 361 F. Supp. 520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge’s benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an “evidentiary hearing” prior to termination of welfare benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.

The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge’s benefits abridged his right to procedural *326due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg demonstrated that the due process requirement of pretermination hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 635, 539 (1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act. 361 F. Supp., at 528.5 Relying entirely upon the District Court’s opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge’s benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974).6 We reverse.

II

At the outset we are confronted by a question as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars the District Court from considering Eldridge’s action. Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act’s *327duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h)7 precludes federal-question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review is 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), which requires exhaustion of the administrative remedies provided under the Act as a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Section 405 (g) in part provides:

“Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of. such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.” 8

*328On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a “final decision” by the Secretary after a “hearing.” It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained full administrative review of the termination of his benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Since the Secretary has not “waived” the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We disagree.

Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under §405 (g). Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as “central to the requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction_” 422 U. S., at 764.9 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle that this condition consists of two elements, only one of which is purely “jurisdictional” in the sense that it cannot be “waived” by the Secretary in a particular casé. The waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no “decision” of any type. And some decision by the Secretary is clearly required by the statute.

*329That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed members of the class. As to the latter the complaint was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it “contain [ed] no allegations that they have even filed an application with the Secretary . . . 422 U. S., at 764. With respect to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had “fully presented their claims for benefits ‘to their district Social Security Office and, upon denial, to the Regional Office for reconsideration.’ ” Id., at 764-765. Eldridge has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim that his benefits should not be terminated because he was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA.

The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination hearing is not controlling.10 As construed in Salfi, § 405 (g) requires only that there be a “final decision” by the Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Wein-berger v. Salfi, O. T. 1974, No. 74-214, App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to Salfi, for, while the *330Secretary had no power to amend the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, he does have authority to determine the timing and content of the procedures challenged here. 42 U. S. C. §405 (a). We do not, however, regard this difference as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest óf a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.

As the non waivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, we next consider the waivable element. The question is whether the denial of Eldridge’s claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently “final” decision with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of internal-review procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940 (1975). As Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to confer. Salfi suggested that under §405 (g) the power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the administrative program is his. But cases may arise where a claimant’s interest in having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency’s judgment is inappropriate. This is such a case.

Eldridge’s constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there *331is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constitutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 156 (1974). In light of the Court’s prior decisions, see, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because of his physical , condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying Eldridge’s substantive *332claim “for other reasons” or upholding it “under other provisions” at the post-termination stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge.

We conclude that the denial of Eldridge’s request for benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 (g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now proceed to the merits of that claim.12

III

A

Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural due process is inapplicable to terminations of Social Security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 401—402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created “property” interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 261-262. Rather, the Secretary contends that the existing administrative procedures, detailed below, provide all the proc*333ess that is constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest.

This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125 (1889). The “right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes final would be adequate if disability benefits were not terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process. The dispute centers upon what process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending review.

In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 266-271, has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Snia-*334dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S., at 96-97, the Court said only that in a replevin suit between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, supra, at 540, held, in the context of the revocation of a state-granted- driver’s license, that due process required only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting that the hearing “need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability.” See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, we sustained the validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was provided. 416 U. S., at 142-146.

These decisions underscore the truism that “ ‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-266; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de*335cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271.

We turn first to a description of the procedures for the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of these procedures.

B

The disability insurance program is administered jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies make the initial determination whether a disability exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. §421 (a).13 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. 4473 (1975).

*336In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate that he is unable

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months_” 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).

To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden of showing, by means of “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” § 423 (d)(3), that he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity that

“he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” §423 (d)(2)(A).14

The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. As Eldridge’s benefits were terminated because he was determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.15

*337The continuing-eligibility investigation is made by a state agency acting through a “team” consisting of a physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with the disabled worker, usually by mail — in which case he is sent a detailed questionnaire — or by telephone, and requests information concerning his present condition, including current medical restrictions and sources of treatment, and any additional information that he considers relevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. CM §6705.1; Disability Insurance State Manual (DISM) §353.3 (TL No. 137, Mar. 5, 1975).16

Information regarding the recipient’s current condition is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the information provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or between two sources of treatment, the agency may arrange for an examination by an independent consulting physician.17 Ibid. Whenever the agency’s tentative assessment of the beneficiary’s condition differs from his *338own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence upon which the proposed determination to terminate is based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical reports and other evidence in his ease file.18 He also may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. Id., § 353.6.

The state agency then makes its final determination, which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM §§ 6701 (b), (c).19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the state agency. 20 CFR §§404.907, 404.909 (1975).20 Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective two months after the month in which medical recovery is found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. § 423 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III).

*339If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 20 CFR §§404.917, 404.927 (1975). The hearing is non-adversary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented by counsel or other spokesmen. §404.934. If this hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, §404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. §405 (g); 20 CFR §404.951 (1975).21

Should it be determined at any point after termination of benefits, that the claimant’s disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C. §404. Cf. §423 (b); 20 CFR §§404.501, 404.503, 404.504 (1975). If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to which he is later determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 42 U. S. C. §404.22

C

Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts *340below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests at stake here and the nature of the existing procedures, we think this was error.

Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this source of income pending final administrative decision on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in nature to that .of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.23

Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence:

“The crucial factor in this context — a factor not present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended — is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.” 397 U. S., at 264 (emphasis in original).

Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need.24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to *341the worker’s income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members, workmen’s compensation awards,25 tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the “many other important programs, both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . . . Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report).

As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. Mor-rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.” 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.

As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), “the possible length of wrongful deprivation of... benefits [also] is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.” The Secretary concedes that the delay between *342a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the delay between the actual cutoff of benefits and final decision after a hearing exceeds one year.

In view of the torpidity of this administrative review process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest resources of the family unit of the physically disabled worker,26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources, other forms of government assistance will become available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence level.27 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., *343at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id., at 201-202 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view of these potential sources of temporary income, there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.

D

An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any administrative process is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 617 (1974); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate by means of “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” 42 U. S. C. §423 (d)(3), that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . .” § 423 (d)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In short, a medical assessment of the worker’s physical or mental condition is required. This is a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and *344veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted that in such circumstances “written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.” 397 U. S., at 269.

By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404, concerning a subject whom they have personally examined.28 In Richardson the Court recognized the “reliability and probative worth of written medical reports,” emphasizing that while there may be “professional disagreement with the medical conclusions” the “specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present.” Id., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-*345maker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg.

The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court’s conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate substitute for oral presentation because they did not provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients lacked the “educational attainment necessary to write effectively” and could not afford professional assistance. In addition, such submissions would not provide the “flexibility of oral presentations” or “permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important.” 397 U. S., at 269. In the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement assesment the administrative procedures under review here fully answer these objections.

The detailed questionnaire which the state agency periodically sends the recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement decision, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. More important, the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources, such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely to be able to communicate more effectively through written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay witnesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law — Cases and Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974).

A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of allowing the disability recipient’s representative full ac*346cess to all information relied upon by the state agency. In addition, prior to the cutoff of benefits the agency informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that, it considers most relevant. Opportunity is then afforded the recipient to submit additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly the accuracy of information in his file as well as the correctness of the agency’s tentative conclusions. These procedures, again as contrasted with. those before the Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to “mold” his argument to respond to the precise issues which the decisionmaker regards as crucial.

Despite these carefully structured procedures, amid point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate. Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the contending parties vary from- a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal rate of only 3.3%.29 Bare statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since *347the administrative review system is operated on an open-file basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence, and such submissions may result in additional medical examinations. Such fresh examinations were held in approximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases in fiscal 1973, either at the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is diminished. Thus, although we view such information as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E

In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed is the puhlic interest. This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits. The most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision. No one can predict the extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits would continue until after such hearings would assure the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of the probable additional financial cost. We only need say that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.

*348Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But the Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1276, 1303.

But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc weighing.of fiscal and administrative burdens against the interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that.differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies “preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940). The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process is the requirement that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” Joint AntiFascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-172 (Frank*349furter, J., concurring). All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to “the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 263-269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 202 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378 (1971).

We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208, 212 (1972), I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, prior to termination of benefits, Eldridge must be af*350forded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seg. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). I would add that the Court’s consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument. It is speculative. Moreover, the very legislative determination to provide disability benfits, without any prerequisite determination of need in fact, presumes a need by the recipient which is not this Court’s function to denigrate. Indeed, in the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits were terminated there was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family’s furniture was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, 47-48. Finally, it is also no argument that a worker, who has been placed in the untenable position of having been denied disability benefits, may still seek other forms of public assistance.

. Mr. Justice CURTIS

delivered the opinion of thé comí:.

This case comes before us on a certificate of division of bpinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey. It is an action of ejectment, in which both parties claim title under Samuel Swartwout — the plaintiffs, under the levy of an execution on the 10th day of April, 1839, and the defendants, under a sale made by the marshal of the' United States for the district of New Jersey, on the 1st day of June, 1839 — by virtue of what is denominated a distress warrant, issued by the solicitor of the treasury under the act of congress of May 15, 1820, entitled, “ An act providing for the better organization of the treasury department.” This act having pro- ■ vided, by its first section, that a lien for the amount .due should exist, on the lands of the debtor from the time of the levy and record thereof in the'office of the district court of the United States for the proper district, and the date of that levy in this case being prior to the date of the judgment under which the plaintiffs’ title was made, the question occurred- in the circuit court, “ whether the said warrant of distress in the special ver-, diet mentioned, and the proceedings thereon and anterior thereto^ under which the defendants claim title, are sufficient,' under the constitution of the United States and the law of the land, to pass and transfer the title and estate of the said Swartwout in and to-the premises in question, as against the lessors of. the plaintiff.”. Upon this' question, the judges being of opposite opinions, it was certified Jo this court, and ha,s been argued by counsel.

*275No objection has been taken to the warrant on account of any; defect or irregularity in the proceedings which preceded its issue. It is not denied that they were in conformity with the requirements of the act of congress. The special- verdict finds that Swartwout was collector of the customs for the port of New York for eight , years before the 29th of March, 1838: that, on the 10th of November, 1838, his account, as such collector, was audited by the first auditor, and certified by the first comptroller of the treasury; and for the balance thus found, amounting to the sum. of $1,374,119/¡I, the warrant in question was issued by the solicitor of the treasury. Its validity is denied by the plain-,' tiffs; upon the ground that so much of the act of, congress, as authorized it, is in conflict with the constitution of the United States.

In support of this position, the plaintiff relies on that part of the first section.of the third article of the constitution which requires the judicial .power of the United - States to be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as congress may, from time to time,, ordain and establish; the judges whereof shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall,- at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Also, on the second section of the same article, which declares that the judicial power shall extend to controversies to, -which the United States shall be a party.

It must be admitted that, if the auditing of this account, and the ascertainment1 of its balance, and the issuing of this process, was an exercise of the judicial power of the United States, the proceeding was void; for the officers who performed these1 acts could exercise no part of that judicial power. They neither constituted a court of the United States, not were they, or either of them, so connected with any such court as to perform even any of the ministerial duties which arise out of judicial proceedings.

The question, whether these acts were an exercise of the judicial power qf the United States, can best be considered under another inquiry, raised by the further objection of the plaintiff, that the effect of the proceedings authorized by the act in question is to deprive the party, against whom the warrant issues, of his liberty and property, “without due process of law;” and, .therefore, is in conflict with the fifth article of the amendments of the constitution.

Taking these two objections together, they raise the questions, whether, under the constitution of the United States, a collector of the customs, from whom a balance of account has been found to be due by accounting officers of the treasury, designated for that purpose by law, can be deprived of his liberty, or property, *276in order to enforce payment of that balance, without the exercise ' of the judicial power of the United States, and yet by due process of law, within the meaning of those terms in the constitution ; and if so, then, secondly, whether the warrant in question was such due process of law ?

The words, “ due process of law,” were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as .the words, “ by the law of the land,” in Magna Charla. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they mean due process of law. The constitutions which ‘had been adopted by the several States before the formation of the federal constitution, following the .language of the great charter more closely, generally contained the words, “ but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” The ordinance of congress of July 13,1787, for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the River Ohio, used the same words.

The constitution of the United States, as adopted, contained the provision, that “ the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.” When the fifth article of amendment containing the words now in question was made, the trial by jury in criminal cases had thus already been provided for. By the sixth and seventh articles of amendment, further special pro-, visions were separately made for that mode of trial in civil and criminal cases. To have followed, as in the state constitutions, and in the ordinance of 1787, the words of Magna Charla, and declared that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or the law Of the land, would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate. To have taken the clause, u law of the land/’ without its immediate context, might possibly have given rise to doubts, which would be effectually dispelled by using those words which the great commentator on Magna Charla had declared to be the true meaning of the phrase, “ law of the land,” in that instrument, and which were undoubtedly then received as their true meaning.

That the warrant now in question is legal process, is not denied. It was issued in conformity with- an act of Congress. But is it “ due process of law ? ” The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on -the executive and judicial powers of the-government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process “ due process of law,” by its mere will. To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether. *277this process, enacted by congress, is due process ? To this the answer must.be twofold. We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so,-we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our-ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period, since the establishment of the English monarchy, when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of .the common law. That they were summary and severe, and had been used for purposes of oppression, is inferable from the fact that one chapter of Magna Charta treáts of their restraint. It declares: “ We or our bailiffs shall not seize any land or rent for any debt as long as the present goods and chattels of the debtor do suffice to pay the debt, and the debtor himself be ready to satisfy therefor. Neither shall the pledges of the debtor be distrained, as long as the principal debtor is sufficient for the payment of the debt; and if the principal debtor fail in payment of the debt, having nothing wherewith to pay, or will not pay where he is able, the pledges shall answer for the debt. And if they will, they shall have the lands and rents.of the debtor until they be satisfied of the debt which they before paid for him, except that the principal debtor can show himself to be acquitted against the said sureties.”

By the common law, the body, lands, and goods of the king’s debtor were liable to be levied on to .obtain payment. In conformity with the above provision of Magna Charta, a conditional writ was framed, commanding the sheriff to inquire of the goods •and chattels of'the debtor, and, if they were insufficient, then to extend on the lands. 3 Co. 12 b; Com. Dig., Debt, G. 2; 2 Inst. 19. But it is said that since the statute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, the practice has -been to issue the writ in án absolute form, without requiring any previous inquisition as to the goods. Gilbert’s Exch. 127.

To authorize a writ of extent, however, the debt must be matter of record in the king’s exchequer. The 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, § 50, made all specialty debts due to the king of the same force and effect as debts by statute staple, thus giving to such, debts the effect of debts of record. In regard to debts due upon siim pie contract, other than those due from collectors' of the revenue and other accountants of the crown, the practice, from very an*278cient times, has been to issue a commission to.inquire as to the existence of the debt.. .

This commission being returned, the debt found was thereby evidenced by a record, and an éxtent could issue, thereon. No notice was required to be given to the alleged debtor of the execution of this commission, (2 Tidd’s Pr. 1047,) though it seems, that; in some cases, an -order for notice might be obtained. 1 Yes, 269. Formerly, no witnesses were examined by the commis-' sion, (Chitty’s Prerog. 267; West, 22;) the affidavit prepared to obtain an order for an immediate extent being the only evidence introduced. But this practice has been recently changed. 11 Price, 29. By the statute 13 Eliz. ch. 4, balances due from, receivers of the revenue and all other accountants of the crown were placed on the same footing as debts acknowledged to be due by statute staple. These balances were found by auditors, the particular officers acting thereon having been, from time to time, varied by legislation and usage. . The different methods of accounting in ancient and modern times are described in Mr. Price’s Treatise' on thé Law and Practice of the Exchequer,, ch. 9. Such balances, when found, were certified to what was called the pipe office, tó be given in charge to the sheriffs for their levy. ■ Price, 231. ,

If an accountant failed to render his accounts, a process was issued, termed' a capias nomine districtionis, against the body, goods, and lands of the accountant, ' Price, 162, 233, note 3..

This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and -enforce paymént of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England, is sufficient to" show that, the methods of ascertaining the existence; and amount of such-debts', and . compelling their. payment, have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other, subjects ; .and that, as respects such debts due from such officers,(< the law of the land .” authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to whát is termed a warrant of distress' in the' act of 1820, now in question.

It is certain that this' diversity in “ the law of the land ” between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was Understood in this country^ and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the .constitution of the United States.. Not only was the process of d’istress in nearly or'quite -universal use for -the collection of taxes, but what was generally termed a warrant of distress, running against the body, goods, and chattels of defaulting receivers of public money, was issued .to some public officer, to'whom was com*279mitted the power to ascertain the amount of the default, and by such warrant proceed to collect it. Without a wearisome repetition of details, it will be sufficient to give one section from the 'Massachusetts act of 1786 : “ That if any constable or collector, to whom any tax or assessment shall be committed to collect, shall be remiss and negligent of his duty, in not levying and paying unto the treasurer arid receiver-general such sum or sums of money as he shall from time to time have received, and as ought .by him to have been paid within the respective time set and limited by the assessor’s warrant, pursuant to law, the treasurer and receiver-general is hereby empowered, after the expiration of the time so set, by warrant under his hand and seal, directed to the sheriff or his deputy, to cause such sum and sums of money to be levied by distress and sale of such deficient constable or collector’s estate, real and personal, returning the overplus, if’any there be; and, for want of such estate, to take the body of such constable or collector, and imprison him until he shall pay the same; which .warrant the. sheriff or his deputy is hereby empowered and required to execute accordingly.” Then follows another provision, that if the deficient sum shall not be made by the first warrant, another shall issue against the town; and if its proper authorities shall fail to take the prescribed means to raise and pay the same, a like warrant of distress shall go against the estates and bodies of the assessors of such town. Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 266. Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut, (Revision of 1784, p. 198;) of Pennsylvania, 1782, (2 Laws of Penn. 13;) of South. Carolina, 1788*, (5 Stats, of S. C. 55;) New York, 1788, (1 Jones & Varick’s Laws, 34;) see also 1 Henning’s Stats, of Virginia, 319, 343 ; 12 Ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont, (1797,1800,) 340. Since the formation of the constitution of the United States, other' States have passed similar laws. See 7 Louis. .An. R. 192. Congress, from an early period, and in repeated instances, has legislated in a similar manner. By the fifteenth section of the*“ Act -to lay and collect a direct tax within the United States,” of July 14,1798, the supervisor of each district was authorized and required to issue a warrant of distress against any delinquent collector and his .sureties, to be levied upon the goods and chattels, and for want thereof upon the, body of such collector; and, failing of satisfaction thereby; upon the goods and chattels of the sureties. 1 Stats, at Large, 602. And again, in 1813, (3 Stats, at Large, 33, § 28,) and 1815, (3 Stats, at Large, 177, § 33,) the comptroller of the treasury was empowered to issue a similar warrant against collectors of the customs and their sureties. • This legislative construction of the constitution, commencing so early in the government, *280when the first occasion for. this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and. the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was,.“ due process of law.” . Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph’s case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse’s case, 4 Cranch, C. C. R. 151; Bullock’s case, (cited 6 Pet. 485, note.)

.. Tested by the common and statute, law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time, of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings-authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due pro'eess of law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector- of customs,‘unless there exists in the constitution some other provision which restrains congress from authorizing such proceedings. For, though “ due process of law ” generally implies and-includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial -proceedings, (2 Inst. 47, 50; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. N. C. Rep. 15; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Van Zandt v. Waddel, 2 Yerger, 260; State Bank v. Cooper, Ibid. 599; Jones’s Heirs v. Perry, 10 Ibid. 59; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis, 311,) yet, this is not universally true'. There may be, and we have seen that there are-cases, under the law of England after Magna Charta, and as it was brought to.this country and acted on here, in which process, in its nature final, issues against the body, lands, 'and goods of certain public debtors without any such trial; and ■ this brings -ús to the question, whether those provisions of the constitution which relate to the judicial, power are incompatible with these proceedings ? •. '

That the auditing of the accounts of a receiver of public moneys, may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial -act, must be admitted.. So are all those administrative ■ duties the performance of which involves an, inquiry into the’-existence' of facts and-the application to them of rules of law. In this sense the act of-the President in', calling out the militia under the act of 1795, 12 Wheat. 19, or of a commissioner who. makes a' certificate for the-extradition of a criminal; under-a treaty, is judicial. But it is not sufficient to bring such matters under the judicial' power,'that they involve thé exercise of judgment upon law and fact. United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40. It'is necessary to' go further, and show hot only tfiat the adjustment of the balances, due. from accounting officers may be, but from their nature must be; controversies -to which therUnited States is a party,' within the ■ meaning of the secbnd section of the third article of th'e*281constitution. We do not doubt the power of congress to provide by law that such a question shall form the subject-matter of a suit in which the judicial power can be exerted. The-act-of 1820 makes such a provision for reviewing the decision of the accounting officers of the treasury. But, until reviewed, it is final and binding; and the-question is, whether its subject-matter is necessarily, and without regard to the consent of congress, a judicial controversy. And we are of opinion it is not. .

■ Among the legislative powers of congress- are the powers “ to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and' excises ; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and welfare of the "United States, to raise" and support armies; to provide and' maintain a navy, and to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution those powers.” What officers should be appointed to colléct the revenue thuá authorized to be raised, and to disburse it in payment of the debts-of the United States; what duties should be required of them; when and how, and to whom they should account, and what security they should furnish, and to what remedies they should be subjected to enforce the proper discharge of their duties, congress was.ta determine. In the exercise of their powers, they have required collectors of customs to be appointed; made it incumbent on them to account, from, time to time, with certain officers of the treasury department, and to furnish sureties, by bond, for the payment of all balances of the public money which may become due from them. Andv by the act-of 1820,, now in question, they , have undertaken to provide summary means to compel these -officers — and- in case of their default, their sureties — to pay such balances of the public money as may be in their hands.

The power to collect and disburse revenue, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into effect, includes all known and appropriate means of effectually collecting ¡and disbursing that revenue, unless some such means should be forbidden in some other part of the constitution. The power has not been exhausted by the receipt of the money by the collector.' Its purpose is to raise money and use it in payment of the debts of the government; and, whoever may have possession of the public money, until it is actually disbursed, the power to úse those known and appropriate means to secure its due application continues.

As we have already shown, the means provided by the act of 1820, do not differ in principle' from those employed in England from remote antiquity — and in many of the States, so far as we know without objection — for this .purpose, at the time the con*282stiiution was formed. It may be added, that probably there are few governments which do or can permit their claims for public taxes, either-on the citizen or the officer-employed for their collection or disbursement, to become subjects of judicial controversy, according tó the có.ürse of the law of the land. Imperative necessity has forced a distinction between such claims and all others, which has sometimes been carried out by summary methods of proceeding, and sometimes by systems of fines‘and penalties, but always in-some way observed. and yielded to. , '

It is true that in-England- all these proceedings were had in what is denominated the court of exchequer, in which Lord Coke says, 4 Inst. 115, the barons are the sovereign auditors of the 'kingdom. But the barons exercise in person nó judicial power in auditing accounts, and it is necessary to remember that the. exchequer includes two distinct organizations, one of which has charge of the revenues of the crown, and the other has long been in fact, and- now is for all purposes, one.of the judicial courts of the kingdom, whose proceedings are and have ■ been as distinct, in most respects, from those of the revenue side of the exchequer, as the proceedings of the circuit court of this district are from those of the treasury; and it would be an unwarrantable assumption to conclude that, because the accounts of receivers of revenue, were settled in what was. déridminated the court of exchequer, they were judicial controversies between the king and Ms 'subjects, according to the .ordinary course of the common law or equity. • The fact, as we have already seen, was otherwise. 1 ' »

It was strongly urged by the plaintiff’s counsel, that though the .government might have the rightful power to provide a' summary remedy for the recovery of its public dues, aside from any exercise of the judicial power, yet it had not done so in this instance. That it had enabled the debtor to apply to the judicial power, and having thus brought the subject-matter under its. cogmzance, it was not for the government to say that the subject-matter was not within the judicial power. That if it were not in its nature a judicial controversy, congress could not make.it such, nor give’ jurisdiction ovér it to the district courts. In short, the argument is, that if this were not, in its nature, a judicial ■ controversy, congress could not have conferred on, the district court power to determine it upon a bill filed by the collector. If it be such a controversy, then it is subject to the. judicial power alone; and the fact.that congress has enabled, the district- court to pass upon it, is conclusive evidence that it is a judicial controversy.

We cannot admit the correctness of the last position. If we *283were of .opinion that this subject-matter cannot be the subject of a judicial controversy, and that, consequently, it cannot be made a subject of judicial cognizance, the consequence would be, that the attempt to bring it under the jurisdiction of a court' of the United States would be ineffectual. But thé previous proceedings of the executive department would not necessarily be affected thereby. They might be final, instead of being subject to judicial review.

But the argument leaves out of view an essential element in the case, and also assumes something which cannot be admitted.

It assumes that the entire subject-matter is or is not, in every mode of presentation, a judicial controversy, essentially and in its own nature, aside from the will of congress to permit it to be so ; and it leaves out of view the fact that the United States is a party.

It is necessary to take into view some- settled rules.

Though, generally, both public and' private wrongs are redressed through judicial action, there are more summary extrajudicial remedies for both. An instance of extra-judicial redress of a private wrong ■ is, the recapture of goods by their lawful .owner; of a- public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement of a'public nuisance; and the recovery of public dries by a summary process of distress, issued by some public officer authorized by law, is an instance of redress of a particular kind of public wrong, by the act of the public through its authorized agents. There is, however, an important distinction between these. Though .a private person may retake fiis property, or abate a nuisance; he is directly responsible for his acts tó the proper judicial tribunals. His authority to do these acts depends not merely on the law, but upon the existence of such facts as áre, in point of law, sufficient to constitute that authorityand he may be required, by an action at law, to prove those facts; but a public agent, who acts, pursuant to the command of a legal precept, can justify his act by the production of such precept. He cannot be made responsible in a judicial tribunal for obeying, the lawful command of the government; and the ^government itself, which gave the command, cannot be sued ■without its own consent.

At the same time' there can be no doubt that the mere question, whether a collector of the customs is indebted to the United States, may be one of judicial cognizance. It is competent for the United States to sue any of its debtors in a court of law. It is equally clear that the United States may consent to be sued, and may yield' this consent upon such terms and under such restrictions as it may think just. Though both the marshal and the government are exempt from suit, for any thing done, by *284the former in obedience to legal process, still, congress may provide by law, that, both, .or either, shall, in a particular class of cases, and under such restrictions as they may think proper to impose, come into a court of law or equity and abide by its determination. The United'States may thus place the government upon the same ground which is occupied by private persons who proceed "to take extra-judicial remedies for their wrongs, and they may. do so to such extent, and with tsuch restrictions, as may be thought fit.

When, therefore,.the act of 1820 enacts, that after the levy of the distress warrant h,as been begun, the collector may bring before á district court the question, whether he is indebted as recited in the warrant, it simply waives a privilege which belongs to the government, and. consents to make the legality of its future proceedings, dependent on the judgment of the court; .as we' have already stated in case of a private person, every fact upon which the legality, of the extra-judicial remedy depends may be drawn in question by a. suit against him. The United States consents that this fact of indebtedness may be drawn in question by á suit against them.. Though they might have withheld their consent, we think that, by granting it, nothing which may not be a subject of judicial cognizance is brought before the court.

.To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it, proper to state that we do not consider congress can-either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the Subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other- hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same time there are matters, involving public rights, which may bé presented in such forrq that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which áre susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the Únited States, as it may deem proper. Equitable claims, to land by the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking instance of such a class of cases; and as'it depends upon the will of. congress whether a remédy in.the'courts shall be allowed at all, in such cases, they may regulate it and prescribe such rulés of determination, as they-may think just and needful. • Thus it has been repeatedly decided in this class of cases, that upon their trial the acts of executive officers, done under the authority of congress,, were conclusive, either upon particular facts involved in the inquiry or upon the whole title. Foley v. Harrison, 15 How. 433; Burgess v. Gray, 16 How. 48; —— v. The Minnesota Mining Company at the' present term. .

It is true; also,' that even in a suit between private persons to. *285try a question of private right, the action of the executive power, upon a matter committed to its determination by the constitution and laws, is conclusive. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635.

To apply these principles to the case before us, we say that, though a suit may be brought against the marshal for seizing property under such a warrant of distress, and’he maybe put to show his justification; yet the action of the executive power in issuing the warrant, pursuant to the act of 1820, passed under the powers to collect and disburse the revenue granted by the constitution, is conclusive evidence of the facts recited in it, and of the authority to make the levy; that though no suit can be brought against the United States without the consent of congress, yet congress may consent to have a suit brought, to try the question whether the collector be indebted, that being a subject capable of judicial determination, and may empower a court to act on that determination, and restrain the levy of the warrant of distress within the limits of the debt judicially found to exist.

It was further urged that, by thus subjecting the proceeding to the determination of - a court, it did conclusively appear that there was no such necessity for a summary remedy, by the action of the executive power, as was essential to enable congress to authorize this mode of proceeding.

. But it seems to us that the just inference from the entire law is, that there was such a necessity for the warrant and the commencement of the levy, but not for its completion, if the collector should interpose, and file his bill and give security. The provision that he may file his bill and give' security, and thus arrest the summary proceedings, only proves that congress thought it not necessary to pursue them, after such security should be given, until a decision should be made by the court. It has no tendency to prove they were not, in the judgment of congress, of the highest necessity under all other circumstances ;• and of this necessity congress alone is the judge;

The remaining objection to this warrant is, that it was issued without the support of an oath or affirmation, and so was forbidden by the fourth article of the amendments of the constitution. But this article has no reference'to civil proceedings for the recovery of debts, of which a search warrant is not made part. The process, in this case, is termed, in the act of com gress,- a warrant of distress. The name bestowed upon it cannot affect its constitutional validity. In substance,' it is an extent authorizing a levy for the satisfaction of a debt; and as no other authority is conferred,. to make searches or seizures, than is ordinarily embraced in every execution issued upon a *286recognizance, or a stipulation in the admiralty, we are of opinion it was not invalid for this cause.

• Borne objection was made to the proceedings of the marshal under the warrant, because he did not levy on certain shares of corporate stock belonging to Swartwout, and because it does not appear, by the return of the warrant, that he had not goods and chattels wherewith to satisfy the exigency of the warrant. .In respect to the corporate stocks, they do not appear to have been goods or chattels, subject to such levy at the time it was made; arid the return of the marshal, that he had levied on the lands' by virtue of the warrant, is, at least, primd facie evidence that his levy was not irregular, by reason of the existence of goods and chattels of the collector subject to his process.

The third question is, therefore, to be answered in the affirmative.

This renders the other questions proposed immaterial, and no answer need be returned thereto.

The other two cases — John Den, ex dem. James B. Murray et al. v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Company. And John Den, ex dem. William P. Rathbone et al. v. Rutsen Suckley et al., are disposed of by this opinion, the same questions having been certified therein."