1 Legislation 1 Legislation

1.1 Legislative Process 1.1 Legislative Process

1.1.1 United States v. Munoz-Flores 1.1.1 United States v. Munoz-Flores

495 U.S. 385 (1990)

UNITED STATES
v.
MUNOZ-FLORES

No. 88-1932.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued February 20, 1990
Decided May 21, 1990

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[387] Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, and Clifford M. Sloan.

Judy Clarke argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Mario G. Conte.

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises the question whether 18 U. S. C. § 3013, which requires courts to impose a monetary "special assessment" on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, was passed in violation of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. That Clause mandates that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We conclude initially that this case does not present a political question and therefore reject the Government's argument that the case is not justiciable. On the merits, we hold that the special assessment statute does [388] not violate the Origination Clause because it is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue."

I

In June 1985, German Munoz-Flores was charged with aiding the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of aiding and abetting aliens to elude examination and inspection by immigration officers. The Magistrate sentenced respondent to probation and ordered him to pay a special assessment of $25 on each count under the then-applicable version of 18 U. S. C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. V). Pet. for Cert. 27a-28a.

Respondent moved to correct his sentence, asserting that the special assessments were unconstitutional because Congress had passed § 3013 in violation of the Origination Clause. The Magistrate denied the motion, and the District Court affirmed. Id., at 26a. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the portion of the District Court's sentencing order that imposed the special assessments. 863 F. 2d 654 (1988). The court held that respondent's claim did not raise a nonjusticiable political question. Id., at 656-657. On the merits, the court ruled that § 3013 was a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue," id., at 657-660, and that it had originated in the Senate because that Chamber was the first to pass an assessment provision, id., at 660-661. The court therefore concluded that § 3013 had been passed in violation of the Origination Clause. Id., at 661.

The United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that § 3013 did not violate the Origination Clause.[1] The [389] Government noted that the Ninth Circuit had rejected its argument that the case raised a political question, Pet. for Cert. 5, n. 5, but did not ask this Court to review that ruling. We granted certiorari and directed the parties to brief the political question issue. 493 U. S. 808 (1989).[2]

II

A

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), this Court identified the features that characterize a case raising a nonjusticiable political question:

"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility [390] of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

Accord, INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 941 (1983) (quoting Baker, supra, at 217).

The United States contends that "[t]he most persuasive factor suggesting nonjusticiability" is the concern that courts not express a "lack of . . . respect" for the House of Representatives. Brief for United States 10.[3] In the Government's view, the House's passage of a bill conclusively establishes that the House has determined either that the bill is not a revenue bill or that it originated in the House. Hence, the Government argues, a court's invalidation of a law on Origination Clause grounds would evince a lack of respect for the House's determination. The Government may be right that a judicial finding that Congress has passed an unconstitutional law might in some sense be said to entail a "lack of respect" for Congress' judgment. But disrespect, in the sense the Government uses the term, cannot be sufficient to create a political question. If it were, every judicial resolution of a constitutional challenge to a congressional enactment would be impermissible. Congress often explicitly considers [391] whether bills violate constitutional provisions. See, e. g., 135 Cong. Rec. 23121-23122 (1989) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (expressing the view that the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 777, does not violate the First Amendment); 133 Cong. Rec. 30498-30499 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that the independent counsel law, 28 U. S. C. § 591 et seq., was unconstitutional). Because Congress is bound by the Constitution, its enactment of any law is predicated at least implicitly on a judgment that the law is constitutional. Indeed, one could argue that Congress explicitly determined that this bill originated in the House because it sent the bill to the President with an "H. J. Res." designation. See post, at 409 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Yet such congressional consideration of constitutional questions does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law's constitutionality. On the contrary, this Court has the duty to review the constitutionality of congressional enactments. As we have said in rejecting a claim identical to the one the Government makes here: "Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the court's avoiding their constitutional responsibility." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 549 (1969).[4]

[392] The United States seeks to differentiate an Origination Clause claim from other constitutional challenges in two ways. The Government first argues that the House has the power to protect its institutional interests by refusing to pass a bill if it believes that the Origination Clause has been violated. Second, the Government maintains that the courts should not review Origination Clause challenges because compliance with that provision does not significantly affect individual rights. Of course, neither the House's power to protect itself nor the asserted lack of a connection between the constitutional claim and individual rights is a factor that Baker identifies as characteristic of cases raising political questions. Rather, the Government attempts to use its arguments to establish that judicial resolution of Origination Clause challenges would entail a substantial lack of respect for the House, a factor that Baker does identify as relevant to the political question determination. Neither of the Government's arguments persuades us.

Although the House certainly can refuse to pass a bill because it violates the Origination Clause, that ability does not absolve this Court of its responsibility to consider constitutional challenges to congressional enactments. See supra, at 391. Nor do the House's incentives to safeguard its origination prerogative obviate the need for judicial review. As an initial matter, we are unwilling to presume that the House has a greater incentive to safeguard its origination power than it does to refuse to pass a bill that it believes is unconstitutional for other reasons. Such a presumption would demonstrate a profound lack of respect for a coordinate branch of Government's pledge to uphold the entire Constitution, [393] not just those provisions that protect its institutional prerogatives.

Even if we were to assume that the House does have more powerful incentives to refuse to pass legislation that violates the Origination Clause, that assumption would not justify the Government's conclusion that the Judiciary has no role to play in Origination Clause challenges. In many cases involving claimed separation-of-powers violations, the branch whose power has allegedly been appropriated has both the incentive to protect its prerogatives and institutional mechanisms to help it do so. Nevertheless, the Court adjudicates those separation-of-powers claims, often without suggesting that they might raise political questions. See, e. g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 371-379 (1989) (holding that Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 3551 et seq., and 28 U. S. C. § 991 et seq., did not result in Executive's wielding legislative powers, despite either House's power to block Act's passage); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 685-696 (1988) (holding that independent counsel provision of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U. S. C. § 591 et seq., is not a congressional or judicial usurpation of executive functions, despite President's veto power); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983) (explicitly finding that separation-of-powers challenge to legislative veto presented no political question). In short, the fact that one institution of Government has mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy by labeling the issue a political question.

The Government's second suggestion — that judicial intervention in this case is unwarranted because the case does not involve individual rights — reduces to the claim that a person suing in his individual capacity has no direct interest in our constitutional system of separation of powers, and thus has no corresponding right to demand that the Judiciary ensure the integrity of that system. This argument is simply irrelevant [394] to the political question doctrine. That doctrine is designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government; the identity of the litigant is immaterial to the presence of these concerns in a particular case. And we are unable to discern how, from the perspective of interbranch relations, the asserted lack of connection between Origination Clause claims and individual rights means that adjudication of such claims would necessarily entail less respect for the House than would judicial consideration of challenges based on constitutional provisions more obviously tied to civil liberties.

Furthermore, and more fundamentally, the Government's claim that compliance with the Origination Clause is irrelevant to ensuring individual rights is in error. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that " `the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty.' " Morrison, supra, at 694 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). See also Morrison, supra, at 697 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) ("The Framers of the Federal Constitution . . . viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government"). Recognizing this, the Court has repeatedly adjudicated separation-of-powers claims brought by people acting in their individual capacities. See, e. g., Mistretta, supra (adjudicating claim that United States Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers on direct appeal by an individual defendant who had been sentenced pursuant to guidelines created by the Commission).

What the Court has said of the allocation of powers among branches is no less true of such allocations within the Legislative Branch. See, e. g., Chadha, supra, at 948-951 (bicameral National Legislature essential to protect liberty); The Federalist No. 63 (defending bicameral Congress on ground that each House will keep the other in check). The Constitution allocates different powers and responsibilities to the House and Senate. Compare, e. g., U. S. Const., Art. II, [395] § 2, cl. 2 (giving Senate "Advice and Consent" power over treaties and appointment of ambassadors, judges, and other officers of the United States), with Art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (stating that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives"). The authors of the Constitution divided such functions between the two Houses based in part on their perceptions of the differing characteristics of the entities. See The Federalist No. 58 (defending the decision to give the origination power to the House on the ground that the Chamber that is more accountable to the people should have the primary role in raising revenue); The Federalist No. 64 (justifying advice and consent function of the Senate on the ground that representatives with longer terms would better serve complex national goals). At base, though, the Framers' purpose was to protect individual rights. As James Madison said in defense of that Clause: "This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure." The Federalist No. 58, p. 359 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Provisions for the separation of powers within the Legislative Branch are thus not different in kind from provisions concerning relations between the branches; both sets of provisions safeguard liberty.

The Government also suggests that a second Baker factor justifies our finding that this case is nonjusticiable: The Court could not fashion "judicially manageable standards" for determining either whether a bill is "for raising Revenue" or where a bill "originates." We do not agree. The Government concedes, as it must, that the "general nature of the inquiry, which involves the analysis of statutes and legislative materials, is one that is familiar to the courts and often central to the judicial function." Brief for United States 9. To be sure, the courts must develop standards for making the revenue and origination determinations, but the Government [396] suggests no reason that developing such standards will be more difficult in this context than in any other. Surely a judicial system capable of determining when punishment is "cruel and unusual," when bail is "[e]xcessive," when searches are "unreasonable," and when congressional action is "necessary and proper" for executing an enumerated power is capable of making the more prosaic judgments demanded by adjudication of Origination Clause challenges.

In short, this case has none of the characteristics that Baker v. Carr identified as essential to a finding that a case raises a political question. It is therefore justiciable.

B

Although JUSTICE STEVENS agrees with the Government that this Court should not entertain Origination Clause challenges, he relies on a novel theory that the Government does not advance. He notes that the Constitution is silent as to the consequences of a violation of the Origination Clause, but that it provides by implication that any bill that passes both Houses and is signed by the President becomes a law. See Art. I, § 7, cl. 2; post, at 401-403, and n. 1. From this JUSTICE STEVENS infers the proposition that "some bills may become law even if they are improperly originated." Post, at 403.

We cannot agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' approach. The better reading of § 7 gives effect to all of its Clauses in determining what procedures the Legislative and Executive Branches must follow to enact a law. In the case of "Bills for raising Revenue," § 7 requires that they originate in the House before they can be properly passed by the two Houses and presented to the President. The Origination Clause is no less a requirement than the rest of the section because "it does not specify what consequences follow from an improper origination," post, at 402. None of the Constitution's commands explicitly sets out a remedy for its violation. Nevertheless, the principle that the courts will strike down a law when Congress has passed it in violation of such a command [397] has been well settled for almost two centuries. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180 (1803). That principle applies whether or not the constitutional provision expressly describes the effects that follow from its violation.

Even were we to accept JUSTICE STEVENS' contrary view — that § 7 provides that a bill becomes a "law" even if it is improperly originated — we would not agree with his conclusion that no remedy is available for a violation of the Origination Clause. Rather, the logical consequence of his view is that the Origination Clause would most appropriately be treated as a constitutional requirement separate from the provisions of § 7 that govern when a bill becomes a "law." Of course, saying that a bill becomes a "law" within the meaning of the second Clause does not answer the question whether that "law" is constitutional. To survive this Court's scrutiny, the "law" must comply with all relevant constitutional limits. A law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.[5]

III

Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this [398] general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency . . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id., at 437.

This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 established a Crime Victims Fund, 98 Stat. 2170, 42 U. S. C. § 10601(a) (1982 ed., Supp. II), as a federal source of funds for programs that compensate and assist crime victims. See § 10601(d) (allocating moneys among programs); § 10602 (delineating eligible compensation programs); § 10603 (delineating eligible assistance programs). The scheme established by the Act includes various mechanisms to provide money for the Fund, including the simultaneously enacted special assessment provision at issue in this case. § 10601(b)(2). Congress also specified, however, that if the total income to the Fund from all sources exceeded $100 million in any one year, the excess would be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury. § 10601(c)(1).[6] Although nothing in the text or the legislative [399] history of the statute explicitly indicates whether Congress expected that the $100 million cap would ever be exceeded, in fact it never was. The Government reports that the first and only excess occurred in fiscal year 1989, when the cap stood at $125 million and receipts were between $133 million and $134 million, Brief for United States 21, n. 21, a claim respondent does not dispute, Brief for Respondent 19, n. 16.

Moreover, only a small percentage of any excess paid into the General Treasury can be attributed to the special assessments. The legislative history of the special assessment provision indicates that Congress anticipated that "substantial amounts [would] not result" from that source of funds. S. Rep. No. 98-497, p. 13 (1984). Reality has accorded with Congress' prediction. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, Victims of Crime Act of 1984: A Report to Congress by the Attorney General 12 (1988) (§ 3013 revenues accounted for four percent of all deposits into the Fund received by United States Attorneys' Offices for fiscal year 1987). Four percent of a minimal and infrequent excess over the statutory cap is properly considered "incidenta[l]."

As in Nebeker and Millard, then, the special assessment provision was passed as part of a particular program to provide money for that program — the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus "incidenta[l]" to that provision's primary purpose. This conclusion is reinforced, not undermined, by the Senate Report that respondent claims establishes that § 3013 is a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." That Report reads: "The purpose of [400] imposing nominal assessment fees is to generate needed income to offset the cost of the [Crime Victims Fund]. Although substantial amounts will not result, these additional amounts will be helpful in financing the program and will constitute new income for the Federal government." S. Rep. No. 98-497, supra, at 13-14 (emphasis added). Respondent's reliance on the emphasized portion of the quoted passage avails him nothing. Read in its entirety, the passage clearly evidences Congress' intent that § 3013 provide funds primarily to support the Crime Victims Fund.

Respondent next contends that even if § 3013 is directed entirely to providing support for the Crime Victims Fund, it still does not fall within the ambit of Nebeker or Millard. Respondent accurately notes that the § 3013 assessments are not collected for the benefit of the payors, those convicted of federal crimes. He then contends, citing Nebeker and Millard, that any bill that provides for the collection of funds is a revenue bill unless it is designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds are collected. Respondent misreads Nebeker and Millard. In neither of those cases did the Court state that a bill must benefit the payor to avoid classification as a revenue bill. Indeed, had the Court adopted such a caveat, the Court in Nebeker would have found the statute to be unconstitutional. There, the Court expressly identified the "people" generally, rather than the banking associations required to pay the tax, as the beneficiaries of the system of currency at issue. 167 U. S., at 203. It nevertheless found that the bill was not a revenue bill, stating that a bill creating a discrete governmental program and providing sources for its financial support is not a revenue bill simply because it creates revenue, a holding that was reaffirmed by Millard. See supra, at 397-398. Thus, the beneficiaries of the bill are not relevant.[7]

[401] Section 3013 is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." We therefore need not consider whether the Origination Clause would require its invalidation if it were a revenue bill. Nebeker, 167 U. S., at 203 (holding consideration of origination question "unnecessary" in light of finding that bill was not a revenue bill).

IV

We hold that this case does not raise a political question and is justiciable. Because the bill at issue here was not one for raising revenue, it could not have been passed in violation of the Origination Clause. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring in the judgment.

In my opinion, a bill that originated unconstitutionally may nevertheless become an enforceable law if passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President. I therefore believe that it is not necessary to decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 3013 was passed in violation of the Origination Clause.

I

The Origination Clause appears in Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, which describes the procedures that the two Houses of Congress and the President shall follow when enacting laws.[8] The Origination Clause is the first of three [402] Clauses in that section. The Clause provides that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," but it does not specify what consequences follow from an improper origination.

The immediately following Clause, however, does speak to consequences. The second Clause of § 7 says, among other things, that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States." An improperly originated bill passed by both Houses would seem to be within a class comprising "Every" bill passed by both Houses, and it therefore seems reasonable to assume that such an improperly originated bill is among those that "shall . . . be presented to the President." The Clause further states that if the President returns to Congress a bill presented to him, and if two-thirds of each House thereafter approves the bill, "it shall become a Law." No exception to this categorical statement is made for bills improperly originated.

The second Clause of § 7 later provides that "any Bill" not acted upon by the President within 10 days "shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it." In this instance, one express exception is made: If Congress adjourns before the [403] 10-day period expires, the bill "shall not be a Law." Again, no exception is made for bills improperly originated.

It is fairly inferred from this language that some bills may become law even if they are improperly originated. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the bill now at issue became law even if improperly originated. That bill is not governed by the provisions just discussed, because it was signed by the President and hence did not become law by virtue of either Presidential inaction or the override of a veto. The language in § 7 dealing with bills signed by the President speaks in terms of necessary, rather than sufficient, conditions: The Clause states only that bills must be presented to the President and that if "he approves he shall sign it." The Clause does not say that any bill signed by the President becomes law, although it does later say that a bill not acted upon becomes law "in like Manner as if he had signed it." In my view, the sufficiency of the procedural conditions in the second Clause is reasonably supplied by implication. I accordingly interpret § 7 to provide that even an improperly originated bill becomes law if it meets the procedural requirements specified later in that section.

II

My reading of the text of § 7 is supported by examination of the Constitution's purposes. I agree with the Court that the purpose of the Origination Clause is to give the most " `immediate representatives of the people' " — Members of the House, directly elected and subject to ouster every two years — an "effectual weapon" for securing the interests of their constituents. Ante, at 395, quoting The Federalist No. 58, p. 359 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For four reasons, I believe that examination of this purpose supports the view that the binding force of an otherwise lawfully enacted bill is not vitiated by an Origination Clause violation.

First, the House is in an excellent position to defend its origination power. A bill that originates in the Senate, [404] whether or not it raises revenue, cannot become law without the assent of the House. The House is free to rely upon the Origination Clause to justify its position in a debate with the Senate, regardless of whether constitutional concerns alone drive the House's position. See Bessette & Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency 8-16, in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order (J. Bessette & J. Tulis, eds., 1981) (discussing ways, aside from judicial enforcement, in which the Constitution shapes political behavior). The Senate may expect that an improperly originated bill will confront a coalition in the House, composed of those who oppose the bill on substantive grounds and those who would favor it on substantive grounds but regard the procedural error as too important to ignore. Taxes rarely go unnoticed at the ballot box, and there is every reason to anticipate that Representatives subject to reelection every two years will jealously guard their power over revenue-raising measures.[9]

Second, the House has greater freedom than does the Judiciary to construe the Origination Clause wisely.[10] The House [405] may, for example, choose to interpret "Bills for raising Revenue" by invoking a test that turns largely upon the substantive economic impact of the measure on society as a whole, or may determine the House of origination by identifying the legislators who were most responsible for the content of the final version of the bill. If employed by the House, rather than the Judiciary, inquiries so searching obviously create no tension between enforcement of the Origination Clause and the democratic principle of the legislative process — a principle which the Clause itself is designed to serve. The House may also examine evidence, including informal private disclosures, unavailable (or incomprehensible) to the Judiciary.

Third, the House is better able than this Court to judge the prejudice resulting from an Origination Clause violation, and so better able than this Court to judge what corrective action, if any, should be taken. The nature of such a power may be comprehended by analogy to our own recognition that a constitutional defect in courtroom procedure does not necessarily vitiate the outcome of that procedure. See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). I see no reason to believe that a defect in statehouse procedure cannot also be harmless: A tax originated in the Senate may nevertheless reflect the views of the people as interpreted by the House, whether because of a coincidence in the judgment of the two branches or because the House directly influenced the Senate's labor. The House's assent to an improperly originated bill is unlikely to be given if its Members believe that the procedural defect harmed the bill's substance. Yet, it would be difficult to imagine how this Court could reasonably assess the prejudice resulting from any particular Origination Clause violation. On my interpretation of § 7, the Constitution confides this responsibility to the House of Representatives instead. One consequence of this interpretation is that an expansive construction of the Clause by the House need [406] not impose spurious formalities, since spurious violations may be ignored.

Fourth, the violation complained of by respondent is unlike those constitutional problems which we have in the past recognized as appropriate for judicial supervision.[11] This case is not one involving the constitutionality of statutes alleged to effect prospective alterations in the constitutional distribution of power. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988). No defect in the representative process threatens to impede a democratic solution to the problem at issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). No claim is made that this statute deals with subjects outside the sweep of congressional power, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985), or that the statute abrogates the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976). Nor, finally, does respondent contend that the Constitution has been violated because action has been taken in derogation of structural bulwarks designed either to safeguard groups specially in need of judicial protection, or to tame the majoritarian tendencies of American politics more generally. See Chadha, supra; Powell, supra; United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976). Indeed, this case presents perhaps the weakest imaginable justification for judicial invalidation of a statute: Respondent contends that the Judiciary must intervene in order to protect a power of the most majoritarian body in the Federal Government, even though that body has an absolute veto over any [407] effort to usurp that power. The democratic structure of the Constitution ensures that the majority rarely if ever needs such help from the Judiciary.[12]

These considerations reinforce my construction of the text of § 7 and lead me to conclude that the statute before us is law regardless of whether it was improperly originated. As a practical matter, this reading of the Constitution precludes judicial review of alleged violations of the Origination Clause. It is up to the House of Representatives to enforce that provision by refusing its consent to any revenue bills that originate in the Senate.[13] The Court's holding, however, may itself be not too far removed from such a consequence: The Court's essential distinction between revenues allocated to particular programs and those allocated to the General Treasury, ante, at 397-398, tends to convert the Origination Clause [408] into a formal accounting requirement, so long as the House consents.[14]

In all events, I think that both a literal and a practical interpretation of the Origination Clause is consistent with the conclusion that a revenue bill becomes a law whenever it is passed by both Houses of Congress and duly signed by the President. Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment.

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.

Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), held that federal courts will not inquire into whether the enrolled bill was the bill actually passed by Congress:

"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. . . . The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated: leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." Id., at 672.

[409] This salutary principle is also supported by the uncertainty and instability that would result if every person were " `required to hunt through the journals of a legislature to determine whether a statute, properly certified by the speaker of the house and the president of the senate, and approved by the governor, is a statute or not." Id., at 677 (quoting Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, 547, 18 A. 325, 327 (1889)).

The same principle, if not the very same holding, leads me to conclude that federal courts should not undertake an independent investigation into the origination of the statute at issue here. The enrolled bill which, when signed by the President, became the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2170, bore the indication "H. J. Res. 648." The designation "H. J. Res." (a standard abbreviation for "House Joint Resolution") attests that the legislation originated in the House. Such an attestation is not explicitly required by the Constitution, but is reasonably necessary to the operation of Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, which requires the President, if he desires to veto a bill, to "return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated." The President can hardly be expected to search the legislative journals (if they have even been printed by the time his veto must be cast) in order to determine where to direct his veto message. Indeed, it can be said that the attestation is reasonably necessary to the operation of Art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (the Revenue-Origination Clause), itself. The President, after all, is bound not to sign an improperly originated revenue bill by the same oath that binds us not to apply it, so he must have a ready means of knowing whence it came.

The enrolled bill's indication of its House of origin establishes that fact as officially and authoritatively as it establishes the fact that its recited text was adopted by both Houses. With respect to either fact a court's holding, based on its own investigation, that the representation made to the President is incorrect would, as Marshall Field said, manifest a lack of respect due a coordinate branch and produce uncertainty [410] as to the state of the law. I cannot imagine this Court's entertaining a claim that purportedly vetoed legislation took effect because, although the President returned it to the House of origination indicated on the enrolled bill, that was not the real house of origination. It should similarly accept the congressional representation in the present case. We should no more gainsay Congress' official assertion of the origin of a bill than we would gainsay its official assertion that the bill was passed by the requisite quorum, see Art. I, § 5, cl. 1; or any more than Congress or the President would gainsay the official assertion of this Court that a judgment was duly considered and approved by our majority vote. Mutual regard between the coordinate branches, and the interest of certainty, both demand that official representations regarding such matters of internal process be accepted at face value.

This disposition does not place forever beyond our reach the only issue in this area that seems to me appropriate for judicial rather than congressional resolution: what sort of bills constitute "Bills for raising Revenue," Art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Whenever Congress wishes to preserve the possibility of a judicial determination on this point, all it need do is originate the bill that contains the arguably revenue-raising measure in the Senate, indicating such origination on the enrolled bill, as by the caption "S. J. Res." This Court may thereby have the last word on what constitutes a bill for raising revenue, and Congress the last word on where a particular bill has originated — which seems to me as it should be.

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

[1] The Ninth Circuit's ruling that § 3013 was passed in violation of the Origination Clause is inconsistent with the holdings of the other six Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue. See United States v. Griffin, 884 F. 2d 655, 656-657 (CA2 1989) (§ 3013 not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue"); United States v. Simpson, 885 F. 2d 36, 40 (CA3 1989) (same); United States v. Herrada, 887 F. 2d 524, 527 (CA5 1989) (same); United States v. Ashburn, 884 F. 2d 901, 903 (CA6 1989) (same); United States v. Tholl, 895 F. 2d 1178, 1181-1182 (CA7 1990) (same); United States v. King, 891 F. 2d 780, 782 (CA10 1989) (same).

[2] This Court has reserved the question whether "there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated." Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 317 (1914). The Court has, however, resolved an Origination Clause claim without suggesting that the claim might be nonjusticiable. Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, 436-437 (1906).

No Court of Appeals has held that an Origination Clause challenge to § 3013 raises a political question. The Ninth Circuit in this case rejected the claim that the issue raises a political question, 863 F. 2d 654, 656-657 (1988), and the Third Circuit has reached the same conclusion, Simpson, supra, at 38-39. Three Circuits have addressed the merits of an Origination Clause claim without mentioning the political question doctrine, Griffin, supra; Ashburn, supra; King, supra; and two Circuits have refused to decide whether the issue raises a political question, Herrada, supra, at 525, and n. 1; Tholl, supra, at 1181-1182, n. 7. But cf. Texas Assn. of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. 2d 163 (CA5 1985) (holding that an Origination Clause challenge to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 324, presented a nonjusticiable political question).

[3] The Government does not argue that all of the factors enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), suggest that this case raises a political question. The Government concedes that no provision of the Constitution demonstrably commits to the House of Representatives the determination of where a bill originated. Brief for United States 9. Moreover, the Government does not suggest that answering the origination question requires any sort of "initial policy determination" that courts ought not make or that the question presents an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made." Nor does it suggest that there is any more danger of "multifarious pronouncements" in this context than in any other in which a court determines the constitutionality of a federal law. Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217.

[4] JUSTICE SCALIA apparently would revisit Powell. He contends that Congress' resolution of the constitutional question in passing the bill bars this Court from independently considering that question. The only case he cites for his argument is Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892). But Field does not support his argument. That case concerned "the nature of the evidence" the Court would consider in determining whether a bill had actually passed Congress. Id., at 670. Appellants had argued that the constitutional Clause providing that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings" implied that whether a bill had passed must be determined by an examination of the journals. See ibid. (quoting Art. I, § 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court rejected that interpretation of the Journal Clause, holding that the Constitution left it to Congress to determine how a bill is to be authenticated as having passed. Id., at 670-671. In the absence of any constitutional requirement binding Congress, we stated that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments" demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. Id., at 672. Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.

[5] In an attempt to resurrect in another guise an argument that we have rejected, see supra, at 392-394, JUSTICE STEVENS seeks to differentiate the Origination Clause from such other constitutional provisions by suggesting that the House would more effectively ensure compliance with the Clause than would this Court. Post, at 403-406. Yet he apparently concedes that this case is justiciable despite his argument that the House is a better forum than the Judiciary for the resolution of Origination Clause disputes. The reasoning does not become persuasive merely because it is used for a different purpose, and we continue to reject it.

[6] The statute has since been amended to provide a cap of $125 million through fiscal year 1991. 102 Stat. 4419, 42 U. S. C. § 10601(c)(1)(B)(i). The amendment also provides that the Judicial Branch will receive the first $2.2 million of excess collections to cover the costs of assessing and collecting criminal fines. § 10601(c)(1)(A). After fiscal year 1991, the cap will be $150 million through fiscal year 1994. § 10601(c)(1)(B)(ii).

[7] A different case might be presented if the program funded were entirely unrelated to the persons paying for the program. Here, § 3013 targets people convicted of federal crimes, a group to which some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime can fairly be attributed. Whether a bill would be "for raising Revenue" where the connection between payor and program was more attenuated is not now before us.

[8] The first two paragraphs of § 7 provide in full:

"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law."

[9] The Court properly observes that the House has an interest in upholding "the entire Constitution, not just those provisions that protect its institutional prerogatives." Ante, at 392-393 (emphasis in original). I agree. It is, however, true that even if the House should mistake its constitutional interest generally, it is unlikely to mistake its more particular interest in being powerful: That specific interest is instrumental to any broader conception the House might have of its duties and interests.

Nevertheless, the Court is again correct to say that the possibility of legislative enforcement does not supply a prudential, nonconstitutional justification for abstaining from constitutional interpretation. Ibid. My point is rather that this possibility is relevant to the substantive task of interpreting § 7 itself.

[10] Respondent observes that the House "has not assumed that it is the final arbiter of the Origination Clause," but has instead "looked to court decisions for guidance in determining whether to return bills to the Senate." Brief for Respondent 11. Although respect for our power of judicial review is a constitutional necessity in the ordinary case, it is not clear that the House's deference is either necessary or wise with respect to this issue. Indeed, a decision by this Court to pass upon Origination Clause questions may be an unfortunate inducement to the House to forbear from an independent inquiry into the interpretive issues posed by the Clause.

[11] This observation bears upon the plausibility of an interpretation of the Origination Clause that effectively insulates origination problems from judicial review. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 384-385 (1821).

[12] I agree with the Court that the Origination Clause is intended to "safeguard liberty." Ante, at 395. Indeed, this must be true, in a general sense, of almost every constitutional provision, since the Constitution aims to "secure the Blessings of Liberty." U. S. Const., Preamble. Of course, the Constitution aims as well to create a Government able to "promote the general Welfare," but liberty and welfare should ultimately coincide.

I also believe, however, that some constitutional provisions are designed to protect liberty in a more specific sense: They protect the rights of individuals as against the majority. Other provisions give the majority sufficient power to act effectively, within limits. In this sense, the First Amendment secures liberty in a way that the Origination Clause does not.

[13] The President obviously might choose to enforce the provision by vetoing an improperly originated bill. It seems clear that the President has the power to do so; it is less clear whether the President has any constitutional duty to police the internal processes of the Congress, or whether he has instead a constitutional duty to defer to Congress on such matters. These issues must be determined by the President; they are not ones we need resolve. It is noteworthy, however, that Article I, § 7, does supply a textual basis for inferring that the President has some constitutional responsibility with respect to matters of origination: Upon vetoing a bill, the President must return it to the House "in which it shall have originated." That phrase is manifestly ambiguous in the case of an improperly originated bill.

[14] The Court's interpretation of the Clause does not appear to prevent the House from interpreting the Clause more aggressively, although the Court does effectively deny the House the power to "deem harmless" a violation of the Clause.

1.1.2 I.N.S. v. Chadha 1.1.2 I.N.S. v. Chadha

462 U.S. 919 (1983)

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
v.
CHADHA ET AL.

No. 80-1832.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued February 22, 1982.
Reargued December 7, 1982.
Decided June 23, 1983[1]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[922] Eugene Gressman reargued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-2170. With him on the briefs was Stanley M. Brand.

Michael Davidson reargued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-2171. With him on the briefs were M. Elizabeth Culbreth and Charles Tiefer.

Solicitor General Lee reargued the cause for the Immigration and Naturalization Service in all cases. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Simms, Edwin S. Kneedler, David A. Strauss, and Thomas O. Sargentich.

Alan B. Morrison reargued the cause for Jagdish Rai Chadha in all cases. With him on the brief was John Cary Sims.[2]

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Robert C. Eckhardt for Certain Members of the United States House of Representatives; and by Paul C. Rosenthal for the Counsel on Administrative Law of the Federal Bar Association.

[923] CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 216, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.

I

Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for having "remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1), at the time in question, provided:

"As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and —

"(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United [924] States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."[3]

After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the Immigration Judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported.

Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(1), the Immigration Judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides:

"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the [925] facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session."

Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), to veto[4] the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides:

"(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsection —

"if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings."

[926] The June 25, 1974, order of the Immigration Judge suspending Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under § 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was the final session in which Congress, pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. The session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Cong. Rec. 42014, 42277 (1975). Absent congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been canceled after this date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d).

On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six] aliens," including Chadha. H. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; 121 Cong Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121 Cong. Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and was not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the floor that

"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution [Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid.

[927] The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.[5] Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Art. I legislative act; it was not [928] submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action.

After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Immigration Judge held that he had no authority to rule on the constitutional validity of § 244(c)(2). On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.

Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, again contending that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was dismissed. App. 55-56.

Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a), Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light of the importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both the Senate and the House of Representatives to file briefs amici curiae.

After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the House was without constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives." 634 F. 2d 408, 436 (1980). The essence of its holding was that § 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 80-1832, 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm.

[929] II

Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court to resolve the issue raised.

A

Appellate Jurisdiction

Both Houses of Congress[6] contend that we are without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides:

"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party."

Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 742, n. 10 (1974), makes clear that a court of appeals is a "court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear that the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or proceeding," that the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an Act of Congress — namely, the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) — unconstitutional. The express requisites for an appeal under § 1252, therefore, have been met.

[930] In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the congressional parties[7] direct attention, however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation of § 244(c)(2), and the Court of Appeals granted that relief. Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.

The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport Chadha. As we have set out more fully, supra, at 928, the INS concluded that it had no power to rule on the constitutionality of that order and accordingly proceeded to implement it. Chadha's appeal challenged that decision and the INS presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to comply with the House action ordering deportation of Chadha. The Court of Appeals set aside the deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport Chadha; steps that the Attorney General would have taken were it not for that decision.

At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. It is apparent that Congress intended that [931] this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical prerequisites of § 1252; in other cases where an Act of Congress is held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in this Court is available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of the United States is a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal under § 1252. The agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The appeal in No. 80-1832 is therefore properly before us.[8]

B

Severability

Congress also contends that the provision for the one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from § 244. Congress argues that if the provision for the one-House veto is held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must fall. If § 244 in its entirety is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) and Chadha would be deported. From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision because he could receive no relief even if his constitutional challenge proves successful.[9]

Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed " `[u]nless it is evident that [932] the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.' " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 (1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1101, which provides:

"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." (Emphasis added.)

This language is unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or of any part of the Act, to depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of the Act as that language is used in the severability clause. Congress clearly intended "the remainder of the Act" to stand if "any particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have more plainly authorized the presumption that the provision for a one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act of which it is a part. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419, 434 (1938).

The presumption as to the severability of the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is supported by the legislative history of § 244. That section and its precursors supplanted the long-established pattern of dealing with deportations like Chadha's on a case-by-case basis through private bills. Although it may be that Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of severability raised by § 406.

[933] The Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 162, required the Secretary of Labor to deport any alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:

"It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in this House that it is impossible to deal with this situation through special bills. We had a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before this House. The House consumed 5 1/2 hours considering four bills and made no disposition of any of the bills." 81 Cong. Rec. 5542 (1937).

Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574, but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong. Rec. 8992-8996 (1938).

Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.

In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, [934] ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as private bills. Just one year later, the House Judiciary Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2), stated in a Report:

"In the light of experience of the last several months, the committee came to the conclusion that the requirement of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in many thousands of individual cases which are submitted by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution mechanism] are of purely administrative nature and they seriously interfere with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the House." H. R. Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949).

The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. Plainly, Congress' desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This legislative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of severability raised by § 406 because there is insufficient evidence that Congress would have continued to subject itself to the onerous burdens of private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be held unconstitutional.

A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, at 234. There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House veto, the [935] administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this delegated authority is preserved since all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the contrary,[10] deportation proceedings will be canceled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2) has expired.[11] Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.

C

Standing

We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance [936] the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation-of-powers dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's private interests. Chadha has demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury . . . ." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79 (1978). If the veto provision violates the Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be canceled. Chadha therefore has standing to challenge the order of the Executive mandated by the House veto.

D

Alternative Relief

It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the constitutional question presented by these cases because Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him. It is argued that since Chadha married a United States citizen on August 10, 1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief may be open under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, and 1255. It is true that Chadha may be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and, as such, could lawfully be accorded permanent residence. Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in these cases, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, under which the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to his country of nationality because of "a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race."

It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in these cases. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention we might well seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim advanced. But at most [937] these other avenues of relief are speculative. It is by no means certain, for example, that Chadha's classification as an immediate relative would result in the adjustment of Chadha's status from nonimmigrant to permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F. 2d 1028 (CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge he will not be deported and will automatically become eligible to apply for citizenship.[12] A person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional validity of the process which led to his status merely on the basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of relief.

E

Jurisdiction

It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a). That section provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act." Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) takes place outside the administrative proceedings conducted under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant contained in § 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional challenge.

In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 216 (1968), this Court held that "§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations [938] made during a proceeding conducted under § 242(b), including those determinations made incident to a motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3 1981).[13] However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in these cases that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." 634 F. 2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.

This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under § 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did not `attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.' " 392 U. S., at 213, quoting [939] Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself, and the relief he seeks — cancellation of deportation — is plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to decide these cases.

F

Case or Controversy

It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S., at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass. This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS take the same position on the constitutionality of the one-House veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.

A case or controversy is presented by these cases. First, from the time of Congress' formal intervention, see n. 5, supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt. Congress is both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). Second, prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement with the Court of Appeals' decision that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's "aggrieved" status for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, see supra, at 929-931. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that "Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), [940] the INS will execute its order and deport him." 634 F. 2d, at 419.[14]

Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of these cases in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of § 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S., at 210, n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).

G

Political Question

It is also argued that these cases present a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Art. I power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is [941] challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976): "Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." Id., at 132.

A brief review of those factors which may indicate the presence of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that our assertion of jurisdiction over these cases does no violence to the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the following circumstances is present:

"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha's claim is "an assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 48. But if this turns the question into a political question virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political question. Chadha indeed argues that one House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision to allow him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine [942] suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts.[15]

Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this case. As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" of Baker for resolving the question presented by these cases. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted, § 244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of "multifarious pronouncements" on this question.

It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be termed "political." But the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke [943] the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a "political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. But "courts cannot reject as `no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated `political' exceeds constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217.

In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether

"a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, presented to and approved by the President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been passed by Congress. . . .

". . . We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, . . . did not become a law." Id., at 669-670 (emphasis in original).

H

The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and we are satisfied the parties are properly before us. The important issues have been fully briefed and [944] twice argued, see 458 U. S. 1120 (1982). The Court's duty in these cases, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821), is clear:

"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."

III

A

We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained:

"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978).

By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the hallmarks — of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies:

"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions [945] were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977).

See also Appendix to JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, post, at 1003.

JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House veto is a useful "political invention," post, at 972, and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even concede this utilitarian argument although the longrange political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable. It has been vigorously debated, and it is instructive to compare the views of the protagonists. See, e. g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982). But policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.

Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides:

"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1. (Emphasis added.)

"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . ." Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added.)

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) [946] shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added.)

These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently noted that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 124. Just as we relied on the textual provision of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of separation of powers in Buckley, we see that the purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral requirement of Art. I, § 1, and § 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of the important question presented in these cases. The very structure of the Articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers, and we now turn to Art. I.

B

The Presentment Clauses

The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers.[16] Presentment to the President and the Presidential [947] veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." 2 Farrand 301-302. As a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, supra, at 945-946, was added. 2 Farrand 304-305.

The decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President. In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), Hamilton focused on the President's role in making laws:

"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence." Id., at 458.

See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 614-615 (3d ed. 1858).

The President's role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, [948] or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role in the legislative process was described later during public debate on ratification:

"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.

". . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at 458 (A. Hamilton).

See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 123 (1926). The Court also has observed that the Presentment Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is grafted on the legislative process:

"The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide . . . ." Myers v. United States, supra, at 123.

C

Bicameralism

The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked [949] upon in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented:

"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1 Farrand 254.

Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single House was antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for only one legislative organ, he warned:

"[W]e shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22, p. 135 (H. Lodge ed. 1888).

This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph Story:

"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] [950] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and relations on society." 1 Story, supra, at 383-384.

These observations are consistent with what many of the Framers expressed, none more cogently than Madison in pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty:

"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit." The Federalist No. 51, p. 324 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (sometimes attributed to "Hamilton or Madison" but now generally attributed to Madison).

See also The Federalist No. 62.

However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states. Those states feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. See 1 Farrand 176-177, 484-491. It need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small states.[17]

[951] We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See id., at 99-104. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.

IV

The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.

Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 121, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And when, as here, [952] one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively acting within its assigned sphere.

Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. See infra, at 955, and nn. 20, 21. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).

Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under § 244. The one-House veto operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha's status.

The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively [953] delegated authority,[18] had determined the alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only [954] by legislation requiring deportation.[19] Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.[20]

The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in these cases further manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation — that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha — no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the [955] President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.[21]

Finally, we see that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action. There are four provisions in the Constitution,[22] explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto:

(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5;

(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6;

(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove Presidential appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2;

(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms.[23] [956] These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged here. On the contrary, they provide further support for the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.

Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally [957] clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I.[24] The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those [958] checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.[25]

The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is crystal [959A] clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.

The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.

V

We hold that the congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

[959B] JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds [960] of statutes, dating back to the 1930's. Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of power to administrative agencies.[26] One reasonably may disagree with Congress' assessment of the veto's utility,[27] but the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than necessary to decide these cases. In my view, the cases may be decided on a narrower ground. When Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

I

A

The Framers perceived that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Theirs was not a baseless fear. Under British rule, the Colonies suffered the abuses of unchecked executive power that were attributed, at least popularly, to a hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1976); The Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation, [961] the States reacted by removing power from the executive and placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But many legislators proved to be little better than the Crown. "The supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities. The legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money schemes, [and] suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts." Levi, supra, at 374-375.

One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation was the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures. The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one person to the "tyranny of shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had not been prevented from assuming judicial power, and " `[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy.' "[28] The Federalist No. 48, supra, at 336 (emphasis in original) (quoting T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (London ed. 1787)). The same concern also was evident in the reports of the Council of the Censors, a body that was charged with determining whether the Pennsylvania Legislature had complied with the State Constitution. The Council found that during this period "[t]he constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution. . . . [C]ases belonging [962] to the judiciary department, frequently [had been] drawn within legislative cognizance and determination." The Federalist No. 48, at 336-337.

It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate branches. Their concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person was expressed not only in this general allocation of power, but also in more specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. As the Court recognized in United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 442 (1965), "the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical . . . prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply — trial by legislature." This Clause, and the separation-of-powers doctrine generally, reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power.

B

The Constitution does not establish three branches with precisely defined boundaries. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam). Rather, as Justice Jackson wrote: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring in judgment). The Court thus has been mindful that the boundaries between each branch should be fixed "according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination." J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). But where one branch has impaired or sought to assume a power central to another branch, the [963] Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 123.

Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 587; Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). These cases present the latter situation.[29]

II

Before considering whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly Congress' actions. Jagdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya, stayed in this country after his student visa expired. Although he was scheduled to be deported, he requested the Immigration and Naturalization Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country. After a hearing,[30] the Service granted Chadha's request and sent — as required by [964] the reservation of the veto right — a report of its action to Congress.

In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it the names of 339 other persons whose deportations also had been suspended by the Service. The House Committee on the Judiciary decided that six of these persons, including Chadha, should not be allowed to remain in this country. Accordingly, it submitted a resolution to the House, which stated simply that "the House of Representatives does not approve the granting of permanent residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter named." 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975). The resolution was not distributed prior to the vote,[31] but the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law explained to the House:

"It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution did not meet [the] statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid. (remarks of Rep. Eilberg).

Without further explanation and without a recorded vote, the House rejected the Service's determination that these six people met the statutory criteria.

On its face, the House's action appears clearly adjudicatory.[32] The House did not enact a general rule; rather it [965] made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other branches. Even if the House did not make a de novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts.[33] See 5 U. S. C. § 704 (providing generally for judicial review of final agency action); cf. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review INS decisions denying suspension of deportation). Where, as here, Congress has exercised a power "that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress," [966] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 138, the decisions of this Court have held that Congress impermissibly assumed a function that the Constitution entrusted to another branch, see id., at 138-141; cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S., at 202.

The impropriety of the House's assumption of this function is confirmed by the fact that its action raises the very danger the Framers sought to avoid — the exercise of unchecked power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to remain in this country.[34] Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency[35] adjudicates individual rights. The only effective constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting majority."

[967A] Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136 (1810). In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its constitutionally prescribed authority. I would not reach the broader question whether legislative vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses.

[967B] JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto." For this reason, the Court's decision is of surpassing importance. And it is for this reason that the Court would have been well advised to decide the cases, if possible, on the narrower grounds of separation of powers, leaving for full consideration the constitutionality of other congressional review statutes operating on such varied matters as war powers and agency rulemaking, some of which concern the independent regulatory agencies.[36]

The prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its importance to Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become a central [968] means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role. Accordingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes.[37] The device is known in every field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the environment, and the economy.

I

The legislative veto developed initially in response to the problems of reorganizing the sprawling Government structure created in response to the Depression. The Reorganization Acts established the chief model for the legislative veto. When President Hoover requested authority to reorganize the Government in 1929, he coupled his request that the "Congress be willing to delegate its authority over the problem (subject to defined principles) to the Executive" with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its consideration." Public Papers of the Presidents, Herbert Hoover, 1929, p. 432 (1974). Congress followed President Hoover's suggestion and authorized reorganization subject to legislative [969] review. Act of June 30, 1932, § 407, 47 Stat. 414. Although the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has since been renewed numerous times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Presidents submitted 115 Reorganization Plans to Congress of which 23 were disapproved by Congress pursuant to legislative veto provisions. See App. A to Brief for United States Senate on Reargument.

Shortly after adoption of the Reorganization Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 561, Congress and the President applied the legislative veto procedure to resolve the delegation problem for national security and foreign affairs. World War II occasioned the need to transfer greater authority to the President in these areas. The legislative veto offered the means by which Congress could confer additional authority while preserving its own constitutional role. During World War II, Congress enacted over 30 statutes conferring powers on the Executive with legislative veto provisions.[38] President Roosevelt accepted the veto as the necessary price for obtaining exceptional authority.[39]

Over the quarter century following World War II, Presidents continued to accept legislative vetoes by one or both Houses as constitutional, while regularly denouncing provisions by which congressional Committees reviewed Executive activity.[40] The legislative veto balanced delegations of [970] statutory authority in new areas of governmental involvement: the space program, international agreements on nuclear energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustment of federal pay rates.[41]

During the 1970's the legislative veto was important in resolving a series of major constitutional disputes between the President and Congress over claims of the President to broad impoundment, war, and national emergency powers. The [971] key provision of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. S. C. § 1544(c), authorizes the termination by concurrent resolution of the use of armed forces in hostilities. A similar measure resolved the problem posed by Presidential claims of inherent power to impound appropriations. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U. S. C. § 1403. In conference, a compromise was achieved under which permanent impoundments, termed "rescissions," would require approval through enactment of legislation. In contrast, temporary impoundments, or "deferrals," would become effective unless disapproved by one House. This compromise provided the President with flexibility, while preserving ultimate congressional control over the budget.[42] Although the War Powers Resolution was enacted over President Nixon's veto, the Impoundment Control Act was enacted with the President's approval. These statutes were followed by others resolving similar problems: the National Emergencies Act, § 202, 90 Stat. 1255, 50 U. S. C. § 1622, resolving the longstanding problems with unchecked Executive emergency power; the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, § 211, 90 Stat. 740, 22 U. S. C. § 2776(b), resolving the problem of foreign arms sales; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, §§ 303(a), 304(a), 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 130, 134, 137, 138, 144-145, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b), 2158, 2153(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V), resolving the problem of exports of nuclear technology.

In the energy field, the legislative veto served to balance broad delegations in legislation emerging from the energy crisis of the 1970's.[43] In the educational field, it was found [972] that fragmented and narrow grant programs "inevitably lead to Executive-Legislative confrontations" because they inaptly limited the Commissioner of Education's authority. S. Rep. No. 93-763, p. 69 (1974). The response was to grant the Commissioner of Education rulemaking authority, subject to a legislative veto. In the trade regulation area, the veto preserved congressional authority over the Federal Trade Commission's broad mandate to make rules to prevent businesses from engaging in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."[44]

Even this brief review suffices to demonstrate that the legislative veto is more than "efficient, convenient, and useful." Ante, at 944. It is an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, assures the accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves [973] Congress' control over lawmaking. Perhaps there are other means of accommodation and accountability, but the increasing reliance of Congress upon the legislative veto suggests that the alternatives to which Congress must now turn are not entirely satisfactory.[45]

[974] The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches — the concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker. While the President has often objected to particular legislative vetoes, generally those left in the hands of congressional Committees, the Executive has more often agreed to legislative review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority.

II

For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's decision today is regretable. The Court's Art. I analysis appears to invalidate all legislative vetoes irrespective of form or subject. Because the legislative veto is commonly found as a check upon rulemaking by administrative agencies and upon broad-based policy decisions of the Executive Branch, it is particularly unfortunate that the Court reaches its decision in cases involving the exercise of a veto over deportation decisions regarding particular individuals. Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as unconstitutional; to strike an entire class of statutes based on consideration of a somewhat atypical and more readily indictable exemplar of the class is irresponsible. It was for cases such as these that Justice Brandeis wrote:

"The Court has frequently called attention to the `great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress . . . .

.....

[975] "The Court will not `formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, [113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)]." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion).

Unfortunately, today's holding is not so limited.[46]

[976] If the legislative veto were as plainly unconstitutional as the Court strives to suggest, its broad ruling today would be more comprehensible. But, the constitutionality of the legislative veto is anything but clear-cut. The issue divides scholars,[47] courts,[48] Attorneys General,[49] and the two other [977] branches of the National Government. If the veto devices so flagrantly disregarded the requirements of Art. I as the Court today suggests, I find it incomprehensible that Congress, whose Members are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, would have placed these mechanisms in nearly 200 separate laws over a period of 50 years.

The reality of the situation is that the constitutional question posed today is one of immense difficulty over which the Executive and Legislative Branches — as well as scholars and judges — have understandably disagreed. That disagreement stems from the silence of the Constitution on the precise question: The Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto. Thus, our task should be to determine whether the legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of Art. I and the principles of separation of powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the Constitution.[50] [978] We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for the legislative veto surprising, and I would not infer disapproval of the mechanism from its absence. From the summer of 1787 to the present the Government of the United States has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers. Only within the last half century has the complexity and size of the Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effective if not the only means to insure its role as the Nation's lawmaker. But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation would grow and new problems of governance would require different solutions. Accordingly, our Federal Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental democratic principles. This was the spirit in which Justice Jackson penned his influential concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case:

"The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952).

This is the perspective from which we should approach the novel constitutional questions presented by the legislative veto. In my view, neither Art. I of the Constitution nor the doctrine of separation of powers is violated by this mechanism [979] by which our elected Representatives preserve their voice in the governance of the Nation.

III

The Court holds that the disapproval of a suspension of deportation by the resolution of one House of Congress is an exercise of legislative power without compliance with the prerequisites for lawmaking set forth in Art. I of the Constitution. Specifically, the Court maintains that the provisions of § 244(c)(2) are inconsistent with the requirement of bicameral approval, implicit in Art. I, § 1, and the requirement that all bills and resolutions that require the concurrence of both Houses be presented to the President, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3.[51]

I do not dispute the Court's truismatic exposition of these Clauses. There is no question that a bill does not become a law until it is approved by both the House and the Senate, and presented to the President. Similarly, I would not hesitate to strike an action of Congress in the form of a concurrent resolution which constituted an exercise of original lawmaking authority. I agree with the Court that the President's [980] qualified veto power is a critical element in the distribution of powers under the Constitution, widely endorsed among the Framers, and intended to serve the President as a defense against legislative encroachment and to check the "passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, p. 458 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). The records of the Convention reveal that it is the first purpose which figured most prominently but I acknowledge the vitality of the second. Id., at 443. I also agree that the bicameral approval required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, "was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto," ante, at 948, and that the need to divide and disperse legislative power figures significantly in our scheme of Government. All of this, Part III of the Court's opinion, is entirely unexceptionable.

It does not, however, answer the constitutional question before us. The power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral approval or Presidential consideration. The veto must be authorized by statute and may only negative what an Executive department or independent agency has proposed. On its face, the legislative veto no more allows one House of Congress to make law than does the Presidential veto confer such power upon the President. Accordingly, the Court properly recognizes that it "must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, apply" and admits that "[n]to every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements of Art. I." Ante, at 952.

A

The terms of the Presentment Clauses suggest only that bills and their equivalent are subject to the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. Article I, § 7, cl. 2, stipulates only that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, [981] shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President" for approval or disapproval, his disapproval then subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. Section 7, cl. 3, goes further:

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill."

Although the Clause does not specify the actions for which the concurrence of both Houses is "necessary," the proceedings at the Philadelphia Convention suggest its purpose was to prevent Congress from circumventing the presentation requirement in the making of new legislation. James Madison observed that if the President's veto was confined to bills, it could be evaded by calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." Accordingly, he proposed that "or resolve" should be added after "bill" in what is now Clause 2 of § 7. 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 301-302 (1911). After a short discussion on the subject, the amendment was rejected. On the following day, however, Randolph renewed the proposal in the substantial form as it now appears, and the motion passed. Id., at 304-305; 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 431 (1845). The chosen language, Madison's comment, and the brevity of the Convention's consideration, all suggest a modest role was intended for the Clause and no broad restraint on congressional authority was contemplated. See Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 Harv. J. Legis. 593, 609-611 (1976). This reading is consistent with the historical background of the Presentment Clause itself which reveals only that the Framers were concerned [982] with limiting the methods for enacting new legislation. The Framers were aware of the experience in Pennsylvania where the legislature had evaded the requirements attached to the passing of legislation by the use of "resolves," and the criticisms directed at this practice by the Council of Censors.[52] There is no record that the Convention contemplated, let alone intended, that these Art. I requirements would someday be invoked to restrain the scope of congressional authority pursuant to duly enacted law.[53]

[983] When the Convention did turn its attention to the scope of Congress' lawmaking power, the Framers were expansive. The Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, vests [984] Congress with the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [the enumerated powers of § 8] and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." It is long settled that Congress may "exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government," and "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415-416, 420 (1819).

B

The Court heeded this counsel in approving the modern administrative state. The Court's holding today that all legislative-type action must be enacted through the lawmaking process ignores that legislative authority is routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups.

"The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century. . . . They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories. . . ." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting).

[985] This Court's decisions sanctioning such delegations make clear that Art. I does not require all action with the effect of legislation to be passed as a law.

Theoretically, agencies and officials were asked only to "fill up the details," and the rule was that "Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a prescribed standard." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 324 (1931). Chief Justice Taft elaborated the standard in J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928): "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." In practice, however, restrictions on the scope of the power that could be delegated diminished and all but disappeared. In only two instances did the Court find an unconstitutional delegation. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). In other cases, the "intelligible principle" through which agencies have attained enormous control over the economic affairs of the country was held to include such formulations as "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); "public interest," New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932); "public convenience, interest, or necessity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933); and "unfair methods of competition." FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).

The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad delegations are matters that still have not been put to rest. But for present purposes, these cases establish that by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law — the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government — made by [986] the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process. There is no question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), provides that a "rule" is an agency statement "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." When agencies are authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is accorded "legislative effect." See, e. g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416 (1977).[54] These regulations bind courts and officers of the Federal Government, may pre-empt state law, see, e. g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982), and grant rights to and impose obligations on the public. In sum, they have the force of law.

If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral [987] approval and without the President's signature. It is thus not apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting test. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with the Art. I requirements.

Nor are there strict limits on the agents that may receive such delegations of legislative authority so that it might be said that the Legislature can delegate authority to others but not to itself. While most authority to issue rules and regulations is given to the Executive Branch and the independent regulatory agencies, statutory delegations to private persons have also passed this Court's scrutiny. In Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939), the statute provided that restrictions upon the production or marketing of agricultural commodities was to become effective only upon the favorable vote by a prescribed majority of the affected farmers. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577 (1939), upheld an Act which gave producers of specified commodities the right to veto marketing orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. Assuming Currin and Rock Royal Co-operative remain sound law, the Court's decision today suggests that Congress may place a "veto" power over suspensions of deportation in private hands or in the hands of an independent agency, but is forbidden to reserve such authority for itself. Perhaps this odd result could be justified on other constitutional grounds, such as the separation of powers, but certainly it cannot be defended as consistent with the Court's view of the Art. I presentment and bicameralism commands.[55]

[988] The Court's opinion in the present cases comes closest to facing the reality of administrative lawmaking in considering the contention that the Attorney General's action in suspending deportation under § 244 is itself a legislative act. The Court posits that the Attorney General is acting in an Art. II enforcement capacity under § 244. This characterization is at odds with Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924), where the power conferred on the Executive to deport aliens was considered a delegation of legislative power. The Court suggests, however, that the Attorney General acts in an Art. II capacity because "[t]he courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always `ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards." Ante, at 953, n. 16. This assumption is simply wrong, as the Court itself points out: "We are aware of no decision . . . where a federal court has reviewed a decision of the Attorney General suspending deportation of an alien pursuant to the standards set out in § 244(a)(1). This is not surprising, given that no party to such action has either the motivation or the right to appeal from it." Ante, at 957, n. 22. It is perhaps on the erroneous premise that judicial review may check abuses of the § 244 power that the Court also submits that "[t]he bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it — a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7." Ante, at 953, n. 16. On the other hand, the Court's reasoning does persuasively explain why a resolution of disapproval [989] under § 244(c)(2) need not again be subject to the bicameral process. Because it serves only to check the Attorney General's exercise of the suspension authority granted by § 244, the disapproval resolution — unlike the Attorney General's action — "cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it — a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I."

More fundamentally, even if the Court correctly characterizes the Attorney General's authority under § 244 as an Art. II Executive power, the Court concedes that certain administrative agency action, such as rulemaking, "may resemble lawmaking" and recognizes that "[t]his Court has referred to agency activity as being `quasi-legislative' in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935)." Ante, at 953, n. 16. Such rules and adjudications by the agencies meet the Court's own definition of legislative action for they "alte[r] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch," ante, at 952, and involve "determinations of policy," ante, at 954. Under the Court's analysis, the Executive Branch and the independent agencies may make rules with the effect of law while Congress, in whom the Framers confided the legislative power, Art. I, § 1, may not exercise a veto which precludes such rules from having operative force. If the effective functioning of a complex modern government requires the delegation of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or "quasi-legislative" in character, I cannot accept that Art. I — which is, after all, the source of the nondelegation doctrine — should forbid Congress to qualify that grant with a legislative veto.[56]

[990] C

The Court also takes no account of perhaps the most relevant consideration: However resolutions of disapproval under § 244(c)(2) are formally characterized, in reality, a departure from the status quo occurs only upon the concurrence of opinion among the House, Senate, and President. Reservations of legislative authority to be exercised by Congress should be upheld if the exercise of such reserved authority is consistent with the distribution of and limits upon legislative power that Art. I provides.

1

As its history reveals, § 244(c)(2) withstands this analysis. Until 1917, Congress had not broadly provided for the deportation of aliens. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. The Immigration Act of 1924 enlarged the categories of [991] aliens subject to mandatory deportation, and substantially increased the likelihood of hardships to individuals by abolishing in most cases the previous time limitation of three years within which deportation proceedings had to be commenced. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. Thousands of persons, who either had entered the country in more lenient times or had been smuggled in as children, or had overstayed their permits, faced the prospect of deportation. Enforcement of the Act grew more rigorous over the years with the deportation of thousands of aliens without regard to the mitigating circumstances of particular cases. See Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1 Public Administration Review 281 (1941). Congress provided relief in certain cases through the passage of private bills.

In 1933, when deportations reached their zenith, the Secretary of Labor temporarily suspended numerous deportations on grounds of hardship, 78 Cong. Rec. 11783 (1934), and proposed legislation to allow certain deportable aliens to remain in the country. H. R. 9725, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The Labor Department bill was opposed, however, as "grant[ing] too much discretionary authority," 78 Cong. Rec. 11790 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Dirksen), and it failed decisively. Id., at 11791.

The following year, the administration proposed bills to authorize an interdepartmental committee to grant permanent residence to deportable aliens who had lived in the United States for 10 years or who had close relatives here. S. 2969 and H. R. 8163, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). These bills were also attacked as an "abandonment of congressional control over the deportation of undesirable aliens," H. R. Rep. No. 1110, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 2 (1935), and were not enacted. A similar fate awaited a bill introduced in the 75th Congress that would have authorized the Secretary to grant permanent residence to up to 8,000 deportable aliens. The measure passed the House, but did not come to a vote in the Senate. H. R. 6391, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 83 Cong. Rec. 8992-8996 (1938).

[992] The succeeding Congress again attempted to find a legislative solution to the deportation problem. The initial House bill required congressional action to cancel individual deportations, 84 Cong. Rec. 10455 (1939), but the Senate amended the legislation to provide that deportable aliens should not be deported unless the Congress by Act or resolution rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. H. R. 5138, § 10, as reported with amendments by S. Rep. No. 1721, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1940). The compromise solution, the immediate predecessor to § 244(c), allowed the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of qualified aliens. Their deportation would be canceled and permanent residence granted if the House and Senate did not adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval. S. Rep. No. 1796, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 5-6 (1940). The Executive Branch played a major role in fashioning this compromise, see 86 Cong. Rec. 8345 (1940), and President Roosevelt approved the legislation, which became the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.

In 1947, the Department of Justice requested legislation authorizing the Attorney General to cancel deportations without congressional review. H. R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The purpose of the proposal was to "save time and energy of everyone concerned . . . ." Regulating Powers of the Attorney General to Suspend Deportation of Aliens: Hearings on H. R. 245, H. R. 674, H. R. 1115, and H. R. 2933 before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1947). The Senate Judiciary Committee objected, stating that "affirmative action by the Congress in all suspension cases should be required before deportation proceedings may be canceled." S. Rep. No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1948). See also H. R. Rep. No. 647, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). Congress not only rejected the Department's request for final authority but also amended the Immigration Act to require that cancellation of deportation be approved [993] by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. President Truman signed the bill without objection. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206.

Practice over the ensuing several years convinced Congress that the requirement of affirmative approval was "not workable . . . and would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the House." House Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949). In preparing the comprehensive Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that for certain classes of aliens the adjustment of status be subject to the disapproval of either House; but deportation of an alien "who is of the criminal, subversive, or immoral classes or who overstays his period of admission," would be canceled only upon a concurrent resolution disapproving the deportation. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 610 (1950). Legislation reflecting this change was passed by both Houses, and enacted into law as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 over President Truman's veto, which was not predicated on the presence of a legislative veto. Pub. L. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. In subsequent years, the Congress refused further requests that the Attorney General be given final authority to grant discretionary relief for specified categories of aliens, and § 244 remained intact to the present.

Section 244(a)(1) authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend the deportation of certain aliens who are otherwise deportable and, upon Congress' approval, to adjust their status to that of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In order to be eligible for this relief, an alien must have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years, must prove he is of good moral character, and must prove that he or his immediate family would suffer "extreme hardship" if he is deported. Judicial review of a denial of relief may be sought. Thus, the suspension proceeding "has two phases: a [994] determination whether the statutory conditions have been met, which generally involves a question of law, and a determination whether relief shall be granted, which [ultimately] is confided to the sound discretion of the Attorney General [and his delegates]." 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 7.9a(5), p. 7-134 (rev. ed. 1983).

There is also a third phase to the process. Under § 244(c) (1) the Attorney General must report all such suspensions, with a detailed statement of facts and reasons, to the Congress. Either House may then act, in that session or the next, to block the suspension of deportation by passing a resolution of disapproval. § 244(c)(2). Upon congressional approval of the suspension — by its silence — the alien's permanent status is adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien.

The history of the Immigration and Nationality Act makes clear that § 244(c)(2) did not alter the division of actual authority between Congress and the Executive. At all times, whether through private bills, or through affirmative concurrent resolutions, or through the present one-House veto, a permanent change in a deportable alien's status could be accomplished only with the agreement of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate.

2

The central concern of the presentment and bicameralism requirements of Art. I is that when a departure from the legal status quo is undertaken, it is done with the approval of the President and both Houses of Congress — or, in the event of a Presidential veto, a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This interest is fully satisfied by the operation of § 244(c)(2). The President's approval is found in the Attorney General's action in recommending to Congress that the deportation order for a given alien be suspended. The House and the Senate indicate their approval of the Executive's action by not passing a resolution of disapproval within the statutory period. Thus, a change in the legal status quo — the deportability of the alien — is consummated only with the approval [995] of each of the three relevant actors. The disagreement of any one of the three maintains the alien's pre-existing status: the Executive may choose not to recommend suspension; the House and Senate may each veto the recommendation. The effect on the rights and obligations of the affected individuals and upon the legislative system is precisely the same as if a private bill were introduced but failed to receive the necessary approval. "The President and the two Houses enjoy exactly the same say in what the law is to be as would have been true for each without the presence of the one-House veto, and nothing in the law is changed absent the concurrence of the President and a majority in each House." Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 250, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978).

This very construction of the Presentment Clauses which the Executive Branch now rejects was the basis upon which the Executive Branch defended the constitutionality of the Reorganization Act, 5 U. S. C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), which provides that the President's proposed reorganization plans take effect only if not vetoed by either House. When the Department of Justice advised the Senate on the constitutionality of congressional review in reorganization legislation in 1949, it stated: "In this procedure there is no question involved of the Congress taking legislative action beyond its initial passage of the Reorganization Act." S. Rep. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1949) (Dept. of Justice Memorandum). This also represents the position of the Attorney General more recently.[57]

[996] Thus understood, § 244(c)(2) fully effectuates the purposes of the bicameralism and presentment requirements. I now briefly consider possible objections to the analysis.

First, it may be asserted that Chadha's status before legislative disapproval is one of nondeportation and that the exercise of the veto, unlike the failure of a private bill, works a change in the status quo. This position plainly ignores the statutory language. At no place in § 244 has Congress delegated to the Attorney General any final power to determine which aliens shall be allowed to remain in the United States. Congress has retained the ultimate power to pass on such changes in deportable status. By its own terms, § 244(a) states that whatever power the Attorney General has been delegated to suspend deportation and adjust status is to be exercisable only "[a]s hereinafter prescribed in this section." Subsection (c) is part of that section. A grant of "suspension" does not cancel the alien's deportation or adjust the alien's status to that of a permanent resident alien. A suspension order is merely a "deferment of deportation," McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 168 (1950), which can mature into a cancellation of deportation and adjustment of status only upon the approval of Congress — by way of silence — under § 244(c)(2). Only then does the statute authorize the Attorney General to "cancel deportation proceedings," § 244(c)(2), and "record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence . . . ." § 244(d). The Immigration and Naturalization Service's action, on behalf of the Attorney General, "cannot become effective without ratification by Congress." 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law [997] and Procedure § 8.14, p. 8-121 (rev. ed. 1983). Until that ratification occurs, the Executive's action is simply a recommendation that Congress finalize the suspension — in itself, it works no legal change.

Second, it may be said that this approach leads to the incongruity that the two-House veto is more suspect than its one-House brother. Although the idea may be initially counterintuitive, on close analysis, it is not at all unusual that the one-House veto is of more certain constitutionality than the two-House version. If the Attorney General's action is a proposal for legislation, then the disapproval of but a single House is all that is required to prevent its passage. Because approval is indicated by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval. The two-House version may present a different question. The concept that "neither branch of Congress, when acting separately, can lawfully exercise more power than is conferred by the Constitution on the whole body," Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 182 (1881), is fully observed.[58]

Third, it may be objected that Congress cannot indicate its approval of legislative change by inaction. In the Court of Appeals' view, inaction by Congress "could equally imply endorsement, acquiescence, passivity, indecision, or indifference," 634 F. 2d 408, 435 (1980), and the Court appears to echo this concern, ante, at 958, n. 23. This objection appears more properly directed at the wisdom of the legislative veto than its constitutionality. The Constitution does not and cannot guarantee that legislators will carefully scrutinize legislation and deliberate before acting. In a democracy it is the electorate that holds the legislators accountable for the wisdom of their choices. It is hard to maintain that a private bill receives any greater individualized scrutiny than a resolution [998] of disapproval under § 244(c)(2). Certainly the legislative veto is no more susceptible to this attack than the Court's increasingly common practice of according weight to the failure of Congress to disturb an Executive or independent agency's action. See n. 11, supra. Earlier this Term, the Court found it important that Congress failed to act on bills proposed to overturn the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the requirements for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600-601 (1983). If Congress may be said to have ratifed the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation without passing new legislation, Congress may also be said to approve a suspension of deportation by the Attorney General when it fails to exercise its veto authority.[59] The requirements of Art. I are not compromised by the congressional scheme.

IV

The Court of Appeals struck § 244(c)(2) as violative of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. It is true that the purpose of separating the authority of Government is to prevent unnecessary and dangerous concentration of power in one branch. For that reason, the Framers saw fit to divide and balance the powers of Government so that each branch would be checked by the others. Virtually every part of our constitutional system bears the mark of this judgment.

[999] But the history of the separation-of-powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality. Apprehensions of an overly powerful branch have not led to undue prophylactic measures that handicap the effective working of the National Government as a whole. The Constitution does not contemplate total separation of the three branches of Government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976). "[A] hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Ibid.[60]

Our decisions reflect this judgment. As already noted, the Court, recognizing that modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues, countenanced the delegation of extensive legislative authority to Executive and independent agencies. J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). The separation-of-powers doctrine has heretofore led to the invalidation of Government action only when the challenged action violated some express provision in the Constitution. In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 118-124 (per curiam), and Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), congressional action compromised the appointment power of the President. See also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 200-201 (1928). In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), an Act of Congress was struck for encroaching upon judicial [1000] power, but the Court found that the Act also impinged upon the Executive's exclusive pardon power. Art. II, § 2. Because we must have a workable efficient Government, this is as it should be.

This is the teaching of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425 (1977), which, in rejecting a separation-of-powers objection to a law requiring that the Administrator take custody of certain Presidential papers, set forth a framework for evaluating such claims:

"[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." Id., at 443.

Section 244(c)(2) survives this test. The legislative veto provision does not "preven[t] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." First, it is clear that the Executive Branch has no "constitutionally assigned" function of suspending the deportation of aliens. " `[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766 (1972), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). Nor can it be said that the inherent function of the Executive Branch in executing the law is involved. The Steel Seizure Case resolved that the Art. II mandate for the President to execute the law is a directive to enforce the law which Congress has written. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). "The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a [1001] duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." Myers v. United States, 272 U. S., at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id., at 247 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Here, § 244 grants the Executive only a qualified suspension authority, and it is only that authority which the President is constitutionally authorized to execute.

Moreover, the Court believes that the legislative veto we consider today is best characterized as an exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Under this characterization, the practice does not, even on the surface, constitute an infringement of executive or judicial prerogative. The Attorney General's suspension of deportation is equivalent to a proposal for legislation. The nature of the Attorney General's role as recommendatory is not altered because § 244 provides for congressional action through disapproval rather than by ratification. In comparison to private bills, which must be initiated in the Congress and which allow a Presidential veto to be overriden by a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, § 244 augments rather than reduces the Executive Branch's authority. So understood, congressional review does not undermine, as the Court of Appeals thought, the "weight and dignity" that attends the decisions of the Executive Branch.

Nor does § 244 infringe on the judicial power, as JUSTICE POWELL would hold. Section 244 makes clear that Congress has reserved its own judgment as part of the statutory process. Congressional action does not substitute for judicial review of the Attorney General's decisions. The Act provides for judicial review of the refusal of the Attorney General to suspend a deportation and to transmit a recommendation to Congress. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139 (1981) (per curiam). But the courts have not been given the authority to review whether an alien should be given permanent status; review is limited to whether the Attorney General has properly [1002] applied the statutory standards for essentially denying the alien a recommendation that his deportable status be changed by the Congress. Moreover, there is no constitutional obligation to provide any judicial review whatever for a failure to suspend deportation. "The power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has been made by Congress to depend." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713-714 (1893). See also Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 576 (1926); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 171-172 (1948); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 590 (1952).

I do not suggest that all legislative vetoes are necessarily consistent with separation-of-powers principles. A legislative check on an inherently executive function, for example, that of initiating prosecutions, poses an entirely different question. But the legislative veto device here — and in many other settings — is far from an instance of legislative tyranny over the Executive. It is a necessary check on the unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both Executive and independent, as they engage in exercising authority delegated by Congress.

V

I regret that I am in disagreement with my colleagues on the fundamental questions that these cases present. But even more I regret the destructive scope of the Court's holding. It reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by the courts which sanctioned the modern administrative state. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history. I fear it will now be more difficult to "insur[e] that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not [1003A] by an appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the people," Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). I must dissent.

[1003B] APPENDIX TO OPINION OF WHITE, J., DISSENTING

STATUTES WITH PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

This compilation, reprinted from the Brief for the United States Senate, identifies and describes briefly current statutory provisions for a legislative veto by one or both Houses of Congress. Statutory provisions for a veto by Committees of the Congress and provisions which require legislation (i. e., passage of a joint resolution) are not included. The 55 statutes in the compilation (some of which contain more than one provision for legislative review) are divided into six broad categories: foreign affairs and national security, budget, international trade, energy, rulemaking and miscellaneous.

"A.

"FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

"1. Act for International Development of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2367 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Funds made available for foreign assistance under the Act may be terminated by concurrent resolution).

"2. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-557 (1973), [as amended,] 50 U. S. C. 1544 [(1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (Absent declaration of war, President may be directed by concurrent resolution to remove United States armed forces engaged in foreign hostilities.)

"3. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, § 807, 87 Stat. 605, 615 (1973), 50 U. S. C. 1431 (National defense contracts obligating the United States for any amount in excess of $25,000,000 may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

[1004] "4. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-365, § 709(c), 88 Stat. 399, 408 (1974), [as amended,] 50 U. S. C. app. 2403-1(c) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Applications for export of defense goods, technology or techniques may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"5. H. R. J. Res. 683, Pub. L. No. 94-110, § 1, 89 Stat. 572 (1975), 22 U. S. C. 2441 note (Assignment of civilian personnel to Sinai may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"6. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849, 860, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2151n [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Foreign assistance to countries not meeting human rights standards may be terminated by concurrent resolution).

"7. International Security Assistance and Arms [Export] Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § [211(a)], 90 Stat. 729, 743, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2776(b) [(1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (President's letter of offer to sell major defense equipment may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"8. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976), 50 U. S. C. 1622 (Presidentially declared national emergency may be terminated by concurrent resolution).

"9. International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-75, § 3(d), 91 Stat. 308, 33 U. S. C. § 1602(d) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential proclamation of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"10. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 16, 91 Stat. 614, 622, 22 U. S. C. § 2753(d)(2) (President's proposed transfer of arms to a third country may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"11. Act of December [28], 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § [207(b)], 91 Stat. 1625, 1628, 50 U. S. C. 1706(b) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidentially declared national emergency and exercise of conditional powers may be terminated by concurrent resolution).

[1005] "12. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, §§ [303(a), 304(a)], 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 120, 130, 134, 137-38, 139, 144, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b), [2158] 2153(d) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Cooperative agreements concerning storage and disposition of spent nuclear fuel, proposed export of nuclear facilities, materials or technology and proposed agreements for international cooperation in nuclear reactor development may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"B.

"BUDGET

"13. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35, 31 U. S. C. 1403 (The proposed deferral of budget authority provided for a specific project or purpose may be disapproved by an impoundment resolution by either House).

"C.

"INTERNATIONAL TRADE

"14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 872, 899, 19 U. S. C. 1981(a) (Tariff or duty recommended by Tariff Commission may be imposed by concurrent resolution of approval).

"15. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 203(c), 302(b), 402(d), 407, 88 Stat. 1978, 2016, 2043, 2057-60, 2063-64, [as amended,] 19 U. S. C. 2253(c), 2412(b), 2432, [2437 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (Proposed Presidential actions on import relief and actions concerning certain countries may be disapproved by concurrent resolution; various Presidential proposals for waiver extensions and for extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to products of foreign countries may be disapproved by simple (either House) or concurrent resolutions).

"16. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U. S. C. [635e(b)] (Presidentially proposed limitation for exports to USSR in [1006] excess of $300,000,000 must be approved by concurrent resolution).

"D.

"ENERGY

"17. Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576, 582, 30 U. S. C. 185(u) (Continuation of oil exports being made pursuant to President's finding that such exports are in the national interest may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"18. Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 12, 88 Stat. 1878, 1892-1893, 42 U. S. C. 5911 (Rules or orders proposed by the President concerning allocation or acquisition of essential materials may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"19. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 551, 89 Stat. 871, 965 (1975), 42 U. S. C. 6421(c) (Certain Presidentially proposed `energy actions' involving fuel economy and pricing may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"20. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-258, § [201(3)], 90 Stat. 303, 309, 10 U. S. C. 7422(c)(2)(C) (President's extension of production period for naval petroleum reserves may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

.....

"22. Department of Energy Act of 1978 — Civilian Applications, Pub. L. No. 95-238, §§ 107, 207(b), 92 Stat. 47, 55, 70, 22 U. S. C. 3224a, 42 U. S. C. 5919(m) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (International agreements and expenditures by Secretary of Energy of appropriations for foreign spent nuclear fuel storage must be approved by concurrent resolution, if not consented to by legislation;) (plans for such use of appropriated funds may be disapproved by either House;) (financing in excess of $50,000,000 for demonstration facilities must be approved by resolution in both Houses).

[1007] "23. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, §§ 205(a), 208, 92 Stat. 629, 641, 668, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1337(a), 1354(c) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Establishment by Secretary of Energy of oil and gas lease bidding system may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (export of oil and gas may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"24. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, §§ 122(c)(1) and (2), 202(c), 206(d)(2), 507, 92 Stat. 3350, 3370, 3371, 3372, 3380, 3406, 15 U. S. C. 3332, 3342(c), 3346(d)(2), 3417 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential reimposition of natural gas price controls may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;) (Congress may reimpose natural gas price controls by concurrent resolution;) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) amendment to pass through incremental costs of natural gas, and exemptions therefrom, may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (procedure for congressional review established).

"25. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § [7(d)(2)(B)] 7(g)(3), 93 Stat. 503, 518, 520, 50 U. S. C. app. 2406(d)(2)(B), 2406(g)(3) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (President's proposal to [export] domestically produce[d] crude oil must be approved by concurrent resolution;) (action by Secretary of Commerce to prohibit or curtail export of agricultural commodities may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"26. Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 104 (b)(3), 104(e), 126(d)(2), 126(d)(3), 128, 129, 132(a)(3), 133 (a)(3), 137(b)(5), 141(d), 179(a), 803, 94 Stat. 611, 618, 619, 620, 623-26, 628-29, 649, 650-52, 659, 660, 664, 666, 679, 776 (1980) 50 U. S. C. app. 2091-93, 2095, 2096, 2097, 42 U. S. C. 8722, 8724, 8725, 8732, 8733, 8737, 8741, 8779, 6240 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Loan guarantees by Departments of Defense, Energy and Commerce in excess of specified amounts may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's proposal to provide loans or guarantees in excess [1008] of established amounts may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed award by President of individual contracts for purchase of more than 75,000 barrels per day of crude oil may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's proposals to overcome energy shortage through synthetic fuels development, and individual contracts to purchase more than 75,000 barrels per day, including use of loans or guarantees, may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (procedures for either House to disapprove proposals made under Act are established;) (request by Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) for additional time to submit its comprehensive strategy may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed amendment to comprehensive strategy by SFC Board of Directors may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of either House or by failure of both Houses to pass concurrent resolution of approval;) (procedure for either House to disapprove certain proposed actions of SFC is established;) (procedure for both Houses to approve by concurrent resolution or either House to reject concurrent resolution for proposed amendments to comprehensive strategy of SFC is established;) (proposed loans and loan guarantees by SFC may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (acquisition by SFC of a synthetic fuels project which is receiving financial assistance may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (SFC contract renegotiations exceeding initial cost estimates by 175% may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed financial assistance to synthetic fuel projects in Western Hemisphere outside United States may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's request to suspend provisions requiring build up of reserves and limiting sale or disposal of certain crude oil reserves must be approved by resolution of both Houses).

"E.

"RULEMAKING

"27. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § [509(a)], 88 Stat. 484, 567, 20 U. S. C. 1232(d)(1) [(1976 ed., [1009] Supp. V)] (Department of Education regulations may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"28. Federal Education Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 109, 93 Stat. 1339, 1364, 2 U. S. C. 438(d)(2) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Proposed rules and regulations of the Federal Election Commission may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"29. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § [2(a)(1)], 88 Stat. 1926, 1948, 28 U. S. C. 2076 (Proposed amendments by Supreme Court of Federal Rules of Evidence may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"30. Act of August 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, § 208, 89 Stat. 433, 436-37, 42 U. S. C. 602 note (Social Security standards proposed by Secretary of Health and Human Services may be disapproved by either House).

"31. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 43(f)(3), 92 Stat. 1705, 1752, 49 U. S. C. 1552(f) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules or regulations governing employee protection program may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"32. Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, §§ 1138, [212(b)], 1409, 92 Stat. 2143, 2327, 2341, 2369, 25 U. S. C. 2018, 20 U. S. C. [927], 1221-3(e) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and regulations proposed under the Act may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"33. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(b)(1), 94 Stat. 349, 352-353 (1980) 42 U. S. C. 1997e [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Attorney General's proposed standards for resolution of grievances of adults confined in correctional facilities may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"34. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a), 94 Stat. 374, 393, 15 U. S. C. 57a-1 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Federal Trade Commission rules may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"35. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 414(b), 93 Stat. 668, 685 (1979), 20 U. S. C. 3474 [1010] [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and regulations promulgated with respect to the various functions, programs and responsibilities transferred by this Act, may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"36. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 102, 94 Stat. 1208, 1213, 29 U. S. C. 1322a [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Schedules proposed by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) which requires an increase in premiums must be approved by concurrent resolution;) (revised premium schedules for voluntary supplemental coverage proposed by PBGC may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"37. Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-592, § 508, 94 Stat. 3437, 3450, 12 U. S. C. [2252 (1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Certain Farm Credit Administration regulations may be disapproved by concurrent resolution or delayed by resolution of either House.)

"38. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 305, 94 Stat. 2767, 2809, 42 U. S. C. 9655 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Environmental Protection Agency regulations concerning hazardous substances releases, liability and compensation may be disapproved by concurrent resolution or by the adoption of either House of a concurrent resolution which is not disapproved by the other House).

"39. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 501, 94 Stat. 2987, 3004, 16 U. S. C. 470w-6 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Regulation proposed by the Secretary of the Interior may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"40. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-464, § 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067, 16 U. S. C. 1463a [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules proposed by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"41. Act of December 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-539, § 4, 94 Stat. 3194, 3195, 7 U. S. C. 136w [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules or regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental [1011] Protection Agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"42. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 533(a)(2), 1107(d), 1142, 1183(a)(2), 1207, 95 Stat. 357, 453, 626, 654, 659, 695, 718-20, 20 U. S. C. 1089, 23 U. S. C. 402(j), 45 U. S. C. 761, 767, 564(c)(3), 15 U. S. C. 2083, 1276, 1204 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Secretary of Education's schedule of expected family contributions for Pell Grant recipients may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (rules promulgated by Secretary of Transportation for programs to reduce accidents, injuries and deaths may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (Secretary of Transportation's plan for the sale of government's common stock in rail system may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;) (Secretary of Transportation's approval of freight transfer agreements may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (amendments to Amtrak's Route and Service Criteria may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of both Houses, or by concurrent resolution of disapproval by either House if such resolution is not disapproved by the other House).

"F.

"MISCELLANEOUS

"43. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-920, § 201, 64 Stat. 1245, 1248, [as amended,] 50 app. U. S. C. 2281(g) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Interstate civil defense compacts may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"44. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § [302(c)], 72 Stat. 426, 433, 42 U. S. C. 2453 (President's transfer to National Air and Space Administration of functions of other departments and agencies may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

[1012] "45. Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-656, § 3, 84 Stat. 1946, 1949, 5 U. S. C. 5305 (President's alternative pay plan may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"46. Act of October 19, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-134, § 5, 87 Stat. 466, 468, 25 U. S. C. 1405 (Plan for use and distribution of funds paid in satisfaction of judgment of Indian Claims Commission or Court of Claims may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"47. Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 6, 87 Stat. 770, 773 (1973), 25 U. S. C. 903d(b) (Plan by Secretary of the Interior for assumption of the assets [of] the Menominee Indian corporation may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"48. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 303, 602(c)(1) and (2), 87 Stat. 774, 784, 814 (1973) (District of Columbia Charter amendments ratified by electors must be approved by concurrent resolution;) (acts of District of Columbia Council may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;) (acts of District of Columbia Council under certain titles of D. C. Code may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"49. Act of December 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 102, 89 Stat. 1124, 12 U. S. C. 461 note (Federal Reserve System Board of Governors may not eliminate or reduce interest rate differentials between banks insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and associations insured by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporations without concurrent resolution of approval).

"50. Veterans' Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-502, § 408, 90 Stat. 2383, 2397-98, 38 U. S. C. 1621 note (President's recommendation for continued enrollment period in Armed Forces educational assistance program may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

[1013] "51. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 203(c), 204(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2743, 2750, 2752, 43 U. S. C. 1713(c), 1714 (Sale of public lands in excess of two thousand five hundred acres and withdrawal of public lands aggregating five thousand acres or more may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"52. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, § [401(a)] 91 Stat. 39, 45, 2 U. S. C. 359 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (President's recommendations regarding rates of salary payment may be disapproved by resolution of either House).

"53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 415, 92 Stat. 1111, 1179, 5 U. S. C. 3131 note [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Continuation of Senior Executive Service may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

"54. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, § 304(b), 92 Stat. 1887, 1906, 31 U. S. C. 1322 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential timetable for reducing unemployment may be superseded by concurrent resolution).

"55. District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-122, § 164, 93 Stat. 866, 891-92 (1979) (Required reports to Congress on the District of Columbia retirement program may be rejected by resolution of either House).

"56. Act of August 29, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-332, § 2, 94 Stat. 1057, 1058, 16 U. S. C. 1432 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Designation of marine sanctuary by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting.

A severability clause creates a presumption that Congress intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force when one part is found to be invalid. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 312 (1936); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 235 [1014] (1932). A severability clause does not, however, conclusively resolve the issue. "[T]he determination, in the end, is reached by" asking "[w]hat was the intent of the lawmakers," Carter, supra, at 312, and "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause." United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585, n. 27 (1968). Because I believe that Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable, I dissent.

Section 244(c)(2) is an exception to the general rule that an alien's deportation shall be suspended when the Attorney General finds that statutory criteria are met. It is severable only if Congress would have intended to permit the Attorney General to suspend deportations without it. This Court has held several times over the years that exceptions such as this are not severable because

"by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature. . . the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant. It confers upon the statute a positive operation beyond the legislative intent, and beyond what anyone can say it would have enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions." Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 95 (1886).

By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court permits suspension of deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should expand the statute in this way without some clear indication that Congress intended such an expansion. As the Court said in Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 484-485 (1922):

"Where an excepting provision in a statute is found unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does not work an enlargement of the scope or operation of other provisions with which that provision was enacted and which was intended to qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed is illustrated in State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167, 174. In dealing with a contention that a statute [1015] containing an unconstitutional provision should be construed as if the remainder stood alone, the court there said: `This would be to mutilate the section and garble its meaning. The legislative intention must not be confounded with their power to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and vitality to a provision of law is one thing, and to refuse to read it is a very different thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is "stricken out." For all the purposes of construction it is to be regarded as part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must be gathered from all that they have said, as well from that which is ineffectual for want of power, as from that which is authorized by law.'

"Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with that restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is competent to give them a larger application."

See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515, 525 (1929).

The Court finds that the legislative history of § 244 shows that Congress intended § 244(c)(2) to be severable because Congress wanted to relieve itself of the burden of private bills. But the history elucidated by the Court shows that Congress was unwilling to give the Executive Branch permission to suspend deportation on its own. Over the years, Congress consistently rejected requests from the Executive for complete discretion in this area. Congress always insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent resolution, as in the 1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as in the present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain some sort of veto.

[1016] It is doubtless true that Congress has the power to provide for suspensions of deportation without a one-House veto. But the Court has failed to identify any evidence that Congress intended to exercise that power. On the contrary, Congress' continued insistence on retaining control of the suspension process indicates that it has never been disposed to give the Executive Branch a free hand. By severing § 244(c)(2) the Court has " `confounded' " Congress' " `intention' " to permit suspensions of deportation " `with their power to carry that intention into effect.' " Davis, supra, at 484, quoting State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167, 174 (1870).

Because I do not believe that § 244(c)(2) is severable, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

[1] Together with No. 80-2170, United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., and No. 80-2171, United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., on certiorari to the same court.

[2] Antonin Scalia, Richard B. Smith, and David Ryrie Brink filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

[3] Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U. S. C. § 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice. Ibid.

[4] In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed. 1979). It appears, however, that congressional devices of the type authorized by § 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as a "veto." See, e. g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L. J. 367 (1977). We refer to the congressional "resolution" authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.

[5] It is not at all clear whether the House generally, or Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood the relationship between H. Res. 926 and the Attorney General's decision to suspend Chadha's deportation. Exactly one year previous to the House veto of the Attorney General's decision in this case, Representative Eilberg introduced a similar resolution disapproving the Attorney General's suspension of deportation in the case of six other aliens. H. Res. 1518, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The following colloquy occurred on the floor of the House:

"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, is this procedure to expedite the ongoing operations of the Department of Justice, as far as these people are concerned. Is it in any way contrary to whatever action the Attorney General has taken on the question of deportation; does the gentleman know?

"Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the answer is no to the gentleman's final question. These aliens have been found to be deportable and the Special Inquiry Officer's decision denying suspension of deportation has been reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. We are complying with the law since all of these decisions have been referred to us for approval or disapproval, and there are hundreds of cases in this category. In these six cases however, we believe it would be grossly improper to allow these people to acquire the status of permanent resident aliens.

"Mr. WYLIE. In other words, the gentleman has been working with the Attorney General's office?

"Mr. EILBERG. Yes.

"Mr. WYLIE. This bill then is in fact a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to do?

"Mr. EILBERG. The gentleman is correct insofar as it relates to the determination of deportability which has been made by the Department of Justice in each of these cases.

"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection." 120 Cong. Rec. 41412 (1974).

Clearly, this was an obfuscation of the effect of a veto under § 244(c)(2). Such a veto in no way constitutes "a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to do." To the contrary, such a resolution was meant to overrule and set aside, or "veto," the Attorney General's determination that, in a particular case, cancellation of deportation would be appropriate under the standards set forth in § 244(a)(1).

[6] Nine Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the position taken in the briefs filed by the Senate and the House of Representatives and have filed a brief amici curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in this case.

[7] The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S. Res. 40 and H. R. Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981, filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore proper "parties" within the meaning of that term in 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977).

[8] In addition to meeting the statutory requisites of § 1252, of course, an appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III. Such a controversy clearly exists in No. 80-1832, as in the other two cases, because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties. See infra, at 939; see also Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 302-305 (1982).

[9] In this case we deem it appropriate to address questions of severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108-109 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585 (1968).

[10] Without the provision for one-House veto, Congress would presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in § 244(c)(2), to enact a law, in accordance with the requirements of Art. I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation, unless, of course, other constitutional principles place substantive limitations on such action. Cf. Attorney General Jackson's attack on H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a bill to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien. The Attorney General called the bill "an historical departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition. It would be the first time that an act of Congress singled out a named individual for deportation." S. Rep. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, p. 9 (1940) (reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18, 1940). See n. 17, infra.

[11] Without the one-House veto, § 244 resembles the "report and wait" provision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941). The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session." Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute did not provide that Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to stay, and ultimately to revise, the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, with Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.

[12] Depending on how the INS interprets its statutory duty under § 244 apart from the challenged portion of § 244(c)(2), Chadha's status may be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent resident as of December 19, 1975 — the last session in which Congress could have attempted to stop the suspension of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's 5-year waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1427(a), would have elapsed.

[13] Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a) would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that required them to report to the District Director of the INS during the Iranian hostage crisis. The aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding. The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation would have been canceled but for § 244(c)(2).

[14] A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983). There, the United States agreed with Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools that certain Revenue Rulings denying tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its agreement with the schools, however, the United States was complying with a court order enjoining it from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminated on the basis of race. Even though the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy, we found an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the challenged law against that party. See id., at 585, n. 9.

[15] The suggestion is made that § 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was passed by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that question. The assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740, n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 841, n. 12 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). See also n. 22, infra. In any event, 11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as unconstitutional. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735, 737-738, n. 7 (1979) (collecting citations to Presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression on the constitutionality of the congressional veto is found in Attorney General William D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933, to President Hoover. 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 56. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable on constitutional grounds. For example, after President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Attorney General Jackson released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the provision allowing the Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution was unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1953).

[16] The widespread approval of the delegates was commented on by Joseph Story:

"In the convention there does not seem to have been much diversity of opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to the president a negative on the laws. The principal points of discussion seem to have been, whether the negative should be absolute, or qualified; and if the latter, by what number of each house the bill should subsequently be passed, in order to become a law; and whether the negative should in either case be exclusively vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other department of the government." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 611 (3d ed. 1858).

See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 21, 97-104, 138-140 (1911) (hereinafter Farrand); id., at 73-80, 181, 298, 301-305.

[17] The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered, even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states affected. See U. S. Const., Art V.

[18] Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in these cases will sanction "lawmaking by the Attorney General. . . . Why is the Attorney General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full bicameral process?" Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. To be sure, some administrative agency action — rulemaking, for example — may resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), which defines an agency's "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ." This Court has referred to agency activity as being "quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935). Clearly, however, "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 123. When the Attorney General performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative" power. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976). The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it — a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always "ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 585; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 373, 440, 541 F. 2d 1, 68 (enbanc) (separate statement of Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble "legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the reason that the Constitution does not so require. That kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is clearly legislative in both character and effect and is not so checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, is therefore clear. Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto.

[19] We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any constitutional provision. See n. 8, supra.

[20] During the Convention of 1787, the application of the President's veto to repeals of statutes was addressed, and the Framers were apparently content with Madison's comment that "[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting the duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal." 2 Farrand 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 587-599 (1953). There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or amend laws by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. I.

[21] This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to "the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control, such as durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id., at 460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667 (1980). See also n. 9, supra.

[22] See also U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1, and Amdt. 12.

[23] An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority. See U. S. Const., Art. V.

One might also include another "exception" to the rule that congressional action having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses. Each House has the power to act alone in determining specified internal matters. Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and § 5, cl. 2. However, this "exception" only empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated instances.

Although the bicameral check was not provided for in any of these provisions for independent congressional action, precautionary alternative checks are evident. For example, Art. II, § 2, requires that two-thirds of the Senators present concur in the Senate's consent to a treaty, rather than the simple majority required for passage of legislation. See The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay); The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton); The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the Framers adopted an alternative protection, in the stead of Presidential veto and bicameralism, by requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present for a conviction of impeachment. Art. I, § 3. We also note that the Court's holding in Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second, three-fourths of the states must ratify any amendment.

[24] JUSTICE POWELL's position is that the one-House veto in this case is a judicial act and therefore unconstitutional as beyond the authority vested in Congress by the Constitution. We agree that there is a sense in which one-House action pursuant to § 244(c)(2) has a judicial cast, since it purports to "review" Executive action. In this case, for example, the sponsor of the resolution vetoing the suspension of Chadha's deportation argued that Chadha "did not meet [the] statutory requirements" for suspension of deportation. Supra, at 926. To be sure, it is normally up to the courts to decide whether an agency has complied with its statutory mandate. See n. 16, supra. But the attempted analogy between judicial action and the one-House veto is less than perfect. Federal courts do not enjoy a roving mandate to correct alleged excesses of administrative agencies; we are limited by Art. III to hearing cases and controversies and no justiciable case or controversy was presented by the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in this country. We are aware of no decision, and JUSTICE POWELL has cited none, where a federal court has reviewed a decision of the Attorney General suspending deportation of an alien pursuant to the standards set out in § 244(a)(1). This is not surprising, given that no party to such action has either the motivation or the right to appeal from it. As JUSTICE WHITE correctly notes, post, at 1001-1002, "the courts have not been given the authority to review whether an alien should be given permanent status; review is limited to whether the Attorney General has properly applied the statutory standards for" denying a request for suspension of deportation. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963), relied on by JUSTICE POWELL, addressed only "whether a refusal by the Attorney General to grant a suspension of deportation is one of those `final orders of deportation' of which direct review by Courts of Appeals is authorized under § 106(a) of the Act." Id., at 221. Thus, JUSTICE POWELL's statement that the one-House veto in this case is "clearly adjudicatory," post, at 964, simply is not supported by his accompanying assertion that the House has "assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts." Post, at 965. We are satisfied that the one-House veto is legislative in purpose and effect and subject to the procedures set out in Art. I.

[25] Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the bicameralism and presentation requirements for the enactment of future legislation affecting aliens. See Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 250-251, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1063-1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978); Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. The explicit prescription for legislative action contained in Art. I cannot be amended by legislation. See n. 13, supra.

JUSTICE WHITE suggests that the Attorney General's action under § 244(c)(1) suspending deportation is equivalent to a proposal for legislation and that because congressional approval is indicated "by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval." Post, at 997. However, as the Court of Appeals noted, that approach "would analogize the effect of the one house disapproval to the failure of one house to vote affirmatively on a private bill." 634 F. 2d 408, 435 (1980). Even if it were clear that Congress entertained such an arcane theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2), which JUSTICE WHITE does not suggest, this would amount to nothing less than an amending of Art. I. The legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty formalities; they were designed to assure that both Houses of Congress and the President participate in the exercise of lawmaking authority. This does not mean that legislation must always be preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that it is not necessary for a legislative body to "articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980). But the steps required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, make certain that there is an opportunity for deliberation and debate. To allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be squared with Art. I.

[26] As JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion explains, the legislative veto has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from bills for executive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. See post, at 968-972. Whether the veto complies with the Presentment Clauses may well turn on the particular context in which it is exercised, and I would be hesitant to conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example presented by this litigation.

[27] See Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 84, 673 F. 2d 425, 475 (1982).

[28] Jefferson later questioned the degree to which the Constitution insulates the judiciary. See D. Malone, Jefferson the President: Second Term, 1805-1809, pp. 304-305 (1974). In response to Chief Justice Marshall's rulings during Aaron Burr's trial, Jefferson stated that the judiciary had favored Burr — whom Jefferson viewed as clearly guilty of treason — at the expense of the country. He predicted that the people " `will see then and amend the error in our Constitution, which makes any branch independent of the nation.' " Id., at 305 (quoting Jefferson's letter to William Giles). The very controversy that attended Burr's trial, however, demonstrates the wisdom in providing a neutral forum, removed from political pressure, for the determination of one person's rights.

[29] The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned function. Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not address the concern that the Congress is exercising unchecked judicial power at the expense of individual liberties. It was precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that the Framers adopted the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

[30] The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice, administers the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary responsiblity for the Act's enforcement. See 8 U. S. C. § 1103. The Act establishes a detailed administrative procedure for determining when a specific person is to be deported, see § 1252(b), and provides for judicial review of this decision, see § 1105a; Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963).

[31] Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before acting on it, see 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975), but the statute providing for the legislative veto limits the time in which Congress may veto the Service's determination that deportation should be suspended. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2). In this case Congress had Chadha's report before it for approximately a year and a half, but failed to act on it until three days before the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, it was required to abandon its normal procedures for considering resolutions, thereby increasing the danger of arbitrary and ill-considered action.

[32] The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in character because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its assigned sphere." Ante, at 952. The Court's presumption provides a useful starting point, but does not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's action alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see ante, at 952-954, that the action is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature. In determining whether one branch unconstitutionally has assumed a power central to another branch, the traditional characterization of the assumed power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). But reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an act, and the more helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid.

[33] The Court reasons in response to this argument that the one-House veto exercised in this case was not judicial in nature because the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not present a justiciable issue that could have been reviewed by a court on appeal. See ante, at 957, n. 22. The Court notes that since the administrative agency decided the case in favor of Chadha, there was no aggrieved party who could appeal. Reliance by the Court on this fact misses the point. Even if review of the particular decision to suspend deportation is not committed to the courts, the House of Representatives assumed a function that generally is entrusted to an impartial tribunual. In my view, the Legislative Branch in effect acted as an appellate court by overruling the Service's application of established law to Chadha. And unlike a court or an administrative agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a hearing before acting. Although the parallel is not entirely complete, the effect on Chadha's personal rights would not have been different in principle had he been acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by one House of Congress to have been guilty.

[34] When Congress grants particular individuals relief or benefits under its spending power, the danger of oppressive action that the separation of powers was designed to avoid is not implicated. Similarly, Congress may authorize the admission of individual aliens by special Acts, but it does not follow that Congress unilaterally may make a judgment that a particular alien has no legal right to remain in this country. See Memorandum Concerning H. R. 9766 Entitled "An Act to Direct the Deportation of Harry Renton Bridges," reprinted in S. Rep. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, p. 8 (1940). As Attorney General Robert Jackson remarked, such a practice "would be an historical departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition." Id., at 9.

[35] We have recognized that independent regulatory agencies and departments of the Executive Branch often exercise authority that is "judicial in nature." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 140-141 (1976). This function, however, forms part of the agencies' execution of public law and is subject to the procedural safeguards, including judicial review, provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. See also n. 5, supra.

[36] AS JUSTICE POWELL observes in his separate opinion, "the respect due [Congress'] judgment as a coordinate branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than necessary to decide these cases." Ante, at 960. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also recognized that "we are not here faced with a situation in which the unforeseeability of future circumstances or the broad scope and complexity of the subject matter of an agency's rulemaking authority preclude the articulation of specific criteria in the governing statute itself. Such factors might present considerations different from those we find here, both as to the question of separation of powers and the legitimacy of the unicameral device." 634 F. 2d 408, 433 (1980) (footnote omitted).

[37] A selected list and brief description of these provisions is appended to this opinion.

[38] Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 983, 1089-1090 (1975) (listing statutes).

[39] The Roosevelt administration submitted proposed legislation containing veto provisions and defended their constitutionality. See, e. g., General Counsel to the Office of Price Administration, Statement on Constitutionality of Concurrent Resolution Provision of Proposed Price Control Bill (H. R. 5479), reprinted in Price-Control Bill: Hearings on H. R. 5479 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 983 (1941).

[40] Presidential objections to the veto, until the veto by President Nixon of the War Powers Resolution, principally concerned bills authorizing Committee vetoes. As the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers found in 1969, "an accommodation was reached years ago on legislative vetoes exercised by the entire Congress or by one House, [while] disputes have continued to arise over the committee form of the veto." S. Rep. No. 91-549, p. 14 (1969). Presidents Kennedy and Johnson proposed enactment of statutes with legislative veto provisions. See National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 4 before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1963) (President Kennedy's proposals for withdrawal of wilderness areas); President's Message to the Congress Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year 1970, 5 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 70, 73 (1969) (President Johnson's proposals allowing legislative veto of tax surcharge). The administration of President Kennedy submitted a memorandum supporting the constitutionality of the legislative veto. See General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture, Constitutionality of Title I of H. R. 6400, 87th Cong., 1st Session (1961), reprinted in Legislative Policy of the Bureau of the Budget: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on Agriculture, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 31-32 (1966). During the administration of President Johnson, the Department of Justice again defended the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision of the Reorganization Act, as contrasted with provisions for a Committee veto. See Separation of Powers: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 206 (1967) (testimony of Frank M. Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel).

[41] National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-568, § 302, 72 Stat. 433 (space program); Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 277 (cooperative nuclear agreements); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 899, 19 U. S. C. § 1981 (tariff recommended by International Trade Commission may be imposed by concurrent resolution of approval); Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-206, § 255(i)(1), 81 Stat. 644.

[42] The Impoundment Control Act's provision for legislative review has been used extensively. Presidents have submitted hundreds of proposed budget deferrals, of which 65 have been disapproved by resolutions of the House or Senate with no protest by the Executive. See App. B to Brief for United States Senate on Reargument.

[43] The veto appears in a host of broad statutory delegations concerning energy rationing, contingency plans, strategic oil reserves, allocation of energy production materials, oil exports, and naval petroleum reserve production. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-258, § 201(3), 90 Stat. 309, 10 U. S. C. § 7422(c)(2)(C); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-163, §§ 159, 201, 401(a), and 455, 89 Stat. 886, 890, 941, and 950, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6239 and 6261, 15 U. S. C. §§ 757 and 760a (strategic oil reserves, rationing and contingency plans, oil price controls and product allocation); Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-577, § 12, 88 Stat. 1892-1893, 42 U. S. C. § 5911 (allocation of energy production materials); Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 582, 30 U. S. C. § 185(u) (oil exports).

[44] Congress found that under the agency's

"very broad authority to prohibit conduct which is `unfair or deceptive'. . . the FTC can regulate virtually every aspect of America's commercial life. . . . The FTC's rules are not merely narrow interpretations of a tightly drawn statute; instead, they are broad policy pronouncements which Congress has an obligation to study and review." 124 Cong. Rec. 5012 (1978) (statement by Rep. Broyhill).

A two-House legislative veto was added to constrain that broad delegation. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 21(a), 94 Stat. 393, 15 U. S. C. § 57a-1(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The constitutionality of that provision is presently pending before us. United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 82-935; United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 82-1044.

[45] While Congress could write certain statutes with greater specificity, it is unlikely that this is a realistic or even desirable substitute for the legislative veto. The controversial nature of many issues would prevent Congress from reaching agreement on many major problems if specificity were required in their enactments. Fuchs, Administrative Agencies and the Energy Problem, 47 Ind. L. J. 606, 608 (1972); Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1695-1696 (1975). For example, in the deportation context, the solution is not for Congress to create more refined categorizations of the deportable aliens whose status should be subject to change. In 1979, the Immigration and Naturalization Service proposed regulations setting forth factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion under numerous provisions of the Act, but not including § 244, to ensure "fair and uniform" adjudication "under appropriate discretionary criteria." 44 Fed. Reg. 36187 (1979). The proposed rule was canceled in 1981, because "[t]here is an inherent failure in any attempt to list those factors which should be considered in the exercise of discretion. It is impossible to list or foresee all of the adverse or favorable factors which may be present in a given set of circumstances." 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981).

Oversight hearings and congressional investigations have their purpose, but unless Congress is to be rendered a think tank or debating society, they are no substitute for the exercise of actual authority. The "delaying" procedure approved in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 15 (1941), while satisfactory for certain measures, has its own shortcomings. Because a new law must be passed to restrain administrative action, Congress must delegate authority without the certain ability of being able to check its exercise.

Finally, the passage of corrective legislation after agency regulations take effect or Executive Branch officials have acted entails the drawbacks endemic to a retroactive response. "Post hoc substantive revision of legislation, the only available corrective mechanism in the absence of postenactment review could have serious prejudicial consequences; if Congress retroactively tampered with a price control system after prices have been set, the economy could be damaged and private rights seriously impaired; if Congress rescinded the sale of arms to a foreign country, our relations with that country would be severely strained; and if Congress reshuffled the bureaucracy after a President's reorganization proposal had taken effect, the results could be chaotic." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1977) (footnote omitted).

[46] Perhaps I am wrong and the Court remains open to consider whether certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with the Art. I requirements. One possibility for the Court and Congress is to accept that a resolution of disapproval cannot be given legal effect in its own right, but may serve as a guide in the interpretation of a delegation of lawmaking authority. The exercise of the veto could be read as a manifestation of legislative intent, which, unless itself contrary to the authorizing statute, serves as the definitive construction of the statute. Therefore, an agency rule vetoed by Congress would not be enforced in the courts because the veto indicates that the agency action departs from the congressional intent.

This limited role for a redefined legislative veto follows in the steps of the longstanding practice of giving some weight to subsequent legislative reaction to administrative rulemaking. The silence of Congress after consideration of a practice by the Executive may be equivalent to acquiescence and consent that the practice be continued until the power exercised be revoked. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 472-473 (1915). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965) (relying on congressional failure to repeal administration interpretation); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280 (1981) (same); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983) (same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 384 (1982) (relying on failure to disturb judicial decision in later revision of law).

Reliance on subsequent legislative reaction has been limited by the fear of overturning the intent of the original Congress and the unreliability of discerning the views of a subsequent Congress. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117-118 (1980); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). These concerns are not forceful when the original statute authorizes subsequent legislative review. The presence of the review provision constitutes an express authorization for a subsequent Congress to participate in defining the meaning of the law. Second, the disapproval resolution allows for a reliable determination of congressional intent. Without the review mechanism, uncertainty over the inferences to draw from subsequent congressional action is understandable. The refusal to pass an amendment, for example, may indicate opposition to that position but could mean that Congress believes the amendment is redundant with the statute as written. By contrast, the exercise of a legislative veto is an unmistakable indication that the agency or Executive decision at issue is disfavored. This is not to suggest that the failure to pass a veto resolution should be given any weight whatever.

[47] For commentary generally favorable to the legislative veto, see Abourezk, Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. J. 323 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 467 (1962); Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Constitutional Separation of Powers, in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order 195 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis eds. 1981); Javits & Klein, supra n. 10, at 455; Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L. J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1064 (1981); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws — Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 565 (1953); Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 Kan. L. Rev. 277 (1975); Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Action, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 489 (1974); Schwartz, Legislative Veto and the Constitution — A Reexamination, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 351 (1978); Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1031 (1955); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 Harv. J. Legis. 593 (1976).

For commentary generally unfavorable to the legislative veto, see J. Bolton, The Legislative Veto: Unseparating the Powers (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive On a Leash?, 56 N. C. L. Rev. 423 (1978); FitzGerald, Congressional Oversight or Congressional Foresight: Guidelines From the Founding Fathers, 28 Ad. L. Rev. 429 (1976); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569 (1953); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735 (1979); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy For System Overload, 3 Regulation 19 (Nov.-Dec. 1979); Watson, supra n. 3, at 983; Comment, Congressional Oversight of Administrative Discretion: Defining the Proper Role of the Legislative Veto, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 1018 (1977); Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 Duke L. J. 285; Recent Developments, The Legislative Veto in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1029 (1977).

[48] Compare Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 556 F. 2d 1028 (1977) (upholding legislative veto provision in Federal Salary Act, 2 U. S. C. § 351 et seq.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978), with Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 673 F. 2d 425 (1982) (holding unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3342 (1976 ed., Supp. V)), appeals docketed, Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, and 81-2171, and cert. pending, Nos. 82-177 and 82-209.

[49] See, e. g., 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 680, 683 (1854); Dept. of Justice, Memorandum re Constitutionality of Provisions in Proposed Reorganization Bills Now Pending in Congress, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1949); Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1953); 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 10, p. 2 (1977).

[50] I limit my concern here to those legislative vetoes which require either one or both Houses of Congress to pass resolutions of approval or disapproval, and leave aside the questions arising from the exercise of such powers by Committees of Congress.

[51] I agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable. Although the general rule is that the presence of a saving clause creates a presumption of divisibility, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 235 (1932), I read the saving clause contained in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as primarily pertaining to the severability of major parts of the Act from one another, not the divisibility of different provisions within a single section. Surely, Congress would want the naturalization provisions of the Act to be severable from the deportation sections. But this does not support preserving § 244 without the legislative veto any more than a saving provision would justify preserving immigration authority without quota limits.

More relevant is the fact that for 40 years Congress has insisted on retaining a voice on individual suspension cases — it has frequently rejected bills which would place final authority in the Executive Branch. It is clear that Congress believed its retention crucial. Given this history, the Court's rewriting of the Act flouts the will of Congress.

[52] The Pennsylvania Constitution required that all "bills of [a] public nature" had to be printed after being introduced and had to lie over until the following session of the legislature before adoption. Pa. Const., § 15 (1776). These printing and layover requirements applied only to "bills." At the time, measures could also be enacted as a resolve, which was allowed by the Constitution as "urgent temporary legislation" without such requirements. A. Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution 152 (1969). Using this method, the Pennsylvania Legislature routinely evaded printing and layover requirements through adoption of resolves. Ibid.

A 1784 report of a committee of the Council of Censors, a state body responsible for periodically reviewing the state government's adherence to its Constitution, charged that the procedures for enacting legislation had been evaded though the adoption of resolves instead of bills. Report of the Committee of the Council of Censors 13 (1784). See Nevins, supra, at 190. When three years later the federal Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia, the delegates were reminded, in the course of discussing the President's veto, of the dangers pointed out by the Council of Censors Report. 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 430 (1845). Furthermore, Madison, who made the motion that led to the Presentment Clause, knew of the Council of Censors Report, The Federalist No. 50, p. 319 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), and was aware of the Pennsylvania experience. See The Federalist No. 48, supra, at 311-312. We have previously recognized the relevance of the Council of Censors Report in interpreting the Constitution. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 529-530 (1969).

[53] Although the legislative veto was not a feature of congressional enactments until the 20th century, the practices of the first Congresses demonstrate that the constraints of Art. I were not envisioned as a constitutional straitjacket. The First Congress, for example, began the practice of arming its Committees with broad investigatory powers without the passage of legislation. See A. Josephy, On the Hill: A History of the American Congress 81-83 (1979). More directly pertinent is the First Congress' treatment of the Northwest Territories Ordinance of 1787. The Ordinance, initially drafted under the Articles of Confederation on July 13, 1787, was the document which governed the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River. The Ordinance authorized the Territories to adopt laws, subject to disapproval in Congress.

"The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in the district, such laws of the original states, criminal and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to Congress, from time to time; which laws shall be in force in the district until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards the legislature shall have authority to alter them as they shall think fit" (emphasis added).

After the Constitution was ratified, the Ordinance was reenacted to conform to the requirements of the Constitution. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51. Certain provisions, such as one relating to appointment of officials by Congress, were changed because of constitutional concerns, but the language allowing disapproval by Congress was retained. Subsequent provisions for territorial laws contained similar language. See, e. g., 48 U. S. C. § 1478.

Although at times Congress disapproved of territorial actions by passing legislation, see e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 44, 2 Stat. 444, on at least two occasions one House of Congress passed resolutions to disapprove territorial laws, only to have the other House fail to pass the measure for reasons pertaining to the subject matter of the bills. First, on February 16, 1795, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution disapproving in one sweep all but one of the laws that the Governors and judges of the Northwest Territory had passed at a legislative session on August 1, 1792. 4 Annals of Cong. 1227. The Senate, however, refused to concur. Id., at 830. See B. Bond, The Civilization of the Old Northwest 70-71 (1934). Second, on May 9, 1800, the House passed a resolution to disapprove of a Mississippi territorial law imposing a license fee on taverns. H. R. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess., 706 (1826 ed.). The Senate unsuccessfully attempted to amend the resolution to strike down all laws of the Mississippi Territory enacted since June 30, 1799. 5 C. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States — Mississippi 94-95 (1937). The histories of the Territories, the correspondence of the era, and the congressional Reports contain no indication that such resolutions disapproving of territorial laws were to be presented to the President or that the authorization for such a "congressional veto" in the Act of Aug. 7, 1789, was of doubtful constitutionality.

The practices of the First Congress are not so clear as to be dispositive of the constitutional question now before us. But it is surely significant that this body, largely composed of the same men who authored Art. I and secured ratification of the Constitution, did not view the Constitution as forbidding a precursor of the modern day legislative veto. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412 (1928) ("In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions").

[54] "Legislative, or substantive, regulations are `issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. . . . Such rules have the force and effect of law.' U. S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30, n. 3 (1947)." Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 425, n. 9.

Substantive agency regulations are clearly exercises of lawmaking authority; agency interpretations of their statutes are only arguably so. But as Henry Monaghan has observed: "Judicial deference to agency `interpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency." Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1983) (emphasis deleted). See, e. g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U. S. 170 (1981).

[55] As the Court acknowledges, the "provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers." Ante, at 946. But these separation-of-powers concerns are that legislative power be exercised by Congress, executive power by the President, and judicial power by the Courts. A scheme which allows delegation of legislative power to the President and the departments under his control, but forbids a check on its exercise by Congress itself obviously denigrates the separation-of-powers concerns underlying Art. I. To be sure, the doctrine of separation of powers is also concerned with checking each branch's exercise of its characteristic authority. Section 244(c)(2) is fully consistent with the need for checks upon congressional authority, infra, at 994-996, and the legislative veto mechanism, more generally is an important check upon Executive authority, supra, at 967-974.

[56] The Court's other reasons for holding the legislative veto subject to the presentment and bicameral passage requirements require but brief discussion. First, the Court posits that the resolution of disapproval should be considered equivalent to new legislation because absent the veto authority of § 244(c)(2) neither House could, short of legislation, effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General has determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Ante, at 952-954. The statement is neither accurate nor meaningful. The Attorney General's power under the Act is only to "suspend" the order of deportation; the "suspension" does not cancel the deportation or adjust the alien's status to that of a permanent resident alien. Cancellation of deportation and adjustment of status must await favorable action by Congress. More important, the question is whether § 244(c)(2) as written is constitutional, and no law is amended or repealed by the resolution of disapproval which is, of course, expressly authorized by that section.

The Court also argues that the legislative character of the challenged action of one House is confirmed by the fact that "when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action." Ante, at 955. Leaving aside again the above-refuted premise that all action with a legislative character requires passage in a law, the short answer is that all of these carefully defined exceptions to the presentment and bicameralism strictures do not involve action of the Congress pursuant to a duly enacted statute. Indeed, for the most part these powers — those of impeachment, review of appointments, and treaty ratification — are not legislative powers at all. The fact that it was essential for the Constitution to stipulate that Congress has the power to impeach and try the President hardly demonstrates a limit upon Congress' authority to reserve itself a legislative veto, through statutes, over subjects within its lawmaking authority.

[57] In his opinion on the constitutionality of the legislative review provisions of the most recent reorganization statute, 5 U. S. C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), Attorney General Bell stated that "the statement in Article I, § 7, of the procedural steps to be followed in the enactment of legislation does not exclude other forms of action by Congress. . . . The procedures prescribed in Article I § 7, for congressional action are not exclusive." 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 10, pp. 2-3 (1977). "[I]f the procedures provided in a given statute have no effect on the constitutional distribution of power between the legislature and the executive," then the statute is constitutional. Id., at 3. In the case of the reorganization statute, the power of the President to refuse to submit a plan, combined with the power of either House of Congress to reject a submitted plan, suffices under the standard to make the statute constitutional. Although the Attorney General sought to limit his opinion to the reorganization statute, and the Executive opposes the instant statute, I see no Art. I basis to distinguish between the two.

[58] Of course, when the authorizing legislation requires approval to be expressed by a positive vote, then the two-House veto would clearly comply with the bicameralism requirement under any analysis.

[59] The Court's doubts that Congress entertained this "arcane" theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2) disregards the fact that this is the historical basis upon which the legislative vetoes contained in the Reorganization Acts have been defended, n. 22, supra, and that the Reorganization Acts then provided the precedent articulated in support of other legislative veto provisions. See, e. g., 87 Cong. Rec. 735 (1941) (Rep. Dirksen) (citing Reorganization Act in support of proposal to include a legislative veto in Lend-Lease Act); H. R. Rep. No. 93-658, p. 42 (1973) (citing Reorganization Act as "sufficient precedent" for legislative veto provision for Impoundment Control Act).

[60] Madison emphasized that the principle of separation of powers is primarily violated "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison noted that the oracle of the separation doctrine, Montesquieu, in writing that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should not be united "in the same person or body of magistrates," did not mean "that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or control over the acts of each other." Id., at 325 (emphasis in original). Indeed, according to Montesquieu, the legislature is uniquely fit to exercise an additional function: "to examine in what manner the laws that it has made have been executed." W. Gwyn, The Meaning of Separation of Powers 102 (1965).

1.1.3 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 1.1.3 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong

426 U.S. 88 (1976)

HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL.
v.
MOW SUN WONG ET AL.

No. 73-1596.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 13, 1975.
Reargued January 12, 1976.
Decided June 1, 1976.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

[89] Solicitor General Bork reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Louis F. Claiborne, Gerald P. Norton, and Bruno A. Ristau.

[90] Edward H. Steinman, by appointment of the Court, 423 U. S. 921, reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David C. Moon and Kenneth Hecht.[1]

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Five aliens, lawfully and permanently residing in the United States, brought this litigation to challenge the validity of a policy, adopted and enforced by the Civil Service Commission and certain other federal agencies, which excludes all persons except American citizens and natives of American Samoa from employment in most positions subject to their respective jurisdictions.[2] Because the policy, the law, and the identity of the parties have changed somewhat since the litigation commenced, [91] we state the facts in detail before addressing the important question which we granted certiorari to resolve. 417 U. S. 944.

I

Each of the five plaintiffs was denied federal employment solely because of his or her alienage. They were all Chinese residents of San Francisco and each was qualified for an available job.

After performing satisfactory work for the Post Office Department for 10 days, respondent Kae Cheong Lui was terminated because his personnel record disclosed that he was not a citizen.[3] Respondents Mow Sun Wong and Siu Hung Mok also demonstrated their ability to perform on the job; they both participated in the California Supplemental Training and Education Program (STEP) and were assigned to federal agencies until the STEP program ended. As a noncitizen, Mow Sun Wong, who had been an electrical engineer in China, was ineligible for employment as a janitor for the General Services Administration. Siu Hung Mok, who had 18 years' experience as a businessman in China, could not retain his job as a file clerk with the Federal Records Center of GSA.

Respondent Francene Lum was not permitted to take an examination for a position as evaluator of educational programs in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Her background included 15 years of teaching experience, a master's degree in education, and periods of graduate study at four universities. Anna Yu, the fifth plaintiff, who is not a respondent because she did not join in the appeal from the adverse decision of the District [92] Court, sought a position as a clerk-typist, but could not take the typing test because she was not a citizen.

Two of the plaintiffs, Mow Sun Wong and Siu Hung Mok, had filed declarations of intent to become citizens; the other three had not. They were all lawfully admitted, Francene Lum in 1946, Anna Yu in 1965, Siu Hung Mok and Kae Cheong Lui in 1968, and Mow Sun Wong in 1969.

On December 22, 1970, they commenced this class action in the Northern District of California. As defendants they named the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the three agencies which had denied them employment.[4]

The complaint alleged that there are about four million aliens living in the United States; they face special problems in seeking employment because our culture, language, and system of government are foreign to them; about 300,000 federal jobs become available each year, but noncitizens are not permitted to compete for those jobs except in rare situations when citizens are not available or when a few positions exempted from the competitive civil service are being filled. Plaintiffs further alleged that the advantage given to citizens seeking federal civil service positions is arbitrary and violates the [93] Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution[5] and Executive Order No. 11,478, 3 CFR 803 (1966-1970 Comp.), which forbids discrimination in federal employment on the basis of "national origin." The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits setting forth the facts stated above. The District Court rejected a challenge to its jurisdiction,[6] but ruled in favor of defendants on the merits. 333 F. Supp. 527. The District Court held that the reference to "national origin" in the Executive Order prohibited discrimination among citizens rather than discrimination between citizens and noncitizens. The court also rejected an argument that the Civil Service Commission regulation was inconsistent with § 502 of the Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970, which permitted payment to classes of persons who are made ineligible by the Civil Service regulation.[7] On that point the court said:

"The Commission has acted permissibly in relation [94] to the Appropriations Act in not opening up the civil service to all those whom Congress has indicated it would be willing to pay for their work." 333 F. Supp., at 531.

Finally, the District Court held that the Commission's discrimination against aliens was constitutional. The court noted that the federal power over aliens is "quite broad, almost plenary," and therefore the classification needed only a rational basis. Ibid. It identified two grounds upon which the President[8] could properly rely: First, that the formation of policy and its execution, at whatever level, should only be entrusted to United States citizens, or, alternatively, that "the Executive may intend that the economic security of its citizens be served by the reservation of competitive civil service positions to them, rather than to aliens." Id., at 532.

Four of the plaintiffs appealed. During the period of [95] over two years that the appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, we decided two cases that recognize the importance of protecting the employment opportunities of aliens.[9] In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, we held that a section of the New York Civil Service Law which provided that only United States citizens could hold permanent positions in the competitive class of the State's civil service violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that Clause also provided the basis for our holding in In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, decided on the same day, that Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from the practice of law was unconstitutional.

In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that neither Sugarman nor Griffiths was controlling because the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on state power are not directly applicable to the Federal Government[10] and because Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the States do not possess.[11] Nevertheless, those decisions provided the Court of Appeals with persuasive reasons for rejecting the bases asserted by the defendants in the District Court as justifications for the Civil Service Commission's policy of discriminating against noncitizens. For we specifically held that the State's legitimate interest [96] in the undivided loyalty of the civil servant who participates directly in the formulation and execution of government policy, was inadequate to support a state restriction indiscriminately disqualifying the "sanitation man, class B," the typist, and the office worker, 413 U. S., at 641-643; moreover, we expressly considered, and rejected, New York's contention that its special interest in the advancement and profit of its own citizens could justify confinement of the State's civil service to citizens of the United States, id., at 643-645.

The Court of Appeals reversed; it agreed with the District Court's analysis of the nonconstitutional issues, but held the regulation violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although refusing to accept respondents' contention that the protection against federal discrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment is co-extensive with that applicable to the States under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that the Commission regulation which "sweeps indiscriminately excluding all aliens from all positions requiring the competitive Civil Service examination" could not be supported by justifications which related to only a small fraction of the positions covered by the rule. 500 F. 2d 1031, 1037. Thus, the court accepted the argument that citizenship might properly be required in positions involving policymaking decisions, or in positions involving national security interests, but the court was unwilling to support an extraordinarily broad exclusion on such narrow shoulders.

Only the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission petitioned for certiorari. Several of the nonpetitioning defendants have no responsibility for the establishment of standards which applicants for federal employment must meet; accordingly, their participation is not necessary. The former Postmaster [97] General is not now a necessary party for a different reason.

In 1971, after the litigation was commenced, Congress established a new Postal Service and removed its officers and employees from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.[12] For the first three years of its existence the new Postal Service retained substantially the same citizenship requirement for employees as did the Civil Service Commission.[13] However, in 1974, without any additional statutory authority or direction, the Postal Service amended its regulation to make all noncitizens who have been accorded permanent resident alien status in the United States eligible for all positions except those at a high executive level or those expressly designated as [98] "sensitive."[14] Thus, although the case is not technically moot as regards the Postal Service,[15] that Service does not now have any interest in defending the challenged Civil Service regulation.

We granted certiorari to decide the following question presented by the petition:

"Whether a regulation of the United States Civil [99] Service Commission that bars resident aliens from employment in the federal competitive civil service is constitutional."

We now address that question.

II

Petitioners have chosen to argue on the merits a somewhat different question. In their brief, the petitioners rephrased the question presented as "[w]hether the Civil Service Commission's regulation . . . is within the constitutional powers of Congress and the President and hence not a constitutionally forbidden discrimination against aliens."[16]

This phrasing of the question assumes that the Commission regulation is one that was mandated by the Congress, the President, or both. On this assumption, the petitioners advance alternative arguments to justify the discrimination as an exercise of the plenary federal power over immigration and naturalization. First, the petitioners argue that the equal protection aspect of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to the exercise of federal power over aliens, and therefore no justification for the rule is necessary.[17] Alternatively, the petitioners argue that the Fifth Amendment imposes only a slight burden of justification on the Federal Government, and that such a burden is easily met by several factors not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Before addressing these arguments, we first discuss certain limitations [100] which the Due Process Clause places on the power of the Federal Government to classify persons subject to its jurisdiction.

The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both Amendments require the same type of analysis, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93, the Court of Appeals correctly stated that the two protections are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ,[18] but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State. On the other hand, when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when there is no special national interest involved, the Due Process Clause has been construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.[19]

In this case we deal with a federal rule having nationwide impact. The petitioners correctly point out that the paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of the holding in Sugarman as decisive of this case.[20] We agree [101] with the petitioners' position that overriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State.[21]

We do not agree, however, with the petitioners' primary submission that the federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to citizens. We recognize that the petitioners' argument draws support from both the federal and the political character of the power over immigration and naturalization.[22] [102] Nevertheless, countervailing considerations require rejection of the extreme position advanced by the petitioners.

The rule enforced by the Commission has its impact on an identifiable class of persons who, entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community.[23] Aliens are not entitled to vote and, as alleged in the complaint, are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our language and customs. The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the rule—ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy—is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty.[24] Indeed, we deal with a [103] rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by due process. It follows that some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated by the Constitution.

Respondents argue that this scrutiny requires invalidation of the Commission rule under traditional equal protection analysis. It is true that our cases establish that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment authorizes that type of analysis of federal rules and therefore that the Clause has a substantive as well as a procedural aspect. However, it is not necessary to resolve respondents' substantive claim, if a narrower inquiry discloses that essential procedures have not been followed.

When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. If the agency which promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting that interest, it may reasonably be presumed that the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule. That presumption would, of course, be fortified by an appropriate statement of reasons identifying the relevant interest. Alternatively, if the rule were expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption.

In this case the petitioners have identified several [104] interests which the Congress or the President might deem sufficient to justify the exclusion of noncitizens from the federal service. They argue, for example, that the broad exclusion may facilitate the President's negotiation of treaties with foreign powers by enabling him to offer employment opportunities to citizens of a given foreign country in exchange for reciprocal concessions—an offer he could not make if those aliens were already eligible for federal jobs. Alternatively, the petitioners argue that reserving the federal service for citizens provides an appropriate incentive to aliens to qualify for naturalization and thereby to participate more effectively in our society. They also point out that the citizenship requirement has been imposed in the United States with substantial consistency for over 100 years and accords with international law and the practice of most foreign countries. Finally, they correctly state that the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions clearly justifies a citizenship requirement in at least some parts of the federal service, and that the broad exclusion serves the valid administrative purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of classifying those positions which properly belong in executive or sensitive categories.[25]

The difficulty with all of these arguments except the last is that they do not identify any interest which can reasonably be assumed to have influenced the Civil Service Commission, the Postal Service, the General Services Administration, or the Department of Health, [105] Education, and Welfare in the administration of their respective responsibilities or, specifically, in the decision to deny employment to the respondents in this litigation. We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiating purposes; but we are not willing to presume that the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, or any of the other original defendants, was deliberately fostering an interest so far removed from his normal responsibilities. Consequently, before evaluating the sufficiency of the asserted justification for the rule, it is important to know whether we are reviewing a policy decision made by Congress and the President or a question of personnel administration determined by the Civil Service Commission.

III

It is perfectly clear that neither the Congress nor the President has ever required the Civil Service Commission to adopt the citizenship requirement as a condition of eligibility for employment in the federal civil service. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the policy has been in effect since the Commission was created in 1883, it is fair to infer that both the Legislature and the Executive have been aware of the policy and have acquiesced in it. In order to decide whether such acquiescence should give the Commission rule the same support as an express statutory or Presidential command, it is appropriate to review the extent to which the policy has been given consideration by Congress or the President, and the nature of the authority specifically delegated to the Commission.

[106] The Commission was originally established pursuant to the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883.[26] That Act was a major piece of reform legislation designed to eliminate the abuses associated with the patronage system from much of the federal service.[27] Before that legislation was passed, the Senate considered and rejected a bill that would have expressly limited civil service appointment to citizens.[28] It is fair to summarize the relevant references to the citizenship requirement, however, as indicating that several Senators assumed that such a requirement would be imposed by the Commission,[29] and that the matter was in an area better handled by regulation than by statute.[30]

[107] In its historical context, the assumption that only citizens would be employed in the federal service is easily understood. The new system of merit appointment, based on competitive examination, was replacing a patronage system in which appointment had often been treated as a method of rewarding support at the polls; since such rewards were presumably reserved for voters (or members of their families) who would necessarily be citizens, citizenship must have characterized most, if not all, federal employees at that time. The assumption that such a requirement would survive the enactment of the new statute is by no means equivalent to a considered judgment that it should do so.

Moreover, it must be acknowledged that in 1883 there was no doubt a greater inclination than we can now accept to regard "foreigners" as a somewhat less desirable class of persons than American citizens. A provincial attitude toward aliens may partially explain the assumption that they would not be employed in the federal service by the new Civil Service Commission. But since that attitude has been implicitly repudiated by our cases requiring that aliens be treated with the dignity and respect accorded to other persons,[31] and since that attitude did not affect the form of the legislation itself, we disregard it in our evaluation of Congress' participation in the decision to impose the citizenship requirement.

When the Commission was created, it immediately [108] adopted the citizenship requirement, and that fact was duly reported to Congress.[32] Congress has not thereafter repudiated, or even considered the desirability of repudiating, the Commission's policy. It has, however, in a number of its Appropriation Acts imposed various limitations on the classes of employees who may receive compensation from the Federal Government. These limitations give rise to conflicting inferences which may be illustrated by reference to five such Acts.

In 1938 Congressman Starnes offered an amendment to the pending appropriation bill[33] to provide that none of the authorized funds could be used to pay the compensation of any federal employee not a citizen of the United States.[34] The stated purpose of the amendment was to give preference to American citizens during a period of widespread unemployment. The amendment was accepted by the House without opposition. In the Senate, however, the restriction was modified to allow employment of any person owing allegiance to the United States, or who was then employed in the service of the United States, or who was needed because citizens with requisite experience and qualifications were not available.[35] In 1939 a similar provision was broadened further to allow compensation for aliens eligible for citizenship who had filed a declaration of intention to become citizens and also for certain Coast Guard veterans who were ineligible for United States citizenship.[36] In 1942 aliens who were [109] citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were exempted from the prohibition,[37] in 1943 the exemption was extended to "nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war,"[38] and then in 1953 the exemption was also made applicable to permanently admitted aliens from the Baltic countries.[39]

In the District Court respondents argued that the exemptions from the limitations included in the Appropriations Acts had become so broad by 1969 as to constitute a congressional determination of policy repudiating the narrow citizenship requirement in the Commission rule. Though not controlling, there is force to this argument. On the other hand, the fact that Congress repeatedly identified citizenship as one appropriate classification of persons eligible for compensation for federal service implies a continuing interest in giving preference, for reasons unrelated to the efficiency of the federal service, to citizens over aliens. In our judgment, however, that fact is less significant than the fact that Congress has consistently authorized payment to a much broader class of potential employees than the narrow category of citizens and natives of American Samoa eligible under the Commission rule. Congress has regularly provided for compensation of any federal employee owing allegiance to the United States. Since it is settled that aliens may take an appropriate oath of allegiance,[40] the statutory category, though not precisely defined, is plainly more flexible and expansive than the Commission rule. Nevertheless, for present purposes we need merely conclude [110] that the Appropriations Acts cannot fairly be construed to evidence either congressional approval or disapproval of the specific Commission rule challenged in this case.

Our review of the relevant Executive Orders leads us to a similar conclusion with respect to the President's responsibility for the rule. The first Civil Service rules promulgated by President Arthur required every applicant for an examination to disclose his citizenship, as well as other information such as his name and address.[41] These rules did not expressly prescribe United States citizenship as a condition for eligibility. It may well be true, however, that the President, like the members of the Senate referred to above, assumed that the Commission would impose such a requirement. Moreover, we must assume that he also became aware of the requirement after the Commission adopted it. Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between acceptance by the President of a Commission rule to which no objection has been made and a decision made by the President himself.

Over the years the Commission revised its rules a number of times. Although it was Commission practice to require citizenship between 1883 and 1895, apparently the first time the requirement was expressly stated in a rule was in 1896.[42] In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt amended the rule to permit persons who "owe allegiance to the United States" to qualify.[43] The amendment did not define that class of persons. The Commission [111] has explained that it was intended to apply to persons in Puerto Rico and the Philippines who then had the status of noncitizen nationals. The language of the amendment, however, would seem broad enough to cover any person willing to take an appropriate oath of allegiance.[44]

In 1906 President Roosevelt again amended the rule by adding an authorization to the Commission, in its discretion, to permit noncitizens to take examinations when "there is a lack of eligibles who are American citizens."[45] The amendment, however, provided that noncitizens should not be certified if eligible citizens were available. Although this amendment had the effect of increasing the employment opportunities of aliens, it unquestionably indicates that President Roosevelt then approved of a policy of giving preference to citizens.

The Executive Order which authorized the promulgation of the specific rule involved in this case was issued by President Eisenhower in 1954. In relevant part it provides:

"The [Civil Service] Commission is authorized to establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education, training and experience, suitability, and physical and mental fitness, and for residence or other requirements which applicants must meet to be admitted to or rated in examinations." Exec. Order No. 10,577, § 2.1 (a), 3 CFR 218, 219 (1954-1958 Comp.).

[112] This direction "to establish standards with respect to citizenship" is not necessarily a command to require citizenship as a general condition of eligibility for federal employment. Rather it is equally, if not more reasonably, susceptible of interpretation as a command to classify positions for which citizenship should be required. Even though such an interpretation might permit the Commission to decide that citizenship should be required for all federal positions, it would remain true that the decision to impose the requirement was made by the Commission rather than the President. That this is in fact the case is demonstrated by the elimination of the citizenship requirement for employment in the Postal Service which took place after this litigation commenced. Pursuant to a broad grant of authority comparable, in its generality and in its absence of any reference to a citizenship requirement, to that applicable to the Civil Service Commission,[46] the Postal Service originally [113] imposed such a requirement and then withdrew it. Neither the establishment nor the withdrawal of the requirement was either mandated or questioned by Congress or the President.

We have no doubt that the statutory directive which merely requires such regulations "as will best promote the efficiency of [the] Service," 5 U. S. C. § 3301 (1), as well as the pertinent Executive Order, gives the Civil Service Commission the same discretion that the Postal Service has actually exercised; the Commission may either retain or modify the citizenship requirement without further authorization from Congress or the President.[47] We are therefore persuaded that our inquiry is whether the national interests which the Government identifies as justifications for the Commission rule are [114] interests on which that agency may properly rely in making a decision implicating the constitutional and social values at stake in this litigation.

We think the petitioners accurately stated the question presented in their certiorari petition. The question is whether the regulation of the United States Civil Service Commission is valid. We proceed to a consideration of that question, assuming, without deciding, that the Congress and the President have the constitutional power to impose the requirement that the Commission has adopted.

IV

It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies. Indeed, it is not even within the responsibility of the Commission to be concerned with the economic consequences of permitting or prohibiting the participation by aliens in employment opportunities in different parts of the national market. On the contrary, the Commission performs a limited and specific function.

The only concern of the Civil Service Commission is the promotion of an efficient federal service.[48] In general [115] it is fair to assume that its goal would be best served by removing unnecessary restrictions on the eligibility of qualified applicants for employment. With only one exception, the interests which the petitioners have put forth as supporting the Commission regulation at issue in this case are not matters which are properly the business of the Commission. That one exception is the administrative desirability of having one simple rule excluding all noncitizens when it is manifest that citizenship is an appropriate and legitimate requirement for some important and sensitive positions. Arguably, therefore, administrative convenience may provide a rational basis for the general rule.

For several reasons that justification is unacceptable in this case. The Civil Service Commission, like other administrative agencies, has an obligation to perform its responsibilities with some degree of expertise, and to make known the reasons for its important decisions. There is nothing in the record before us, or in matter of which we may properly take judicial notice, to indicate that the Commission actually made any considered evaluation of the relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value to the service of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other. Nor can we reasonably infer that the administrative burden of establishing the job classifications for which citizenship is an appropriate requirement would be a particularly onerous task for an expert in personnel matters; indeed, the Postal Service apparently encountered no particular difficulty in making such a classification. Of greater significance, however, is the quality of the interest at stake. Any fair balancing of the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of employment opportunities caused by the Commission's indiscriminate [116] policy, as opposed to what may be nothing more than a hypothetical justification, requires rejection of the argument of administrative convenience in this case.[49]

In sum, assuming without deciding that the national interests identified by the petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination by the Civil Service Commission. The impact of the rule on the millions of lawfully admitted resident aliens is precisely the same as the aggregate impact of comparable state rules which were invalidated by our decision in Sugarman. By broadly denying this class substantial opportunities for employment, the Civil Service Commission rule deprives its members of an aspect of liberty. Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General of the United States,[50] due process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation of an important liberty be made either at a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the Civil Service Commission, that it be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that agency. We hold that § 338.101 (a) of the Civil Service Commission Regulations has deprived these respondents [117] of liberty without due process of law and is therefore invalid.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion with the understanding that there are reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

The Court's opinion enunciates a novel conception of the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and from this concept proceeds to evolve a doctrine of delegation of legislative authority which seems to me to be quite contrary to the doctrine established by a long and not hitherto questioned line of our decisions. Neither of the Court's innovations is completely without appeal in this particular case, but even if we were to treat the matter as an original question I think such appeal is outweighed by the potential mischief which the doctrine bids fair to make in other areas of the law.

I

At the outset it is important to recognize that the power of the federal courts is severely limited in the areas of immigration and regulation of aliens. As we reiterated recently in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766 (1972):

"`The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether [118] from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.' " Quoting from Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895).

It is also clear that the exclusive power of Congress to prescribe the terms and conditions of entry includes the power to regulate aliens in various ways once they are here. E. g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 69-70 (1941). Indeed the Court, by holding that the regulation in question would presumptively have been valid if "expressly mandated by the Congress," ante, at 103, concedes the congressional power to exclude aliens from employment in the civil service altogether if it so desires or to limit their participation.

This broad congressional power is in some respects subject to procedural limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If an alien subject to deportation proceedings claims to be a citizen, he is entitled to a judicial determination of that claim. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922). If he lawfully obtains tenured Government employment, and is thereby protected against discharge except for cause, he is entitled to a hearing before being discharged. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). But neither an alien nor a citizen has any protected liberty interests in obtaining federal employment. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896-899 (1961). Nor in the absence of some form of statutory tenure is a Government employee entitled to a hearing prior to discharge, for "government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer." [119] Id., at 896. See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959).

The Court, however, seems to overlook this limitation on judicial power in justifying judicial intervention by holding:

"The rule enforced by the Commission has its impact on an identifiable class of persons who, entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community." Ante, at 102.

This is a classic equal protection analysis such as formed the basis of the Court's holding in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 641 (1973), that States could not bar aliens from the state civil service. Sugarman specifically did not decide whether similar restrictions by the Federal Government would violate equal protection principles (as applied to the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954)).

However, while positing an equal protection problem, the Court does not rely on an equal protection analysis, conceding that "overriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State." Ante, at 101. Thus the Court seems to agree that the Equal Protection Clause does not provide a basis for invalidating this denial of federal civil service employment. The Court instead inexplicably melds together the concepts of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process to produce the following holding:

"The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the rule—ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy—is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of [120] an interest in liberty. Indeed, we deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by due process." Ante, at 102-103 (footnote omitted).

The meaning of this statement in the Court's opinion is not immediately apparent. As already noted, there is no general "liberty" interest in either acquiring federal employment or, in the absence of a statutory tenure, in retaining it, so that the person who is denied employment or who is discharged may insist upon a due process hearing. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), is cited by the Court to support the proposition that there is a "liberty" interest at stake here. But to the extent that the holding of that case remains unmodified by Cafeteria Workers, supra, it deals with a substantive liberty interest which may not be arbitrarily denied by legislative enactment; that interest is closely akin to the interest of the aliens asserted in Sugarman, supra, and In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973). Since the Court declines to pass upon the claim asserted by respondents based upon those cases, it is difficult to see how Truax is relevant to its analysis.

There is a liberty interest in obtaining public employment which is protected against procedural deprivation in certain circumstances, as the Court's citation to Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573-574 (1972), ante, at 102 n. 23, indicates. But the cases cited in that passage from Roth, cases such as Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957), and Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 (1963), are distinguishable from the present case in at least two respects. In the first place they were both efforts by States, not to deny public employment, but to go further [121] and proscribe the right to practice one's chosen profession in the private sector of the economy. Even more importantly, the vice found in each of those cases was the failure of the State to grant a "full prior hearing," 408 U. S., at 574.

But in the case presently before the Court, there is simply no issue which would require a hearing in order to establish any matter of disputed fact. All of the respondents freely concede that they are aliens. Their claim is not that they were entitled to a hearing in order to establish the fact that they were citizens, or to establish some other relevant fact; indeed they request no hearing for any purpose. Petitioners assert that due to respondents' alienage they are barred from federal employment, and respondents simply contend that they may not be.

Yet the Court does not decide this issue, but proceeds instead to hold that procedural due process includes not only a shield against arbitrary action but a scalped with which one may dissect the administrative organization of the Federal Government.

"When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest." Ante, at 103.

But the "overriding national interest" asserted by the petitioners is not a specific interest in excluding these particular aliens from the civil service, but a general interest in formulating policies toward aliens. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952). As such it is not necessary for the petitioners to demonstrate why they chose to exclude aliens from the civil service. [122] To require them to do so is to subject the Government to the same type of equal protection analysis to which the States are subject under Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, a result which the Court specifically abjures. Ante, at 100-101. What the Court seems to do is to engraft notions of due process onto the case law from this Court dealing with the delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to administrative agencies.

In two cases decided in the October Term 1934 the Court held that Congress "is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is . . . vested" by Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529 (1935). Panama Rfg. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). Nothing in either of those opinions, the only cases in which delegations to administrative agencies have been struck down, suggested any reliance upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and it seems a fair statement to say that the Court has not seen fit during the 40 years following these decisions to enlarge in the slightest their relatively narrow holdings.

Not only is such reliance unjustified by prior decisions of this Court as to the scope of the due process guarantee, but it flies in the face of those cases which hold that the manner in which policies concerning aliens are made within the political branches of the government is not subject to judicial scrutiny. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954).[51]

[123] II

The sole ground by which such procedures may properly be challenged is to argue that there was an improper delegation of authority, which has not previously been thought to depend upon the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause.

The Court, while not shaping its argument in these terms seems to hold that the delegation here was faulty. Yet, it seems to me too clear to admit of argument that under the traditional standards governing the delegation of authority the Civil Service Commission was fully empowered to act in the manner in which it did in this case.

Congress, in the Civil Service Act, 5 U. S. C. § 3301, delegated to the President the power to

"(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service; [and]

"(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability for the employment sought . . . ."[52]

The President, acting under this grant of authority as well as the "authority vested in [him] by the Constitution," promulgated Executive Order No. 10,577, 3 CFR 218 (1954-1958 Comp.), in which he authorized the Civil Service Commission

"to establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education . . . and for residence or other requirements which applicants must meet to be admitted to or rated in examinations." Id., § 2.1 (a), p. 219.

[124] Acting pursuant to this authority the Civil Service Commission then promulgated the regulations in question which exclude aliens from examination for or appointment to (except under certain special circumstances) the civil service.

Both Congress and the President thus took a power which they possessed and, instead of exercising it directly, chose to delegate it. This is the process by which all federal regulations are promulgated and to forbid it would be to necessarily dismantle the entire structure of the Executive Branch. But the majority does not challenge the procedure as to all cases. Rather, the challenge seems to be leveled only at policies which "rais[e] . . . constitutional questions." Ante, at 113 n. 46. In those cases it becomes necessary for the agency, which was concededly acting within the scope of its delegated power, to provide reasons which will justify its actions in the eyes of the courts.

But, as previously discussed, such a holding overlooks the basic principle that a decision to exclude aliens from the civil service is a political decision reserved to Congress, the wisdom of which may not be challenged in the courts. Once it is determined that the agency in question was properly delegated the power by Congress to make decisions regarding citizenship of prospective civil servants, then the reasons for which that power was exercised are as foreclosed from judicial scrutiny as if Congress had made the decision itself. The fact that Congress has delegated a power does not provide a back door through which to attack a policy which would otherwise have been immune from attack.[53]

[125] For this Court to hold, ante, at 114, that the agency chosen by Congress, through the President, to effectuate its policies, has "no responsibility" in that area is to interfere in an area in which the Court itself clearly has "no responsibility": the organization of the Executive Branch. Congress, through the President, obviously gave responsibility in this area to the Civil Service Commission. The wisdom of that delegation is not for us to evaluate. Finally I note that, though there is no requirement that it do so, it would appear that, contrary to the Court's assertion, Congress has in fact spoken directly to this issue. In § 502 of the Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970, 83 Stat. 336 (discussed by the Court, ante, at 93-94), Congress provided that no compensation will be paid to any employee of the Government who is not (1) a citizen, (2) "a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen" or (3) a person who "owes allegiance to the United States."

Since respondents are not citizens the question arises as to which of the other categories they fit into. The effective date of the Act was December 11, 1969. Yet according to the record, none of the respondents was employed until August 1970 and one, Lum, was never employed by the Government.

[126] At the time of their discharge none of the respondents had declared their loyalty to the United States. While it is not clear what it means to "owe allegiance," it must mean something, and there has been no assertion by respondents that they qualified. Indeed, in June 1971, after the litigation was begun, Mow Sun Wong and Sin Hung Mok filed affidavits with the District Court asserting: "I owe allegiance to the United States." This would seem to imply that, at the time of their discharge, they did not qualify under the statute.

III

Since I do not believe that the Court is correct in concluding that the regulation promulgated by the Civil Service Commission is invalid because of any lack of authority in the Commission to promulgate the rule, I must address the question of whether "the national interests" identified by the petitioners would adequately support a "determination . . . to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service." Ante, at 116. This question was saved in both Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), and in In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973), and I agree with the Court that "the paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of the holding in Sugarman as decisive of this case." Ante, at 100.

"For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government." Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 81.

"[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. [127] Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S., at 588-589, quoted in Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 81 n. 17.

See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S., at 765-767; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711-713 (1893).

I conclude therefore that Congress, in the exercise of its political judgment, could have excluded aliens from the civil service. The fact that it chose, in a separate political decision, to allow the Civil Service Commission to make this determination does not render the governmental policy any less "political" and, consequently, does not render it any more subject to judicial scrutiny under the reasoning of Diaz, ante, p. 67. The regulations here, enforced without question for nearly a century, do not infringe upon any constitutional right of these respondents. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert Allen Sedler and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Vilma S. Martinez and Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; and by Sandigan et al.

[2] The Civil Service Commission's regulations, 5 CFR § 338.101 (1976), provide in pertinent part:

"(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.

"(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States. However, a noncitizen may be given (1) a limited executive assignment under section 305.509 of this chapter in the absence of qualified citizens or (2) an appointment in rare cases under section 316.601 of this chapter, unless the appointment is prohibited by statute."

Apparently the only persons other than citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States are noncitizen "nationals." See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101 (a) (21), (22), 1408. The Solicitor General has advised us that the Commission construes the phrase as covering only natives of American Samoa. Brief for Petitioners 81 n. 67.

[3] The termination letter, dated October 19, 1970, read:

"Your personnel records indicate that you are not a citizen of the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to terminate your services effective close of business October 20/1970 in accordance with the Postal Manual Regulations 711.531."

[4] The defendants named in the original complaint were Robert E. Hampton, Chairman, James E. Johnson, and L. J. Andolsek, Commissioners, Nicholas J. Oganovic, Executive Director, and Asa T. Briley, Regional Director, of the United States Civil Service Commission; Robert L. Kunzig, then Administrator, and Thomas Hannon, Regional Administrator, of the General Services Administration; Elliot Richardson, then Secretary, and Robert Coop, Regional Director, of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Winton Blount, then Postmaster General of the United States; Lim Poon Lee, Postmaster of the city and county of San Francisco; and Russel E. James, Regional Director of the United States Post Office Department.

[5] The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:

"No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."

[6] Judge Peckham held that jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1331. He found no merit in the argument that there had been no waiver of sovereign immunity; he was also satisfied that the action is one which "arises under" the Constitution and laws of the United States and that each plaintiff's claim satisfied the jurisdictional amount.

[7] Section 502 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:

"[N]o part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in continental United States unless such person (1) is a citizen of the United States, (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date, (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States . . . ." 83 Stat. 336.

[8] In using the term "Executive," it is clear that Judge Peckham intended to identify the President, rather than any of the defendant agency heads:

"It is quite rational and reasonable for the Executive, via a grant of power from the Legislature, to determine that the formation of policy and its execution, at whatever level, should be entrusted only to United States citizens. Moreover, as an alternative rational basis for the regulation herein, the Executive may intend that the economic security of its citizens be served by the reservation of competitive civil service positions to them, rather than to aliens." 333 F. Supp., at 532.

[9] Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, and In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, were both decided on June 25, 1973. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, was decided on June 14, 1971, only a few weeks before the District Court decision.

[10] The Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, provides:

"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

[11] Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

"The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . ."

[12] Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719. The technical amendment to Title 5 removed the officers and employees of the Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission from the definitions of officers and employees who are subject to civil service.

[13] During this period the Postal Service Personnel Handbook provided:

"317.3 Citizenship Requirements

".31 Applicability

".311 Except as provided in 317.312 below, only persons who are citizens of, or owe allegiance to the United States shall be given appointments in the Postal Service. Natives of American Samoa are the only noncitizens who, as a group, owe permanent allegiance to the United States.

".312 Regional Postmasters General may approve individual appointments of noncitizen nationals under unusual circumstances such as when qualified citizens are not available. These appointments will be subject to the individual prior approval of the Regional Postmaster General.

".32 Responsibility for Determining Citizenship

"The appointing officer is responsible for determining that all persons selected for appointment meet the citizenship requirement." Transmittal Letter 2, 8-18-72.

[14] The Postal Bulletin issued on May 2, 1974 substituted the following "citizenship requirements" for those quoted in n. 12, supra:

"317.3 Citizenship Requirements

".31 Noncitizens of the United States who have been accorded permanent resident alien status in the United States are eligible for appointment to all Postal Service positions other than positions in levels PES-20 and above, and positions designated by the Postal Service as sensitive. Natives of American Samoa are eligible for appointment to all Postal Service positions. Appointments of non-citizens to positions in levels PES-20 and above or to positions designated as sensitive can only be made with the prior approval of the appropriate Regional Postmaster General or an Assistant Post-master General, in headquarters.

".32 The appointing officer may make his determination as to whether the appointee is a citizen of the United States on the basis of the eligible's sworn or affirmed statement, on Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, at the time of appointment. A noncitizen's permanent resident alien status shall be determined by reference to the appointee's Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-151), which the permanent resident alien is furnished by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

".33 The appointing officer is responsible for determining that all persons selected for appointment meet the requirements of sections 317.31 and 317.32.

"Regional and local postal officials should take appropriate measures to insure that announcements and forms conform to the new policy, and that prospective applicants for postal employment are given correct information concerning the policy."

[15] Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629. The Postal Service, in modifying its citizenship regulations (n. 13, supra), specifically indicated that it was doing so "[a]s a result of recent Federal litigation." Postal Bull., May 2, 1974. p. 2.

[16] Brief for Petitioners 2.

[17] The petitioners state:

"Our primary submission is that the decision to limit employment of noncitizens in the federal competitive civil service is likewise a matter beyond the reach of the equal protection principle." Id., at 24-25.

[18] Since the Due Process Clause appears in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whereas the Equal Protection Clause does not, it is quite clear that the primary office of the latter differs from, and is additive to, the protection guaranteed by the former.

[19] Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500.

[20] In that case we did not reach the question whether New York's citizenship restriction was in conflict with Congress' comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization, see 413 U. S., at 646, where we cited Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380, and we were careful to avoid intimating any view on the question raised in the case now before us. We stated:

"We are aware that citizenship requirements are imposed in certain aspects of the federal service. See 5 U. S. C. § 3301; Exec. Order No. 10577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, § 2.1 (1954); 5 CFR §§ 338.101, 302.203 (g) (1973); and, for example, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriation Act, 1972, § 602, Pub. L. 92-49, 85 Stat. 122, and Public Works Appropriations Act, 1971, § 502, Pub. L. 91-439, 84 Stat. 902. In deciding the present case, we intimate no view as to whether these federal citizenship requirements are or are not susceptible of constitutional challenge. See Jalil v. Hampton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 415, 460 F. 2d 923, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 Geo. L. J. 207 (1972)." 413 U. S., at 646 n. 12.

[21] It should, of course, be noted that in Sugarman we merely held that the flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that had little if any relation to a State's legitimate interests could not withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and we were careful to point out that the holding did not preclude individualized determinations that particular persons could be refused employment on the basis of noncitizenship, or that citizenship could be required as a qualification for appropriately defined classes of positions. See id., at 646-647.

[22] It is important to note that the authority to control immigration is not only vested solely in the Federal Government, rather than the States, see Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42, but also that the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713, where Mr. Justice Gray, writing for the Court, stated:

"The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene."

[23] Some of these disadvantages stem directly from the Constitution itself, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 651-653 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The legitimacy of the delineation of the affected class buttresses the conclusion that it is "a `discrete and insular' minority," see In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721 and, of course, is consistent with the premise that the class is one whose members suffer special disabilities.

[24] See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573-574, and cases cited. See also the statement for the Court by Mr. Justice Hughes in Truax v. Raich, supra, a case dealing with the employment opportunities of aliens:

"It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. . . . If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41.

[25] We note, however, that the petitioners do not rely on the District Court's reasoning that the regulation might be justified as serving the economic security of United States citizens. Our discussion of the "special public interest" doctrine in Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 643-645, no doubt explains the petitioners' failure to press this argument in this case. We have no occasion, therefore, to decide when, if ever, that doctrine might justify federal legislation.

[26] 22 Stat. 403.

[27] See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 149; H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service 1-11 (1958).

[28] A companion bill introduced by Senator Dawes (S. 939) would have expressly provided that "appointments are open to competition to any citizen of the United States, male or female. . . . [V]acancies shall be filled by competitive examination open to all citizens, in conformity with the provisions of this act . . . ." Appendix to S. Rep. No. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1882).

The Senate Committee also eliminated, apparently as unnecessary, a preamble that referred to the desirability of allowing "so far as practicable all citizens" equal employment opportunities. See S. Rep. No. 576, supra, at XII; see also 14 Cong. Rec. 661 (1882).

[29] See, e. g., the remarks of Senator Hawley:

"Of course it will not do to admit to examination everybody that applies for it. There will be requirements—anybody can think of a few in a moment—the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, he must be in fair physical health, he must be within reasonable limits as to age, he certainly must be able to read and write." Id., at 243.

[30] It is noteworthy, however, that other grounds for exclusion from the federal service that would normally be governed by regulation were expressly identified in the statute itself. See § 8 prohibiting the employment of persons habitually using intoxicating beverages to excess, and § 9 prohibiting the employment of members of a family already adequately represented in public service. 22 Stat. 406.

[31] Our recent opinion in In re Griffiths noted that from "its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew strength from the immigration of aliens." 413 U. S., at 719. After referring to their self-evident contributions to the social and economic life of the country, and after reviewing the objectionable character of any classification based on alienage, we stated: "Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities." Id., at 722.

[32] See the Instructions to Applicants Who Wish to Enter the United States Civil Service as reprinted on p. 83 of the Second Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission (1885).

[33] Independent Offices Appropriation Bill (H. R. 8837, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.).

[34] 83 Cong. Rec. 357.

[35] Id., at 2424.

[36] See House Manager's Report on the Conference on Amendment of the Senate to H. R. 8947, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1981, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The provision appeared in several Appropriations Acts. See 52 Stat. 148, 289, 435, 1162.

[37] 56 Stat. 422.

[38] 57 Stat. 196.

[39] 67 Stat. 435.

[40] See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 726 n. 18.

[41] Rule XI, Civil Service Rules, promulgated Nov. 7, 1883. First Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission 47 (1884).

[42] Rule V of the Civil Service Rules of May 6, 1896, expressly provided: "Every applicant for examination must be a citizen of the United States . . . ." See Thirteenth Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission 57 (1897).

[43] See Twentieth Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission 48 (1904).

[44] It is, of course, clear that one need not be a citizen in order to take in good conscience an oath to support the Constitution. See In re Griffiths, supra, at 726 n. 18.

[45] Exec. Order No. 458 (June 13, 1906). Prior to that amendment, Executive Orders had been issued waiving the citizenship requirement in specific cases because of a lack of qualified citizens. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 434 (Mar. 28, 1906).

[46] The relevant portions of 39 U. S. C. § 1001 read as follows:

"§ 1001. Appointment and status.

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the Postal Service shall appoint all officers and employees of the Postal Service.

"(b) Officers and employees of the Postal Service (other than those individuals appointed under sections 202, 204, and 1001 (c) of this title) shall be in the postal career service, which shall be a part of the civil service. Such appointments and promotions shall be in accordance with the procedures established by the Postal Service. The Postal Service shall establish procedures, in accordance with this title, to assure its officers and employees meaningful opportunities for promotion and career development and to assure its officers and employees full protection of their employment rights by guaranteeing them an opportunity for a fair hearing on adverse actions, with representatives of their own choosing.

.....

"(e) The Postal Service shall have the right, consistent with section 1003 and chapter 12 of this title and applicable laws, regulations, and collective-bargaining agreements—

"(1) to direct officers and employees of the Postal Service in the performance of official duties;

"(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain officers and employees in positions within the Postal Service, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against such officers and employees;

"(3) to relieve officers and employees from duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons;

"(4) to maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to it;

"(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted;

"(6) to prescribe a uniform dress to be worn by letter carriers and other designated employees; and

"(7) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out its mission in emergency situations."

[47] Even if this conclusion were doubtful, in view of the consequences of the rule it would be appropriate to require a much more explicit directive from either Congress or the President before accepting the conclusion that the political branches of Government would consciously adopt a policy raising the constitutional questions presented by this rule. Cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 345; Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 299-300.

[48] The Commission, of course, acts under the direction of the President.

Title 5 U. S. C. § 3301 (1) provides:

"The President may—

"(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service;

Title 5 U. S. C. § 1302 (a) provides:

"(a) The Civil Service Commission, subject to the rules prescribed by the President under this title for the administration of the competitive service, shall prescribe regulations for, control, supervise, and preserve the records of, examinations for the competitive service."

[49] We find no merit in the petitioners' argument that a more discriminating rule would inevitably breed litigation which in turn would enhance the administrative burden. For even though the argument of administrative convenience may not support a total exclusion, it would adequately support a rather broad classification of positions reflecting the considered judgment of an agency expert in personnel matters. For the classification itself would demonstrate that the Commission had at least considered the extent to which the imposition of the rule is consistent with its assigned mission.

[50] See 8 U. S. C. § 1103.

[51] In Galvan the Court held that congressional policies "pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government." 347 U. S., at 531. As such, the only judicial review of those policies is to insure that the Government has respected the demands of procedural due process not whether the policies themselves are constitutionally valid.

[52] Also, 5 U. S. C. § 1302 directly authorized the Civil Service Commission, subject to rules prescribed by the President, to "prescribe regulations for . . . examinations for the competitive service."

[53] In Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948), the Court approved a delegation of authority from Congress through the President to the Attorney General to deport any "alien enemies" whom the Attorney General deemed to be "dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States." Presidential Proclamation No. 2655, 59 Stat. 870 (1945). The Court held that the "Attorney General was the President's voice and conscience. A war power of the President not subject to judicial review is not transmuted into a judicially reviewable action because the President chooses to have that power exercised within narrower limits than Congress authorized." 335 U. S., at 165-166.

1.1.4 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia 1.1.4 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia

486 F.3d 1342 (2007)

PUBLIC CITIZEN, Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 06-5232.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued February 9, 2007.
Decided May 29, 2007.

Allison M. Zieve argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Adina H. Rosenbaum, Brian Wolfman, and Scott L. Nelson.

Martha Jane Perkins was on the brief for amici curiae Representatives Henry R. Waxman, et al. in support of appellant urging reversal.

Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, Jonathan F. Cohn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney. R. [1343] Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Michael F. Altschul and Helgi C. Walker were on the brief for amicus curiae CTIA-The Wireless Association in support of appellee.

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Article I of the United States Constitution requires that before proposed legislation may "become[] a Law," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, "(1) a bill containing its exact text [must be] approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate [must] approve[] precisely the same text; and (3) that text [must be] signed into law by the President," Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998). Public Citizen, a not-for-profit consumer advocacy organization, filed suit in District Court claiming that the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) ("DRA" or "Act"), is invalid because the bill that was presented to the President did not first pass both chambers of Congress in the exact same form. In particular, Public Citizen contends that the statute's enactment did not comport with the bicameral passage requirement of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, because the version of the legislation that was presented to the House contained a clerk's error with respect to one term, so the House and Senate voted on slightly different versions of the bill and the President signed the version passed by the Senate. Public Citizen asserts that it is irrelevant that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate both signed a version of the proposed legislation identical to the version signed by the President. Nor does it matter, Public Citizen argues, that the congressional leaders' signatures attest that indistinguishable legislative text passed both houses.

The District Court held that Public Citizen's bicameralism claim is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892). See Public Citizen v. Clerk, U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 451 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.D.C. 2006). In that case, the Court held that the judiciary must treat the attestations of "the two houses, through their presiding officers" as "conclusive evidence that [a bill] was passed by Congress." Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672-73, 12 S.Ct. 495. Under Marshall Field, a bill signed by the leaders of the House and Senate—an attested "enrolled bill"—establishes that Congress passed the text included therein "according to the forms of the Constitution," and it "should be deemed complete and unimpeachable." Id. at 672-73, 12 S.Ct. 495. Recognizing that Marshall Field's "enrolled bill rule" prohibited it from questioning the congressional pedigree of the bill signed by the Speaker and President pro tempore, the District Court dismissed Public Citizen's complaint and denied its motion for summary judgment. Public Citizen, 451 F.Supp.2d 109.

Public Citizen has appealed, arguing that while Marshall Field may prohibit the impeachment of an enrolled bill by reference to congressional journals, the decision does not bar a court from considering other evidence extrinsic to an enrolled bill. Public Citizen claims further that even if Marshall Field was not so restricted as originally decided, subsequent decisions of the Court have narrowed the enrolled bill rule. Appellee and CTIA—the Wireless [1344] Association ("CTIA"), appearing as amicus curiae, urge affirmance and contend that Public Citizen lacks standing to challenge the DRA.

We agree with the District Court that the enrolled bill rule of Marshall Field controls the disposition of this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. We find it unnecessary to determine whether Public Citizen has standing to bring suit, because we conclude that the Marshall Field rule of dismissal "represents the sort of `threshold question' [that] . . . may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction." Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005).

I. BACKGROUND

A. "Engrossed Bills" and "Enrolled Bills" in the House and Senate

Congress has established specific procedures governing passage of a bill:

[1] Every bill . . . in each House of Congress shall, when such bill . . . passes either House, be printed, and such printed copy shall be called the engrossed bill. . . .

[2] Said engrossed bill . . . shall be signed by the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate, and shall be sent to the other House, and in that form shall be dealt with by that House and its officers, and, if passed, returned signed by said Clerk or Secretary.

[3] When such bill . . . shall have passed both Houses, it shall be printed and shall then be called the enrolled bill, . . . signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and sent to the President of the United States.

1 U.S.C. § 106. An "engrossed bill" is thus one that has passed one chamber of Congress, while an "enrolled bill" has passed both the House and the Senate.

B. Public Citizen's Challenge to the DRA

On February 8, 2006, President Bush signed a budget bill known as the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. In ten titles, the DRA amends a variety of familiar statutes, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Communications Act of 1934, and the Social Security Act. The provisions of the DRA are sweeping: the Act, inter alia, effects extensive changes to Medicare and Medicaid laws, provides relief for victims of Hurricane Katrina, creates a program through which households may obtain coupons to defray the cost of digital-to-analog converter boxes for their televisions, and, significantly, for purposes of this law suit, amends the U.S. Code to increase the filing fee for civil actions in federal district courts from $250 to $350.

Approximately six weeks after the President signed the DRA, Public Citizen filed a complaint against the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ("Clerk"), arguing that as an organization that routinely files civil suits, it anticipated having to pay the $100 fee increase on a regular basis. Public Citizen asked the District Court to declare the Act unconstitutional and compel the Clerk to maintain the $250 filing fee.

The facts in this case are straightforward and largely undisputed. Nonetheless, on review of a motion to dismiss, we "must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant [Public Citizen] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will therefore recite the facts underlying the complaint as they have been presented by Public Citizen.

[1345] According to the complaint, in the Fall of 2005, the House and Senate passed different versions of a budget bill referred to as S. 1932. To iron out the differences, the legislation was sent to a conference committee. The committee produced a conference report which failed to pass the Senate. Shortly thereafter the Senate passed an amended version of S. 1932 wherein § 5101 specified a 13-month duration of Medicare payments for certain durable medical equipment. However, when the Senate clerk transmitted the engrossed S. 1932 to the House, he mistakenly changed § 5101 of the bill to reflect a 36-month duration of payments for durable medical equipment rather than the 13-month duration actually approved by the Senate. The House voted on this engrossed bill, including the erroneous duration figure. Because the legislation originated in the Senate, the House returned it to the Senate for enrollment. The Senate clerk, recognizing the transcription error in the engrossed bill, altered the text of the enrolled bill so that it included a 13-month rather than a 36-month duration. The version of the DRA signed by the presiding officers contains the 13-month figure. Thus, since the 13-month duration term in the enrolled bill passed the Senate but not the House, the President signed legislation that did not actually pass both houses of Congress in precisely the same form.

After filing its complaint, Public Citizen moved for summary judgment. The Clerk lodged a motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court denied Public Citizen's motion and granted dismissal, concluding that even if it accepted Public Citizen's allegations as true, the bicameralism challenge still "must fail" under the enrolled bill rule of Marshall Field. Public Citizen, 451 F.Supp.2d at 128. Public Citizen now appeals the dismissal of its complaint and denial of its motion for summary judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The District Court dismissed Public Citizen's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and denied its motion for summary judgment, see FED. R. CIV. P. 56. A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo—meaning that this court applies the same decisional principles as the District Courts. See, e.g., Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1039-40 (D.C.Cir. 2003). A denial of a motion for summary judgment typically is not a final order, so it is ordinarily not appealable. See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 296 (D.C.Cir. 2006). However, an order denying a motion for summary judgment may be reviewed on appeal "where it is accompanied by a final order disposing of all issues before the district court." Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992). We review a denial of summary judgment de novo. "The test to be applied in reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion is that summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact or when viewing the evidence and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Standing and Other Threshold Issues

The Clerk and CTIA contend that Public Citizen cannot meet the irreducible [1346] constitutional minimum of standing. Appellee's Br. at 30-32; Br. of Amicus Curiae at 19-27; see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (describing Article III standing requirements). In particular, CTIA argues that, "in addition to requiring injury-in-fact and causation, Article III obliges the plaintiff to establish that the alleged injury is judicially redressable. Because the putatively unconstitutional provision of the DRA can be severed from the concededly valid remainder of the Act, Public Citizen's grievance concerning increased filing fees simply would not be redressed by a favorable decision in this appeal." Br. of Amicus Curiae at 4 (citation omitted). The Clerk concurs in this view, Appellee's Br. at 30, but argues in the alternative that we may affirm without addressing standing, because Marshall Field erects a threshold barrier to judicial inquiry, id. at 30 n. 7. We agree that we may affirm without reaching the issue of standing.

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Supreme Court held "that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question" to be answered prior to any merits inquiry. 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The Court emphasized that in order to dismiss a claim for failure "to state a cause of action" a court must have "power to adjudicate the case." Id. at 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Therefore, such a dismissal cannot be issued "before resolving a dispute" concerning jurisdiction. Id. at 92, 118 S.Ct. 1003. The Court noted, however, that in some cases involving "extraordinary procedural postures," id. at 98, 118 S.Ct. 1003, federal courts have permissibly resolved the merits of a dispute without first addressing an outstanding jurisdictional question, see id. at 98-101, 118 S.Ct. 1003. The Court added that some of these cases "must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Id. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003; see also id. at 110-11, 118 S.Ct. 1003 ("[T]he Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in reserv[ing] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party.") (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Further diluting the "purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question," the Court in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999), observed that

[w]hile Steel Co. reasoned that subject-matter jurisdiction necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits, the same principle does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues. "[A] court that dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds such as . . . personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separation of powers principles underlying . . . Steel Company." It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits. Thus, as the Court observed in Steel Co., district courts do not overstep Article III limits when they decline jurisdiction of state-law claims on discretionary grounds without determining whether those claims fall within their pendent jurisdiction, or abstain . . . without deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy. . . .

Id. at 584-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563 (internal citations omitted); see also Seale v. INS, 323 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Despite [1347] sweeping language . . . Steel Co. does not, in all instances, create an absolute rule against bypassing questions of a jurisdictional nature.").

Doubts about Steel Co.'s reach were significantly quelled in Tenet when the Court held that a federal court is not obliged to decide jurisdictional issues before certain nonjurisdictional "rule[s] designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry." Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230. In Tenet, the Court held that the Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 23 L.Ed. 605 (1875), rule of dismissal may be addressed before finding jurisdiction. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230. Totten involved a suit brought by "a self-styled Civil War spy [against] . . . the United States to enforce its obligations under their secret espionage agreement." Id. at 3, 125 S.Ct. 1230. The Court concluded that "public policy forb[ids]" such a suit, id., since "[e]ven a small chance that some court will order disclosure of a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources to close up like a clam," id. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 1230 (internal quotation marks omitted). When two alleged Cold War spies brought a similar suit, the Tenet Court held that "the Totten rule of dismissal . . . represents the sort of `threshold question' [that] . . . may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction," explaining that "[i]t would be inconsistent with the unique and categorical nature of the Totten bar—a rule designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry—to first allow discovery or other proceedings in order to resolve the jurisdictional question." Id. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230.

Justice Scalia joined the majority but wrote separately to emphasize his belief that Tenet does not broaden Steel Co. He argued that when the majority opinion

describes "the unique and categorical nature of the Totten bar . . .," it is assuredly not describing the mere everyday absence of a cause of action. As applied today, the bar of Totten is a jurisdictional one.

Of course even if it were not, given the squarely applicable precedent of Totten, the absence of a cause of action is so clear that [the] claims are frivolous— establishing another jurisdictional ground for dismissal that the Steel Co. majority opinion acknowledges.

Id. at 12, 125 S.Ct. 1230 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Although the majority opinion does not say explicitly whether Totten erects a "jurisdictional" bar, it does state that the rule stems from public policy concerns without mentioning Article III limitations. More significantly, the Tenet Court phrases its holding in terms that undermine Justice Scalia's contention: "[T]he Totten rule of dismissal . . . represents the sort of `threshold question' [that] . . . may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction." Id. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230 (emphasis added).

Any remaining doubt as to whether a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction was put to rest in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007). In Sinochem, the Supreme Court applied Tenet to another rule of dismissal "designed . . . to preclude judicial inquiry." Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230. The Court held that "a district court has discretion to respond at once to a . . . forum non conveniens plea, and need not take up first any other threshold objection [such as] . . . whether it has authority to adjudicate the cause." Sinochem, 127 S.Ct. at 1188, 127 S.Ct. 1184. Since dismissal pursuant to the forum [1348] non conveniens doctrine—like a Totten dismissal—"den[ies] audience to a case on the merits," the Court reasoned, it "does not entail any assumption . . . of substantive `law-declaring power.'" Id. at 1191-93 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563). No one would contend that forum non conveniens constitutes a jurisdictional ground for dismissal. Indeed, the Sinochem decision refers to a district court's "discretion to" dismiss pursuant to the doctrine. Id. at 1188. Sinochem thus firmly establishes that certain non-merits, nonjurisdictional issues may be addressed preliminarily, because "`[j]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.'" Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006)).

There are two lines of analysis pursuant to which it might be argued that Marshall Field's enrolled bill rule creates a "jurisdictional" bar. First, because the Court based its holding in part upon separation of powers concerns, see Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 673, 12 S.Ct. 495, the rule could be viewed as an application of the political question doctrine which is derived from Article III's "controversy" requirement, Massachusetts v. EPA, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1452, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214-15, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (describing Marshall Field as involving considerations similar to those in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), which were "committed to congressional resolution" and based on "criteria of decision that necessarily escape[] the judicial grasp"); Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (citing Marshall Field as an application of the political question doctrine); see also United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Another doctrine closely related to—if not inherent in—the political question doctrine is the so-called `enrolled bill rule.'"); United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (characterizing extension of the enrolled bill rule as an application of the political question doctrine). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (describing Marshall Field as "address[ing] and resolv[ing] the question whether" an attested enrolled bill does not become a law if it has not in fact been passed by Congress); cf. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (clarifying prudential nature of abstention in case challenging committee seat distribution). Second, because the enrolled bill rule foreordains the failure of Public Citizen's challenge, Marshall Field also could be seen as depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to claims that are "so . . . foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court . . . as not to involve a federal controversy." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In any event, the Marshall Field rule most certainly falls within the ambit of Tenet and Sinochem. The District Court "assume[d] without deciding that [the Clerk's] motion to dismiss . . . [was] properly made pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6)," since it concluded that "the label applied d[id] not affect [its] analysis or outcome." Public Citizen, 451 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 9. But the enrolled bill rule does not authorize a merits dismissal for failure to state a claim. Rather, like the Totten rule of dismissal and forum non conveniens, the enrolled bill rule is "designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry," Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230. Where an attested enrolled bill exists, a court must dismiss prior to adjudicating a bicameralism challenge, "`denying audience to [the] case on the merits,'" Sinochem, [1349] 127 S.Ct. at 1191 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585, 119 S.Ct. 1563). At a minimum, the Marshall Field rule is thus a non-merits threshold ground for dismissal. We therefore need not decide whether the enrolled bill rule creates a jurisdictional bar. Nor is it necessary for us to determine whether Public Citizen lacks standing. Accordingly, we will proceed directly to Marshall Field dismissal.

C. The Enrolled Bill Rule

1. Marshall Field Squarely Applies

In Marshall Field, importers protesting duties levied against them sought to have the Tariff Act of 1890 declared unconstitutional. 143 U.S. at 662-69, 12 S.Ct. 495. According to the importers, even though the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate had endorsed the bill as having passed the bodies over which they presided, "it [was] shown by the Congressional record of proceedings, reports of committees of each house, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress" that part of the bill passed was missing in the version enrolled. Id. at 668-69, 12 S.Ct. 495. The importers argued that the Journal Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal."), enshrines congressional journals—not the enrolled bill—as "the best, if not conclusive, evidence upon the issue as to whether a bill was, in fact, passed by the two houses of Congress." Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 670, 12 S.Ct. 495.

The Court rejected this interpretation of the bicameral passage requirement, holding that the object of the Journal Clause is to ensure transparency in legislative activities, not to "prescribe the mode in which the fact of the original passage of a bill by the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be authenticated, or preclude Congress from adopting any mode to that end which its wisdom suggests." Id. at 670-71, 12 S.Ct. 495. Recognizing that Congress had long chosen signing of the enrolled bill by the presiding members of both houses as its method of authentication, the Court held that "the judicial department [must] act upon that assurance, and . . . accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Id. at 671-72, 12 S.Ct. 495.

The Marshall Field Court rested this conclusion upon two rationales. First, the Court reasoned by reference to public policy:

[W]e cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and by the approval of the President, and been deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, was not in fact passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and therefore did not become a law.

Id. at 670, 12 S.Ct. 495.

Better, far better, that a provision should occasionally find its way into the statute through mistake, or even fraud, than that every act . . . should at any and all times be liable to be put in issue and impeached. . . . Such a state of uncertainty in the statute laws of the land would lead to mischiefs absolutely intolerable.

[1350] Id. at 675, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 676, 12 S.Ct. 495. Second, the Court based its holding on separation of powers concerns, citing "the respect due to a coördinate branch of the government." Id. at 673, 12 S.Ct. 495; see also id. at 676-77, 12 S.Ct. 495 (explaining that "the spectacle of examination of [congressional proceedings by the courts]" would "subordinate[] the legislature and disregard[] that coequal position in our system of the three departments of government" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court crafted a clear rule: "[I]t is not competent for [a party raising a bicameralism challenge] to show, from the journals of either house, from the reports of committees or from other documents printed by authority of Congress, that [an] enrolled bill" differs from that actually passed by Congress. Id. at 680, 12 S.Ct. 495. The only "evidence upon which a court may act when the issue is made as to whether a bill . . . asserted to have become a law, was or was not passed by Congress" is an enrolled act attested to by declaration of "the two houses, through their presiding officers." Id. at 670, 672, 12 S.Ct. 495. An enrolled bill, "thus attested," "is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress." Id. at 672-73, 12 S.Ct. 495. "[T]he enrollment itself is the record, which is conclusive as to what the statute is. . . ." Id. at 675, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the case at bar, the record contains a copy of the DRA bearing the signatures of then Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert and President pro tempore of the Senate Ted Stevens. Where such an attested enrolled bill exists, Marshall Field requires "the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept [the bill] as having passed Congress." Id. at 672, 12 S.Ct. 495. Even if "the Congressional record of proceedings, reports of committees of each house, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress," id. at 668-69, 12 S.Ct. 495, indicate that the House voted to enact a 36-month duration of Medicare payments for certain durable medical equipment while the Senate passed a 13-month figure, the courts are barred from considering this extrinsic evidence. The District Court therefore correctly dismissed Public Citizen's complaint pursuant to the enrolled bill rule.

2. Public Citizen's Attempts to Distinguish and Narrow Marshall Field

Public Citizen admits that the importers in Marshall Field "offered exhibits other than the journals, such as excerpts from the Congressional Record" and acknowledges the Court's references to "reports of committees [and] other documents printed by authority of [C]ongress." Appellant's Br. at 24-25. But Public Citizen argues that since the importers primarily relied upon congressional journals and "journals are the only evidence discussed" at length in the opinion, the Marshall Field Court's expansive statements regarding the conclusive nature of the enrolled bill constitute "dicta going beyond what was necessary to decide the case" and the decision should be read to hold only that as between journals and an enrolled bill, the enrolled bill is the superior evidence. Id. at 21-25.

We easily reject this attempt to distinguish Marshall Field as a case concerned solely with congressional journals. As noted above, the Court first held that "the enrollment itself is the record, which is conclusive as to what the statute is," and it cannot be impeached by other materials. Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 675, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then confirmed that "it is not [1351] competent for the appellants to show, from the journals of either house, from the reports of committees or from other documents printed by authority of Congress, that the enrolled bill . . . as finally passed, contained a section that does not appear in the enrolled act." Id. at 680, 12 S.Ct. 495 (emphasis added).

Nothing in the Marshall Field opinion purports to limit application of the enrolled bill rule to journal-based challenges. And neither of the Court's rationales applies solely to impeachment by journals. No less "uncertainty in the statute laws" upon which "depend public and private interests of vast magnitude," id. at 670, 675, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks omitted), would result from allowing collateral attack of the enrolled bill by congressional documents other than journals. And "the spectacle of examination of journals by [the courts]" no more "subordinates the legislature," id. at 676-77, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), than does inspection of other materials. Marshall Field's plain language and justification cannot be read to create a rule of dismissal limited to the claims of plaintiffs who rely primarily upon journals to rebut an attested enrolled bill.

Public Citizen also contends that even if Marshall Field was not so restricted as originally decided, subsequent precedent has narrowed its holding. We view the legal landscape quite differently. First, the Supreme Court has applied the enrolled bill rule, see Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 562, 16 S.Ct. 890, 40 L.Ed. 1069 (1896) (taking attested enrolled bill of Arizona legislature "to have been enacted in the mode required by law, and to be unimpeachable"), and extended Marshall Field's holding to claims challenging state ratification of constitutional amendments, see Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137, 42 S.Ct. 217, 66 L.Ed. 505 (1922) ("As the Legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to [ratify the Nineteenth Amendment], official notice to the Secretary [of State], duly authenticated, that they had done so was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts."); cf. Sitka, 845 F.2d at 46-47 (same where Sixteenth Amendment was challenged); Stahl, 792 F.2d at 1440-41 (same); United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).

Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals have consistently invoked Marshall Field in refusing to conduct other inquiries "into the internal governance of Congress." Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 571 (9th Cir. 1989); see, e.g., United States v. Campbell, No. 06-3418, 221 Fed.Appx. 459, 2007 WL 1028785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) (unpublished order) ("Campbell proposes to argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which gives district judges jurisdiction to hear criminal prosecutions, has no legal effect because the House and Senate did not vote on it in the same session of Congress. . . . The enrolled bill rule prevents looking behind laws in th[at] way. . . ."); Mester Mfg., 879 F.2d at 570-71 (holding that "[i]n the absence of express constitutional direction, [the courts must] defer to the reasonable procedures Congress has ordained for its internal business" where an employer "assert[ed] that [the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986] is entirely null and void, as unconstitutionally passed . . . because Congress has no constitutional authority to present a bill after adjournment sine die"); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 F. 39, 42-43 (9th Cir. 1904) ("The appellant cannot go behind the authenticated published statutes of the United States, and show that an act which purports to have been approved on a certain date was in fact approved on a different date."); cf. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 522 [1352] (D.C.Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that a statute may only be supported by a rational basis included in congressional papers and citing Marshall Field for the proposition that "Congress has broad discretion in determining what must be published in the official record").

Finally, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Marshall Field in a case clarifying the limits of the enrolled bill rule:

[T]he Marshall Field doctrine does not preclude us from asking whether the statute means something other than what the punctuation dictates. . . . The Marshall Field doctrine concerns the nature of the evidence the Court [may] consider in determining whether a bill had actually passed Congress; it places no limits on the evidence a court may consider in determining the meaning of a bill that has passed Congress.

U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding Marshall Field irrelevant where the court's "task . . . [was] not to doubt the accuracy or validity of [a bill's] language, but merely to determine what Congress intended by it"); Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The enrolled bill doctrine . . . forestall[s] judicial inquiry into procedural irregularities occurring prior to the enactment of bills, not inherent defects in bills as enrolled.").

Even in the face of this evidence, Public Citizen argues that "there can be no question that courts may look behind an enrolled bill to assess whether a law was passed." Appellant's Br. at 10. Appellant rests this claim on the concluding sentence of an oblique footnote in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990), see id. at 391 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1964, a case decided three years prior to the Court's reaffirmance of Marshall Field in U.S. National Bank of Oregon.

In Munoz-Flores, a Magistrate ordered the defendant to pay a special assessment for each federal misdemeanor to which he pled guilty. 495 U.S. at 388, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Munoz-Flores argued that the statute authorizing such assessments "was passed in violation of the Origination Clause" which "mandates that `[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.'" Id. at 387-88, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1). In an earlier Origination Clause decision, the Court avoided determining whether the enrolled bill rule applies to such challenges by first concluding that the act before it was "clearly not a revenue bill." See Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 200-03, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897). Although the Munoz-Flores Court likewise ultimately decided that the bill at issue "was not one for raising revenue" and therefore found "consideration of [the] origination question unnecessary," 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal quotation marks omitted), it first addressed justiciability. The Court framed its holding that Munoz-Flores' claim was justiciable in terms of the traditional political question doctrine under Baker v. Carr, never mentioning Marshall Field in the text of its opinion. Id. at 389-96, 110 S.Ct. 1964.

Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's justiciability determination, stating that the Marshall Field "principle, if not the very same holding, [led him] to conclude that federal courts should not undertake an independent investigation into the origination of [a] statute . . . [where] . . . [t]he designation `H.J. Res.' (a standard abbreviation for `House Joint Resolution') attests that the legislation originated in the [1353] House." Id. at 408-10, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The Munoz-Flores Court responded in a footnote:

JUSTICE SCALIA . . . contends that Congress' resolution of the constitutional question in passing the bill [with an "H.J. Res." designation] bars this Court from independently considering that question. The only case he cites for his argument is Marshall Field. . . . But Field does not support his argument. That case concerned "the nature of the evidence" the Court would consider in determining whether a bill had actually passed Congress. . . . The Court rejected [the importers'] interpretation of the Journal Clause, holding that the Constitution left it to Congress to determine how a bill is to be authenticated as having passed. In the absence of any constitutional requirement binding Congress, we stated that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments" demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.

Id. at 391 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal citations omitted).

Public Citizen reads the last lines of this footnote to effectively distinguish between Journal Clause challenges on one hand and Origination Clause and Bicameralism Clause challenges on the other:

The distinction made . . . is between requirements with respect to the enactment of laws and requirements that do not affect valid enactment. Thus, for example, the Constitution requires Congress to keep journals, but neither the Constitution nor any statute conditions the enactment of laws on the keeping of journals or imposes requirements on the content of journals. Accordingly, as in Marshall Field, the content of congressional journals cannot be used to impeach the validity of an enrolled bill that has been signed. . . . On the other hand, the Constitution requires that legislation to raise revenue originate in the House. Therefore, as in Munoz-Flores, the courts may look beyond an enrolled bill to determine whether a law has been passed in accordance with that constitutional condition. . . .

At issue in this case is another requirement for the valid enactment of law—the requirement that identical legislation be passed in both the House and the Senate before it is presented to the President for his signature. In accordance with both Munoz-Flores and Marshall Field, the Court can and should examine the evidence that this requirement has been violated.

Appellant's Br. at 10-11.

Public Citizen's attempt to square the Munoz-Flores footnote with Court precedent fails. In assessing appellant's claim, it is important to recall that Munoz-Flores did not in any way involve the question raised in Marshall Field, i.e., whether an authenticated enrolled bill had passed Congress. The question instead was whether a provision that unquestionably had passed Congress constituted a bill for raising revenue. It is not plausible to think that the Court meant to overrule the enrolled bill rule in the last two sentences of an obscure footnote in a case that did not involve an application of the rule. Under Public Citizen's interpretation, the Munoz-Flores Court overruled the time-tested Marshall Field decision sub silento in a footnote, and then three years later inadvertently referenced the purportedly defunct rule in U.S. National Bank of Oregon. See 508 U.S. at 455 n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2173. The argument collapses under its own weight.

[1354] The last two sentences of the cited footnote in Munoz-Flores defy easy comprehension. Nonetheless, the text of the footnote is clear on one point: the Court did not mean to overturn or modify the enrolled bill rule of Marshall Field. The Court's footnote in Munoz-Flores clearly states that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress." 495 U.S. at 392 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then says: "Where . . . a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply." Id. In other words, Marshall Field does apply in a case of the sort at hand, where the court must "accept as passed [the bill] authenticated in the manner provided by Congress." Id. There is nothing in the footnote to indicate that the Court meant to distinguish between challenges arising under the Journal Clause as opposed to challenges arising under the Origination Clause and Bicameralism Clause, as Public Citizen suggests. Indeed, the footnote appears unambiguous in reaffirming that there can be no Bicameralism Clause challenge when a bill has been authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. The text of the footnote may be less than carefully crafted, but it does not admit of the strained construction offered by appellant.

Even more problematic for Public Citizen is that, given our finding that Marshall Field has not been overturned or modified by Munoz-Flores, there can be no doubt that the application of appellant's theory to the case at bar is positively foreclosed by Marshall Field. The decision in Marshall Field addressed a bicameralism challenge, so for us to embrace Public Citizen's argument that the enrolled bill rule does not apply to "requirement[s] for the valid enactment of law," such as the Bicameralism Clause, would be tantamount to narrowing Marshall Field entirely out of existence. Public Citizen's claim that Marshall Field involved only a Journal Clause challenge and no bicameralism challenge is belied by the facts of that case. Although the importers sought support from the Journal Clause in their attempt to impeach the attested enrolled bill, they advanced a Bicameralism Clause challenge, just as Public Citizen does.

We acknowledge that the language of the Munoz-Flores footnote is cumbersome, making it difficult to discern precisely what the Court meant to say. The footnote indicates that the "H.J. Res." moniker does not carry the conclusive weight in the Origination Clause context that the signatures of the presiding officers command in the Bicameralism Clause context. In the text of its decision, the Munoz-Flores Court stated that adjudication of an Origination Clause challenge despite the existence of an "H.J. Res." designation no more "express[es] a lack of respect for the House of Representatives" than does any other constitutional challenge. Id. at 390-91, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In light of this conclusion, the Munoz-Flores footnote might be seen as a simple attempt, in response to Justice Scalia's contention to the contrary, to distinguish Origination Clause challenges from Bicameralism Clause challenges based on the lesser applicability of the separation of powers rationale in the former context. This is hardly a satisfying explanation, however. Alternatively, the footnote might be viewed as an ex post interpretation of Marshall Field. In other words, if in the post-Marshall Field legal landscape any bicameralism challenge made in the face of an attested enrolled bill really raises no constitutional claim, the Munoz-Flores Court could have—with perfect hindsight—treated the claim in Marshall [1355] Field itself as similarly implicating no constitutional provision. This makes some sense. We need not resolve the puzzle of the footnote, however, because we are satisfied that the Court's decision in Munoz-Flores does not purport to overrule or modify the enrolled bill rule.

At bottom, Public Citizen asks that we set aside directly controlling Supreme Court precedent in favor of an ambiguous footnote. Public Citizen attempts to alter the balance, arguing that the engrossed bill it proffers as evidence that the House passed a 36-month duration figure is a "public record" far more reliable than journals and one given "official status" when Congress adopted 1 U.S.C. § 106 after the Court decided Marshall Field. Appellant's Br. at 31-34. But this is beside the point, because the argument in no way undercuts the public policy and separation of powers rationales that undergird the enrolled bill rule. One need only look to the breadth of the DRA to understand the "vast magnitude" of "public and private interests" which depend upon the certainty of statutes. Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 670, 12 S.Ct. 495. And today, no less than in 1892, the spectacle of courts directing legislative authentication procedures and otherwise meddling in the inner workings of Congress "disregards that coequal position . . . of the three [branches] of government." Id. at 676, 12 S.Ct. 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that we "should [not] conclude [that its] more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). Therefore, even if we were inclined to think that the Munoz-Flores footnote offers some implicit support for Public Citizen's position—and we are not—this would not change the outcome that we reach today. The District Court correctly decided that the enrolled bill rule governs the disposition of this case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

1.1.5 Clinton v. City of New York 1.1.5 Clinton v. City of New York

524 U.S. 417 (1998)

CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL.
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK et al.

No. 97-1374.

United States Supreme Court.

Argued April 27, 1998.
Decided June 25, 1998.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[419] [419] [420] Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 449. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Connor, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Part III, post, p. 453. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined as to Part III, post, p. 469.

Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the appellants. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Douglas N. Letter.

Louis R. Cohen argued the cause for appellees Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., et al. With him on the brief were Lloyd N. Cutler, Lawrence A. Kasten, Donald B. Holbrook, Randon W. Wilson, and William H. Orton. Charles J. Cooper argued the cause for appellees City of New York et al. With him on the briefs were M. Sean Laane, Leonard J. Koerner, Alan G. Krams, David B. Goldin, and Peter F. Nadel.[1]

Justice Stevens, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Line Item Veto Act (Act), 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U. S. C. § 691 et seq. (1994 ed., Supp. II), was enacted in April 1996 [421] and became effective on January 1, 1997. The following day, six Members of Congress who had voted against the Act brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia challenging its constitutionality. On April 10, 1997, the District Court entered an order holding that the Act is unconstitutional. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25. In obedience to the statutory direction to allow a direct, expedited appeal to this Court, see §§ 692(b)—(c), we promptly noted probable jurisdiction and expedited review, 520 U. S. 1194 (1997). We determined, however, that the Members of Congress did not have standing to sue because they had not "alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing," Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 830 (1997); thus, "[i]n . . . light of [the] overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere," id., at 820, we remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Less than two months after our decision in that case, the President exercised his authority to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 515, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 895-896, 990-993. Appellees, claiming that they had been injured by two of those cancellations, filed these cases in the District Court. That Court again held the statute invalid, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177— 182 (1998), and we again expedited our review, 522 U. S. 1144 (1998). We now hold that these appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act and, reaching the merits, we agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitution.

I

We begin by reviewing the canceled items that are at issue in these cases. [422] Section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, authorizes the Federal Government to transfer huge sums of money to the States to help finance medical care for the indigent. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(b). In 1991, Congress directed that those federal subsidies be reduced by the amount of certain taxes levied by the States on health care providers.[2] In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) notified the State of New York that 15 of its taxes were covered by the 1991 Act, and that as of June 30, 1994, the statute therefore required New York to return $955 million to the United States. The notice advised the State that it could apply for a waiver on certain statutory grounds. New York did request a waiver for those tax programs, as well as for a number of others, but HHS has not formally acted on any of those waiver requests. New York has estimated that the amount at issue for the period from October 1992 through March 1997 is as high as $2.6 billion.

Because HHS had not taken any action on the waiver requests, New York turned to Congress for relief. On August 5, 1997, Congress enacted a law that resolved the issue in New York's favor. Section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 identifies the disputed taxes and provides that they "are deemed to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the requirements" of the relevant provisions of the 1991 statute.[3]

[423] On August 11, 1997, the President sent identical notices to the Senate and to the House of Representatives canceling "one item of new direct spending," specifying § 4722(c) as that item, and stating that he had determined that "this cancellation will reduce the Federal budget deficit." He explained that § 4722(c) would have permitted New York "to continue relying upon impermissible provider taxes to finance its Medicaid program" and that "[t]his preferential treatment would have increased Medicaid costs, would have treated New York differently from all other States, and would have established a costly precedent for other States to request comparable treatment."[4]Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997

A person who realizes a profit from the sale of securities is generally subject to a capital gains tax. Under existing law, however, an ordinary business corporation can acquire a corporation, including a food processing or refining company, in a merger or stock-for-stock transaction in which no gain is recognized to the seller, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 354(a), 368(a); the seller's tax payment, therefore, is deferred. If, however, the purchaser is a farmers' cooperative, the parties cannot structure such a transaction because the stock of the cooperative may be held only by its members, see § 521(b)(2); thus, a seller dealing with a farmers' cooperative cannot obtain the benefits of tax deferral.

[424] In § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended § 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer the recognition of gain if they sell their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives.[5] The purpose of the amendment, as repeatedly explained by its sponsors, was "to facilitate the transfer of refiners and processors to farmers' cooperatives."[6] The [425] amendment to § 1042 was one of the 79 "limited tax benefits" authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and specifically identified in Title XVII of that Act as "subject to [the] line item veto."[7]

On the same date that he canceled the "item of new direct spending" involving New York's health care programs, the President also canceled this limited tax benefit. In his explanation of that action, the President endorsed the objective of encouraging "value-added farming through the purchase by farmers' cooperatives of refiners or processors of agricultural goods,"[8] but concluded that the provision lacked safeguards and also "failed to target its benefits to small-andmedium-size cooperatives."[9]

II

Appellees filed two separate actions against the President[10] and other federal officials challenging these two cancellations. The plaintiffs in the first case are the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The plaintiffs in the second are a farmers' cooperative consisting of about 30 potato growers in Idaho and an individual farmer who is a member and officer of the cooperative. The District Court consolidated the two cases and determined that at least one [426] of the plaintiffs in each had standing under Article III of the Constitution.

Appellee New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) is responsible for the operation of public health care facilities throughout the City of New York. If HHS ultimately denies the State's waiver requests, New York law will automatically require[11] NYCHHC to make retroactive tax payments to the State of about $4 million for each of the years at issue. 985 F. Supp., at 172. This contingent liability for NYCHHC, and comparable potential liabilities for the other appellee health care providers, were eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and revived by the President's cancellation of that provision. The District Court held that the cancellation of the statutory protection against these liabilities constituted sufficient injury to give these providers Article III standing.

Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was formed in May 1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing their crops and stabilizing prices, in part through a strategy of acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the members of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-party processors. At that time, Congress was considering the amendment to the capital gains tax that was expressly intended to aid farmers' cooperatives in the purchase of processing facilities, and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the amendment if passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on behalf of Snake River, was engaged in negotiations with the [427] owner of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for the tax benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations terminated when the President canceled § 968. Snake River is currently considering the possible purchase of other processing facilities in Idaho if the President's cancellation is reversed. Based on these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River plaintiffs were injured by the President's cancellation of § 968, as they "lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities now that the sellers will not [be] able to take advantage of section 968's tax breaks." Id. , at 177.

On the merits, the District Court held that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws in two respects. First, the laws that resulted after the cancellations "were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress." Id., at 178.[12] Moreover, the President violated Article I "when he unilaterally canceled provisions of duly enacted statutes." Id., at 179.[13] As a separate basis for [428] its decision, the District Court also held that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government." Ibid.

III

As in the prior challenge to the Line Item Veto Act, we initially confront jurisdictional questions. The appellees invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under the section of the Act entitled "Expedited review." That section, 2 U. S. C. § 692(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II), expressly authorizes "[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected" by the Act to bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of the Act is unconstitutional. Although the Government did not question the applicability of that section in the District Court, it now argues that, with the exception of Mike Cranney, the appellees are not "individuals" within the meaning of § 692(a)(1). Because the argument poses a jurisdictional question (although not one of constitutional magnitude), it is not waived by the failure to raise it in the District Court. The fact that the argument did not previously occur to the able lawyers for the Government does, however, confirm our view that in the context of the entire section Congress undoubtedly intended the word "individual" to be construed as synonymous with the word "person."[14]

The special section authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality [429] of the Act. Subsection (a)(2) requires that copies of any complaint filed under subsection (a)(1) "shall be promptly delivered" to both Houses of Congress, and that each House shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes a direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District Court, and requires that the appeal be filed within 10 days. Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and this Court "to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a)." There is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Government's new-found reading of § 692 "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 574 (1982).[15]

We are also unpersuaded by the Government's argument that appellees' challenge to the constitutionality of the Act is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual "Cases" and "Controversies," and that "the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process." Whit- [430] more v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990).[16] Our disposition of the first challenge to the constitutionality of this Act demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respecting the constitutional limits on our jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views as promptly as possible. But these cases differ from Raines, not only because the President's exercise of his cancellation authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the dispute, but more importantly because the parties have alleged a "personal stake" in having an actual injury redressed rather than an "institutional injury" that is "abstract and widely dispersed." 521 U. S., at 829.

In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Government argues that the appellees are not actually injured because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the claims are advanced by the wrong parties. We find no merit in the suggestion that New York's injury is merely speculative because HHS has not yet acted on the State's waiver requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly concluded that the State, and the appellees, "suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law." 985 F. Supp., at 174. The self-evident significance of the contingent liability is confirmed by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory attention, and that the President selected for cancellation only this one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes at Large. His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion [431] dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President's cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.[17]

We also reject the Government's argument that New York's claim is advanced by the wrong parties because the claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees. Under New York statutes that are already in place, it is clear that both the City of New York[18] and the appellee health care providers[19] will be assessed by the State for substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have to make to the Federal Government. To the extent of such assessments, they have the same potential liability as the State does.[20]

[432] The Snake River farmers' cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted § 968 for the specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of assets.[21] The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory "bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected § 968 as one of only two tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to utilize the benefits of § 968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a taxdeferred sale when the President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President's cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase.[22] By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents. See, e. g., Investment [433] Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 620 (1971); 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III `injury-in-fact' requirement]. . . . It follows logically that any . . . petitioner who is likely to suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing test").

Appellees' injury in this regard is at least as concrete as the injury suffered by the respondents in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). In that case, we considered whether a rule that generally limited water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160 acres applied to the much larger tracts of the Imperial Irrigation District in southeastern California; application of that limitation would have given large landowners an incentive to sell excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price for irrigated land. The District Court had held that the 160-acre limitation did not apply, and farmers who had hoped to purchase the excess land sought to appeal. We acknowledged that the farmers had not presented "detailed information about [their] financial resources," and noted that "the prospect of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential purchasers" besides the farmers. Id., at 367, n. 17. Nonetheless, "even though they could not with certainty establish that they would be able to purchase excess lands" if the judgment were reversed, id., at 367, we found standing because it was "likely that excess lands would become available at less than market prices," id., at 368. The Snake River appellees have alleged an injury that is as specific and immediate as that in Yellen. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72-78 (1978).[23]

[434] As with the New York case, the Government argues that the wrong parties are before the Court—that because the sellers of the processing facilities would have received the tax benefits, only they have standing to challenge the cancellation of § 968. This argument not only ignores the fact that the cooperatives were the intended beneficiaries of § 968, but also overlooks the self-evident proposition that more than one party may have standing to challenge a particular action or inaction.[24] Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff [435] is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing—regardless of whether there are others who would [436] also have standing to sue. Thus, we are satisfied that both of these actions are Article III "Cases" that we have a duty to decide.

IV

The Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to "cancel in whole" three types of provisions that have been signed into law: "(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit." 2 U. S. C. § 691(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II). It is undisputed that the New York case involves an "item of new direct spending" and that the Snake River case involves a "limited tax benefit" as those terms are defined in the Act. It is also undisputed that each of those provisions had been signed into law pursuant to Article I, § 7, of the Constitution before it was canceled.

The Act requires the President to adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other relevant information about the items. See 2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II). He must determine, with respect to each cancellation, that it will "(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest." § 691(a)(A). Moreover, he must transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled provision. See § 691(a)(B). It is undisputed that the President meticulously followed these procedures in these cases.

A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the special message from the President. See § 691b(a). If, however, a "disapproval bill" pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the cancellations set forth in that message become "null and void." Ibid. The Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of a "disapproval bill," see § 691d, but no such bill was passed for [437] either of the cancellations involved in these cases.[25] A majority vote of both Houses is sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, see § 691(c), but he does, of course, retain his constitutional authority to veto such a bill.[26]

The effect of a cancellation is plainly stated in § 691e, which defines the principal terms used in the Act. With respect to both an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit, the cancellation prevents the item "from having legal force or effect." §§ 691e(4)(B)—(C).[27] Thus, under the [438] plain text of the statute, the two actions of the President that are challenged in these cases prevented one section of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and one section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 "from having legal force or effect." The remaining provisions of those statutes, with the exception of the second canceled item in the latter, continue to have the same force and effect as they had when signed into law.

In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. "[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 954 (1983). There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . ." Art. II, § 3. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals.[28] Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but "before it become[s] a Law," it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it." Art. I, § 7, cl. 2.[29] His [439] "return" of a bill, which is usually described as a "veto,"[30] is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.

There are important differences between the President's "return" of a bill pursuant to Article I, § 7, and the exercise of the President's cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.

There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only "be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, [440] procedure." Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either "approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto."[31] What has emerged in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the "finely wrought" procedure that the Framers designed.

At oral argument, the Government suggested that the cancellations at issue in these cases do not effect a "repeal" of the canceled items because under the special "lock box" provisions of the Act,[32] a canceled item "retain[s] real, legal [441] budgetary effect" insofar as it prevents Congress and the President from spending the savings that result from the cancellation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.[33] The text of the Act expressly provides, however, that a cancellation prevents a direct spending or tax benefit provision "from having legal force or effect." 2 U. S. C. §§ 691e(4)(B)—(C). That a canceled item may have "real, legal budgetary effect" as a result of the lock box procedure does not change the fact that by canceling the items at issue in these cases, the President made them entirely inoperative as to appellees. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provides a tax benefit, and § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer relieves New York of its contingent liability.[34] Such significant changes do not lose their character simply because the canceled provisions may have some continuing financial effect on the Government.[35] The cancellation of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not canceled.

[442] V

The Government advances two related arguments to support its position that despite the unambiguous provisions of the Act, cancellations do not amend or repeal properly enacted statutes in violation of the Presentment Clause. First, relying primarily on Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), the Government contends that the cancellations were merely exercises of discretionary authority granted to the President by the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act read in light of the previously enacted Line Item Veto Act. Second, the Government submits that the substance of the authority to cancel tax and spending items "is, in practical effect, no more and no less than the power to `decline to spend' specified sums of money, or to `decline to implement' specified tax measures." Brief for Appellants 40. Neither argument is persuasive.

In Field v. Clark, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567. That statute contained a "free list" of almost 300 specific articles that were exempted from import duties "unless otherwise specially provided for in this act." Id., at 602. Section 3 was a special provision that directed the President to suspend that exemption for sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides "whenever, and so often" as he should be satisfied that any country producing and exporting those products imposed duties on the agricultural products of the United States that he deemed to be "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. . . ." Id., at 612, quoted in Field, 143 U. S., at 680. The section then specified the duties to be imposed on those products during any such suspension. The Court provided this explanation for its conclusion that § 3 had not delegated legislative power to the President:

"Nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President. . . . [W]hen he ascertained the fact that duties [443] and exactions, reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States by a country producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea or hides, it became his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws. . . . It was a part of the law itself as it left the hands of Congress that the provisions, full and complete in themselves, permitting the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, from particular countries, should be suspended, in a given contingency, and that in case of such suspensions certain duties should be imposed." Id., at 693.

This passage identifies three critical differences between the power to suspend the exemption from import duties and the power to cancel portions of a duly enacted statute. First, the exercise of the suspension power was contingent upon a condition that did not exist when the Tariff Act was passed: the imposition of "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" import duties by other countries. In contrast, the exercise of the cancellation power within five days after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes. Second, under the Tariff Act, when the President determined that the contingency had arisen, he had a duty to suspend; in contrast, while it is true that the President was required by the Act to make three determinations before he canceled a provision, see 2 [444] U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Finally, whenever the President suspended an exemption under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute. In contrast, whenever the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment.[36] Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy Article I, § 7.

The Government's reliance upon other tariff and import statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same reasons.[37] Some of those statutes authorized the President to "suspen[d] and discontinu[e]" statutory duties upon his determination that discriminatory duties imposed by other nations had been abolished. See 143 U. S., at 686-687 (discussing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat. 308).[38] A slightly different statute, [445] Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 2, 4 Stat. 425, provided that certain statutory provisions imposing duties on foreign ships "shall be repealed" upon the same no-discrimination determination by the President. See 143 U. S., at 687; see also id., at 686 (discussing similar tariff statute, Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224, which provided that duties "are hereby repealed," "[s]uch repeal to take effect . . . whenever the President" makes the required determination).

The cited statutes all relate to foreign trade, and this Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President has "a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936). "Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries." Ibid.[39] More important, when enacting the statutes discussed in Field, Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President.[40] The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in Article I, § 7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no [446] moment. Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, § 7, without amending the Constitution.[41]

Neither are we persuaded by the Government's contention that the President's authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefit items is no greater than his traditional authority to decline to spend appropriated funds. The Government has reviewed in some detail the series of statutes in which Congress has given the Executive broad discretion over the expenditure of appropriated funds. For example, the First Congress appropriated "sum[s] not exceeding" specified amounts to be spent on various Government operations. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190. In those statutes, as in later years, the President was given wide discretion with respect to both the amounts to be spent and how the money would be allocated among different functions. It is argued that the Line Item Veto Act merely confers comparable discretionary authority over the expenditure of appropriated funds. The critical [447] difference between this statute and all of its predecessors, however, is that unlike any of them, this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes. None of the Act's predecessors could even arguably have been construed to authorize such a change.

VI

Although they are implicit in what we have already written, the profound importance of these cases makes it appropriate to emphasize three points.

First, we express no opinion about the wisdom of the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act. Many members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures for the purpose of "ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington." H. R. Conf. Rep. 104-491, p. 15 (1996).[42] The text of the Act was itself the product of much debate and deliberation in both Houses of Congress and that precise text was signed into law by the President. We do not lightly conclude that their action was unauthorized by the Constitution.[43] We have, however, twice had full argument and briefing on the question and have concluded that our duty is clear.

Second, although appellees challenge the validity of the Act on alternative grounds, the only issue we address concerns the "finely wrought" procedure commanded by the Constitution. Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. We have been [448] favored with extensive debate about the scope of Congress' power to delegate lawmaking authority, or its functional equivalent, to the President. The excellent briefs filed by the parties and their amici curiae have provided us with valuable historical information that illuminates the delegation issue but does not really bear on the narrow issue that is dispositive of these cases. Thus, because we conclude that the Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, we find it unnecessary to consider the District Court's alternative holding that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government." 985 F. Supp., at 179.[44]

Third, our decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a 500-page document that became "Public Law 105-33" after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the President. The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken before a bill may "become a law." Art. I, § 7. If one paragraph of that text had been omitted at any one of those three stages, Public Law 105-33 would not have been validly enacted. If the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the President to create a different law—one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the President for signature. Something that might be known as "Public Law 105-33 as modified by the President" may or [449] may not be desirable, but it is surely not a document that may "become a law" pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, § 7, of the Constitution.

If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may "become a law," such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution. Cf. U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 837 (1995).

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kennedy, concurring.

A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril. The statute before us, then, is of first importance, for it seems undeniable the Act will tend to restrain persistent excessive spending. Nevertheless, for the reasons given by Justice Stevens in the opinion for the Court, the statute must be found invalid. Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.

I write to respond to my colleague Justice Breyer, who observes that the statute does not threaten the liberties of individual citizens, a point on which I disagree. See post, at 496-497. The argument is related to his earlier suggestion that our role is lessened here because the two political branches are adjusting their own powers between themselves. Post, at 472, 482-483. To say the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority would seem to require acceptance of two premises: first, that the public good demands it, and second, that liberty is not at risk. The former premise is inadmissible. The Constitution's structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 276-277 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, [450] 478 U. S. 714, 736 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 944— 945, 958-959 (1983); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 73-74 (1982). The latter premise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.

Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty. The Federalist states the axiom in these explicit terms: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands. . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). So convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary. The Federalist No. 84, pp. 513, 515; G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, pp. 536-543 (1969). It was at Madison's insistence that the First Congress enacted the Bill of Rights. R. Goldwin, From Parchment to Power 75-153 (1997). It would be a grave mistake, however, to think a Bill of Rights in Madison's scheme then or in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of powers of lesser importance. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131, 1132 (1991).

In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some degree of control to a remote central authority, one branch of government ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one [451] branch to influence basic political decisions. Quoting Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers made the point in the following manner:

"`When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,' says he, `there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to exe- cute them in a tyrannical manner.' Again: `Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. ` " The Federalist No. 47, supra, at 303.

It follows that if a citizen who is taxed has the measure of the tax or the decision to spend determined by the Executive alone, without adequate control by the citizen's Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened. Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives of citizens. The individual loses liberty in a real sense if that instrument is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints.

The principal object of the statute, it is true, was not to enhance the President's power to reward one group and punish another, to help one set of taxpayers and hurt another, to favor one State and ignore another. Yet these are its undeniable effects. The law establishes a new mechanism which gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target, in order to disfavor the group or to extract further concessions from Congress. The law is the functional equivalent of a line item veto and enhances the President's powers beyond what the Framers would have endorsed.

It is no answer, of course, to say that Congress surrendered its authority by its own hand; nor does it suffice to point out that a new statute, signed by the President or [452] enacted over his veto, could restore to Congress the power it now seeks to relinquish. That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The Constitution is a compact enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those of other Congresses to follow. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 880 (1991); cf. Chadha, supra, at 942, n. 13. Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.

Separation of powers helps to ensure the ability of each branch to be vigorous in asserting its proper authority. In this respect the device operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be exercised. The citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power. If this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have been so afterwards. Though Chadha involved the deportation of a person, while the case before us involves the expenditure of money or the grant of a tax exemption, this circumstance does not mean that the vertical operation of the separation of powers is irrelevant here. By increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure.

The Constitution is not bereft of controls over improvident spending. Federalism is one safeguard, for political accountability is easier to enforce within the States than nationwide. The other principal mechanism, of course, is control of the political branches by an informed and responsible electorate. Whether or not federalism and control by the electorate are adequate for the problem at hand, they are two of the structures the Framers designed for the problem the statute strives to confront. The Framers of the Constitution [453] could not command statesmanship. They could simply provide structures from which it might emerge. The fact that these mechanisms, plus the proper functioning of the separation of powers itself, are not employed, or that they prove insufficient, cannot validate an otherwise unconstitutional device. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, and with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Part III, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Today the Court acknowledges the "`overriding and timehonored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere.' " Ante, at 421, quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820 (1997). It proceeds, however, to ignore the prescribed statutory limits of our jurisdiction by permitting the expedited-review provisions of the Line Item Veto Act to be invoked by persons who are not "individual[s]," 2 U. S. C. § 692 (1994 ed., Supp. II); and to ignore the constitutional limits of our jurisdiction by permitting one party to challenge the Government's denial to another party of favorable tax treatment from which the first party might, but just as likely might not, gain a concrete benefit. In my view, the Snake River appellees lack standing to challenge the President's cancellation of the "limited tax benefit," and the constitutionality of that action should not be addressed. I think the New York appellees have standing to challenge the President's cancellation of an "item of new direct spending"; I believe we have statutory authority (other than the expedited-review provision) to address that challenge; but unlike the Court I find the President's cancellation of spending items to be entirely in accord with the Constitution.

I

The Court's unrestrained zeal to reach the merits of this case is evident in its disregard of the statute's expeditedreview [454] provision, which extends that special procedure to "[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected by [the Act]." § 692. With the exception of Mike Cranney, a natural person, the appellees—corporations, cooperatives, and governmental entities—are not "individuals" under any accepted usage of that term. Worse still, the first provision of the United States Code confirms that insofar as this word is concerned, Congress speaks English like the rest of us: "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the wor[d] `person'. . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. " 1 U. S. C. § 1 (emphasis added). And doubly worse, one of the definitional provisions of this very Act expressly distinguishes "individuals" from "persons." A tax law does not create a "limited tax benefit," it says, so long as

"any difference in the treatment of persons is based solely on—
"(I) in the case of businesses and associations, the size or form of the business or association involved;
"(II) in the case of individuals, general demographic conditions, such as income, marital status, number of dependents, or tax return filing status . . . ." 2 U. S. C. § 691e(9)(B)(iii) (1994 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added).

The Court majestically sweeps the plain language of the statute aside, declaring that "[t]here is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases brought by corporate persons." Ante, at 429. Indeed, the Court says, it would be "absurd" for Congress to have done so. Ibid. But Congress treats individuals more favorably than corporations and other associations all the time. There is nothing whatever extraordinary—and surely nothing so [455] bizarre as to permit this Court to declare a "scrivener's error"—in believing that individuals will suffer more seriously from delay in the receipt of "vetoed" benefits or tax savings than corporations will, and therefore according individuals (but not corporations) expedited review. It may be unlikely that this is what Congress actually had in mind; but it is what Congress said, it is not so absurd as to be an obvious mistake, and it is therefore the law.

The only individual who has sued, and thus the only appellee who qualifies for expedited review under § 692, is Mike Cranney. Since § 692 does not confer jurisdiction over the claims of the other appellees, we must dismiss them, unless we have jurisdiction under another statute. In their complaints, appellees sought declaratory relief not only under § 692(a), but also under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, invoking the District Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. After the District Court ruled, the Government appealed directly to this Court, but it also filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In light of the Government's representation that it desires "[t]o eliminate any possibility that the district court's decision might escape review," Reply Brief for Appellants 2, n. 1, I would deem its appeal to this Court a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, see 28 U. S. C. § 2101(e), and grant it. Under this Court's Rule 11, "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court." In light of the public importance of the issues involved, and the little sense it would make for the Government to pursue its appeal against one appellee in this Court and against the others in the Court of Appeals, the entire case, in my view, qualifies for certiorari review before judgment.

[456] II

Not only must we be satisfied that we have statutory jurisdiction to hear this case; we must be satisfied that we have jurisdiction under Article III. "To meet the standing requirements of Article III, `[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' " Raines, 521 U. S., at 818, quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).

In the first action before us, appellees Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) and Mike Cranney, Snake River's Director and Vice-Chairman, challenge the constitutionality of the President's cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The Snake River appellees have standing, in the Court's view, because § 968 gave them "the equivalent of a statutory `bargaining chip,' " and "[b]y depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents." Ante, at 432. It is unclear whether the Court means that deprivation of a "bargaining chip" itself suffices for standing, or that such deprivation suffices in the present case because it creates a likelihood of economic injury. The former is wrong as a matter of law, and the latter is wrong as a matter of fact, on the facts alleged.

For the proposition that "a denial of a benefit in the bargaining process" can suffice for standing the Court relies in a footnote, see ante, at 433, n. 22, on Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656 (1993). There, an association of contractors alleged that a city ordinance according racial preferences in the award of city contracts denied its members equal protection of the laws. Id., at 658-659. The association's members had regularly bid on and performed city contracts, and would have bid on designated set-aside contracts but for the ordinance. Id., at 659. We held that the association had [457] standing even without proof that its members would have been awarded contracts absent the challenged discrimination. The reason, we explained, is that "[t]he `injury in fact' in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit." Id., at 666, citing two earlier equal protection cases, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 362 (1970), and Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989). In other words, Northeastern Florida did not hold, as the Court suggests, that harm to one's bargaining position is an "injury in fact," but rather that, in an equal protection case, the denial of equal treatment is. Inasmuch as Snake River does not challenge the Line Item Veto Act on equal protection grounds, Northeastern Florida is in apposite. And I know of no case outside the equal protection field in which the mere detriment to one's "bargaining position," as opposed to a demonstrated loss of some bargain, has been held to confer standing. The proposition that standing is established by the mere reduction in one's chances of receiving a financial benefit is contradicted by Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), which held that low-income persons who had been denied treatment at local hospitals lacked standing to challenge an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling that reduced the amount of charitable care necessary for the hospitals to qualify for tax-exempt status. The situation in that case was strikingly similar to the one before us here: The denial of a tax benefit to a third party was alleged to reduce the chances of a financial benefit to the plaintiffs. And standing was denied.

But even if harm to one's bargaining position were a legally cognizable injury, Snake River has not alleged, as it must, facts sufficient to demonstrate that it personally has suffered that injury. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975). In Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights, supra, the plaintiffs at least had applied for the financial benefit which had allegedly [458] been rendered less likely of receipt; the present suit, by contrast, resembles a complaint asserting that the plaintiff's chances of winning the lottery were reduced, filed by a plaintiff who never bought a lottery ticket, or who tore it up before the winner was announced. Snake River has presented no evidence to show that it was engaged in bargaining, and that that bargaining was impaired by the President's cancellation of § 968. The Court says that Snake River "was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a taxdeferred sale when the President canceled § 968," ante, at 432. There is, however, no evidence of "negotiations," only of two "discussions." According to the affidavit of Mike Cranney:

"On or about May 1997, I spoke with Howard Phillips, the principal owner of Idaho Potato Packers, concerning the possibility that, if the Cooperative Tax Act were passed, Snake River Potato Growers might purchase a Blackfoot, Idaho processing facility in a transaction that would allow the deferral of gain. Mr. Phillips expressed an interest in such a transaction if the Cooperative Tax Act were to pass. Mr. Phillips also acknowledged to me that Jim Chapman, our General Manager, had engaged him in a previous discussion concerning this matter." App. 112.

This affidavit would have set forth something of significance if it had said that Phillips had expressed an interest in the transaction "if and only if the Cooperative Tax Act were to pass." But of course it is most unlikely he said that; Idaho Potato Packers (IPP) could get just as much from the sale without the Act as with the Act, so long as the price was right. The affidavit would also have set forth something of significance if it had said that Phillips had expressed an interest in the sale "at a particular price if the Cooperative Tax Act were to pass." But it does not say that either. [459] Nor does it even say that the President's action caused IPP to reconsider. Moreover, it was Snake River, not IPP, that terminated the discussions. According to Cranney, "[t]he President's cancellation of the Cooperative Tax Act caused me to terminate discussions with Phillips about the possibility of Snake River Potato Growers buying the Idaho Potato Packers facility." Id., at 114. So all we know from the record is that Snake River had two discussions with IPP concerning the sale of its processing facility on the tax deferred basis the Act would allow; that IPP was interested; and that Snake River ended the discussions after the President's action. We do not know that Snake River was prepared to offer a price—tax deferral or no—that would cross IPP's laugh threshold. We do not even know for certain that the tax deferral was a significant attraction to IPP; we know only that Cranney thought it was. On these facts—which never even bring things to the point of bargaining—it is pure conjecture to say that Snake River suffered an impaired bargaining position. As we have said many times, conjectural or hypothetical injuries do not suffice for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).

Nor has Snake River demonstrated, as the Court finds, that "the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents." Ante, at 432. Presumably the economic injury the Court has in mind is Snake River's loss of a bargain purchase of a processing plant. But there is no evidence, and indeed not even an allegation, that before the President's action such a purchase was likely. The most that Snake River alleges is that the President's action rendered it "more difficult for plaintiffs to purchase qualified processors," App. 12. And even if that abstract "increased difficulty" sufficed for injury in fact (which it does not), the existence of even that is pure speculation. For all that appears, no owner of a processing plant would have been willing to sell to Snake [460] River at any price that Snake River could afford—and the impossible cannot be made "more difficult." All we know is that a potential seller was "interested" in talking about the subject before the President's action, and that after the President's action Snake River itself decided to proceed no further. If this establishes a "likelihood" that Snake River would have made a bargain purchase but for the President's action, or even a "likelihood" that the President's action rendered "more difficult" a purchase that was realistically within Snake River's grasp, then we must adopt for our standing jurisprudence a new definition of likely: "plausible."

Twice before have we addressed whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Government's tax treatment of a third party, and twice before have we held that the speculative nature of a third party's response to changes in federal tax laws defeats standing. In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), we found it "purely speculative whether the denials of service . . . fairly can be traced to [the IRS's] `encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id., at 42-43. We found it "equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services." Id., at 43. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), we held that parents of black children attending public schools lacked standing to challenge IRS policies concerning tax exemptions for private schools. The parents alleged, inter alia, that "federal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in their communities impair their ability to have their public schools desegregated." Id., at 752— 753. We concluded that "the injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the Government conduct . . . challenge[d] as unlawful," id., at 757, and that "it is entirely speculative . . . whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies," id., at 758. Likewise, here, it is purely speculative whether a tax [461] deferral would have prompted any sale, let alone one that reflected the tax benefit in the sale price.

The closest case the Court can appeal to as precedent for its finding of standing is Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). Even on its own terms, Bryant is distinguishable. As that case came to us, it involved a dispute between a class of some 800 landowners in the Imperial Valley, each of whom owned more than 160 acres, and a group of Imperial Valley residents who wished to purchase lands owned by that class. The point at issue was the application to those lands of a statutory provision that forbade delivery of water from a federal reclamation project to irrigable land held by a single owner in excess of 160 acres, and that limited the sale price of any lands so held in excess of 160 acres to a maximum amount, fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, based on fair market value in 1929, before the valley was irrigated by water from the Boulder Canyon Project. Id., at 366-367. That price would of course be "far below [the lands'] current market values." Id. , at 367, n. 17. The Court concluded that the would-be purchasers "had a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy to afford them standing." Id., at 368. It is true, as the Court today emphasizes, that the purchasers had not presented "detailed information about [their] financial resources," but the Court thought that unnecessary only because "purchasers of such land would stand to reap significant gains on resale." Id. , at 367, n. 17. Financing, in other words, would be easy to come by. Here, by contrast, not only do we have no notion whether Snake River has the cash in hand to afford IPP's bottom-line price, but we also have no reason to believe that financing of the purchase will be readily available. Potato processing plants, unlike agricultural land in the Imperial Valley, do not have a readily available resale market. On the other side of the equation, it was also much clearer in Bryant that if the suit came out in the would-be purchasers' favor, many of the landowners would be willing to sell. The alternative would be [462] withdrawing the land from agricultural production, whereas sale—even at bargain-basement prices for the land—would at least enable recoupment of the cost of improvements, such as drainage systems. Ibid. In the present case, by contrast, we have no reason to believe that IPP is not operating its processing plant at a profit, and will not continue to do so in the future; Snake River has proffered no evidence that IPP or any other processor would surely have sold if only the President had not canceled the tax deferral. The only uncertainty in Bryant was whether any of the respondents would wind up as buyers of any of the excess land; that seemed probable enough, since "respondents are residents of the Imperial Valley who desire to purchase the excess land for purposes of farming." Ibid. We have no basis to say that it is "likely" that Snake River would have purchased a processing facility if § 968 had not been canceled.

More fundamentally, however, the reasoning of Bryant should not govern the present case because it represents a crabbed view of the standing doctrine that has been superseded. Bryant was decided at the tail-end of "an era in which it was thought that the only function of the constitutional requirement of standing was `to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,' " Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 11 (1998), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Thus, the Bryant Court ultimately afforded the respondents standing simply because they "had a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy," 447 U. S., at 368, not because they had demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability. "That parsimonious view of the function of Article III standing has since yielded to the acknowledgment that the constitutional requirement is a `means of "defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,"` and `a part of the basic charter . . . provid[ing] for the interaction between [the federal] government and the governments of the several States,' " Spencer, supra, at 11-12, quoting Valley Forge [463] Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 474, 476 (1982). While Snake River in the present case may indeed have enough of a "stake" to assure adverseness, the matter it brings before us is inappropriate for our resolution because its allegations do not establish an injury in fact, attributable to the Presidential action it challenges, and remediable by this Court's invalidation of that Presidential action.

Because, in my view, Snake River has no standing to bring this suit, we have no jurisdiction to resolve its challenge to the President's authority to cancel a "limited tax benefit."

III

I agree with the Court that the New York appellees have standing to challenge the President's cancellation of § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as an "item of new direct spending." See ante, at 430-431. The tax liability they will incur under New York law is a concrete and particularized injury, fairly traceable to the President's action, and avoided if that action is undone. Unlike the Court, however, I do not believe that Executive cancellation of this item of direct spending violates the Presentment Clause.

The Presentment Clause requires, in relevant part, that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. There is no question that enactment of the Balanced Budget Act complied with these requirements: the House and Senate passed the bill, and the President signed it into law. It was only after the requirements of the Presentment Clause had been satisfied that the President exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act to cancel the spending item. Thus, the Court's problem with the Act is not that it authorizes the President to veto parts of a bill and sign others into law, but rather that it authorizes [464] him to "cancel"—prevent from "having legal force or effect"—certain parts of duly enacted statutes.

Article I, § 7, of the Constitution obviously prevents the President from canceling a law that Congress has not authorized him to cancel. Such action cannot possibly be considered part of his execution of the law, and if it is legislative action, as the Court observes, "`repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.' " Ante, at 438, quoting from INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 954 (1983). But that is not this case. It was certainly arguable, as an original matter, that Art. I, § 7, also prevents the President from canceling a law which itself authorizes the President to cancel it. But as the Court acknowledges, that argument has long since been made and rejected. In 1809, Congress passed a law authorizing the President to cancel trade restrictions against Great Britain and France if either revoked edicts directed at the United States. Act of Mar. 1, 1809, § 11, 2 Stat. 528. Joseph Story regarded the conferral of that authority as entirely unremarkable in The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (CCD Mass. 1812). The Tariff Act of 1890 authorized the President to "suspend, by proclamation to that effect" certain of its provisions if he determined that other countries were imposing "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 3, 26 Stat. 612. This Court upheld the constitutionality of that Act in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), reciting the history since 1798 of statutes conferring upon the President the power to, inter alia, "discontinue the prohibitions and restraints hereby enacted and declared," id., at 684, "suspend the operation of the aforesaid act," id., at 685, and "declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative," id., at 688.

As much as the Court goes on about Art. I, § 7, therefore, that provision does not demand the result the Court reaches. It no more categorically prohibits the Executive reduction of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing statutes that authorize such reduction, than it categorically [465] prohibits the Executive augmentation of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing statutes that authorize such augmentation—generally known as substantive rule making. There are, to be sure, limits upon the former just as there are limits upon the latter—and I am prepared to acknowledge that the limits upon the former may be much more severe. Those limits are established, however, not by some categorical prohibition of Art. I, § 7, which our cases conclusively disprove, but by what has come to be known as the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority: When authorized Executive reduction or augmentation is allowed to go too far, it usurps the nondelegable function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.

It is this doctrine, and not the Presentment Clause, that was discussed in the Field opinion, and it is this doctrine, and not the Presentment Clause, that is the issue presented by the statute before us here. That is why the Court is correct to distinguish prior authorizations of Executive cancellation, such as the one involved in Field, on the ground that they were contingent upon an Executive finding of fact, and on the ground that they related to the field of foreign affairs, an area where the President has a special "`degree of discretion and freedom,' " ante, at 445 (citation omitted). These distinctions have nothing to do with whether the details of Art. I, § 7, have been complied with, but everything to do with whether the authorizations went too far by transferring to the Executive a degree of political, lawmaking power that our traditions demand be retained by the Legislative Branch.

I turn, then, to the crux of the matter: whether Congress's authorizing the President to cancel an item of spending gives him a power that our history and traditions show must reside exclusively in the Legislative Branch. I may note, to begin with, that the Line Item Veto Act is not the first statute to authorize the President to "cancel" spending items. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986), we addressed the [466] constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), which required the President, if the federal budget deficit exceeded a certain amount, to issue a "sequestration" order mandating spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General, § 902. The effect of sequestration was that "amounts sequestered .. . shall be permanently cancelled." § 902(a)(4) (emphasis added). We held that the Act was unconstitutional, not because it impermissibly gave the Executive legislative power, but because it gave the Comptroller General, an officer of the Legislative Branch over whom Congress retained removal power, "the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made," 478 U. S., at 733, "functions . . . plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms," id., at 732-733 (emphasis added). The President's discretion under the Line Item Veto Act is certainly broader than the Comptroller General's discretion was under the 1985 Act, but it is no broader than the discretion traditionally granted the President in his execution of spending laws.

Insofar as the degree of political, "lawmaking" power conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's worth of difference between Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress's authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion. And the latter has been done since the founding of the Nation. From 1789-1791, the First Congress made lump-sum appropriations for the entire Government—"sum[s] not exceeding" specified amounts for broad purposes. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190. From a very early date Congress also made permissive individual appropriations, leaving the decision whether to spend the money to the President's unfettered discretion. In 1803, it appropriated $50,000 for the President to build "not exceeding fifteen gun boats, to be armed, [467] manned and fitted out, and employed for such purposes as in his opinion the public service may require," Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 206. President Jefferson reported that "[t]he sum of fifty thousand dollars appropriated by Congress for providing gun boats remains unexpended. The favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of that law unnecessary," 13 Annals of Cong. 14 (1803). Examples of appropriations committed to the discretion of the President abound in our history. During the Civil War, an Act appropriated over $76 million to be divided among various items "as the exigencies of the service may require," Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 32, 12 Stat. 344-345. During the Great Depression, Congress appropriated $950 million "for such projects and/or purposes and under such rules and regulations as the President in his discretion may prescribe," Act of Feb. 15, 1934, ch. 13, 48 Stat. 351, and $4 billion for general classes of projects, the money to be spent "in the discretion and under the direction of the President," Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115. The constitutionality of such appropriations has never seriously been questioned. Rather, "[t]hat Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing details of expenditures for which it appropriates must, of course, be plain. Appropriations and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies." Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 321-322 (1937).

Certain Presidents have claimed Executive authority to withhold appropriated funds even absent an express conferral of discretion to do so. In 1876, for example, President Grant reported to Congress that he would not spend money appropriated for certain harbor and river improvements, see Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132, because "[u]nder no circumstances [would he] allow expenditures upon works not clearly national," and in his view, the appropriations [468] were for "works of purely private or local interest, in no sense national," 4 Cong. Rec. 5628. President Franklin D. Roosevelt impounded funds appropriated for a flood control reservoir and levee in Oklahoma. See Act of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 377, 55 Stat. 638, 645; Hearings on S. 373 before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 848-849 (1973). President Truman ordered the impoundment of hundreds of millions of dollars that had been appropriated for military aircraft. See Act of Oct. 29, 1949, ch. 787, 63 Stat. 987, 1013; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 538-539 (W. Reid ed. 1964). President Nixon, the Mahatma Gandhi of all impounders, asserted at a press conference in 1973 that his "constitutional right" to impound appropriated funds was "absolutely clear." The President's News Conference of Jan. 31, 1973, 9 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 109-110 (1973). Our decision two years later in Train v. City of New York, 420 U. S. 35 (1975), proved him wrong, but it implicitly confirmed that Congress may confer discretion upon the Executive to withhold appropriated funds, even funds appropriated for a specific purpose. The statute at issue in Train authorized spending "not to exceed" specified sums for certain projects, and directed that such "[s]ums authorized to be appropriated . . . shall be allotted" by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1285, 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. III). Upon enactment of this statute, the President directed the Administrator to allot no more than a certain part of the amount authorized. 420 U. S., at 40. This Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the statute did not grant the Executive discretion to withhold the funds, but required allotment of the full amount authorized. Id., at 44-47.

The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to "decline to spend" any item [469] of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act does instead—authorizing the President to "cancel" an item of spending—is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President's action it authorizes in fact is not a line-item veto and thus does not offend Art. I, § 7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.

IV

I would hold that the President's cancellation of § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as an item of direct spending does not violate the Constitution. Because I find no party before us who has standing to challenge the President's cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, I do not reach the question whether that violates the Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia join as to Part III, dissenting.

I

I agree with the Court that the parties have standing, but I do not agree with its ultimate conclusion. In my view the Line Item Veto Act (Act) does not violate any specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit [470] separation-of-powers principle. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional.

II

I approach the constitutional question before us with three general considerations in mind. First, the Act represents a legislative effort to provide the President with the power to give effect to some, but not to all, of the expenditure and revenue-diminishing provisions contained in a single massive appropriations bill. And this objective is constitutionally proper.

When our Nation was founded, Congress could easily have provided the President with this kind of power. In that time period, our population was less than 4 million, see U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 1, p. 8 (1975), federal employees numbered fewer than 5,000, see id., pt. 2, at 1103, annual federal budget outlays totaled approximately $4 million, see id., pt. 2, at 1104, and the entire operative text of Congress' first general appropriations law read as follows:

"Be it enacted . . . [t]hat there be appropriated for the service of the present year, to be paid out of the monies which arise, either from the requisitions heretofore made upon the several states, or from the duties on import and tonnage, the following sums, viz. A sum not exceeding two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the civil list, under the late and present government; a sum not exceeding one hundred and thirty-seven thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the department of war; a sum not exceeding one hundred and ninety thousand dollars for discharging the warrants issued by the late board of treasury, and remaining unsatisfied; and a sum not exceeding ninetysix thousand dollars for paying the pensions to invalids." Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 95.

[471] At that time, a Congress, wishing to give a President the power to select among appropriations, could simply have embodied each appropriation in a separate bill, each bill subject to a separate Presidential veto.

Today, however, our population is about 250 million, see U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, 1990 Census, the Federal Government employs more than 4 million people, see Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998: Analytical Perspectives 207 (1997) (hereinafter Analytical Perspectives), the annual federal budget is $1.5 trillion, see Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998: Budget 303 (1997) (hereinafter Budget), and a typical budget appropriations bill may have a dozen titles, hundreds of sections, and spread across more than 500 pages of the Statutes at Large. See, e. g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251. Congress cannot divide such a bill into thousands, or tens of thousands, of separate appropriations bills, each one of which the President would have to sign, or to veto, separately. Thus, the question is whether the Constitution permits Congress to choose a particular novel means to achieve this same, constitutionally legitimate, end.

Second, the case in part requires us to focus upon the Constitution's generally phrased structural provisions, provisions that delegate all "legislative" power to Congress and vest all "executive" power in the President. See Part IV, infra. The Court, when applying these provisions, has interpreted them generously in terms of the institutional arrangements that they permit. See, e. g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding delegation of authority to Sentencing Commission to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 53-54 (1932) (permitting non-Article III commission to adjudicate factual [472] disputes arising under federal dock workers' compensation statute). See generally, e. g., OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 145 (1941) ("In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions" without delegating details of regulatory scheme to executive agency); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Constitution permits "interdependence" and flexible relations between branches in order to secure "workable government"); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928) (Taft, C. J.) ("[T]he extent and character of . . . assistance [between the different branches] must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination"); Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 53 ("[R]egard must be had" in cases "where constitutional limits are invoked, not to mere matters of form but to the substance of what is required").

Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall, in a well-known passage, explained,

"To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819).

This passage, like the cases I have just mentioned, calls attention to the genius of the Framers' pragmatic vision, which this Court has long recognized in cases that find constitutional room for necessary institutional innovation.

Third, we need not here referee a dispute among the other two branches. And, as the majority points out:

[473] "`When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons.' " Ante, at 447, n. 42 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 736 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

Cf. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., supra, at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress . . . [and when] the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum").

These three background circumstances mean that, when one measures the literal words of the Act against the Constitution's literal commands, the fact that the Act may closely resemble a different, literally unconstitutional, arrangement is beside the point. To drive exactly 65 miles per hour on an interstate highway closely resembles an act that violates the speed limit. But it does not violate that limit, for small differences matter when the question is one of literal violation of law. No more does this Act literally violate the Constitution's words. See Part III, infra.

The background circumstances also mean that we are to interpret nonliteral separation-of-powers principles in light of the need for "workable government." Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., supra, at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). If we apply those principles in light of that objective, as this Court has applied them in the past, the Act is constitutional. See Part IV, infra.

III

The Court believes that the Act violates the literal text of the Constitution. A simple syllogism captures its basic reasoning:

[474] Major Premise: The Constitution sets forth an exclusive method for enacting, repealing, or amending laws. See ante, at 438-440.
Minor Premise: The Act authorizes the President to "repea[l] or amen[d]" laws in a different way, namely by announcing a cancellation of a portion of a previously enacted law. See ante, at 436-438.
Conclusion: The Act is inconsistent with the Constitution. See ante, at 448-449.

I find this syllogism unconvincing, however, because its Minor Premise is faulty. When the President "canceled" the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any law. He simply followed the law, leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.

To understand why one cannot say, literally speaking, that the President has repealed or amended any law, imagine how the provisions of law before us might have been, but were not, written. Imagine that the canceled New York health care tax provision at issue here, Pub. L. 105-33, § 4722(c), 111 Stat. 515 (quoted in full ante, at 422-423, n. 2), had instead said the following:

"Section One. Taxes . . . that were collected by the State of New York from a health care provider before June 1, 1997, and for which a waiver of the provisions [requiring payment] have been sought . . . are deemed to be permissible health care related taxes . . . provided however that the President may prevent the just- mentioned provision from having legal force or effect if he determines x, y, and z" (Assume x, y, and z to be the same determinations required by the Line Item Veto Act).

Whatever a person might say, or think, about the constitutionality of this imaginary law, there is one thing the English language would prevent one from saying. One could not say that a President who "prevent[s]" the deeming language [475] from "having legal force or effect," see 2 U. S. C. § 691e(4)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. II),has either repealed or amended this particular hypothetical statute. Rather, the President has followed that law to the letter. He has exercised the power it explicitly delegates to him. He has executed the law, not repealed it.

It could make no significant difference to this linguistic point were the italicized proviso to appear, not as part of what I have called Section One, but, instead, at the bottom of the statute page, say, referenced by an asterisk, with a statement that it applies to every spending provision in the Act next to which a similar asterisk appears. And that being so, it could make no difference if that proviso appeared, instead, in a different, earlier enacted law, along with legal language that makes it applicable to every future spending provision picked out according to a specified formula. See, e. g., Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1063, 2 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (enforcing strict spending and deficit-neutrality limits on future appropriations statutes); see also 1 U. S. C. § 1 (in "any Act of Congress" singular words include plural, and vice versa) (emphasis added).

But, of course, this last mentioned possibility is this very case. The earlier law, namely, the Line Item Veto Act, says that "the President may . . . prevent such [future] budget authority from having legal force or effect." 2 U. S. C. §§ 691(a), 691e(4)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. II). Its definitional sections make clear that it applies to the 1997 New York health care provision, see § 691e(8), just as they give a special legal meaning to the word "cancel," § 691e(4). For that reason, one cannot dispose of this case through a purely literal analysis as the majority does. Literally speaking, the President has not "repealed" or "amended" anything. He has simply executed a power conferred upon him by Congress, which power is contained in laws that were enacted in compliance with the exclusive method set forth in the Constitution. See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 693 (1892) (President's [476] power to raise tariff rates "was a part of the law itself, as it left the hands of Congress " (emphasis added)).

Nor can one dismiss this literal compliance as some kind of formal quibble, as if it were somehow "obvious" that what the President has done "amounts to," "comes close to," or is "analogous to" the repeal or amendment of a previously enacted law. That is because the power the Act grants the President (to render designated appropriations items without "legal force or effect") also "amounts to," "comes close to," or is "analogous to" a different legal animal, the delegation of a power to choose one legal path as opposed to another, such as a power to appoint.

To take a simple example, a legal document, say, a will or a trust instrument, might grant a beneficiary the power (a) to appoint property "to Jones for his life, remainder to Smith for 10 years so long as Smith . . . etc., and then to Brown," or (b) to appoint the same property "to Black and the heirs of his body," or (c) not to exercise the power of appointment at all. See, e. g., 5 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on Law of Wills § 45.8 (rev. 3d ed. 1962) (describing power of appointment). To choose the second or third of these alternatives prevents from taking effect the legal consequences that flow from the first alternative, which the legal instrument describes in detail. Any such choice, made in the exercise of a delegated power, renders that first alternative language without "legal force or effect." But such a choice does not "repeal" or "amend" either that language or the document itself. The will or trust instrument, in delegating the power of appointment, has not delegated a power to amend or to repeal the instrument; to the contrary, it requires the delegated power to be exercised in accordance with the instrument's terms. Id., § 45.9, pp. 516-518.

The trust example is useful not merely because of its simplicity, but also because it illustrates the logic that must apply when a power to execute is conferred, not by a private trust document, but by a federal statute. This is not the [477] first time that Congress has delegated to the President or to others this kind of power—a contingent power to deny effect to certain statutory language. See, e. g., Pub. L. 95-384, § 13(a), 92 Stat. 737 ("Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be of no further force and effect upon the President's determination and certification to the Congress that the resumption of full military cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United States and [other criteria]") (emphasis added); 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate rules of practice and procedure in federal courts, and "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force and effect ") (emphasis added); 41 U. S. C. § 405b (subsection (a) requires the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to issue "[g]overnment-wide regulations" setting forth a variety of conflict of interest standards, but subsection (e) says that "if the President determine[s]" that the regulations "would have a significantly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the mission" of Government agencies, "the requirement [to promulgate] the regulations . . . shall be null and void ") (emphasis added); Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, § 252(a)(4), 99 Stat. 1074 (authorizing the President to issue a "final order" that has the effect of "permanently cancell[ing] " sequestered amounts in spending statutes in order to achieve budget compliance) (emphasis added); Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-695 ("Public Law 89-732 [dealing with immigration from Cuba] is repealed . . . upon a determination by the President . . . that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power") (emphasis added); Pub. L. 99-498, § 701, 100 Stat. 1532 (amending § 758 of the Higher Education Act of 1965) (Secretary of Education "may" sell common stock in an educational loan corporation; if the Secretary decides to sell stock, and "if the Student Loan Marketing Association acquires from the Secretary" over 50 percent of the voting stock, "section 754 [governing composition of the Board of Directors] shall be of no further force or effect ") (emphasis [478] added); Pub. L. 104-134, § 2901(c), 110 Stat. 1321-160 (President is "authorized to suspend the provisions of the [preceding] proviso" which suspension may last for entire effective period of proviso, if he determines suspension is "appropriate based upon the public interest in sound environmental management . . . [or] the protection of national or locallyaffected interests, or protection of any cultural, biological or historic resources").

All of these examples, like the Act, delegate a power to take action that will render statutory provisions "without force or effect." Every one of these examples, like the present Act, delegates the power to choose between alternatives, each of which the statute spells out in some detail. None of these examples delegates a power to "repeal" or "amend" a statute, or to "make" a new law. Nor does the Act. Rather, the delegated power to nullify statutory language was itself created and defined by Congress, and included in the statute books on an equal footing with (indeed, as a component part of) the sections that are potentially subject to nullification. As a Pennsylvania court put the matter more than a century ago: "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power." Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873).

In fact, a power to appoint property offers a closer analogy to the power delegated here than one might at first suspect. That is because the Act contains a "lockbox" feature, which gives legal significance to the enactment of a particular appropriations item even if, and even after, the President has rendered it without "force or effect." See 2 U. S. C. § 691c (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also ante, at 440-441, n. 31 (describing "lockbox"); but cf. Letter from Counsel for Snake River Cooperative, dated Apr. 29, 1998 (available in Clerk of Court's case file) (arguing "lockbox" feature inapplicable here due to special provision in Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the constitutionality and severability of which have not been argued). In essence, the "lockbox" feature: (1) points to a [479] Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act requirement that, when Congress enacts a "budget busting" appropriation bill, automatically reduces authorized spending for a host of federal programs in a pro rata way; (2) notes that cancellation of an item (say, a $2 billion item) would, absent the "lockbox" provision, neutralize (by up to $2 billion) the potential "budget busting" effects of other bills (and therefore potentially the President could cancel items in order to "save" the other programs from the mandatory cuts, resulting in no net deficit reduction); and (3) says that this "neutralization" will not occur (i. e., the pro rata reductions will take place just as if the $2 billion item had not been canceled), so that the canceled items truly provide additional budget savings over and above the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings regime. See generally H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, pp. 23-24 (1996) ("lockbox" provision included "to ensure that the savings from the cancellation of [items] are devoted to deficit reduction and are not available to offset a deficit increase in another law"). That is why the Government says that the Act provides a "lockbox," and why it seems fair to say that, despite the Act's use of the word "cancel," the Act does not delegate to the President the power truly to cancel a line item expenditure (returning the legal status quo to one in which the item had never been enacted). Rather, it delegates to the President the power to decide how to spend the money to which the line item refers—either for the specific purpose mentioned in the item, or for general deficit reduction via the "lockbox" feature.

These features of the law do not mean that the delegated power is, or is just like, a power to appoint property. But they do mean that it is not, and it is not just like, the repeal or amendment of a law, or, for that matter, a true line item veto (despite the Act's title). Because one cannot say that the President's exercise of the power the Act grants is, literally speaking, a "repeal" or "amendment," the fact that the Act's procedures differ from the Constitution's exclusive procedures [480] for enacting (or repealing) legislation is beside the point. The Act itself was enacted in accordance with these procedures, and its failure to require the President to satisfy those procedures does not make the Act unconstitutional.

IV

Because I disagree with the Court's holding of literal violation, I must consider whether the Act nonetheless violates separation-of-powers principles—principles that arise out of the Constitution's vesting of the "executive Power" in "a President," U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1, and "[a]ll legislative Powers" in "a Congress," Art. I, § 1. There are three relevant separation-of-powers questions here: (1) Has Congress given the President the wrong kind of power, i. e., "nonExecutive" power? (2) Has Congress given the President the power to "encroach" upon Congress' own constitutionally reserved territory? (3) Has Congress given the President too much power, violating the doctrine of "nondelegation?" These three limitations help assure "adequate control by the citizen's Representatives in Congress," upon which Justice Kennedy properly insists. See ante, at 451 (concurring opinion). And with respect to this Act, the answer to all these questions is "no."

A

Viewed conceptually, the power the Act conveys is the right kind of power. It is "executive." As explained above, an exercise of that power "executes" the Act. Conceptually speaking, it closely resembles the kind of delegated authority—to spend or not to spend appropriations, to change or not to change tariff rates—that Congress has frequently granted the President, any differences being differences in degree, not kind. See Part IV—C, infra.

The fact that one could also characterize this kind of power as "legislative," say, if Congress itself (by amending the appropriations bill) prevented a provision from taking effect, is beside the point. This Court has frequently found that the [481] exercise of a particular power, such as the power to make rules of broad applicability, American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 310-313 (1953), or to adjudicate claims, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 50-51, 54; Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 354-356 (1958), can fall within the constitutional purview of more than one branch of Government. See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825) (Marshall, C. J.) ("Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself"). The Court does not "carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision" or "divide the branches into watertight compartments," Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), for, as others have said, the Constitution "blend[s]" as well as "separat[es]" powers in order to create a workable government. 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 1.09, p. 68 (1958).

The Court has upheld congressional delegation of rulemaking power and adjudicatory power to federal agencies, American Trucking Assns. v. United States, supra, at 310— 313; Wiener v. United States, supra, at 354-356, guidelinewriting power to a Sentencing Commission, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S., at 412, and prosecutor-appointment power to judges, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 696-697 (1988). It is far easier conceptually to reconcile the power at issue here with the relevant constitutional description ("executive") than in many of these cases. And cases in which the Court may have found a delegated power and the basic constitutional function of another branch conceptually irreconcilable are yet more distant. See, e. g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930) (power to award radio licenses not a "judicial" power).

If there is a separation-of-powers violation, then, it must rest, not upon purely conceptual grounds, but upon some important conflict between the Act and a significant separation-of-powers objective.

[482] B

The Act does not undermine what this Court has often described as the principal function of the separation of powers, which is to maintain the tripartite structure of the Federal Government—and thereby protect individual liberty— by providing a "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); Mistretta v. United States, supra, at 380-382. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (separation of powers confers on each branch the means "to resist encroachments of the others"); 1 Davis, supra, § 1.09, at 68 ("The danger is not blended power[;] [t]he danger is unchecked power"); see also, e. g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986) (invalidating congressional intrusion on Executive Branch); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982) (Congress may not give away Article III "judicial" power to an Article I judge); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926) (Congress cannot limit President's power to remove Executive Branch official).

In contrast to these cases, one cannot say that the Act "encroaches" upon Congress' power, when Congress retained the power to insert, by simple majority, into any future appropriations bill, into any section of any such bill, or into any phrase of any section, a provision that says the Act will not apply. See 2 U. S. C. § 691f(c)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 824 (1997) (Congress can "exempt a given appropriations bill (or a given provision in an appropriations bill) from the Act"). Congress also retained the power to "disapprov[e]," and thereby reinstate, any of the President's cancellations. See 2 U. S. C. § 691b(a). And it is Congress that drafts and enacts the appropriations statutes that are subject to the Act in the first place—and thereby defines the outer limits of the President's cancellation authority. Thus this Act is not the sort of delegation "without . . . sufficient check" that concerns Justice Kennedy. [483] See ante, at 450 (concurring opinion). Indeed, the President acts only in response to, and on the terms set by, the Congress.

Nor can one say that the Act's basic substantive objective is constitutionally improper, for the earliest Congresses could, see Part II, supra, and often did, confer on the President this sort of discretionary authority over spending, see ante, at 466-467 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 412 (Taft, C. J.) ("[C]ontemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and the framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs . . . fixes the construction to be given to its provisions"). And, if an individual Member of Congress, who, say, favors aid to Country A but not to Country B, objects to the Act on the ground that the President may "rewrite" an appropriations law to do the opposite, one can respond: "But a majority of Congress voted that he have that power; you may vote to exempt the relevant appropriations provision from the Act; and if you command a majority, your appropriation is safe." Where the burden of overcoming legislative inertia lies is within the power of Congress to determine by rule. Where is the encroachment?

Nor can one say the Act's grant of power "aggrandizes" the Presidential office. The grant is limited to the context of the budget. It is limited to the power to spend, or not to spend, particular appropriated items, and the power to permit, or not to permit, specific limited exemptions from generally applicable tax law from taking effect. These powers, as I will explain in detail, resemble those the President has exercised in the past on other occasions. See Part IV—C, infra. The delegation of those powers to the President may strengthen the Presidency, but any such change in Executive Branch authority seems minute when compared with the changes worked by delegations of other kinds of authority that the Court in the past has upheld. See, e. g., American [484] Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298 (1953) (delegation of rule making authority); Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948) (delegation to determine and regulate "excessive" profits); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) (delegation of adjudicatory authority); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833 (1986) (same).

C

The "nondelegation" doctrine represents an added constitutional check upon Congress' authority to delegate power to the Executive Branch. And it raises a more serious constitutional obstacle here. The Constitution permits Congress to "see[k] assistance from another branch" of Government, the "extent and character" of that assistance to be fixed "according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." J. W. Hampton, supra, at 406. But there are limits on the way in which Congress can obtain such assistance; it "cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a prescribed standard." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 324 (1931). Or, in Chief Justice Taft's more familiar words, the Constitution permits only those delegations where Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." J. W. Hampton, supra, at 409 (emphasis added).

The Act before us seeks to create such a principle in three ways. The first is procedural. The Act tells the President that, in "identifying dollar amounts [or] . . . items. . . for cancellation" (which I take to refer to his selection of the amounts or items he will "prevent from having legal force or effect"), he is to "consider," among other things,

"the legislative history, construction, and purposes of the law which contains [those amounts or items, and]. . . any specific sources of information referenced in [485] such law or . . . the best available information . . . ." 2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II).

The second is purposive. The clear purpose behind the Act, confirmed by its legislative history, is to promote "greater fiscal accountability" and to "eliminate wasteful federal spending and . . . special tax breaks." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, p. 15 (1996).

The third is substantive. The President must determine that, to "prevent" the item or amount "from having legal force or effect" will "reduce the Federal budget deficit; . . . not impair any essential Government functions; and . . . not harm the national interest." 2 U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II).

The resulting standards are broad. But this Court has upheld standards that are equally broad, or broader. See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" require) (internal quotation marks omitted); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600-603 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577 (1939) (if milk prices were "unreasonable," Secretary of Agriculture could "fi[x]" prices to a level that was "in the public interest"). See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (delegation of authority to determine "excessive" profits); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104-105 (1946) (delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent "unfairly or inequitably" distributing voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 427 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be "fair" and "equitable").

Indeed, the Court has only twice in its history found that a congressional delegation of power violated the "nondelegation" [486] doctrine. One such case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), was in a sense a special case, for it was discovered in the midst of the case that the particular exercise of the power at issue, the promulgation of a Petroleum Code under the National Industrial Recovery Act, did not contain any legally operative sentence. Id., at 412-413. The other case, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), involved a delegation through the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, that contained not simply a broad standard ("fair competition"), but also the conferral of power on private parties to promulgate rules applying that standard to virtually all of American industry, id., at 521-525. As Justice Cardozo put it, the legislation exemplified "delegation running riot," which created a "roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them." Id., at 553, 551 (concurring opinion).

The case before us does not involve any such "roving commission," nor does it involve delegation to private parties, nor does it bring all of American industry within its scope. It is limited to one area of Government, the budget, and it seeks to give the President the power, in one portion of that budget, to tailor spending and special tax relief to what he concludes are the demands of fiscal responsibility. Nor is the standard that governs his judgment, though broad, any broader than the standard that currently governs the award of television licenses, namely, "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U. S. C. § 303 (emphasis added). To the contrary, (a) the broadly phrased limitations in the Act, together with (b) its evident deficit reduction purpose, and (c) a procedure that guarantees Presidential awareness of the reasons for including a particular provision in a budget bill, taken together, guide the President's exercise of his discretionary powers.

1

The relevant similarities and differences among and between this case and other "nondelegation" cases can be listed [487] more systematically as follows: First, as I have just said, like statutes delegating power to award broadcast television licenses, or to regulate the securities industry, or to develop and enforce work place safety rules, the Act is aimed at a discrete problem: namely, a particular set of expenditures within the federal budget. The Act concerns, not the entire economy, cf. Schecter Poultry Corp., supra, but the annual federal budget. Within the budget it applies only to discretionary budget authority and new direct spending items, that together amount to approximately a third of the current annual budget outlays, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; see also Budget 303, and to "limited tax benefits" that (because each can affect no more than 100 people, see 2 U. S. C. § 691e(9)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II)), amount to a tiny fraction of federal revenues and appropriations. Compare Analytical Perspectives 73-75 (listing over $500 billion in overall "tax expenditures" that OMB estimated were contained in federal law in 1997) and Budget 303 (federal outlays and receipts in 1997 were both over $1.5 trillion ) with App. to Juris. Statement 71a (President's cancellation message for Snake River appellees' limited tax benefit, estimating annual "value" of benefit, in terms of revenue loss, at about $20 million ).

Second, like the award of television licenses, the particular problem involved—determining whether or not a particular amount of money should be spent or whether a particular dispensation from tax law should be granted a few individuals—does not readily lend itself to a significantly more specific standard. The Act makes clear that the President should consider the reasons for the expenditure, measure those reasons against the desirability of avoiding a deficit (or building a surplus), and make up his mind about the comparative weight of these conflicting goals. Congress might have expressed this matter in other language, but could it have done so in a significantly more specific way? See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 216 ("[P]ublic interest, convenience, or necessity" standard is [488] "`as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit' ") (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940)). The statute's language, I believe, is sufficient to provide the President, and the public, with a fairly clear idea as to what Congress had in mind. And the public can judge the merits of the President's choices accordingly. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S., at 426 (standards were "sufficiently definite and precise to enable . . . the public to ascertain . . . conform[ity]").

Third, insofar as monetary expenditure (but not "tax expenditure") is at issue, the President acts in an area where history helps to justify the discretionary power that Congress has delegated, and where history may inform his exercise of the Act's delegated authority. Congress has frequently delegated the President the authority to spend, or not to spend, particular sums of money. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190; Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115 (appropriating over $4 billion to be spent "in the discretion and under the direction of the President" for economic relief measures); see also ante, at 466-467 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing numerous examples).

Fourth, the Constitution permits Congress to rely upon context and history as providing the necessary standard for the exercise of the delegated power. See, e. g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co. (Station WIBO), 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933) ("public interest, convenience, or necessity [standard] . . . is to be interpreted by its context"); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253 (1947) (otherwise vague delegation to regulate banks was "sufficiently explicit, against the background of custom, to be adequate"). Relying upon context, Congress has sometimes granted the President broad discretionary authority over [489] spending in laws that mention no standard at all. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 535-536 (granting the President recess authority to transfer money "appropriated for a particular branch of expenditure in [a] department" to be "applied [instead] to another branch of expenditure in the same department"); Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, §§ 202(b), 203(b), 82 Stat. 271-272; (authorizing the President annually to reserve up to $6 billion in outlays and $10 billion in new obligation authority); Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1969, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1970, §§ 401, 501, 84 Stat. 405— 407. In this case, too, context and purpose can give meaning to highly general language. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., supra, at 285; Fahey v. Malonee, supra, at 250-253; cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S., at 777 (Congress has "at least expressed . . . satisfaction with the existing specificity of the Act"); Train v. City of New York, 420 U. S. 35, 44-47 (1975) (disallowing President Nixon's efforts to impound funds because Court found Congress did not intend him to exercise the power in that instance).

On the other hand, I must recognize that there are important differences between the delegation before us and other broad, constitutionally acceptable delegations to Executive Branch agencies—differences that argue against my conclusion. In particular, a broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency differs from the delegation at issue here in that agencies often develop subsidiary rules under the statute, rules that explain the general "public interest" language. Doing so diminishes the risk that the agency will use the breadth of a grant of authority as a cloak for unreasonable or unfair implementation. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 3:15, pp. 207-208 (2d ed. 1978). Moreover, agencies are typically subject to judicial review, which review provides an additional check against arbitrary implementation. See, e. g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United [490] States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 40-42 (1983). The President has not so narrowed his discretionary power through rule, nor is his implementation subject to judicial review under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e. g. , Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 801 (1992) (APA does not apply to President absent express statement by Congress).

While I believe that these last mentioned considerations are important, they are not determinative. The President, unlike most agency decision makers, is an elected official. He is responsible to the voters, who, in principle, will judge the manner in which he exercises his delegated authority. Whether the President's expenditure decisions, for example, are arbitrary is a matter that in the past has been left primarily to those voters to consider. And this Court has made clear that judicial review is less appropriate when the President's own discretion, rather than that of an agency, is at stake. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462, 476 (1994) (Presidential decision on military base closure recommendations not reviewable; President could "approv[e] or disapprov[e] the recommendations for whatever reason he sees fit"); Franklin, 505 U. S., at 801 (President's decision whether or not to transmit census report to Congress was unreviewable by courts for abuse of discretion); cf. id., at 799-800 (it was "important to the integrity of the process" that the decision was made by the President, a "constitutional officer" as opposed to the unelected Secretary of Commerce). These matters reflect in part the Constitution's own delegation of "executive Power" to "a President," Art. II, § 1; cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 710-711 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing unitary Executive), and we must take this into account when applying the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine to questions of Presidential authority.

Consequently I believe that the power the Act grants the President to prevent spending items from taking effect does not violate the "nondelegation" doctrine.

[491] 2

Most, but not all, of the considerations mentioned in the previous subsection apply to the Act's delegation to the President of the authority to prevent "from having legal force or effect" a "limited tax benefit," which term the Act defines in terms of special tax relief for fewer than 100 (or in some instances 10) beneficiaries, which tax relief is not available to others who are somewhat similarly situated. 2 U. S. C. § 691e(9) (1994 ed., Supp. II). There are, however, two related significant differences between the "limited tax benefit" and the spending items considered above, which make the "limited tax benefit" question more difficult. First, the history is different. The history of Presidential authority to pick and to choose is less voluminous. Second, the subject matter (increasing or decreasing an individual's taxes) makes the considerations discussed at the end of the last section (i. e., the danger of an arbitrary exercise of delegated power) of greater concern. But these differences, in my view, are not sufficient to change the "nondelegation" result.

For one thing, this Court has made clear that the standard we must use to judge whether a law violates the "nondelegation" doctrine is the same in the tax area as in any other. In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212 (1989), the Court considered whether Congress, in the exercise of its taxing power, could delegate to the Secretary of Transportation the authority to establish a system of pipeline user fees. In rejecting the argument that the "fees" were actually a "tax," and that the law amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' own power to tax, the unanimous Court said that:

"From its earliest days to the present, Congress, when enacting tax legislation, has varied the degree of specificity and the consequent degree of discretionary authority delegated to the Executive . . . .

. . . . .

[492] "We find no support . . . for [the] contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power. . . . Even if the user fees are a form of taxation, we hold that the delegation of discretionary authority under Congress' taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges. Congress may wisely choose to be more circumspect in delegating authority under the Taxing Clause than under other of its enumerated powers, but this is not a heightened degree of prudence required by the Constitution." Id., at 221-223.

For another thing, this Court has upheld tax statutes that delegate to the President the power to change taxes under very broad standards. In 1890, for example, Congress authorized the President to "suspend" the provisions of the tariff statute, thereby raising tariff rates, if the President determined that other nations were imposing "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" tariff rates on specialized commodities. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 612. And the Court upheld the statute against constitutional attack. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S., at 693-694 ("[N]o valid objection can be made" to such statutes "conferring authority or discretion" on the President) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 411 (President "authorized" to "suspend the operation of" a customs law "if in his judgment the public interest should require it"); Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, § 1, 1 Stat. 372 (empowering President to lay an embargo on ships in ports "whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require" and to revoke related regulations "whenever he shall think proper"). In 1922 Congress gave the President the authority to adjust tariff rates to "equalize" the differences in costs of production at home and abroad, see Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, [493] § 315(a), 42 Stat. 941-942. The Court also upheld this delegation against constitutional attack. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).

These statutory delegations resemble today's Act more closely than one might at first suspect. They involve a duty on imports, which is a tax. That tax in the last century was as important then as the income tax is now, for it provided most of the Federal Government's revenues. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2, at 1106 (in 1890, when Congress passed the statute at issue in Field, tariff revenues were 57% of the total receipts of the Federal Government). And the delegation then thus affected a far higher percentage of federal revenues than the tax-related delegation over extremely "limited" tax benefits here. See supra, at 487.

The standards at issue in these earlier laws, such as "unreasonable," were frequently vague and without precise meaning. See, e. g., Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 3, 26 Stat. 612. Indeed, the word "equalize" in the 1922 statute, 42 Stat. 942, could not have been administered as if it offered the precision it seems to promise, for a tariff that literally "equalized" domestic and foreign production costs would, because of transport costs, have virtually ended foreign trade.

Nor can I accept the majority's effort to distinguish these examples. The majority says that these statutes imposed a specific "duty" upon the President to act upon the occurrence of a specified event. See ante, at 443. But, in fact, some of the statutes imposed no duty upon the President at all. See, e. g., Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 411 (President "authorized" to "suspend the operation of" a customs law "if in his judgment the public interest should require it"). Others imposed a "duty" in terms so vague as to leave substantial discretion in the President's hands. See Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 612 (President's "duty" to suspend tariff law was triggered "whenever" and "so often as" he was "satisfied" [494] that "unequal and unreasonable" rates were imposed); see also Field v. Clark, supra, at 691 (historically in the flexible tariff statutes Congress has "invest[ed] the President with large discretion").

The majority also tries to distinguish these examples on the ground that the President there executed congressional policy while here he rejects that policy. See ante, at 444. The President here, however, in exercising his delegated authority does not reject congressional policy. Rather, he executes a law in which Congress has specified its desire that the President have the very authority he has exercised. See Part III, supra.

The majority further points out that these cases concern imports, an area that, it says, implicates foreign policy and therefore justifies an unusual degree of discretion by the President. See ante, at 445. Congress, however, has not limited its delegations of taxation authority to the "foreign policy" arena. The first Congress gave the Secretary of the Treasury the "power to mitigate or remit" statutory penalties for nonpayment of liquor taxes "upon such terms and conditions as shall appear to him reasonable." Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 209. A few years later, the Secretary was authorized, in lieu of collecting the stamp duty enacted by Congress, "to agree to an annual composition for the amount of such stamp duty, with any of the said banks, of one per centum on the amount of the annual dividend made by such banks." Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 528. More recently, Congress has given to the Executive Branch the authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code], including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). And the Court has held that such rules and regulations, "which undoubtedly affect individual taxpayer liability, are . . . without doubt the result of entirely appropriate delegations of discretionary authority [495] by Congress." Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S., at 222. I do not believe the Court would hold the same delegations at issue in J. W. Hampton and Field unconstitutional were they to arise in a more obviously domestic area.

Finally, the tax-related delegation is limited in ways that tend to diminish any widespread risk of arbitrary Presidential decision making:

(1) The Act does not give the President authority to change general tax policy. That is because the limited tax benefits are defined in terms of deviations from tax policy, i. e., special benefits to fewer than 100 individuals. See 2 U. S. C. § 691e(9)(A)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also Analytical Perpectives 84 (defining "tax expenditure" as "a preferential exception to the baseline provisions of the tax structure").

(2) The Act requires the President to make the same kind of policy judgment with respect to these special benefits as with respect to items of spending. He is to consider the budget as a whole, he is to consider the particular history of the tax benefit provision, and he is to consider whether the provision is worth the loss of revenue it causes in the same way that he must decide whether a particular expenditure item is worth the added revenue that it requires. See supra, at 484-485.

(3) The delegated authority does not destroy any individual's expectation of receiving a particular benefit, for the Act is written to say to the small group of taxpayers who may receive the benefit, "Taxpayers, you will receive an exemption from ordinary tax laws, but only if the President decides the budgetary loss is not too great."

(4) The "limited tax benefit" provisions involve only a small part of the federal budget, probably less than one percent of total annual outlays and revenues. Compare Budget 303 (federal outlays and receipts in 1997 were both over $1.5 trillion ) with App. to Juris. Statement 71a (President's cancellation message for Snake River appellees' limited tax benefit, [496] estimating annual "value" of benefit, in terms of revenue loss, at about $20 million ) and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, § 1701, 111 Stat. 1099 (identifying only 79 "limited tax benefits" subject to cancellation in the entire tax statute).

(5) Because the "tax benefit" provisions are part and parcel of the budget provisions, and because the Act in defining them, focuses upon "revenue-losing" tax provisions, 2 U. S. C. § 691e(9)(A)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. II), it regards "tax benefits" as if they were a special kind of spending, namely spending that puts back into the pockets of a small group of taxpayers, money that "baseline" tax policy would otherwise take from them. There is, therefore, no need to consider this provision as if it represented a delegation of authority to the President, outside the budget expenditure context, to set major policy under the federal tax laws. But cf. Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, supra, at 222-223 (no "different and stricter" nondelegation doctrine in the taxation context). Still less does approval of the delegation in this case, given the long history of Presidential discretion in the budgetary context, automatically justify the delegation to the President of the authority to alter the effect of other laws outside that context.

The upshot is that, in my view, the "limited tax benefit" provisions do not differ enough from the "spending" provisions to warrant a different "nondelegation" result.

V

In sum, I recognize that the Act before us is novel. In a sense, it skirts a constitutional edge. But that edge has to do with means, not ends. The means chosen do not amount literally to the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a law. Nor, for that matter, do they amount literally to the "line item veto" that the Act's title announces. Those means do not violate any basic separation-of-powers principle. They do not improperly shift the constitutionally foreseen balance of power from Congress to the President. Nor, since [497] they comply with separation-of-powers principles, do they threaten the liberties of individual citizens. They represent an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government work better. The Constitution, in my view, authorizes Congress and the President to try novel methods in this way. Consequently, with respect, I dissent.

[1] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States Senate by Thomas B. Griffith, Morgan J. Frankel, and Steven F. Huefner; for Marci Hamilton, pro se, and David Schoenbrod, pro se; for Congressman Dan Burton et al. by James M. Spears; and for John S. Baker, Jr., pro se.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Bar of the City of New York by Louis A. Craco, Jr., James F. Parver, and David P. Felsher; for Senator Robert C. Byrd et al. by Michael Davidson and Mark A. Patterson; and for Representative Henry W. Waxman et al. by Alan B. Morrison.

[2] Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793, 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(w).

[3] Section 4722(c) provides:

"(c) WAIVER OF CERTAIN PROVIDER TAX PROVISIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, taxes, fees, or assessments, as defined in section 1903(w)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 1396b(w)(3)(A)), that were collected by the State of New York from a health care provider before June 1, 1997, and for which a waiver of the provisions of subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 1903(w)(3) of such Act has been applied for, or that would, but for this subsection require that such a waiver be applied for, in accordance with subparagraph (E) of such section, and, (if so applied for) upon which action by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (including any judicial review of any such proceeding) has not been completed as of July 23, 1997, are deemed to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 1903(w)(3) of such Act." 111 Stat. 515.

[4] App. to Juris. Statement 63a—64a (Cancellation No. 97-3). The quoted text is an excerpt from the statement of reasons for the cancellation, which is required by the Line Item Veto Act. See 2 U. S. C. § 691a (1994 ed., Supp. II).

[5] Section 968(a) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 amended 26 U. S. C. § 1042 by adding a new subsection (g),which defined the sellers eligible for the exemption as follows:

"(2) QUALIFIED REFINER OR PROCESSOR.—For purposes of this subsection, the term `qualified refiner or processor' means a domestic corporation—

"(A) substantially all of the activities of which consist of the active conduct of the trade or business of refining or processing agricultural or horticultural products, and

"(B) which, during the 1-year period ending on the date of the sale, purchases more than one-half of such products to be refined or processed from—

"(i)farmers who make up the eligible farmers' cooperative which is purchasing stock in the corporation in a transaction to which this subsection is to apply, or

"(ii)such cooperative." 111 Stat. 896.

[6] H. R. Rep. No. 105-148, p. 420 (1997); see also 141 Cong. Rec. S18739 (Dec. 15, 1995) (Senator Hatch, introducing a previous version of the bill, stating that it "would provide farmers who form farmers cooperatives the opportunity for an ownership interest in the processing and marketing of their products"); ibid. (Senator Craig, cosponsor of a previous bill, stating that "[c]urrently, farmers cannot compete with other business entities . . . in buying such [processing] businesses because of the advantages inherent in the tax deferrals available in transactions with these other purchases"; bill "would be helpful to farmers cooperatives"); App. 116-117 (Letter from Congress persons Roberts and Stenholm (Dec. 1, 1995)) (congressional sponsors stating that a previous version of the bill was intended to "provide American farmers a more firm economic footing and more control over their economic destiny. We believe this proposal will help farmers, through their cooperatives, purchase facilities to refine and process their raw commodities into value-added products. . . . It will encourage farmers to help themselves in a more market-oriented environment by vertically integrating. If this legislation is passed, we are confident that, 10 years from now, we will look on this bill as one of the most beneficial actions Congress took for U. S. farmers").

[7] § 1701(30), 111 Stat. 1101.

[8] App. to Juris. Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97-2).On the day the President canceled § 968,he stated:"Because I strongly support family farmers, farm cooperatives, and the acquisition of production facilities by co-ops,this was a very difficult decision forme." App. 125. He added that creating incentives so that farmers' cooperatives can obtain processing facilities is a "very worthy goal."Id., at 130.

[9] App. to Juris. Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97-2).Section 968 was one of the two limited tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that the President canceled.

[10] In both actions, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional and that the particular cancellation was invalid; neither setof plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the President.

[11] See, e. g., N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807—c(18)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1997— 1998) ("In the event the secretary of the department of health and human services determines that the assessments do not . . . qualify based on any such exclusion, then the exclusion shall be deemed to have been null and void . . . and the commissioner shall collect any retroactive amount due as a result . . . . Interest and penalties shall be measured from the due date of ninety days following notice from the commissioner"); § 2807—d(12) (1993) (same); § 2807—j(11) (Supp. 1997-1998) (same); § 2807—s(8) (same).

[12] As the District Court explained: "These laws reflected the best judgment of both Houses. The laws that resulted after the President's line item veto were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress. There is no way of knowing whether these laws, in their truncated form, would have received the requisite support from both the House and the Senate. Because the laws that emerged after the Line Item Veto are not the same laws that proceeded through the legislative process, as required, the resulting laws are not valid." 985 F. Supp., at 178-179.

[13] "Unilateral action by any single participant in the law-making process is precisely what the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses were designed to prevent. Once a bill becomes law, it can only be repealed or amended through another, independent legislative enactment, which itself must conform with the requirements of Article I. Any rescissions must be agreed upon by a majority of both Houses of Congress. The President cannot single-handedly revise the work of the other two participants in the lawmaking process, as he did here when he vetoed certain provisions of these statutes." Ibid.

[14] Although in ordinary usage both "individual" and "person" often refer to an individual human being, see, e. g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1152, 1686 (1986) ("individual" defined as a "single human being"; "person" defined as "an individual human being"), "person" often has a broader meaning in the law, see, e. g., 1 U. S. C. § 1 ("person" includes "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals").

[15] Justice Scalia objects to our conclusion that the Government's reading of the statute would produce an absurd result. Post, at 454-455. Nonetheless, he states that "`the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.' " Post, at 455 (quoting this Court's Rule 11). Unlike Justice Scalia, however, we need not rely on our own sense of the importance of the issue involved; instead, the structure of § 692 makes it clear that Congress believed the issue warranted expedited review and, therefore, that Congress did not intend the result that the word "individual" would dictate in other contexts.

[16] To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).

[17] Because the cancellation of the legislative equivalent of a favorable final judgment causes immediate injury, the Government's reliance on Anderson v. Green, 513 U. S. 557 (1995) (per curiam), is misplaced. That case involved a challenge to a California statute that would have imposed limits on welfare payments to new residents during their first year of residence in California. The statute could not become effective without a waiver from HHS. Although such a waiver had been in effect when the action was filed, it had been vacated in a separate proceeding and HHS had not sought review of that judgment. Accordingly, at the time the Anderson case reached this Court, the plaintiffs were receiving the same benefits as long-term residents; they had suffered no injury. We held that the case was not ripe because, unless and until HHS issued a new waiver, any future injury was purely conjectural. Id., at 559 ("The parties [i. e., the plaintiffs and California, but not HHS] have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural"). Unlike New York in this case, they were not contingently liable for anything.

[18] App. 106-107.

[19] See n. 10, supra.

[20] The Government relies on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), to support its argument that the State, and not appellees, should be bringing this claim. In Warth we held, inter alia, that citizens of Rochester did not have standing to challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of another community because their claimed injury of increased taxation turned on the prospective actions of Rochester officials. Id. , at 509. Appellees' injury in this case, however, does not turn on the independent actions of third parties, as existing New York law will automatically require that appellees reimburse the State.

Because both the City of New York and the health care appellees have standing, we need not consider whether the appellee unions also have standing to sue. See, e. g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 721 (1986).

[21] See n. 5, supra.

[22] App. 111-115 (Declaration of Mike Cranney).

[23] The Government argues that there can be an Article III injury only if Snake River would have actually obtained a facility on favorable terms. We have held, however, that a denial of a benefit in the bargaining process can itself create an Article III injury, irrespective of the end result. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993). In that case an association of contractors challenged a city ordinance that accorded preferential treatment to certain minority-owned businesses in the award of city contracts. The Court of Appeals had held that the association lacked standing "because it failed to allege that one or more of its members would have been awarded a contract but for the challenged ordinance." Id., at 664. We rejected the Court of Appeals' position, stating that it "cannot be reconciled with our precedents." Ibid. Even though the preference applied to only a small percentage of the city's business, and even though there was no showing that any party would have received a contract absent the ordinance, we held that the prospective bidders had standing; the "injury in fact" was the harm to the contractors in the negotiation process, "not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit." Id., at 666.

Having found that both the New York and Snake River appellees are actually injured, traceability and redress ability are easily satisfied—each injury is traceable to the President's cancellation of § 4722(c) or § 968, and would be redressed by a declaratory judgment that the cancellations are invalid.

[24] Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), are distinguishable, as each of those cases involved a speculative chain of causation quite different from the situation here. In Allen, parents of black public school children alleged that, even though it was the policy of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools, the IRS had "not adopted sufficient standards and procedures" to enforce this policy. 468 U. S., at 739. The parents alleged that the lax enforcement caused white students to attend discriminatory private schools and, therefore, interfered with their children's opportunity to attend desegregated public schools. We held that the chain of causation between the challenged action and the alleged injury was too attenuated to confer standing:

"It is, first, uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools are in fact receiving tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative. . . whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies. . . . It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the public schools." Id., at 758 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Simon, the respondents challenged an IRS Revenue Ruling that granted favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services to the poor. The respondents argued that the Revenue Ruling "`encouraged' hospitals to deny services to indigents." 426 U. S., at 42. As in Allen, we held that the chain of causation was too attenuated:

"It is purely speculative whether the denials of service . . . fairly can be traced to [the IRS's] `encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.

"It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services. So far as the complaint sheds light, it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services." 426 U. S., at 42-43. See also id., at 45 ("Speculative inferences are necessary to connect [respondents'] injury to the challenged actions of petitioners").

The injury in the present case is comparable to the repeal of a law granting a subsidy to sellers of processing plants if, and only if, they sell to farmers' cooperatives. Every farmers' cooperative seeking to buy a processing plant is harmed by that repeal.

[25] Congress failed to act upon proposed legislation to disapprove these cancellations. See S. 1157, H. R. 2444, S. 1144, and H. R. 2436, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). Indeed, despite the fact that the President has canceled at least 82 items since the Act was passed, see Statement of June E. O'Neill, Director, Congressional Budget Office, Line Item Veto Act After One Year, The Process and Its Implementation, before the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process of the House Committee on Rules, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 11-12, 1998), Congress has enacted only one law, over a Presidential veto, disapproving any cancellation, see Pub. L. 105-159, 112 Stat. 19 (1998) (disapproving the cancellation of 38 military construction spending items).

[26] See n. 29, infra.

[27] The term "cancel," used in connection with any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, means "to rescind." 2 U. S. C. § 691e(4)(A). The entire definition reads as follows:

"The term `cancel' or `cancellation' means—

"(A) with respect to any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, to rescind;

"(B) with respect to any item of new direct spending—

"(i) that is budget authority provided by law (other than an appropriation law), to prevent such budget authority from having legal force or effect;

"(ii) that is entitlement authority, to prevent the specific legal obligation of the United States from having legal force or effect; or

"(iii) through the food stamp program, to prevent the specific provision of law that results in an increase in budget authority or outlays for that program from having legal force or effect; and

"(C) with respect to a limited tax benefit, to prevent the specific provision of law that provides such benefit from having legal force or effect." 2 U. S. C. § 691e(4) (1994 ed., Supp. II).

[28] See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1555, p. 413 (1833) (Art. II, § 3, enables the President "to point out the evil, and to suggest the remedy").

[29] The full text of the relevant paragraph of § 7 provides:

"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it,with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law."

[30] "In constitutional terms, `veto' is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 925, n. 2 (1983) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed. 1979)).

[31] 33 Writings of George Washington 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); see also W. Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities and Its Limitations 11 (1916) (stating that the President "has no power to veto part of a bill and let the rest become a law"); cf. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *154 ("The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses").

[32] The lockbox procedure ensures that savings resulting from cancellations are used to reduce the deficit, rather than to offset deficit increases arising from other laws. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 691c(a)—(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, pp. 23-24 (1996). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates the deficit reduction resulting from each cancellation of new direct spending or limited tax benefit items and presents its estimate as a separate entry in the "pay-as-you-go" report submitted to Congress pursuant to § 252(d) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), 2 U. S. C. § 902(d). See § 691c(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 23. The "pay-as-you-go" requirement acts as a self-imposed limitation on Congress' ability to increase spending and/or reduce revenue: If spending increases are not offset by revenue increases (or if revenue reductions are not offset by spending reductions), then a "sequester" of the excess budgeted funds is required. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 900(b), 901(a)(1), 902(b), 906(l ). OMB does not include the estimated savings resulting from a cancellation in the report it must submit under §§ 252(b) and 254 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U. S. C. §§ 902(b), 904. See § 691c(a)(2)(B). By providing in this way that such savings "shall not be included in the pay-as-you-go balances," Congress ensures that "savings from the cancellation of new direct spending or limited tax benefits are devoted to deficit reduction and are not available to offset a deficit increase in another law." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 23. Thus, the "pay-as-you-go" cap does not change upon cancellation because the canceled item is not treated as canceled. Moreover, if Congress enacts a disapproval bill, "OMB will not score this legislation as increasing the deficit under pay as you go." Ibid.

[33] The Snake River appellees have argued that the lockbox provisions have no such effect with respect to the canceled tax benefits at issue. Because we reject the Government's suggestion that the lockbox provisions alter our constitutional analysis, however, we find it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over the details of the lockbox procedure's applicability.

[34] Thus, although "Congress's use of infelicitous terminology cannot transform the cancellation into an unconstitutional amendment or repeal of an enacted law," Brief for Appellants 40-41 (citations omitted), the actual effect of a cancellation is entirely consistent with the language of the Act.

[35] Moreover, Congress always retains the option of statutorily amending or repealing the lockbox provisions and/or the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, so as to eliminate any lingering financial effect of canceled items.

[36] For example, one reason that the President gave for canceling § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act was his conclusion that "this provision failed to target its benefits to small-and-medium size cooperatives." App. to Juris. Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97-2); see n. 8, supra. Because the Line Item Veto Act requires the President to act within five days, every exercise of the cancellation power will necessarily be based on the same facts and circumstances that Congress considered, and therefore constitute a rejection of the policy choice made by Congress.

[37] The Court did not, of course, expressly consider in Field whether those statutes comported with the requirements of the Presentment Clause.

[38] Cf. 143 U. S., at 688 (discussing Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, § 2, 14 Stat. 4, which permitted the President to "declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative" and lift import restrictions on foreign cattle and hides upon a showing that such importation would not endanger U. S. cattle).

[39] Indeed, the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), so limited its reasoning: "[I]n the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, itis often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, . . .to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations." Id., at 691.

[40] See also J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 407 (1928) ("Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of an Executive").

[41] The Government argues that the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072(b), permits this Court to "repeal" prior laws without violating Article I, § 7. Section 2072(b) provides that this Court may promulgate rules of procedure for the lower federal courts and that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." See Sibbach v.Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 10 (1941) (stating that the procedural rules that this Court promulgates, "if they are within the authority granted by Congress, repeal" a prior inconsistent procedural statute); see also Henderson v. United States, 517 U. S. 654, 664 (1996) (citing § 2072(b)). In enacting § 2072(b), however, Congress expressly provided that laws inconsistent with the procedural rules promulgated by this Court would automatically be repealed upon the enactment of new rules in order to create a uniform system of rules for Article III courts. As in the tariff statutes, Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular event—here, the promulgation of procedural rules by this Court.

[42] Cf.Taft, The Presidency, supra n.30, at 21 ("A President with the power to veto items in appropriation bills might exercise a good restraining influence in cutting down the total annual expenses of the government. But this is not the right way").

[43] See Bowsher, 478 U. S., at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons").

[44] We also find it unnecessary to consider whether the provisions of the Act relating to discretionary budget authority are severable from the Act's tax benefit and direct spending provisions. We note, however, that the Act contains no severability clause; a severability provision that had appeared in the Senate bill was dropped in conference without explanation. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 17, 41.