Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper application of our decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).1 436 U. S. 925. Petitioner Scott was convicted of theft and fined $50 after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. His conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate appellate court and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois, over Scott's contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution required that Illinois provide trial counsel to him at its expense.

Petitioner Scott was convicted of shoplifting merchandise valued at less than $150. The applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both.2 The petitioner argues that a line of this Court’s cases culminating in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, requires state provision of counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty.

*369The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this contention, quoting the following language from Argersinger:

“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U. S., at 37.

“Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.” Id., at 40.

The Supreme Court of Illinois went on to state that it was “not inclined to extend Argersinger” to the case where a defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually imposed upon the defendant. 68 Ill. 2d 260, 272, 360 N. E. 2d 881, 882 (1077). We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the Federal Constitution does not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant such as petitioner, and we therefore affirm its judgment.

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner referred to the issue in this case as “the question left open in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1072).” Pet. for Cert. 5. Whether this question was indeed “left open” in Argersinger depends upon whether one considers that opinion to be a point in a moving line or a holding that the States are required to go only so far in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in quoting the above language from Argersinger, clearly viewed the latter as Argersinger’s holding. *370Additional support for this proposition may be derived from the concluding paragraph of the opinion in that case:

“The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today’s ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ so necessary where one’s liberty is in jeopardy.” 407 U. S., at 40.

Petitioner, on the other hand, refers to language in the Court’s opinion, responding to the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, which states that the Court “need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved . . . for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail.” Id., at 37.

There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense. W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 27-30 (1955). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), the Court held that Alabama was obligated to appoint counsel for the Scottsboro defendants, phrasing the inquiry as “whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 52. It concluded its opinion with the following language:

“The United States by statute and every state in the Union by express provision of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous *371accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that right." Id., at 73.

Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), held that not every indigent defendant accused in a state criminal prosecution was entitled to appointment of counsel. A determination had to be made in each individual case whether failure to appoint counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness. Betts was in turn overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, Betts was described as holding “that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 372 U. S., at 339.

Several Terms later the Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), that the right to jury trial in federal court guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held, however: “It is doubtless true that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses . . . .” Id., at 159 (footnote omitted). In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970), the controlling opinion of Mr. Justice White concluded that “no offense can be deemed 'petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”

In Argersinger the State of Florida urged that a similar dichotomy be employed in the right-to-counsel area: Any offense punishable by less than six months in jail should not *372require appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant.3 The Argersinger Court rejected this analogy, however, observing that “the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge alone.” 407 U. S., at 29.

The number of separate opinions in Gideon, Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger, suggests that constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another. The process of incorporation creates special difficulties, for the state and federal contexts are often different and application of the same principle may have ramifications distinct in degree and kind. The range of human conduct regulated by state criminal laws is much broader than that of the federal criminal laws, particularly on the “petty” offense part of the spectrum. As a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to extrapolate an already extended line when, although the general nature of the principle sought to be applied is clear, its precise limits and their ramifications become less so. We have now in our decided cases departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment. And we cannot fall back on the common law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of misdemeanors. See Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 60.

In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it thought these arguments were factually incorrect. 407 U. S., at 37 n. 7. But they were rejected in much larger part because of the Court’s conclusion that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent *373defendant had been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule. The Court in its opinion repeatedly referred to trials “where an accused is deprived of his liberty,” id., at 32, and to “a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period,” id., at 33. The Chief Justice in his opinion concurring in the result also observed that “any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter.” Id., at 41.

Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are not unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings.4 Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment— is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.5 We therefore hold that the Sixth *374and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is accordingly

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Powell,

concurring.

For the reasons stated in my opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 44 (1972), I do not think the rule adopted by the Court in that case is required by the Constitution. Moreover, the drawing of a line based on whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious consequences. The Argersinger rule also tends to impair the proper functioning of the criminal justice system in that trial judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except the charge, all too often will be compelled to forgo the legislatively granted option to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. Preserving this option by providing counsel often will be impossible or impracticable — particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be available.

Despite my continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule, it was approved by the Court in the 1972 opinion and four Justices have reaffirmed it today. It is important that this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the country that confront this problem daily. Accordingly, and mindful of stare decisis, I join the opinion of the *375Court. I do so, however, with the hope that in due time a majority will recognize that a more flexible rule is consistent with due process and will better serve the cause of justice.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the right includes the right of the indigent to have counsel provided. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), held that the right recognized in Gideon extends to the trial of any offense for which a convicted defendant is likely to be incarcerated.

This case presents the question whether the right to counsel extends to a person accused of an offense that, although punishable by incarceration, is actually punished only by a fine. Petitioner Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969), an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or by a fine of up to $500, or by both. About four months before Argersinger was decided, Scott had a bench trial, without counsel, and without notice of entitlement to retain counsel or, if indigent,1 to have counsel provided. He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a $50 fine.

The Court, in an opinion that at best ignores the basic principles of prior decisions, affirms Scott’s conviction without *376counsel because he was sentenced only to pay a fine. In my view, the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment and the Court’s precedents compel the conclusion that Scott’s uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and should be reversed.

I

The Court’s opinion intimates that the Court’s precedents ordaining the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds in state criminal proceedings fail to provide a principled basis for deciding this case. That is demonstrably not so. The principles developed in the relevant precedents are clear and sound. The Court simply chooses to ignore them.

Gideon v. Wainwright held that, because representation by counsel in a criminal proceeding is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” 372 U. S., at 342, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment:

“[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed *377fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” Id., at 344.

Earlier precedents had recognized that the assistance of appointed counsel was critical, not only to equalize the sides in an adversary criminal process,2 but also to give substance to other constitutional and procedural protections afforded criminal defendants.3 Gideon established the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds as a categorical *378requirement, making the Court’s former case-by-case due process analysis, cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), unnecessary in cases covered by its holding. Gideon involved a felony prosecution, but that fact was not crucial to the decision ; its reasoning extended, in the words of the Sixth Amendment, to “all criminal prosecutions.” 4

Argersinger v. Hamlin took a cautious approach toward implementing the logical consequences of Gideon’s rationale. The petitioner in Argersinger had been sentenced to jail for 90 days after conviction — at a trial without counsel — of carrying a concealed weapon, a Florida offense carrying an authorized penalty of imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of up to $1,000. The State, relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), urged that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, like the right to jury trial, should not apply to accuseds charged with “petty” offenses punishable by less than six months’ imprisonment. But Argersinger refused to extend the “petty” offense limitation to the right to counsel. The Court pointed out that the limitation was contrary to the express words of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantee its enumerated rights “[i]n all criminal prosecutions”; that the right to jury trial was the only Sixth Amendment right applicable to the States that had been held inapplicable to “petty offenses”;5 that this *379limitation had been based on historical considerations peculiar to the right to jury trial; 6 and that the right to counsel was more fundamentally related to the fairness of criminal prosecutions than the right to jury trial and was in fact essential to the meaningful exercise of other Sixth Amendment protections.7

Although its analysis, like that in Gideon and other earlier cases, suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should apply to all state criminal prosecutions, Argersinger held only that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by six months of incarceration or less, if he is likely to be sentenced to incarceration for any time if convicted. The question of the right to counsel in cases in which incarceration was authorized but would not be imposed was expressly reserved.8

II

In my view petitioner could prevail in this case without extending the right to counsel beyond what was assumed to exist in Argersinger. Neither party in that case questioned *380the existence of the right to counsel in trials involving “non-petty” offenses punishable by more than six months in jail.9 The question the Court addressed was whether the right applied to some “petty” offenses to which the right to jury trial did not extend. The Court's reasoning in applying the right to counsel in the case before it — that the right to counsel is more fundamental to a fair proceeding than the right to jury trial and that the historical limitations on the jury trial right are irrelevant to the right to counsel — certainly cannot support a standard for the right to counsel that is more restrictive than the standard for granting a right to jury trial. As my Brother Powell commented in his opinion concurring in the result in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 45-46: “It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial.” Argersinger thus established a “two dimensional” test for the right to counsel: the right attaches to any “nonpetty” offense punishable by more than six months in jail and in addition to any offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless of the maximum authorized penalty. See Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 601 (1975).

The offense of “theft” with which Scott was charged is certainly not a “petty” one. It is punishable by a sentence of up to one year in jail. Unlike many traffic or other “regulatory” offenses, it carries the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravity.10 The State indicated at oral argument that the *381services of a professional prosecutor were considered essential to the prosecution of this offense. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S., at 49 (Powell, J., concurring in result). Likewise, nonindigent defendants charged with this offense would be well advised to hire the “best lawyers they can get.” 11 Scott’s right to the assistance of appointed counsel is thus plainly mandated by the logic of the Court’s prior cases, including Argersinger itself.12

Ill

But rather than decide consonant with the assumption in regard to nonpetty offenses that was both implicit and explicit *382in Argersinger, the Court today retreats to the indefensible position that the Argersinger "actual imprisonment” standard is the only test for determining the boundary of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in state misdemeanor cases, thus necessarily deciding that in many cases (such as this one) a defendant will have no right to appointed counsel even when he has a constitutional right to a jury trial. This is simply an intolerable result. Not only is the “actual imprisonment” standard unprecedented as the exclusive test, but also the problems inherent in its application demonstrate the superiority of an “authorized imprisonment” standard that would require the appointment of counsel for indigents accused of any offense for which imprisonment for any time is authorized.

First, the “authorized imprisonment” standard more faithfully implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment identified in Gideon. The procedural rules established by state statutes are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for an offense, not to the actual penalty imposed in particular cases. The authorized penalty is also a better predictor of the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach to conviction of an offense.13 With the exception of Argersinger, authorized penalties have been used consistently by this Court as the true measures of the seriousness of offenses. See, e. g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S., at 68-70; Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147, 149 (1969); United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922). Imprisonment is a sanction particularly associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses punishable by imprisonment accordingly possess the characteris*383tics found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel. By contrast, the “actual imprisonment” standard, as the Court’s opinion in this case demonstrates, denies the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions to accuseds who suffer the severe consequences of prosecution other than imprisonment.

Second, the “authorized imprisonment” test presents no problems of administration. It avoids the necessity for time-consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias. These problems with the “actual imprisonment” standard were suggested in my Brother Powell’s concurrence in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 52-55, which was echoed in scholarly criticism of that decision.14 Petitioner emphasizes these defects, arguing with considerable force that implementation of the “actual imprisonment” standard must assuredly lead to violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner 47-59.

Finally, the “authorized imprisonment” test ensures that courts will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the appropriate range of penalties to be considered for each offense. Under the “actual imprisonment” standard,

“[t]he judge will ... be forced to decide in advance of trial — and without hearing the evidence — whether he will forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the availability *384of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without counsel.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 53 (Powell, J., concurring in result).

The “authorized imprisonment” standard, on the other hand, respects the allocation of functions between legislatures and courts in the administration of the criminal justice system.

The apparent reason for the Court’s adoption of the “actual imprisonment” standard for all misdemeanors is concern for the economic burden that an “authorized imprisonment” standard might place on the States. But, with all respect, that concern is both irrelevant and speculative.

This Court’s role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions of state governments. A unanimous Court made that clear in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 196-197 (1971), in rejecting a proposed fiscal justification for providing free transcripts for appeals only when the appellant was subject to imprisonment:

“This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin [v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956)] .... Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State’s fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.”15

In any event, the extent of the alleged burden on the States is, as the Court admits, ante, at 373-374, n. 5, speculative. Al*385though more persons are charged with misdemeanors punishable by incarceration than are charged with felonies, a smaller percentage of persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as indigent, and misdemeanor cases as a rule require far less attorney time.16

Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economically feasible, and the establishment of such systems to replace appointment of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable levels even when the number of cases requiring appointment of counsel increases dramatically.17 The public defender system alternative also answers the argument that an “authorized imprisonment” standard would clog the courts with inexperienced appointed counsel.

Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent’s alarmist prophecies that an “authorized imprisonment” standard would wreak havoc on the States is that the standard has not produced that result in the substantial number of States that already provide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is *386authorized — States that include a large majority of the country’s population and a great diversity of urban and rural environments.18 Moreover, of those States that do not yet *387provide counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is authorized, many provide counsel when periods of imprisonment longer than 30 days,19 3 months,20 or 6 months21 are author*388ized. In fact, Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States.22

It may well be that adoption by this Court of an “authorized imprisonment” standard would lead state and local governments to re-examine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local government might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for certain minor offenses in light of the expense of meeting the requirements of the Constitution. In my view this re-examination is long overdue.23 In any *389event, the Court’s “actual imprisonment” standard must inevitably lead the courts to make this re-examination, which plainly should more properly be a legislative responsibility.

IV

The Court’s opinion turns the reasoning of Argersinger on its head. It restricts the right to counsel, perhaps the most fundamental Sixth Amendment right,24 more narrowly than the admittedly less fundamental right to jury trial.25 The abstract pretext that “constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another,” ante, at 372, cannot camouflage the anomalous result the Court reaches. Today’s decision reminds one of Mr. Justice Black’s description of Betts v. Brady: “an anachronism when handed down” that “ma[kes] an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 345, 344.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

For substantially the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, I would hold that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those Amendments. Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prose*390cuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).

This resolution, I feel, would provide the “bright line” that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger.

On this approach, of course, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott’s conviction should be reversed, since he was convicted of an offense for which he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. I, therefore, dissent.

Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the Sixth Amendment right of an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both, to the assistance of court-appointed counsel. Two prior decisions control the Court’s judgment. First, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), this Court held that defense counsel must be appointed in any criminal prosecution, “whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,” id., at 37, “that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period,” id., at 33. Later, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 373-374 (1979), the Court drew the line at “actual imprisonment,” holding that counsel need not be appointed when the defendant is fined for the charged crime, but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

*658Defendant-respondent LeReed Shelton, convicted of third-degree assault, was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. The question presented is whether the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as delineated in Argersinger and Scott, applies to a defendant in Shelton’s situation. We hold that a suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded “the guiding hand of counsel” in the prosecution for the crime charged. Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).

I

After representing himself at a bench trial in the District Court of Etowah County, Alabama, Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault, a class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2,000 fine, Ala. Code §§13A-6-22, 13A-5-7(a)(l), 13A-5-12(a)(l) (1994). He invoked his right to a new trial before a jury in Circuit Court, Ala. Code § 12-12-71 (1995), where he again appeared without a lawyer and was again convicted. The court repeatedly warned Shelton about the problems self-representation entailed, see App. 9, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense.

The Circuit Court sentenced Shelton to serve 30 days in the county prison. As authorized by Alabama law, however, Ala. Code § 15-22-50 (1995), the court suspended that sentence and placed Shelton on two years’ unsupervised probation, conditioned on his payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25, and restitution in the amount of $516.69.

Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Alabama Court of Criminal *659Appeals affirmed.1 That court initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded for a determination whether Shelton had “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right.” App. 7. When the case returned from remand, however, the appeals court reversed course: A suspended sentence, the court concluded, does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel unless there is “evidence in the record that the [defendant] has actually been deprived of liberty.” Id., at 13. Because Shelton remained on probation, the court held that he had not been denied any Sixth Amendment right at trial. Id., at 14.

The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in relevant part. Referring to this Court’s decisions in Argersinger and Scott, the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant may not be “sentenced to a term of imprisonment” absent provision of counsel. App.'37. In the Alabama high court’s view, a suspended sentence constitutes a “term of imprisonment” within the meaning of Argersinger and Scott even though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable. And because the State is constitutionally barred from activating the conditional sentence, the Alabama court concluded, “ ‘the threat itself is hollow and should be considered a nullity.’ ” App. 37 (quoting United States v. Reilley, 948 F. 2d 648, 654 (CA10 1991)). Accordingly, the court affirmed Shelton’s conviction and the monetary portion of his punishment, but invalidated “that aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of *660suspended jail time.” App. 40. By reversing Shelton’s suspended sentence, the State informs us, the court also vacated the two-year term of probation. See Brief for Petitioner 6.2

Courts have divided on the Sixth Amendment question presented in this case. Some have agreed with the decision below that appointment of counsel is a constitutional prerequisite to imposition of a conditional or suspended prison sentence. See, e. g., Reilley, 948 F. 2d, at 654; United States v. Foster, 904 F. 2d 20, 21 (CA9 1990); United States v. White, 529 F. 2d 1390, 1394 (CA8 1976). Others have rejected that proposition. See, e. g., Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F. 2d 269, 274 (CA5), vacated on other grounds, 414 U. S. 895 (1973); Griswold v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 113, 116-117, 472 S. E. 2d 789, 791 (1996); State v. Hansen, 273 Mont. 321, 325, 903 P. 2d 194, 197 (1995). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 532 U. S. 1018 (2001).

II

Three positions are before us in this case. In line with the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Shelton argues that an indigent defendant may not receive a suspended sentence unless he is offered or waives the assistance of state-appointed counsel. Brief for Respondent 5-27.3 Ala*661bama now concedes that the Sixth Amendment bars activation of a suspended sentence for an uncounseled conviction, but maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit imposition of such a sentence as a method of effectuating probationary punishment. Reply Brief 4-13. To assure full airing of the question presented, we invited an amicus curiae (ami-cus) to argue in support of a third position, one Alabama has abandoned: Failure to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant “does not bar the imposition of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor, even though the defendant might be incarcerated in the event probation is revoked.” 534 U. S. 987 (2001).4

A

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963), we held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to state-appointed counsel, firmly established in federal-court proceedings in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. We clarified the scope of that right in Arger-singer, holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case “that actually leads to imprisonment.” 407 U. S., at 33. Seven Terms later, Scott confirmed Argersinger’s “delimitation],” 440 U. S., at 373. Although the governing statute in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year, see id., at 368, we held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was a $50 fine, id., at 373. “Even were the matter res nova,” we stated, “the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel” in nonfelony cases. Ibid.

*662Subsequent decisions have reiterated the Argersinger-Scott “actual imprisonment” standard. See, e. g., Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 203 (2001) (“any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance”); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 113 (1996); Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 746 (1994) (constitutional line is “between criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those that did not”); id., at 750 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“The Court in Scott, relying on ArgersingerQ drew a bright line between imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties.”); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 26 (1981). It is thus the controlling rule that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 37.

B

Applying the “actual imprisonment” rule to the case before us, we take up first the question we asked amicus to address: Where the State provides no counsel to an indigent defendant, does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant’s violation of the terms of probation? We conclude that it does not. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense. The uncounseled conviction at that point “result[s] in imprisonment,” Nichols, 511 U. S., at 746; it “end[s] up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty,” Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 40. This is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Argersinger and Scott, does not allow.

Amicus resists this reasoning primarily on two grounds. First, he attempts to align this case with our decisions in Nichols and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 11-18 *663(hereinafter Fried Brief). We conclude that Shelton’s case is not properly bracketed with those dispositions.

Nichols presented the question whether the Sixth Amendment barred consideration of a defendant’s prior uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction in determining his sentence for a subsequent felony offense. 511 U. S., at 740. Nichols pleaded guilty to federal felony drug charges. Several years earlier, unrepresented by counsel, he was fined but not incarcerated for the state misdemeanor of driving under the influence (DUI). Including the DUI conviction in the federal Sentencing Guidelines calculation allowed the trial court to impose a sentence for the felony drug conviction “25 months longér than if the misdemeanor conviction had not been considered.” Id., at 741. We upheld this result, concluding that “an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.” Id., at 749. In Gagnon, the question was whether the defendant, who was placed on probation pursuant to a suspended sentence for armed robbery, had a due process right to representation by appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing. 411 U. S., at 783. We held that counsel was not invariably required in parole or probation revocation proceedings; we directed, instead, a “case-by-case approach” turning on the character of the issues involved. Id., at 788-791.

Considered together, amicus contends, Nichols and Gagnon establish this principle: Sequential proceedings must be analyzed separately for Sixth Amendment purposes, Fried Brief 11-18, and only those proceedings “resulting] in immediate actual imprisonment” trigger the right to state-appointed counsel, id., at 13 (emphasis added). Thus, the defendant in Nichols had no right to appointed counsel in the DUI proceeding because he was hot immediately imprisoned at the conclusion of that proceeding. The uncounseled DUI, valid when imposed, did not later become invalid be*664cause it was used to enhance the length of imprisonment that followed a separate and subsequent felony proceeding. Just so here, amicus contends: Shelton had no right to appointed counsel in the Circuit Court because he was not incarcerated immediately after trial; his conviction and suspended sentence were thus valid and could serve as proper predicates for actual imprisonment at a later hearing to revoke his probation. See Fried Brief 14, 23-24.

Gagnon and Nichols do not stand for the broad proposition amicus would extract from them. The dispositive factor in those cases was not whether incarceration occurred immediately or only after some delay. Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned. See Nichols, 511 U. S., at 743, n. 9 (absent waiver, right to appointed counsel in felony cases is absolute). Unlike this case, in which revocation of probation would trigger a prison term imposed for a misdemeanor of which Shelton was found guilty without the aid of counsel, the sentences imposed in Nichols and Gagnon were for felony convictions — a federal drug conviction in Nichols, and a state armed robbery conviction in Gagnon — for which the right to counsel is unquestioned. See Nichols, 511 U. S., at 747 (relevant sentencing provisions punished only “the last offense committed by the defendant,” and did not constitute or “change the penalty imposed for the earlier” uncounseled misdemeanor); Gagnon, 411 U. S., at 789 (distinguishing “the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution” from “the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime”).

Thus, neither Nichols nor Gagnon altered or diminished Argersinger’s command that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense .. . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial,” 407 U. S., at 37 (emphasis added). Far from *665supporting amicus’ position, Gagnon and Nichols simply highlight that the Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceedings corresponding to Shelton’s Circuit Court trial, where his guilt was adjudicated, eligibity for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined.

Nichols is further distinguishable for the related reason that the Court there applied a “less exacting” standard “consistent with the traditional understanding of the sentencing process.” 511 U. S., at 747. Once guilt has been established, we noted in Nichols, sentencing courts may take into account not only “a defendant’s prior convictions, but... also [his] past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.” Ibid. Thus, in accord with due process, Nichols “could have been sentenced more severely based simply on evidence of the underlying conduct that gave rise” to his previous conviction, id., at 748 (emphasis added), even if he had never been charged with that conduct, Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and even if he had been acquitted of the misdemeanor with the aid of appointed counsel, United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam). That relaxed standard has no application in this case, where the question is whether the defendant may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable because the defendant had access to “the guiding hand of counsel,” Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Amicus also contends that “practical considerations clearly weigh against” the extension of the Sixth Amendment appointed-counsel right to a defendant in Shelton’s situation. Fried Brief 23. He cites figures suggesting that although conditional sentences are commonly imposed, they are rarely activated. Id., at 20-22; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21 (speculating that “hundreds of thousands” of uncounseled defendants receive suspended sentences, but only “thousands” of that large number are incarcerated upon violating the terms of their probation). Based on these estimations, ami- *666 cus argues that a rule requiring appointed counsel in every case involving a suspended sentence would unduly hamper the States’ attempts to impose effective probationary punishment. A more “workable solution,” he contends, would permit imposition of a suspended sentence on an uncounseled defendant and require appointment of counsel, if at all, only at the probation revocation stage, when incarceration is imminent. Fried Brief 18, 23-24.

Amicus observes that probation is “now a critical tool of law enforcement in low level cases.” Id., at 22. Even so, it does not follow that preservation of that tool warrants the reduction of the Sixth Amendment’s domain that would result from the regime amicus hypothesizes. Amicus does not describe the contours of the hearing that, he suggests, might precede revocation of a term of probation imposed on an uncounseled defendant. See id., at 24 (raising, but not endeavoring to answer, several potential questions about the nature of the revocation hearing amicus contemplates). In Alabama, however, the character of the probation revocation hearing currently afforded is not in doubt. The proceeding is an “informal” one, Buckelew v. State, 48 Ala. App. 418, 421, 265 So. 2d 202, 205 (Crim. App. 1972), at which the defendant has no right to counsel, and the court no obligation to observe customary rules of evidence, Martin v. State, 46 Ala. App. 310, 311, 241 So. 2d 339, 340 (Crim. App. 1970).

More significant, the sole issue at the hearing — apart from determinations about the necessity of confinement, see Ala. Code § 15-22-54(d)(4) (1975) — is whether the defendant breached the terms of probation. See Martin, 46 Ala. App., at 312, 241 So. 2d, at 341 (“All that is required in a hearing of this character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has violated a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The validity or reliability of the underlying conviction is beyond attack. See Buckelew, 48 Ala. App., at 421, *667265 So. 2d, at 205 (“a probation hearing cannot entertain a collateral attack on a judgment of another circuit”).

We think it plain that a hearing so timed and structured cannot compensate for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration. Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and sentenced, and unable to challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation revocation hearing, a defendant in Shelton’s circumstances faces incarceration on a conviction that has never been subjected to “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,” United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 656 (1984). The Sixth Amendment does not countenance this result.

In a variation on amicus’ position, the dissent would limit review in this case to the question whether the imposition of Shelton’s suspended sentence required appointment of counsel, answering that question “plainly no” because such a step “does not deprive a defendant of his personal liberty.” Post, at 676. Only if the sentence is later activated, the dissent contends, need the Court “ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of [Shelton’s] sentence comply with the Constitution.” Ibid.

Severing the analysis in this manner makes little sense. One cannot assess the constitutionality of imposing a suspended sentence while simultaneously walling off the procedures that will precede its activation. The dissent imagines a set of safeguards Alabama might provide at the probation revocation stage sufficient to cure its failure to appoint counsel prior to sentencing, including, perhaps, “complete retrial of the misdemeanor violation with assistance of counsel,” post, at 677. But there is no cause for speculation about Alabama’s procedures; they are established by Alabama statute and decisional law, see supra, at 666 and this page, and they bear no resemblance to those the dissent invents in its effort to sanction the prospect of Shelton’s imprisonment on *668an uncounseled conviction.5 Assessing the issue before us in light of actual circumstances, we do not comprehend how the procedures Alabama in fact provides at the probation revocation hearing could bring Shelton’s sentence within constitutional bounds.6

Nor do we agree with amicus or the dissent that our holding will “substantially limit the states’ ability” to impose probation, Fried Brief 22, or encumber them with a “large, new burden,” post, at 680. Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal Constitution. See *669 Nichols, 511 U. S., at 748-749, n. 12. All but 16 States, for example, would provide counsel to a defendant in Shelton’s circumstances, either because he received a substantial fine7 or because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense8 or provided for a maximum prison term of one year.9 See Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-22,13A-5-7(a)(l), 13A-5-12(a)(l) (1994). There is thus scant reason to believe that a rule conditioning imposition of a suspended sentence on provision of appointed counsel would affect existing practice *670in the large majority of the States.10 And given the current commitment of most jurisdictions to affording court-appointed counsel to indigent misdemeanants while simultaneously preserving the option of probationary punishment, we do not share amicus’ concern that other States may lack the capacity and resources to do the same.

Moreover, even if amicus is correct that “some courts and jurisdictions at least [canjnot bear” the costs of the rule we confirm today, Fried Brief 23, those States need not abandon probation or equivalent measures as viable forms of punish*671ment. Although they may not attach probation to an imposed and suspended prison sentence, States unable or unwilling routinely to provide appointed counsel to misde-meanants in Shelton’s situation are not without recourse to another option capable of yielding a similar result.

That option is pretrial probation, employed in some form by at least 23 States. See App. to Reply Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 1a-2a (collecting state statutes). Under such an arrangement, the prosecutor and defendant agree to the defendant’s participation in a pretrial rehabilitation program,11 which includes conditions typical of post-trial probation. The adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence for the underlying offense then occur only if and when the defendant breaches those conditions. Ibid.; see, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56e (2001); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 310-320, 316 (2002) (“The conditions of the [pretrial rehabilitation] program may be such as may be imposed with respect to probation after conviction of a crime.”); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55(3) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (pretrial “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal” may require defendant “to observe certain specified conditions of conduct”).12

Like the regime urged by amicus, this system reserves the appointed-counsel requirement for the “small percent*672age” of cases in which incarceration proves necessary, Fried Brief 21, thus allowing a State to “supervise a course of rehabilitation” without providing a lawyer every time it wishes to pursue such a course, Gagnon, 411 U. S., at 784. Unlike amicus’ position, however, pretrial probation also respects the constitutional imperative that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial,” Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 37.

C

Alabama concedes that activation of a suspended sentence results in the imprisonment of an uncounseled defendant “for a term that relates to the original offense” and therefore “crosses the line of ‘actual imprisonment’” established in Argersinger and Scott. Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 8. Shelton cannot be imprisoned, Alabama thus acknowledges, “unless the State has afforded him 'the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense,” Scott, 440 U. S., at 374; see Reply Brief 9. Alabama maintains, however, that there is no constitutional barrier to imposition of a suspended sentence that can never be enforced; the State therefore urges reversal of the Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment insofar as it vacated the term of probation Shelton was ordered to serve.

In effect, Alabama invites us to regard two years’ probation for Shelton as a separate and independent sentence, which “the State would have the same power to enforce [as] a judgment of a mere fine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Scott, Alabama emphasizes, squarely held that a fine-only sentence does not trigger a right to court-appointed counsel, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; similarly, Alabama maintains, probation uncoupled from a prison sentence should trigger no immediate right to appointed counsel. Seen as a freestanding sentence, Alabama further asserts, probation could be enforced, as a criminal fine or restitution order could, in a contempt pro*673ceeding. See Reply Brief 11-12; Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 10-13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.

Alabama describes the contempt proceeding it envisions as one in which Shelton would receive “the full panoply of due process,” including the assistance of counsel. Reply Brief 12. Any sanction imposed would be for “post-conviction wrongdoing,” not for the offense of conviction. Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 11. “The maximum penalty faced would be a $100 fine and five days’ imprisonment,” Reply Brief 12 (citing Ala. Code § 12-11-30(5) (1995)), not the 30 days ordered and suspended by the Alabama Circuit Court, see sufra, at 658.

There is not so much as a hint, however, in the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, that Shelton’s probation term is separable from the prison term to which it was tethered. Absent any prior presentation of the position the State now takes,13 we resist passing on it in the first instance. Our resistance to acting as a court of first view instead of one of review is heightened by the Alabama Attorney General’s acknowledgment at oral argument that he did not know of any State that imposes, postconviction, on a par with a fine, a term of probation unattached to a suspended sentence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. The novelty of the State’s current position is further marked by the unqualified statement in Alabama’s opening brief that, “[b]y reversing Shelton’s suspended sentence, the [Supreme Court of Alabama] correspondingly vacated the two-year probationary term.” Brief for Petitioner 6.

*674In short, Alabama has developed its position late in this litigation and before the wrong forum. It is for the Alabama Supreme Court to consider before this Court does whether the suspended sentence alone is invalid, leaving Shelton’s probation term freestanding and independently effective. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Ed. Assn., 426 U. S. 482, 488 (1976) (“We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [the State’s] law by the highest court of the State.”). We confine our review to the ruling the Alabama Supreme Court made in the case as presented to it: “[A] defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel.” App. 40 (emphasis added); see Brief for Petitioner 6. We find no infirmity in that holding.

* * *

Satisfied that Shelton is entitled to appointed counsel at the critical stage when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and his vulnerability to imprisonment is determined, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join,

dissenting.

In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 37 (1972), we held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” (Emphasis added.) Although, we said, the “run of misdemeanors will not be affected” by this rule, “in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit” of appointed counsel. Id., at 40 (emphasis added). We affirmed this rule in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979), drawing a bright line between imprisonment and *675the mere threat of imprisonment: “[T]he central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is' eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” Id., at 373 (emphasis added). We have repeatedly emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel. See, e. g., Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 203 (2001) (“any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance” (emphasis added)); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 113 (1996) (“right [to appointed counsel] does not extend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed” (emphasis added)); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 26 (1981) (the Court “has refused to extend the right to appointed counsel to include prosecutions which, though criminal, do not result in the defendant’s loss of personal liberty ” (emphasis added)).

Today’s decision ignores this long and consistent jurisprudence, extending the misdemeanor right to counsel to cases bearing the mere threat of imprisonment. Respondent’s 30-day suspended sentence, and the accompanying 2-year term of probation, are invalidated for lack of appointed counsel even though respondent has not suffered, and may never suffer, a deprivation of liberty. The Court holds that the suspended sentence violates respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it “may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of [respondent’s] liberty,”’ ante, at 658 (emphasis added), if he someday violates the terms of probation, if a court determines that the violation merits revocation of probation, Ala. Code § 15 — 22—54(d)(1) (1995), and if the court determines that no other punishment will “adequately protect the community from further criminal activity” or “avoid depreciating the seriousness of the violation,” §15-22-54(d)(4). And to all of these contingencies there must yet *676be added, before the Court’s decision makes sense, an element of rank speculation. Should all these contingencies occur, the Court speculates, the Alabama Supreme Court would mechanically apply its decisional law applicable to routine probation revocation (which establishes procedures that the Court finds inadequate) rather than adopt special procedures for situations that raise constitutional questions in light of Argersinger and Scott Ante, at 666-668. The Court has miraculously divined how the Alabama justices would resolve a constitutional question.1

. But that question is not the one before us, and the Court has no business offering an advisory opinion on its answer. We are asked to decide whether “imposition of a suspended or conditional sentence in a misdemeanor case invoke[s] a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Pet. for Cert. i. Since imposition of a suspended sentence does not deprive a defendant of his personal liberty, the answer to that question is plainly no. In the future, if and when the State of Alabama seeks to imprison respondent on the previously suspended sentence, we can ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of that sentence comply with the Constitution. But that question is not before us now. Given our longstanding refusal to issue advisory opinions, Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), particularly with respect to constitutional questions (as to which we seek to avoid even wow-advisory opinions, Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring)), I am amazed by the Court’s conclusion that it “makes little *677sense” to limit today’s decision to the question presented (the constitutionality of imposing a suspended sentence on uncounseled misdemeanants) and to avoid a question not presented (the constitutionality of the “procedures that will precede its activation”). Ante, at 667.

Although the Court at one point purports to limit its decision to suspended sentences imposed on uncounseled misde-meanants in States, like Alabama, that offer only “minimal procedures” during probation revocation hearings, see ante, at 668, n. 5, the text of today’s opinion repudiates that limitation. In answering the question we asked amicus to address — whether “the Sixth Amendment permit[s] activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant’s violation of the terms of probation” — the Court states without qualification that “it does not.” Ante, at 662. Thus, when the Court says it “doubt[s]” that any procedures attending the reimpo-sition of the suspended sentence “could satisfy the Sixth Amendment,” ante, at 668, n. 5, it must be using doubt as a euphemism for certitude.

The Court has no basis, moreover, for its “doubt.” Surely the procedures attending reimposition of a suspended sentence would be adequate if they required, upon the defendant’s request, complete retrial of the misdemeanor violation with assistance of counsel. By what right does the Court deprive the State of that option?2 It may well be a sensible *678option, since most defendants will be induced to comply with the terms of their probation by the mere threat of a retrial that could send them to jail, and since the expense of those rare, counseled retrials may be much less than the expense of providing counsel initially in all misdemeanor cases that bear a possible sentence of imprisonment. And it may well be that, in some cases, even procedures short of complete retrial will suffice.3

*679Our prior opinions placed considerable weight on the practical consequences of expanding the right to appointed counsel beyond cases of actual imprisonment. See, e. g., Scott, 440 U. S., at 373 (any extension of Argersinger would “impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States”); see also Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 56-62 (Powell, J., concurring in result) (same). Today, the Court gives this consideration the back of its hand. Its observation that “[a]ll but 16 States” already appoint counsel for defendants like respondent, ante, at 669, is interesting but quite irrelevant, since today’s holding is not confined to defendants like respondent. Appointed counsel must henceforth be offered before any defendant can be awarded a suspended sentence, no matter how short. Only 24 States have announced a rule of this scope.4 Thus, the Court’s deci*680sion imposes a large, new burden on a majority of the States, including some of the poorest (e. g., Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi, see U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *681Statistical Abstract of the United States 426 (2001)). That burden consists not only of the cost of providing state-paid counsel in cases of such insignificance that even financially prosperous defendants sometimes forgo the expense of hired counsel; but also the cost of enabling courts and prosecutors to respond to the “over-lawyering” of minor cases. See Argersinger, supra, at 58-59 (Powell, J., concurring in result). Nor should we discount the burden placed on the minority 24 States that currently provide counsel: that they keep their current disposition forever in place, however imprudent experience proves it to be.

Today’s imposition upon the States finds justification neither in the text of the Constitution, nor in the settled practices of our people, nor in the prior jurisprudence of this Court. I respectfully dissent.

*807Me. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment. This clear constitutional rule has emerged from a series of cases decided here over the last 50 years.1 The question before us now is whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Stated another way, the question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. It is not an easy question, but we have concluded that a State may not constitutionally do so.

I

Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside at the trial appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Well before the date of trial, however, Faretta requested that he be permitted to represent himself. Questioning by the judge revealed that Faretta had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that he did not want to be represented by the public defender because he believed that that office was “very loaded down with ... a heavy case load.” The judge *808responded that he believed Faretta was “making a mistake” and emphasized that in further proceedings Faretta would receive no special favors.2 Nevertheless, after establishing that Faretta wanted to represent himself and did not want a lawyer, the judge, in a “preliminary ruling,” accepted Faretta’s waiver of the assistance of counsel. The judge indicated, however, that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself.

Several weeks thereafter, but still prior to trial, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta’s ability to conduct his own defense, and questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors.3 After con*809sideration of Faretta’s answers, and observation of his demeanor, the judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assist*810anee of counsel, and also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense4 The judge, accordingly, reversed his earlier ruling permitting self-representation and again appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta’s subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected, as were his efforts to make certain motions on his own behalf.5 Throughout *811the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta’s defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender’s office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged, and the judge sentenced him to prison.

The California Court of Appeal, relying upon a then-recent California Supreme Court decision that had expressly decided the issue,6 affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right *812to represent himself.7 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed Faretta’s conviction. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion, and the California Supreme Court denied review.8 We granted certiorari. 415 U. S. 975.

II

In the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President Washington one day before the Sixth Amend*813ment was proposed, provided that “in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of . . . counsel .. . The right is currently codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1654.

With few exceptions, each of the several States also accords a defendant the right to represent himself in any criminal case.9 The Constitutions of 36 States explicitly confer that right.10 Moreover, many state courts have *814expressed the view that the right is also supported by the Constitution of the United States.11

This Court has more than once indicated the same view. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a “correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help.” The defendant in that case, indicted for federal mail fraud violations, insisted on conducting his own defense without benefit of counsel. He also requested a bench trial and signed a waiver of his right to trial by jury. The prosecution consented to the waiver of a jury, and the waiver was accepted by the court. The defendant was convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that a person accused of a felony could not competently waive his right to trial by jury except upon the advice of a lawyer. This Court reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding that “an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.” Id., at 275.

The Adams case does not, of course, necessarily resolve the issue before us. It held only that “the Constitution *815does not force a lawyer upon a defendant.” Id., at 279.12 Whether the Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant is a different question. But the Court in Adams did recognize, albeit in dictum, an affirmative right of self-representation:

“The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused’s position before the law. . . .

"... What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters. ... To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms.

“. . . When the administration of the criminal law ... is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards ... is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.” Id., at 279-280 (emphasis added).

In other settings as well, the Court has indicated that *816a defendant has a constitutionally protected right to represent himself in a criminal trial. For example, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused a right to be present at all stages of the proceedings where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his absence. This right to “presence” was based upon the premise that the “defense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be present at the examination of jurors or the summing up of counsel, for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself.” Id., at 106 (emphasis added). And in Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, the Court, in holding that a convicted person had no absolute right to argue his own appeal, said this holding was in “sharp contrast” to his “recognized privilege of conducting his own defense at the trial.” Id., at 285.

The United States Courts of Appeals have repeatedly held that the right of self-representation is protected by the Bill of Rights. In United States v. Plattner, 330 F. 2d 271, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that the Sixth Amendment grants the accused the rights of confrontation, of compulsory process for witnesses in his favor, and of assistance of counsel as minimum procedural requirements in federal criminal prosecutions. The right to the assistance of counsel, the court concluded, was intended to supplement the other rights of the defendant, and not to impair “the absolute and primary right to conduct one’s own defense in propria persona.” Id., at 274. The court found support for its decision in the language of the 1789 federal statute; in the statutes and rules governing criminal procedure, see 28 U. S. C. § 1654, and Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; in the many state constitutions that expressly guarantee self-*817representation; and in this Court’s recognition of the right in Adams and Pnce. On these grounds, the Court of Appeals held that implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law, and implicit also in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to the assistance of counsel, is “the right of the accused personally to manage and conduct his own defense in a criminal case.” 330 F. 2d, at 274. See also United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2); MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F. 2d 35, 41 (CA5); United States v. Sternman, 415 F. 2d 1165, 1169-1170 (CA6); Lowe v. United States, 418 F. 2d 100, 103 (CA7); United States v. Warner, 428 F. 2d 730, 733 (CA8); Haslam v. United States, 431 F. 2d 362, 365 (CA9); compare United States v. Dougherty, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 76, 86, 473 F. 2d 1113, 1123 (intimating right is constitutional but finding it unnecessary to reach issue) with Brown v. United States, 105 U. S. App. D. C. 77, 79-80, 264 F. 2d 363, 365-366 (plurality opinion stating right is no more than statutory in nature).

This Court’s past recognition of the right of self-representation, the federal-court authority holding the right to be of constitutional dimension, and the state constitutions pointing to the right’s fundamental nature form a consensus not easily ignored. “[T]he mere fact that a path is a beaten one,” Mr. Justice Jackson once observed, “is a persuasive reason for following it.”13 We confront here a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.

*818Ill

This consensus is soundly premised. The right of self-representation finds support in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged.

A

The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

Because these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are part of the “due process of law” that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States.14 The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of American justice-— through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 176 (Harlan, J., concurring).

*819The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” who must be “confronted with the witnesses against him,” and who must be accorded “compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation — to make one’s own defense personally — is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.15 The right to de*820fend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.

The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the “assistance” of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master;16 and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 7-8; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 439. This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant’s consent, at the *821outset, to accept counsel as his representative. An unwanted counsel “represents” the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.

B

The Sixth Amendment, when naturally read, thus implies a right of self-representation. This reading is reinforced by the Amendment’s roots in English legal history.

In the long history of British criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was' the Star. Chamber. That curious institution, which flourished in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, was of mixed executive and judicial character, and characteristically departed from common-law traditions. For those reasons, and because it specialized in trying “political” offenses, the Star Chamber has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual rights.17 The Star Chamber not merely allowed but required defendants to have counsel. The defendant’s answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel. When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever reason, the defendant was *822considered to have confessed.18 Stephen commented on this procedure: “There is something specially repugnant to justice in using rules of practice in such a manner as *823to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his defence.” 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 341-342 (1883). The Star Chamber was swept away in 1641 by the revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament. The notion of obligatory counsel disappeared with it.

By the common law of that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation that was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime. At one time, every litigant was required to “appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own cause in his own words.”19 While a right to counsel developed early in civil cases and in cases of misdemeanor, a prohibition against the assistance of counsel continued for centuries in prosecutions for felony or treason.20 Thus, in the 16th and 17th centuries the accused felon or traitor stood alone, with neither counsel nor the benefit of other rights — to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process — that we now associate with a genuinely fair adversary proceeding. The trial was merely a “long argument between the prisoner and the *824counsel for the Crown.” 21 As harsh as this now seems, at least “the prisoner was allowed to make what statements he liked. . . . Obviously this public oral trial presented many more opportunities to a prisoner than the secret enquiry based on written depositions, which, on the continent, had taken the place of a trial. . . .” 22 With the Treason Act of 1695, there began a long and important era of reform in English criminal procedure. The 1695 statute granted to the accused traitor the rights to a copy of the indictment, to have his witnesses testify under oath, and “to make . . . full Defence, by Counsel learned in the Law.” 23 It also provided for court appointment of counsel, but only if the accused so desired 24 *825Thus, as new rights developed, the accused retained his established right “to make what statements he liked.” 25 The right to counsel was viewed as guaranteeing a choice between representation by counsel and the traditional practice of self-representation. The ban on counsel in felony cases, which had been substantially eroded in the courts,26 was finally eliminated by statute in 1836.27 In more recent years, Parliament has provided for court appointment of counsel in serious criminal cases, but only at the accused's request.28 At no point in this process of reform in England was counsel ever forced upon the *826defendant. The common-law rule, succinctly stated in R. v. Woodward, [1944] K. B. 118, 119, [1944] 1 All E. R. 159, 160, has evidently always been that “no person charged with a criminal offence can have counsel forced upon him against his will.” 29 See 3 Halsbury’s Laws of England ¶ 1141, pp. 624-625 (4th ed. 1973) ; R. v. Maybury, 11 L. T. R. (n. s.) 566 (Q. B. 1865).

C

In the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of self-representation was, if anything, more fervent than in England.

The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers. When the Colonies were first settled, “the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing AttomeysGeneral and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of the King’s Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King’s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.” 30 This prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where “distrust *827of lawyers became an institution.” 31 Several Colonies prohibited pleading for hire in the 17th century.32 The prejudice persisted into the 18th century as “the lower classes came to identify lawyers with the upper class.” 33 The years of Revolution and Confederation saw an upsurge of antilawyer sentiment, a “sudden revival, after the War of the Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class.” 34 In the heat of these sentiments the Constitution was forged.

This is not to say that the Colonies were slow to recognize the value of counsel in criminal cases. Colonial judges soon departed from ancient English practice and allowed accused felons the aid of counsel for their defense.35 At the same time, however, the basic right of *828self-representation was never questioned. We have found no instance where a colonial court required a defendant in a criminal case to accept as his representative an unwanted lawyer. Indeed, even where counsel was permitted, the general practice continued to be self-representation.36

The right of self-representation was guaranteed in many colonial charters and declarations of rights. These early documents establish that the “right to counsel” meant to the colonists a right to choose between pleading through a lawyer and representing oneself.37 After the *829Declaration of Independence, the right of self-representation, along with other rights basic to the making of a defense, entered the new state constitutions in wholesale fashion.38 The right to counsel was clearly thought to *830supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself,39 utilizing his personal rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process. And when the Colonies or newly independent States provided by statute rather than by constitution for court appointment of counsel in criminal cases, they also meticulously preserved the right of the accused to defend himself personally.40

*831The recognition of the right of self-representation was not limited to the state lawmakers. As we have noted, § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, signed one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed, guaranteed in the federal courts the right of all parties to “plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of . . . counsel.” 1 Stat. 92. See 28 U. S. C. § 1654. At the time James Madison drafted the Sixth Amendment, some state constitutions guaranteed an accused the right to be heard “by himself” and by counsel; others provided that an accused was to be “allowed” counsel.41 The various state proposals for the Bill of Rights had similar variations in terminology.42 *832In each case, however, the counsel provision was embedded in a package of defense rights granted personally to the accused. There is no indication that the differences in phrasing about “counsel” reflected any differences of principle about self-representation. No State or Colony had ever forced counsel upon an accused; no spokesman had ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable, much less advisable. If anyone had thought that the Sixth Amendment, as drafted, failed to protect the long-respected right of self-representation, there would undoubtedly have been some debate or comment on the issue. But there was none.

In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right might be considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel. To the contrary, the colonists and'the Framers, as well as their English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an “assistance” for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself. The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history.

IV

There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25. For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure *833the defendant a fair trial.43 And a strong argument can surely be made that the whole thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an unwilling defendant.

But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the Pounders,44 yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them. And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no *834doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice.45

It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of “that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351 (Brennan, J., concurring).46

*835V

When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S., at 464-465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 723-724 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S., at 279.

Here, weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel. The record afiirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will. The trial judge had warned Faretta that he thought it was a mistake not to accept *836the assistance of counsel, and that Faretta would be required to follow all the “ground rules” of trial procedure.47 We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire 48 For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.

In forcing Faretta, under these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the California courts deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Accordingly, the judgment before us is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

This case, like Herring v. New York, post, p. 853, announced today, is another example of the judicial tendency to constitutionalize what is thought “good.” That effort fails on its own terms here, because there is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his own defense to criminal charges.1 Moreover, there is no constitutional basis for *837the Court’s holding, and it can only add to the problems of an already malfunctioning criminal justice system. I therefore dissent.

I

The most striking feature of the Court’s opinion is that it devotes so little discussion to the matter which it concedes is the core of the decision, that is, discerning an independent basis in the Constitution for the supposed right to represent oneself in a criminal trial.2 See ante, at 818-821, and n. 15. Its ultimate assertion that such a right is tucked between the lines of the Sixth Amendment is contradicted by the Amendment’s language and its consistent judicial interpretation.

As the Court seems to recognize, ante, at 820, the conclusion that the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are “personal” to an accused reflects nothing more than the obvious fact that it is he who is on trial and therefore has need of a defense.3 But neither that nearly *838trivial proposition nor the language of the Amendment, which speaks in uniformly mandatory terms, leads to the further conclusion that the right to counsel is merely supplemental and may be dispensed with at the whim of the accused. Rather, this Court’s decisions have consistently included the right to counsel as an integral part of the bundle making up the larger “right to a defense as we know it.” For example, in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), the Court reversed a summary contempt conviction at the hands of a “one-man grand jury,” and had this to say:

“We . . . hold that failure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law. A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” Id., at 273.

See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 27-33 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963).

The reason for this hardly requires explanation. The fact of the matter is that in all but an extraordinarily small number of cases an accused will lose whatever defense he may have if he undertakes to conduct the trial himself. The Court’s opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), puts the point eloquently:

“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may *839be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.” Id., at 69.

Obviously, these considerations do not vary depending upon whether the accused actively desires to be represented by counsel or wishes to proceed pro se. Nor is it accurate to suggest, as the Court seems to later in its opinion, that the quality of his representation at trial is a matter with which only the accused is legitimately concerned. See ante, at 834. Although we have adopted an adversary system of criminal justice, see Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, the prosecution is more than an ordinary litigant, and the trial judge is not simply an automaton who insures that technical rules are adhered to. Both are charged with the duty of insuring that justice, in the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87, and n. 2 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). That goal is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant’s ill-advised decision to waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by the lame explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the “freedom” “to go to jail under his own banner . . . .” United States ex rel. *840 Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2 1965). The system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction.

In short, both the “spirit and the logic” of the Sixth Amendment are that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible defense; in the vast majority of cases this command can be honored only by means of the expressly guaranteed right to counsel, and the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the accused is capable of conducting his defense. True freedom of choice and society’s interest in seeing that justice is achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court retains discretion to reject any attempted waiver of counsel and insist that the accused be tried ¿ccording to the Constitution. This discretion is as critical an element of basic fairness as a trial judge’s discretion to decline to accept a plea of guilty. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262 (1971).

II

The Court’s attempt to support its result by collecting dicta from prior decisions is no more persuasive than its analysis of the Sixth Amendment. Considered in context, the cases upon which the Court relies to “beat its path” either lead it nowhere or point in precisely the opposite direction.

In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), and Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946), the defendants had competently waived counsel but later sought to renounce actions taken by them while proceeding pro se. In both cases this Court upheld the convictions, holding that neither an uncounseled waiver of jury trial nor an uncounseled guilty plea is inherently defective under the Constitution. The language which the Court so carefully excises from those opinions relates, not to an affirmative right of self-representation, but to *841the consequences of waiver.4 In Adams, for example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter was careful to point out that his reference to a defendant’s “correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help” meant only that “[h]e may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.. . ,” 317 U. S., at 279. See United States v. Warner, 428 F. 2d 730, 733 (CA8 1970). But, as the Court recognizes, the power to waive a constitutional right does not carry with it the right to insist upon its opposite. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1965).

Similarly, in Carter the Court’s opinion observed that the Constitution “does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant,” citing Adams. 329 U. S., at 174 — 175 (emphasis added). I, for one, find this statement impossible to square with the Court’s present holding that an accused is absolutely entitled to dispense with a lawyer’s help under all conditions. Thus, although Adams and Carter support the Court’s conclusion that a defendant who represents himself may not thereafter disaffirm his deliberate trial decisions, see ante, at 834-835, n. 46, they provide it no comfort regarding the primary issue in this case.5

*842Far more nearly in point is Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266 (1948), where this Court held that, although the courts of appeals possess the power to command that a prisoner be produced to argue his own appeal, the exercise of that power is a matter of sound judicial discretion. An examination of the whole of the Court's reasoning on this point is instructive:

“The discretionary nature of the power in question grows out of the fact that a prisoner has no absolute right to argue his own appeal or even to be present at the proceedings in an appellate court. The absence of that right is in sharp contrast to his constitutional prerogative of being present in person at each significant stage of a felony prosecution, and to his recognized privilege of conducting his own defense at the trial. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. Among those so limited is the otherwise unqualified right given by § 272 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 394 [now § 1654], to parties in all the courts of the United States to ‘plead and manage their own causes personally.' ” Id., at 285-286 (citations omitted).

It barely requires emphasis that this passage contrasts the “constitutional prerogative” to be present at trial with the “recognized privilege” of self-representation, and strongly implies that the latter arises only from the federal statute. It is difficult to imagine a position less consistent with Price v. Johnston than that taken by the Court today.

*843The Court of Appeals cases relied upon by the Court are likewise dubious authority for its views. Only one of those cases, United States v. Plattner, 330 F. 2d 271 (CA2 1964), even attempted a reasoned analysis of the issue, and the decision in that case was largely based upon the misreading of Adams and Price which the Court perpetuates in its opinion today. See 330 F. 2d, at 275. In every other case cited ante, at 817, the Courts of Appeals assumed that the right of self-representation was constitutionally based but found that the right had not been violated and affirmed the conviction under review. It is highly questionable whether such holdings would even establish the law of the Circuits from which they came.

In short, what the Court represents as a well-traveled road is in reality a constitutional trail which it is blazing for the first time today, one that has not even been hinted at in our previous decisions. Far from an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, it is a perversion of the provision to which we gave full .meaning in Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger v. Hamlin.

Ill

Like Me. Justice Blackmun, I hesitate to participate in the Court’s attempt to use history to take it where legal analysis cannot. Piecing together shreds of English legal history and early state constitutional and statutory provisions, without a full elaboration of the context in which they occurred or any evidence that they were relied upon by the drafters of our Federal Constitution, creates more questions than it answers and hardly provides the firm foundation upon which the creation of new constitutional rights should rest. We are well reminded that this Court once employed an exhaustive analysis of English and colonial practices regarding the *844right to counsel to justify the conclusion that it was fundamental to a fair trial and, less than 10 years later, used essentially the same material to conclude that it was not. Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 60-65, with Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 465-471 (1942).

As if to illustrate this point, the single historical fact cited by the Court which would appear truly relevant to ascertaining the meaning of the Sixth Amendment proves too much. As the Court points out, ante, at 831, § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided a statutory right to self-representation in federal criminal trials. The text of the Sixth Amendment, which expressly provides only for a right to counsel, was proposed the day after the Judiciary Act was signed. It can hardly be suggested that the Members of the Congress of 1789, then few in number, were unfamiliar with the Amendment’s carefully structured language, which had been under discussion since the 1787 Constitutional Convention. And it would be most remarkable to suggest, had the right to conduct one’s own defense been considered so critical as to require constitutional protection, that it would have been left to implication. Rather, under traditional canons of construction, inclusion of the right in the Judiciary Act and its omission from the constitutional amendment drafted at the same time by many of the same men, supports the conclusion that the omission was intentional.

There is no way to reconcile the idea that the Sixth Amendment impliedly guaranteed the right of an accused to conduct his own defense with the contemporaneous action of the Congress in passing a statute explicitly giving that right. If the Sixth Amendment created a right to self-representation it was unnecessary for Congress to enact any statute on the subject at all. *845In this case, therefore, history ought to lead judges to conclude that the Constitution leaves to the judgment of legislatures, and the flexible process of statutory amendment, the question whether criminal defendants should be permitted to conduct their trials pro se. See Betts v. Brady, supra. And the fact that we have not hinted at a contrary view for 185 years is surely entitled to some weight in the scales.6 Cf. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922).

IV

Society has the right to expect that, when courts find new rights implied in the Constitution, their potential effect upon the resources of our criminal justice system will be considered. However, such considerations are conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion in this case.

It hardly needs repeating that courts at all levels are already handicapped by the unsupplied demand for competent advocates, with the result that it often takes far longer to complete a given case than experienced counsel would require. If we were to assume that there will be widespread exercise of the newly discovered constitutional right to self-representation, it would almost certainly follow that there will be added congestion in the courts and that the quality of justice will suffer. Moreover, the Court blandly assumes that once an accused has elected to defend himself he will be bound by his choice and not be heard to complain of it later. Ante, at 834-835, n. 46. This assumption ignores the role of appellate review, for the reported cases are replete with instances of a convicted defendant being relieved of a *846deliberate decision even when made with the advice of counsel. See Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962). It is totally unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that an accused will always be held to the consequences of a decision to conduct his own defense. Unless, as may be the case, most persons accused of crime have more wit than to insist upon the dubious benefit that the Court confers today, we can expect that many expensive and good-faith prosecutions will be nullified on appeal for reasons that trial courts are now deprived of the power to prevent.7

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

Today the Court holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to every defendant in a state criminal trial the right to proceed without counsel whenever he elects to do so. I find no textual support for this conclusion in the language of the Sixth Amendment. I find the historical evidence relied upon by the Court to be unpersuasive, especially in light of the recent history of criminal procedure. Finally, I fear that the right to self-representation constitutionalized today frequently will cause procedural confusion without advancing any significant strategic interest of the defendant. I therefore dissent.

I

The starting point, of course, is the language of the Sixth Amendment:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en*847joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

It is self-evident that the Amendment makes no direct reference to self-representation. Indeed, the Court concedes that the right to self-representation is “not stated in the Amendment in so many words.” Ante, at 819.

It could be argued that the right to assistance of counsel necessarily carries with it the right to waive assistance of counsel. The Court recognizes, however, ante, at 819-820, n. 15, that it has squarely rejected any mechanical interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court in Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 34 — 35 (1965), stated: “The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.”

Where then in the Sixth Amendment does one find this right to self-representation? According to the Court, it is “necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.” Ante, at 819. The Court’s chain of inferences is delicate and deserves scrutiny. The Court starts with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment is “a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense.” Ante, at 818. From this proposition the Court concludes that the Sixth Amendment “constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it.” Ibid. Up to this point, at least as a general proposition, the Court’s reasoning is unexception*848able. The Court, however, then concludes that because the specific rights in the Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused, the accused must have a right to exercise those rights personally. Stated somewhat more succinctly, the Court reasons that because the accused has a personal right to “a defense as we know it,” he necessarily has a right to make that defense personally. I disagree. Although I believe the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused, I do not agree that the Sixth Amendment guarantees any particular procedural method of asserting those rights. If an accused has enjoyed a speedy trial by an impartial jury in which he was informed of the nature of the accusation, confronted with the witnesses against him, afforded the power of compulsory process, and represented effectively by competent counsel, I do not see that the Sixth Amendment requires more.

The Court suggests that thrusting counsel upon the accused against his considered wish violates the logic of the Sixth Amendment because counsel is to be an assistant, not a master. The Court seeks to support its conclusion by historical analogy to the notorious procedures of the Star Chamber. The potential for exaggerated analogy, however, is markedly diminished when one recalls that petitioner is seeking an absolute right to self-representation. This is not a case where defense counsel, against the wishes of the defendant or with inadequate consultation, has adopted a trial strategy that significantly affects one of the accused’s constitutional rights. For such overbearing conduct by counsel, there is a remedy. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966) ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 439 (1963). Nor is this a case where distrust, animosity, or other personal differences between the accused and his would-be counsel have rendered effective representation unlikely or impossible. *849See Brown v. Craven, 424 F. 2d 1166, 1169-1170 (CA9 1970). See also Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). Nor is this even a case where a defendant has been forced, against his wishes to expend his personal resources to pay for counsel for his defense. See generally Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972). Instead, the Court holds that any defendant in any criminal proceeding may insist on representing himself regardless of how complex the trial is likely to be and regardless of how frivolous the defendant’s motivations may be. I cannot agree that there is anything in the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment that requires the States to subordinate the solemn business of conducting a criminal prosecution to the whimsical — albeit voluntary — caprice of every accused who wishes to use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political self-gratification.

The Court seems to suggest that so long as the accused is willing to pay the consequences of his folly, there is no reason for not allowing a defendant the right to self-representation. Ante, at 834. See also United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F. 2d 12, 15 (CA2 1965) (“[E]ven in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires . . .”). That view ignores the established principle that the interest of the State in a criminal prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). See also Singer v. United States, 380 U. S., at 37. For my part, I do not believe that any amount of pro se pleading can cure the injury to society of an unjust result, but I do believe that a just result should prove to be an effective balm for almost any frustrated pro se defendant.

*850II

The Court argues that its conclusion is supported by the historical evidence on self-representation. It is true that self-representation was common, if not required, in 18th century English and American prosecutions. The Court points with special emphasis to the guarantees of self-representation in colonial charters, early state constitutions, and § 35 of the first Judiciary Act as evidence contemporaneous with the Bill of Rights of widespread recognition of a right to self-representation.

I do not participate in the Court’s reliance on the historical evidence. To begin with, the historical evidence seems to me to be inconclusive in revealing the original understanding of the language of the Sixth Amendment. At the time the Amendment was first proposed, both the right to self-representation and the right to assistance of counsel in federal prosecutions were guaranteed by statute. The Sixth Amendment expressly constitutionalized the right to assistance of counsel but remained conspicuously silent on any right of self-representation. The Court believes that this silence of the Sixth Amendment as to the latter right is evidence of the Framers’ belief that the right was so obvious and fundamental that it did not need to be included “in so many words” in order to be protected by the Amendment. I believe it is at least equally plausible to conclude that the Amendment’s silence as to the right of self-representation indicates that the Framers simply did not have the subject in mind when they drafted the language.

The paucity of historical support for the Court’s position becomes far more profound when one examines it against the background of two developments in the more recent history of criminal procedure. First, until the middle of the 19th century, the defendant in a criminal proceeding in this country was almost always disqualified *851from testifying as a witness because of his “interest” in the outcome. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570 (1961). Thus, the ability to defend “in person” was frequently the defendant’s only chance to present his side of the case to the judge or jury. See, e. g., Wilson v. State, 50 Tenn. 232 (1871). Such Draconian rules of evidence, of course, are now a relic of the past because virtually every State has passed a statute abrogating the common-law rule of disqualification. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S., at 575-577, 596. With the abolition of the common-law disqualification, the right to appear “in person” as well as by counsel lost most, if not all, of its original importance. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1175, 1192-1194 (1970).

The second historical development is this Court’s elaboration of the right to counsel. The road the Court has traveled from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), need not be recounted here. For our purposes, it is sufficient to recall that from start to finish the development of the right to counsel has been based on the premise that representation by counsel is essential to ensure a fair trial. The Court concedes this and acknowledges that “a strong argument can surely be made that the whole thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an unwilling defendant.” Ante, at 833. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that self-representation must be allowed despite the obvious dangers of unjust convictions in order to protect the individual defendant’s right of free choice. As I have already indicated, I cannot agree to such a drastic curtailment of the interest of the State in seeing that justice is done in a real and objective sense.

*852Ill

In conclusion, I note briefly the procedural problems that, I suspect, today's decision will visit upon trial courts in the future. Although the Court indicates that a pro se defendant necessarily waives any claim he might otherwise make of ineffective assistance of counsel, ante, at 834 — 835, n. 46, the opinion leaves open a host of other procedural questions. Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel? How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional counsel? I assume that many of these questions will be answered with finality in due course. Many of them, however, such as the standards of waiver and the treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation. The procedural problems spawned by an absolute right to self-representation will far outweigh whatever tactical advantage the defendant may feel he has gained by electing to represent himself.

If there is any truth to the old proverb that “one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,'' the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right, on one to make a fool of himself.

*671Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This ease requires us to consider the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.

I

A

During a 10-day period in September 1976, respondent planned and committed three groups of crimes, which in-*672eluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnaping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.

Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense of hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was subject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and multiple counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury trial, again acting against counsel’s advice, and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder charges.

In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated, however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes. E. g., id., at 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that he had “a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility” but that he was making no statement at all about his likely sentencing decision. Id., at 62.

Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. He chose instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation.

In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke with respondent about his background. He also spoke on *673the telephone with respondent’s wife and mother, though he did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations with his client gave no indication that respondent had psychological problems. Id., at A266.

Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look further for evidence concerning respondent’s character and emotional state. That decision reflected trial counsel’s sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent’s confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent’s background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea colloquy communicated sufficient information about these subjects, and by forgoing the opportunity to present new evidence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on psychiatric evidence of its own. Id., at A223-A225.

Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He successfully moved to exclude respondent’s “rap sheet.” Id., at A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence report might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would have included respondent’s criminal history and thereby would have undermined the claim of no significant history of criminal activity, he did not request that one be prepared. App. to Pet. for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266.

At the sentencing hearing, counsel’s strategy was based primarily on the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy as well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime. Counsel argued that respondent’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty. Id., at A265-A266. Counsel also argued that respondent had no history of criminal activity and that respondent com*674mitted the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. He further argued that respondent should be spared death because he had surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a codefendant and because respondent was fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The State put on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not cross-examine the medical experts who testified about the manner of death of respondent’s victims.

The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the murder victim’s sisters-in-law, who sustained severe — in one case, ultimately fatal — injuries.

With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge made the same findings for all three capital murders. First, although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions, respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances “would still clearly far outweigh” that mitigating factor. Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, respondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of his acts. Third, none of the victims was a participant in, or consented to, respondent’s conduct. Fourth, respondent’s *675participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respondent’s age (26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation, especially when viewed in light of respondent’s planning of the crimes and disposition of the proceeds of the various accompanying thefts.

In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating circumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant) mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: “A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663-664 (Fla. 1978) (quoting trial court findings), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 937 (1979). He therefore sentenced respondent to death on each of the three counts of murder and to prison terms for the other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.

B

Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief in state court on numerous grounds, among them that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding. Respondent challenged counsel’s assistance in six respects. He asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts. In support of the claim, respondent submitted 14 affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that respondent, though not under the influ*676ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma” at the time of his crimes. App. 7; see also id,., at 14.

The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record evidence conclusively showed that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet. for Cert. A206-A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial errors required little discussion. First, there were no grounds to request a continuance, so there was no error in not requesting one when respondent pleaded guilty. Id., at A218-A220. Second, failure to request a presentence investigation was not a serious error because the trial judge had discretion not to grant such a request and because any presentence investigation would have resulted in admission of respondent’s “rap sheet” and thus would have undermined his assertion of no significant history of criminal activity. Id., at A226-A228. Third, the argument and memorandum given to the sentencing judge were “admirable” in light of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating circumstances. Id., at A228. Fourth, there was no error in failure to examine the medical examiner’s reports or to cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the manner of death of respondent’s victims, since respondent admitted that the victims died in the ways shown by the unchallenged medical evidence. Id., at A229.

The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other bases for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out that a psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted by state order soon after respondent’s initial arraignment. That report states that there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of the crimes. Moreover, both the reports submitted in the collateral proceeding state that, although respondent was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma,” he was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three *677reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention, counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack.

The court rejected the challenge to counsel’s failure to develop and to present character evidence for much the same reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceeding showed nothing more than that certain persons would have testified that respondent was basically a good person who was worried about his family’s financial problems. Respondent himself had already testified along those lines at the plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent’s admission of a course of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judge had stated that the death sentence would be appropriate even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the character evidence offered in the collateral attack.

Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel’s assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found: “[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each of the . . . things [that respondent alleged counsel had failed to do] *678at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have been any different. The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case were completely overwhelming . . . App. to Pet. for Cert. A230.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (1981). For essentially the reasons given by the trial court, the State Supreme Court concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case of either “substantial deficiency or possible prejudice” and, indeed, had “failed to such a degree that we believe, to the point of a moral certainty, that he is entitled to no relief . . . .” Id., at 287. Respondent’s claims were “shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 286.

C

Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief, among them ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance, as those he had identified in state court. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into trial counsel’s efforts to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances. Respondent offered the affidavits and reports he had submitted in the state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial counsel to testify. The State of Florida, over respondent’s objection, called the trial judge to testify.

• The District Court disputed none of the state court factual findings concerning trial counsel’s assistance and made findings of its own that are consistent with the state court findings. The account of trial counsel’s actions and decisions given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to *679investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he did, no prejudice to respondent’s sentence resulted from any such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge’s testimony but also on the same factors that led the state courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that “there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant possibility,” that any errors of trial counsel had affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for Cert. A285-A286. The District Court went on to reject all of respondent’s other grounds for relief, including one not exhausted in state court, which the District Court considered because, among other reasons, the State urged its consideration. Id., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to apply to the particular facts the framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it developed in its opinion. 673 F. 2d 879 (1982). The panel decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, decided to rehear the case en banc. 679 F. 2d 23 (1982). The full Court of Appeals developed its own framework for analyzing ineffective assistance claims and reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for new factfinding under the newly announced standards. 693 F. 2d 1243 (1982).

The court noted at the outset that, because respondent had raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing in the District Court, the habeas petition might be characterized as a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal of the entire petition. The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement is “a matter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction” and hence admitted of exceptions. The court agreed with the District Court that this case came within an exception to the mixed petition rule. 693 F. 2d, at 1248, n. 7.

*680Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded criminal defendants a right to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 1250. The court remarked in passing that no special standard applies in capital cases such as the one before it: the punishment that a defendant faces is merely one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether counsel was reasonably effective. Id., at 1250, n. 12. The court then addressed respondent’s contention that his trial counsel’s assistance was not reasonably effective because counsel breached his duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.

The court agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed legal choices can be made only after investigation of options. The court observed that counsel’s investigatory decisions must be assessed in light of the information known at the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that “[t]he amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies precise measurement.” Id., at 1251. Nevertheless, putting guilty-plea cases to one side, the court attempted to classify cases presenting issues concerning the scope of the duty to investigate before proceeding to trial.

If there is only one plausible line of defense, the court concluded, counsel must conduct a “reasonably substantial investigation” into that line of defense, since there can be no strategic choice that renders such an investigation unnecessary. Id., at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel relies at trial on only one line of defense, although others are available. In either case, the investigation need not be exhaustive. It must include “ ‘an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved.’” Id., at 1253 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F. 2d 103, 104 (CA5 1979)). The scope of the duty, however, depends *681on such facts as the strength of the government’s case and the likelihood that pursuing certain leads may prove more harmful than helpful. 693 F. 2d, at 1253, n. 16.

If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substantially before making a strategic choice about which lines to rely on at trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investigations, the strategic choices made as a result “will seldom if ever” be found wanting. Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel’s informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment. Id., at 1254.

If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain lines of defense for other than strategic reasons. Id., at 1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may force early strategic choices, often based solely on conversations with the defendant and a review of the prosecution’s evidence. Those strategic choices about which lines of defense to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they are based. Thus, “when counsel’s assumptions are reasonable given the totality of the circumstances and when counsel’s strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those assumptions, counsel need not investigate lines of defense that he has chosen not to employ at trial.” Id., at 1255 (footnote omitted). Among the factors relevant to deciding whether particular strategic choices are reasonable are the experience of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued lines of defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking an unpursued line of defense. Id., at 1256-1257, n. 23.

Having outlined the standards forjudging whether defense counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate, the Court of Appeals turned its attention to the question of the prejudice to the *682defense that must be shown before counsel’s errors justify reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government interference in the representation process, or of inherently prejudicial conflicts of interest had this Court said that no special showing of prejudice need be made. Id., at 1258-1259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel, where the government is not directly responsible for the deficiencies and where evidence of deficiency may be more accessible to the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant must show that counsel’s errors “resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense.” Id., at 1262. This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is compatible with the “cause and prejudice” standard for overcoming procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a showing, which could virtually always be made, of some conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel’s errors. The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was, in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 1260-1262.

The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied in the Eleventh Circuit in challenges to convictions on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in federal habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280 (opinion of Tjoflat, J.); id., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and although some believed that no remand was necessary in this case, id., at 1281-1285 (opinion of Johnson, J., joined by Anderson, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), a majority *683of the judges of the en banc court agreed that the case should be remanded for application of the newly announced standards. Summarily rejecting respondent’s claims other than ineffectiveness of counsel, the court accordingly reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. On remand, the court finally ruled, the state trial judge’s testimony, though admissible “to the extent that it contains personal knowledge of historical facts or expert opinion,” was not to be considered admitted into evidence to explain the judge’s mental processes in reaching his sentencing decision. Id., at 1262-1263; see Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 306-307 (1904).

D

Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously considered in any generality. The Court has considered Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648. With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which involved a claim that counsel’s assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of interest, the Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim of “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1976).

In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of Appeals and all but a few state courts have now adopted the “reasonably effective assistance” standard in one formulation or another. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 151-152 (CA21983); App. B to Brief for United States in United States v. Cronic, O. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno, *684Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s Representation of Criminal Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more than formulation. See App. C to Brief for United States in United States v. Cronic, supra, at 7a-10a; Sarno, supra, at 83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in this case expressly rejected the prejudice standard articulated by Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 371, 374-375, 624 F. 2d 196, 208, 211-212 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979), and adopted by the State of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d, at 1001, a standard that requires a showing that specified deficient conduct of counsel was likely to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 693 F. 2d, at 1261-1262.

For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. 462 U. S. 1105 (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions, though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 515-520. We therefore address the merits of the constitutional issue.

II

In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through *685the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the “ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution” to which they are entitled. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275, 276 (1942); see Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69.

Because of the vital importance of counsel’s assistance, this Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.

*686For that reason, the Court has recognized that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-613 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593-596 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant). Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by failing to render “adequate legal assistance,” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 344. Id., at 345-350 (actual conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer’s performance renders assistance ineffective).

The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter class of cases — that is, those presenting claims of “actual ineffectiveness.” In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we must take its purpose — to ensure a fair trial — as the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.

The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding such as that provided by Florida law. We need not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance. A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case, however, is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision, see Barclay *687v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952-954 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role at trial — to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision. For purposes of describing counsel’s duties, therefore, Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.

Ill

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

A

As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d, at 151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770, 771, that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not “a reasonably competent attorney” and the advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted de*688fendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers simply to “counsel,” not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 346. From counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 68-69.

These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take *689account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 371, 624 F. 2d, at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 133-134 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, at 101. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, *690The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 343 (1983).

The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense. Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.

Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

These standards require no special amplification in order to define counsel’s duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate*691gic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.

The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s other litigation decisions. See United States v. Decoster, supra, at 372-373, 624 F. 2d, at 209-210.

B

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U. S. 361, 364-365 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to en*692sure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.

In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 659, and n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Ante, at 658. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent.

One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote omitted).

*693Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors “impaired the presentation of the defense.” Brief for Respondent 58. That standard, however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed an error, “impairs” the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.

On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative standard has several strengths. It defines the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is inevitable, is anything but precise. The standard also reflects the profound importance of finality in criminal proceed*694ings. Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite appropriate.

Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112 (1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.

Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of a witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, at 872-874. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. *695An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. It should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decision-maker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency. Although these factors may actually have entered into counsel’s selection of strategies and, to that limited extent, may thus affect the performance inquiry, they are irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the proceeding under review, and evidence about, for example, a particular judge’s sentencing practices, should not be considered in the prejudice determination.

The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.

In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to *696be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.

h — I <1

A number of practical considerations are important for the application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.

To the extent that this has already been the guiding inquiry in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do not require reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected under different standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d, at 153 (in several years of applying “farce and mockery” standard along with “reasonable competence” standard, court “never found that the result of a case hinged on the choice of a particular standard”). In particular, the minor differences in the lower courts’ precise formulations of the performance standard are insignificant: the different *697formulations are mere variations of the overarching reasonableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid down today. The difference, however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim only in the rarest case.

Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not. determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.

The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated by the “cause and prejudice” test for overcoming procedural waivers of claims of error, the presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judgment. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 162-169 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 (1982). An ineffectiveness claim, however, as our articulation of the standards that govern decision of such claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, see id., *698at 126, no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings.

Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Ineffectiveness is not a question of “basic, primary, or historical fac[t],” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963). Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference requirement of § 2254(d), and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.

V

Having articulated general standards for judging ineffectiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the general principles. The record makes it possible to do so. There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292 (1982).

Application of the governing principles is not difficult in this case. The facts as described above, see supra, at 671-678, make clear that the conduct of respondent’s counsel at and before respondent’s sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the *699challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence.

With respect to the performance component, the record shows that respondent’s counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent’s acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. Although counsel understandably felt hopeless about respondent’s prospects, see App. 383-384, 400-401, nothing in the record indicates, as one possible reading of the District Court’s opinion suggests, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A282, that counsel’s sense of hope-, lessness distorted his professional judgment. Counsel’s strategy choice was well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable.

The trial judge’s views on the importance of owning up to one’s crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testimony on respondent’s character to what had come in at the plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent’s criminal history, which counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On these facts, there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial counsel’s defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable professional judgment.

With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of respondent’s claim is even more stark. The evidence that respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the *700sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state courts and District Court found, at most this evidence shows that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance. Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence respondent now offers might even have been harmful to his case: his “rap sheet” would probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports would have directly contradicted respondent’s claim that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to his case.

Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance components of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on the trial judge’s testimony at the District Court hearing. We therefore need not consider the general admissibility of that testimony, although, as noted supra, at 695, that testimony is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Moreover, the prejudice question is resolvable, and hence the ineffectiveness claim can be rejected, without regard to the evidence presented at the District Court hearing. The state courts properly concluded that the ineffectiveness claim was merit-less without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally, respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel’s assistance. Respondent’s sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair.

*701We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.

Justice Brennan,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the Court’s opinion but dissent from its judgment. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would vacate respondent’s death sentence and remand the case for further proceedings.1

*702I

I ease and United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648, present our first occasions to elaborate the appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Cronic, the Court considers such claims in the context of cases “in which the surrounding circumstances [make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial,” ante, at 661. This case, in contrast, concerns claims of ineffective assistance based on allegations of specific errors by counsel— claims which, by their very nature, require courts to evaluate both the attorney’s performance and the effect of that performance on the reliability and fairness of the proceeding. Accordingly, a defendant making a claim of this kind must show not only that his lawyer’s performance was inadequate but also that he was prejudiced thereby. See also Cronic, ante, at 659, n. 26.

I join the Court’s opinion because I believe that the standards it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve progressive development of this area of the law. Like all federal courts and most state courts that have previously addressed the matter, see ante, at 683-684, the Court concludes that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Ante, at 687. And, *703rejecting the strict “outcome-determinative” test employed by some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate standard for prejudice a requirement that the defendant “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” defining a “reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Ante, at 694. I believe these standards are sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time, the standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind.

With respect to the performance standard, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that a “particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct” would be inappropriate. Ante, at 688. Precisely because the standard of “reasonably effective assistance” adopted today requires that counsel’s performance be measured in light of the particular circumstances of the case, I do not believe our decision “will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine in this area,” post, at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court’s suggestion that today’s decision is largely consistent with the approach taken by the lower courts, ante, at 696, simply indicates that those courts may continue to develop governing principles on a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition, as they have in the past. Similarly, the prejudice standard announced today does not erect an insurmountable obstacle to meritorious claims, but rather simply requires courts carefully to examine trial records in light of both the nature and seriousness of counsel’s errors and their effect in the particular circumstances of the case. Ante, at 695.2

*704HH I — H

Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they be considered in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the standards announced today can and should be applied with concern for the special considerations that must attend review of counsel’s performance in a capital sentencing proceeding. In contrast to a case in which a finding of ineffective assistance requires a new trial, a conclusion that counsel was ineffective with respect to only the penalty phase of a capital trial imposes on the State the far lesser burden of reconsideration of the sentence alone. On the other hand, the consequences to the defendant of incompetent assistance at a capital sentencing could not, of course, be greater. Recognizing the unique seriousness of such a proceeding, we have repeatedly emphasized that “‘where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.’” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 188-189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).

For that reason, we have consistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of fact-finding. As Justice Marshall emphasized last Term:

“This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long before the Court established the right to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 336 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71-72 (1932). Time *705and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case. See, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). . . .

“Because of th[e] basic difference between the death penalty and all other punishments, this Court has consistently recognized that there is ‘a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ Ibid” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 913-914 (1983) (dissenting opinion).

See also id., at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In short, this Court has taken special care to minimize the possibility that death sentences are “imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 118 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

In the sentencing phase of a capital case, “[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.” Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). For that reason, we have repeatedly insisted that “the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S., at 112. In fact, as Justice O’Connor has noted, a sentencing judge’s failure to consider relevant aspects of a defendant’s character and background creates such an unacceptable risk that the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed that, even in cases where the matter was not raised below, the “interests of justice” may impose on reviewing courts “a duty to remand [the] case for resentencing.” Id., at 117, n., and 119 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

*706Of course, “[t]he right to present, and to have the sen-tencer consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little if defense counsel fails to look for mitigating evidence or fails to present a case in mitigation at the capital sentencing hearing.” Comment, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983). See, e. g., Burger v. Zant, 718 F. 2d 979 (CA11 1983) (defendant, 17 years old at time of crime, sentenced to death after counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation), stay granted, post, at 902. Accordingly, counsel’s general duty to investigate, ante, at 690, takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death; claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that duty should therefore be considered with commensurate care.

That the Court rejects the ineffective-assistance claim in this case should not, of course, be understood to reflect any diminution in commitment to the principle that “ ‘the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.’” Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, at 112 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). I am satisfied that the standards announced today will go far towards assisting lower federal courts and state courts in discharging their constitutional duty to ensure that every criminal defendant receives the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a person accused of a crime the right to the aid of a lawyer in preparing and presenting his defense. It has long been settled that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assist-*707anee of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). The state and lower federal courts have developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance.1 Today, for the first time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. For the most part, the majority’s efforts are unhelpful. Neither of its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims. And, in its zeal to survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority makes many other generalizations and suggestions that I find unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take adequate account of the fact that the locus of this case is a capital sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I join neither the Court’s opinion nor its judgment.

I

The opinion of the Court revolves around two holdings. First, the majority ties the constitutional minima of attorney performance to a simple “standard of reasonableness.” Ante, at 688. Second, the majority holds that only an error of counsel that has sufficient impact on a trial to “undermine confidence in the outcome” is grounds for overturning a conviction. Ante, at 694. I disagree with both of these rulings.

A

My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave *708“reasonably” and must act like “a reasonably competent attorney,” ante, at 687, is to tell them almost nothing. In essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes “professional” representation, and has discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed standards governing the performance of defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby not only abdicated its own responsiblity to interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs.

The debilitating ambiguity of an “objective standard of reasonableness” in this context is illustrated by the majority’s failure to address important issues concerning the quality of representation mandated by the Constitution. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case. Is a “reasonably competent attorney” a reasonably competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney? It is also a fact that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale?2 The majority offers no clues as to the proper responses to these questions.

The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific standards primarily on the ground that “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take ac*709count of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” Ante, at 688-689. I agree that counsel must be afforded “wide latitude” when making “tactical decisions” regarding trial strategy, see ante, at 689; cf. infra, at 712, 713, but many aspects of the job of a criminal defense attorney are more amenable to judicial oversight. For example, much of the work involved in preparing for a trial, applying for bail, conferring with one’s client, making timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are color-able grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of uniform standards.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents one sound attempt to develop particularized standards designed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance. See 693 F. 2d 1243, 1251-1258 (CA5 1982) (en banc). For other, generally consistent efforts, see United States v. Decoster, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 333-334, 487 F. 2d 1197, 1203-1204 (1973), disapproved on rehearing, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 624 F. 2d 196 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226 (CA4), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 849 (1968); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424-425, 590 P. 2d 859, 866 (1979); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 550-557, 205 N. W. 2d 1, 6-9 (1973).3 By refusing to address the merits of these proposals, and indeed suggesting that no such effort is worthwhile, the opinion of the Court, I fear, will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine in this area.

*710B

I object to the prejudice standard adopted by the Court for two independent reasons. First, it is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government’s evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.4 In view of all these impediments to a fair evaluation of the probability that the outcome of a trial was affected by ineffectiveness of counsel, it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

*711Second and more fundamentally, the assumption on which the Court’s holding rests is that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted. In my view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.5 The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State does not, in my opinion, constitute due process.

In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23 (1967), we acknowledged that certain constitutional rights are “so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” Among these rights is the right to the assistance of counsel at trial. Id., at 23, n. 8; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).6 In my view, the right *712to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to abridgment of the latter.7 I would thus hold that a showing that the performance of a defendant’s lawyer departed from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby.

II

Even if I were inclined to join the majority’s two central holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly regrettable are the majority’s discussion of the “presumption” of reasonableness to be accorded lawyers’ decisions and its attempt to prejudge the merits of claims previously rejected by lower courts using different legal standards.

A

In defining the standard of attorney performance required by the Constitution, the majority appropriately notes that many problems confronting criminal defense attorneys admit of “a range of legitimate” responses. Ante, at 689. And the majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a lawyer’s selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of hindsight. Ibid. The majority goes on, however, to suggest that reviewing courts should “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct” was constitutionally acceptable, ibid.; see ante, at 690, 696, and should “appl[y] a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” ante, at 691.

I am not sure what these phrases mean, and I doubt that they will be self-explanatory to lower courts. If they denote nothing more than that a defendant claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel has the burden of proof, I *713would agree. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 658. But the adjectives “strong” and “heavy” might be read as imposing upon defendants an unusually weighty burden of persuasion. If that is the majority’s intent, I must respectfully dissent. The range of acceptable behavior defined by “prevailing professional norms,” ante, at 688, seems to me sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the flexibility they need in responding to novel problems of trial strategy. To afford attorneys more latitude, by “strongly presuming” that their behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel.

The only justification the majority itself provides for its proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the courts with frivolous suits and “dampen the ardor” of defense counsel. See ante, at 690. I have more confidence than the majority in the ability of state and federal courts expeditiously to dispose of meritless arguments and to ensure that responsible, innovative lawyering is not inhibited. In my view, little will be gained and much may be lost by instructing the lower courts to proceed on the assumption that a defendant’s challenge to his lawyer’s performance will be insubstantial.

B

For many years the lower courts have been debating the meaning of “effective” assistance of counsel. Different courts have developed different standards. On the issue of the level of performance required by the Constitution, some courts have adopted the forgiving “farce-and-mockery” standard,8 while others have adopted various versions of *714the "reasonable competence” standard.9 On the issue of the level of prejudice necessary to compel a new trial, the courts have taken a wide variety of positions, ranging from the stringent “outcome-determinative” test,10 to the rule that a showing of incompetence on the part of defense counsel automatically requires reversal of the conviction regardless of the injury to the defendant.11

The Court today substantially resolves these disputes. The majority holds that the Constitution is violated when defense counsel’s representation falls below the level expected of reasonably competent defense counsel, ante, at 687-691, and so affects the trial that there is a “reasonable probability” that, absent counsel’s error, the outcome would have been different, ante, at 691-696.

Curiously, though, the Court discounts the significance of its rulings, suggesting that its choice of standards matters little and that few if any cases would have been decided differently if the lower courts had always applied the tests announced today. See ante, at 696-697. Surely the judges in the state and lower federal courts will be surprised to learn that the distinctions they have so fiercely debated for many years are in fact unimportant.

The majority’s comments on this point seem to be prompted principally by a reluctance to acknowledge that today’s decision will require a reassessment of many previously rejected ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The majority’s unhappiness on this score is understandable, but its efforts to mitigate the perceived problem will be ineffectual. Nothing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hith*715erto have been using standards more tolerant of ineffectual advocacy of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as well as new, under the principles laid down today.

► — I l l — H

The majority suggests that, “[f]or purposes of describing counsel’s duties,” a capital sentencing proceeding “need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.” Ante, at 687. I cannot agree.

The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitution requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a capital case than in other cases.

“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).12

The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component of the system of protections designed to ensure that capital punishment is'administered with some degree of rationality. “Reliability” in the imposition of the death sentence can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of “all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.” Jurek v. Terns, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The job of amassing that information and presenting it *716in an organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is entrusted principally to the defendant’s lawyer. The importance to the process of counsel’s efforts,13 combined with the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require that the standards for determining what constitutes “effective assistance” be applied especially stringently in capital sentencing proceedings.14

It matters little whether strict scrutiny of a claim that ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a death sentence is achieved through modification of the Sixth Amendment standards or through especially careful application of those standards. Justice Brennan suggests that the necessary adjustment of the level of performance required of counsel in capital sentencing proceedings can be effected simply by construing the phrase, “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” in a manner that takes into account the nature of the impending penalty. Ante, at 704-706. Though I would prefer a more specific iteration of counsel’s duties in this special context,151 can accept that proposal. However, when instructing lower courts regarding the probability of impact upon the outcome that requires a resentencing, I think the Court would do best explicitly to modify the legal standard itself.16 In my view, a person on death row, whose counsel’s performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be compelled to demonstrate a “reasonable prob*717ability” that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had been competent, see ante, at 694; if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the outcome would have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redeter-mination of his fate. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 121-122 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).17

1 — 1 <1

The views expressed m the preceding section oblige me to dissent from the majority’s disposition of the case before us.18 It is undisputed that respondent’s trial counsel made virtually no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony from respondent’s relatives, friends, or former employers pertaining to respondent’s character or background. Had counsel done so, he would have found several persons willing and able to testify that, in their experience, respondent was a responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his family, and active in the affairs of his church. See App. 338-365. Respondent contends that his lawyer could have and should have used that testimony to "humanize” respondent, to counteract the impression conveyed by the trial that he was little more than a cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been admitted, respondent argues, his chances of obtaining a life sentence would have been significantly better.

*718Measured against the standards outlined above, respondent’s contentions are substantial. Experienced members of the death-penalty bar have long recognized the crucial importance of adducing evidence at a sentencing proceeding that establishes the defendant’s social and familial connections. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 800-808, 334-335 (1983). The State makes a colorable— though in my view not compelling — argument that defense counsel in this case might have made a reasonable “strategic” decision not to present such evidence at the sentencing hearing on the assumption that an unadorned acknowledgment of respondent’s responsibility for his crimes would be more likely to appeal to the trial judge, who was reputed to respect persons who accepted responsiblity for their actions.19 But however justifiable such a choice might have been after counsel had fairly assessed the potential strength of the mitigating evidence available to him, counsel’s failure to make any significant effort to find out what evidence might be garnered from respondent’s relatives and acquaintances surely cannot be described as “reasonable.” Counsel’s failure to investigate is particularly suspicious in light of his candid admission that respondent’s confessions and conduct in the course of the trial gave him a feeling of “hopelessness” regarding the possibility of saving respondent’s life, see App. 383-384, 400-401.

*719That the aggravating circumstances implicated by respondent’s criminal conduct were substantial, see ante, at 700, does not vitiate respondent’s constitutional claim; judges and juries in cases involving behavior at least as egregious have shown mercy, particularly when afforded an opportunity to see other facets of the defendant’s personality and life.20 Nor is respondent’s contention defeated by the possibility that the material his counsel turned up might not have been sufficient to establish a statutory mitigating circumstance under Florida law; Florida sentencing judges and the Florida Supreme Court sometimes refuse to impose death sentences in cases “in which, even though statutory mitigating circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggravating circumstances, the addition of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances tips the scales in favor of life imprisonment.” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 964 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).

If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating evidence, he might well have decided to present some such material at the hearing. If he had done so, there is a significant chance that respondent would have been given a life sentence. In my view, those possibilities, conjoined with the unreasonableness of counsel’s failure to investigate, are more than sufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment and to entitle respondent to a new sentencing proceeding.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), this Court considered whether the Constitution bars defense counsel from conceding a capital defendant's guilt at trial "when [the] defendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects," id., at 178, 125 S.Ct. 551. In that case, defense counsel had several times explained to the defendant a proposed guilt-phase concession strategy, but the defendant was unresponsive. Id., at 186, 125 S.Ct. 551. We held that when counsel confers with the defendant and the defendant remains silent, neither approving nor protesting counsel's proposed concession strategy, id., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551, "[no] blanket rule demand[s] the defendant's explicit consent" to implementation of that strategy, id., at 192, 125 S.Ct. 551.

In the case now before us, in contrast to Nixon, the defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt. App. 286-287, 505-506. Yet the trial court permitted counsel, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, to tell the jury the defendant "committed three murders.... [H]e's guilty." Id., at 509, 510. We hold that a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel's experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Guaranteeing a defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," the Sixth Amendment so demands. With individual liberty-and, in capital cases, life-at stake, it is the defendant's prerogative, not counsel's, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I

On May 5, 2008, Christine and Willie Young and Gregory Colston were shot and killed in the Youngs' home in Bossier City, Louisiana. The three victims were the mother, stepfather, and son of Robert *1506McCoy's estranged wife, Yolanda. Several days later, police arrested McCoy in Idaho. Extradited to Louisiana, McCoy was appointed counsel from the public defender's office. A Bossier Parish grand jury indicted McCoy on three counts of first-degree murder, and the prosecutor gave notice of intent to seek the death penalty. McCoy pleaded not guilty. Throughout the proceedings, he insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. App. 284-286. At defense counsel's request, a court-appointed sanity commission examined McCoy and found him competent to stand trial.

In December 2009 and January 2010, McCoy told the court his relationship with assigned counsel had broken down irretrievably. He sought and gained leave to represent himself until his parents engaged new counsel for him. In March 2010, Larry English, engaged by McCoy's parents, enrolled as McCoy's counsel. English eventually concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and that, absent a concession at the guilt stage that McCoy was the killer, a death sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty phase.1 McCoy, English reported, was "furious" when told, two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, that English would concede McCoy's commission of the triple murders. Id., at 286.2 McCoy told English "not to make that concession," and English knew of McCoy's "complet[e] oppos[ition] to [English] telling the jury that [McCoy] was guilty of killing the three victims"; instead of any concession, McCoy pressed English to pursue acquittal. Id., at 286-287.

At a July 26, 2011 hearing, McCoy sought to terminate English's representation, id., at 449, and English asked to be relieved if McCoy secured other counsel, id., at 458. With trial set to start two days later, the court refused to relieve English and directed that he remain as counsel of record. Id., at 461. "[Y]ou are the attorney," the court told English when he expressed disagreement with McCoy's wish to put on a defense case, and "you have to make the trial decision of what you're going to proceed with." Id., at 469.

At the beginning of his opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial, English told the jury there was "no way reasonably possible" that they could hear the prosecution's evidence and reach "any other conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these individuals' death." Id., at 504. McCoy protested; out of earshot of the jury, McCoy told the court that English was "selling [him] out" by maintaining that McCoy "murdered [his] family." Id., at 505-506. The trial court reiterated *1507that English was "representing" McCoy and told McCoy that the court would not permit "any other outbursts." Id., at 506. Continuing his opening statement, English told the jury the evidence is "unambiguous," "my client committed three murders." Id., at 509. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. In his closing argument, English reiterated that McCoy was the killer. On that issue, English told the jury that he "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]." Id., at 647. The jury then returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on all three counts. At the penalty phase, English again conceded "Robert McCoy committed these crimes," id., at 751, but urged mercy in view of McCoy's "serious mental and emotional issues," id., at 755. The jury returned three death verdicts.

Represented by new counsel, McCoy unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing English to concede McCoy "committed three murders," id., at 509, over McCoy's objection. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that defense counsel had authority so to concede guilt, despite the defendant's opposition to any admission of guilt. See 2014-1449 (La.10/19/16), 218 So.3d 535. The concession was permissible, the court concluded, because counsel reasonably believed that admitting guilt afforded McCoy the best chance to avoid a death sentence.

We granted certiorari in view of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on the question whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant's intransigent and unambiguous objection. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 53, 198 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017). Compare with the instant case, e.g., Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842-846 (Del.2009) (counsel's pursuit of a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict over defendant's "vociferous and repeated protestations" of innocence violated defendant's "constitutional right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his case"); State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 440, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (2000) (counsel's admission of client's involvement in murder when client adamantly maintained his innocence contravened Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process right to a fair trial).

II

A

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." At common law, self-representation was the norm. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (citing 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 211 (2d ed. 1909)). As the laws of England and the American Colonies developed, providing for a right to counsel in criminal cases, self-representation remained common and the right to proceed without counsel was recognized. Faretta, 422 U.S., at 824-828, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Even now, when most defendants choose to be represented by counsel, see, e.g., Goldschmidt & Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se Defense, 1996-2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 81, 91 (2015) (0.2% of federal felony defendants proceeded pro se ), an accused may insist upon representing herself-however counterproductive that course may be, see Faretta, 422 U.S., at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525. As this Court explained, "[t]he right to defend is personal," and a defendant's choice in exercising that right "must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Ibid. (quoting *1508Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.").

The choice is not all or nothing: To gain assistance, a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel. For the Sixth Amendment, in "grant[ing] to the accused personally the right to make his defense," "speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant." Faretta, 422 U.S., at 819-820, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382, n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (the Sixth Amendment "contemplat[es] a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense"). Trial management is the lawyer's province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as "what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence." Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248, 128 S.Ct. 1765, 170 L.Ed.2d 616 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client-notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983).

Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this latter category. Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant's own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial. These are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client's objectives; they are choices about what the client's objectives in fact are . See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (self-representation will often increase the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome but "is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty"); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the State.").

Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding the death penalty, as English did in this case. But the client may not share that objective. He may wish to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family members. Or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for any hope, however small, of exoneration. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22 (it is for the defendant to make the value judgment whether "to take a minuscule chance of not being convicted and spending a life in ... prison"); Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U.L. Rev. 1147, 1178 (2010) (for some defendants, "the possibility of an acquittal, even if remote, may be more valuable than the difference between a life and a death sentence"); cf. Jae Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1969, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017) (recognizing that a defendant might reject a plea and prefer "taking a chance at trial"

*1509despite "[a]lmost certai [n]" conviction (emphasis deleted)). When a client expressly asserts that the objective of "his defence" is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt. U.S. Const. Amdt. 6 (emphasis added); see ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (2016) (a "lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation").

Preserving for the defendant the ability to decide whether to maintain his innocence should not displace counsel's, or the court's, respective trial management roles. See Gonzalez, 553 U.S., at 249, 128 S.Ct. 1765 ("[n]umerous choices affecting conduct of the trial" do not require client consent, including "the objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance"); cf. post, at 1515 - 1516. Counsel, in any case, must still develop a trial strategy and discuss it with her client, see Nixon, 543 U.S., at 178, 125 S.Ct. 551, explaining why, in her view, conceding guilt would be the best option. In this case, the court had determined that McCoy was competent to stand trial, i.e., that McCoy had "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam )).3 If, after consultations with English concerning the management of the defense, McCoy disagreed with English's proposal to concede McCoy committed three murders, it was not open to English to override McCoy's objection. English could not interfere with McCoy's telling the jury "I was not the murderer," although counsel could, if consistent with providing effective assistance, focus his own collaboration on urging that McCoy's mental state weighed against conviction. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23.

B

Florida v. Nixon, see supra, at 1505 - 1506, is not to the contrary. Nixon's attorney did not negate Nixon's autonomy by overriding Nixon's desired defense objective, for Nixon never asserted any such objective. Nixon "was generally unresponsive" during discussions of trial strategy, and "never verbally approved or protested" counsel's proposed approach. 543 U.S., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551. Nixon complained about the admission of his guilt only after trial. Id., at 185, 125 S.Ct. 551. McCoy, in contrast, opposed English's assertion of his guilt at every opportunity, before and during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court. See App. 286-287, 456, 505-506. See also Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 847 (distinguishing Nixon because, "[i]n stark contrast to the defendant's silence in that case, Cooke repeatedly objected to his counsel's objective of obtaining a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and asserted his factual innocence consistent with his plea of not guilty"). If a client declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant's best interest. Presented with express statements of the client's will to maintain innocence, however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way. See Gonzalez, 553 U.S., at 254, 128 S.Ct. 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[A]ction taken by counsel over his client's objection ...

*1510ha[s] the effect of revoking [counsel's] agency with respect to the action in question.").

The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that English's refusal to maintain McCoy's innocence was necessitated by Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) (2017), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." 218 So.3d, at 564. Presenting McCoy's alibi defense, the court said, would put English in an "ethical conundrum," implicating English in perjury. Id., at 565 (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173-176, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) ). But McCoy's case does not resemble Nix, where the defendant told his lawyer that he intended to commit perjury. There was no such avowed perjury here. Cf. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Comment 8 ("The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false."). English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying, see App. 285-286; English simply disbelieved McCoy's account in view of the prosecution's evidence. English's express motivation for conceding guilt was not to avoid suborning perjury, but to try to build credibility with the jury, and thus obtain a sentence lesser than death. Id., at 287. Louisiana's ethical rules might have stopped English from presenting McCoy's alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved. But Louisiana has identified no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoy's guilt over McCoy's objection. See 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 11.6(c), p. 935 (4th ed. 2015) ("A lawyer is not placed in a professionally embarrassing position when he is reluctantly required ... to go to trial in a weak case, since that decision is clearly attributed to his client.").

The dissent describes the conflict between English and McCoy as "rare" and "unlikely to recur." Post, at 1512, 1514 - 1515, and n. 2. Yet the Louisiana Supreme Court parted ways with three other State Supreme Courts that have addressed this conflict in the past twenty years. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 691 (Colo.2010) ("Although defense counsel is free to develop defense theories based on reasonable assessments of the evidence, as guided by her professional judgment, she cannot usurp those fundamental choices given directly to criminal defendants by the United States and the Colorado Constitutions."); Cooke, 977 A.2d 803 (Del.2009) ; Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000). In each of the three cases, as here, the defendant repeatedly and adamantly insisted on maintaining his factual innocence despite counsel's preferred course: concession of the defendant's commission of criminal acts and pursuit of diminished capacity, mental illness, or lack of premeditation defenses. See Bergerud, 223 P.3d, at 690-691 ; Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 814 ; Carter, 270 Kan., at 429, 14 P.3d, at 1141. These were not strategic disputes about whether to concede an element of a charged offense, cf. post, at 1515 - 1516; they were intractable disagreements about the fundamental objective of the defendant's representation. For McCoy, that objective was to maintain "I did not kill the members of my family." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. In this stark scenario, we agree with the majority of state courts of last resort that counsel may not admit her client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection to that admission.

III

Because a client's autonomy, not counsel's competence, is in issue, we do *1511not apply our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), or United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), to McCoy's claim. See Brief for Petitioner 43-48; Brief for Respondent 46-52. To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily must show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, however, the violation of McCoy's protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy's sole prerogative.

Violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy ranks as error of the kind our decisions have called "structural"; when present, such an error is not subject to harmless-error review. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S., at 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 (harmless-error analysis is inapplicable to deprivations of the self-representation right, because "[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless"); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (choice of counsel is structural); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (public trial is structural). Structural error "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds," as distinguished from a lapse or flaw that is "simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). An error may be ranked structural, we have explained, "if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest," such as "the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty." Weaver, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1908 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S., at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ). An error might also count as structural when its effects are too hard to measure, as is true of the right to counsel of choice, or where the error will inevitably signal fundamental unfairness, as we have said of a judge's failure to tell the jury that it may not convict unless it finds the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 582 U.S., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1908 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557, and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ).

Under at least the first two rationales, counsel's admission of a client's guilt over the client's express objection is error structural in kind. See Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 849 ("Counsel's override negated Cooke's decisions regarding his constitutional rights, and created a structural defect in the proceedings as a whole."). Such an admission blocks the defendant's right to make the fundamental choices about his own defense. And the effects of the admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly be swayed by a lawyer's concession of his client's guilt. McCoy must therefore be accorded a new trial without any need first to show prejudice.4

*1512Larry English was placed in a difficult position; he had an unruly client and faced a strong government case. He reasonably thought the objective of his representation should be avoidance of the death penalty. But McCoy insistently maintained: "I did not murder my family." App. 506. Once he communicated that to court and counsel, strenuously objecting to English's proposed strategy, a concession of guilt should have been off the table. The trial court's allowance of English's admission of McCoy's guilt despite McCoy's insistent objections was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment. Because the error was structural, a new trial is the required corrective.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.

The Constitution gives us the authority to decide real cases and controversies; we do not have the right to simplify or otherwise change the facts of a case in order to make our work easier or to achieve a desired result. But that is exactly what the Court does in this case. The Court overturns petitioner's convictions for three counts of first-degree murder by attributing to his trial attorney, Larry English, something that English never did. The Court holds that English violated petitioner's constitutional rights by "admit[ting] h[is] client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection." Ante, at 1510 - 1511.1 But English did not admit that petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder. Instead, faced with overwhelming evidence that petitioner shot and killed the three victims, English admitted that petitioner committed one element of that offense, i.e., that he killed the victims. But English strenuously argued that petitioner was not guilty of first-degree murder because he lacked the intent (the mens rea ) required for the offense. App. 508-512. So the Court's newly discovered fundamental right simply does not apply to the real facts of this case.

I

The real case is far more complex. Indeed, the real situation English faced at the beginning of petitioner's trial was the result of a freakish confluence of factors that is unlikely to recur.

*1513Retained by petitioner's family, English found himself in a predicament as the trial date approached. The evidence against his client was truly "overwhelming," as the Louisiana Supreme Court aptly noted. 2014-1449 (La.10/19/16), 218 So.3d 535, 565 (2016). Among other things, the evidence showed the following. Before the killings took place, petitioner had abused and threatened to kill his wife, and she was therefore under police protection. On the night of the killings, petitioner's mother-in-law made a 911 call and was heard screaming petitioner's first name. She yelled: " 'She ain't here, Robert ... I don't know where she is. The detectives have her. Talk to the detectives. She ain't in there, Robert.' " Id., at 542. Moments later, a gunshot was heard, and the 911 call was disconnected.

Officers were dispatched to the scene, and on arrival, they found three dead or dying victims-petitioner's mother-in-law, her husband, and the teenage son of petitioner's wife. The officers saw a man who fit petitioner's description fleeing in petitioner's car. They chased the suspect, but he abandoned the car along with critical evidence linking him to the crime: the cordless phone petitioner's mother-in-law had used to call 911 and a receipt for the type of ammunition used to kill the victims. Petitioner was eventually arrested while hitchhiking in Idaho, and a loaded gun found in his possession was identified as the one used to shoot the victims. In addition to all this, a witness testified that petitioner had asked to borrow money to purchase bullets shortly before the shootings, and surveillance footage showed petitioner purchasing the ammunition on the day of the killings. And two of petitioner's friends testified that he confessed to killing at least one person.

Despite all this evidence, petitioner, who had been found competent to stand trial and had refused to plead guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did not kill the victims. He claimed that the victims were killed by the local police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and federal officials, reaching from Louisiana to Idaho. Petitioner believed that even his attorney and the trial judge had joined the plot. App. 509.

Unwilling to go along with this incredible and uncorroborated defense, English told petitioner "some eight months" before trial that the only viable strategy was to admit the killings and to concentrate on attempting to avoid a sentence of death. 218 So.3d, at 558. At that point-aware of English's strong views-petitioner could have discharged English and sought new counsel willing to pursue his conspiracy defense; under the Sixth Amendment, that was his right. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). But petitioner stated "several different times" that he was "confident with Mr. English." App. 411, 437.

The weekend before trial, however, petitioner changed his mind. He asked the trial court to replace English, and English asked for permission to withdraw. Petitioner stated that he had secured substitute counsel, but he was unable to provide the name of this new counsel, and no new attorney ever appeared. The court refused these requests and also denied petitioner's last-minute request to represent himself. (Petitioner does not challenge these decisions here.) So petitioner and English were stuck with each other, and petitioner availed himself of his right to take the stand to tell his wild story. Under those circumstances, what was English supposed to do?

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that English could not have put on petitioner's desired defense without violating state *1514ethics rules, see 218 So.3d, at 564-565, but this Court effectively overrules the state court on this issue of state law, ante, at 1509 - 1510. However, even if it is assumed that the Court is correct on this ethics issue, the result of mounting petitioner's conspiracy defense almost certainly would have been disastrous. That approach stood no chance of winning an acquittal and would have severely damaged English's credibility in the eyes of the jury, thus undermining his ability to argue effectively against the imposition of a death sentence at the penalty phase of the trial. As English observed, taking that path would have only "help[ed] the District Attorney send [petitioner] to the death chamber." App. 396. (In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191-192, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), this Court made essentially the same point.) So, again, what was English supposed to do?

When pressed at oral argument before this Court, petitioner's current counsel eventually provided an answer: English was not required to take any affirmative steps to support petitioner's bizarre defense, but instead of conceding that petitioner shot the victims, English should have ignored that element entirely. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23. So the fundamental right supposedly violated in this case comes down to the difference between the two statements set out below.

Constitutional : "First-degree murder requires proof both that the accused killed the victim and that he acted with the intent to kill. I submit to you that my client did not have the intent required for conviction for that offense."

Unconstitutional : "First-degree murder requires proof both that the accused killed the victim and that he acted with the intent to kill. I admit that my client shot and killed the victims, but I submit to you that he did not have the intent required for conviction for that offense."

The practical difference between these two statements is negligible. If English had conspicuously refrained from endorsing petitioner's story and had based his defense solely on petitioner's dubious mental condition, the jury would surely have gotten the message that English was essentially conceding that petitioner killed the victims. But according to petitioner's current attorney, the difference is fundamental. The first formulation, he admits, is perfectly fine. The latter, on the other hand, is a violation so egregious that the defendant's conviction must be reversed even if there is no chance that the misstep caused any harm. It is no wonder that the Court declines to embrace this argument and instead turns to an issue that the case at hand does not actually present.

II

The constitutional right that the Court has now discovered-a criminal defendant's right to insist that his attorney contest his guilt with respect to all charged offenses-is like a rare plant that blooms every decade or so. Having made its first appearance today, the right is unlikely to figure in another case for many years to come. Why is this so?

First, it is hard to see how the right could come into play in any case other than a capital case in which the jury must decide both guilt and punishment. In all other cases, guilt is almost always the only issue for the jury, and therefore admitting guilt of all charged offenses will achieve nothing. It is hard to imagine a situation in which a competent attorney might take that approach. So the right that the Court has discovered is effectively confined to capital cases.

Second, few rational defendants facing a possible death sentence are likely to insist *1515on contesting guilt where there is no real chance of acquittal and where admitting guilt may improve the chances of avoiding execution. Indeed, under such circumstances, the odds are that a rational defendant will plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. By the same token, an attorney is unlikely to insist on admitting guilt over the defendant's objection unless the attorney believes that contesting guilt would be futile. So the right is most likely to arise in cases involving irrational capital defendants.2

Third, where a capital defendant and his retained attorney cannot agree on a basic trial strategy, the attorney and client will generally part ways unless, as in this case, the court is not apprised until the eve of trial. The client will then either search for another attorney or decide to represent himself. So the field of cases in which this right might arise is limited further still-to cases involving irrational capital defendants who disagree with their attorneys' proposed strategy yet continue to retain them.

Fourth, if counsel is appointed, and unreasonably insists on admitting guilt over the defendant's objection, a capable trial judge will almost certainly grant a timely request to appoint substitute counsel. And if such a request is denied, the ruling may be vulnerable on appeal.

Finally, even if all the above conditions are met, the right that the Court now discovers will not come into play unless the defendant expressly protests counsel's strategy of admitting guilt. Where the defendant is advised of the strategy and says nothing, or is equivocal, the right is deemed to have been waived. See Nixon, 543 U.S., at 192, 125 S.Ct. 551.

In short, the right that the Court now discovers is likely to appear only rarely,3 and because the present case is so unique, it is hard to see how it meets our stated criteria for granting review. See this Court's Rules 10(b)-(c). Review would at least be understandable if the strategy that English pursued had worked an injustice, but the Court does not make that claim-and with good reason. Endorsing petitioner's bizarre defense would have been extraordinarily unwise, and dancing the fine line recommended by petitioner's current attorney would have done no good. It would have had no effect on the outcome of the trial, and it is hard to see how that approach would have respected petitioner's "autonomy," ante, at 1507 - 1508, 1508 - 1509, 1509, 1510 - 1511, any more than the more straightforward approach that English took. If petitioner is retried, it will be interesting to see what petitioner's current counsel or any other attorney to *1516whom the case is handed off will do. It is a safe bet that no attorney will put on petitioner's conspiracy defense.

III

While the question that the Court decides is unlikely to make another appearance for quite some time, a related-and difficult-question may arise more frequently: When guilt is the sole issue for the jury, is it ever permissible for counsel to make the unilateral decision to concede an element of the offense charged? If today's decision were understood to address that question, it would have important implications.

Under current precedent, there are some decisions on which a criminal defendant has the final say. For example, a defendant cannot be forced to enter a plea against his wishes. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5-7, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966). Similarly, no matter what counsel thinks best, a defendant has the right to insist on a jury trial and to take the stand and testify in his own defense. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). And if, as in this case, a defendant and retained counsel do not see eye to eye, the client can always attempt to find another attorney who will accede to his wishes. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557. A defendant can also choose to dispense with counsel entirely and represent himself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

While these fundamental decisions must be made by a criminal defendant, most of the decisions that arise in criminal cases are the prerogative of counsel. (Our adversarial system would break down if defense counsel were required to obtain the client's approval for every important move made during the course of the case.) Among the decisions that counsel is free to make unilaterally are the following: choosing the basic line of defense, moving to suppress evidence, delivering an opening statement and deciding what to say in the opening, objecting to the admission of evidence, cross-examining witnesses, offering evidence and calling defense witnesses, and deciding what to say in summation. See, e.g., New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-115, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). On which side of the line does conceding some but not all elements of the charged offense fall?

Some criminal offenses contain elements that the prosecution can easily prove beyond any shadow of a doubt. A prior felony conviction is a good example. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). Suppose that the prosecution is willing to stipulate that the defendant has a prior felony conviction but is prepared, if necessary, to offer certified judgments of conviction for multiple prior violent felonies. If the defendant insists on contesting the convictions on frivolous grounds, must counsel go along? Does the same rule apply to all elements? If there are elements that may not be admitted over the defendant's objection, must counsel go further and actually contest those elements? Or is it permissible if counsel refrains from expressly conceding those elements but essentially admits them by walking the fine line recommended at argument by petitioner's current attorney?

What about conceding that a defendant is guilty, not of the offense charged, but of a lesser included offense? That is what English did in this case. He admitted that petitioner was guilty of the noncapital offense of second-degree murder in an effort *1517to prevent a death sentence. App. 651.4 Is admitting guilt of a lesser included offense over the defendant's objection always unconstitutional? Where the evidence strongly supports conviction for first-degree murder, is it unconstitutional for defense counsel to make the decision to admit guilt of any lesser included form of homicide-even manslaughter? What about simple assault?

These are not easy questions, and the fact that they have not come up in this Court for more than two centuries suggests that they will arise infrequently in the future. I would leave those questions for another day and limit our decision to the particular (and highly unusual) situation in the actual case before us. And given the situation in which English found himself when trial commenced, I would hold that he did not violate any fundamental right by expressly acknowledging that petitioner killed the victims instead of engaging in the barren exercise that petitioner's current counsel now recommends.

IV

Having discovered a new right not at issue in the real case before us, the Court compounds its error by summarily concluding that a violation of this right "ranks as error of the kind our decisions have called 'structural.' " Ante, at 1510.

The Court concedes that the Louisiana Supreme Court did not decide the structural-error question and that we " 'did not grant certiorari to review' that question." Ante, at 1511, n. 4. We have stated time and again that we are "a court of review, not of first view" and, for that reason, have refused to decide issues not addressed below. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) ; see also, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 851, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) ; McWilliams v. Dunn, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1790, 1801, 198 L.Ed.2d 341 (2017) ; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ----, ----, n., 137 S.Ct. 1539, 1547-1548, n., 198 L.Ed.2d 52 (2017) ; BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 1559-1560, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1178, 1190, 197 L.Ed.2d 585 (2017) ; McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1159, 1169-1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 500 (2017) ; Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1144, 1151-1152, 197 L.Ed.2d 442 (2017) ; Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 911, 921-922, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017).

In this case, however, the court-of-review maxim does not suit the majority's purposes, so it is happy to take the first view. And the majority does so without adversarial briefing on the question. See Brief for Respondent 45-46, n. 5.5 Under *1518comparable circumstances, we have refrained from taking the lead on the question of structural error. See e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526-527, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) ; Faretta, 422 U.S., at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; id., at 852, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). There is no good reason to take a different approach in this case.

The Court ignores the question actually presented by the case before us and instead decides this case on the basis of a newly discovered constitutional right that is not implicated by what really occurred at petitioner's trial. I would base our decision on what really took place, and under the highly unusual facts of this case, I would affirm the judgment below.

I therefore respectfully dissent.