13 Rules v. Orders 13 Rules v. Orders

13.1 SEC v. Chenery Corp. 13.1 SEC v. Chenery Corp.

318 U.S. 80 (1943)

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
v.
CHENERY CORPORATION ET AL.

No. 254.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued December 17, 18, 1942.
Decided February 1, 1943.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

[81] Mr. Chester T. Lane, with whom Solicitor General Fahy and Messrs. Richard S. Salant, John F. Davis, Homer Kripke, and Theodore L. Thau were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Spencer Gordon for respondents.

Mr. Allen S. Hubbard was on a brief for the Federal Water and Gas Corporation, respondent.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondents, who were officers, directors, and controlling stockholders of the Federal Water Service Corporation (hereafter called Federal), a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, c. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79, brought this proceeding under § 24(a) of the Act to review an order made by the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 24, 1941, approving a plan of reorganization for the company. Under the Commission's order, preferred stock acquired by the respondents during the period in which successive reorganization plans proposed by the management of the company were before the Commission, was not permitted to participate in the reorganization on an equal footing with all other preferred stock. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, with one judge dissenting, set the Commission's order aside, 128 F.2d 303, and because the question presented looms large in the administration of the Act, we brought the case here.

[82] The relevant facts are as follows. In 1937, Federal was a typical public utility holding company. Incorporated in Delaware, its assets consisted of securities of subsidiary water, gas, electric, and other companies in thirteen states and one foreign country. The respondents controlled Federal through their control of its parent, Utility Operators Company, which owned all of the outstanding shares of Federal's Class B common stock, representing the controlling voting power in the company. On November 8, 1937, when Federal registered as a holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, its management filed a plan for reorganization under §§ 7 and 11 of the Act, the relevant portions of which are copied in the margin.[1] This plan, as well as two other plans later [83] submitted by Federal, provided for participation by Class B stockholders in the equity of the proposed reorganized company. This feature of the plans was unacceptable to the Commission, and all were ultimately withdrawn. [84] On March 30, 1940, a fourth plan was filed by Federal. This plan, proposing a merger of Federal, Utility Operators Company, and Federal Water and Gas Corporation, a wholly-owned inactive subsidiary of Federal, contained no provision for participation by the Class B stock. Instead, that class of stock was to be surrendered for cancellation, and the preferred and Class A common stock of Federal were to be converted into common stock of the new corporation. As the Commission pointed out in its analysis of the proposed plan, "except for the 5.3% of new common allocated to the present holders of Class A stock, substantially all of the equity of the reorganized company will be given to the present preferred stockholders."

During the period from November 8, 1937, to June 30, 1940, while the successive reorganization plans were before the Commission, the respondents purchased a total of 12,407 shares of Federal's preferred stock. (The total number of outstanding shares of Federal's preferred stock was 159,269.) These purchases were made on the over-the-counter market through brokers at prices lower than the book value of the common stock of the new corporation into which the preferred stock would have been converted under the proposed plan. If this feature of the plan had been approved by the Commission, the respondents through their holdings of Federal's preferred stock would [85] have acquired more than 10 per cent of the common stock of the new corporation. The respondents frankly admitted that their purpose in buying the preferred stock was to protect their interests in the company.

In ascertaining whether the terms of issuance of the new common stock were "fair and equitable" or "detrimental to the interests of investors" within § 7 of the Act, the Commission found that it could not approve the proposed plan so long as the preferred stock acquired by the respondents would be permitted to share on a parity with other preferred stock. The Commission did not find fraud or lack of disclosure, but it concluded that the respondents, as Federal's managers, were fiduciaries and hence under a "duty of fair dealing" not to trade in the securities of the corporation while plans for its reorganization were before the Commission. It recommended that a formula be devised under which the respondents' preferred stock would participate only to the extent of the purchase prices paid plus accumulated dividends since the dates of such purchases. Accordingly, the plan was thereafter amended to provide that the preferred stock acquired by the respondents, unlike the preferred stock held by others, would not be converted into stock of the reorganized company, but could only be surrendered at cost plus 4 per cent interest. The Commission, over the respondents' objections, approved the plan as thus amended, and it is this order which is now under review.

We completely agree with the Commission that officers and directors who manage a holding company in process of reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 occupy positions of trust. We reject a lax view of fiduciary obligations and insist upon their scrupulous observance. See Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421, 441; Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88; and see Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8-9. But to say that a man is a fiduciary [86] only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?

The Commission did not find that the respondents as managers of Federal acted covertly or traded on inside knowledge, or that their position as reorganization managers enabled them to purchase the preferred stock at prices lower than they would otherwise have had to pay, or that their acquisition of the stock in any way prejudiced the interests of the corporation or its stockholders. To be sure, the new stock into which the respondents' preferred stock would be converted under the plan of reorganization would have a book value — which may or may not represent market value — considerably greater than the prices paid for the preferred stock. But that would equally be true of purchases of preferred stock made by other investors. The respondents, the Commission tells us, acquired their stock as the outside world did, and upon no better terms. The Commission dealt with this as a specific case, and not as the application of a general rule formulating rules of conduct for reorganization managers. Consequently, it is a vital consideration that the Commission conceded that the respondents did not acquire their stock through any favoring circumstances. In its own words, "honesty, full disclosure, and purchase at a fair price" characterized the transactions. The Commission did not suggest that, as a result of their purchases of preferred stock, the respondents would be unjustly enriched. On the contrary, the question before the Commission was whether the respondents, simply because they were reorganization managers, should be denied the benefits to be received by the 6,000 other preferred stockholders. Some technical rule of law must have moved the Commission to single out the respondents and deny their preferred [87] stock the right to participate equally in the reorganization. To ascertain the precise basis of its determination, we must look to the Commission's opinion.

The Commission stated that "in the process of formulation of a `voluntary' reorganization plan, the management of a corporation occupies a fiduciary position toward all of the security holders to be affected, and that it is subjected to the same standards as other fiduciaries with respect to dealing with the property which is the subject matter of the trust." Applying by analogy the restrictions imposed on trustees in trafficking in property held by them in trust for others, Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 557, the Commission ruled that even though the management does not hold the stock of the corporation in trust for the stockholders, nevertheless the "duty of fair dealing" which the management owes to the stockholders is violated if those in control of the corporation purchase its stock, even at a fair price, openly and without fraud. The Commission concluded that "honesty, full disclosure, and purchase at a fair price do not take the case outside the rule."

In reaching this result the Commission stated that it was merely applying "the broad equitable principles enunciated in the cases heretofore cited," namely, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 557; Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 119-20, and Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545. Its opinion plainly shows that the Commission purported to be acting only as it assumed a court of equity would have acted in a similar case. Since the decision of the Commission was explicitly based upon the applicability of principles of equity announced by courts, its validity must likewise be judged on that basis. The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.

[88] In confining our review to a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the Commission itself based its action, we do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct "although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245. The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure that where the correctness of the lower court's decision depends upon a determination of fact which only a jury could make but which has not been made, the appellate court cannot take the place of the jury. Like considerations govern review of administrative orders. If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.

If, therefore, the rule applied by the Commission is to be judged solely on the basis of its adherence to principles of equity derived from judicial decisions, its order plainly cannot stand. As the Commission concedes here, the courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers and directors, from buying and selling the corporation's stock.[2] [89] The cases upon which the Commission relied do not establish principles of law and equity which in themselves are sufficient to sustain its order. The only question in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, was whether claims obtained by the controlling stockholders of a bankrupt corporation were to be treated equally with the claims of other creditors where the evidence revealed "a scheme to defraud creditors reminiscent of some of the evils with which 13 Eliz. c. 5 was designed to cope," 308 U.S. at 296. Another case relied upon, Woods v. City Bank Co., 312 U.S. 262, held only that a bankruptcy court, in the exercise of its plenary power to review fees and expenses in connection with a reorganization proceeding under Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840, could deny compensation to protective committees representing conflicting interests. Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, and Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, dealt with the specific obligations of express trustees and not with those of persons in control of a corporate enterprise toward its stockholders.

Determination of what is "fair and equitable" calls for the application of ethical standards to particular sets of facts. But these standards are not static. In evolving standards of fairness and equity, the Commission is not bound by settled judicial precedents. Congress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right and what is wrong than those prevalent at the time the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 became law. But the Commission did not in this case proffer new standards reflecting the experience gained by it in effectuating the legislative policy. On the contrary, it explicitly disavowed any purpose of going beyond those which the courts had theretofore recognized. Since the Commission professed to decide the case before it according to settled judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by the standards which the Commission itself invoked. [90] And judged by those standards, i.e., those which would be enforced by a court of equity, we must conclude that the Commission was in error in deeming its action controlled by established judicial principles.

But the Commission urges here that the order should nevertheless be sustained because "the effect of trading by management is not measured by the fairness of individual transactions between buyer and seller, but by its relation to the timing and dynamics of the reorganization which the management itself initiates and so largely controls." Its argument lays stress upon the "strategic position enjoyed by the management in this type of reorganization proceeding and the vesting in it of statutory powers available to no other representative of security holders." It contends that these considerations warrant the stern rule applied in this case since the Commission "has dealt extensively with corporate reorganizations, both under the Act, and other statutes entrusted to it," and "has, in addition, exhaustively studied protective and reorganization committees," and that the situation was therefore "peculiarly within the Commission's special administrative competence."

In determining whether to approve the plan of reorganization proposed by Federal's management, the Commission could inquire, under § 7 (d) (6) and (e) of the Act, whether the proposal was "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers," and, under § 11 (e), whether it was "fair and equitable." That these provisions were meant to confer upon the Commission broad powers for the protection of the public plainly appears from the reports of the Congressional committees in charge of the legislation. The provisions of § 7 were "designed to give adequate protection to investors and consumers . . . and are in accord with the underlying purpose of the legislation to give to investors and consumers full protection against the deleterious practices [91] which have characterized certain holding-company finance in the past." Sen. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 28. Similarly, the authority given the Commission by § 11 was intended to be responsive to the demands of the particular situations with which the Commission would be faced: "Under these subsections [11 (d), (e), and (f)], Commission approval of reorganization plans and supervision of the conditions under which such plans are prepared will make it impossible for a group of favored insiders to continue their domination over inarticulate and helpless minorities, or even as is often the case, majorities . . ." Id., p. 33.

In view of this legislative history, reflecting the range of public interests committed to the care of the Commission, § 17 (a) and (b), which requires officers and directors of any holding company registered under the Act to file statements of their security holdings in the company and provides that profits made from dealing in such securities within any period of less than six months shall inure to the benefit of the company, cannot be regarded as a limitation upon the power of the Commission to deal with other situations in which officers and directors have failed to measure up to the standards of conduct imposed upon them by the Act. The Act vests in the officers and directors of a holding company registered under the Act broad powers as representatives of all the stockholders. Besides the Commission, only the management can initiate a proceeding before the Commission to simplify the corporate structure and to effect a fair and equitable distribution of voting power among security holders. Only the management can amend a plan under §§ 7 and 11 (e), and this it may do at any time; only the management can withdraw the plan, and this too it may do at will; and even after the Commission has approved a plan, it cannot be carried out without the consent of the management.

[92] Notwithstanding § 17 (a) and (b), therefore, the Commission could take appropriate action for the correction of reorganization abuses found to be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers." It was entitled to take into account those more subtle factors in the marketing of utility company securities that gave rise to the very grave evils which the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935 was designed to correct. See the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 126 F.2d 325, 332.

But the difficulty remains that the considerations urged here in support of the Commission's order were not those upon which its action was based. The Commission did not rely upon "its special administrative competence"; it formulated no judgment upon the requirements of the "public interest or the interest of investors or consumers" in the situation before it. Through its preoccupation with the special problems of utility reorganizations the Commission accumulates an experience and insight denied to others. Had the Commission, acting upon its experience and peculiar competence, promulgated a general rule of which its order here was a particular application, the problem for our consideration would be very different. Whether and to what extent directors or officers should be prohibited from buying or selling stock of the corporation during its reorganization, presents problems of policy for the judgment of Congress or of the body to which it has delegated power to deal with the matter. Abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only by prohibitions not concerned with the fairness of a particular transaction. But before transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of [93] government authorized to prescribe such standards — either the courts or Congress or an agency to which Congress has delegated its authority. Congress itself did not proscribe the respondents' purchases of preferred stock in Federal. Established judicial doctrines do not condemn these transactions. Nor has the Commission, acting under the rule-making powers delegated to it by § 11 (e), promulgated new general standards of conduct. It purported merely to be applying an existing judge-made rule of equity. The Commission's determination can stand, therefore, only if it found that the specific transactions under scrutiny showed misuse by the respondents of their position as reorganization managers, in that as such managers they took advantage of the corporation or the other stockholders or the investing public. The record is utterly barren of any such showing. Indeed, such a claim against the respondents was explicitly disavowed by the Commission.

In view of the conditions imposed by the Commission in approving the plan, it is clear that the respondents were charged with violation of a positive command of law rather than with any moral wrong. If there has been a wrong, it would be against the stockholders from whom they purchased the preferred stock at less than the book value of the new stock — which, as we have already said, may or may not be its real value. But the Commission did not regard such stockholders as beneficiaries of the respondents' "trust" and hence entitled to restitution. The Commission did not undo the purchases deemed by it to have been made by the respondents in violation of their fiduciary obligations. Instead, the Commission confirmed the purchases and ordered that the stock be surrendered to the corporation.

Judged, therefore, as a determination based upon judge-made rules of equity, the Commission's order cannot be upheld. Its action must be measured by what the Commission [94] did, not by what it might have done. It is not for us to determine independently what is "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers" or "fair or equitable" within the meaning of §§ 7 and 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The Commission's action cannot be upheld merely because findings might have been made and considerations disclosed which would justify its order as an appropriate safeguard for the interests protected by the Act. There must be such a responsible finding. Compare United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 510-11. There is no such finding here.

Congress has seen fit to subject to judicial review such orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission as the one before us. That the scope of such review is narrowly circumscribed is beside the point. For the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review. If the action rests upon an administrative determination — an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency — of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do so. But if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law. In either event the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. "The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197. What was said in that case is equally applicable here: "We do not intend to enter the province that belongs to the Board, nor do we do so. All we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with [95] which Congress has empowered it. This is to affirm most emphatically the authority of the Board." Ibid. Compare United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 488-90. In finding that the Commission's order cannot be sustained, we are not imposing any trammels on its powers. We are not enforcing formal requirements. We are not suggesting that the Commission must justify its exercise of administrative discretion in any particular manner or with artistic refinement. We are not sticking in the bark of words. We merely hold that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.

The cause should therefore be remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the Commission for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate.

So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY concur, dissenting.

For reasons set out in the Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion below, I agree that these respondents, officers and directors of the Corporations seeking reorganization, acted in a fiduciary capacity in formulating and managing plans they submitted to the Commission, and that, as fiduciaries, they should be held to a scrupulous observance of their trust. I further agree that Congress conferred on the Commission "broad powers for the protection of the public," investors and consumers; and that the Commission, not the Court, was invested by Congress with authority to determine whether a proposed reorganization or merger would be "fair and equitable," or whether [96] it would be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers."

The conclusions of the Court with which I disagree are those in which it holds that while the Securities and Exchange Commission has abundant power to meet the situation presented by the activities of these respondents, it has not done so. This conclusion is apparently based on the premise that the Commission has relied upon the common law rather than on "new standards reflecting the experience gained by it in effectuating legislative policy," and that the common law does not support its conclusion; that the Commission could have promulgated "a general rule of which its order here was a particular application," but instead made merely an ad hoc judgment; and that the Commission made no finding that these practices would prejudice anyone.

The Commission's actual finding was that "The plan of reorganization herein considered, like the previous plans filed with us over the past several years, was formulated by the management of Federal, and discussions concerning the reorganization of this corporation have taken place between the management and the staff of the Commission over the past several years;" that C.T. Chenery purchased 8,618 shares of preferred stock during this period; that other officers and directors of the concerns involved acquired 3,789 shares during the same period; that for this stock these respondent fiduciaries paid $328,346.89 and then submitted their latest reorganization plan, under which this purchased stock would have a book value in the reorganization company of $1,162,431.90. In the light of these and other facts the Commission concluded that the new plan would be "unfair, inequitable, and detrimental, so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management at low prices is to be permitted to share on a parity with other preferred stock." The Commission declined to give "effectiveness" to the proposed plan and entered [97] "adverse findings" against it under §§ 7(d) (1) and 7(d) (2) of the controlling Act, resting its refusal to approve on this statement: "We find that the provisions for participation by the preferred stock held by the management result in the terms of issuance of the new securities being detrimental to the interests of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable."

The grounds upon which the Commission made its findings seem clear enough to me. Accepting, as the Court does, the fiduciary relationship of these respondents in managing the Commission proceedings, it follows that their peculiar information as to the stock values under their proposed plan afforded them opportunities for stock purchase profits which other stockholders did not have. While such fiduciaries, they bought preferred stock and then offered a reorganization plan which would give this stock a book value of four times the price they had paid for it. What the Commission has done is to say that no such reward shall be reaped by these fiduciaries. At the same time they are permitted to recover the full purchase price with interest. To permit their reorganization plan to put them in the same position as the old stockholders gives to these fiduciaries an unconscionable profit for trading with inside information.

I can see nothing improper in the Commission's findings and determinations. On the contrary, the rule they evolved appears to me to be a salutary one, adequately supported by cogent reasons and thoroughly consistent with the high standards of conduct which should be required of fiduciaries. That the Commission saw fit to draw support for its own administrative conclusion from decisions of courts should not detract from the validity of its findings. Entrusted as the Commission is with the responsibility of lifting the standard of transactions in the market place in order that the managers of financial ventures may not impose upon the general investing public, [98] it seems wholly appropriate that the Commission should have recognized the influence of admonitory language like the following it approvingly quoted from Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545:

"A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."

The decisions cited by the Commission seem to me to show the soundness of the conclusion it reached. As judges we are entitled to a sense of gratification that the common law has been able to make so substantial a contribution to the development of the administrative law of this field. See e.g. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503; Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106. Of course the Commission is not limited to common law principles in protecting investors and the public, but even if it were so limited the Magruder case would in my opinion provide complete support for the position taken by the Commission: "The intention is to provide against any possible selfish interest exercising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is owing in a fiduciary capacity. . . . It makes no difference that the estate was not a loser in the transaction or that the commission was no more than the services were reasonably worth." pp. 119, 120. The distinction now seen by the Court between these cases and the instant problem comes to little more than that the fact situations are similar but not identical.

While I consider that the cases on which the Commission relied give full support to the conclusion it reached, I do not suppose, as the Court does, that the Commission's rule is not fully based on Commission experience. The [99] Commission did not "explicitly disavow" any reliance on what its members had learned in their years of experience, and of course they, as trade experts, made their findings that respondent's practice was "detrimental to the interests of investors" in the light of their knowledge. That they did not unduly parade fact data across the pages of their reports is a commendable saving of effort since they meant merely to announce for their own jurisdiction an obvious rule of honest dealing closely related to common law standards. Of course, the Commission can now change the form of its decision to comply with the Court order. The Court can require the Commission to use more words; but it seems difficult to imagine how more words or different words could further illuminate its purpose or its determination. A judicial requirement of circumstantially detailed findings as the price of court approval can bog the administrative power in a quagmire of minutiae. Hypercritical exactions as to findings can provide a handy but an almost invisible glideway enabling courts to pass "from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194. Here for instance, the Court apparently holds that the Commission has full power to do exactly what it did; but the Court sends the matter back to the Commission to revise the language of its opinion, in order, I suppose, that the Court may reappraise the reasons which moved the Commission to determine that the conduct of these fiduciaries was detrimental to the public and investors. The Act under which the Commission proceeded does not purport to vest us with authority to make such a reappraisal.

That the Commission has chosen to proceed case by case rather than by a general pronouncement does not appear to me to merit criticism. The intimation is that the Commission can act only through general formulae rigidly adhered to. In the first place, the rule of the single case is obviously a general advertisement to the trade, [100] and in the second place the briefs before us indicate that this is but one of a number of cases in which the Commission is moving to an identical result on a broad front. But aside from these considerations the Act gives the Commission wide powers to evolve policy standards, and this may well be done case by case, as under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310-312.

The whole point of the Commission finding has been lost if it is criticized for a failure to show injury to particular shareholders. The Commission holding is that it should not "undertake to decide case by case whether the management's trading has in fact operated to the detriment of the persons whom it represents," because the "tendency to evil" from this practice is so great that the Commission desires to attach to it a conclusive presumption of impropriety.

The rule the Commission adopted here is appropriate. Protection of investors from insiders was one of the chief reasons which led to adoption of the law which the Commission was selected to administer.[3] That purpose can be greatly retarded by overmeticulous exactions, exactions which require a detailed narration of underlying reasons which prompt the Commission to require high standards of honesty and fairness. I favor approving the rule they applied.

[1] "SEC. 7. (a) A registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof may file a declaration with the Commission, regarding any of the acts enumerated in subsection (a) of section 6, in such form as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers. Such declaration shall include —

"(1) such of the information and documents which are required to be filed in order to register a security under section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, as the Commission may by rules and regulations or order prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers; and

"(2) such additional information, in such form and detail, and such documents regarding the declarant or any associate company thereof, the particular security and compliance with such State laws as may apply to the act in question as the Commission may by rules and regulations or order prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers. . . .

"(d) If the requirements of subsections (c) and (g) are satisfied, the Commission shall permit a declaration regarding the issue or sale of a security to become effective unless the Commission finds that —

......

"(6) the terms and conditions of the issue or sale of the security are detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers.

"(e) If the requirements of subsection (g) are satisfied, the Commission shall permit a declaration to become effective regarding the exercise of a privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security unless the Commission finds that such exercise of such privilege or right will result in an unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among holders of the securities of the declarant or is otherwise detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers.

"(f) Any order permitting a declaration to become effective may contain such terms and conditions as the Commission finds necessary to assure compliance with the conditions specified in this section. . . .

"SEC. 11. (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission to examine the corporate structure of every registered holding company and subsidiary company thereof, the relationships among the companies in the holding-company system of every such company and the character of the interests thereof and the properties owned or controlled thereby to determine the extent to which the corporate structure of such holding-company system and the companies therein may be simplified, unnecessary complexities therein eliminated, voting power fairly and equitably distributed among the holders of securities thereof, and the properties and business thereof confined to those necessary or appropriate to the operations of an integrated public-utility system. . . .

"(e) In accordance with such rules and regulations or order as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers, any registered holding company or any subsidiary company of a registered holding company may, at any time after January 1, 1936, submit a plan to the Commission for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or for other action by such company or any subsidiary company thereof for the purpose of enabling such company or any subsidiary company thereof to comply with the provisions of subsection (b). If, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan, as submitted or as modified, necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan, the Commission shall make an order approving such plan; and the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f) of section 18, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. If, upon any such application, the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall approve such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of section 11, the court as a court of equity may, to such extent as it deems necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms and provisions of such plan, take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of the company or companies and the assets thereof, wherever located; and the court shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, and the court may constitute and appoint the Commission as sole trustee, to hold or administer, under the direction of the court and in accordance with the plan theretofore approved by the court and the Commission, the assets so possessed. . . ."

[2] See 1 Dodd and Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) 498-500, 583-86, 621-22; 1 Morawetz on Private Corporations (2d ed. 1886) §§ 516-21, pp. 482-89.

[3] "Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others." Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Stock Exchange Practices, Report No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 55.

13.2 SEC v. Chenery Corp. 13.2 SEC v. Chenery Corp.

332 U.S. 194 (1947)

SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
v.
CHENERY CORPORATION ET AL.

No. 81.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued December 13, 16, 1946.
Decided June 23, 1947.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.[1]

[195] Roger S. Foster argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Theodore L. Thau.

[196] Spencer Gordon argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in No. 81.

Allen S. Hubbard argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 82.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is here for the second time. In S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, we held that an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission could not be sustained on the grounds upon which that agency acted. We therefore directed that the case be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate. On remand, the Commission reexamined the problem, recast its rationale and reached the same result, The issue now is whether the Commission's action is proper in light of the principles established in our prior decision.

When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.

We also emphasized in our prior decision an important corollary of the foregoing rule. If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled [197] to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other words, "We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511.

Applying this rule and its corollary, the Court was unable to sustain the Commission's original action. The Commission had been dealing with the reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation (Federal), a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803. During the period when successive reorganization plans proposed by the management were before the Commission, the officers, directors and controlling stockholders of Federal purchased a substantial amount of Federal's preferred stock on the over-the-counter market. Under the fourth reorganization plan, this preferred stock was to be converted into common stock of a new corporation; on the basis of the purchases of preferred stock, the management would have received more than 10% of this new common stock. It was frankly admitted that the management's purpose in buying the preferred stock was to protect its interest in the new company. It was also plain that there was no fraud or lack of disclosure in making these purchases.

But the Commission would not approve the fourth plan so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management was to be treated on a parity with the other preferred stock. It felt that the officers and directors of a holding company in process of reorganization under the Act were fiduciaries and were under a duty not to trade in the securities of that company during the reorganization period. 8 S.E.C. 893, 915-921. And so the plan was amended to provide that the preferred stock acquired by the management, unlike that held by others, was not to be converted [198] into the new common stock; instead, it was to be surrendered at cost plus dividends accumulated since the purchase dates. As amended, the plan was approved by the Commission over the management's objections. 10 S.E.C. 200.

The Court interpreted the Commission's order approving this amended plan as grounded solely upon judicial authority. The Commission appeared to have treated the preferred stock acquired by the management in accordance with what it thought were standards theretofore recognized by courts. If it intended to create new standards growing out of its experience in effectuating the legislative policy, it failed to express itself with sufficient clarity and precision to be so understood. Hence the order was judged by the only standards clearly invoked by the Commission. On that basis, the order could not stand. The opinion pointed out that courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers and directors, from buying and selling the corporation's stock. Nor was it felt that the cases upon which the Commission relied established any principles of law or equity which in themselves would be sufficient to justify this order.

The opinion further noted that neither Congress nor the Commission had promulgated any general rule proscribing such action as the purchase of preferred stock by Federal's management. And the only judge-made rule of equity which might have justified the Commission's order related to fraud or mismanagement of the reorganization by the officers and directors, matters which were admittedly absent in this situation.

After the case was remanded to the Commission, Federal Water and Gas Corp. (Federal Water), the surviving corporation under the reorganization plan, made an application for approval of an amendment to the plan to provide [199] for the issuance of new common stock of the reorganized company. This stock was to be distributed to the members of Federal's management on the basis of the shares of the old preferred stock which they had acquired during the period of reorganization, thereby placing them in the same position as the public holders of the old preferred stock. The intervening members of Federal's management joined in this request. The Commission denied the application in an order issued on February 8, 1945. Holding Company Act Release No. 5584. That order was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 154 F.2d 6, which felt that our prior decision precluded such action by the Commission.

The latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of relying on judicial precedents which do not sustain it. This time, after a thorough reexamination of the problem in light of the purposes and standards of the Holding Company Act, the Commission has concluded that the proposed transaction is inconsistent with the standards of §§ 7 and 11 of the Act. It has drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its order.

The argument is pressed upon us, however, that the Commission was foreclosed from taking such a step following our prior decision. It is said that, in the absence of findings of conscious wrongdoing on the part of Federal's management, the Commission could not determine by an order in this particular case that it was inconsistent with the statutory standards to permit Federal's management to realize a profit through the reorganization purchases. All that it could do was to enter an order allowing an amendment to the plan so that the proposed transaction could be consummated. Under this view, the Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule [200] outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect upon the instant situation.

We reject this contention, for it grows out of a misapprehension of our prior decision and of the Commission's statutory duties. We held no more and no less than that the Commission's first order was unsupportable for the reasons supplied by that agency. But when the case left this Court, the problem whether Federal's management should be treated equally with other preferred stockholders still lacked a final and complete answer. It was clear that the Commission could not give a negative answer by resort to prior judicial declarations. And it was also clear that the Commission was not bound by settled judicial precedents in a situation of this nature. 318 U.S. at 89. Still unsettled, however, was the answer the Commission might give were it to bring to bear on the facts the proper administrative and statutory considerations, a function which belongs exclusively to the Commission in the first instance. The administrative process had taken an erroneous rather than a final turn. Hence we carefully refrained from expressing any views as to the propriety of an order rooted in the proper and relevant considerations. See Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608, 613-614.

When the case was directed to be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate, it was with the thought that the Commission would give full effect to its duties in harmony with the views we had expressed. Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 364, 374; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 278. This obviously meant something more than the entry of a perfunctory order giving parity treatment to the management holdings of preferred stock. The fact that the Commission had committed a legal error in its first disposition of the case certainly gave Federal's [201] management no vested right to receive the benefits of such an order. See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145. After the remand was made, therefore, the Commission was bound to deal with the problem afresh, performing the function delegated to it by Congress. It was again charged with the duty of measuring the proposed treatment of the management's preferred stock holdings by relevant and proper standards. Only in that way could the legislative policies embodied in the Act be effectuated. Cf. Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219, 227-228.

The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the particular proposal before it. The Commission was asked to grant or deny effectiveness to a proposed amendment to Federal's reorganization plan whereby the management would be accorded parity treatment on its holdings. It could do that only in the form of an order, entered after a due consideration of the particular facts in light of the relevant and proper standards. That was true regardless of whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regulation. Indeed, if the Commission rightly felt that the proposed amendment was inconsistent with those standards, an order giving effect to the amendment merely because there was no general rule or regulation covering the matter would be unjustified.

It is true that our prior decision explicitly recognized the possibility that the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its statutory rule-making powers, in which case the issue for our consideration would have been entirely different from that which did confront us. 318 U.S. 92-93. But we did not mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from that agency to perform [202] its statutory duty in this case. To hold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceeding but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this nature, would be to stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do.

Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise. See Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.

In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or [203] the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421.

Hence we refuse to say that the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304. That such action might have a retroactive effect was not necessarily fatal to its validity. Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law. See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 620.

And so in this case, the fact that the Commission's order might retroactively prevent Federal's management from securing the profits and control which were the objects of the preferred stock purchases may well be outweighed by the dangers inherent in such purchases from the statutory standpoint. If that is true, the argument of retroactivity becomes nothing more than a claim that the Commission lacks power to enforce the standards of [204] the Act in this proceeding. Such a claim deserves rejection.

The problem in this case thus resolves itself into a determination of whether the Commission's action in denying effectiveness to the proposed amendment to the Federal reorganization plan can be justified on the basis upon which it clearly rests. As we have noted, the Commission avoided placing its sole reliance on inapplicable judicial precedents. Rather it has derived its conclusions from the particular facts in the case, its general experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of statutory requirements. It is those matters which are the guide for our review.

The Commission concluded that it could not find that the reorganization plan, if amended as proposed, would be "fair and equitable to the persons affected thereby" within the meaning of § 11 (e) of the Act, under which the reorganization was taking place. Its view was that the amended plan would involve the issuance of securities on terms "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors" contrary to §§ 7 (d) (6) and 7 (e), and would result in an "unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power" among the Federal security holders within the meaning of § 7(e). It was led to this result "not by proof that the interveners [Federal's management] committed acts of conscious wrongdoing but by the character of the conflicting interests created by the interveners' program of stock purchases carried out while plans for reorganization were under consideration."

The Commission noted that Federal's management controlled a large multi-state utility system and that its influence permeated down to the lowest tier of operating companies. The financial, operational and accounting policies of the parent and its subsidiaries were therefore under the management's strict control. The broad range of business judgments vested in Federal's management [205] multiplied opportunities for affecting the market price of Federal's outstanding securities and made the exercise of judgment on any matter a subject of greatest significance to investors. Added to these normal managerial powers, the Commission pointed out that a holding company management obtains special powers in the course of a voluntary reorganization under § 11 (e) of the Holding Company Act. The management represents the stockholders in such a reorganization, initiates the proceeding, draws up and files the plan, and can file amendments thereto at any time. These additional powers may introduce conflicts between the management's normal interests and its responsibilities to the various classes of stockholders which it represents in the reorganization. Moreover, because of its representative status, the management has special opportunities to obtain advance information of the attitude of the Commission.

Drawing upon its experience, the Commission indicated that all these normal and special powers of the holding company management during the course of a § 11(e) reorganization placed in the management's command "a formidable battery of devices that would enable it, if it should choose to use them selfishly, to affect in material degree the ultimate allocation of new securities among the various existing classes, to influence the market for its own gain, and to manipulate or obstruct the reorganization required by the mandate of the statute." In that setting, the Commission felt that a management program of stock purchase would give rise to the temptation and the opportunity to shape the reorganization proceeding so as to encourage public selling on the market at low prices. No management could engage in such a program without raising serious questions as to whether its personal interests had not opposed its duties "to exercise disinterested judgment in matters pertaining to subsidiaries' accounting, budgetary and dividend policies, to present [206] publicly an unprejudiced financial picture of the enterprise, and to effectuate a fair and feasible plan expeditiously."

The Commission further felt that its answer should be the same even where proof of intentional wrongdoing on the management's part is lacking. Assuming a conflict of interests, the Commission thought that the absence of actual misconduct is immaterial; injury to the public investors and to the corporation may result just as readily. "Questionable transactions may be explained away, and an abuse of investors and the administrative process may be perpetrated without evil intent, yet the injury will remain." Moreover, the Commission was of the view that the delays and the difficulties involved in probing the mental processes and personal integrity of corporate officials do not warrant any distinction on the basis of evil intent, the plain fact being "that an absence of unfairness or detriment in cases of this sort would be practically impossible to establish by proof."

Turning to the facts in this case, the Commission noted the salient fact that the primary object of Federal's management in buying the preferred stock was admittedly to obtain the voting power that was accruing to that stock through the reorganization and to profit from the investment therein. That stock had been purchased in the market at prices that were depressed in relation to what the management anticipated would be, and what in fact was, the earning and asset value of its reorganization equivalent. The Commission admitted that the good faith and personal integrity of this management were not in question; but as to the management's justification of its motives, the Commission concluded that it was merely trying to "deny that they made selfish use of their powers during the period when their conflict of interest, vis-a-vis public investors, was in existence owing to their purchase program." Federal's management had [207] thus placed itself in a position where it was "peculiarly susceptible to temptation to conduct the reorganization for personal gain rather than the public good" and where its desire to make advantageous purchases of stock could have an important influence, even though subconsciously, upon many of the decisions to be made in the course of the reorganization. Accordingly, the Commission felt that all of its general considerations of the problem were applicable to this case.

The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle adopted is none of our concern. See Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548. Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224.

We are unable to say in this case that the Commission erred in reaching the result it did. The facts being undisputed, we are free to disturb the Commission's conclusion only if it lacks any rational and statutory foundation. In that connection, the Commission has made a thorough examination of the problem, utilizing statutory standards and its own accumulated experience with reorganization matters. In essence, it has made what we indicated in our prior opinion would be an informed, expert judgment on the problem. It has taken into account "those more subtle factors in the marketing of utility company securities that gave rise to the very grave evils which the Public Utility Holding [Company] Act of 1935 was designed to correct" and has relied upon the fact that "Abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only by prohibitions [208] not concerned with the fairness of a particular transaction." 318 U.S. at 92.

Such factors may properly be considered by the Commission in determining whether to approve a plan of reorganization of a utility holding company, or an amendment to such a plan. The "fair and equitable" rule of § 11 (e) and the standard of what is "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers" under § 7 (d) (6) and § 7 (e) were inserted by the framers of the Act in order that the Commission might have broad powers to protect the various interests at stake. 318 U.S. at 90-91. The application of those criteria, whether in the form of a particular order or a general regulation, necessarily requires the use of informed discretion by the Commission. The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal of the Commission's judgment save where it has plainly abused its discretion in these matters. See United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225; I.C.C. v. Railway Labor Assn., 315 U.S. 373. Such an abuse is not present in this case.

The purchase by a holding company management of that company's securities during the course of a reorganization may well be thought to be so fraught with danger as to warrant a denial of the benefits and profits accruing to the management. The possibility that such a stock purchase program will result in detriment to the public investors is not a fanciful one. The influence that program may have upon the important decisions to be made by the management during reorganization is not inconsequential. Since the officers and directors occupy fiduciary positions during this period, their actions are to be held to a higher standard than that imposed upon the general investing public. There is thus a reasonable basis for a judgment that the benefits and profits accruing to the management from the stock purchases should be prohibited, regardless of the good faith involved. And [209] it is a judgment that can justifiably be reached in terms of fairness and equitableness, to the end that the interests of the public, the investors and the consumers might be protected. But it is a judgment based upon public policy, a judgment which Congress has indicated is of the type for the Commission to make.

The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 800. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurs in the result.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissent, but there is not now opportunity for a response adequate to the issues raised by the Court's opinion. These concern the rule of law in its application to the administrative process and the function of this Court in reviewing administrative action. Accordingly, the detailed grounds for dissent will be filed in due course.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.[2]

The Court by this present decision sustains the identical administrative order which only recently it held invalid. [210] S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80. As the Court correctly notes, the Commission has only "recast its rationale and reached the same result." (Par. 1.)[3] There being no change in the order, no additional evidence in the record and no amendment of relevant legislation, it is clear that there has been a shift in attitude between that of the controlling membership of the Court when the case was first here and that of those who have the power of decision on this second review.

I feel constrained to disagree with the reasoning offered to rationalize this shift. It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant, even where granted to him by Congress. It reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint. While the opinion does not have the adherence of a majority of the full Court, if its pronouncements should become governing principles they would, in practice, put most administrative orders over and above the law.

I.

The essential facts are few and are not in dispute.[4] This corporation filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a voluntary plan of reorganization. While the reorganization proceedings were pending sixteen officers and directors bought on the open market about 7 1/2% of the corporation's preferred stock. Both the Commission and the Court admit that these purchases were not forbidden by any law, judicial precedent, regulation or rule of the Commission. Nevertheless, the Commission has [211] ordered these individuals to surrender their shares to the corporation at cost, plus 4% interest, and the Court now approves that order.

It is helpful, before considering whether this order is authorized by law, to reflect on what it is and what it is not. It is not conceivably a discharge of the Commission's duty to determine whether a proposed plan of reorganization would be "fair and equitable." It has nothing to do with the corporate structure, or the classes and amounts of stock, or voting rights or dividend preferences. It does not remotely affect the impersonal financial or legal factors of the plan. It is a personal deprivation denying particular persons the right to continue to own their stock and to exercise its privileges. Other persons who bought at the same time and price in the open market would be allowed to keep and convert their stock. Thus, the order is in no sense an exercise of the function of control over the terms and relations of the corporate securities.

Neither is the order one merely to regulate the future use of property. It literally takes valuable property away from its lawful owners for the benefit of other private parties without full compensation and the Court expressly approves the taking. It says that the stock owned by these persons is denied conversion along with similar stock owned by others; "instead, it was to be surrendered at cost plus dividends accumulated since the purchase dates." (Par. 5.) It should be noted that this formula was subsequently altered to read "cost plus 4% interest." That this basis was less than its value is recognized, for the Court says "That stock had been purchased in the market at prices that were depressed in relation to what the management anticipated would be, and what in fact was, the earning and asset value of its reorganization equivalent." (Par. 24.) Admittedly, the value above cost, and interest on it, simply is taken from the owners, [212] without compensation. No such power has ever been confirmed in any administrative body.

It should also be noted that neither the Court nor the Commission purports to adjudge a forfeiture of this property as a consequence of sharp dealing or breach of trust. The Court says, "The Commission admitted that the good faith and personal integrity of this management were not in question;. . . ." (Par. 24.) And again, "It was frankly admitted that the management's purpose in buying the preferred stock was to protect its interest in the new company. It was also plain that there was no fraud or lack of disclosure in making these purchases." (Par. 4.)

II.

The reversal of the position of this Court is due to a fundamental change in prevailing philosophy. The basic assumption of the earlier opinion as therein stated was, "But before transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such standards. . . ." S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92-93. The basic assumption of the present opinion is stated thus: "The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the particular proposal before it." (Par. 13.) This puts in juxtaposition the two conflicting philosophies which produce opposite results in the same case and on the same facts. The difference between the first and the latest decision of the Court is thus simply the difference between holding that administrative orders must have a basis in law and a holding that absence of a legal basis is no ground on which courts may annul them.

As there admittedly is no law or regulation to support this order, we peruse the Court's opinion diligently to find [213] on what grounds it is now held that the Court of Appeals, on pain of being reversed for error, was required to stamp this order with its approval. We find but one. That is the principle of judicial deference to administrative experience. That argument is five times stressed in as many different contexts, and I quote just enough to identify the instances: "The Commission," it says, "has drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations." (Par. 9.) "Rather it has derived its conclusions from the particular facts in the case, its general experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of statutory requirements." (Par. 19.) "Drawing upon its experience, the Commission indicated . . .," etc. (Par. 22.) ".. . the Commission has made a thorough examination of the problem, utilizing statutory standards and its own accumulated experience with reorganization matters." (Par. 26.) And finally, of the order the Court says, "It is the product of administrative experience," etc. (Par. 29.)

What are we to make of this reiterated deference to "administrative experience" when in another context the Court says, "Hence, we refuse to say that the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct."? (Par. 17.) (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court's reasoning adds up to this: The Commission must be sustained because of its accumulated experience in solving a problem with which it had never before been confronted!

Of course, thus to uphold the Commission by professing to find that it has enunciated a "new standard of conduct" brings the Court squarely against the invalidity of retroactive law-making. But the Court does not falter. "That such action might have a retroactive effect [214] was not necessarily fatal to its validity." (Par. 17.) "But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles." (Par. 17.) Of course, if what these parties did really was condemned by "statutory design" or "legal and equitable principles," it could be stopped without resort to a new rule and there would be no retroactivity to condone. But if it had been the Court's view that some law already prohibited the purchases, it would hardly have been necessary three sentences earlier to hold that the Commission was not prohibited "from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct." (Par. 17.) (Emphasis supplied.)

I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, "The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it."

III.

But one does not need to comprehend the processes by which other minds reach a given result in order to estimate the practical consequences of their pronouncement upon judicial review of administrative orders.

If it is of no consequence that no rule of law be existent to support an administrative order, and the Court of Appeals is obliged to defer to administrative experience and to sustain a Commission's power merely because it has been asserted and exercised, of what use is it to print a record or briefs in the case, or to hear argument? Administrative experience always is present, at least to the degree that it is here, and would always dictate a like deference by this Court to an assertion of administrative power. Must the reviewing court, as this Court does in this opinion, support the order on a presumptive or imputed experience even though the Court is obliged to discredit such experience in the very same opinion? Is [215] fictitious experience to be conclusive in matters of law and particularly in the interpretation of statutes, as the Court's opinion now intimates, or just in fact finding which has been the function which the Court has heretofore sustained upon the argument of administrative experience?

I suggest that administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point — it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law. And what action is, and what is not, within the law must be determined by courts, when authorized to review, no matter how much deference is due to the agency's fact finding. Surely an administrative agency is not a law unto itself, but the Court does not really face up to the fact that this is the justification it is offering for sustaining the Commission action.

Even if the Commission had, as the Court says, utilized this case to announce a new legal standard of conduct, there would be hurdles to be cleared, but we need not dwell on them now. Because to promulgate a general rule of law, either by regulation or by case law, is something the Commission expressly declined to do. It did not previously promulgate, and it does not by this order profess to promulgate, any rule or regulation to prohibit such purchases absolutely or under stated conditions. On the other hand, its position is that no such rule or standard would be fair and equitable in all cases.[5]

[216] IV.

Whether, as matter of policy, corporate managers during reorganization should be prohibited from buying or selling its stock, is not a question for us to decide. But it is for us to decide whether, so long as no law or regulation prohibits them from buying, their purchases may be forfeited, or not, in the discretion of the Commission. If such a power exists in words of the statute or in their implication, it would be possible to point it out and thus end the case. Instead, the Court admits that there was no law prohibiting these purchases when they were made, or at any time thereafter. And, except for this decision, there is none now.

The truth is that in this decision the Court approves the Commission's assertion of power to govern the matter without law, power to force surrender of stock so purchased whenever it will, and power also to overlook such acquisitions if it so chooses. The reasons which will lead it to take one course as against the other remain locked in its own breast, and it has not and apparently does not intend to commit them to any rule or regulation. This administrative authoritarianism, this power to decide without law, is what the Court seems to approve in so many words: "The absence of a general rule or regulation [217] governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission's duties. . . ." (Par. 13). This seems to me to undervalue and to belittle the place of law, even in the system of administrative justice. It calls to mind Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement that "Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable."[6]

V.

The Court's averment concerning this order, that "It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process," (Par. 29) is the first instance in which the administrative process is sustained by reliance on that disregard of law which enemies of the process have always alleged to be its principal evil. It is the first encouragement this Court has given to conscious lawlessness as a permissible rule of administrative action. This decision is an ominous one to those who believe that men should be governed by laws that they may ascertain and abide by, and which will guide the action of those in authority as well as of those who are subject to authority.[7]

I have long urged, and still believe, that the administrative process deserves fostering in our system as an expeditious and nontechnical method of applying law in specialized [218] fields.[8] I can not agree that it be used, and I think its continued effectiveness is endangered when it is used, as a method of dispensing with law in those fields.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins in this opinion.

[1] Together with No. 82, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Federal Water & Gas Corp., also on certiorari to the same Court.

[2] Filed October 6, 1947.

[3] For convenience of reference, I have numbered consecutively the paragraphs of the Court's opinion, and cite quotations accordingly.

[4] The facts and the law of the case generally are fully set forth in the first opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Groner of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Commission's order (75 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 128 F.2d 303) and in his second opinion (80 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 154 F.2d 6) again reversing the Commission's order after it had "recast its rationale."

[5] The Commission, speaking of such a rule, appends the following note to its opinion:

"Without flexibility the rule might itself operate unfairly. Limitation to cost appears appropriate here, but would be inappropriate in a case where the cost of the security purchased was in excess of its reorganization value, and in some instances cash payment by the company would not be feasible. In addition, special treatment of any sort might be inappropriate for incidental purchases not made as part of a program in contemplation of reorganization benefits. In this connection, we wish to emphasize that our concern here is not primarily with the normal corporate powers which make it possible for officers and directors to influence the market for their own gain, in the absence of reorganization, by a choice of dividend policies, accounting practices, published reports, and the like. The questions of fairness and detriment here presented arise before us in the context of a capital readjustment. At that point our scrutiny is called for, and that our scrutiny is to be vigilant cannot be doubted. See Appendix to Sen. Rep. No. 621 (74th Cong., 1st Sess.) on S. 2796, at p. 58, quoted supra."

[6] The Growth of the Law, p. 3.

[7] On the same day, the Court denied its own authority to recognize and enforce, without Congressional action, an unlegislated liability much less novel than the one imposed here, and that in the field of tort law which traditionally has developed by decisional rather than by legislative process. The result is to confirm in an executive agency a discretion to act outside of established law that goes beyond any judicial discretion as well as beyond any legislative delegation. Compare United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301.

[8] See statement before House of Delegates, American Bar Association, 1939. (1939 Proceedings, House of Delegates, XXV A.B.A. Journal 95.) Also see Report as Attorney General to president Roosevelt recommending veto of Walter-Logan Bill — made part of veto message, Vol. 86, Part 12, Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 3d Session, p. 13943.

13.4 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 13.4 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY, DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INC.

No. 72-1598.

Argued January 14, 1974

Decided April 23, 1974

*268Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 295.

Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, and Linda Sher.

Richard E. Moot argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents two questions: -first, whether the National Labor Relations Board properly determined *269that all “managerial employees/’ except those whose participation in a labor organization would create a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities, are covered by the National Labor Relations Act;1 and second, whether the Board must proceed by rulemaking rather than by adjudication in determining whether certain buyers are “managerial employees.” We answer both questions in the negative.

I

Respondent Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc. (company), operates a plant in Wheatfield, New York, where it is engaged in research and development in the design and fabrication of aerospace products. On July 30, 1970, Amalgamated Local No. 1286 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (union) petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (Board) for a representation election to determine whether the union would be certified as the bargaining representative of the 25 buyers in the purchasing and procurement department at the company’s plant. The company opposed the petition on the ground that the buyers were “managerial’ employees” and thus were not covered by the Act.

The relevant facts adduced at the representation hearing are as follows. The purchasing and procurement department receives requisition orders from other departments at the plant and is responsible for purchasing all of the company’s needs from outside suppliers. Some items are standardized and may be purchased “off the' shelf” from various distributors .and suppliers. Other items must be made to the company’s specifications, and the requisition orders may be accompanied by detailed blueprints and other technical plans. Requisitions often designate a particular vendor, and in some instances the *270buyer must obtain approval before selecting a different one. Where no vendor is specified, the buyer is free to choose-one.

Absent specific instructions to the 'contrary, buyers have full- discretion, without any dollar limit, to select' prospective, vendors, draft invitations to bid, evaluate submitted bids, negotiate price and terms, and prepare purchase orders. Buyers execute all purchase orders up to $50,000, They may place or cancel orders of less than $5,000 on their own signature. ’ On commitments in excess of $5,000, buyers must' obtain the approval of a superior, with higher levels of approval required as the purchase cost increases. For the Minute Man missile project, which represents 70% of the company’s sales, purchase decisions are made by a team of personnel from the engineering, quality assurance, finance, and manufacturing departments. The buyer serves as team chairman and signs the purchase order, but a representative from the pricing and negotiation department participates in working out the terms.

After the representation hearing, the Regional Director transferred the case to the Board. On. May 20, .1971, the Board issued its decision holding that the company’s buyers constituted an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining and directing an election. 190 N. L. R. B. 431. Relying on its recent decision in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 185 N. L. R. B. 550 (1970), the Board first stated that even though the company’s buyers might be “managerial employees,” 2 they *271were nevertheless covered by the Act and entitled to its protections^ The Board then rejected the company’s alternative contention that representation should be denied because the buyers’ authority to commit the company’s credit/ select vendors, and negotiate purchase prices would create a potential conflict of interest between the buyers as union members and the company. In essence, the company argued that buyers would be more receptive to bids from union contractors and would klso influence “make or buy” decisions in favor of “make,” thus creating additional work for sister unions in the plant. The Board thought, however, that-any possible conflict was “unsupported conjecture” since the buyérs’ “.discretion and latitude for independent action* must take place within the confines of the general directions which the Employer has established” and that “any possible temptation to allow sympathy for sister unions to influence such decisions could effectively be controlled by the Employer.” 190 N. L. R. B., at 431.

On June 16, 1971, a representation election was conducted in which 15 of the buyers voted for the union and nine against. On August 12, the Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company’s buyers. That same day, ■ however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of another Board order in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602, and held that “managerial employees” were not covered by the Act and were therefore not entitled to its protections.3 Ia., at 610.

Encouraged by the Eighth Circuit’s decision, r,he company moved the Board for reconsideration of its earlier *272order. The Board denied the motion, 196 N. L. R. B. 827 (1972), stating that it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and. would adhere to its'own decision in North Arkansas'. In the. Board’s view, Congress intended to excludé from the Act only those “managerial employees” associated with the “formulation and implementation of labor relations policies.” Id., at 828. In each case, the “fundamental touchstone” was “whether the duties and responsibilities of any managerial employee or group of managerial employees do or do not include determinations which should be made free of any conflict of interest which could arise if the person involved was a participating member of a labor organization.” Ibid. Turning to the present case, the Board reiterated,its prior finding that the company had not shown that union organization of its buyers would create a conflict of interest in labor relations.

The company stood by its contention that the buyers, as “managerial employees,” were not covered by the Act and refused to bargain .with the union. An unfair labor practice complaint resulted in a Board finding that the company had violated §§ 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1), and an order compelling the company to bargain with the union. 197 N. L. R. B. 209 (1972). Subsequently, the company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second .Circuit for review" of the order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement:

The Court of Appeals denied enforcement. 475 F. 2d 485 (1973). After reviewing the legislative history'of the. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and the Board’s decisions in this area, the court concluded that Congress had intended to exclude all true “managerial employees” from the protection of the Act. . It explained *273that this “exclusion embraced not only an employee ‘so closely related to or aligned with management as to pla,ce the employee in a position of conflict of interest between his employer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the other’ but also one who is ‘formulating, determining and effectuating his employer’s policies or has discretion, independent of an employer’s established policy, in the performance of his duties,’ Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 37, 41 (7 Cir. 1969).” 475 F. 2d, at 494. The court added, however, that “the Board would [not] be precluded, on proper proceedings, from determining that buyers, or some types of buyers, are not true ‘managerial employees’ and consequently come within the protection of § 8 (a)(5) and (1).” Ibid.

Turning to the merits of the present case, the court acknowledged that there was substantial evidence that the company’s buyers were not sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy to constitute true “managerial employees.” Nevertheless, the court denied enforcement for two reasons. First, it was not certain that the Board’s decision rested on a factual determination that these buyers' were not true “managerial employees” rather than .on “its new, and in our view, erroneous holding that it- was free to regard all managerial employees as covered by the Act unless their duties met” the conflict-of-interest touchstone. Id., a.t .494-495. Second, although the Board was not precluded from holding that buyers, or softie types of buyers, were not “managerial employees,” the court thought that, in view of the Board’s long line of cases holding the contrary, it could not accomplish this change of position by adjudication. Rather, the Board should conduct a rulemaking proceeding in, conformity with § 6 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 156.1 The court therefore remanded the case to the Board for such a proceeding.

*274We granted the. Board’s petition for certiorari. 414 U. S. 816.

II

We begin with the question whether all “managerial employees,” rather than just those in positions susceptible to. conflicts of interest in labor relations, are excluded from the protections of the Act.4 The Board’s early decisions, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and subsequent Board and court decisions provide the necessary guidance for our inquiry. In examining these authorities, we draw on several established principles of statutory construction. In addition to the importance of legislative history, a court may *275accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration.5 This is especially so where Congress has re-enacted the statute without pertinent change.6 In these circumstances, congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.7 We have also recognized that subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier, statute is entitled to significant weight.8 Application of these principles-leads us to conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly classified as “managerial.”

A

The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, did not expressly mention the term “managerial employee.” After the Act’s passage, however, the Board developed the concept of “managerial employee” in a series of cases involving the appropriateness'of bargaining units. The first cases established that “managerial employees” were not to be included in a unit with rank-and-file employees. In *276Freiz & Sons, 47 N. L. R. B. 43, 47 (1943), for example, the Board excluded expediters from a proposed ■ unit of production and maintenance workers because they were “closely related to the management.” Similarly, in Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N. L. R. B. 1491, 1498 (1944), expediters were again excluded from a unit containing office, technical, clerical, and professional employees because “the authority possessed by [the expediters] to exercise their discretion in making commitments on behalf of the Company stamps them as. managerial.” This rationale was soon applied to buyers. See, e. g., Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 509, 512 (1944); Vulcan Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 733, 736 (1944); Barrett Division, Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N. L. R. B. 903, 905 (1946); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N L. R. B. 1242, 1245-1246 (1946). The Board summarized its policy on “managerial employees” in Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317, 1322 (1946):

“We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies. These employees we have considered and still deem to be ‘managerial/ in that they express and make operative the decisions of management.”

Whether the Board regarded all “managerial employees” as entirely outside the protection of the Act, as well as inappropriate for inclusion in a rank-and-file bargaining unit, is less certain. To be sure, at no time did the Board certify even a separate unit of “managerial employees” or state that such was possible. The Board was cautious, however, in determining which employees were “managerial.” For example, in Dravo Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 1174, 1177 (1944), the Board excluded buyers and expediters' from a unit of office and clerical em*277ployees, but reserved the question whether all such employees were to be considered “managerial”:

“This is not to say, however, that buyers and expediters are to be denied the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining under the Act. The precise relationship of the buyers and expediters to management here is not now being determined by us.”

- During this period the Board’s policy with respect to the related but narrower category of “supervisory employees” manifested a progressive uncertainty. The Board first excluded supervisors from units of rank-and-file employees, e. g., Mueller Brass Co., 39 N. L. R. B. 167, 171 (1942), but in Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N. L. R. B. 961, supplemental decision, 44 N. L. R. B. 165. (1942), it certified a separate unit composed of supervisors who were to be represented by an independent union. Shortly thereafter, in Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 874 (1942), the Board approved a unit of supervisors whose union was affiliated with a union of rank-and-file employees. This trend was soon halted, however, by Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943), where the Board held that supervisors, although literally “employees” under the Act, could not be organized in any unit. And in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N. L. R. B. 626, 628-629 (1945), the Board further held that timestudy men, whose “ ‘interests and functions’ ” were “ ‘sufficiently akin to those of management,’ ” should neither be included in a unit with other-employees, nor be established as a separate unit.”

Maryland Drydock, supra, was subsequently overruled in Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4, 64 N. L. R. B. 1212 (1945), where the Board held that foremen could constitute an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. The Board’s position was upheld 5^1 by this Court in *278Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947). In view of the subsequent legislative reversal of the Packard decision, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas is especially pertinent. Id., at 493. He stated:

“The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line between .management and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating'group , on
the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these two groups. The struggle for control or . power between ■management and labor becomes secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership.
“I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the basic policy questions which underlie the present decision. For if foremen are ‘employees’ within-the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents — -indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the president; all who are commonly• referred to as the management, with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see how we could deny it and yet allow the present application. But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in warring camps.
“[I]f Congress, when it enacted the National Labor *279Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none.” Id., at 494-495.

Mr. Justice Douglas also noted that the Wagner Act was intended to protect “laborers” and “workers” whose right to organize and bargain collectively had not been recognized by industry, resulting in strikes, strife, and unrest. By contrast, there was no similar history with respect to foremen, managers, superintendents, or vice presidents. Id., at 496-497. Furthermdre, other legislation indicated that where Congress desired to include managerial or supervisory personnel in the category of employees, it did so expressly. See, e. g., Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 151; Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq.; Social Security Act, § 1101, 49 Stat. 647.

B

The Packard decision was a major factor in bringing about the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136. The House bill, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. ’ (1947),9 providéd for the exclusion of *280“supervisors,” a. category broadly defined to include any individual who had authority to hire, transfer, promote, discharge, reward, or discipline other employees or effectively to recommend such action. It also excluded (i) those who had authority to determine or effectively recommend the amount of wages earned by other employees; (ii) those employed in labor relations, personnel, and employment departments, as well as police and time-study personnel; and (iii) confidential employees. The Senate version of the bill, S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),10 also excluded supervisors, but defined that category more narrowly than the House version, distinguishing between “straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine management *281prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such action.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1947). It was the Senate’s view that employees such as “straw bosses,” who had only minor supervisory duties, should be included within the Act’s protections.

Significantly, both the House Report and the Senate Report voiced concern over the Board’s broad reading of the term “employee” to include those clearly within the managerial hierarchy. Focusing on Mr. Justice Douglas’- dissent in Packard, the Senate Report specifically mentioned that even, vice presidents might be unionized under the Board’s decision. Ibid. It also noted that unionization of supervisors had hurt productivity, increased the accident rate, upset the balance of power in collective bargaining, and tended to blur the line between management and labor. Id., at 4^5. The House Report echoed the concern for reduction of industrial output and noted that unionization of supervisors had deprived employers of the loyal representations to which they were entitled.11 And in criticizing the *282Board’s expansive reading of the Act’s definition of the term “employees,” the House Report noted that “[w]hferu. Congress passed the Labor Act, we were concerned,' as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of ‘workers’ and ‘wage earners,’ not of the boss.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1947).

The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version of' the bill. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1947). The House Managers’ statement in explanation of the Conference, Committee Report stated:

“The conference agreement, in the definition of ‘supervisor,’ limits such term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the case of persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the House bill, since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as outside the scope of the aet. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect. The conference agreement does not treat time-study personnel or guards as supervisors, as did the House bill. Since, however, time-study employees may qualify as professional personnel, the special provisions of the Senate amendment . . . applicable with respect to professional employees will cover many of this category. In the case of guards, the conference agreement does not permit the *283certification of a labor organization as the bargaining representative of guards if it admits to membership, or is affiliated with any organization that admits to membership, employees other than guards.” Id., at 35-36.

The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 may be summarized as follows. The House wanted to include certain persons within the definition of “supervisors,” such as straw bosses, whom the Senate believed should be protected by the Act. As to these persons, the Senate’s view prevailed. There were other persons, however, who both the House and the Senate believed were plainly outside the Act. The House wanted to make the exclusion of certain of these persons explicit. In the conference agreement, representatives from both the House and the Senate agreed that a specific provision was unnecessary since the Board had long regarded such persons as outside the Act. Among those mentioned as impliedly excluded were persons working in “labor relations, personnel and empldyment departments,” and “confidential employees.” But assuredly this did not exhaust the universe of such excluded persons. The legislative history strongly suggests that there also were other employees, much higher in the managerial structure, who were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the" Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary. For example, in its discussion of confidential employees, the House Report noted that “[m]ost of the people who would qualify as ‘confidential’ employees are executives and are excluded from the act in any event.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, p. 23 (emphasis added).12 We think *284the inference is plain that “managerial employees” were ■paramount among this impliedly excluded group. The Court of Appeals in the instant case put the issue well:

“Congress recognized there were other persons so much more clearly ‘managerial’ that it was inconceivable that the Board would treat them as employees. Surely Congress could not have supposed that, while ‘confidential secretaries’ could not be organized, their bosses could be. In other words, Congress failed to enact the portion of Mr. Justice Douglas’ Packard dissent relating to the organization of executives, not because it disagreed but because it deemed this unnecessary.” 475 F. 2d, at 491-492.13 (Footnote omitted.)

*285c

Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board itself adhered to the view that “managerial employees” were outside the Act. In Denver Dry Goods, 74 N. L. R. B. 1167, 1175 (1947), assistant buyers, who *286were required to set good sales records as examples to sales employees, to assist buyers in the selection of merchandise, and to assume the buyer’s duties when the latter was not present, were excluded by the Board on the ground that “the. interests of these employees are more closely identified with those of management.” The Board reiterated this reading of the Act in Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N. L. R. B. 320, 323 n. 4 (1947):

“The determination of ‘managerial,’ like the determination of ‘supervisory,’ is to some extent necessarily a matter of the degree of authority exercised. We have in the past, and before the passage of the recent amendments to the Act, recognized and defined as' ‘managerial’ employees, executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of their employer, and have excluded such managerial employees from bargaining units. We believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the continuance of this practice.” (Citations omitted.)

Buyers and assistant buyers were again excluded in Denton’s, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 35-37 (1949), because their “interests . . . are more-closely identified, with management . . •. .” And in American Locomotive Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 115, 116-117 (1950), the Board held that buyers could neither be included, in a unit of office and clerical employees nor placed in a separate unit, stating-:

“The Employer maintains that the buyers are representatives of management. As it appears that the buyers are authorized to make substantial purchases for the Employer, we find that they aie representatives of management, and as such may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act.”

Buyers, who were authorized to bind the employer without prior approval, were also excluded from a unit in *287Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N. L. R. B. 458, 464 (1953), Because “they are representatives of management and as such may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act.”

Finally, in Swift & Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 752, 753-754 (1956), the Board reaffirmed its long-held understanding of the scope of the Act. In refusing to approve a unit of procurement drivers who were found to be representative of management, the Board declared:.

“It was the clear' intent of Congress to" exclude from the coverage of-the Act all individuals allied with management. Such individuals' cannot be deemed to be employees for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, we reaffirm the Board’s position that .representatives of management may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act (Footnotes omitted.)

Until its decision in- North Arkansas in 1970, the Board consistently followed this reading of the Act.14 It never *288certified any unit of “managerial employees,” separate or otherwise, and repeatedly stated that it was Congress’ intent that such employees not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act. And it was this reading which was permitted to stand when Congress again amended the Act in 1959. 73 Stat. 519.

The Board’s exclusion of “managerial employees” defined as those who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer,” 15 has also been approved by courts without exception. See, e. g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F. 2d 1151, 1158 (CA7), cert, denied, 400 Ü. S. 831 (1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA7 1969) ; Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 727, 730 (CA2), cert, denied, 396 U. S. 902 (1969); Retail Clerks International Assn. v. NLRB, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 63, 65-66, 366 F. 2d 642, 644-645 (1966) (Burger, J.), cert, denied, 386 U. S. 1017 (1967); 16 International Ladies’ *289Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 339 F. 2d 116, 123 (CA2 1964) (Marshall, J.).17 And in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602 (1971), the Eighth Circuit r ^viewed the history of the Act and specifically disapproved the Board’s departure from its earlier position.

D

In sum, the Board’s early decisions, the purpose and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act- of 1947, the Board’s subsequent and consistent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions of the courts of appeals all point unmistakably to the conclusion that “managerial employees” are not covered by the Act.18 We agree with the Court of Appeals below that the Board “is not now free” to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act. 475 F. 2d, at 494.

In view of our conclusion, the case must be remanded to permit the Board to apply the proper legal standard *290in determining the status of these buyers.19 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 85 (1943); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S. 233, 249 (1972). We express no opinion as to whether these buyers fall within the category of “managerial employees.” 20

III

The Court of Appeals also held that, although the Board was not precluded from determining that buyers or some types of buyers were not “managerial employees,” it could do so only by invoking its rulemaking procedures under § 6 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 156.21 We disagree.

*291At the outset, the precise nature of the present issue must be noted. The question is not whether the Board should have resorted to rulemaking, or in fact improperly-promulgated a “rule,” when in the context of the prior representation proceeding it held that the Act covers all “managerial employees” except those meeting the new “conflict of interest in labor relations” touchstone. Our conclusion that the Board applied the wrong legal standard makes consideration of that issue unnecessary. Rather, the present question is whether on remand the Board must invoke its rulemaking procedures if it deter*292mines, in light of our opinion, that these buyers are not “managerial employees”' under the Act. The Court of Appeals thought that rulemaking was reqfiired-because any Board finding that the company’s buyers are not “managerial” would be contrary to its prior decisions22 and would presumably be in the nature of a general rule designed “to fit all cases at all times.”

A similar issue was presented to this Court in its second decision in SEC v. Chenery Cory., 332 U. S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II).23 There, the respondent corporation argued that in an adjudicative proceeding the Commission could not apply a general standard that it had formulated for the first time-in that proceeding. Rather, the Commission was required tó resort instead to its rulemaking procedures if it desired to promulgate a new standard that would govern future conduct. In rejecting this contention, the Court first noted that the Commission had a statutory duty to decide the issue at hand in light of the proper standards and that this duty remained “regardless of whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regulation.” Id., at 201. The Court continued:

“The function of filling in the interstices of the [Securities] Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules, to be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which *293arise. . . . Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold.of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.
“In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.” Id., at 202-203. (Emphasis added.)

The Court concluded that “the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the. administrative agency.” Id., at 203.

And in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969), the Court upheld a Board order enforcing an election list requirement first promulgated in an earlier adjudicative proceeding in Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N. L. R. B. 1236 (1966). The plurality opinion of Mr. *294Justice Fortas, joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White, recognized that “[adjudicated cases may and do . . . serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein,” and that such cases “generally provide a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future cases.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, at 765-766. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall, also noted that the Board had both adjudicative and rulemaking powers and that the' choice between the two was “within its informed discretion.” Id., at 772.

The views expressed in Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon make plain that the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s discretion. Although there may be situations where the Board’s reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act, nothing in the present case would justify such a conclusion. ' Indeed, there is ample indication that adjudication is especially appropriate in the instant context. As the Court of Appeals noted, “[t]here must be tens of thousands of manufacturing, wholesale and retail units which employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter.” 475 F. 2d, at 496. Moreover, duties of buyers vary widely depending on the company or industry. It is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed which would have more than marginal utility. The Board thus has reason to proceed with caution, developing its standards in a case-by-case manner with attention to the specific character of the buyers’ authority and duties in eg'ch compapy.- The Board’s judgment that-adjudication best serves this purpose is entitled to great weight.

*295The possible reliance of industry on the Board’s past decisions with respect to buyers does not require a different result. It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing from such reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the issue in an adjudicative proceeding. Furthermore, this is not a case in which some new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions which were taken' in good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements. Nor are fines or damages involved here. In any event, concern about such consequences is largely speculative, for the Board has not yet finally determined whether these buyers are “managerial.”

It is true, of course, that rulemaking would provide the Board with a forum for soliciting the informed views of those affected in industry and labor before embarking on a new course. But surely the Board has discretion to decide that the adjudicative procedures in this case may also produce the relevant information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues. Those most immediately affected, the buyers and the company in the particular case, are accorded a full opportunity to be heard before the Board makes its determination.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings' in conformity with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting in part.

I concur in Part III of the Court’s opinion insofar as it holds that the Board was not required to resort to rule-making in deciding this case, but I dissent from its hold*296ing in Part II that managerial employees, as a class are not “employees” within the .meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.

Section 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, provides that “[ejmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing____” Section 8(a)(1),-29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice to interfere with the rights guaranteed in § 7, and under §8 (a)(5), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (5),"it is an unfair practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives- of his “employees.” For the purposes of the foregoing sections, the term “employée” as defined in § 2 (3) of the Act, means “any employee” of the employer,

“but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . ?’ 29 . U. S. C. § 152 (3).

The issue in this case is whether the term “employee” excludes not only those specifically excluded by § 2 but also the broad category of “managerial” employees who, although literally “employees” of the employer and not expressly excluded by § 2, are nevertheless not to be considered employees for the purposes of the Act because they make , and implement managerial policies. The Court holds that no managerial employee is an. employee for the'purposes of the Act. I cannot agrén with' this conclusion. ■

*297The Act is very plain on its face — “any employee,” with specified exclusions, is entitled to the benefits of the Act. Each of the exclusions is a narrow and precisely defined class, and none of them mentions managerial . employees. “Supervisors” are excluded, but a precise definition of that class, much narrower than the. class of managerial employees, is provided in §2 (11):

“any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,,. or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend -such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11).

Without more, it could not be concluded that Congress meant to exclude a whole category of employees in addition to those expressly excepted in § 2 (3). To infer that all managerial employees are not employees for purposes of the Act because a specified managerial subgroup, supervisors, was expressly excluded, is unwarranted, at least where Congress was careful to define precisely what employees were within the scope of the - supervisory exclusion.

What is morei Congress in § 2 (12), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12), has defined a special subclass of professional employees having special skills and duties “involving -the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in” the performance of their work. These employees are obviously “employees” for fhe purposes of the. Act; and in § 9, 29 U. S. C. § 159, after investing the Board with the powers necessary to decide- the units appropriate for collective bargaining, it is provided *298that the Board shall not hold any bargaining unit to be appropriate “if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit.” It is apparent, it seems to me, that there are many professional employees who would qualify as managerial employees; yet the Act clearly treats them as employees for purposes of the Act and Congress assumed they would have full organizational and bargaining rights unless it was provided otherwise in accordance with congressional desires. Hence § 9 (b).

Insofar as the face of the Act is concerned, and as compared with an across-the-board exclusion of “managerial” employees, the present ruling of the Board,, which excludes only those managerial employees whose work may involve them in a conflict of interest if they are permitted, to bargain collectively, is a far narrower exclusion adhering much more.closely to the rationale of the supervisory exclusion and to the apparent intent' of Congress. The Court nevertheless not only holds that the term employee may be construed to exclude managerial employees but also that it must be so construed. No narrower exclusion, it is said, in addition to those expressly provided for,, will satisfy the Act.

Although it would appear to be a difficult and questionable feat to rewrite the statute so substantially, the Court purports to find license for its result in the legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the Act, read in the light of previous and subsequent Board and court decisions. It is true that the exclusion of supervisors from the definition of employees first occurred in 1947, but, with all respect, I find no basis in the history of these amendments, read in the light of prior Board cases, for concluding that Congress intended to exclude all *299managerial employees, in addition to supervisors, from the benefits of the Act.

As I understand its decisions, the Board at no time prior to 1947 completely excluded the broad category of managerial, employees from the class of employees protected by the Act. The Court concedes that the Board’s cases during this period involved only the exclusion of managerial employees from bargaining units of rank-and-file workers. Some of the Board’s statements may have been ambiguous, but no Board case held or had occasion to hold that managerial employees as a group would riot be protected by the Act. As the Court acknowledges, the Board, in one decision excluding buyers and expediters from a unit of office and clerical employees, pointedly expressed the caveat that “[t]his is not to say, however, that buyers and expediters are to be denied the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining under the Act.” Dravo Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 1174, 1177 (1944). In Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 509, 512 (1944), where the Board excluded buyers from a bargaining unit of office and clerical employees, the reason given for the exclusion was “that their duties are closely allied to management, differing materially from those of the other clerical employees.” And in Vulcan Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 733, 736 (1944), the Board excluded a buyer from a production and maintenance employees’ unit, not because a managerial employee could not be accorded bargaining rights, but “[b]ecause of the responsibility of his position and his peculiar relationship to management, and in view of the fact that his interests are apparently different from those of the production and maintenance employees.” This line of Board decisions addressed the question whether certain managerial employees had sufficient community of interest with rankr-arid-file employees to be included in the“same bargaining unit with them, and the Board was exercising its power to designate *300appropriate bargaining units under §9. It is clear that the Board at no time held managerial employees to be outside the scope of the Act during the period prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments.

The Board’s position with respect to supervisors, as a class, vacillated during this time, the Board first excluding supervisors from rank-and-file units but recognizing units confined to supervisory employees, then refusing to recognize any bargaining units of supervisors and finally returning to its earlier rule. But even when the Board determined for a short period that supervisors should not be permitted to organize either with other employees or in separate units, it never went as far as to hold supervisors not to be “employees” under the Act. This was the Court’s understanding of the Board’s position in Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 n. 3 (1947), the very case which prompted the 80th Congress to go further than the Board had ever gone and exclude supervisors entirely from the- category of employees accorded bargaining rights under the Act.1 In Maryland, Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733, 738, 740 (1943), the Board was “no longer convinced that, from the mere determina*301tion that a supervisor is an employee it follows that supervisors may constitute appropriate bargaining units” because “the benefits which supervisory employees might achieve through being certified as collective-bargaining units would be outweighed not only by the dangers inherent in the commingling of management and employee functions, but also in its possible restrictive effect upon the organizational freedom of rank and file employees.” Shortly thereafter, the Board, faced with a claim by the employer that foremen are not employees within the meaning of the Act, did not address this possible ground of decision but held instead that it was “not- persuaded that the factors militating against the establishment of units of supervisory employees, set forth in . . . the Maryland Drydock case, are obviated by the circumstance that the union seeking to represent such employees is an independent, unaffiliated union.” General Motors Corp., 51 N. L. R. B. 457, 460 (1943). Moreover, the Board held in Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N. L. R. B. 348 (1944), that while a bargaining unit of supervisory employees might not be appropriate, a supervisor, like other employees, was nonetheless protected- against an unfair labor practice: “We conclude that supervisors are .‘employees’ and that supervisory status does not by its’ own force remove an employee from the protection of Section 8 (1) and (3)” of the Act. Id., at 353. Ultimately, in the Packard cases, 61 N. L. R. B. 4, 64 N. L. R. B. 1212 (1945), the Board reverted to its earlier rule that bargaining units of supervisors were entitled to recognition under the Act as long as they included no ránk-and-file. members.

When Congress undertook to amend the Act following this Court’s decision in' Packard upholding the Board’s inclusion of supervisprs as employees under the Act, it was acting in .light of a renewed Board policy to *302permit supervisory employees to organize in separate units under the mantle of the Act’s protection, an' enduring Board policy not. to exclude supervisors from the statutory definition of employees, and a further policy which excluded managerial employees from rank-and-file units but had never denied them the right to establish separate bargaining units or placed them outside the Act’s definition of “employee.” The amendments adopted by Congress in 1947 in light of this pattern of Board practice clearly intended to do away with the Packard decision approving the Board’s authority to grant recognition to unions of supervisors. The House and the Senate both proposed to exclude supervisors from the individuals defined as employees for purposes of the Act.' The Senate definition of “supervisor” was limited to individuals with authority, in the employer’s interest, to take or recommend action involving the employment of other employees, if the exercise of such authority required the use of independent judgment, S. 1129 §2(11).. But the proposed House definition would also have identified as excluded “supervisors” (a) those who could determine or effectively recommend the wages to be paid other employees, (b) employees with responsibility in the area of labor relations, personnel, employment; police, or time-study matters, and (c) confidential employees, H. R. 3020 § 2 (12). Neither of these proposals sought to exclude in express terms the entire category of “managerial employees,” i. e., those who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies beyond the area of labor relations, whether by defining such persons as “supervisors” or by proposing a separate exclusion for “managerial employees.” Such a step could easily have been taken had Congress intended to exclude these individuals from the protection of the Act. But it was not, despite the fact that the Board had recently considered whether *303certain employees should be denied organizational rights, either because they were supervisory or, separately, because their job responsibilities involved the exercise of managerial discretion. See, e. g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317, 1322 (1946); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N. L. R. B. 1242 (1946). One would expect that if Congress had intended to eliminate the Board’s authority to accord bargaining rights to managerial employees, as well as supervisors, it would have said so, particularly as Board practice had treated these two categories separately and differently.

The Court would fill this gap by referring to the House Managers’ statement accompanying the Conference Committee Report and explaining the adoption of the narrower. Senate definition of excluded “supervisors.” This report is indeed instructive, but it indicates even mere-clearly, in my opinion, that Congress did not contemplate the exclusion of managerial employees from the coverage of the Act:

“The conference agreement, in the definition of ‘supervisor,’ limits such term to those individuals ■treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the'case of persons working'in labor relatiois, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as vías done in the House bill, since the Board has treat 3d, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as' outside the scope of the act. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to such people as confidential employees as well, and it was not the intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect. The conference agreement does not treat time-study personnel or guards as supervisors, -as did the House bill. jSince, however, time-study employees may qualify as professional personnel, *304the special provisions of the Senate- amendment . . . applicable with respect to professional employees will' cover many in this category; In the case .of guards, the conference agreement does not permit-the certification of a labor organization as the. bargaining representative-of guards if it admits to membership, of is affiliated with any organization that admits io membership, employees other than guards. The provision dealing with the certification of bargaining units for guards is dealt with in section 9 (b) of the conference agreement....” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35-36 (1947).

The Court emphasizes that the statutory language adopted in the 1947 amendments did not expressly exclude persons working 'in labor relations, personnel, or employment departments, or confidential employees, but that these were “impliedly excluded” from the Act’s coverage by dint of the House Managers’ statements just quoted. From this premise, the Court proceeds to assume that other • categories of employees, similarly not excluded under the express terms of the amended definition of “employee,” were also impliedly excluded from the Act. In my view, there is no warrant for the assumption that groups of employees, which the statute, or express legislative statements, do not address, are to be excluded from the Act; nor is there any legislative debate whatsoever which can reasonably be construed as expressing an authoritative intent to exclude managerial employees as a class.

The House Managers’ statement accompanying the Conference Committee Report explains that the Act' was not amended expressly to exclude labor relations and confidential employees from coverage undef the Act, because it was already prevailing Board practice to exclude these employees. This was not an entirely accu*305rate representation of Board practice, which seemed to hold only that such employees fehould not be included in rank-and-file bargaining units, and not necessarily that they would have no protections under the Act, see, e. g., Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 47 (1945); Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317 (1946), but even accepting the House Managers’ statement as an authoritative direction that these workers were not to' be considered employees within the meaning of- § 2, it does not follow that other groups of employees, regarding whom no such explicit direction was set forth and whom the Board had not treated in such a manner, were also intended to be excluded. Such statement implied that certain groups of employees were to be excluded, but it also noted that some timestudy personnel could qualify as professional employees and could therefore organize in units .which a majority of them approved, and that guards were not wholly excluded from the Act, but were restricted to' units composed solely of other guards. §9(b), 29 U. S. C. §159(b). Given that Congress made specific provision for timestudy and plant protection employees, who were to be entitled to bargaining rights, and that it expressed a desire to exclude only labor relations and confidential employees whom it thought the Board had previously held outside the Act, there is no reason to suppose from the further congressional silence that special provisions, whether of inclusion or exclusion, were intended with respect to other categories of employees. If'’ it be argued that the absence of any express treatment of managerial employees by Congress was ■ somehow intended to codify prior Board practice, then the unavoidable fact is that Board decisions had not held that managerial employees were unprotected by the Act. They had only, been excluded from rank-and-file bargaining units. Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history as to what *306Congress might have perceived the Board’s rule to be with respect to managerial employees as a class.2

Nor is the Court’s position much ádvanced by the few passing references in the House Report and in the floor debates, which the Court cites, ante, at 283, and nn. 12 and 13, for the assumption that “executives” would be excluded from the Act apart from whether they were confidential employees or not, and for the discussion of supervisors as representatives of management whom' the amendments sought to exclude. In none of the cited passages was the category ■ of “managerial employees,” as the Board had defined it, ever addressed, and the focus of these remarks is clearly directed at the exclusion of supervisors as defined in the proposed amendments. Perhaps it was clear to Congress that a confidential secretary’s superior would be excluded by the Act, but such an individual would either be a confidential employee himself, or a supervisor, or both. We are referred to *307nothing in the debates or other congressional materials where the category of managerial employees, as distinguished from the class of supervisory employees, a distinction the Board had previously drawn, is discussed.3

Finally, if we are to consider the 1947 amendments as intending to enact the views of the dissenting Justices in Packard, it should be noted that the dissent interpreted the National Labor Relations Act to “put in the employer category'all those who acted for management not only in formulating but also in executing its labor policies.” 330 U. S., at 496. (Emphasis supplied.) See also id., at 500. Limiting the exclusion of managerial employees to those who are charged with the formulation or implementation of labor relations policies, as the Board has now done in the case before us, is *308entirely consistent with this view and with the purposes of the Act. As thq Senate Report noted, its concern in changing the law with respect to supervisory employees, as construed by Packard, was that the balance of power in the collective-bargaining process had been upset by “the successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the Wagner Act for covering supervisory personnel, traditionally regarded as part of management, into organizations composed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they were hired to supervise.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947). See also H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 3553. Where an employee may be deemed managerial because of the nature of his duties apart from supervision of other employees, however, there is no reason to suppose that union affiliation, at least in separate units, would raise the same labor relations concern.

Following the Taft-Hartley amendments .in 1947, the Board continued to hold, as it had frequently held before, that buyers, and others with managerial interests, were to be excluded from bargaining units of other employees. Denver Dry Goods, 74 N. L. R. B. 1167 (1947); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N. L. R. B. 320 (1947); Denton’s, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 35, 37 (1949); Wise, Smith & Co., 83 N. L. R. B. 1019, 1021 n. 6 (1949); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 89 N. L. R. B. 8, 14 (1950). But in 1950, in American Locomotive Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 115, 117, the Board, in rejecting the inclusion of buyers in an office and clerical employees unit or their placement in a separate bargaining unit, said that “[a]s it appears that the buyers are authorized to make substantial purchases for the Employer, we find that they are representatives of management, and -as such may not be accorded bargainipg rights under the Act.” Reliance for this *309statement was placed on the Wise, Smith cfc Co. case and Westinghouse Electric case which involved the appropriateness of placing the managerial employees in a particular bargaining unit. In Swift & Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 752 (1956), the Board held that á proposed unit of procurement drivers could not be accorded bargaining rights, even in a separate unit. There, the Board flatly asserted .that it was “the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all individuals allied with management.” Id., at 753-754. The sole support for this statement, which the Board has now repudiated, was a reference to the statutory definitions of “employee” and “employer” and to the Conference Committee Report’s explanation of the term “supervisors,” as quoted above and reprinted in the Congressional Record.

. The Board thereafter continued to exclude managerial employees from bargaining units of other employees, occasionally citing Swift, e. g., Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 118 N. L. R. B. 1364, 1365 n. 2 (1957); AFL-CIO, 120 N. L. R. B. 969 (1958),'but more frequently excluding managerial employees from particular units without citing that case or suggesting that the excluded workers were not protected employees. E. g., Mack Trucks, Inc., 116 N. L. R. B. 1576, 1577-1578 (1956); Diana Shop, 118 N. L. R. B. 743, 745 (1957); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120 N. L. R. B. 1652, 1654 (1958); Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N. L. R. B. 817, 822 (1958); Weaver Motors, 123 N. L. R. B. 209, 216 (1959); Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N. L. R. B. 569, 572 (1963).

Until the Board overruled Swift in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 185 N. L. R. B. 550 (1970), it had thus actually held only twice that managerial employees could not be. afforded protection under the Act, and its support for that conclusion was without any persuasive appeal. It is true, of course, that the Board had not held to the contrary either, and that *310various courts of appeals interpreted and deferred to the Board’s position as one of total exclusion of managerial employees from the scope of the Act, although in none of these cases was that conclusion necessary to the result reached. But the Board has now rejected this broad exclusion, and the question is whether the current view should be sustained. That the Board now refuses to follow its prior precedents is no reason to overturn it, for we have frequently sustained Board decisions over7 ruling its prior interpretations of the Act. E. g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168 (1973); Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947). And the face of the Act and the events of 1947 demonstrate that the Board’s present decision is a permissible construction of the statute.

Nor did Congress in 1959, when it again amended the statute, expressly or impliedly enact or approve the statutory interpretation announced in Swift <fc Co. The 1959 amendments dealt with secondary boycotts' and picketing, and we are cited to nothing suggesting that the attention of Congress at that time was directed to or focused on the question whether managerial employees were covered or excluded in the statute. Congressional silence does not imply legislative approval of ail Board rulings theretofore made. As the Court noted in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 241-242 (1970), which overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962):

“Nor can we agree that the conclusive weight should be accorded to the failure of Congress to respond to Sinclair on the theory that congressional silence should be interpreted as acceptance of the decision. The Court has cautioned that '[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.’ Girouard v. *311United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946). Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive circumstances evidencing a clear design that congressional inaction be .taken as acceptance of Sinclair, the mere silence of Congress is not a sufficient reason for refusing to consider the decision.”

See also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 431 (1955). Similarly, from the congressional silence in 1959 concerning Swift’s exclusion of managerial employees from the protection of the Act, it should not be assumed that' Congress intended to approve of Swift and foreclose the possibility of the Board’s reconsidering Swift and overruling it on further and more examining reflection. NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U. S. 344, 350-352 (1953).

The Board’s decisions in this area have not established a cohesive and precise pattern of rulings. It is often difficult to tell whether an individual decision is based on the propriety of excluding certain employees from a particular bargaining unit or whether the worker under consideration is thought to be outside the scope of the Act. But this Court has consistently said that it will accept the Board’s determination of whether a particular individual is an “employee” under the Act if that determination “has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law " NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944); NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U. S. 254, 260 (1968). There is no reason here to- hamstring the Board and deny a broad category of employees those protections of the Act which neither the statutory language nor its legislative history- requires simply because the Board at one time interpreted the Act — erroneously it seems to me — to exclude all managerial as well as supervisory employees.

I respectfully dissent.