Me. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In sustaining a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets. The court rejected appellants’ claim that the statute abridges freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue presented in this context is one of first impression in this Court. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to our consideration of the merits. 430 U. S. 964 (1977). We now reverse.

I

The statute at issue, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977), prohibits appellants, two national banking *768associations and three business corporations,1 from making contributions or expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.” The statute further specifies that “[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.” A corporation that violates § 8 may receive a maximum fine of $50,000; a corporate officer, director, or agent who violates the section may receive a maximum fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both.2

*769Appellants wanted to spend money to publicize their views on a proposed constitutional amendment that was to be submitted to the voters as a ballot question at a general election on November 2,1976. The amendment would have permitted the legislature to impose a graduated tax on the income of individuals. After appellee, the Attorney General of Massachusetts, informed appellants that he intended to enforce § 8 against them, they brought this action seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional. On April 26, 1976, the case was submitted to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court on an expedited basis and upon agreed facts, in order to settle the question before the upcoming election.3 Judgment was reserved and the case referred to the full court that same day.

*770Appellants argued that § 8 violates the First Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and similar provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. They prayed that the statute be declared unconstitutional on its face and as it would be applied to their proposed expenditures. The parties’ statement of agreed facts reflected their disagreement as to the effect that the adoption of a personal income tax would have on appellants’ business; it noted that “[t]here is a division of opinion among economists as to whether and to what extent a graduated income tax imposed solely on individuals would affect the business and assets of corporations.” App. 17. Appellee did not dispute that appellants’ management believed that the tax would have a significant effect on their businesses.4

*771On September 22, 1976, the full bench directed the single justice to enter judgment upholding the constitutionality of § 8. An opinion followed on February 1,1977. In addressing appellants’ constitutional contentions,5 the court acknowledged that § 8 “operate [s] in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976), and viewed the principal question as “whether business corporations, such as [appellants], have First Amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons or associations of natural persons.” 371 Mass. 773, 783, 359 N. E. 2d 1262, 1269. The court found its answer in the .contours of a corporation’s constitutional right, as a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, not to be deprived of property without due process of law. Distinguishing the First Amendment rights of a natural person from the more limited rights of a corporation, the court concluded that “whether its rights are designated ‘liberty’ rights or ‘property’ rights, a corporation’s property and business interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. . . . [A] s an incident of such protection, corporations also possess certain rights of speech and expression under the First Amendment.” Id., at 784, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1270 . (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, the court held that “only when a general political issue materially affects a corporation’s business, property or assets may that corporation claim First Amendment protection for its speech or other *772activities entitling it to communicate its position on that issue to the general public.” Since this limitation is “identical to the legislative command in the first sentence of [§8],” the court concluded that the legislature “has clearly identified in the challenged statute the parameters of corporate free speech.” Id., at 785, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1270.

The court also declined to say that there was “no rational basis for [the] legislative determination,” embodied in the second sentence of § 8, that a ballot question concerning the taxation of individuals could not materially affect the interests of a corporation. Id., at 786, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1271. In rejecting appellants’ argument that this second sentence established a conclusive presumption in violation of the Due Process Clause, the court construed § 8 to embody two distinct crimes: The first prohibits a corporation from spending money to influence the vote on a ballot question not materially affecting its business interests; the second, and more specific, prohibition makes it criminal per se for a corporation to spend money to influence the vote on a ballot question solely concerning individual taxation. While acknowledging that the second crime is “related to the general crime” stated in the first sentence of § 8, the court intimated that the second sentence was intended to make criminal an expenditure of the type proposed by appellants without regard to specific proof of the materiality of the question to the corporation’s business interests.6 Id., at 795 n. 19, 790-791, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1276 n. 19, *7731273-1274. The court nevertheless seems to have reintroduced the “materially affecting” concept into its interpretation of the second sentence of § 8, as a limitation on the scope of the so-called “second crime” imposed by the Federal Constitution rather than the Massachusetts Legislature. Id., at 786, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1271. But because the court thought appellants had not made a sufficient showing of material effect, their challenge to the statutory prohibition as applied to them also failed.

Appellants’ other arguments fared no better. Adopting a narrowing construction of the statute,7 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention that § 8 is overbroad. It also found no merit in appellants’ vagueness argument because the specific prohibition against corporate expenditures on a referendum solely concerning individual taxation is “both precise and definite.” Id., at 791, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1273-1274. *774Finally, the court held that appellants were not denied the equal protection of the laws.8

II

Because the 1976 referendum has been held, and the proposed constitutional amendment defeated, we face at the outset a question of mootness. As the case falls within the class of controversies “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), we conclude that it is not moot. Present here are both elements identified in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975), as precluding a finding of mootness in the absence of a class action: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.”

Under no reasonably foreseeable circumstances could appellants obtain plenary review by this Court of the issue here presented in advance of a referendum on a similar' constitutional amendment. In each of the legislature’s four attempts to obtain constitutional authorization to enact a graduated income tax, including this most recent one, the period of time between legislative authorization of the proposal and its submission to the voters was approximately 18 months. This proved too short a period of time for appellants to obtain complete judicial review, and there is every reason to believe that any future suit would take at least as long. Furthermore, a decision allowing the desired expenditures would be an empty gesture unless it afforded appellants sufficient opportunity prior to the election date to communicate their views effectively.

Nor can there be any serious doubt that there is a “reasonable expectation,” Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, that appel*775lants again will be subject to the threat of prosecution under § 8. The 1976 election marked the fourth time in recent years that a proposed graduated income tax amendment has been submitted to the Massachusetts voters. Appellee’s suggestion that the legislature may abandon its quest for a constitutional amendment is purely speculative.9 Appellants insist that they will continue to oppose the constitutional amendment, and there is no reason to believe that the Attorney General will refrain from prosecuting violations of § 8.10 Compare Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 546-547 (1976), with Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 514, 521 (1974).

Meanwhile, § 8 remains on the books as a complete prohibition of corporate expenditures related to individual tax referenda, and as a restraining influence on corporate expenditures concerning other ballot questions. The criminal penalties of § 8 discourage challenge by violation, and the effect of the statute on arguably protected speech will persist. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974); see American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 770 n. 1 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972). Accordingly, we conclude that this cáse is not moot and proceed to address the merits.

Ill

The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and to what extent corporations have First Amend*776ment rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper question therefore is not whether corporations “have” First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether § 8 abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.

A

The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.

“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.. .. Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940).

The referendum issue that appellants wish to address falls squarely within this description. In appellants’ view, the enactment of a graduated personal income tax, as proposed to be authorized by constitutional amendment, would have a seriously adverse effect on the economy of the State. See n. 4, supra. The importance of the referendum issue to the people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed. Its merits, however, are the subject of sharp disagreement.

As the Court said in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966), “there is practically universal agreement that á major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free *777discussion of governmental affairs.” If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,11 and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.12 The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.

The court below nevertheless held that corporate speech is protected by the First Amendment only when it pertains directly to the corporation’s business interests. In deciding whether this novel and restrictive gloss on the First Amendment comports with the Constitution and the precedents of this Court, we need not survey the outer boundaries of the Amendment’s protection of corporate speech, or address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.13 *778The question in this case, simply put, is whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection. We turn now to that question.

B

The court below found confirmation of the legislature’s definition of the scope of a corporation’s First Amendment rights in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting that the First Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, and seizing upon the observation that corporations “cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), the court concluded that a corporation’s First Amendment rights must derive from its property rights under the Fourteenth.14

*779This is an artificial mode of analysis, untenable under decisions of this Court.

“In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. That principle has been followed and reaffirmed to the present day.” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 (1952) (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

*780Freedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925) (opinion of the Court); id., at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937); Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1926), and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right when it has been asserted by corporations.15 See, e. g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 47 (1961); Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, supra. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936), the Court rejected the very reasoning adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court and did not rely on the corporation's property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in sustaining its freedom of speech.16

*781Yet appellee suggests that First Amendment rights generally have been afforded only to corporations engaged in the communications business or through which individuals express themselves, and the court below apparently accepted the “materially affecting” theory as the conceptual common denominator between appellee’s position and the precedents of this Court. It is true that the “materially affecting” requirement would have been satisfied in the Court’s decisions affording protection to the speech of media corporations and corporations otherwise in the business of communication or entertainment, and to the commercial speech of business corporations. See cases cited in n. 14, supra. In such cases, the speech would be connected to the corporation’s business almost by definition. But the effect on the business of the corporation was not the governing rationale in any of these decisions. None of them mentions, let alone attributes significance to, the fact that the subject of the challenged communication materially affected the corporation’s business.

The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.17 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S., at 219; see *782Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 863-864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). But the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten.18 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 51 n. 56; *783Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 389-390 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). Similarly, the Court’s decisions involving corporations in the business of communication or entertainment are based not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.19 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 389 (1967). Even decisions seemingly based exclusively on the individual’s right to express himself acknowledge that the expression may contribute to society’s edification. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).

Nor do our recent commercial speech cases lend support to appellee’s business interest theory. They illustrate that the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to' the seller’s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the “free flow of commercial information.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 764 (1976); see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85,95 (1977).20

*784C

We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property. The “materially affecting” requirement is not an identification of the boundaries of corporate speech etched by the Constitution itself. Rather, it amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.

Section 8 permits a corporation to communicate to the public its views on certain referendum subjects — those materially affecting its business — but not others. It also singles out one kind of ballot question — individual, taxation — as a subject about which corporations may never make their ideas public. The legislature has drawn the line between permissible and impermissible speech according to whether there is a sufficient nexus, as defined by the legislature, between the issue presented to the voters and the business interests of the speaker.

In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is consti*785tutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). If a legislature may direct business corporations to “stick to business,” it also may limit other corporations— religious, charitable, or civic — to their respective “business” when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment.21 Especially where, as here, the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people,22 the First Amendment is *786plainly offended. Yet the State contends that its action is necessitated by governmental interests of the highest order. We next consider these asserted interests.

IV

The constitutionality of § 8’s prohibition of the “exposition of ideas” by corporations turns on whether it can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction of freedom of speech. Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed at speech itself,23 and the speech is intimately related to the process of governing, “the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,” Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438-439 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S., at 463; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945), “and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 362 (1976). Even then, the State must employ means “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment. ...” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 25; see NAACP v. Button, supra, at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).

The Supreme Judicial Court did not subject § 8 to “the critical scrutiny demanded under accepted First Amendment *787and equal protection principles,” Buckley, supra, at 11, because of its view that the First Amendment does not apply to appellants’ proposed speech.24 For this reason the court did not even discuss the State’s interests in considering appellants’ First Amendment argument. The court adverted to the conceivable interests served by § 8 only in rejecting appellants’ equal protection claim.25 Appellee nevertheless advances two principal justifications for. the prohibition of corporate speech. The first is the State’s interest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen’s confidence in government. The second is the interest in protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation. However weighty these interests may be in the context of partisan candidate elect*788ions,26 they either are not implicated in this case or are not served at all, or in other than a random manner, by the prohibition in § 8.

A

f Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing ^corruption, and “sustain [ing] the active, alert responsibility *789of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government”27 are interests of the highest importance. Buckley, supra; United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 570 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 139 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934). Preservation of the individual citizen’s confidence in government is equally important. Buckley, supra, at 27; CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973).

Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his view that these interests are endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a referendum issue. They hinge upon the assumption that such participation would exert an undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and — • in the end — destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of government. According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other points of view. If appellee’s arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our consideration. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). But there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts,28 or that *790there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government. Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 388 (1962).

Nor are appellee’s arguments inherently persuasive or supported by the precedents of this Court. Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public -office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections, e. g., United States v. Automobile Workers, supra; United States v. CIO, supra, simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.29 To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution “protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.” Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S., at 689. We noted only recently that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order *791to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48-49.30 Moreover, the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.31 They may consider, in making their *792judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.32 But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment. Wood v. Georgia, supra. In sum, “[a] restriction so destructive of the right of public discussion [as § 8], without greater or more imminent danger to the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the freedoms secured by the First Amendment.” 33

B

Finally, appellee argues that § 8, protects corporate shareholders, an interest that is both legitimate and traditionally within the province of state law. Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 82-84 (1975). The statute is said to serve this interest by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of *793views with which some shareholders may disagree. This purpose is belied, however, by the provisions of the statute, which are both underinclusive and overinclusive.

The underinclusiveness of the statute is self-evident. Corporate expenditures with respect to a referendum are prohibited, while corporate activity with respect to the passage or defeat of legislation is permitted, see n. 31, supra, even though corporations may engage in lobbying more often than they take positions on ballot questions submitted to the voters. Nor does § 8 prohibit a corporation from expressing its views, by the expenditure of corporate funds, on any public issue until it becomes the subject of a referendum, though the displeasure of disapproving shareholders is unlikely to be any less.

The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out for special treatment undermines the likelihood of a genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It suggests instead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations on a particular subject. Indeed, appellee has conceded that “the legislative and judicial history of the statute indicates . . . that the second crime was ‘tailor-made' to prohibit corporate campaign contributions to' oppose a graduated income tax amendment." Brief for Appellee 6.

Nor is the fact that § 8 is limited to banks and business corporations without relevance. Excluded from its provisions and criminal sanctions are entities or organized groups in which numbers of persons may hold an interest or membership, and which often have resources comparable to those of large corporations. Minorities in such groups or entities may have interests with respect to institutional speech quite comparable to those of minority shareholders in a corporation. Thus the exclusion of Massachusetts business trusts, real estate investment trusts, labor unions, and other associations undermines the plausibility of the State’s purported concern for the persons who happen to be shareholders in the banks and corporations covered by § 8.

*794The overinclusiveness of the statute is demonstrated by the fact that § 8 would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution or expenditure. Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues.34 Acting through their power to elect *795the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests. In addition to intracorporate remedies, minority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of management.

Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a “compelling” interest under the circumstances of this case, we find “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort” to prohibit appellants from speaking. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S., at 485.

V

Because that portion of § 8 challenged by appellants prohibits protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest, it must be invalidated. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is

Reversed.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

concurring.

I join the opinion and judgment of the Court but write separately to raise some questions likely to arise in this area in the future.

*796A disquieting aspect of Massachusetts’ position is that it may carry the risk of impinging on the First Amendment rights of those who employ the corporate form — as most do— to carry on the business of mass communications, particularly the large media conglomerates. This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from corporations such as the appellants in this case.

Making traditional use of the corporate form, some media enterprises have amassed vast wealth and power and conduct many activities, some directly related — and some not — to their publishing and broadcasting activities. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 248-254 (1974). Today, a corporation might own the dominant newspaper in one or more large metropolitan centers, television and radio stations in those same centers and others, a newspaper chain, news magazines with nationwide circulation, national or worldwide wire news services, and substantial interests in book publishing and distribution enterprises. Corporate ownership may extend, vertically, to pulp mills and pulp timberlands to insure an adequate, continuing supply of newsprint and to trucking and steamship lines for the purpose of transporting the newsprint to the presses. Such activities would be logical economic auxiliaries tó a publishing conglomerate. Ownership also may extend beyond to business activities unrelated to the task of publishing newspapers and magazines or broadcasting radio and television programs. Obviously, such far-reaching ownership would not be possible without the state-provided corporate form and its “special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets . . . .” Post, at 809 (White, J., dissenting).

In terms of “unfair advantage in the political process” and “corporate domination of the electoral process,” post, at 809-810, it could be argued that such media conglomerates as I de*797scribe pose a much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra; ante, at 791 n. 30. In Tornillo, for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires “has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion.” 418 U. S., at 250.

In terms of Massachusetts’ other concern, the interests of minority shareholders, I perceive no basis for saying that the managers and directors of the media conglomerates are more or less sensitive to the views and desires of minority shareholders than are corporate officers generally.1 Nor can it be said, even if relevant to First Amendment analysis — which it is not — that the former are more virtuous, wise, or restrained in the exercise of corporate power than are the latter. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U. S. 94, 124-125 (1973); 14 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 46 (A. Libscomb ed. 1904) (letter to Dr. Walter Jones, Jan. 2, 1814). Thus, no factual distinction has been identified as yet that would justify government restraints on the right of appellants to express their views without, at the same time, opening the door to similar restraints on media conglomerates with their vastly greater influence.

Despite these factual similarities between media and non-media corporations, those who view the Press Clause as somehow conferring special and extraordinary privileges or status on the “institutional press” — which are not extended to those *798who wish to express ideas other than by publishing a newspaper — might perceive no danger to institutional media corporations flowing from the position asserted by Massachusetts. Under this narrow reading of the Press Clause, government could perhaps impose on nonmedia corporations restrictions not permissible with respect to “media” enterprises. Cf. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 Va. L. Rev. 731, 767-770 (1977).2 The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the “institutional press” any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all others.3

I perceive two fundamental difficulties with a narrow reading of the Press Clause. First, although certainty on this point is not possible, the history of the Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a “special” or “institutional” privilege. See Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 88-99 (1975). The common 18th century understanding of freedom of the press is suggested by Andrew Bradford, a colonial American newspaperman. In defining the nature of the liberty, he did not limit it to a particular group:

“But, by the Freedom of the Press, I mean a Liberty, within the Bounds of Law, for any Man to communicate to the Public, his Sentiments on the Important Points of *799Religion and Government; of proposing any Laws, which he apprehends may be for the Good of his Countrey, and of applying for the Repeal of such, as he Judges pernicious. . . .

“This is the Liberty of the Press, the great Palladium of all our other Liberties, which I hope the good People of this Province, will forever enjoy . . . .” A. Bradford, Sentiments on the Liberty of the Press, in L. Levy, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson 41-42 (1966) (emphasis deleted) (first published in Bradford’s The American Weekly Mercury, a Philadelphia newspaper, Apr. 25, 1734).

Indeed most pre-First Amendment commentators “who employed the term 'freedom of speech’ with great frequency, used it synonomously with freedom of the press.” L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 174 (1960).

Those interpreting the Press Clause as extending protection only to, or creating a special role for, the “institutional press” must either (a) assert such an intention on the part of the Framers for which no supporting evidence is available, cf. Lange, supra, at 89-91; (b) argue that events after 1791 somehow operated to “constitutionalize” this interpretation, see Bezanson, supra n. 3, at 788; or (c) candidly acknowledging the absence of historical support, suggest that the intent of the Framers is not important today. See Nimmer, supra n. 3, at 640-641.

To conclude that the Framers did not intend to limit the freedom of the press to one select group is not necessarily to suggest that the Press Clause is redundant. The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs,4 while the Press Clause *800focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and "comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938).5 Yet there is no fundamental distinction between expression and dissemination. The liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although complementary to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited special mention simply because it had been more often the object of official restraints. Soon after the invention of the printing press, English and continental monarchs, fearful of the power implicit in its use and the threat to Establishment thought and order — political and religious— devised restraints, such as licensing, censors, indices of prohibited books, and prosecutions for seditious libel, which gen*801erally were unknown in the pre-printing press era. Official restrictions were the official response to the new, disquieting idea that this invention would provide a means for mass communication.

The second fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status on a limited group is one of definition. See Lange, supra, at 100-107. The very task of including some entities within the “institutional press” while excluding others, whether undertaken by legislature, court, or administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England — a system the First Amendment was intended to ban from this country. Lovell v. Griffin, supra, at 451-452. Further, the officials undertaking that task would be required to distinguish the protected from the unprotected on the basis of such variables as ¡content of expression, frequency or fervor of expression, or ownership of the technological means of dissemination. Yet nothing in this Court’s opinions supports such a confining approach to the scope of Press Clause protection.6 Indeed, the Court has plainly intimated the contrary view:

“Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right’ which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.’ . . . The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press ... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow *802of information to the public . . . .” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 704-705 (1972), quoting Lovell v. Griffin, supra, at 450, 452.

The meaning of the Press Clause, as a provision separate and apart from the Speech Clause, is implicated only indirectly by this case. Yet Massachusetts’ position poses serious questions. The evolution of traditional newspapers into modem corporate conglomerates in which the daily dissemination of news by print is no longer the major part of the whole enterprise suggests the need for caution in limiting the First Amendment rights of corporations as such. Thus, the tentative probings of this brief inquiry are wholly consistent, I think, with the Court’s refusal to sustain § 8’s serious and potentially dangerous restriction on the freedom of political speech.

Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide dissemination. “[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. ‘. . . the liberty of the press is no greater and no less . . .’ than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

In short, the First Amendment does not “belong” to any definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

The Massachusetts statute challenged here forbids the use of corporate funds to publish views about referenda issues having no material effect on the business, property, or assets of *803the corporation. The legislative judgment that the personal income tax issue, which is the subject of the referendum out of which this case arose, has no such effect was sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and is not disapproved by this Court today. Hence, as this case comes to us, the issue is whether'a State may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with the corporate business. The Court commendably enough squarely faces the issue but unfortunately errs in deciding it. The Court invalidates the Massachusetts statute and holds that the First Amendment guarantees corporate managers the right to use not only their personal funds, but also those of the corporation, to circulate fact and opinion irrelevant to the business placed in their charge and necessarily representing their own personal or collective views about political and social questions. I do not suggest for a moment that the First Amendment requires a State to forbid such use of corporate funds, but I do strongly disagree that the First Amendment forbids state interference with managerial decisions of this kind.

By holding that Massachusetts may not prohibit corporate expenditures or contributions made in connection with referenda involving issues having no material connection with the corporate business, the Court not only invalidates a statute which has been on the books in one form or another for many years, but also casts considerable doubt upon the constitutionality of legislation passed by some 31 States restricting corporate political activity,1 as well as upon the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U. S. C. § 441b (1976 ed.). The Court's fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment *804of First Amendment rights accomplished by the statute must be evaluated are themselves derived from the First Amendment. The question posed by this case, as approached by the Court, is whether the State has struck the best possible balance, i. e., the one which it would have chosen, between competing First Amendment interests. Although in my view the choice made by the State would survive even the most exacting scrutiny, perhaps a rational argument might be made to the contrary. What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to the proper balance for that of Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation reasonably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political arena where the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.2 Moreover, the result reached today in critical respects marks a drastic departure from the Court’s prior decisions which have protected against governmental infringement the very First Amendment interests which the Court now deems inadequate to justify the Massachusetts statute.

I

There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. Indeed, what some have considered to' be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all *805furthered by corporate speech.3 It is clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations are not “an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.” 4 They do not represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice. Undoubtedly, as this Court has recognized, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), there are some corporations formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes shared by all their members, or, as in the case of the press, of disseminating information and ideas. Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a means of achieving effective self-expression. But this is hardly the case generally with corporations operated for the purpose of making profits. Shareholders in such entities do not share a common set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the business of disseminating news and opinion. In fact, as discussed infra, the government has a strong interest in assuring that investment decisions are not predicated upon agreement or disagreement with the activities of corporations in the political arena.

Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase. Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, activities such as advertising and other communications integrally related to the operation of the corporation’s business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders.5 This unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make expenditures or undertake activities designed *806to influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the corporations’ economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.6

The self-expression of the communicator is not the only value encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas. Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds which makes the communication of ideas possible, it *807can be argued, furthers the purposes of the First Amendment. This proposition does not establish, however, that the right of the general public to receive communications financed by-means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as that to hear other forms of expression. In the first place, as discussed supra, corporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the connection with individual self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional protection of speech provided by the First Amendment. Ideas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection. Secondly, the restriction of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon individual speech. Even the complete curtailment of corporate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-to-day business functions would leave individuals, including corporate shareholders, employees, and customers, free to communicate their thoughts-. Moreover, it is unlikely that any significant communication would be lost by such a prohibition. These individuals would remain perfectly free to communicate any ideas which could be conveyed by means of the corporate form. Indeed, such individuals could even form associations for the very purpose of promoting political or ideological causes.7

I recognize that there may be certain communications undertaken by corporations which could not be restricted without impinging seriously upon the right to receive information. In the absence of advertising and similar promotional activities, for example, the ability of consumers to obtain information relating to products manufactured by cor*808porations would be significantly impeded. There is also a need for employees, customers, and shareholders of corporations to be able to receive communications about matters relating to the functioning of corporations. Such communications are clearly desired by all investors and may well be viewed as an associational form of self-expression. See United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 121-123 (1948). Moreover, it is unlikely that such information would be disseminated by sources other than corporations. It is for such reasons that the Court has extended a certain degree of First Amendment protection to activities of this kind.8 None of these considerations, however, are implicated by a prohibition upon corporate expenditures relating to referenda concerning questions of general public concern having no connection with corporate business affairs.

It bears emphasis here that the Massachusetts statute forbids the expenditure of corporate funds in connection with referenda but in no way forbids the board of directors of a corporation from formulating and making public what it represents as the views of the corporation even though the subject addressed has no material effect whatsoever on the business of the corporation. These views could be publicized at the indi*809vidual expense of the officers, directors, stockholders, or anyone else interested in circulating the corporate view on matters irrelevant to its business.

The governmental interest in regulating corporate political communications, especially those relating to electoral matters, also raises considerations which differ significantly from those governing the regulation of individual speech. Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of furthering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, perpetual life, andcthe accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets are normally applied to them. States have provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy generally. It has long been recognized, however, that the special status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process. Although Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), provides support for the position that the desire to equalize the financial resources available to candidates does not justify the limitation upon the expression of support which a restriction upon individual contributions entails,9 the interest of Massachusetts and the many other States which have restricted corporate political activity is quite different. It is not one of equalizing the resources of opposing candidates or opposing positions, but rather of preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially where, as here, the issue involved has no material connection with the business of the corporation. The State need not permit its own creation to consume it. Massachusetts could *810permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas. Ordinarily, the expenditure of funds to promote political causes may be assumed to bear some relation to the fervency with which they are held. Corporate political expression, however, is not only divorced from the convictions of individual corporate ■ shareholders, but also, because of the ease with which corporations are permitted to accumulate capital, bears no relation to the conviction with which the ideas expressed are held by the communicator.10

The Court’s opinion appears to recognize at least the possibility that fear of corporate domination of the electoral process would justify restrictions upon corporate expenditures and contributions in connection with referenda but brushes this interest aside by asserting that “there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts,” ante, at 789, and by suggesting that the statute in issue represents an attempt to give an unfair advantage to those who hold views in opposition to positions which would otherwise be financed by corporations. Ante, at 785-786. It fails even to allude to the fact, however, that Massachusetts’ most recent experience with unrestrained corporate expenditures in connection *811with ballot questions establishes precisely the contrary. In 1972, a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution which would have authorized the imposition of a graduated income tax on both individuals and corporations was put to the voters. The Committee for Jobs and Government Economy, an organized political committee, raised and expended approximately $120,000 to oppose the proposed amendment, the bulk of it raised through large corporate contributions. Three of the present appellant corporations each contributed $3,000 to this committee. In contrast, the Coalition for Tax Reform, Inc., the only political committee organized to support the 1972 amendment, was able to raise and expend only approximately $7,000. App. to Jurisdictional Statement 41; App. to Record 48-84. Perhaps these figures reflect the Court's view of the appropriate role which corporations should play in the Massachusetts electoral process, but it nowhere explains why it is entitled to substitute its judgment for that of Massachusetts and other States,11 as well as the United States, which have acted to correct or prevent similar domination of the electoral process by corporate wealth.

This Nation has for many years recognized the need for measures designed to prevent corporate domination of the political process. The Corrupt Practices Act, first enacted in 1907, has consistently barred corporate contributions in con*812nection with federal elections. This Court has repeatedly recognized that one of the principal purposes of this prohibition is “to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital.” United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 585 (1957). See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 415-416 (1972); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S., at 113. Although this Court has never adjudicated the constitutionality of the Act, there is no' suggestion in its cases construing it, cited supra, that this purpose is in any sense illegitimate or deserving of other than the utmost respect; indeed, the thrust of its opinions, until today, Has been to the contrary. See Automobile Workers, supra, at 585; Pipefitters, supra, at 415-416.

II

There is an additional overriding interest related to the prevention of corporate domination which is substantially advanced by Massachusetts’ restrictions upon corporate contributions: assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree where, as is the case here, the issue involved does not materially affect the business, property, or other affairs of the corporation.12 The State has not interfered with the prerogatives of corporate management to communicate about matters that have material impact on the business affairs entrusted to them, however much individual stockholders may disagree on economic or ideological grounds. Nor has the State forbidden management from formulating and circulating its views at its own expense or at the expense of others, even where the subject at issue is irrelevant to corporate business affairs. But Massachusetts *813has chosen to forbid corporate management from spending corporate funds in referenda elections absent some demonstrable effect of the issue on the economic life of the company. In short, corporate management may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the management, individually or as a group.

This is not only a policy which a State may adopt consistent with the First Amendment but one which protects the very freedoms that this Court has held to be guaranteed by the First Amendment. In Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), the Court struck down a West Virginia statute which compelled children enrolled in public school to salute the flag and pledge allegiance to it on the ground that the First Amendment prohibits public authorities from requiring an individual to express support for or agreement with a cause with which he disagrees or concerning, which he prefers to remain silent. Subsequent cases have applied this principle to prohibit organizations to which individuals are compelled to belong as a condition of employment from using compulsory dues to support candidates, political parties, or other forms of political expression which which members disagree or do not wish to support. In Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 (1961), the Court was presented with allegations that a union shop authorized by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 152 Eleventh, had used the union treasury to which all employees were compelled to contribute “to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [the petitioners] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they] disagreed.” 367 U. S., at 744. The Court recognized that compelling contributions for such purposes presented constitutional “questions of the utmost gravity” and consequently construed the Act to prohibit the use of compulsory union dues for political purposes. Id., at 749-750. Last Term, *814in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977), we confronted these constitutional questions and held that a State may not, even indirectly, require an individual to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of employment. At issue were political expenditures made by a public employees’ union. Michigan law provided that unions and local government employers might agree to an agency-shop arrangement pursuant to which every employee — even those not union members — must pay to the union, as a condition of employment, union dues or a service fee equivalent in amount to union dues. The legislation itself was not coercive; it did not command that local governments employ only those workers who were willing to pay union dues, but left it to a bargaining representative democratically elected by a majority of the employees to enter or not enter into such a contractual arrangement through collective bargaining. In addition, of course, no one was compelled to work at a job covered by an agency-shop arrangement. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that under such circumstances the use of funds contributed by dissenting employees for political purposes impermissibly infringed their First Amendment right to adhere to their own beliefs and to refuse to' defer to or support the beliefs of others.

Presumably, unlike the situations presented by Street and Abood, the use of funds invested by shareholders with opposing views by Massachusetts corporations in connection with referenda or elections would not constitute state action and, consequently, would not violate the First Amendment. Until now, however, the States have always been free to adopt measures designed to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not compelled to do so. It could hardly be plausibly contended that just because Massachusetts’ regulation of corporations is less extensive than Michigan’s regulation of labor-management relations, Massachusetts may not constitutionally prohibit the very evil which Michigan may not consti*815tutionally permit. Yet this is precisely what the Court today holds. Although the Court places great stress upon the alleged infringement of the right to receive information produced by Massachusetts’ ban on corporate expenditures which, for the reasons stated supra, I believe to be misconceived, it fails to explain why such an interest was not sufficient to compel a different weighing of First Amendment interests and, consequently, a different result in Abood. After all, even contributions for political causes coerced by labor unions would, under the Court’s analysis, increase unions’ ability to disseminate their views and, consequently, increase the amount of information available to the general public.

The Court assumes that the interest in preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views which are irrelevant to the corporate business and with which some shareholders may disagree is a compelling one, but concludes that the Massachusetts statute is nevertheless/ invalid because the State has failed to adopt the means best suited, in its opinion, for achieving this end. Ante, at 792-795. It proposes that the aggrieved shareholder assert his interest in preventing the expenditure of funds for nonbusiness causes he finds unconscionable through the channels provided by “corporate democracy” and purports to be mystified as to “why the dissenting shareholder’s wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others where equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders.” Ante, at 794, and n. 34. It should be obvious that the alternative means upon the adequacy of which the majority is willing to predicate a constitutional adjudication is no more able to satisfy the State’s interest than a ruling in Street and Abood leaving aggrieved employees to the remedies provided by union democracy would have satisfied the demands of the First Amendment. The interest which the State wishes to protect here is identical to that which the Court has previously held to be protected by *816the First Amendment: the right to adhere to one’s own beliefs and to refuse to support the dissemination of the personal and political views of others, regardless of how large a majority they may compose. In most contexts, of course, the views of the dissenting shareholder have little, if any, First Amendment significance. By purchasing interests in corporations shareholders accept the fact that corporations are going to make decisions concerning matters such as advertising integrally related to their business operations according to the procedures set forth in their charters and bylaws. Otherwise, corporations could not function. First Amendment concerns of stockholders are directly implicated, however, when a corporation chooses to use its privileged status to finance ideological crusades which are unconnected with the corporate business or property and which some shareholders might not wish to support. Once again, we are provided no explanation whatsoever by the Court as to why the State’s interest is of less constitutional weight than that of corporations to participate financially in the electoral process and as to why the balance between two First Amendment interests should be struck by this Court. Moreover, the Court offers no reason whatsoever for constitutionally imposing its choice of means to achieve a legitimate goal and invalidating those chosen by the State.13

*817Abood cannot be distinguished, as the present Court attempts to do, ante, at 794-795, n. 34, on the ground that the Court there did not constitutionally prohibit expenditures by unions for the election of political candidates or for ideological causes so long as they are financed from assessments paid by employees who are not coerced into doing so against their will. In the first place, the Court did not purport to hold that all political or ideological expenditures not constitutionally prohibited were constitutionally protected. A State might well conclude that the most and perhaps, in its view, the only effective way of preventing unions or corporations from using funds contributed by differing members or shareholders to support political causes having no connection with the business of the organization is to absolutely ban such expenditures. *818Secondly, unlike the remedies available to the Court in Street and Abood which required unions to refund the exacted funds in the proportion that union political expenditures with which a member disagreed bore to total union expenditures, no such alternative is readily available which would enable a corporate shareholder to maintain his investment in a corporation without supporting its electoral or political ventures other than prohibiting corporations from participating in such activities. There is no apparent way of segregating one shareholder’s ownership interest in a corporation from another’s. It is no answer to respond, as the Court does, that the dissenting “shareholder is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason.” Ante, at 794 n. 34. The employees in Street and Abood were also free to seek other jobs where they would not be compelled to finance causes with which they disagreed, but we held in Abood that First Amendment rights could not be so burdened. Clearly the State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment opportunities.

Finally, even if corporations developed an effective mechanism for rebating to shareholders that portion of their investment used to finance political activities with which they disagreed, a State may still choose to restrict corporate political activity irrelevant to business functions on the grounds that many investors would be deterred from investing in corporations because of a wish not to associate with corporations propagating certain views. The State has an interest not only in enabling individuals to exercise freedom of conscience without penalty but also in eliminating the danger that investment decisions will be significantly influenced by the ideological views of corporations. While the latter concern may not be of the same constitutional magnitude as the former, it is far from trivial. Corporations, as previously noted, are created by the State as a means of furthering the public welfare. One of *819their functions is to determine, by their success in obtaining funds, the uses to which society’s resources are to be put. A State may legitimately conclude that corporations would not serve as economically efficient vehicles for such decisions if the investment preferences of the public were significantly affected by their ideological or political activities. It has long been recognized that such pursuits are not the proper business of corporations. The common law was generally interpreted as prohibiting corporate political participation.14 Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules permit corporations to refuse to submit for shareholder vote any proposal which concerns a general economic, political, racial, religious, or social cause that is not significantly related to the business of the corporation or is not within its control.15

The necessity of prohibiting corporate political expenditures in order to prevent the use of corporate funds for purposes with which shareholders may disagree is not a unique perception of Massachusetts. This Court has repeatedly recognized that one of the purposes of the Corrupt Practices Act was to prevent the use of corporate or union funds for political purposes without the consent of the shareholders or union members and to protect minority interests from domination by corporate or union leadership.16 Although the Court has never, as noted supra, adjudicated the constitutionality of the Act, it has consistently treated this objective with deference. Indeed, in United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), the Court construed a previous version of the Corrupt Practices Act so as to *820conform its prohibitions to those activities to which the Court believed union members or shareholders might object. After noting that if the statute “were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to' their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality,” id., at 121, the Court held that the statute did not prohibit such in-house publications. It was persuaded that the purposes of the Act would not be impeded by such an interpretation, because it “is unduly stretching language to say that the members or stockholders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational activities, including the advocacy thereby of governmental policies affecting their interests, and the support thereby of candidates thought to' be favorable to' their interests.” Id., at 123.

The Court today purports not to foreclose the possibility that the Corrupt Practices Act and state statutes which prohibit corporate expenditures only in the context of elections to public office may survive constitutional scrutiny because of the interest in preventing the corruption of elected representatives through the creation of political debts. Ante, at 788 n. 26. It does not choose to explain or even suggest, however, why the state interests which it so cursorily dismisses are less worthy than the interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of it. More importantly, the analytical framework employed by the Court clearly raises great doubt about the Corrupt Practices Act. The question in the present case, as viewed by the Court, “is whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection,” ante, at 778, which it answers in the negative. But the Court has previously held in Buckley v. Valeo that the interest in preventing corruption is insufficient to justify restrictions upon individual expend*821itures relative to candidates for political office. If the corporate identity of the speaker makes no difference, all the Court has done is to reserve the formal interment of the Corrupt Practices Act and similar state statutes for another day. As I understand the view that has now become part of First Amendment jurisprudence, the use of corporate funds, even for causes irrelevant to the corporation’s business, may be no more limited than that of individual funds. Hence, corporate contributions to and expenditures on behalf of political candidates may be no more limited than those of individuals. Individual contributions under federal law are limited but not entirely forbidden, and under Buckley v. Valeo expenditures may not constitutionally be limited at all. Most state corrupt practices Acts, like the federal Act, forbid any contributions or expenditures by corporations to or for a political candidate.

In my view, the interests in protecting a system of freedom of expression, set forth supra, are sufficient to justify any incremental curtailment in the volume of expression which the Massachusetts statute might produce. I would hold that apart from corporate activities, such as those discussed in Part I, supra, and exempted from regulation in CIO, which are integrally related to corporate business operations, a State may prohibit corporate expenditures for political or ideological purposes. There can be no doubt that corporate expenditures in connection with referenda immaterial to corporate business affairs fall clearly into the category of corporate activities which may be barred. The electoral process, of course, is the essence of our democracy. It is an arena in which the public interest in preventing corporate domination and the coerced support by shareholders of causes with which they disagree is at its strongest and any claim that corporate expenditures are integral to the economic functioning of the corporation is at its weakest.17

*822I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

This Court decided at an early date, with neither argument nor discussion, that a business corporation is a “person” entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 396 (1886). Likewise, it soon became accepted that the property of a corporation was protected under the Due Process Clause of that same Amendment. See, e. g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522 (1898). Nevertheless, we concluded soon thereafter that the liberty protected by that Amendment “is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.” Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 255 (1906). Before today, our only considered and explicit departures from that holding have been that a corporation engaged in the business of publishing or broadcasting enjoys the same liberty of the press as is enjoyed by natural persons, Gosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936), and that a nonprofit membership corporation organized for the purpose of “achieving . . . equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community” enjoys certain liberties of political expression. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963).

The question presented today, whether business corporations have a constitutionally protected liberty to engage in political activities, has never been squarely addressed by any previous decision of this Court.1 However, the General Court *823of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Congress of the United States, and the legislatures of 30 other States of this Republic have considered the matter, and have concluded that restrictions upon the political activity of business corporations are both politically desirable and constitutionally permissible. The judgment of such a broad consensus of governmental bodies expressed over a period of many decades is entitled to considerable deference from this Court. I think it quite probable that their judgment may properly be reconciled with our controlling precedents, but I am certain that under my views of the limited application of the First Amendment to the States, which I share with the two immediately preceding occupants of my seat on the Court, but not with my present colleagues, the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should be affirmed.

Early in our history, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described the status of a corporation in the eyes of federal law:

“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.” Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819).

The appellants herein either were created by the Commonwealth or were admitted into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes described in their charters and regulated by *824state law.2 Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698-701 (1944) (corporations do not enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination), our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are “incidental to its verexistence.” Dartmouth College, supra, at 636.

There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.3 Crosjean so held, and our subsequent cases have so assumed. E. g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 *825U. S. 254 (1964) ,4 Until recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 761-770 (1976). Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.

It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.5 A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its efficiency as *826an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit commercial corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to protect the corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though it may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection. Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.6 I would think that any particular form of organi*827zation upon which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.

One need not adopt such a restrictive view of the political liberties of ‘busiñ'ékk'corporations to affirm the..judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court in this case. That court reasoned that this Court’s decisions entitling the property óf a corporation to constitutional protection should be construed as recognizing the liberty of a corporation to express itself on political matters concerning that property. Thus, the Court construed the statute in question not to forbid political expres*828sion by a corporation “when a general political issue materially affects a corporation’s business, property or assets.” 371 Mass. 773, 785, 359 N. E. 2d 1262, 1270 (1977).

I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to engage in political activity with regard to matters having no material effect on its business is necessarily incidental to the purposes for which the Commonwealth permitted these corporations to be organized or admitted within its boundaries. Nor can I disagree with the Supreme Judicial Court’s factual finding that no such effect has been shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed provides at least as much protection as the Fourteenth Amendment requires, I believe it is constitutionally valid.

It is true, as the Court points out, ante, at 781-783, that recent decisions of this Court have emphasized the interest of the public in receiving the information offered by the speaker seeking protection. The free flow of information is in no way diminished by the Commonwealth’s decision to permit the operation of business corporations with limited rights of political expression. All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464,474 (1977).

I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court.

Me. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility.

I

In December 1973, the Commission, appellee here, ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that “promot[es] the use of electricity.” App. to Juris. *559Statement 31a. The order was based on the Commission’s finding that “the interconnected utility system in New York State does not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-1974 winter.” Id., at 26a.

Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., the appellant in this case, opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. App. A10. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.

The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses “into two broad categories: promotional — advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility services — and institutional and informational, a broad category inclusive of all advertising not clearly intended to promote sales.” 1 App. to Juris. Statement 35a. The Commission declared all promotional advertising contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. It acknowledged that the ban is not a perfect vehicle for conserving energy. For example, the Commission’s order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption during periods when demand for electricity is low. By limiting growth in “off-peak” consumption, the ban limits the “beneficial side effects” of such growth in terms of more efficient use of existing powerplants. Id., at 37a. And since oil dealers are not under the Commission’s jurisdiction and *560thus remain free to advertise, it was recognized that the ban can achieve only “piecemeal conservationism” Still, the Commission adopted the restriction because it was deemed likely to “result in some dampening of unnecessary growth” in energy consumption. Ibid.

The Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informational” advertising designed to encourage “shifts of consumption” from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. Ibid, (emphasis in orginal). Informational advertising would not seek to increase aggregate consumption, but would invite a leveling of demand throughout any given 24-hour period. The agency offered to review “specific proposals by the companies for specifically described [advertising] programs that meet these criteria.” Id., at 38a.

When it rejected requests for rehearing on the Policy Statement, the Commission supplemented its rationale for the advertising ban. The agency observed that additional electricity probably would be more expensive to produce than existing output. Because electricity rates in New York were not then based on marginal cost,2 the Commission feared that additional power would be priced below the actual cost of generation. The additional electricity would be subsidized by all consumers through generally higher rates. Id., at 57a-58a. The state agency also thought that promotional advertising would give “misleading signals” to the public by appearing to encourage energy consumption at a time when conservation is needed. Id., at 59a.

Appellant challenged the order in state court, arguing that the Commission had restrained commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 The Commis*561sion’s order was upheld by the trial court and at the intermediate appellate level.4 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. It found little value to advertising in “the noncompetitive market in which electric corporations operate.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 110, 390 N. E. 2d 749, 757 (1979). Since consumers “have no choice regarding the source of their electric power,” the court denied that “promotional advertising of electricity might contribute to society’s interest in ‘informed and reliable’ economic decisionmaking.” Ibid. The court also observed that by encouraging consumption, promotional advertising would only exacerbate the current energy situation. Id., at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 758. The court concluded that the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 962 (1979), and now reverse.

The Commission’s order restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 363-364 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 761-762. Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible *562dissemination of information. In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected the “highly paternalistic” view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. “[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them. . . .” Id., at 770; see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 92 (1977). Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 374.

Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized "the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978); see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381; see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Ya. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1979).5 The *563Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. 436 U. S., at 456, 457. The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.

The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 783 (1978). Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, Friedman v. Rogers, supra, at 13, 15-16; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra, at 46A-465, or *564commercial speech related to illegal activity, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 388 (1973).6

If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.

Under the first criterion, the Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state interest involved. In both Bates and Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court concluded that an advertising ban could not be imposed to protect the ethical or performance standards of a profession. The Court noted in Virginia Pharmacy Board that “[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the other.” 425 U. S., at 769. In Bates, the Court overturned an advertising prohibition that was designed to protect the “quality” of a lawyer’s work. *565“Restraints on advertising . . . are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work.” 433 U. S., at 378.7

The second criterion recognizes that the First Amendment mandates that speech restrictions be “narrowly drawn.” In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 438 (1978).8 The regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest, see First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 794-795, nor can it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well. For example, in Bates the Court explicitly did not “foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required” in promotional materials. 433 U. S., at 384. See Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, at 773. And in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 701-702 (1977), we held that the State’s “arguments ... do not justify the total suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives.” This holding left open the possibility that *566the State could implement more carefully drawn restrictions. See id., at 712 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in judgment) ; id., at 716-717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment).9

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

Ill

We now apply this four-step analysis for commercial speech to the Commission’s arguments in support of its ban on promotional advertising.

A

The Commission does not claim that the expression at issue either is inaccurate or relates to unlawful activity. Yet the New York Court of Appeals questioned whether Central Hudson’s advertising is protected commercial speech. Because appellant holds a monopoly over the sale of electricity in its service area, the state court suggested that the Commission’s order restricts no commercial speech of any worth. The court stated that advertising in a "noncompetitive market” *567could not improve the decisionmaking of consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 757. The court saw no constitutional problem with barring commercial speech that it viewed as conveying little useful information.

This reasoning falls short of establishing that appellant’s advertising is not commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. Monopoly over the supply of a product provides no protection from competition with substitutes for that product. Electric utilities compete with suppliers of fuel oil and natural gas in several markets, such as those for home heating and industrial power. This Court noted the existence of interfuel competition 45 years ago, see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 294 U. S. 63, 72 (1935). Each energy source continues to offer peculiar advantages and disadvantages that may influence consumer choice. For consumers in those competitive markets, advertising by utilities is just as valuable as advertising by unregulated firms.10

Even in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the information available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment. The New York court’s argument appears to assume that the providers of a monopoly service or product are willing to pay for wholly ineffective advertising. Most businesses— even regulated monopolies — are unlikely to underwrite promotional advertising that is of no interest or use to consumers. Indeed, a monopoly enterprise legitimately may wish to inform the public that it has developed new services or terms of doing business. A consumer may need information to aid his decision whether or not to use the monopoly service at all, or how much of the service he should purchase. In the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we *568may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising.11 Since no such extraordinary conditions have been identified in this case, appellant’s monopoly position does not alter the First Amendment’s protection for its commercial speech.

B

The Commission offers two state interests as justifications for the ban on promotional advertising. The first concerns energy conservation. Any increase in demand for electricity— during peak or off-peak periods — means greater consumption of energy. The Commission argues, and the New York, court agreed, that the State’s interest in conserving energy is sufficient to support suppression of advertising designed to increase consumption of electricity. In view of our country’s dependence on energy resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the importance of energy conservation. Plainly, therefore, the state interest asserted is substantial.

The Commission also argues that promotional advertising will aggravate inequities caused by the failure to base the utilities’ rates on marginal cost. The utilities argued to the Commission that if they could promote the use of electricity in periods of low demand, they would improve their utilization of generating capacity. The Commission responded that promotion of off-peak consumption also would increase consumption during peak periods. If peak demand were to rise, the absence of marginal cost rates would mean that the rates charged for the additional power would not reflect the true costs of expanding production. Instead, the extra costs would *569be borne by all consumers through higher overall rates. Withqut promotional advertising, the Commission stated, this inequitable turn of events would be less likely to occur. The choice among rate structures involves difficult and important questions of economic supply and distributional fairness.12 The State’s concern that rates be fair and efficient represents a clear and substantial governmental interest.

C

Next, we focus on the relationship between the State’s interests and the advertising ban. Under this criterion, the Commission’s laudable concern over the equity and efficiency of appellant’s rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting protected speech. The link between the advertising prohibition and appellant’s rate structure is, at most, tenuous. The impact of promotional advertising on the equity of appellant’s rates is highly speculative. Advertising to increase off-peak usage would have to increase peak usage, while other factors that directly affect the fairness and efficiency of appellant’s rates remained constant. Such conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silencing appellant’s promotional advertising.

In contrast, the State’s interest in energy conservation is directly advanced by the Commission order at issue here. There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales. Thus, we find a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Commission’s order.

D

We come finally to the critical inquiry in this case: whether the Commission’s complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by the First Amendment is no more extensive than *570necessary to further the State’s interest in energy conservation. The Commission’s order reaches all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use. But the energy conservation rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use. In addition, no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State’s interests.

Appellant insists that but for the ban, it would advertise products and services that use energy efficiently. These include the “heat pump,” which both parties acknowledge to be a major improvement in electric heating, and the use of electric heat as a “backup” to solar and other heat sources. Although the Commission has questioned the efficiency of electric heating before this Court, neither the Commission’s Policy Statement nor its order denying rehearing made findings on this issue. In the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we must credit as within the realm of possibility the claim that electric heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances.

The Commission’s order prevents appellant from promoting electric services that would reduce energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources, or that would consume roughly the same amount of energy as do alternative sources. In neither situation would the utility’s advertising endanger conservation or mislead the public. To. the extent that the Commission’s order suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State’s interest in energy conservation, the Commission’s order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and must be invalidated. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978).

The Commission also has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant’s commercial expression. To fur*571ther its policy of conservation, the Commission could attempt to restrict the format and content of Central Hudson’s advertising. It might, for example, require that the advertisements include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions and for the foreseeable future. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 14, 405 F. 2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U. S. 842 (1969).13 In the absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central Hudson’s advertising.14

IV

Our decision today in no way disparages the national interest in energy conservation. We accept without reservation the argument that conservation, as well as the development of alternative energy sources, is an imperative national goal. Administrative bodies empowered to regulate electric utilities have the authority — and indeed the duty — -to take appropriate action to further this goal. When, however, such action in*572volves the suppression of speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state interest. In this case, the record before us fails to show that the total ban on promotional advertising meets this requirement.15

Accordingly, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

concurring in the judgment.

One of the major difficulties in this case is the proper characterization of the Commission’s Policy Statement. I find it impossible to determine on the present record whether the Commission’s ban on all “promotional” advertising, in contrast to “institutional and informational” advertising, see ante, at 559, is intended to encompass more than “commercial speech.” I am inclined to think that Mr. Justice Stevens is correct that the Commission’s order prohibits more than mere proposals to engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions, and therefore I agree with his conclusion that the ban surely violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But even on the assumption that the Court is correct that the Commission’s order reaches only commercial speech, I agree with Mr. Justice Blackmun that “[n]o differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information.” Post, at 578.

Accordingly, with the qualifications implicit in the pre*573ceding paragraph, I join the opinions of Mr. Justice Black-mun and Mr. Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Public Service Commission’s ban on promotional advertising of electricity by public utilities is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I concur only in the Court’s judgment, however, because I believe the test now evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, non-coercive commercial speech.

The Court asserts, ante, at 566, that “a four-part analysis has developed” from our decisions concerning commercial speech. Under this four-part test a restraint on commercial “communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity” is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, and suppression is permitted whenever it “directly advances” a “substantial” governmental interest and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Ante, at 564 and 566. I agree with the Court that this level of intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech. I do not agree, however, that the Court’s four-part test is the proper one to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State .cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly.

Since the Court, without citing empirical data or other authority, finds a “direct link” between advertising and energy consumption, it leaves open the possibility that the State may suppress advertising of electricity in order to lessen demand for electricity. I, of course, agree with the Court that, *574in today’s world, energy conservation is a goal of paramount national and local importance. I disagree with the Court, however, when it says that suppression of speech may be a permissible means to achieve that goal. Mr. Justice Stevens appropriately notes: “The justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s message persuasive. Without the aid of any coercion, deception, or misinformation, truthful communication may persuade some citizens to consume more electricity than they otherwise would.” Post, at 581.

The Court recognizes that we have never held that commercial speech may be suppressed in order to further the State’s interest in discouraging purchases of the underlying product that is advertised. Ante, at 566, n. 9. Permissible restraints on commercial speech have been limited to measures designed to protect consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques.1 Those designed to deprive consumers of information about products or services that are legally offered for sale consistently have been invalidated.2

I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to “dampen” demand for or use of the product. Even though “commercial” speech is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt *575by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. As the Court recognizes, the State’s policy choices are insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citizens is molded by the information that government chooses to give them. Ante, at 566, n. 9 (“We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy”). See Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. Ill. Law Forum 1080, 1080-1083.

If the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public. See generally Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 243-251 (1976). Our cases indicate that this guarantee applies even to commercial speech. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we held that Virginia could not pursue its goal of encouraging the public to patronize the “professional pharmacist” (one who provided individual attention and a stable pharmacist-customer relationship) by “keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.” Id., at 770. We noted that our decision left the State free to pursue its goal of maintaining high standards among its pharmacists by “requiring] whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists.” Ibid.

We went on in Virginia Pharmacy Board to discuss the types of regulation of commercial speech that, due to the “commonsense differences” between this form of speech and other forms, are or may be constitutionally permissible. We indicated that government may impose reasonable “time, *576place, and manner” restrictions, and that it can deal with false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech. We noted that the question of advertising of illegal transactions and the special problems of the electronic broadcast media were not presented.

Concluding with a restatement of the type of restraint that is not permitted, we said: “What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of con-cededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. . . . [W]e conclude that the answer to this [question] is in the negative.” Id., at 773.

Virginia Pharmacy Board did not analyze the State’s interests to determine whether they were “substantial.” Obviously, preventing professional dereliction and low quality health care are “substantial,” legitimate, and important state goals. Nor did the opinion analyze the ban on speech to determine whether it “directly advance [d],” ante, at 566, 569, these goals. We also did not inquire whether a “more limited regulation of . . . commercial expression,” ante, at 570, would adequately serve the State’s interests. Rather, we held that the State “may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in ignorance.” 425 U. S., at 770. (Emphasis supplied.)

Until today, this principle has governed. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 (1977), we considered whether a town could ban “For Sale” signs on residential property to further its goal of promoting stable, racially integrated housing. We did note that the record did not establish that the ordinance was necessary to enable the State to achieve its goal. The holding of Linmark, however, was much broader.3 We stated:

“The constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, *577is far more basic. The Township Council here, like the Virginia Assembly in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information . . . which pertains to sales activity in Willing-boro. . . . The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners’ self-interest and the corporate interest of the township: they will choose to leave town. The Council’s concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of “For Sale” signs — with offerors communicating offers to offerees — but with the substance of the information communicated to Willingboro citizens.” Id., at 96.

The Court in Linmark resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of review applies to suppression of commercial information, where the purpose of the restaint is to influence behavior by depriving citizens of information. The Court followed the strong statement above with an explicit adoption of the standard advocated by Mr. Justice Brandéis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927): “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” 431 U. S., at 97.

Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 700-702 (1977), also applied to content-based restraints on commercial speech the same standard of review we have applied to other varieties of speech. There the Court held that a ban on advertising of contraceptives could not be justified *578by the State’s interest in avoiding “ 'legitimation’ of illicit sexual behavior” because the advertisements could not be characterized as “ 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action,’ ” id., at 701, quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969).

Our prior references to the “ 'commonsense differences’ ” between commercial speech and other speech " 'suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.’ ” Limnark Associates, 431 U. S., at 98, quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 771-772, n. 24. We have not suggested that the “commonsense differences” between commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress • truthful, nondeceptive, noneoercive commercial speech. The differences articulated by the Court, see ante, at 564, n. 6, justify a more permissive approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coercion, and these differences explain why doctrines designed to prevent “chilling” of protected speech are inapplicable to commercial speech. No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information. The Court stated in Carey v. Population Services International:

“Appellants suggest no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render these discredited arguments meritorious when offered to justify prohibitions on commercial speech. On the contrary, such arguments are clearly directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited advertising but at the ideas conveyed and form of expression — the core of First Amendment values.” 431 U. S., at 701, n. 28 (emphasis added).

*579It appears that the Court would permit the State to ban all direct advertising of air conditioning, assuming that a more limited restriction on such advertising would not effectively deter the public from cooling its homes.. In my view, our cases do not support this type of suppression. If a governmental unit believes that use or overuse of air conditioning is a serious problem, it must attack that problem directly, by prohibiting air conditioning or regulating thermostat levels. Just as the Commonwealth of Virginia may promote professionalism of pharmacists directly, so too New York may not promote energy conservation “by keeping the public in ignorance.” Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 770.

Me. Justice Stevens,

with whom Me. Justice Beennan joins, concurring in the judgment.

Because “commercial speech” is afforded less constitutional protection than other forms of speech,1 it is important that the commercial speech concept not be defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed. The issue in this case is whether New York’s prohibition on the promotion of the use of electricity through advertising is a ban on nothing but commercial speech.

In my judgment one of the two definitions the Court uses in addressing that issue is too broad and the other may be somewhat too narrow. The Court first describes commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Ante, at 561. Although it is not entirely clear whether this definition uses the subject matter of the speech or the motivation of the speaker as the limiting factor, it seems clear to me that it encompasses speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First Amendment. Neither a labor leader’s exhortation to *580strike, nor an economist’s dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protection because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. Thus, the Court’s first definition of commercial speech is unquestionably too broad.2

The Court’s second definition refers to “ ‘speech proposing a commercial transaction.’ ” Ante, at 562. A saleman’s solicitation, a broker’s offer, and a manufacturer’s publication of a price list or the terms of his standard warranty would unquestionably fit within this concept.3 Presumably, the definition is intended to encompass advertising that advises possible buyers of the availability of specific products at specific prices and describes the advantages of purchasing such items. Perhaps it also extends to other communications that do little more than make the name of a product or a service more familiar to the general public. Whatever the precise contours of the concept, and perhaps it is too early to enunciate an exact formulation, I am persuaded that it should not include the entire range of communication that is embraced within the term “promotional advertising.”

This case involves a governmental regulation that completely bans promotional advertising by an electric utility. This ban encompasses a great deal more than mere proposals to engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions. It prohibits all advocacy of the immediate or future use of elec*581tricity. It curtails expression by an informed and interested group of persons of their point of view on questions relating to the production and consumption of electrical energy — questions frequently discussed and debated by our political leaders. For example, an electric company’s advocacy of the use of electric heat for environmental reasons, as opposed to wood-burning stoves, would seem to fall squarely within New York’s promotional advertising ban and also within the bounds of maximum First Amendment protection. The breadth of the ban thus exceeds the boundaries of the commercial speech concept, however that concept may be defined.4

The justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s message persuasive. Without the aid of any coercion, deception, or misinformation, truthful communication may persuade some citizens to consume more electricity than they otherwise would. I assume that such a consequence would be undesirable and that government may therefore prohibit and punish the unnecessary or excessive use of electricity. But if the perceived harm associated with greater electrical usage is not sufficiently serious to justify direct regulation, surely it does'not constitute the kind of clear and present danger that can justify the suppression of speech.

*582Although they were written in a different context, the words used by Mr. Justice Brandéis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376-377, explain my reaction to the prohibition against advocacy involved in this case:

“But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution.” (Footnote omitted.)5

*583In sum, I concur in the result because I do not consider this to be a “commercial speech” case. Accordingly, I see no need to decide whether the Court’s four-part analysis, ante, at 566, adequately protects commercial speech — as properly defined— in the face of a blanket ban of the sort involved in this case.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The Court today invalidates an order issued by the New York Public Service Commission designed to promote a policy that has been declared to be of critical national concern. The order was issued by the Commission in 1973 in response to the Mideastern oil embargo crisis. It prohibits electric corporations “from promoting the use of electricity through the use of advertising, subsidy payments ... , or employee incentives.” State of New York Public Service Commission, Case No. 26532 (Dec. 5, 1973), App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added). Although the immediate crisis created by the oil embargo has subsided, the ban on promotional advertising remains in effect. The regulation was re-examined by the New York Public Service Commission in 1977. Its constitutionality was subsequently upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, which concluded that the paramount national interest in energy conservation justified its retention.1

*584The Court’s asserted justification for invalidating the New York law is the public interest discerned by the Court to underlie the First Amendment in the free flow of commercial information. Prior to this Court’s recent decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), however, commercial speech was afforded no protection under the First Amendment whatsoever. See, e. g.¡ Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). Given what seems to me full recognition of the holding of Virginia Pharmacy Board that commercial speech is entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection, I think the Court is nonetheless incorrect in invalidating the carefully considered state ban on promotional advertising in light of pressing national and state energy needs.

The Court’s analysis in my view is wrong in several respects. Initially, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the speech of a state-created monopoly, which is the subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. I also think that the Court errs here in failing to recognize that the state law is most accurately viewed as an economic regulation and that the speech involved (if it falls within the scope of the First Amendment at all) occupies a significantly more subordinate position in the hierarchy of First Amendment values than the Court gives it today. Finally, the Court in reaching its decision improperly substitutes its own judgment for that of the State in deciding how a proper ban on promotional advertising should be drafted. With regard to this latter point, the Court adopts as its final part of a four-part test a “no more *585extensive than necessary” analysis that will unduly impair a state legislature’s ability to adopt legislation reasonably designed to promote interests that have always been rightly thought to be of great importance to the State.

I

In concluding that appellant’s promotional advertising constitutes protected speech, the Court reasons that speech by electric utilities is valuable to consumers who must decide whether to use the monopoly service or turn to an alternative energy source, and if they decide to use the service how much of it to purchase. Ante, at 567. The Court in so doing “assume [s] that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising.” Ante, at 568. The Court’s analysis ignores the fact that the monopoly here is entirely state-created and subject to an extensive state regulatory scheme from which it derives benefits as well as burdens.

While this Court has stated that the “capacity [of speech] for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777 (1978), the source of the speech nevertheless may be relevant in determining whether a given message is protected under the First Amendment.2 When the source of the speech is a state-created monopoly such as this, traditional First Amendment concerns, if they come into play at all, certainly do not justify the broad interventionist role adopted by the Court today. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. *586Public Service Comm’n, ante, at 549-550, Mr. Justice Black-mun observed:

“A public utility is a state-created monopoly. See, e. g., N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 68 (McKinney 1955); Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Developments in the States 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 458-461 (1979); Comment, Utility Rates, Consumers, and the New York State Public Service Commission, 39 Albany L. Rev. 707, 709-714 (1975). Although monopolies generally are against the public policies of the United States and of the State of New York, see, e. g., N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 (McKinney 1968 and Supp. 1979-1980), . . . utilities are permitted to operate as monopolies because of a determination by the State that the public interest is better served by protecting them from competition. See 2 A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 113-171 (1971).

“This exceptional grant of power to private enterprises justifies extensive oversight on the part of the State to protect the ratepayers from exploitation of the monopoly power through excessive rates and other forms of overreaching. . . . New York law gives its Public Service Commission plenary supervisory powers over all property, real and personal, 'used or to be used for or in connection with or to facilitate the . . . sale or furnishing of electricity for light, heat or power.’ N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 2 (12) and 66 (1) (McKinney 1955).”

Thus, although First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, holds that speech of a corporation is entitled to some First Amendment protection, it by no means follows that a utility with monopoly power conferred by a State is also entitled to such protection.

The state-created monopoly status of a utility arises from the unique characteristics of the services that a utility provides. As recognized in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579, 595-596 (1976), “public utility regulation typically *587assumes that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that public controls are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation.” The consequences of this natural monopoly in my view justify much more wide-ranging supervision and control of a utility under the First Amendment than this Court held in Bellotti to be permissible with regard to ordinary corporations. Corporate status is generally conferred as a result of a State’s determination that the corporate characteristics “enhance its efficiency as an economic entity.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 825-826 (Rehnqtjist, J., dissenting). A utility, by contrast, fulfills a function that serves special public interests as a result of the natural monopoly of the service provided. Indeed, the extensive regulations governing decisionmaking by public utilities suggest that for purposes of First Amendment analysis, a utility is far closer to a state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary corporation.3 Accordingly, I think a State has broad discretion in determining the statements that a utility may make in that such statements emanate from the entity created by the State to provide important and unique public services. And a state regulatory body charged with the oversight of these types of services may reasonably decide to impose on the utility a special duty to conform its conduct to *588the agency’s conception of the public interest. Thus I think it is constitutionally permissible for it to decide that promotional advertising is inconsistent with the public interest in energy conservation. I also think New York’s ban on such advertising falls within the scope of permissible state regulation of an economic activity by an entity that could not exist in corporate form, say nothing of enjoy monopoly status, were it not for the laws of New York.4

II

This Court has previously recognized that although commercial speech may be entitled to First Amendment protection, that protection is not as extensive as that accorded to the advocacy of ideas. Thus, we stated in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978):

“Expression concerning purely commercial transactions has come within the ambit of the Amendment’s protec*589tion only recently. In rejecting the notion that such speech 'is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment/ Virginia Pharmacy, supra, at 761, we were careful not to hold 'that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms’ of speech. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24. We have not discarded the 'common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. Ibid. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” (Footnote omitted.)

The Court’s decision today fails to give due deference to this subordinate position of commercial speech. The Court in so doing returns to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.

I had thought by now it had become well established that a State has broad discretion in imposing economic regulations. As this Court stated in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934):

''[T]here can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects. . . .

*590“So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. ... [I]t does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise.”

And Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed more recently in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963):

“The doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely — has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”

The State of New York has determined here that economic realities require the grant of monopoly status to public utilities in order to distribute efficiently the services they provide, and in granting utilities such status it has made them subject to an extensive regulatory scheme. When the State adopted this scheme and when its Public Service Commission issued its initial ban on promotional advertising in 1973, commercial speech had not been held to fall within the scope of the First Amendment at all. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), however, subsequently accorded commercial speech a limited measure of First Amendment protection.

*591The Court today holds not only that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, but also that when it is protected a State may not regulate it unless its reason for doing so amounts to a “substantial” governmental interest, its regulation “directly advances” that interest, and its manner of regulation is “not more extensive than necessary” to serve the interest. Ante, at 566. The test adopted by the Court thus elevates the protection accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the First Amendment to a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech. I think the Court in so doing has effectively accomplished the “devitalization” of the First Amendment that it counseled against in Ohralik. I think it has also, by labeling economic regulation of business conduct as a restraint on “free speech,” gone far to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as Lochner and Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927). New York’s order here is in my view more akin to an economic regulation to which virtually complete deference should be accorded by this Court.

I doubt there would be any question as to the constitutionality of New York’s conservation effort if the Public Service Commission had chosen to raise the price of electricity, see, e. g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Cory., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), to condition its sale on specified terms, see, e. g., Nebbia v. New York, supra, at 527-528, or to restrict its production, see, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). In terms of constitutional values, I think that such controls are virtually indistinguishable from the State’s ban on promotional advertising.

An ostensible justification for striking down New York’s ban on promotional advertising is that this Court has previously “rejected the 'highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. '[PJeople will perceive their own best interests if *592only they are well enough informed and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them. . ..’ ” Ante, at 562. Whatever the merits of this view, I think the Court has carried its logic too far here.

The view apparently derives from the Court’s frequent reference to the “marketplace of ideas,” which was deemed analogous to the commercial market in which a laissez-faire policy would lead to optimum economic decisionmaking under the guidance of the “invisible hand.” See, e. g., Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776). This notion was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919), wherein he stated that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . .” See also, e. g., Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm’n, ante, at 534; J. Mill, On Liberty (1858); J. Milton, Areo-pagitica, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing (1644).

While it is true that an important objective of the First Amendment is to foster the free flow of information, identification of speech that falls within its protection is not aided by the metaphorical reference to a “marketplace of ideas.” There is no reason for believing that the marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more than there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions in the commercial market. See, e. g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 967-981 (1978). Indeed, many types of speech have been held to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment, thereby subject to governmental regulation, despite this Court’s references to a marketplace of ideas. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U. S. 250 (1952) (group libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). It also has been held that the government has *593a greater interest in regulating some types of protected speech than others. See, e. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, supra (commercial speech). And as this Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 344, n. 9 (1974): “Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo [the] harm of a defamatory falsehood. Indeed the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.” The Court similarly has recognized that false and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection. See, e. g., ante, at 566.

The above examples illustrate that in a number of instances government may constitutionally decide that societal interests justify the imposition of restrictions on the free flow of information. When the question is whether a given commercial message is protected, I do not think this Court’s determination that the information will “assist” consumers justifies judicial invalidation of a reasonably drafted state restriction on such speech when the restriction is designed to promote a concededly substantial state interest. I consequently disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the societal interest in the dissemination of commercial information is sufficient to justify a restriction on the State’s authority to regulate promotional advertising by utilities; indeed, in the case of a regulated monopoly, it is difficult for me to distinguish “society” from the state legislature and the Public Service Commission. Nor do I think there is any basis for concluding that individual citizens of the State will recognize the need for and act to promote energy conservation to the extent the government deems appropriate, if only the channels of communication are left open.5 Thus, even if I were *594to agree that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, I would hold here that the State’s decision to ban promotional advertising, in light of the substantial state interest at stake, is a constitutionally permissible exercise of its power to adopt regulations designed to promote the interests of its citizens.

The plethora of opinions filed in this case highlights the doctrinal difficulties that emerge from this Court’s decisions granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech. My Brother Stevens, quoting Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376-377 (1927), includes Mr. Justice Brandéis’ statement that “[t]hose who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did-not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.” Ante, at 582. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion, joins only in the Court’s judgment because he believes that the Court’s opinion “does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech.” Ante, at 573. Both Mr. Justice Stevens, ante, at 582, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, ante, at 577, would apply the following formulation by Mr. Justice Brandéis of the clear-and-present-danger test to the regulation of speech at issue in this case:

“If there be time to expose through discussion the false*595hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” Whitney v. California, supra, at 377 (concurring opinion).

Although the Court today does not go so far as to adopt this position, its reasons for invalidating New York’s ban on promotional advertising make it quite difficult for a legislature to draft a statute regulating promotional advertising that will satisfy the First Amendment requirements established by the Court in this context. See Part III, infra.

Two ideas are here at war with one another, and their resolution, although it be on a judicial battlefield, will be a very difficult one. The sort of “advocacy” of which Mr. Justice Brandéis spoke was not the advocacy on the part of a utility to use more of its product. Nor do I think those who won our independence, while declining to “exalt order at the cost of liberty,” would have viewed a merchant’s unfettered freedom to advertise in hawking his wares as a “liberty” not subject to extensive regulation in light of the government’s substantial interest in attaining “order” in the economic sphere.

While I agree that when the government attempts to regulate speech of those expressing views on public issues, the speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it presents “a clear and present danger” of a substantive evil that the government has a right to prohibit, see, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919), I think it is important to recognize that this test is appropriate in the political context in light of the central importance of such speech to our system of self-government. As observed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976):

“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to *596such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people/ ”

And in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964), this Court stated that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”

The First Amendment, however, does not always require a clear and present danger to be present before the government may regulate speech. Although First Amendment protection is not limited to the “exposition of ideas” on public issues, see, e. g., Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948)— both because the line between the informing and the entertaining is elusive and because art, literature, and the like may contribute to important First Amendment interests of the individual in freedom of speech — it is well established that the government may regulate obscenity even though its does not present a clear and present danger. Compare, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 57-58 (1973), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969). Indecent speech, at least when broadcast over the airwaves, also may be regulated absent a clear and present danger of the type described by Mr. Justice Brandéis and required by this Court in Brandenburg. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). And in a slightly different context this Court declined to apply the clear-and-present-danger test to a conspiracy among members of the press in violation of the Sherman Act because to do so would “degrade” that doctrine. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 7 (1945). Nor does the Court today apply the clear-and-present-danger test in invalidating New York’s ban on promotional advertising. As noted above, in these and other contexts the Court has clearly rejected the notion that there must be a free “marketplace of ideas.”

If the complaint of those who feel the Court’s opinion does not go far enough is that the “only test of truth is its ability *597to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas” — the test advocated by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address, and by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion) — there is no reason whatsoever to limit the protection accorded commercial speech to “truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive” speech. See ante, at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). If the “commercial speech” is in fact misleading, the “marketplace of ideas” will in time reveal that fact. It may not reveal it sufficiently soon to avoid harm to numerous people, but if the reasoning of Brandéis and Holmes is applied in this context, that was one of the risks we took in protecting free speech in a democratic society.

Unfortunately, although the “marketplace of ideas” has a historically and sensibly defined context in the world of political speech, it has virtually none in the realm of business transactions. Even so staunch a defender of the First Amendment as Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S., at 650, n., stated:

“Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant’ who goes from door to door 'selling pots.’ ”

And yet, with the change in solicitation and advertising techniques, the line between what Central Hudson did here and the peddler selling pots in Alexandria a generation ago is difficult, if not impossible to fix. Doubtless that was why Mr. Justice Black joined the unanimous opinion of the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S., at 54, in which the Court stated:

“This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these pub-*598lie thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

I remain of the view that the Court unlocked a Pandora’s Box when it “elevated” commercial speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976). The line between “commercial speech,” and the kind of speech that those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a technically or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer problems than has the development of judicial doctrine in this area since Virginia Pharmacy Board. For in the world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a “fraudulent” idea: there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the “marketplace of ideas” through our majoritarian system of election and representative government. The free flow of information is important in this context not because it will lead, to the discovery of any objective “truth,” but because it is essential to our system of self-government.

The notion that more speech is the remedy to expose falsehood and fallacies is wholly out of place in the commercial bazaar, where if applied logically the remedy of one who was defrauded would be merely a statement, available upon request, reciting the Latin maxim “caveat emptor.” But since “fraudulent speech” in this area is to be remediable under Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, the remedy of one defrauded is a lawsuit or an agency proceeding based on common-law notions of fraud that are separated by a world of difference *599from the realm of politics and government. What time, legal decisions, and common sense have so widely severed, I declined to join in Virginia Pharmacy Board, and regret now to see the Court reaping the seeds that it there sowed. For in a democracy, the economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson that our ancestors learned long ago, and that our descendants will undoubtedly have to relearn many years hence.

Ill

The Court concedes that the state interest in energy conservation is plainly substantial, ante, at 568, as is the State’s concern that its rates be fair and efficient. Ante, at 569. It also concedes that there is a direct link between the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising and the State’s interest in conservation. Ibid. The Court nonetheless strikes down the ban on promotional advertising because the Commission has failed to demonstrate, under the final part of the Court’s four-part test, that its regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interest. Ante, at 569-571. In reaching this conclusion, the Court conjures up potential advertisements that a utility might make that conceivably would result in net energy savings. The Court does not indicate that the New York Public Service Commission has in fact construed its ban on “promotional” advertising to preclude the dissemination of information that clearly would result in a net energy savings, nor does it even suggest that the Commission has been confronted with and rejected such an advertising proposal.6 The final part of the Court’s test *600thus leaves room for so many hypothetical “better” ways that any ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the invalidation of what the state agency actually did. As Mr. Justice Blackmun observed in Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 188-189 (1979) (concurring opinion):

“A° judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.”

Here the Court concludes that the State’s interest in energy conservation cannot justify a blanket ban on promotional advertising. In its statement of the facts, the Court observes that the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising is not “a perfect vehicle for conserving energy.” It states:

“[T]he Commission’s order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption during periods when demand for electricity is low. By limiting growth in ‘off-peak’ consumption, the ban limits the ‘beneficial side effects’ of such growth in terms of more efficient use of existing powerplants. [App. to Juris. Statement] 37a.” Ante, at 559.

The Court’s analysis in this regard is in my view fundamentally misguided because it fails to recognize that the beneficial side effects of “more efficient use” may be inconsistent with the goal of energy conservation. Indeed, the Commission explicitly found that the promotion of off-peak consumption would impair conservation efforts.7 The Commission stated:

“Increased off-peak generation, . . . while conferring *601some beneficial side effects, also consumes valuable energy resources and, if it is the result of increased sales, necessarily creates incremental air pollution and thermal discharges to waterways. More important, any increase in off-peak generation from most of the major companies producing electricity in this State would not, at this time, be produced from coal or nuclear resources, but would require the use of oil-fired generating facilities. The increased requirement for fuel oil to serve the incremental off-peak load created by promotional advertising would aggravate the nation’s already unacceptably high level of dependence on foreign sources of supply and would, in addition, frustrate rather than encourage conservation efforts.” App. to Juris. Statement 37a.8

The Court also observes, as the Commission acknowledged, that the ban on promotional advertising can achieve only “piecemeal conservationism” because oil dealers are not under the Commission’s jurisdiction, and they remain free to advertise. Until I have mastered electrical engineering and marketing, I am not prepared to contradict by virtue of my judicial office those who assume that the ban will be successful in making a substantial contribution to conservation efforts. *602And I doubt that any of this Court’s First Amendment decisions justify striking down the Commission’s order because more steps toward conservation could have been made This is especially true when, as here, the Commission lacks authority over oil dealers.

The Court concludes that the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising must be struck down because it is more extensive than necessary: it may result in the suppression of advertising by utilities that promotes the use of electrical devices or services that cause no net increase in total energy use. The Court’s reasoning in this regard, however, is highly speculative. The Court provides two examples that it claims support its conclusion. It first states that both parties acknowledge that the “heat pump” will be “a major improvement in electric heating,” and that but for the ban the utilities would advertise this type of “energy efficien[t]” product.9 The New York Public Service Commission, however, considered the merits of the heat pump and concluded that it would most likely result in an overall increase in electric energy consumption. The Commission stated:

“[Installation of a heat pump means also installation of central air-conditioning. To this extent, promotion of off-peak electric space heating involves promotion of on-peak summer air-conditioning as well as on-peak usage *603of electricity for water heating. And the price of electricity to most consumers in the State does not now fully reflect the much higher marginal costs of on-peak consumption in summer peaking markets. In these circumstances, there would be a subsidization of consumption on-peak, and consequently, higher rates for all consumers.” App. to Juris. Statement 58a.

Subsidization of peak consumption not only may encourage the use of scarce energy resources during peak periods, but also may lead to larger Preserve generating capacity requirements for the State.

The Court next asserts that electric heating as a backup to solar and other heat may be an efficient alternative energy source. Ante, at 570. The Court fails to establish, however, that an advertising proposal of this sort was properly presented to the Commission. Indeed, the Court’s concession that the Commission did not make findings on this issue suggests that the Commission did not even consider it. Nor does the Court rely on any support for its assertion other than the assertion of appellant. Rather, it speculates that “[i]n the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we must credit as within the realm of possibility the claim that electric heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances.” Ibid10

Ordinarily it is the role of the State Public Service Commission to make factual determinations concerning whether a device or service will result in a net energy savings and, if so, whether and to what extent state law permits dissemination of information about the device or service. Otherwise, *604as here, this Court will have no factual basis for its assertions. And the State will never have an opportunity to consider the issue and thus to construe its law in a manner consistent with the Federal Constitution. As stated in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 256-257 (1953):

“It would indeed be undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation. Nor are we so ready to frustrate the expressed will of Congress or that of the state legislatures. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 172.”

I think the Court would do well to heed the admonition in Barrows here. The terms of the order of the New York Public Service Commission in my view indicate that advertising designed to promote net savings in energy use does not fall within the scope of the ban. The order prohibits electric corporations “from promoting the use of electricity through the use of advertising, subsidy payments ... , or employee incentives.” App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added). It is not clear to me that advertising that is likely to result in net savings of energy is advertising that “promot[es] the use of electricity,” nor does the Court point to any language in the Commission order that suggests it has adopted this construction. Rather, it would seem more accurate to characterize such advertising as designed to “discourage” the use of electricity.11 Indeed, I think it is quite likely that the Com*605mission would view advertising that would clearly result in a net savings in energy as consistent with the objectives of its order and therefore permissible.12 The Commission, for example, has authorized the dissemination of information that would result in shifts in electrical energy demand, thereby reducing the demand for electricity during peak periods. Id., at 37a.13 It has also indicated a willingness to consider at least some other types of “specific proposals” submitted by utilities. Id., at 37a-38a. And it clearly permits informational as opposed to promotional dissemination of information. Id., at 43a-46a. Even if the Commission were ultimately to reject the view that its ban on promotional advertising does not include advertising that results in net energy savings, I think the Commission should at least be given an opportunity to consider it.

It is in my view inappropriate for the Court to invalidate the State’s ban on commercial advertising here, based on its speculation that in some cases the advertising may result in a net savings in electrical energy use, and in the cases in which it is clear a net energy savings would result from utility advertising, the Public Service Commission would apply its *606ban so as to proscribe such advertising. Even assuming that the Court’s speculation is correct, I do not think it follows that facial invalidation of the ban is the appropriate course. As stated in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974), “even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally pre-scribable . . . conduct. . . .’ CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580-581 (1973).” This is clearly the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.

*532Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In January 1999, the Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09 (2000). Petitioners, a group of cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar manufacturers and retailers, filed suit in Federal District Court claiming that the regulations violate federal law and the United States Constitution. In large measure, the District Court determined that the regulations are valid and enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the regulations are not pre-empted by federal law and do not violate the First Amendment. The first question presented for our review is whether certain cigarette advertising regulations are pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. The second question presented is whether certain regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment.

*533hH

In November 1998, Massachusetts, along with over 40 other States, reached a landmark agreement with major manufacturers in the cigarette industry. The signatory States settled their claims against these companies in exchange for monetary payments and permanent injunctive relief. See App. 253-258 (Outline of Terms for Massachusetts in National Tobacco Settlement); Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 23, 1998), http://www.naag.org. At the press conference covering Massachusetts’ decision to sign the agreement, then-Attorney General Scott Harshbarger announced that as one of his last acts in office, he would create consumer protection regulations to restrict advertising and sales practices for tobacco products. He explained that the regulations were necessary in order to “close holes” in the settlement agreement and “to stop Big Tobacco from recruiting new customers among the children of Massachusetts.” App. 251.

In January 1999, pursuant to his authority to prevent unfair or deceptive practices in trade, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 93A, § 2 (1997), the Massachusetts Attorney General (Attorney General) promulgated regulations governing the sale and advertisement of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. The purpose of the cigarette and smokeless tobacco regulations is “to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under legal age . . . [and] in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.” 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §21.01 (2000). The similar purpose of the cigar regulations is “to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigars and little cigars are packaged, marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts [so that] . . . consumers may be adequately informed about the health *534risks associated with cigar smoking, its addictive properties, and the false perception that cigars are a safe alternative to cigarettes . . . [and so that] the incidence of cigar use by children under legal age is addressed ... in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.” Ibid. The regulations have a broader scope than the master settlement agreement, reaching advertising, sales practices, and members of the tobacco industry not covered by the agreement. The regulations place a variety of restrictions on outdoor advertising, point-of-sale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail, promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars.

The cigarette and smokeless tobacco regulations being challenged before this Court provide:

“(2) Retail Outlet Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§21.04(4)], it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or distributes cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products through a retail outlet located within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following retail outlet sales practices:

“(c) Using self-service displays of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products;

“(d) Failing to place cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products out of the reach of all consumers, and in a location accessible only to outlet personnel.” §§ 21.04(2)(c)-(d).

“(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in [§ 21.04(6)], it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer to engage in any of the following practices:

“(a) Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed stadiums and advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed toward or visible from the *535outside of the establishment, in any location that is within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school;

“(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products any portion of which is placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school, and which is not an adult-only retail establishment.” §§21.04(5)(a)-(b).

The cigar regulations that are still at issue provide:

“(1) Retail Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§22.06(4)], it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or distributes cigars or little cigars directly to consumers within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following practices:

“(a) sampling of cigars or little cigars or promotional give-aways of cigars or little cigars.” §21.06(l)(a).

“(2) Retail Outlet Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§ 22.06(4)], it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or distributes cigars or little cigars through a retail outlet located within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following retail outlet sales practices:

“(c) Using self-service displays of cigars or little cigars;

“(d) Failing to place cigars and little cigars out of the reach of all consumers, and in a location accessible only to outlet personnel.” §§22.06(2)(c)-(d).

“(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in [§ 22.06(6)], it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer to engage in any of the following practices:

*536“(a) Outdoor advertising of cigars or little cigars, including advertising in enclosed stadiums and advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed toward or visible from the outside of the establishment, in any location within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school;

“(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigars or little cigars any portion of which is placed low;er than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school, and which is not an adult-only retail establishment.” §§22.06(5)(a)-(b).

The term “advertisement” is defined as:

“any oral, written, graphic, or pictorial statement or representation, made by, or on behalf of, any person who manufactures, packages, imports for sale, distributes or sells within Massachusetts [tobacco products], the purpose or effect of which is to promote the use or sale of the product. Advertisement includes, without limitation, any picture, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, graphic display, visual image, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of [tobacco product]. This includes, without limitation, utilitarian items and permanent or semi-permanent fixtures with such indicia of product identification such as lighting fixtures, awnings, display cases, clocks and door mats, but does not include utilitarian items with a volume of 200 cubic inches or less.” §§21.03, 22.03.

Before the effective date of the regulations, February 1, 2000, members of the tobacco industry sued the Attorney General in the United States District Court for the District *537of Massachusetts. Four cigarette manufacturers (Lorillard Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Philip Morris Incorporated), a maker of smokeless tobacco products (U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Company), and several cigar manufacturers and retailers claimed that many of the regulations violate the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The parties sought summary judgment. 76 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (1999); 84 F. Supp. 2d 180,183 (2000).

In its first ruling, the District Court considered the Supremacy Clause claim that the FCLAA, 15 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq., pre-empts the cigarette advertising regulations. 76 F. Supp. 2d, at 128-134. The FCLAA prescribes the health warnings that must appear on packaging and in advertisements for cigarettes. The FCLAA contains a pre-emption provision that prohibits a State from imposing any “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion of . . . cigarettes.” § 1334(b). The FCLAA’s pre-emption provision does not cover smokeless tobacco or cigars.

The District Court explained that the central question for purposes of pre-emption is whether the regulations create a predicate legal duty based on smoking and health. The court reasoned that to read the pre-emption provision to proscribe any state advertising regulation enacted due to health concerns about smoking would expand Congress’ purpose beyond a reasonable scope and leave States powerless to regulate in the area. The court concluded that restrictions on the location of advertising are not based on smoking and health and thus are not pre-empted by the FCLAA. The District Court also concluded that a provision that permitted retailers to display a black and white “tombstone” sign reading “Tobacco Products Sold Here,” 940 Code of Mass. Regs. § 21.04(6) (2000), was pre-empted by the FCLAA.

*538In a separate ruling, the District Court considered the claim that the Attorney General’s regulations violate the First Amendment. 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 183-196. Rejecting petitioners’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply, the court applied the four-part test of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980), for commercial speech. The court reasoned that the Attorney General had provided an adequate basis for regulating cigars and smokeless tobacco as well as cigarettes because of the similarities among the products. The court held that the outdoor advertising regulations, which prohibit outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground, do not violate the First Amendment because they advance a substantial government interest and are narrowly tailored to suppress no more speech than necessary. The court concluded that the sales practices regulations, which restrict the location and distribution of tobacco products, survive scrutiny because they do not implicate a significant speech interest. The court invalidated the point-of-sale advertising regulations, which require that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor, finding that the Attorney General had not provided sufficient justification for that restriction. The District Court’s ruling with respect to the cigar warning requirements and the Commerce Clause is not before this Court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued a stay pending appeal, App. 8-9, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court’s judgment, Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F. 3d 30 (2000). With respect to the Supremacy Clause, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the Attorney General’s cigarette. advertising regulations are not preempted by the FCLAA. The First Circuit was persuaded by the reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits, which had concluded that the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision is ambiguous, and held that the provision pre-empts regula*539tions of the content, but not the location, of cigarette advertising. See Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F. 3d 100, 104-110 (CA2 1999); Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 189 F. 3d 633, 636-640 (CA7 1999).

With respect to the First Amendment, the Court of Appeals applied the Central Hudson test. 447 U. S. 557 (1980). The court held that the outdoor advertising regulations do not violate the First Amendment. The court concluded that the restriction on outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground directly advances the State’s substantial interest in preventing tobacco use by minors. The court also found that the outdoor advertising regulations restrict no more speech than necessary, reasoning that the distance chosen by the Attorney General is the sort of determination better suited for legislative and executive decisionmakers than courts. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the point-of-sale advertising regulations, again concluding that the Attorney General is better suited to determine what restrictions are necessary. The Court of Appeals also held that the sales practices regulations are valid under the First Amendment. The court found that the regulations directly advance the State’s interest in preventing minors’ access to tobacco products and that the regulations are narrowly tailored because retailers have a variety of other means to present the packaging of their products and to allow customers to examine the products.

As for the argument that smokeless tobacco and cigars are different from cigarettes, the court expressed some misgivings about equating all tobacco products, but ultimately decided that the Attorney General had presented sufficient evidence with respect to all three products to regulate them similarly. The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to the cigar warning requirements and the Commerce Clause is not before this Court.

*540The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate pending disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari. App. 13. The cigarette manufacturers and U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Company filed a petition, challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to the outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations on pre-emption and First Amendment grounds, and the sales practices regulations on First Amendment grounds. The cigar companies filed a separate petition, again raising a First Amendment challenge to the outdoor advertising, point-of-sale advertising, and sales practices regulations. We granted both petitions, 531 U. S. 1068 (2001), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals with respect to whether the FCLAA pre-empts cigarette advertising regulations like those at issue here, cf. Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept., 195 F. 3d 1065 (CA9 1999), and to decide the important First Amendment issues presented in these cases.

II

Before reaching the First Amendment issues, we must decide to what extent federal law pre-empts the Attorney General’s regulations. The cigarette petitioners contend that the FCLAA, 15 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq., pre-empts the Attorney General’s cigarette advertising regulations.

A

Article VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution commands that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427 (1819) (“It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments”). This relatively clear and simple mandate has generated considerable discussion in cases where we have had to discern whether Congress has pre-empted state action in a particu*541lar area. State action may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional enactment, see, e. g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517 (1992), by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, see, e. g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982), or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment, see, e. g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869-874 (2000).

In the FCLAA, Congress has crafted a comprehensive federal scheme governing the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. The FCLAAs pre-emption provision provides:

“(a) Additional statements

“No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.

“(b) State regulations

“No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U. S. C. § 1334.

The FCLAAs pre-emption provision does not cover smokeless tobacco or cigars.

In these cases, our task is to identify the domain expressly pre-empted, see Cipollone, supra, at 517, because “an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute . . . supports a reasonable inference . . . that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters,” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 288 (1995). Congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” of our inquiry. Cipollone, supra, at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because “federal law is said to bar state action in [a] fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,” namely, advertising, see Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 108 (1932), we “wor[k] on the assumption that *542the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996).

Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 438 (1999). In the pre-emption provision, Congress unequivocally precludes the requirement of any additional statements on cigarette packages beyond those provided in § 1333. 15 U. S. C. § 1334(a). Congress further precludes States or localities from imposing any requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. § 1334(b). Without question, the second clause is more expansive than the first; it employs far more sweeping language to describe the state action that is pre-empted. We must give meaning to each element of the pre-emption provision. We are aided in our interpretation by considering the predecessor pre-emption provision and the circumstances in which the current language was adopted. See Medtronic, supra, at 486; McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136, 139 (1991); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988).

In 1964, the groundbreaking Report of the Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health concluded that “[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.” Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, U. S. Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee, Smoking and Health 33. In 1965, Congress enacted the FCLAA as a proactive measure in the face of impending regulation by federal agencies and the States. Pub. L. 89-92,79 Stat. 282. See also Cipollone, supra, at 513-515. The purpose of the FCLAA was twofold: to inform the public adequately about the hazards of cigarette smoking, and to protect the national *543economy from interference due to diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to the relationship between smoking and health. Pub. L. 89-92, § 2. The FCLAA prescribed a label for cigarette packages: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.” §4. The FCLAA also required the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to report annually to Congress about the health consequences of smoking and the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. § 5.

Section 5 of the FCLAA included a pre-emption provision in which “Congress spoke precisely and narrowly.” Cipol-lone, supra, at 518. Subsection (a) prohibited any requirement of additional statements on cigarette packaging. Subsection (b) provided that “[n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.” Section 10 of the FCLAA set a termination date of July 1, 1969, for these provisions. As we have previously explained, “on their face, [the preemption] provisions merely prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels [subsection (a)] or in cigarette advertisements [subsection (b)].” Cipollone, supra, at 518.

The FCLAA was enacted with the expectation that Congress would reexamine it in 1969 in light of the developing information about cigarette smoking and health. H. R. Rep. No. 586, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1965); 111 Cong. Rec. 16541 (1965). In the intervening years, Congress received reports and recommendations from the HEW Secretary and the FTC. S. Rep. No. 91-566, pp. 2-6 (1969). The HEW Secretary recommended that Congress strengthen the warning, require the warning on all packages and in advertisements, and publish tar and nicotine levels on packages and in advertisements. Id., at 4. The FTC made similar and additional *544recommendations. The FTC sought a complete ban on radio and television advertising, a requirement that broadcasters devote time for health hazard announcements concerning smoking, and increased funding for public education and research about smoking. Id., at 6. The FTC urged Congress not to continue to prevent federal agencies from regulating cigarette advertising. Id., at 10. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had concluded that advertising which promoted the use of cigarettes created a duty in broadcast stations to provide information about the hazards of cigarette smoking. Id., at 6-7.

In 1969, House and Senate committees held hearings about the health effects of cigarette smoking and advertising by the cigarette industry. The bill that emerged from the House of Representatives strengthened the warning and maintained the pre-emption provision. The Senate amended that bill, adding the ban on radio and television advertising, and changing the pre-emption language to its present form. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-897, pp. 4-5 (1970).

The final result was the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, in which Congress, following the Senate’s amendments, made three significant changes to the FCLAA. Pub. L. 91-222, §2, 84 Stat. 87. First, Congress drafted a new label that read: “Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.” FCLAA, §4. Second, Congress declared it unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium off electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the FCCr-J6. Finally, Congress enacted the current pre-emption provision, which proscribes any “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes. § 5(b). The new subsection (b) did not pre-empt regulation by federal agencies, freeing the FTC to impose warning requirements in cigarette advertising. See Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 515. The new pre-emption provision, like its predecessor, only applied to cigarettes, and not other tobacco products.

*545In 1984, Congress again amended the FCLAA in the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act. Pub. L. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200. The purpose of the Act was to “provide a new strategy for making Americans more aware of any adverse health effects of smoking, to assure the timely and widespread dissemination of research findings and to enable individuals to make informed decisions about smoking.” §2. The Act established a series of warnings to appear on a rotating basis on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertising, § 4, and directed the Health and Human Services Secretary to create and implement an educational program about the health effects of cigarette smoking, §3.

The FTC has continued to report on trade practices in the cigarette industry. In 1999, the first year since the master settlement agreement, the FTC reported that the cigarette industry expended $8.24 billion on advertising and promotions, the largest expenditure ever. FTC, Cigarette Report for 1999, p. 1 (2000). Substantial increases were found in point-of-sale promotions, payments made to retailers to facilitate sales, and retail offers such as buy one, get one free, or product giveaways. Id., at 4-5. Substantial decreases, however, were reported for outdoor advertising and transit advertising. Id., at 2. Congress and federal agencies continue to monitor advertising and promotion practices in the cigarette industry.

The scope and meaning of the current pre-emption provision become clearer once we consider the original preemption language and the amendments to the FCLAA. Without question, “the plain language of the pre-emption provision in the 1969 Act is much broader.” Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 520. Rather than preventing only “statements,” the amended provision reaches all “requirement^] or prohibition^]... imposed under State law.” And, although the former statute reached only statements “in the advertising,” the current provision governs “with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes. See ibid. Congress expanded the pre-emption provision with respect to the *546States, and at the same time, it allowed the FTC to regulate cigarette advertising. Congress also prohibited cigarette advertising in electronic media altogether. Viewed in light of the context in which the current pre-emption provision was adopted, we must determine whether the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts’ regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes.

B

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the FCLAA pre-empts any “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... with respect to the advertising or promotion of . . . cigarettes,” 15 U. S. C. § 1334(b), but concluded that the FCLAA does not nullify Massachusetts’ cigarette advertising regulations. The court concentrated its analysis on whether the regulations are “with respect to” advertising and promotion, relying on two of its sister Circuits to conclude that the FCLAA only pre-empts regulations of the content of cigarette advertising. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the Attorney General’s regulations are a form of zoning, a traditional area of state power; therefore the presumption against pre-emption applied.

The cigarette petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals’ “with respect to” analysis is inconsistent with the FCLAA’s statutory text and legislative history, and gives the States license to prohibit almost all cigarette advertising. Petitioners also maintain that there is no basis for construing the pre-emption provision to prohibit only content-based advertising regulations.

Although they support the Court of Appeals’ result, the Attorney General and United States as amicus curiae do not fully endorse that court’s textual analysis of the pre-emption provision. Instead, they assert that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted because they are not “based on smoking and health.” The Attorney General and *547the United States also contend that the regulations are not pre-empted because they do not prescribe the content of cigarette advertising and they fall squarely within the State’s traditional powers to control the location of advertising and to protect the welfare of children.

Turning first to the language in the pre-emption provision relied upon by the Court of Appeals, we reject the notion that the Attorney General’s cigarette advertising regulations are not “with respect to” advertising and promotion. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ analogy to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In some cases concerning ERISA’s pre-emption of state law, the Court has had to decide whether a particular state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA even though the state law makes no express reference to such a plan. See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S., at 324-325. Here, however, there is no question about an indirect relationship between the regulations and cigarette advertising because the regulations expressly target cigarette advertising. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. § 21.04(5) (2000).

Before this Court, the Attorney General focuses on a different phrase in the pre-emption provision: “based on smoking and health.” The Attorney General argues that the cigarette advertising regulations are not “based on smoking and health,” because they do not involve health-related content in cigarette advertising but instead target youth exposure to cigarette advertising. To be sure, Members of this Court have debated the precise meaning of “based on smoking and health,” see Cipollone, supra, at 529, n. 7 (plurality opinion), but we cannot agree with the Attorney General’s narrow construction of the phrase.

As Congress enacted the current pre-emption provision, Congress did not concern itself solely with health warnings for cigarettes. In the 1969 amendments, Congress not only *548enhanced its scheme,to warn the public about the hazards of cigarette smoking, but also sought to protect the public, including youth, from being inundated with images of cigarette smoking in advertising. In pursuit of the latter goal, Congress banned electronic media advertising of cigarettes. And to the extent that Congress contemplated additional targeted regulation of cigarette advertising, it vested that authority in the FTC.

The context in which Congress crafted the current preemption provision leads us to conclude that Congress prohibited state cigarette advertising regulations motivated by concerns about smoking and health. Massachusetts has attempted to address the incidence of underage cigarette smoking by regulating advertising, see 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §21.01 (2000), much like Congress’ ban on cigarette advertising in electronic media. At bottom, the concern about youth exposure to cigarette advertising is intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and health. Thus the Attorney General’s attempt to distinguish one concern from the other must be rejected.

The Attorney General next claims that the State’s outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations for cigarettes are not pre-empted because they govern the location, and not the content, of advertising. This is also Justice Stevens’ main point with respect to pre-emption. Post,' at 595 (opinion concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).

The content versus location distinction has some surface appeal. The pre-emption provision immediately follows the section of the FCLAA that prescribes warnings. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 1333, 1334. The pre-emption provision itself refers to cigarettes “labeled in conformity with” the statute. § 1334(b). But the content/location distinction cannot be squared with the language of the pre-emption provision, which reaches all “requirements” and “prohibitions” “imposed under State law.” A distinction between the content *549of advertising and the location of advertising in the FCLAA also cannot be reconciled with Congress’ own location-based restriction, which bans advertising in electronic media, but not elsewhere. See § 1335. We are not at liberty to pick and choose which provisions in the legislative scheme we will consider, see post, at 596, n. 5 (opinion of Stevens, J.), but must examine the FCLAA as a whole.

Moreover, any distinction between the content and location of cigarette advertising collapses once the implications of that approach are fully considered. At oral argument, the Attorney General was pressed to explain what types of state regulations of cigarette advertising, in his view, are preempted by the FCLAA. The Attorney General maintained that a state law that required cigarette retailers to remove the word “tobacco” from advertisements, or required cigarette billboards to be blank, would be pre-empted if it were a regulation of “health-related content.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 42. The Attorney General also maintained, however, that a complete ban on all cigarette advertising would not be preempted because Congress did not intend to invade local control over zoning. Id., at 42-44. The latter position clearly follows from the factual distinction between content and location, but it finds no support in the text of the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision. We believe that Congress wished to ensure that “a State could not do through negative mandate (e. g., banning all cigarette advertising) that which it already was forbidden to do through positive mandate (e. g., mandating particular cautionary statements).” Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 539 (Blackmun, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Vango Media, Inc. v. New York, 34 F. 3d 68 (CA2 1994) (holding pre-empted a regulation that required one public health message for every four cigarette advertisements).

Justice Stevens, post, at 595-598, maintains that Congress did not intend to displace state regulation of the location of cigarette advertising. There is a critical distinction, *550however, between generally applicable zoning regulations, see infra, at 551-552, and regulations targeting cigarette advertising. The latter type of regulation, which is inevitably motivated by concerns about smoking and health, squarely contradicts the FCLAA. The FCLAA's comprehensive warnings, advertising restrictions, and pre-emption provision would make little sense if a State or locality could simply target and ban all cigarette advertising.

Justice Stevens finds it ironic that we conclude that “federal law precludes States and localities from protecting children from dangerous products within 1,000 feet of a school,” in light of our prior conclusion that the “Federal Government lacks the constitutional authority to impose a similarly motivated ban” in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995). Post, at 598-599, n. 8. Our holding is not as broad as Justice Stevens states; we hold only that the FCLAA pre-empts state regulations targeting cigarette advertising. States remain free to enact generally applicable zoning regulations, and to regulate conduct with respect to cigarette use and sales. Infra, at 552. The reference to Lopez is also inapposite. In Lopez, we held that Congress exceeded the limits of its Commerce Clause power in the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm in a school zone. 514 U. S., at 558-568. These cases, by contrast, concern the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of pre-emption as applied in a case where Congress expressly precluded certain state regulations of cigarette advertising. Massachusetts did not raise a constitutional challenge to the FCLAA, and we are not confronted with whether Congress exceeded its constitutionally delegated authority in enacting the FCLAA.

In sum, we fail to see how the FCLAA and its pre-emption provision permit a distinction between the specific concern about minors and cigarette advertising and the more general concern about smoking and^ health in cigarette advertising, especially in light of the fact that Congress crafted a legisla*551tive solution for those very concerns. We also conclude that a distinction between state regulation of the location as opposed to the content of cigarette advertising has no foundation in the text of the pre-emption provision. Congress pre-empted state cigarette advertising regulations like the Attorney General’s because they would upset federal legislative choices to require specific warnings and to impose the ban on cigarette advertising in electronic media in order to address concerns about smoking and health. Accordingly, we hold that the Attorney General’s outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations targeting cigarettes are preempted by the FCLAA.

C

Although the FCLAA prevents States and localities from imposing special requirements or prohibitions “based on smoking and health” “with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes, that language still leaves significant power in the hands of States to impose generally applicable zoning regulations and to regulate conduct. As we noted in Cipollone, “each phrase within [the provision] limits the universe of [state action] pre-empted by the statute.” 505 U. S., at 524 (plurality opinion).

For instance, the FCLAA does not restrict a State or locality’s ability to enact generally applicable zoning restrictions. We have recognized that state interests in traffic safety and esthetics may justify zoning regulations for advertising. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 507-508 (1981). See also St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 274 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 529-531 (1917). Although Congress has taken into account the unique concerns about cigarette smoking and health in advertising, there is no indication that Congress intended to displace local community interests in general regulations of the location of billboards or large marquee advertising, or that Congress intended cigarette advertisers to be afforded special treatment in that regard. Re*552strictions on the location and size of advertisements that apply to cigarettes on equal terms with other products appear to be outside the ambit of the pre-emption provision. Such restrictions are not “based on smoking and health.”

The FCLAA also does not foreclose all state regulation of conduct as it relates to the sale or use of cigarettes. The FCLAA’s pre-emption provision explicitly governs state regulations of “advertising or promotion.”* Accordingly, the FCLAA does not pre-empt state laws prohibiting cigarette sales to minors. To the contrary, there is an established congressional policy that supports such laws; Congress has required States to prohibit tobacco sales to minors as a condition of receiving federal block grant funding for substance abuse treatment activities. 106 Stat. 394, 388, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300x-26(a)(1), 300x-21.

In Massachusetts, it is illegal to sell or distribute tobacco products to persons under the age of 18. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 270, § 6 (2000). Having prohibited the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors, the State may prohibit common inchoate offenses that attach to criminal conduct, such as solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt. Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 563-564; Carey v. Population Seros. Int’l, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 772 (1976); 60 Fed. Reg. 41330-41332 (1995) (citing evidence that industry may be attempting to induce individuals under 18 to smoke cigarettes). States and localities also have at their disposal other means of regulating conduct to ensure that minors do not obtain cigarettes. See Part III-D, infra.

*553D

The smokeless tobacco petitioners argue that if the State’s outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations for cigarettes are pre-empted, then the same advertising regulations with respect to smokeless tobacco must be invalidated because they cannot be severed from the cigarette provisions. Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. 00-596 and 00-597, p. 4, n. 5. The District Court did not reach the severability issue with respect to the advertising provisions that are before this Court. 76 F. Supp. 2d, at 134, n. 11. The Court of Appeals also did not reach severability because that court likewise concluded that the cigarette advertising regulations were not pre-empted. 218 F. 3d, at 37, n. 3. We decline to reach an issue that was not decided below. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 470 (1999).

Ill

By its terms, the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision only applies to cigarettes. Accordingly, we must evaluate the smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners’ First Amendment challenges to the State’s outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations. The cigarette petitioners did not raise a pre-emption challenge to the sales practices regulations. Thus, we must analyze the cigarette as well as the smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners’ claim that certain sales practices regulations for tobacco products violate the First Amendment.

A

For over 25 years, the Court has recognized that commercial speech does not fall outside the purview of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, at 762. Instead, the Court has afforded commercial speech a measure of First Amendment protection “ ‘commensurate’ ” with its position in relation to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. See, e. g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., *554515 U. S. 618, 623 (1995) (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989)). In recognition of the “distinction between speech proposing a commer-* cial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech,” Central Hudson, supra, at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted), we developed a framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech that is “substantially similar” to the test for time, place, and manner restrictions, Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, supra, at 477. The analysis contains four elements:

“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Central Hudson, supra, at 566.

Petitioners urge us to reject the Central Hudson analysis and apply strict scrutiny. They are not the first litigants to do so. See, e. g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173,184 (1999). Admittedly, several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular eases. See, e. g., Greater New Orleans, supra, at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); U Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484,501,510-514 (1996) (joint opinion of Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.); id., at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But here, as in Greater New Orleans, we see “no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as *555applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.” 527 U. S., at 184.

Only the last two steps of Central Hudson's four-part analysis are at issue here. The Attorney General has assumed for purposes of summary judgment that petitioners’ speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. 218 F. 3d, at 43; 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 185-186. With respect to the second step, none of the petitioners contests the importance of the State’s interest in preventing the use of tobacco products by minors. Brief for Petitioners Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. in No. 00-596, p. 41; Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. 00-596 and 00-597, at 16; Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, p. 8.

The third step of Central Hudson concerns the relationship between the harm that underlies the State’s interest and the means identified by the State to advance that interest. It requires that

“the speech restriction directly and materially advanc[e] the asserted governmental interest. ‘This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.’ ” Greater New Orleans, supra, at 188 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 770-771 (1993)).

We do not, however, require that “empirical data come ... accompanied by a surfeit of background information.... [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’ ” Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., supra, at 628 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

*556The last step of the Central Hudson analysis “complements” the third step, “asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it.” Greater New Orleans, swpra, at 188. We have made it clear that “the least restrictive means” is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable “ ‘fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.’ ” Went For It, Inc., supra, at 682 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, supra, at 480). Focusing on the third and fourth steps of the Central Hudson analysis, we first address the outdoor advertising and point-of-sale advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars. We then address the sales practices regulations for all tobacco products.

B

The outdoor advertising regulations prohibit smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or playground. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§21.04(5)(a), 22.06(5)(a) (2000). The District Court and Court of Appeals concluded that the Attorney General had identified a real problem with underage use of tobacco products, that limiting youth exposure to advertising would combat that problem, and that the regulations burdened no more speech than necessary to accomplish the State’s goal. 218 F. 3d, at 44-53; 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 186-193. The smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners take issue with all of these conclusions.

1

The smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners contend that the Attorney General’s regulations do not satisfy Central Hudson’s third step. They maintain that although the Attorney General may have identified a problem with underage cigarette smoking, he has not identified an equally severe problem with respect to underage use of smokeless tobacco *557or cigars. The smokeless tobacco petitioner emphasizes the “lack of parity” between cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. GO-596 and 00-597, at 19; Reply Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. 00-596 and 00-597, pp. 4,10-11. The cigar petitioners catalog a list of differences between cigars and other tobacco products, including the characteristics of the products and marketing strategies. Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, at 9-11. The petitioners finally contend that the Attorney General cannot prove that advertising has a causal link to tobacco use such that limiting advertising will materially alleviate any problem of underage use of their products. Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. 00-596 and 00-597, at 20-22; Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, at 9-16.

In previous cases, we have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect. See Rubin, 514 U. S., at 487; United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 434 (1993); Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 568-569. The Attorney General cites numerous studies to support this theory in the case of tobacco products.

The Attorney General relies in part on evidence gathered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in its attempt to regulate the advertising of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, FDA Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (1995); Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, FDA Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (1996). The FDA promulgated the advertising regulations after finding that the period prior to adulthood is when an overwhelming majority of Americans first decide to use tobacco products, and that advertising plays a crucial *558role in that decision. Id., at 44398-44399. We later held that thé FDA lacks statutory authority to regulate tobacco products. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 (2000). Nevertheless, the Attorney General relies on the FDA’s proceedings and other studies to support his decision that advertising affects demand for tobacco products. Cf. Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion) (cities and localities may rely on evidence from other jurisdictions to demonstrate harmful secondary effects of adult entertainment and to justify regulation); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, 583-584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (same); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 50-52 (1986) (same). See also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 393, and n. 6 (2000) (discussing evidence of corruption and the appearance of corruption in campaign finance).

In its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA considered several studies of tobacco advertising and trends in the use of various tobacco products. The Surgeon General’s report and the Institute of Medicine’s report found that “there is sufficient evidence to conclude that advertising and labeling play a significant and important contributory role in a young person’s decision to use cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products.” 60 Fed. Reg. 41332. See also Pierce et al., Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking, 279 JAMA 511, 514 (1998).

For instance, children smoke fewer brands of cigarettes than adults, and those choices directly track the most heavily advertised brands, unlike adult choices, which are more dispersed and related to pricing. FDA Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41332. Another study revealed that 72% of 6 year olds and 52% of children ages 3 to 6 recognized “Joe Camel,” the cartoon anthropomorphic symbol of R. J. Reynolds’ Camel brand cigarettes. Id., at 41333. After the introduction of Joe Camel, Camel cigarettes’ share of the youth market rose from 4% to 13%. Id., at 41330. The FDA also identified *559trends in tobacco consumption among certain populations, such as young women, that correlated to the introduction and marketing of products geared toward that population. Id., at 41333.

The FDA also made specific findings with respect to smokeless tobacco. The FDA concluded that “[t]he recent and very large increase in the use of smokeless tobacco products by young people and the addictive nature of these products has persuaded the agency that these products must be included in any regulatory approach that is designed to help prevent future generations of young people from becoming addicted to nicotine-containing tobacco products.” Id., at 41318. Studies have 'analyzed smokeless tobacco use by young people, discussing trends based on gender, school grade, and locale. See, e. g., Boyd et al., Use of Smokeless Tobacco among Children and Adolescents in the United States, 16 Preventative Medicine 402-418 (1987), Record, Doc. No. 38, Exh. 63.

Researchers tracked a dramatic shift in patterns of smokeless tobacco use from older to younger users over the past 30 years. See, e.g., FDA Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41317; Tomar, Giovano, & Erickson, Smokeless tobacco brand preference and brand switching among US adolescents and young adults, 4 Tobacco Control 67 (1995), Record, Doc. No. 38, Exh. 62; Department of Health and Human Services, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General 163 (1994), Record, Doc. No. 36, Exh. 1. In particular, the smokeless tobacco industry boosted sales tenfold in the 1970’s and 1980’s by targeting young males. FDA Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41331. See also National Cancer Institute, Cigars: Health Effects and Trends, Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, p. 16 (1998), Record, Doc. No. 39, Exh. 67. Another study documented the targeting of youth through smokeless tobacco sales and advertising techniques. Ernster, Advertising and Promotion of Smokeless Tobacco Products, National Cancer Institute *560Monograph No. 8, pp. 87-93 (1989), Record, Doc. No. 38, Exh. 66.

The Attorney General presents different evidence with respect to cigars. There was no data on underage cigar use prior to 1996 because the behavior was considered “uncommon enough not to be worthy of examination.” Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, at 13; FTC Report to Congress: Cigar Sales and Advertising and Promotional Expenses for Calendar Years 1996 and 1997, p. 9 (1999), Record, Doc. No. 39, Exh. 71. In 1995, the FDA decided not to include cigars in its attempted regulation of tobacco product advertising, explaining that “the agency does not currently have sufficient evidence that these products are drug delivery devices .... FDA has focused its investigation of its authority over tobacco products on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products, and not on pipe tobacco or cigars, because young people predominantly use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.” 60 Fed. Reg. 41322.

More recently, however, data on youth cigar use has emerged. The National Cancer Institute concluded in its 1998 Monograph that the rate of cigar use by minors is increasing and that, in some States, the cigar use rates are higher than the smokeless tobacco use rates for minors. Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, at 19,42-51. In its 1999 Report to Congress, the FTC concluded that “substantial numbers of adolescents are trying cigars.” FTC Report to Congress, at 9. See also Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Youth Use of Cigars: Patterns of Use and Perceptions of Risk (1999), Record, Doc. No. 39, Exh. 78.

Studies have also demonstrated a link between advertising and demand for cigars. After Congress recognized the power of images in advertising and banned cigarette advertising in electronic media, television advertising of small cigars “increased dramatically in 1972 and 1973,” “filled the void left by cigarette advertisers,” and “sales . . . soared.” *561Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, at 24. In 1973, Congress extended the electronic media advertising ban for cigarettes to little cigars. Little Cigar Act, Pub. L. 93-109, § 3, 87 Stat. 352, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1335. In the 1990’s, cigar advertising campaigns triggered a boost in sales. Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, at 215.

Our review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. In addition, we disagree with petitioners’ claim that there is no evidence that preventing targeted campaigns and limiting youth exposure to advertising will decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. On this record and in the posture of summary judgment, we are unable to conclude that the Attorney General’s decision to regulate advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars in an effort to combat the use of tobacco products by minors was based on mere “speculation [and] conjecture.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S., at 770.

2

Whatever the strength of the Attorney General’s evidence to justify the outdoor advertising regulations, however, we conclude that the regulations do not satisfy the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis. The final step of the Central Hudson analysis, the “critical inquiry in this case,” requires a reasonable fit between the means and ends of the regulatory scheme. 447 U. S., at 569. The Attorney General’s regulations do not meet this standard. The broad sweep of the regulations indicates that the Attorney General did not “carefully calculate] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed” by the regulations. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 417 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The outdoor advertising regulations prohibit any smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of schools *562or playgrounds. In the District Court, petitioners maintained that this prohibition would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston, Worcester, and Springfield, Massachusetts. 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 191. The 87% to 91% figure appears to include not only the effect of the regulations, but also the limitations imposed by other generally applicable zoning restrictions. See App. 161-167. The Attorney General disputed petitioners’ figures but “concede[d] that the reach of the regulations is substantial.” 218 F. 3d, at 50. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulations prohibit advertising in a substantial portion of the major metropolitan areas of Massachusetts. Ibid.

The substantial geographical reach of the Attorney General’s outdoor advertising regulations is compounded by other factors. “Outdoor” advertising includes not only advertising located outside an establishment, but also advertising inside a store if that advertising is visible from outside the store. The regulations restrict advertisements of any size and the term advertisement also includes oral statements. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§21.03, 22.03 (2000).

In some geographical areas, these regulations would constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers. The breadth and scope of the regulations, and the process by which the Attorney General adopted the regulations, do not demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests involved.

First, the Attorney General did not seem to consider the impact of the 1,000-foot restriction on commercial speech in major metropolitan areas. The Attorney General apparently selected the 1,000-foot distance based on the FDA’s decision to impose an identical 1,000-foot restriction when it attempted to regulate cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising. See FDA Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44399; Brief for Respondents 45, and n. 23. But the FDA’s 1,000-foot regulation was not an adequate basis for the Attorney Gen*563eral to tailor the Massachusetts regulations. The degree to which speech is suppressed — or alternative avenues for speech remain available — under a particular regulatory scheme tends to be case specific. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U. S., at 53-54. And a case specific analysis makes sense, for although a State or locality may have common interests and concerns about underage smoking and the effects of tobacco advertisements, the impact of a restriction on speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place. The FDA’s regulations would have had widely disparate effects nationwide. Even in Massachusetts, the effect of the Attorney General’s speech regulations will vary based on whether a locale is rural, suburban, or urban. The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation demonstrates a lack of tailoring.

In addition, the range of communications restricted seems unduly broad. For instance, it is not clear from the regulatory scheme why a ban on oral communications is necessary to further the State’s interest. Apparently that restriction means that a retailer, is unable to answer inquiries about its tobacco products if that communication occurs outdoors. Similarly, a ban on all signs of any size seems ill suited to target the problem of highly visible billboards, as opposed to smaller signs. To the extent that studies have identified particular advertising and promotion practices that appeal to youth, tailoring would involve targeting those practices while permitting others. As crafted, the regulations make no distinction among practices on this basis.

The Court of Appeals recognized that the smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners’ concern about the amount of speech restricted was “valid,” but reasoned that there was an “obvious connection to the state’s interest in protecting minors.” 218 F. 3d, at 50. Even on the premise that Massachusetts has demonstrated a connection between the outdoor advertising regulations and its substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use, the question of tailoring re*564mains. The Court of Appeals failed to follow through with an analysis of the countervailing First Amendment interests.

The State’s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity. We must consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco products. In a case involving indecent speech on the Internet we explained that “the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials ... does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 875 (1997) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox”); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957) (“The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children”). As the State protects children from tobacco advertisements, tobacco manufacturers and retailers and their adult consumers still have a protected interest in communication. Cf. American Civil Liberties Union, supra, at 886-889 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the creation of “adult zones” on the Internet).

In some instances, Massachusetts’ outdoor advertising regulations would impose particularly onerous burdens on speech. For example, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that because cigar manufacturers and retailers conduct a limited amount of advertising in comparison to other tobacco products, “the relative lack of cigar advertising also means that the burden imposed on cigar advertisers is correspondingly small.” 218 F. 3d, at 49. If some retailers have relatively small advertising budgets, and use *565few avenues of communication, then the Attorney General’s outdoor advertising regulations potentially place a greater, not lesser, burden on those retailers’ speech. Furthermore, to the extent that cigar products and cigar advertising differ from that of other tobacco products, that difference should inform the inquiry into what speech restrictions are necessary.

In addition, a retailer in Massachusetts may have no means of communicating to passersby on the street that it sells tobacco products because alternative forms of advertisement, like newspapers, do not allow that retailer to propose an instant transaction in the way that onsite advertising does. The ban on any indoor advertising that is visible from the outside also presents problems in establishments like convenience stores, which have unique security concerns that counsel in favor of full visibility of the store from the outside. It is these sorts of considerations that the Attorney General failed to incorporate into the regulatory scheme.

We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State’s substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use. Justice Stevens urges that the Court remand the case for further development of the factual record. Post, at 601-603. We believe that a remand is inappropriate in these cases because the State had ample opportunity to develop a record with respect to tailoring (as it had to justify its decision to regulate advertising), and additional evidence would not alter the nature of the scheme before the Court. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U. S., at 189, n. 6.

A careful calculation of the costs of a speech regulation does not mean that a State must demonstrate that there is no incursion on legitimate speech interests, but a speech regulation cannot unduly impinge on the speaker’s ability to propose a commercial transaction and the adult listener’s opportunity to obtain information about products. After *566reviewing the outdoor advertising regulations, we find the calculation in these cases insufficient for purposes of the First Amendment.

C

Massachusetts has also restricted indoor, point-of-sale advertising for smokeless tobacco and cigars. Advertising cannot be “placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of” any school or playground. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000). The District Court invalidated these provisions, concluding that the Attorney General had not provided a sufficient basis for regulating indoor advertising. 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 192-193, 195. The Court of Appeals reversed. 218 F. 3d, at 50-51. The court explained: “We do have some misgivings about the effectiveness of a restriction that is based on the assumption that minors under five feet tall will not, or will less frequently, raise their view above eye-level, but we find that such [a] determination falls within that range of reasonableness in which the Attorney General is best suited to pass judgment.” Id., at 51.

We conclude that the point-of-sale advertising regulations fail both the third and fourth steps of the Central Hudson analysis. A regulation cannot be sustained if it “ ‘provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose,’ ” Edenfield, 507 U. S., at 770 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 564), or if there is “little chance” that the restriction will advance the State’s goal, Greater New Orleans, supra, at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). As outlined above, the State’s goal is to prevent minors from using tobacco products and to curb demand for that activity by limiting youth exposure to advertising. The 5-foot rule does not seem to advance that goal. Not all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings.

*567By contrast to Justice Stevens, post, at 604-605, we do not believe this regulation can be construed as a mere regulation of conduct under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). To qualify as a regulation of communicative action governed by the scrutiny outlined in O’Brien, the State’s regulation must be unrelated to expression. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 403 (1989). See also Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S., at 289-296 (plurality opinion). Here, Massachusetts’ height restriction is an attempt to regulate directly the communicative impact of indoor advertising.

Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco advertisements and displays that entice children, much like floor-level candy displays in a convenience store, but the blanket height restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal. The Court of Appeals recognized that the efficacy of the regulation was questionable, but decided that, “[i]n any event, the burden on speech imposed by the provision is very limited.” 218 F. 3d, at 51. There is no de minimis exception for a speech restriction that lacks sufficient tailoring or justification. We conclude that the restriction on the height of indoor advertising is invalid under Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs.

D

The Attorney General also promulgated a number of regulations that restrict sales practices by cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar manufacturers and retailers. Among other restrictions, the regulations bar the use of self-service displays and require that tobacco products be placed out of the reach of all consumers in a location accessible only to salespersons. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(2)(c)-(d), 22.06(2)(c)-(d) (2000). The cigarette petitioners do not challenge the sales practices regulations on pre-emption grounds. Brief for Petitioners Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. in No. 00-596, at 5, n. 2. Two of the cigarette petitioners (Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and Lorillard Tobacco Company), petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Com*568pany, and the cigar petitioners challenge the sales practices regulations on First Amendment grounds. The cigar petitioners additionally challenge a provision that prohibits sampling or promotional giveaways of cigars or little cigars. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. § 22.06(l)(a) (2000).

The District Court concluded that these restrictions implicate no cognizable speech interest, 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 195-196, but the Court of Appeals did not fully adopt that reasoning. The Court of Appeals recognized that self-service displays “often do have some communicative commercial function,” but noted that the restriction in the regulations “is not on speech, but rather on the physical location of actual tobacco products.” 218 F. 3d, at 53. The court reasoned that nothing in the regulations would prevent the display of empty tobacco product containers, so long as no actual tobacco product was displayed, much like movie jackets at a video store. Ibid. With respect to cigar products, the court observed that retailers traditionally allow access to those products, so that the consumer may make a selection on the basis of a number of objective and subjective factors including the aroma and feel of the cigars. Ibid. Even assuming a speech interest, however, the court concluded that the regulations were narrowly tailored to serve the State’s substantial interest in preventing access to tobacco products by minors. Id., at 54. The court also noted that the restrictions do not apply to adult-only establishments. Ibid.

Petitioners devoted little of their briefing to the sales practices regulations, and our understanding of the regulations is accordingly limited by the parties’ submissions. As we read the regulations, they basically require tobacco retailers to place tobacco products behind counters and require customers to have contact with a salesperson before they are able to handle a tobacco product.

The cigarette and smokeless tobacco petitioners contend that “the same First Amendment principles that require invalidation of the outdoor and indoor advertising restrictions *569require invalidation of the display regulations at issue in this case.” Brief for Petitioners Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. in No. 00-596, at 46, n. 7. See also Reply Brief for Petitioner U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. in Nos. 00-596 and 00-597, at 12, n. 7. The cigar petitioners contend that self-service displays for cigars cannot be prohibited because each brand of cigar is unique and customers traditionally have sought to handle and compare cigars at the time of purchase. Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, at 23, n. 9; Reply Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, p. 10, n. 7.

We reject these contentions. Assuming that petitioners have a cognizable speech interest in a particular means of displaying their products, cf. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410 (1993) (distribution of a magazine through newsracks), these regulations withstand First Amendment scrutiny.

Massachusetts’ sales practices provisions regulate conduct that may have a communicative component, but Massachusetts seeks to regulate the placement of tobacco products for reasons unrelated to the communication of ideas. See O’Brien, supra, at 382. See also Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S., at 289 (plurality opinion); id., at 310 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johnson, supra, at 403. We conclude that the State has demonstrated a substantial interest in preventing access to tobacco products by minors and has adopted an appropriately narrow means of advancing that interest. See O’Brien, supra, at 382.

Unattended displays of tobacco products present an opportunity for access without the proper age verification required by law. Thus, the State prohibits self-service and other displays that would allow an individual to obtain tobacco products without direct contact with a salesperson. It is clear that the regulations leave open ample channels of communication. The regulations do not significantly impede adult access to tobacco products. Moreover, retailers have other *570means of exercising any cognizable speech interest in the presentation of their products. We presume that vendors may place empty tobacco packaging on open display, and display actual tobacco products so long as that display is only accessible to sales personnel. As for cigars, there is no indication in the regulations that a customer is unable to examine a cigar prior to purchase, so long as that examination takes place through a salesperson.

'The cigar petitioners also list Massachusetts’ prohibition on sampling and free giveaways among the regulations they challenge on. First Amendment grounds. See 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §22.06(1)(a) (2000); Brief for Petitioners Altadis U. S. A. Inc. et al. in No. 00-597, at 2. At no point in their briefs or at oral argument, however, did the cigar petitioners argue the merits of their First Amendment claim with respect to the sampling and giveaway regulation. We decline to address an issue that was not sufficiently briefed and argued before this Court. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 855, 366, n. 10 (1994); Williams v. United States, 503 U. S. 193, 206 (1992); Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 38-40 (1989).

We conclude that the sales practices regulations withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The means chosen by the State are narrowly tailored to prevent access to tobacco products by minors, are unrelated to expression, and leave open alternative avenues for vendors to convey information about products and for would-be customers to inspect products before purchase.

IV

We have observed that “tobacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the United States.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S., at 161. From a policy perspective, it is understandable for the States to attempt to prevent minors from using tobacco products before they reach an age where they are capable of weighing *571for themselves the risks and potential benefits of tobacco use, and other adult activities. Federal law, however, places limits on policy choices available to the States.

In these cases, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme to address cigarette smoking and health in advertising and pre-empted state regulation of cigarette advertising that attempts to address that same concern, even with respect to youth. The First Amendment also constrains state efforts to limit advertising of tobacco products, because so long as the sale and use of tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating information about its products and adult customers have an interest in receiving that information.

To the extent that federal law and the First Amendment do not prohibit state action, States and localities remain free to eombat the problem of underage tobacco use by appropriate means. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kennedy,

with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

The obvious overbreadth of the outdoor advertising restrictions suffices to invalidate them under the fourth part of the test in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980). As a result, in my view, there is no need to consider whether the restrictions satisfy the third part of the test, a proposition about which there is considerable doubt. Cf. post, at 583-584 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Neither are we required to consider whether Central Hudson should be retained in the face of the substantial objections that can be made to it. See post, at 574-582 (opinion of Thomas, J.). My continuing concerns that the test gives *572insufficient protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech require me to refrain from expressing agreement with the Court’s application of the third part of Central Hudson. See, e.g., kh Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 501-504 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.). With the exception of Part III — B—1, then, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Thomas,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the opinion of the Court (with the exception of Part III — B—1) because I agree that the Massachusetts cigarette advertising regulations are pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1831 et seq. I also agree with the Court’s disposition of the First Amendment challenges to the other regulations at issue here, and I share the Court’s view that the regulations fail even the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980). At the same time, I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as “commercial.” See .W Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). I would subject all of the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First Amendment.

I

At the heart of this litigation is a Massachusetts regulation that imposes a sweeping ban on speech about tobacco products. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §21.04(5) (2000), which governs cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and § 22.06(5), which governs cigars, prohibit all outdoor advertising, all indoor advertising that can be seen from outdoors, and all point-of-sale advertising (even if not visible from outdoors) that is *573lower than five feet from the floor.1 These restrictions are superficially limited in their geographic scope: They apply only within 1,000 feet of “any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school.” §21.04(5)(a). But the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the zone of prohibition covers as much as 90 percent of the three largest cities in Massachusetts, Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F. 3d 30, 50 (CA1 2000), so the practical effect is little different from that of a total ban. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 812 (2000) (“The Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans”).

Respondents suggest in passing that the regulations are “zoning-type restrictions” that should receive “the intermediate level of scrutiny traditionally associated with various forms of ‘time, place, and manner’ regulations.” Brief for Respondents 31. We have indeed upheld time, place, and manner regulations that prohibited certain kinds of outdoor signs, see, e.g., Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984), and we have similarly upheld zoning laws that had the effect of restricting certain kinds of sexually explicit expression, see, e. g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986). But the abiding characteristic of valid time, place, and manner regulations is their content neutrality. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791-796 (1989). In Vincent the city prohibited all signs on public property, not to sup*574press the message conveyed by any of the signs, but simply to minimize the esthetic effect of visual clutter. Likewise, the ordinance in Renton was aimed not at expression, but at the “secondary effects” caused by adult businesses.

The regulations here are very different. Massachusetts is not concerned with any “secondary effects” of tobacco advertising — it is concerned with the advertising’s primary effect, which is to induce those who view the advertisements to purchase and use tobacco products. Cf. Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988) (“Listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ we referred to in Renton”). In other words, it seeks to suppress speech about tobacco because it objects to the content of that speech. We have consistently applied strict scrutiny to such content-based regulations of speech. See, e. g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641-643 (1994).

A

There was once a time when this Court declined to give any First Amendment protection to commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), the Court went so far as to say that “the Constitution imposes [no] restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.” Id., at 54. That position was repudiated in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), which explained that even speech “which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’” is protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973)). Since then, the Court has followed an uncertain course — much of the uncertainty being generated by the malleability of the four-part balancing test of Central Hudson. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U. S., at 520-522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

*575I have observed previously that there is no “philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.” Id., at 522. Indeed, I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. See id., at 523, n. 4 (citing Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990)).2

It should be clear that if these regulations targeted anything other than advertising for commercial products — if, for example, they were directed at billboards promoting political candidates — all would agree that the restrictions should be subjected to strict scrutiny. In my view, an asserted government interest in keeping people ignorant by suppressing expression “is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of ‘commercial’ speech than it can justify regulation of ‘noncoinmercial’ speech.” 517 U. S., at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). That is essentially the interest asserted here, and, adhering to the views I expressed in H Liquormart, I would subject the Massachusetts regulations to strict scrutiny.

B

Even if one accepts the premise that commercial speech generally is entitled to a lower level of constitutional protection than are other forms of speech, it does not follow that the regulations here deserve anything less than strict scrutiny. Although we have recognized several categories of *576speech that normally receive reduced First Amendment protection, or no First Amendment protection at all, we have never held that the government may regulate speech within those categories in any way that it wishes. Rather, we have said “that these areas of speech can, consistently with thé First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 383 (1992). Even when speech falls into a category of reduced constitutional protection, the government may not engage in content discrimination for reasons unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that place it within the category. For example, a city may ban obscenity (because obscenity is an unprotected category, see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957)), but it may not ban “only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government.” R. A. V, supra, at 384.

In explaining the distinction between commercial speech and other forms of speech, we have emphasized that commercial speech is both “more easily verifiable by its disseminator” and less likely to be “chilled by proper regulation.” Virginia Bd., 425 U. S., at 772, n. 24. These characteristics led us to conclude that, in the context of commercial speech, it is “less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” and also that it is more “appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.” Ibid. Whatever the validity of this reasoning, it is limited to the peculiarly commercial harms that commercial speech can threaten — i. e., the risk of deceptive or misleading advertising. As we observed in R. A. V:

“[A] State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection) is in its view greater there. But a State may not prohibit *577only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion.” 505 U. S., at 388-389 (citations omitted).

In 44 Liquormart, several Members of the Court said much the same thing:

“[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.” 517 U. S., at 501 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.).

Whatever power the State may have to regulate commercial speech, it may not use that power to limit the content of commercial speech, as it has done here, “for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process.” Such content-discriminatory regulation — like all other content-based regulation of speech — must be subjected to strict scrutiny.

C

In an effort to avoid the implications of these basic principles of First Amendment law, respondents make two principal claims. First, they argue that the regulations target deceptive and misleading speech. See Brief for Respondents 33 (“Petitioners’ advertising clearly engenders ‘the potential for deception or confusion’ that allows for regulation of commercial speech based on its content” (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 65 (1983))). Second, they argue that the regulations restrict speech that promotes an illegal transaction — i e., the sale of tobacco to minors. See Brief for Respondents 15 (“The regulations . . . exhibit a close connection to a commercial transaction the State has prohibited”).

Neither theory is properly before the Court. For purposes of summary judgment, respondents were willing to as*578sume “that the tobacco advertisements at issue here are truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful activity.” 218 F. 3d, at 43. Although respondents now claim that they have not conceded this point, see Brief for Respondents 35, n. 17, the fact remains that they did not urge their theories in the lower courts, and in general, we do not consider arguments for affirmance that were not presented below. See, e. g., Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 205 (2001). These concessions should make this an easy case, one clearly controlled by 44 Liquormart and by Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173 (1999). At all events, even if we were to entertain these arguments, neither is persuasive.

Respondents suggest that tobacco advertising is misleading because “its youthful imagery and . . . sheer ubiquity” leads children to believe “that tobacco use is desirable and pervasive.” Brief for Respondents 33; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7 (“[S]o many children lack the maturity in judgment to resist the tobacco industry’s appeals to excitement, glamour, and independence”). This justification is belied, however, by the sweeping overinclusivity of the regulations. Massachusetts has done nothing to target its prohibition to advertisements appealing to “excitement, glamour, and independence”; the ban applies with equal force to appeals to torpor, homeliness, and servility. It has not focused on “youthful imagery”; smokers depicted on the sides of buildings may no more play shuffleboard than they may ride skateboards.

The regulations even prohibit a store from accurately stating the prices at which cigarettes are sold. Such a display could not possibly be misleading, unless one accepts the State’s apparent view that the simple existence of tobacco advertisements misleads people into believing that tobacco use is more pervasive than it actually is. The State misunderstands the purpose of advertising. Promoting a product that is not yet pervasively used (or a cause that is not yet *579widely supported) is a primary purpose of advertising. Tobacco advertisements would be no more misleading for suggesting pervasive use of tobacco products than are any other advertisements that attempt to expand a market for a product, or to rally support for a political movement. Any inference from the advertisements that businesses would like for tobacco use to be pervasive is entirely reasonable, and advertising that gives rise to that inference is in no way deceptive.

The State also contends that tobacco advertisements may be restricted because they propose an illegal sale of tobacco to minors. A direct solicitation of unlawful activity may of course be proscribed, whether or not it is commercial in nature. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). The State’s power to punish speech that solicits or incites crime has nothing to do with the commercial character of the speech. After all, it is often the case that solicitation to commit a crime is entirely noncommercial. The harm that the State seeks to prevent is the harm caused by the unlawful activity that is solicited; it is unrelated to the commercial transaction itself. Thus there is no reason to apply anything other than our usual rule for evaluating solicitation and incitement simply because the speech in question happens to be commercial. See Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678, 701-702 (1977).

Viewed as an effort to proscribe solicitation to unlawful conduct, these regulations clearly fail the Brandenburg test. A State may not “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg, supra, at 447. Even if Massachusetts could prohibit advertisements reading, “Hey kids, buy cigarettes here,” these regulations sweep much more broadly than that. They cover “any ... statement or representation ... the purpose or effect of which is to promote the use or sale” of tobacco products, whether or not the statement is directly or indi*580rectly addressed to minors. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §21.03 (2000). On respondents’ theory, all tobacco advertising may be limited because some of its viewers may not legally act on it.

It is difficult to see any stopping point to a rule that would allow a State to prohibit all speech in favor of an activity in which it is illegal for minors to engage. Presumably, the State could ban car advertisements in an effort to enforce its restrictions on underage driving. It could regulate advertisements urging people to vote, because children are not permitted to vote. And, although the Solicitor General resisted this implication of her theory, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56, the State could prohibit advertisements for adult businesses, which children are forbidden to patronize.

At bottom, respondents’ theory rests on the premise that an indirect solicitation is enough to empower the State to regulate speech, and that, as petitioners put it, even an advertisement directed at adults “will give any children who may happen to see it the wrong idea and therefore must be suppressed from public view.” Brief for Petitioners Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. in No. 00-596, p. 36. This view is foreign to the First Amendment. “Every idea is an incitement,” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and if speech may be suppressed whenever it might inspire someone to act unlawfully, then there is no limit to the State’s censorial power. Cf. American Booksellers Assn., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (CA7 1985), aff’d, 475 U. S. 1001 (1986).

There is a deeper flaw in the State’s argument. Even if Massachusetts has a valid interest in regulating speech directed at children — who, it argues, may be more easily misled, and to whom the sale of tobacco products is unlawful— it may not pursue that interest at the expense of the free speech rights of adults.

The theory that public debate should be limited in order to protect impressionable children has a long historical pedi*581gree: Socrates was condemned for being “a doer of evil, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth.” 1 Dialogues of Plato, Apology 348 (B. Jowett transí., 4th ed. 1953). But the theory has met with a less enthusiastic reception in this Court than it did in the Athenian assembly. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957), we struck down a statute restricting the sale of materials “ ‘tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts.’ ” Id., at 381 (quoting then Mich. Penal Code § 343). The effect of the law, we observed, was “to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.” 352 U. S., at 383. As Justice Frankfurter colorfully put it, “Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.” Ibid.

We have held consistently that speech “cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 213-214 (1975); accord, Bolger, 463 U. S., at 74 (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox”). To be sure, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S, 726 (1978), we upheld the Federal Communications Commission’s power to regulate indecent but nonobscene radio broadcasts. But Pacifica relied heavily on what it considered to be the “special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 868 (1997). It emphasized that radio is “uniquely pervasive” and “uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.” Pacifica, supra, at 748-749 (emphasis added).

Outside of the broadcasting context, we have adhered to the view that “the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials” does not “justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.” Reno, supra, at 875; see also Playboy Entertainment, 529 U. S.) at 814 (“[Tjhe objective of shielding children does not *582suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative”). Massachusetts may not avoid the application of strict scrutiny simply because it seeks to protect children.

II

Under strict scrutiny, the advertising ban may be saved only if it is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest. See, e.g., id., at 813. If that interest could be served by an alternative that is less restrictive of speech, then the State must use that alternative instead. See ibid.; Reno, supra, at 874. Applying this standard, the regulations here must fail.

A

Massachusetts asserts a compelling interest in reducing tobacco use among minors. Applied to adults, an interest in manipulating market choices by keeping people ignorant would not be legitimate, let alone compelling. See supra, at 575. But assuming that there is a compelling interest in reducing underage smoking, and that the ban on outdoor advertising promotes this interest, I doubt that the same is true of the ban on point-of-sale advertising below five feet. See 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000). The Court of Appeals admitted to having “some misgivings about the effectiveness of a restriction that is based on the assumption that minors under five feet tall will not, or will less frequently, raise their view above eye-level,” 218 F. 3d, at 51, as well it might have, since respondents have produced no evidence to support this counterintuitive assumption. Obviously even short children can see objects that are taller than they are. Anyway, by the time they are 12V2 years old, both the median girl and the median boy are over five feet tall. See U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Growth Charts (2000). Thus, there is no reason to believe that this regulation does anything to protect minors from *583exposure to tobacco advertising.3 Far from serving a compelling interest, the ban on displays below five feet seems to lack even a minimally rational relationship to any conceivable interest.

There is also considerable reason to doubt that the restrictions on cigar and smokeless tobacco outdoor advertising promote any state interest. Outdoor advertising for cigars, after all, is virtually nonexistent. Cigar makers use no billboards in Massachusetts, and in fact their nationwide outdoor advertising budget is only about $50,000 per year. See 218 F. 3d, at 49. To the extent outdoor advertising exists, there is no evidence that it is targeted at youth or has a significant effect on youth. The Court of Appeals focused on the State’s evidence of a relationship between “tobacco advertising and tobacco use,” id., at 48, thus eliding the dearth of evidence showing any relationship between cigar advertising and cigar use by minors. Respondents principally rely on a National Cancer Institute report on cigar smoking, see Brief for Respondents 39, n. 19. But that report contains only the conclusory assertion that cigars are being “heavily promoted in ways likely to influence adolescent use,” and it does not even discuss outdoor advertising, instead focusing on “[endorsements by celebrities,” “the re*584surgence of cigar smoking in movies,” and “cigar lifestyle magazines such as ‘Cigar Aficionado.’” National Cancer Institute, Cigars: Health Effects and Trends, Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 9, pp. 14-15 (1998), Record, Doc. No. 39, Exh. 67. The report candidly acknowledges that “[additional information is needed to better characterize marketing efforts for cigars” and “to learn the extent to which advertising and promotion for cigars . . . reaches and affects kids.” Id., at 216-217. In other words, respondents have adduced no evidence that a ban on cigar advertising will do anything to promote their asserted interest.

Much the same is true of smokeless tobacco. Here respondents place primary reliance on evidence that, in the late 1960’s, the U. S. Smokeless Tobacco Company increased its sales through advertising targeted at young males. See Brief for Respondents 39, n. 19. But this does nothing to show that advertising affecting minors is a problem today. The Court invokes the Food and Drug Administration’s findings, see ante, at 559-560, but the report it cites based its conclusions on the observed “very large increase in the use of smokeless tobacco products by young people.” 60 Fed. Reg. 41318 (1995). This premise is contradicted by one of respondents’ own studies, which reports a large, steady decrease in smokeless tobacco use among Massachusetts high school students during the 1990’s. See App. 292. This finding casts some doubt on whether the State’s interest in additional regulation is truly compelling. More importantly, because cigarette smoking among high school students has not exhibited such a trend, see ibid., it indicates that respondents’ effort to aggregate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is misguided.

B

In any case, even assuming that the regulations advance a compelling state interest, they must be struck down because they are not narrowly tailored. The Court is correct, see ante, at 561-563, that the arbitrary 1,000-foot radius demon*585strates a lack of narrow tailoring, but the problem goes deeper than that. A prohibited zone defined solely by circles drawn around schools and playgrounds is necessarily overinclusive, regardless of the radii of the circles. Consider, for example, a billboard located within 1,000 feet of a school but visible only from an elevated freeway that runs nearby. Such a billboard would not threaten any of the interests respondents assert, but it would be banned anyway, because the regulations take no account of whether the advertisement could even be seen by children. The prohibited zone is even more suspect where, as here, it includes all but 10 percent of the area in the three largest cities in the State.

The loose tailoring of the advertising ban is displayed not only in its geographic scope but also in the nature of the advertisements it affects. The regulations define “advertisement” very broadly; the term includes any “written . . . statement or representation, made by” a person who sells tobacco products, “the purpose or effect of which is to promote the use or sale of the product.” 940 Code of Mass. Regs. § 21.03 (2000). Almost everything a business does has the purpose of promoting the sale of its products, so this definition would cover anything a tobacco retailer might say. Some of the prohibited speech would not even be commercial. If a store displayed a sign promoting a candidate for Attorney General who had promised to repeal the tobacco regulations if elected, it probably would be doing so with the long-term purpose of promoting sales, and the display of such a sign would be illegal.

Even if the definition of “advertisement” were read more narrowly so as to require a specific reference to tobacco products, it still would have Draconian effects. It would, for example, prohibit a tobacconist from displaying a sign reading “Joe’s Cigar Shop.” The effect of this rule is not to make cigars impossible to find; retailers are after all allowed to display a 576-square-inch black-and-white sign reading “Tobacco Products Sold Here.” §22.06(6). Rather, it is to *586make individual cigar retailers more difficult to identify by making them change their names. Respondents assert no interest in cigar retailer anonymity, and it is difficult to conceive of any other interest to which this rule could be said to be narrowly tailored.

The regulations fail the narrow tailoring inquiry for another, more fundamental reason. In addition to examining a narrower advertising ban, the State should have examined ways of advancing its interest that do not require limiting speech at all. Here, respondents had several alternatives. Most obviously, they could have directly regulated the conduct with which they were concerned. See, e. g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476, 490-491 (1995) (invalidating ban on disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, in part because the Government could have pursued alternatives such as “directly limiting the alcohol content of beers”); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U. S., at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[I]t would seem that directly banning a product (or ... otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising”). Massachusetts already prohibits the sale of tobacco to minors, but it could take steps to enforce that prohibition more vigorously. It also could enact laws prohibiting the purchase, possession, or use of tobacco by minors. And, if its concern is that tobacco advertising communicates a message with which it disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with “more speech, not enforced silence,” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Ill

Underlying many of the arguments of respondents and their amici is the idea that tobacco is in some sense sui gene-ris — that it is so special, so unlike any other object of regulation, that application of normal First Amendment principles should be suspended. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 50 *587(referring to tobacco use as “one of the State’s — and indeed the Nation’s — most urgent problems”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20 (cataloging the prevalence and the effects of tobacco use); Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (advocating “the authority of governments to protect children from uniquely dangerous messages”). Smoking poses serious health risks, and advertising may induce children (who lack the judgment to make an intelligent decision about whether to smoke) to begin smoking, which can lead to addiction. The State’s assessment of the urgency of the problem posed by tobacco is a policy judgment, and it is not this Court’s place to second-guess it. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to point out that to uphold the Massachusetts tobacco regulations would be to accept a line of reasoning that would permit restrictions on advertising for a host of other products.

Tobacco use is, we are told, “the single leading cause of preventable death in the United States.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. The second largest contributor to mortality rates in the United States is obesity. Koplan & Dietz, Caloric Imbalance and Public Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1579 (1999). It is associated with increased incidence of diabetes, hypertension, and coronary artery disease, ibid., and it represents a public health problem that is rapidly growing worse. See Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991-1998, 282 JAMA 1519 (1999). Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades has had many causes, a significant factor has been the increased availability of large quantities of high-calorie, high-fat foods.' See Hill, Environmental Contributions to the Obesity Epidemic, 280 Science 1871 (1998). Such foods, of course, have been aggressively marketed and promoted by fast food companies. See Nestle & Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 115 Public Health Reports 12, 18 (2000).

*588Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly targeting children in their advertising. Fast food companies do so openly. See, e.g., Kramer, McB’s Steals Another Toy from BK, Advertising Age, Nov. 15, 1999, p. 1 (describing a McDonald’s promotional campaign); Lucas, BK Takes Choice Message to Kids, Adweek, June 29, 1998, p. 4 (describing a Burger King promotional campaign). Moreover, there is considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing children’s eating behavior. See Borzekowski & Robinson, The 30-Second Effect, 101 J. Am. Dietetic Assn. 42 (2001); Taras, Sallis, Patterson, Nader, & Nelson, Television’s Influence on Children’s Diet and Physical Activity, 10 J. Dev. & Behav. Pediatrics 176 (1989). The effect of advertising on children’s eating habits is significant for two reasons. First, childhood obesity is a serious health problem in its own right. Troiano & Flegal, Overweight Children and Adolescents, 101 Pediatrics 497 (1998). Second, eating preferences formed in childhood tend to persist in adulthood. Birch & Fisher, Development of Eating Behaviors Among Children and Adolescents, 101 Pediatrics 539 (1998). So even though fast food is not addictive in the same way tobacco is, children’s exposure to fast food advertising can have deleterious consequences that are difficult to reverse.

To take another example, the third largest cause of preventable deaths in the United States is alcohol. McGinnis & Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207,2208 (1993). Alcohol use is associated with tens of thousands of deaths each year from cancers and digestive diseases. Id., at 2208-2209. And the victims of alcohol use are not limited to those who drink alcohol. In 1996, over 17,000 people were killed, and over 321,000 people were injured, in alcohol-related car accidents. U. S. Dept, of Justice, Alcohol and Crime 13 (1998). Each year, alcohol is involved in several million violent crimes,. including almost 200,000 sexual assaults. Id., at 3-4.

*589Although every State prohibits the sale of alcohol to those under age 21, much alcohol advertising is viewed by children. Federal Trade Commission, J. Evans & R. Kelly, Self-Regulation in the Alcohol Industry (Sept. 1999); Grube & Wallack, Television Beer Advertising and Drinking Knowledge, Beliefs, arid Intentions among Schoolchildren, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 254 (1994). Not surprisingly, there is considerable evidence that exposure to alcohol advertising is associated with underage drinking. See Atkin, Survey and Experimental Research on Effects of Alcohol Advertising, in The Effects of the Mass Media on the Use and Abuse of Alcohol 39 (S. Martin ed. 1995); Madden & Grube, The Frequency and Nature of Alcohol and Tobacco Advertising in Televised Sports, 1990 through 1992, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 297 (1994).

Like underage tobacco use, underage drinking has effects that cannot be undone later in life. Those who begin drinking early are much more likely to become .dependent on alcohol. Indeed, the probability of lifetime alcohol dependence decreases approximately 14 percent with each additional year of age at which alcohol is first used. Grant & Dawson, Age at Onset of Alcohol Use and its Association with DSM-IV Alcohol Abuse and Dependence, 9 J. Substance Abuse 103, 108 (1997). And obviously the effects of underage drinking are irreversible for the nearly 1,700 Americans killed each year by teenage drunk drivers. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998 Youth Fatal Crash and Alcohol Facts.

Respondents have identified no principle of law or logic that would preclude the imposition of restrictions on fast food and alcohol advértising similar to those they seek to impose on tobacco advertising. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56-57. In effect, they seek a “vice” exception to the First Amendment. No such exception exists. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U. S., at 513-514 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.). If it did, it would have almost no limit, for “any product that poses some threat to *590public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as relating to Vice activity.’ ” Id., at 514. That is why “a ‘vice’ label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that activity.” Ibid.

No legislature has ever sought to restrict speech about an activity it regarded as harmless and inoffensive. Calls for limits on expression always are made when the specter of some threatened harm is looming. The identity of the harm may vary People will be inspired by totalitarian dogmas and subvert the Republic. They will be inflamed by racial demagoguery and embrace hatred and bigotry. Or they will be enticed by cigarette advertisements and choose to smoke, risking disease. It is therefore no answer for the State to say that the makers of cigarettes are doing harm: perhaps they are. But in that respect they are no different from the purveyors of other harmful products, or the advocates of harmful ideas. When the State seeks to silence them, they are all entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.

Justice Souter,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I, II-C, II-D, III-A, III-B-1, III-C, and III-D of the Court’s opinion. I join Part I of the opinion of Justice Stevens concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent from Part III-B-2 of the opinion of the Court, and like Justice Stevens would remand for trial on the constitutionality of the 1,000-foot limit.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, and with whom Justice Souter joins as to Part I, concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.

This suit presents two separate sets of issues. The first— involving pre-emption — is straightforward. The second— *591involving the First Amendment — is more complex. Because I strongly disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (FCLAA or Act), 15 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq., as amended, precludes States and localities from regulating the location of cigarette advertising, I dissent from Parts II-A and II-B of the Court’s opinion. On the First Amendment questions, I agree with the Court both that the outdoor advertising restrictions imposed by Massachusetts serve legitimate and important state interests and that the record does not indicate that the measures were properly tailored to serve those interests. Because the present record does not enable us to adjudicate the merits of those claims on summary judgment, I would vacate the decision upholding those restrictions and remand for trial on the constitutionality of the outdoor advertising regulations. Finally, because I do not believe that either the point-of-sale advertising restrictions or the sales practice restrictions implicate significant First Amendment concerns, I would uphold them in their entirety.

I

As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 541-542, under prevailing principles, any examination of the scope of a preemption provision must “ ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by .. . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also, e. g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996). As the regulations at issue in this suit implicate two powers that lie at the heart of the States’ traditional police power — the power to regulate land usage and the power to protect the health and safety of minors — our precedents require that the Court construe the pre-emption provision “narrow[ly].” Id., at 485; *592see also Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 518. If Congress’ intent to pre-empt a particular category of regulation is ambiguous, such regulations are not pre-empted.1

The text of the pre-emption provision must be viewed in context, with proper attention paid to the history, structure, and purpose of the regulatory scheme in which it appears. See, e. g., Medtronic, 518 U. S., at 484-486; New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655-656 (1995); Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 513-515, 519-520, 529, 530, n. 27; accord, ante, at 542.2 An assessment of the scope of a pre-emption provision must give effect to a “reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.” Medtronic, 518 U. S., at 486.

This task, properly performed, leads inexorably to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to pre-empt state and local regulations of the location of cigarette advertising when it adopted the provision at issue in this suit. In both 1965 and 1969, Congress made clear the purposes of its regulatory *593endeavor, explaining with precision the federal policies motivating its actions. According to the Acts, Congress adopted a “comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,” for two reasons: (1) to inform the public that smoking may be hazardous to health and (2) to ensure that commerce and the interstate economy not be “impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” 15 U. S. C. § 1331.

In order to serve the second purpose it was necessary to pre-empt state regulation of the content of both cigarette labels and cigarette advertising. If one State required the inclusion of a particular warning on the package of cigarettes while another State demanded a different formulation, cigarette manufacturers would have been forced into the difficult and costly practice of producing different packaging for use in different States. To foreclose the waste of resources that would be entailed by such a patchwork regulatory system, Congress expressly precluded other regulators from requiring the placement on cigarette packaging of any “statement relating to smoking and health.” § 1334(a). Similar concerns applied to cigarette advertising. If different regulatory bodies required that different warnings or statements be used when cigarette manufacturers advertised their products, the text and layout of a company’s ads would have had to differ from locale to locale. The resulting costs would have come with little or no health benefit. Moreover, given the nature of publishing, it might well have been the cáse that cigarette companies would not have been able to advertise in national publications without violating the laws of some jurisdictions. In response to these concerns, Congress adopted a parallel provision pre-empting state and local regulations requiring inclusion in cigarette advertising of any “statement relating to smoking and health.” § 1334(b) (1970 ed.) (amended 1970).

*594There was, however, no need to interfere with state or local zoning laws or other regulations prescribing limitations on the location of signs or billboards. Laws prohibiting a cigarette company from hanging a billboard near a school in Boston in no way conflict with laws permitting the hanging of such a billboard in other jurisdictions. Nor would such laws even impose a significant administrative burden on would-be advertisers, as the great majority of localities impose general restrictions on signage, thus requiring advertisers to examine local law before posting signs whether or not cigarette-specific laws are pre-empted. See Greater N. Y. Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F. 3d 100, 109 (CA2 1999) (“Divergent local zoning restrictions on the location of sign advertising are a commonplace feature of the national landscape and cigarette advertisers have always been bound to observe them”). Hence, it is unsurprising that Congress did not include any provision in the 1965 Act pre-empting location restrictions.

The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act), §2, 84 Stat. 87, made two important changes in the pre-emption provision. First, it limited the applicability of the advertising prong to States and localities, paving the way for further federal regulation of cigarette advertising. FCLAA, § 4. Second, it expanded the scope of the advertising pre-emption provision. Where previously States were prohibited from requiring particular statements in cigarette advertising based on health concerns, they would henceforth be prohibited from imposing any “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes. § 5(b), 15 U. S. C. § 1334(b).3

*595Ripped from its context, this provision could theoretically be read as a breathtaking expansion of the limitations imposed by the 1965 Act. However, both our precedents and common sense require us to read statutory provisions — and, in particular, pre-emption clauses — in the context of both their neighboring provisions and of the history and purpose of the statutory scheme. See swpra, at 592. When so viewed, it is quite clear that the 1969 amendments were intended to expand the provision to capture a narrow set of content regulations that would have escaped pre-emption under the prior provision, not to fundamentally reorder the division of regulatory authority between the Federal and State Governments.

All signs point inescapably to the conclusion that Congress only intended to pre-empt content regulations in the 1969 Act. It is of crucial importance that, in making modifications of the pre-emption provision, Congress did not alter the statement laying out the federal policies the provision was intended to serve. See 15 U. S. C. § 1331. To this day, the stated federal policies in this area are (1) to inform the public of the dangers of cigarette smoking and (2) to protect the cigarette companies from the burdens of confusing and contradictory state regulations of their labels and advertisements. See ibid. The retention of this provision unchanged is strong evidence that Congress’ only intention in expanding the pre-emption clause was to capture forms of content regulation that had fallen through the cracks of the prior provision — for example, state laws prohibiting cigarette manufacturers from making particular claims in their advertising or requiring them to utilize specified layouts or include particular graphics in their marketing.4

*596The legislative history of the provision also supports such a reading. The record does not contain any evidence that Congress intended to expand the scope of pre-emption beyond content restrictions.5 To the contrary, the Senate Report makes it clear that the changes merely “clarified” the scope of the original provision. S. Rep. No. 91-566, p. 12 (1969). Even as amended, Congress perceived the provision as “narrowly phrased” and emphasized that its purpose is to “avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations.” Ibid. According to the Senate Report, the changes “in no way affect the power of any state or political subdivision of any state with respect to . . . the sale of cigarettes to minors ... or similar police regulations.” Ibid.

In analyzing the scope of the pre-emption provision, the Courts of Appeals have almost uniformly concluded that state and local laws regulating the location of billboards and signs are not pre-empted. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F. 3d 30, 39-41 (CA1 2000) (case below); Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F. 3d 100, 104-110 (CA2 1999); Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 189 F. 3d 633, *597686-640 (CA7 1999); Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63 F. 3d 1318 (CA4 1995); contra, Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce Cty. Health Dept., 195 F. 3d 1065 (CA9 1999). The decisions in those cases relied heavily upon our discussion of the same pre-emption provision in Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 515-524. In Cipollone, while the Members of the Court expressed three different opinions concerning the scope of pre-emption mandated by the provision, those differences related entirely to which, if any, of the plaintiff’s claims based on the content of the defendants’ advertising were pre-empted by § 5. Nary a word in any of the three Cipollone opinions supports the thesis that § 5 should be interpreted to pre-empt state regulation of the location of signs advertising cigarettes. Indeed, seven of the nine Justices subscribed to opinions that explicitly tethered the scope of the pre-emption provision to Congress’ concern with “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations.” Id., at 519; id., at 534, 541 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).

I am firmly convinced that, when Congress amended the pre-emption provision in 1969, it did not intend to expand the application of the provision beyond content regulations.6 *598I, therefore, find the conclusion inescapable that the zoning regulation at issue in this suit is not a “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising” within the meaning of the 1969 Act.7 Even if I were not so convinced, however, I would still dissent from the Court’s conclusion with regard to pre-emption, because the provision is, at the very least, ambiguous. The historical record simply does not reflect that it was Congress’ “‘clear and manifest purpose,’ ” id., at 516, to pre-empt attempts by States to utilize their traditional zoning authority to protect the health and welfare of minors. Absent such a manifest purpose, Massachusetts and its sister States retain their traditional police powers.8

*599hH

On the First Amendment issues raised by petitioners, my disagreements with the majority are less significant. I would, however, reach different dispositions as to the 1,000-foot rule and the height restrictions for indoor advertising, and my evaluation of the sales practice restrictions differs from the Court’s.

The 1.000-Foot Rule

I am in complete accord with the Court’s analysis of the importance of the interests served by the advertising restrictions. As the Court lucidly explains, few interests are more “compelling,” anté, at 564, than ensuring that minors do not become addicted to a dangerous drug before they are able to make a mature and informed decision as to the health risks associated with that substance. Unlike other products sold for human consumption, tobacco products are addictive and ultimately lethal for many long-term users. When that interest is combined with the State’s concomitant concern for the effective enforcement of its laws regarding the sale of tobacco to minors, it becomes clear that Massachusetts’ regulations serve interests of the highest order and are, therefore, immune from any ends-based challenge, whatever level of scrutiny one chooses to employ.

Nevertheless, noble ends do not save a speech-restricting statute whose means are poorly tailored. Such statutes *600may be invalid for two different reasons. First, the means chosen may be insufficiently related to the ends they purportedly serve. See, e. g., Rubin v. Coots Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476 (1995) (striking a statute prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content because the provision did not significantly forward the government’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens). Alternatively, the statute may be so broadly drawn that, while effectively achieving its ends, it unduly restricts communications that are unrelated to its policy aims. See, e. g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803,812 (2000) (striking a statute intended to protect children from indecent television broadcasts, in part because it constituted “a significant restriction of communication between speakers and willing adult listeners”). The second difficulty is most frequently encountered when government adopts measures for the protection of children that impose substantial restrictions on the ability of adults to communicate with one another. See, e.g., Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., supra; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989).

To my mind, the 1,000-foot rule does not present a tailoring problem of the first type. For reasons cogently explained in our prior opinions and in the opinion of the Court, we may fairly assume that advertising stimulates consumption and, therefore, that regulations limiting advertising will facilitate efforts to stem consumption.9 See, e.g., Rubin, 514 U. S., at 487; United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 434 (1993); ante, at 557. Furthermore, if the government’s intention is to limit consumption by a particular segment of the community — in this case, minors — it is *601appropriate, indeed necessary, to tailor advertising restrictions to the areas where that segment of the community congregates — in this case, the area surrounding schools and playgrounds.

However, I share the majority’s concern as to whether the 1,000-foot rule unduly restricts the ability of cigarette manufacturers to convey lawful information to adult consumers. This, of course, is a question of line-drawing. While a ban on all communications about a given subject would be the most effective way to prevent children from exposure to such material, the State cannot by fiat reduce the level of discourse to that which is “fit for children.” Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957); cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox”). On the other hand, efforts to protect children from exposure to harmful material will undoubtedly have some spillover effect on the free speech rights of adults. See, e. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 749-750, and n. 28 (1978).

Finding the appropriate balance is no easy matter. Though many factors plausibly enter the equation when calculating whether a child-directed location restriction goes too far in regulating adult speech, one crucial question is whether the regulatory scheme leaves available sufficient “alternative avenues of communication.” Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 50 (1986); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 819 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord, ante, at 563. Because I do not think the record contains sufficient information to enable us to answer that question, I would vacate the award of summary judgment upholding the 1,000-foot rule and remand for trial on that issue. Therefore, while I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals did not sufficiently consider the implications of the 1,000-foot rule for the lawful communication of adults, see ante, at 561-566, *602I dissent from the disposition reflected in Part III-B-2 of the Court’s opinion.

There is no doubt that the 1,000-foot rule prohibits cigarette advertising in a substantial portion of Massachusetts’ largest cities. Even on that questipn, however, the parties remain in dispute as to the percentage of these urban areas that is actually off limits to tobacco advertising. See ante, at 562. Moreover, the record is entirely silent on the impact of the regulation in other portions of the Commonwealth. The dearth of reliable statistical information as to the scope of the ban is problematic.

More importantly, the Court lacks sufficient qualitative information as to the areas where cigarette advertising is prohibited and those where it is permitted. The fact that 80% or 90% of an urban area is unavailable to tobacco advertisements may be constitutionally irrelevant if the available areas are so heavily trafficked or so central to the city’s cultural life that they provide a sufficient forum for the propagation of a manufacturer’s message. One electric sign in Times Square or at the foot of the Golden Gate Bridge may be seen by more potential customers than a hundred signs dispersed in residential neighborhoods.

Finally, the Court lacks information as to other avenues of communication available to cigarette manufacturers and retailers. For example, depending on the answers to empirical questions on which we lack data, the ubiquity of print advertisements hawking particular brands of cigarettes might suffice to inform adult consumers of the special advantages of the respective brands. Similarly, print advertisements, circulars mailed to people’s homes, word of mouth, and general information may or may not be sufficient to imbue the adult population with the knowledge that particular stores, chains of stores, or types of stores sell tobacco products.10

*603In granting summary judgment for the respondents, the District Judge treated the First Amendment issues in this suit as pure questions of law and stated that “there are no material facts in dispute concerning these issues,” 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 183 (Mass. 2000). With due respect, I disagree. While the ultimate question before us is one of law, the answer to that question turns on complicated factual questions relating to the practical effects of the regulations. As the record does not reveal the answer to these disputed questions of fact, the court should have denied summary judgment to both parties and allowed the parties to present further evidence.

I note, moreover, that the alleged “overinclusivity” of the advertising regulations, ante, at 578 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), while relevant to whether the regulations are narrowly tailored, does not “beli[e]” the claim that tobacco advertising imagery misleads children into believing that smoking is healthy, glamorous, or sophisticated, ibid. See Brief for American Legacy Foundation as Amicus Curiae 4-5, and nn. 9, 10; Brief for City of Los Angeles et al. as Amici Curiae 4 (documenting charge that advertisements for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco target underage smokers). For purposes of summary judgment, the State conceded that the tobacco companies’ advertising concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Under the Court’s disposition of the cases today, the State remains free to proffer evidence that the advertising is in fact misleading. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976) (“[M]uch commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this problem”). I would vacate the grant of summary judgment to respondents on this issue and remand for further proceedings.

*604The Sales Practice and Indoor Advertising Restrictions

After addressing petitioners’ challenge to the sales practice restrictions imposed by the Massachusetts statute, the Court concluded that these provisions did not violate the First Amendment. I concur in that judgment, but write separately on this issue to make two brief points.

First, I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the sales practice restrictions are best analyzed as regulating conduct, not speech. See 218 F. 3d, at 53. While the decision how to display one’s products no doubt serves a marginal communicative function, the same can be said of virtually any human activity performed with the hope or intention of evoking the interest of others. This Court has long recognized the need to differentiate between legislation that targets expression and legislation that targets conduct for legitimate non-speech-related reasons but imposes an incidental burden on expression. See, e. g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). However difficult that line may be to draw, it seems clear to me that laws requiring that stores maintain items behind counters and prohibiting self-service displays fall squarely on the conduct side of the line. Restrictions as to the accessibility of dangerous or legally restricted products are a common feature of the regulatory regime governing American retail stores. I see nothing the least bit constitutionally problematic in requiring individuals to ask for the assistance of a salesclerk in order to examine or purchase a handgun, a bottle of penicillin, or a package of cigarettes.

Second, though I admit the question is closer, I would, for similar reasons, uphold the regulation limiting tobacco advertising in certain retail establishments to the space five feet or more above the floor.11 When viewed in isolation, this provision appears to target speech. Further, to the ex*605tent that it does target speech it may well run into constitutional problems, as the connection between the ends the statute purports to serve and the means it has chosen are dubious. Nonetheless, I am ultimately persuaded that the provision is unobjectionable because it is little more than an adjunct to the other sales practice restrictions. As the Commonwealth of Massachusetts can properly legislate the placement of products and the nature of displays in its convenience stores, I would not draw a distinction between such restrictions and height restrictions on related product advertising. I would accord the Commonwealth some latitude in imposing restrictions that can have only the slightest impact on the ability of adults to purchase a poisonous product and may save some children from taking the first step on the road to addiction.

Ill

Because I strongly disagree with the Court’s conclusion on the pre-emption issue, I dissent from Parts II-A and II-B of its opinion. Though I agree with much of what the Court has to say about the First Amendment, I ultimately disagree with its disposition or its reasoning on each of the regulations before us.12