Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-A-2.†

The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953). Concerned that this fundamental nonperseeution principle of the First Amendment was implicated here, however, we granted certiorari. 503 U. S. 935 (1992).

*524Our review confirms that the laws in question were enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation’s essential commitment to religious freedom. The challenged laws had an impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs. We invalidate the challenged enactments and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

A

This case involves practices of the Santería religion, which originated in the 19th century. When hundreds of thousands of members of the Yoruba people were brought as slaves from western Africa to Cuba, their traditional African religion absorbed significant elements of Roman Catholicism. The resulting syncretion, or fusion, is Santería, “the way of the saints.” The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are often present at Santería rites, and Santería devotees attend the Catholic sacraments. 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469-1470 (SD Fla. 1989); 13 Encyclopedia of Religion 66 (M. Eliade ed. 1987); 1 Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience 183 (C. Lippy & P. Williams eds. 1988).

The Santería faith teaches that every individual has a destiny from God, a destiny fulfilled with the aid and energy of the orishas. The basis of the Santería religion is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice. 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, swpra, at 66. The sacrifice of animals as part of religious rituals has ancient roots. See generally 12 id., at 554-556. Animal sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Old Testament, see 14 Encyclopaedia Judaica 600, 600-*525605 (1971), and it played an important role in the practice of Judaism before destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem, see id., at 605-612. In modern Islam, there is an annual sacrifice commemorating Abraham’s sacrifice of a ram in the stead of his son. See C. Glassé, Concise Encyclopedia of Islam 178 (1989); 7 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 456.

According to Santería teaching, the orishas are powerful but not immortal. They depend for survival on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new members and priests, and during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in Santería rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid arteries in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten, except after healing and death rituals. See 723 F. Supp., at 1471-1472; 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 66; M. González-Wippler, The Santería Experience 105 (1982).

Santería adherents faced widespread persecution in Cuba, so the religion and its rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Santería and its rites remains infrequent. See 723 F. Supp., at 1470; 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 67; M. González-Wippler, Santería: The Religion 3-4 (1989). The religion was brought to this Nation most often by exiles from the Cuban revolution. The District Court estimated that there are at least 50,000 practitioners in South Florida today. See 723 F. Supp., at 1470.

B

Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973. The Church and its congregants practice the Santería religion. The president of the Church is petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, who is also the Church’s priest and holds the religious title of Italero, the second highest in the Santería faith. In April 1987, the Church leased land in *526the city of Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to establish a house of worship as well as a school, cultural center, and museum. Pichardo indicated that the Church’s goal was to bring the practice of the Santería faith, including its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open. The Church began the process of obtaining utility service and receiving the necessary licensing, inspection, and zoning approvals. Although the Church’s efforts at obtaining the necessary licenses and permits were far from smooth, see 723 F. Supp., at 1477-1478, it appears that it received all needed approvals by early August 1987.

The prospect of a Santería church in their midst was distressing to many members of the Hialeah community, and the announcement of the plans to open a Santería church in Hialeah prompted the city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. The resolutions and ordinances passed at that and later meetings are set forth in the Appendix following this opinion.

A summary suffices here, beginning with the enactments passed at the June 9 meeting. First, the city council adopted Resolution 87-66, which noted the “concern” expressed by residents of the city “that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,” and declared that “[t]he City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.” Next, the council approved an emergency ordinance, Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated in full, except as to penalty, Florida’s animal cruelty laws. Fla. Stat. ch. 828 (1987). Among other things, the incorporated state law subjected to criminal punishment “[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal.” §828.12.

The city council desired to undertake further legislative action, but Florida law prohibited a municipality from enacting legislation relating to animal cruelty that conflicted with *527state law. § 828.27(4). To obtain clarification, Hialeah’s city attorney requested an opinion from the attorney general of Florida as to whether §828.12 prohibited “a religious group from sacrificing an animal in a religious ritual or practice” and whether the city could enact ordinances “making religious animal sacrifice unlawful.” The attorney general responded in mid-July. He concluded that the “ritual sacrifice of animals for purposes other than food consumption” was not a “necessary” killing and so was prohibited by §828.12. Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 87-56, Annual Report of the Atty. Gen. 146, 147, 149 (1988). The attorney general appeared to define “unnecessary” as “done without any useful motive, in a spirit of wanton cruelty or for the mere pleasure of destruction without being in any sense beneficial or useful to the person killing the animal.” Id., at 149, n. 11. He advised that religious animal sacrifice was against state law, so that a city ordinance prohibiting it would not be in conflict. Id., at 151.

The city council responded at first with a hortatory enactment, Resolution 87-90, that noted its residents’ “great concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices” and the state-law prohibition. The resolution declared the city policy “to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals” within Hialeah and announced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice “will be prosecuted.”

In September 1987, the city council adopted three substantive ordinances addressing the issue of religious animal sacrifice. Ordinance 87-52 defined “sacrifice” as “to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption,” and prohibited owning or possessing an animal “intending to use such animal for food purposes.” It restricted application of this prohibition, however, to any individual or group that “kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed.” The ordinance *528contained an exemption for slaughtering by “licensed establishment[s]” of animals “specifically raised for food purposes.” Declaring, moreover, that the city council “has determined that the sacrificing of animals within the city limits is contrary to the public health, safety, welfare and morals of the community,” the city council adopted Ordinance 87-71. That ordinance defined “sacrifice” as had Ordinance 87-52, and then provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida.” The final Ordinance, 87-72, defined “slaughter” as “the killing of animals for food” and prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. The ordinance provided an exemption, however, for the slaughter or processing for sale of “small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law.” All ordinances and resolutions passed the city council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both.

Following enactment of these ordinances, the Chureh and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Named as defendants were the city of Hialeah and its mayor and members of its city council in their individual capacities. Alleging violations of petitioners’ rights under, inter alia, the Free Exercise Clause, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive and monetary relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, finding that they had absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that the ordinances and resolutions adopted by the council did not constitute an official policy of harassment, as alleged by petitioners. 688 F. Supp. 1522 (SD Fla. 1988).

After a 9-day bench trial on the remaining claims, the District Court ruled for the city, finding no violation of petition*529ers’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 723 F. Supp. 1467 (SD Fla. 1989). (The court rejected as well petitioners’ other claims, which are not at issue here.) Although acknowledging that “the ordinances are not religiously neutral,” id., at 1476, and that the city’s concern about animal sacrifice was “prompted” by the establishment of the Church in the city, id., at 1479, the District Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinances was not to exclude the Church from the city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for whatever reason practiced, id., at 1479,1483. The court also found that the ordinances did not target religious conduct “on their face,” though it noted that in any event “specifically regulating [religious] conduct” does not violate the First Amendment “when [the conduct] is deemed inconsistent with public health and welfare.” Id., at 1483-1484. Thus, the court concluded that, at most, the ordinances’ effect on petitioners’ religious conduct was “incidental to [their] secular purpose and effect.” Id., at 1484.

The District Court proceeded to determine whether the governmental interests underlying the ordinances were compelling and, if so, to balance the “governmental and religious, interests.” The court noted that “[t]his ‘balance depends upon the cost to the government of altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by the government activity.’ ” Ibid., quoting Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F. 2d 729, 734 (CA11 1983), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 827 (1984). The court found four compelling interests. First, the court found that animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk, both to participants and the general public. According to the court, animals that are to be sacrificed are often kept in unsanitary conditions and are uninspected, and animal remains are found in public places. 723 F. Supp., at 1474-1475, 1485. Second, the court found emotional injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals. Id., at 1475-1476, 1485-1486. Third, the court found compelling the city’s in*530terest in protecting animals from cruel and unnecessary killing. The court determined that the method of killing used in Santería sacrifice was “unreliable and not humane, and that the animals, before being sacrificed, are often kept in conditions that produce a great deal of fear and stress in the animal.” Id., at 1472-1473, 1486. Fourth, the District Court found compelling the city’s interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. Id., at 1486. This legal determination was not accompanied by factual findings.

Balancing the competing governmental and religious interests, the District Court concluded the compelling governmental interests “fully justify the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice” accomplished by the ordinances. Id., at 1487. The court also concluded that an exception to the sacrifice prohibition for religious conduct would “‘unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest’ ” because any more narrow restrictions — e. g., regulation of disposal of animal carcasses — would be unenforceable as a result of the secret nature of the Santería religion. Id., at 1486-1487, and nn. 57-59. A religious exemption from the city’s ordinances, concluded the court, would defeat the city’s compelling interests in enforcing the prohibition. Id., at 1487.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. Judgt. order reported at 936 F. 2d 586 (1991). Choosing not to rely on the District Court’s recitation of a compelling interest in promoting the welfare of children, the Court of Appeals stated simply that it concluded the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2. It declined to address the effect of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), decided after the District Court’s opinion, because the District Court “employed an arguably stricter standard” than that applied in Smith. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2, n. 1.

*531>-H

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof____” (Emphasis added.) The city does not argue that Santería is not a “religion” within the meaning of the First Amendment. Nor could it. Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 714 (1981). Given the historical association between animal sacrifice and religious worship, see supra, at 524-525, petitioners’ assertion that animal sacrifice is an integral part of their religion “cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible.” Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829, 834, n. 2 (1989). Neither the city nor the courts below, moreover, have questioned the sincerity of petitioners’ professed desire to conduct animal sacrifices for religious reasons. We must consider petitioners’ First Amendment claim.

In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our eases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this ease, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance *532that interest. These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements. We begin by discussing neutrality.

A

In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general. See, e. g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 225 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1947). These cases, however, for the most part have addressed governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a question different, at least in its formulation and emphasis, from the issue here. Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor their religion because of the religious ceremonies it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive in our analysis.

At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. See, e. g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S., at 69-70. Indeed, it was “historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.” Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 464, and n. 2 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in re-*533suit); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890). These principles, though not often at issue in our Free Exercise Clause eases, have played a role in some. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978), for example, we invalidated a state law that disqualified members of the clergy from holding certain public offices, because it “impose[d] special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious status,” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 877. On the same principle, in Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra, we found that a municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional manner when interpreted to prohibit preaching in a public park by a Jehovah’s Witness but to permit preaching during the course of a Catholic mass or Protestant church service. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 272-273 (1951). Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982) (state statute that treated some religious denominations more favorably than others violated the Establishment Clause).

1

Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, McDaniel v. Paty, supra, at 626 (plurality opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra, at 878-879; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct. To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context. Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial neutrality because they use the words *534“sacrifice” and “ritual,” words with strong religious connotations. Brief for Petitioners 16-17. We agree that these words are consistent with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive. The words “sacrifice” and “ritual” have a religious origin, but current use admits also of secular meanings. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1961, 1996 (1971). See also 12 Encyclopedia of Religion, at 556 (“[T]he word sacrifice ultimately became very much a secular term in common usage”). The ordinances, furthermore, define “sacrifice” in secular terms, without referring to religious practices.

We reject the contention advanced by the city, see Brief for Respondent 15, that our inquiry must end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause “forbids subtle departures from neutrality,” Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 452 (1971), and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs,” Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 703 (opinion of Burger, C. J.). Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt. “The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.” Walz v. Tax Comn'n of New York City, 397 U. S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santería worship service was the object of the ordinances. First, though use of the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” does not compel a finding of improper targeting of the Santería religion, the choice of these words is support for our conclusion. There are further respects in which the text of the city council’s enactments discloses the improper attempt to target Santería. *535Resolution 87-66, adopted June 9, 1987, recited that “residents and eitizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,” and “reiterate[d]” the city’s commitment to prohibit “any and all [such] acts of any and all religious groups.” No one suggests, and on this record it cannot be maintained, that city officials had in mind a religion other than Santería.

It becomes evident that these ordinances target Santería sacrifice when the ordinances’ operation is considered. Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. To be sure, adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible targeting. For example, a social harm may have been a legitimate concern of government for reasons quite apart from discrimination. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S., at 442. See, e. g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890). See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1319 (1970). The subject at hand does implicate, of course, multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity, for example, the suffering or mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed animals and health hazards from improper disposal. But the ordinances when considered together disclose an object remote from these legitimate concerns. The design of these laws accomplishes instead a “religious gerrymander,” Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring), an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.

It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct subject to Ordinances 87-40,87-52, and 87-71 is the religious exercise of Santería church members. The texts show that they were drafted in tandem to achieve this result. We begin with Ordinance 87-71. It prohibits the sacrifice of animals, but defines sacrifice as “to unnecessarily kill... an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the *536primary purpose of food consumption.” The definition excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifice, and the primary purpose requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting kosher slaughter, see 723 F. Supp., at 1480. We need not discuss whether this differential treatment of two religions is itself an independent constitutional violation. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S., at 244-246. It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for our conclusion that Santería alone was the exclusive legislative concern. The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are prohibited other than Santería sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an offering to the oriskas, not food consumption. Indeed, careful drafting ensured that, although Santería sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished.

Operating in similar fashion is Ordinance 87-52, which prohibits the “possession], sacrifice, or slaughter” of an animal with the “inten[t] to use such animal for food purposes.” This prohibition, extending to the keeping of an animal as well as the killing itself, applies if the animal is killed in “any type of ritual” and there is an intent to use the animal for food, whether or not it is in fact consumed for food. The ordinance exempts, however, “any licensed [food] establishment” with regard to “any animals which are specifically raised for food purposes,” if the activity is permitted by zoning and other laws. This exception, too, seems intended to cover kosher slaughter. Again, the burden of the ordinance, in practical terms, falls on Santería adherents but almost no others: If the killing is — unlike most Santería sacrifices — unaccompanied by the intent to use the animal for food, then it is not prohibited by Ordinance 87-52; if the killing is specifically for food but does not occur during the course of “any type of ritual,” it again falls outside the prohibition; and if *537the killing is for food and occurs during the course of a ritual, it is still exempted if it occurs in a properly zoned and licensed establishment and involves animals “specifically raised for food purposes.” A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibitions. Each contributes to the gerrymander.

Ordinance 87-40 incorporates the Florida animal cruelty statute, Fla. Stat. §828.12 (1987). Its prohibition is broad on its face, punishing “[w]hoever ... unnecessarily . .. kills any animal.” The city claims that this ordinance is the epitome of a neutral prohibition. Brief for Respondent 13-14. The problem, however, is the interpretation given to the ordinance by respondent and the Florida attorney general. Killings for religious reasons are deemed unnecessary, whereas most other killings fall outside the prohibition. The city, on what seems to be a per se basis, deems hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of insects and pests, and euthanasia as necessary. See id., at 22. There is no indication in the record that respondent has concluded that hunting or fishing for sport is unnecessary. Indeed, one of the few reported Florida cases decided under § 828.12 concludes that the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds is not unnecessary. See Kiper v. State, 310 So. 2d 42 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1975). Further, because it requires an evaluation of the particular justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a system of “individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 884. As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government “may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” Ibid., quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S., at 708 (opinion of Burger, C. J.). Respondent’s application of the ordinance’s test of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonre*538ligious reasons. Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory treatment. Id., at 722, and n. 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); id., at 708 (opinion of Burger, C. J.); United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 264, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

We also find significant evidence of the ordinances’ improper targeting of Santería sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends. It is not unreasonable to infer, at least when there are no persuasive indications to the contrary, that a law which visits “gratuitous restrictions” on religious conduct, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S., at 520 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests, but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation.

The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a fiat prohibition of all Santería sacrificial practice.* If improper disposal, not the sacrifice itself, is the harm to be prevented, the city could have imposed a general regulation on the disposal of organic garbage. It did not do so. Indeed, counsel for the city conceded at oral argument that, under the ordinances, Santería sacrifices would be illegal even if they occurred in licensed, inspected, and zoned slaughterhouses. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. See also id., at 42,48. Thus, these broad ordinances prohibit Santería sacrifice even when it does not threaten the city’s *539interest in the public health. The District Court accepted the argument that narrower regulation would be unenforceable because of the secrecy in the Santería rituals and the lack of any central religious authority to require compliance with secular disposal regulations. See 723 F. Supp., at 1486-1487, and nn. 58-59. It is difficult to understand, however, how a prohibition of the sacrifices themselves, which occur in private, is enforceable if a ban on improper disposal, which occurs in public, is not. The neutrality of a law is suspect if First Amendment freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves prohibited by direct regulation. See, e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939).

Under similar analysis, narrower regulation would achieve the city’s interest in preventing cruelty to animals. With regard to the city’s interest in ensuring the adequate care of animals, regulation of conditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal is kept, is the logical response to the city’s concern, not a prohibition on possession for the purpose of sacrifice. The same is true for the city’s interest in prohibiting cruel methods of killing. Under federal and Florida law and Ordinance 87-40, which incorporates Florida law in this regard, killing an animal by the “simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument” — the method used in kosher slaughter — is approved as humane. See 7 U. S. C. § 1902(b); Fla. Stat. § 828.23(7)(b) (1991); Ordinance 87-40, § 1. The District Court found that, though Santería sacrifice also results in severance of the carotid arteries, the method used during sacrifice is less reliable and therefore not humane. See 723 F. Supp., at 1472-1473. If the city has a real concern that other methods are less humane, however, the subject of the regulation should be the method of slaughter itself, not a religious classification that is said to bear some general relation to it.

Ordinance 87-72 — unlike the three other ordinances— does appear to apply to substantial nonreligious conduct and *540not to be overbroad. For our purposes here, however, the four substantive ordinances may be treated as a group for neutrality purposes. Ordinance 87-72 was passed the same day as Ordinance 87-71 and was enacted, as were the three others, in direct response to the opening of the Church. It would be implausible to suggest that the three other ordinances, but not Ordinance 87-72, had as their object the suppression of religion. We need not decide whether Ordinance 87-72 could survive constitutional scrutiny if it existed separately; it must be invalidated because it functions, with the rest of the enactments in question, to suppress Santería religious worship.

2

In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases. As Justice Harlan noted in the related context of the Establishment Clause, “[njeutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U. S., at 696 (concurring opinion). Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council’s object from both direct and circumstantial evidence. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body. Id., at 267-268. These objective factors bear on the question of discriminatory object. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279, n. 24 (1979).

That the ordinances were enacted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ ” their suppression of Santería religious practice, id., at 279, is revealed by the events preceding their enactment. Although respondent claimed at oral argument *541that it had experienced significant problems resulting from the sacrifice of animals within the city before the announced opening of the Church, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27,46, the city council made no attempt to address the supposed problem before its meeting in June 1987, just weeks after the Church announced plans to open. The minutes and taped excerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in the record, evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials toward the Santería religion and its practice of animal sacrifice. The public crowd that attended the June 9 meetings interrupted statements by council members critical of Santería with cheers and the brief comments of Pichardo with taunts. When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the ordinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba “people were put in jail for practicing this religion,” the audience applauded. Taped excerpts of Hialeah City Council Meeting, June 9,1987.

Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar vein. For example, Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief that Santería was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: “[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?” Councilman Cardoso said that Santería devotees at the Church “are in violation of everything this country stands for.” Councilman Mejides indicated that he was “totally against the sacrificing of animals” and distinguished kosher slaughter because it had a “real purpose.” The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice an animal for consumption,” he continued, “but for any other purposes, I don’t believe that the Bible allows that.” The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: “What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?”

Various Hialeah city officials made comparable comments. The chaplain of the Hialeah Police Department told the city council that Santería was a sin, “foolishness,” “an abomination to the Lord,” and the worship of “demons.” He advised *542the city council: “We need to be helping people and sharing with them the truth that is found in Jesus Christ.” He concluded: “I would exhort you ... not to permit this Church to exist.” The city attorney commented that Resolution 87-66 indicated: “This community will not tolerate religious practices which are abhorrent to its citizens ...Ibid. Similar comments were made by the deputy city attorney. This history discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal sacrifice by Santería worshippers because of its religious motivation.

3

In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santería adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed clear error in failing to reach this conclusion.

B

We turn next to a second requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the rule that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 879-881. All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause “proteet[s] religious observers against unequal treatment,” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), and inequality results when a legislature decides that *543the governmental Interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation.

The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The principle underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in our First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e. g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U. S. 663, 669-670 (1991); University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 201 (1990); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 585 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S., at 245-246; Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440, 449 (1969). In this ease we need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights.

Respondent claims that Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71 advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals. The ordinances are under-inclusive for those ends. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santería sacrifice does. The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential. Despite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice. Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express provision. For example, fishing — which occurs in Hialeah, see A. Khedouri & F. Khedouri, South Florida Inside Out 57 (1991) — is legal. Extermination of mice and rats within a home is also permitted. Florida law incorporated by Ordinance 87-40 sanctions *544euthanasia of “stray, neglected, abandoned, or unwanted animals,” Fla. Stat. §828.058 (1987); destruction of animals judicially removed from their owners “for humanitarian reasons” or when the animal “is of no commercial value,” §828.073(4)(c)(2); the infliction of pain or suffering “in the interest of medical science,” § 828.02; the placing of poison in one’s yard or enclosure, §828.08; and the use of a live animal “to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting,” §828.122(6)(b), and “to hunt wild hogs,” §828.122(6)(e).

The city concedes that “neither the State of Florida nor the City has enacted a generally applicable ban on the killing of animals.” Brief for Respondent 21. It asserts, however, that animal sacrifice is “different” from the animal killings that are permitted by law. Ibid. According to the city, it is “self-evident” that killing animals for food is “important”; the eradication of insects and pests is “obviously justified”; and the euthanasia of excess animals “makes sense.” Id., at 22. These ipse dixits do not explain why religion alone must bear the burden of the ordinances, when many of these secular killings fall within the city’s interest in preventing the cruel treatment of animals.

The ordinances are also underinelusive with regard to the city’s interest in public health, which is threatened by the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places and the consumption of uninspected meat, see Brief for Respondent 32, citing 723 F. Supp., at 1474-1475, 1485. Neither interest is pursued by respondent with regard to conduct that is not motivated by religious conviction. The health risks posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses are the same whether Santería sacrifice or some nonreligious killing preceded it. The city does not, however, prohibit hunters from bringing their kill to their houses, nor does it regulate disposal after their activity. Despite substantial testimony at trial that the same public health hazards result from improper disposal of garbage by restaurants, see 11 Record 566, *545590-591, restaurants are outside the scope of the ordinances. Improper disposal is a general problem that causes substantial health risks, 723 F. Supp., at 1485, but which respondent addresses only when it results from religious exercise.

The ordinances are underinclusive as well with regard to the health risk posed by consumption of uninspected meat. Under the city’s ordinances, hunters may eat their kill and fishermen may eat their catch without undergoing governmental inspection. Likewise, state law requires inspection of meat that is sold but exempts meat from animals raised for the use of the owner and “members of his household and nonpaying guests and employees.” Fla. Stat. § 585.88(l)(a) (1991). The asserted interest in inspected meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that of religious animal sacrifice.

Ordinance 87-72, which prohibits the slaughter of animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses, is underinclusive on its face. The ordinance includes an exemption for “any person, group, or organization” that “slaughters or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law.” See Fla. Stat. § 828.24(3) (1991). Respondent has not explained why commercial operations that slaughter “small numbers” of hogs and cattle do not implicate its professed desire to prevent cruelty to animals and preserve the public health. Although the city has classified Santería sacrifice as slaughter, subjecting it to this ordinance, it does not regulate other killings for food in like manner.

We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances “ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santería worshippers] but not upon itself.” Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J,, concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This *546precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent.

Ill

A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance “ ‘interests of the highest order”’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S., at 628, quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972). The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not “water[ed] . . . down” but “really means what it says.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 888. A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare eases. It follows from what we have already said that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.

First, even were the governmental interests compelling, the ordinances are not drawn in narrow terms to accomplish those interests. As we have discussed, see supra, at 538-540, 543-546, all four ordinances are overbroad or under-inclusive in substantial respects. The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree. The absence of narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 232 (1987).

Respondent has not demonstrated, moreover, that, in the context of these ordinances, its governmental interests are compelling. Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible *547measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.” Florida Star v. B. J. F., supra, at 541-542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 119-120 (1991). Cf. Florida Star v. B. J. F., supra, at 540-541; Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 104-105 (1979); id., at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). As we show above, see supra, at 543-546, the ordinances are underinelusive to a substantial extent with respect to each of the interests that respondent has asserted, and it is only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the weight of the governmental restrictions. There can be no serious claim that those interests justify the ordinances.

IV

The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures. Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.

Reversed.

*548APPENDIX TO OPINION OP THE COURT

City of Hialeah, Florida, Resolution No. 87-66, adopted June 9,1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety, and

“WHEREAS, the Florida Constitution, Article I, Declaration of Rights, Section 3, Religious Freedom, specifically states that religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or ssfsty

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

“1. The City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”

City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-40, adopted June 9,1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, the citizens of the City of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern over the potential for animal sacrifices being conducted in the City of Hialeah; and

“WHEREAS, Section 828.27, Florida Statutes, provides that ‘nothing contained in this section shall prevent any county or municipality from enacting any ordinance relating to animal control or cruelty to animals which is identical to the provisions of this Chapter . .. except as to penalty/

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

*549“Section 1. The Mayor and City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, hereby adopt Florida Statute, Chapter 828 — ‘Cruelty to Animals’ (copy attached hereto and made a part hereof), in its entirety (relating to animal control or cruelty to animals), except as to penalty.

“Section 2. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.

“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

“Section 3. Penalties.

“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

“jSection k- Inclusion in Code.

“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to conform to the uniform numbering system of the Code.

“Section 5. Severability Clause.

“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional by the judge or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or uneonstitutionality shall not effect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of this ordinance.

“Section 6. Effective Date.

“This Ordinance shall become effective when passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”

City of Hialeah Resolution No. 87-90, adopted August 11, 1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern regard*550ing the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices in the City of Hialeah, Florida; and

“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has received an opinion from the Attorney General of the State of Florida, concluding that public ritualistic animal sacrifices is [sic] a violation of the Florida State Statute on Cruelty to Animals; and

“WHEREAS, the Attorney General farther held that the sacrificial killing of animals other than for the primary purpose of food consumption is prohibited under state law; and

“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has enacted an ordinance mirroring state law prohibiting cruelty to animals.

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

“Section 1. It is the policy of the Mayor and City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah, FLorida [sic]. Any individual or organization that seeks to practice animal sacrifice in violation of state and local law will be prosecuted.”

City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-52, adopted September 8, 1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices within the City of Hialeah, Florida; and

“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has received an opinion from the Attorney General of the State of Florida, concluding that public ritualistic animal sacrifice, other than for the primary purpose of food consumption, is a violation of state law; and

*551“WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has enacted an ordinance (Ordinance No. 87-40), mirroring the state law prohibiting cruelty to animals.

‘WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, now wishes to specifically prohibit the possession of animals for slaughter or sacrifice within the City, of Hialeah, Florida.

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

“Section 1. Chapter 6 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Hialeah, Florida, is hereby amended by adding thereto two (2) new Sections 6-8 ‘Definitions’ and 6-9 ‘Prohibition Against Possession Of Animals For Slaughter Or Sacrifice’, which is to read as follows:

“Section 6-8. Definitions

“1. Animal — any living dumb creature.

“2. Sacrifice — to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.

“3. Slaughter — the killing of animals for food.

“Section 6-9. Prohibition Against Possession of Animals for Slaughter Or Sacrifice.

“1. No person shall own, keep or otherwise possess, sacrifice, or slaughter any sheep, goat, pig, cow or the young of such species, poultry, rabbit, dog, cat, or any other animal, intending to use such animal for food purposes.

“2. This section is applicable to any group or individual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed.

“3. Nothing in this ordinance is to be interpreted as prohibiting any licensed establishment from slaughtering for food purposes any animals which are specifically *552raised for food purposes where such activity is properly zoned and/or permitted under state and local law and under rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Agriculture.

“Section 2. Repeal of Ordinance in Conflict.

“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

“Section 3. Penalties.

“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

“Section 4- Inclusion in Code.

“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to conform to the uniform numbering system of the Code.

“Section 5. Severability Clause.

“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional by the judgement or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not effect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of this ordinance.

“Section 6. Effective Date.

“This Ordinance shall become effective when passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”

City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-71, adopted September 22, 1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, has determined that the sacrificing of animals *553within the city limits is contrary to the public health, safety, welfare and morals of the community; and

“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, desires to have qualified societies or corporations organized under the laws of the State of Florida, to be authorized to investigate and prosecute any violation^) of the ordinance herein after set forth, and for the registration of the agents of said societies.

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

“Section 1. For the purpose of this ordinance, the word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.

“Section 2. For the purpose of this ordinance, the word animal shall mean: any living dumb creature.

“Section S. It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida.

“Section A All societies or associations for the prevention of cruelty to animals organized under the laws of the State of Florida, seeking to register with the City of Hialeah for purposes of investigating and assisting in the prosecution of violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance, shall apply to the City Council for authorization to so register and shall be registered with the Office of the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, following approval by the City Council at a public hearing in accordance with rules and regulations (i. e., criteria) established by the City Council by resolution, and shall thereafter, be empowered to assist in the proseetion of any violation of this Ordinance.

*554“Section 5. Any society or association for the prevention of cruelly to animals registered with the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 hereinabove, may appoint agents for the purposes of investigating and assisting in the prosecution of violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance, or any other laws of the City of Hialeah, Florida, for the purpose of protecting animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.

“Section 6. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.

“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

“Section 7. Penalties.

“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

“Section 8. Inclusion in Code.

“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to conform to the uniform numbering system of the Code.

“Section 9. Severability Clause.

“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional by the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or uneonstitutionality shall not effect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of this Ordinance.

“Section 10. Effective Date.

“This Ordinance shall become effective when passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”

*555City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-72, adopted September 22,1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, has determined that the slaughtering of animals on the premises other than those properly zoned as a slaughter house, is contrary to the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Hialeah, Florida.

“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:

“Section 1. For the purpose of this Ordinance, the word slaughter shall mean: the killing of animals for food.

“Section 2. For the purpose of this Ordinance, the word animal shall mean: any living dumb creature.

“Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to slaughter any animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah, Florida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter house, and meeting all the health, safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City for the operation of a slaughter house.

“Section A All societies or associations for the prevention of cruelty to animals organized under the laws of the State of Florida, seeking to register with the City of Hialeah for purposes of investigating and assisting in the prosecution of violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance, shall apply to the City Council for authorization to so register and shall be registered with the Office of the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, following approval by the City Council at a public hearing in accordance with rules and regulations (i. e., criteria) established by the City Council by resolution, and shall thereafter, be empowered to assist in the proseetion of any violations of this Ordinance.

*556“Section 5. Any society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals registered with the Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 hereinabove, may appoint agents for the purposes of investigating and assisting in the prosecution of violations and provisions [sic] of this Ordinance, or any other laws of the City of Hialeah, Florida, for the purpose of protecting animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.

“Section 6. This Ordinance shall not apply to any person, group, or organization that slaughters, or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law.

“Section 7. Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.

“All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.

“Section 8. Penalties.

“Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

“Section 9. Inclusion in Code.

“The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah, as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sections of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to conform to the uniform numbering system of the Code.

“Section 10. Severability Clause.

“If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional by the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or uneonstitutionality shall not effeet any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of this ordinance.

*557“Section 11. Effective Date.

“This Ordinance shall become effective when passed by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.”

Justice Scalia,

with whom

The Court analyzes the “neutrality” and the “general applicability” of the Hialeah ordinances in separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively), and allocates various invalidating factors to one or the other of those sections. If it were necessary to make a clear distinction between the two terms, I would draw a line somewhat different from the Court’s. But I think it is not necessary, and would frankly acknowledge that the terms are not only “interrelated,” ante, at 531, but substantially overlap.

The terms “neutrality” and “general applicability” are not to be found within the First Amendment itself, of course, but are used in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), and earlier cases to describe those characteristics which cause a law that prohibits an activity a particular individual wishes to engage in for religious reasons nonetheless not to constitute a “law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion (e. g., a law excluding members of a certain sect from public benefits, cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978)), see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 703-704 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.); whereas the defect of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953). But certainly a law that is not of general applicability (in the sense *558I have described) can be considered “nonneutral”; and certainly no law that is nonneutral (in the relevant sense) can be thought to be of general applicability. Because I agree with most of the invalidating factors set forth in Part II of the Court’s opinion, and because it seems to me a matter of no consequence under which rubric (“neutrality,” Part II-A, or “general applicability,” Part II-B) each invalidating factor is discussed, I join the judgment of the Court and all of its opinion except section 2 of Part II-A.

I do not join that section because it departs from the opinion’s general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers, i. e., whether the Hialeah City Council actually intended to disfavor the religion of Santería. As I have noted elsewhere, it is virtually impossible to determine the singular “motive” of a collective legislative body, see, e. g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 636-639 (1987) (dissenting opinion), and this Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries, see, e. g., Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130-131 (1810) (Marshall, C. J.); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383-384 (1968).

Perhaps there are contexts in which determination of legislative motive must be undertaken. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). But I do not think that is true of analysis under the First Amendment (or the Fourteenth, to the extent it incorporates the First). See Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]....” This does not put us in the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors. Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to suppress the practices of Santería, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how those laws could be said to “prohibi[t] the free exercise” of *559religion. Nor, in my view, does it matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens. Had the ordinances here been passed with no motive on the part of any councilman except the ardent desire to prevent cruelty to animals (as might in fact have been the case), they would nonetheless be invalid.

Justice Soutee,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

This ease turns on a principle about which there is no disagreement, that the Free Exercise Clause bars government action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice. The Court holds that Hialeah’s animal-sacrifice laws violate that principle, and I concur in that holding without reservation.

Because prohibiting religious exercise is the object of the laws at hand, this ease does not present the more difficult issue addressed in our last free-exereise ease, Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), which announced the rule that a “neutral, generally applicable” law does not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause even when it prohibits religious exercise in effect. The Court today refers to that rule in dicta, and despite my general agreement with the Court’s opinion I do not join Part II, where the dicta appear, for I have doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence. I write separately to explain why the Smith rule is not germane to this case and to express my view that, in a case presenting the issue, the Court should reexamine the rule Smith declared.

I

According to Smith, if prohibiting the exercise of religion results from enforcing a “neutral, generally applicable” law, the Free Exercise Clause has not been offended. Id., at 878-880. I call this the Smith rule to distinguish it from the noncontroversial principle, also expressed in Smith though *560established long before, that the Free Exercise Clause is offended when prohibiting religious exercise results from a law that is not neutral or generally applicable. It is this noneontroversial principle, that the Free Exercise Clause requires neutrality and general applicability, that is at issue here. But before turning to the relationship of Smith to this ease, it will help to get the terms in order, for the significance of the Smith rule is not only in its statement that the Free Exercise Clause requires no more than “neutrality” and “general applicability,” but also in its adoption of a particular, narrow conception of free-exereise neutrality.

That the Free Exercise Clause contains a “requirement for governmental neutrality,” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 220 (1972), is hardly a novel proposition; though the term does not appear in the First Amendment, our cases have used it as shorthand to describe, at least in part, what the Clause commands. See, e. g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U. S. 378, 384 (1990); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 717 (1981); Yoder, supra, at 220; Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222 (1963); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 627-629 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a nonneutral law without using the term). Nor is there anything unusual about the notion that the Free Exercise Clause requires general applicability, though the Court, until today, has not used exactly that term in stating a reason for invalidation. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953); cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 585 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 245-246 (1982).1

*561While general applicability is, for the most part, self-explanatory, free-exercise neutrality is not self-revealing. Cf. Lee v. Weismcm, 505 U. S. 577, 627 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (considering Establishment Clause neutrality). A law that is religion neutral on its face or in its purpose may lack neutrality in its effect by forbidding something that religion requires or requiring something that religion forbids. Cf. McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1989) (“[A] regulation is not neutral in an economic sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities”). A secular law, applicable to all, that prohibits consumption of alcohol, for example, will affect members of religions that require the use of wine differently from members of other religions and nonbelievers, disproportionately burdening the practice of, say, Catholicism or Judaism. Without an exemption for sacramental wine, Prohibition may fail the test of religion neutrality.2

It does not necessarily follow from that observation, of course, that the First Amendment requires an exemption from Prohibition; that depends on the meaning of neutrality as the Free Exercise Clause embraces it. The point here is the unremarkable one that our common notion of neutrality is broad enough to cover not merely what might be called formal neutrality, which as a free-exercise requirement *562would only bar laws with an object to discriminate against religion, but also what might be called substantive neutrality, which, in addition to demanding a secular object, would generally require government to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws. See generally Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993 (1990). If the Free Exercise Clause secures only protection against deliberate discrimination, a formal requirement will exhaust the Clause’s neutrality command; if the Free Exercise Clause, rather, safeguards a right to engage in religious activity free from unnecessary governmental interference, the Clause requires substantive, as well as formal, neutrality.3

Though Smith used the term “neutrality” without a modifier, the rule it announced plainly assumes that free-exercise neutrality is of the formal sort. Distinguishing between laws whose “object” is to prohibit religious exercise and those that prohibit religious exercise as an “incidental effect,” Smith placed only the former within the reaches of the Free Exercise Clause; the latter, laws that satisfy formal neutrality, Smith would subject to no free-exercise scrutiny at all, even when they prohibit religious exercise in application. 494 U. S., at 878. The four Justices who rejected the Smith rule, by contrast, read the Free Exercise Clause as embracing what I have termed substantive neutrality. The enforcement of a law “neutral on its face,” they said, may “nonetheless offend [the Free Exercise Clause’s] requirement *563for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Id., at 896 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The rule these Justices saw as flowing from free-exercise neutrality, in contrast to the Smith rule, “requires] the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id., at 894 (emphasis added).

The proposition for which the Smith rule stands, then, is that formal neutrality, along with general applicability, are sufficient conditions for constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause. That proposition is not at issue in this case, however, for Hialeah’s animal-sacrifice ordinances are not neutral under any definition, any more than they are generally applicable. This case, rather, involves the noncontroversial principle repeated in Smith, that formal neutrality and general applicability are necessary conditions for free-exercise constitutionality. It is only “this fundamental non-persecution principle of the First Amendment [that is] implicated here,” ante, at 523, and it is to that principle that the Court adverts when it holds that Hialeah’s ordinances “fail to satisfy the Smith requirements,” ante, at 532. In applying that principle the Court does not tread on troublesome ground.

In considering, for example, whether Hialeah’s animal-sacrifice laws violate free-exercise neutrality, the Court rightly observes that “[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons,”* ibid., and correctly finds Hialeah’s laws to fail those standards. The question whether the protections of the Free Exercise Clause also pertain if the law at issue, though nondiscriminatory in its object, has the effect nonetheless of placing a burden on religious exercise is not before the Court *564today, and the Court’s intimations on the matter are therefore dicta.

The Court also rightly finds Hialeah’s laws to fail the test of general applicability, and as the Court “need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights,” ante, at 543, it need not discuss the rules that apply to prohibitions found to be generally applicable. The question whether “there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability,” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 220, is not before the Court in this case, and, again, suggestions on that score are dicta.

II

In being so readily susceptible to resolution by applying the Free Exercise Clause’s “fundamental nonpersecution principle,” ante, at 523, this is far from a representative free-exercise case. While, as the Court observes, the Hialeah City Council has provided a rare example of a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise, ante, at 523-524, Smith was typical of our free-exercise eases, involving as it did a formally neutral, generally applicable law. The rule Smith announced, however, was decidedly untypical of the cases involving the same type of law. Because Smith left those prior cases standing, we are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence in tension with itself, a tension that should be addressed, and that may legitimately be addressed, by reexamining the Smith rule in the next case that would turn upon its application.

A

In developing standards to judge the enforceability of formally neutral, generally applicable laws against the mandates of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court has addressed *565the concepts of neutrality and general applicability by indicating, in language hard to read as not foreclosing the Smith rule, that the Free Exercise Clause embraces more than mere formal neutrality, and that formal neutrality and general applicability are not sufficient conditions for free-exercise constitutionality:

“In a variety of ways we have said that ‘[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.’ ” Thomas, 450 U. S., at 717 (quoting Yoder, supra, at 220).

“[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability.” 450 U. S., at 717.

Not long before the Smith decision, indeed, the Court specifically rejected the argument that “neutral and uniform” requirements for governmental benefits need satisfy only a reasonableness standard, in part because “[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 141 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we have said, “[o]ur cases have established that ‘[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.’” Swaggart Ministries, 493 U. S., at 384-385 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 699 (1989)).

Thus we have applied the same rigorous scrutiny to burdens on religious exercise resulting from the enforcement of formally neutral, generally applicable laws as we have applied to burdens caused by laws that single out religious ex*566ercise: “ ‘only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion/ ” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S., at 628 (plurality opinion) (quoting Yoder, supra, at 215). Compare McDaniel, supra, at 628-629 (plurality opinion) (applying that test to a law aimed at religious conduct) with Yoder, supra, at 215-229 (applying that test to a formally neutral, general law). Other eases in which the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to the enforcement of formally neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious exercise include Hernandez v. Commissioner, supra, at 699; Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, supra, at 141; Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 604 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982); Thomas, supra, at 718; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 304-307 (1940).

Though Smith sought to distinguish the free-exercise cases in which the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general application, see 494 U. S., at 881-885, I am not persuaded. Wisconsin v. Yoder, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, according to Smith, were not true free-exercise cases but “hybrid[s]” involving “the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of parents ... to direct the education of their children.” Smith, supra, at 881,882. Neither opinion, however, leaves any doubt that “fundamental claims of religious freedom [were] at stake.” Yoder, supra, at 221; see also Cantwell, supra, at 303-307.4 *567And the distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.

Smith sought to confine the remaining free-exercise exemption victories, which involved unemployment compensa*568tion systems, see Frazee, supra; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); and Sherbert, supra, as “standing] for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” 494 U. S., at 884. But prior to Smith the Court had already refused to accept that explanation of the unemployment compensation cases. See Hobbie, supra, at 142, n. 7; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 715-716 (1986) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at 727-732 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); id., at 733 (White, J., dissenting). And, again, the distinction fails to exclude Smith: “If Smith is viewed as an unemployment compensation case, the distinction is obviously spurious. If Smith is viewed as a hypothetical criminal prosecution for peyote use, there would be an individual governmental assessment of the defendants’ motives and actions in the form of a criminal trial.” McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1124 (1990). Smith also distinguished the unemployment compensation cases on the ground that they did not involve “an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.” 494 U. S., at 884. But even Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy, on which Smith drew for its analysis of the unemployment compensation cases, would have applied its reasonableness test only to “denial of government benefits” and not to “governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons,” Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 706 (opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.); to the latter category of governmental action, it would have applied the test employed in Yoder, which involved an across-the-board criminal prohibition and which Chief Justice Burger’s opinion treated as an ordinary free-*569exercise case. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S., at 706-707; id., at 705, n. 15; Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S., at 628, n. 8 (noting cases in which courts considered claims for exemptions from general criminal prohibitions, cases the Court thought were “illustrative of the general nature of free-exereise protections and the delicate balancing required by our decisions in [Sherbert and Yoder,] when an important state interest is shown”).

As for the cases on which Smith primarily relied as establishing the rule it embraced, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879), and Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), see Smith, supra, at 879, their subsequent treatment by the Court would seem to require rejection of the Smith rule. Reyno Ids, which in upholding the polygamy conviction of a Mormon stressed the evils it saw as associated with polygamy, see 98 U. S., at 166 (“polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and . .. fetters the people in stationary despotism”); id., at 165, 168, has been read as consistent with the principle that religious conduct may be regulated by general or targeting law only if the conduct “pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S., at 403; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U. S., at 257-258; Bob Jones University, 461 U. S., at 603; Yoder, supra, at 230. And Gobitis, after three Justices who originally joined the opinion renounced it for disregarding the government’s constitutional obligation “to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities,” Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 624 (1942) (opinion of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.), was explicitly overruled in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943); see also id., at 643-644 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).

Since holding in 1940 that the Free Exercise Clause applies to the States, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, the Court repeatedly has stated that the Clause sets strict limits on the government’s power to burden religious exercise, whether it is a law’s object to do so or its unantici*570pated effect. Smith responded to these statements by suggesting that the Court did not really mean what it said, detecting in at least the most reeent opinions a lack of commitment to the compelling-interest test in the context of formally neutral laws. Smith, supra, at 884-885. But even if the Court’s commitment were that palid, it would argue only for moderating the language of the test, not for eliminating constitutional scrutiny altogether. In any event, I would have trouble concluding that the Court has not meant what it has said in more than a dozen cases over several decades, particularly when in the same period it repeatedly applied the compelling-interest test to require exemptions, even in a ease decided the year before Smith. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829 (1989).5 In sum, it seems to me difficult to escape the con*571elusion that, whatever Smith’s virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with settled law.

B

The Smith rule, in my view, may be reexamined consistently with principles of stare decisis. To begin with, the Smith rule was not subject to “full-dress argument” prior to its announcement. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 676-677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The State of Oregon in Smith contended that its refusal to exempt religious peyote use survived the strict scrutiny required by “settled free exercise principles,” inasmuch as the State had “a compelling interest in regulating” the practice of peyote use and could not “accommodate the religious practice without compromis*572ing its interest.” Brief for Petitioners in Smith, O. T. 1989, No. 88-1213, p. 5; see also id., at 5-36; Reply Brief for Petitioners in Smith, pp. 6-20. Respondents joined issue on the outcome of strict scrutiny on the facts before the Court, see Brief for Respondents in Smith, pp. 14-41, and neither party squarely addressed the proposition the Court was to embrace, that the Free Exercise Clause was irrelevant to the dispute. Sound judicial decisionmaking requires “both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense” of the issues in dispute, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419 (1978), and a constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument. Cf. Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 173 (1958) (declining to address “an important and complex” issue concerning the scope of collateral attack upon criminal sentences because it had received “only meagre argument” from the parties, and the Court thought it “should have the benefit of a full argument before dealing with the question”).

The Smith rule’s vitality as precedent is limited further by the seeming want of any need of it in resolving the question presented in that case. Justice O’Connor reached the same result as the majority by applying, as the parties had requested, “our established free exercise jurisprudence,” 494 U. S., at 903, and the majority never determined that the case could not be resolved on the narrower ground, going instead straight to the broader constitutional rule. But the Court’s better practice, one supported by the same principles of restraint that underlie the rule of stare decisis, is not to “ ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)). While I am not suggesting that the Smith Court lacked the power to announce its rule, I think a rule of law unnecessary to the outcome of a case, especially one not put *573into play by the parties, approaches without more the sort of “dicta... which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 627 (1935); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 454-455 (1972).

I do not, of course, mean to imply that a broad constitutional rule announced without Ml briefing and argument necessarily lacks precedential weight. Over time, such a decision may become "part of the tissue of the law,” Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 455 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and may be subject to reliance in a way that new and unexpected decisions are not. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 854-855 (1992). Smith, however, is not such a case. By the same token, by pointing out Smith’s recent vintage I do not mean to suggest that novelty alone is enough to justify reconsideration. “[Sitare decisis,” as Justice Frankfurter wrote, "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula,” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940), and the decision whether to adhere to a prior decision, particularly a constitutional decision, is a complex and difficult one that does not lend itself to resolution by application of simple, categorical rules, but that must account for a variety of often competing considerations.

The considerations of full briefing, necessity, and novelty thus do not exhaust the legitimate reasons for reexamining prior decisions, or even for reexamining the Smith rule. One important further consideration warrants mention here, however, because it demands the reexamination I have in mind. Smith presents not the usual question of whether to follow a constitutional rule, but the question of which constitutional rule to follow, for Smith refrained from overruling prior free-exercise cases that contain a free-exereise rule fundamentally at odds with the rule Smith declared. Smith, indeed, announced its rule by relying squarely upon *574the precedent of prior cases. See 494 U. S., at 878 (“Our decisions reveal that the . . . reading” of the Free Exercise Clause contained in the Smith rule “is the correct one”). Since that precedent is nonetheless at odds with the Smith rule, as I have discussed above, the result is an intolerable tension in free-exercise law which may be resolved, consistently with principles of stare decisis, in a case in which the tension is presented and its resolution pivotal.

While the tension on which I rely exists within the body of our extant case law, a rereading of that case law will not, of course, mark the limits of any enquiry directed to reexamining the Smith rule, which should be reviewed in light not only of the precedent on which it was rested but also of the text of the Free Exercise Clause and its origins. As for text, Smith did not assert that the plain language of the Free Exercise Clause compelled its rule, but only that the rule was “a permissible reading” of the Clause. Ibid. Suffice it to say that a respectable argument may be made that the pre-Smith law comes closer to fulfilling the language of the Free Exercise Clause than the rule Smith announced. “[T]he Free Exercise Clause ..., by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion,” Thomas, 450 U. S., at 713, specifying an activity and then flatly protecting it against government prohibition. The Clause draws no distinction between laws whose object is to prohibit religious exercise and laws with that effect, on its face seemingly applying to both.

Nor did Smith consider the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, though overlooking the opportunity was no unique transgression. Save in a handful of passing remarks, the Court has not explored the history of the Clause since its early attempts in 1879 and 1890, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S., at 162-166, and Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890), attempts that recent scholarship makes clear were incomplete. See generally McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, *575103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990).6 The curious absence of history from our freé-exercise decisions creates a stark contrast with our cases under the Establishment Clause, where historical analysis has been so prominent.7

This is not the place to explore the history that a century of free-exercise opinions have overlooked, and it is enough to note that, when the opportunity to reexamine Smith presents itself, we may consider recent scholarship raising serious questions about the Smith rule’s consonance with the original understanding and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause. See McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, supra; Durham, Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 71, 79-85 (1992); see also Office of Legal Policy, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Attorney General, Religious Liberty under the Free Exercise Clause 38-42 (1986) (predating Smith). There appears to be a strong argument from the *576Clause’s development in the First Congress, from its origins in the post-Revolution state constitutions and pre-Revolution colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to which the Framers adhered, that the Clause was originally understood to preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one’s duty to one’s God, unless those activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs of the State. If, as this scholarship suggests, the Free Exercise Clause’s original “purpose [was] to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority,” School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 223, then there would be powerful reason to interpret the Clause to accord with its natural reading, as applying to all laws prohibiting religious exercise in fact, not just those aimed at its prohibition, and to hold the neutrality needed to implement such a purpose to be the substantive neutrality of our pre-Smith eases, not the formal neutrality sufficient for constitutionality under Smith.8

*577The scholarship on the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause is, to be sure, not uniform. See, e. g., Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992); Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245 (1991). And there are differences of opinion as to the weight appropriately accorded original meaning. But whether or not one considers the original designs of the Clause binding, the interpretive significance of those designs surely ranks in the hierarchy of issues to be explored in resolving the tension inherent in free-exereise law as it stands today.

Ill

The extent to which the Free Exercise Clause requires government to refrain from impeding religious exercise defines nothing less than the respective relationships in our constitutional democracy of the individual to government and to God. “Neutral, generally applicable” laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the nonadherent, have the unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a choice between God and government. Our cases now present competing answers to the question when government, while pursuing secular ends, may compel disobedience to what one believes religion commands. The case before us is rightly decided without resolving the existing tension, which remains for another day when it may be squarely faced.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom

The Court holds today that the city of Hialeah violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it passed a set of restrictive ordinances explicitly directed at petitioners’ religious practice. With this holding I agree. I write separately to emphasize that the First Amendment’s protection of religion extends beyond those rare occasions on which the government explicitly targets religion (or a particular reli*578gion) for disfavored treatment, as is done in this case. In my view, a statute that burdens the free exercise of religion “may stand only if the law in general, and the State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 907 (1990) (dissenting opinion). The Court, however, applies a different test. It applies the test announced in Smith, under which “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Ante, at 531. I continue to believe that Smith was wrongly decided, because it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination principle. See 494 U. S., at 908-909. Thus, while I agree with the result the Court reaches in this case, I arrive at that result by a different route.

When the State enacts legislation that intentionally or unintentionally places a burden upon religiously motivated practice, it must justify that burden by “showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div,, 450 U. S. 707, 718 (1981). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972). A State may no more create an underinclusive statute, one that fails truly to promote its purported compelling interest, than it may create an overinclusive statute, one that encompasses more protected conduct than necessary to achieve its goal. In the latter circumstance, the broad scope of the statute is unnecessary to serve the interest, and the statute fails for that reason. In the former situation, the fact that allegedly harmful conduct falls outside the statute’s scope belies a governmental assertion that it has genuinely pursued an interest “of the highest order.” Ibid. If the State’s goal is important enough to prohibit religiously motivated activity, it *579will not and must not stop at religiously motivated activity. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 390 (1978) (invalidating certain restrictions on marriage as “grossly underinelusive with respect to [their] purpose”); Supreme Court of N. H. v. Piper, 470 U. S. 274, 285, n. 19 (1985) (a rule excluding nonresidents from the bar of New Hampshire “is under-inclusive . . . because it permits lawyers who move away from the State to retain their membership in the bar”).

In this case, the ordinances at issue are both overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to the state interests they purportedly serve. They are overinclusive, as the majority correctly explains, because the “legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santería sacrificial practice.” Ante, at 538. They are underinclusive as well, because “[d]espite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.” Ante, at 543. Moreover, the “ordinances are also underinclusive with regard to the city’s interest in public health ....” Ante, at 544.

When a law discriminates against religion as such, as do the ordinances in this case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 402-403, 407 (1963) (holding that governmental regulation that imposes a burden upon religious practice must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest). This is true because a law that targets religious practice for disfavored treatment both burdens the free exercise of religion and, by definition, is not precisely tailored to a compelling governmental interest.

Thus, unlike the majority, I do not believe that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Ante, at 546. In my view, regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny. It is for this reason *580that a statute that explicitly restricts religious practices violates the First Amendment. Otherwise, however, a[t]he First Amendment... does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices.” Smith, 494 U. S., at 894 (opinion concurring in judgment).

It is only in the rare case that a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious practice as such. See ibid. Because respondent here does single out religion in this way, the present ease is an easy one to decide.

A harder ease would be presented if petitioners were requesting an exemption from a generally applicable anti-cruelty law. The result in the case before the Court today, and the fact that every Member of the Court concurs in that result, does not necessarily reflect this Court’s views of the strength of a State’s interest in prohibiting cruelty to animals. This case does not present, and I therefore decline to reach, the question whether the Free Exercise Clause would require a religious exemption from a law that sincerely pursued the goal of protecting animals from cruel treatment. The number of organizations that have filed amicus briefs on behalf of this interest,* however, demonstrates that it is not a concern to be treated lightly.

Mr. Justice Clark

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by *165reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The cases were consolidated for argument and we consider them together although each involves different facts and circumstances. The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the section which defines the term “religious training and belief/’ as used in the Act, as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” The constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) The section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson (No. 51) and Peter (No. 29) also claim that their beliefs come within the meaning of the section. Jakobson claims that he meets the standards of § 6 (j) because his opposition to war is based on belief in a Supreme Reality and is therefore an obligation superior to one resulting from man’s relationship to his fellowman. Peter contends that his opposition to war derives from his acceptance of the existence of a universal power beyond that of man and that this acceptance in fact constitutes belief in a Supreme Being, qualifying him for exemption. We granted certiorari in each of the cases because of their importance in the administration of the Act. 377 U. S. 922.

We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression “Supreme Being” rather than the designation “God,” was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief *166“in a relation to a Supreme Being” is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is “in a relation to a Supreme Being” and the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in No. 29.

The Facts in the Cases.

No. 50: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S (student) and he remained in this status until 1958 when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his “religious” belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, “rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ ”; that his “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God” did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever”; that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.” R. 69-70,73. He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.” R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere, hon*167est, and made in good faith; and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger’s claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being” as required by § 6 (j) of the Act. At trial Seeger’s counsel admitted that Seeger’s belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because “under the present law Mr. Seeger’s position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently,” R. 49, and could be “accommodated” under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished “between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs” and was, therefore, an “impermissible classification” under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 326 F. 2d 846.

No. 51: Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not believe in a Supreme Being as required by § 6 (j). 325 F. 2d 409.

Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953 and intermittently enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was not until April 1958 that he made claim to noncombatant classification (1-A-O) as a conscientious objector. He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a “Supreme Being” who was “Creator of Man” in the sense of being “ultimately responsible for the existence of” man and who was “the Supreme Reality” of which “the existence of man is the resultR. 44. (Emphasis in the original.) He explained that his reli*168gious and social thinking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be “partly spiritual” and, therefore, “partly akin to the Supreme Reality”; and that his “most important religious law” was that “no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man’s life as a means to any other end . . . .” R. 45-46. In December 1958 he requested a 1-0 classification since he felt that participation in any form of military service would involve him in “too many situations and relationships that would be a strain on [his] conscience that [he felt he] must avoid.” R. 70. He submitted a long memorandum of “notes on religion” in which he defined religion as the “sum and essence of one’s basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence,” R. 72 (emphasis in the original); he said that he believed in “Godness” which was “the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being of the Universe”; that to deny its existence would but deny the existence of the universe because “anything that Is, has an Ultimate Cause for its Being.” R. 73. There was a relationship to Godness, he stated, in two directions, i. e., “vertically, towards Godness directly,” and “horizontally, towards Godness through Mankind and the World.” R. 74. He accepted the latter one. The Board classified him 1-A-O and Jakobson appealed. The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon a personal moral code and that he was not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It did not indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i. e., insincerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a personal moral code. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of § 6 (j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson’s beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.

*169No. 29: Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to execute section VII of the questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred. In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his conviction was religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John Haynes Holmes’ definition of religion as “the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands .. . [; it] is the supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling his deepest, and living his best.” R. 27. The source of his conviction he attributed to reading and meditation “in our democratic American culture, with its values derived from the western religious and philosophical tradition.” Ibid. As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he supposed “you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use.” R. 11. In 1959 he was classified 1-A, although there was no evidence in the record that he was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction for failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals, assuming arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed, 324 F. 2d 173.

Background of § 6 (j).

Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931), enunciated the rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objec*170tion to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various conscription laws when he declared that “in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained.” At 633 (dissenting opinion). In a similar vein Harlan Fiske Stone, later Chief Justice, drew from the Nation’s past when he declared that

“both morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man’s moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process.” Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Col. Univ. Q. 253, 269 (1919).

Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons of certain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the history of this country. Various methods of ameliorating their difficulty were adopted by the Colonies, and were later perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions. Thus by the time of the Civil War there existed a state pattern of exempting conscientious objectors on religious grounds. In the Federal Militia Act of 1862 control of conscription was left primarily in the States. However, General Order No. 99, issued by the Adjutant General pursuant to that Act, provided for striking from the conscription list those who were exempted by the States; it also established a commutation or substitution system fashioned from earlier state enactments. With the Federal Conscription Act of 1863, *171which enacted the commutation and substitution provisions of General Order No. 99, the Federal Government occupied the field entirely, and in the 1864 Draft Act, 13 Stat. 9, it extended exemptions to those conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations opposed to the bearing of arms and who were prohibited from doing so by the articles of faith of their denominations. Selective Service System Monograph Nó. 11, Conscientious Objection 40^41 (1950). In that same year the Confederacy exempted certain pacifist sects from military duty. Id., at 46.

The need for conscription did not again arise until World War I. The Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 78, afforded exemptions to conscientious objectors who were affiliated with a “well-recognized religious sect or organization [then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its members to participate in war in any form . . . .” The Act required that all persons be inducted into the armed services, but allowed the conscientious objectors to perform noncombatant service in capacities designated by the President of the United States. Although the 1917 Act excused religious objectors only, in December 1917, the Secretary of War instructed that “personal scruples against war” be considered as constituting “conscientious objection.” Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 54-55 (1950). This Act, including its conscientious objector provisions, was upheld against constitutional attack in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389-390 (1918).

In adopting the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act Congress broadened the exemption afforded in the 1917 Act by making it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious sect if the claimant’s own opposition to war was based on “religious training and belief.” 54 Stat. 889. Those found to be within the exemption were *172not inducted into the armed services but were assigned to noncombatant service under the supervision of the Selective Service System. The Congress recognized that one might be religious without belonging to an organized church just as surely as minority members of a faith not opposed to war might through religious reading reach a conviction against participation in war. Congress Looks at the Conscientious Objector (National Service Board for Religious Objectors, 1943) 71, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89. Indeed, the consensus of the witnesses appearing before the congressional committees Was that individual belief — rather than membership in a church or sect — determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct; and that “there is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God.” Id., at 29-31. See also the proposals which were made to the House Military Affairs Committee but rejected. Id., at 21-23, 82-83, 85. Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to one’s individual belief the Congress nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing from armed service those who believed that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of not participating in war in any form.

Between 1940 and 1948 two courts of appeals1 held that the phrase “religious training and belief” did not include philosophical, social or political policy. Then in 1948 the Congress amended the language of the statute and declared that “religious training and belief” was to be defined as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” The only significant mention of *173this change in the provision appears in the teport of the Senate Armed Services Committee recommending adoption. It said simply this: “This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. (See United States v. Berman [sic], 156 F. (2d) 377, certiorari denied, 329 U. S. 795.)” S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 14.

Interpretation of § 6 (j).

1. The crux of the problem lies in the phrase “religious training and belief” which Congress has defined as “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” In assigning meaning to this statutory language we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government, and in matters which can be said to fall within these areas the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the state. United States v. Macintosh, supra (dissenting opinion). The statute further excludes those whose opposition to war stems from a “merely personal moral code,” a phrase to which we shall have occasion to turn later in discussing the application of § 6 (j) to these cases. We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with *174or intimate any decision on that situation in these eases. Nor do the parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger who bases his position here not on factual but on purely constitutional grounds) is that they adhere to theism, which is the “Belief in the existence of a god or gods; . . . Belief in superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods,” as opposed to atheism.2 Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: Does the term “Supreme Being” as used in § 6 (j) mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, “to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent”? Webster’s New International Dictionary (Second Edition). In considering this question we resolve it solely in relation to the language of § 6 (j) and not otherwise.

2. New would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase “Supreme Being” a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country. Over 250 sects inhabit our land. Some believe in a purely personal God, some in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life envisioning as its ultimate goal the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace. There are those who think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being is *175the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss. Even those religious groups which have traditionally opposed war in every form have splintered into various denominations: from 1940 to 1947 there were four denominations using the name “Friends,” Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 13 (1950); the “Church of the Brethren” was the official name of the oldest and largest church body of four denominations composed of those commonly called Brethren, id., at 11; and the “Mennonite Church” was the largest of 17 denominations, including the Amish and Hutterites, grouped as “Mennonite bodies” in the 1936 report on the Census of Religious Bodies, id., at 9. This vast panoply of beliefs reveals the magnitude of the problem which faced the Congress when it set about providing an exemption from armed service. It also emphasizes the care that Congress realized was necessary in the fashioning of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs.

In spite of the elusive nature of the inquiry, we are not without certain guidelines. In amending the 1940 Act, Congress adopted almost intact the language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, supra:

“The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” At 633-634. (Emphasis supplied.)

By comparing the statutory definition with those words, however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broadened them by substituting the phrase “Supreme Being” for the appellation “God.” And in so doing it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as “Supreme Being.” By so refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief *176Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word “God” had myriad meanings for men of faith:

“[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of conscience within its proper field.” At 634.

Moreover, the Senate Report on the bill specifically states that § 6 (j) was intended to re-enact “substantially the same provisions as were found” in the 1940 Act. That statute, of course, refers to “religious training and belief” without more. Admittedly, all of the parties here purport to base their objection on religious belief. It appears, therefore, that we need only look to this clear statement of congressional intent as set out in the report. Under the 1940 Act it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within that phrase would cpme all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the fife of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.

*1773. The Government takes the position that since Berman v. United States, supra, was cited in the Senate Report on the 1948 Act, Congress must have desired to adopt the Berman interpretation of what constitutes “religious belief.” Such a claim, however, will not bear scrutiny. First, we think it clear that an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more weight than the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number of things. Congress specifically stated that it intended to re-enact substantially the same provisions as were found in the 1940 Act. Moreover, the history of that Act reveals no evidence of a desire to restrict the concept of religious belief. On the contrary the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee which reported out the 1940 exemption provisions stated:

“We heard the conscientious objectors and all of their representatives that we could possibly hear, and, summing it all up, their whole objection to the bill, aside from their objection to compulsory military training, was based upon the right of conscientious objection and in most instances to the right of the ministerial students to continue in their studies, and we have provided ample protection for those classes and those groups.” 86 Cong. Rec. 11368 (1940).

During the House debate on the bill, Mr. Faddis of Pennsylvania made the following statement:

“We have made provision to take care of conscientious objectors. I am sure the committee has had all the sympathy in the world with those who appeared claiming to have religious scruples against rendering military service in its various degrees. Some appeared who had conscientious scruples against handling lethal weapons, but who had no *178scruples against performing other duties which did not actually bring them into combat. Others appeared who claimed to have conscientious scruples against participating in any of the activities that would go along with the Army. The committee took all of these into consideration and has written a bill which, I believe, will take care of all the reasonable objections of this class of people.” 86 Cong. Rec. 11418 (1940).

Thus the history of the Act belies the notion that it was to be restrictive in application and available only to those believing in a traditional God.

As for the citation to Berman, it might mean a number of things. But we think that Congress’ action in citing it must be construed in such a way as to make it consistent with its express statement that it meant substantially to re-enact the 1940 provision. As far as we can find, there is not one word to indicate congressional concern over any conflict between Kauten and Berman. Surely, if it thought that two clashing interpretations as to what amounted to “religious belief” had to be resolved, it would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. Thus, we think that rather than citing Berman for what it said “religious belief” was, Congress cited it for what it said “religious belief” was not. For both Kauten and Berman hold in common the conclusion that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs are political, social or philosophical in nature, rather than religious. Both, in fact, denied exemption on that very ground. It seems more likely, therefore, that it was this point which led Congress to cite Berman. The first part of the § 6 (j) definition — belief in a relation to a Supreme Being — was indeed set out in Berman, with the exception that the court used the word “God” rather than “Supreme Being.” However, as the Government recognizes, Berman took that language word for word from Macintosh. Far from *179requiring a conclusion contrary to the one we reach here, Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion, as we have pointed out, supports our interpretation.

Admittedly, the second half of the statutory definition— the rejection of sociological and moral views — was taken directly from Berman. But, as we have noted, this same view was adhered to in United States v. Kauten, supra. Indeed the Selective Service System has stated its view of the cases’ significance in these terms: “The United States v. Kauten and Herman Berman v. United States cases ruled that a valid conscientious objector claim to exemption must be based solely on 'religious training and belief’ and not on philosophical, political, social, or other grounds . . . Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 337 (1950). See id., at 278. That the conclusions of the Selective Service System are not to be taken lightly is evidenced in this statement by Senator Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and sponsor of the Senate bill containing the present version of § 6 (j):

“The bill which is now pending follows the 1940 act, with very few technical amendments, worked out by those in Selective Service who had charge of the conscientious-objector problem during the war.” x 94 Cong. Rec. 7305 (1948).

Thus we conclude that in enacting § 6 (j) Congress simply made explicit what the courts of appeals had correctly found implicit in the 1940 Act. Moreover, it is perfectly reasonable that Congress should have selected Berman for its citation, since this Court denied certiorari in that case, a circumstance not present in Kauten.

Section 6 (j), then, is no more than a clarification of the 1940 provision involving only certain “technical amendments,” to use the words of Senator Gurney. As such it continues the congressional policy of providing exemption from military service for those whose opposition *180is based on grounds that can fairly be said to be “religious.” 3 To hold otherwise would not only fly in the face of Congress’ entire action in the past; it would ignore the historic position of our country on this issue since its founding.

4. Moreover, we believe this construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community. The eminent Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views the Government concedes would come within the statute, identifies God not as a projection “out there” or beyond the skies but as the ground of our very being. The Court of Appeals stated in No. 51 that Jakobson’s views “parallel [those of] this eminent theologian rather strikingly.” 325 F. 2d, at 415-416. In his book, Systematic Theology, Dr. Tillich says:

“I have written of the God above the God of theism .... In such a state [of self-affirmation] the God of both religious and theological language disappears. But something remains, namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the ‘God above God,’ the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God.” II Systematic Theology 12 (1957).

*181Another eminent cleric, the Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson, in his book, Honest To God (1963), states:

“The Bible speaks of a God ‘up there.’ No doubt its picture of a three-decker universe, of ‘the heaven above, the earth beneath and the waters under the earth,’ was once taken quite literally. . . At 11. “[Later] in place of a God who is literally or physically ‘up there’ we have accepted, as part of our mental furniture, a God who is spiritually or metaphysically ‘out there.’ . . . But now it seems there is no room for him, not merely in the inn, but in the entire universe: for there are no vacant places left. In reality, of course, our new view of the universe has made not the slightest difference....” At 13-14.

“But the idea of a God spiritually or metaphysically ‘out there’ dies very much harder. Indeed, most people would be seriously disturbed by the thought that it should need to die at all. For it is their God, and they have nothing to put in its place. . . . Every one of us lives with some mental picture of a God ‘out there,’ a God who ‘exists’ above and beyond the world he made, a God ‘to’ whom we pray and to whom we ‘go’ when we die.” At 14.

“But the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the whole conception of a God ‘out there,’ which has served us so well since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming more of a hindrance than a help.” At 15-16. (Emphasis in original.)

The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council included a most significant declaration on religion: 4

*182“The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ultimate end, God. Men expect from the various religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is the moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?

“Ever since primordial days, numerous peoples have had a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of things and over the events that make up the lives of men; some have even come to know of a Supreme Being and Father. Religions in an advanced culture have been able to use more refined concepts and a more developed language in their struggle for an answer to man’s religious questions.

“Nothing that is true and holy in these religions is scorned by the Catholic Church. Ceaselessly the Church proclaims Christ, ‘the Way, the Truth, and the Life,’ in whom God reconciled all things to Himself. The Church regards with sincere reverence those ways of action and of life, precepts and teachings which, although they differ from the ones she sets forth, reflect nonetheless a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men.”

Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, states in his book, Ethics As a Religion (1951), that “[ejverybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively few) believes in some kind of God,” and that “The proper question to ask, therefore, is *183not the futile one, Do you believe in God? but rather, What kind of God do you believe in?” Id., at 86-87. Dr. Muzzey attempts to answer that question:

“Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men. What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires in men moral purpose.” At 95.

“Thus the ‘God’ that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements which retard its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the right.’ ” At 98.

These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow a construction on the provisions of § 6 (j) and thereby lend conclusive support to the construction which we today find that Congress intended.

5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is fur*184nished a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant’s words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?

Moreover, it must be remembered that in resolving these exemption problems one deals with the beliefs of different individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight. Recognition of this was implicit in this language, cited by the Berman court from State v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N. W. 894 (1906):

“Surely a scheme of life designed to obviate [man’s inhumanity to man], and by removing temptations, and all the allurements of ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness, patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not pertaining to religion when its devotees regard it as an essential tenet of their religious faith.” 132 Iowa, at 315, 109 N. W., at 898, cited in Berman v. United States, 156 F. 2d 377, 381. (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.)

The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s “Supreme Being” or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 86 (1944): “Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.” Local *185boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.” Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.

But we hasten to emphasize that while the “truth” of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is “truly held.” This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact — a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out that in Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946), this Court held that:

“The provision making the decisions of the local boards ‘final’ means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant.” At 122-123.

Application of § 6 (j) to the Instant Cases,.

As we noted earlier, the statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a “merely personal moral code.” The records in these cases, how*186ever, show that at no time did any one of the applicants suggest that his objection was based on a “merely personal moral code.” Indeed at the outset each of them claimed in his application that his objection was based on a religious belief. We have construed the statutory definition broadly and it follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of the words “merely personal” seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant’s belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants in these cases meet the test that we lay down then their objections cannot be based on a “merely personal” moral code.

In Seeger, No. 50, the Court of Appeals failed to find sufficient “externally compelled beliefs.” However, it did find that “it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is not bowing to ‘external commands’ in virtually the same sense as is the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power.” 326 F. 2d, at 853. It found little distinction between Jakobson’s devotion to a mystical force of “Godness” and Seeger’s compulsion to “goodness.” Of course, as we have said, the statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress intended no such distinction.

The Court of Appeals also found that there was no question of the applicant’s sincerity. He was a product of a devout Roman Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which he said “much of [his] thought is derived”; he approved of their opposition to war in any form; he devoted his spare hours to the Amer*187ican Friends Service Committee and was assigned to hospital duty.

In summary, Seeger professed “religious belief” and “religious faith.” He did not disavow any belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being”; indeed he stated that “the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.” He decried the tremendous “spiritual” price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich’s thoughts:

“And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God . . . .” Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations 57 (1948). (Emphasis supplied.)

It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term “Supreme Being.” But as we have said Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.

In Jakobson, No. 51, the Court of Appeals found that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm that judgment.

We reach a like conclusion in No. 29. It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged “some power manifest in *188nature . . . the supreme expression” that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied, “you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use.” We think that under the test we establish here the Board would grant the exemption to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in No. 29.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

concurring.

If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others — an invidious discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497.

The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words “Supreme Being” to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one we said that the words of a statute may be strained “in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt.” United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47.1

*189The words “a Supreme Being” have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian. civilization the idea of God had taken hold in many forms. Mention of only two— Hinduism and Buddhism — illustrates the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept. In the Hindu religion the Supreme Being is conceived in the forms of several cult Deities. The chief of these, which stand for the Hindu Triad, are Brahma, Vishnu and Siva. Another Deity, and the one most widely worshipped, is Sakti, the Mother Goddess, conceived as power, both destructive and creative. Though Hindu religion encompasses the worship of many Deities, it believes in only one single God, the eternally existent One Being with his manifold attributes and manifestations. This idea is expressed in Rigveda, the earliest sacred text of the Hindus, in verse 46 of a hymn attributed to the mythical seer Dirgha-tamas (Rigveda, I, 164):

“They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna and Agni And also heavenly beautiful Garutman: The Real is One, though sages name it variously— They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan.”

See Smart, Reasons and Faiths, p. 35, n. 1 (1958); 32 Harvard Oriental Series, pp. 434-435 (Lanman ed. 1925). See generally 31 and 32 id.; Editors of Life Magazine, The World’s Great Religions, Vol. 1, pp. 17-48 (1963).

Indian philosophy, which comprises several schools of thought, has advanced different theories of the nature of the Supreme Being. According to the Upanisads, Hindu sacred texts, the Supreme Being is described as the power which creates and sustains everything, and to which the Created things return upon dissolution. The word which is commonly used in the Upanisads to indicate the Supreme Being is Brahman. Philosophically, the

*190Supreme Being is the transcendental Reality which is Truth, Knowledge, and Bliss. It is the source of the entire universe. In this aspect Brahman is Isvara, a personal Lord and Creator of the universe, an object of worship. But, in the view of one school of thought, that of Sankara, even this is an imperfect and limited conception of Brahman which must be transcended: to think of Brahman as the Creator of the material world is necessarily to form a concept infected with illusion, or maya — which is what the world really is, in highest truth. Ultimately, mystically, Brahman must be understood as without attributes, as neti neti (not this, not that). See Smart, op. cit., supra, p. 133.

Buddhism — whose advent marked the reform of Hinduism — continued somewhat the same concept. As stated by Nancy Wilson Ross, “God — if I may borrow that word for a moment — the universe, and man are one indissoluble existence, one total whole. Only THIS — capital THIS— is. Anything and everything that appears to us as an individual entity or phenomenon, whether it be a planet or an atom/a mouse or a man, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in form; every activity that takes place, whether it be birth or death, loving or eating breakfast, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in activity. When we look at things this way, naturally we cannot believe that each individual person has been endowed with a special and individual soul or self. Each one of us is but a cell, as it were, in the body of the Great Self, a cell that comes into being, performs its functions, and passes away, transformed into another manifestation. Though we have temporary individuality, that temporary, limited individuality is not either a true self or our true self. Our true self is the Great Self; our true body is the Body of Reality, or the Dharmakaya, to give it its technical Buddhist name.” The World of Zen, p. 18 (1960).

*191Does a Buddhist believe in “God” or a “Supreme Being” ? That, of course, depends on how one defines “God,” as one eminent student of Buddhism has explained:

“It has often been suggested that Buddhism is an atheistic system of thought, and this assumption has given rise to quite a number of discussions. Some have claimed that since Buddhism knew no God, it could not be a religion; others that since Buddhism obviously was a religion which knew no God, the belief in God was not essential to religion. These discussions assume that God is an unambiguous term, which is by no means the case.” Conze, Buddhism, pp. 38-39 (1959).

Dr. Conze then says that if “God” is taken to mean a personal Creator of the universe, then the Buddhist has no interest in the concept. Id., p. 39. But if “God” means something like the state of oneness with God as described by some Christian mystics, then the Buddhist surely believes in “God,” since this state is almost indistinguishable from the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, “the supreme Reality; . . . the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace.” Id., pp. 39-40. And finally, if “God” means one of the many Deities in an at least superficially polytheistic religion like Hinduism, then Buddhism tolerates a belief in many Gods: “the Buddhists believe that a Faith can be kept alive only if it can be adapted to the mental habits of the average person. In consequence, we find that, in the earlier Scriptures, the deities of Brahmanism are taken for granted and that, later on, the Buddhists adopted the local Gods of any district to which they came.” Id., p. 42.

When the present Act was adopted in 1948 we were a nation of Buddhists, Confucianists, and Taoists, as well as Christians. Hawaii, then a Territory, was indeed filled with Buddhists, Buddhism being “probably the major *192faith, if Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are deemed different faiths.” Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States, p. 560 (1964). Organized Buddhism first came to Hawaii in 1887 when Japanese laborers were brought to work on the plantations. There are now numerous Buddhist sects in Hawaii, and the temple of the Shin sect in Honolulu is said to have the largest congregation of any religious organization in the city. See Mulholland, Religion in Hawaii, pp. 44-50 (1961).

In the continental United States Buddhism is found “in real strength” in Utah, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and California. “Most of the Buddhists in the United States are Japanese or Japanese-Americans; however, there are ‘English’ departments in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Tacoma.” Mead, Handbook of Denominations, p. 61 (1961). The Buddhist Churches of North America, organized in 1914 as the Buddhist Mission of North America and incorporated under the present name in 1942, represent the Jodo Shinshu Sect of Buddhism in this country. This sect is the only Buddhist group reporting information to the annual Yearbook of American Churches. In 1961, the latest year for which figures are available, this group alone had 55 churches and an inclusive membership of 60,000; it maintained 89 church schools with a total enrollment of 11,150. Yearbook of American Churches, p. 30 (1965). According to one source, the total number of Buddhists of all sects in North' America is 171,000. See World Almanac, p. 636 (1965).

When the Congress spoke in the vague general terms of a Supreme Being I cannot, therefore, assume that it was so parochial as to use the words in the narrow sense urged on us. I would attribute tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities. In sum, I agree with the Court that any person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which in his life fills the same place as a be*193lief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist;2 one, as a sincere believer in “goodness and virtue for their own sakes.” His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.

Me. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. § 215 Criminal Code, IS U. S. C. § 338; § 37 Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 88. The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged a scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am movement through the use of the mails. The charge was that certain designated corporations were formed, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in the I Am movement sought “by means of false and fraudulent representations, pretenses and promises.” The false representations charged were eighteen in number. It is sufficient at this point to say that they covered respondents’ alleged religious doctrines or beliefs. They were all set forth in the first count. The following are representative:

that Guy W. Ballard, now deceased, alias Saint Ger-main, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King, had been selected and thereby designated by the alleged “ascertained masters,” Saint Germain, as a divine messenger; and that the words of “ascended masters” and the words of the alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mankind through the medium of the said Guy W. Ballard;

that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard, by reason of their alleged high spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, had been selected as divine messengers through which the words of the alleged “ascended masters,” in-*80eluding the alleged Saint Germain, would be communicated to mankind under the teachings commonly known as the “I Am” movement; that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard had, by reason of supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries, or ailments, and did falsely represent to persons intended to be defrauded that the three designated persons had the ability and power to cure persons of those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which are ordinarily classified by the medical profession as being incurable diseases; and did further represent that the three designated persons had in fact cured either by the activity of one, either, or all of said persons, hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments;

Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was followed by the charge that respondents “well knew” it was false. After enumerating the eighteen misrepresentations the indictment also alleged:

At the time of making all of the afore-alleged representations by the defendants, and each of them, the defendants, and each of them, well knew that all of said aforementioned representations were false and untrue and were made with the intention on the part of the defendants, and each of them, to cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to be defrauded, and to obtain from persons intended to be defrauded by the defendants, money, property, and other things of value and to convert the same to the use and the benefit of the defendants, and each of them;

The indictment contained twelve counts, one of which charged a conspiracy to defraud. The first count set forth all of the eighteen representations, as we have said. Each of the other counts incorporated and realleged all of them and added no additional ones. There was a demurrer and a motion to quash, each of which asserted, among other things, that the indictment attacked the religious beliefs *81of respondents and sought to restrict the free exercise of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States. These motions were denied by the District Court. Early in the trial, however, objections were raised to the admission of certain evidence concerning respondents’ religious beliefs. The court conferred with counsel in absence of the jury and with the acquiescence of counsel for the United States and for respondents confined the issues on this phase of the case to the question of the good faith of respondents. At the request of counsel for both sides the court advised the jury of that action in the following language:

Now, gentlemen, here is the issue in this case:

First, the defendants in this case made certain representations of belief in a divinity and in a supernatural power. Some of the teachings of the defendants, representations, might seem extremely improbable to a great many people. For instance, the appearance of Jesus to dictate some of the works that we have had introduced in evidence, as testified to here at the opening transcription, or shaking hands with Jesus, to some people that might seem highly improbable. I point that out as one of the many statements.

Whether that is true or not is not the concern of this Court and is not the concern of the jury — and they are going to be told so in their instructions. As far as this Court sees the issue, it is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote or taught in their classes. They are not going to be permitted to speculate on the actuality of the happening of those incidents. Now, I think I have made that as clear as I can. Therefore, the religious beliefs of these defendants cannot be an issue in this court.

The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that.

If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe that Jesus came down and die-*82tated, or that Saint Germain came down and dictated, did not believe the things that they wrote, the things that they preached, but used the mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury should find them guilty. Therefore, gentlemen, religion cannot come into this case.

The District Court reiterated that admonition in the charge to the jury and made it abundantly clear. The following portion of the charge is typical:

The question of the defendants’ good faith is the cardinal question in this case. You are not to be concerned with the religious belief of the defendants, or any of them. The jury will be called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the defendants honestly and in good faith believed the representations which are set forth in the indictment, and honestly and in good faith believed that the benefits which they represented would flow from their belief to those who embraced and followed their teachings, or whether these representations were mere pretenses without honest belief on the part of the defendants or any of them, and, were the representations made for the purpose of procuring money, and were the mails used for this purpose.

As we have said, counsel for the defense acquiesced in this treatment of the matter, made no objection to it during the trial, and indeed treated it without protest as the law of the case throughout the proceedings prior to the verdict. Respondents did not change their position before the District Court after verdict and contend that the truth or verity of their religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. In their motion for new trial they did contend, however, that the withdrawal of these issues from the jury was error because it was in effect an amendment of the indictment. That was also one of their specifications of errors on appeal. And other errors urged on appeal included the overruling of the demurrer to the indictment and the motion to quash, and the *83disallowance of proof of the truth of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs.

The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and granted a new trial, one judge dissenting. 138 E. 2d 540. In its view the restriction of the issue in question to that of good faith was error. Its reason was that the scheme to defraud alleged in the indictment was that respondents made the eighteen alleged false representations; and that to prove that defendants devised the scheme described in the indictment “it was necessary to prove that they schemed to make some, at least, of the (eighteen) representations . . . and that some, at least, of the representations which they schemed to make were false.” 138 F. 2d 545. One judge thought that the ruling of the District Court was also error because it was “as prejudicial to the issue of honest belief as to the issue of purposeful misrepresentation.” Id., p. 546.

The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented.

The United States contends that the District Court withdrew from the jury’s consideration only the truth or falsity of those representations which related to religious concepts or beliefs and that there were representations charged in the indictment which fell within a different category.1 The argument is that this latter group of *84representations was submitted to the jury, that they were adequate to constitute an offense under the Act, and that they were supported by the requisite evidence. It is thus sought to bring the case within the rule of Hall v. United States, 168 U. S. 632, 639-640, which held that where an indictment contained “all the necessary averments to constitute an offense created by the statute,” a conviction would not be set aside because a “totally immaterial fact” was averred but not proved. We do not stop to ascertain the relevancy of that rule to this case, for we are of the view that all of the representations charged in the indictment which related at least in part to the religious doctrines or beliefs of respondents were withheld from the jury. The trial judge did not differentiate them. He referred in the charge to the “religious beliefs” and “doctrines taught by the defendants” as matters withheld from the jury. And in stating that the issue of good faith was the “cardinal question” in the case he charged, as already noted, that “The jury will be called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the defendants honestly and in good faith believed the representations which are set forth in the indictment.” Nowhere in the charge were any of the separate representations submitted to the jury. A careful reading of the whole charge leads us to agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals on this phase of the case that the only issue submitted to the jury was the question as stated by the District Court, of respondents’ “belief in their representations and promises.”

The United States contends that respondents acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of the truth of their reli*85gious doctrines or beliefs and that their consent bars them from insisting on a different course once that one turned out to be unsuccessful. Reliance for that position is sought in Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189. That case stands for the proposition that, apart from situations involving an unfair trial, an appellate court will not grant a new trial to a defendant on the ground of improper introduction of evidence or improper comment by the prosecutor, where the defendant acquiesced in that course and made no objection to it. In fairness to respondents that principle cannot be applied here. The real ob jection of respondents is not that the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Their demurrer and motion to quash made clear their position that that issue should be withheld from the jury on the basis of the First Amendment. Moreover, their position at all times was and still is that the court should have gone the whole way and withheld from the jury both that issue and the issue of their good faith. Their demurrer and motion to quash asked for dismissal of the entire indictment. Their argument that the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs should have gone to the jury when the question of their good faith was submitted was and is merely an alternative argument. They never forsook their position that the indictment should have been dismissed and that none of it was good. Moreover, respondents’ motion for new trial challenged the propriety of the action of the District Court in withdrawing from the jury the issue of the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs without also withdrawing the question of their good faith. So we conclude that the rule of Johnson v. United States, supra, does not prevent respondents from reasserting now that no part of the indictment should have been submitted to the jury.

As we have noted, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question of the truth of the representations concerning *86respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. And it remanded the case for a new trial. It may be that the Circuit Court of Appeals took that action because it did not think that the indictment could be properly construed as charging a scheme to defraud by means other than misrepresentations of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs. Or that court may have concluded that the withdrawal of the issue of the truth of those religious doctrines or beliefs was unwarranted because it resulted in a substantial change in the character of the crime charged. But on whichever basis that court rested its action, we do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Whatever this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment precludes such a course, as the United States seems to concede. “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728. The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only “forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship” but also “safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303. “Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” Id., pp. 303-304. Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624. It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. *87Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man’s relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105. As stated in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342, “With man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with.” See Prince *88v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158. So we conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines of respondents.

Respondents maintain that the reversal of the judgment of conviction was justified on other distinct grounds. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach those questions. Respondents may, of course, urge them here in support of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 538-539; Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U. S. 555, 560, 567-568. But since attention was centered on the issues which we have discussed, the remaining questions were not fully presented to this Court either in the briefs or oral argument. In view of these circumstances we deem it more appropriate to remand the cause to the Circuit Court of Appeals so that it may pass on the questions reserved. Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U. S. 257, 267-268; Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U. S. 583. If any questions of importance survive and are presented here, we will then have the benefit of the views of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Until that additional consideration is had, we cannot be sure that it will be necessary to pass on any of the other constitutional issues which respondents claim to have reserved.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Chief Justice Stone,

dissenting:

I am not prepared to say that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion affords immunity from crim-minal prosecution for the fraudulent procurement of money by false statements as to one’s religious experiences, *89more than it renders polygamy or libel immune from criminal prosecution. Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572; cf. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 715. I cannot say that freedom of thought and worship includes freedom to procure money by making knowingly false statements about one’s religious experiences. To go no further, if it were shown that a defendant in this case had asserted as a part of the alleged fraudulent scheme, that he had physically shaken hands with St. Germain in San Francisco on a day named, or that, as the indictment here alleges, by the exertion of his spiritual power he “had in fact cured . . . hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments,” I should not doubt that it would be open to the Government to submit to the jury proof that he had never been in San Francisco and that no such cures had ever been effected. In any event I see no occasion for making any pronouncement on this subject in the present case.

The indictment charges respondents’ use of the mails to defraud and a conspiracy to commit that offense by false statements of their religious experiences which had not in fact occurred. But it also charged that the representations were “falsely and fraudulently” made, that respondents “well knew” that these representations were untrue, and that they were made by respondents with the intent to cheat and defraud those to whom they were made. With the assent of the prosecution and the defense the trial judge withdrew from the consideration of the jury the question whether the alleged religious experiences had in fact occurred, but submitted to the jury the single issue whether petitioners honestly believed that they had occurred, with the instruction that if the jury did not so find, then it should return a verdict of guilty. On this *90issue the jury, on ample evidence that respondents were without belief in the statements which they had made to their victims, found a verdict of guilty. The state of one’s mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent misrepresentation as is one’s physical condition or the state of his bodily health. See Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517; cf. Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 313. There are no exceptions to the charge and no contention that the trial court rejected any relevant evidence which petitioners sought to offer. Since the indictment and the evidence support the conviction, it is irrelevant whether the religious experiences alleged did or did not in fact occur or whether that issue could or could not, for constitutional reasons, have been rightly submitted to the jury. Certainly none of respondents’ constitutional rights are violated if they are prosecuted for the fraudulent procurement of money by false representations as to their beliefs, religious or otherwise.

Obviously if the question whether the religious experiences in fact occurred could not constitutionally have been submitted to the jury the court rightly withdrew it. If it could have been submitted I know of no reason why the parties could not, with the advice of counsel, assent to its withdrawal from the jury. And where, as here, the indictment charges two sets of false statements, each independently sufficient to sustain the conviction, I cannot accept respondents’ contention that the withdrawal of one set and the submission of the other to the jury amounted to an amendment of the indictment.

An indictment is amended when it is so altered as to charge a different offense from that found by the grand jury. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1. But here there was no alteration of the indictment, Salinger v. United States, 272 U. S. 542, 549, nor did the court’s action, in effect, add anything to it by submitting to the jury matters which *91it did not charge. United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619, 622. In Salinger v. United States, supra, 548-9, we explicitly held that where an indictment charges several offenses, or the commission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from the jury’s consideration of one offense or one alleged method of committing it does not constitute a forbidden amendment of the indictment. See also Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393, 402-3; Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 602. Were the rule otherwise the common practice of withdrawing from the jury’s consideration one count of an indictment while submitting others for its verdict, sustained in Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539, 542, would be a fatal error.

We may assume that under some circumstances the submission to the jury of part only of the matters alleged in the indictment might result in such surprise to the defendant as to amount to the denial of a fair trial. But, as in the analogous case of a variance between pleading and proof, a conviction can be reversed only upon a showing of injury to the “substantial rights” of the accused. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 82. Here no claim of surprise has been or could be made. The indictment plainly charged both falsity of, and lack of good faith belief in the representations made, and it was agreed at the outset of the trial, without objection from the defendants, that only the issue of respondents’ good faith belief in the representations of religious experiences would be submitted to the jury. Respondents, who were represented by counsel, at no time in the course of the trial offered any objection to this limitation of the issues, or any contention that it would result in a prohibited amendment of the indictment. So far as appears from the record before us the point was raised for the first time in the specifications of errors in the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is asserted that it was argued to the District Court on *92motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. If so, there was still no surprise by a ruling to which, as we have said, respondents’ counsel assented when it was made.

On the issue submitted to the jury in this case it properly rendered a verdict of gujlty. As no legally sufficient reason for disturbing it appears, I think the judgment below should be reversed and that of the District Court reinstated.

Mr. Justice Jackson,

dissenting:

I should say the defendants have done just that for which they are indicted. If I might agree to their conviction without creating a precedent, I cheerfully would do so. I can see in their teachings nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth. But that does not dispose of the constitutional question whether misrepresentation of religious experience or belief is prosecutable; it rather emphasizes the danger of such prosecutions.

The Ballard family claimed miraculous communication with the spirit world and supernatural power to heal the sick. They were brought to trial for mail fraud on an indictment which charged that their representations were false and that they “well knew” they were false. The trjal judge, obviously troubled, ruled that the court could not try whether the statements were untrue, but could inquire whether the defendants knew them to be untrue; and, if so, they could be convicted.

I find it difficult to reconcile this conclusion with our traditional religious freedoms.

In the first place, as a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that they have been true in his expe*93rience. Likewise, th;at one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said happened’never did happen./ How can the Government prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false? If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.

In the second place, any inquiry into intellectual honesty in religion raises profound psychological problems. William James, who wrote on these matters as a scientist, reminds us that it is not theology and ceremonies which keep religion going. Its vitality is in the religious experiences of many people. “If you ask what these experiences are, they are conversations with the unseen, voices and visions, responses to prayer, changes of heart, deliverances from fear, inflowings of help, assurances of support, whenever certain persons set their own internal attitude, in certain appropriate ways.”1 If religious liberty includes, as it must, the right to communicate such experiences to others, it seems to me an impossible task for juries to separate fancied ones from real ones, dreams from happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance. Such experiences, like some tones and colors, have existence for one, but none at all for another. They cannot be verified to the minds of those whose field of consciousness does not include religious insight. When one comes to trial which turns on any aspect of religious belief or representation, unbelievers among his judges are likely not to understand and are almost certain not to believe him.

-•■-''And then I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious representation amounts to actionable fraud. James points out that “Faith means belief *94in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible.”'2 Belief in what one may demonstrate to the senses is not faith. All schools of religious thought make enormous assumptions, generally on the basis of revelations authenticated by some sign or miracle. The appeal in such matters is to a very different plane of credulity than is invoked by representations of secular fact in commerce. Some who profess belief in the Bible read literally what others read as allegory or metaphor, as they read Aesop’s fables. Religious symbolism is even used by some with the same mental reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and even more difficult to say how far it is reliance upon a teacher’s literal belief which induces followers to give him money.

There appear to be persons — let us hope not many— who find refreshment and courage in the teachings of the “I Am” cult. If the members of the sect get comfort from the celestial guidance of their “Saint Germain,” however doubtful it seems to me, it is hard to say that they do not get what they pay for. Scores of sects flourish in this country by teaching what to me are queer notions. It is plain that there is wide variety in American religious taste. The Ballards are not alone in catering to it with a pretty dubious product.

The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not financial. The collections aggregate a tempting total, but individual payments are not ruinous. I doubt if the vigilance of the law is equal to making money stick by over-credulous people. But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. There are those who hunger and thirst after higher values which they feel wanting in *95J their humdrum lives. They live in mental confusion or ■ moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and I moral support. When they are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism and confusion follow. The wrong of ■’ these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is j that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal [ of rubbish.

"" Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious persecution. I do not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud for making false representations on matters other than faith or experience, as for example if one represents that funds are being used to construct a church when in fact they are being used for personal purposes. But that is not this case, which reaches into wholly dangerous ground. When does less than full belief in a professed credo become actionable fraud if one is soliciting gifts or legacies? Such inquiries may discomfort orthodox as well as unconventional religious teachers, for even the most regular of them are sometimes accused of taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt.

\ I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this \ business of judicially examining other people’s faiths.

Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on- Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.1 When she was unable to obtain' other employment because from conscientious scruples' she would not take Saturday work,2 she filed a claim for *400unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment -Compensation Act.3 That law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be “able to work and . . . available for work’.'; and, fur*401ther, that a claimant is ineligible for benefits “ [i] f . . .-he has failed, without good causé . . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer . . . The appellee Employment Secu-. rity Commission, in administrative proceedings under the statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought 'her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept “suitable work when offered ... by the employment office or thé employer .'...” The Commission’s finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County.. That court’s judgment was* in turn affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant’s contention that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional -liberties because such, a construction of the statute “places no restriction upon the appellant’s freedom .of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.” 240 S. C. 286, 303-304, 125 S. E. 2d 737, 7464 We noted probable *402jurisdiction of appellant’s appeal. 371 TJ. S. 938. We reverse the judgmént of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I.

The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly-closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. On the other hand, *403the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for “even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 603. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e. g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14.

Plainly enough, appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant’s constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a “compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate . . . .” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438.

II.

We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion. We think it is clear that it does. In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State’s general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our *404inquiry.5 For “[i]f the purpose &r effect of a law is to impede the* observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.” Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, at 607. Here not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

Nor may the South Carolina court’s construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant’s “right” but merely a “privilege.” It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.6 American *405Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 390; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191-192; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146,155-156. For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611, the Court recognized with respect to Federal Social Security benefits that “[t]he interest of a covered employee under the Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause.” In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. We there struck down a condition which limited the availability of a tax exemption to those members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state government granting the exemption. While the State was surely under no obligation to afford such an exemption, we held that the imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression and thereby threatened to “produce a result which .the State could not command directly.” 357 U. S., *406at 526. “To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.” Id., at 518. Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.

Significantly South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian’s religious liberty. When in times of “national emergency” the textile plants are authorized by the State Commissioner of Labor to operate on Sunday, “no employee shall be required to work on Sunday,. . . who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday work; and if any employee should refuse to work on Sunday on account of conscientious . . objections he or she shall not jeopardize his or her seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other manner.” S. C. Code, § 64-4. No question of.the disqualification of a Sunday worshipper for benefits is likely to arise, since we cannot suppose that an employer will discharge him in violation of this statute. The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus 'Compounded by the religious discrimination which South Carolina’s general statutory scheme necessarily effects.

III.

We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First- Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation,” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. *407No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present caso. The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. But that possibility is not apposite here because no such objection appears to have been made before the South Carolina Supreme Court, and we are unwilling to assess the importance of an asserted state interest without the views of' the state court. Nor,' if the contention had been made below, would the record appear to sustain it; there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents now advance. Even if consideration of such. evidence is not foreclosed by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 — a question- as to which we intimate no view since it is not before us — it is highly doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties. For-even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative form's of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.7 Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. *408479, 487-490; Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 144-149.

In these respects, then, the state interest asserted in the present case is wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify the less direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld v. Brown, supra. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served “to make the practice of [the Orthodox Jewish merchants’] . . . religious beliefs more expensive,” 366 U. S., at 605. But the statute was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case — a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of pest for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved, the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an administrative *409problem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the- entire statutory-scheme unworkable.8 In the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court that appellant’s religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.9

IV.

In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the “establishment” of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, ante, p. 203. Nor does the recognition of the appellant’s right to unemployment benefits under the state statute serve to abridge any other person’s religious liberties. 'Nor do we, by our decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part *410of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment. This is not a case in which an employee’s religious convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society. See note 2, supra. Finally, nothing we say today constrains the States to adopt any particular form or scheme of unemployment compensation. Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a. worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest. This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a half ago, namely that no State may “exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation:” Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16.

In view of the result we have reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to- consider appellant’s claim that the denial of benefits also deprived her of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

concurring.

The case we have for decision seems to me to be of small dimensions, though profoundly important. The question is whether the South Carolina law which dénies unemployment compensation to a Seventh-day Adventist, who, because of her religion, has declined to work on her Sabbath, is a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion as those words are used in the First Amendment. *411It seems obvious to me that this-law does run afoul of that clause.

Religious scruples of Moslems require them to attend a mosque on Friday and to pray five times daily.1 Religious scruples of a Sikh require -him to carry a regular or a symbolic sword. Rex v. Singh, 39 A. I. R. 53 (Allahabad, 1952). Religious scruples of a Jehovah’s Witness teach him to be a colporteur, going from door to door, from town to town, distributing his religious pamphlets. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105. Religious scruples of a Quaker compel him to refrain from swearing and to affirm instead. See King v. Fearson, Fed. Cas. No. 7,790, 14 Fed. Cas. 520; 1 U. S. C. § 1; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (d); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (dissenting opinion). Religious scruples of a Buddhist may require him to refrain from partaking of any flesh, even of fish.2

The examples could be multiplied, including those of the Seventh-day Adventist whose Sabbath is Saturday and who is advised not to eat some meats.3 .

These suffice,, however, to show that .many-people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society — beliefs that are. protected by the First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of “police” or “health” regulations reflecting the majority’s views'

Some have thought that a majority of a community can, through state action, compel a minority to observe their particular religious scruples so long as the majority’s rule can be said to perform some valid secular function. *412That was the essence of the Court’s decision in the Sunday Blue Law Cases (Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U. S. 617; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420), a ruling from which I- then dissented (McGowan v. Maryland, supra, pp. 575-576) and still dissent. See Arlan’s Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U. S. 218.

That ruling of the Court travels part of the distance that South Carolina asks us to go now. She asks us to hold that when it comes to a day of rest a Sabbatarian must conform with the scruples of the 'majority in order to obtain unemployment benefits.

The result turns not on the degree of injury, which may indeed be nonexistent by ordinary standards. The harm is the interference with the individual’s scruples or conscience — an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences off from government. The interference here is as' plain as it is in Soviet Russia, where a churchgoer is given a second-class citizenship, resulting in harm though perhaps not in measurable damages.

This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of government, but solely in terms of what government may not .-do. to an individual in violar tion of his religious scruples. The fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean, that L can demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the' government.

Those considerations, however, are not relevant here. If appellant is otherwise qualified for unemployment benefits, payments will be made to her not as a Seventh-day Adventist, but as an unemployed worker. Conceivably these payments will indirectly benefit her church, *413but no more so than does the salary of any public employee. Thus, this case does not involve the problems of direct or indirect state assistance to a religious organization — matters relevant to the Establishment Clause, not in issue here.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring in the result.

Although fully agreeing with the result which the Court reaches in this case, I cannot join the Court’s opinion. This case presents a double-barreled dilemma, which in all candor I think the Court’s opinion has not succeeded in papering over. The dilemma ought to be resolved.

I.

Twenty-three years ago in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, the Court said that both, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment were made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the intervening years several cases involving claims of state abridgment of. individual religious freedom have been decided here— most recently Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488. During the same period “cases dealing with the specific problems arising under the ‘Establishment’ Clause which have reached this Court are few in number.” 1 The most recent are last Term’s Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, and this Term’s Schempp and Murray cases, ante, p. 203.

I am convinced, that no liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause explicit in the First Amendment and imbedded in the Fourteenth. And. I regret that on *414occasion, and specifically in Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, the Court has shown what has seemed to me a distressing insensitivity to the appropriate demands of this constitutional guarantee. By contrast I think that the Court’s approach to the Establishment Clause has on occasion, and specifically in Engel, Schempp and Murray, been not only insensitive, but positively wooden, and that the Court has accorded to the Establishment Clause a meaning which neither the words, the history, nor the intention of the authors of that specific constitutional provision even remotely suggests.

But my views as to the correctness of the Court’s decisions in these cases are beside the point here. The point is that the decisions are on the books. And the result is that there are many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision .with the' Court’s insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause.2 The controversy now before us is clearly such a case.

Because the appellant refuses to accept available jobs which would require her to work on Saturdays, South Carolina has declined to pay unemployment compensation benefits to her. Her refusal to work on Saturdays is based on the tenets of her religious faith. [The Court says that South Carolina cannot under these circumstances declare her to be not “available for work” within the meaning of its statute because to do so would violate her constitutional right to the free exercise of her religion.

Yet what this Court has said about the Establishment Clause must inevitably lead to a diametrically opposite result. If the appellant’s refusal to work on Saturdays *415were based on indolence, or on a compulsive desire to watch the Saturday television programs; no one would say that South Carolina could not hold that she was not “available for work” within the meaning of its statute. That being so, the Establishment Clause as construed by this Court not only permits but affirmatively requires South Carolina equally to deny the appellant’s claim for unemployment compensation when her refusal to work on Saturdays is based upon her religious creed. For, as said in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 11, the Establishment Clause bespeaks “a government . . . stripped of all power ... to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions . . . ,” and no State “can. pass laws which aid one religion . . . .” Id., at 15. In Mr. justice Rutledge’s words, adopted by the Court today in Schempp, ante, p. 217, the Establishment Clause forbids “every form of public aid or support for religion.” 330 U. S., at 32. In the words of the Court in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431, reaffirmed today in the Schempp case, ante, p. 221, the Establishment Clause forbids the “financial support of government” to be “placed behind a particular religious belief.”

To require South Carolina to so administer its laws as to pay public money to the appellant under the circumstances of this- case is thus clearly to require the State to violate the Establishment Clause as construed by this Court. This poses no problem for me, because I think the Court’s mechanistic concept of the Establishment Clause is historically unsound and constitutionally wrong. I think the process of constitutional decision in the area of the relationships between government and religion demands considerably more than the invocation of broad-brushed rhetoric of the kind I have quoted. And I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality and aceommoda*416tion to individual belief or disbelief. In short, I think pur Constitution commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom — not only for a minority, however small — not. only for the majority, however large — but for each of us.

South Carolina would deny unemployment benefits to a mother unavailable for work on Saturdays because she was unable to get a babysitter.3 Thus, we do not have before us a situation where a State provides unemployment compensation generally, and singles out for disqualification only those persons who are unavailable for work on religious grounds. This is not, in short, a scheme which operates so as to discriminate against religion as such. But the Court nevertheless holds that the State must prefer a religious over a secular ground for. being unavailable for work — that state financial support, of the appellant’s religion is constitutionally required to carry out “the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences. . . .”

Yet in cases decided under the Establishment Clause the Court has decreed otherwise. It has decreed that government must blind itself to the differing religious beliefs and traditions of the people. With all respect, I think it is the Court’s duty to'face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court. It is a duty, I submit, which we owe to the people, the States, and the Nation, and a duty which we owe to ourselves. For so long as the resounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric of some of our Establishment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be disregarded at will as in the present case, *417or to be undiscriminatingly invoked as in the Schempp case; ante, p. 203, so long will the possibility of consistent and perceptive decision in this most difficult and delicate area of constitutional law be impeded. and impaired. And so long, I fear, will the guarantee of true religious freedom in our pluralistic society be uncertain and insecure.

II.

My second difference with the Court’s opinion is that I cannot agree that today’s decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld v. Brown, supra. The Court .says that there was a “less direct burden upon religious practices” in that : case than in this. With all respect, I think the Court is mistaken, simply as a matter of fact. .The Braunfeld case involved a state criminal statute. The undisputed effect of that statute, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in that case, was that “ ‘Plaintiff, Abraham Braunfeld, will be unable to continue in his business if he may not stay open on Sunday and he will thereby lose his capital investment.’ In other words, the issue in this case — and we do not understand either appellees or the Court to contend otherwise — is whether a State may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion.” 366 U. S., at 611.

The impact upon the appellant’s religious freedom in the present case is considerably less onerous. We deal here not with a criminal statute, but with the particularized administration of South Carolina’s Unemployment Compensation Act. Even upon the unlikely assumption that the appellant could not find suitable non-Saturday employment,4 the appellant at the worst would be denied *418a maximum of 22 weeks of compensation payments. I agree with the Court that the possibility of that denial is enough to infringe upon the appellant’s constitutional right to the free exercise of her religion. But it. is clear to me that in order to reach this conclusion the Court must explicitly reject the reasoning of Braunfeld v. Brown. I think the Braunfeld case was wrongly decided and should be overruled, and accordingly I concur in the result reached by the Court in the case before us.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

Today’s decision is disturbing both in its rejection of existing precedent and in its implications for the future. The significance of the decision can bes.t be understood after an examination of the state law applied in this case.

South Carolina’s Unemployment Compensation Law was enacted in 1936 in response to the grave social, and economic problems that arose during the depression of that period. As stated in the statute itself:

“Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to health, morals and welfare of the people of this State; involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and' concern . . . ; the achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life; this can be provided by encouraging the employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance.” § 68-38. (Emphasis added.)

*419Thus the purpose of the legislature was to tide people over, and to avoid social and economic chaos, during periods when work was unavailable. But at the same time there was clearly no intent to provide relief for those who for purely personal reasons were or became unavailable for work. In accordance with this design, the legislature provided, in § 68-113, that “[a]n unemployed insured worker shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that . . . [h]e is able to work and is available for work . . . (Emphasis added.)

The South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied this law in conformity with its clearly expressed purpose. It has consistently held that one is not “available for work” if his unemployment-has resulted not from the inability of industry to provide a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter how compelling. The reference to “involuntary unemployment” in the legislative statement of policy, whatever a sociologist, philosopher, or theologian might say, has been interpreted not to embrace such personal circumstances. See, e. g., Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Comm’n, 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (claimant was “unavailable for work” when she became unable to work the third shift, and limited her availability to the other -two, because of the need to care for her four children) ; Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm’n, 219 S. C. 239, 64 S. E. 2d 644; Hartsville Cotton Mill v. South Carolina Employment Security Comm’n, 224 S. C. 407, 79 S. E. 2d 381.

In the present case all that the state court has done is to apply- these accepted principles. Since virtually all of the mills in the Spartanburg area were operating on a six-day week, the appellant was “unavailable for work,” and thus ineligible for benefits, when personal considera*420tions prevented her from accepting employment on a full-time basis in the industry and locality in which she had worked. The fact that these personal considerations sprang from her religious convictions was wholly without relevance to the state .court’s application of the law. Thus in no proper sense can it be said that the State discriminated against the appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs or that she was denied benefits because she was a Seventh-day Adventist. She was denied benefits just as any other claimant would be denied benefits who was not “available for work” for personal reasons.1

With this background, this Court’s decision comes into clearer focus. What the Court is holding is that if the State chooses to condition unemployment compensation on the applicant’s availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception — and to provide benefits — for those whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions.2 Such a holding has particular significance in two respects.

*421First, despite the Court’s protestations to the contrary, the decision necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, which held that it did not offend the “Free Exercise” Clause of the Constitution for a State to forbid a Sabbatarian to do business on Sunday. The secular purpose of the statute before us today is even clearer than that involved in Braunfeld. And just as in Braunfeld — where exceptions to the Sunday closing laws for Sabbatarians would have been inconsistent with the purpose to achieve a uniform day of rest and would have required case-by-case inquiry into religious beliefs — so here, an exception to the rules of eligibility based on religious convictions would necessitate judicial examination of those convictions and would be at odds with the limited purpose of the statute to smooth out the economy during periods of industrial instability. Finally, the indirect financial burden of the present law is far less than that involved in Braunfeld. Forcing a store owner to close his business on Sunday may well have the effect of depriving him of a satisfactory livelihood if his religious convictions require him to close on Saturday as well. Here we are dealing only with temporary benefits, amounting to a fraction of regular weekly wages and running for not more than 22 weeks. See §§ 68-104, 68-105. Clearly, any differences between this case and Braunfeld cut against the present appellant.3

*422Second, the implications of the present decision are far more troublesome than its apparently narrow dimensions would indicate at first glance. The meaning of today’s holding, as already noted, is that the State must furnish unemployment benefits to one who is unavailable for work if the unavailability stems from the exercise of religious convictions. The State, in other words, must single put for financial assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though it. denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior (in this case, inability to work on Saturdays) is not religiously motivated.

It has been suggested that such singling out of religious conduct for special treatment may violate the constitutional limitations on state action. See Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1; cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 515 (concurring opinion). My own view, however, is that at least under the circumstances of this case it would, be a permissible accommodation of religion for the State, if it chose to do so, to create an exception to its eligibility requirements for persons like the appellant. The constitutional obligation of “neutrality,” see School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, ante, p. 222, is not so narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation. There are too many instances in which no such course can be charted, too many areas in which the pervasive activities of the State justify some special provision for religion to prevent it from being submerged by an all-embracing secularism. The State violates its obligation of neutrality *423when, for example,, it mandates a daily religious exercise in its public schools, with all the attendant pressures on the school children that such an exercise entails. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra. But there is, I believe, enough flexibility in the Constitution to permit a legislative judgment accommodating an unemployment compensation law to the exercise of religious beliefs such as appellant’s.

For very much the same reasons, however, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the State is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception to its general rule of eligibility in the present case. Those situations in which the Constitution may require special treatment on account of religion are, in my view, few and far between, arid this view is amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area. See, e. g., Braunfeld v. Brown, supra; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145. Such compulsion in the present case is particularly inappropriate in light of the indirect, remote, and insubstantial effect of the decision below on the exercise of appellant’s religion and in light of the direct financial assistance to religion that today’s decision requires.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.4

*874 Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use.

I

Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a “controlled substance” unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner. Ore. Rev. Stat. §475.992(4) (1987). The law defines “controlled substance” as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U. S. C. §§811-812, as modified by the State Board of Pharmacy. Ore. Rev. Stat. §475.005(6) (1987). Persons who violate this provision by possessing a controlled substance listed on Schedule I are “guilty of a Class B felony.” §475.992(4)(a). As compiled by the State Board of Pharmacy under its statutory authority, see §475.035, Schedule I contains the drug peyote, a hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora ivilliamsii Lemaire. Ore. Admin. Rule 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988).

Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter respondents) were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members. When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division (hereinafter petitioner) for unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related “misconduct.” The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding that the denial of benefits violated respondents’ free exercise rights under the First Amendment,

*875 On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because respondents’ consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law. The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the criminality of respondents’ peyote use was irrelevant to resolution of their constitutional claim — since the purpose of the “misconduct” provision under which respondents had been disqualified was not to enforce the State’s criminal laws but to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation fund, and since that purpose was inadequate to justify the burden that disqualification imposed on respondents’ religious practice. Citing our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981), the court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 301 Ore. 209, 217-219, 721 P. 2d 445, 449-450 (1986). We granted certiorari. 480 U. S. 916 (1987).

Before this Court in 1987, petitioner continued to maintain that the illegality of respondents’ peyote consumption was relevant to their constitutional claim. We agreed, concluding that “if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U. S. 660, 670 (1988) (Smith I). We noted, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court had not decided whether respondents’ sacramental use of peyote was in fact proscribed by Oregon’s controlled substance law, and that this issue was a matter of dispute between the parties. Being “uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon,” we determined that it would not be “appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.” Id., at 673. Accordingly, we *876 vacated the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 674.

On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that respondents’ religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition of the Oregon statute, which “makes no exception for the sacramental use” of the drug. 307 Ore. 68, 72-73, 763 P. 2d 146, 148 (1988). It then considered whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and concluded that it was not. The court therefore reaffirmed its previous ruling that the State could not deny unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in that practice.

We again granted certiorari. 489 U. S. 1077 (1989).

II

Respondents’ claim for relief rests on our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136 (1987), in which we held that a State could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual’s willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion. As we observed in Smith I, however, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law. We held that distinction to be critical, for “if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon,” and “the State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious motivation.” 485 U. S., at 672. Now that the Oregon Supreme Court has confirmed that Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, we proceed to consider whether that prohibition is permissible under the Free Exercise Clause.

A

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into *877 the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ...” U. S. Const., Arndt. 1 (emphasis added). The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.” Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 402. The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 86-88 (1944), impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 69 (1953); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 245 (1982), or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma, see Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440, 445-452 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 95-119 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696, 708-725 (1976).

But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used *878 for worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.

Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” one large step further. They contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words, that “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as “abridging the freedom ... of the press” of those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 139 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust laws to press), with Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250-251 (1936) (striking down license tax applied only to newspapers with weekly circulation above a specified level); see generally Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 581 (1983).

Our decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one. We have never held that an individual’s religious be *879 liefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. As described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 594-595 (1940): “Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted).” We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879), where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice. “Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Id., at 166-167.

Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, supra, at 595 (collecting cases). In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), we held that a mother could be prosecuted under the child labor laws *880 for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her religious motivation notwithstanding. We found no constitutional infirmity in “excluding [these children] from doing there what no other children may do.” Id., at 171. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing laws against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 461 (1971), we sustained the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated free exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds.

Our most recent decision involving a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual’s religion was United States v. Lee, 455 U. S., at 258-261. There, an Amish employer, on behalf of himself and his employees, sought exemption from collection and payment of Social Security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support programs. We rejected the claim that an exemption was constitutionally required. There would be no way, we observed, to distinguish the Amish believer’s objection to Social Security taxes from the religious objections that others might have to the collection or use of other taxes. - “If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.” Id., at 260. Cf. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more difficult).

*881 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304-307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school). 1 *882 Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion, cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977) (invalidating compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag salute statute challenged by religious objectors). And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed”).

The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now. There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls. “Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.” Gillette v. United States, supra, at 461.

B

Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a *883 religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. See id., at 402-403; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S., at 699. Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion. See Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136 (1987). We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied, see United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971). In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693 (1986), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to a federal statutory scheme that required benefit applicants and recipients to provide them Social Security numbers. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security number for their daughter. We held the statute’s application to the plaintiffs valid regardless of whether it was necessary to effectuate a compelling interest. See 476 U. S., at 699-701. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439 (1988), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to the Government’s logging and road construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native American Tribes, even though it was undisputed that the activities “could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices,” 485 U. S., at 451. *884 In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503 (1986), we rejected application of the Sherbert test to military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342 (1987), we sustained, without mentioning the Sherbert test, a, prison’s refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend worship services.

Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. As a plurality of the Court noted in Roy, a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant’s unemployment: “The statutory conditions [in Sherbert and Thomas] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, ‘without good cause,’ he had quit work’ or refused available work. The ‘good cause’ standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 708 (opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.). See also Sherbert, supra, at 401, n. 4 (reading state unemployment compensation law as allowing benefits for unemployment caused by at least some “personal reasons”). As the plurality pointed out in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason. Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 708.

Whether or not the decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct. Although, as noted earlier, we have sometimes used the Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws, see United States v. *885 Lee, supra, at 257-260; Gillette v. United States, supra, at 462, we have never applied the test to invalidate one. We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.” Lyng, supra, at 451. To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is “compelling” — permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S., at 167 — contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 2

The “compelling government interest” requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race, see, e. g., *886 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 432 (1984), or before the government may regulate the content of speech, see, e. g., Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989), is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields — equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech — are constitutional norms; what it would produce here — a private right to ignore generally applicable laws — is a constitutional anomaly. 3

Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents’ proposal by requiring a “compelling state interest” only when the conduct prohibited is “central” to the individual’s religion. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S., at 474-476 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is no *887 more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of religious beliefs before applying a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the “importance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is “central” to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.” United States v. Lee, 455 U. S., at 263 n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring). As we reaffirmed only last Term, “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S., at 699. Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S., at 716; Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S., at 450; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595, 602-606 (1979); United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 85-87 (1944). 4

*888 If the “compelling interest” test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if “compelling interest” really means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S., at 606, and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind — ranging from *889 compulsory military service, see, e. g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971), to the payment of taxes, see, e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, see, e. g., Funkhouser v. State, 763 P. 2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), compulsory vaccination laws, see, e. g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S. W. 2d 816 (1964), drug laws, see, e. g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989), and traffic laws, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, see Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290 (1985), child labor laws, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), animal cruelty laws, see, e. g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (SD Fla. 1989), cf. State v. Massey, 229 N. C. 734, 51 S. E. 2d 179, appeal dism’d, 336 U. S. 942 (1949), environmental protection laws, see United States v. Little, 638 F. Supp. 337 (Mont. 1986), and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races, see, e. g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 603-604 (1983). The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does not require this. 5

*890 Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13 — 3402(B)(1)—(3) (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-22-317(3) (1985); N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989). But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.

* * *

Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug. The decision of the Oregon Supreme Court is accordingly reversed.

It is so ordered.

*891 Justice O’Connor,

Although I agree with the result the Court reaches in this case, I cannot join its opinion. In my view, today’s holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.

I

At the outset, I note that I agree with the Court’s implicit determination that the constitutional question upon which we granted review — whether the Free Exercise Clause protects a person’s religiously motivated use of peyote from the reach of a State’s general criminal law prohibition — is properly presented in this case. As the Court recounts, respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter respondents) were denied unemployment compensation benefits because their sacramental use of peyote constituted work-related “misconduct,” not because they violated Oregon’s general criminal prohibition against possession of peyote. We held, however, in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U. S. 660 (1988) (Smith I), that whether a State may, consistent with federal law, deny unemployment compensation benefits to persons for their religious use of peyote depends on whether the State, as a matter of state law, has criminalized the underlying conduct. See id., at 670-672. The Oregon Supreme Court, on remand from this Court, concluded that “the Oregon statute against possession of controlled substances, which include peyote, makes no exception for the sacramental use of peyote.” 307 Ore. 68, 72-73, 763 P. 2d 146, 148 (1988) (footnote omitted).

*892 Respondents contend that, because the Oregon Supreme Court declined to decide whether the Oregon Constitution prohibits criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote, see id., at 73, n. 3, 763 P. 2d, at 148, n. 3, any ruling on the federal constitutional question would be premature. Respondents are of course correct that the Oregon Supreme Court may eventually decide that the Oregon Constitution requires the State to provide an exemption from its general criminal prohibition for the religious use of peyote. Such a decision would then reopen the question whether a State may nevertheless deny unemployment compensation benefits to claimants who are discharged for engaging in such conduct. As the case comes to us today, however, the Oregon Supreme Court has plainly ruled that Oregon’s prohibition against possession of controlled substances does not contain an exemption for the religious use of peyote. In light of our decision in Smith I, which makes this finding a “necessary predicate to a correct evaluation of respondents’ federal claim,” 485 U. S., at 672, the question presented and addressed is properly before the Court.

II

The Court today extracts from our long history of free exercise precedents the single categorical rule that “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.” Ante, at 878 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court holds that where the law is a generally applicable criminal prohibition, our usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even apply. Ante, at 884. To reach this sweeping result, however, the Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but must also disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct.

*893 A

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), we held that this prohibition applies to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment and that it categorically forbids government regulation of religious beliefs. Id., at 303. As the Court recognizes, however, the “free exercise” of religion often, if not invariably, requires the performance of (or abstention from) certain acts. Ante, at 877; cf. 3 A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles 401-402 (J. Murray ed. 1897) (defining “exercise” to include “[t]he practice and performance of rites and ceremonies, worship, etc.; the right or permission to celebrate the observances (of a religion)” and religious observances such as acts of public and private worship, preaching, and prophesying). “[B]elief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 220 (1972). Because the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must be at least presumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause.

The Court today, however, interprets the Clause to permit the government to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by an individual’s religious beliefs, so long as that prohibition is generally applicable. Ante, at 878. But a law that prohibits certain conduct — conduct that happens to be an act of worship for someone — manifestly does prohibit that person’s free exercise of his religion. A person who is barred from engaging in religiously motivated conduct is barred from freely exercising his religion. Moreover, that person is barred from freely exercising his religion regardless of whether the law prohibits the conduct only when engaged in for religious reasons, only by members of that religion, or by all persons. It is difficult to deny that a law that prohib *894 its religiously motivated conduct, even if the law is generally applicable, does not at least implicate First Amendment concerns.

The Court responds that generally applicable laws are “one large step” removed from laws aimed at specific religious practices. Ibid. The First Amendment, however, does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices. Indeed, few States would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such. Our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice. If the First Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice. As we have noted in a slightly different context, “‘[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides. ’ ” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136, 141-142 (1987) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 727 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

To say that a person’s right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our established First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. See, e. g., Cantwell, supra, at 304; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 161-167 (1879). Instead, we have respected both the First Amendment’s express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 699 *895 (1989); Hobbie, supra, at 141; United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 718 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 626-629 (1978) (plurality opinion); Yoder, supra, at 215; Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 732 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943). The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests “of the highest order,” Yoder, supra, at 215. “Only an especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Roy, supra, at 728 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Court attempts to support its narrow reading of the Clause by claiming that “[w]e have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” Ante, at 878-879. But as the Court later notes, as it must, in cases such as Cantwell and Yoder we have in fact interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to forbid application of a generally applicable prohibition to religiously motivated conduct. See Cantwell, supra, at 304-307; Yoder, 406 U. S., at 214-234. Indeed, in Yoder we expressely rejected the interpretation the Court now adopts:

“[0]ur decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject *896 to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers. But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. . . .

"... A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Id., at 219-220 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

The Court endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cant-well and Yoder by labeling them “hybrid” decisions, ante, at 892, but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause, see Cantwell, 310 U. S., at 303-307; Yoder, supra, at 219-229, and that we have consistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence. Moreover, in each of the other cases cited by the Court to support its categorical rule, ante, at 879-880, we rejected the particular constitutional claims before us only after carefully weighing the competing interests. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168-170 (1944) (state interest in regulating children’s activities justifies denial of religious exemption from child labor laws); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 608-609 (1961) (plurality opinion) (state interest in uniform day of rest justifies denial of religious exemption from Sunday closing law); Gillette, supra, at 462 (state interest in military affairs justifies denial of religious exemption from conscription laws); Lee, supra, at 258-259 (state interest in comprehensive Social Security system justifies denial of religious exemption from mandatory participation requirement). That we rejected the free exer *897 cise claims in those cases hardly calls into question the applicability of First Amendment doctrine in the first place. Indeed, it is surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us.

B

Respondents, of course, do not contend that their conduct is automatically immune from all governmental regulation simply because it is motivated by their sincere religious beliefs. The Court’s rejection of that argument, ante, at 882, might therefore be regarded as merely harmless dictum. Rather, respondents invoke our traditional compelling interest test to argue that the Free Exercise Clause requires the State to grant them a limited exemption from its general criminal prohibition against the possession of peyote. The Court today, however, denies them even the opportunity to make that argument, concluding that “the sounder approach.,, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [compelling interest] test inapplicable to” challenges to general criminal prohibitions'. Ante, at 885.

In my view, however, the essence of a. free' exercise claim, is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious’ practices or beliefs, whether the burden is imposed directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make abandonment of one’s own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil community. As we explained in Thomas:

“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.” 450 U. S., at 717-718.

*898 See also Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829, 832 (1989); Hobbie, 480 U. S., at 141. A State that makes criminal an individual’s religiously motivated conduct burdens that individual’s free exercise of religion in the severest manner possible, for it “results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.” Braunfeld, supra, at 605. I would have thought it beyond argument that such laws implicate free exercise concerns.

Indeed, we have never distinguished between cases in which a State conditions receipt of a benefit on conduct prohibited by religious beliefs and cases in which a State affirmatively prohibits such conduct. The Sherbert compelling interest test applies in both kinds of cases. See, e. g., Lee, 455 U. S., at 257-260 (applying Sherbert to uphold Social Security tax liability); Gillette, 401 U. S., at 462 (applying Sherbert to uphold military conscription requirement); Yoder, 406 U. S., at 215-234 (applying Sherbert to strike down criminal convictions for violation of compulsory school attendance law). As I noted in Bowen v. Roy:

“The fact that the underlying dispute involves an award of benefits rather than an exaction of penalties does not grant the Government license to apply a different version of the Constitution. ...

“. . . The fact that appellees seek exemption from a precondition that the Government attaches to an award of benefits does not, therefore, generate a meaningful distinction between this case and one where appellees seek an exemption from the Government’s imposition of penalties upon them.” 476 U. S., at 731-732 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

See also Hobbie, supra, at 141-142; Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 404. I would reaffirm that principle today: A neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a State may legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome than a neutral civil *899 statute placing legitimate conditions on the award of a state benefit.

Legislatures, of course, have always been “left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” Reynolds, 98 U. S., at 164; see also Yoder, supra, at 219-220; Braunfeld, 366 U. S., at 603-604. Yet because of the close relationship between conduct and religious belief, “[i]n every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.” Cantwell, 310 U. S., at 304. Once it has been shown that a government regulation or criminal prohibition burdens the free exercise of religion, we have consistently asked the government to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector “is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest,” Lee, supra, at 257-258, or represents “the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest,” Thomas, supra, at 718. See, e. g., Braunfeld, supra, at 607; Sherbert, supra, at 406; Yoder, supra, at 214-215; Roy, 476 U. S., at 728-732 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). To me, the sounder approach — the approach more consistent with our role as judges to decide each case on its individual merits — is to apply this test in each case to determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is compelling. Even if, as an empirical matter, a government’s criminal laws might usually serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or public order, the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim. Cf. McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 628, n. 8 (plurality opinion) (noting application of Sherbert to general criminal prohibitions and the “delicate balancing required by our decisions in” Sherbert and Yoder). Given the range of conduct that a State might legitimately make *900 criminal, we cannot assume, merely because a law carries criminal sanctions and is generally applicable, that the First' Amendment never requires the State to grant a limited exemption for religiously motivated conduct.

Moreover, we have not “rejected” or “declined to apply” the compelling interest test in our recent cases. Ante, at 883-884. Recent cases have instead affirmed that test as a fundamental part of our First Amendment doctrine. See, e. g., Hernandez, 490 U. S., at 699; Hobbie, supra, at 141— 142 (rejecting Chief Justice Burger’s suggestion in Roy, supra, at 707-708, that free exercise claims be assessed under a less rigorous “reasonable means” standard). The cases cited by the Court signal no retreat from our consistent adherence to the compelling interest test. In both Bowen v. Roy, supra, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439 (1988), for example, we expressly distinguished Sherbert on the ground that the First Amendment does not “require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development .... The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Roy, supra, at 699; see Lyng, supra, at 449. This distinction makes sense because “the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.” Sherbert, supra, at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). Because the case sub judice, like the other cases in which we have applied Sherbert, plainly falls into the former category, I would apply those established precedents to the facts of this case.

Similarly, the other cases cited by the Court for the proposition that we have rejected application of the Sherbert test outside the unemployment compensation field, ante, at 884, are distinguishable because they arose in the narrow, specialized contexts in which we have not traditionally re *901 quired the government to justify a burden on religious conduct by articulating a compelling interest. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986) (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society”); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342, 349 (1987) (“[Pjrison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights”) (citation omitted). That we did not apply the compelling interest test in these cases says nothing about whether the test should continue to apply in paradigm free exercise cases such as the one presented here.

The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion. Although the Court suggests that the compelling interest test, as applied to generally applicable laws, would result in a “constitutional anomaly,” ante, at 886, the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a “constitutional nor[m],” not an “anomaly.” Ibid. Nor would application of our established free exercise doctrine to this case necessarily be incompatible with our equal protection cases. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 618 (1982) (race-neutral law that “ ‘bears more heavily on one race than another’” may violate equal protection) (citation omitted); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 492-495 (1977) (grand jury selection). We have in any event recognized that the Free Exercise Clause protects values distinct from those protected by the Equal Protection Clause. See Hobbie, 480 U. S., at 141-142. As the language of the *902 Clause itself makes clear, an individual’s free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity. See, e. g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 9 (“[T]he text of the First Amendment itself ‘singles out’ religion for special protections”); P. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 17 (1964). A law that makes criminal such an activity therefore triggers constitutional concern — and heightened judicial scrutiny — even if it does not target the particular religious conduct at issue. Our free speech cases similarly recognize that neutral regulations that affect free speech values are subject to a balancing, rather than categorical, approach. See, e. g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 46-47 (1986); cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 792-794 (1983) (generally applicable laws may impinge on free association concerns). The Court’s parade of horribles, ante, at 888-889, not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state interests.

Finally, the Court today suggests that the disfavoring of minority religions is an “unavoidable consequence” under our system of government and that accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process. Ante, at 890. In my view, however, the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Amish. Indeed, the words of Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)) are apt:

*903 “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” 319 U. S., at 638.

See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views”). The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. For the Court to deem this command a “luxury,” ante, at 888, is to denigrate “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights.”

Ill

The Court’s holding today not only misreads settled First Amendment precedent; it appears to be unnecessary to this case. I would reach the same result applying our established free exercise jurisprudence.

A

There is no dispute that Oregon’s criminal prohibition of peyote places a severe burden on the ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion. Peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church and is regarded as vital to respondents’ ability to practice their religion. See O. Stewart, Peyote Religion: A History 327-336 (1987) (describing modern status of peyotism); E. Anderson, Peyote: The Divine Cactus 41-65 (1980) (describing peyote ceremonies); Teachings from *904 the American Earth: Indian Religion and Philosophy 96-104 (D. Tedlock & B. Tedlock eds. 1975) (same); see also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721-722, 394 P. 2d 813, 817-818 (1964). As we noted in Smith I, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that “the Native American Church is a recognized religion, that peyote is a sacrament of that church, and that respondent’s beliefs were sincerely held.” 485 U. S., at 667. Under Oregon law, as construed by that State’s highest court, members of the Native American Church must choose between carrying out the ritual embodying their religious beliefs and avoidance of criminal prosecution. That choice is, in my view, more than sufficient to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.

There is also no dispute that Oregon has a significant interest in enforcing laws that control the possession and use of controlled substances by its citizens. See, e. g., Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 403 (religiously motivated conduct may be regulated where such conduct “pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order”); Yoder, 406 U. S., at 220 (“[Activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare”). As we recently noted, drug abuse is “one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population” and thus “one of the most serious problems confronting our society today.” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 668, 674 (1989). Indeed, under federal law (incorporated by Oregon law in relevant part, see Ore. Rev. Stat. §475.005(6) (1987)), peyote is specifically regulated as a Schedule I controlled substance, which means that Congress has found that it has a high potential for abuse, that there is no currently accepted medical use, and that there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision. See 21 U. S. C. § 812(b)(1). See generally R. Julien, A Primer of Drug Action 149 (3d ed. 1981). In light of our recent decisions holding that the governmental *905 interests in the collection of income tax, Hernandez, 490 U. S., at 699-700, a comprehensive Social Security system, see Lee, 455 U. S., at 258-259, and military conscription, see Gillette, 401 U. S., at 460, are compelling, respondents do not seriously dispute that Oregon has a compelling interest in prohibiting the possession of peyote by its citizens.

B

Thus, the critical question in this case is whether exempting respondents from the State’s general criminal prohibition “will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.” Lee, supra, at 259; see also Roy, 476 U. S., at 727 (“[T]he Government must accommodate a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by narrowly tailored means”); Yoder, supra, at 221; Braunfeld, 366 U. S., at 605-607. Although the question is close, I would conclude that uniform application of Oregon’s criminal prohibition is “essential to accomplish,” Lee, supra, at 257, its overriding interest in preventing the physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance. Oregon’s criminal prohibition represents that State’s judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one person, is inherently harmful and dangerous. Because the health effects caused by the use of controlled substances exist regardless of the motivation of the user, the use of such substances, even for religious purposes, violates the very purpose of the laws that prohibit them. Cf. State v. Massey, 229 N. C. 734, 51 S. E. 2d 179 (denying religious exemption to municipal ordinance prohibiting handling of poisonous reptiles), appeal dism’d sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U. S. 942 (1949). Moreover, in view of the societal interest in preventing trafficking in controlled substances, uniform application of the criminal prohibition at issue is essential to the effectiveness of Oregon’s stated interest in preventing any possession of peyote. Cf. Jacobson v. *906 Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905) (denying exemption from small pox vaccination requirement).

For these reasons, I believe that granting a selective exemption in this case would seriously impair Oregon’s compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by its citizens. Under such circumstances, the Free Exercise Clause does not require the State to accommodate respondents’ religiously motivated conduct. See, e. g., Thomas, 450 U. S., at 719. Unlike in Yoder, where we noted that “[t]he record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society,” 406 U. S., at 234; see also id., at 238-240 (White, J., concurring), a religious exemption in this case would be incompatible with the State’s interest in controlling use and possession of illegal drugs.

Respondents contend that any incompatibility is belied by the fact that the Federal Government and several States provide exemptions for the religious use of peyote, see 21 CFR § 1307.31 (1989); 307 Ore., at 73, n. 2, 763 P. 2d, at 148, n. 2 (citing 11 state statutes that expressly exempt sacramental peyote use from criminal proscription). But other governments may surely choose to grant an exemption without Oregon, with its specific asserted interest in uniform application of its drug laws, being required to do so by the First Amendment. Respondents also note that the sacramental use of peyote is central to the tenets of the Native American Church, but I agree with the Court, ante, at 886-887, that because “ ‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith,’” quoting Hernandez, supra, at 699, our determination of the constitutionality of Oregon’s general criminal prohibition cannot, and should not, turn on the centrality of the particular *907 religious practice at issue. This does not mean, of course, that courts may not make factual findings as to whether a claimant holds a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the challenged law. The distinction between questions of centrality and questions of sincerity and burden is admittedly fine, but it is one that is an established part of our free exercise doctrine, see Ballard, 322 U. S., at 85-88, and one that courts are capable of making. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 303-305 (1985).

I would therefore adhere to our established free exercise jurisprudence and hold that the State in this case has a compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens and that accommodating respondents’ religiously motivated conduct “will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.” Lee, supra, at 259. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Justice Blackmun,

This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means. 1

*908 Until today, I thought this was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The majority, however, perfunctorily dismisses it as a “constitutional anomaly.” Ante, at 886. As carefully detailed in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, ante, p. 891, the majority is able to arrive at this view only by mischaracterizing this Court’s precedents. The Court discards leading free exercise cases such as Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), as “hybrid.” Ante, at 882. The Court views traditional free exercise analysis as somehow inapplicable to criminal prohibitions (as opposed to conditions on the receipt of benefits), and to state laws of general applicability (as opposed, presumably, to laws that expressly single out religious practices). Ante, at 884-885. The Court cites cases in which, due to various exceptional circumstances, we found strict scrutiny inapposite, to hint that the Court has repudiated that standard altogether. Ante, at 882-884. In short, it effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution. One hopes that the Court is aware of the consequences, and that its result is not a product of overreaction to the serious problems the country’s drug crisis has generated.

This distorted view of our precedents leads the majority to conclude that strict scrutiny of a state law burdening the free exercise of religion is a “luxury” that a well-ordered society *909 cannot afford, ante, at 888, and that the repression of minority religions is an “unavoidable consequence of democratic government.” Ante, at 890. I do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a “luxury,” but an essential element of liberty — and they could not have thought religious intolerance “unavoidable,” for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.

For these reasons, I agree with Justice O’Connor’s analysis of the applicable free exercise doctrine, and I join parts I and II of her opinion. 2 As she points out, “the critical question in this case is whether exempting respondents from the State’s general criminal prohibition ‘will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.’” Ante, at 905, quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 259 (1982). I do disagree, however, with her specific answer to that question.

I

In weighing the clear interest of respondents Smith and Black (hereinafter respondents) in the free exercise of their religion against Oregon’s asserted interest in enforcing its drug laws, it is important to articulate in precise terms the state interest involved. It is not the State’s broad interest *910 in fighting the critical “war on drugs” that must be weighed against respondents’ claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 728 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This Court has consistently asked the Government to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector ‘is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest,’” quoting Lee, 455 U. S., at 257-258); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 719 (1981) (“focus of the inquiry” concerning State’s asserted interest must be “properly narrowed”); Yoder, 406 U. S., at 221 (“Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake,” the Court will not accept a State’s “sweeping claim” that its interest in compulsory education is compelling; despite the validity of this interest “in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption”). Failure to reduce the competing interests to the same plane of generality tends to distort the weighing process in the State’s favor. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 327, 330-331 (1969) (“The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of the fundamental concerns of government: public health and safety, public peace and order, defense, revenue. To measure an individual interest directly against one of these rarified values inevitably makes the individual interest appear the less significant”); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1943) (“When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect to other claims or demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same plane ... [or else] we may decide the question in advance in our very way of putting it”).

The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, *911 cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In this case, the State actually has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious users of peyote. Oregon has never sought to prosecute respondents, and does not claim that it has made significant enforcement efforts against other religious users of peyote. 3 The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. But a government interest in “symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), cannot suffice to abrogate the constitutional rights of individuals.

Similarly, this Court’s prior decisions have not allowed a government to rely on mere speculation about potential harms, but have demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious exception. See Thomas, 450 U. S., at 719 (rejecting State’s reasons for refusing religious exemption, for lack of “evidence in the record”); Yoder, 406 U. S., at 224-229 (rejecting State’s argument concerning the dangers of a religious exemption as speculative, and unsupported by the record); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 407 (1963) (“[Tjhere is no proof whatever to warrant such fears . . . as those which the [State] now advance[s]”). In this case, the State’s justification for refusing to recognize an exception to its criminal laws for religious peyote use is entirely speculative.

The State proclaims an interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs. It offers, however, no evidence that the religious use of pey *912 ote has ever harmed anyone. 4 The factual findings of other courts cast doubt on the State’s assumption that religious use of peyote is harmful. See State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 30, 504 P. 2d 950, 953 (1973) (“[T]he State failed to prove that the quantities of peyote used in the sacraments of the Native American Church are sufficiently harmful to the health and welfare of the participants so as to permit a legitimate intrusion under the State’s police power”); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722-723, 394 P. 2d 813, 818 (1964) (“[A]s the Attorney General . . . admits, . . . the opinion of scientists and other experts is ‘that peyote . . . works no permanent deleterious injury to the Indian’ ”).

The fact that peyote is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance does not, by itself, show that any and all uses of peyote, in any circumstance, are inherently harmful and dangerous. The Federal Government, which created the classifications of unlawful drugs from which Oregon’s drug laws are derived, apparently does not find peyote so dangerous as to preclude an exemption for religious use. 5 Moreover, *913 other Schedule I drugs have lawful uses. See Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 279 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 6, n. 4, 878 F. 2d 1458, 1463, n. 4 (medical and research uses of marijuana).

The carefully circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used peyote is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of unlawful drugs. 6 The Native American Church’s internal restrictions on, and supervision of, its members’ use of peyote substantially obviate the State’s health and safety concerns. See id., at 10, 878 F. 2d, at 1467 (“‘The Administrator [of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)] finds that . . . the Native American Church’s use of peyote is isolated to specific ceremonial occasions,”’ and so “‘an accommodation can be made for a religious organization which uses peyote in circumscribed ceremonies’” (quoting DEA Final Order)); id., at 7, 878 F. 2d, at 1464 (“[F]or members of the Native American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious”); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d, at 721, 394 P. 2d, at 817 (“[T]o use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious”); R. Julien, A Primer of Drug Action 148 (3d ed. 1981) (“[P]eyote is seldom abused by members of the Native American *914 Church”); Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in Teachings from the American Earth 96, 104 (D. Tedlock & B. Tedlock eds. 1975) (“[T]he Native American Church . . . refuses to permit the presence of curiosity seekers at its rites, and vigorously opposes the sale or use of Peyote for non-sacramental purposes”); Bergman, Navajo Peyote Use: Its Apparent Safety, 128 Am. J. Psychiatry 695 (1971) (Bergman). 7

Moreover, just as in Yoder, the values and interests of those seeking a religious exemption in this case are congruent, to a great degree, with those the State seeks to promote through its drug laws. See Yoder, 406 U. S., at 224, 228-229 (since the Amish accept formal schooling up to 8th grade, and then provide “ideal” vocational education, State’s interest in enforcing its law against the Amish is “less substantial than ... for children generally”); id., at 238 (White, J., concurring). Not only does the church’s doctrine forbid nonreligious use of peyote; it also generally advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol. See Brief for Association on American Indian Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae 33-34 (the church’s “ethical code” has four parts: brotherly love, care of family, self-reliance, and avoidance of alcohol (quoting from the church membership card)); Olsen, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 7, 878 F. 2d, at 1464 (the Native American Church, “for all purposes other than the special, stylized ceremony, reinforced the state’s prohibition”); *915 Woody, 61 Cal. 2d, at 721-722, n. 3, 394 P. 2d, at 818, n. 3 (“[M]ost anthropological authorities hold Peyotism to be a positive, rather than negative, force in the lives of its adherents . . . the church forbids the use of alcohol . . .”). There is considerable evidence that the spiritual and social support provided by the church has been effective in combating the tragic effects of alcoholism on the Native American population. Two noted experts on peyotism, Dr. Omer C. Stewart and Dr. Robert Bergman, testified by affidavit to this effect on behalf of respondent Smith before the Employment Appeal Board. Smith Tr., Exh. 7; see also E. Anderson, Peyote: The Divine Cactus 165-166 (1980) (research by Dr. Bergman suggests “that the religious use of peyote seemed to be directed in an ego-strengthening direction with an emphasis on interpersonal relationships where each individual is assured of his own significance as well as the support of the group”; many people have “‘come through difficult crises with the help of this religion .... It provides real help in seeing themselves not as people whose place and way in the world is gone, but as people whose way can be strong enough to change and meet new challenges’ ” (quoting Bergman 698)); Pascarosa & Futterman, Ethnopsychedelic Therapy for Alcoholics: Observations in the Peyote Ritual of the Native American Church, 8 J. of Psychedelic Drugs, No. 3, p. 215 (1976) (religious peyote use has been helpful in overcoming alcoholism); Albaugh & Anderson, Peyote in the Treatment of Alcoholism among American Indians, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 1247, 1249 (1974) (“[T]he philosophy, teachings, and format of the [Native American Church] can be of great benefit to the Indian alcoholic”); see generally O. Stewart, Peyote Religion 75 et seq. (1987) (noting frequent observations, across many tribes and periods in history, of correlation between peyotist religion and abstinence from alcohol). Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, Native American Church members’ spiri *916 tual code exemplifies values that Oregon’s drug laws are presumably intended to foster.

The State also seeks to support its refusal to make an exception for religious use of peyote by invoking its interest in abolishing drug trafficking. There is, however, practically no illegal traffic in peyote. See Olsen, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, 7, 878 F. 2d, at 1463, 1467 (quoting DEA Final Order to the effect that total amount of peyote seized and analyzed by federal authorities between 1980 and 1987 was 19.4 pounds; in contrast, total amount of marijuana seized during that period was over 15 million pounds). Also, the availability of peyote for religious use, even if Oregon were to allow an exemption from its criminal laws, would still be strictly controlled by federal regulations, see 21 U. S. C. §§821-823 (registration requirements for distribution of controlled substances); 21 CFR § 1307.31 (1989) (distribution of peyote to Native American Church subject to registration requirements), and by the State of Texas, the only State in which peyote grows in significant quantities. See Texas Health & Safety Code Ann. §481.111 (1990 pamphlet); Texas Admin. Code, Tit. 37, pt. 1, ch. 13, Controlled Substances Regulations, §§ 13.35-13.41 (1989); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d, at 720, 394 P. 2d, at 816 (peyote is “found in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and northern Mexico”). Peyote simply is not a popular drug; its distribution for use in religious rituals has nothing to do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country.

Finally, the State argues that granting an exception for religious peyote use would erode its interest in the uniform, fair, and certain enforcement of its drug laws. The State fears that, if it grants an exemption for religious peyote use, a flood of other claims to religious exemptions will follow. It would then be placed in a dilemma, it says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hinder its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions. This *917 argument, however, could be made in almost any free exercise case. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933, 947 (1989) (“Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe”). This Court, however, consistently has rejected similar arguments in past free exercise cases, and it should do so here as well. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829, 835 (1989) (rejecting State’s speculation concerning cumulative effect of many similar claims); Thomas, 450 U. S., at 719 (same); Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 407.

The State’s apprehension of a flood of other religious claims is purely speculative. Almost half the States, and the Federal Government, have maintained an exemption for religious peyote use for many years, and apparently have not found themselves overwhelmed by claims to other religious exemptions. 8 Allowing an exemption for religious peyote use *918 would not necessarily oblige the State to grant a similar exemption to other religious groups. The unusual circumstances that make the religious use of peyote compatible with the State’s interests in health and safety and in preventing drug trafficking would not apply to other religious claims. Some religions, for example, might not restrict drug use to a limited ceremonial context, as does the Native American Church. See, e. g., Olsen, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 7, 878 F. 2d, at 1464 (“[T]he Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church . . . teaches that marijuana is properly smoked ‘continually all day’”). Some religious claims, see n. 8, supra, involve drugs such as marijuana and heroin, in which there is significant illegal traffic, with its attendant greed and violence, so that it would be difficult to grant a religious exemption without seriously compromising law enforcement efforts. 9 That the State might grant an exemption for religious peyote use, but deny other religious claims arising in different circumstances, would not violate the Establishment Clause. Though the State must treat all religions equally, and not favor one over another, this obligation is fulfilled by the uniform application of the “compelling interest” test to all free exercise claims, not by reaching uniform results as to all claims; A showing that religious peyote use does not unduly interfere with the State’s interests is “one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make,” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 236; this does not mean that an exemption limited to peyote use is tantamount to an establishment of religion. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 144-145 (1987) (“[T]he government may (and *919 sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and . . . may do so without violating the Establishment Clause”); Yoder, 406 U. S., at 220-221 (“Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general [law] . . . may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise”); id., at 234, n. 22.

II

Finally, although I agree with Justice O’Connor that courts should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of religious doctrine, a particular practice is “central” to the religion, ante, at 906-907, I do not think this means that the courts must turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s restrictions on the adherents of a minority religion. Cf. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 219 (since “education is inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of their religion . . . [, just as] baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may be for others,” enforcement of State’s compulsory education law would “gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs”).

Respondents believe, and their sincerity has never been at issue, that the peyote plant embodies their deity, and eating it is an act of worship and communion. Without peyote, they could not enact the essential ritual of their religion. See Brief for Association on American Indian Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae 5-6 (“To the members, peyote is consecrated with powers to heal body, mind and spirit. It is a teacher; it teaches the way to spiritual life through living in harmony and balance with the forces of the Creation. The rituals are an integral part of the life process. They embody a form of worship in which the sacrament Peyote is the means for communicating with the Great Spirit”). See also O. Stewart, Peyote Religion 327-330 (1987) (description of peyote ritual); *920 T. Hillerman, People of Darkness 153 (1980) (description of Navajo peyote ritual).

If Oregon can constitutionally prosecute them for this act of worship, they, like the Amish, may be “forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. This potentially devastating impact must be viewed in light of the federal policy — reached in reaction to many years of religious persecution and intolerance — of protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U. S. C. § 1996 (1982 ed.) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions . . . , including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites”). 10 Congress recognized that certain substances, such as peyote, “have religious significance because they are sacred, they have power, they heal, they are necessary to the exercise of *921 the rites of the religion, they are necessary to the cultural integrity of the tribe, and, therefore, religious survival.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1308, p. 2 (1978).

The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in itself, may not create rights enforceable against government action restricting religious freedom, but this Court must scrupulously apply its free exercise analysis to the religious claims of Native Americans, however unorthodox they may be. Otherwise, both the First Amendment and the stated policy of Congress will offer to Native Americans merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise.

Ill

For these reasons, I conclude that Oregon’s interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of peyote is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents’ right to the free exercise of their religion. Since the State could not constitutionally enforce its criminal prohibition against respondents, the interests underlying the State’s drug laws cannot justify its denial of unemployment benefits. Absent such justification, the State’s regulatory interest in denying benefits for religiously motivated “misconduct,” see ante, at 874, is indistinguishable from the state interests this Court has rejected in Frazee, Hobbie, Thomas, and Sherbert. The State of Oregon cannot, consistently with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment benefits.

Held Invalid
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713 (a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713 (a)(1)(iv); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (a)(1)(iv)

Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-2 Syllabus ^*

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the "Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the Government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

At issue here are regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010(ACA), which, as relevant here, requires specified employers' group health plans to furnish "preventive care and screenings" for women without "any cost sharing requirements," 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). Congress did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered; it authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration, a component of HHS, to decide. Ibid . Nonexempt employers are generally required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4 that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from this contraceptive mandate. HHS has also effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations with religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services. Under this accommodation, the insurance issuer must exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer's plan and provide plan participants with separate payments for contraceptive services without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the employer, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries.

In these cases, the owners of three closely held for-profit corporations have sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point. In separate actions, they sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies (collectively HHS) under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, seeking to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health coverage for the four objectionable contraceptives. In No. 13-356, the District Court denied the Hahns and their company-Conestoga Wood Specialties-a preliminary injunction. Affirming, the Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not "engage in religious exercise" under RFRA or the First Amendment, and that the mandate imposed no requirements on the Hahns in their personal capacity. In No. 13-354, the Greens, their children, and their companies-Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel-were also denied a preliminary injunction, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that the Greens' businesses are "persons" under RFRA, and that the corporations had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claim because the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their exercise of religion and HHS had not demonstrated a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate against them; in the alternative, the court held that HHS had not proved that the mandate was the "least restrictive means" of furthering a compelling governmental interest.

Held : As applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA. Pp. 2761 - 2785.

(a) RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations like Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel. Pp. 2761 - 2775.

(1) HHS argues that the companies cannot sue because they are for-profit corporations, and that the owners cannot sue because the regulations apply only to the companies, but that would leave merchants with a difficult choice: give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits of operating as corporations. RFRA's text shows that Congress designed the statute to provide very broad protection for religious liberty and did not intend to put merchants to such a choice. It employed the familiar legal fiction of including corporations within RFRA's definition of "persons," but the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders, officers, and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them. Pp. 2761 - 2768.

(2) HHS and the dissent make several unpersuasive arguments. Pp. 2768 - 2775.

(i) Nothing in RFRA suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of "person," which "include[s] corporations, ... as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1 . The Court has entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 .

And HHS's concession that a nonprofit corporation can be a "person" under RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the term does not reach for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of "person" includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations. Pp. 2768 - 2769.

(ii) HHS and the dissent nonetheless argue that RFRA does not cover Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel because they cannot "exercise ... religion." They offer no persuasive explanation for this conclusion. The corporate form alone cannot explain it because RFRA indisputably protects nonprofit corporations. And the profit-making objective of the corporations cannot explain it because the Court has entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to make a profit as retail merchants. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 . Business practices compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within the understanding of the "exercise of religion" that this Court set out in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 . Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate law. States, including those in which the plaintiff corporations were incorporated, authorize corporations to pursue any lawful purpose or business, including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners' religious principles. Pp. 2769 - 2772.

(iii) Also flawed is the claim that RFRA offers no protection because it only codified pre- Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents, none of which squarely recognized free-exercise rights for for-profit corporations. First, nothing in RFRA as originally enacted suggested that its definition of "exercise of religion" was meant to be tied to pre- Smith interpretations of the First Amendment. Second, if RFRA's original text were not clear enough, the RLUIPA amendment surely dispels any doubt that Congress intended to separate the definition of the phrase from that in First Amendment case law. Third, the pre- Smith case of Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 , 81 S.Ct. 1122 , 6 L.Ed.2d 536 , suggests, if anything, that for-profit corporations can exercise religion. Finally, the results would be absurd if RFRA, a law enacted to provide very broad protection for religious liberty, merely restored this Court's pre- Smith decisions in ossified form and restricted RFRA claims to plaintiffs who fell within a category of plaintiffs whose claims the Court had recognized before Smith . Pp. 2772 - 2774.

(3) Finally, HHS contends that Congress could not have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations because of the difficulty of ascertaining the "beliefs" of large, publicly traded corporations, but HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring. HHS has also provided no evidence that the purported problem of determining the sincerity of an asserted religious belief moved Congress to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA's protection. That disputes among the owners of corporations might arise is not a problem unique to this context. State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes. Pp. 2774 - 2775.

(b) HHS's contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion. Pp. 2775 - 2779.

(1) It requires the Hahns and Greens to engage in conduct that seriously violates their sincere religious belief that life begins at conception. If they and their companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences: about $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year for Mardel. And if they drop coverage altogether, they could face penalties of roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel. Pp. 2775 - 2776.

(2) Amici supporting HHS argue that the $2,000 per-employee penalty is less than the average cost of providing insurance, and therefore that dropping insurance coverage eliminates any substantial burden imposed by the mandate. HHS has never argued this and the Court does not know its position with respect to the argument. But even if the Court reached the argument, it would find it unpersuasive: It ignores the fact that the plaintiffs have religious reasons for providing health-insurance coverage for their employees, and it is far from clear that the net cost to the companies of providing insurance is more than the cost of dropping their insurance plans and paying the ACA penalty. Pp. 2776 - 2777.

(3) HHS argues that the connection between what the objecting parties must do and the end that they find to be morally wrong is too attenuated because it is the employee who will choose the coverage and contraceptive method she uses. But RFRA's question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial burden on the objecting parties' ability to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs. The belief of the Hahns and Greens implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another. It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable. In fact, this Court considered and rejected a nearly identical argument in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 . The Court's "narrow function ... is to determine" whether the plaintiffs' asserted religious belief reflects "an honest conviction," ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 716 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , and there is no dispute here that it does. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 , 689, 91 S.Ct. 2091 , 29 L.Ed.2d 790 ; and Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 , 248-249, 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 , distinguished. Pp. 2777 - 2779.

(c) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is a compelling governmental interest, but the Government has failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Pp. 2779 - 2785.

(1) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA. Pp. 2779 - 2780.

(2) The Government has failed to satisfy RFRA's least-restrictive-means standard. HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. The Government could, e.g., assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their employers' religious objections. Or it could extend the accommodation that HHS has already established for religious nonprofit organizations to non-profit employers with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate. That accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion and it still serves HHS's stated interests. Pp. 2780 - 2783.

(3) This decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate and should not be understood to hold that all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions, must necessarily fall if they conflict with an employer's religious beliefs. Nor does it provide a shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as a religious practice. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 , 71 L.Ed.2d 127 , which upheld the payment of Social Security taxes despite an employer's religious objection, is not analogous. It turned primarily on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation; and if Lee were a RFRA case, the fundamental point would still be that there is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes. Here, there is an alternative to the contraceptive mandate. Pp. 2783 - 2785.

No. 13-354, 723 F.3d 1114 , affirmed; No. 13-356, 724 F.3d 377 , reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to all but Part III-C-1. BREYER AND KAGAN, JJ., filed a dissenting opinion.

Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for the private parties.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for the federal government.

Paul D. Clement, Michael H. McGinley, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, Peter M. Dobelbower, General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Oklahoma City, OK, S. Kyle Duncan, Counsel of Record, Eric C. Rassbach, Luke W. Goodrich, Hannah C. Smith, Mark L. Rienzi, Lori H. Windham, Adèle Auxier Keim, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, Joshua D. Hawley, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, counsel for Respondents.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors General, Joseph R. Palmore, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark B. Stern, Alisa B. Klein, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Jordan W. Lorence, Steven H. Aden, Gregory S. Baylor, Matthew S. Bowman, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, David A. Cortman, Counsel of Record, Kevin H. Theriot, Rory T. Gray, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA, Charles W. Proctor, III, Law Offices of Proctor, Lindsay & Dixon, Chadds Ford, PA, Randall L. Wenger, Independence Law Center, Harrisburg, PA, for Petitioners Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation et al.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide in these cases whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq ., permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies' owners. We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.

In holding that the HHS mandate is unlawful, we reject HHS's argument that the owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole proprietorships or general partnerships. The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious beliefs.

Since RFRA applies in these cases, we must decide whether the challenged HHS regulations substantially burden the exercise of religion, and we hold that they do. The owners of the businesses have religious objections to abortion, and according to their religious beliefs the four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients. If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price-as much as $1.3 million per day, or about $475 million per year, in the case of one of the companies. If these consequences do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.

Under RFRA, a Government action that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling government interest, and we assume that the HHS regulations satisfy this requirement. But in order for the HHS mandate to be sustained, it must also constitute the least restrictive means of serving that interest, and the mandate plainly fails that test. There are other ways in which Congress or HHS could equally ensure that every woman has cost-free access to the particular contraceptives at issue here and, indeed, to all FDA-approved contraceptives.

In fact, HHS has already devised and implemented a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as employees of companies whose owners have no religious objections to providing such coverage. The employees of these religious nonprofit corporations still have access to insurance coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives; and according to HHS, this system imposes no net economic burden on the insurance companies that are required to provide or secure the coverage.

Although HHS has made this system available to religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the contraceptive mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same system cannot be made available when the owners of for-profit corporations have similar religious objections. We therefore conclude that this system constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government's aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty. And under RFRA, that conclusion means that enforcement of the HHS contraceptive mandate against the objecting parties in these cases is unlawful.

As this description of our reasoning shows, our holding is very specific. We do not hold, as the principal dissent alleges, that for-profit corporations and other commercial enterprises can "opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs." Post, at 2787 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). Nor do we hold, as the dissent implies, that such corporations have free rein to take steps that impose "disadvantages ... on others" or that require "the general public [to] pick up the tab." Post, at 2787 . And we certainly do not hold or suggest that "RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on ... thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby." Post, at 2787. ¹ The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.

I

A

Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty . RFRA's enactment came three years after this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which largely repudiated the method of analyzing free-exercise claims that had been used in cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). In determining whether challenged government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, those decisions used a balancing test that took into account whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government interest. Applying this test, the Court held in Sherbert that an employee who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath could not be denied unemployment benefits. 374 U.S., at 408-409 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 . And in Yoder , the Court held that Amish children could not be required to comply with a state law demanding that they remain in school until the age of 16 even though their religion required them to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their formative adolescent years. 406 U.S., at 210-211, 234-236 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 .

In Smith, however, the Court rejected "the balancing test set forth in Sherbert ." 494 U.S., at 883 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . Smith concerned two members of the Native American Church who were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. When they sought unemployment benefits, the State of Oregon rejected their claims on the ground that consumption of peyote was a crime, but the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, held that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. 494 U.S., at 875 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 .

This Court then reversed, observing that use of the Sherbert test whenever a person objected on religious grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable law "would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." 494 U.S., at 888 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . The Court therefore held that, under the First Amendment, "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 , 514, 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).

Congress responded to Smith by enacting RFRA. "[L]aws [that are] 'neutral' toward religion," Congress found, "may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2); see also § 2000bb(a)(4). In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability." § 2000bb-1(a). ² If the Government substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." § 2000bb-1(b). ³

As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the Federal Government and the States, but the constitutional authority invoked for regulating federal and state agencies differed. As applied to a federal agency, RFRA is based on the enumerated power that supports the particular agency's work, ⁴ but in attempting to regulate the States and their subdivisions, Congress relied on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the First Amendment. 521 U.S., at 516-517 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 . In City of Boerne, however, we held that Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority because "[t]he stringent test RFRA demands" "far exceed[ed] any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith ." Id., at 533-534 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 . See also id., at 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 .

Following our decision in City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq . That statute, enacted under Congress's Commerce and Spending Clause powers, imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 , 715-716, 125 S.Ct. 2113 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). And, what is most relevant for present purposes, RLUIPA amended RFRA's definition of the "exercise of religion." See § 2000bb-2(4) (importing RLUIPA definition). Before RLUIPA, RFRA's definition made reference to the First Amendment. See § 2000bb-2(4) (1994 ed.) (defining "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment"). In RLUIPA, in an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the "exercise of religion" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). And Congress mandated that this concept "be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution." § 2000cc-3(g). ⁵

B

At issue in these cases are HHS regulations promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010(ACA), 124 Stat. 119 . ACA generally requires employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer "a group health plan or group health insurance coverage" that provides "minimum essential coverage." 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2); §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2). Any covered employer that does not provide such coverage must pay a substantial price. Specifically, if a covered employer provides group health insurance but its plan fails to comply with ACA's group-health-plan requirements, the employer may be required to pay $100 per day for each affected "individual." §§ 4980D(a)-(b). And if the employer decides to stop providing health insurance altogether and at least one full-time employee enrolls in a health plan and qualifies for a subsidy on one of the government-run ACA exchanges, the employer must pay $2,000 per year for each of its full-time employees. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(1).

Unless an exception applies, ACA requires an employer's group health plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish "preventive care and screenings" for women without "any cost sharing requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). Congress itself, however, did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered. Instead, Congress authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a component of HHS, to make that important and sensitive decision. Ibid . The HRSA in turn consulted the Institute of Medicine, a nonprofit group of volunteer advisers, in determining which preventive services to require. See 77 Fed.Reg. 8725-8726 (2012).

In August 2011, based on the Institute's recommendations, the HRSA promulgated the Women's Preventive Services Guidelines. See id., at 8725-8726, and n. 1; online at http:// hrsa. gov/ womens guidelines (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The Guidelines provide that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide "coverage, without cost sharing" for "[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [ (FDA) ] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling." 77 Fed.Reg. 8725 (internal quotation marks omitted) . Although many of the required, FDA-approved methods of contraception work by preventing the fertilization of an egg, four of those methods (those specifically at issue in these cases) may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. See Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, pp. 9-10, n. 4; ⁶ FDA, Birth Control: Medicines to Help You. ⁷

HHS also authorized the HRSA to establish exemptions from the contraceptive mandate for "religious employers." 45 CFR § 147.131 (a). That category encompasses "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches," as well as "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order." See ibid (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033 (a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)). In its Guidelines, HRSA exempted these organizations from the requirement to cover contraceptive services. See http:// hrsa. gov/ womens guidelines.

In addition, HHS has effectively exempted certain religious nonprofit organizations, described under HHS regulations as "eligible organizations," from the contraceptive mandate. See 45 CFR § 147.131 (b); 78 Fed.Reg. 39874 (2013). An "eligible organization" means a nonprofit organization that "holds itself out as a religious organization" and "opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services required to be covered ... on account of religious objections." 45 CFR § 147.131 (b). To qualify for this accommodation, an employer must certify that it is such an organization. § 147.131(b)(4). When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that one of its clients has invoked this provision, the issuer must then exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer's plan and provide separate payments for contraceptive services for plan participants without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the eligible organization, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. § 147.131(c). ⁸ Although this procedure requires the issuer to bear the cost of these services, HHS has determined that this obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from the services. 78 Fed.Reg. 39877. ⁹

In addition to these exemptions for religious organizations, ACA exempts a great many employers from most of its coverage requirements. Employers providing "grandfathered health plans"-those that existed prior to March 23, 2010, and that have not made specified changes after that date-need not comply with many of the Act's requirements, including the contraceptive mandate. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18011 (a), (e). And employers with fewer than 50 employees are not required to provide health insurance at all. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2).

All told, the contraceptive mandate "presently does not apply to tens of millions of people." 723 F.3d 1114 , 1143 (C.A.10 2013). This is attributable, in large part, to grandfathered health plans: Over one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in America with employer-sponsored health plans were enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2013. Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 53; Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2013 Annual Survey 43, 221. ¹⁰ The count for employees working for firms that do not have to provide insurance at all because they employ fewer than 50 employees is 34 million workers. See The Whitehouse, Health Reform for Small Businesses: The Affordable Care Act Increases Choice and Saving Money for Small Businesses 1. ¹¹

II

A

Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are devout members of the Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination. The Mennonite Church opposes abortion and believes that "[t]he fetus in its earliest stages ... shares humanity with those who conceived it." ¹²

Fifty years ago, Norman Hahn started a wood-working business in his garage, and since then, this company, Conestoga Wood Specialties, has grown and now has 950 employees. Conestoga is organized under Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation. The Hahns exercise sole ownership of the closely held business; they control its board of directors and hold all of its voting shares. One of the Hahn sons serves as the president and CEO.

The Hahns believe that they are required to run their business "in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles." 917 F.Supp.2d 394 , 402 (E.D.Pa.2013). To that end, the company's mission, as they see it, is to "operate in a professional environment founded upon the highest ethical, moral, and Christian principles." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The company's "Vision and Values Statements" affirms that Conestoga endeavors to "ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the Hahns'] Christian heritage." App. in No. 13-356, p. 94 (complaint).

As explained in Conestoga's board-adopted "Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life," the Hahns believe that "human life begins at conception."

724 F.3d 377 , 382, and n. 5 (C.A.3 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is therefore "against [their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life" after conception, which they believe is a "sin against God to which they are held accountable." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Hahns have accordingly excluded from the group-health-insurance plan they offer to their employees certain contraceptive methods that they consider to be abortifacients. Id., at 382 .

The Hahns and Conestoga sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, seeking to enjoin application of ACA's contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health-insurance coverage for four FDA-approved contraceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an egg. ¹³ These include two forms of emergency contraception commonly called "morning after" pills and two types of intrauterine devices. ¹⁴

In opposing the requirement to provide coverage for the contraceptives to which they object, the Hahns argued that "it is immoral and sinful for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support these drugs." Ibid . The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, see 917 F.Supp.2d, at 419 , and the Third Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion, holding that "for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise" within the meaning of RFRA or the First Amendment. 724 F.3d, at 381 . The Third Circuit also rejected the claims brought by the Hahns themselves because it concluded that the HHS "[m]andate does not impose any requirements on the Hahns" in their personal capacity. Id., at 389 .

B

David and Barbara Green and their three children are Christians who own and operate two family businesses. Forty-five years ago, David Green started an arts-and-crafts store that has grown into a nationwide chain called Hobby Lobby. There are now 500 Hobby Lobby stores, and the company has more than 13,000 employees. 723 F.3d, at 1122 . Hobby Lobby is organized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law.

One of David's sons started an affiliated business, Mardel, which operates 35 Christian bookstores and employs close to 400 people. Ibid . Mardel is also organized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law.

Though these two businesses have expanded over the years, they remain closely held, and David, Barbara, and their children retain exclusive control of both companies. Ibid . David serves as the CEO of Hobby Lobby, and his three children serve as the president, vice president, and vice CEO. See Brief for Respondents in No. 13-354, p. 8. ¹⁵

Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose commits the Greens to "[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles." App. in No. 13-354, pp. 134-135 (complaint). Each family member has signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance with the family's religious beliefs and to use the family assets to support Christian ministries. 723 F.3d, at 1122 . In accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores close on Sundays, even though the Greens calculate that they lose millions in sales annually by doing so. Id., at 1122 ; App. in No. 13-354, at 136-137. The businesses refuse to engage in profitable transactions that facilitate or promote alcohol use; they contribute profits to Christian missionaries and ministries; and they buy hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to "know Jesus as Lord and Savior." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Like the Hahns, the Greens believe that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point. 723 F.3d, at 1122 . They specifically object to the same four contraceptive methods as the Hahns and, like the Hahns, they have no objection to the other 16 FDA-approved methods of birth control. Id., at 1125 . Although their group-health-insurance plan predates the enactment of ACA, it is not a grandfathered plan because Hobby Lobby elected not to retain grandfathered status before the contraceptive mandate was proposed. Id., at 1124 .

The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel sued HHS and other federal agencies and officials to challenge the contraceptive mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. ¹⁶ The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, see 870 F.Supp.2d 1278 (W.D.Okla.2012), and the plaintiffs appealed, moving for initial en banc consideration. The Tenth Circuit granted that motion and reversed in a divided opinion. Contrary to the conclusion of the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that the Greens' two for-profit businesses are "persons" within the meaning of RFRA and therefore may bring suit under that law.

The court then held that the corporations had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claim. 723 F.3d, at 1140-1147 . The court concluded that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion by requiring the companies to choose between "compromis[ing] their religious beliefs" and paying a heavy fee-either "close to $475 million more in taxes every year" if they simply refused to provide coverage for the contraceptives at issue, or "roughly $26 million" annually if they "drop[ped] health-insurance benefits for all employees." Id., at 1141 .

The court next held that HHS had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate against the Greens' businesses and, in the alternative, that HHS had failed to prove that enforcement of the mandate was the "least restrictive means" of furthering the Government's asserted interests. Id., at 1143-1144 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). After concluding that the companies had "demonstrated irreparable harm," the court reversed and remanded for the District Court to consider the remaining factors of the preliminary-injunction test. Id., at 1147 . ¹⁷

We granted certiorari. 571 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 678 , 187 L.Ed.2d 544 (2013).

III

A

RFRA prohibits the "Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the Government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b) (emphasis added). The first question that we must address is whether this provision applies to regulations that govern the activities of for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel.

HHS contends that neither these companies nor their owners can even be heard under RFRA. According to HHS, the companies cannot sue because they seek to make a profit for their owners, and the owners cannot be heard because the regulations, at least as a formal matter, apply only to the companies and not to the owners as individuals. HHS's argument would have dramatic consequences.

Consider this Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion). In that case, five Orthodox Jewish merchants who ran small retail businesses in Philadelphia challenged a Pennsylvania Sunday closing law as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Because of their faith, these merchants closed their shops on Saturday, and they argued that requiring them to remain shut on Sunday threatened them with financial ruin. The Court entertained their claim (although it ruled against them on the merits), and if a similar claim were raised today under RFRA against a jurisdiction still subject to the Act (for example, the District of Columbia, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(2)), the merchants would be entitled to be heard. According to HHS, however, if these merchants chose to incorporate their businesses-without in any way changing the size or nature of their businesses-they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights. HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations.

As we have seen, RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty. By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally required. ¹⁸ Is there any reason to think that the Congress that enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners to the choice that HHS suggests? An examination of RFRA's text, to which we turn in the next part of this opinion, reveals that Congress did no such thing.

As we will show, Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within RFRA's definition of "persons." But it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated with the company. Protecting corporations from government seizure of their property without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in the corporations' financial well-being. And protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.

In holding that Conestoga, as a "secular, for-profit corporation," lacks RFRA protection, the Third Circuit wrote as follows:

"General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors." 724 F.3d, at 385 (emphasis added).

All of this is true-but quite beside the point. Corporations, "separate and apart from" the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.

B

1

As we noted above, RFRA applies to "a person's" exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b), and RFRA itself does not define the term "person." We therefore look to the Dictionary Act, which we must consult "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise." 1 U.S.C. § 1 .

Under the Dictionary Act, "the wor[d] 'person' ... include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." Ibid. ; see FCC v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1177 , 1182-1183, 179 L.Ed.2d 132 (2011) ("We have no doubt that 'person,' in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear"). Thus, unless there is something about the RFRA context that "indicates otherwise," the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer to the question whether the companies involved in these cases may be heard.

We see nothing in RFRA that suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition, and HHS makes little effort to argue otherwise. We have entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations, see Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (RFRA);

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 694 , 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (Free Exercise); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (Free Exercise), and HHS concedes that a nonprofit corporation can be a "person" within the meaning of RFRA. See Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 17; Reply Brief in No. 13-354, at 7-8. ¹⁹

This concession effectively dispatches any argument that the term "person" as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held corporations involved in these cases. No known understanding of the term "person" includes some but not all corporations. The term "person" sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations. ²⁰ Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 , 378, 125 S.Ct. 716 , 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) ("To give th[e] same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one").

2

The principal argument advanced by HHS and the principal dissent regarding RFRA protection for Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel focuses not on the statutory term "person," but on the phrase "exercise of religion." According to HHS and the dissent, these corporations are not protected by RFRA because they cannot exercise religion. Neither HHS nor the dissent, however, provides any persuasive explanation for this conclusion.

Is it because of the corporate form? The corporate form alone cannot provide the explanation because, as we have pointed out, HHS concedes that nonprofit corporations can be protected by RFRA. The dissent suggests that nonprofit corporations are special because furthering their religious "autonomy ... often furthers individual religious freedom as well." Post, at 2794 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 , 342, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). But this principle applies equally to for-profit corporations: Furthering their religious freedom also "furthers individual religious freedom." In these cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns. ²¹

If the corporate form is not enough, what about the profit-making objective? In Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 , we entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to make a profit as retail merchants, and the Court never even hinted that this objective precluded their claims. As the Court explained in a later case, the "exercise of religion" involves "not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts" that are "engaged in for religious reasons." Smith, 494 U.S., at 877 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition. Thus, a law that "operates so as to make the practice of ... religious beliefs more expensive" in the context of business activities imposes a burden on the exercise of religion. Braunfeld, supra, at 605 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 ; see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 , 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051 , 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (recognizing that "compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with [Amish employers'] free exercise rights").

If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, ²² why can't Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the same?

Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money. ²³ This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law. "Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or business." 1 J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the Law of Corporations § 4:1, p. 224 (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added); see 1A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 102 (rev. ed. 2010). While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.

HHS would draw a sharp line between nonprofit corporations (which, HHS concedes, are protected by RFRA) and for-profit corporations (which HHS would leave unprotected), but the actual picture is less clear-cut. Not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so in order to maximize profit. For example, organizations with religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential advantages of that corporate form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candidates who promote their religious or charitable goals. ²⁴ In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize the "benefit corporation," a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners. ²⁵

In any event, the objectives that may properly be pursued by the companies in these cases are governed by the laws of the States in which they were incorporated-Pennsylvania and Oklahoma-and the laws of those States permit for-profit corporations to pursue "any lawful purpose" or "act," including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners' religious principles. 15 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 1301 (2001) ("Corporations may be incorporated under this subpart for any lawful purpose or purposes"); Okla. Stat., Tit. 18, §§ 1002, 1005 (West 2012) ("[E]very corporation, whether profit or not for profit" may "be incorporated or organized ... to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes"); see also § 1006(A)(3); Brief for State of Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in No. 13-354.

3

HHS and the principal dissent make one additional argument in an effort to show that a for-profit corporation cannot engage in the "exercise of religion" within the meaning of RFRA: HHS argues that RFRA did no more than codify this Court's pre- Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents, and because none of those cases squarely held that a for-profit corporation has free-exercise rights, RFRA does not confer such protection. This argument has many flaws.

First, nothing in the text of RFRA as originally enacted suggested that the statutory phrase "exercise of religion under the First Amendment" was meant to be tied to this Court's pre- Smith interpretation of that Amendment. When first enacted, RFRA defined the "exercise of religion" to mean "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment"-not the exercise of religion as recognized only by then-existing Supreme Court precedents. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994 ed.). When Congress wants to link the meaning of a statutory provision to a body of this Court's case law, it knows how to do so. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (authorizing habeas relief from a state-court decision that "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").

Second, if the original text of RFRA was not clear enough on this point-and we think it was-the amendment of RFRA through RLUIPA surely dispels any doubt. That amendment deleted the prior reference to the First Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2000 ed.) (incorporating § 2000cc-5), and neither HHS nor the principal dissent can explain why Congress did this if it wanted to tie RFRA coverage tightly to the specific holdings of our pre- Smith free-exercise cases. Moreover, as discussed, the amendment went further, providing that the exercise of religion "shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution." § 2000cc-3(g). It is simply not possible to read these provisions as restricting the concept of the "exercise of religion" to those practices specifically addressed in our pre- Smith decisions.

Third, the one pre- Smith case involving the free-exercise rights of a for-profit corporation suggests, if anything, that for-profit corporations possess such rights. In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 , 81 S.Ct. 1122 , 6 L.Ed.2d 536 (1961), the Massachusetts Sunday closing law was challenged by a kosher market that was organized as a for-profit corporation, by customers of the market, and by a rabbi. The Commonwealth argued that the corporation lacked "standing" to assert a free-exercise claim, ²⁶ but not one member of the Court expressed agreement with that argument. The plurality opinion for four Justices rejected the First Amendment claim on the merits based on the reasoning in Braunfeld, and reserved decision on the question whether the corporation had "standing" to raise the claim. See 366 U.S., at 631, 81 S.Ct. 1122 . The three dissenters, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, found the law unconstitutional as applied to the corporation and the other challengers and thus implicitly recognized their right to assert a free-exercise claim. See id., at 642 , 81 S.Ct. 1122 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 578-579, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting as to related cases including Gallagher ). Finally, Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which was joined by Justice Harlan, upheld the Massachusetts law on the merits but did not question or reserve decision on the issue of the right of the corporation or any of the other challengers to be heard. See McGowan, 366 U.S., at 521-522 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 . It is quite a stretch to argue that RFRA, a law enacted to provide very broad protection for religious liberty, left for-profit corporations unprotected simply because in Gallagher -the only pre- Smith case in which the issue was raised-a majority of the Justices did not find it necessary to decide whether the kosher market's corporate status barred it from raising a free-exercise claim.

Finally, the results would be absurd if RFRA merely restored this Court's pre- Smith decisions in ossified form and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of plaintiffs one of whom had brought a free-exercise claim that this Court entertained in the years before Smith. For example, we are not aware of any pre- Smith case in which this Court entertained a free-exercise claim brought by a resident noncitizen. Are such persons also beyond RFRA's protective reach simply because the Court never addressed their rights before Smith ?

Presumably in recognition of the weakness of this argument, both HHS and the principal dissent fall back on the broader contention that the Nation lacks a tradition of exempting for-profit corporations from generally applicable laws. By contrast, HHS contends, statutes like Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-19(A), expressly exempt churches and other nonprofit religious institutions but not for-profit corporations. See Brief for HHS in No. 13-356, p. 26. In making this argument, however, HHS did not call to our attention the fact that some federal statutes do exempt categories of entities that include for-profit corporations from laws that would otherwise require these entities to engage in activities to which they object on grounds of conscience. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2); § 238n(a). ²⁷ If Title VII and similar laws show anything, it is that Congress speaks with specificity when it intends a religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations.

4

Finally, HHS contends that Congress could not have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations because it is difficult as a practical matter to ascertain the sincere "beliefs" of a corporation. HHS goes so far as to raise the specter of "divisive, polarizing proxy battles over the religious identity of large, publicly traded corporations such as IBM or General Electric." Brief for HHS in No. 13-356, at 30.

These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders-including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders-would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable. In any event, we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA's applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs. ²⁸

HHS has also provided no evidence that the purported problem of determining the sincerity of an asserted religious belief moved Congress to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA's protection. On the contrary, the scope of RLUIPA shows that Congress was confident of the ability of the federal courts to weed out insincere claims. RLUIPA applies to "institutionalized persons," a category that consists primarily of prisoners, and by the time of RLUIPA's enactment, the propensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubious sincerity was well documented. ²⁹ Nevertheless, after our decision in City of Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA to preserve the right of prisoners to raise religious liberty claims. If Congress thought that the federal courts were up to the job of dealing with insincere prisoner claims, there is no reason to believe that Congress limited RFRA's reach out of concern for the seemingly less difficult task of doing the same in corporate cases. And if, as HHS seems to concede, Congress wanted RFRA to apply to nonprofit corporations, see, Reply Brief in No. 13-354, at 7-8, what reason is there to think that Congress believed that spotting insincere claims would be tougher in cases involving for-profits?

HHS and the principal dissent express concern about the possibility of disputes among the owners of corporations, but that is not a problem that arises because of RFRA or that is unique to this context. The owners of closely held corporations may-and sometimes do-disagree about the conduct of business. 1 Treatise of the Law of Corporations § 14:11. And even if RFRA did not exist, the owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion. For example, some might want a company's stores to remain open on the Sabbath in order to make more money, and others might want the stores to close for religious reasons. State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. See, e.g., ibid; id., § 3:2; Del.Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 351 (2011) (providing that certificate of incorporation may provide how "the business of the corporation shall be managed"). Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.

For all these reasons, we hold that a federal regulation's restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA. ³⁰

IV

Because RFRA applies in these cases, we must next ask whether the HHS contraceptive mandate "substantially burden[s]" the exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). We have little trouble concluding that it does.

A

As we have noted, the Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that life begins at conception. They therefore object on religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers methods of birth control that, as HHS acknowledges, see Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 9, n. 4, may result in the destruction of an embryo. By requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.

If the Hahns and Greens and their companies do not yield to this demand, the economic consequences will be severe. If the companies continue to offer group health plans that do not cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day for each affected individual. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D. For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 million per day or about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million per year. These sums are surely substantial.

It is true that the plaintiffs could avoid these assessments by dropping insurance coverage altogether and thus forcing their employees to obtain health insurance on one of the exchanges established under ACA. But if at least one of their full-time employees were to qualify for a subsidy on one of the government-run exchanges, this course would also entail substantial economic consequences. The companies could face penalties of $2,000 per employee each year. § 4980H. These penalties would amount to roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.

B

Although these totals are high, amici supporting HHS have suggested that the $2,000 per-employee penalty is actually less than the average cost of providing health insurance, see Brief for Religious Organizations 22, and therefore, they claim, the companies could readily eliminate any substantial burden by forcing their employees to obtain insurance in the government exchanges. We do not generally entertain arguments that were not raised below and are not advanced in this Court by any party, see United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 , 60, n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 1559 , 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 532, n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 , 370, 81 S.Ct. 132 , 5 L.Ed.2d 128 (1960), and there are strong reasons to adhere to that practice in these cases. HHS, which presumably could have compiled the relevant statistics, has never made this argument-not in its voluminous briefing or at oral argument in this Court nor, to our knowledge, in any of the numerous cases in which the issue now before us has been litigated around the country. As things now stand, we do not even know what the Government's position might be with respect to these amici's intensely empirical argument. ³¹ For this same reason, the plaintiffs have never had an opportunity to respond to this novel claim that-contrary to their longstanding practice and that of most large employers-they would be better off discarding their employer insurance plans altogether.

Even if we were to reach this argument, we would find it unpersuasive. As an initial matter, it entirely ignores the fact that the Hahns and Greens and their companies have religious reasons for providing health-insurance coverage for their employees. Before the advent of ACA, they were not legally compelled to provide insurance, but they nevertheless did so-in part, no doubt, for conventional business reasons, but also in part because their religious beliefs govern their relations with their employees. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13-356, p. 11g; App. in No. 13-354, at 139.

Putting aside the religious dimension of the decision to provide insurance, moreover, it is far from clear that the net cost to the companies of providing insurance is more than the cost of dropping their insurance plans and paying the ACA penalty. Health insurance is a benefit that employees value. If the companies simply eliminated that benefit and forced employees to purchase their own insurance on the exchanges, without offering additional compensation, it is predictable that the companies would face a competitive disadvantage in retaining and attracting skilled workers. See App. in No. 13-354, at 153.

The companies could attempt to make up for the elimination of a group health plan by increasing wages, but this would be costly. Group health insurance is generally less expensive than comparable individual coverage, so the amount of the salary increase needed to fully compensate for the termination of insurance coverage may well exceed the cost to the companies of providing the insurance. In addition, any salary increase would have to take into account the fact that employees must pay income taxes on wages but not on the value of employer-provided health insurance. 26 U.S.C. § 106 (a). Likewise, employers can deduct the cost of providing health insurance, see § 162(a)(1), but apparently cannot deduct the amount of the penalty that they must pay if insurance is not provided; that difference also must be taken into account. Given these economic incentives, it is far from clear that it would be financially advantageous for an employer to drop coverage and pay the penalty. ³²

In sum, we refuse to sustain the challenged regulations on the ground-never maintained by the Government-that dropping insurance coverage eliminates the substantial burden that the HHS mandate imposes. We doubt that the Congress that enacted RFRA-or, for that matter, ACA-would have believed it a tolerable result to put family-run businesses to the choice of violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or making all of their employees lose their existing healthcare plans.

C

In taking the position that the HHS mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, HHS's main argument (echoed by the principal dissent) is basically that the connection between what the objecting parties must do (provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception that may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated. Brief for HHS in 13-354, pp. 31-34; post, at 2798 - 2799. HHS and the dissent note that providing the coverage would not itself result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage of the coverage and to use one of the four methods at issue. ³³ Ibid.

This argument dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs ) and instead addresses a very different question that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable). The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another. ³⁴ Arrogating the authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question, HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step. See, e.g ., Smith, 494 U.S., at 887 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine ... the plausibility of a religious claim"); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 , 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136 , 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 , 450, 89 S.Ct. 601 , 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969).

Moreover, in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), we considered and rejected an argument that is nearly identical to the one now urged by HHS and the dissent. In Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness was initially employed making sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses, but he was later transferred to a job making turrets for tanks. Id., at 710 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 . Because he objected on religious grounds to participating in the manufacture of weapons, he lost his job and sought unemployment compensation. Ruling against the employee, the state court had difficulty with the line that the employee drew between work that he found to be consistent with his religious beliefs (helping to manufacture steel that was used in making weapons) and work that he found morally objectionable (helping to make the weapons themselves). This Court, however, held that "it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one." Id., at 715 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 . ³⁵

Similarly, in these cases, the Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our "narrow function ... in this context is to determine" whether the line drawn reflects "an honest conviction," id ., at 716 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , and there is no dispute that it does.

HHS nevertheless compares these cases to decisions in which we rejected the argument that the use of general tax revenue to subsidize the secular activities of religious institutions violated the Free Exercise Clause. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 , 689, 91 S.Ct. 2091 , 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971) (plurality); Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 , 248-249, 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). But in those cases, while the subsidies were clearly contrary to the challengers' views on a secular issue, namely, proper church-state relations, the challengers never articulated a religious objection to the subsidies. As we put it in Tilton, they were "unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs." 403 U.S., at 689 , 91 S.Ct. 2091 (plurality opinion); see Allen, supra, at 249 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 ("[A]ppellants have not contended that the New York law in any way coerces them as individuals in the practice of their religion"). Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs do assert that funding the specific contraceptive methods at issue violates their religious beliefs, and HHS does not question their sincerity. Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of money-as much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby-if they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.

V

Since the HHS contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, we must move on and decide whether HHS has shown that the mandate both "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).

A

HHS asserts that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests, but many of these are couched in very broad terms, such as promoting "public health" and "gender equality." Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 46, 49. RFRA, however, contemplates a "more focused" inquiry: It "requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened." O Centro, 546 U.S., at 430-431 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 (quoting § 2000bb-1(b)). This requires us to "loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests" and to "scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants"-in other words, to look to the marginal interest in enforcing the contraceptive mandate in these cases. O Centro, supra, at 431 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 .

In addition to asserting these very broadly framed interests, HHS maintains that the mandate serves a compelling interest in ensuring that all women have access to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing. See Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 14-15, 49; see Brief for HHS in No. 13-356, at 10, 48. Under our cases, women (and men) have a constitutional right to obtain contraceptives, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485-486, 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and HHS tells us that "[s]tudies have demonstrated that even moderate copayments for preventive services can deter patients from receiving those services." Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The objecting parties contend that HHS has not shown that the mandate serves a compelling government interest, and it is arguable that there are features of ACA that support that view. As we have noted, many employees-those covered by grandfathered plans and those who work for employers with fewer than 50 employees-may have no contraceptive coverage without cost sharing at all.

HHS responds that many legal requirements have exceptions and the existence of exceptions does not in itself indicate that the principal interest served by a law is not compelling. Even a compelling interest may be outweighed in some circumstances by another even weightier consideration. In these cases, however, the interest served by one of the biggest exceptions, the exception for grandfathered plans, is simply the interest of employers in avoiding the inconvenience of amending an existing plan. Grandfathered plans are required "to comply with a subset of the Affordable Care Act's health reform provisions" that provide what HHS has described as "particularly significant protections." 75 Fed.Reg. 34540 (2010). But the contraceptive mandate is expressly excluded from this subset. Ibid .

We find it unnecessary to adjudicate this issue. We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA, and we will proceed to consider the final prong of the RFRA test, i.e., whether HHS has shown that the contraceptive mandate is "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." § 2000bb-1(b)(2).

B

The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , and it is not satisfied here. HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in these cases. See §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b) (requiring the Government to "demonstrat[e] that application of [a substantial] burden to the person ... is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest" (emphasis added)).

The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections. This would certainly be less restrictive of the plaintiffs' religious liberty, and HHS has not shown, see § 2000bb-1(b)(2), that this is not a viable alternative. HHS has not provided any estimate of the average cost per employee of providing access to these contraceptives, two of which, according to the FDA, are designed primarily for emergency use. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, online at http:// www. fda. gov/ forconsumers/ byaudience/ forwomen/ free publications/ ucm 313215. htm. Nor has HHS provided any statistics regarding the number of employees who might be affected because they work for corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel. Nor has HHS told us that it is unable to provide such statistics. It seems likely, however, that the cost of providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDA-approved contraceptives) would be minor when compared with the overall cost of ACA. According to one of the Congressional Budget Office's most recent forecasts, ACA's insurance-coverage provisions will cost the Federal Government more than $1.3 trillion through the next decade. See CBO, Updated Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, April 2014, p. 2. ³⁶ If, as HHS tells us, providing all women with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception is a Government interest of the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS's argument that it cannot be required under RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal.

HHS contends that RFRA does not permit us to take this option into account because "RFRA cannot be used to require creation of entirely new programs." Brief for HHS in 13-354, at 15. ³⁷ But we see nothing in RFRA that supports this argument, and drawing the line between the "creation of an entirely new program" and the modification of an existing program (which RFRA surely allows) would be fraught with problems. We do not doubt that cost may be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis, but both RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens' religious beliefs. Cf. § 2000cc-3(c) (RLUIPA: "[T]his chapter may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise."). HHS's view that RFRA can never require the Government to spend even a small amount reflects a judgment about the importance of religious liberty that was not shared by the Congress that enacted that law.

In the end, however, we need not rely on the option of a new, government-funded program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-means test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs. As we explained above, HHS has already established an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections. See supra, at 2763 - 2764, and nn. 8-9. Under that accommodation, the organization can self-certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular contraceptive services. See 45 CFR §§ 147.131 (b)(4), (c)(1); 26 CFR §§ 54.9815 -2713A(a)(4), (b). If the organization makes such a certification, the organization's insurance issuer or third-party administrator must "[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan" and "[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered" without imposing "any cost-sharing requirements ... on the eligible organization, the group health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries." 45 CFR § 147.131 (c)(2); 26 CFR § 54.9815 -2713A(c)(2). ³⁸

We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims. ³⁹ At a minimum, however, it does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated interests equally well. ⁴⁰

The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraceptive mandate, and there is none. ⁴¹ Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs' female employees would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, and they would continue to "face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles," post, at 2802 (internal quotation marks omitted), because their employers' insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage, see, e.g., 45 CFR §§ 147.131 (c)- (d); cf.

26 CFR §§ 54.9815 -2713A(b), (d). Ironically, it is the dissent's approach that would "[i]mped[e] women's receipt of benefits by 'requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new government funded and administered health benefit,' " post, at 2802, because the dissent would effectively compel religious employers to drop health-insurance coverage altogether, leaving their employees to find individual plans on government-run exchanges or elsewhere. This is indeed "scarcely what Congress contemplated." Ibid.

C

HHS and the principal dissent argue that a ruling in favor of the objecting parties in these cases will lead to a flood of religious objections regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs, such as vaccinations and blood transfusions, but HHS has made no effort to substantiate this prediction. ⁴² HHS points to no evidence that insurance plans in existence prior to the enactment of ACA excluded coverage for such items. Nor has HHS provided evidence that any significant number of employers sought exemption, on religious grounds, from any of ACA's coverage requirements other than the contraceptive mandate.

It is HHS's apparent belief that no insurance-coverage mandate would violate RFRA-no matter how significantly it impinges on the religious liberties of employers-that would lead to intolerable consequences. Under HHS's view, RFRA would permit the Government to require all employers to provide coverage for any medical procedure allowed by law in the jurisdiction in question-for instance, third-trimester abortions or assisted suicide. The owners of many closely held corporations could not in good conscience provide such coverage, and thus HHS would effectively exclude these people from full participation in the economic life of the Nation. RFRA was enacted to prevent such an outcome.

In any event, our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer's religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.

The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. See post, at 2804 - 2805. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.

HHS also raises for the first time in this Court the argument that applying the contraceptive mandate to for-profit employers with sincere religious objections is essential to the comprehensive health-insurance scheme that ACA establishes. HHS analogizes the contraceptive mandate to the requirement to pay Social Security taxes, which we upheld in Lee despite the religious objection of an employer, but these cases are quite different. Our holding in Lee turned primarily on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation. We noted that "[t]he obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes." 455 U.S., at 260 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 . Based on that premise, we explained that it was untenable to allow individuals to seek exemptions from taxes based on religious objections to particular Government expenditures: "If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax." Ibid. We observed that "[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief." Ibid. ; see O Centro, 546 U.S., at 435 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 .

Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, case, but if the issue in Lee were analyzed under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there simply is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes. Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos. Recognizing exemptions from the contraceptive mandate is very different. ACA does not create a large national pool of tax revenue for use in purchasing healthcare coverage. Rather, individual employers like the plaintiffs purchase insurance for their own employees. And contrary to the principal dissent's characterization, the employers' contributions do not necessarily funnel into "undifferentiated funds." Post, at 2799. The accommodation established by HHS requires issuers to have a mechanism by which to "segregate premium revenue collected from the eligible organization from the monies used to provide payments for contraceptive services." 45 CFR § 147.131 (c)(2)(ii). Recognizing a religious accommodation under RFRA for particular coverage requirements, therefore, does not threaten the viability of ACA's comprehensive scheme in the way that recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures from general tax revenues would. ⁴³

In its final pages, the principal dissent reveals that its fundamental objection to the claims of the plaintiffs is an objection to RFRA itself. The dissent worries about forcing the federal courts to apply RFRA to a host of claims made by litigants seeking a religious exemption from generally applicable laws, and the dissent expresses a desire to keep the courts out of this business. See post, at 2804 - 2806. In making this plea, the dissent reiterates a point made forcefully by the Court in Smith. 494 U.S., at 888-889 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 (applying the Sherbert test to all free- exercise claims "would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind"). But Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the position that "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5). The wisdom of Congress's judgment on this matter is not our concern. Our responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and under the standard that RFRA prescribes, the HHS contraceptive mandate is unlawful.

* * *

The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.

The judgment of the Tenth Circuit in No. 13-354 is affirmed; the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 13-356 is reversed, and that case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice KENNEDY, concurring.

It seems to me appropriate, in joining the Court's opinion, to add these few remarks. At the outset it should be said that the Court's opinion does not have the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and powerful dissent. The Court and the dissent disagree on the proper interpretation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), but do agree on the purpose of that statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. It is to ensure that interests in religious freedom are protected. Ante, at 2760 - 2761; post, at 2790 - 2791 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).

In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and a divine law. For those who choose this course, free exercise is essential in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by their religious precepts. Free exercise in this sense implicates more than just freedom of belief. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 303, 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). It means, too, the right to express those beliefs and to establish one's religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community. But in a complex society and an era of pervasive governmental regulation, defining the proper realm for free exercise can be difficult. In these cases the plaintiffs deem it necessary to exercise their religious beliefs within the context of their own closely held, for-profit corporations. They claim protection under RFRA, the federal statute discussed with care and in detail in the Court's opinion.

As the Court notes, under our precedents, RFRA imposes a " 'stringent test.' " Ante, at 2761 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 , 533, 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997)). The Government must demonstrate that the application of a substantial burden to a person's exercise of religion "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." § 2000bb-1(b).

As to RFRA's first requirement, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) makes the case that the mandate serves the Government's compelling interest in providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female employees, coverage that is significantly more costly than for a male employee. Ante, at 2779; see, e.g ., Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, pp. 14-15. There are many medical conditions for which pregnancy is contraindicated. See, e.g., id ., at 2784. It is important to confirm that a premise of the Court's opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and compelling interest in the health of female employees. Ante, at 2780.

But the Government has not made the second showing required by RFRA, that the means it uses to regulate is the least restrictive way to further its interest. As the Court's opinion explains, the record in these cases shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework to provide coverage. That framework is one that HHS has itself devised, that the plaintiffs have not criticized with a specific objection that has been considered in detail by the courts in this litigation, and that is less restrictive than the means challenged by the plaintiffs in these cases. Ante, at 2763 - 2764, and n. 9, 2781 - 2782.

The means the Government chose is the imposition of a direct mandate on the employers in these cases. Ante, at 2762 - 2763. But in other instances the Government has allowed the same contraception coverage in issue here to be provided to employees of nonprofit religious organizations, as an accommodation to the religious objections of those entities. See ante, at 2763 - 2764, and n. 9, 2781 - 2782. The accommodation works by requiring insurance companies to cover, without cost sharing, contraception coverage for female employees who wish it. That accommodation equally furthers the Government's interest but does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. See ante, at 2782.

On this record and as explained by the Court, the Government has not met its burden of showing that it cannot accommodate the plaintiffs' similar religious objections under this established framework. RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between different religious believers-burdening one while accommodating the other-when it may treat both equally by offering both of them the same accommodation.

The parties who were the plaintiffs in the District Courts argue that the Government could pay for the methods that are found objectionable. Brief for Respondents in No. 13-354, p. 58. In discussing this alternative, the Court does not address whether the proper response to a legitimate claim for freedom in the health care arena is for the Government to create an additional program. Ante, at 2780 - 2782. The Court properly does not resolve whether one freedom should be protected by creating incentives for additional government constraints. In these cases, it is the Court's understanding that an accommodation may be made to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government. As the Court makes clear, this is not a case where it can be established that it is difficult to accommodate the government's interest, and in fact the mechanism for doing so is already in place. Ante, at 2781 - 2782.

"[T]he American community is today, as it long has been, a rich mosaic of religious faiths." Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1811 , 1849, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014) (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Among the reasons the United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling. In these cases the means to reconcile those two priorities are at hand in the existing accommodation the Government has designed, identified, and used for circumstances closely parallel to those presented here. RFRA requires the Government to use this less restrictive means. As the Court explains, this existing model, designed precisely for this problem, might well suffice to distinguish the instant cases from many others in which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious claims based on an alleged statutory right of free exercise. Ante, at 2782 - 2783.

For these reasons and others put forth by the Court, I join its opinion.

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, and with whom Justice BREYER and Justice KAGAN join as to all but Part III-C-1, dissenting.

In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs. See ante, at 2767 - 2785. Compelling governmental interests in uniform compliance with the law, and disadvantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on others, hold no sway, the Court decides, at least when there is a "less restrictive alternative." And such an alternative, the Court suggests, there always will be whenever, in lieu of tolling an enterprise claiming a religion-based exemption, the government, i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab. See ante, at 2780 - 2782. ¹

The Court does not pretend that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause demands religion-based accommodations so extreme, for our decisions leave no doubt on that score. See infra, at 2789 - 2791. Instead, the Court holds that Congress, in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., dictated the extraordinary religion-based exemptions today's decision endorses. In the Court's view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners' religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations employ. Persuaded that Congress enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the havoc the Court's judgment can introduce, I dissent.

I

"The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 , 856, 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Congress acted on that understanding when, as part of a nationwide insurance program intended to be comprehensive, it called for coverage of preventive care responsive to women's needs. Carrying out Congress' direction, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in consultation with public health experts, promulgated regulations requiring group health plans to cover all forms of contraception approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The genesis of this coverage should enlighten the Court's resolution of these cases.

A

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), in its initial form, specified three categories of preventive care that health plans must cover at no added cost to the plan participant or beneficiary. ² Particular services were to be recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, an independent panel of experts. The scheme had a large gap, however; it left out preventive services that "many women's health advocates and medical professionals believe are critically important." 155 Cong. Rec. 28841 (2009) (statement of Sen. Boxer). To correct this oversight, Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the Women's Health Amendment, which added to the ACA's minimum coverage requirements a new category of preventive services specific to women's health.

Women paid significantly more than men for preventive care, the amendment's proponents noted; in fact, cost barriers operated to block many women from obtaining needed care at all. See, e.g., id., at 29070 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("Women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men."); id., at 29302 (statement of Sen. Mikulski) ("copayments are [often] so high that [women] avoid getting [preventive and screening services] in the first place"). And increased access to contraceptive services, the sponsors comprehended, would yield important public health gains. See, e.g., id., at 29768 (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("This bill will expand health insurance coverage to the vast majority of [the 17 million women of reproductive age in the United States who are uninsured].... This expanded access will reduce unintended pregnancies.").

As altered by the Women's Health Amendment's passage, the ACA requires new insurance plans to include coverage without cost sharing of "such additional preventive care and screenings ... as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration [ (HRSA) ]," a unit of HHS. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). Thus charged, the HRSA developed recommendations in consultation with the Institute of Medicine (IOM). See 77 Fed.Reg. 8725-8726 (2012). ³ The IOM convened a group of independent experts, including "specialists in disease prevention [and] women's health"; those experts prepared a report evaluating the efficacy of a number of preventive services. IOM, Clinical Prevention Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 2 (2011) (hereinafter IOM Report). Consistent with the findings of "[n]umerous health professional associations" and other organizations, the IOM experts determined that preventive coverage should include the "full range" of FDA-approved contraceptive methods. Id., at 10. See also id., at 102-110.

In making that recommendation, the IOM's report expressed concerns similar to those voiced by congressional proponents of the Women's Health Amendment. The report noted the disproportionate burden women carried for comprehensive health services and the adverse health consequences of excluding contraception from preventive care available to employees without cost sharing. See, e.g., id., at 19 ("[W]omen are consistently more likely than men to report a wide range of cost-related barriers to receiving ... medical tests and treatments and to filling prescriptions for themselves and their families."); id., at 103-104, 107 (pregnancy may be contraindicated for women with certain medical conditions, for example, some congenital heart diseases, pulmonary hypertension, and Marfan syndrome, and contraceptives may be used to reduce risk of endometrial cancer, among other serious medical conditions); id ., at 103 (women with unintended pregnancies are more likely to experience depression and anxiety, and their children face "increased odds of preterm birth and low birth weight").

In line with the IOM's suggestions, the HRSA adopted guidelines recommending coverage of "[a]ll [FDA-] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity." ⁴ Thereafter, HHS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Treasury promulgated regulations requiring group health plans to include coverage of the contraceptive services recommended in the HRSA guidelines, subject to certain exceptions, described infra, at 2800 - 2801. ⁵ This opinion refers to these regulations as the contraceptive coverage requirement.

B

While the Women's Health Amendment succeeded, a countermove proved unavailing. The Senate voted down the so-called "conscience amendment," which would have enabled any employer or insurance provider to deny coverage based on its asserted "religious beliefs or moral convictions." 158 Cong. Rec. S539 (Feb. 9, 2012); see id., at S1162-S1173 (Mar. 1, 2012) (debate and vote). ⁶ That amendment, Senator Mikulski observed, would have "pu[t] the personal opinion of employers and insurers over the practice of medicine." Id., at S1127 (Feb. 29, 2012). Rejecting the "conscience amendment," Congress left health care decisions-including the choice among contraceptive methods-in the hands of women, with the aid of their health care providers.

II

Any First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim Hobby Lobby or Conestoga ⁷ might assert is foreclosed by this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). In Smith, two members of the Native American Church were dismissed from their jobs and denied unemployment benefits because they ingested peyote at, and as an essential element of, a religious ceremony. Oregon law forbade the consumption of peyote, and this Court, relying on that prohibition, rejected the employees' claim that the denial of unemployment benefits violated their free exercise rights. The First Amendment is not offended, Smith held, when "prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of [governmental regulation] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision." Id., at 878 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ; see id., at 878-879 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ("an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"). The ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement applies generally, it is "otherwise valid," it trains on women's well being, not on the exercise of religion, and any effect it has on such exercise is incidental.

Even if Smith did not control, the Free Exercise Clause would not require the exemption Hobby Lobby and Conestoga seek. Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances, the Court has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties. ⁸

The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations' employees and covered dependents. It would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers' beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 527 , 565, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 , 93 (2004) ("We are unaware of any decision in which ... [the U.S. Supreme Court] has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third parties."). In sum, with respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech claims, " '[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins.' " Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L.Rev. 932 , 957 (1919).

III

A

Lacking a tenable claim under the Free Exercise Clause, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga rely on RFRA, a statute instructing that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the government shows that application of the burden is "the least restrictive means" to further a "compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b)(2). In RFRA, Congress "adopt[ed] a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith ." Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 , 424, 126 S.Ct. 1211 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006).

RFRA's purpose is specific and written into the statute itself. The Act was crafted to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." § 2000bb(b)(1). ⁹ See also § 2000bb(a)(5) ("[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests."); ante, at 2785 (agreeing that the pre- Smith compelling interest test is "workable" and "strike[s] sensible balances").

The legislative history is correspondingly emphatic on RFRA's aim. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 103-111, p. 12 (1993) (hereinafter Senate Report) (RFRA's purpose was "only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, " not to "unsettle other areas of the law."); 139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (RFRA was "designed to restore the compelling interest test for deciding free exercise claims."). In line with this restorative purpose, Congress expected courts considering RFRA claims to "look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance." Senate Report 8. See also H.R.Rep. No. 103-88, pp. 6-7 (1993) (hereinafter House Report) (same). In short, the Act reinstates the law as it was prior to Smith, without "creat[ing] ... new rights for any religious practice or for any potential litigant." 139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Given the Act's moderate purpose, it is hardly surprising that RFRA's enactment in 1993 provoked little controversy. See Brief for Senator Murray et al. as Amici Curiae 8 (hereinafter Senators Brief) (RFRA was approved by a 97-to-3 vote in the Senate and a voice vote in the House of Representatives).

B

Despite these authoritative indications, the Court sees RFRA as a bold initiative departing from, rather than restoring, pre- Smith jurisprudence. See ante, at 2761, n. 3, 2761 - 2762, 2767, 2771 - 2773. To support its conception of RFRA as a measure detached from this Court's decisions, one that sets a new course, the Court points first to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., which altered RFRA's definition of the term "exercise of religion." RFRA, as originally enacted, defined that term to mean "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." § 2000bb-2(4) (1994 ed.). See ante, at 2761 - 2762. As amended by RLUIPA, RFRA's definition now includes "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000bb-2(4) (2012 ed.) (cross-referencing § 2000cc-5). That definitional change, according to the Court, reflects "an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law." Ante, at 2761 - 2762.

The Court's reading is not plausible. RLUIPA's alteration clarifies that courts should not question the centrality of a particular religious exercise. But the amendment in no way suggests that Congress meant to expand the class of entities qualified to mount religious accommodation claims, nor does it relieve courts of the obligation to inquire whether a government action substantially burdens a religious exercise. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 , 535 (C.A.D.C.2009) (Brown, J., concurring) ("There is no doubt that RLUIPA's drafters, in changing the definition of 'exercise of religion,' wanted to broaden the scope of the kinds of practices protected by RFRA, not increase the universe of individuals protected by RFRA."); H.R.Rep. No. 106-219, p. 30 (1999). See also Gilardi v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 , 1211 (C.A.D.C.2013) (RFRA, as amended, "provides us with no helpful definition of 'exercise of religion.' "); Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072 , 1073 (C.A.D.C.2001) ("The [RLUIPA] amendments did not alter RFRA's basic prohibition that the '[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion.' "). ¹⁰

Next, the Court highlights RFRA's requirement that the government, if its action substantially burdens a person's religious observance, must demonstrate that it chose the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling interest. "[B]y imposing a least-restrictive-means test," the Court suggests, RFRA "went beyond what was required by our pre- Smith decisions." Ante, at 2767, n. 18 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997)). See also ante, at 2761, n. 3. But as RFRA's statements of purpose and legislative history make clear, Congress intended only to restore, not to scrap or alter, the balancing test as this Court had applied it pre- Smith . See supra, at 2790 - 2791. See also Senate Report 9 (RFRA's "compelling interest test generally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently than it was prior to Smith ."); House Report 7 (same).

The Congress that passed RFRA correctly read this Court's pre- Smith case law as including within the "compelling interest test" a "least restrictive means" requirement. See, e.g., Senate Report 5 ("Where [a substantial] burden is placed upon the free exercise of religion, the Court ruled [in Sherbert ], the Government must demonstrate that it is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest."). And the view that the pre- Smith test included a "least restrictive means" requirement had been aired in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee by experts on religious freedom. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2969 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 78-79 (1993) (statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).

Our decision in City of Boerne, it is true, states that the least restrictive means requirement "was not used in the pre- Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify." See ante, at 2761, n. 3, 2767, n. 18. As just indicated, however, that statement does not accurately convey the Court's pre- Smith jurisprudence. See Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 407 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ("[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat [the problem] without infringing First Amendment rights."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 , 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."). See also Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation and Why They Are Wrong, 21 Cardozo L.Rev. 415 , 424 (1999) ("In Boerne, the Court erroneously said that the least restrictive means test 'was not used in the pre- Smith jurisprudence.' "). ¹¹

C

With RFRA's restorative purpose in mind, I turn to the Act's application to the instant lawsuits. That task, in view of the positions taken by the Court, requires consideration of several questions, each potentially dispositive of Hobby Lobby's and Conestoga's claims: Do for-profit corporations rank among "person[s]" who "exercise ... religion"? Assuming that they do, does the contraceptive coverage requirement "substantially burden" their religious exercise? If so, is the requirement "in furtherance of a compelling government interest"? And last, does the requirement represent the least restrictive means for furthering that interest?

Misguided by its errant premise that RFRA moved beyond the pre- Smith case law, the Court falters at each step of its analysis.

1

RFRA's compelling interest test, as noted, see supra, at 2790, applies to government actions that "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). This reference, the Court submits, incorporates the definition of "person" found in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 , which extends to "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." See ante, at 2768 . The Dictionary Act's definition, however, controls only where "context" does not "indicat[e] otherwise." § 1. Here, context does so indicate. RFRA speaks of "a person's exercise of religion ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). See also §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(a). ¹² Whether a corporation qualifies as a "person" capable of exercising religion is an inquiry one cannot answer without reference to the "full body" of pre- Smith "free-exercise caselaw." Gilardi, 733 F.3d, at 1212 . There is in that case law no support for the notion that free exercise rights pertain to for-profit corporations.

Until this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a for-profit corporation's qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. ¹³ The absence of such precedent is just what one would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities. As Chief Justice Marshall observed nearly two centuries ago, a corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 , 636, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819). Corporations, Justice Stevens more recently reminded, "have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires." Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 , 466, 130 S.Ct. 876 , 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The First Amendment's free exercise protections, the Court has indeed recognized, shelter churches and other nonprofit religion-based organizations. ¹⁴ "For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community," and "furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well." Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 , 342, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). The Court's "special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,"

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 694 , 706, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), however, is just that. No such solicitude is traditional for commercial organizations. ¹⁵ Indeed, until today, religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity operating in "the commercial, profit-making world." Amos, 483 U.S., at 337 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 . ¹⁶

The reason why is hardly obscure. Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict the work force of for-profit corporations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(a); cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 , 80-81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 , 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious exercise, but such accommodation must not come "at the expense of other[ employees]").

The distinction between a community made up of believers in the same religion and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is, constantly escapes the Court's attention. ¹⁷ One can only wonder why the Court shuts this key difference from sight.

Reading RFRA, as the Court does, to require extension of religion-based exemptions to for-profit corporations surely is not grounded in the pre- Smith precedent Congress sought to preserve. Had Congress intended RFRA to initiate a change so huge, a clarion statement to that effect likely would have been made in the legislation. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 , 468, 121 S.Ct. 903 , 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (Congress does not "hide elephants in mouseholes"). The text of RFRA makes no such statement and the legislative history does not so much as mention for-profit corporations. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 , 1169 (C.A.10 2013) (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (legislative record lacks "any suggestion that Congress foresaw, let alone intended that, RFRA would cover for-profit corporations"). See also Senators Brief 10-13 (none of the cases cited in House or Senate Judiciary Committee reports accompanying RFRA, or mentioned during floor speeches, recognized the free exercise rights of for-profit corporations).

The Court notes that for-profit corporations may support charitable causes and use their funds for religious ends, and therefore questions the distinction between such corporations and religious nonprofit organizations. See ante, at 2769 - 2772. See also ante, at 2786 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (criticizing the Government for "distinguishing between different religious believers-burdening one while accommodating the other-when it may treat both equally by offering both of them the same accommodation"). ¹⁸ Again, the Court forgets that religious organizations exist to serve a community of believers. For-profit corporations do not fit that bill. Moreover, history is not on the Court's side. Recognition of the discrete characters of "ecclesiastical and lay" corporations dates back to Blackstone, see 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 458 (1765), and was reiterated by this Court centuries before the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code. See Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 , 49, 3 L.Ed. 650 (1815) (describing religious corporations); Trustees of Dartmouth College, 4 Wheat., at 645 (discussing "eleemosynary" corporations, including those "created for the promotion of religion"). To reiterate, "for- profit corporations are different from religious non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared by a community of believers]." Gilardi, 733 F.3d, at 1242 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis deleted).

Citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), the Court questions why, if "a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, [Hobby Lobby and Conestoga] can't ... do the same?" Ante, at 2770 (footnote omitted). See also ante, at 2767 - 2768. But even accepting, arguendo, the premise that unincorporated business enterprises may gain religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's conclusion is unsound. In a sole proprietorship, the business and its owner are one and the same. By incorporating a business, however, an individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for the entity's obligations. One might ask why the separation should hold only when it serves the interest of those who control the corporation. In any event, Braunfeld is hardly impressive authority for the entitlement Hobby Lobby and Conestoga seek. The free exercise claim asserted there was promptly rejected on the merits.

The Court's determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is bound to have untoward effects. Although the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private. ¹⁹ Little doubt that RFRA claims will proliferate, for the Court's expansive notion of corporate personhood-combined with its other errors in construing RFRA-invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their faith.

2

Even if Hobby Lobby and Conestoga were deemed RFRA "person[s]," to gain an exemption, they must demonstrate that the contraceptive coverage requirement "substantially burden[s] [their] exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). Congress no doubt meant the modifier "substantially" to carry weight. In the original draft of RFRA, the word "burden" appeared unmodified. The word "substantially" was inserted pursuant to a clarifying amendment offered by Senators Kennedy and Hatch. See 139 Cong. Rec. 26180. In proposing the amendment, Senator Kennedy stated that RFRA, in accord with the Court's pre- Smith case law, "does not require the Government to justify every action that has some effect on religious exercise." Ibid.

The Court barely pauses to inquire whether any burden imposed by the contraceptive coverage requirement is substantial. Instead, it rests on the Greens' and Hahns' "belie[f] that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage." Ante, at 2778. ²⁰ I agree with the Court that the Green and Hahn families' religious convictions regarding contraception are sincerely held. See Thomas, 450 U.S., at 715 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 (courts are not to question where an individual "dr[aws] the line" in defining which practices run afoul of her religious beliefs). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). ²¹ But those beliefs, however deeply held, do not suffice to sustain a RFRA claim. RFRA, properly understood, distinguishes between "factual allegations that [plaintiffs'] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature," which a court must accept as true, and the "legal conclusion ... that [plaintiffs'] religious exercise is substantially burdened," an inquiry the court must undertake. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 , 679 (C.A.D.C.2008).

That distinction is a facet of the pre- Smith jurisprudence RFRA incorporates. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 , 106 S.Ct. 2147 , 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), is instructive. There, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the Government's use of a Native American child's Social Security number for purposes of administering benefit programs. Without questioning the sincerity of the father's religious belief that "use of [his daughter's Social Security] number may harm [her] spirit," the Court concluded that the Government's internal uses of that number "place[d] [no] restriction on what [the father] may believe or what he may do." Id., at 699 , 106 S.Ct. 2147 . Recognizing that the father's "religious views may not accept" the position that the challenged uses concerned only the Government's internal affairs, the Court explained that "for the adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must supply the frame of reference." Id., at 700-701, n. 6 , 106 S.Ct. 2147 . See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 , 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136 , 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (distinguishing between, on the one hand, "question[s] [of] the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds," and, on the other, "whether the alleged burden imposed [by the challenged government action] is a substantial one"). Inattentive to this guidance, today's decision elides entirely the distinction between the sincerity of a challenger's religious belief and the substantiality of the burden placed on the challenger.

Undertaking the inquiry that the Court forgoes, I would conclude that the connection between the families' religious objections and the contraceptive coverage requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial. The requirement carries no command that Hobby Lobby or Conestoga purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable. Instead, it calls on the companies covered by the requirement to direct money into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of benefits under comprehensive health plans. Those plans, in order to comply with the ACA, see supra, at 2788 - 2790, must offer contraceptive coverage without cost sharing, just as they must cover an array of other preventive services.

Importantly, the decisions whether to claim benefits under the plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or Conestoga, but by the covered employees and dependents, in consultation with their health care providers. Should an employee of Hobby Lobby or Conestoga share the religious beliefs of the Greens and Hahns, she is of course under no compulsion to use the contraceptives in question. But "[n]o individual decision by an employee and her physician-be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced-is in any meaningful sense [her employer's] decision or action." Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 , 865 (C.A.7 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). It is doubtful that Congress, when it specified that burdens must be "substantia[l]," had in mind a linkage thus interrupted by independent decisionmakers (the woman and her health counselor) standing between the challenged government action and the religious exercise claimed to be infringed. Any decision to use contraceptives made by a woman covered under Hobby Lobby's or Conestoga's plan will not be propelled by the Government, it will be the woman's autonomous choice, informed by the physician she consults.

3

Even if one were to conclude that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga meet the substantial burden requirement, the Government has shown that the contraceptive coverage for which the ACA provides furthers compelling interests in public health and women's well being. Those interests are concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence. To recapitulate, the mandated contraception coverage enables women to avoid the health problems unintended pregnancies may visit on them and their children. See IOM Report 102-107. The coverage helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening. See Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 14-15. And the mandate secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy, preventing certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and pelvic pain. Brief for Ovarian Cancer National Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 4, 6-7, 15-16; 78 Fed.Reg. 39872 (2013); IOM Report 107.

That Hobby Lobby and Conestoga resist coverage for only 4 of the 20 FDA-approved contraceptives does not lessen these compelling interests. Notably, the corporations exclude intrauterine devices (IUDs), devices significantly more effective, and significantly more expensive than other contraceptive methods. See id., at 105. ²² Moreover, the Court's reasoning appears to permit commercial enterprises like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga to exclude from their group health plans all forms of contraceptives. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39 (counsel for Hobby Lobby acknowledged that his "argument ... would apply just as well if the employer said 'no contraceptives' " (internal quotation marks added)).

Perhaps the gravity of the interests at stake has led the Court to assume, for purposes of its RFRA analysis, that the compelling interest criterion is met in these cases. See ante, at 2780. ²³ It bears note in this regard that the cost of an IUD is nearly equivalent to a month's full-time pay for workers earning the minimum wage, Brief for Guttmacher Institute et al. as Amici Curiae 16; that almost one-third of women would change their contraceptive method if costs were not a factor, Frost & Darroch, Factors Associated With Contraceptive Choice and Inconsistent Method Use, United States, 2004, 40 Perspectives on Sexual & Reproductive Health 94, 98 (2008); and that only one-fourth of women who request an IUD actually have one inserted after finding out how expensive it would be, Gariepy, Simon, Patel, Creinin, & Schwarz, The Impact of Out-of-Pocket Expense on IUD Utilization Among Women With Private Insurance, 84 Contraception e39, e40 (2011). See also Eisenberg, supra, at S60 (recent study found that women who face out-of-pocket IUD costs in excess of $50 were "11-times less likely to obtain an IUD than women who had to pay less than $50"); Postlethwaite, Trussell, Zoolakis, Shabear, & Petitti, A Comparison of Contraceptive Procurement Pre- and Post-Benefit Change, 76 Contraception 360, 361-362 (2007) (when one health system eliminated patient cost sharing for IUDs, use of this form of contraception more than doubled).

Stepping back from its assumption that compelling interests support the contraceptive coverage requirement, the Court notes that small employers and grandfathered plans are not subject to the requirement. If there is a compelling interest in contraceptive coverage, the Court suggests, Congress would not have created these exclusions. See ante, at 2779 - 2780.

Federal statutes often include exemptions for small employers, and such provisions have never been held to undermine the interests served by these statutes. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (4)(A)(i) (applicable to employers with 50 or more employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b) (originally exempting employers with fewer than 50 employees, 81 Stat. 605 , the statute now governs employers with 20 or more employees); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5)(A) (applicable to employers with 15 or more employees); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (originally exempting employers with fewer than 25 employees, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 , 505, n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1235 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), the statute now governs employers with 15 or more employees).

The ACA's grandfathering provision, 42 U.S.C. § 18011 , allows a phasing-in period for compliance with a number of the Act's requirements (not just the contraceptive coverage or other preventive services provisions). Once specified changes are made, grandfathered status ceases. See 45 CFR § 147.140 (g). Hobby Lobby's own situation is illustrative. By the time this litigation commenced, Hobby Lobby did not have grandfathered status. Asked why by the District Court, Hobby Lobby's counsel explained that the "grandfathering requirements mean that you can't make a whole menu of changes to your plan that involve things like the amount of co-pays, the amount of co-insurance, deductibles, that sort of thing." App. in No. 13-354, pp. 39-40. Counsel acknowledged that, "just because of economic realities, our plan has to shift over time. I mean, insurance plans, as everyone knows, shif[t] over time." Id., at 40 . ²⁴ The percentage of employees in grandfathered plans is steadily declining, having dropped from 56% in 2011 to 48% in 2012 to 36% in 2013. Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer Benefits 2013 Annual Survey 7, 196. In short, far from ranking as a categorical exemption, the grandfathering provision is "temporary, intended to be a means for gradually transitioning employers into mandatory coverage." Gilardi, 733 F.3d, at 1241 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Court ultimately acknowledges a critical point: RFRA's application " must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries." Ante, at 2781, n. 37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 , 720, 125 S.Ct. 2113 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005); emphasis added). No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to others-here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect. Cf. supra, at 2790 - 2791; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 , 177, 64 S.Ct. 438 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[The] limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom ... begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.").

4

After assuming the existence of compelling government interests, the Court holds that the contraceptive coverage requirement fails to satisfy RFRA's least restrictive means test. But the Government has shown that there is no less restrictive, equally effective means that would both (1) satisfy the challengers' religious objections to providing insurance coverage for certain contraceptives (which they believe cause abortions); and (2) carry out the objective of the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, to ensure that women employees receive, at no cost to them, the preventive care needed to safeguard their health and well being. A "least restrictive means" cannot require employees to relinquish benefits accorded them by federal law in order to ensure that their commercial employers can adhere unreservedly to their religious tenets. See supra, at 2790 - 2791, 2801. ²⁵

Then let the government pay (rather than the employees who do not share their employer's faith), the Court suggests. "The most straightforward [alternative]," the Court asserts, "would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing ... contraceptives ... to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections." Ante, at 2780. The ACA, however, requires coverage of preventive services through the existing employer-based system of health insurance "so that [employees] face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles." 78 Fed.Reg. 39888. Impeding women's receipt of benefits "by requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded and administered] health benefit" was scarcely what Congress contemplated. Ibid. Moreover, Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq., "is the nation's only dedicated source of federal funding for safety net family planning services." Brief for National Health Law Program et al. as Amici Curiae 23. "Safety net programs like Title X are not designed to absorb the unmet needs of ... insured individuals." Id., at 24 . Note, too, that Congress declined to write into law the preferential treatment Hobby Lobby and Conestoga describe as a less restrictive alternative. See supra, at 2789.

And where is the stopping point to the "let the government pay" alternative? Suppose an employer's sincerely held religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the minimum wage, see Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 , 303, 105 S.Ct. 1953 , 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), or according women equal pay for substantially similar work, see Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 , 1392 (C.A.4 1990)? Does it rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the government to provide the money or benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection? ²⁶ Because the Court cannot easily answer that question, it proposes something else: Extension to commercial enterprises of the accommodation already afforded to nonprofit religion-based organizations. See ante, at 2759 - 2760, 2763 - 2764, 2781 - 2783. "At a minimum," according to the Court, such an approach would not "impinge on [Hobby Lobby's and Conestoga's] religious belief." Ante, at 2782. I have already discussed the "special solicitude"

generally accorded nonprofit religion-based organizations that exist to serve a community of believers, solicitude never before accorded to commercial enterprises comprising employees of diverse faiths. See supra, at 2794 - 2796.

Ultimately, the Court hedges on its proposal to align for-profit enterprises with nonprofit religion-based organizations. "We do not decide today whether [the] approach [the opinion advances] complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims." Ante, at 2782. Counsel for Hobby Lobby was similarly noncommittal. Asked at oral argument whether the Court-proposed alternative was acceptable, ²⁷ counsel responded: "We haven't been offered that accommodation, so we haven't had to decide what kind of objection, if any, we would make to that." Tr. of Oral Arg. 86-87.

Conestoga suggests that, if its employees had to acquire and pay for the contraceptives (to which the corporation objects) on their own, a tax credit would qualify as a less restrictive alternative. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 13-356, p. 64. A tax credit, of course, is one variety of "let the government pay." In addition to departing from the existing employer-based system of health insurance, Conestoga's alternative would require a woman to reach into her own pocket in the first instance, and it would do nothing for the woman too poor to be aided by a tax credit.

In sum, in view of what Congress sought to accomplish, i.e., comprehensive preventive care for women furnished through employer-based health plans, none of the proffered alternatives would satisfactorily serve the compelling interests to which Congress responded.

IV

Among the pathmarking pre- Smith decisions RFRA preserved is United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 , 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). Lee, a sole proprietor engaged in farming and carpentry, was a member of the Old Order Amish. He sincerely believed that withholding Social Security taxes from his employees or paying the employer's share of such taxes would violate the Amish faith. This Court held that, although the obligations imposed by the Social Security system conflicted with Lee's religious beliefs, the burden was not unconstitutional. Id., at 260-261 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 . See also id., at 258 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 (recognizing the important governmental interest in providing a "nationwide ... comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants, with costs shared by employers and employees"). ²⁸ The Government urges that Lee should control the challenges brought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. See Brief for Respondents in No. 13-356, p. 18. In contrast, today's Court dismisses Lee as a tax case. See ante, at 2783 - 2784. Indeed, it was a tax case and the Court in Lee homed in on "[t]he difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in the area of taxation." 455 U.S., at 259 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 .

But the Lee Court made two key points one cannot confine to tax cases. "When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice," the Court observed, "the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity." Id., at 261 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 . The statutory scheme of employer-based comprehensive health coverage involved in these cases is surely binding on others engaged in the same trade or business as the corporate challengers here, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. Further, the Court recognized in Lee that allowing a religion-based exemption to a commercial employer would "operat[e] to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees." Ibid. ²⁹ No doubt the Greens and Hahns and all who share their beliefs may decline to acquire for themselves the contraceptives in question. But that choice may not be imposed on employees who hold other beliefs. Working for Hobby Lobby or Conestoga, in other words, should not deprive employees of the preventive care available to workers at the shop next door, ³⁰ at least in the absence of directions from the Legislature or Administration to do so.

Why should decisions of this order be made by Congress or the regulatory authority, and not this Court? Hobby Lobby and Conestoga surely do not stand alone as commercial enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.Supp. 941 , 945 (D.S.C.1966) (owner of restaurant chain refused to serve black patrons based on his religious beliefs opposing racial integration), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (C.A.4 1967), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 , 88 S.Ct. 964 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968); In re Minnesota ex rel. McClure, 370 N.W.2d 844 , 847 (Minn.1985) (born-again Christians who owned closely held, for-profit health clubs believed that the Bible proscribed hiring or retaining an "individua[l] living with but not married to a person of the opposite sex," "a young, single woman working without her father's consent or a married woman working without her husband's consent," and any person "antagonistic to the Bible," including "fornicators and homosexuals" (internal quotation marks omitted)), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 , 106 S.Ct. 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040 , --- N.M. ----, 309 P.3d 53 (for-profit photography business owned by a husband and wife refused to photograph a lesbian couple's commitment ceremony based on the religious beliefs of the company's owners), cert. denied, 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1787 , 188 L.Ed.2d 757 (2014). Would RFRA require exemptions in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court divine which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are not? Isn't the Court disarmed from making such a judgment given its recognition that "courts must not presume to determine ... the plausibility of a religious claim"? Ante, at 2778.

Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah's Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)? ³¹ According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, "each one of these cases ... would have to be evaluated on its own ... apply [ing] the compelling interest-least restrictive alternative test." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Not much help there for the lower courts bound by today's decision.

The Court, however, sees nothing to worry about. Today's cases, the Court concludes, are "concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer's religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them." Ante, at 2783. But the Court has assumed, for RFRA purposes, that the interest in women's health and well being is compelling and has come up with no means adequate to serve that interest, the one motivating Congress to adopt the Women's Health Amendment.

There is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts "out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims," Lee, 455 U.S., at 263, n. 2 , 102 S.Ct. 1051 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), or the sincerity with which an asserted religious belief is held. Indeed, approving some religious claims while deeming others unworthy of accommodation could be "perceived as favoring one religion over another," the very "risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude." Ibid. The Court, I fear, has ventured into a minefield, cf. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 , 730 (C.A.9 2010) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring), by its immoderate reading of RFRA. I would confine religious exemptions under that Act to organizations formed "for a religious purpose," "engage[d] primarily in carrying out that religious purpose," and not "engaged ...

substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts." See id., at 748 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).

* * *

For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Justice BREYER and Justice KAGAN, dissenting.

We agree with Justice GINSBURG that the plaintiffs' challenge to the contraceptive coverage requirement fails on the merits. We need not and do not decide whether either for-profit corporations or their owners may bring claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Accordingly, we join all but Part III-C-1 of Justice GINSBURG's dissenting opinion.

*712Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA or Act), 114 Stat. 804, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc-l(a)(l)-(2), provides in part: “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” Plaintiffs below, petitioners here, are current and former inmates of institutions operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and assert that they are adherents of “nonmainstream” religions: the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian.1 They complain that Ohio prison officials (respondents here), in violation of RLUIPA, have failed to accommodate their religious exercise

*713“in a variety of different ways, including retaliating and discriminating against them for exercising their nontraditional faiths, denying them access to religious literature, denying them the same opportunities for group worship that are granted to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding them to adhere to the dress and appearance mandates of their religions, withholding religious ceremonial items that are substantially identical to those that the adherents of mainstream religions are permitted, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith.” Brief for United States 5.

For purposes of this litigation at its current stage, respondents have stipulated that petitioners are members of bona fide religions and that they are sincere in their beliefs. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (SD Ohio 2002).

In response to petitioners’ complaints, respondent prison officials have mounted a facial challenge to the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA; respondents contend, inter alia, that the Act improperly advances religion in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The District Court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss petitioners’ complaints, but the Court of Appeals reversed that determination. The appeals court held, as the prison officials urged, that the portion of RLUIPA applicable to institutionalized persons, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc-l, violates the Establishment Clause. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

“This Court has long recognized that the government may .. . accommodate religious practices ... without violating the Establishment Clause.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 144-145 (1987). Just last Term, in Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712 (2004), the Court reaffirmed that “there is room for play in the joints between” the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the Establishment Clause. *714Id., at 718 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 669 (1970)). “At some point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’ ” Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 334-335 (1987) (quoting Hobbie, 480 U. S., at 145). But § 3 of RLUIPA, we hold, does not, on its face, exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious practices.

I

A

RLUIPA is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with this Court’s precedents. Ten years before RLUIPA’s enactment, the Court held, in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878-882 (1990), that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. In particular, we ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon from enforcing its blanket ban on peyote possession with no allowance for sacramental use of the drug. Accordingly, the State could deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of their religiously inspired peyote use. Id., at 874, 890. The Court recognized, however, that the political branches could shield religious exercise through legislative accommodation, for example, by making an exception to proscriptive drug laws for sacramental peyote use. Id., at 890.

Responding to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. RFRA “prohibits ‘[government’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) *715is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’ ” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1997) (quoting §2000bb-1; brackets in original). “[Universal” in its coverage, RFRA “applie[d] to all Federal and State law,” id., at 516 (quoting former § 2000bb-3(a)), but notably lacked a Commerce Clause underpinning or a Spending Clause limitation to recipients of federal funds. In City of Boerne, this Court invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 532-536.2

Congress again responded, this time by enacting RLUIPA. Less sweeping than RFRA, and invoking federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, RLUIPA targets two areas: Section 2 of the Act concerns land-use regulation, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc;3 §3 relates to religious exercise by institutionalized persons, § 2000cc-1. Section 3, at issue here, provides that “[n]o [state or local] government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the government shows that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). The Act defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Section 3 applies when “the substantial burden [on religious exercise] is imposed in a program or *716activity that receives Federal financial assistance,”4 or “the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.” ' § 2000cc-l(b)(l)-(2). “A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” § 2000ce-2(a).

Before enacting §3, Congress documented, in hearings spanning three years, that “frivolous or arbitrary” barriers impeded institutionalized persons’ religious exercise. See 146 Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA) (hereinafter Joint Statement) (“Whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways.”).5 To se*717cure redress for inmates who encountered undue barriers to their religious observances, Congress carried over from RFRA the “compelling governmental interest”/“least restrictive means” standard. See id., at 16698. Lawmakers anticipated, however, that courts entertaining complaints under § 3 would accord “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators.” Id., at 16699 (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, p. 10 (1993)).

B

Petitioners initially filed suit against respondents asserting claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After RLUIPA’s enactment, petitioners amended their complaints to include claims under §3. Respondents moved to dismiss the statutory claims, arguing, inter alia, that § 3 violates the Establishment Clause. 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 846. Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a), the United States intervened in the District Court to defend RLUIPA’s constitutionality. 349 F. 3d 257, 261 (CA6 2003).

Adopting the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the District Court rejected the argument that §3 conflicts with the Establishment Clause. 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 846-848. As to the Act’s impact on a prison’s staff and general inmate population, the court stated that RLUIPA “permits safety and security — which are undisputedly compelling state interests — to outweigh an inmate’s claim to a religious accommodation.” Id., at 848. On the thin record before it, the court declined to find, as respondents had urged, that enforcement of RLUIPA, inevitably, would compromise prison security. Ibid.

On interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971),6 the Court of Ap*718peals held that § 3 of RLUIPA “impermissibly advances] religion by giving greater protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights.” 349 F. 3d, at 264. Affording “religious prisoners rights superior to those of nonreligious prisoners,” the court suggested, might “encour-ag[e] prisoners to become religious in order to enjoy greater rights.” Id., at 266.

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among Courts of Appeals on the question whether RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision, § 3 of the Act, is consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 543 U. S. 924 (2004).7 Compare 349 F. 3d 257 with Madison v. Riter, 355 F. 3d 310, 313 (CA4 2003) (§3 of RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F. 3d 601, 610-611 (CA7 2003) (same); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F. 3d 1062, 1068-1069 (CA9 2002) (same). We *719now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

II

A

The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first of the two Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of church and state. The second, the Free Exercise Clause, requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people. While the two Clauses express complementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures. See Locke, 540 U. S., at 718 (“These two Clauses . . . are frequently in tension.”); Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669 (“The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”).

Our decisions recognize that “there is room for play in the joints” between the Clauses, id., at 669, some space for legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Smith, 494 U. S., at 890 (“[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation . . . .”); Amos, 483 U. S., at 329-330 (Federal Government may exempt secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination in employment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional obligation of ‘neutrality’ is not so narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation.” (citation omitted)). In accord with the majority of Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the question, see supra, at 718 and this *720page, we hold that §3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the Religion Clauses: On its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause.

Foremost, we find RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise. See Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 705 (1994) (government need not “be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice”); Amos, 483 U. S., at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (removal of government-imposed burdens on religious exercise is more likely to be perceived “as an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion”). Furthermore, the Act on its face does not founder on shoals our prior decisions have identified: Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703 (1985); and they must be satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths, see Kiryas Joel, 512 U. S. 687.8

“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of... physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine . . . .” Smith, 494 U. S., at 877. Section 3 covers state-run institutions— mental hospitals, prisons, and the like — in which the government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian soci*721ety and severely disabling to private religious exercise. 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc-l(a); § 1997; see Joint Statement 16699 (“Institutional residents’ right to practice their faith is at the mercy of those running the institution.”).9 RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.10

*722We note in this regard the Federal Government’s accommodation of religious practice by members of the military. See, e. g., 10 U. S. C. § 3073 (referring to Army chaplains); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F. 2d 223, 225-229 (CA2 1985) (describing the Army chaplaincy program). In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503 (1986), we held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the Air Force to exempt an Orthodox Jewish officer from uniform dress regulations so that he could wear a yarmulke indoors. In a military community, the Court observed, “there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.” Id., at 507 (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted). Congress responded to Goldman by prescribing that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform,” unless “the wearing of the item would interfere with the performance [of] military duties [or] the item of apparel is not neat and conservative.” 10 U. S, C. § 774(a)-(b).

We do not read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests. In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that “arm[ed] Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate^] as their Sabbath.” 472 U. S., at 709. We held the law invalid under the Establishment Clause because it “unyieldingly] weighted]” the interests of Sabbatarians “over all other interests.” Id., at 710.

We have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied.in an appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns. While the Act adopts a *723“compelling governmental interest” standard, see supra, at 715, “[c]ontext matters” in the application of that standard. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327 (2003).11 Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). They anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Joint Statement 16699 (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10).12

Finally, RLUIPA does not differentiate among bona fide faiths. In Kiryas Joel, we invalidated a state law that carved out a separate school district to serve exclusively a *724community of highly religious Jews, the Satmar Hasidim. We held that the law violated the Establishment Clause, 512 U. S., at 690, in part because it “single[d] out a particular religious sect for special treatment,” id,., at 706 (footnote omitted). RLUIPA presents no such defect. It confers no privileged status on any particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide faith for disadvantageous treatment.

B

The Sixth Circuit misread our precedents to require invalidation of RLUIPA as “impermissibly advancing religion by giving greater protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights.” 349 F. 3d, at 264. Our decision in Amos counsels otherwise. There, we upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge a provision exempting “religious organizations from Title VIPs prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion.” 483 U. S., at 329. The District Court in Amos, reasoning in part that the exemption improperly “single[d] out religious entities for a benefit,” id., at 338, had “declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to secular activity,” id., at 333. Religious accommodations, we held, need not “come packaged with benefits to secular entities.” Id., at 338; see Madison, 355 F. 3d, at 318 (“There is no requirement that legislative protections for fundamental rights march in lockstep.”).

Were the Court of Appeals’ view the correct reading of our decisions, all manner of religious accommodations would fall. Congressional permission for members of the military to wear religious apparel while in uniform would fail, see 10 U. S. C. § 774, as would accommodations Ohio itself makes. Ohio could not, as it now does, accommodate “traditionally recognized” religions, 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 832: The State provides inmates with chaplains “but not with publicists or political consultants,” and allows “prisoners to assemble *725for worship, but not for political rallies,” Reply Brief for United States 5.

In upholding RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision, we emphasize that respondents “have raised a facial challenge to [the Act’s] constitutionality, and have not contended that under the facts of any of [petitioners’] specific cases . . . [that] applying RLUIPA would produce unconstitutional results.” 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 831. The District Court, noting the underdeveloped state of the record, concluded: A finding “that it is factually impossible to provide the kind of accommodations that RLUIPA will require without significantly compromising prison security or the levels of service provided to other inmates” cannot be made at this juncture. Id., at 848 (emphasis added).13 We agree.

“For more than a decade, the federal Bureau of Prisons has managed the largest correctional system in the Nation under the same heightened scrutiny standard as RLUIPA without compromising prison security, public safety, or the constitutional rights of other prisoners.” Brief for United States 24 (citation omitted). The Congress that enacted RLUIPA was aware of the Bureau’s experience. See Joint Statement 16700 (letter from Dept, of Justice to Sen. Hatch) (“[W]e do not believe [RLUIPA] would have an unreasonable *726impact on prison operations. RFRA has been in effect in the Federal prison system for six years and compliance with that statute has not been an unreasonable burden to the Federal prison system.”). We see no reason to anticipate that abusive prisoner litigation will overburden the operations of state and local institutions. The procedures mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we note, are designed to inhibit frivolous filings.14

Should inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition. In that event, adjudication in as-applied challenges would be in order.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, arid the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the Court that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) is constitutional under our modern Establishment Clause case law.1 I write to explain why a *727proper historical understanding of the Clause as a federalism provision leads to the same conclusion.2

I — I

The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Amdt. 1. As I have explained, an important function of the Clause was to “ma[ke] clear that Congress could not interfere with state establishments.” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 50 (2004) (opinion concurring in judgment). The Clause, then, “is best understood as a *728federalism provision” that “protects state establishments from federal interference.” Ibid.; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 677-680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ohio contends that this federalism understanding of the Clause prevents federal oversight of state choices within the “ ‘play in the joints’ ” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 718-719 (2004). In other words, Ohio asserts that the Clause protects the States from federal interference with otherwise constitutionally permissible choices regarding religious policy. In Ohio’s view, RLUIPA intrudes on such state policy choices and hence violates the Clause.

Ohio’s vision of the range of protected state authority overreads the Clause. Ohio and its amici contend that, even though “States can no longer establish preferred churches” because the Clause has been incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,3 “Congress is as unable as ever to contravene constitutionally permissible State choices regarding religious policy.” Brief for Respondents 26 (emphasis added); Brief for Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae 6-13. That is not what the Clause says. The Clause prohibits Congress from enacting legislation “respecting an establishment of religion” (emphasis added); it does not prohibit Congress from enacting legislation “respecting religion” or “taking cognizance of religion.” *729P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 106-107 (2002). At the founding, establishment involved “ ‘coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty,’ ” Newdow, supra, at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Lee, supra, at 640-641 (Scalia, J., dissenting), in turn citing L. Levy, The Establishment Clause 4 (1986)), including “ ‘governmental preferences for particular religious faiths,’ ” 542 U. S., at 53 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 856 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). In other words, establishment at the founding involved, for example, mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers. See 542 U. S., at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Lee, supra, at 640-641 (Scalia, J., dissenting); McConnell 2131; L. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 10 (2d ed. 1994). To proscribe Congress from making laws “respecting an establishment of religion,” therefore, was to forbid legislation respecting coercive state establishments, not to preclude Congress from legislating on religion generally.

History, at least that presented by Ohio, does not show that the Clause hermetically seals the Federal Government out of the field of religion. Ohio points to, among other things, the words of James Madison in defense of the Constitution at the Virginia Ratifying Convention: “There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.” General Defense of the Constitution (June 12,1788), reprinted in 11 Papers of James Madison 130 (R. Rutland, C. Hobson, W. Rachal, & J. Sisson eds. 1977). Ohio also relies on James Iredell’s statement discussing the Religious Test Clause at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention:

“[Congress] certainly [has] no authority to interfere in the establishment of any religion whatsoever .... Is there any power given to Congress in matters of reli*730gion? Can they pass a single act to impair our religious liberties? If they could, it would be a just cause of alarm .... If any future Congress should pass an act concerning the religion of the country, it would be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by the Constitution, and which the people would not obey.” Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), in 5 Founders’ Constitution 90 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).

These quotations do not establish the Framers’ beliefs about the scope of the Establishment Clause. Instead, they demonstrate only that some of the Framers may have believed that the National Government had no authority to legislate concerning religion, because no enumerated power gave it that authority. Ohio’s Spending Clause and Commerce Clause challenges, therefore, may well have merit. See n. 2, supra.

In any event, Ohio has not shown that the Establishment Clause codified Madison’s or Iredell’s view that the Federal Government could not legislate regarding religion. An un-enacted version of the Clause, proposed in the House of Representatives, demonstrates the opposite. It provided that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.” 1 Annals of Cong. 731 (1789); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 96-97 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The words ultimately adopted, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” “identified a position from which [Madison] had once sought to distinguish his own,” Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, at 106. Whatever he thought of those words, “he clearly did not mind language less severe than that which he had [previously] used.” Ibid. The version of the Clause finally adopted is narrower than Ohio claims.

Nor does the other historical evidence on which Ohio relies — Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution— prove its theory. Leaving aside the problems with relying *731on this source as an indicator of the original understanding, see U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 856 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), it is unpersuasive in its own right. Justice Story did say that “the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions.” Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 702-703 (1833) (reprinted 1987). In context, however, his statement concerned only Congress’ inability to legislate with respect to religious establishment. See id., at 701 (“The real object of the amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government”); id., at 702 (“[I]t was deemed advisable to exclude from the national government all power to act upon the subject.... It was impossible, that there should not arise perpetual strife and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendancy, if the national government were left free to create a religious establishment”).

In short, the view that the Establishment Clause precludes Congress from legislating respecting religion lacks historical provenance, at least based on the history of which I am aware. Even when enacting laws that bind the States pursuant to valid exercises of its enumerated powers, Congress need not observe strict separation between church and state, or steer clear of the subject of religion. It need only refrain from making laws “respecting an establishment of religion”; it must not interfere with a state establishment of religion. For example, Congress presumably could not require a State to establish a religion any more than it could preclude a State from establishing a religion.

I — } I — I

On its face — the relevant inquiry, as this is a facial challenge — RLUIPA is not a law “respecting an establishment of *732religion.” RLUIPA provides, as relevant: “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person,” first, “furtherfs] a compelling governmental interest,” and second, “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C. §§2000cc-l(a)(l)-(2). This provision does not prohibit or interfere with state establishments, since no State has established (or constitutionally could establish, given an incorporated Clause) a religion. Nor does the provision require a State to establish a religion: It does not force a State to coerce religious observance or payment of taxes supporting clergy, or require a State to prefer one religious sect over another. It is a law respecting religion, but not one respecting an establishment of religion.

In addition, RLUIPA’s text applies to all laws passed by state and local governments, including “rule[s] of general applicability,” ibid., whether or not they concern an establishment of religion. State and local governments obviously have many laws that have nothing to do with religion, let alone establishments thereof. Numerous applications of RLUIPA therefore do not contravene the Establishment Clause, and a facial challenge based on the Clause must fail. See United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 314 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).

It also bears noting that Congress, pursuant to its Spending Clause authority, conditioned the States’ receipt of federal funds on their compliance with RLUIPA. §2000cc-1(b)(1) (“This section applies in any case in which . . . the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance”). As noted above, n. 2, supra, RLUIPA may well exceed the spending power. Nonetheless, while Congress’ condition stands, the States *733subject themselves to that condition by voluntarily accepting federal funds. The States’ voluntary acceptance of Congress’ condition undercuts Ohio’s argument that Congress is encroaching on its turf.

*715Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of Washington established the Promise Scholarship Program to assist academically gifted students with postsecondary education expenses. In. accordance with the State Constitution, students may not use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional theology. We hold that such an exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The Washington State Legislature found that “[s]tudents who work hard . . . and successfully complete high school with high academic marks may not have the financial ability to attend college because they cannot obtain financial aid or the financial aid is insufficient.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.119.005 (West Supp. 2004). In 1999, to assist these high-achieving students, the legislature created the *716Promise Scholarship Program, which provides a scholarship, renewable for one year, to eligible students for postsecond-ary education expenses. Students may spend their funds on any education-related expense, including room and board. The scholarships are funded through the State’s general fund, and their amount varies each year depending on the annual appropriation, which is evenly prorated among the eligible students. Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-050(2) (2003). The scholarship was worth $1,125 for academic year 1999-2000 and $1,542 for 2000-2001.

To be eligible for the scholarship, a student must meet academic, income, and enrollment requirements. A student must graduate from a Washington public or private high school and either graduate in the top 15% of his graduating class, or attain on the first attempt a cumulative score of 1,200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I or a score, of 27 or better on the American College Test. §§250-80-020(12)(a) to (d). The student’s family income must be less than 135% of the State’s median. §250-80-020(12)(e). Finally, the student must enroll “at least half time in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state of Washington,” and may not pursue a degree in theology at that institution while receiving the scholarship. §§250-80-020(12)(f) to (g); see also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B. 10.814 (West 1997) (“No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology”). Private institutions, including those religiously affiliated, qualify as “ ‘[eligible postsecondary institution[s]’ ” if they are accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting body. See Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-020(13). A “degree in theology” is not defined in the statute, but, as both parties concede, the statute simply codifies the State’s constitutional prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith.” Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8; see also Wash. Const., Art. I, § 11.

*717A student who applies for the scholarship and meets the academic and income requirements is notified that he is eligible for the scholarship if he meets the enrollment requirements. E. g., App. 95. Once the student enrolls at an eligible institution, the institution must certify that the student is enrolled at least half time and that the student is not pursuing a degree in devotional theology. The institution, rather than the State, determines whether the student’s major is devotional. Id., at 126, 131. If the student meets the enrollment requirements, the scholarship funds are sent to the institution for distribution to the student to pay for tuition or other educational expenses. See Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-060.

Respondent, Joshua Davey, was awarded a Promise Scholarship, and chose to attend Northwest College. Northwest is a private, Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, and is an eligible institution under the Promise Scholarship Program. Davey had “planned for many years to attend a Bible college and to prepare [himself] through that college training for a lifetime of ministry, specifically as a church pastor.” App. 40. To that end, when he enrolled in Northwest College, he decided to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration. Id., at 43. There is no dispute that the pastoral ministries degree is devotional and therefore excluded under the Promise Scholarship Program.

At the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year, Davey met with Northwest’s director of financial aid. He learned for the first time at this meeting that he could not use his scholarship to pursue a devotional theology degree. He was informed that to receive the funds appropriated for his use, he must certify in writing that he was not pursuing such a degree at Northwest.1 He refused to sign the form and did not receive any scholarship funds.

*718Davey then brought an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against various state officials (hereinafter State) in the District Court for the Western District of Washington to enjoin the State from refusing to award the scholarship solely because a student is pursuing a devotional theology degree, and for damages. He argued the denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue a theology degree violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the District Court denied Davey’s request for a preliminary injunction, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court rejected Davey’s constitutional claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the State.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 299 F. 3d 748 (2002). The court concluded that the State had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment and thus under our decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), the State’s exclusion of theology majors must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 299 F. 3d, at 757-758. Finding that the State’s own antiestablishment concerns were not compelling, the court declared Washington's Promise Scholarship Program unconstitutional. Id., at 760. We granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 1031 (2003), and now reverse.

The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 469 (1973) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677 (1971)). Yet we have long said that “there is room for play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 669 (1970). In *719other words, there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.

This case involves that “play in the joints” described above. Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 652 (2002); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 399-400 (1983). As such, there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology, see Witters, supra, at 489, and the State does not contend otherwise. The question before us, however, is whether Washington, pursuant to its own constitution,2 which has been authoritatively interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students for the ministry, see Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 369-370, 771 P. 2d 1119, 1122 (1989) (en banc); cf. Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 629, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (1984) (en banc) (“It is not the role of the State to pay for the religious education of future ministers”), rev’d, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), can deny them such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause.

*720Davey urges us to answer' that question in the negative. He contends that under the rule we enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect, to religion.3 We reject his claim of presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning. In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of animal slaughter. We found that the law sought to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santería religion. . 508 U. S., at 535. In the present case, the State’s disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the community. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978). And it does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and *721receiving a government benefit.4 See ibid.; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 460 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.

Justice Scalia argues, however, that generally available benefits are part of the “baseline against which burdens on religion are measured.” Post, at 726 (dissenting opinion). Because the Promise Scholarship Program funds training for .all secular professions, Justice Scalia contends the State must also fund training for religious professions. See post, at 726-727. But training for religious professions and training for secular professions are not fungible. Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed, majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit. See Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 919, 436 P. 2d 189, 193 (1967) (en banc) (holding public funds may not be expended for “that category of instruction that resembles worship and manifests a devotion to religion and religious principles in thought, feeling, belief, and conduct”); App. 40 (Davey stating his “religious beliefs [were] the only reason for [him] to seek a college degree”). And the subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views — in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment — that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or professions. That a State would deal differently with religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings is a product of these views, not evidence of hostility toward religion.

*722Even though the differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution, the interest it seeks to further is scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.5 Since the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an “established” religion.6 See R. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education 15-17, 19-20, 26-37 (1950); F. Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America 188 (2003) (“In defending their religious liberty against overreaching clergy, Americans in all regions found that Radical Whig ideas best framed their argument that state-supported clergy undermined liberty of conscience and should be opposed”); see also J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 65, 68 (1947) *723(appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.) (noting the dangers to civil liberties from supporting clergy with public funds).

Most States that sought to avoid an establishment of religion around the time of the founding placed in their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to support the ministry. E. g., Ga. Const., Art. IV, §5 (1789), reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 789 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (reprinted 1993) (“All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own”); Pa. Const., Art. II (1776), in 5 id., at 3082 (“[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent”); N. J. Const., Art. XVIII (1776), in id., at 2597 (similar); Del. Const., Art. I, § 1 (1792), in 1 id., at 568 (similar); Ky. Const., Art. XII, § 3 (1792), in 3 id., at 1274 (similar); Vt. Const., Ch. I, Art. 3 (1793), in 6 id., at 3762 (similar); Tenn. Const., Art. XI, §3 (1796), in id., at 3422 (similar); Ohio Const., Art. VIII, § 3 (1802), in 5 id., at 2910 (similar). The plain text of these constitutional provisions prohibited any tax dollars from supporting the clergy. We have found nothing to indicate, as Justice Scalia contends, post, at 728, n. 1, that these provisions would not have applied so long as the State equally supported other professions or if the amount at stake was de minimis. That early state constitutions saw no problem in explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state dollars reinforces our conclusion that religious instruction is of a different ilk.7

*724Far from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits.8 The program permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited. As Northwest advertises, its “concept of education is distinctly Christian in the evangelical sense.” App. 168. It prepares all of its students, “through instruction, through modeling, [and] through [its] classes, to use . . . the Bible as their guide, as the truth,” no matter their chosen *725profession. Id., at 169. And under the Promise Scholarship Program’s current guidelines, students are still eligible to take devotional theology courses.9 Davey notes all students at Northwest are required to take at least four devotional courses, “Exploring the Bible,” “Principles of Spiritual Development,” “Evangelism in the Christian Life,” and “Christian Doctrine,” Brief for Respondent 11, n. 5; see also App. 151, and some students may have additional religious requirements as part of their majors. Brief for Respondent 11, n. 5; see also App. 150-151.

In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.10 Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.

Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of Washington.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

*726Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.

In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), the majority opinion held that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral... must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny,” id., at 546, and that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face,” id., at 533. The concurrence of two Justices stated that “[w]hen a law discriminates against religion as such, ... it automatically will fail strict scrutiny.” Id., at 579 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). And the concurrence of a third Justice endorsed the “noncontroversial principle” that “formal neutrality” is a “necessary conditio[n] for free-exercise constitutionality.” Id., at 563 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). These opinions are irreconcilable with today's decision, which sustains a public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion.

HH

We articulated the principle that governs this case more than 50 years ago in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947):

“New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.” Id., at 16 (emphasis deleted).

When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured; and when the State withholds *727that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.

That is precisely what the State of Washington has done here. It has created a generally available public benefit, whose receipt is conditioned only on academic performance, income, and attendance at an accredited school. It has then carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion: theology. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.l 19.010(8) (West Supp. 2004); Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-020(12)(g) (2003). No field of study but religion is singled out for disfavor in this fashion. Davey is not asking for a special benefit to which others are not entitled. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439,453 (1988). He seeks only equal treatment — the right to direct his scholarship to his chosen course of study, a right every other Promise Scholar enjoys.

The Court’s reference to historical “popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders,” ante, at 722, is therefore quite misplaced. That history involved not the inclusion of religious ministers in public benefits programs like the one at issue here, but laws that singled them out for financial aid. For example, the Virginia bill at which Madison’s Remonstrance was directed provided: “[F]or the support of Christian teachers ... [a] sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed ....” A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson, supra, at 72. Laws supporting the clergy in other States operated in a similar fashion. See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 131, 169, 270, 295, 304, 386 (1902). One can concede the Framers’ hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that says nothing about whether the clergy had to be excluded from benefits the State made available to all. No one would seriously contend, for example, that the Fram*728ers would have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church.1

The Court does not dispute that the Free Exercise Clause places some constraints on public benefits programs, but finds none here, based on a principle of “ ‘play in the joints.’ ” Ante, at 719. I use the term “principle” loosely, for that is not so much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing constitutional directives. There is nothing anomalous about constitutional commands that abut. A municipality hiring public contractors may not discriminate against blacks or in favor of them; it cannot discriminate a little bit each way and then plead “play in the joints” when haled into court. If the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as well as easy ones.

Even if “play in the joints” were a valid legal principle, surely it would apply only when it was a close call whether complying with one of the Religion Clauses would violate the other. But that is not the case here. It is not just that “the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional *729theology.” Ibid. The establishment question would not even be close, as is evident from the fact that this Court’s decision in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), was unanimous. Perhaps some formally neutral public benefits programs are so gerrymandered and devoid of plausible secular purpose that they might raise specters of state aid to religion, but an evenhanded Promise Scholarship Program is not among them.

In any case, the State already has all the play in the joints it needs. There are any number of ways it could respect both its unusually sensitive concern for the conscience of its taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause. It could make the scholarships redeemable only at public universities (where it sets the curriculum), or only for select courses of study. Either option would replace a program that facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens not to subsidize it. The State could also simply abandon the scholarship program altogether. If that seems a dear price to pay for freedom of conscience, it is only because the State has defined that freedom so broadly that it would be offended by a program with such an incidental, indirect religious effect.

What is the nature of the State’s asserted interest here? It cannot be protecting the pocketbooks of its citizens; given the tiny fraction of Promise Scholars who would pursue theology degrees, the amount of any citizen^ tax bill at stake is de minimis. It cannot be preventing mistaken appearance of endorsement; where a State merely declines to penalize students for selecting a religious major, “[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw ... an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.” Id., at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Nor can Washington’s exclusion be defended as a means of assuring that the State will neither favor nor disfavor Davey in his religious calling. Davey will throughout his life contribute to the public fisc through sales taxes on *730personal purchases, property taxes on his home, and so on; and nothing in the Court's opinion turns on whether Davey winds up a net winner or loser in the State’s tax-and-spend scheme.

No, the interest to which the Court defers is not fear of a conceivable Establishment Clause violation, budget constraints, avoidance of endorsement, or substantive neutrality — none of these. It is a pure philosophical preference: the State’s opinion that it would violate taxpayers’ freedom of conscience not to discriminate against candidates for the ministry. This sort of protection of “freedom of conscience” has no logical limit and can justify the singling out of religion for exclusion from public programs in virtually any context. The Court never says whether it deems this interest compelling (the opinion is devoid of any mention of standard of review) but, self-evidently, it is not.2

*731II

The Court makes no serious attempt to defend the program’s neutrality, and instead identifies two features thought to render its discrimination less offensive. The first is the lightness of Davey’s burden. The Court offers no authority for approving facial discrimination against religion simply because its material consequences are not severe. I might understand such a test if we were still in the business of reviewing facially neutral laws that merely happen to burden some individual’s religious exercise, but we are not. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 885 (1990). Discrimination on the face of a statute is something else. The indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial. The Court has not required proof of “substantial” concrete harm with other forms of discrimination, see, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493-495 (1954); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976), and it should not do so here.

Even if there were some threshold quantum-of-harm requirement, surely Davey has satisfied it. The First Amendment, after all, guarantees free exercise of religion, and when the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for religious exercise — whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit — religious practice is anything but free. The Court’s only response is that “Promise Scholars may still use their scholarship to pursue a secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying devotional theology.” Ante, at 721, n. 4. But part of what makes a Promise Scholarship attractive is that the recipient can apply it to his preferred course of study at his preferred accredited institution. That is part of the “benefit” the State confers. The Court distinguishes our precedents only by swapping the benefit to which Davey was actually entitled (a scholarship for his chosen course of study) with another, less valuable one (a scholarship for any course of study but his chosen *732one). On such reasoning, any facially discriminatory benefits program can be redeemed simply by redefining what it guarantees.

The other reason the Court thinks this particular facial discrimination less offensive is that the scholarship program was not motivated by animus toward religion. The Court does not explain why the legislature’s motive matters, and I fail to see why it should. If a State deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we do not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the evil the Constitution prohibits. It is sufficient that the citizen’s rights have been infringed. “[It does not] matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 559 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

The Court has not approached other forms of discrimination this way. When we declared racial segregation unconstitutional, we did not ask whether the State had originally adopted the regime, not out of “animus” against blacks, but because of a well-meaning but misguided belief that the races would be better off apart. It was sufficient to note the current effect of segregation on racial minorities. See Brown, supra, at 493-495. Similarly, the Court does not excuse statutes that facially discriminate against women just because they are the vestigial product of a well-intentioned view of women’s appropriate social role. See, e. g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 549-551 (1996); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C, 261 U. S. 525, 552-553 (1923). We do sometimes look to legislative intent to smoke out more subtle instances of discrimination, but we do so as a supplement to the core guarantee of facially equal treatment, not as a replacement for it. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 546 (1999).

There is no need to rely on analogies, however, because we have rejected the Court’s methodology in this very con*733text. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978), we considered a Tennessee statute that disqualified clergy from participation in the state constitutional convention. That statute, like the one here, was based upon a state constitutional provision — a clause in the 1796 Tennessee Constitution that disqualified clergy from sitting in the legislature. Id., at 621, and n. 1 (plurality opinion). The State defended the statute as an attempt to be faithful to its constitutional separation of church and state, and we accepted that claimed benevolent purpose as bona fide. See id., at 628. Nonetheless, because it did not justify facial discrimination against religion, we invalidated the restriction. Id., at 629.3

It may be that Washington’s original purpose in excluding the clergy from public benefits was benign, and the same might be true of its purpose in maintaining the exclusion today. But those singled out for disfavor can be forgiven for suspecting more invidious forces at work. Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious minority. Most citizens of this country identify themselves as professing some religious belief, but the State’s policy poses no obstacle to practitioners of only a tepid, civic version of faith. Those the statutory exclusion actually affects — those whose belief in their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and their lives to its ministry — are a far narrower set. One need not delve too far into modern popular culture to perceive a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction. In an era when the Court is so quick to come to the aid of other disfavored groups, see, e. g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 635 (1996), its indifference in this case, which involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually speaks, is exceptional.

*734Today’s holding is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go. What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits on the ground that taxpayers’ freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense? This may seem fanciful, but recall that France has proposed banning religious attire from schools, invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today. See Sciolino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faith Out of School, N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2003, p. A17, col. 1. When the public’s freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal treatment, benevolent motives shade into indifference and ultimately into repression. Having accepted the justification in this case, the Court is less well equipped to fend it off in the future. I respectfully dissent.

Justice Thomas,

dissenting.

Because the parties agree that a “degree in theology” means a degree that is “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith,” Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8, I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case. With this understanding, I join Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The contested statute denies Promise Scholarships to students who pursue “a degree in theology.” See Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-020(12)(g) (2003) (defining an “‘[eligible student,’” in part, as one who “[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.10.814 (West 1997) (“No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology”). But the statute itself does not define “theology.” And the usual definition of the term “theology” is not limited to devotional studies. “Theology” is defined as “[t]he study of the nature *735of God and religious truth” and the “rational inquiry into religious questions.” American Heritage Dictionary 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (1991) (“the study of religious faith, practice, and experience” and “the study of God and his relation to the world”). These definitions include the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.

Assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe that Justice Scalia’s application of our precedents is correct. Because neither party contests the validity of these precedents, I join Justice Scalia’s dissent.

*643Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of Ohio has established a pilot program designed to provide educational choices to families with children who *644reside in the Cleveland City School District. The question presented is whether this program offends the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.

There are more than 75,000 children enrolled in the Cleveland City School District. The majority of these children are from low-income and minority families. Few of these families enjoy the means to send their children to any school other than an inner-city public school. For more than a generation, however, Cleveland’s public schools have been among the worst performing public schools in the Nation. In 1995, a Federal District Court declared a “crisis of magnitude” and placed the entire Cleveland school district under state control. See Reed v. Rhodes, No. 1:73 CV 1300 (ND Ohio, Mar. 3, 1995). Shortly thereafter, the state auditor found that Cleveland’s public schools were in the midst of a “crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.” Cleveland City School District Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996). The district had failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for minimal acceptable performance. Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all levels performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public schools. More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before graduation. Of those students who managed to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to graduate. Of those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels comparable to their counterparts in other cities.

It is against this backdrop that Ohio enacted, among other initiatives, its Pilot Project Scholarship Program, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§3313.974-3313.979 (Anderson 1999 and Supp. 2000) (program). The program provides financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been “under federal court order requiring supervision and opera*645tional management of the district by the state superintendent.” § 3313.975(A). Cleveland is the only Ohio school district to fall within that category.

The program provides two basic kinds of assistance to parents of children in a covered district. First, the program provides tuition aid for students in kindergarten through third grade, expanding each year through eighth grade, to attend a participating public or private school of their parent’s choosing. §§ 3313.975(B) and (C)(1). Second, the program provides tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. § 3313.975(A).

The tuition aid portion of the program is designed to provide educational choices to parents who reside in a covered district. Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate in the program and accept program students so long as the school is located within the boundaries of a covered district and meets statewide educational standards. § 313.976(A)(3). Participating private schools must agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to “advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.” § 3313.976(A)(6). Any public school located in a school district adjacent to the covered district may also participate in the program. § 3313.976(C). Adjacent public schools are eligible to receive a $2,250 tuition grant for each program student accepted in addition to the full amount of per-pupil state funding attributable to each additional student. §§ 3313.976(C), 3317.0B(I)(1).1 All participating schools, *646whether public or private, are required to accept students in accordance with rules and procedures established by the state superintendent. §§3313.977(A)(l)(a)-(c).

Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. §§ 3313.978(A) and (C)(1). For these lowest income families, participating private schools may not charge a parental copayment greater than $250. §3313.976(A)(8). For all other families, the program pays 75% of tuition costs, up to $1,875, with no copayment cap. §§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A). These families receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds the number of low-income children who choose to participate.2 Where tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child. If parents choose a private school, checks are made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to the chosen school. § 3313.979.

The tutorial aid portion of the program provides tutorial assistance through grants to any student in a covered district who chooses to remain in public school. Parents arrange for registered tutors to provide assistance to their children and then submit bills for those services to the State for payment. §§ 3313.976(D), 3313.979(C). Students from low-income families receive 90% of the amount charged for such assistance up to $360. All other students receive 75% of that amount. § 3313.978(B). The number of tutorial assistance grants offered to students in a covered district must equal the number of tuition aid scholarships provided to stu*647dents enrolled at participating private or adjacent public schools. § 3313.975(A).

The program has been in operation within the Cleveland City School District since the 1996-1997 school year. In the 1999-2000 school year, 56 private schools participated in the program, 46 (or 82%) of which had a religious affiliation. None of the public schools in districts adjacent to Cleveland have elected to participate. More than 3,700 students participated in the scholarship program, most of whom (96%) enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of these students were from families at or below the poverty line. In the 1998-1999 school year, approximately 1,400 Cleveland public school students received tutorial aid. This number was expected to double during the 1999-2000 school year.

The program is part of a broader undertaking by the State to enhance the educational options of Cleveland’s schoolchildren in response to the 1995 takeover. That undertaking includes programs governing community and magnet schools. Community schools are funded under state law but are run by their own school boards, not by local school districts. §§ 3314.01(B), 3314.04. These schools enjoy academic independence to hire their own teachers and to determine their own curriculum. They can have no religious affiliation and are required to accept students by lottery. During the 1999-2000 school year, there were 10 startup community schools in the Cleveland City School District with more than 1,900 students enrolled. For each child enrolled in a community school, the school receives state funding of $4,518, twice the funding a participating program school may receive.

Magnet schools are public schools operated by a local school board that emphasize a particular subject area, teaching method, or service to students. For each student enrolled in a magnet school, the school district receives $7,746, including state funding of $4,167, the same amount received *648per student enrolled at a traditional public school. As of 1999, parents in Cleveland were able to choose from among 23 magnet schools, which together enrolled more than 13,000 students in kindergarten through eighth grade. These schools provide specialized teaching methods, such as Montessori, or a particularized curriculum focus, such as foreign language, computers, or the arts.

In 1996, respondents, a group of Ohio taxpayers, challenged the Ohio program in state court on state and federal grounds. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected respondents’ federal claims, but held that the enactment of the program violated certain procedural requirements of the Ohio Constitution. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 8-9, 711 N. E. 2d 203, 211 (1999). The state legislature immediately cured this defect, leaving the basic provisions discussed above intact.

In July 1999, respondents filed this action in United States District Court, seeking to enjoin the reenacted program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In August 1999, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction barring further implementation of the program, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725 (ND Ohio), which we stayed pending review by the Court of Appeals, 528 U. S. 983 (1999). In December 1999, the District Court granted summary judgment for respondents. 72 F. Supp. 2d 834. In December 2000, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, finding that the program had the “primary effect” of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 234 F. 3d 945 (CA6). The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate pending disposition in this Court. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-1779, p. 151. We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), and now reverse the Court of Appeals.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the “purpose” *649or “effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 222-223 (1997) (“[W]e continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion [and] whether the aid has the ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion” (citations omitted)). There is no dispute that the program challenged here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, the question presented is whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden “effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion.

To answer that question, our decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 810-814 (2000) (plurality opinion); id., at 841-844 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Agostini, supra, at 225-227; Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 842 (1995) (collecting cases), and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1 (1993). While our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of direct aid programs has “changed significantly” over the past two decades, Agostini, supra, at 236, our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has remained consistent and unbroken. Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges.

In Mueller, we rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota program authorizing tax deductions for various educational expenses, including private school tu*650ition costs, even though the great majority of the program’s beneficiaries (96%) were parents of children in religious schools. We began by focusing on the class of beneficiaries, finding that because the class included “all parents,” including parents with “children [who] attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools,” 463 U. S., at 397 (emphasis in original), the program was “not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause,” id., at 399 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981) (“The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect”)). Then, viewing the program as a whole, we emphasized the principle of private choice, noting that public funds were made available to religious schools “only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children.” 463 U. S., at 399-400. This, we said, ensured that “no ‘imprimatur of state approval’ can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally.” Id., at 399 (quoting Widmar, supra, at 274)). We thus found it irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry that the vast majority of beneficiaries were parents of children in religious schools, saying:

“We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law.” 463 U. S., at 401.

That the program was one of true private choice, with no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious schools, was sufficient for the program to survive scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.

In Witters, we used identical reasoning to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a student studying at a religious institution to become a pastor. Looking at the program as a whole, we observed that “[a]ny aid . . . that ulti*651mately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.” 474 U. S., at 487. We further remarked that, as in Mueller, “[the] program is made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.” 474 U. S., at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these factors, we held that the program was not inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Id., at 488-489.

Five Members of the Court, in separate opinions, emphasized the general rule from Mueller that the amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions "by individual aid recipients was not relevant to the constitutional inquiry. 474 U. S., at 490-491 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Mueller, supra, at 398-399); 474 U. S., at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 490 (White, J., concurring). Our holding thus rested not on whether few or many recipients chose to expend government aid at a religious school but, rather, on whether recipients generally were empowered to direct the aid to schools or institutions of their own choosing.

Finally, in Zobrest, we applied Mueller and Witters to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools. Reviewing our earlier decisions, we stated that “government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge.” 509 U. S., at 8. Looking once again to the challenged program as a whole, we observed that the program “distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as ‘disabled.’ ” Id., at 10. Its “primary beneficiaries,” we said, were “disabled children, not sectarian schools.” Id., at 12.

*652We further observed that “[b]y according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents.” Id., at 10. Our focus again was on neutrality and the principle of private choice, not on the number of program beneficiaries attending religious schools. Id., at 10-11. See, e. g., Agostini, 521 U. S., at 229 (“Zobrest did not turn on the fact that James Zobrest had, at the time of litigation, been the only child using a publicly funded sign-language interpreter to attend a parochial school”). Because the program ensured that parents were the ones to select a religious school as the best learning environment for their handicapped child, the circuit between government and religion was broken, and the Establishment Clause was not implicated.

Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. As a plurality of this Court recently observed:

“[I]f numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid, pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special *653favors that might lead to a religious establishment.” Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 810.

See also id., at 843 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[W]hen government aid supports a school’s religious mission only because of independent decisions made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, ‘no reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts ... an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief’ ” (quoting Witters, 474 U. S., at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). It is precisely for these reasons that we have never found a program of true private choice to offend the Establishment Clause.

We believe that the program challenged here is a program of true private choice, consistent with Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and thus constitutional. As was true in those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the children of a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion, i. e., any parent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District. The program permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a financial incentive to do so. Program benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no reference to religion. The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a preference for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at participating schools.

There are no “financial incentive[s]” that “ske[w]” the program toward religious schools. Witters, supra, at 487-488. Such incentives “[are] not present... where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both reli*654gious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Agostini, supra, at 231. The program here in fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools. Adjacent public schools, should any choose to accept program students, are also eligible to receive two to three times the state funding of a private religious school. Families too have a financial disincentive to choose a private religious school over other schools. Parents that choose to participate in the scholarship program and then to enroll their children in a private school (religious or nonreligious) must copay a portion of the school’s tuition. Families that choose a community school, magnet school, or traditional public school pay nothing. Although such features of the program are not necessary to its constitutionality, they clearly dispel the claim that the program “creates .. . financial incentive[s] for parents to choose a sectarian school.” Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 10.3

Respondents suggest that even without a financial incentive for parents to choose a religious school, the program creates a “public perception that the State is endorsing religious practices and beliefs.” Brief for Respondents Simmons-Harris et al. 37-38. But we have repeatedly rec*655ognized that no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 399; Witters, supra, at 488-489; Zobrest, supra, at 10-11; e.g., Mitchell, supra, at 842-843 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools... differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same religious schools”). The argument is particularly misplaced here since “the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware” of the “history and context” underlying a challenged program. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Any objective observer familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.

There also is no evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age children. Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational choices: They may remain in public school as before, remain in public school with publicly funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. That 46 of the 56 private schools now participating in the program are religious schools does not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coerc*656ing parents into sending their children to religious schools, and that question must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a program scholarship and then choose a religious school.

Justice Souter speculates that because more private religious schools currently participate in the program, the program itself must somehow discourage the participation of private nonreligious schools. Post, at 70S-705 (dissenting opinion).4 But Cleveland’s preponderance of religiously af*657filiated private schools certainly did not arise as a result of the program; it is a phenomenon common to many American cities. See U. S. Dept, of Ed., National Center for Education Statistics, Private School Universe Survey: 1999-2000, pp. 2-4 (NCES 2001-330, 2001) (hereinafter Private School Universe Survey) (cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24). Indeed, by all accounts the program has captured a remarkable cross-section of private schools, religious and nonreligious. It is true that 82% of Cleveland’s participating private schools are religious schools, but it is also true that 81% of private schools in Ohio are religious • schools. See Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (citing Private School Universe Survey). To attribute constitutional significance to this figure, moreover, would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in some parts of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of private schools are religious schools, see Ohio Educational Directory (Lodging of Respondents Gatton et al., available in Clerk of Court’s case file), and Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-1751, p. 12, n. 1, but not in inner-city Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed, but where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be greater. Cf. Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 17 (“[T]he percentages of sectarian to nonsectarian private schools within Florida’s 67 school districts . . . vary from zero to 100 percent”). Likewise, an identical private choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as Maine or Utah, where less *658than 45% of private schools are religious schools, but not in other States, such as Nebraska or Kansas, where over 90% of private schools are religious schools. Id., at 15-16 (citing Private School Universe Survey).

Respondents and Justice Souter claim that even if we do not focus on the number of participating schools that are religious schools, we should attach constitutional significance to the fact that 96% of scholarship recipients have enrolled in religious schools. They claim that this alone proves parents lack genuine choice, even if no parent has ever said so. We need not consider this argument in detail, since it was flatly rejected in Mueller, where we found it irrelevant that 96% of parents taking deductions for tuition expenses paid tuition at religious schools. Indeed, we have recently found it irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools. See Agostini, 521 U. S., at 229 (“Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid” (citing Mueller, 463 U. S., at 401)); see also Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 812, n. 6 (plurality opinion) (“[Agostini] held that the proportion of aid benefiting students at religious schools pursuant to a neutral program involving private choices was irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry”); id., at 848 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (same) (quoting Agostini, supra, at 229). The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school. As we said in Mueller, “[s]uch an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated.” 463 U. S., at 401.

*659This point is aptly illustrated here. The 96% figure upon which respondents and Justice Souter rely discounts entirely (1) the more than 1,900 Cleveland children enrolled in alternative community schools, (2) the more than 13,000 children enrolled in alternative magnet schools, and (3) the more than 1,400 children enrolled in traditional public schools with tutorial assistance. See supra, at 647-648. Including some or all of these children in the denominator of children enrolled in nontraditional schools during the 1999-2000 school year drops the percentage enrolled in religious schools from 96% to under 20%. See also J. Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of Parental Choice in Cleveland 11, Table 4 (Oct. 8,1999), App. 217a (reporting that only 16.5% of nontraditional schoolchildren in Cleveland choose religious schools). The 96% figure also represents but a snapshot of one particular school year. In the 1997-1998 school year, by contrast, only 78% of scholarship recipients attended religious schools. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-1751, p. 5a. The difference was attributable to two private nonreligious, schools that had accepted 15% of all scholarship students electing instead to register as community schools, in light of larger per-pupil funding for community schools and the uncertain future of the scholarship program generated by this litigation. See App. 59a-62a, 209a, 223a-227a.5 Many of the students enrolled in these schools *660as scholarship students remained enrolled as community school students, id., at 145a-146a, thus demonstrating the arbitrariness of counting one type of school but not the other to assess primary effect, e. g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3314.11 (Anderson 1999) (establishing a single “office of school options” to “provide services that facilitate the management of the community schools program and the pilot project scholarship program”). In spite of repeated questioning from the Court at oral argument, respondents offered no convincing justification for their approach, which relies entirely on such arbitrary classifications. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-60.6

*661Respondents finally claim that we should look to Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), to decide these cases. We disagree for two reasons. First, the program in Nyquist was quite different from the program challenged here. Nyquist involved a New York program that gave a package of benefits exclusively to private schools and the parents of private school enroll-ees. Although the program was enacted for ostensibly secular purposes, id., at 773-774, we found that its “function” was “unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions,” id., at 783 (emphasis added). Its genesis, we said, was that private religious schools faced “increasingly grave fiscal problems.” Id., at 795. The program thus provided direct money grants to religious schools. Id., at 762-764. It provided tax benefits “unrelated to the amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition,” ensuring a windfall, to parents of children in religious schools. Id., at 790. It similarly provided tuition reimbursements designed explicitly to “offe[r] ... an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools.” Id., at 786. Indeed, the program flatly prohibited the participation of any public school, or parent of any public school enrollee. Id., at 763-765. Ohio’s program shares none of these features.

Second, were there any doubt that the program challenged in Nyquist is far removed from the program challenged here, we expressly reserved judgment with respect to “a case involving some form of public assistance ie.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.” Id., at 782-783, n. 38. That, of course, is the very question now before us, and it has since been answered, first in Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399 (“[A] program ... that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause” (citing Nyquist, supra, at 782-783, n. 38)), *662then in Witters, 474 U. S., at 487 (“Washington’s program is ‘made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited’ ” (quoting Nyquist, supra, at 782-783, n. 38)), and again in Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 12-13 (“[T]he function of the [program] is hardly ‘to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions’” (quoting Nyquist, supra, at 782-783, n. 38)). To the extent the scope of Nyquist has remained an open question in light of these later decisions, we now hold that Nyquist does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here, offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.7

In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of *663decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend the Establishment Clause.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice O’Connor,

concurring.

The Court holds that Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§3313.974-3313.979 (Anderson 1999 and Supp. 2000) (voucher program), survives respondents’ Establishment Clause challenge. While I join the Court’s opinion, I write separately for two reasons. First, although the Court takes an important step, I do not believe that today’s decision, when considered in light of other longstanding government programs that impact religious organizations and our prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence, marks a dramatic break from the past. Second, given the emphasis the Court places on verifying that parents of voucher students in religious schools have exercised “true private choice,” I think it is worth elaborating on the Court’s conclusion that this inquiry should consider all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to parents. To do otherwise is to ignore how the educational system in Cleveland actually functions.

I

These cases are different from prior indirect aid cases in part because a significant portion of the funds appropriated for the voucher program reach religious schools without restrictions on the use of these funds. The share of public resources that reach religious schools is not, however, as significant as respondents suggest. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Simmons-Harris et al. 1-2. Data from the 1999-2000 school year indicate that 82 percent of schools participating in the voucher program were religious and that 96 percent of participating students enrolled in religious *664schools, see App. in Nos. 00-3055, etc. (CA6), p. 1679 (46 of 56 private schools in the program are religiously affiliated; 3,637 of 3,765 voucher students attend religious private schools), but these data are incomplete. These statistics do not take into account all of the reasonable educational choices that may be available to students in Cleveland public schools. When one considers the option to attend community schools, the percentage of students enrolled in religious schools falls to 62.1 percent. If magnet schools are included in the mix, this percentage falls to 16.5 percent. See J. Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of Parental Choice in Cleveland 11, Table 4 (Oct. 8, 1999), App. 217a (reporting 2,087 students in community schools and 16,184 students in magnet schools).

Even these numbers do not paint a complete picture. The Cleveland program provides voucher applicants from low-income families with up to $2,250 in tuition assistance and provides the remaining applicants with up to $1,875 in tuition assistance. §§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A) and (C)(1). In contrast, the State provides community schools $4,518 per pupil and magnet schools, on average, $7,097 per pupil. Affidavit of Caroline M. Hoxby ¶¶4^ 4c, App. 56a. Even if one assumes that all voucher students came from low-income families and that each voucher student used up the entire $2,250 voucher, at most $8.2 million of public funds flowed to religious schools under the voucher program in 1999-2000. Although just over one-half as many students attended community schools as religious private schools on the state fisc, the State spent over $1 million more — $9.4 million — on students in community schools than on students in religious private schools because per-pupil aid to community schools is more than double the per-pupil aid to private schools under the voucher program. Moreover, the amount spent on religious private schools is minor compared to the $114.8 million the State spent on students in the Cleveland magnet schools.

*665Although $8.2 million is no small sum, it pales in comparison to the amount of funds that federal,- state, and local governments already provide religious institutions. Religious organizations may qualify for exemptions from the federal corporate income tax, see 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3); the corporate income tax in many States, see, e. g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §23701d (West 1992); and property taxes in all 50 States, see Turner, Property Tax Exemptions for Nonprofits, 12 Probate & Property 25 (Sept./Oct. 1998); and clergy qualify for a federal tax break on income used for housing expenses, 26 U. S. C. § 1402(a)(8). In addition, the Federal Government provides individuals, corporations, trusts, and estates a tax deduction for charitable contributions to qualified religious groups. See §§ 170, 642(c). Finally, the Federal Government and certain state governments provide tax credits for educational expenses, many of which are spent on education at religious schools. See, e.g., §25A (Hope tax credit); Minn. Stat. § 290.0674 (Supp. 2001).

Most of these tax policies are well established, see, e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for educational expenses); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (upholding an exemption for religious organizations from New York property tax), yet confer a significant relative benefit on religious institutions. The state property tax exemptions for religious institutions alone amount to very large sums annually. For example, available data suggest that Colorado’s exemption lowers that State’s tax revenues by more than $40 million annually, see Rabey, Exemptions a Matter of Faith: No Proof Required of Tax-Free Churches, Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Oct. 26, 1992, p. Bl; Colorado Debates Church, Nonprofit Tax-Exempt Status, Philadelphia Enquirer, Oct. 4, 1996, p. 8; Maryland’s exemption lowers revenues by more than $60 million, see Maryland Dept, of Assessment and Taxation, 2001 SDAT Annual Report (Apr. 25, 2002), http://www.dat.state.md.us/sdatweb/stats/ *66601ar_rpt.html (Internet sources available in Clerk of Court’s case file); Wisconsin’s exemption lowers revenues by approximately $122 million, see Wisconsin Dept, of Revenue, Division of Research and Analysis, Summary of Tax Exemption Devices 2001, Property Tax (Apr. 25, 2002), http://www.dor. state.wi.us/ra/sumOOpro.html ($5,688 billion in exempt religious property; statewide average property tax rate of $21.46 per $1,000 of property); and Louisiana’s exemption, looking just at the city of New Orleans, lowers revenues by over $36 million, see Bureau of Governmental Research, Property Tax Exemptions and Assessment Administration in Orleans Parish: Summary and Recommendations 2 (Dec. 1999) ($22.6 million for houses of worship and $14.1 million for religious schools). As for the Federal Government, the tax deduction for charitable contributions reduces federal tax revenues by nearly $25 billion annually, see U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 344 (2000) (hereinafter Statistical Abstract), and it is reported that over 60 percent of household charitable contributions go to religious charities, id., at 397. Even the relatively minor exemptions lower federal tax receipts by substantial amounts. The parsonage exemption, for example, lowers revenues by around $500 million. See Diaz, Ramstad Prepares Bill to Retain Tax Break for Clergy’s Housing, Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 30, 2002, p. 4A.

These tax exemptions, which have “much the same effect as [cash grants] ... of the amount of tax [avoided],” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 544 (1983); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 859-860, esp. n. 4 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring), are just part of the picture. Federal dollars also reach religiously affiliated organizations through public health programs such as Medicare, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395-1395ggg, and Medicaid, §1396 et seq., through educational programs such as the Pell Grant program, 20 U. S. C. § 1070a, and the G. I. Bill of Rights, 38 U. S. C. §§3451, 3698; and *667through childcare programs such as the Child Care and Development Block Grant Program (CCDBG), 42 U. S. C. § 9858 (1994 ed., Supp. V). Medicare and Medicaid provide federal funds to pay for the healthcare of the elderly and the poor, respectively, see 1 B. Furrow, T. Greaney, S. Johnson, T. Jost, & R. Schwartz, Health Law 545-546 (2d ed. 2000); 2 id., at 2; the Pell Grant program and the G. I. Bill subsidize higher education of low-income individuals and veterans, respectively, see Mulleneaux, The Failure to Provide Adequate Higher Education Tax Incentives for Lower-Income Individuals, 14 Akron Tax J. 27, 31 (1999); and the CCDBG program finances child care for low-income parents, see Pitegoff, Child Care Policy and the Welfare Reform Act, 6 J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 113, 121-122 (1997). These programs are well-established parts of our social welfare system, see, e. g., Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 782-783, n. 38 (1973), and can be quite substantial, see Statistical Abstract 92 (Table 120) ($211.4 billion spent on Medicare and nearly $176.9 billion on Medicaid in 1998), id., at 135 (Table 208) ($9.1 billion in financial aid provided by the Department of Education and $280.5 million by the Department of Defense in 1999); Bush On Welfare: Tougher Work Rules, More State Control, Congress Daily, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 8 ($4.8 billion for the CCDBG program in 2001).

A significant portion of the funds appropriated for these programs reach religiously affiliated institutions, typically without restrictions on its subsequent use. For example, it has been reported that religious hospitals, which account for 18 percent of all hospital beds nationwide, rely on Medicare funds for 36 percent of their revenue. Merger-Watch, New Study Details Public Funding of Religious Hospitals (Jan. 2002), http://www.mergerwatch.org/inthenews/ publicfunding.html. Moreover, taking into account both Medicare and Medicaid, religious hospitals received nearly $45 billion from the federal fisc in 1998. Ibid. Federal aid *668to religious schools is also substantial. Although data for all States are not available, data from Minnesota, for example, suggest that a substantial share of Pell Grant and other federal funds for college tuition reach religious schools. Roughly one-third or $27.1 million of the federal tuition dollars spent on students at schools in Minnesota were used at private 4-year colleges. Minnesota Higher Education Services Office, Financial Aid Awarded, Fiscal Year 1999: Grants, Loans, and Student Earning from Institution Jobs (Jan. 24, 2001). The vast majority of these funds — $23.5 million— flowed to religiously affiliated institutions. Ibid.

Against this background, the support that the Cleveland voucher program provides religious institutions is neither substantial nor atypical of existing government programs. While this observation is not intended to justify the Cleveland voucher program under the Establishment Clause, see post, at 709-710, n. 19 (Souter, J., dissenting), it places in broader perspective alarmist claims about implications of the Cleveland program and the Court’s decision in these cases. See post, at 685-686 (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at 715-716 (Souter, J., dissenting); post, p. 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

II

Nor does today’s decision signal a major departure from this Court’s prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence. A central tool in our analysis of cases in this area has been the Lemon test. As originally formulated, a statute passed this test only if it had “a secular legislative purpose,” if its “principal or primary effect” was one that “neither advance[d] nor inhibited] religion,” and if it did “not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 218, 232-233 (1997), we folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry. This made sense because both inquiries rely on the same evidence, see ibid., and the degree of entangle*669ment has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The test today is basically the same as that set forth in School Dish of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222 (1963) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)), over 40 years ago.

The Court’s opinion in these cases focuses on a narrow question related to the Lemon test: how to apply the primary effects prong in indirect aid cases? Specifically, it clarifies the basic inquiry when trying to determine whether a program that distributes aid to beneficiaries, rather than directly to service providers, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 613-614, or, as I have put it, of “endors[ing] or disapproving] . . . religion,” Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 691-692 (concurring opinion); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). See also ante, at 652. Courts are instructed to consider two factors: first, whether the program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious status of beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the answer to either query is “no,” the program should be struck down under the Establishment Clause. See ante, at 652-653.

Justice Souter portrays this inquiry as a departure from Everson. See post, at 687-688 (dissenting opinion). A fair reading of the holding in that case suggests quite the opposite. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court held that the “[First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.” Everson, supra, at 18; see also Schempp, supra, at 218, 222. *670How else could the Court have upheld a state program to provide students transportation to public and religious schools alike? What the Court clarifies in these cases is that the Establishment Clause also requires that state aid flowing to religious organizations through the hands of beneficiaries must do so only at the direction of those beneficiaries. Such a refinement of the Lemon test surely does not betray Everson.

Ill

There is little question in my mind that the Cleveland voucher program is neutral as between religious schools and nonreligious schools. See ante, at 653-654. Justice Sou-ter rejects the Court’s notion of neutrality, proposing that the neutrality of a program should be gauged not by the opportunities it presents but rather by its effects. In particular, a “neutrality test... [should] focus on a category of aid that may be directed to religious as well as secular schools, and ask whether the scheme favors a religious direction.” Post, at 697 (dissenting opinion). JUSTICE SOUTER doubts that the Cleveland program is neutral under this view. He surmises that the cap on tuition that voucher schools may charge low-income students encourages these students to attend religious rather than nonreligious private voucher schools. See post, at 704-705. But Justice Souter’s notion of neutrality is inconsistent with that in our case law. As we put it in Agostini, government aid must be “made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.” 521 U. S., at 231.

I do not agree that the nonreligious schools have failed to provide Cleveland parents reasonable alternatives to religious schools in the voucher program. For nonreligious schools to qualify as genuine options for parents, they need not be superior to religious schools in every respect. They need only be adequate substitutes for religious schools in the eyes of parents. The District Court record demonstrates that nonreligious schools were able to compete effectively *671with Catholic and other religious schools in the Cleveland voucher program. See ante, at 656-657, n. 4. The best evidence of this is that many parents with vouchers selected nonreligious private schools over religious alternatives and an even larger number of parents send their children to community and magnet schools rather than seeking vouchers at all. Supra, at 663-664. Moreover, there is no record evidence that any voucher-eligible student was turned away from a nonreligious private school in the voucher program, let alone a community or magnet school. See 234 F. 3d 945, 969 (CA6 2000) (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Affidavit of David L. Brennan ¶ 8, App. 147a.

To support his hunch about the effect of the cap on tuition under the voucher program, Justice Soutee cites national data to suggest that, on average, Catholic schools have a cost advantage over other types of schools. See post, at 705-706, n. 15 (dissenting opinion). Even if national statistics were relevant for evaluating the Cleveland program, Justice Sou-tee ignores evidence which suggests that, at a national level, nonreligious private schools may target a market for a different, if not a higher, quality of education. For example, nonreligious private schools are smaller, see U. S. Dept. of Ed., National Center for Education Statistics, Private School Universe Survey, 1997-1998 (Oct. 1999) (Table 60) (87 and 269 students per private nonreligious and Catholic elementary school, respectively); have smaller class sizes, see ibid. (9.4 and 18.8 students per teacher at private nonreligious and Catholic elementary schools, respectively); have more highly educated teachers, see U. S. Dept. of Ed., National Center for Education Statistics, Private Schools in the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1993-1994 (NCES 97-459, July 1997) (Table 3.4) (37.9 percent of nonreligious private school teachers but only 29.9 percent of Catholic school teachers have Master’s degrees); and have principals with longer job tenure than Catholic schools, see ibid. (Table 3.7) (average ten*672ure of principals at private nonreligious and Catholic schools is 8.2 and 4.7 years, respectively).

Additionally, Justice Souter’s theory that the Cleveland voucher program’s cap on the tuition encourages low-income students to attend religious schools ignores that these students receive nearly double the amount of tuition assistance under the community schools program than under the voucher program and that none of the community schools is religious. See ante, at 647.

In my view the more significant finding in these cases is that Cleveland parents who use vouchers to send their children to religious private schools do so as a result of true private choice. The Court rejects, correctly, the notion that the high percentage of voucher recipients who enroll in religious private schools necessarily demonstrates that parents do not actually have the option to send their children to nonreligious schools. Ante, at 656-660. Likewise, the mere fact that some parents enrolled their children in religious schools associated with a different faith than their own, see post, at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting), says little about whether these parents had reasonable nonreligious options. Indeed, no voucher student has been known to be turned away from a nonreligious private school participating in the voucher program. Supra this page. This is impressive given evidence in the record that the present litigation has discouraged the entry of some nonreligious private schools into the voucher program. Declaration of David P. Zanotti ¶¶5, 10, App. 225a, 227a. Finally, as demonstrated above, the Cleveland program does not establish financial incentives to undertake a religious education.

I find the Court’s answer to the question whether parents of students eligible for vouchers have a genuine choice between religious and nonreligious schools persuasive. In looking at the voucher program, all the choices available to potential beneficiaries of the government program should be considered. In these cases, parents who were eligible to *673apply for a voucher also had the option, at a minimum, to send their children to community schools. Yet the Court of Appeals chose not to look at community schools, let alone magnet schools, when evaluating the Cleveland voucher program. See 234 F. 3d, at 958. That decision was incorrect. Focusing in these cases only on the program challenged by respondents ignores how the educational system in Cleveland actually functions. The record indicates that, in 1999, two nonreligious private schools that had previously served 15 percent of the students in the voucher program were prompted to convert to community schools because parents were concerned about the litigation surrounding the program, and because a new community schools program provided more per-pupil financial aid. Many of the students that enrolled in the two schools under the voucher program transferred to the community schools program and continued to attend these schools. See Affidavit of David L. Brennan ¶¶3, 10, App. 145a, 147a; Declaration of David P. Zanotti ¶¶ 4 — 10, id., at 225a-227a. This incident provides strong evidence that both parents and nonreligious schools view the voucher program and the community schools program as reasonable alternatives.

Considering all the educational options available to parents whose children are eligible for vouchers, including community and magnet schools, the Court finds that parents in the Cleveland schools have an array of nonreligious options. Ante, at 655. Not surprisingly, respondents present no evidence that any students who were candidates for a voucher were denied slots in a community school or a magnet school. Indeed, the record suggests the opposite with respect to community schools.' See Affidavit of David L. Brennan ¶ 8, App. 147 a.

Justice Souter nonetheless claims that, of the 10 community schools operating in Cleveland during the 1999-2000 school year, 4 were unavailable to students with vouchers and 4 others reported poor test scores. See post, at 702-*674703, n. 10 (dissenting opinion). But that analysis unreasonably limits the choices available to Cleveland parents. It is undisputed that Cleveland’s 24 magnet schools are reasonable alternatives to voucher schools. See post, at 701-702, n. 9 (Souter, J., dissenting); http://www.cmsdnet.net/ administration/EducationalServices/magnet.htm (June 20, 2002). And of the four community schools Justice Souter claims are unavailable to voucher students, he is correct only about one (Life Skills Center of Cleveland). Affidavit of Steven M. Puckett ¶ 12, App. 162a. JUSTICE Souter rejects the three other community schools (Horizon Science Academy, Cleveland Alternative Learning, and International Preparatory School) because they did not offer primary school classes, were targeted toward poor students or students with disciplinary or academic problems, or were not in operation for a year. See post, at 702-703, n. 10. But a community school need not offer primary school classes to be an alternative to religious middle schools, and catering to impoverished or otherwise challenged students may make a school more attractive to certain inner-city parents. Moreover, the one community school that was closed in 1999-2000 was merely looking for a new location and was operational in other years. See Affidavit of Steven M. Puckett ¶ 12, App. 162a; Ohio Dept, of Ed., Office of School Options, Community Schools, Ohio’s Community School Directory' (June 22, 2002), http://www.ode.state.oh.us/community_ schools/community_school_directory/default.asp. Two more community schools were scheduled to open after the 1999-2000 school year. See Affidavit of Steven M. Puckett ¶ 13, App. 163a.

Of the six community schools that Justice Souter admits as alternatives to the voucher program in 1999-2000, he notes that four (the Broadway, Cathedral, Chapelside, and Lincoln Park campuses of the Hope Academy) reported lower test scores than public schools during the school year after the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to re*675spondents, according to report cards prepared by the Ohio Department of Education. See post, at 702-703, n. 10 (dissenting opinion). (One, Old Brooklyn Montessori School, performed better than public schools. Ibid.; see also Ohio Dept, of Ed., 2001 Community School Report Card, Old Brooklyn Montessori School 5 (community school scored higher than public schools in four of five subjects in 1999-2000).) These report cards underestimate the value of the four Hope Academy schools. Before they entered the community school program, two of them participated in the voucher program. Although they received far less state funding in that capacity, they had among the highest rates of parental satisfaction of all voucher schools, religious or nonreligious. See P. Peterson, W. Howell, & J. Greene, An Evaluation of the Cleveland Voucher Program after Two Years 6, Table 4 (June 1999) (hereinafter Peterson). This is particularly impressive given that a Harvard University study found that the Hope Academy schools attracted the “poorest and most educationally disadvantaged students.” J. Greene, W. Howell, P. Peterson, Lessons from the Cleveland Scholarship Program 22, 24 (Oct. 15, 1997). Moreover, Justice Souter’s evaluation of the Hope Academy schools assumes that the only relevant measure of school quality is academic performance. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that parents in the inner city also choose schools that provide discipline and a safe environment for their children. On these dimensions some of the schools that Justice Sou-TER derides have performed quite ably. See Peterson, Table 7.

Ultimately, Justice Souter relies on very narrow data to draw rather broad conclusions. One year of poor test scores at four community schools targeted at the most challenged students from the inner city says little about the value of those schools, let alone the quality of the 6 other community schools and 24 magnet schools in Cleveland. Justice Sou-ter’s use of statistics confirms the Court’s wisdom in refus*676ing to consider them when assessing the Cleveland program’s constitutionality. See ante, at 658. What appears to motivate Justice Souter’s analysis is a desire for a limiting principle to rule out certain nonreligious schools as alternatives to religious schools in the voucher program. See post, at 700,701-702, n. 9 (dissenting opinion). But the goal of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is to determine whether, after the Cleveland voucher program was enacted, parents were free to direct state educational aid in either a nonreligious or religious direction. See ante, at 655-656. That inquiry requires an evaluation of all reasonable educational options Ohio provides the Cleveland school system, regardless of whether they are formally made available in the same section of the Ohio Code as the voucher program.

Based on the reasoning in the Court’s opinion, which is consistent with the realities of the Cleveland educational system, I am persuaded that the Cleveland voucher program affords parents of eligible children genuine nonreligious options and is consistent with the Establishment Clause.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

Frederick Douglass once said that “[education .. . means emancipation. ■ It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made free.”1 Today many of our inner-city public schools deny emancipation to urban minority students. Despite this Court’s observation nearly 50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954), that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education,” urban children have been forced into a system that continually fails them. These cases present an *677example of such failures. Besieged by escalating financial problems and declining academic achievement, the Cleveland City School District was in the midst of an academic emergency when Ohio enacted its scholarship program.

The dissents and respondents wish to invoke the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth, to constrain a State’s neutral efforts to provide greater educational opportunity for underprivileged minority students. Today’s decision properly upholds the program as constitutional, and I join it in full.

I

This Court has often considered whether efforts to provide children with the best educational resources conflict with constitutional limitations. Attempts to provide aid to religious schools or to allow some degree of religious involvement in public schools have generated significant controversy and litigation as States try to navigate the line between the secular and the religious in education. See generally Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203, 237-238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution does not tell judges “where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education”). We have recently decided several cases challenging federal aid programs that include religious schools. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997). To determine whether a federal program survives scrutiny under the Establishment Clause, we have considered whether it has a secular purpose and whether it has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. See Mitchell, supra, at 807-808. I agree with the Court that Ohio’s program easily passes muster under our stringent test, but, as a matter of first principles, I question whether this test should be applied to the States.

*678The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” On its face, this provision places no limit on the States with regard to religion. The Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by extension their citizens, from the imposition of an established religion by the Federal Government.2 Whether and how this Clause should constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a more difficult question.

The Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally restructured the relationship between individuals and the States and ensured that States would not deprive citizens of liberty without due process of law. It guarantees citizenship to all individuals born or naturalized in the United States and provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” As Justice Harlan noted, the Fourteenth Amendment “added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 555 (1896) (dissenting opinion). When rights are incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain, individual liberty.

Consequently, in the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal Government. “States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement [in religion] — on a neu*679tral basis — than the Federal Government.” Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, while the Federal Government may “make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest. By considering the particular religious liberty right alleged to be invaded by a State, federal courts can strike a proper balance between the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of States on the other.3

Whatever the textual and historical merits of incorporating the Establishment Clause, I can accept that the Fourteenth Amendment protects religious liberty rights.4 But I *680cannot accept its use to oppose neutral programs of school choice through the incorporation of the Establishment Clause. There would be a tragic irony in converting the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of individual liberty into a prohibition on the exercise of educational choice.

II

The wisdom of allowing States greater latitude in dealing with matters of religion and education can be easily appreciated in this context. Respondents advocate using the Fourteenth Amendment to handcuff the State’s ability to experiment with education. But without education one can hardly exercise the civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Faced, with a severe educational crisis, the State of Ohio enacted wide-ranging educational reform that allows voluntary participation of private and religious schools in educating poor urban children otherwise condemned to failing public schools. The program does not force any individual to submit to religious indoctrination or education. It simply gives parents a greater choice as to where and in what manner to educate their children.5 This is a choice that those with greater means have routinely exercised.

*681Cleveland parents now have a variety of educational choices. There are traditional public schools, magnet schools, and privately run community schools, in addition to the scholarship program. Currently, 46 of the 66 private schools participating in the scholarship program are church affiliated (35 are Catholic), and 96 percent of students in the program attend religious schools. See App. 281a-286a; 234 F. 3d 945, 949 (CA6 2000). Thus, were the Court to disallow the inclusion of religious schools, Cleveland children could use their scholarships at only 10 private schools.

In addition to expanding the reach of the scholarship program, the inclusion of religious schools makes sense given Ohio’s purpose of increasing educational performance and opportunities. Religious schools, like other private schools, achieve far better educational results than their public counterparts. For example, the students at Cleveland’s Catholic schools score significantly higher on Ohio proficiency tests than students at Cleveland public schools. Of Cleveland eighth graders taking the 1999 Ohio proficiency test, 95 percent in Catholic schools passed the reading test, whereas only 57 percent in public schools passed. And 75 percent of Catholic school students passed the math proficiency test, compared to only 22 percent of public school students. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-1777, p. 10. But the success of religious and private schools is in the end beside the point, because the State has a constitutional right to experiment with a variety of different programs to promote educational opportunity. That Ohio’s program includes successful schools simply indicates that such reform can in fact provide improved education to underprivileged urban children.

Although one of the purposes of public schools was to promote democracy and a more egalitarian culture,6 failing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority children most in need of educational opportunity. At the time *682of Reconstruction, blacks considered public education “a matter of personal liberation and a necessary function of a free society.” J. Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935, p. 18 (1988). Today, however, the promise of public school education has failed poor inner-city blacks. While in theory providing education to everyone, the quality of public schools varies significantly across districts. Just as blacks supported public education during Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now support school choice programs because they provide the greatest educational opportunities for their children in struggling communities.7 Opponents of the program raise formalistic concerns about the Establishment Clause but ignore the core purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While the romanticized ideal of universal public education resonates with the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban families just want the best education for their children, who will certainly need it to function in our high-tech and advanced society. As Thomas Sowell noted 30 years ago: “Most black people have faced too many grim, concrete problems to be romantics. They want and need certain tangible results, which can be achieved only by developing certain specific abilities.” Black Education: Myths and Tragedies 228 (1972). The same is true today. An individual’s life prospects increase dramatically with each successfully completed phase of education. For instance, a black high *683school dropout earns just over $13,500, but with a high school degree the average income is almost $21,000. Blacks with a bachelor’s degree have an average annual income of about $37,500, and $75,500 with a professional degree. See U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 140 (2001) (Table 218). Staying in school and earning a degree generates real and tangible financial benefits, whereas failure to obtain even a high school degree essentially relegates students to a life of poverty and, all too often, of crime.8 The failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can arm minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of discrimination’s effects.

* * *

Ten States have enacted some form of publicly funded private school choice as one means of raising the quality of education provided to underprivileged urban children.9 These programs address the root of the problem with failing urban public schools that disproportionately affect minority students. Society’s other solution to these educational failures is often to provide racial preferences in higher education. Such preferences, however, run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against distinctions based on race. See Plessy, 163 U. S., at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). By contrast, school choice programs that involve religious schools *684appear unconstitutional only to those who would twist the Fourteenth Amendment against itself by expansively incorporating the Establishment Clause. Converting the Fourteenth Amendment from a guarantee of opportunity to an obstacle against education reform distorts our constitutional values and disserves those in the greatest need.

As Frederick Douglass poignantly noted, “no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long benighted people, than giving to them, as we are here earnestly this day endeavoring to do, the means of an education.”10

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Is a law that authorizes the use of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of grammar school children in particular religious faiths a “law respecting an establishment of religion” within the meaning of the First Amendment? In answering that question, I think we should ignore three factual matters that are discussed at length by my colleagues.

First, the severe educational crisis that confronted the Cleveland City School District when Ohio enacted its voucher program is not a matter that should affect our appraisal of its constitutionality. In the 1999-2000 school year, that program provided relief to less than five percent of the students enrolled in the district's schools. The solution to the disastrous conditions that prevented over 90 percent of the student body from meeting basic proficiency standards obviously required massive improvements unrelated to the voucher program.1 Of course, the emergency may have *685given some families a powerful motivation to leave the public school system and accept religious indoctrination that they would otherwise have avoided, but that is not a valid reason for upholding the program.

Second, the wide range of choices that have been made available to students within the public school system has no bearing on the question whether the State may pay the tuition for students who wish to reject public education entirely and attend private schools that will provide them with a sectarian education. The fact that the vast majority of the voucher recipients who have entirely rejected public education receive religious indoctrination at state expense does, however, support the claim that the law is one “respecting an establishment of religion.” The State may choose to divide up its public schools into a dozen different options and label them magnet schools, community schools, or whatever else it decides to call them, but the State is still required to provide a public education and it is the State’s decision to fund private school education over and above its traditional obligation that is at issue in these cases.2

Third, the voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over an education in the public school system seems to me quite irrelevant to the question whether the government’s choice to pay for religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible. Today, however, the Court seems to have decided that the mere fact that a family that cannot afford a private education wants its children educated in a parochial school is a sufficient justification for this use of public funds.

For the reasons stated by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, I am convinced that the Court’s decision is profoundly misguided. Admittedly, in reaching that conclusion *686I have been influenced by my understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust one another. Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Court's majority holds that the Establishment Clause is no bar to Ohio’s payment of tuition at private religious elementary and middle schools under a scheme that systematically provides tax money to support the schools’ religious missions. The occasion for the legislation thus upheld is the condition of public education in the city of Cleveland. The record indicates that the schools are failing to serve their objective, and the vouchers in issue here are said to be needed to provide adequate alternatives to them. If there were an excuse for giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause, it would probably apply here. But there is no excuse. Constitutional limitations are placed on government to preserve constitutional values in hard cases, like these. “ [Constitutional lines have to be drawn, and on one side of every one of them is an otherwise sympathetic case that provokes impatience with the Constitution and with the line. But constitutional lines are the price of constitutional government.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 254 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). I therefore respectfully dissent.

The applicability of the Establishment Clause1 to public funding of benefits to religious schools was settled in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), which inau*687gurated the modern era of establishment doctrine. The Court stated the principle in words from which there was no dissent:

“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id., at 16.

The Court has never in so many words repudiated this statement, let alone, in so many words, overruled Everson.

Today, however, the majority holds that the Establishment Clause is not offended by Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program, under which students may be eligible to receive as much as $2,250 in the form of tuition vouchers transferable to religious schools. In the city of Cleveland the overwhelming proportion of large appropriations for voucher money must be spent on religious schools if it is to be spent at all, and will be spent in amounts that cover almost all of tuition. The money will thus pay for eligible students’ instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion as well, in schools that can fairly be characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension.2 Public tax money will pay at a systemic level for teaching the covenant with Israel and Mosaic law in Jewish schools, the primacy of the Apostle Peter and the Papacy in Catholic schools, the truth of reformed Christianity in Protestant schools, and the revelation to the Prophet in Muslim schools, to speak only of major religious groupings in the Republic.

*688How can a Court consistently leave Everson on the books and approve the Ohio vouchers? The answer is that it cannot. It is only by ignoring Everson that the majority can claim to rest on traditional law in its invocation of neutral aid provisions and private choice to sanction the Ohio law. It is, moreover, only by ignoring the meaning of neutrality and private choice themselves that the majority can even pretend to rest today’s decision on those criteria.

H-Í

The majority’s statements of Establishment Clause doctrine cannot be appreciated without some historical perspective on the Court’s announced limitations on government aid to religious education, and its repeated repudiation of limits previously set. My object here is not to give any nuanced exposition of the cases, which I tried to classify in some detail in an earlier opinion, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 873-899 (2000) (dissenting opinion), but to set out the broad doctrinal stages covered in the modern era, and to show that doctrinal bankruptcy has been reached today.

Viewed with the necessary generality, the cases can be categorized in three groups. In the period from 1947 to 1968, the basic principle of no aid to religion through school benefits was unquestioned. Thereafter for some 15 years, the Court termed its efforts as attempts to draw a line against aid that would be divertible to support the religious, as distinct from the secular, activity of an institutional beneficiary. Then, starting in 1983, concern with divertibility was gradually lost in favor of approving aid in amounts unlikely to afford substantial benefits to religious schools, when offered evenhandedly without regard to a recipient’s religious character, and when channeled to a religious institution only by the genuinely free choice of some private individual. Now, the three stages are succeeded by a fourth, in which the substantial character of government aid is held to have no constitutional significance, and the espoused criteria *689of neutrality in offering aid, and private choice in directing it, are shown to be nothing but examples of verbal formalism.

A

Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing inaugurated the modern development of Establishment Clause doctrine at the behest of a taxpayer challenging state provision of “tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils” on regular city buses as part of a general scheme to reimburse the public-transportation costs of children attending both public and private nonprofit schools. 330 U. S., at 17. Although the Court split, no Justice disagreed with the basic doctrinal principle already quoted, that “[n]o tax in any amount . . . can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, . . . whatever form they may adopt to teach . . . religion.” Id., at 16. Nor did any Member of the Court deny the tension between the New Jersey program and the aims of the Establishment Clause. The majority upheld the state law on the strength of rights of religious-school students under the Free Exercise Clause, id., at 17-18, which was thought to entitle them to free public transportation when offered as a “general government servie[e]” to all schoolchildren, id., at 17. Despite the indirect benefit to religious education, the transportation was simply treated like “ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks,” id., at 17-18, and, most significantly, “state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic,” id., at 17. The dissenters, however, found the benefit to religion too pronounced to survive the general principle of no establishment, no aid, and they described it as running counter to every objective served by the establishment ban: New Jersey’s use of tax-raised funds foi'ced a taxpayer to “contribute] to the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves in so far as... religions differ,” id., at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted); it exposed religious *690liberty to the threat of dependence on state money, id., at 53; and it had already sparked political conflicts with opponents of public funding, id., at 54.3

The difficulty of drawing a line that preserved the basic principle of no aid was no less obvious some 20 years later in Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), which upheld a New York law authorizing local school boards to lend textbooks in secular subjects to children attending religious schools, a result not self-evident from Everson’s “general government services” rationale. The Court relied instead on the theory that the in-kind aid could only be used for secular educational purposes, 392 U. S., at 243, and found it relevant that “no funds or books are furnished [directly] to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools,” id., at 243-244.4 Justice Black, who wrote Everson, led the dissenters. Textbooks, even when “‘secular,’ realistically will in some way inevitably tend to propagate the religious views of the favored sect,” 392 U. S., at 252, he wrote, and Justice Douglas raised other objections underlying the establishment ban, id., at 254-266. Religious schools would request those books most in keeping with their faiths, and public boards would have final approval power: “If the board of education supinely submits by approving and supplying the sectarian or sectarian-oriented textbooks, the struggle to keep church *691and state separate has been lost. If the board resists, then the battle line between church and state will have been drawn . . . Id., at 256 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The scheme was sure to fuel strife among religions as well: “we can rest assured that a contest will be on to provide those books for religious schools which the dominant religious group concludes best reflect the theocentric or other philosophy of the particular church.” Id., at 265.

Transcending even the sharp disagreement, however, was

“the consistency in the way the Justices went about deciding the case .... Neither side rested on any facile application of the ‘test’ or any simplistic reliance on the generality or evenhandedness of the state law. Disagreement concentrated on the true intent inferrable behind the law, the feasibility of distinguishing in fact between religious and secular teaching in church schools, and the reality or sham of lending books to pupils instead of supplying books to schools.... [T]he stress was on the practical significance of the actual benefits received by the schools.” Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 876 (Souter, J., dissenting).

B

Allen recognized the reality that “religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education,” 392 U. S., at 245; if state aid could be restricted to serve the second, it might be permissible under the Establishment Clause. But in the retrenchment that followed, the Court saw that the two educational functions were so intertwined in religious primary and secondary schools that aid to secular education could not readily be segregated, and the intrusive monitoring required to enforce the line itself raised Establishment Clause concerns about the entanglement of church and state. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 620 (1971) (striking down program supplementing salaries for teachers of secular subjects in private schools). To avoid *692the entanglement, the Court's focus in the post -Allen cases was on the principle of divertibility, on discerning when ostensibly secular government aid to religious schools was susceptible to religious uses. The greater the risk of diversion to religion (and the monitoring necessary to avoid it), the less legitimate the aid scheme was under the no-aid principle. On the one hand, the Court tried to be practical, and when the aid recipients were not so “pervasively sectarian” that their secular and religious functions were inextricably intertwined, the Court generally upheld aid earmarked for secular use. See, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). But otherwise the principle of nondivertibility was enforced strictly, with its violation being presumed in most cases, even when state aid seemed secular on its face. Compare, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973) (striking down state program reimbursing private schools’ administrative costs for teacher-prepared tests in compulsory secular subjects), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 255 (1977) (upholding similar program using standardized tests); and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369-372 (1975) (no public funding for staff and materials for “auxiliary services” like guidance counseling and speech and hearing services), with Wolman, supra, at 244 (permitting state aid for diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychological testing).

The fact that the Court’s suspicion of divertibility reflected a concern with the substance of the no-aid principle is apparent in its rejection of stratagems invented to dodge it. In Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), for example, the Court struck down a New York program of tuition grants for poor parents and tax deductions for more affluent ones who sent their children to private schools. The Nyquist Court dismissed warranties of a “statistical guarantee,” that the scheme provided at most 15% of the total cost of an education at a religious school, *693id., at 787-788, which could presumably be matched to a secular 15% of a child’s education at the school. And it rejected the idea that the path of state aid to religious schools might be dispositive: “far from providing a per se immunity from examination of the substance of the State’s program, the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered.” Id., at 781. The point was that “the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.” Id., at 783.5 Nyquist thus held that aid to parents through tax deductions was no different from forbidden direct aid to religious schools for religious uses. The focus remained on what the public money bought when it reached the end point of its disbursement.

C

Like all criteria requiring judicial assessment of risk, diver tibility is an invitation to argument, but the object of the arguments provoked has always been a realistic assessment of facts aimed at respecting the principle of no aid. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), however, that object began to fade, for Mueller started down the road from realism to formalism.

*694The aid in Mueller was in substance indistinguishable from that in Nyquist, see 463 U. S., at 396-397, n. 6, and both were substantively difficult to distinguish from aid directly to religious schools, id., at 399. But the Court upheld the Minnesota tax deductions in Mueller, emphasizing their neutral availability for religious and secular educational expenses and the role of private choice in taking them. Id., at 397-398. The Court relied on the same two principles in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), approving one student’s use of a vocational training subsidy for the blind at a religious college, characterizing it as aid to individuals from which religious schools could derive no “large” benefit: “the full benefits of the program [are not] limited, in large part or in whole, to students at sectarian institutions.” Id., at 488.

School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 395-396, and n. 13 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997), clarified that the notions of evenhandedness neutrality and private choice in Mueller did not apply to cases involving direct aid to religious schools, which were still subject to the divertibility test. But in Agostini, where the substance of the aid was identical to that in Ball, public employees teaching remedial secular classes in private schools, the Court rejected the 30-year-old presumption of divertibility, and instead found it sufficient that the aid “supplemented]” but did not “supplant” existing educational services, 521 U. S., at 210, 230. The Court, contrary to Ball, viewed the aid as aid “directly to the eligible students . . . no matter where they choose to attend school.” 521 U. S., at 229.

In the 12 years between Ball and Agostini, the Court decided not only Witters, but two other cases emphasizing the form of neutrality and private choice over the substance of aid to religious uses, but always in circumstances where any aid to religion was isolated and insubstantial. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1 (1993), like Wit*695ters, involved one student’s choice to spend funds from a general public program at a religious school (to pay for a sign-language interpreter). As in Witters, the Court reasoned that “[disabled children, not sectarian schools, [were] the primary beneficiaries . . . ; to the extent sectarian schools benefit at all ... , they are only incidental beneficiaries.” 509 U. S., at 12. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), like Zobrest and Witters, involved an individual and insubstantial use of neutrally available public funds for a religious purpose (to print an evangelical magazine).

To be sure, the aid in Agostini was systemic and arguably substantial, but, as I have said, the majority there chose to view it as a bare “supplement.” 521 U. S., at 229. And this was how the controlling opinion described the systemic aid in our most recent case, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793 (2000), as aid going merely to a “portion” of the religious schools’ budgets, id., at 860 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The plurality in that case did not feel so uncomfortable about jettisoning substance entirely in favor of form, finding it sufficient that the aid was neutral and that there was virtual private choice, since any aid “first passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere.” Id., at 816. But that was only the plurality view.

Hence it seems fair to say that it was not until today that substantiality of aid has clearly been rejected as irrelevant by a majority of this Court, just as it has not been until today that a majority, not a plurality, has held purely formal criteria to suffice for scrutinizing aid that ends up in the coffers of religious schools. Today’s cases are notable for their stark illustration of the inadequacy of the majority’s chosen formal analysis.

II

Although it has taken half a century since Everson to reach the majority’s twin standards of neutrality and *696free choice, the facts show that, in the majority’s hands, even these criteria cannot convincingly legitimize the Ohio scheme.

A

Consider first the criterion of neutrality. As recently as two Terms ago, a majority of the Court recognized that neutrality conceived of as evenhandedness toward aid recipients had never been treated as alone sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause, Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 838-839 (O’Con-nor, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting). But at least in its limited significance, formal neutrality seemed to serve some purpose. Today, however, the majority employs the neutrality criterion in a way that renders it impossible to understand.

Neutrality in this sense refers, of course, to evenhandedness in setting eligibility as between potential religious and secular recipients of public money. Id., at 809-810 (plurality opinion); id., at 878-884 (Souter, J., dissenting) (three senses of “neutrality”).6 Thus, for example, the aid scheme in Witters provided an eligible recipient with a scholarship to be used at any institution within a practically unlimited universe of schools, 474 U. S., at 488; it did not tend to provide more or less aid depending on which one the scholarship recipient chose, and there was no indication that the maximum scholarship amount would be insufficient at secular *697schools. Neither did any condition of Zobrest’s interpreter’s subsidy favor religious education. See 509 U. S., at 10.

In order to apply the neutrality test, then, it makes sense to focus on a category of aid that may be directed to religious as well as secular schools, and ask whether the scheme favors a religious direction. Here, one would ask whether the voucher provisions, allowing for as much as $2,250 toward private school tuition (or a grant to a public school in an adjacent district), were written in a way that skewed the scheme toward benefiting religious schools.

This, however, is not what the majority asks. The majority looks not to the provisions for tuition vouchers, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976 (West Supp. 2002), but to every provision for educational opportunity: “The program permits the participation of all schools within the district, [as well as public schools in adjacent districts], religious or nonreligious.” Ante, at 653 (emphasis in original). The majority then finds confirmation that “participation of all schools” satisfies neutrality by noting that the better part of total state educational expenditure goes to public schools, ante, at 654, thus showing there is no favor of religion.

The illogic is patent. If regular, public schools (which can get no voucher payments) “participate” in a voucher scheme with schools that can, and public expenditure is still predominantly on public schools, then the majority’s reasoning would find neutrality in a scheme of vouchers available for private tuition in districts with no secular private schools at all. “Neutrality” as the majority employs the term is, literally, verbal and nothing more. This, indeed, is the only way the majority can gloss over the very nonneutral feature of the total scheme covering “all schools”: public tutors may receive from the State no more than $324 per child to support extra tutoring (that is, the State’s 90% of a total amount of $360), App. 166a, whereas the tuition voucher schools (which *698turn out to be mostly religious) can receive up to $2,250, id., at 56a.7

Why the majority does not simply accept the fact that the challenge here is to the more generous voucher scheme and judge its neutrality in relation to religious use of voucher money seems very odd. It seems odd, that is, until one recognizes that comparable schools for applying the criterion of neutrality are also the comparable schools for applying the other majority criterion, whether the immediate recipients of voucher aid have a genuinely free choice of religious and secular schools to receive the voucher money. And in applying this second criterion, the consideration of “all schools” is ostensibly helpful to the majority position.

B

The majority addresses the issue of choice the same way it addresses neutrality, by asking whether recipients or potential recipients of voucher aid have a choice of public schools among secular alternatives to religious schools. Again, however, the majority asks the wrong question and misapplies the criterion. The majority has confused choice in spending scholarships with choice from the entire menu of *699possible educational placements, most of them open to anyone willing to attend a public school. I say “confused” because the majority’s new use of the choice criterion, which it frames negatively as “whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools/’ ante, at 655-656, ignores the reason for having a private choice enquiry in the first place. Cases since Mueller have found private choice relevant under a rule that aid to religious schools can be permissible so long as it first passes through the hands of students or parents.8 The majority’s view that all educational choices are comparable for purposes of choice thus ignores the whole point of the choice test: it is a criterion for deciding whether indirect aid to a religious school is legitimate because it passes through private hands that can spend or use the aid in a secular school. The question is whether the private hand is genuinely free to send the money in either a secular direction or a religious one. The majority now has transformed this question about private choice in channeling aid into a question about selecting from examples of state spending (on education) including direct spending on magnet and community public schools that goes through no private hands and could never reach a religious school under any circumstance. When the choice test is transformed from where to spend the money to where to go to school, it is cut loose from its very purpose.

*700Defining choice as choice in spending the money or channeling the aid is, moreover, necessary if the choice criterion is to function as a limiting principle at all. If “choice” is present whenever there is any educational alternative to the religious school to which vouchers can be endorsed, then there will always be a choice and the voucher can always be constitutional, even in a system in which there is not a single private secular school as an alternative to the religious school. See supra, at 697 (noting the same result under the majority’s formulation of the neutrality criterion). And because it is unlikely that any participating private religious school will enroll more pupils than the generally available public system, it will be easy to generate numbers suggesting that aid to religion is not the significant intent or effect of the voucher scheme.

That is, in fact, just the kind of rhetorical argument that the majority accepts in these cases. In addition to secular private schools (129 students), the majority considers public schools with tuition assistance (roughly 1,400 students), magnet schools (13,000 students), and community schools (1,900 students), and concludes that fewer than 20% of pupils receive state vouchers to attend religious schools. Ante, at 659. (In fact, the numbers would seem even more favorable to the majority’s argument if enrollment in traditional public schools without tutoring were considered, an alternative the majority thinks relevant to the private choice en-quiry, ante, at 655.) Justice O’Connor focuses on how much money is spent on each educational option and notes that at most $8.2 million is spent on vouchers for students attending religious schools, ante, at 664 (concurring opinion), which is only 6% of the State’s expenditure if one includes separate funding for Cleveland’s community ($9.4 million) and magnet ($114.8 million) public schools. The variations show how results may shift when a judge can pick and choose the alternatives to use in the comparisons, and they also show what dependably comfortable results the choice crite*701rion will yield if the identification of relevant choices is wide open. If the choice of relevant alternatives is an open one, proponents of voucher aid will always win, because they will always be able to find a “choice” somewhere that will show the bulk of public spending to be secular. The choice en-quiry will be diluted to the point that it can screen out nothing, and the result will always be determined by selecting the alternatives to be treated as choices.

Confining the relevant choices to spending choices, on the other hand, is not vulnerable to comparable criticism. Although leaving the selection of alternatives for choice wide open, as the majority would, virtually guarantees the availability of a “choice” that will satisfy the criterion, limiting the choices to spending choices will not guarantee a negative result in every case. There may, after all, be cases in which a voucher recipient will have a real choice, with enough secular private school desks in relation to the number of religious ones, and a voucher amount high enough to meet secular private school tuition levels. See infra, at 704-707. But, even to the extent that choice-to-spend does tend to limit the number of religious funding options that pass muster, the choice criterion has to be understood this way in order, as I have said, for it to function as a limiting principle.9 Otherwise *702there is surely no point in requiring the choice to be a true or real or genuine one.10

*703It is not, of course, that I think even a genuine choice criterion is up to the task of the Establishment Clause when substantial state funds go to religious teaching; the discussion in Part III, infra, shows that it is not. The point is simply that if the majority wishes to claim that choice is a criterion, it must define choice in a way that can function as a criterion with a practical capacity to screen something out.

If, contrary to the majority, we ask the right question about genuine choice to use the vouchers, the answer shows that something is influencing choices in a way that aims the money in a religious direction: of 56 private schools in the district participating in the voucher program (only 53 of which accepted voucher students in 1999-2000), 46 of them are religious; 96.6% of all voucher recipients go to religious schools, only 3.4% to nonreligious ones. See App. 281a-286a. Unfortunately for the majority position, there is no explanation for this that suggests the religious direction results simply from free choices by parents. One answer to these statistics, for example, which would be consistent with the genuine choice claimed to be operating, might be that 96.6% of families choosing to avail themselves of vouchers choose to educate their children in schools of their own religion. This would not, in my view, render the scheme constitutional, but it would speak to the majority’s choice criterion. *704Evidence shows, however, that almost two out of three families using vouchers to send their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those schools. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-1777, p. 147a.11 The families made it clear they had not chosen the schools because they wished their children to be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of educational opportunity.12

Even so, the fact that some 2,270 students chose to apply their vouchers to schools of other religions, App. 281a-286a, might be consistent with true choice if the students “chose” their religious schools over a wide array of private nonreligious options, or if it could be shown generally that Ohio’s program had no effect on educational choices and thus no impermissible effect of advancing religious education. But both possibilities are contrary to fact. First, even if all existing nonreligious private schools in Cleveland were willing to accept large numbers of voucher students, only a few more than the 129 currently enrolled in such schools would be able to attend, as the total enrollment at all nonreligious private schools in Cleveland for kindergarten through eighth grade is only 510 children, see Brief for California Alliance for Public Schools as Amicus Curiae 15, and there is no indication that these schools have many open seats.13 Second, the *705$2,500 cap that the program places on tuition for participating low-income pupils has the effect of curtailing the participation of nonreligious schools: “nonreligious schools with higher tuition (about $4,000) stated that they could afford to accommodate just a few voucher students.”14 By comparison, the average tuition at participating Catholic schools in Cleveland in 1999-2000 was $1,592, almost $1,000 below the cap.15

*706Of course, the obvious fix would be to increase the value of vouchers so that existing nonreligious private and non-Catholic religious schools would be able to enroll more voucher students, and to provide incentives for educators to create new such schools given that few presently exist. Private choice, if as robust as that available to the seminarian in Witters, would then be “true private choice” under the majority’s criterion. But it is simply unrealistic to presume that parents of elementary and middle school students in Cleveland will have a range of secular and religious choices even arguably comparable to the statewide program for vocational and higher education in Witters. And to get to that hypothetical point would require that such massive financial support be made available to religion as to disserve every objective of the Establishment Clause even more than the present scheme does. See Part III — B, infra.16

*707There is, in any case, no way to interpret the 96.6% of current voucher money going to religious schools as reflecting a free and genuine choice by the families that apply for vouchers. The 96.6% reflects, instead, the fact that too few nonreligious school desks are available and few but religious schools can afford to accept more than a handful of voucher students. And contrary to the majority’s assertion, ante, at 654, public schools in adjacent districts hardly have a financial incentive to participate in the Ohio voucher program, and none has.17 For the overwhelming number of children in the voucher scheme, the only alternative to the public schools is religious. And it is entirely irrelevant that the State did not deliberately design the network of private schools for the sake of channeling money into religious institutions. The criterion is one of genuinely free choice on the part of the private individuals who choose, and a Hobson’s choice is not a choice, whatever the reason for being Hobsonian.

Ill

I do not dissent merely because the majority has misapplied its own law, for even if I assumed arguendo that the *708majority’s formal criteria were satisfied on the facts, today’s conclusion would be profoundly at odds with the Constitution. Proof of this is clear on two levels. The first is circumstantial, in the now discarded symptom of violation, the substantial dimension of the aid. The second is direct, in the defiance of every objective supposed to be served by the bar against establishment.

A

The scale of the aid to religious schools approved today is unprecedented, both in the number of dollars and in the proportion of systemic school expenditure supported. Each measure has received attention in previous cases. On one hand, the sheer quantity of aid, when delivered to a class of religious primary and secondary schools, was suspect on the theory that the greater the aid, the greater its proportion to a religious school’s existing expenditures, and the greater the likelihood that public money was supporting religious as well as secular instruction. As we said in Meek, “it would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate'secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role” as the object of aid that comes in “substantial amounts.” 421 U. S., at 365. Cf. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 787-788 (rejecting argument that tuition assistance covered only 15% of education costs, presumably secular, at religious schools). Conversely, the more “attenuated [the] financial benefit. . . that eventually flows to parochial schools,” the more the Court has been willing to find a form of state aid permissible. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 400.18

*709On the other hand, the Court has found the gross amount unhelpful for Establishment Clause analysis when the aid afforded a benefit solely to one individual, however substantial as to him, but only an incidental benefit to the religious school at which the individual chose to spend the State’s money. See Witters, 474 U. S., at 488; cf. Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 12. When neither the design nor the implementation of an aid scheme channels a series of individual students’ subsidies toward religious recipients, the relevant beneficiaries for establishment purposes, the Establishment Clause is unlikely to be implicated. The majority’s reliance on the observations of five Members of the Court in Witters as to the irrelevance of substantiality of aid in that case, see ante, at 651, is therefore beside the point in the matter before us, which involves considerable sums of public funds systematically distributed through thousands of students attending religious elementary and middle schools in the city of Cleveland.19

*710The Cleveland voucher program has cost Ohio taxpayers $33 million since its implementation in 1996 ($28 million in voucher payments, $5 million in administrative costs), and its cost was expected to exceed $8 million in the 2001-2002 school year. People for the American Way Foundation, Five Years and Counting: A Closer Look at the Cleveland Voucher Program 1-2 (Sept. 25, 2001) (hereinafter Cleveland Voucher Program) (cited in Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae 9). These tax-raised funds are on top of the textbooks, reading and math tutors, laboratory equipment, and the like that Ohio provides to private schools, worth roughly $600 per child. Cleveland Voucher Program 2.20

The gross amounts of public money contributed are symptomatic of the scope of what the taxpayers’ money buys for a broad class of religious-school students. In paying for practically the full amount of tuition for thousands of qualifying students,21 cf. Nyquist, supra, at 781-783 .(state aid amounting to 50% of tuition was unconstitutional), the scholarships purchase everything that tuition purchases, be it instruction in math or indoctrination in faith. The eonse-*711quenees of “substantial” aid hypothesized in Meek are realized here: the majority makes no pretense that substantial amounts of tax money are not systematically underwriting religious practice and indoctrination.

B

It is virtually superfluous to point out that every objective underlying the prohibition of religious establishment is betrayed by this scheme, but something has to be said about the enormity of the violation. I anticipated these objectives earlier, supra, at 689-690, in discussing Everson, which cataloged them, the first being respect for freedom of conscience. Jefferson described it as the idea that no one “shall be compelled to... support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever,” A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 The Founders’ Constitution 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987), even a “teacher of his own religious persuasion,” ibid., and Madison thought it violated by any “‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence ... of his property for the support of any ... establishment.’ ” Memorial and Remonstrance ¶ 3, reprinted in Everson, 330 U. S., at 65-66. “Any tax to establish religion is antithetical to the command that the minds of men always be wholly free,” Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).22 Madison’s objection to three pence has simply been lost in the majority’s formalism.

As for the second objective, to save religion from its own corruption, Madison wrote of the “ ‘experience ... that eccle*712siastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.’” Memorial and Remonstrance ¶ 7, reprinted in Everson, 330 U. S., at 67. In Madison’s time, the manifestations were “pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity[,] in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution,” ibid.; in the 21st century, the risk is one of “corrosive secularism” to religious schools, Ball, 473 U. S., at 385, and the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools’ mission to educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their faith. Even “[t]he favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

The risk is already being realized. In Ohio, for example, a condition of receiving government money under the program is that participating religious schools may not “discriminate on the basis of . . . religion,” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(4) (West Supp. 2002), which means the school may not give admission preferences to children who are members of the patron faith; children of a parish are generally consigned to the same admission lotteries as nonbelievers, §§3313.977(A)(l)(c)-(d). This indeed was the exact object of a 1999 amendment repealing the portion of a predecessor statute that had allowed an admission preference for “[cjhildren ... whose parents are affiliated with any organization that provides financial support to the school, at the discretion of the school.” § 3313.977(A)(1)(d) (West 1999). Nor is the State’s religious antidiscrimination restriction limited to student admission policies: by its terms, a participating religious school may well be forbidden to choose a member of its own clergy to serve as teacher or principal over a layperson of a different religion claiming *713equal qualification for the job.23 Cf. National Catholic Educational Association, Balance Sheet for Catholic Elementary Schools: 2001 Income and Expenses 25 (2001) (“31% of [reporting Catholic elementary and middle] schools had at least one full-time teacher who was a religious sister”)- Indeed, a separate condition that “[t]he school. . . not . . . teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of . . . religion,” § 3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp. 2002), could be understood (or subsequently broadened) to prohibit religions from teaching traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error, sinfulness, or ignorance of others,24 if they want government money for their schools.

*714For perspective on this foot-in-the-door of religious regulation, it is well to remember that the money has barely begun to flow. Prior examples of aid, whether grants through individuals or in-kind assistance, were never significant enough to alter the basic fiscal structure of religious schools; state aid was welcome, but not indispensable. See, e. g., Mitchell, 530 U. S., at 802 (federal funds could only supplement funds from nonfederal sources); Agostini, 521 U. S., at 210 (federally funded services could “ ‘supplement, and in no case supplant, the level of services’” already provided). But given the figures already involved here, there is no question that religious schools in Ohio are on the way to becoming bigger businesses with budgets enhanced to fit their new stream of tax-raised income. See, e. g., People for the American Way Foundation, A Painful Price 5, 9, 11 (Feb. 14, 2002) (of 91 schools participating in the Milwaukee program, 75 received voucher payments in excess of tuition, 61 of those were religious and averaged $185,000 worth of overpayment per school, justified in part to “raise low salaries”). The administrators of those same schools are also no doubt following the politics of a move in the Ohio State Senate to raise the current maximum value of a school voucher from $2,250 to the base amount of current state spending on each public school student ($4,814 for the 2001 fiscal year). See Bloedel, Bill Analysis of S. B. No. 89,124th Ohio Gen. Assembly, regular session 2001-2002 (Ohio Legislative Service Commission). Ohio, in fact, is merely replicating the experience in Wisconsin, where a similar increase in the value of educational vouchers in Milwaukee has induced the creation of some 23 new private schools, Public Policy Forum, Research Brief, vol. 90, no. 1, p. 3 (Jan. 23, 2002), some of which, we may safely surmise, are religious. New schools have presumably *715pegged their financial prospects to the government from the start, and the odds are that increases in government aid will bring the threshold voucher amount closer to the tuition at even more expensive religious schools.

When government aid goes up, so does reliance on it; the only thing likely to go down is independence. If Justice Douglas in Allen was concerned with state agencies, influenced by powerful religious groups, choosing the textbooks that parochial schools would use, 392 U. S., at 265 (dissenting opinion), how much more is there reason to wonder when dependence will become great enough to give the State of Ohio an effective veto over basic decisions on the content of currículums? A day will come when religious schools will learn what political leverage can do, just as Ohio’s politicians are now getting a lesson in the leverage exercised by religion.

Increased voucher spending is not, however, the sole portent of growing regulation of religious practice in the school, for state mandates to moderate religious teaching may well be the most obvious response to the third concern behind the ban on establishment, its inextricable link with social conflict. See Mitchell, supra, at 872 (Souter, J., dissenting); Everson, 330 U. S., at 8-11. As appropriations for religious subsidy rise, competition for the money will tap sectarian religion’s capacity for discord. “Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers alone will benefit most, there another.” Id., at 53. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

Justice Breyer has addressed this issue in his own dissenting opinion, which I join, and here it is enough to say that the intensity of the expectable friction can be gauged by realizing that the scramble for money will energize not only contending sectarians, but taxpayers who take their liberty of conscience seriously. Religious teaching at taxpayer *716expense simply cannot be cordoned from taxpayer politics, and every major religion currently espouses social positions that provoke intense opposition. Not all taxpaying Protestant citizens, for example, will be content to underwrite the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church condemning the death penalty.25 Nor will all of America’s Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement of the religious Zionism taught in many religious Jewish schools, which combines “a nationalistic sentiment” in support of Israel with a “deeply religious” element.26 Nor will every secular taxpayer be content to support Muslim views on differential treatment of the sexes,27 or, for that matter, to fund the espousal of a wife’s obligation of obedience to her husband, presumably taught in any schools adopting the articles of faith of the Southern Baptist Convention.28 Views like these, and innumerable others, have been safe in the sectarian pulpits and classrooms of this Nation not only because the Free Exercise Clause protects them directly, but because the ban on supporting religious establishment has protected free exercise, by keeping it relatively private. With the arrival of vouchers in religious schools, that privacy will go, and along with it will go confidence that religious disagreement will stay moderate.

* * *

If the divisiveness permitted by today’s majority is to be avoided in the short term, it will be avoided only by action *717of the political branches at the state and national levels. Legislatures not driven to desperation by the problems of public education may be able to see the threat in vouchers negotiable in sectarian schools. Perhaps even cities with problems like Cleveland’s will perceive the danger, now that they know a federal court will not save them from it.

My own course as a judge on the Court cannot, however, simply be to hope that the political branches will save us from the consequences of the majority’s decision. Everson’s statement is still the touchstone of sound law, even though the reality is that in the matter of educational aid the Establishment Clause has largely been read away. True, the majority has not approved vouchers for religious schools alone, or aid earmarked for religious instruction. But no scheme so clumsy will ever get before us, and in the cases that we may see, like these, the Establishment Clause is largely silenced. I do not have the option to leave it silent, and I hope that a future Court will reconsider today’s dramatic departure from basic Establishment Clause principle.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Souter join, dissenting.

I join Justice Souter’s opinion, and I agree substantially with Justice Stevens. I write separately, however, to emphasize the risk that publicly financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict. I do so because I believe that the Establishment Clause concern for protecting the Nation’s social fabric from religious conflict poses an overriding obstacle to the implementation of this well-intentioned school voucher program. And by explaining the nature of the concern, I hope to demonstrate why, in my view, “parental choice” cannot significantly alleviate the constitutional problem. See Part IV, infra.

I

The First Amendment begins with a prohibition, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of *718religion,” and a guarantee, that the government shall not prohibit “the free exercise thereof.” These Clauses embody an understanding, reached in the 17th century after decades of religious war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens, permits those citizens to “worship God in their own way,” and allows all families to “teach their children and to form their characters” as they wish. C. Radcliffe, The Law & Its Compass 71 (1960). The Clauses reflect the Framers’ vision of an American Nation free of the religious strife that had long plagued the nations of Europe. See, e. g., Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969) (religious strife was “one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall”); B. Kosmin & S. Lachman, One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society 24 (1993) (First Amendment designed in “part to prevent the religious wars of Europe from entering the United States”). Whatever the Framers might have thought about particular 18th-century school funding practices, they undeniably intended an interpretation of the Religion Clauses that would implement this basic First Amendment objective.

In part for this reason, the Court’s 20th-century Establishment Clause cases — both those limiting the practice of religion in public schools and those limiting the public funding of private religious education — focused directly upon social conflict, potentially created when government becomes involved in religious education. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the Court held that the Establishment Clause forbids prayer in public elementary and secondary schools. It did so in part because it recognized the “anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggle] with one another to obtain the Government’s stamp of approval... .” Id., at 429. And it added:

“The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that when*719ever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.” Id., at 431.

See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 588 (1992) (striking down school-sanctioned prayer at high school graduation ceremony because “potential for divisiveness” has “particular relevance” in school environment); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Bible-reading program violated Establishment Clause in part because it gave rise “to those very divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom” that come with government efforts to impose religious influence on “young impressionable [school] children”).

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the Court held that the Establishment Clause forbids state funding, through salary supplements, of religious school teachers. It did so in part because of the “threat” that this funding would create religious “divisiveness” that would harm “the normal political process.” Id., at 622. The Court explained:

“[Political debate and division . . . are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which [the First Amendment’s religious clauses were] . . . intended to protect.” Ibid.

And in Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973), the Court struck down a state statute that, much like voucher programs, provided aid for parents whose children attended religious schools, explaining that the “assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for . . . continuing political strife over aid to religion.”

When it decided these 20th-century Establishment Clause cases, the Court did not deny that an earlier American soci*720ety might have found a less clear-cut church/state separation compatible with social tranquility. Indeed, historians point out that during the early years of the Republic, American schools — including the first public schools — were Protestant in character. Their students recited Protestant prayers, read the King James version of the Bible, and learned Protestant religious ideals. See, e. g., D. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the American Common School, in History and Education 217-226 (P. Nash ed. 1970). Those practices may have wrongly discriminated against members of minority religions, but given the small number of such individuals, the teaching of Protestant religions in schools did not threaten serious social conflict. See Kosmin & Lach-man, supra, at 45 (Catholics constituted less than 2% of American church-affiliated population at time of founding).

The 20th-century Court was fully aware, however, that immigration and growth had changed American society dramatically since its early years. By 1850, 1.6 million Catholics lived in America, and by 1900 that number rose to 12 million. Jeffries & Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 299-300 (Nov. 2001). There were similar percentage increases in the Jewish population. Kosmin & Lachman, supra, at 45-46. Not surprisingly, with this increase in numbers, members of non-Protestant religions, particularly Catholics, began to resist the Protestant domination of the public schools. Scholars report that by the mid-19th century religious conflict over matters such as Bible reading “grew intense,” as Catholics resisted and Protestants fought back to preserve their domination. Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 300. “Dreading Catholic domination,” native Protestants “terrorized Catholics.” P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 219 (2002). In some States “Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing to read from the Protestant Bible, and crowds . . . rioted over whether Catholic children could be *721released from the classroom during Bible reading.” Jeff-ries & Ryan, 100 Mich. L. Rev., at 300.

The 20th-century Court was also aware that political efforts to right the wrong of discrimination against religious minorities in primary education had failed; in fact they had exacerbated religious conflict. Catholics sought equal government support for the education of their children in the form of aid for private Catholic schools. But the “Protestant position” on this matter, scholars report, “was that public schools must be ‘nonsectarian’ (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other Protestant observances) and public money must not support ‘sectarian’ schools (which in practical terms meant Catholic).” Id., at 301. And this sentiment played a significant role in creating a movement that sought to amend several state constitutions (often successfully), and to amend the United States Constitution (unsuccessfully) to make certain that government would not help pay for “sectarian” (i e., Catholic) schooling for children. Id., at 301-305. See also Hamburger, supra, at 287.

These historical circumstances suggest that the Court, applying the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment to 20th-century American society, faced an interpretive dilemma that was in part practical. The Court appreciated the religious diversity of contemporary American society. See Schempp, supra, at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring). It realized that the status quo favored some religions at the expense of others. And it understood the Establishment Clause to prohibit (among other things) any such favoritism. • Yet how did the Clause achieve that objective? Did it simply require the government to give each religion an equal chance to introduce religion into the primary schools — a kind of “equal opportunity” approach to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause? Or, did that Clause avoid government favoritism of some religions by insisting upon “separation” — that the government achieve *722equal treatment by removing itself from the business of providing religious education for children? This interpretive choice arose in respect both to religious activities in public schools and government aid to private education.

In both areas the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause required “separation,” in part because an “equal opportunity” approach was not workable. With respect to religious activities in the public schools, how could the Clause require public primary and secondary school teachers, when reading prayers or the Bible, only to treat all religions alike? In many places there were too many religions, too diverse a set of religious practices, too many whose spiritual beliefs denied the virtue of formal religious training. This diversity made it difficult, if not impossible, to devise meaningful forms of “equal treatment” by providing an “equal opportunity” for all to introduce their own religious practices into the public schools.

With respect to government aid to private education, did not history show that efforts to obtain equivalent funding for the private education of children whose parents did not hold popular religious beliefs only exacerbated religious strife? As Justice Rutledge recognized:

“Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one [religious sect] by numbers [of adherents] alone will benefit most, there another. This is precisely the history of societies which have had an established religion and dissident groups.” Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (dissenting opinion).

The upshot is the development of constitutional doctrine that reads the Establishment Clause as avoiding religious strife, not by providing every religion with an equal opportunity (say, to secure state binding or to pray in the public *723schools), but by drawing fairly clear lines of separation between church and state — at least where the heartland of religious belief, such as primary religious education, is at issue.

II

The principle underlying these cases — avoiding religiously based social conflict — remains of great concern. As religiously diverse as America had become when the Court decided its major 20th-century Establishment Clause cases, we are exponentially more diverse today. America boasts more than 55 different religious groups and subgroups with a significant number of members. Graduate Center of the City University of New York, B. Kosmin, E. Mayer, & A. Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey 12-13 (2001). Major religions include, among others, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs. Ibid. And several of these major religions contain different subsidiary sects with different religious beliefs. See Lester, Oh, Gods!, The Atlantic Monthly 37 (Feb. 2002). Newer Christian immigrant groups are “expressing their Christianity in languages, customs, and independent churches that are barely recognizable, and often controversial, for European-ancestry Catholics and Protestants.” H. Ebaugh & J. Chafetz, Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations 4 (abridged student ed. 2002).

Under these modern-day circumstances, how is the “equal opportunity” principle to work — without risking the “struggle of sect against sect” against which Justice Rutledge warned? School voucher programs finance the religious education of the young. And, if widely adopted, they may well provide billions of dollars that will do so. Why will different religions not become concerned about, and seek to influence, the criteria used to channel this money to religious schools? Why will they not want to examine the implementation of the programs that provide this money — to determine, for ex*724ample, whether implementation has biased a program toward or against particular sects, or whether recipient religious schools are adequately fulfilling a program’s criteria? If so, just how is the State to resolve the resulting controversies without provoking legitimate fears of the kinds of religious favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a Nation, threaten social dissension?

Consider the voucher program here at issue. That program insists that the religious school accept students of all religions. Does that criterion treat fairly groups whose religion forbids them to do so? The program also insists that no participating school “advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp. 2002). And it requires the State to “revoke the registration of any school if, after a hearing, the superintendent determines that the school is in violation” of the program’s rules. § 3313.976(B). As one amicus argues, “it is difficult to imagine a more divisive activity” than the appointment of state officials as referees to determine whether a particular religious doctrine “teaches hatred or advocates lawlessness.” Brief for National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty as Ami-cus Curiae 23.

How are state officials to adjudicate claims that one religion or another is advocating, for example, civil disobedience in response to unjust laws, the use of illegal drugs in a religious ceremony, or resort to force to call attention to what it views as an immoral social practice? What kind of public hearing will there be in response to claims that one religion or another is continuing to teach a view of history that casts members of other religions in the worst possible light? How will the public react to government funding for schools that take controversial religious positions on topics that are of current popular interest — say, the conflict in the Middle East or the war on terrorism? Yet any major funding program *725for primary religious education will require criteria. And the selection of those criteria, as well as their application, inevitably pose problems that are divisive. Efforts to respond to these problems not only will seriously entangle church and state, see Lemon, 403 U. S., at 622, but also will promote division among religious groups, as one group or another fears (often legitimately) that it will receive unfair treatment at the hands of the government.

I recognize that other nations, for example Great Britain and France, have in the past reconciled religious school funding and religious freedom without creating serious' strife. Yet British and French societies are religiously more homogeneous — and it bears noting that recent waves of immigration have begun to create problems of social division there as well. See, e. g., The Muslims of France, 75 Foreign Affairs 78 (1996) (describing increased religious strife in France, as exemplified by expulsion of teenage girls from school for wearing traditional Muslim scarves); Ahmed, Extreme Prejudice; Muslims in Britain, The Times of London, May 2, 1992, p. 10 (describing religious strife in connection with increased Muslim immigration in Great Britain).

In a society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect against religious strife, particularly when what is at issue is an area as central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary education, of the next generation’s minds and spirits. See, e. g., .Webster, On the Education of Youth in America (1790), in Essays on Education in the Early Republic 43, 53, 59 (F. Rudolph ed. 1965) (“[Education of youth” is “of more consequence than making laws and preaching the gospel, because it lays the foundation on which both law and gospel rest for success”); Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Christian Education (1965) (“[T]he Catholic school can be such an aid to the fulfillment of the mission of the People of God and to the fostering of dialogue between *726the Church and mankind, to the benefit of both, it retains even in our present circumstances the utmost importance”).

III

I concede that the Establishment Clause currently permits States to channel various forms of assistance to religious schools, for example, transportation costs for students, computers, and secular texts. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947); Mitchell v. Helms, 580 U. S. 793 (2000). States now certify the nonsectarian educational content of religious school education. See, e. g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F. 2d 940 (CA1 1989). Yet the consequence has not been great turmoil. But see, e. g., May, Charter School’s Religious Tone; Operation of South Bay Academy Raises Church-State Questions, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 17, 2001, p. Al (describing increased government supervision of charter schools after complaints that students were “studying Islam in class and praying with their teachers,” and Muslim educators complaining of “‘post-Sept. 11 anti-Muslim sentiment’”).

School voucher programs differ, however, in both kind and degree from aid programs upheld in the past. They differ in kind because they direct financing to a core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to young children. For that reason the constitutional demand for “separation” is of particular constitutional concern. See, e. g., Weisman, 505 U. S., at 592 (“heightened concerns” in context of primary education); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 583-584 (1987) (“Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools”).

Private schools that participate in Ohio’s program, for example, recognize the importance of primary religious education, for they pronounce that their goals are to “communicate the gospel,” “provide opportunities to ... experience a faith community,” “provide ... for growth in prayer,” and “pro*727vide instruction in religious truths and values.” App. 408a, 487a. History suggests, not that such private school teaching of religion is undesirable, but that government funding of this kind of religious endeavor is far more contentious than providing funding for secular textbooks, computers, vocational training, or even funding for adults who wish to obtain a college education at a religious university. See supra, at 720-722. Contrary to Justice O’Connor’s opinion, ante, at 665-666 (concurring opinion), history also shows that government involvement in religious primary education is far more divisive than state property tax exemptions for religious institutions or tax deductions for charitable contributions, both of which come far closer to exemplifying the neutrality that distinguishes, for example, fire protection on the one hand from direct monetary assistance on the other. Federal aid to religiously based hospitals, ante, at 666 (O’Connor, J., concurring), is even further removed from education, which lies at the heartland of religious belief.

Vouchers also differ in degree. The aid programs recently upheld by the Court involved limited amounts of aid to religion. But the majority’s analysis here appears to permit a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public secular schools to private religious schools. That fact, combined with the use to which these dollars will be put, exacerbates the conflict problem. State aid that takes the form of peripheral secular items, with prohibitions against diversion of funds to religious teaching, holds significantly less potential for social division. In this respect as well, the secular aid upheld in Mitchell differs dramatically from the present ease. Although it was conceivable that minor amounts of money eould have, contrary to the statute, found their way to the religious activities of the recipients, see 530 U. S., at 864 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment), that case is at worst the camel’s nose, while the litigation before us is the camel itself.

*728 >

I do not believe that the “parental choice aspect of the voucher program sufficiently offsets the concerns I have mentioned. Parental choice cannot help the taxpayer who does not want to finance the religious education of children. It will not always help the parent who may see little real choice between inadequate nonsectarian public education and adequate education at a school whose religious teachings are contrary to his own. It will not satisfy religious minorities unable to participate because they are too few in number to support the creation of their own private schools. It will not satisfy groups whose religious beliefs preclude them from participating in a government-sponsored program, and who may well feel ignored as government funds primarily support the education of children in the doctrines of the dominant religions. And it does little to ameliorate the entanglement problems or the related problems of social division that Part II, supra, describes. Consequently, the fact that the parent may choose which school can cash the government’s voucher check does not alleviate the Establishment Clause concerns associated with voucher programs.

V

The Court, in effect, turns the clock back. It adopts, under the name of “neutrality,” an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that this Court rejected more than half a century ago. In its view, the parental choice that offers each religious group a kind of equal opportunity to secure government funding overcomes the Establishment Clause concern for social concord. An earlier Court found that “equal opportunity” principle insufficient; it read the Clause as insisting upon greater separation of church and state, at least in respect to primary education. See Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 783. In a society composed of many different religious creeds, I fear that this present departure from the Court’s earlier understanding risks creating a form of reli*729giously based conflict potentially harmful to the Nation’s social fabric. Because I believe the Establishment Clause was written in part to avoid this kind of conflict, and for reasons set forth by Justice Souter and Justice Stevens, I respectfully dissent.