*451 Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We review from the standpoint of its validity under the Federal Constitution a judgment of civil contempt entered against petitioner, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in the courts of Alabama. The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State’s Attorney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the Association. The judgment of contempt was based upon petitioner’s refusal to comply fully with a court order requiring in part the production of membership lists. Petitioner’s claim is that the order, in the circumstances shown by this record, violated rights assured to petitioner and its members under the Constitution.

Alabama has a statute similar to those of many other States which requires a foreign corporation, except as exempted, to qualify before doing business by filing its corporate charter with the Secretary of State and designating a place of business and an agent to receive service of process. The statute imposes a finé on a corporation transacting intrastate business before qualifying and provides for criminal prosecution of officers of such a corporation. Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 10, §§ 192-198. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York. Its purposes, fostered on a nationwide basis, are those indicated by its name, * and it oper *452 ates through chartered affiliates which are independent unincorporated associations, with membership therein equivalent to membership in petitioner. The first Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918. Since that time the aims of the Association have been advanced through activities of its affiliates, and in 1951 the Association itself opened a regional office in Alabama, at which it employed two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Association has never complied with the qualification statute, from which it considered itself exempt.

In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the State Circuit Court, Montgomery County, to enjoin the Association from conducting further activities within, and to oust it from, the State. Among other things the bill in equity alleged that the Association had opened a regional office and had organized-various affiliates in Alabama; had recruited members and solicited contributions within the State; had given financial support and furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university; and had supported a Negro boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers without regard to race. The bill recited that the Association, by continuing to do business in Alabama without complying with the qualification statute, was “. . . causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief . . . On the day the complaint was filed, the Circuit Court issued ex parte an order restraining the Association, pendente lite, from engaging in *453 further activities within the State and forbidding it to take any steps to qualify itself to do business therein.

Petitioner demurred to the allegations of the bill and moved to dissolve the restraining order. It contended that its activities did not subject it to the qualification requirements of the statute and that in any event what the State sought to accomplish by its suit would violate rights to freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Before the date set for a hearing on this motion, the State moved for the production of a large number of the Association’s records and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama “members” and “agents” of the Association. It alleged that all such documents were necessary for adequate preparation for the hearing, in view of petitioner’s denial of the conduct of intrastate business within the meaning of the qualification statute. Over petitioner’s objections, the court ordered the production, of a substantial part of the requested records, including the membership lists, and postponed the hearing on the restraining order to a date later than the time ordered for production.

Thereafter petitioner filed its answer to the bill in equity. It admitted its Alabama activities substantially as alleged in the complaint and that it had not qualified to do business in the State. Although still disclaiming the statute’s application to it, petitioner offered to qualify if the bar from qualification made part of the restraining order were lifted, and it submitted with the answer an executed set of the forms required by the statute. However petitioner did not comply with the production order, and for this failure was adjudged in civil contempt and fined $10,000. The contempt judgment provided that the fine would be subject to reduction or remission if compliance *454 were forthcoming within five days but otherwise would be increased to $100,000.

At the end of the five-day period petitioner produced substantially all the data called for by the production order except its membership lists, as to which it contended that Alabama could not constitutionally compel disclosure, and moved to modify or vacate the contempt judgment, or stay its execution pending appellate review. This motion was denied. While a similar stay application, which was later denied, was pending before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Circuit Court made a further order adjudging petitioner in continuing contempt and increasing the fine already imposed to $100,000. Under Alabama law, see Jacoby v. Goetter, Weil & Co., 74 Ala. 427, the effect of the contempt adjudication was to foreclose petitioner from obtaining a hearing on the merits of the underlying ouster action, or from taking any steps to dissolve the temporary restraining order which had been issued ex parte, until it purged itself of contempt. But cf. Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 232 U. S. 318; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409.

The State Supreme Court thereafter twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review this final contempt judgment, the first time, 91 So. 2d 221, for insufficiency of the petition’s allegations and the second time on procedural grounds. 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional questions presented. 353 U. S. 972.

1 — 1

We address ourselves first to respondent’s contention that we lack jurisdiction because the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Alabama rests on an independent nonfederal ground, namely, that petitioner in applying for certiorari had pursued the wrong appellate *455 remedy under state law. Respondent recognizes that our jurisdiction is not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on by the state court is “without any fair or substantial support,” Ward v. Board of County Commissioners, 253 U. S. 17, 22. It thus becomes our duty to ascertain, “. . . in order that constitutional guaranties may appropriately be enforced, whether the asserted non-federal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment.” Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773.

The Alabama Supreme Court held that it could not consider the constitutional issues underlying the contempt judgment which related to the power of the State to order production of membership lists because review by certiorari was limited to instances “. . . where the court lacked jurisdiction of the proceeding, or where on the face of it the order disobeyed was void, or where procedural requirements with respect to citation for contempt and the like were not observed, or where the fact of contempt is not sustained . . . .” 265 Ala., at 353, 91 So. 2d, at 217. The proper means for petitioner to obtain review of the judgment in light of its constitutional claims, said the court, was by way of mandamus to quash the discovery order prior to the contempt adjudication. Because of petitioner’s failure to pursue this remedy, its challenge to the contempt order was restricted to the above grounds. Apparently not deeming the constitutional objections to draw into question whether “on the face of it the order disobeyed was void,” the court found no infirmity in the contempt judgment under this limited scope of review. At the same time it did go on to consider petitioner’s constitutional challenge to the order to produce membership lists but found it untenable since membership lists were not privileged against disclosure pursuant to reasonable state demands and since the privilege against self-incrimination was not available to corporations.

*456 We are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review available upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment. As early as 1909 that court said in such a case, Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, at 276, 279-280, 50 So. 218, at 220, 221:

“Originally, on certiorari, only the question of jurisdiction was inquired into; but this limit has been removed, and now the court ‘examines the law questions involved in the case which may affect its merits.’...

“. . . [T]he judgment of this court is that the proper way to review the action of the court in cases of this kind is by certiorari, and not by appeal.

“We think that certiorari is a better remedy than mandamus, because the office of a ‘mandamus’ is to require the lower court or judge to act, and not ‘to correct error or to reverse judicial action,’. . . whereas, in a proceeding by certiorari, errors of law in the judicial action of the lower court may be inquired into and corrected.”

This statement was in full accord with the earlier case of Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, 4 So. 279, and the practice in the later Alabama cases, until we reach the present one, appears to have been entirely consistent with this rule. See Ex parte Wheeler, 231 Ala. 356, 358, 165 So. 74, 75-76; Ex parte Blakey, 240 Ala. 517, 199 So. 857; Ex parte Sellers, 250 Ala. 87, 88, 33 So. 2d 349, 350. For example, in Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 42 So. 2d 17, decided as late- as 1949, the petitioner had been held in contempt for his refusal to obey a court order to produce names of members of the Ku Klux Klan. On writ of certiorari, constitutional grounds were urged in part for *457 reversal of the contempt conviction. In denying the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had been accorded due process, and in explaining its denial the court considered and rejected various constitutional claims relating to the validity of the order. There was no intimation that the petitioner had selected an inappropriate form of appellate review to obtain consideration of all questions of law raised by a contempt judgment.

The Alabama cases do indicate, as was said in the opinion below, that an order requiring production of evidence “. . . may be reviewed on petition for mandamus.” 265 Ala., at 353, 91 So. 2d, at 217. (Italics added.) See Ex parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783; cf. Ex parte Driver, 255 Ala. 118, 50 So. 2d 413. But we can discover nothing in the prior state cases which suggests that mandamus is the exclusive remedy for reviewing court orders after disobedience of them has led to contempt judgments. Nor, so far as we can find, do any of these prior decisions indicate that the validity of such orders can be drawn in question by way of certiorari only in instances where a defendant had no opportunity to apply for mandamus. Although the opinion below suggests no such distinction, the State now argues that this was in fact the situation in all of the earlier certiorari cases, because there the contempt adjudications, unlike here, had followed almost immediately the disobedience to the court orders. Even if that is indeed the rationale of the Alabama Supreme Court’s present decision, such a local procedural rule, although it may now appear in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of procedures to obtain appellate review, cannot avail the State here, because petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its existence. Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitu *458 tional rights. Cf. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673.

That there was justified reliance here is further indicated by what the Alabama Supreme Court said in disposing of petitioner’s motion for a stay of the first contempt judgment in this case. This motion, which was filed prior to the final contempt judgment and which stressed constitutional issues, recited that “[t]he only way in which the [Association] can seek a review of the validity of the order upon which the adjudication of contempt is based [is] by filing a petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court.” In denying the motion, 265 Ala. 356, 357, 91 So. 2d 220, 221, the Supreme Court stated:

“It is the established rule of this Court that the proper method of reviewing a judgment for civil contempt of the kind here involved is by a petition for common law writ of certiorari ....

“But the petitioner here has not applied for writ of certiorari, and we do not feel that the petition [for a stay] presently before us warrants our interference with the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County here sought to be stayed.”

We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s federal claims.

II.

The Association both urges that it is constitutionally entitled to resist official inquiry into its membership lists, and that it may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be protected from compelled disclosure by the State of their affiliation with the Association as revealed by the membership lists. We think that petitioner argues more appropriately the rights of its members, and that its nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it act as their representative before this *459 Court. In so concluding, we reject respondent’s argument that the Association lacks standing to assert here constitutional rights pertaining to the members, who are not of course parties to the litigation.

To limit the breadth of issues which must be dealt with in particular litigation, this Court has generally insisted that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to themselves. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44; Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1951 ed.), § 298. This rule is related to the broader doctrine that constitutional adjudication should where possible be avoided. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (concurring opinion). The principle is not disrespected where constitutional rights of persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-259; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 183-187 (concurring opinion).

If petitioner’s rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection with the Association despite the production order, it is manifest that this right is properly assertable by the Association. To require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The Association, which provides in- its constitution that “[a]ny person who is in accordance with [its] principles and policies . . .” may become a member, is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views. The reasonable likelihood that the Association itself through diminished financial support and membership may be adversely *460 affected if production is compelled is a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its members. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-536.

III.

We thus reach petitioner’s claim that the production order in the state litigation trespasses upon fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner argues that in view of the facts and circumstances shown in the record, the effect of compelled disclosure of the membership lists will be to abridge the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful association in support of their common, beliefs. It contends that governmental action which, although not directly suppressing association, nevertheless carries this consequence, can be justified only upon some overriding valid interest of the State.

Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement' of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 321. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the *461 effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.

The fact that Alabama,- so far as is relevant to the validity of the contempt judgment presently under review, has taken no direct action, cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, supra; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, to restrict the right of petitioner’s members to associate freely, does not end inquiry into the effect of the production order. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 402. In the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Thus in Douds, the Court stressed that the legislation there challenged, which on its face sought to regulate labor unions and to secure stability in interstate commerce, would have the practical effect “of discouraging” the .exercise of constitutionally protected political rights, 339 U. S., at 393, and it upheld the statute only after concluding that the reasons advanced for its enactment were constitutionally sufficient to justify its possible deterrent effect upon such freedoms. Similar recognition of possible unconstitutional intimidation of the free exercise of the right to advocate underlay this Court’s narrow construction of the authority of a congressional committee investigating lobbying and of an Act regulating lobbying, although in neither case was there an effort to suppress speech. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46-47; United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 625-626. The governmental action challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties. Statutes imposing taxes upon rather than prohibiting particular activity have been struck down when perceived to have the consequence of unduly curtailing the liberty of freedom of press assured under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. American *462 Press Co., 297 U. S. 233; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105.

It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations. When referring to the varied forms of governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly, it said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 402: “A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature.” Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs. Cf. United States v. Rumely, supra, at 56-58 (concurring opinion).

We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association. Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner’s Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and *463 its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.

It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner’s members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner’s activities follows not from state action but from private community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold.

We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of their constitutionally protected right of association. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 400; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161. Such a ". . . subordinating interest of the State must be compelling,” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 265 (concurring opinion). It is not of moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.

It is important to bear in mind that petitioner asserts no right to absolute immunity from state investigation, and no right to disregard Alabama’s laws. As shown by its substantial compliance with the production order, petitioner does not deny Alabama’s right to obtain from it such information as the State desires concerning the pur *464 poses of the Association and its activities within the State. Petitioner has not objected to divulging the identity of its members who are employed by or hold official positions with it. It has urged the rights solely of its ordinary rank- and-file members. This is therefore not analogous to a case involving the interest of a State in protecting its citizens in their dealings with paid solicitors or agents of foreign corporations by requiring identification. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 306; Thomas v. Collins, supra, at 538.

Whether there was "justification” in this instance turns solely on the substantiality of Alabama’s interest in obtaining the membership lists. During the course of a hearing before the Alabama Circuit Court on a motion of petitioner to set aside the production order, the State Attorney General presented at length, under examination by petitioner, the State’s reason for requesting the membership lists. The exclusive purpose was to determine whether petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama foreign corporation registration statute, and the membership lists were expected to help resolve this question. The issues in the litigation commenced by Alabama by its bill in equity were whether the character of petitioner and its activities in Alabama had been such as to maké petitioner subject to the registration statute, and whether the extent of petitioner’s activities without qualifying suggested its permanent ouster from the State. Without intimating the slightest view upon the merits of these issues, we' are unable to perceive that the disclosure of the names of petitioner’s rank-and-file members has a substantial bearing on either of them. As matters stand in the state court, petitioner (1) has admitted its presence and conduct of activities in Alabama since 1918; (2) has offered to comply in all respects with the state qualification statute, although pre *465 serving its contention that the statute does not apply to it; and (3) has apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the membership lists, by furnishing the Attorney General with varied business records, its charter and statement of purposes, the names of all of its directors and officers, and with the total number of its Alabama members and the amount of their dues. These last items would not on this record appear subject to constitutional challenge and have been furnished, but whatever interest the State may have in obtaining names of ordinary members has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner’s constitutional objections to the production order.

From what, has already been said, we think it apparent that Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, cannot be relied on in support of the State’s position, for that case involved markedly different considerations in terms of the interest of the State in obtaining disclosure. There, this Court upheld, as applied to a member of a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, a New York statute requiring any unincorporated association which demanded an oath as a condition to membership to file with state officials copies of its “. . . constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and oath of membership, together with a roster of its membership and a list of its officers for the current year.” N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 664, §§ 53, 56. In its opinion, the Court took care to emphasize the nature of the organization which New York sought to regulate. The decision was based on the particular character of the Klan’s activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation and violence, which the Court assumed was before the state legislature when it enacted the statute, and of which the Court itself took judicial notice. Furthermore, the situation before us is significantly different from that in Bryant, because the organization there had made no effort to comply with *466 any of the requirements of New York’s statute but rather had refused to furnish the State with any information as to its local activities.

We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And we conclude that Alabama has fallen short of showing a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have. Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the $100,000 fine which resulted from petitioner’s refusal to comply with the production order in this respect must fall.

IV.

Petitioner joins with, its attack upon the production order a challenge to the constitutionality of the State’s ex parte temporary restraining order preventing it from soliciting support in Alabama, and it asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes such state action. But as noted above, petitioner has never received a hearing on the merits of the ouster suit, and we do not consider these questions properly here. The Supreme Court of Alabama noted in its denial of the petition for certiorari that such petition raised solely a question pertinent to the contempt adjudication. “The ultimate aim and purpose of the litigation is to determine the right of the state to enjoin petitioners from doing business in Alabama. That question, however, is not before us in this proceeding.” 265 Ala., at 352, 91 So. 2d, at 216. The proper method for raising questions in the state appellate courts pertinent to the underlying suit for an injunction appears *467 to be by appeal, after a hearing on the merits and final judgment by the lower state court. Only from the disposition of such an appeal can review be sought here.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama must be reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

*220Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

For the second time in recent years we consider constitutional questions arising from a program designed to facilitate *221extracurricular student speech at a public university. Respondents are a group of students at the University of Wisconsin (hereinafter University). They brought a First Amendment challenge to a mandatory student activity fee imposed by petitioner Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and used in part by the University to support student organizations engaging in political or ideological speech. Respondents object to the speech and expression of some of the student organizations. Relying upon our precedents which protect members of unions and bar associations from being required to pay fees used for speech the members find objectionable, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals invalidated the University’s student fee program. The University contends that its mandatory student activity fee and the speech which it supports are appropriate to further its educational mission.

We reverse. The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral. We do not sustain, however, the student referendum mechanism of the University’s program, which appears to permit the exaction of fees in violation of the viewpoint neutrality principle. As to that aspect of the program, we remand for further proceedings.

I

of Wisconsin is a public corporation of the State of Wisconsin. See Wis. Stat. §36.07(1) (1993-1994). State law defines the University's mission in broad terms: “to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate society by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and humane sensitivities ... and a sense of purpose.” *222§ 36.01(2). Some 30,000 undergraduate students and 10,000 graduate and professional students attend the University’s Madison campus, ranking it among the Nation’s largest institutions of higher learning. Students come to the renowned University from all 50 States and from 72 foreign countries. Last year marked its 150th anniversary; and to celebrate its distinguished history, the University sponsored a series of research initiatives, campus forums and workshops, historical exhibits, and public lectures, all reaffirming its commitment to explore the universe of knowledge and ideas.

The responsibility for governing the University of Wisconsin System is vested by law with the board of regents. § 36.09(1). The same law empowers the students to share in aspects of the University’s governance. One of those functions is to administer the student activities fee program. By statute the “[s]tudents in consultation with the chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the board [of regents] shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those student fees which constitute substantial support for campus student activities.” §36.09(5). The students do so, in large measure, through their student government, called the Associated Students of Madison (ASM), and various ASM subcommittees. The program the University maintains to support the extracurricular activities undertaken by many of its student organizations is the subject of the present controversy.

It seems that since its founding the University has required full-time students enrolled at its Madison campus to pay a nonrefundable activity fee. App. 154. For the 1995— 1996 academic year, when this suit was commenced, the activity fee amounted to $331.50 per year. The fee is segregated from the University’s tuition charge. Once collected, the activity fees are deposited by the University into the accounts of the State of Wisconsin. Id., at 9. The fees are drawn upon by the University to support various campus services and extracurricular student activities. In the Uni*223versity’s view, the activity fees “enhance the educational experience” of its students by “promoting] extracurricular activities,” “stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse points of view,” enabling “participation] in political activity,” “promoting] student participation] in campus administrative activity,” and providing “opportunities to develop social skills,” all consistent with the University’s mission. Id., at 154-155.

The board of regents classifies the segregated fee into allo-cable and nonallocable portions. The nonallocable portion approximates 80% of the total fee and covers expenses such as student health services, intramural sports, debt service, and the upkeep and operations of the student union facilities. Id., at 13. Respondents did not challenge the purposes to which the University commits the nonallocable portion of the segregated fee. Id., at 37.

The allocable portion of the fee supports extracurricular endeavors pursued by the University’s registered student organizations or RSO’s. To qualify for RSO status students must organize as a not-for-profit group, limit membership primarily to students, and agree to undertake activities related to student life on campus. Id., at 15. During the 1995-1996 school year, 628 groups had RSO status on the Madison campus. Id., at 255. To name but a few, RSO’s included the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats; the College Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. As one would expect, the expressive activities undertaken by RSO’s are diverse in range and content, from displaying posters and circulating newsletters throughout the campus, to hosting campus debates and guest speakers, and to what can best be described as political lobbying.

RSO’s may obtain a portion of the allocable fees in one of three ways. Most do so by seeking funding from the Student Government Activity Fund (SGAF), administered *224by the ASM. SGAF moneys may be issued to support an RSO’s operations and events, as well as travel expenses “central to the purpose of the organization.” Id., at 18. As an alternative, an RSO can apply for funding from the General Student Services Fund (GSSF), administered through the ASM’s finance committee. During the 1995-1996 academic year, 15 RSO’s received GSSF funding. These RSO’s included a campus tutoring center, the student radio station, a student environmental group, a gay and bisexual student center, a community legal office, an AIDS support network, a campus women’s center, and the Wisconsin Student Public Interest Research Group (WISPIRG). Id., at 16-17. The University acknowledges that, in addition to providing campus services (e. g., tutoring and counseling), the GSSF-funded RSO’s engage in political and ideological expression. Brief for Petitioner 10.

The GSSF, as well as the SGAF, consists of moneys originating in the allocable portion of the mandatory fee. The parties have stipulated that, with respect to SGAF and GSSF funding, “[t]he process for reviewing and approving allocations for funding is administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion,” id., at 14-15, and that the University does not use the fee program for “advocating a particular point of view.” Id., at 39.

A student referendum provides a third means for an RSO to obtain funding. Id., at 16. While the record is sparse on this feature of the University’s program, the parties inform us that the student body can vote either to approve or to disapprove an assessment for a particular RSO. One referendum resulted in an allocation of $45,000 to WISPIRG during the 1995-1996 academic year. At oral argument, counsel for the University acknowledged that a referendum could also operate to defund an RSO or to veto a funding decision of the ASM. In October 1996, for example, the student body voted to terminate funding to a national student organization to which the University belonged. Id., at 215. Both parties *225confirmed at oral argument that their stipulation regarding the program’s viewpoint neutrality does not extend to the referendum process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19, 29.

With respect to GSSF and SGAF funding, the ASM or its finance committee makes initial funding decisions. App. 14-15. The ASM does so in an open session, and interested students may attend meetings when RSO funding is discussed. Id., at 14. It also appears that the ASM must approve the results of a student referendum. Approval appears pro forma, however, as counsel for the University advised us that the student government “voluntarily views th[e] referendum as binding.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Once the ASM approves an RSO’s funding application, it forwards its decision to the chancellor and to the board of regents for their review and approval. App. 18, 19. Approximately 30% of the University’s RSO’s received funding during the 1995-1996 academic year.

RSO’s, as a general rule, do not receive lump-sum cash distributions. Rather, RSO’s obtain funding support on a reimbursement basis by submitting receipts or invoices to the University. Guidelines identify expenses appropriate for reimbursement. Permitted expenditures include, in the main, costs for printing, postage, office supplies, and use of University facilities and equipment. Materials printed with student fees must contain a disclaimer that the views expressed are not those of the ASM. The University also reimburses RSO’s for fees arising from membership in “other related and non-profit organizations.” Id., at 251.

The University’s policy establishes purposes for which fees may not be expended. RSO’s may not receive reimbursement for “[g]ifts, donations, and contributions,” the costs of legal services, or for “[activities which are politically partisan or religious in nature.” Id., at 251-252. (The policy does not give examples of the prohibited expenditures.) A separate policy statement on GSSF funding states that an RSO can receive funding if it “does not have a primarily *226political orientation (i. e. is not a registered political group).” Id., at 238. The same policy adds that an RSO “shall not use [student fees] for any lobbying purposes.” Ibid. At one point in their brief respondents suggest that the prohibition against expenditures for “politically partisan” purposes renders the program not viewpoint neutral. Brief for Respondents 31. In view of the fact that both parties entered a stipulation to the contrary at the outset of this litigation, which was again reiterated during oral argument in this Court, we do not consider respondents’ challenge to this aspect of the University’s program.

The University’s Student Organization Handbook has guidelines for regulating the conduct and activities of RSO’s. In addition to obligating RSO’s to adhere to the fee program’s rules and regulations, the guidelines establish procedures authorizing any student to complain to the University that an RSO is in noncompliance. An extensive investigative process is in place to evaluate and remedy violations. The University’s policy includes a range of sanctions for noncompliance, including probation, suspension, or termination of RSO status.

One RSO that appears to operate in a manner distinct from others is WISPIRG. For reasons not clear from the record, WISPIRG receives lump-sum cash distributions from the University. University counsel informed us that this distribution reduced the GSSF portion of the fee pool. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. The full extent of the uses to which WISPIRG puts its funds is unclear. We do know, however, that WISPIRG sponsored on-campus events regarding homelessness and environmental and consumer protection issues. App. 348. It coordinated community food drives and educational programs and spent a portion of its activity fees for the lobbying efforts of its parent organization and for student internships aimed at influencing legislation. Id., at 344, 347.

In March 1996, respondents, each of whom attended or still attend the University’s Madison campus, filed suit in the *227United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against members of the board of regents. Respondents alleged, inter alia, that imposition of the segregated fee violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. They contended the University must grant them the choice not to fund those RSO’s that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to their personal beliefs. Respondents requested both injunctive and declaratory relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in their favor, declaring the University’s segregated fee program invalid under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). The District Court decided the fee program compelled students “to support political and ideological activity with which they disagree” in violation of respondents’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a. The court did not reach respondents’ free exercise claim. The District Court’s order enjoined the board of regents from using segregated fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F. 3d 717 (1998). As the District Court had done, the Court of Appeals found our compelled speech precedents controlling. After examining the University’s fee program under the three-part test outlined in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991), it concluded that the program was not germane to the University’s mission, did not further a vital policy of the University, and imposed too much of a burden on respondents’ free speech rights. “[Ljike the objecting union members in Abood,” the Court of Appeals reasoned, the students here have a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with their own personal beliefs. 151F. 3d, at 731. It added that *228protecting the objecting students’ free speech rights was “of heightened concern” following our decision in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), because “[i]f the university cannot discriminate in the disbursement of funds, it is imperative that students not be compelled to fund organizations which engage in political and ideological activities — that is the only way to protect the individual’s rights.” 151 F. 3d, at 730, n. 11. The Court of Appeals extended the District Court’s order and enjoined the board of regents from requiring objecting students to pay that portion of the fee used to fund RSO’s engaged in political or ideological expression. Id., at.735.

Three members of the Court of Appeals dissented from the denial of the University’s motion for rehearing en banc. In -their view, the panel opinion overlooked the “crucial difference between a requirement to pay money to an organization that explicitly aims to subsidize one viewpoint to the exclusion of other viewpoints, as in Abood and Keller, and a requirement to pay a fee to a group that creates a viewpoint-neutral forum, as is true of the student activity fee here.” Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F. 3d 1124, 1129 (CA7 1998) (D. Wood, J., dissenting).

Other courts addressing First Amendment challenges to similar student fee programs have reached conflicting results. Compare Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Ed., 166 F. 3d 1032, 1038-1040 (CA9 1999); Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F. 2d 111, 123 (CA5 1992), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1087 (1993); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F. 2d 475, 480 (CA4 1983); Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 105, 542 P. 2d 762, 769 (1975) (en banc), with Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal. 4th 843, 862-863, 844 P. 2d 500, 513-514, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 863 (1993). These conflicts, together with the importance of the issue presented, led us to grant certiorari. 526 U. S. 1038 (1999). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

*229HH I — i

It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies. See, e. g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 548-549 (1983). The case we decide here, however, does not raise the issue of the government’s right, or, to be more specific, the state-controlled University’s right, to use its own funds to advance a particular message. The University’s whole justification for fostering the challenged expression is that it springs from the initiative of the students, who alone give it purpose and content in the course of their extracurricular endeavors.

The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under the principle that the government can speak for itself. If the challenged speech here were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the speaker. That is not the case before us.

The University of Wisconsin exacts the fee at issue for the sole purpose of facilitating the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students. We conclude the objecting students may insist upon certain safeguards with respect to the expressive activities which they are required to support. Our public forum cases are instructive here by close *230analogy. This is true even though the student activities fund is not a public forum in the traditional sense of the term and despite the circumstance that those cases most often involve a demand for access, not a claim to be exempt from supporting speech. See, e. g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). The standard of viewpoint neutrality found in the public forum cases provides the standard we find controlling. We decide that the viewpoint neutrality requirement of the University program is in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students. The student referendum aspect of the program for funding speech and expressive activities, however, appears to be inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement.

We must begin by recognizing that the complaining students are being required to pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even offensive. The Abood and Keller cases, then, provide the beginning point for our analysis. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). While those precedents identify the interests of the protesting students, the means of implementing First Amendment protections adopted in those decisions are neither applicable nor workable in the context of extracurricular student speech at a university.

In Abood, some nonunion public school teachers challenged an agreement requiring them, as a condition of their employment, to pay a service fee equal in amount to union dues. 431 U. S., at 211-212. The objecting teachers alleged that the union’s use of their fees to engage in political speech violated their freedom of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 213. The Court agreed and held that any objecting teacher could “prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining repre*231sentative.” Id., at 234. The principles outlined in Abood provided the foundation for our later decision in Keller. There we held that lawyers admitted to practice in California could be required to join a state bar association and to fund activities “germane” to the association’s mission of “regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.” 496 U. S., at 13-14. The lawyers could not, however, be required to fund the bar association’s own political expression. Id., at 16.

The proposition that students who attend the University cannot be required to pay subsidies for the speech of other students without some First Amendment protection follows from the Abood and Keller cases. Students enroll in public universities to seek fulfillment of their personal aspirations and of their own potential. If the University conditions the opportunity to receive a college education, an opportunity comparable in importance to joining a labor union or bar association, on an agreement to support objectionable, extracurricular expression by other students, the rights acknowledged in Abood and Keller become implicated. It infringes on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be required, by this mandatory student activity fee program, to pay subsidies for the objectionable speech of others without any recognition of the State’s corresponding duty to him or her. Yet recognition must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech.

In Abood and Keller, the constitutional rule took the form of limiting the required subsidy to speech germane to the. purposes of the union or bar association. The standard of germane speech as applied to student speech at a university is unworkable, however, and gives insufficient protection both to the objecting students and to the University program itself. Even in the context of a labor union, whose functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and understood by the law and the courts after a long history of gov-*232eminent regulation and judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and what is not. The difficulty manifested itself in our decision in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991), where different Members of the Court reached varying conclusions regarding what expressive activity was or was not germane to the mission of the association. If it is difficult to define germane speech with ease or precision where a union or bar association is the party, the standard becomes all the more unmanageable in the public university setting, particularly where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech and ideas.

The speech the University seeks to encourage in the program before us is distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored bounds. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to pursue. It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning.

Just as the vast extent of permitted expression makes the test of germane speech inappropriate for intervention, so too does it underscore the high potential for intrusion on the First Amendment rights of the objecting students. It is all but inevitable that the fees will result in subsidies to speech which some students find objectionable and offensive to their personal beliefs. If the standard of germane speech is inapplicable, then, it might be argued the remedy is to allow each student to list those causes which he or she will or will not support. If a university decided that its students’ First Amendment interests were better protected by some type of optional or refund system it would be free to do so. We decline to impose a system of that sort as a constitutional requirement, however. The restriction could be so disruptive and expensive that the program to support extracurricular speech would be ineffective. The First Amendment does not require the University to put the program at risk.

*233The University may determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall. If the University reaches this conclusion, it is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these ends.

The University must provide some protection to its students’ First Amendment interests, however. The proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support. Viewpoint neutrality was the obligation to which we gave substance in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995). There the University of Virginia feared that any association with a student newspaper advancing religious viewpoints would violate the Establishment Clause. We rejected the argument, holding that the school’s adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student fee program would prevent “any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the University.” Id., at 841. While Rosenberger was concerned with the rights a student has to use an extracurricular speech program already in place, today’s case considers the antecedent question, acknowledged but unresolved in Rosenberger: whether a public university may require its students to pay a fee which creates the mechanism for the extracurricular speech in the first instance. When a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others. There is symmetry then in our holding here and in Rosenberger: Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program’s operation once the funds have been collected. We conclude that the University of Wisconsin may sustain *234the extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using mandatory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the operational principle.

The parties have stipulated that the program the University has developed to stimulate extracurricular student expression respects the principle of viewpoint neutrality. If the stipulation is to continue to control the case, the University’s program in its basic structure must be found consistent with the First Amendment.

We make no distinction between campus activities and the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO’s. Those activities, respondents tell us, often bear no relationship to' the University’s reason for imposing the segregated fee in the first instaneé, to foster vibrant campus debate among students. If the University shares those concerns, it is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting off-campus travel or other expenditures by RSO’s, for it may create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected. Cf. id., at 829-830. We find no principled way, however, to impose upon the University, as a constitutional matter, a requirement to adopt geographic or spatial restrictions as a condition for RSOs’ entitlement to reimbursement. Universities possess significant interests in encouraging students to take advantage of the social, civic, cultural, and religious opportunities available in surrounding communities and throughout the country. Universities, like all of society, are finding that traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in communications, information transfer, and the means of discourse. If the rule of viewpoint neutrality is respected, our holding affords the University latitude to adjust its extracurricular student speech program to accommodate these advances and opportunities.

Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, or — of *235particular importance — its faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983). The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play.

When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position. In the instant case, the speech is not that of the University or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic context, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered. Cf. Rosenberger, supra, at 833 (discussing the discretion universities possess in deciding matters relating to their educational mission).

III

It remains to discuss the referendum aspect of the University’s program. While the record is not well developed on the point, it appears that by majority vote of the student body a given RSO may be funded or defunded. It is unclear to us what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality in this part of the process. To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent. That principle is controlling here. A remand is necessary and appropriate to *236resolve this point; and the case in all events must be reexamined in light of the principles we have discussed.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In this Court, the parties shall bear their own costs.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.

The majority today validates the University’s student activity fee after recognizing a new category of First Amendment interests and a new standard of viewpoint neutrality protection. I agree that the University’s scheme is permissible, but do not believe that the Court should take the occasion to impose a east-iron viewpoint neutrality requirement to uphold it. See ante, at 233-234. Instead, I would hold that the First Amendment interest claimed by the student respondents (hereinafter Southworth) here is simply insufficient to merit protection by anything more than the viewpoint neutrality already accorded by the University, and I would go no further.1

The parties have stipulated that the grant scheme is administered on a viewpoint neutral basis, and like the majority I take the case on that assumption. The question before us is thus properly cast not as whether viewpoint neutrality is required, but whether Southworth has a claim to relief from this specific viewpoint neutral scheme.2 Two sources of law might be considered in answering this question.

*237The first comprises First Amendment and related cases grouped under the umbrella of academic freedom.3 Such law might be implicated by the University’s proffered rationale, that the grant scheme funded by the student activity fee is an integral element in the discharge of its educational mission. App. 253 (excerpt from Dean of Students Office Student Organization Handbook noting that the activities of student groups constitute a “‘second curriculum’”); id., at 41, 42-44 (statement of Associate Dean of Students of the UW-Madison noting academic importance of funding scheme); see also ante, at 233. Our understanding of academic freedom has included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that universities and schools should have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to teach. In Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214 (1985), we recognized these related conceptions: “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.” Id., at 226, n. 12 (citations omitted). Some of the opinions in our books emphasize broad conceptions of academic freedom that if accepted by the Court might seem to clothe the University with an immunity to any challenge to regulations made or obligations imposed in the discharge of its educational mission. So, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957), Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result and joined by Justice Harlan, explained the *238importance of a university’s ability to define its own mission by quoting from a statement on the open universities in South Africa:

“ ‘It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’” Id., at 263 (citations omitted).

These broad statements on academic freedom do not dispose of the case here, however. Ewing addressed not the relationship between academic freedom and First Amendment burdens imposed by a university, but a due process challenge to a university’s academic decisions, while as to them the case stopped short of recognizing absolute autonomy. Ewing, supra, at 226, and n. 12. And Justice Frankfurter’s discussion in Sweezy, though not rejected, was not adopted by the full Court, Sweezy, supra, at 263 (opinion concurring in result). Our other cases on academic freedom thus far have dealt with more limited subjects, and do not compel the conclusion that the objecting university student is without a First Amendment claim here.4 While we have spoken in terms of a wide protection for the academic free*239dom and autonomy that bars legislatures (and courts) from imposing conditions on the spectrum of subjects taught and viewpoints expressed in college teaching (as the majority recognizes, ante, at 232), we have never held that universities lie entirely beyond the reach of students’ First Amendment rights.5 Thus our prior cases do not go so far as to control the result in this one, and going beyond those cases would be out of order, simply because the University has not litigated on grounds of academic freedom. As to that freedom and university autonomy, then, it is enough to say that protecting a university’s discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objections to student fees. Sweezy, supra, at 262-264 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Ewing, supra, at 226, n. 12.

The second avenue for addressing Southworth’s claim to a pro rata refund or the total abolition of the student activity fee is to see how closely the circumstances here resemble instances of governmental speech mandates found to require relief. As a threshold matter, it is plain that this case falls far afield of those involving compelled or controlled speeeh, apart from subsidy schemes. Indirectly transmitting a fraction of a student activity fee to an organization with an offensive message is in no sense equivalent to restricting or modifying the message a student wishes to express. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572-574 (1995). Nor does it require an individual to bear an offensive statement personally, as in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 707 (1977), let alone to affirm a moral or political commitment, as in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 626-629 (1943). In each of these cases, the government was imposing far more directly and offensively on an objecting individual than col*240lecting the fee that indirectly funds the jumble of other speakers’ messages in this case.

Next, I agree with the majority that the Abood and Keller line of cases does not control the remedy here, the situation of the students being significantly different from that of union or bar association members. Ante, at 230; see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). First, the relationship between the fee payer and the ultimately objectionable expression is far more attenuated. In the union and bar association cases, an individual was required to join or at least drop money in the coffers of the very organization promoting messages subject to objection. Abood, supra, at 211-213, 215; Keller, supra, at 13-14. The connection between the forced contributor and the ultimate message was as direct as the unmediated contribution to the organization doing the speaking. The student contributor, however, has to fund only a distributing agency having itself no social, political, or ideological character and itself engaging (as all parties agree) in no expression of any distinct message.6 App. 14-15, 34, 39, 41. Indeed, the disbursements, varying from year to year, are as likely as not to fund an organization that disputes the very message an individual student finds exceptionable. Id., at 39. Thus, the clear connection between fee payer and offensive speech that loomed large in our decisions in the union and bar cases is simply not evident here.

Second, South worth’s objection has less force than it might otherwise carry because the challenged fees support a gov-*241eminent program that aims to broaden public discourse. As I noted in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 873-874, and n. 3, 889-891 (1995) (dissenting opinion), the university fee at issue is a tax.7 The state university compels it; it is paid into state accounts; and it is disbursed under the ultimate authority of the State. Wis. Stat. §36.09(5) (1993-1994); App. 9, 18-19. Although the facts here may not fit neatly under our holdings on government speech (and the University has expressly renounced any such claim),8 ante, at 229, our cases do suggest that under the First Amendment the government may properly use its tax revenue to promote general discourse.9 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), we rejected a challenge to a congressional program providing viewpoint neutral subsidies to all Presidential candidates based in part on this reasoning:

“[The program] is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. Thus, [the program] furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values.” Id., at 92-93 (footnotes omitted).

*242And we have recognized the same principle outside of the sphere of government spending as well. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), we rejected a shopping mall owner’s blanket claim that "a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others.” Id., at 85 (footnote omitted). We then upheld the right of individuals to exercise state-protected rights of expression on a shopping mall owner’s property, noting among other things that there was no danger that such a requirement would “ *dampe[n] the vigor and limi[t] the variety of public debate.’ ” Id., at 87, 88 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 257 (1974) (alteration in original)). The same consideration goes against the fee payer’s speech objection to the scheme here.

Third, our prior compelled speech and compelled funding cases are distinguishable on the basis of the legitimacy of governmental interest. No one disputes the University’s assertion that some educational value is derived from the activities supported by the fee, ante, at 232-233; supra, at 237, whereas there was no governmental interest in mandating union or bar association support beyond supporting the collective bargaining and professional regulatory functions of those organizations, see Abood, supra, at 223-224; Keller, supra, at 13-14. Nor was there any legitimate governmental interest in requiring the publication or affirmation of propositions with which the bearer or speaker did not agree.10 Wooley, 430 U. S., at 716-717; Barnette, 319 U. S., at 640-642.

Finally, the weakness of Southworth’s claim is underscored by its setting within a university, whose students are inevitably required to support the expression of personally *243offensive viewpoints in ways that cannot he thought constitutionally objectionable unless one is prepared to deny the University its choice over what to teach. No one disputes that some fraction of students’ tuition payments may be used for course offerings that are ideologically offensive to some students, and for paying professors who say things in the university forum that are radically at odds with the politics of particular students. Least of all does anyone claim that the University is somehow required to offer a spectrum of courses to satisfy a viewpoint neutrality requirement. See Rosenberger, supra, at 892-893, and nn. 11-12 (Souter, J., dissenting). The University need not provide junior years abroad in North Korea as well as France, instruct in the theory of plutocracy as well as democracy, or teach Nietzsche as well as St. Thomas. Since uses of tuition payments (not optional for anyone who wishes to stay in college) may fund offensive speech far more obviously than the student activity fee does, it is difficult to see how the activity fee could present a stronger argument for a refund.

In sum, I see no basis to provide relief from the scheme being administered, would go no further, and respectfully concur in the judgment.

*643Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners are the Boy Scouts of America and the Monmouth Council, a division of the Boy Scouts of America (col*644lectively, Boy Scouts). The Boy Scouts is a private, not-for-profit organization engaged in instilling its system of values in young people. The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill. Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose adult membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s public accommodations law requires that the Boy Scouts readmit Dale. This ease presents the question whether applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law in this way violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association. We hold that it does.

I

James Dale entered Scouting in 1978 at the age of eight by joining Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142. Dale became a Boy Scout in 1981 and remained a Scout until he turned 18. By all accounts, Dale was an exemplary Scout. In 1988, he achieved the rank of Eagle Scout, one of Scouting’s highest honors.

Dale applied for adult membership in the Boy Scouts in 1989. The Boy Scouts approved his application for the position of assistant scoutmaster of Troop 78. Around the same time, Dale left home to attend Rutgers University. After arriving at Rutgers, Dale first acknowledged to himself and *645others that he is gay. He quickly became involved with, and eventually became the eopresident of, the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. In 1990, Dale attended a seminar addressing the psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers. A newspaper covering the event interviewed Dale about his advocacy of homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role models. In early July 1990, the newspaper published the interview and Dale’s photograph over a caption identifying him as the eopresident of the Lesbian/ Gay Alliance.

Later that month, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive James Kay revoking his adult membership. Dale wrote to Kay requesting the reason for Monmouth Council’s decision. Kay responded by letter that the Boy Scouts “specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.” App. 137.

In 1992, Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey Superior Court. The complaint alleged that the Boy Scouts had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute and its common law by revoking Dale’s membership based solely on his sexual orientation. New Jersey’s public accommodations statute prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-4 and 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000); see Appendix, infra, at 661-663.

The New Jersey Superior Court’s Chancery Division granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts. The court held that New Jersey’s public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation, and that, alternatively, the Boy Scouts is a distinctly private group exempted from coverage under New Jersey’s law. The court rejected Dale’s common-law claim, holding that New Jersey’s policy is embodied in the public accommodations law. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts’ position in respect of active homosexuality was clear *646and held that the First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader.

The New Jersey Superior Court’s Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Dale’s common-law claim, but otherwise reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 308 N. J. Super. 516, 706 A. 2d 270 (1998). It held that New Jersey’s public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts and that the Boy Scouts violated it. The Appellate Division rejected the Boy Scouts’ federal constitutional claims.

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. It held that the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation subject to the public accommodations law, that the organization was not exempt from the law under any of its express exceptions, and that the Boy Scouts violated the law by revoking Dale’s membership based on his avowed homosexuality. After considering the state-law issues, the court addressed the Boy Scouts’ claims that application of the public accommodations law in this ease violated its federal constitutional rights “‘to enter into and maintain . . . intimate or private relationships . . . [and] to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech.’” 160 N. J. 562, 605,734 A. 2d 1196, 1219 (1999) (quoting Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 544 (1987)). With respect to the right to intimate association, the court concluded that the Boy Scouts’ “large size, nonseleetivity, inclusive rather than exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not ‘sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection’ under the freedom of intimate association.” 160 N. J., at 608-609, 734 A. 2d, at 1221 (quoting Duarte, supra, at 546). With respect to the right of expressive association, the court “agree[d] that Boy Scouts expresses a belief in moral values and uses its activities to encourage the moral development *647of its members.” 160 N. J., at 613, 734 A. 2d, at 1223. But the court concluded that it was “not persuaded . . . that a shared goal of Boy Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral.” Ibid., 734 A. 2d, at 1223-1224 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court held “that Dale’s membership does not violate the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association because his inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way [the Boy Scouts’] existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.’” Id., at 615, 734 A. 2d, at 1225 (quoting Duarte, supra, at 548). The court also determined that New Jersey has a compelling interest in eliminating “the destructive consequences of discrimination from our society,” and that its public accommodations law abridges no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose. 160 N. J., at 619-620, 734 A. 2d, at 1227-1228. Finally, the court addressed the Boy Scouts’ reliance on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995), in support of its claimed First Amendment right to exclude Dale. The court determined that Hurley did not require deciding the ease in favor of the Boy Scouts because “the reinstatement of Dale does not compel Boy Scouts to express any message.” 160 N. J., at 624, 734 A. 2d, at 1229.

We granted the Boy Seouts’ petition for certiorari to determine whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law violated the First Amendment. 528 U. S. 1109 (2000).

II

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984), we observed that “implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment” is “a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” This right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would *648rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas. See ibid. (stating that protection of the right to expressive association is “especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority”). Government actions that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is “intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association” like a “regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.” Id., at 623. Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express. Thus, “[fjreedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Ibid.

The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 13 (1988). But the freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute. We have held that the freedom could be overridden “by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Roberts, supra, at 623.

To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in “expressive association.” The First Amendment’s protection of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.

Because this is a First Amendment ease where the ultimate conclusions of law are virtually inseparable from findings of fact, we are obligated to independently review the *649factual record to ensure that the state court’s judgment does not unlawfully intrude on free expression. See Hurley, supra, at 567-568. The record reveals the following. The Boy Scouts is a private, nonprofit organization. According to its mission statement:

“It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential.

“The values we strive to instill are based on those found in the Scout Oath and Law:

“Scout Oath

“On my honor I will do my best

“To do my duty to God and my country

“and to obey the Scout Law;

“To help other people at all times;

“To keep myself physically strong,

“mentally awake, and morally straight.

“Scout Law

“A Scout is:

“Trustworthy Obedient

“Loyal Cheerful

“Helpful Thrifty

“Friendly Brave

“Courteous Clean

“Kind Reverent.” App. 184.

Thus, the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: “[T]o instill values in young people.” Ibid. The Boy Scouts seeks to instill these values by having its adult leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping, archery, and fishing. During the time spent with the youth members, the scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy *650Scouts’ values — both expressly and by example. It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity. See Roberts, swpra, at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service might become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement”).

Given that the Boy Scouts engages in expressive activity, we must determine whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. This inquiry necessarily requires us first to explore, to a limited extent, the nature of the Boy Scouts’ view of homosexuality.

The values the Boy Scouts seeks to instill are “based on” those listed in the Scout Oath and Law. App. 184. The Boy Scouts explains that the Scout Oath and Law provide “a positive moral code for living; they are a list of ‘do’s’ rather than ‘don’ts.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 3. The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the values represented by the terms “morally straight” and “clean.”

Obviously, the Scout Oath and Law do not expressly mention sexuality or sexual orientation. See supra, at 649. And the terms “morally straight” and “clean” are by no means self-defining. Different people would attribute to those terms very different meanings. For example, some people may believe that engaging in homosexual conduct is not at odds with being “morally straight” and “clean.” And others may believe that engaging in homosexual conduct is contrary to being “morally straight” and “clean.” The Boy Scouts says it falls within the latter category.

The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts’ beliefs and found that the “exclusion of members solely on the basis of their sexual orientation is inconsistent with Boy *651Scouts’ commitment to a diverse and ‘representative’ membership ... [and] contradicts Boy Scouts’ overarching objective to reach ‘all eligible youth.’” 160 N. J., at 618, 734 A. 2d, at 1226. The court concluded that the exclusion of members like Dale “appears antithetical to the organization’s goals and philosophy.” Ibid. But our cases reject this sort of inquiry; it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U. S. 107, 124 (1981) (“[A]s is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational”); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[Rjeligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection”).

The Boy Scouts asserts that it “teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not morally straight,” Brief for Petitioners 39, and that it does “not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,” Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion. We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality. But because the record before us contains written evidence of the Boy Scouts’ viewpoint, we look to it as instructive, if only on the question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs.

A 1978 position statement to the Boy Scouts’ Executive Committee, signed by Downing B. Jenks, the President of the Boy Scouts, and Harvey L. Price, the Chief Scout Executive, expresses the Boy Scouts’ “official position” with regard to “homosexuality and Scouting”:

“Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual be a volunteer Scout leader?

*652“A. No. The Boy Scouts of America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right. We do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate. We will continue to select only those who in our judgment meet our standards and qualifications for leadership.” App. 453-454.

Thus, at least as of 1978 — the year James Dale entered Scouting — the official position of the Boy Scouts was that avowed homosexuals were not to be Scout leaders.

A position statement promulgated by the Boy Scouts in 1991 (after Dale’s membership was revoked but before this litigation was filed) also supports its current view:

‘We believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed, and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.” Id., at 457.

This position statement was redrafted numerous times but its core message remained consistent. For example, a 1993 position statement, the most recent in the record, reads, in part:

“The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization. We do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with these expectations. Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the BSA.” Id., at 461.

The Boy Scouts publicly expressed its views with respect to homosexual conduct by its assertions in prior litigation. For example, throughout a California ease with similar facts filed in the early 1980’s, the Boy Scouts consistently asserted the same position with respect to homosexuality that it asserts today. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy *653Scouts of America, No. C-365529 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 25, 1991); 48 Cal. App. 4th 670, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (1994); 17 Cal. 4th 670,952 P. 2d 218 (1998). We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.

We must then determine whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not “promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression. See, e. g., La Follette, supra, at 123-124 (considering whether a Wisconsin law burdened the National Party’s assoeiational rights and stating that “a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party”). That is not to say that an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message. But here Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who have “become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their sexual orientation.” App. 11. Dale was the copresident of a gay and lesbian organization at college and remains a gay rights activist. Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.

Hurley is illustrative on this point. There we considered whether the application of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law to require the organizers of a private St. Patrick’s Day parade to include among the marchers an Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group, GLIB, violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights. We noted that the parade organizers did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner. We observed:

*654“[A] contingent marching behind the organization’s banner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals .... The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.” 515 U. S., at 574-575.

Here, we have found that the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not “promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. As the presence of GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have interfered with the parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout’s choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.

The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the Boy Scouts’ ability to disseminate its message was not significantly affected by the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster because of the following findings:

“Boy Scout members do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is immoral; Boy Scouts discourages its leaders from disseminating any views on sexual issues; and Boy Scouts includes sponsors and members who subscribe to different views *655in respect of homosexuality.” 160 N. J., at 612, 734 A. 2d, at 1223.

We disagree with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion drawn from these findings.

First, associations do not have to associate for the “purpose” of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection. For example, the purpose of the St. Patrick’s Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held that the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonetheless.

Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders from disseminating views on sexual issues — a fact that the Boy Scouts disputes with contrary evidence — the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts’ method of expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example, this fact does not negate the sincerity of its belief discussed above.

Third, the First Amendment simply does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group’s policy to be “expressive association.” The Boy Scouts takes an official position with respect to homosexual conduct, and that is sufficient for First Amendment purposes. In this same vein, Dale makes much of the claim that the Boy Scouts does not revoke the membership of heterosexual Scout leaders that openly disagree with the Boy Scouts’ policy on sexual orientation. But if this is true, it is irrelevant.1 The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay *656rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection.

Having determined that the Boy Scouts is an expressive association and that the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its expression, we inquire whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept Dale as an assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Scouts’ freedom of expressive association. We conclude that it does.

State public accommodations laws were originally enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional places of public accommodation — like inns and trains. See, e.g., Hurley, supra, at 571-572 (explaining the history of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law); Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 627-629 (1996) (describing the evolution of public accommodations laws). Over time, the public accommodations laws have expanded to cover more places.2 New Jersey’s statu*657tory definition of “ ‘[a] place of public accommodation’ ” is extremely broad. The term is said to “include, but not be limited to,” a list of over 50 types of places. N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5 — 5(Z) (West Supp. 2000); see Appendix, infra, at 661-663. Many on the list are what one would expect to be places where the public is invited. For example, the statute includes as places of public accommodation taverns, restaurants, retail shops, and public libraries. But the statute also includes places that often may not carry with them open invitations to the public, like summer camps and roof gardens. In this ease, the New Jersey Supreme Court went a step further and applied its public accommodations law to a private entity without even attempting to tie the term “place” to a physical location.3 As the definition of “public accommodation” has expanded from clearly commercial entities, such as restaurants, bars, and hotels, to membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts, the potential for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights of organizations has increased.

We recognized in cases such as Roberts and Duarte that States have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations. But in each of these cases we went on to conclude that the enforcement of these statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to express. In Roberts, we said “[i]ndeed, the Jayeees has failed to demonstrate ... *658any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association.” 468 U. S., at 626. In Duarte, we said:

“impediments to the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment. In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.” 481 U. S., at 548 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We thereupon concluded in each of these cases that the organizations’ First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the States’ public accommodations laws.

In Hurley, we said that public accommodations laws “are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.” 515 U. S., at 572. But we went on to note that in that case “the Massachusetts [public accommodations] law has been applied in a peculiar way” because “any contingent of protected individuals with a message would have the right to participate in petitioners’ speech, so that the communication produced by the private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own.” Id., at 572-573. And in the associational freedom cases such as Roberts, Duarte, and New York State Club Assn., after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went on to examine whether or not the application of the state law would impose any “serious burden” on the organization’s rights of expressive association. So in these cases, the associational interest in freedom of expression has *659been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the other.

Dale contends that we should apply the intermediate standard of review enunciated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), to evaluate the competing interests. There the Court enunciated a four-part test for review of a governmental regulation that has only an incidental effect on protected speech — in that case the symbolic burning of a draft card. A law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards only incidentally affects the free speech rights of those who happen to use a violation of that law as a symbol of protest. But New Jersey’s public accommodations law directly and immediately affects assoeiational rights, in this ease associational rights that enjoy First Amendment protection. Thus, O’Brien is inapplicable.

In Hurley, we applied traditional First Amendment analysis to hold that the application of the Massachusetts public accommodations law to a parade violated the First Amendment rights of the parade organizers. Although we did not explicitly deem the parade in Hurley an expressive association, the analysis we applied there is similar to the analysis we apply here. We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor , homosexual conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association. That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement through the application of its public accommodations law.4

*660Justice Stevens’ dissent makes much of its observation that the public perception of homosexuality in this country has changed. See post, at 699-700. Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained greater societal acceptance. See ibid. But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these views. The First Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not. See, e. g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989) (holding that Johnson’s conviction for burning the American flag violates the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a Ku Klux Klan leader’s conviction for advocating unlawfulness as a means of political reform violates the First Amendment). And the fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view.

Justice Stevens’ extolling of Justice Brandéis’ comments in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion); see post, at 664, 700, confuses two entirely different principles. In New State Ice, the Court struck down an Oklahoma regulation prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice without a license. Justice Brandéis, a champion of state experimentation in the economic realm, dissented. But Justice Brandéis was never a champion of state experimentation in the suppression of free speech. To the contrary, his First Amendment commentary provides compelling support for the Court’s opinion in this case. In speaking of the Founders of this Nation, Justice Brandéis emphasized that they “believed that free*661dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion). He continued:

“Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.” Id., at 375-376.

We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization’s expressive message. “While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 579.

The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000). “Obtaining employment, accommodations and privileges without discrimination; civil right

“All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public aeeommoda*662tion, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”

N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000). “Definitions

“As used in this act, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context:

“l. ‘A place of public accommodation’ shall include, but not be limited to: any tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer camp, summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, whether for entertainment of transient guests or accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest; any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant, eating house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; any place maintained for the sale of ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, soda water or confections, or where any beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises; any garage, any public conveyance operated on land or water, or in the air, any stations and terminals thereof; any bathhouse, boardwalk, or seashore accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or hall; any theatre, motion-picture house, music hall, roof garden, skating rink, swimming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley, gymnasium, shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of amusement; any comfort station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any public library; any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or business school, high school, academy, college and university, or any educational institution under the supervision of the State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey. *663Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution, and the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed; nor shall anything herein contained be construed to bar any private secondary or post secondary school from using in good faith criteria other than race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry or af-fectional or sexual orientation in the admission of students.”

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

New Jersey “prides itself on judging each individual by his or her merits” and on being “in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from our society.” Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N. J. 55, 80, 389 A. 2d 465, 478 (1978). Since 1945, it has had a law against discrimination. The law broadly protects the opportunity of all persons to obtain the advantages and privileges “of any place of public accommodation.” N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000). The New Jersey Supreme Court’s construction of the statutory definition of a “place of public accommodation” has given its statute a more expansive coverage than most similar state statutes. And as amended in 1991, the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of nine different traits including an individual’s “sexual orientation.”1 The question in this case is whether that ex*664pansive construction trenches on the federal constitutional rights of the Boy Scouts of America (BSA).

Because every state law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice with principle, Justice Brandéis’ comment on the States’ right to experiment with “things social” is directly applicable to this ease.

“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion).

In its “exercise of this high power” today, the Court does not accord this “courageous State” the respect that is its due.

The majority holds that New Jersey’s law violates BSA’s right to associate and its right to free speech. But that law *665does not “impos[e] any serious burdens” on BSA’s "collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals,” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622, 626-627 (1984), nor does it force BSA to communicate any message that it does not wish to endorse. New Jersey’s law, therefore, abridges no constitutional right of BSA.

I

James Dale joined BSA as a Cub Scout in 1978, when he was eight years old. Three years later he became a Boy Scout, and he remained a member until his 18th birthday. Along the way, he earned 25 merit badges, was admitted into the prestigious Order of the Arrow, and was awarded the rank of Eagle Scout — an honor given to only three percent of all Scouts. In 1989, BSA approved his application to be an Assistant Scoutmaster.

On July 19, 1990, after more than 12 years of active and honored participation, the BSA sent Dale a letter advising him of the revocation of his membership. The letter stated that membership in BSA “is a privilege” that may be denied "whenever there is a concern that an individual may not meet the high standards of membership which the BSA seeks to provide for American youth.” App. 185. Expressing surprise at.his sudden expulsion, Dale sent a letter requesting an explanation of the decision. Id., at 186. In response, BSA sent him a second letter stating that the grounds for the decision “are the standards for leadership established by the Boy Scouts of America, which specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.” Id., at 137. At that time, no such standard had been publicly expressed by BSA.

In this case, BSA contends that it teaches the young boys who are Scouts that homosexuality is immoral. Consequently, it argues, it would violate its right to associate to force it to admit homosexuals as members, as doing so would be at odds with its own shared goals and values. This contention, quite plainly, requires us to look at what, exactly, are the values that BSA actually teaches.

*666BSA’s mission statement reads as follows: “It is the mission of the Boy Seouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential.” Id., at 184. Its federal charter declares its purpose is “to promote, through organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred values, using the methods which were in common use by Boy Scouts on June 15, 1916.” 86 U. S. C. §23; see also App. 315-316. BSA describes itself as having a “representative membership,” which it defines as “boy membership [that] reflects proportionately the characteristics of the boy population of its service area.” Id., at 65. In particular, the group emphasizes that “[n]either the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy.... To meet these responsibilities we have made a commitment that our membership shall be representative of all the population in every community, district, and council.” Id., at 66-67 (emphasis in original).

To instill its shared values, BSA has adopted a “Scout Oath” and a “Scout Law” setting forth its central tenets. For example, the Scout Law requires a member to promise, among other things, that he will be “obedient.” Accompanying definitions for the terms found in the Oath and Law are provided in the Boy Scout Handbook and the Scoutmaster Handbook. For instance, the Boy Scout Handbook defines “obedient” as follows:

“A Scout is OBEDIENT. A Scout follows the rules of his family, school, and troop. He obeys the laws of his community and country. If he thinks these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed in an orderly manner rather than disobey them.” Id., at 188 (emphasis deleted).

*667To bolster its claim that its shared goals include teaching that homosexuality is wrong, BSA directs our attention to two terms appearing in the Scout Oath and Law. The first is the phrase “morally straight,” which appears in the Oath (“On my honor I will do my best ... To keep myself . . . morally straight”); the second term is the word “clean,” which appears in a list of 12 characteristics together constituting the Scout Law.

The Boy Scout Handbook defines “morally straight,” as such:

“To be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your relationships with others should be honest and open. Be clean in your speech and actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs. The values you follow as a Scout will help you become virtuous and self-reliant.” Id,., at 218 (emphasis deleted).

The Scoutmaster Handbook emphasizes these points about being “morally straight”:

“In any consideration of moral fitness, a key word has to be ‘courage.’ A boy’s courage to do what his head and his heart tell him is right. And the courage to refuse to do what his heart and his head say is wrong. Moral fitness, like emotional fitness, will clearly present opportunities for wise guidance by an alert Scoutmaster.” Id., at 239-240.

As for the term “clean,” the Boy Scout Handbook offers the following:

“A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He chooses the company of those who live by these same ideals. He helps keep his home and community clean.

“Yoti never need to be ashamed of dirt that will wash off. If you play hard and work hard you can’t help get*668ting dirty. But when the game is over or the work is done, that kind of dirt disappears with soap and water. “There’s another kind of dirt that won’t come off by washing. It is the kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts.

“Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that ridicule other people and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs and jokes making fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or mental limitations. A Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in such mean-spirited behavior. He avoids it in his own words and deeds. He defends those who are targets of insults.” Id., at 225-226 (emphasis in original); see also id., at 189.2

It is plain as the light of day that neither one of these principles — “morally straight” and “clean” — says the slightest thing about homosexuality. Indeed, neither term in the Boy *669Scouts’ Law and Oath expresses any position whatsoever on sexual matters.

BSA’s published guidance on that topic underscores this point. Scouts, for example, are directed to receive their sex education at home or in school, but not from the organization: “Your parents or guardian or a sex education teacher should give you the facts about sex that you must know.” Boy Scout Handbook (1992) (reprinted in App. 211). To be sure, Scouts are not forbidden from asking their Scoutmaster about issues of a sexual nature, but Scoutmasters are, literally, the last person Scouts are encouraged to ask: “If you have questions about growing up, about relationships, sex, or making good decisions, ask. Talk with your parents, religious leaders, teachers, or Scoutmaster.” Ibid. Moreover, Scoutmasters are specifically directed to steer curious adolescents to other sources of information:

“If Scouts ask for information regarding... sexual activity, answer honestly and factually, but stay within your realm of expertise and comfort. If a Scout has serious concerns that you cannot answer, refer him to his family, religious leader, doctor, or other professional.” Scoutmaster Handbook (1990) (reprinted in App. 264).

More specifically, BSA has set forth a number of rules for Scoutmasters when these types of issues come up:

“You may have boys asking you for information or advice about sexual matters....

“How should you handle such matters?

“Rule number 1: You do not undertake to instruct Scouts, in any formalized manner, in the subject of sex and family life. The reasons are that it is not construed to be Scouting’s proper area, and that you are probably not well qualified to do this.

“Rule number 2: If Scouts come to you to ask questions or to seek advice, you would give it within your compe-*670tenee. A boy who appears to he asking about sexual intercourse, however, may really only be worried about his pimples, so it is well to find out just what information is needed.

“Rule number 3: You should refer boys with sexual problems to persons better qualified than you [are] to handle them. If the boy has a spiritual leader or a doctor who can deal with them, he should go there. If such persons are not available, you may just have to do the best you can. But don’t try to play a highly professional role. And at the other extreme, avoid passing the buck.” Scoutmaster Handbook (1972) (reprinted in App. 546-547) (emphasis added).

In light of BSA’s self-proclaimed ecumenism, furthermore, it is even more difficult to discern any shared goals or common moral stance on homosexuality. Insofar as religious matters are concerned, BSA’s bylaws state that it is “absolutely nonsectarian in its attitude toward... religious training.” Id., at 362. “The BSA does not define what constitutes duty to God or the practice of religion. This is the responsibility of parents and religious leaders.” Id., at 76. In fact, many diverse religious organizations sponsor local Boy Scout troops. Brief for Petitioners 3. Because a number of religious groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or wrong and reject discrimination against homosexuals,3 it is exceedingly difficult to believe that BSA none*671theless adopts a single particular religious or moral philosophy when it comes to sexual orientation. This is especially so in light of the fact that Scouts are advised to seek guidance on sexual matters from their religious leaders (and Scoutmasters are told to refer Scouts to them);4 BSA surely is aware that some religions do not teach that homosexuality is wrong.

II

The Court seeks to fill the void by pointing to a statement of “policies and procedures relating to homosexuality and Scouting,” App. 453, signed by BSA’s President and Chief Scout Executive in 1978 and addressed to the members of the Executive Committee of the national organization. Ante, at 651-652. The letter says that the BSA does “not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate.” App. 454. But when the entire 1978 letter is read, BSA’s position is far more equivocal:

“4. Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual be employed by the Boy Scouts of America as a professional or non-professional?

“A. Boy Scouts of America does not knowingly employ homosexuals as professionals or non-professionals. We are unaware of any present laws which would prohibit this policy.

*672“5. Q. Should a professional or non-professional individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual be terminated?

“A. Yes, in the absence of any law to the contrary. At the present time we are unaware of any statute or ordinance in the United States which prohibits discrimination against individual’s employment upon the basis of homosexuality. In the event that such a law was applicable, it would be necessary for the Boy Scouts of America to obey it, in this case as in Paragraph I above. It is our position, however, that homosexuality and professional or non-professional employment in Scouting are not appropriate.” Id., at 454-455 (emphasis added).

Four aspects of the 1978 policy statement are relevant to the proper disposition of this case. First, at most this letter simply adopts an exclusionary membership policy. But simply adopting such a policy has never been considered sufficient, by itself, to prevail on a right to associate claim. See infra, at 678-685.

Second, the 1978 policy was never publicly expressed — unlike, for example, the Scout’s duty to be “obedient.” It was an internal memorandum, never circulated beyond the few members of BSA’s Executive Committee. It remained, in effect, a secret Boy Scouts policy. Far from claiming any intent to express an idea that would be burdened by the presence of homosexuals, BSA’s public posture — to the world and to the Scouts themselves — remained what it had always been: one of tolerance, welcoming all classes of boys and young men. In this respect, BSA’s claim is even weaker than those we have rejected in the past. See ibid.

Third, it is apparent that the draftsmen of the policy statement foresaw the possibility that laws against discrimination might one day be amended to protect homosexuals from employment discrimination. Their statement clearly provided that, in the event such a law conflicted with their policy, a Scout’s duty to be “obedient” and “obe[y] the laws,” even if “he thinks [the laws] are unfair,” would prevail in such a *673contingency. See supra, at 666. In 1978, however, BSA apparently did not consider it to be a serious possibility that a State might one day characterize the Scouts as a “place of public accommodation” with a duty to open its membership to all qualified individuals. The portions of the statement dealing with membership simply assume that membership in the Scouts is a “privilege” that BSA is free to grant or to withhold. The statement does not address the question whether the publicly proclaimed duty to obey the law should prevail over the private discriminatory policy if, and when, a conflict between the two should arise — as it now has in New Jersey. At the very least, then, the statement reflects no unequivocal view on homosexuality. Indeed, the statement suggests that an appropriate way for BSA to preserve its unpublished exclusionary policy would include an open and forthright attempt to seek an amendment of New Jersey’s statute. (“If he thinks these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed in an orderly manner rather than disobey them.”)

Fourth, the 1978 statement simply says that homosexuality is not “appropriate.” It makes no effort to connect that statement to a shared goal or expressive activity of the Boy Scouts. Whatever values BSA seeks to instill in Scouts, the idea that homosexuality is not “appropriate” appears entirely unconnected to, and is mentioned nowhere in, the myriad of publicly declared values and creeds of the BSA. That idea does not appear to be among any of the principles actually taught to Scouts. Rather, the 1978 policy appears to be no more than a private statement of a few BSA executives that the organization wishes to exclude gays — and that wish has nothing to do with any expression BSA actually engages in.

The majority also relies on four other policy statements that were issued between 1991 and 1993.5 All of them were *674written and issued after BSA revoked Dale’s membership. Accordingly, they have little, if any, relevance to the legal question before this Court.6 In any event, they do not bolster BSA’s claim.

In 1991, BSA issued two statements both stating: “We believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed, and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.” App. 457-458. A third statement issued in 1992 was substantially the same. Id., at 459. By 1998, however, the policy had changed:

“BSA Position

“The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization.

“We do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with these expectations.

“Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the BSA.” Id., at 461.

Aside from the fact that these statements were all issued after Dale’s membership was revoked, there are four important points relevant to them. First, while the 1991 and 1992 *675statements tried to tie BSA’s exclusionary policy to the meaning of the Scout Oath and Law, the 1998 statement abandoned that effort. Rather, BSA’s 1993 homosexual exclusion policy was based on its view that including gays would be contrary to “the expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization.” Ibid. Instead of linking its policy to its central tenets or shared goals — to teach certain definitions of what it means to be “morally straight” and “clean” — BSA chose instead to justify its policy on the “expeetatio[n]” that its members preferred to exclude homosexuals. The 1998 policy statement, in other words, was not based on any expressive activity or on any moral view about homosexuality. It was simply an exclusionary membership policy, similar to those we have held insufficient in the past. See infra, at 678-685.

Second, even during the brief period in 1991 and 1992, when BSA tried to connect its exclusion of homosexuals to its definition of terms found in the Oath and Law, there is no evidence that Scouts were actually taught anything about homosexuality’s alleged inconsistency with those principles. Beyond the single sentence in these policy statements, there is no indication of any shared goal of teaching that homosexuality is incompatible with being “morally straight” and “clean.” Neither BSA’s mission statement nor its official membership policy was altered; no Boy Scout or Scoutmaster Handbook was amended to reflect the policy statement; no lessons were imparted to Scouts; no change was made to BSA’s policy on limiting discussion of sexual matters; and no effort was made to restrict acceptable religious affiliations to those that condemn homosexuality. In short, there is no evidence that this view was part of any collective effort to foster beliefs about homosexuality.7

*676Third, BSA never took any clear and unequivocal position on homosexuality. Though the 1991 and 1992 policies state one interpretation of “morally straight” and “clean,” the group’s published definitions appearing in the Boy Scout and Scoutmaster Handbooks take quite another view. And BSA’s broad religious tolerance combined with its declaration that sexual matters are not its “proper area” render its views on the issue equivocal at best and incoherent at worst. We have never held, however, that a group can throw together any mixture of contradictory positions and then invoke the right to associate to defend any one of those views. At a minimum, a group seeking to prevail over an antidis-crimination law must adhere to a clear and unequivocal view.

Fourth, at most the 1991 and 1992 statements declare only that BSA believed “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed.” App. 457 (emphasis added). But New Jersey’s law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And when Dale was expelled from the Boy Scouts, BSA said it did so because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sexual conduct.8

It is clear, then* that nothing in these policy statements supports BSA’s claim. The only policy written before the revocation of Dale’s membership was an equivocal, undisclosed statement that evidences no connection between the group’s discriminatory intentions and its expressive interests. The later policies demonstrate a brief — -though ulti*677mately abandoned — attempt to tie BSA’s exclusion to its expression, but other than a single sentence, BSA fails to show that it ever taught Scouts that homosexuality is not “morally straight” or “clean,” or that such a view was part of the group’s collective efforts to foster a belief. Furthermore, BSA’s policy statements fail to establish any clear, consistent, and unequivocal position on homosexuality. Nor did BSA have any reason to think Dale’s sexual conduct, as opposed to his orientation, was contrary to the group’s values.

BSA’s inability to make its position clear and its failure to connect its alleged policy to its expressive activities is highly significant. By the time Dale was expelled from the Boy Scouts in 1990, BSA had already been engaged in several suits under a variety of state antidiscrimination public accommodation laws challenging various aspects of its membership policy.9 Indeed, BSA had filed amicus briefs before this Court in two earlier right to associate cases (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), and Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481U. S. 537 (1987)) pointing to these very cases; it was clearly on notice by 1990 that it might well be subjected to state public accommodation antidiscrimination laws, and that a court might one day reject its claimed right to associate. Yet it took no steps prior to Dale’s expulsion to clarify how its exclusivity was connected to its expression. It speaks volumes about the credibility of BSA’s claim to a shared goal that homosexuality is incompatible with Scouting that since at least 1984 it had been aware of this issue — indeed, concerned enough to twice file amicus briefs before this *678Court — yet it did nothing in the intervening six years (or even in the years after Dale’s explusion) to explain clearly and openly why the presence of homosexuals would affect its expressive activities, or to make the view of “morally straight” and “clean” taken in its 1991 and 1992 policies a part of the values actually instilled in Scouts through the Handbook, lessons, or otherwise.

Ill

BSA’s claim finds no support in our cases. We have recognized “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment— speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Roberts, 468 U. S., at 618. And we have acknowledged that “when the State interferes with individuals’ selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association . . . may be implicated.” Ibid. But “[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not . . . absolute”; rather, “the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which . . . the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given ease.” Id., at 628, 618. Indeed, the right to associate does not mean “that in every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.” New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1,13 (1988). For example, we have routinely and easily rejected assertions of this right by expressive organizations with discriminatory membership policies, such as private schools,10 law *679firms,11 and labor organizations.12 In fact, until today, we have never once found a claimed right to associate in the selection of members to prevail in the face of a State’s anti-discrimination law. To the contrary, we have squarely held that a State’s antidiscrimination law does not violate a group’s right to associate simply because the law conflicts with that group’s exclusionary membership policy.

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), we addressed just such a conflict. The Jaycees was a nonprofit membership organization “‘designed to inculcate in the individual membership ... a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and ... to provide ... an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their community.’” Id., at 612-613. The organization was divided into local chapters, described as “ ‘young men’s organization[s],’ ” in which regular membership was restricted to males between the ages of 18 and 35. Id., at 613. But Minnesota’s Human Rights Act, which applied to the Jaycees, made it unlawful to “‘deny any person the full and equal *680enjoyment of ... a place of public accommodation because of . . . sex.’” Id., at 615. The Jaycees, however, claimed that applying the law to it violated its right to associate — in particular its right to maintain its selective membership policy.

We rejected that claim. Cautioning that the right to associate is not “absolute,” we held that “[[infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Id., at 623. We found the State’s purpose of eliminating discrimination is a compelling state interest that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Id., at 623-626. We also held that Minnesota’s law is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The Jaycees had “failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive association.” Id., at 626. Though the Jaycees had “taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, [and]... regularly engage in a variety of... activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment,” there was “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” Id., at 626-627. “The Act,” we held, “requires no change in the Jaycees’ creed of promoting the interest of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members.” Id., at 627.

We took a similar approach in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537 (1987). Rotary International, a nonprofit corporation, was founded as “‘an organization of business and professional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build good*681will and peace in the world.’” Id., at 539. It admitted a cross section of worthy business and community leaders, id., at 540, but refused membership to women. “[T]he exclusion of women,” explained the group’s General Secretary, “results in an ‘aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male membership.’ ” Id., at 541. That policy also allowed the organization “to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores.” Ibid. Though California’s Civil Rights Act, which applied to Rotary International, prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, id., at 541-542, n. 2, the organization claimed a right to associate, including the right to select its members.

As in Jaycees, we rejected the claim, holding that “the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.” 481 U. S., at 548. “To be sure,” we continued, “Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First Amendment. But [California’s Civil Rights Act] does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the community.” Ibid. Finally, even if California’s law worked a “slight infringement on Rotary members’ right of expressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.” Id., at 549.13

*682Several principles are made perfectly clear by Jaycees and Rotary Club. First, to prevail on a claim of expressive association in the face of a State’s antidiscrimination law, it is not enough simply to engage in some kind of expressive activity. Both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment,14 yet that fact was not dispositive. Second, it is not enough to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary membership policy. Both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club did that as well.15 Third, it is not sufficient merely to articulate some connection between the group’s expressive activities and its exclusionary policy. The Rotary Club, for example, justified its male-only membership policy by pointing to the “ ‘aspect of fellowship . . . that is enjoyed by the [exclusively] male membership’ ” and by claiming that only with an exclusively male membership *683could it “operate effectively” in foreign countries. Rotary Club, 481 U. S., at 541.

Rather, in Jaycees, we asked whether Minnesota’s Human Rights Law requiring the admission of women “impose[d] any serious burdens” on the group’s “collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals” 468 U. S., at 622, 626-627 (emphases added). Notwithstanding the group’s obvious publicly stated exclusionary policy, we did not view the inclusion of women as a “serious burden” on the Jaycees’ ability to engage in the protected speech of its choice. Similarly, in Rotary Club, we asked whether California’s law would “affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability” to engage in their protected speech, or whether the law would require the clubs “to abandon their basic goals.” 481 U. S., at 548 (emphases added); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 581 (1995) (“[A] private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club’s existing members”); New York State Club Assn., 487 U. S., at 13 (to prevail on a right to associate claim, the group must “be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462-463 (1958) (asking whether law “entail[ed] the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association” and whether law is “likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs”). The relevant question is whether the mere inclusion of the person at issue would “impose any serious burden,” “affect in any significant way,” or be “a substantial restraint upon” the organization’s “shared goals,” “basic goals,” or “collective effort to foster beliefs.” Accordingly, it is necessary to examine what, exactly, are *684BSA’s shared goals and the degree to which its expressive activities would he burdened, affected, or restrained by including homosexuals.

The evidence before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that BSA has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality. BSA’s mission statement and federal charter say nothing on the matter; its official membership policy is silent; its Scout Oath and Law — and accompanying definitions — are devoid of any view on the topic; its guidance for Scouts and Scoutmasters on sexuality declare that such matters are “not construed to be Scouting’s proper area,” but are the province of a Scout’s parents and pastor; and BSA’s posture respecting religion tolerates a wide variety of views on the issue of homosexuality. Moreover, there is simply no evidence that BSA otherwise teaches anything in this area, or that it instructs Scouts on matters involving homosexuality in ways not conveyed in the Boy Scout or Scoutmaster Handbooks. In short, Boy Scouts of America is simply silent on homosexuality. There is no shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief about homosexuality at all — let alone one that is significantly burdened by admitting homosexuals.

As in Jaycees, there is “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of [homosexuals] will impede the [Boy Scouts’] ability to engage in [its] protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views” and New Jersey’s law “requires no change in [BSA’s] creed.” 468 U. S., at 626-627. And like Rotary Club, New Jersey’s law “does not require [BSA] to abandon or alter any of” its activities. 481 U. S., at 548. The evidence relied on by the Court is not to the contrary. The undisclosed 1978 policy certainly adds nothing to the actual views disseminated to the Scouts. It simply says that homosexuality is not “appropriate.” There is no reason to give that policy statement more weight than Rotary International’s assertion that all-male membership *685fosters the group’s “fellowship” and was the only way it could “operate effectively.” As for BSA’s postrevocation statements, at most they simply adopt a policy of discrimination, which is no more dispositive than the openly discriminatory policies held insufficient in Jaycees and Rotary Club; there is no evidence here that BSA’s policy was necessary to— or even a part of — BSA’s expressive activities or was ever taught to Scouts.

Equally important is BSA’s failure to adopt any clear position on homosexuality. BSA’s temporary, though ultimately abandoned, view that homosexuality is incompatible with being “morally straight” and “clean” is a far cry from the clear, unequivocal statement necessary to prevail on its claim. Despite the solitary sentences in the 1991 and 1992 policies, the group continued to disclaim any single religious or moral position as a general matter and actively eschewed teaching any lesson on sexuality. It also continued to define “morally straight” and “clean” in the Boy Scout and Scoutmaster Handbooks without any reference to homosexuality. As noted earlier, nothing in our cases suggests that a group can prevail on a right to expressive association if it, effectively, speaks out of both sides of its mouth. A State’s anti-discrimination law does not impose a “serious burden” or a “substantial restraint” upon the group’s “shared goals” if the group itself is unable to identify its own stance with any clarity.

IV

The majority pretermits this entire analysis. It finds that BSA in fact “ ‘teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not morally straight.’ ” Ante, at 651. This conclusion, remarkably, rests entirely on statements in BSA’s briefs. See ibid, (citing Brief for Petitioners 39; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5). Moreover, the majority insists that we must “give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression” and “we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.” Ante, at *686653. So long as the record “contains written evidence” to support a group’s bare assertion, “[w]e need not inquire farther.” Ante, at 651. Once the organization “asserts” that it engages in particular expression, ibid., “[w]e cannot doubt” the truth of that assertion, ante, at 653.

This is an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further. It is even more astonishing in the First Amendment area, because, as the majority itself acknowledges, “we are obligated to independently review the factual record.” Ante, at 648-649. It is an odd form of independent review that consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims. But the majority insists that our inquiry must be “limited,” ante, at 650, because “it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent,” ante, at 651. See also Brief for Petitioners 25 (“[T]he Constitution protects [BSA’s] ability to control its own message”).

But nothing in our cases calls for this Court to do any such thing. An organization can adopt the message of its choice, and it is not this Court’s place to disagree with it. But we must inquire whether the group is, in fact, expressing a message (whatever it may be) and whether that message (if one is expressed) is significantly affected by a State’s antidis-crimination law. More critically, that inquiry requires our independent analysis, rather than deference to a group’s litigating posture. Reflection on the subject dictates that such an inquiry is required.

Surely there are instances in which an organization that truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State’s antidiscrimination laws will have a First Amendment right to association that precludes forced compliance with those laws. But that right is not a freedom to discriminate at will, nor is it a right to maintain an exclusionary member*687ship policy simply out of fear of what the public reaction would be if the group’s membership were opened up. It is an implicit right designed to protect the enumerated rights of the First Amendment, not a license to act on any discriminatory impulse. To prevail in asserting a right of expressive association as a defense to a charge of violating an anti-discrimination law, the organization must at least show it has adopted and advocated an unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom the organization seeks to exclude. If this Court were to defer to whatever position an organization is prepared to assert in its briefs, there would be no way to mark the proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand. Shielding a litigant’s elaim from judicial scrutiny would, in turn, render civil rights legislation a nullity, and turn this important constitutional right into a farce. Accordingly, the Court’s prescription of total deference will not do. In this respect, Justice Frankfurter’s words seem particularly apt:

“Elaborately to argue against this contention is to dignify a elaim devoid of constitutional substance. Of course a State may leave abstention from such discrimi-nations to the conscience of individuals. On the other hand, a State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another’s hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.” Railway *688Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 826 U. S. 88, 98 (1945) (concurring opinion).

There is, of course, a valid concern that a court’s independent review may run the risk of paying too little heed to an organization’s sincerely held views. But unless one is prepared to turn the right to associate into a free pass out of antidiscrimination laws, an independent inquiry is a necessity. Though the group must show that its expressive activities will be substantially burdened by the State’s law, if that law truly has a significant effect on a group’s speech, even the subtle speaker will be able to identify that impact.

In this ease, no such concern is warranted. It is .entirely clear that BSA in fact expresses no clear, unequivocal message burdened by New Jersey’s law.

V

Even if BSA’s right to associate argument fails, it nonetheless might have a First Amendment right to refrain from including debate and dialogue about homosexuality as part of its mission to instill values in Scouts. It can, for example, advise Scouts who are entering adulthood and have questions about sex to talk “with your parents, religious leaders, teachers, or Scoutmaster,” and, in turn, it can direct Scoutmasters who are asked such questions “not undertake to instruct Scouts, in any formalized manner, in the subject of sex and family life” because “it is not construed to be Seout-ing’s proper area.” See supra, at 669-670. Dale’s right to advocate certain beliefs in a public forum or in a private debate does not include a right to advocate these ideas when he is working as a Scoutmaster. And BSA cannot be compelled to include a message about homosexuality among the values it actually chooses to teach its Scouts, if it would prefer to remain silent on that subject.

In. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), we recognized that the government may not “require] affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,” nor *689“force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief,” even if doing so does not require the person to “forego any contrary convictions of their own.” Id., at 633-634. “[0]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’ ” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 573. Though the majority mistakenly treats this statement as going to the right to associate, it actually refers to a free speech claim. See id., at 564-565, 580-581 (noting distinction between free speech and right to associate claims). As with the right to associate claim, though, the court is obligated to engage in an independent inquiry into whether the mere inclusion of homosexuals would actually force BSA to proclaim a message it does not want to send. Id., at 567.

In its briefs, BSA implies, even if it does not directly argue, that Dale would use his Scoutmaster position as a “bully pulpit” to convey immoral messages to his troop, and therefore his inclusion in the group would compel BSA to include a message it does not want to impart. Brief for Petitioners 21-22. Even though the majority does not endorse that argument, I think it is important to explain why it lacks merit, before considering the argument the majority does accept.

BSA has not contended, nor does the record support, that Dale had ever advocated a view on homosexuality to his troop before his membership was revoked. Accordingly, BSA’s revocation could only have been based on an assumption that he would do so in the future. But the only information BSA had at the time it revoked Dale’s membership was a newspaper article describing a seminar at Rutgers University on the topic of homosexual teenagers that Dale attended. The relevant passage reads:

“James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alliance with Shariee Richardson, also 19, said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while attending a military academy.

*690“He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second year at Rutgers.

“‘I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting of me/ Dale said, adding he wasn’t just seeking sexual experiences, but a community that would take him in and provide him with a support network and friends.” App. 517.

Nothing in that article, however, even remotely suggests that Dale would advocate any views on homosexuality to his troop. The Scoutmaster Handbook instructs Dale, like all Scoutmasters, that sexual issues are not their “proper area,” and there is no evidence that Dale had any intention of violating this rule. Indeed, from all accounts Dale was a model Boy Scout and Assistant Scoutmaster up until the day his membership was revoked, and there is no reason to believe that he would suddenly disobey the directives of BSA because of anything he said in the newspaper article.

To be sure, the article did say that Dale was co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University, and that group presumably engages in advocacy regarding homosexual issues. But surely many members of BSA engage in expressive activities outside of their troop, and surely BSA does not want all of that expression to be carried on inside the troop. For example, a Scoutmaster may be a member of a religious group that encourages its followers to convert others to its faith. Or a Scoutmaster may belong to a political party that encourages its members to advance its views among family and friends.16 Yet BSA does not think it is appropriate for Scoutmasters to proselytize a particular faith to unwilling Scouts or to attempt to convert them from one *691religion to another.17 Nor does BSA think it appropriate for Scouts or Scoutmasters to bring politics into the troop.18 From all accounts, then, BSA does not discourage or forbid outside expressive activity, but relies on compliance with its policies and trusts Scouts and Scoutmasters alike not to bring unwanted views into the organization. Of course, a disobedient member who flouts BSA’s policy may be expelled. But there is no basis for BSA to presume that a homosexual will be unable to comply with BSA’s policy not to discuss sexual matters any more than it would presume that politically or religiously active members could not resist the urge to proselytize or politicize during troop meetings.19 As BSA itself puts it, its rights are “not implicated unless a prospective leader presents himself as a role model ineon-*692sistent with Boy Seouting’s understanding of the Scout Oath and Law.” Brief for Petitioners 6 (emphases added).20

The majority, though, does not rest its conclusion on the claim that Dale will use his position as a bully pulpit. Rather, it contends that Dale’s mere presence among the Boy Scouts will itself force the group to convey a message about homosexuality — even if Dale has no intention of doing so. The majority holds that “[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distine[t] . . . message,” and, accordingly, BSA is entitled to exclude that message. Ante, at 655-656. In particular, “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of be*693havior.” Ante, at 653; see also Brief for Petitioners 24 (“By donning the uniform of an adult leader in Scouting, he would 'celebrate [his] identity’ as an openly gay Scout leader”).

The majority’s argument relies exclusively on Hurley v. Irish-Americcm Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995). In that case, petitioners John Hurley and the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council ran a privately operated St. Patrick’s Day parade. Respondent, an organization known as “GLIB,” represented a contingent of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who sought to march in the petitioners’ parade “as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals.” Id., at 561. When the parade organizers refused GLIB’s admission, GLIB brought suit under Massachusetts’ antidiscrimination law. That statute, like New Jersey’s law, prohibited discrimination on account of sexual orientation in any place of public accommodation, which the state courts interpreted to include the parade. Petitioners argued that forcing them to include GLIB in their parade would violate their free speech rights.

We agreed. We first pointed out that the St. Patrick’s Day - parade — like most every parade — is an inherently expressive undertaking. Id., at 568-570. Next, we reaffirmed that the government may not compel anyone to proclaim a belief with which he or she disagrees. Id., at 573-574. We then found that GLIB’s marching in the parade would be an expressive act suggesting the view “that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals.” Id., at 574. Finally, we held that GLIB’s participation in the parade “would likely be pei’-eeived” as the parade organizers’ own speech — or at least as a view which they approved — because of a parade organizer’s customary control over who marches in the parade. Id., at 575. Though Hurley has a superficial similarity to the present ease, a close inspection reveals a wide gulf between that case and the one before us today.

*694First, it was critical to our analysis that GLIB was actually conveying a message by participating in the parade — otherwise, the parade organizers could hardly claim that they were being forced to include any unwanted message at all. Our conclusion that GLIB was conveying a message was inextricably tied to the fact that GLIB wanted to march in a parade, as well as the manner in which it intended to march. We noted the “inherent expressiveness of marching [in a parade] to make a point,” id., at 568, and in particular that GLIB was formed for the purpose of making a particular point about gay pride, id., at 561, 570. More specifically, GLIB “distributed a fact sheet describing the members’ intentions” and, in a previous parade, had “marched behind a shamrock-strewn banner with the simple inscription ‘Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.’” Id., at 570. “[A] contingent marching behind the organization’s banner,” we said, would clearly convey a message. Id., at 574. Indeed, we expressly distinguished between the members of GLIB, who marched as a unit to express their views about their own sexual orientation, on the one hand, and homosexuals who might participate as individuals in the parade without intending to express anything about their sexuality by doing so. Id., at 572-573.

Second, we found it relevant that GLIB’s message “would likely be perceived” as the parade organizers’ own speech. Id., at 575. That was so because “[p]arades and demonstrations ... are not understood to be so neutrally presented or selectively viewed” as, say, a broadcast by a cable operator, who is usually considered to be “merely ‘a conduit’ for the speech” produced by others. Id., at 575-576. Rather, parade organizers are usually understood to make the “customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade.” Id., at 575. ■

Dale’s inclusion in the Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in Hurley. His participation sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world. Unlike GLIB, Dale did not *695carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message. If there is any kind of message being sent, then, it is by the mere act of joining the Boy Scouts. Such an act does not constitute an instance of symbolic speech under the First Amendment.21

It is true, of course, that some acts are so imbued with symbolic meaning that they qualify as “speech” under the First Amendment. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968). At the same time, however, “[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” Ibid. Though participating in the Scouts could itself conceivably send a message on some level, it is not the kind of act that we have recognized as speech. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 24-25 (1989).22 Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.

*696The only apparent explanation for the majority’s holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their presence alone — unlike any other individual’s — should be singled out for special First Amendment treatment. Under the majority’s reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label “homosexual.” That label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism. Though unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority.23 As counsel for BSA remarked, Dale “put a banner‘around his neck when he ... got himself into the newspaper.... He created a reputation.... He can’t take that banner off. He put it on himself and, indeed, he has continued to put it on himself.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.

Another difference between this ease and Hurley lies in the fact that Hurley involved the parade organizers’ claim to determine the content of the message they wish to give at a particular time and place. The standards governing such a claim are simply different from the standards that govern BSA’s claim of a right of expressive association. Generally, a private person or a private organization has a right to refuse to broadcast a message with which it disagrees, and a right to refuse to contradict or garble its own specific statement at any given place or time by including the messages of others. An expressive association claim, however, normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position on some issue over time. This is why a different kind of scrutiny must be given to an expressive association claim, lest the right of expressive association simply turn into a right to discriminate whenever some group can think of an expressive object that would seem to be inconsistent with the ad*697mission of some person as a member or at odds with the appointment of a person to a leadership position in the group.

Furthermore, it is not likely that BSA would be understood to send any message, either to Scouts or to the world, simply by admitting someone as a member. Over the years, BSA has generously welcomed over 87 million young Americans into its ranks. In 1992 over one million adults were active BSA members. 160 N. J. 562, 571, 734 A. 2d 1196, 1200 (1999). The notion that an organization of that size and enormous prestige implicitly endorses the views that each of those adults may express in a non-Seouting context is simply mind boggling. Indeed, in this case there is no evidence that the young Scouts in Dale’s troop, or members of their families, were even aware of his sexual orientation, either before or after his public statements at Rutgers University.24 It is equally farfetched to assert that Dale’s open declaration of his homosexuality, reported in a local newspaper, will effectively force BSA to send a message to anyone simply because it allows Dale to be an Assistant Scoutmaster. For an Olympic gold medal winner or a Wimbledon tennis champion, being “openly gay” perhaps communicates a message — for example, that openness about one’s sexual orientation is more virtuous than concealment; that a homosexual person can be a capable and virtuous person who should be judged like anyone else; and that homosexuality is not immoral— but it certainly does not follow that they necessarily send a message on behalf of the organizations that sponsor the activities in which they excel. The fact that such persons participate in these organizations is not usually construed to convey a message on behalf of those organizations any more than does the inclusion of women, African-Americans, reli*698gious minorities, or any other discrete group.25 Surely the organizations are not forced by antidiscrimination laws to take any position on the legitimacy of any individual’s private beliefs or private conduct.

The State of New Jersey has decided that people who are open and frank about their sexual orientation are entitled to equal access to employment as schoolteachers, police officers, librarians, athletic coaches, and a host of other jobs filled by citizens who serve as role models for children and adults alike. Dozens of Scout units throughout the State are sponsored by public agencies, such as schools and fire departments, that employ such role models. BSA’s affiliation with numerous public agencies that comply with New Jersey’s law against discrimination cannot be understood to convey any particular message endorsing or condoning the activities of all these people.26

*699VI

Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals “have ancient roots.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 192 (1986). Like equally atavistic opinions about certain racial groups, those roots have been nourished by sectarian doctrine. Id., at 196-197 (Burger, C. J., concurring); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1,3 (1967).27 See also Mathews v. Lucas, 421U. S. 495,520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black, and white”). Over the years, however, interaction with real people, rather than mere adherence to traditional ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes, have modified those opinions. A few examples: The American Psychiatric Association’s and the American Psychological Association’s removal of “homosexuality” from their lists of mental disorders;28 a move toward greater understanding within some religious communities;29 Justice Blaekmun’s classic opinion in Bowers;30 *700Georgia’s invalidation of the statute upheld in Bowers;31 and New Jersey’s enactment of the provision at issue in this ease. Indeed, the past month alone has witnessed some remarkable changes in attitudes about homosexuals.32

That such prejudices are still prevalent and that they have caused serious and tangible harm to countless members of the class New Jersey seeks to protect are established matters of fact that neither the Boy Scouts nor the Court disputes. That harm can only be aggravated by the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual way of thinking about strangers. As Justice Brandéis so wisely advised, “we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.”

If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. I respectfully dissent.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

I join Justice Stevens’s dissent but add this further word on the significance of Part VI of his opinion. There, Justice Stevens describes the changing attitudes toward gay people and notes a parallel with the decline of stereotypical thinking about race and gender. The legitimacy of New *701Jersey’s interest in forbidding discrimination on all these bases by those furnishing public accommodations is, as Justice Stevens indicates, acknowledged by many to be beyond question. The fact that we are cognizant of this laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality should not, however, be taken to control the resolution of this case.

Boy Scouts of America (BSA) is entitled, consistently with its own tenets and the open doors of American courts, to raise a federal constitutional basis for resisting the application of New Jersey’s law. BSA has done that and has chosen to defend against enforcement of the state public accommodations law on the ground that the First Amendment protects expressive association: individuals have a right to join together to advocate opinions free from government interference. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984). BSA has disclaimed any argument that Dale’s past or future actions, as distinct from his unapologetie declaration of sexual orientation, would justify his exclusion from BSA. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13.

The right of expressive association does not, of course, turn on the popularity of the views advanced by a group that claims protection. Whether the group appears to this Court to be in the vanguard or rearguard of social thinking is irrelevant to the group’s rights. I conclude that BSA has not made out an expressive association claim, therefore, not because of what BSA may espouse, but because of its failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message. As Justice Stevens explains, no group can claim a right of expressive association without identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way. To require less, and to allow exemption from a public accommodations statute based on any individual’s difference from an alleged group ideal, however expressed and however inconsistently claimed, would convert the right of expres*702sive association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law.*

If, on the other hand, an expressive association claim has met the conditions Justice Stevens describes as necessary, there may well be circumstances in which the antidiscrimination law must yield, as he says. It is certainly possible for an individual to become so identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly. When that position is at odds with a group’s advocated position, applying an antidiscrimination statute to require the group’s acceptance of the individual in a position of group leadership could so modify or muddle or frustrate the group’s advocacy as to violate the expressive assoeiational right. While it is not our business here to rule on any such hypothetical, it is at least clear that our estimate of the progressive character of the group’s position will be irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis if such a case comes to us for decision.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the First Amendment permits a State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or support. We hold that it does not, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

A

Millions of Americans, due to age, illness, or injury, are unable to live in their own homes without assistance and are unable to afford the expense of in-home care. In order to prevent these individuals from having to enter a nursing home or other facility, the federal Medicaid program funds state-run programs that provide in-home services to individuals whose conditions would otherwise require institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1). A State that adopts such a program receives federal funds to compensate persons who attend to the daily needs of individuals needing in-home care. Ibid. ; see also 42 CFR §§ 440.180 , 441.300-441.310 (2013). Almost every State has established such a program. See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Understanding Medicaid Home and Community Services: A Primer (2010).

One of those States is Illinois, which has created the Illinois Department of Human Services Home Services Program, known colloquially as the state "Rehabilitation Program." Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f) (West 2012); 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 676.10 (2007). "[D]esigned to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals who may instead be satisfactorily maintained at home at a lesser cost to the State," § 676.10(a), the Rehabilitation *2624 Program allows participants to hire a "personal assistant" who provides homecare services tailored to the individual's needs. Many of these personal assistants are relatives of the person receiving care, and some of them provide care in their own homes. See App. 16-18.

Illinois law establishes an employer-employee relationship between the person receiving the care and the person providing it. The law states explicitly that the person receiving home care-the "customer"-"shall be the employer of the [personal assistant]." 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 676.30(b) (emphasis added). A "personal assistant" is defined as "an individual employed by the customer to provide ... varied services that have been approved by the customer's physician," § 676.30(p) (emphasis added), and the law makes clear that Illinois "shall not have control or input in the employment relationship between the customer and the personal assistants." § 676.10(c).

Other provisions of the law emphasize the customer's employer status. The customer "is responsible for controlling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the [personal assistant (or PA) ], including, without limitation, locating and hiring the PA, training the PA, directing, evaluating and otherwise supervising the work performed by the personal assistant, imposing ... disciplinary action against the PA, and terminating the employment relationship between the customer and the PA." § 676.30(b). ¹ In general, the customer "has complete discretion in which Personal Assistant he/she wishes to hire." § 684.20(b).

A customer also controls the contents of the document, the Service Plan, that lists the services that the customer will receive. § 684.10(a). No Service Plan may take effect without the approval of both the customer and the customer's physician. See § 684.10, 684.40, 684.50, 684.75. Service Plans are highly individualized. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board noted in 1985 that "[t]here is no typical employment arrangement here, public or otherwise; rather, there simply exists an arrangement whereby the state of Illinois pays individuals ... to work under the direction and control of private third parties." Illinois Dept. of Central Management Serv., No. S-RC-115, 2 PERI ¶ 2007, p. VIII-30, (1985), superseded, 2003 Ill. Laws p. 1929.

While customers exercise predominant control over their employment relationship with personal assistants, the State, subsidized by the federal Medicaid program, pays the personal assistants' salaries. The amount paid varies depending on the services provided, but as a general matter, it "corresponds to the amount the State would expect to pay for the nursing care component of institutionalization if the individual chose institutionalization." 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 679.50(a).

Other than providing compensation, the State's role is comparatively small. The State sets some basic threshold qualifications for employment. See *2625 §§ 686.10(h)(1)-(10). ² (For example, a personal assistant must have a Social Security number, must possess basic communication skills, and must complete an employment agreement with the customer. §§ 686.10, 686.20, 686.40.) The State mandates an annual performance review by the customer, helps the customer conduct that review, and mediates disagreements between customers and their personal assistants. § 686.30. The State suggests certain duties that personal assistants should assume, such as performing "household tasks," "shopping," providing "personal care," performing "incidental health care tasks," and "monitoring to ensure the health and safety of the customer." § 686.20. In addition, a state employee must "identify the appropriate level of service provider" " based on the customer's approval of the initial Service Plan," § 684.20(a) (emphasis added), and must sign each customer's Service Plan. § 684.10.

B

Section 6 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) authorizes state employees to join labor unions and to bargain collectively on the terms and conditions of employment. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, § 315/6(a). This law applies to "[e]mployees of the State and any political subdivision of the State," subject to certain exceptions, and it provides for a union to be recognized if it is "designated by the [Public Labor Relations] Board as the representative of the majority of public employees in an appropriate unit...." §§ 315/6(a), (c) .

The PLRA contains an agency-fee provision, i.e., a provision under which members of a bargaining unit who do not wish to join the union are nevertheless required to pay a fee to the union. See Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 , 409, n. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2140 , 48 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976). Labeled a "fair share" provision, this section of the PLRA provides: "When a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an exclusive representative, it may include in the agreement a provision requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of the organization to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the collective-bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment." § 315/6(e). This payment is "deducted by the employer from the earnings of the nonmember employees and paid to the employee organization." Ibid.

In the 1980's, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) petitioned the Illinois Labor Relations Board for permission to represent personal assistants employed by customers in the Rehabilitation Program, but the board rebuffed this effort. Illinois Dept. of Central Management Servs., supra, at VIII-30. The board concluded that "it is clear ... that [Illinois] does not exercise the type of control over the petitioned-for employees necessary *2626 to be considered, in the collective bargaining context envisioned by the [PLRA], their 'employer' or, at least, their sole employer." Ibid.

In March 2003, however, Illinois' newly elected Governor, Rod Blagojevich, circumvented this decision by issuing Executive Order 2003-08. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a-47a. The order noted the Illinois Labor Relations Board decision but nevertheless called for state recognition of a union as the personal assistants' exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with the State. This was necessary, Gov. Blagojevich declared, so that the State could "receive feedback from the personal assistants in order to effectively and efficiently deliver home services." Id ., at 46a. Without such representation, the Governor proclaimed, personal assistants "cannot effectively voice their concerns about the organization of the Home Services program, their role in the program, or the terms and conditions of their employment under the Program." Ibid.

Several months later, the Illinois Legislature codified that executive order by amending the PLRA. Pub. Act no. 93-204, § 5, 2003 Ill. Laws p. 1930. While acknowledging "the right of the persons receiving services ... to hire and fire personal assistants or supervise them," the Act declared personal assistants to be "public employees" of the State of Illinois-but "[s]olely for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act." Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f). The statute emphasized that personal assistants are not state employees for any other purpose, "including but not limited to, purposes of vicarious liability in tort and purposes of statutory retirement or health insurance benefits." Ibid.

Following a vote, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana (SEIU-HII) was designated as the personal assistants' exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining. See App. 23. The union and the State subsequently entered into collective-bargaining agreements that require all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a "fair share" of the union dues. Id ., at 24-25. These payments are deducted directly from the personal assistants' Medicaid payments. Ibid. The record in this case shows that each year, personal assistants in Illinois pay SEIU-HII more than $3.6 million in fees. Id., at 25.

C

Three of the petitioners in the case now before us-Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, and Stephanie Yencer-Price-are personal assistants under the Rehabilitation Program. They all provide in-home services to family members or other individuals suffering from disabilities. ³ Susan Watts, for example, serves as personal assistant for her daughter, who requires constant care due to quadriplegic cerebral palsy and other conditions. See App. 18.

In 2010, these petitioners filed a putative class action on behalf of all Rehabilitation Program personal assistants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See 656 F.3d 692 , 696 (C.A.7 2011). Their complaint, which named the Governor and the union as defendants, sought an injunction against enforcement of the fair-share provision and a declaration that the Illinois PLRA violates the First Amendment insofar as it requires personal assistants to pay a fee to a union that they do not wish to support. Ibid.

*2627 The District Court dismissed their claims with prejudice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in relevant part, concluding that the case was controlled by this Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U.S. 209 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 , 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). 656 F.3d, at 698 . The Seventh Circuit held that Illinois and the customers who receive in-home care are "joint employers" of the personal assistants, and the court stated that it had "no difficulty concluding that the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of Abood ." Ibid.

Petitioners sought certiorari. Their petition pointed out that other States were following Illinois' lead by enacting laws or issuing executive orders that deem personal assistants to be state employees for the purpose of unionization and the assessment of fair-share fees. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Petitioners also noted that Illinois has enacted a law that deems "individual maintenance home health workers"-a category that includes registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certain therapists who work in private homes-to be "public employees" for similar purposes. Ill. Pub. Act no. 97-1158, 2012 Ill. Laws p. 7823.

In light of the important First Amendment questions these laws raise, we granted certiorari. 570 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 48 , 186 L.Ed.2d 962 (2013).

II

In upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit relied on this Court's decision in Abood supra, which held that state employees who choose not to join a public-sector union may nevertheless be compelled to pay an agency fee to support union work that is related to the collective-bargaining process. Id ., at 235-236 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . Two Terms ago, in Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2277 , 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012), we pointed out that Abood is "something of an anomaly." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2290 . " 'The primary purpose' of permitting unions to collect fees from nonmembers," we noted, "is 'to prevent nonmembers from free-riding on the union's efforts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the union's collective bargaining without sharing the costs incurred.' " Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 (quoting Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn ., 551 U.S. 177 , 181, 127 S.Ct. 2372 , 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007)). But "[s]uch free-rider arguments ... are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections." 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 .

For this reason, Abood stands out, but the State of Illinois now asks us to sanction what amounts to a very significant expansion of Abood -so that it applies, not just to full-fledged public employees, but also to others who are deemed to be public employees solely for the purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee. Faced with this argument, we begin by examining the path that led to this Court's decision in Abood.

A

The starting point was Railway Employes' v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 , 76 S.Ct. 714 , 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), a case in which the First Amendment was barely mentioned. The dispute in Hanson resulted from an amendment to the Railway Labor Act (RLA). Id., at 229, 232, 76 S.Ct. 714 . As originally enacted in 1926, the Act did not permit a collective-bargaining agreement to require employees to join or make any payments to a union. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 , 750, 81 S.Ct. 1784 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). At that time and for many years thereafter, there was "a strong and long-standing tradition of voluntary *2628 unionism on the part of the standard rail unions." Ibid .

Eventually, however, the view of the unions changed. See ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 760-761 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . The RLA's framework for resolving labor disputes "is more complex than that of any other industry," ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 755 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 , and amendments enacted in 1934 increased the financial burden on unions by creating the 36-member National Railroad Adjustment Board, one-half of whose members were appointed and paid by the unions. Id ., at 759-760 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . In seeking authorization to enter into union-shop agreements, i.e., agreements requiring all employees to join a union and thus pay union dues, see Oil Workers, 426 U.S., at 409, n. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 2140 , the unions' principal argument "was based on their role in this regulatory framework." Street, 367 U.S., at 761 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . A union spokesman argued that the financial burdens resulting from the Act's unique and complex scheme justified union-shop provisions in order to provide the unions with needed dues. Ibid.

These arguments were successful, and the Act was amended in 1951 to permit a railroad and a union to enter into an agreement containing a union-shop provision. This amendment brought the Act into conflict with the laws of States that guaranteed the "right to work" and thereby outlawed the union shop. Nebraska, the setting of Hanson, was one such State. 351 U.S., at 228 , 76 S.Ct. 714 .

In Hanson, the Union Pacific Railroad Company and its unionized workers entered into a collective-bargaining agreement that contained a provision requiring employees, "as a condition of their continued employment," to join and remain members of the union. Id ., at 227 , 76 S.Ct. 714 . Employees who did not want to join the union brought suit in state court, contending that the union-shop provision violated a provision of the Nebraska Constitution banning adverse employment actions " 'because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization.' " Id ., at 228 , 76 S.Ct. 714 (quoting Neb. Const., Art. XV, § 13). The employer countered that the RLA trumped the Nebraska provision, but the Nebraska courts agreed with the employees and struck down the union-shop agreement.

When the case reached this Court, the primary issue was whether the provision of the RLA that authorized union-shop agreements was "germane to the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause." 351 U.S., at 234-235 , 76 S.Ct. 714 . In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that this provision represented a permissible regulation of commerce. The Court reasoned that the challenged provision " 'stabilized labor-management relations' " and thus furthered " 'industrial peace.' " Id ., at 233-234 , 76 S.Ct. 714 .

The employees also raised what amounted to a facial constitutional challenge to the same provision of the RLA. The employees claimed that a "union shop agreement forces men into ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights." Id ., at 236 , 76 S.Ct. 714 . But because the lawsuit had been filed shortly after the collective-bargaining agreement was approved, the record contained no evidence that the union had actually engaged in political or ideological activities. ⁴

*2629 The Hanson Court dismissed the objecting employees' First Amendment argument with a single sentence. The Court wrote: "On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar." Id ., at 238 , 76 S.Ct. 714 .

This explanation was remarkable for two reasons. First, the Court had never previously held that compulsory membership in and the payment of dues to an integrated bar was constitutional, and the constitutionality of such a requirement was hardly a foregone conclusion. Indeed, that issue did not reach the Court until five years later, and it produced a plurality opinion and four separate writings. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 , 81 S.Ct. 1826 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1191 (1961) (plurality opinion). ⁵

Second, in his Lathrop dissent, Justice Douglas, the author of Hanson, came to the conclusion that the First Amendment did not permit compulsory membership in an integrated bar. See 367 U.S., at 878-880, 81 S.Ct. 1826 . The analogy drawn in Hanson, he wrote, fails. "Once we approve this measure," he warned, "we sanction a device where men and women in almost any profession or calling can be at least partially regimented behind causes which they oppose." 367 U.S., at 884, 81 S.Ct. 1826 . He continued:

"I look on the Hanson case as a narrow exception to be closely confined. Unless we so treat it, we practically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into goose-stepping brigades. Those brigades are not compatible with the First Amendment." Id., at 884-885 , 81 S.Ct. 1826 (footnote omitted).

The First Amendment analysis in Hanson was thin, and the Court's resulting First Amendment holding was narrow. As the Court later noted, "all that was held in Hanson was that [the RLA] was constitutional in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give 'financial support' to unions legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents." Street, 367 U.S., at 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784 (emphasis added). The Court did not suggest that "industrial peace" could justify a law that "forces men into ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought," or a law that forces a person to "conform to [a union's] ideology." Hanson, supra, at 236-237, 76 S.Ct. 714 . The RLA did not compel such results, and the record in Hanson did not show that this had occurred.

B

Five years later, in Street, supra, the Court considered another case in which workers objected to a union shop. Employees of the Southern Railway System raised a First Amendment challenge, contending that a substantial part of the money that they were required to pay to the union was used to support political candidates and causes with which they disagreed. A Georgia court enjoined the enforcement of the union-shop provision and entered judgment for the dissenting employees in the amount of the payments that they had been forced to make to the union. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Id ., at 742-745, 81 S.Ct. 1784 .

*2630 Reviewing the State Supreme Court's decision, this Court recognized that the case presented constitutional questions "of the utmost gravity," ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 749 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 , but the Court found it unnecessary to reach those questions. Instead, the Court construed the RLA "as not vesting the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted money." Id ., at 768 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . Specifically, the Court held, the Act "is to be construed to deny the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes." Id ., at 768-769 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 .

Having construed the RLA to contain this restriction, the Street Court then went on to discuss the remedies available for employees who objected to the use of union funds for political causes. The Court suggested two: The dissenting employees could be given a refund of the portion of their dues spent by the union for political or ideological purposes, or they could be given a refund of the portion spent on those political purposes that they had advised the union they disapproved. ⁶ Id ., at 774-775, 81 S.Ct. 1784 .

Justice Black, writing in dissent, objected to the Court's suggested remedies, and he accurately predicted that the Court's approach would lead to serious practical problems. Id ., at 796-797 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . That approach, he wrote, while "very lucrative to special masters, accountants and lawyers," would do little for "the individual workers whose First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated." Id., at 796 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . He concluded:

"Unions composed of a voluntary membership, like all other voluntary groups, should be free in this country to fight in the public forum to advance their own causes, to promote their choice of candidates and parties and to work for the doctrines or the laws they favor. But to the extent that Government steps in to force people to help espouse the particular causes of a group, that group-whether composed of railroad workers or lawyers-loses its status as a voluntary group." Ibid.

Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, also dissented, arguing that the Court's remedy was conceptually flawed because a union may further the objectives of members by political means. See ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 813-815 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . He noted, for example, that reports from the AFL-CIO Executive Council "emphasize that labor's participation in urging legislation and candidacies is a major one." Id ., at 813 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 . In light of "the detailed list of national and international problems on which the AFL-CIO speaks," he opined, "it seems rather naive" to believe "that economic and political concerns are separable." Id ., at 814 , 81 S.Ct. 1784 .

C

This brings us to Abood, which, unlike Hanson and Street, involved a public-sector collective-bargaining agreement. The Detroit Federation of Teachers served "as the exclusive representative of teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education." 431 U.S., at 211-212 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . The collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the board contained an agency-shop clause requiring every teacher to "pay the Union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members." Id ., at 212 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . A putative class of teachers sued to invalidate this clause. Asserting that *2631 "they opposed collective bargaining in the public sector," the plaintiffs argued that " 'a substantial part' " of their dues would be used to fund union " 'activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice.' " Id ., at 212-213 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

This Court treated the First Amendment issue as largely settled by Hanson and Street . 431 U.S., at 217, 223 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . The Court acknowledged that Street was resolved as a matter of statutory construction without reaching any constitutional issues, 431 U.S., at 220 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 , and the Court recognized that forced membership and forced contributions impinge on free speech and associational rights, id ., at 223 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . But the Court dismissed the objecting teachers' constitutional arguments with this observation: "[T]he judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress." Id., at 222 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

The Abood Court understood Hanson and Street to have upheld union-shop agreements in the private sector based on two primary considerations: the desirability of "labor peace" and the problem of " 'free riders[hip].' " 431 U.S., at 220-222, 224 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

The Court thought that agency-shop provisions promote labor peace because the Court saw a close link between such provisions and the "principle of exclusive union representation." Id ., at 220 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . This principle, the Court explained, "prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization." Id ., at 220-221 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . In addition, the Court noted, the "designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment." Id ., at 220 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . And the Court pointed out that exclusive representation "frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations." Id ., at 221 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

Turning to the problem of free ridership, Abood noted that a union must " 'fairly and equitably ... represent all employees' " regardless of union membership, and the Court wrote as follows: The "union-shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders' to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation." Id ., at 221-222 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

The plaintiffs in Abood argued that Hanson and Street should not be given much weight because they did not arise in the public sector, and the Court acknowledged that public-sector bargaining is different from private-sector bargaining in some notable respects. 431 U.S., at 227-228 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . For example, although public and private employers both desire to keep costs down, the Court recognized that a public employer "lacks an important discipline against agreeing to increases in labor costs that in a market system would require price increases." Id ., at 228 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . The Court also noted that "decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process" undertaken by people "ultimately responsible to the *2632 electorate." Ibid. Thus, whether a public employer accedes to a union's demands, the Court wrote, "will depend upon a blend of political ingredients," thereby giving public employees "more influence in the decisionmaking process that is possessed by employees similarly organized in the private sector." Ibid. But despite these acknowledged differences between private- and public-sector bargaining, the Court treated Hanson and Street as essentially controlling.

Instead of drawing a line between the private and public sectors, the Abood Court drew a line between, on the one hand, a union's expenditures for "collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes," 431 U.S., at 232 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 , and, on the other, expenditures for political or ideological purposes. Id ., at 236 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

D

The Abood Court's analysis is questionable on several grounds. Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the decision, but several have become more evident and troubling in the years since then.

The Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and Street as having all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector union. As we have explained, Street was not a constitutional decision at all, and Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsupported sentence that its author essentially abandoned a few years later. Surely a First Amendment issue of this importance deserved better treatment.

The Abood Court fundamentally misunderstood the holding in Hanson, which was really quite narrow. As the Court made clear in Street, "all that was held in Hanson was that [the RLA] was constitutional in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give 'financial support' to unions legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents." 367 U.S., at 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784 (emphasis added). In Abood, on the other hand, the State of Michigan did more than simply authorize the imposition of an agency fee. A state instrumentality, the Detroit Board of Education, actually imposed that fee. This presented a very different question.

Abood failed to appreciate the difference between the core union speech involuntarily subsidized by dissenting public-sector employees and the core union speech involuntarily funded by their counterparts in the private sector. In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector. In the years since Abood, as state and local expenditures on employee wages and benefits have mushroomed, the importance of the difference between bargaining in the public and private sectors has been driven home. ⁷

Abood failed to appreciate the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing in public-sector cases between union expenditures that are made for collective-bargaining purposes and those that are made to achieve political ends. In the private sector, the line is easier to see. Collective bargaining concerns the union's dealings with the employer; political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government. But in the public sector, both collective-bargaining *2633 and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government.

Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify public-sector union expenditures as either "chargeable" (in Abood 's terms, expenditures for "collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes," id., at 232, 97 S.Ct. 1782 ) or nonchargeable ( i.e., expenditures for political or ideological purposes, ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id ., at 236 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ). In the years since Abood, the Court has struggled repeatedly with this issue. See Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 , 104 S.Ct. 1883 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 , 106 S.Ct. 1066 , 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn ., 500 U.S. 507 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 , 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991); Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 , 129 S.Ct. 798 , 172 L.Ed.2d 552 (2009). In Lehnert, the Court held that "chargeable activities must (1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop." 500 U.S., at 519 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 . But as noted in Justice SCALIA's dissent in that case, "each one of the three 'prongs' of the test involves a substantial judgment call (What is 'germane'? What is 'justified'? What is a 'significant' additional burden)." Id ., at 551 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

Abood likewise did not foresee the practical problems that would face objecting nonmembers. Employees who suspect that a union has improperly put certain expenses in the "germane" category must bear a heavy burden if they wish to challenge the union's actions. "[T]he onus is on the employees to come up with the resources to mount the legal challenge in a timely fashion," Knox, 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2294 (citing Lehnert, supra, at 513, 111 S.Ct. 1950 ), and litigating such cases is expensive. Because of the open-ended nature of the Lehnert test, classifying particular categories of expenses may not be straightforward. See Jibson v. Michigan Ed. Assn.-NEA , 30 F.3d 723 , 730 (C.A.6 1994). And although Hudson required that a union's books be audited, auditors do not themselves review the correctness of a union's categorization. See Knox, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2294 (citing Andrews v. Education Assn. of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335 , 340 (C.A.2 1987)). See also American Federation of Television and Recording Artists, Portland Local, 327 N.L.R.B. 474 , 477 (1999) ("It is settled that determinations concerning whether particular expenditures are chargeable are legal determinations which are outside the expertise of the auditor. Thus, as we have stated, the function of the auditor is to verify that the expenditures that the union claims it made were in fact made for the purposes claimed, not to pass on the correctness of the union's allocation of expenditures to the chargeable and nonchargeable categories"); California Saw and Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 , 241 (1995) ("We first agree [that the company at issue] did not violate its duty of fair representation by failing to use an independent auditor to determine the allocation of chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures"); Price v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 927 F.2d 88 , 93-94 (C.A.2 1991) (" Hudson requires only that the usual function of an auditor be performed, i.e., to determine that the expenses claimed were in fact made. That function does not require that the auditor make a legal decision as to the appropriateness of the allocation of expenses *2634 to the chargeable and non-chargeable categories").

Finally, a critical pillar of the Abood Court's analysis rests on an unsupported empirical assumption, namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the public sector is dependent on a union or agency shop. As we will explain, see infra, at 2640 - 2641, this assumption is unwarranted.

III

A

Despite all this, the State of Illinois now asks us to approve a very substantial expansion of Abood 's reach. Abood involved full-fledged public employees, but in this case, the status of the personal assistants is much different. The Illinois Legislature has taken pains to specify that personal assistants are public employees for one purpose only: collective bargaining. For all other purposes, Illinois regards the personal assistants as private-sector employees. This approach has important practical consequences.

For one thing, the State's authority with respect to these two groups is vastly different. In the case of full-fledged public employees, the State establishes all of the duties imposed on each employee, as well as all of the qualifications needed for each position. The State vets applicants and chooses the employees to be hired. The State provides or arranges for whatever training is needed, and it supervises and evaluates the employees' job performance and imposes corrective measures if appropriate. If a state employee's performance is deficient, the State may discharge the employee in accordance with whatever procedures are required by law.

With respect to the personal assistants involved in this case, the picture is entirely changed. The job duties of personal assistants are specified in their individualized Service Plans, which must be approved by the customer and the customer's physician. 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 684.10. Customers have complete discretion to hire any personal assistant who meets the meager basic qualifications that the State prescribes in § 686.10. See § 676.30(b) (the customer "is responsible for controlling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the [personal assistant], including, without limitation, locating and hiring the [personal assistant]" (emphasis added)); § 684.20(b) ("complete discretion in which Personal Assistant [the customer] wishes to hire" subject to baseline eligibility requirements).

Customers supervise their personal assistants on a daily basis, and no provision of the Illinois statute or implementing regulations gives the State the right to enter the home in which the personal assistant is employed for the purpose of checking on the personal assistant's job performance. Cf. § 676.20(b) (customer controls "without limitation ... supervising the work performed by the [personal assistant], imposing ... disciplinary action against the [personal assistant]"). And while state law mandates an annual review of each personal assistant's work, that evaluation is also controlled by the customer. §§ 686.10(k), 686.30. A state counselor is assigned to assist the customer in performing the review but has no power to override the customer's evaluation. See ibid. Nor do the regulations empower the State to discharge a personal assistant for substandard performance. See n. 1, supra . Discharge, like hiring, is entirely in the hands of the customer. See § 676.30.

Consistent with this scheme, under which personal assistants are almost entirely answerable to the customers and not to the State, Illinois withholds from personal assistants most of the rights and *2635 benefits enjoyed by full-fledged state employees. As we have noted already, state law explicitly excludes personal assistants from statutory retirement and health insurance benefits. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f). It also excludes personal assistants from group life insurance and certain other employee benefits provided under the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971. Ibid . ("Personal assistants shall not be covered by the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971"). And the State "does not provide paid vacation, holiday, or sick leave" to personal assistants. 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 686.10(h)(7).

Personal assistants also appear to be ineligible for a host of benefits under a variety of other state laws, including the State Employee Vacation Time Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, § 360/1); the State Employee Health Savings Account Law (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, § 377/10-1); the State Employee Job Sharing Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, § 380/0.01); the State Employee Indemnification Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, § 350/2); and the Sick Leave Bank Act. See Ill. Stat., ch. 5, § 400/1. Personal assistants are apparently not entitled to the protection that the Illinois Whistleblower Act provides for full-fledged state employees. See Ill. Stat., ch. 740, § 174/1. And it likewise appears that personal assistants are shut out of many other state employee programs and benefits. The Illinois Department of Central Management Services lists many such programs and benefits, including a deferred compensation program, full worker's compensation privileges, ⁸ behavioral health programs, a program that allows state employees to retain health insurance for a time after leaving state employment, a commuter savings program, dental and vision programs, and a flexible spending program. ⁹ All of these programs and benefits appear to fall within the provision of the Rehabilitation Program declaring that personal assistants are not state employees for "any purposes" other than collective bargaining. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f).

Just as the State denies personal assistants most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full-fledged state workers, the State does not assume responsibility for actions taken by personal assistants during the course of their employment. The governing statute explicitly disclaims "vicarious liability in tort." Ibid . So if a personal assistant steals from a customer, neglects a customer, or abuses a customer, the State washes its hands.

Illinois deems personal assistants to be state employees for one purpose only, collective bargaining, ¹⁰ but the scope of bargaining that may be conducted on their behalf is sharply limited. Under the governing Illinois statute, collective bargaining can occur only for "terms and conditions of employment that are within the State's control." Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f). That is not very much.

*2636 As an illustration, consider the subjects of mandatory bargaining under federal and state labor law that are out of bounds when it comes to personal assistants. Under federal law, mandatory subjects include the days of the week and the hours of the day during which an employee must work, ¹¹ lunch breaks, ¹² holidays, ¹³ vacations, ¹⁴ termination of employment, ¹⁵ and changes in job duties. ¹⁶ Illinois law similarly makes subject to mandatory collective-bargaining decisions concerning the "hours and terms and conditions of employment." Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 181 Ill.2d 191 , 201, 229 Ill.Dec. 522 , 692 N.E.2d 295 , 301 (1998); see also, e.g., Aurora Sergeants Assn., 24 PERI ¶ 25 (2008) (holding that days of the week worked by police officers is subject to mandatory collective bargaining). But under the Rehabilitation Program, all these topics are governed by the Service Plan, with respect to which the union has no role. See § 676.30(b) (the customer "is responsible for controlling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the PA, including, without limitation, locating and hiring the PA, training the PA, directing, evaluating, and otherwise supervising the work performed by the PA, imposing ... disciplinary action against the PA, and terminating the employment relationship between the customer and the PA"); § 684.50 (the Service Plan must specify "the frequency with which the specific tasks are to be provided" and "the number of hours each task is to be provided per month").

B

1

The unusual status of personal assistants has important implications for present purposes. Abood 's rationale, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, is based on the assumption that the union possesses the full scope of powers and duties generally available under American labor law. Under the Illinois scheme now before us, however, the union's powers and duties are sharply circumscribed, and as a result, even the best argument for the "extraordinary power" that Abood allows a union to wield, see Davenport, 551 U.S., at 184 , 127 S.Ct. 2372 , is a poor fit.

In our post- Abood cases involving public-sector agency-fee issues, Abood has been a given, and our task has been to attempt to understand its rationale and to apply it in a way that is consistent with that rationale. In that vein, Abood 's reasoning has been described as follows. The mere fact that nonunion members benefit from union speech is not enough to justify an agency fee because "private speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for." Lehnert, 500 U.S., at 556 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). What justifies the agency fee, the argument goes, is the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers. Ibid . Specifically, the union must not discriminate between members and nonmembers in "negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement *2637 and representing the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing grievances." Ibid. This means that the union "cannot, for example, negotiate particularly high wage increases for its members in exchange for accepting no increases for others." Ibid . And it has the duty to provide equal and effective representation for nonmembers in grievance proceedings, see Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 5, §§ 315/6, 315/8, an undertaking that can be very involved. See, e.g., SEIU: Member Resources, available at www. seiu. or/ a/ members/ disputes- and- grievances- rights- procedures- and- best- practices. php (detailing the steps involved in adjusting grievances).

This argument has little force in the situation now before us. Illinois law specifies that personal assistants "shall be paid at the hourly rate set by law," see 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 686.40(a), and therefore the union cannot be in the position of having to sacrifice higher pay for its members in order to protect the nonmembers whom it is obligated to represent. And as for the adjustment of grievances, the union's authority and responsibilities are narrow, as we have seen. The union has no authority with respect to any grievances that a personal assistant may have with a customer, and the customer has virtually complete control over a personal assistant's work.

The union's limited authority in this area has important practical implications. Suppose, for example that a customer fires a personal assistant because the customer wrongly believes that the assistant stole a fork. Or suppose that a personal assistant is discharged because the assistant shows no interest in the customer's favorite daytime soaps. Can the union file a grievance on behalf of the assistant? The answer is no.

It is true that Illinois law requires a collective-bargaining agreement to "contain a grievance resolution procedure which shall apply to all employees in the bargaining unit," Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, § 315/8, but in the situation here, this procedure appears to relate solely to any grievance that a personal assistant may have with the State, ¹⁷ not with the customer for whom the personal assistant works. ¹⁸

*2638 2

Because of Abood 's questionable foundations, and because the personal assistants are quite different from full-fledged public employees, we refuse to extend Abood to the new situation now before us. ¹⁹ Abood itself has clear boundaries; it applies to public employees. Extending those boundaries to encompass partial-public employees, quasi-public employees, or simply private employees would invite problems. Consider a continuum, ranging, on the one hand, from full-fledged state employees to, on the other hand, individuals who follow a common calling and benefit from advocacy or lobbying conducted by a group to which they do not belong and pay no dues. A State may not force every person who benefits from this group's efforts to make payments to the group. See Lehnert, 500 U.S., at 556 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). But what if regulation of this group is increased? What if the Federal Government or a State begins to provide or increases subsidies in this area? At what point, short of the point at which the individuals in question become full-fledged state employees, should Abood apply?

If respondents' and the dissent's views were adopted, a host of workers who receive payments from a governmental entity for some sort of service would be candidates for inclusion within Abood 's reach. Medicare-funded home health employees may be one such group. See Brief for Petitioners 51; 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m); 42 CFR § 424.22 (a). The same goes for adult foster care providers in Oregon (Ore.Rev.Stat. § 443.733 (2013)) and Washington (Wash. Rev.Code § 41.56.029 (2012)) and certain workers under the federal Child Care and Development Fund programs ( 45 CFR § 98.2 ).

If we allowed Abood to be extended to those who are not full-fledged public employees, it would be hard to see just where to draw the line, ²⁰ and we therefore confine Abood 's reach to full-fledged state employees. ²¹

*2639 IV

A

Because Abood is not controlling, we must analyze the constitutionality of the payments compelled by Illinois law under generally applicable First Amendment standards. As we explained in Knox , "[t]he government may not prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves." 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2288 ; see also, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 , 797, 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 , 63 S.Ct. 1178 , 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 , 713-715, 97 S.Ct. 1428 , 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). And "compelled funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups" presents the same dangers as compelled speech. Knox, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2288 . As a result, we explained in Knox that an agency-fee provision imposes "a 'significant impingement on First Amendment rights,' " and this cannot be tolerated unless it passes "exacting First Amendment scrutiny." 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 .

In Knox , we considered specific features of an agency-shop agreement-allowing a union to impose upon nonmembers a special assessment or dues increase without providing notice and without obtaining the nonmembers' affirmative agreement-and we held that these features could not even satisfy the standard employed in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 , 415, 121 S.Ct. 2334 , 150 L.Ed.2d 438 (2001), where we struck down a provision that compelled the subsidization of commercial speech. We did not suggest, however, that the compelled speech in Knox was like the commercial speech in United Foods . On the contrary, we observed that "[t]he subject of the speech at issue [in United Foods ]-promoting the sale of mushrooms-was not one that is likely to stir the passions of many, but the mundane commercial nature of that speech only highlights the importance of our analysis and our holding." Knox, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 .

While the features of the agency-fee provision in Knox could not meet even the commercial-speech standard employed in United Foods, it is apparent that the speech compelled in this case is not commercial speech. Our precedents define commercial speech as "speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction," United Foods, supra, at 409, 121 S.Ct. 2334 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 761-762, 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976)), and the union speech in question in this case does much more than that. As a consequence, it is arguable that the United Foods standard is too permissive.

B

For present purposes, however, no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is needed because the agency-fee provision here cannot satisfy even the test used in Knox . Specifically, this provision does not serve a " 'compelling state interes[t] ... that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.' " Knox, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 , 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984)). Respondents contend that the agency-fee *2640 provision in this case furthers several important interests, but none is sufficient.

1

Focusing on the benefits of the union's status as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the unit, respondents argue that the agency-fee provision promotes "labor peace," but their argument largely misses the point. Petitioners do not contend that they have a First Amendment right to form a rival union. Nor do they challenge the authority of the SEIU-HII to serve as the exclusive representative of all the personal assistants in bargaining with the State. All they seek is the right not to be forced to contribute to the union, with which they broadly disagree.

A union's status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right to collect an agency fee from non-members are not inextricably linked. For example, employees in some federal agencies may choose a union to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit, but no employee is required to join the union or to pay any union fee. Under federal law, in agencies in which unionization is permitted, "[e]ach employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right." 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (emphasis added). ²²

Moreover, even if the agency fee provision at issue here were tied to the union's status as exclusive bargaining agents, features of the Illinois scheme would still undermine the argument that the agency fee plays an important role in maintaining labor peace. For one thing, any threat to labor peace is diminished because the personal assistants do not work together in a common state facility but instead spend all their time in private homes, either the customers' or their own. Cf. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 , 51, 103 S.Ct. 948 , 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ("[E]xclusion of the rival union may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor-peace within the schools"). Federal labor law reflects the fact that the organization of household workers like the personal assistants does not further the interest of labor peace. "[A]ny individual employed ... in the domestic service of any family or person at his home" is excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3).

The union's very restricted role under the Illinois law is also significant. Since the union is largely limited to petitioning the State for greater pay and benefits, the specter of conflicting demands by personal assistants is lessened. And of course, State officials must deal on a daily basis with conflicting pleas for funding in many contexts.

2

Respondents also maintain that the agency-fee provision promotes the welfare of personal assistants and thus contributes to the success of the Rehabilitation Program. As a result of unionization, they claim, the wages and benefits of personal assistants have been substantially improved; ²³ orientation and training programs, *2641 background checks, and a program to deal with lost and erroneous paychecks have been instituted; ²⁴ and a procedure was established to resolve grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement (but apparently not grievances relating to a Service Plan or actions taken by a customer). ²⁵

The thrust of these arguments is that the union has been an effective advocate for personal assistants in the State of Illinois, and we will assume that this is correct. But in order to pass exacting scrutiny, more must be shown. The agency-fee provision cannot be sustained unless the cited benefits for personal assistants could not have been achieved if the union had been required to depend for funding on the dues paid by those personal assistants who chose to join. No such showing has been made.

In claiming that the agency fee was needed to bring about the cited improvements, the State is in a curious position. The State is not like the closed-fisted employer that is bent on minimizing employee wages and benefits and that yields only grudgingly under intense union pressure. As Governor Blagojevich put it in the executive order that first created the Illinois program, the State took the initiative because it was eager for "feedback" regarding the needs and views of the personal assistants. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 46. Thereafter, a majority of the personal assistants voted to unionize. When they did so, they must have realized that this would require the payment of union dues, and therefore it may be presumed that a high percentage of these personal assistants became union members and are willingly paying union dues. Why are these dues insufficient to enable the union to provide "feedback" to a State that is highly receptive to suggestions for increased wages and other improvements? A host of organizations advocate on behalf of the interests of persons falling within an occupational group, and many of these groups are quite successful even though they are dependent on voluntary contributions. Respondents' showing falls far short of what the First Amendment demands.

V

Respondents and their supporting amici make two additional arguments that must be addressed.

A

First, respondents and the Solicitor General urge us to apply a balancing test derived from Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). See Brief for Respondent Quinn 25-26; Brief for SEIU-HII 35-36; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And they claim that under the Pickering analysis, the Illinois scheme must be sustained. This argument represents an effort to find a new justification for the decision in Abood, because neither in that case nor in any subsequent related case have we seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing. ²⁶

*2642 In any event, this effort to recast Abood falls short. To begin, the Pickering test is inapplicable because with respect to the personal assistants, the State is not acting in a traditional employer role. ²⁷ But even if it were, application of Pickering would not sustain the agency-fee provision.

Pickering and later cases in the same line concern the constitutionality of restrictions on speech by public employees. Under those cases, employee speech is unprotected if it is not on a matter of public concern (or is pursuant to an employee's job duties), but speech on matters of public concern may be restricted only if "the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees" outweighs "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern." 391 U.S., at 568 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 . See also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2488 , 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 , 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 , 674, 114 S.Ct. 1878 , 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).

Attempting to fit Abood into the Pickering framework, the United States contends that union speech that is germane to collective bargaining does not address matters of public concern and, as a result, is not protected. Taking up this argument, the dissent insists that the speech at issue here is not a matter of public concern. According to the dissent, this is "the prosaic stuff of collective bargaining." Post, at 2655. Does it have any effect on the public? The dissent's answer is: "not terribly much." Post, at 2655. As the dissent sees it, speech about such funding is not qualitatively different from the complaints of a small-town police chief regarding such matters as the denial of $338 in overtime pay or directives concerning the use of police vehicles and smoking in the police station. See post, at 2655; Borough of Duryea, supra, at 2655 , 131 S.Ct., at 2492-2493 . ²⁸

This argument flies in the face of reality. In this case, for example, the category of union speech that is germane to collective bargaining unquestionably includes speech in favor of increased wages and benefits for personal assistants. Increased wages and benefits for personal assistants would almost certainly mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid program, and it is impossible to argue that the level of *2643 Medicaid funding (or, for that matter, state spending for employee benefits in general) is not a matter of great public concern.

In recent years, Medicaid expenditures have represented nearly a quarter of all state expenditures. See National Association of State Budget Officers, Summary: Fall 2013 Fiscal Survey of States (Dec. 10, 2013), online at http:// www. nasbo. org. "Medicaid has steadily eaten up a growing share of state budgets." ²⁹ In fiscal year 2014, "[t]hirty-five states increased spending for Medicaid for a net increase of $6.8 billion." Ibid . Accordingly, speech by a powerful union that relates to the subject of Medicaid funding cannot be equated with the sort of speech that our cases have treated as concerning matters of only private concern. See, e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 , 125 S.Ct. 521 , 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) ( per curiam ); Connick, supra, at 148 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 (speech that "reflect[ed] one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause célèbre " (emphasis added)).

For this reason, if Pickering were to be applied, it would be necessary to proceed to the next step of the analysis prescribed in that case, and this would require an assessment of both the degree to which the agency-fee provision promotes the efficiency of the Rehabilitation Program and the degree to which that provision interferes with the First Amendment interests of those personal assistants who do not wish to support the union.

We need not discuss this analysis at length because it is covered by what we have already said. Agency-fee provisions unquestionably impose a heavy burden on the First Amendment interests of objecting employees. See Knox, 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2294 (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S., at 513 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 ; Jibson v. Michigan Ed. Assn., 30 F.3d 723 , 730 (C.A.6 1994)). And on the other side of the balance, the arguments on which the United States relies-relating to the promotion of labor peace and the problem of free riders-have already been discussed. Thus, even if the permissibility of the agency-shop provision in the collective-bargaining agreement now at issue were analyzed under Pickering, that provision could not be upheld.

B

Respondents contend, finally, that a refusal to extend Abood to cover the situation presented in this case will call into question our decisions in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2228 , 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), and Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 , 120 S.Ct. 1346 , 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). Respondents are mistaken.

In Keller, we considered the constitutionality of a rule applicable to all members of an "integrated" bar, i.e., "an association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law." 496 U.S., at 5 , 110 S.Ct. 2228 . We held that members of this bar could not be required to pay the portion of bar dues used for political or ideological purposes but that they could be required to pay the portion of the dues used for activities connected with proposing ethical codes and disciplining bar members. Id ., at 14 , 110 S.Ct. 2228 .

This decision fits comfortably within the framework applied in the present case. Licensed attorneys are subject to detailed ethics rules, and the bar rule requiring the payment of dues was part of this regulatory scheme. The portion of *2644 the rule that we upheld served the "State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services." Ibid. States also have a strong interest in allocating to the members of the bar, rather than the general public, the expense of ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices. Thus, our decision in this case is wholly consistent with our holding in Keller .

Contrary to respondents' submission, the same is true with respect to Southworth, supra . In that case, we upheld the constitutionality of a university-imposed mandatory student activities fee that was used in part to support a wide array of student groups that engaged in expressive activity. The mandatory fee was challenged by students who objected to some of the expression that the fee was used to subsidize, but we rejected that challenge, and our holding is entirely consistent with our decision in this case.

Public universities have a compelling interest in promoting student expression in a manner that is viewpoint neutral. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). This may be done by providing funding for a broad array of student groups. If the groups funded are truly diverse, many students are likely to disagree with things that are said by some groups. And if every student were entitled to a partial exemption from the fee requirement so that no portion of the student's fee went to support a group that the student did not wish to support, the administrative problems would likely be insuperable. Our decision today thus does not undermine Southworth .

* * *

For all these reasons, we refuse to extend Abood in the manner that Illinois seeks. If we accepted Illinois' argument, we would approve an unprecedented violation of the bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support. The First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program who do not want to join or support the union.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, ³⁰ and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 , 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), *2645 answers the question presented in this case. Abood held that a government entity may, consistently with the First Amendment, require public employees to pay a fair share of the cost that a union incurs negotiating on their behalf for better terms of employment. That is exactly what Illinois did in entering into collective bargaining agreements with the Service Employees International Union Healthcare (SEIU) which included fair-share provisions. Contrary to the Court's decision, those agreements fall squarely within Abood 's holding. Here, Illinois employs, jointly with individuals suffering from disabilities, the in-home care providers whom the SEIU represents. Illinois establishes, following negotiations with the union, the most important terms of their employment, including wages, benefits, and basic qualifications. And Illinois's interests in imposing fair-share fees apply no less to those caregivers than to other state workers. The petitioners' challenge should therefore fail.

And that result would fully comport with our decisions applying the First Amendment to public employment. Abood is not, as the majority at one point describes it, "something of an anomaly," allowing uncommon interference with individuals' expressive activities. Ante, at 2627. Rather, the lines it draws and the balance it strikes reflect the way courts generally evaluate claims that a condition of public employment violates the First Amendment. Our decisions have long afforded government entities broad latitude to manage their workforces, even when that affects speech they could not regulate in other contexts. Abood is of a piece with all those decisions: While protecting an employee's most significant expression, that decision also enables the government to advance its interests in operating effectively-by bargaining, if it so chooses, with a single employee representative and preventing free riding on that union's efforts.

For that reason, one aspect of today's opinion is cause for satisfaction, though hardly applause. As this case came to us, the principal question it presented was whether to overrule Abood : The petitioners devoted the lion's share of their briefing and argument to urging us to overturn that nearly 40-year-old precedent (and the respondents and amici countered in the same vein). Today's majority cannot resist taking potshots at Abood, see ante, at 2632 - 2634, but it ignores the petitioners' invitation to depart from principles of stare decisis . And the essential work in the majority's opinion comes from its extended (though mistaken) distinction of Abood, see ante, at 2633 - 2638, not from its gratuitous dicta critiquing Abood 's foundations. That is to the good-or at least better than it might be. The Abood rule is deeply entrenched, and is the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but thousands of contracts between unions and governments across the Nation. Our precedent about precedent, fairly understood and applied, makes it impossible for this Court to reverse that decision.

I

I begin where this case should also end-with this Court's decision in Abood . There, some public school teachers in Detroit challenged a clause in their collective bargaining agreement compelling non-union members to pay the union a service charge equivalent to regular dues. The Court upheld the requirement so long as the union was using the money for "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment," rather than for political or ideological activities. 431 U.S., at 225-226 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . In so doing, the Court acknowledged that such a fair-share provision "has an impact upon [public employees'

*2646 ] First Amendment interests"; employees, after all, might object to policies adopted or "activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative." Id., at 222 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . Still, the Court thought, the government's own interests "constitutionally justified" the interference. Ibid. Detroit had decided, the Court explained, that bargaining with a single employee representative would promote "labor stability" and peaceful labor relations-by ensuring, for example, that different groups of employees did not present "conflicting demands." Id., at 221, 229 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . And because such an exclusive bargaining agent has a legal duty to represent all employees, rather than just its own members, a compulsory surcharge fairly distributes "the cost of [bargaining] among those who benefit" and "counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders.' " Id., at 222 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

This case thus raises a straightforward question: Does Abood apply equally to Illinois's care providers as to Detroit's teachers? No one thinks that the fair-share provisions in the two cases differ in any relevant respect. Nor do the petitioners allege that the SEIU is crossing the line Abood drew by using their payments for political or ideological activities. The only point in dispute is whether it matters that the personal assistants here are employees not only of the State but also of the disabled persons for whom they care. Just as the Court of Appeals held, that fact should make no difference to the analysis. See 656 F.3d 692 , 698 (C.A.7 2011).

To see how easily Abood resolves this case, consider how Illinois structured the petitioners' employment, and also why it did so. The petitioners work in Illinois's Medicaid-funded Rehabilitation Program, which provides in-home services to persons with disabilities who otherwise would face institutionalization. Under the program, each disabled person (the State calls them "customers") receives care from a personal assistant; the total workforce exceeds 20,000. The State could have asserted comprehensive control over all the caregivers' activities. But because of the personalized nature of the services provided, Illinois instead chose (as other States have as well) to share authority with the customers themselves. The result is that each caregiver has joint employers-the State and the customer-with each controlling significant aspects of the assistant's work. ¹

For its part, Illinois sets all the workforce-wide terms of employment. Most notably, the State determines and pays the employees' wages and benefits, including health insurance (while also withholding taxes). See 89 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 686.10(h)(10), 686.40(a)-(b) (2007); App. 44-46. By regulation, Illinois establishes the job's basic qualifications: for example, the assistant must provide references or recommendations and have adequate experience and training for the services given. See §§ 686.10(c), (f). So too, the State describes the services any personal assistant may provide, and prescribes the terms of standard employment contracts entered into between personal assistants and customers. See §§ 686.10(h), 686.20.

*2647 Illinois as well structures the individual relationship between the customer and his assistant (in ways the majority barely acknowledges). Along with both the customer and his physician, a state-employed counselor develops a service plan laying out the assistant's specific job responsibilities, hours, and working conditions. See §§ 684.10, 684.50. That counselor also assists the customer in conducting a state-mandated annual performance review, based on state-established criteria, and mediates any resulting disagreements. See § 686.30.

Within the structure designed by the State, the customer of course has crucial responsibilities. He exercises day-to-day supervisory control over the personal assistant. See § 676.30(b). And he gets both to hire a particular caregiver (from among the pool of applicants Illinois has deemed qualified) and to impose any needed discipline, up to and including discharge. See ibid. ; § 677.40(d). But even as to those matters, the State plays a role. Before a customer may hire an assistant, the counselor must sign off on the employee's ability to follow the customer's directions and communicate with him. See §§ 686.10(d)-(e) (requiring that the employee demonstrate these capabilities "to the satisfaction of" the counselor). And although only a customer can actually fire an assistant, the State can effectively do so by refusing to pay one who fails to "meet [state] standards." § 677.40(d). The majority reads that language narrowly, see ante, at 2624, n. 1, 22, but the State does not: It has made clear not just in its litigation papers, but also in its collective bargaining agreements and customer guidance that it will withhold payment from an assistant (or altogether disqualify her from the program) based on credible allegations of customer abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation. See App. 55; Brief for Respondent Quinn 3, 50; Ill. Dept. of Human Servs., Customer Guidance for Managing Providers 8, online at http:// www. dhs. state. il. us/ One Net Library/ 27897/ documents/ Brochures/ 4365. pdf (as visited June 27, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). ²

Given that set of arrangements, Abood should control. Although a customer can manage his own relationship with a caregiver, Illinois has sole authority over every workforce-wide term and condition of the assistants' employment-in other words, the issues most likely to be the subject of collective bargaining. In particular, if an assistant wants an increase in pay, she must ask the State, not the individual customer. So too if she wants better benefits. (Although the majority notes that caregivers do not receive statutory retirement and health insurance benefits, see ante, at 2634 - 2635, that is irrelevant: Collective bargaining between the State and SEIU has focused on benefits from the beginning, and has produced state-funded health insurance for personal assistants.) And because it is Illinois that would sit down at a bargaining table to address those subjects-the ones that matter most to employees and so most affect workforce stability-the State's stake in a fair-share provision is the same as in Abood . Here too, the State has an interest in promoting effective operations by negotiating with an equitably and adequately funded exclusive bargaining agent over terms and conditions of employment. That Illinois has delegated to program customers various individualized employment issues makes *2648 no difference to those state interests. If anything, as the State has contended, the dispersion of employees across numerous workplaces and the absence of day-to-day state supervision provides an additional reason for Illinois to want to "address concerns common to all personal assistants" by negotiating with a single representative: Only in that way, the State explains, can the employees effectively convey their concerns about employment under the Rehabilitation Program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a (Exec. Order No. 2003-8).

Indeed, the history of that program forcefully demonstrates Illinois's interest in bargaining with an adequately funded exclusive bargaining agent-that is, the interest Abood recognized and protected. Workforce shortages and high turnover have long plagued in-home care programs, principally because of low wages and benefits. That labor instability lessens the quality of care, which in turn, forces disabled persons into institutions and (massively) increases costs to the State. See Brief for Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute as Amicus Curiae 16-26; Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 4-5. The individual customers are powerless to address those systemic issues; rather, the State-because of its control over workforce-wide terms of employment-is the single employer that can do so. And here Illinois determined (as have nine other States, see Brief for Respondent SEIU 51, n. 14) that negotiations with an exclusive representative offered the best chance to set the Rehabilitation Program on firmer footing. Because of that bargaining, as the majority acknowledges, home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than 10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited from better training and workplace safety measures. See ante, at 2640 - 2641; Brief for Respondent Quinn 7; App. 44-48. The State, in return, has obtained guarantees against strikes or other work stoppages, see id., at 55-and most important, believes it has gotten a more stable workforce providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associated with institutionalization. Illinois's experience thus might serve as a veritable poster child for Abood -not, as the majority would have it, some strange extension of that decision.

It is not altogether easy to understand why the majority thinks what it thinks: Today's opinion takes the tack of throwing everything against the wall in the hope that something might stick. A vain hope, as it turns out. Even once disentangled, the various strands of the majority's reasoning do not distinguish this case from Abood .

Parts of the majority's analysis appear to rest on the simple presence of another employer, possessing significant responsibilities, in addition to the State. See ante, at 2633 - 2634, 2636. But this Court's cases provide no warrant for holding that joint public employees are not real ones. To the contrary, the Court has made clear that the government's wide latitude to manage its workforce extends to such employees, even as against their First Amendment claims. The government's prerogative as employer, we recently explained, turns not on the "formal status" of an employee, but on the nature of the public "interests at stake"; we therefore rejected the view that "the Government's broad authority in managing its affairs should apply with diminished force" to contract employees whose "direct employment relationship" is with another party. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 , ----, 131 S.Ct. 746 , 758-759, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011). And indeed, we reached the same result (in language that might have been written for this case) when such employees "d [id] not work at the government's workplace[,]

*2649 d[id] not interact daily with government officers and employees," and were not subject to the government's "day-to-day control" over "the details of how work is done." Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 , 676-677, 116 S.Ct. 2342 , 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). ³ Here, as I have explained, Illinois's interests as an employer and program administrator are substantial, see supra, at 2646 - 2648; and accordingly, the State's sharing of employment responsibilities with another party should not matter. ⁴

Next, the majority emphasizes that the Illinois Legislature deemed personal assistants "public employees" solely "for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act" and not for other purposes, like granting statutory benefits and incurring vicarious liability in tort. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, § 2405/3(f) (West 2012); see ante, at 2626, 2634 - 2635; but cf. Martin v. Illinois, 2005 WL 2267733 , *5-*8 (Ill. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, July 26, 2005) (treating caregivers as public employees for purposes of workers' compensation). ⁵ But once again, it is hard to see why that fact is relevant. The majority must agree (this Court has made the point often enough) that "state law labels," adopted for a whole host of reasons, do not determine whether the State is acting as an employer for purposes of the First Amendment. E.g., Umbehr, 518 U.S., at 679 , 116 S.Ct. 2342 . The true issue is whether Illinois has a sufficient stake in, and control over, the petitioners' terms and conditions of employment to implicate Abood 's rationales and trigger its application. And once more, that question has a clear answer: As I have shown, Illinois negotiates all workforce-wide terms of the caregivers' employment as part of its effort to promote labor stability and effectively administer its Rehabilitation Program. See supra, at 2626 - 2627. As contrasted to that all-important fact, whether Illinois incurs vicarious liability for caregivers' torts, see ante, at 2635, or grants them certain statutory benefits like health insurance, see ante, at 2634 - 2635, is beside the point. And still more so because the State and SEIU can bargain over most such matters; for example, as I have noted, the two have *2650 reached agreement on providing state-funded health coverage, see supra, at 2648.

Further, the majority claims, "the scope of bargaining" that the SEIU may conduct for caregivers is "circumscribed" because the customer has authority over individualized employment matters like hiring and firing. Ante, at 2635 - 2637. But (at the risk of sounding like a broken record) so what? Most States limit the scope of permissible bargaining in the public sector-often ruling out of bounds similar, individualized decisions. See R. Kearney & P. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 75-77 (5th ed. 2014) ("The great majority of state statutes" exclude "certain matters from the scope of negotiations," including, for example, personnel decisions respecting "hiring, promotion, and dismissal"); Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L.Rev. 1611 , 1684 (1984) (Many state statutes "explicitly limit [ ] the scope of bargaining, typically by excluding decisions on personnel management"). Here, the scope of collective bargaining-over wages and benefits, as well as basic duties and qualifications-more than suffices to implicate the state interests justifying Abood . Those are the matters, after all, most likely to concern employees generally and thus most likely to affect the nature and quality of the State's workforce. The idea that Abood applies only if a union can bargain with the State over every issue comes from nowhere and relates to nothing in that decision-and would revolutionize public labor law.

Finally, the majority places weight on an idiosyncrasy of Illinois law: that a regulation requires uniform wages for all personal assistants. See ante, at 2636. According to the majority, that means Abood 's free-rider rationale "has little force in the situation now before us": Even absent the duty of fair representation (requiring the union to work on behalf of all employees, members and non-members alike, see infra, at 2656 - 2657), the union could not bargain one employee's wages against another's. Ante, at 2637. ⁶ But that idea is doubly wrong. First, the Illinois regulation applies only to wages. It does not cover, for example, the significant health benefits that the SEIU has obtained for in-home caregivers, or any other benefits for which it may bargain in the future. Nor does the regulation prevent preferential participation in the grievance process, which governs all disputes between Illinois and caregivers arising from the terms of their agreement. See n. 2, supra . And second, even if the regulation covered everything subject to collective bargaining, the majority's reasoning is a non-sequitur. All the regulation would do then is serve as suspenders to the duty of fair representation's belt: That Illinois has two ways to ensure that the results of collective bargaining redound to the benefit of all employees serves to compound, rather than mitigate, the union's free-rider problem.

As far as I can tell, that covers the majority's reasons for distinguishing this case from Abood . And even when considered in combination, as the majority does, they do not succeed. What makes matters still worse is the perverse result of the majority's decision: It penalizes the State for giving disabled persons some control over their own care. If Illinois had structured the program, as it could have, to centralize every aspect of the employment relationship, no question could possibly *2651 have arisen about Abood 's application. Nothing should change because the State chose to respect the dignity and independence of program beneficiaries by allowing them to select and discharge, as well as supervise day-to-day, their own caregivers. A joint employer remains an employer, and here, as I have noted, Illinois kept authority over all workforce-wide terms of employment-the very issues most likely to be the subject of collective bargaining. The State thus should also retain the prerogative-as part of its effort to "ensure efficient and effective delivery of personal care services"-to require all employees to contribute fairly to their bargaining agent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a (Exec. Order No. 2003-8).

II

Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of plausibly distinguishing this case from Abood, the petitioners raised a more fundamental question: the continued viability of Abood as to all public employees, even what the majority calls "full-fledged" ones. Ante, at 2627. That issue occupied the brunt of the briefing and argument in this Court. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 16-24; Brief for Respondent SEIU 15-44; Brief for Respondent Quinn 15-29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-21, 32-39, 42-47, 50-60. The majority declines the petitioners' request to overturn precedent-and rightly so: This Court does not have anything close to the special justification necessary to overturn Abood . Still, the majority cannot restrain itself from providing a critique of that decision, suggesting that it might have resolved the case differently in the first instance. That dicta is off-base: Abood corresponds precisely to this Court's overall framework for assessing public employees' First Amendment claims. To accept that framework, while holding Abood at arms-length, is to wish for a sui generis rule, lacking in justification, applying exclusively to union fees.

A

This Court's view of stare decisis makes plain why the majority cannot-and did not-overturn Abood . That doctrine, we have stated, is a "foundation stone of the rule of law." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024 , 2036, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). It "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles [and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). As important, it "contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process," ibid. , by ensuring that decisions are "founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals," Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 , 265, 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). For all those reasons, this Court has always held that "any departure" from precedent "demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 , 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984).

And Abood is not just any precedent: It is entrenched in a way not many decisions are. Over nearly four decades, we have cited Abood favorably numerous times, and we have repeatedly affirmed and applied its core distinction between the costs of collective bargaining (which the government can demand its employees share) and those of political activities (which it cannot). See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 , 213-214, 129 S.Ct. 798 , 172 L.Ed.2d 552 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507 , 519, 111 S.Ct. 1950 , 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 , 301-302, 106 S.Ct. 1066 , 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 , 455-457, 104 S.Ct. 1883 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984). Reviewing *2652 those decisions, this Court recently-and unanimously-called the Abood rule "a general First Amendment principle." Locke, 555 U.S., at 213-215 , 129 S.Ct. 798 . And indeed, the Court has relied on that rule in deciding cases involving compulsory fees outside the labor context-which today's majority reaffirms as good law, see ante, at 2643 - 2644. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 , 9-17, 110 S.Ct. 2228 , 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (state bar fees); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 , 230-232, 120 S.Ct. 1346 , 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000) (public university student fees); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 , 471-473, 117 S.Ct. 2130 , 138 L.Ed.2d 585 (1997) (commercial advertising assessments). Not until two years ago, in Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2277 , 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012), did the Court so much as whisper (there without the benefit of briefing or argument, see id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2296-2299 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment)) that it had any misgivings about Abood .

Perhaps still more important, Abood has created enormous reliance interests. More than 20 States have enacted statutes authorizing fair-share provisions, and on that basis public entities of all stripes have entered into multi-year contracts with unions containing such clauses. " Stare decisis has added force," we have held, when overturning a precedent would require "States to reexamine [and amend] their statutes." Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 , 202-203, 112 S.Ct. 560 , 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991). And on top of that, "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights." Payne, 501 U.S., at 828 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 . Here, governments and unions across the country have entered into thousands of contracts involving millions of employees in reliance on Abood . Reliance interests do not come any stronger.

The majority's criticisms of Abood do not remotely defeat those powerful reasons for adhering to the decision. The special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis . And the majority's critique extends no further. It is mostly just a catalog of errors Abood supposedly committed-reproaches that could have been leveled as easily 40 years ago as today. Only the idea that Abood did not "anticipate" or "foresee" the difficulties of distinguishing between collective bargaining and political activities, see ante, at 2632 - 2633, might be thought different. But in fact, Abood predicted precisely those issues. See 431 U.S., at 236 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ("There will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining ... and ideological activities"). It simply disagreed with today's majority about whether in this context, as in many others, lines that are less than pristine are still worth using. And in any event, the majority much overstates the difficulties of classifying union expenditures. The Court's most recent decision on the subject unanimously resolved the single issue that had divided lower courts. See Locke, 555 U.S., at 217-221 , 129 S.Ct. 798 . So it is not surprising that the majority fails to offer any concrete examples of thorny classification problems. If the kind of hand-wringing about blurry lines that the majority offers were enough to justify breaking with precedent, we might have to discard whole volumes of the U.S. Reports.

And the majority says nothing to the contrary: It does not pretend to have the requisite justifications to overrule Abood . Readers of today's decision will know that Abood does not rank on the majority's top- *2653 ten list of favorite precedents-and that the majority could not restrain itself from saying (and saying and saying) so. Yet they will also know that the majority could not, even after receiving full-dress briefing and argument, come up with reasons anywhere near sufficient to reverse the decision. Much has gone wrong in today's ruling, but this has not: Save for an unfortunate hiving off of ostensibly "partial-public" employees, ante, at 2638, Abood remains the law.

B

And even apart from stare decisis, that result is as it should be; indeed, it is the only outcome that makes sense in the context of our caselaw. In numerous cases decided over many decades, this Court has addressed the government's authority to adopt measures limiting expression in the capacity not of sovereign but of employer. Abood fits-fits hand-in-glove-with all those cases, in both reasoning and result. Were that rule not in place, our law respecting public employees' speech rights would contain a serious anomaly-a different legal standard (and not a good one) applying exclusively to union fees.

This Court has long acknowledged that the government has wider constitutional latitude when it is acting as employer than as sovereign. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 , 598, 128 S.Ct. 2146 , 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) ("[T]here is a crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising the power to regulate ... and the government acting ... to manage [its] internal operation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Time and again our cases have recognized that the Government has a much freer hand" in dealing with its employees than with other citizens. NASA, 562 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 757. We have explained that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated" in the public workplace-that the government must have the ability to decide how to manage its employees in order to best provide services to the public. Engquist, 553 U.S., at 598 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 . In effect, we have tried to place the government-qua-employer in a similar (though not identical) position to the private employer, recognizing that both face comparable challenges in maintaining a productive workforce. The result is that a public employee "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 , 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 , 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). "[A]lthough government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context." Engquist, 553 U.S., at 600 , 128 S.Ct. 2146 .

Further, this Court has developed and applied those principles in numerous cases involving First Amendment claims. "Government employers, like private employers," we have explained, "need a significant degree of control over their employees' words" in order to "efficient[ly] provi[de] public services." Garcetti, 547 U.S., at 418 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 . Accordingly, we have devised methods for distinguishing between speech restrictions reflecting the kind of concerns private employers often hold (which are constitutional) and those exploiting the employment relationship to restrict employees' speech as private citizens (which are not). Most notably, the Court uses a two-step test originating in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). First, if the expression at issue does not relate to "a matter of public concern," the employee "has no First *2654 Amendment cause of action." Garcetti, 547 U.S., at 418 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 . Second, even if the speech addresses a matter of public concern, a court is to determine whether the government "had an adequate justification" for its action, ibid., by balancing "the interests of the [employee] as a citizen ... and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees," Pickering, 391 U.S., at 568 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 .

Abood is of a piece with all those decisions; and indeed, its core analysis mirrors Pickering 's. The Abood Court recognized that fair-share provisions function as prerequisites to employment, assessed to cover the costs of representing employees in collective bargaining. Private employers, Abood noted, often established such employment conditions, to ensure adequate funding of an exclusive bargaining agent, and thus to promote labor stability. Abood acknowledged (contrary to the majority's statement, see ante, at 2632) certain "differences in the nature of collective bargaining in the public and private sectors." 431 U.S., at 227 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ; see id., at 227-229 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 . But the Court concluded that the government, acting as employer, should have the same prerogative as a private business in deciding how best to negotiate with its employees over such matters as wages and benefits. See id., at 229 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ("[T]here can be no principled basis for" distinguishing between a public and private employer's view that a fair-share clause will promote "labor stability"). At the same time, the Court recognized the need for some mechanism to ensure that the government could not leverage its power as employer to impinge on speech its employees undertook as citizens on matters of public import. See id., at 234-236 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 .

The Court struck the appropriate balance by drawing a line, corresponding to Pickering 's, between fees for collective bargaining and those for political activities. On the one side, Abood decided, speech within the employment relationship about pay and working conditions pertains mostly to private concerns and implicates the government's interests as employer; thus, the government could compel fair-share fees for collective bargaining. On the other side, speech in political campaigns relates to matters of public concern and has no bearing on the government's interest in structuring its workforce; thus, compelled fees for those activities are forbidden. In that way, the law surrounding fair-share provisions coheres with the law relating to public employees' speech generally. Or, said otherwise, an anomaly in the government's regulation of its workforce would arise in Abood 's absence: Public employers could then pursue all policies, except this single one, reasonably designed to manage personnel and enhance the effectiveness of their programs.

The majority's critique of Abood principally goes astray by deeming all this irrelevant. This Court, the majority insists, has never "seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing." Ante, at 2641. But to rely on Abood ' s failure to cite Pickering more often, as the majority does, see ante, at 2641, n. 26, is to miss the essential point. Although stemming from different historic antecedents, the two decisions addressed variants of the same issue: the extent of the government's power to adopt employment conditions affecting expression. And as just discussed, the two gave strikingly parallel answers, providing a coherent framework to adjudicate the constitutionality of those regulations.

To the extent the majority engages with that framework, its analysis founders at *2655 the first step, in assessing the First Amendment value of the speech at issue here. A running motif of the majority opinion is that collective bargaining in the public sector raises significant questions about the level of government spending. Ante, at 2632 - 2633 and n. 7, 2642 and nn. 28-29. By financing the SEIU's collective bargaining over wages and benefits, the majority suggests, in-home caregivers-whether they wish to or not-take one side in a debate about those issues.

But that view of the First Amendment interests at stake blinks decades' worth of this Court's precedent. Our decisions (tracing from Pickering as well as Abood ) teach that internal workplace speech about public employees' wages, benefits, and such-that is, the prosaic stuff of collective bargaining-does not become speech of "public concern" just because those employment terms may have broader consequence. To the contrary, we have made clear that except in narrow circumstances we will not allow an employee to make a "federal constitutional issue" out of basic "employment matters, including working conditions, pay, discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations." Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2488 , 2496, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011); see Umbehr, 518 U.S., at 675 , 116 S.Ct. 2342 (public employees' "speech on merely private employment matters is unprotected"). Indeed, even Abood 's original detractors conceded that an employee's interest in expressing views, within the workplace context, about "narrowly defined economic issues [like] salaries and pension benefits" is "relatively insignificant" and "weak." 431 U.S., at 263, n. 16 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). (Those Justices saved their fire for teachers' speech relating to education policy. See ibid. ) And nowhere has the Court ever suggested, as the majority does today, see ante, at 2642 and n. 28, that if a certain dollar amount is at stake (but how much, exactly?), the constitutional treatment of an employee's expression becomes any different.

Consider an analogy, not involving union fees: Suppose an employee violates a government employer's work rules by demanding, at various inopportune times and places, higher wages for both himself and his co-workers (which, of course, will drive up public spending). The government employer disciplines the employee, and he brings a First Amendment claim. Would the Court consider his speech a matter of public concern under Pickering ? I cannot believe it would, and indeed the petitioners' own counsel joins me in that view. He maintained at oral argument that such speech would concern merely an "internal proprietary matter," thus allowing the employer to take disciplinary action. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 10. If the majority thinks otherwise, government entities across the country should prepare themselves for unprecedented limitations on their ability to regulate their workforces. But again, I doubt they need to worry, because this Court has never come close to holding that any matter of public employment affecting public spending (which is to say most such matters) becomes for that reason alone an issue of public concern. (And on the off-chance that both the petitioners and I are wrong on that score, I am doubly confident that the government would prevail under Pickering 's balancing test.)

I can see no reason to treat the expressive interests of workers objecting to payment of union fees, like the petitioners here, as worthy of greater consideration. The subject matter of the speech is the same: wages and benefits for public employees. Or to put the point more fully: In both cases (mine and the real one), the employer is sanctioning employees for *2656 choosing either to say or not to say something respecting their terms and conditions of employment. Of course, in my hypothetical, the employer is stopping the employee from speaking, whereas in this or any other case involving union fees, the employer is forcing the employee to support such expression. But I am sure the majority would agree that that difference does not make a difference-in other words, that the "difference between compelled speech and compelled silence" is "without constitutional significance." Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 , 796, 108 S.Ct. 2667 , 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). Hence, in analyzing the kind of expression involved in this case, Abood corresponds to Pickering (and vice versa)-with each permitting a government to regulate such activity in aid of managing its workforce to provide public services.

Perhaps, though, the majority's skepticism about Abood comes from a different source: its failure to fully grasp the government's interest in bargaining with an adequately funded exclusive bargaining representative. One of the majority's criticisms of Abood, stated still more prominently in Knox, 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289-2290 , goes something as follows. Abood (so the majority says) wrongly saw a government's interest in bargaining with an exclusive representative as "inextricably linked" with a fair-share agreement. Ante, at 2640; see ante, at 2633 - 2634. A State, the majority (a bit grudgingly) acknowledges, may well have reasons to bargain with a single agent for all employees; and without a fair-share agreement, that union's activities will benefit employees who do not pay dues. Yet "[s]uch free-rider arguments," the majority avers, "are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections." Ante, at 2627 - 2628 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2289 ). In the majority's words: "A host of organizations advocate on behalf of the interests of persons falling within an occupational group, and many of these groups are quite successful even though they are dependent on voluntary contributions." Ante, at 2641.

But Abood and a host of our other opinions have explained and relied on an essential distinction between unions and special-interest organizations generally. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S., at 221-222 and n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1782 ; Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 , 750, 108 S.Ct. 2641 , 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 , 762, 81 S.Ct. 1784 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). The law compels unions to represent-and represent fairly-every worker in a bargaining unit, regardless whether they join or contribute to the union. That creates a collective action problem of far greater magnitude than in the typical interest group, because the union cannot give any special advantages to its own backers. In such a circumstance, not just those who oppose but those who favor a union have an economic incentive to withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty-as against financial self-interest-can explain their support. Hence arises the legal rule countenancing fair-share agreements: It ensures that a union will receive adequate funding, notwithstanding its legally imposed disability-and so that a government wishing to bargain with an exclusive representative will have a viable counterpart.

As is often the case, Justice SCALIA put the point best:

"Where the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the union to demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end, where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from *2657 the union, it may compel them to pay the cost. The 'compelling state interest' that justifies this constitutional rule is not simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to the benefit of 'free-riding' nonmembers; private speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for. What is distinctive, however, about the 'free riders' [in unions] ... is that ... the law requires the union to carry [them]-indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit [them], even at the expense of its other interests.... [T]he free ridership (if it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by circumstances but mandated by government decree." Lehnert, 500 U.S., at 556 , 111 S.Ct. 1950 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

And in other parts of its opinion, the majority itself mimics the point, thus recognizing the core rationale of Abood : What justifies the agency fee, the majority notes, is "the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers." Ante, at 2636; see ante, at 2638, n. 18. Exactly right; indeed, that is as clear a one-sentence account of Abood 's free-rider rationale as appears in this Court's decisions.

Still, the majority too quickly says, it has no worries in this case: Given that Illinois's caregivers voted to unionize, "it may be presumed that a high percentage of [them] became union members and are willingly paying union dues." Ante, at 2641. But in fact nothing of the sort may be so presumed, given that union supporters (no less than union detractors) have an economic incentive to free ride. See supra, at 2656 - 2657. The federal workforce, on which the majority relies, see ante, at 2640, provides a case in point. There many fewer employees pay dues than have voted for a union to represent them. ⁷ And why, after all, should that endemic free-riding be surprising? Does the majority think that public employees are immune from basic principles of economics? If not, the majority can have no basis for thinking that absent a fair-share clause, a union can attract sufficient dues to adequately support its functions.

This case in fact offers a prime illustration of how a fair-share agreement may serve important government interests. Recall that Illinois decided that collective bargaining with an exclusive representative of in-home caregivers would enable it to provide improved services through its Rehabilitation Program. See supra, at 2648. The State thought such bargaining would enable it to attract a better and more stable workforce to serve disabled patients, preventing their institutionalization and thereby decreasing total state expenditures. The majority does not deny the State's legitimate interest in choosing to negotiate with an exclusive bargaining agent, in service of administering an effective program. See ante, at 2640 - 2641. But the majority does deny Illinois the means it reasonably deemed appropriate to effectuate that policy-a fair-share provision ensuring that the union has the funds necessary to carry out its responsibilities *2658 on behalf of in-home caregivers. The majority does so against the weight of all precedent, and based on "empirical assumption[s]," ante, at 2634, lacking any foundation. Abood got this matter right; the majority gets it wrong: Illinois has a more than sufficient interest, in managing its workforce and administering the Rehabilitation Program, to require employees to pay a fair share of a union's costs of collective bargaining.

III

For many decades, Americans have debated the pros and cons of right-to-work laws and fair-share requirements. All across the country and continuing to the present day, citizens have engaged in passionate argument about the issue and have made disparate policy choices. The petitioners in this case asked this Court to end that discussion for the entire public sector, by overruling Abood and thus imposing a right-to-work regime for all government employees. The good news out of this case is clear: The majority declined that radical request. The Court did not, as the petitioners wanted, deprive every state and local government, in the management of their employees and programs, of the tool that many have thought necessary and appropriate to make collective bargaining work.

The bad news is just as simple: The majority robbed Illinois of that choice in administering its in-home care program. For some 40 years, Abood has struck a stable balance-consistent with this Court's general framework for assessing public employees' First Amendment claims-between those employees' rights and government entities' interests in managing their workforces. The majority today misapplies Abood, which properly should control this case. Nothing separates, for purposes of that decision, Illinois's personal assistants from any other public employees. The balance Abood struck thus should have defeated the petitioners' demand to invalidate Illinois's fair-share agreement. I respectfully dissent.