CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

[502] Archie D. Gray and Bernard A. Golding argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were John E. Green, Jr. and Matthew S. Gibson.

Max J. Gwertzman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The questions are whether the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, if so, whether that power was abused in this case.

The respondent-plaintiff brought this action in the Southern District of New York, but resides at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he operated a public warehouse. He alleges that the petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Lynchburg, so carelessly handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause [503] an explosion and fire which consumed the warehouse building to his damage of $41,889.10, destroyed merchandise and fixtures to his damage of $3,602.40, caused injury to his business and profits of $20,038.27, and burned the property of customers in his custody under warehousing agreements to the extent of $300,000. He asks judgment of $365,529.77 with costs and disbursements, and interest from the date of the fire. The action clearly is one in tort.

The petitioner-defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to receive service of process. When sued in New York, the defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia, where the plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.

The case, on its merits, involves no federal question and was brought in the United States District Court solely because of diversity in citizenship of the parties. Because of the character of its jurisdiction and the holdings of and under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, the District Court considered that the law of New York as to forum non conveniens applied and that it required the case to be left to Virginia courts.^[1] It therefore dismissed.

The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed as to the applicability of New York law, took a restrictive view of the application of the entire doctrine in federal courts and, one judge dissenting, reversed.^[2] The case is here on certiorari. 328 U.S. 830.

[504] I.

It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern District of New York and empower that court to entertain it.^[3] But that does not settle the question whether it must do so. Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.

This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, the rule is:

"Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal." Canada Malting Co., Ltd., v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23.

We later expressly said that a state court "may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294, n. 5. Even where federal rights binding on state courts under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged, this Court has sustained state courts in a refusal to entertain a litigation between a nonresident and a foreign corporation or between two foreign corporations. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. [505] Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U.S. 373. It has held the use of an inappropriate forum in one case an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312. On substantially forum non conveniens grounds we have required federal courts to relinquish decision of cases within their jurisdiction where the court would have to participate in the administrative policy of a state. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315; but cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228. And most recently we decided Williams v. Green Bay & Western R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, in which the Court, without questioning the validity of the doctrine, held it had been applied in that case without justification.^[4]

It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act we have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44; Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698. Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to other cases governed by the general venue statutes.

[506] But the court below says that "The Kepner case . . . warned against refusal of jurisdiction in a particular case controlled by congressional act; here the only difference is that congressional act, plus judicial interpretation (under the Neirbo case), spells out the result." 153 F.2d at 885. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, however, which controlled decision in the Kepner case, specifically provides where venue may be had in any suit on a cause of action arising under that statute. What the court below refers to as "congressional act, plus judicial interpretation," is the general statute of venue in diversity suits, plus our decision that it gives the defendant "a personal privilege respecting the venue, or place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive, at his election," Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as interpreted by Kepner, increases the number of places where the defendant may be sued and makes him accept the plaintiff's choice. The Neirbo case is only a declaration that if the defendant, by filing consent to be sued, waives its privilege to be sued at its place of residence, it may be sued in the federal courts at the place where it has consented to be sued. But the general venue statute plus the Neirbo interpretation do not add up to a declaration that the court must respect the choice of the plaintiff, no matter what the type of suit or issues involved. The two taken together mean only that the defendant may consent to be sued, and it is proper for the federal court to take jurisdiction, not that the plaintiff's choice cannot be questioned. The defendant's consent to be sued extends only to give the court jurisdiction of the person; it assumes that the court, having the parties before it, will apply all the applicable law, including, in those cases where it is appropriate, its discretionary judgment as to whether the suit should be entertained. In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into [507] play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.

II.

The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.

Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with a discretion to change the place of trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.^[5] The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in exercising its power. But the problem is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.^[6]

[508] Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.^[7]

If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.^[8] But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community [509] which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.

The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and as to the standards that guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the same as the federal rule. Murnan v. Wabash R. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508; Wedemann v. United States Trust Co., 258 N.Y. 315, 179 N.E. 712; see Gregonis v. Philadelphia and Reading Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223. It would not be profitable, therefore, to pursue inquiry as to the source from which our rule must flow.

III.

Turning to the question whether this is one of those rather rare cases where the doctrine should be applied, we look first to the interests of the litigants.

The plaintiff himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any event connected with the case take place there, nor does any witness, with the possible exception of experts, live there. No one connected with that side of the case save counsel for the plaintiff resides there, and he has candidly told us that he was retained by insurance companies interested presumably because of subrogation. His affidavits and argument are devoted to controverting claims as to defendant's inconvenience rather than to showing that the present forum serves any convenience [510] of his own, with one exception. The only justification for trial in New York advanced here is one rejected by the district court and is set forth in the brief as follows:

"This Court can readily realize that an action of this type, involving as it does a claim for damages in an amount close to $400,000, is one which may stagger the imagination of a local jury which is surely unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of such a nature. Furthermore, removed from Lynchburg, the respondent will have an opportunity to try this case free from local influences and preconceived notions which may make it difficult to procure a jury which has no previous knowledge of any of the facts herein."

This unproven premise that jurors of New York live on terms of intimacy with $400,000 transactions is not an assumption we easily make. Nor can we assume that a jury from Lynchburg and vicinity would be "staggered" by contemplating the value of a warehouse building that stood in their region, or of merchandise and fixtures such as were used there, nor are they likely to be staggered by the value of chattels which the people of that neighborhood put in storage. It is a strange argument on behalf of a Virginia plaintiff that the community which gave him patronage to make his business valuable is not capable of furnishing jurors who know the value of the goods they store, the building they are stored in, or the business their patronage creates. And there is no specification of any local influence, other than accurate knowledge of local conditions, that would make a fair trial improbable. The net of this is that we cannot say the District Court was bound to entertain a provincial fear of the provincialism of a Virginia jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff without even a suggested reason for transporting this suit to New York.

[511] Defendant points out that not only the plaintiff, but every person who participated in the acts charged to be negligent, resides in or near Lynchburg. It also claims a need to interplead an alleged independent contractor which made the delivery of the gasoline and which is a Virginia corporation domiciled in Lynchburg, that it cannot interplead in New York. There also are approximately 350 persons residing in and around Lynchburg who stored with plaintiff the goods for the damage to which he seeks to recover. The extent to which they have left the community since the fire and the number of them who will actually be needed is in dispute. The complaint alleges that defendant's conduct violated Lynchburg ordinances. Conditions are said to require proof by firemen and by many others. The learned and experienced trial judge was not unaware that litigants generally manage to try their cases with fewer witnesses than they predict in such motions as this. But he was justified in concluding that this trial is likely to be long and to involve calling many witnesses, and that Lynchburg, some 400 miles from New York, is the source of all proofs for either side, with possible exception of experts. Certainly to fix the place of trial at a point where litigants cannot compel personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to court, jury or most litigants. Nor is it necessarily cured by the statement of plaintiff's counsel that he will see to getting many of the witnesses to the trial and that some of them "would be delighted to come to New York to testify." There may be circumstances where such a proposal should be given weight. In others, the offer may not turn out to be as generous as defendant or court might suppose it to be. Such matters are for the District Court to decide in exercise of a sound discretion.

The court likewise could well have concluded that the task of the trial court would be simplified by trial in Virginia. [512] If trial was in a state court, it could apply its own law to events occurring there. If in federal court by reason of diversity of citizenship, the court would apply the law of its own state in which it is likely to be experienced. The course of adjudication in New York federal court might be beset with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the case is litigated in Virginia where it arose.

We are convinced that the District Court did not exceed its powers or the bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's complaint and remitting him to the courts of his own community. The Circuit Court of Appeals took too restrictive a view of the doctrine as approved by this Court. Its judgment is

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent. They do not set out the factual reasons for their dissent since the Court's affirmance of Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., decided today, post, p. 518, would control.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

The defendant corporation is organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, but is qualified to do business and maintains an office in New York. Plaintiff is an individual residing and doing business in Virginia. The accident in which plaintiff alleges to have been damaged occurred in Lynchburg, Virginia. Plaintiff brought this action in the Federal District Court in New York. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, carried over into the Judicial Code, § 24, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1), confers jurisdiction upon federal district courts of all actions at law between citizens of different states. The Court does not suggest that the federal district court in New York lacks jurisdiction under this statute or that the venue was improper in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 112. Cf. Neirbo Co. v. [513] Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165. But it holds that a district court may abdicate its jurisdiction when a defendant shows to the satisfaction of a district court that it would be more convenient and less vexatious for the defendant if the trial were held in another jurisdiction. Neither the venue statute nor the statute which has governed jurisdiction since 1789 contains any indication or implication that a federal district court, once satisfied that jurisdiction and venue requirements have been met, may decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Except in relation to the exercise of the extraordinary admiralty and equity powers of district courts, this Court has never before held contrary to the general principle that "the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment, and to afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction." Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175, quoted with approval in Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534. See also Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44; Evey v. Mexican C.R. Co., 81 F. 294.^[9] Never until today has this Court held, in actions for money damages for violations of common law or statutory rights, that a district court can abdicate its statutory duty to exercise its jurisdiction for the alleged convenience of the defendant to a lawsuit. Compare Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120.

For reasons peculiar to the special problems of admiralty and to the extraordinary remedies of equity, the courts exercising admiralty and equity powers have been permitted [514] at times to decline to exercise their jurisdiction. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Co., 285 U.S. 413; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123; cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549. This exception is rooted in the kind of relief which these courts grant and the kinds of problems which they solve. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 n. 29. Courts of equity developed to afford relief where a money judgment in the common law courts provided no adequate remedy for an injured person.^[10] From the beginning of equitable jurisdiction up to now, the chancery courts have generally granted or withheld their special remedies at their discretion; and "courts of admiralty .. . act upon enlarged principles of equity." O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287, 297. But this Court has, on many occasions, severely restricted the discretion of district courts to decline to grant even the extraordinary equitable remedies. Meredith v. Winter Haven, supra, and cases there cited at 234, 235. Previously federal courts have not generally been allowed the broad and indefinite discretion to dispose even of equity cases solely on a trial court's judgment of the relative convenience of the forum for the parties themselves. For a major factor in these equity decisions has been the relative ability of the forum to shape and execute its equitable remedy. Cf. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra.

[515] No such discretionary authority to decline to decide a case, however, has, before today, been vested in federal courts in actions for money judgments deriving from statutes or the common law.^[11] To engraft the doctrine of forum non conveniens upon the statutes fixing jurisdiction and proper venue in the district courts in such actions, seems to me to be far more than the mere filling in of the interstices of those statutes.^[12]

It may be that a statute should be passed authorizing the federal district courts to decline to try so-called common law cases according to the convenience of the parties. But whether there should be such a statute, and determination of its scope and the safeguards which should surround it, are, in my judgment, questions of policy which Congress should decide. There are strong arguments presented by the Court in its opinion why federal courts exercising their common law jurisdiction should have the discretionary powers which equity courts have always possessed in dispensing equitable relief. I think equally strong arguments could be advanced to show that they should not. For any individual or corporate defendant who does part of his business in states other than the one in which he [516] is sued will almost invariably be put to some inconvenience to defend himself. It will be a poorly represented multi-state defendant who cannot produce substantial evidence and good reasons fitting the rule now adopted by this Court tending to establish that the forum of the action against him is most inconvenient. The Court's new rule will thus clutter the very threshold of the federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact concerning the relative convenience of forums. The preliminary disposition of this factual question will, I believe, produce the very kind of uncertainty, confusion, and hardship which stalled and handicapped persons seeking compensation for maritime injuries following this Court's decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. The broad and indefinite discretion left to federal courts to decide the question of convenience from the welter of factors which are relevant to such a judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible. Yet plaintiffs will be asked "to determine with certainty before bringing their actions that factual question over which courts regularly divide among themselves and within their own membership. As penalty for error, the injured individual may not only suffer serious financial loss through the delay and expense of litigation, but discover that his claim has been barred by the statute of limitations in the prmper forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere." Davis v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 254.

This very case illustrates the hazards of delay. It must be begun anew in another forum after the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and now this Court, have had their time-consuming say as to the relative convenience of the forum in which the plaintiff chose to seek redress. Whether the statute of limitations has run [517] against the plaintiff, we do not know. The convenience which the individual defendant will enjoy from the Court's new rule of forum non conveniens in law actions may be thought to justify its inherent delays, uncertainties, administrative complications and hardships. But in any event, Congress has not yet said so; and I do not think that this Court should, 150 years after the passage of the Judiciary Act, fill in what it thinks is a deficiency in the deliberate policy which Congress adopted.^[13] Whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for Congress to adopt it.

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE joins in this opinion.

[1] Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291.

[2] Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883.

[3] See 28 U.S.C. § 112; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U.S. 165.

[4] The doctrine did not originate in federal but in state courts. This Court in recognizing and approving it by name has never indicated that it was rejecting application of the doctrine to law actions which had been an integral and necessary part of evolution of the doctrine. And cf. Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120. Wherever it is applied in courts of other jurisdictions, its application does not depend on whether the action is at law, Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N.Y.S. 884; Murnan v. Wabash R. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508; Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 A. 895; or in equity, Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E.2d 550; Egbert v. Short, [1907] 2 Ch. 205. See footnote 1, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., decided this day, post, p. 518.

[5] See Foster, Place of Trial — Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 47, 62.

[6] See Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141; cf. La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13. Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N.Y.S. 884; Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 A. 895; see Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson R.R. Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120; Great Western Railway Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305.

[7] See Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867, 889.

[8] See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 1.

[9] In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58, it was stated that: "The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that implication." Cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 388.

[10] Although the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity in federal courts has been abolished by the adoption of the single form of civil action, Rule 2, F.R.C.P., see 1 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) c. 2, there remains to federal courts the same discretion, no more and no less, in the exercise of special equitable remedies as existed before the adoption of the federal rules. Neither the rules, the statutes, tradition, nor practical considerations justify application of equitable discretion to actions for money judgments based on common law or statutory rights.

[11] This Court, whose jurisdiction is primarily appellate, has held that it need not exercise its constitutionally granted original jurisdiction even at common law where there is another suitable forum. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 464-65. But the Constitution, not Congress, fixes this Court's jurisdiction. And it was this Court's duty to interpret its constitutional jurisdiction. It is the duty of Congress to fix the jurisdiction of the district courts by statute. It did so. It is not the duty of this Court to amend that statute.

[12] "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218, 221. See also dissenting opinion, State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185, 202, n. 23 and authorities there collected.

[13] The very law review articles which are relied upon to document this theory of a federal rule of forum non conveniens reveal that judicial adoption of this theory without a new act of Congress would be an unwarranted judicial innovation. Foster, Place of Trial — Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 52; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 1, 18. For instance, it is stated that "No matter how little dispute there is as to the desirability of such legislation, there is comparatively little chance of overcoming legislative inertia and securing its passage unless some accident happens to focus attention upon it. The best hope is that the courts will feel free to take appropriate action without specific legislation authorizing them to do so." Foster, supra at 52.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[237] James M. Fitzsimons argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-848. With him on the brief were Charles J. McKelvey, Ann S. Pepperman, and Keith A. Jones. Warner W. Gardner argued the cause for petitioner in [238] No. 80-883. With him on the briefs were Nancy J. Bregstein and Ronald C. Scott.

Daniel C. Cathcart argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in both cases.^[2]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases arise out of an air crash that took place in Scotland. Respondent, acting as representative of the estates of several Scottish citizens killed in the accident, brought wrongful-death actions against petitioners that were ultimately transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. After noting that an alternative forum existed in Scotland, the District Court granted their motions. 479 F. Supp. 727 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 630 F. 2d 149 (1980). The Court of Appeals based its decision, at least in part, on the ground that dismissal is automatically barred where the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum chosen by the plaintiff. Because we conclude that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should not, by itself, bar dismissal, and because we conclude that the District Court did not otherwise abuse its discretion, we reverse.

I

A

In July 1976, a small commercial aircraft crashed in the Scottish highlands during the course of a charter flight from [239] Blackpool to Perth. The pilot and five passengers were killed instantly. The decedents were all Scottish subjects and residents, as are their heirs and next of kin. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. At the time of the crash the plane was subject to Scottish air traffic control.

The aircraft, a twin-engine Piper Aztec, was manufactured in Pennsylvania by petitioner Piper Aircraft Co. (Piper). The propellers were manufactured in Ohio by petitioner Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Hartzell). At the time of the crash the aircraft was registered in Great Britain and was owned and maintained by Air Navigation and Trading Co., Ltd. (Air Navigation). It was operated by McDonald Aviation, Ltd. (McDonald), a Scottish air taxi service. Both Air Navigation and McDonald were organized in the United Kingdom. The wreckage of the plane is now in a hangar in Farnsborough, England.

The British Department of Trade investigated the accident shortly after it occurred. A preliminary report found that the plane crashed after developing a spin, and suggested that mechanical failure in the plane or the propeller was responsible. At Hartzell's request, this report was reviewed by a three-member Review Board, which held a 9-day adversary hearing attended by all interested parties. The Review Board found no evidence of defective equipment and indicated that pilot error may have contributed to the accident. The pilot, who had obtained his commercial pilot's license only three months earlier, was flying over high ground at an altitude considerably lower than the minimum height required by his company's operations manual.

In July 1977, a California probate court appointed respondent Gaynell Reyno administratrix of the estates of the five passengers. Reyno is not related to and does not know any of the decedents or their survivors; she was a legal secretary to the attorney who filed this lawsuit. Several days after her appointment, Reyno commenced separate wrongful-death [240] actions against Piper and Hartzell in the Superior Court of California, claiming negligence and strict liability.^[3] Air Navigation, McDonald, and the estate of the pilot are not parties to this litigation. The survivors of the five passengers whose estates are represented by Reyno filed a separate action in the United Kingdom against Air Navigation, McDonald, and the pilot's estate.^[4] Reyno candidly admits that the action against Piper and Hartzell was filed in the United States because its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more favorable to her position than are those of Scotland. Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort. Moreover, it permits wrongful-death actions only when brought by a decedent's relatives. The relatives may sue only for "loss of support and society."^[5]

On petitioners' motion, the suit was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Piper then moved for transfer to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a).^[6] Hartzell moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer.^[7] In December 1977, the District Court quashed service on [241] Hartzell and transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Respondent then properly served process on Hartzell.

B

In May 1978, after the suit had been transferred, both Hartzell and Piper moved to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The District Court granted these motions in October 1979. It relied on the balancing test set forth by this Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), and its companion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947). In those decisions, the Court stated that a plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. However, when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant. . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience," or when the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems," the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case. Koster, supra, at 524. To guide trial court discretion, the Court provided a list of "private interest factors" affecting the convenience of the litigants, and a list of "public interest factors" affecting the convenience of the forum. Gilbert, supra, at 508-509.^[8]

[242] After describing our decisions in Gilbert and Koster, the District Court analyzed the facts of these cases. It began by observing that an alternative forum existed in Scotland; Piper and Hartzell had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts and to waive any statute of limitations defense that might be available. It then stated that plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to little weight. The court recognized that a plaintiff's choice ordinarily deserves substantial deference. It noted, however, that Reyno "is a representative of foreign citizens and residents seeking a forum in the United States because of the more liberal rules concerning products liability law," and that "the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American citizen or resident, and particularly when the foreign citizens seek to benefit from the more liberal tort rules provided for the protection of citizens and residents of the United States." 479 F. Supp., at 731.

The District Court next examined several factors relating to the private interests of the litigants, and determined that these factors strongly pointed towards Scotland as the appropriate forum. Although evidence concerning the design, manufacture, and testing of the plane and propeller is located in the United States, the connections with Scotland are otherwise "overwhelming." Id., at 732. The real parties in interest are citizens of Scotland, as were all the decedents. Witnesses who could testify regarding the maintenance of the aircraft, the training of the pilot, and the investigation of the accident — all essential to the defense — are in Great Britain. Moreover, all witnesses to damages are located in Scotland. Trial would be aided by familiarity with Scottish topography, and by easy access to the wreckage.

The District Court reasoned that because crucial witnesses and evidence were beyond the reach of compulsory process, and because the defendants would not be able to implead potential Scottish third-party defendants, it would be "unfair to make Piper and Hartzell proceed to trial in this forum." Id., [243] at 733. The survivors had brought separate actions in Scotland against the pilot, McDonald, and Air Navigation. "[I]t would be fairer to all parties and less costly if the entire case was presented to one jury with available testimony from all relevant witnesses." Ibid. Although the court recognized that if trial were held in the United States, Piper and Hartzell could file indemnity or contribution actions against the Scottish defendants, it believed that there was a significant risk of inconsistent verdicts.^[9]

The District Court concluded that the relevant public interests also pointed strongly towards dismissal. The court determined that Pennsylvania law would apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell if the case were tried in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.^[10] As a result, "trial in this forum would be hopelessly complex and confusing for a jury." Id., at 734. In addition, the court noted that it was unfamiliar with Scottish law and thus would have to rely upon experts from that country. The court also found that the trial would be enormously costly and time-consuming; that it would be unfair to burden citizens with jury duty when the Middle District [244] of Pennsylvania has little connection with the controversy; and that Scotland has a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation.

In opposing the motions to dismiss, respondent contended that dismissal would be unfair because Scottish law was less favorable. The District Court explicitly rejected this claim. It reasoned that the possibility that dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change in the law did not deserve significant weight; any deficiency in the foreign law was a "matter to be dealt with in the foreign forum." Id., at 738.

C

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The decision to reverse appears to be based on two alternative grounds. First, the Court held that the District Court abused its discretion in conducting the Gilbert analysis. Second, the Court held that dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals began its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis by noting that the plaintiff's choice of forum deserved substantial weight, even though the real parties in interest are nonresidents. It then rejected the District Court's balancing of the private interests. It found that Piper and Hartzell had failed adequately to support their claim that key witnesses would be unavailable if trial were held in the United States: they had never specified the witnesses they would call and the testimony these witnesses would provide. The Court of Appeals gave little weight to the fact that piper and Hartzell would not be able to implead potential Scottish third-party defendants, reasoning that this difficulty would be "burdensome" but not "unfair," 630 F. 2d, at 162.^[11] Finally, the court stated that resolution of the suit [245] would not be significantly aided by familiarity with Scottish topography, or by viewing the wreckage.

The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's analysis of the public interest factors. It found that the District Court gave undue emphasis to the application of Scottish law: " `the mere fact that the court is called upon to determine and apply foreign law does not present a legal problem of the sort which would justify the dismissal of a case otherwise properly before the court.' " Id., at 163 (quoting Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F. 2d 423, 427 (CA3 1970)). In any event, it believed that Scottish law need not be applied. After conducting its own choice-of-law analysis, the Court of Appeals determined that American law would govern the actions against both Piper and Hartzell.^[12] The same choice-of-law analysis apparently led it to conclude that Pennsylvania and Ohio, rather than Scotland, are the jurisdictions with the greatest policy interests in the dispute, and that all other public interest factors favored trial in the United States.^[13]

[246] In any event, it appears that the Court of Appeals would have reversed even if the District Court had properly balanced the public and private interests. The court stated:

"[I]t is apparent that the dismissal would work a change in the applicable law so that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would be eliminated from the case. But . . . a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a statutory transfer, `should not, despite its convenience, result in a change in the applicable law.' Only when American law is not applicable, or when the foreign jurisdiction would, as a matter of its won choice of law, give the plaintiff the benefit of the claim to which she is entitled here, would dismissal be justified." 630 F. 2d, at 163-164 (footnote omitted) (quoting DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F. 2d 895, 899 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 904 (1978)).

In other words, the court decided that dismissal is automatically barred if it would lead to a change in the applicable law unfavorable to the plaintiff.

We granted certiorari in these case to consider the questions they raise concerning the proper application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 450 U. S. 909 (1981).^[14]

[247] II

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.

We expressly rejected the position adopted by the Court of Appeals in our decision in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 (1932). That case arose out of a collision between two vessels in American waters. The Canadian owners of cargo lost in the accident sued the Canadian owners of one of the vessels in Federal District Court. The cargo owners chose an American court in large part because the relevant American liability rules were more favorable than the Canadian rules. The District Court dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs argued that dismissal was inappropriate because Canadian laws were less favorable to them. This Court nonetheless affirmed:

"We have no occasion to enquire by what law rights of the parties are governed, as we are of the opinion [248] that, under any view of that question, it lay within the discretion of the District Court to decline to assume jurisdiction over the controversy. . . . `[T]he court will not take cognizance of the case if justice would be as well done by remitting the parties to their home forum.' " Id., at 419-420 (quoting Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U. S. 515, 517 (1930).

The Court further stated that "[t]here was no basis for the contention that the District Court abused its discretion." 285 U. S., at 423.

It is true that Canada Malting was decided before Gilbert, and that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not fully crystallized until our decision in that case.^[15] However, Gilbert in no way affects the validity of Canada Malting. Indeed, [249] by holding that the central focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience, Gilbert implicitly recognized that dismissal may not be barred solely because of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law.^[16] Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.^[17] If substantial weight were given to the possibility of an unfavorable change in law, however, dismissal might be barred even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient.

The Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with this Court's earlier forum non conveniens decisions in another respect. Those decisions have repeatedly emphasized the need to retain flexibility. In Gilbert, the Court refused to identify specific circumstances "which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy." 330 U. S., at 508. Similarly, in Koster, the Court rejected the contention that where a trial would involve inquiry into the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, dismissal was always appropriate. "That is one, but only one, factor which may show convenience." 330 U. S., at 527. And in Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549, 557 (1946), we stated that we would not lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion, and that "[e]ach case turns on its facts." If central emphasis were [250] placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.

In fact, if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums. Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.

Except for the court below, every Federal Court of Appeals that has considered this question after Gilbert has held that dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be granted even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff's chance of recovery. See, e. g., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 248-249, 637 F. 2d 775, 794-795 (1980); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F. 2d 448, 453 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1052 (1976); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F. 2d 281, 283 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 920 (1966).^[18] Several Courts have relied expressly on Canada Malting to hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change of law should not, by itself, bar dismissal. See Fitzgerald [251] v. Texaco, Inc., supra; Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908 (ED Va. 1959).

The Court of Appeals' approach is not only inconsistent with the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine, but also poses substantial practical problems. If the possibility of a change in law were given substantial weight, deciding motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become quite difficult. Choice-of-law analysis would become extremely important, and the courts would frequently be required to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions. First, the trial court would have to determine what law would apply if the case were tried in the chosen forum, and what law would apply if the case were tried in the alternative forum. It would then have to compare the rights, remedies, and procedures available under the law that would be applied in each forum. Dismissal would be appropriate only if the court concluded that the law applied by the alternative forum is as favorable to the plaintiff as that of the chosen forum. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law. As we stated in Gilbert, the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be required to "untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." 330 U. S., at 509.

Upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals would result in other practical problems. At least where the foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer as defendant,^[19] a court could not dismiss the case on grounds of forum non [252] conveniens where dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change in law. The American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs,^[20] would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the United States would increase and further congest already crowded courts.^[21]

[253] The Court of Appeals based its decision, at least in part, on an analogy between dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens and transfers between federal courts pursuant to § 1404(a). In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U. S. 612 (1964), this Court ruled that a § 1404(a) transfer should not result in a change in the applicable law. Relying on dictum in an earlier Third Circuit opinion interpreting Van Dusen, the court below held that that principle is also applicable to a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. 630 F. 2d, at 164, and n. 51 (citing DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F. 2d, at 899). However, § 1404(a) transfers are different than dismissals on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Congress enacted § 1404(a) to permit change of venue between federal courts. Although the statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Revisor's Note, H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A132 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., A127 (1946), it was intended to be a revision rather than a codification of the common law. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29 (1955). District courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id., at 31-32.

The reasoning employed in Van Dusen v. Barrack is simply inapplicable to dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens. That case did not discuss the common-law doctrine. Rather, it focused on "the construction and application" of § 1404(a). 376 U. S., at 613.^[22] Emphasizing the remedial [254] purpose of the statute, Barrack concluded that Congress could not have intended a transfer to be accompanied by a change in law. Id., at 622. The statute was designed as a "federal housekeeping measure," allowing easy change of venue within a unified federal system. Id., at 613. The Court feared that if a change in venue were accompanied by a change in law, forum-shopping parties would take unfair advantage of the relaxed standards for transfer. The rule was necessary to ensure the just and efficient operation of the statute.^[23]

We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.^[24] In these cases, however, the remedies that [255] would be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall within this category. Although the relatives of the decedents may not be able to rely on a strict liability theory, and although their potential damages award may be smaller, there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.

III

The Court of Appeals also erred in rejecting the District Court's Gilbert analysis. The Court of Appeals stated that more weight should have been given to the plaintiff's choice of forum, and criticized the District Court's analysis of the private and public interests. However, the District Court's decision regarding the deference due plaintiff's choice of forum was appropriate. Furthermore, we do not believe that the District Court abused its discretion in weighing the private and public interests.

A

The District Court acknowledged that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum. It held, however, that the presumption applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.

The District Court's distinction between resident or citizen plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully justified. In Koster, the Court indicated that a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum. 330 U. S., at 524.^[25] When the home forum has [256] been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference.^[26]

[257] B

The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference. Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 511-512; Koster, 330 U. S., at 531. Here, the Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that the standard of review was one of abuse of discretion. In examining the District Court's analysis of the public and private interests, however, the Court of Appeals seems to have lost sight of this rule, and substituted its own judgment for that of the District Court.

(1)

In analyzing the private interest factors, the District Court stated that the connections with Scotland are "overwhelming." 479 F. Supp., at 732. This characterization may be somewhat exaggerated. Particularly with respect to the question of relative ease of access to sources of proof, the private interests point in both directions. As respondent emphasizes, records concerning the design, manufacture, and testing of the propeller and plane are located in the United States. She would have greater access to sources of proof relevant to her strict liability and negligence theories if trial were held here.^[27] However, the District Court did not act [258] unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland. A large proportion of the relevant evidence is located in Great Britain.

The Court of Appeals found that the problems of proof could not be given any weight because Piper and Hartzell failed to describe with specificity the evidence they would not be able to obtain if trial were held in the United States. It suggested that defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must submit affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the testimony these witnesses would provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum. Such detail is not necessary.^[28] Piper and Hartzell have moved for dismissal precisely because many crucial witnesses are located beyond the reach of compulsory process, and thus are difficult to identify or interview. Requiring extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of their motion. Of course, defendants must provide enough information to enable the District Court to balance the parties' interests. Our examination of the record convinces us that sufficient information [259] was provided here. Both Piper and Hartzell submitted affidavits describing the evidentiary problems they would face if the trial were held in the United States.^[29]

The District Court correctly concluded that the problems posed by the inability to implead potential third-party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland. Joinder of the pilot's estate, Air Navigation, and McDonald is crucial to the presentation of petitioners' defense. If Piper and Hartzell can show that the accident was caused not by a design defect, but rather by the negligence of the pilot, the plane's owners, or the charter company, they will be relieved of all liability. It is true, of course, that if Hartzell and Piper were found liable after a trial in the United States, they could institute an action for indemnity or contribution against these parties in Scotland. It would be far more convenient, however, to resolve all claims in one trial. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Forcing petitioners to rely on actions for indemnity or contributions would be "burdensome" but not "unfair." 630 F. 2d, at 162. Finding that trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum would be burdensome, however, is sufficient to support dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens.^[30]

(2)

The District Court's review of the factors relating to the public interest was also reasonable. On the basis of its [260] choice-of-law analysis, it concluded that if the case were tried in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law would apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell. It stated that a trial involving two sets of laws would be confusing to the jury. It also noted its own lack of familiarity with Scottish law. Consideration of these problems was clearly appropriate under Gilbert; in that case we explicitly held that the need to apply foreign law pointed towards dismissal.^[31] The Court of Appeals found that the District Court's choice-of-law analysis was incorrect, and that American law would apply to both Hartzell and Piper. Thus, lack of familiarity with foreign law would not be a problem. Even if the Court of Appeals' conclusion is correct, however, all other public interest factors favored trial in Scotland.

Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. The accident occurred in its airspace. All of the decedents were Scottish. Apart from Piper and Hartzell, all potential plaintiffs and defendants are either Scottish or English. As we stated in Gilbert, there is "a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." 330 U. S., at 509. Respondent argues that American citizens have an interest in ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing defective products, and that additional deterrence might be obtained if Piper and Hartzell were tried in the United States, where they could be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict liability. However, the incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an [261] American court is likely to be insignificant. The American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here.

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law bars dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. It also erred in rejecting the District Court's Gilbert analysis. The District Court properly decided that the presumption in favor of the respondent's forum choice applied with less than maximum force because the real parties in interest are foreign. It did not act unreasonably in deciding that the private interests pointed towards trial in Scotland. Nor did it act unreasonably in deciding that the public interests favored trial in Scotland. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of these cases.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. However, like JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS, I would not proceed to deal with the issues addressed in Part III. To that extent, I am in dissent.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

In No. 80-848, only one question is presented for review to this Court:

"Whether, in an action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs against American defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of [262] forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied if the case were litigated in the district court is more favorable to them than the law that would be applied by the courts of their own nation." Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-848, p. i.

In No. 80-883, the Court limited its grant of certiorari, see 450 U. S. 909, to the same question:

"Must a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens be denied whenever the law of the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that which would be applied by the district court?" Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-883, p. i.

I agree that this question should be answered in the negative. Having decided that question, I would simply remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of the question whether the District Court correctly decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in which to litigate a claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was defectively designed and manufactured in Pennsylvania.

[1] Together with No. 80-883, Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

[2] John D. Dillow, Samuel F. Pearce, John J. Hennelly, Jr., and Thomas C. Walsh filed a brief for Boeing Co. et al. as amici curiaeurging reversal.

Thomas G. Smith filed a brief for the Law Offices of Gerald C. Stearns as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

[3] Avco-Lycoming, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane's engines, was also named as a defendant. It was subsequently dismissed from the suit by stipulation.

[4] The pilot's estate has also filed suit in the United Kingdom against Air Navigation, McDonald, Piper, and Hartzell.

[5] See Affidavit of Donald Ian Kerr MacLeod, App. A19 (affidavit submitted to District Court by petitioners describing Scottish law). Suits for damages are governed by The Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.

[6] Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."

[7] The District Court concluded that it could not assert personal jurisdiction over Hartzell consistent with due process. However, it decided not to dismiss Hartzell because the corporation would be amenable to process in Pennsylvania.

[8] The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants included the "relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 508. The public factors bearing on the question included the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home"; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. Id., at 509.

[9] The District Court explained that inconsistent verdicts might result if petitioners were held liable on the basis of strict liability here, and then required to prove negligence in an indemnity action in Scotland. Moreover, even if the same standard of liability applied, there was a danger that different juries would find different facts and produce inconsistent results.

[10] Under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941), a court ordinarily must apply the choice-of-law rules of the State in which it sits. However, where a case is transferred pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a), it must apply the choice-of-law rules of the State from which the case was transferred. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U. S. 612 (1946). Relying on these two cases, the District Court concluded that California choice-of-law rules would apply to Piper, and Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules would apply to Hartzell. It further concluded that California applied a "governmental interests" analysis in resolving choice-of-law problems, and that Pennsylvania employed a "significant contacts" analysis. The court used the "governmental interests" analysis to determine that Pennsylvania liability rules would apply to Piper, and the "significant contacts" analysis to determine that Scottish liability rules would apply to Hartzell.

[11] The court claimed that the risk of inconsistent verdicts was slight because Pennsylvania and Scotland both adhere to principles of res judicata.

[12] The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that California choice-of-law rules applied to Piper, and that Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules applied to Hartzell, see n. 8, supra. It did not agree, however, that California used a "governmental interests" analysis and that Pennsylvania used a "significant contacts" analysis. Rather, it believed that both jurisdictions employed the "false conflicts" test. Applying this test, it concluded that Ohio and Pennsylvania had a greater policy interest in the dispute than Scotland, and that American law would apply to both Piper and Hartzell.

[13] The court's reasoning on this point is somewhat unclear. It states:

"We have held that under the applicable choice of law rules Pennsylvania and Ohio are the jurisdictions with the greatest policy interest in this dispute. It follows that the other public interest factors that should be considered under the Supreme Court cases of Gilbert and Koster favor trial in this country rather than Scotland." 630 F. 2d, at 171.

The Court of Appeals concluded as part of its choice-of-law analysis that the United States had the greatest policy interest in the dispute. See n. 10, supra. It apparently believed that this conclusion necessarily implied that the forum non conveniens public interest factors pointed toward trial in the United States.

[14] We granted certiorari in No. 80-848 to consider the question "[w]hether, in an action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs against American defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied if the case were litigated in the district court is more favorable to them than the law that would be applied by the courts of their own nation." We granted certiorari in No. 80-883 to consider the question whether "a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens[should] be denied whenever the law of the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that which would be applied by the district court."

In this opinion, we begin by considering whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law automatically bars dismissal. Part II, infra. Since we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, we then consider its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis to determine whether dismissal was otherwise appropriate. Part III, infra. We believe that it is necessary to discuss the Gilbert analysis in order to properly dispose of the cases.

The questions on which certiorari was granted are sufficiently broad to justify our discussion of the District Court's Gilbert analysis. However, even if the issues we discuss in Part III are not within the bounds of the questions with respect to which certiorari was granted, our consideration of these issues is not inappropriate. An order limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. We may consider questions outside the scope of the limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the proper disposition of the case. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928); McCandless v. Furlaud, 293 U. S. 67 (1934); Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967).

[15] The doctrine of forum non conveniens has a long history. It originated in Scotland, see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 909-911 (1947), and became part of the common law of many States, see id., at 911-912; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1929). The doctrine was also frequently applied in federal admiralty actions. See, e. g., Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.; see also Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L. Q. 12 (1949). In Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549 (1946), the Court first indicated that motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens could be made in federal diversity actions. The doctrine became firmly established when Gilbert and Kosterwere decided one year later.

In previous forum non conveniens decisions, the Court has left unresolved the question whether under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in a diversity case. Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 509; Koster, 330 U. S., at 529; Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., supra, at 551, 558-559. The Court did not decide this issue because the same result would have been reached in each case under federal or state law. The lower courts in these cases reached the same conclusion: Pennsylvania and California law on forum non conveniens dismissals are virtually identical to federal law. See 630 F. 2d, at 158. Thus, here also, we need not resolve the Erie question.

[16] See also Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., supra, at 555, n. 4 (citing with approval a Scottish case that dismissed an action on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the possibility of an unfavorable change in law).

[17] In other words, Gilbert held that dismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or take advantage of favorable law. This is precisely the situation in which the Court of Appeals' rule would bar dismissal.

[18] Cf. Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F. 2d 1027, 1032 (CA3 1980) (dismissal affirmed where "Norwegian substantive law will predominate the trial of this case and the mere presence of a count pleaded under Connecticut law but which may have little chance of success does not warrant a different conclusion"). But see DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F. 2d 895, 899 (CA3 1977) (dictum) (principle that § 1404(a) transfer should not result in change in law is no less applicable to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 904 (1978). The court below relied on the dictum in DeMateos in reaching its decision. See infra, at 253-254.

[19] In fact, the defendant might not even have to be American. A foreign plaintiff seeking damages for an accident that occurred abroad might be able to obtain service of process on a foreign defendant who does business in the United States. Under the Court of Appeals' holding, dismissal would be barred if the law in the alternative forum were less favorable to the plaintiff — even though none of the parties are American, and even though there is absolutely no nexus between the subject matter of the litigation and the United States.

[20] First, all but 6 of the 50 American States — Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming — offer strict liability. 1 CCH Prod. Liability Rep. § 4016 (1981). Rules roughly equivalent to American strict liability are effective in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. West Germany and Japan have a strict liability statute for pharmaceuticals. However, strict liability remains primarily an American innovation. Second, the tort plaintiff may choose, at least potentially, from among 50 jurisdictions if he decides to file suit in the United States. Each of these jurisdictions applies its own set of malleable choice-of-law rules. Third, jury trials are almost always available in the United States, while they are never provided in civil law jurisdictions. G. Gloss, Comparative law 12 (1979);; J. Merryman, the Civil Law Tradition 121 (1969). Even in the United Kingdom, most civil actions are not tried before a jury. 1 G. Keeton, The United Kingdom, The Development of its Laws and Constitutions 309 (1955). Fourth, unlike most foreign jurisdictions, American courts allow contingent attorney's fees, and do not tax losing parties with their opponents' attorney's fees. R. Schlesinger, Comparative Laws: Cases, Text, Materials 275-277 (3d ed. 1970); Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement — Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 342, 393 (1978). Fifth, discovery is more extensive in American than in foreign courts. R. Schlesinger, supra, at 307, 310, and n. 33.

[21] In holding that the possibility of a change in law unfavorable to the plaintiff should not be given substantial weight, we also necessarily hold that the possibility of a change in law favorable to defendant should not be considered. Respondent suggests that Piper and Hartzell filed the motion to dismiss, not simply because trial in the United States would be inconvenient, but also because they believe the laws of Scotland are more favorable. She argues that this should be taken into account in the analysis of the private interests. We recognize, of course, that Piper and Hartzell may be engaged in reverse forum-shopping. However, this possibility ordinarily should not enter into a trial court's analysis of the private interests. If the defendant is able to overcome the presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is appropriate — regardless of the fact that defendant may also be motivated by a desire to obtain a more favorable forum. Cf. Koleckener Reederieund Kohlenhandel v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F. 2d 754, 757 (CA2) (defendant not entitled to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens solely because the law of the original forum is less favorable to him than the law of the alternative forum), cert. dism'd by stipulation, 348 U. S. 801 (1954).

[22] Barrack at least implicitly recognized that the rule it announced for transfer under § 1404(a) was not the common-law rule. It cited several decisions under § 1404(a) in which lower courts had been "strongly inclined to protect plaintiffs against the risk that transfer might be accompanied by a prejudicial change in applicable state laws." 376 U. S., at 630, n. 26. These decisions frequently rested on the assumption that a change in law would have been unavoidable under common law forum non conveniens, but could be avoided under § 1404(a). See, e. g., Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410, 414 (NM 1949).

[23] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has expressly rejected the contention that rules governing transfers pursuant to § 1404(a) also govern forum non conveniens dismissals. Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F. 2d 1156 (1978).

[24] At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction. Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 506-507. In rare circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute. Cf. Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F. R. D. 445 (Del. 1978) (court refuses to dismiss, where alternative forum is Ecuador, it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the case, and there is n generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust enrichment and tort claims asserted).

[25] In Koster, we stated that "[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown." 330 U. S., at 524. See also Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U. S. 684, 697 (1950) ("suit by a United States citizen against a foreign respondent brings into force considerations very different from those in suits between foreigners"); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,285 U. S., at 421 ("[t]he rule recognizing an unqualified discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in admiralty between foreigners appears to be supported by an unbroken line of decisions in the lower federal courts").

As the District Court correctly noted in its opinion, 479 F. Supp., at 731; see also n. 10, supra, the lower federal courts have routinely given less weight to a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum. See, e. g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 175 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 408, 536 F. 2d 429, 435 (1976); Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong Amber, 513 F. 2d 667, 672 (CA9 1975); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F. 2d 448, 451 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1052 (1976); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F. 2d 611, 614 (CA3), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 945 (1966); Ionescu v. E. F. Hutton & Co. (France), 465 F. Supp. 139 (SDNY 1979); Michell v. General Motors Crop., 439 F. Supp. 24, 27 (ND Ohio 1977).

A citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive weight, however. See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 252-253, 637 F. 2d 775, 796-797 (1980); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F. 2d 975 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1035 (1978). Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal in proper.

[26] See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., supra,at 253, 637 F. 2d, at 797 (citizenship and residence are proxies for convenience); see also Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373, 382-383 (1980).

Respondent argues that since plaintiffs will ordinarily file suit in the jurisdiction that offers the most favorable law, establishing a strong presumption in favor of both home and foreign plaintiffs will ensure that defendants will always be held to the highest possible standard of accountability for their purported wrongdoing. However, the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum has never been intended to guarantee that the plaintiff will be able to select the law that will govern the case. See supra, at 247-250.

[27] In the future, where similar problems are presented, district courts might dismiss subject to the condition that defendant corporations agree to provide the records relevant to the plaintiff's claims.

[28] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has expressly rejected such a requirement. Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., supra, at 451, n. 3. In other cases, dismissals have been affirmed despite the failure to provide detailed affidavits. See Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910, 924 (SDNY 1977), aff'd., 588 F. 2d 880 (CA2 1978). And in a decision handed down two weeks after the decision in this case, another Third Circuit panel affirmed a dismissal without mentioning such a requirement. See Dahl v. United Technologies Corp.,632 F. 2d 1027 (1980).

The Court of Appeals apparently relied on an analogy to motions to transfer under 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a). 630 F. 2d, at 160-161. It cited Marbury-Pattillo Construction Co. v. Bayside Warehouse Co., 490 F. 2d 155, 158 (CA5 1974), and Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F. 2d 145, 148 (CA10 1967), which suggest an affidavit requirement in the § 1404(a) context. As we have explained, however, dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens and § 1404(a) transfers are not directly comparable. See supra, at 253-254.

[29] See Affidavit of Ronald C. Scott, App. to Pet. for Cert. of Hartzell Propeller, Inc., A75; Affidavit of Charles J. McKelvey, App. to Pet. for Cert. of Piper Aircraft Co. 1f. The affidavit provided to the District Court by Piper states that it would call the following witnesses: the relatives of the decedents; the owners and employees of McDonald; the persons responsible for the training and licensing of the pilot; the persons responsible for servicing and maintaining the aircraft; and two or three of its own employees involved in the design and manufacture of the aircraft.

[30] See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U. S. App. D. C., at 244, 637 F. 2d, at 790 (relying on similar argument in approving dismissal of action arising out of helicopter crash that took place in Norway).

[31] Many forum non conveniens decisions have held that the need to apply foreign law favors dismissal. See, e. g., Calavo Growers of California v. Belgium, 632 F. 2d 963, 967 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1084 (1981); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F. 2d, at 1165. Of course, this factor alone is not sufficient to warrant dismissal when a balancing of all relevant factors shows that the plaintiff's chosen forum is appropriate. See, e. g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 175 U. S. App. D. C., at 409, 536 F. 2d, at 436; Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F. 2d 353, 357 (CA5), cert. denied, 349 U. S. 922 (1955).

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

Charles J. Merriam argued the cause for petitioner in No. 25. With him on the brief was Samuel B. Smith.

John C. Butler argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 26.

Daniel V. O'Keeffe argued the cause for respondents in No. 25. With him on the brief were Lloyd C. Root and John O'C. FitzGerald.

Warren E. King argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in No. 26.

MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.

To relieve against what was apparently thought to be the harshness of dismissal, under the doctrine of forum [336] non conveniens, of an action brought in an inconvenient one of two or more legally available forums, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, and concerned by the reach of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44,^[2] Congress, in 1948, enacted 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a), which provides:

"§ 1404. Change of venue.

"(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."

The instant cases present the question whether a District Court, in which a civil action has been properly brought, is empowered by § 1404 (a) to transfer the action, on the motion of the defendant, to a district in which the plaintiff did not have a right to bring it.

No. 25, Blaski.—Respondents, Blaski and others, residents of Illinois, brought this patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against one Howell and a Texas corporation controlled by him, alleging that the defendants are residents of, and maintain their only place of business in, the City of Dallas, in the Northern District of Texas, where they are infringing respondents' patents. After being served with process and filing their answer, the defendants moved, under § 1404 (a), to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.^[3] Respondents objected to the [337] transfer on the ground that, inasmuch as the defendants did not reside, maintain a place of business, or infringe the patents in, and could not have been served with process in, the Illinois district, the courts of that district lacked venue over the action^[4] and ability to command jurisdiction over the defendants;^[5] that therefore that district was not a forum in which the respondents had a right to bring the action, and, hence, the court was without power to transfer it to that district. Without mentioning that objection or the question it raised, the District Court found that "the motion should be granted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses in the interest of justice," and ordered the case transferred to the Illinois district. Thereupon, respondents moved in the Fifth Circuit for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the vacation of that order. That court, holding that "[t]he purposes for which § 1404 (a) was enacted would be unduly circumscribed if a transfer could not be made `in the interest of justice' to a district where the defendants not only waive venue but to which they seek the transfer," denied the motion. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F. 2d 737, 738.

Upon receipt of a certified copy of the pleadings and record, the Illinois District Court assigned the action to Judge Hoffman's calendar. Respondents promptly moved for an order remanding the action on the ground that the Texas District Court did not have power to make the transfer order and, hence, the Illinois District Court was not thereby vested with jurisdiction of the action. [338] After expressing his view that the "weight of reason and logic" favored "retransfer of this case to Texas," Judge Hoffman, with misgivings, denied the motion. Respondents then filed in the Seventh Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Hoffman to reverse his order. After hearing and rehearing, the Seventh Circuit, holding that "[w]hen Congress provided [in § 1404 (a)] for transfer [of a civil action] to a district `where it might have been brought,' it is hardly open to doubt but that it referred to a district where the plaintiff . . . had a right to bring the case," and that respondents did not have a right to bring this action in the Illinois district, granted the writ, one judge dissenting. 260 F. 2d 317.

No. 26, Behimer.—Diversity of citizenship then existing, respondents, Behimer and Roberts, residents of Illinois and New York, respectively, brought this stockholders' derivative action, as minority stockholders of Utah Oil Refining Corporation, a Utah corporation, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Standard Oil Company and Standard Oil Foundation, Inc., Indiana corporations but licensed to do and doing business in the Northern District of Illinois, for damages claimed to have been sustained through the alleged illegal acquisition by defendants of the assets of the Utah corporation at an inadequate price.

After being served with process and filing their answer, the defendants moved, under § 1404 (a), to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the District of Utah.^[6] Respondents objected to the transfer on the [339] ground that, inasmuch as the defendants were not incorporated in or licensed to do or doing business in, and could not be served with process in. the district of Utah, the courts of that district lacked venue over the action^[7] and ability to command jurisdiction over the defendants;^[8] that therefore that district was not a forum in which the respondents had a right to bring the action, and, hence, the court was without power to transfer it to that district. Without mentioning the question raised by that objection, the court found that the proposed transfer would be "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice," and ordered the case transferred to the district of Utah.

Respondents then filed in the Seventh Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to reverse its order. After hearing, the Seventh Circuit, following its decision in Blaski v. Hoffman, supra, granted the writ. 261 F. 2d 467.

To settle the conflict that has arisen among the circuits respecting the proper interpretation and application of § 1404 (a),^[9] we granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 904; 361 U. S. 809.

[340] Without sacrifice or slight of any tenable position, the parties have in this Court commendably narrowed their contentions to the scope of the only relevant inquiry. The points of contention may be sharpened by first observing what is not in contest. Discretion of the district judges concerned is not involved. Propriety of the remedy of mandamus is not assailed. No claim is made here that the order of the Fifth Circuit denying the motion of respondents in the Blaski case for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus, 245 F. 2d 737, precluded Judge Hoffman or the Seventh Circuit from remanding that case.^[10] Petitioners concede that these actions were [341] properly brought in the respective transferor forums; that statutory venue did not exist over either of these actions in the respective transferee districts,^[11] and that the respective defendants were not within the reach of the process of the respective transferee courts.^[12] They concede, too, [342] that § 1404 (a), being "not unlimited," "may be utilized only to direct an action to any other district or division `where it might have been brought,' " and that, like the superseded doctrine of forum non conveniens, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 507, the statute requires "an alternative forum in which plaintiff might proceed."

Petitioners' "thesis" and sole claim is that § 1404 (a), being remedial, Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 71, should be broadly construed, and, when so construed, the phrase "where it might have been brought" should be held to relate not only to the time of the bringing of the action, but also to the time of the transfer; and that "if at such time the transferee forum has the power to adjudicate the issues of the action, it is a forum in which the action might then have been brought."^[13] (Emphasis added.) They argue that in the interim between the bringing of the action and the filing of a motion to transfer it, the defendants may move their residence to, or, if corporations, may begin the transaction of business in, some other district, and, if such is done, the phrase "where it might have been brought" should be construed to empower the District Court to transfer the action, on motion of the defendants, to such other district; and that, similarly, if, as here, the defendants move to transfer the action to some other district and consent to submit to the jurisdiction of such other district, the latter district should be held one "in which the action might then have been brought." (Emphasis added.)

We do not agree. We do not think the § 1404 (a) phrase "where it might have been brought" can be interpreted to mean, as petitioners' theory would require, [343] "where it may now be rebrought, with defendants' consent." This Court has said, in a different context, that § 1404 (a) is "unambiguous, direct [and] clear," Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S., at 58, and that "the unequivocal words of § 1404 (a) and the legislative history . . . [establish] that Congress indeed meant what it said." United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78, 84. Like the Seventh Circuit, 260 F. 2d, at 322, we think the dissenting opinion of Judges Hastie and McLaughlin in Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Rodney, 186 F. 2d 111 (C. A. 3d Cir.), correctly answered this contention:

"But we do not see how the conduct of a defendant after suit has been instituted can add to the forums where `it might have been brought.' In the normal meaning of words this language of Section 1404 (a) directs the attention of the judge who is considering a transfer to the situation which existed when suit was instituted."

It is not to be doubted that the transferee courts, like every District Court, had jurisdiction to entertain actions of the character involved, but it is obvious that they did not acquire jurisdiction over these particular actions when they were brought in the transferor courts. The transferee courts could have acquired jurisdiction over these actions only if properly brought in those courts, or if validly transferred thereto under § 1404 (a). Of course, venue, like jurisdiction over the person, may be waived. A defendant, properly served with process by a court having subject matter jurisdiction, waives venue by failing seasonably to assert it, or even simply by making default. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177, 179-180; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165. But the power of a District Court under § 1404 (a) to transfer an action to another district is made to depend not upon the wish or waiver of the defendant but, rather, upon whether the transferee district was one [344] in which the action "might have been brought" by the plaintiff.

The thesis urged by petitioners would not only do violence to the plain words of § 1404 (a), but would also inject gross discrimination. That thesis, if adopted, would empower a District Court, upon a finding of convenience, to transfer an action to any district desired by the defendants and in which they were willing to waive their statutory defenses as to venue and jurisdiction over their persons, regardless of the fact that such transferee district was not one in which the action "might have been brought" by the plaintiff. Conversely, that thesis would not permit the court, upon motion of the plaintiffs and a like showing of convenience, to transfer the action to the same district, without the consent and waiver of venue and personal jurisdiction defenses by the defendants. Nothing in § 1404 (a), or in its legislative history, suggests such a unilateral objective and we should not, under the guise of interpretation, ascribe to Congress any such discriminatory purpose.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that:

"If when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is a district `where [the action] might have been brought.' If he does not have that right, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is not a district `where it might have been brought,' and it is immaterial that the defendant subsequently [makes himself subject, by consent, waiver of venue and personal jurisdiction defenses or otherwise, to the jurisdiction of some other forum]." 260 F. 2d, at 321 and 261 F. 2d, at 469.

Inasmuch as the respondents (plaintiffs) did not have a right to bring these actions in the respective transferee districts, it follows that the judgments of the Court of Appeals were correct and must be

Affirmed.

[345] MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in No. 25.

Two Courts of Appeals disagreed about the meaning of a federal law, as conscientious federal courts sometimes do. From the point of view of efficient judicial administration the resulting history of this litigation is no subject for applause. But, as the Court points out, no claim was made here that the decision of the Fifth Circuit precluded Judge Hoffman or the Seventh Circuit from remanding the case, and on the merits of that question I agree with the Court that principles of res judicata were inapplicable. In any event, the conflict between the Circuits is now resolved, and what happened here will not happen again.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.^[14]

My special disagreement with the Court in this case concerns a matter of judicial administration arising out of the fact that after the question on the merits had been considered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the same question between the same parties was later independently again adjudicated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. I cannot join the Court's approval of the right of the Seventh Circuit to make such a re-examination. It is true that in its opinion in this case and No. 26, Sullivan v. Behimer, decided today, the Court settles the question over which the two Courts of Appeals disagreed, so that it should not recur. This is not, however, an isolated case. A general principle of judicial administration in the federal courts is at stake. In addition, while the Court today settles one problem arising in the application of § 1404 (a), other questions involving that section may readily give rise to conflicting [346] views among the eleven Courts of Appeals. Under the Court's opinion, for example, transfer always depends upon the meaning of the federal venue statutes, and upon the jurisdiction of the transferee court over the person of the defendant, which may be a problem of constitutional dimensions, and there is obviously a substantial opportunity for conflict between the Courts of Appeals over those matters. We ought to forestall in other situations of potential controversy the kind of judicial unseemliness which this case discloses.

Plaintiffs brought this action for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Defendants moved pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) to have it transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. Finding transfer to be "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," the Texas District Court granted the motion and transferred the action to Illinois. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to require the Texas District Court to set aside the transfer. In plaintiffs' view the Northern District of Illinois was not a place where the action "might have been brought," and thus the Texas District Court had no power to transfer the action there under § 1404 (a). The Fifth Circuit fully examined the merits of this claim and rejected it, holding that in the circumstances before the court the Northern District of Illinois was a jurisdiction where the action "might have been brought." Leave to file a mandamus petition was therefore denied, and the action was duly transferred. 245 F. 2d 737.

Upon the assignment of the action to the calendar of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, plaintiffs moved that court to disregard the explicit decision of another District Court in the same case, sustained by the appropriate Court of [347] Appeals, and to send the case back to Texas. Plaintiffs advanced precisely the claim already rejected by the Fifth Circuit, namely, that the Northern District of Illinois was not a place where the action "might have been brought" within the proper meaning of § 1404 (a). Transfer had, in their view, erroneously been ordered by the Texas District Court and the power to transfer erroneously approved by the Fifth Circuit. Plaintiffs' application was denied by the Illinois District Court. Still not accepting the decision against them, plaintiffs again sought an appellate remedy by way of mandamus, this time in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Initially, mandamus was denied. On rehearing, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the prior decision of the Fifth Circuit was wrong. It held that § 1404 (a) did not authorize transfer to Illinois, and it ordered the action "remanded" to the Texas District Court within the Fifth Circuit, from whence it had come, to go forward there. 260 F. 2d 317. That "remand" is the order which is here on certiorari. 359 U. S. 904.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has thus refused to permit an Illinois District Court to entertain an action transferred to it with the approval, after full consideration of the problem involved, of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit considered no evidence not before the Fifth Circuit in so deciding. It considered precisely the same issue and reached a contrary legal conclusion. This was after explicit prior adjudication of the question at the same level of the federal system in the same case and between the same parties. Because the question involved is the transferability of the action, the consequence of the Seventh Circuit's disregard of the Fifth Circuit's prior decision is not only that a question once decided has been reopened, with all the wasted motion, delay and [348] expense which that normally entails. Unless and until this Court acts, the litigants have no forum in which trial may go forward. Each Court of Appeals involved has refused to have the District Court in its Circuit hear the case and has sent it to a District Court in the other.

This is the judicial conduct the Court now approves. The Court does not suggest that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was powerless, was without jurisdiction, to review, as it did, the question of the applicability of § 1404 (a) to this case. The occasion for the Fifth Circuit's review by way of mandamus may have been, as the Court suggests, "to protect its appellate jurisdiction," but there can be no question that the Fifth Circuit undertook to and did resolve on its merits the controversy between the parties regarding the meaning of § 1404 (a). Yet the Court decides that the review in the Fifth Circuit was so much wasted motion, properly ignored by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in arriving at a contrary result. The case is treated just as if the Fifth Circuit had never considered the questions involved in it. I am at a loss to appreciate why all the considerations bearing on the good administration of justice which underlie the technical doctrine of res judicata did not apply here to require the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to defer to the previous decision. "Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause." Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522, 525-526. One would suppose that these considerations would be [349] especially important in enforcing comity among federal courts of equal authority.

The fact that the issue involved is the propriety of a transfer of the action only makes the case for deference to the previous decision of a coordinate court in the same litigation that much stronger. The course of judicial action now approved by the Court allows transfer over a persisting objection only when concurred in by two sets of courts: those in the place where the case begins, and those in the place to which transfer is ordered. Not only does the place of trial thus remain unsettled for an unnecessarily long time to accommodate double judicial consideration, but, as this case shows, the result of a disagreement between the courts involved is that the litigation cannot go forward at all unless this Court resolves the matter. Surely a seemly system of judicial remedies, especially appellate judicial remedies, regarding controverted transfer provisions of the United States Code should encourage, not discourage, quick settlement of questions of transfer and should preclude two Courts of Appeals from creating, through their disagreement in the same case, an impasse to the litigation which only this Court can remove. Section 1404 (a) was meant to serve the ends of "convenience" and "justice" in the trial of actions. It perverts those ends to permit a question arising under § 1404 (a), as here, to be litigated, in turn, before a District Court and Court of Appeals in one Circuit, and a District Court and Court of Appeals in another Circuit, one thousand miles distant, thereby delaying trial for a year and a half, only to have the result of all that preliminary litigation be that trial may not go forward at all until this Court shall settle the question of where it shall go forward, after at least another year's delay.

We are not vouchsafed claims of reason or of the due administration of justice that require the duplication of [350] appellate remedies approved by the Court in this case. Why is not a single judicial appellate remedy in a Court of Appeals entirely adequate for one aggrieved by a transfer? Once the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had decided, after due consideration, that the proper meaning of § 1404 (a) included Illinois as a place where the action "might have been brought," this should have ended the matter, except of course for this Court's power of review of that decision through the writ of certiorari, a power which we declined to exercise in this case. Nor does such a view of right and wise judicial administration depend upon the nature of the procedural or even jurisdictional issue in controversy. Technically, res judicata controls even a decision on a matter of true jurisdiction. "We see no reason why a court, in the absence of an allegation of fraud in obtaining the judgment, should examine again the question whether the court making the earlier determination on an actual contest over jurisdiction between the parties, did have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation." Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, at 172. See also Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., supra, 283 U. S. 522. Surely, a prior decision of a federal court on the unfundamental issue of venue ought to receive similar respect from a coordinate federal court when the parties and the facts are the same. The question is of the appropriate scheme of judicial remedies for enforcing rights under a federal remedial statute aimed at enhancing the fair administration of justice in the federal courts. It is not consonant with reason to permit a duplicate appellate procedure for questions under this statute, thereby forestalling final decision on a pre-trial matter which ought to be decided as expeditiously as possible, causing wasteful delay and expense, and thus depriving the statutory motion to transfer of effectiveness in achieving the ends of "convenience" and "justice" for which it was created.

[351] MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.^[15]

The problem in this case is of important concern to the effective administration of justice in the federal courts. At issue is the scope of 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a), providing for the transfer of litigation from one Federal District Court to another. The main federal venue statutes necessarily deal with classes of cases, without regard to the occasional situation in which a normally appropriate venue may operate vexatiously. Section 1404 (a) was devised to avoid needless hardship and even miscarriage of justice by empowering district judges to recognize special circumstances calling for special relief. It provides that an action, although begun in a place falling within the normally applicable venue rubric may be sent by the District Court to go forward in another district much more appropriate when judged by the criteria of judicial justice.

The terms of § 1404 (a) are as follows:

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."

The part of § 1404 (a) the meaning of which is at issue here is its last phrase, "any other district or division where it [the action] might have been brought." The significance of this phrase is this: even though a place be found to be an overwhelmingly more appropriate forum from the standpoint of "convenience" and "justice," the litigation may not be sent to go forward there unless it is a [352] place where the action "might have been brought." Upon the scope to be given this phrase thus depends almost entirely the effectiveness of § 1404 (a) to insure an appropriate place of trial, when the action is begun in an oppressive forum.

One would have to be singularly unmindful of the treachery and versatility of our language to deny that as a mere matter of English the words "where it might have been brought" may carry more than one meaning. For example, under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, civil actions are "commenced" by filing a complaint with the court. As a matter of English there is no reason why "commenced" so used should not be thought to be synonymous with "brought" as used in § 1404 (a), so that an action "might have been brought" in any district where a complaint might have been filed, or perhaps only in districts with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. As a matter of English alone, the phrase might just as well be thought to refer either to those places where the defendant "might have been" served with process, or to those places where the action "might have been brought" in light of the applicable venue provision, for those provisions speak generally of where actions "may be brought." Or the phrase may be thought as a matter of English alone to refer to those places where the action "might have been brought" in light of the applicable statute of limitations, or other provisions preventing a court from reaching the merits of the litigation. On the face of its words alone, the phrase may refer to any one of these considerations, i. e., venue, amenability to service, or period of limitations, to all of them or to none of them, or to others as well.^[16] And to [353] the extent that these are matters which may or may not be raised at the defendant's election, the English of the phrase surely does not tell whether the defendant's actual or potential waiver or failure to raise such objections is to be taken into account in determining whether a district is one in which the action "might have been brought," or whether the phrase refers only to those districts where the plaintiff "might have brought" the action even over a timely objection on the part of the defendant, that is, where he had "a right" to bring it.

The particular problem in the present case has been a relatively commonplace one in the application of § 1404 (a), and it demonstrates the failure of the words of the section, considered merely as words, to define with precision those places where an action "might have been brought." The problem here is this. Action was brought by plaintiff in district A, a proper venue under the applicable venue statute. Defendant objected and moved for transfer to district B, submitting that in the interests of "convenience" and "justice" to all concerned the action should go forward there instead of in district A. District B, however, is one in which, had the complaint been [354] filed there, the plaintiff would have been unable without the defendant's consent to serve him with process. In addition, the defendant in District B, had the complaint been filed there, would have had an objection to the venue, under the applicable venue statute. In moving for transfer to B, the defendant stipulates to waiving all objections to venue there and to submitting his person to the jurisdiction of District Court B, should transfer be ordered. The District Court in A agrees that B, not A, is the appropriate place for trial and is disposed to transfer the action there, for in light of the defendant's stipulation there is no way in which the plaintiff can be prejudiced by the lack of venue in B or the impossibility, as an original matter, of serving defendant there. Is B a place where the action "might have been brought" so that the transfer can be effected? The Court finds it "plain," from the words of the phrase themselves, that B is not such a place, and that, for it, is the end of the matter.

We would all agree that B would be a place where the action "might have been brought" if it were a place of statutory venue, if the defendant had always been amenable to process there, and if B had no other special characteristics whereby the defendant could prevent consideration there of the merits of the cause of action. Almost every statute has a core of indisputable application, and this statute plainly applies to permit transfer to a place where there could never have been any objection to the maintenance of the action. But is it clear, as the Court would have it, that, as a mere matter of English, because potential objections peculiar to the forum would have been present in B, it is not to be deemed a place where the action "might have been brought," although defendant not only might but is prepared to waive, as he effectively may, such objections?

[355] I submit that it is not clear from the words themselves, and the experience in the lower courts gives compelling proof of it. At least 28 District Courts, located in all parts of the Nation, have had to give concrete meaning to the set of words in controversy. These are the judges who are, to use a familiar but appropriate phrase, on the firing line, who are in much more intimate, continuous touch with the needs for the effective functioning of the federal judicial system at the trial level than is this Court. They have not found the last phrase of § 1404 (a) unambiguous. There has been anything but the substantial uniformity of views to be expected in the application of a clear and unambiguous direction. There have been severe differences with regard to whether § 1404 (a) is ever available as a remedy to a plaintiff forced into an inconvenient forum, and if so under what conditions.^[17] With regard to defendants' motions to transfer, it has been held that "brought" in § 1404 (a) is synonymous with "commenced" in Rule 3 so that transfer may be made to virtually any district dictated by "convenience" and "justice."^[18] It has been held that the phrase is to be applied as if it read "where it might have been brought now," thus giving full effect to a waiver of objections by defendant [356] in moving for transfer.^[19] It has been said, on the other hand, that "[s]ection 1404 (a) . . . contemplates statutory venue and not consent venue."^[20]

With regard to the particular problem in this case, which has arisen most often, a majority of the District Courts which have considered the problem have ruled against the Court's "plain" meaning of the statute. At least seven District Courts have ruled that, because of the defendant's consent to have the action go forward there, a district is one where the action "might have been brought," even though it is a place where the defendant might either have objected to the venue, or avoided process, or both had the action been brought there originally.^[21] At least three District Courts have held or implied to the contrary, that the defendant's consent is not relevant, and that such a district cannot be one where the action "might have been brought."^[22] Two others have simply denied motions by the defendant on the ground that the transferee court was not one where the action "might have been brought," without discussing whether [357] in moving for transfer the defendant had consented to go forward in the transferee court, or what the effect of that consent would be.^[23] Two District Courts have granted the defendants' motion to transfer, making the matter turn on the presence of a number of defendants and the fact that some of them were suable as of right in the transferee court.^[24] Two others have found the amenability of the defendant to service of process in the place to which transfer is proposed to be wholly irrelevant to whether the action "might have been brought" there, and have ordered transfer to such a place on the plaintiff's motion even though the defendant did not consent.^[25] It simply cannot be said in the face of this experience that the words of the statute are so compellingly precise, so unambiguous, that § 1404 (a) as a matter of "plain words" does not apply in the present case.

The experience in the Courts of Appeals is also revealing. Of the six cases where defendants have moved for transfer, in only two has it been held that the defendant's consent to the transfer is not relevant in determining whether the place to which transfer is proposed is a place where the action "might have been brought," and these are the two decisions of the Seventh Circuit now before us. Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F. 2d 317 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1958); Behimer v. Sullivan, 261 F. 2d 467 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1958). [358] The Third Circuit has ruled in favor of transfer on the defendant's motion to a place where the defendant might have objected to the venue, Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F. 2d 111 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1951). The First and Second Circuits have ruled in favor of transfer on defendant's motion to a place where the defendant could not have been served with process, Torres v. Walsh, 221 F. 2d 319 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1955); In re Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1954). And the Second and Fifth Circuits have ruled in favor of transfer on defendant's motion to a place where there was neither statutory venue nor a chance to serve the defendant, Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F. 2d 85 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1951); Ex parte Blaski, 245 F. 2d 737 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1957). All these courts have considered the meaning of the phrase in detail and have held that the place to which transfer was proposed was a place where the action "might have been brought." Thus the Court's view of the meaning of § 1404 (a) is contrary to the rulings of every Court of Appeals but one which has considered the problem, and is contrary to the view of more than half the District Courts as well. Yet the Court maintains that the statute unambiguously means what its says it does.

Surely, the Court creates its own verbal prison in holding that "the plain words" of § 1404 (a) dictate that transfer may not be made in this case although transfer concededly was in the interest of "convenience" and "justice." Moreover, the Court, while finding the statutory words "plain," decides the case by applying, not the statutory language, but a formula of words found nowhere in the statute, namely, whether plaintiffs had "a right to bring these actions in the respective transferee districts." This is the Court's language, not that of Congress. Although it is of course a grammatically plausible interpretation of the phrase "where it might have been brought," it has been, I submit, established that it is not [359] by any means the only plausible interpretation. In fact, the Court's rephrasing, as distinguished from Congress' phrasing, gives the narrowest possible scope to the operation of § 1404 (a). There can be expected to be very few, if any, alternative forums in a given case where the plaintiff has a "right" to sue, considering that that means places of unobjectionable venue where the defendant is amenable to service of process and where there are no other impediments such as a statute of limitations which the defendant can rely on to defeat the action.

This case, then, cannot be decided, and is not decided, by the short way of a mechanical application of Congress' words to the situation. Indeed, it would be extraordinary if a case which could be so decided were deemed worthy of this Court's attention twelve years after the applicable statute was enacted. To conclude, as the Court does, that the transferee court is inexorably designated by the inherent force of the words "where it might have been brought" is to state a conclusion that conceals the process by which the meaning is, as a matter of choice, extracted from the words.

The problem in this case is one of resolving an ambiguity by all the considerations relevant to resolving an ambiguity concerning the conduct of litigation, and more particularly the considerations that are relevant to resolving an ambiguous direction for the fair conduct of litigation in the federal judicial system. At the crux of the business, as I see it, is the realization that we are concerned here not with a question of a limitation upon the power of a federal court but with the place in which that court may exercise its power. We are dealing, that is, not with the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which is beyond the power of litigants to confer, but with the locality of a lawsuit, the rules regulating which are designed mainly for the convenience of the litigants. "[T]he locality of a law suit—the place where judicial authority may be [360] exercised—though defined by legislation relates to the convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition. . . . [A venue statute] `merely accords to the defendant a personal privilege respecting the venue, or place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive, at his election.' Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177, 179." Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 168. And in that case the Court was merely reiterating considerations already forcefully set out in General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore R. Co., 260 U. S. 261, and Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 260 U. S. 653. This basic difference "between the court's power and the litigant's convenience is historic in the federal courts." 308 U. S., at 168.

Applying these considerations to a problem under a different statute but relevant to the present one, namely, whether removal from a state court to a federal court might be had upon the motion of the defendant when the federal court was one where the venue would have been subject to objection, had the action originally been brought there, this Court, speaking unanimously through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, discriminatingly reminded that "[i]t therefore cannot be affirmed broadly that this suit could not have been brought . . . [in the federal court] but only that it could not have been brought and maintained in that court over a seasonable objection by the company to being sued there." This analysis has striking application to the present problem under § 1404 (a), and it is also relevant here that the Court sanctioned removal in that case to a federal court with no statutory venue, partly because "there could be no purpose in extending to removals the personal privilege accorded to defendants by [the venue statutes] . . . since removals are had only at the instance of defendants." General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore R. Co., 260 U. S. 261, 273, 275. See also, to the same effect, Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 260 [361] U. S. 653, overruling Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, and qualifying In re Moore, 209 U. S. 490. The rule that statutory venue rules governing the place of trial do not affect the power of a federal court to entertain an action, or of the plaintiff to bring it, but only afford the defendant a privilege to object to the place chosen, is now enacted as part of the Judicial Code. 28 U. S. C. § 1406 (b). And of course it needs no discussion that a defendant is always free voluntarily to submit his person to the jurisdiction of a federal court.

In light of the nature of rules governing the place of trial in the federal system, as thus expounded and codified, as distinguished from limitation upon the power of the federal courts to adjudicate, what are the competing considerations here? The transferee court in this case plainly had and has jurisdiction to adjudicate this action with the defendant's acquiescence. As the defendant, whose privilege it is to object to the place of trial, has moved for transfer, and has acquiesced to going forward with the litigation in the transferee court, it would appear presumptively, unless there are strong considerations otherwise, that there is no impediment to effecting the transfer so long as "convenience" and "justice" dictate that it be made. It does not counsel otherwise that here the plaintiff is to be sent to a venue to which he objects, whereas ordinarily, when the defendant waives his privilege to object to the place of trial, it is to acquiesce in the plaintiff's choice of forum. This would be a powerful argument if, under § 1404 (a), a transfer were to be made whenever requested by the defendant. Such is not the case, and this bears emphasis. A transfer can be made under § 1404 (a) to a place where the action "might have been brought" only when "convenience" and "justice" so dictate, not whenever the defendant so moves. A legitimate objection by the plaintiff to proceeding in the transferee forum will presumably be reflected in a decision that [362] the interest of justice does not require the transfer, and so it becomes irrelevant that the proposed place of transfer is deemed one where the action "might have been brought." If the plaintiff's objection to proceedings in the transferee court is not consonant with the interests of justice, a good reason is wanting why the transfer should not be made.

On the other hand, the Court's view restricts transfer, when concededly warranted in the interest of justice, to protect no legitimate interest on the part of the plaintiff. And by making transfer turn on whether the defendant could have been served with process in the transferee district on the day the action was brought, the Court's view may create difficult problems in ascertaining that fact, especially in the case of non-corporate defendants. These are problems which have no conceivable relation to the proper administration of a provision meant to assure the most convenient and just place for trial.

Nor is it necessary to reach the Court's result in order to preserve an appropriate meaning for the phrase "where it might have been brought." I fully agree that the final words of § 1404 (a) are words of limitation upon the scope of the provision. But to hold as I would that a district is one where the action "might have been brought" when the defendant consents to going forward with the litigation there, does not remove the quality of those words as a limitation. The words compel the defendant in effect to waive any objections to going forward in the transferee district which he might have had if the action had been brought there, in order to obtain a transfer. The words therefore insure that transfer will not be a device for doing the plaintiff out of any forum in which to proceed, no matter how inconvenient. The words in any case, plainly limit the plaintiff's right to seek a transfer when the defendant does not consent to the change of venue. Moreover, the words may serve to prevent transfer to [363] courts with a lack of federal power to adjudicate the matter of the dispute which the defendant cannot confer with his consent.^[26] In light of the fact that the venue statutes in Title 28, U. S. C., are phrased in terms of where the action "may be brought," or in some cases where it "shall" or "must" be brought,^[27] the most obvious limiting significance of the phrase "where it might have been brought" is that it refers to places where, under the venue provisions, the action, "may," "shall," or "must" be brought assuming the existence of federal jurisdiction.^[28] In the meaning of federal venue provisions as expounded by this Court, and by Congress in § 1406 (b), these, as has been said, are not only places where, under the applicable provision, no objection to the venue is available to the defendant. They are also places where the defendant consents to be sued.

The relevant legislative history of § 1404 (a) is found in the statement in the Reviser's Notes, accompanying the 1948 Judicial Code, that § 1404 (a) "was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens."^[29] Under that doctrine, the remedy for an inconvenient [364] forum was not to transfer the action, but to dismiss it. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 506-507, we held that "[i]n all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them." It is entirely "in accordance" with this view of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to hold that transfer may be made at the instance of the defendant, regardless of the plaintiff's right as an original matter to sue him in the transferee court, so long as the defendant stipulates to going forward with the litigation there. Indeed, to hold otherwise as the Court does is to limit § 1404 (a) to a much narrower operation than the nonstatutory doctrine of forum non conveniens. Investigation has disclosed several forum non conveniens cases, one of them in this Court, where dismissal of the action on the defendant's motion was made upon the condition of the defendant's voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of another more convenient forum when that forum was not available to the plaintiff as of right over the defendant's objection. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 49 F. 2d 802, 804, affirmed, 285 U. S. 413, 424; Giatilis v. The Darnie, 171 F. Supp. 751, 754; Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co. v. The Rio Salado, 67 F. Supp. 115, 116; Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Bristol City Line of Steamships, 41 F. Supp. 386, 389; The City of Agra, 35 F. Supp. 351; Strassburger v. Singer Mfg. Co., 263 App. Div. 518, 33 N. Y. Supp. 2d 424; Wendel v. Hoffman, 258 App. Div. 1084, 18 N. Y. Supp. 2d 96. See also Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F. 2d 990, and Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U. S. 684, 697-698: "it was improper under the circumstances here shown to remit a United States citizen to the courts of a foreign country without assuring the citizen that respondents would appear in those courts and that security would be given [365] equal to what had been obtained by attachment in the District Court. The power of the District Court to give a libellant such assurance is shown by Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 424 [supra]." In view of the familiarity of this device of dismissing for forum non conveniens when as of right no other forum was available to plaintiff, upon the defendant's agreement to appear in the more convenient forum, it is almost necessary to suppose, in light of the Reviser's description of § 1404 (a) as "in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens," that transfer under § 1404 (a) may likewise be made where the defendant consents to going forward with the case in the transferee court.

The only consideration of the Court not resting on the "plain meaning" of § 1404 (a) is that it would constitute "gross discrimination" to permit transfer to be made with the defendant's consent and over the plaintiff's objection to a district to which the plaintiff could not similarly obtain transfer over the defendant's objection. To speak of such a situation as regards this statute as "discrimination" is a sterile use of the concept. Mutuality is not an empty or abstract doctrine; it summarizes the reality of fair dealing between litigants. Transfer cannot be made under this statute unless it is found to be in the interest of "convenience" and in the interest of "justice." Whether a party is in any sense being "discriminated" against through a transfer is certainly relevant to whether the interest of justice is being served. If the interest of justice is being served, as it must be for a transfer to be made, how can it be said that there is "discrimination" in any meaningful sense? Moreover, the transfer provision cannot be viewed in isolation in finding "discrimination." It, after all, operates to temper only to a slight degree the enormous "discrimination" inherent in our system of litigation, whereby the sole choice of forum, from among those where service is possible and venue unobjectionable, [366] is placed with the plaintiff. The plaintiff may choose from among these forums at will; under § 1404 (a) the defendant must satisfy a very substantial burden of demonstrating where "justice" and "convenience" lie, in order to have his objection to a forum of hardship, in the particular situation, respected.

In summary, then, the "plain meaning" of § 1404 (a) does not conclude the present case against the transfer, for the statute, as applied in this case, is not "plain" in meaning one way or another, but contains ambiguities which must be resolved by considerations relevant to the problem with which the statute deals. Moreover, the most obvious significance for the set of words here in question, considered as self-contained words, is that they have regard for the limitations contained in the regular statutory rules of venue. Those rules, it is beyond dispute, take into account the consent of the defendant to proceed in the forum, even if it is not a forum designated by statute. And the doctrine of forum non conveniens "in accordance with" which § 1404 (a) was drafted, also took into account the defendant's consent to proceed in another forum to which he was not obligated to submit. Nor can a decision against transfer be rested upon notions of "discrimination" or of unfairness to the plaintiff in wrenching him out of the forum of his choice to go forward in a place to which he objects. In the proper administration of § 1404 (a), such consequences cannot survive the necessity to find transfer to be in the interests of "convenience" and "justice," before it can be made. On the other hand, to restrict transfer as the Court does to those very few places where the defendant was originally amenable to process and could have had no objection to the venue is drastically to restrict the number of situations in which § 1404 (a) may serve the interests of justice by relieving the parties from a vexatious forum. And it is to restrict the operation of the section capriciously, for [367] such a drastic limitation is not counseled by any legitimate interest of the plaintiff, or by any interest of the federal courts in their jurisdiction. The defendant's interest of course is not involved because he is the movant for transfer.

The essence of this case is to give fair scope to the role of § 1404 (a) in our system of venue regulations, that is, a system whereby litigation may be brought in only a limited number of federal districts, which are chosen generally upon the basis of presumed convenience. Two extremes are possible in the administration of such a system, duly mindful of the fact that in our jurisprudence venue does not touch the power of the court. (1) All venue may be determined solely by rigid rules, which the defendant may invoke and which work for convenience in the generality of cases. In such an extreme situation there would be no means of responding to the special circumstances of particular cases when the rigid venue rules are inappropriate. (2) At the other extreme there may be no rigid venue provisions, but all venue may be determined, upon the defendant's objection to the plaintiff's choice of forum, by a finding of fact in each case of what is the most convenient forum from the point of view of the parties and the court. The element of undesirability in the second extreme is that it involves too much preliminary litigation; it is desirable in that it makes venue responsive to actual convenience. The first extreme is undesirable for according too little, in fact nothing, to actual convenience when the case is a special one; it is desirable in that it does away with preliminary litigation.

If anything is plain, from its history and from its words, it is that § 1404 (a) means to afford a balance, a compromise, between these two extremes. It is in this spirit that its provisions must be read. In the ordinary course the regular venue rules are to prevail, with no preliminary litigation to determine the actual convenience. But the [368] statute means to allow for cases where the ordinary rules are found to work a great hardship; there, actual convenience is to prevail. We should therefore not, as the Court has done, impose limitations upon the operation of § 1404 (a) which have no relation to ordinary considerations governing the place of trial in the federal system and which arbitrarily prevent actual convenience from determining the place of trial. The limitations upon the section should only be those which recognize legitimate countervailing considerations to the free reign of actual convenience, namely limitations regarding the power of the federal courts to adjudicate, and limitation recognizing the historic privilege of the defendant, should he choose to exercise it, to object to the place of trial unless it is affirmatively designated by the venue statute.

It may be urged in answer to this analysis that if transfer is available as a matter of "convenience" and "justice" in every case in which the defendant consents to going forward in the transferee court, § 1404 (a) will entail burdensome preliminary litigation and may, if improperly administered, prove vexatious to plaintiffs. Thus, even arbitrary limitations, such as the Court imposes, may be said to be warranted. In effect this argument against transfer in situations like the present implies distrust in the ability and character of district judges to hold the balance even, that is, to dispose quickly of frivolous contentions and to prevent transfer from proving unduly prejudicial to plaintiffs while according it its proper scope to deal with cases of real inconvenience. "Such apprehension implies a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure. It reflects an attitude against which we were warned by Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the whole Court, likewise in regard to a question of procedure: `Universal distrust creates universal incompetence.' [369] Graham v. United States, 231 U. S. 474, 480." Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185. As in that case, doubts here should be resolved in favor of the competence of the District Courts wisely to administer § 1404 (a). Whatever salutary effect that section is to have must in any event depend upon due appreciation by district judges of the relevant considerations involved in ordering a transfer. Nothing is to be gained by parceling out the areas of their discretion mechanically, making distinctions which have no relevance to the manner in which venue provisions are ordinarily administered in the federal courts. I would therefore permit considerations of "convenience" and "justice" to be operative whenever the defendant consents to going forward in the transferee court on the same terms on which he was sued in the original forum. Against a rare abuse, there will always be available the corrective supervisory power of the Courts of Appeals, and ultimately of this Court.

[1] Together with No. 26, Sullivan, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, v. Behimer et al., argued April 20, 1960, also on certiorari to the same Court.

[2] See the Reviser's Notes following 28 U. S. C. § 1404.

[3] The asserted basis of the motion was that trial of the action in the Illinois District Court would be more convenient to the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice because several actions involving the validity of these patents were then pending in that court, and that pretrial and discovery steps taken in those actions had developed a substantial amount of evidence that would be relevant and useful in this action.

Defendants also stated in the motion that, if and when the case be so transferred, they would waive all objections to the venue of the Illinois District Court over the action and would enter their appearance in the action in that court.

[4] See 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b), quoted in note 10, infra.

[5] See Rule 4 (f) of the Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., quoted in note 11, infra.

[6] The motion asserted, and the court found, that trial of the action in the district of Utah would be more convenient to the parties and witnesses for the reasons, among others, that all of the officers and directors, and a majority of the minority stockholders, of the Utah corporation reside in that district; that the books and records of the corporation are located in that district; that the substantive law of Utah governs the action, and that the calendar of the Utah court was less congested than the Illinois one.

As part of their motion, defendants stated that, in the event of the transfer of the action as requested, they would waive all objections to the venue of the Utah court and enter appearances in the action in that court.

[7] See 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), quoted in note 10, infra.

[8] See Rule 4 (f) of the Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., quoted in note 11, infra.

[9] The decisions of the circuits are in great conflict and confusion. The Second Circuit has held one way on a plaintiff's motion and the other on a defendant's motion. Compare Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949, 952-953, with Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F. 2d 85, and Torres v. Walsh, 221 F. 2d 319. The Fifth Circuit, too, has held both ways. Compare Blackmar v. Guerre, 190 F. 2d 427, 429, with Ex parte Blaski, 245 F. 2d 737. The Ninth Circuit has held a District Court to be without power to transfer an action, on plaintiff's motion, to a district in which plaintiff did not have a legal right to bring it originally. Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F. 2d 777, 780. The Third Circuit has held, two of the five judges dissenting, that a District Court has power to transfer an action, on defendant's motion, to a district in which the plaintiff did not have a legal right to bring it. Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Rodney, 186 F. 2d 111. The First Circuit has upheld transfer, on defendant's motion, to a district in which venue existed but where process could not be served on defendants (but defendants had been served in the transferor district). In re Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174.

[10] That order did not purport to determine the jurisdiction of the transferee court and therefore did not preclude Judge Hoffman of power to determine his own jurisdiction, nor did it preclude the power of the Seventh Circuit to review his action. Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F. 2d 715 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Wilson v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 101 F. Supp. 56 (D. C. W. D. Mo.); United States v. Reid, 104 F. Supp. 260, 266 (D. C. E. D. Ark.). Several reasons why principles of res judicata do not apply may be stated in a few sentences. The orders of the Texas and Illinois District Courts on the respective motions to transfer and to remand, like the orders of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits on the respective petitions for mandamus, were (1) interlocutory, (2) not upon the merits, and (3) were entered in the same case by courts of coordinate jurisdiction. Here the sole basis of the right of the Fifth Circuit to entertain the petition for a writ of mandamus was to protect its appellate jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a); Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F. 2d 866, 869-870 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949, 951 (C. A. 2d Cir.); In re Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174, 177 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Torres v. Walsh, 221 F. 2d 319, 321 (C. A. 2d Cir.) and, by denying leave to file the petition, it forsook such right, but it did not thereby determine that the Illinois District Court had jurisdiction of the action. The question of that court's jurisdiction still remained subject to attack as of right on appeal to the Seventh Circuit from any final judgment in the action. When, therefore, jurisdiction of the District Court was assailed in the Seventh Circuit, by the petition for mandamus, that court surely had power to determine whether it would hold, on such an appeal, that the Illinois District Court did or did not have jurisdiction of the action and, if not, to say so and thus avoid the delays and expense of a futile trial.

[11] Venue over patent infringement actions is prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b), which provides:

"(b) Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."

See Stonite Prod. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561; Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222.

General venue over actions against corporations is prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), which provides:

"(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."

[12] General provisions respecting service of the process of federal courts are prescribed by Rule 4 (f) of the Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., which provides:

"(f) Territorial limits of effective service.

"All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45."

[13] A similar view was expressed in Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Rodney, 186 F. 2d 111 (C. A. 3d Cir.). The court there thought that the § 1404 (a) phrase "might have been brought" means "could now be brought." Id., at 114.

[14] [This opinion applies only to No. 25, Hoffman v. Blaski. For opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in No. 26, Sullivan v. Behimer, see post, p. 351.]

[15] [This opinion applies only to No. 26, Sullivan v. Behimer. For opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in No. 25, Hoffman v. Blaski, see ante, p. 345.]

[16] See, e. g., Felchlin v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (D. C. S. D. Calif. 1955) (transfer denied on defendant's motion because plaintiff was an executor not qualified in transferee court); Masterpiece Products, Inc., v. United Artists Corp., 90 F. Supp. 750 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1950) (transfer denied on defendant's motion because, had the action originally been brought in the transferee court, the alignment of parties would have been different, there being one involuntary party, thereby destroying complete diversity of citizenship); Lucas v. New York Central R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 536 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1950) (transfer denied on defendant's motion because defendant's corporate status would have destroyed diversity of citizenship had the action been brought in the transferee court). In all of these cases transfer was denied because the transferee court was deemed not to be one where the action "might have been brought." See also Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1952) (denying the defendant's motion for transfer in part because the action was a local one, and state courts in the transferee district would not have taken jurisdiction over it).

[17] See, e. g., Dufek v. Roux Distrib. Co., 125 F. Supp. 716 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1954); Barnhart v. Rogers Producing Co., 86 F. Supp. 595 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1949); Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. C. Mass. 1955); United States v. Reid, 104 F. Supp. 260 (D. C. E. D. Ark. 1952); Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (D. C. S. D. Iowa 1952); McGee v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1957); Rogers v. Halford, 107 F. Supp. 295 (D. C. E. D. Wisc. 1952); Herzog v. Central Steel Tube Co., 98 F. Supp. 607 (D. C. S. D. Iowa 1951); Mitchell v. Gundlach, 136 F. Supp. 169 (D. C. Md. 1955); McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 643 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1950).

[18] Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72, 74 (D. C. S. D. Iowa 1952).

[19] Cain v. Bowater's Newfoundland Pulp & Paper Mills, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1954).

[20] Johnson v. Harris, 112 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1953).

[21] Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 141 F. Supp. 692 (D. C. Minn. 1956); McGee v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1957); Welch v. Esso Shipping Co., 112 F. Supp. 611 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1953); Mire v. Esso Shipping Co., 112 F. Supp. 612 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1953); Cain v. Bowater's Newfoundland Pulp & Paper Mills, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 949 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1954); Anthony v. RKO Radio Pictures, 103 F. Supp. 56 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1951); Blaski v. Howell (D. C. N. D. Ill., March 14, 1958).

[22] General Electric Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1955); Tivoli Realty v. Paramount Pictures, 89 F. Supp. 278 (D. C. Del. 1950); Felchlin v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (D. C. S. D. Calif. 1955). See also Johnson v. Harris, 112 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1953) (dictum).

[23] Silbert v. Nu-Car Carriers, 111 F. Supp. 357 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1953); Hampton Theaters, Inc., v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 90 F. Supp. 645 (D. C. D. C. 1950). See also Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1952) (denying the defendants' motion to transfer in part because the plaintiff would not have been amenable to process in the transferee court).

[24] Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 45 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1950); Glasfloss Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 90 F. Supp. 967 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1950).

[25] McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 643 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1950); Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. C. Mass. 1955).

[26] See cases cited in note 1, supra.

[27] See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1391, 1392 (a) and (b), 1393 (a) and (b), 1396-1399, 1400 (b), 1401 and 1403.

[28] See Chief Judge Magruder's opinion for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174, 184.

[29] The whole of the statement in the Reviser's Note dealing with subsection (a) of § 1404 is as follows:

"Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, . . . 314 U. S. 44, . . . which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so."

John Swift v. George W. Tyson.

The case'was submitted to the Court on printed arguments by Mr. Fessenden, for the plaintiff;' and by Mr. Dana, for the de­fendant.

Mr. Dana, for- the defendant.

Mr. Justice Story

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes before us from the Circuit-Court of the, south­ern district.s>í New York, upon a certificate of division', of the ■ judges of that Court.

The action wasbrought- by the plaintiff, Swift, as endorsee, against the defendant, Tyson, as acceptor, upon a-bill of exchange dated at Portland, Maine, on the first day of May, 1836, for the sum of' one thousand five hundred and-forty dollars, thirty, cents, payable six months after date and grace, drawn by one: Nathaniel Norton and one - Jairas S. Keith upon and accepted by Tyson, at the city of New York,-in favour of. the order, of Nathaniel Norton, and by Norton endorsed to the plaintiff. The bill was dishonoured at maturity.

At the trial the acceptance, and endorsement 'of the bill were admitted, and the plaintiff there rested his case. The 'defendant then introduced in evidence the answer of Swift to á bill of dis­covery, by which it appeared that Swift took the bill before it became due, in payment of a promissory note due to him by Nor­ton .and-Keith; that he understood that the bill was accepted in part payment of some lands sold by Norton to a company in New York.; that. Swift was a bona fide holder- of the bill, not having ■any notice Of any thing in the sale or title to the lands, or other­wise,.impeaching the transaction, and with the full belief that the bill was justly due. The particular circumstances are fully set forth in the answer in the record; but-it does not seem necessary farther to-state them. The defendant then offered to prove, that 'the Dill was accepted by the defendant as part consideration for the purchase of certain lands in the state of Maine, which.Norton and Keith.represented themselves to be the owners ofrand.also represented to he of great value, and contracted to convey, a good title thereto; and that the representations were in every respect fraudulent and false, and Norton and Keith had no title to the lands, and that the same were- of little or no valúe. The plain­tiff objected to the admission of such testimony, or of any testi­mony, as against him, impeaching or showing a failure of the consideration, on which the bill was accepted, under the facts ad­mitted by the defendant, and those proved by him, by reading the answer of the plaintiff to the bill of discovery. The judges of the Circuit Court thereupon divided in opinion upon the following point or question of law; Whether, under the. facts last mentioned,' the defendant was entitled to the same defence to the action as if the suit was between the original parties to the bill,- that is'to say, Norton, qr. Norton -and Keith, and the .defendant; and'whe­ther the evidence- so offered was admissible as against the plain­tiff in the action. And this .is the question certified to us for our decision,

. There is no. doubt, that a bonsi fide holder of a negotiable in-. strument for- a valuable consideration, without.anv notice of facts which impeach its validity .as between the > antecedent parties, if he takes it under an endorsement made.before the same becomes due, holds the title unaffected bythese.factsfand may recover thereon, although as between the antecedent parties the transac­tion, may be without any legal.-validity.- -This is a doctrine so long,-and so .well established, and so-essential to-the security of negotiable paper,-that it is laid up. among the fundaméntate of the law; andr requires no authority or reasoning to be now brought in its support. - As little doubt is there, that the .holder, of any negotiable paper, before it is due, is not bound to prove tha't.he is a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration, without notice; for the law will presume that, in the absence or ail rebutting proofs, and therefore it is incumbent upon the defendant to esta­blish by way of defence satisfactory proofs of the contrary, and thus to overcome the prima facie title of the plaintiff.

In the present case, the plaintiff is a bona fide holder without notice for what the law deems a good and valid consideration, that is, for a pre-existing debt; and the only real question in the cause is, whether, under the circumstances of the present case, such a pre-existing debt constitutes a valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule applicable, to negotiable instruments. We say, under the circumstances of the present case, for the ac­ceptance having been made in'New York, the argument on behalf of the defendant is, that the contract' is to be treated as a New York contract, and therefore to be governed by-.the laws of New York, as' expounded- by its Courts, as well upon geneial principles, as by the express provisions of the thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20. And then it is further con-, tended, that by the daw of New York, as thus expounded by its Courts, a pre-existing debt does not constitute, in the sense of the general rule, a valuable consideration applicable to negotiable instruments.

.In the first place, then, let us examine into the' decisions of the Courts of New York upon this subject. In the. earliest case, Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. R. 289, the Supreme Court of New York appear to have held, that a pre-existing debt was a sufficient consideration to entitle a bonü fide holder without notice to reco­ver the amount of a note endorsed to him, which might not, as between, the original parties, be valid. The same doctrine was affirmed by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Chan., Rep. 54. Upon that occasion" he said, that negotiable paper can be assigned or transferred by an agent or factor or by any other person, fraudulently, so as to bind the true owner as against the holder, provided it be taken in the usual course of trade, and for a fair and valuable consideration without notice of the fraud. But he added, that the holders in that case were not entitled to,, the benefit of the rule, because it was not negotiated to them in the usual course of business or trade, nor in payment of any antecedent and existing debt, nor for cash, or property ad­vanced, debt created, or responsibility incurred, on the • strength and credit of the notes; thus directly affirming, that a pre-existing debt was a fair and valuable consideration within the protection of the general rule. And he has since affirmed the same doctrine, upon a full review of it, in his Commentaries, 3 Kent. Comm, sect. 44, p. 81. The decision in the case of Bay v. Coddington was afterwards affirmed in the Court of Errors, 20 Johns. R. 637, and the general reasoning of the chancellor was fully sustained. There were indeed peculiar circumstances in that case, which the Court seem to have considered as entitling it to be treated as an exception to the general rule, upon the ground either because the receipt of the notes was under suspicious circumstances, the transfer having been made after the known insolvency of the endorser,- or because the holder had received it as a mere security for contingent responsibilities, with which the holders had not then become charged. There was, however, a considerable diversity of opinion among the members of the Court, upon that occasion, several of them holding that the decree ought to be re­versed, others affirming that a pré-existing debt was a valuable consideration, sufficient to protect the holders, and others again insisting,-that-a pre-existent debt was not sufficient. From that period, however, for a series of years, it seems to have been held by the Supreme Court of the staté, that a pre-existing debt was not a sufficient consideration to shut out the equities of the origi­nal parties in favour of the holders. But no case to that effect has ever been decided in the Court of Errors. The cases cited at'the. bar, and especially Roosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. R. 85; The Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. R. 593; and Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. R. 605, are directly in point. But the more re­cent cases, The Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Wend. R. 490, and The Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. R. 115, have greatly shaken, if they have not entirely overthrown those decisions, and seem to have brought back the doctrine to that promulgated in the earliest cases. So.that, to sáy the least of it, it admits of serious - doubt, whether any doctrine upon this question can at the present "time be treated as finally established; and it is certain, that the Court of Errors have not pronounced ahy positive opi­nion- upon it.

But, admitting the doctrine.to be fully settled in New York, it remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon this Court, if it differs from the principles established in the general commer­cial law. It is observable that the Courts of N&w York do not found their decisions upon this point upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage: but they deduce the doc­trine from the general principles of commercial law. It is, how­ever, contended, that the thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act of 17S9, ch. 20, furnishes a rule obligatory upon- this Court to ■follow the decisions of the state tribunals in all cases to which they apply. That section provides “ that the laws of the several states, except- where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require .or provide, shall be' re­garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the United ^States, in cases where they apply.” In order to maintain the argument, it' is éssential, therefore, to hold, that the .word “ laws,” in this section, includes within the scope of its meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the.decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not bf themselves laws. They are often re­examined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective,.-or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrecf. The laws of a state are more usually under­stood to mean the rales and .enactments promulgated by the legislative authority -thereof, or long established local customs having the force of laws. ' In all the various casés which have hitherto come before, us for decision, this Court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to .the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights .and title's to things. having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and' intraierritorial in their nature and character. .It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature,- not at-all dependent upon local statutes or’ local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other -written instru­ments, and especially to questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon géneral reason­ing and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case. And we have not now the slightest difficulty in holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not ex­tend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial- nature, the true, interpretation and effect whereof are . to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principlés and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.. Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and -will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive au­thority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero,, adopted by Lord Mans­field in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great mea­sure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Non erit alia lex Romee, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eadem-. que lex obtenebit.

It becomes necessary for us,, therefore, upon the present occa­sion to express our own opinion of the true result of the commer­cial law upon the question now before us. And we have no hesitation in saying, that a pre-existing ■ debt does constitute a valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule, already stated, as applicable to negotiable instruments. Assuming it to be true, (which, however, may well admit of some doubt from, the generality of the language,) that the holder of a negotiable instrument is unaffected with, the equities between the antece­dent parties,-of which he ha’s no notice, only where he receives-it in the usual course of trade and business for a valuable considera­tion, before it becomes due; we are prepared to say, that receiving it in payment of, or as security for-a pre-existing debt, is according to -the known usual course of trade and business. And why upon principle should not a pre-existing debt be deemed such a valuable consideration ? It is for the benefit and conve­nience of the commercial world to give as wide an extent as practicable to,the credit and circulation of negotiable paper, that it may pass not only as security for new purchases and advances, made upon the transfer thereof, but also in payment of and as security for pre-existing debts. The creditor is thereby enabled to realize or to secure his debt, and thus may safely give a pro­longed credit, or forbear from taking any legal steps to enforce his rights. The debtor also has the. advantage of making his negotiable securities of equivalent value to cash. But establish the opposite conclusion, that negotiable paper cannot be applied in payment of or as security for pre-existing debts, without letting in all the equities between-the original and antecedent parties, add the value and circulation of such securities must be essentially diminish­ed, and the debtor driven to the embarrassment of making a sale thereof, often at a ruinous discount, to some third-person, and then by circuity to apply the proceeds to the payment of his debts. What, indeed, upon such a doctrine would become of that large class of cases] where new notes are given by the same or by other parties, bv. way of renewal or security to banks, in. lieu of old securities discounted by them, which have arrived at maturity ? Probably more than one-half of all bank transactions in our country, as well as those of other countries, are of this nature. The doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing debts.

This question has be.en several times before this Court, and it has been uniformly held, that it makes no difference whatsoever as to the rights of the holder, whether the debt for which the ne­gotiable instrument is transferred to him is a pre-existing debt, or is contracted at the time of the transfer. In each case he equally gives credit to the instrument. The cases of Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheaton, R. 66, 70, 73, and Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, R. 170, 182, are directly in point.

In England the same doctrine has been uniformly acted upon. As long ago as the case of Pillans and Rose v. Van Meirop and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1664, the very point was made and the objec­tion was overruled. That,indeed, was a case of far more stringency thaii the one now before us; for the bill of exchange, there drawn in discharge-of, a pre-existing debt, was held to bind the party as acceptor, upon a mere promise made by him tp accept before the bill was actually drawn. Upon that occasion Lord Mansfield, likening the caáe, to that of a letter of credit, said, that a.letter of credit may be given for money already advanced,, as well as for money to be' advanced in future: and the whole Court held the plaintiff entitled to recover. From that period downward there is not a single case to be found in England in which it has ever been held by the Court, that a pre-existing debt was not a valua­ble consideration, sufficient to protect the holder, within-the mean­ing, of the general rule, although incidental dicta have been sometimes relied on to establish the contrary, such as the dictum of Lord Chief Justice Abbott in. Smith v. De Witt, 6 Dowl. & Ryland, 120, and De la Chaumette v. The Bank of England, 9 Barn. & Cres. 209, where, however, the decision turned upon very different considerations.

Mr. Justice Bayley, in his valuable Work on bills of exchange and. promissory notes, lays down the rule in the most general terms. "The want of consideration,’* says he, "in foto or in pkrt, cannot be insisted on, .if the plaintiff or- any intermediate party between him and the. defendant took the bill, or note bonáfide and upon', a valid consideration.” Bayley on Bills, p. 499, 500, 5th London edition, 1830. It is observable that he here uses the .words "valid consideration,” obviously intending to make the distinction, that it is not intended to apply solely to cases, where a present consideration for advances of money on goods or otherwise takes place at the time of the transfer and upon the credit thereof. And in this'he is fully borne out by the authori­ties. They go farther, and establish, that a transfer as security for past, and even for future responsibilities, will,for-this purpose, be a sufficient, valid, and valuable consideration. Thus, in the case of Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Starkie, R. 1, it was held by' Lord Ellenborough, that if a banker be. Under acceptances to an amount beyond the cash balance in his hands, every bill he holds of that customer’s, boná fide,he is to be considered as holding for value; and it makes no difference though he hold other collateral secu­rities, more than sufficient to coyer the excess of his acceptances. The same doctrine was affirmed. by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Bloxham, 8 Ves. 531, as equally applicable to past and to future acceptances: "The subsequent cases, of Heywood v. Watson, 4. Bing. R. 496, and Bramah v. Roberts, 1 Bing. New Ca. 469, and Percival v. Frampton, 2 Cromp. Mees. & Rose, 180, are to the same effect. . They directly establish that" a bona fide holder, taking a negotiable note in payment'of or as security for a pre­existing'debt,'is. a holder for a valuable consideration, entitled to protection against all the equities between' the antecedent parties. And .these are the latest-decisions, which our researches have enabled us to ascertain to have" been made in the English Courts upon this subject.'

. In the American Courts, so far as we have been able to trace the decisions, the same doctrine seems generally but not universally to'prevail: In Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. R. 388, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, after an elaborate review of the English áhd New York’ adjudications, held, upon general principies- , of commercial law, that a pre-existing debt was a valuable, considera­tion, sufficient to convey a valid title to a boná fide holder against all the antecedent parties to a negotiable note. There is no reason to doubt, that the same rule ' has been adopted and constantly ad­hered to in Massachusetts; and certainly there is no trace fo be found to the contrary. In truth, in the silence "of any adjudi cations upon the subject, ip a case'of such frequent and almost daily occurrence, in the commercial states, it may fairly be pre­sumed, that whatever constitutes a valid and .valuable considera­tion in other cases of contract to support titles of the-most solémn nature, is held á fortiori-to-be sufficient in cases of negotiable instruments, as indispensable to the security of holders, and the facility and safety of their circulation. Be this as it may,-we entertain no doubt, that a bona fide holder, for-a-.pre-existing debt, of a negotiable instrument, is not affected by any equities between the antecedent parties, where he has received the same before it became dffe, without- notice of any such equities. We are all, therefore, of opinion, that the question on this point, propounded by the Circuit Court for our consideration,, ought to be answered in the negative; and we shall accordingly direct it so to be certified to the Circuit Court. .

Mr. Justice Catron

said:

Upon the. point of difference between the judges below,. I concur, that the extinguishment of a debt, and the giving a post consideration, such as the record presents, will protect the pur­chaser and assignee of a negotiable note from the infirmity affect­ing the instrument before it wus negotiated. But I am unwilling to sanction the introduction into the opinion of this Court, a doc­trine aside from the case made by the record, or argued by the counsel, assuming to maintain, that a negotiable note or bill pledged as collateral Security for a previous debt, is taken by the creditor in the due course of trade; and that he stands on the foot of him who purchases in the market for money, or takes the in­strument in extinguishment of a previous debt. State Courts of high authority on commercial questions' have held otherwise; and that they will yield to a mere expression of opinion of this Court, or change their course of decision in conformity to the recent English cases referred to in the principal opinion, is impro­bable : whereas, if the question was permitted to rest until it fairly arose, the decision of it either 'way by this Court, probably, would, and I think ought to settle it. As such a result is not to be 'ex­pected from the opinion-in this cause, I am unwilling to embar­rass myself with so much of it as treats of negotiable instruments taken as- a pledge. I never heard this question spoken of as belonging to the case, until-the principal opinion was presented last evening; and therefore I am not prepared to give' any opi­nion, even was it called-for by the record.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the south­ern district, of New York, and on the point and question on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this Court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is .the opinion of this Court, that the defendant was not, under-the facts stated, entitled to the same defence to the action as if the suit was between the original parties to the bill; that is to say, the said Norton, or the said Norton and Keith and the defendant: and that the evidence offered.in defence and objected to, was not admissible as against the plaintiff in this action. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that an answer .in the negative be certified to the said Circuit Court.