*77Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises issues concerning the claim preclusive effect 1 of a state-court judgment in the context of a subsequent suit, under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1976 ed., Supp. V), in federal court.

I

Petitioner, Dr. Ethel D. Migra, was employed by the Warren (Ohio) City School District Board of Education from August 1976 to June 1979. She served as supervisor of elementary education. Her employment was on an annual basis under written contracts for successive school years.

*78On April 17, 1979, at a regularly scheduled meeting, the Board, with all five of its members present, unanimously adopted a resolution renewing Dr. Migra’s employment as supervisor for the 1979-1980 school year. Being advised of this, she accepted the renewed appointment by letter dated April 18 delivered to a member of the Board on April 23. Early the following morning her letter was passed on to the Superintendent of Schools and to the Board’s President.

The Board, however, held a special meeting, called by its President, on the morning of April 24. Although there appear to have been some irregularities about the call, see Brief for Respondents 19, n., four of the five members of the Board were present. The President first read Dr. Migra’s acceptance letter. Then, after disposing of other business, a motion was made and adopted, by a vote of 3 to 1, not to renew petitioner’s employment for the 1979-1980 school year. Dr. Migra was given written notice of this nonrenewal and never received a written contract of employment for that year. The Board’s absent member, James Culver, learned of the special meeting and of Dr. Migra’s termination after he returned from Florida on April 25 where he had attended a National School Boards Convention.

Petitioner brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, Ohio, against the Board and its three members who had voted not to renew her employment. The complaint, although in five counts, presented what the parties now accept as essentially two causes of action, namely, breach of contract by the Board, and wrongful interference by the individual members with petitioner’s contract of employment. The state court, after a bench trial, “reserved and continued” the “issue of conspiracy” and did not reach the question of the individual members’ liability. App. 39. It ruled that under Ohio law petitioner had accepted the employment proffered for 1979-1980, that this created a binding contract between her and the Board, and that the Board’s subsequent action purporting not to renew the employment *79relationship had no legal effect. Id., at 41-52. The court awarded Dr. Migra reinstatement to her position and compensatory damages. Id., at 52. Thereafter, petitioner moved the state trial court to dismiss without prejudice “the issue of the conspiracy and individual board member liability.” Id., at 53. That motion was granted. Id., at 54. The Ohio Court of Appeals, Eleventh District, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. Review was denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio.2

In July 1980, Dr. Migra filed the present action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the Board, its then individual members, and the Superintendent of Schools. Id., at 3. Her complaint alleged that she had become the director of a commission appointed by the Board to fashion a voluntary plan for the desegregation of the District’s elementary schools; that she had prepared a social studies curriculum; that the individual defendants objected to and opposed the curriculum and resisted the desegregation plan; that hostility and ill will toward petitioner developed; and that, as a consequence, the individual defendants determined not to renew petitioner’s contract of employment. Id., at 5-6. Many of the alleged facts had been proved in the earlier state-court litigation. Dr. Migra claimed that the Board’s actions were intended to punish her for the exercise of her First Amendment rights. She also claimed that the actions deprived her of property without due process and denied her equal protection. Her federal claim *80thus arose under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1976 ed., Supp. V). She requested injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. App. 11-12. Answers were filed in due course and shortly thereafter the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata and the bar of the statute of limitations. Id., at 13-24.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-17 — C-31, D-32. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, by a short unreported order, affirmed. Id., at A-15. See 703 F. 2d 564 (1982).3 Because of the importance of the issue, and because of differences among the Courts of Appeals, see n. 6, infra, we granted cer-tiorari. 459 U. S. 1102 (1983).

HH HH

The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause4 is implemented by the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738. That statute reads in pertinent part:

“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”

*81It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered. In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), this Court said:

“Indeed, though the federal courts may look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so. . . .” Id., at 96.

This principle was restated in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461 (1982):

“Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.” Id., at 466.

See also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306 (1983). Accordingly, in the absence of federal law modifying the operation of § 1738, the preclusive effect in federal court of petitioner’s state-court judgment is determined by Ohio law.

In Allen, the Court considered whether 42 U. S. C. § 1983 modified the operation of § 1738 so that a state-court judgment was to receive less than normal preclusive effect in a suit brought in federal court under § 1983. In that case, the respondent had been convicted in a state-court criminal proceeding. In that proceeding, the respondent sought to suppress certain evidence against him on the ground that it had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The respondent then brought a § 1983 suit in federal court against the officers who had seized the evidence. The District Court held the suit barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) because *82the issue of a Fourth Amendment violation had been resolved against the respondent by the denial of his suppression motion in the criminal trial. The Court of Appeals reversed. That court concluded that, because a § 1983 suit was the respondent’s only route to a federal forum for his constitutional claim,5 and because one of § 1983’s underlying purposes was to provide a federal cause of action in situations where state courts were not adequately protecting individual rights, the respondent should be allowed to proceed to trial in federal court unencumbered by collateral estoppel. This Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals, explaining:

“[N]othing in the language of § 1983 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 .... Section 1983 creates a new federal cause of action. It says nothing about the preclusive effect of state-court judgments.

“Moreover, the legislative history of § 1983 does not in any clear way suggest that Congress intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion. . . . [T]he legislative history as a whole . . . lends only the most equivocal support to any argument that, in cases where the state courts have recognized the constitutional claims asserted and provided fair procedures for determining them, Congress intended to override § 1738 or the common-law rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Since repeals by implication are disfavored . . . much clearer support than this would be required to hold that § 1738 and the traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits.” 449 U. S., at 97-99.

*83 Allen therefore made clear that issues actually litigated in a state-court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 suit as they enjoy in the courts of the State where the judgment was rendered.

The Court in Allen left open the possibility, however, that the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment might be different as to a federal issue that a § 1983 litigant could have raised but did not raise in the earlier state-court proceeding.6 449 U. S., at 97, n. 10. That is the central issue to be resolved in the present case. Petitioner did not litigate her § 1983 claim in state court, and she asserts that the state-court judgment should not preclude her suit in federal court simply because her federal claim could have been litigated in the state-court proceeding. Thus, petitioner urges this Court to interpret the interplay of § 1738 and § 1983 in such a way as to accord state-court judgments preclusive effect in § 1983 suits only as to issues actually litigated in state court.

It is difficult to see how the policy concerns underlying § 1983 would justify a distinction between the issue preclu-sive and claim preclusive effects of state-court judgments. The argument that state-court judgments should have less preclusive effect in § 1983 suits than in other federal suits is based on Congress’ expressed concern over the adequacy of *84state courts as protectors of federal rights. See, e. g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 241-242 (1972). Allen recognized that the enactment of § 1983 was motivated partially out of such concern, 449 U. S., at 98-99, but Allen nevertheless held that § 1983 did not open the way to relitigation of an issue that had been determined in a state criminal proceeding. Any distrust of state courts that would justify a limitation on the preclusive effect of state judgments in § 1983 suits would presumably apply equally to issues that actually were decided in a state court as well as to those that could have been. If §1983 created an exception to the general preclusive effect accorded to state-court judgments, such an exception would seem to require similar treatment of both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Having rejected in Allen the view that state-court judgments have no issue pre-clusive effect in § 1983 suits, we must reject the view that § 1983 prevents the judgment in petitioner’s state-court proceeding from creating a claim preclusion bar in this case.

Petitioner suggests that to give state-court judgments full issue preclusive effect but not claim preclusive effect would enable litigants to bring their state claims in state court and their federal claims in federal court, thereby taking advantage of the relative expertise of both forums. Although such a division may seem attractive from a plaintiff’s perspective, it is not the system established by § 1738. That statute embodies the view that it is more important to give full faith and credit to state-court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state claims. This reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.

In the present litigation, petitioner does not claim that the state court would not have adjudicated her federal claims had she presented them in her original suit in state court. Alternatively, petitioner could have obtained a federal forum for *85her federal claim by litigating it first in a federal court.7 Section 1983, however, does not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner a right to proceed to judgment in state court on her state claims and then turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims. We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s state-court judgment in this litigation has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the Ohio state courts.

t — I HH 1 — 1

It appears to us that preclusion law in Ohio has experienced a gradual evolution, and that Ohio courts recently have applied preclusion concepts more broadly than in the past. For example, in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N. E. 2d 707 (1945), a plaintiff who suffered both personal injury and property damages in an automobile accident was held entitled to maintain a separate suit against the defendant for each type of injury. The theory was that “[ijnjuries to both person and property suffered by the same person as a result of the same wrongful act are infringements of different rights and give rise to distinct causes of action . . . .” Id., at *86321, 61 N. E. 2d, at 709 (syllabus ¶4).8 In Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N. E. 2d 599 (1958), however, the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically overruled “[paragraph four of the syllabus in the [Vasu] case.” Id., at 221, 235, 147 N. E. 2d, at 599, 607. The new approach was declared to be more in accord with “modern practice,” id., at 235, 147 N. E. 2d, at 607, and was adopted in the hope that it might reduce “much of the vexatious litigation, with its attendant confusion, which has resulted in recent years from the filing of separate petitions by the same plaintiff, one for personal injuries and one for property damage although sustained simultaneously.” Id., at 234-235, 147 N. E. 2d, at 607.

This holding, of course, did not fully solve for the Ohio law the question as to what constitutes a “cause of action” for claim preclusion purposes. The definition of “cause of action” or “claim” is critical in the present context because it seems that a basic rule of Ohio law is that a person is entitled to one lawsuit for each “cause of action” he possesses. Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N. E. 2d 67 (1943); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N. E. 2d 10 (1969).

In 1968, the Supreme Court of Ohio twice dealt with the question of what constitutes a cause of action for preclusion purposes. Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 233 N. E. 2d 506; Sharp v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Ohio St. 2d 134, 239 N. E. 2d 49. In each of these cases, although a second action against the defendant was permitted, the court clearly was developing a broader and more expansive attitude toward claim preclusion. See Henderson, 13 Ohio St. 2d, at 35, 38, 233 N. E. 2d, at 509-511; Sharp, 15 Ohio St. 2d, at 140, 239 N. E. 2d, at 54. In addition, the Ohio Supreme *87Court in 1970 adopted Rule 13 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure establishing a compulsory counterclaim provision like its federal counterpart in Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Then, in 1982, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted what appears to be a broad doctrine of preclusion indeed, although in a defensive, not offensive, context. Johnson’s Island, Inc. v. Board of Township Trustees, 69 Ohio St. 2d 241, 431 N. E. 2d 672. The first syllabus by the court recites:

“When in a prior injunction action brought to enjoin the defendant landowner’s violation of a zoning law, the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of nonconforming use, but does not assert the unconstitutionality of the law, the landowner is, on the principle of res judicata, barred from later bringing a declaratory judgment action alleging such law to be unconstitutional.” Ibid., 431 N. E. 2d, at 673.

See also Stromberg v. Board of Ed. of Bratenahl, 64 Ohio St. 2d 98, 413 N. E. 2d 1184 (1980).

In reading the opinion of the District Court in the present litigation, we are unable to determine whether that court was applying what it thought was the Ohio law of preclusion. The opinion cites a Sixth Circuit opinion that purported to enunciate Ohio law, Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Assn., 431 F. 2d 1209 (1970), and also relied on precedents from other Federal Courts of Appeals applying both federal and state law. Our holding today makes clear that Ohio state preclusion law is to be applied to this case. Prudence also dictates that it is the District Court, in the first instance, not this Court, that should interpret Ohio preclusion law and apply it.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court so that it may instruct the District Court to conduct such further proceedings as are required by, and are consistent with, this opinion.

It is so ordered.

*88Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join, concurring.

In Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 75 (1903), this Court held that a federal court “can accord [a state judgment] no greater efficacy” than would the judgment-rendering State. That holding has been adhered to on at least three occasions since that time. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U. S. 4, 7-8 (1940); Wright v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 216 U. S. 420, 429 (1910); City of Covington v. First National Bank, 198 U. S. 100, 107-109 (1905). The Court has also indicated that the States are bound by a similar rule under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 529 (1873). The Court is thus justified in this case to rule that preclusion must be determined under state law, even if there would be preclusion under federal standards..

This construction of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 and its predecessors is unfortunate. In terms of the purpose of that section, which is to require federal courts to give effect to state-court judgments, there is no reason to hold that a federal court may not give preclusive effect to a state judgment simply because the judgment would not bar relitigation in the state courts. If the federal courts have developed rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel that prevent relitigation in circumstances that would not be preclusive in state courts, the federal courts should be free to apply them, the parties then being free to relitigate in the state courts. The contrary construction of § 1738 is nevertheless one of long standing, and Congress has not seen fit to disturb it, however justified such an action might have been.

Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.

I

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent in California state court, alleging inducement of breach of contract and various business torts. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), and successfully moved to dismiss petitioner’s claims as barred by California’s 2-year statute of limitations. In its order of dismissal, the District Court, adopting language suggested by respondent, dismissed petitioner’s claims “in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. Without contesting the District Court’s designation of its dismissal as “on the merits,” petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court’s order. 168 F. 3d 501 (1999) (table). Petitioner also brought suit against respondent in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action, which were not time barred under Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations. Respondent sought in-junctive relief against this action from the California federal court under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, and removed the action to the United States District Court for the *500District of Maryland on federal-question grounds (diversity grounds were not available because Lockheed “is a Maryland citizen,” Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913, 914 (1997)). The California federal court denied the relief requested, and the Maryland federal court remanded the case to state court because the federal question arose only by way of defense, ibid. Following a hearing, the Maryland state court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner then returned to. the California federal court and the Ninth Circuit, unsuccessfully moving both courts to amend the former’s earlier order so as to indicate that the dismissal was not “on the merits.” Petitioner also appealed the Maryland trial court’s order of dismissal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that, regardless of whether California would have accorded claim-preclusive effect to a statute-of-limitations dismissal by one of its own courts, the dismissal by the California federal court barred the complaint filed in Maryland, since the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim preclusive. 128 Md. App. 39, 736 A. 2d 1104 (1999). After the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review the case, we granted certiorari. 530 U. S. 1260 (2000).

II

Petitioner contends that the outcome of this case is controlled by Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130, 135 (1875), which held that the res judicata effect of a federal diversity judgment “is such as would belong to judgments of the State courts rendered under similar circumstances,” and may not be accorded any “higher sanctity or effect.” Since, petitioner argues, the dismissal of an action on statute-of-limitations grounds by a California state court would not be claim preclusive, it follows that the similar dismissal of this diversity action by the California federal court cannot be *501claim preclusive. While we agree that this would be the result demanded by Du/passeur, the case is not dispositive because it was decided under the Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 196, which required federal courts to apply the procedural law of the forum State in nonequity eases. That arguably affected the outcome of the case. See Dupasseur, supra, at 135. See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments §87, Comment a, p. 315 (1980) (hereinafter Restatement) (“Since procedural law largely determines the matters that may be adjudicated in an action, state law had to be considered in ascertaining the effect of a federal judgment”).

Respondent, for its part, contends that the outcome of this case is controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which provides as follows:

“Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”

Since the dismissal here did not “otherwise specif[y]” (indeed, it specifically stated that it was “on the merits”), and did not pertain to the excepted subjects of jurisdiction, venue, or joinder, it follows, respondent contends, that the dismissal “is entitled to claim preclusive effect.” Brief for Respondent 3-4.

Implicit in this reasoning is the unstated minor premise that all judgments denominated “on the merits” are entitled to claim-preclusive effect. That premise is not necessarily valid. The original connotation of an “on the merits” adjudication is one that actually “pass[es] directly on the substance *502of [a particular] claim” before the court. Restatement § 19, Comment a, at 161. That connotation remains common to every jurisdiction of which we are aware. See ibid. (“The prototypical] [judgment on the merits is] one in which the merits of [a party’s] claim are in fact adjudicated [for or] against the [party] after trial of the substantive issues”). And it is, we think, the meaning intended in those many statements to the effect that a judgment “on the merits” triggers the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. See, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326, n. 5 (1979) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action”); Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co., 14 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 92 P. 2d 804, 806 (1939) (“[A] final judgment, rendered upon the merits by a court having jurisdiction of the cause ... is a complete bar to a new suit between [the parties or their privies] on the same cause of action” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

But over the years the meaning of the term “judgment on the merits” “has gradually undergone change,” R. Marcus, M. Redish, & E. Sherman, Civil Procedure: A Modern Approach 1140-1141 (3d ed. 2000), and it has come to be applied to some judgments (such as the one involved here) that do not pass upon the substantive merits of a claim and hence do not (in many jurisdictions) entail claim-preclusive effect. Compare, e. g., Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal. 2d 819, 826, 167 P. 2d 719, 724 (1946), and Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1591, 1596, 273 Cal. Rptr. 438, 441 (1990), with Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 228 (1995) (statute of limitations); Goddard, supra, at 50-51, 92 P. 2d, at 806-807, and Allston v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 25 App. Div. 2d 545, 546, 267 N. Y. S. 2d 564, 565-566 (1966), with Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 399, n. 3 (1981) (demurrer or failure to state a claim). See also Restatement § 19, Com*503ment a and Reporter’s Note; 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4439, pp. 355-358 (1981) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). That is why the Restatement of Judgments has abandoned the use of the term — “because of its possibly misleading connotations,” Restatement § 19, Comment a, at 161.

In short, it is no longer true that a judgment “on the merits” is necessarily a judgment entitled to claim-preclusive effect; and there are a number of reasons for believing that the phrase “adjudication upon the merits” does not bear that meaning in Rule 41(b). To begin with, Rule 41(b) sets forth nothing more than a default rule for determining the import of a dismissal (a dismissal is “upon the merits,” with the three stated exceptions, unless the court “otherwise specifies”). This would be a highly peculiar context in which to announce a federally prescribed rule on the complex question of claim preclusion, saying in effect, “All federal dismissals (with three specified exceptions) preclude suit elsewhere, unless the court otherwise specifies.”

And even apart from the purely default character of Rule 41(b), it would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of the rendering court itself. Indeed, such a rule would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 28 U. S. C. § 2072(b). Cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U. S. 815, 842 (1999) (adopting a “limiting construction” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) in order to “minimiz[e] potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act, and [to] avoi[d] serious constitutional concerns”). In the present case, for example, if California law left petitioner free to sue on this claim in Maryland even after the California statute of limitations had expired, the federal court’s extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41(b)’s *504mandated claim-preclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to violate this limitation.

Moreover, as so interpreted, the Rule would in many cases violate the federalism principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 804 U. S. 64, 78-80 (1938), by engendering “ ‘substantial’ variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation” which would “[l]ikely . . . influence the choice of a forum,” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 467-468 (1965). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108-110 (1945). Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U. S. 740, 748-753 (1980). With regard to the claim-preclusion issue involved in the present case, for example, the traditional rule is that expiration of the applicable statute of limitations merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that dismissal on that ground does not have claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations periods. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 142(2), 143 (1969); Restatement of Judgments §49, Comment a (1942). Out-of-state defendants sued on stale claims in California and in other States adhering to this traditional rule would systematically remove state-law suits brought against them to federal court — where, unless otherwise specified, a statute-of-limitations dismissal would bar suit everywhere.1

Finally, if Rule 41(b) did mean what respondent suggests, we would surely have relied upon it in our cases recognizing the claim-preclusive effect of federal judgments in federal-question cases. Yet for over half a century since the pro*505mulgation of Rule 41(b), we have not once done so. See, e. g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 488-489, n. 9 (1994); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, supra, at 398; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 324, n. 12 (1971).

We think the key to a more reasonable interpretation of the meaning of “operates as an adjudication upon the merits” in Rule 41(b) is to be found in Rule 41(a), which, in discussing the effect of voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff, makes clear that an “adjudication upon the merits” is the opposite of a “dismissal without prejudice”:

“Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based, on or including the same claim.”

See also 18 Wright & Miller § 4435, at 329, n. 4 (“Both parts of Rule 41... use the phrase ‘without prejudice’ as a contrast to adjudication on the merits”); 9 id., §2373, at 396, n. 4 (“‘[W]ith prejudice’ is an acceptable form of shorthand for ‘an adjudication upon the merits’”). See also Goddard, 14 Cal. 2d, at 54, 92 P. 2d, at 808 (stating that a dismissal “with prejudice” evinces “[t]he intention of the court to make [the dismissal] on the merits”). The primary meaning of “dismissal without prejudice,” we think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim. That will also ordinarily (though not always) have the consequence of not barring the claim from other courts, but its primary meaning relates to the dismissing court itself. Thus, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) defines “dismissed without prejudice” as “removed from the court’s docket in such a way that the plaintiff may refile the same suit on the same claim,” id., at 482, and defines “dismissal without prejudice” as “[a] dismissal that *506does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the lawsuit within the applicable limitations period/' ibid.

We think, then, that the effect of the “adjudication upon the merits” default provision of Rule 41(b) — and, presumably, of the explicit order in the present case that used the language of that default provision — is simply that, unlike a dismissal “without prejudice,” the dismissal in the present case barred refiling of the same claim in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That is undoubtedly a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient one, for claim-preclusive effect in other courts.2

Ill

Having concluded that the claim-preclusive effect, in Maryland, of this California federal diversity judgment is dictated neither by Dupasseur v. Rochereau, as petitioner contends, nor by Rule 41(b), as respondent contends, we turn to consideration of what determines the issue. Neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1,3 nor the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1788,4 ad*507dresses the question. By their terms they govern the effects to be given only to state-court judgments (and, in the case of the statute, to judgments by courts of territories and possessions). And no other federal textual provision, neither of the Constitution nor of any statute, addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a judgment in a federal diversity action.

It is also true, however, that no federal textual provision addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment in a federal-question case, yet we have long held that States cannot give those judgments merely whatever effect they would give their own judgments, but must accord them the effect that this Court prescribes. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1938); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 290-291 (1906); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499, 514-515 (1903). The reasoning of that line of cases suggests, moreover, that even when States are allowed to give federal judgments (notably, judgments in diversity cases) no more than the effect accorded to state judgments, that disposition is by direction of this Court, which has the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments:

“It is true that for some purposes and within certain limits it is only required that the judgments of the courts of the United States shall be given the same force and effect as are given the judgments of the courts of the States wherein they are rendered; but it is equally true that whether a Federal judgment has been given due force and effect in the state court is a Federal question reviewable by this court, which will determine for itself whether such judgment has been given due weight or otherwise. . . .

“When is the state court obliged to give to Federal judgments only the force and effect it gives to state court judgments within its own jurisdiction? Such cases are distinctly pointed out in the opinion of Mr. Jus*508tice Bradley in Dupasseur v. Rochereau [which stated that the case was a diversity case, applying state law under state procedure].” Ibid.

In other words, in Dupasseur the State was allowed (indeed, required) to give a federal diversity judgment no more effect than it would accord one of its own judgments only because reference to state law was the federal rule that this Court deemed appropriate. In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity. See generally R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1473 (4th ed. 1996); Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L. J. 741 (1976).

It is left to us, then, to determine the appropriate federal rule. And despite the sea change that has occurred in the background law since Dupasseur was decided — not only repeal of the Conformity Act but also the watershed decision of this Court in Erie — we think the result decreed by Du-passeur continues to be correct for diversity cases. Since state, rather than federal, substantive law is at issue there is no need for a uniform federal rule. And indeed, nationwide uniformity in the substance of the matter is better served by having the same claim-preclusive rule (the state rule) apply whether the dismissal has been ordered by a state or a federal court. This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U. S. 415, 429-431 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U. S., at 752-753; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U. S. 198, 202-205 (1956); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 117 (1943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 212 (1939). As we have alluded to above, any other rule would produce the sort of “forum-shopping . . . and . . . inequitable ad*509ministration of the laws” that Erie seeks to avoid, Hanna, 380 U. S., at 468, since filing in, or removing to, federal court would be encouraged by the divergent effects that the litigants would anticipate from likely grounds of dismissal. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S., at 109-110.

This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests. If, for example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation of discovery orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their own processes might justify a contrary federal rule. No such conflict with potential federal interests exists in the present case. Dismissal of this state cause of action was decreed by the California federal court .only because the California statute of limitations so required; and there is no conceivable federal interest in giving that time bar more effect in other courts than the California courts themselves would impose.

* * *

Because the claim-preclusive effect of the California federal court’s dismissal “upon the merits” of petitioner’s action on statute-of-limitations grounds is governed by a federal rule that in turn incorporates California’s law of claim preclusion (the content of which we do not pass upon today), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the dismissal necessarily precluded the bringing of this action in the Maryland courts. The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Harry B. Frank, J.

Defendant American Airlines moves, pursuant to CPLR 602 (subd. [a]), for an order directing that all issues of liability in the death actions brought by plaintiffs Landano and Kirchstein be joined for trial with the 20 other American Airlines cases subject to joint trial under an order of the Appellate Division dated November 10, 1967. [See 28 A D 2d 986.]

The actions all arise out of the crash, in Kentucky on November 8, 1965, of an American Airlines aircraft while the plane was en route from La Guardia Airport, New York to an airport in Covington, Kentucky. The crash resulted in the death of 58 out of the 62 persons aboard and, in addition to the multiple *42actions pending in this court, comparable actions have been instituted in other States and in various United States District Courts.

Of the various actions instituted as a result of the crash, the first case to be tried to conclusion was that brought in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas (Creasy v. American Airlines), which resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff therein against the defendant American Airlines. On a prior motion brought in the Hart case herein, the opinion of Mr. Justice Quinn, dated May 15, 1968, noted that in the Creasy trial, which lasted some 19 days, the Texas court applied the Kentucky wrongful death statute and submitted the question of American Airlines ’ liability on the basis of the substantive law of Kentucky relating to negligence. Deference to the pleadings in the two actions here sought to be joined for trial indicates that the basis for the recovery sought against defendant American Airlines is similarly predicated, and it is undisputable from the pleadings and papers herein that the issue of defendant airline’s liability in these cases is identical to the issue in that regard determined in the Texas action.

In light of the Texas result which has now been affirmed on appeal, plaintiffs Landano and Kirchstein oppose defendant’s motion for a joint trial by cross-moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability which, if granted, would obviate a trial on such issue and necessarily require a denial of defendant’s motion.

Plaintiffs contend that while, concededly, they were not parties to the Texas action, nevertheless the determination in that action of defendant’s liability for the plane crash of November 8, 1965 is, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, conclusive on the issue of defendant’s liability for such crash in the actions brought by these plaintiffs.

In its recent decision in Schwartz v. Public Administrator (24 N Y 2d 65, 69) our Court of Appeals definitively crystalized the controlling considerations governing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this State and ‘ ‘ arrived at a modern and stable statement of the law of res judicata ’ ’ grounded on ‘ ‘ the sound principle that, where it can be fairly said that a party has had a full opportunity to litigate a particular issue, he cannot reasonably demand a second one ”. While our highest court’s decisions have long reflected dissatisfaction with the traditional restrictive limitations surrounding res judicata and have emphasized instead 1 ‘ a rule of .reason and practical necessity ” (see, for example, Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 18; Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N Y 2d *43116; Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N Y 2d 105; B. R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N Y 2d 141), the Schwarts decision delineates the scope of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and expressly determines that “ there are but two necessary requirements for invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel” (24 N Y 2d at p. 71). These requirements are described in clear and unambiguous terms. "There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action,, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.”

No extended discussion is necessary to Demonstrate that such requirements are amply met in the instant cases. As already indicated, the issue of defendant airline’s liability for the crash in which plaintiffs ’ decedents perished is. identical to the issue of liability litigated in the Texas action where defendant was similarly charged with responsibility for that s?me accident. Indeed, in an airplane crash there are absent any of the problems with respect to 61 identity of issue” on liability which might arise in other types of accidents involving multiple participants such as automobile accident oases. With respect to the second requirement, it is in no way disputed that defendant, had a full and fair opportunity to conte at the issue of its liability in the course of the 19-day trial in the Texas action, anti in order to defeat collateral estoppel on ¿his ground the burden rests on the defendant to show that it had no such opportunity.

While defendant presents various arguments as to why the finding on liability should not be applied in these eases, it relies most heavily upon the prior decision of Mr. Justice Quinn in the Hart matter, hereinbefore referred to, which was affirmed, without opinion by the Appellate Division (31 A D 2d 896). Although defendant concedes that such decision is not “in a strict sense ” the law of the case here, it nevertheless contends that such decision compels a denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. This court disagrees. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the controlling factor in the Hart decision was the nondomicilliary status of the plaintiffs therein involved and the unwillingness of the court to apply the New York law of collateral estoppel with respect to a Texas determination on behalf of ‘ ‘ non-domicilliary dependents of a deceased nondomicilliary 6 bread winner ’ ’ ’ having no significant contacts with New York. While such result will undoubtedly be effective to discourage possible “ forum shopping ” by nonresidents, it does not, as defendant argues, preclude the application of the New York doctrine of collateral estoppel in an action brought *44by New York dependents of deceased New York residents. As was pointed out in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines (9 N Y 2d 34, 39) which involved a death action arising out of an airplane crash where decedent had been a New York resident, “ The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if possible provide protection for our own. State’s people against unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters.” The ‘State of Texas has no legitimate interest in imposing its rules on collateral estoppel upon these New York residents and a holding that permits such result would indeed constitute the “ anachronistic treatment ” warned ag*ainst in Kilberg, The fact that the plaintiffs herein involved are New York domiciliiaries, as were their decedents, sufficiently establishes this State’s superior interest in the issue of collateral estoppel. It may ibe observed that these plaintiffs occupy much the sane relationship to the State of Texas as the nonresident Hart plaintiffs do to New York, and the unavailability of the New York rule on collateral estoppel to the Hart plaintiffs is equally relevant in holding the instant resident plaintiffs outside tie scope of the Texas rule on that issue.

Defendant’s reliance on “full faith and credit” to defeat the application of collateral estoppel herein is misplaced. This 'is not a situation where- the judgment, as such, of the Texas court is sought to be enforced. What is here involved is a policy determination by our cotarts that 1 £ £ One who has had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew ’ ” (B. R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N Y 2d 141, 144, supra), and, further, refusal “to tolerate a condition where, on relatively the same set of facts, one fact-finder', be it court or jury ” may find a party liable while another exonerates him leading to the “ inconsistent results which are always a blemish on a judicial system ” (Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N Y 2d 65, 74, supra). It is in order to carry out these policy determinations in the disposition of cases in this jurisdiction that an evidentiary use is being made of a particular issue determination made in the Texas action.

Perhaps the strongest argument for applying the New York doctrine of collateral estoppel herein is the nature of the showing by defendant of the supposed £ ‘ inequity ’ ’ that would ensue from such application. There is a belabored emphasis on the merits of ‘1 mutuality of estoppel” and its favored status in “ a majority of jurisdictions ”. Such of course wholly ignores the fact that our highest court has resoundingly stated in terms leaving no rdom for doubt that “ the doctrine of mutuality ’ is a dead letter ” (B. R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N Y 2d 141, 147, *45 supra.) Elimination of the doctrine of mutuality has been in recognition of the superior importance of the principle that “ ‘ “ Where a full opportunity has been afforded to a party to the prior action and he has failed to prove his freedom from liability or to establish liability or culpability on the part of another, there is no reason for permitting him to retry these issues.” ’ ” (B. R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N Y 2d 141, 146, supra; Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N Y 2d 65, supra.)

Among the reasons submitted by defendant as to why it should have an opportunity to retry the issue of its liability, notwithstanding its failure to prove its freedom therefrom on the trial in Texas, is the argument that such issue was submitted to the jury under the substantive law of Kentucky which is less favorable to defendant than is the New York law. While one is tempted to wonder what the argument would be if the situation were reversed, such contention is in any event wholly without merit since a New York court would also be obliged to submit the case under the substantive law of Kentucky, the place where the crash occurred. As 1 ‘ the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred ’ ’ Kentucky would have a predominant interest ‘1 in regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place ”. (Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N Y 2d 473, 483.)

Defendant further seeks to forestall the conclusive effect of the Texas liability determination on the ground that such may be “an aberration ’ ’ stemming from local prejudice against corporate defendants or from sympathy considerations. Such conjectural mus'ings, which significantly are in no way documented by any supporting facts, are, of course, a complete indictment of all notions of ‘ ‘ full faith and credit ’ ’ of which defendant is elsewhere so solicitous.

Even more interesting is the argument raised by defendant which may be paraphrased in Biblical terms as ‘1 hear them not for they know not what they do ”. Defendant seriously suggests that the determination in the Texas action should not be accorded further conclusive effect because that action involved only a single claimant and the jury’s decision as to defendant’s negligence is somehow impaired because rendered ‘1 without any awareness whatsoever by the jury that its verdict would determine the obligation of the defendant to many other persons not before it”. It is apparently defendant’s contention that the issue as to whether or not it was negligent in the operation of its aircraft is in some manner dependent upon the number of claims which may ultimately be asserted *46against it. This court is unaware of any rule of law which supports this novel rule of liability, nor has defendant cited any authority in that regard.

The arguments raised by defendant are without substance and merely demonstrate a ‘ ‘ grasping at straws ’ ’. There has been no showing sufficient to raise any triable issue on either of the two requirements necessary to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel — i.e. “identity of issue” and “full and fair opportunity to contest ”. Both such elements having been established hereon, collateral estoppel will be applied.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment is granted and defendant’s motion for a joint trial is denied. Settle order providing for an assessment of damages.