4 Defenses 4 Defenses

4.1 Unconscionability 4.1 Unconscionability

4.1.1 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (DC Court of Appeals) 4.1.1 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (DC Court of Appeals)

Ora Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3389.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Feb. 3, 1964.

Decided March 30, 1964.

*915R. R. Curry and Pierre E. Dostert, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Harry Protas, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

QUINN, Associate Judge.

Appellant, a person of limited education separated from her husband, is maintaining herself and her seven children by means of public assistance. During the period 1957-1962 she had a continuous course of dealings with appellee from which she purchased many household articles on the installment plan. These included sheets, curtains, rugs, chairs, a chest of drawers, beds, mattresses, a washing machine, and a stereo set. In 1963 appellee filed a complaint in replevin for possession of all the items purchased by appellant, alleging that her payments were in default and that it retained title to the goods according to the sales contracts. By the writ of replevin appellee obtained a bed, chest of drawers, washing machine, and the stereo set. After hearing testimony and examining the contracts, the trial court entered judgment for appellee.

Appellant’s principal contentions on appeal are (1) there was a lack of meeting of the minds, and (2) the contracts were against public policy.

Appellant signed fourteen contracts in all. They were approximately six inches in length and each contained a long paragraph in extremely fine print. One of the sentences in this paragraph provided that payments, after the first purchase, were to be prorated on all purchases then outstanding. Mathematically, this had the effect of keeping a balance due on all items until the time balance was completely eliminated. It meant that title to the first purchase, remained in appellee until the fourteenth purchase, made some five years later, was fully paid.

At trial appellant testified that she understood the agreements to mean that when payments on the running account were sufficient to balance the amount due on an individual item, the item became hers. She testified that most of the purchases were made at her home; that the contracts were signed in blank; that she did not read the instruments; and that she was not provided with a copy. She admitted, however, that she did not ask anyone to read or explain the contracts to her.

*916We have stated that “one who refrains from reading a contract and in conscious ignorance of its terms voluntarily assents thereto will not be relieved from his bad bargain.” Bob Wilson, Inc. v. Swann, D.C.Mun.App., 168 A.2d 198, 199 (1961). “One who signs a contract has a duty to read it and is obligated according to its terms.” Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, D.C.App., 188 A.2d 348, 349 (1963). “It is as much the duty of a person who cannot read the language in which a contract is written to have someone read it to him before he signs it, as it is the duty of one who can read to peruse it himself before signing it.” Stern v. Moneyweight Scale Co., 42 App.D.C. 162, 165 (1914).

A careful review of the record shows that appellant’s assent was not obtained “by fraud or even misrepresentation falling short of fraud.” Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, supra. This is not a case of mutual misunderstanding but a unilateral mistake. Under these circumstances, appellant’s first contention is without merit.

Appellant’s second argument presents a more serious question. The record reveals that prior to the last purchase appellant had reduced the balance in her account to $164. The last purchase, a stereo set, raised the balance due to $678. Significantly, at the time of this and the preceding purchases, appellee was aware of appellant’s financial position. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of appellant’s social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount, appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.

We cannot condemn too strongly appellee’s conduct. It raises serious questions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings. A review of the legislation in the District of Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to public policy. We note that were the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Art. 83 §§ 128-153, or its equivalent, in force in the District of Columbia, we could grant appellant appropriate relief. We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar.

Affirmed.

4.1.2 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (DC Circuit) 4.1.2 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (DC Circuit)

Ora Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY, Appellee. William THORNE et al., Appellants, v. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY, Appellee.

Nos. 18604, 18605.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 9, 1965.

Decided Aug. 11, 1965.

*447Mr. Pierre E. Dostert, Washington, D. C., counsel for appellants in No. 18,605, argued for all appellants.

Mr. R. R. Curry, Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,604.

Mr. Harry Protas, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Mr. Gerhard P. Van Arkel (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., as amicus curiae.

Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Danaher and Wright, Circuit Judges.

J. SHELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

Appellee, Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, operates a retail furniture store in the District of Columbia. During the period from 1957 to 1962 each appellant in these cases purchased a number of household items from Walker-Thomas, for which payment was to be made in installments. The terms of each purchase were contained in a printed form contract which set forth the value of the purchased item and purported to lease the item to appellant for a stipulated monthly rent payment. The contract then provided, in substance, that title would remain in Walker-Thomas until the total of all the monthly payments made equaled the stated value of the item, at which time appellants could take title. In the event of a default in the payment of any monthly installment, Walker-Thomas could repossess the item.

The contract further provided that “the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser] to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser] under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter made by [:purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such payment is made.” Emphasis added.) The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on every item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all the items previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased automatically became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous dealings.

On May 12, 1962, appellant Thorne purchased an item described as a Daveno, three tables, and two lamps, having total stated value of $391.10. Shortly thereafter, he defaulted on his monthly payments and appellee sought to replevy all the items purchased since the first transaction in 1958. Similarly, on April 17, 1962, appellant Williams bought a stereo set of stated value of $514.95.1 She too defaulted shortly thereafter, and appellee sought to replevy all the items purchased since December, 1957. The Court of General Sessions granted judgment for appellee. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted appellants’ motion for leave to appeal to this court.

Appellants’ principal contention, rejected by both the trial and the appellate courts below, is that these contracts, or at least some of them, are unconscionable and, hence, not enforceable. In its opin*448ion in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 198 A.2d 914, 916 (1964), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained its rejection of this contention as follows:

“Appellant’s second argument presents a more serious question. The record reveals that prior to the last purchase appellant had reduced the balance in her account to $164. The last purchase, a stereo set, raised the balance due to $678. Significantly, at the time of this and the preceding ■ purchases, appellee was aware of appellant’s financial position. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of appellant’s social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount, appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.
“We cannot condemn too strongly appellee’s conduct. It raises serious questions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings. A review of the legislation in the District of Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to public policy. We note that were the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Art. 83 §§ 128-153, or its equivalent, in force in the District of Columbia, we could grant appellant appropriate relief. We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar.”

We do not agree that the court lacked the power to refuse enforcement to contracts found to be unconscionable. In other jurisdictions, it has been held as a matter of common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable.2 While no decision of this court so holding has been found, the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not be given full enforcement is by no means novel. In Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445, 20 L.Ed. 438 (1870), the Supreme Court stated:

“ * * * If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to. * * * ”3

Since we have never adopted or rejected such a rule,4 the question here presented is actually one of first impression.

Congress has recently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, which specifically provides that the court may refuse to enforce a contract which it finds to be unconscionable at the time it was made. 28 D.C.Code § 2-302 (Supp. IV 1965). The enactment of this section, which occurred subsequent to the contracts here in suit, does not mean that *449the common law of the District of Columbia was otherwise at the time of enactment, nor does it preclude the court from adopting a similar rule in the exercise of its powers to develop the common law for the District of Columbia. In fact, in view of the absence of prior authority on the point, we consider the congressional adoption of § 2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly derived.5 Accordingly, we hold that where the element of unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.

Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.6 Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.7 The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.8 But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the *450agreement are not to be questioned9 should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.10

In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it be mechanically applied. The terms are to be considered “in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or ease.”11 Corbin suggests the test' as being whether the terms are “so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place.” 1 Corbin, op. cit. supra Note 2.12 We think this formulation correctly states the test to be applied in those cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon entering the contract.

Because the trial court and the appellate court did not feel that enforcement could be refused, no findings were made on the possible unconscionability of the contracts in these cases. Since the record is not sufficient for our deciding the issue as a matter of law, the cases must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

DANAHER, Circuit Judge

(dissenting) :

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals obviously was as unhappy about the situation here presented as any of us can possibly be. Its opinion in the Williams case, quoted in the majority text, concludes: “We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar.”

My view is thus summed up by an able court which made no finding that there had actually been sharp practice. Rather the appellant seems to have known precisely where she stood.

There are many aspects of public policy here involved. What is a luxury to some may seem an outright necessity to others. Is public oversight to be required of the expenditures of relief funds? A washing machine, e. g., in the hands of a relief client might become a fruitful source of income. Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain business establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expecting their pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the risk. Perhaps a remedy when necessary will be found within the provisions of the “Loan Shark” law, D.C.Code §§ 26-601 et seq. (1961).

I mention such matters only to emphasize the desirability of a cautious approach to any such problem, particularly since the law for so long has allowed parties such great latitude in making their own contracts. I dare say there must annually be thousands upon thousands of installment credit transactions in this jurisdiction, and one can only speculate *451as to the efféct the decision in these cases will have.1

I join the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in its disposition of the issues.

4.1.3 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 4.1.3 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.

[676 NYS2d 569]

Tony Brower et al., Appellants, et al., Plaintiffs, v Gateway 2000, Inc., et al., Respondents.

First Department,

August 13, 1998

*248APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Thomas A. Holman of counsel, New York City {Zachary Alan Starr on the brief; Starr & Holman, L. L. P., attorneys), for appellants.

Robert M. Rader of counsel, New York City {Daniel R. Murdock and Alan B. Howard on the brief; Winston & Strawn, attorneys), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Milonas, J. P.

Appellants are among the many consumers who purchased computers and software products from defendant Gateway 2000 through a direct-sales system, by mail or telephone order. As of July 3, 1995, it was Gateway’s practice to include with the materials shipped to the purchaser along with the merchandise a copy of its “Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement” and any relevant warranties for the products in the shipment. The Agreement begins with a “Note to the Customer,” which provides, in slightly larger print than the remainder of the document, in a box that spans the width of the page: “This document contains Gateway 2000’s Standard Terms and Conditions. By keeping your Gateway 2000 computer system beyond thirty (30) days after the date of delivery, you accept these Terms and Conditions.” The document consists of 16 paragraphs, and, as is relevant to this appeal, paragraph 10 of the agreement, entitled “dispute resolution,” reads as follows: “Any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or its interpretation shall be settled exclusively and finally by arbitration. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration shall be conducted in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. before a sole arbitrator. Any award rendered in any such arbitration proceeding shall be final and binding on each of the parties, and judgment may be entered thereon in a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Plaintiffs commenced this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging deceptive sales practices in seven causes of action, including breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud *249and unfair trade practices. In particular, the allegations focused on Gateway’s representations and advertising that promised “service when you need it,” including around-the-clock free technical support, free software technical support and certain on-site services. According to plaintiffs, not only were they unable to avail themselves of this offer because it was virtually impossible to get through to a technician, but also Gateway continued to advertise this claim notwithstanding numerous complaints and reports about the problem.

Insofar as is relevant to appellants, who purchased their computers after July 3, 1995, Gateway moved to dismiss the complaint based on the arbitration clause in the Agreement. Appellants argued that the arbitration clause is invalid under UCC 2-207, unconscionable under UCC 2-302 and an unenforceable contract of adhesion. Specifically, they claimed that the provision was obscure; that a customer could not reasonably be expected to appreciate or investigate its meaning and effect; that the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was not a forum commonly used for consumer matters; and that because ICC headquarters were in France, it was particularly difficult to locate the organization and its rules. To illustrate just how inaccessible the forum was, appellants advised the court that the ICC was not registered with the Secretary of State, that efforts to locate and contact the ICC had been unsuccessful and that apparently the only way to attempt to contact the ICC was through the United States Council for International Business, with which the ICC maintained some sort of relationship.

In support of their arguments, appellants submitted a copy of the ICC’s Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration and contended that the cost of ICC arbitration was prohibitive, particularly given the amount of the typical consumer claim involved. For example, a claim of less than $50,000 required advance fees of $4,000 (more than the cost of most Gateway products), of which the $2000 registration fee was nonrefundable even if the consumer prevailed at the arbitration. Consumers would also incur travel expenses disproportionate to the damages sought, which appellants’ counsel estimated would not exceed $1,000 per customer in this action, as well as bear the cost of Gateway’s legal fees if the consumer did not prevail at the arbitration; in this respect, the ICC Rules follow the “loser pays” rule used in England. Also, although Chicago was designated as the site of the actual arbitration, all correspondence must be sent to ICC headquarters in France.

*250The IAS Court dismissed the complaint as to appellants based on the arbitration clause in the Agreements delivered with their computers. We agree with the court’s decision and reasoning in all respects but for the issue of the unconscionability of the designation of the ICC as the arbitration body.

First, the court properly rejected appellants’ argument that the arbitration clause was invalid under UCC 2-207. Appellants claim that when they placed their order they did not bargain for, much less accept, arbitration of any dispute, and therefore the arbitration clause in the agreement that accompanied the merchandise shipment was a “material alteration” of a pre-existing oral agreement. Under UCC 2-207 (2), such a material alteration constitutes “proposals for addition to the contract” that become part of the contract only upon appellants’ express acceptance. However, as the court correctly concluded, the clause was not a “material alteration” of an oral agreement, but, rather, simply one provision of the sole contract that existed between the parties. That contract, the court explained, was formed and acceptance was manifested not when the order was placed but only with the retention of the merchandise beyond the 30 days specified in the Agreement enclosed in the shipment of merchandise. Accordingly, the contract was outside the scope of UCC 2-207.

In reaching its conclusion, the IAS Court took note of the litigation in Federal courts on this very issue, and, indeed, on this very arbitration clause. In Hill v Gateway 2000 (105 F3d 1147, cert denied — US —, 118 S Ct 47), plaintiffs in a class action contested the identical Gateway contract in dispute before us, including the enforceability of the arbitration clause. As that court framed the issue, the “[tjerms inside Gateway’s box stand or fall together. If they constitute the parties’ contract because the Hills had an opportunity to return the computer after reading them, then all must be enforced” (supra, at 1148). The court then concluded that the contract was not formed with the placement of a telephone order or with the delivery of the goods. Instead, an enforceable contract was formed only with the consumer’s decision to retain the merchandise beyond the 30-day period specified in the agreement. Thus, the agreement as a whole, including the arbitration clause, was enforceable.

This conclusion was in keeping with the same court’s decision in ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg (86 F3d 1447), where it found that detailed terms enclosed within the packaging of particular computer software purchased in a retail outlet constituted the *251contract between the vendor and the consumer who retained the product. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that UCC 2-207 did not apply and indeed was “irrelevant” to such transactions, noting that the section is generally invoked where multiple agreements have been exchanged between the parties in a classic “battle of the forms,” whereas ProCD (as well as Hill and this case) involves but a single form (supra, at 1452).

The Hill decision, in its examination of the formation of the contract, takes note of the realities of conducting business in today’s world. Transactions involving “cash now, terms later” have become commonplace, enabling the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated merchandise such as computers over the phone or by mail—and even by computer. Indeed, the concept of “[p]ayment preceding the revelation of full terms” is particularly common in certain industries, such as air transportation and insurance (supra, at 1149; ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, supra, at 1451).

While Hill and ProCD, as the IAS Court recognized, are not controlling (although they are decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit encompassing the forum State designated for arbitration), we agree with their rationale that, in such transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the goods. By the terms of the Agreement at issue, it is only after the consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise for more than 30 days—within which the consumer has presumably examined and even used the product(s) and read the agreement—that the contract has been effectuated. In this respect, the case is distinguishable from S&T Sportswear Corp. v Drake Fabrics (190 AD2d 598), cited by appellants, where this Court found that an arbitration clause found on the reverse side of defendant’s draft sales contract did constitute a “material alteration” where the parties did in fact have a pre-existing oral agreement.

While appellants argue that Hill (supra) is contrary to the law of New York in that it departs from the holding of cases such as Matter of Marlene Indus. Corp. (Carnac Textiles) (45 NY2d 327) and its progeny, we disagree with their interpretation of both cases: Hill not only involves one form only, as distinguished from the “battle of the forms” scenario of the cases appellants cite, but these cases are simply inapplicable because, as explained, no contract was formed here or in Hill until the merchandise was retained beyond the 30-day period. The disputed arbitration clause is simply one provision of the sole contract “proposed” between the parties.

*252Second, with respect to appellants’ claim that the arbitration clause is unenforceable as a contract of adhesion, in that it involved no choice or negotiation on the part of the consumer but was a “take it or leave it” proposition (see, e.g., Matter of State of New York v Ford Motor Co., 74 NY2d 495, 503), we find that this argument, too, was properly rejected by the IAS Court. Although the parties clearly do not possess equal bargaining power, this factor alone does not invalidate the contract as one of adhesion. As the IAS Court observed, with the ability to make the purchase elsewhere and the express option to return the goods, the consumer is not in a “take it or leave it” position at all; if any term of the agreement is unacceptable to the consumer, he or she can easily buy a competitor’s product instead—either from a retailer or directly from the manufacturer—and reject Gateway’s agreement by returning the merchandise (see, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute, 499 US 585, 593-594; Matter of Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Altman, 209 AD2d 195). The consumer has 30 days to make that decision. Within that time, the consumer can inspect the goods and examine and seek clarification of the terms of the agreement; until those 30 days have elapsed, the consumer has the unqualified right to return the merchandise, because the goods or terms are unsatisfactory or for no reason at all.

While returning the goods to avoid the formation of the contract entails affirmative action on the part of the consumer, and even some expense, this may be seen as a trade-off for the convenience and savings for which the consumer presumably opted when he or she chose to make a purchase of such consequence by phone or mail as an alternative to on-site retail shopping. That a consumer does not read the agreement or thereafter claims he or she failed to understand or appreciate some term therein does not invalidate the contract any more than such claim would undo a contract formed under other circumstances (see, e.g., Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21, 30). We further note that appellants’ claim of adhesion is identical to that made and rejected in Filias v Gateway 2000, an unreported case brought to our attention by both parties that interprets the same Gateway agreement (No. 97C 2523 [ND 111, Jan. 15, 1998, transferred by 1997 US Dist LEXIS 7115 [ED Mich, Apr. 8, 1997, Zatkoff, J.]).

Finally, we turn to appellants’ argument that the IAS Court should have declared the contract unenforceable, pursuant to UCC 2-302, on the ground that the arbitration clause is unconscionable due to the unduly burdensome procedure and *253cost for the individual consumer. The IAS Court found that while a class action lawsuit, such as the one herein, may be a less costly alternative to the arbitration (which is generally less costly than litigation), that does not alter the binding effect of the valid arbitration clause contained in the agreement (see, Harris v Shearson Hayden Stone, 82 AD2d 87, 92-93, affd 56 NY2d 627 for reasons stated below, see also, Matter of Ball [SFX Broadcasting], 236 AD2d 158, appeal dismissed 91 NY2d 921).

As a general matter, under New York law, unconscionability requires a showing that a contract is “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made” (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d 1, 10). That is, there must be “some showing of ‘an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party’ [citation omitted]” (Matter of State of New York v Avco Fin. Servs., 50 NY2d 383, 389). The Avco Court took pains to note, however, that the purpose of this doctrine is not to redress the inequality between the parties but simply to ensure that the more powerful party cannot “ ‘surprise’ ” the other party with some overly oppressive term (supra, at 389).

As to the procedural element, a court will look to the contract formation process to determine if in fact one party lacked any meaningful choice in entering into the contract, taking into consideration such factors as the setting of the transaction, the experience and education of the party claiming unconscionability, whether the contract contained “fine print,” whether the seller used “high-pressured tactics” and any disparity in the parties’ bargaining power (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, at 11). None of these factors supports appellants’ claim here. Any purchaser has 30 days within which to thoroughly examine the contents of their shipment, including the terms of the Agreement, and seek clarification of any term therein (e.g., Matter of Ball [SFX Broadcasting], supra, at 161). The Agreement itself, which is entitled in large print “Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement,” consists of only four pages and 16 paragraphs, all of which appear in the same size print. Moreover, despite appellants’ claims to the contrary, the arbitration clause is in no way “hidden” or “tucked away” within a complex document of inordinate length, nor is the option of returning the merchandise, to avoid the contract, somehow a “precarious” one. We also reject appellants’ insinuation that, by using the word “standard,” Gateway deliberately *254meant to convey to the consumer that the terms were standard within the industry, when the document clearly purports to be no more than Gateway’s “standard terms and conditions.”

With respect to the substantive element, which entails an examination of the substance of the Agreement in order to determine whether the terms unreasonably favor one party (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, 73 NY2d, at 12), we do not find that the possible inconvenience of the chosen site (Chicago) alone rises to the level of unconscionability. We do find, however, that the excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before the ICC is unreasonable and surely serves to deter the individual consumer from invoking the process (see, Matter of Teleserve Sys. [MCI Telecommunications Corp.], 230 AD2d 585, 594, lv denied App Div, 1st Dept, Sept. 30, 1997, 1997 NY App Div LEXIS 10626). Barred from resorting to the courts by the arbitration clause in the first instance, the designation of a financially prohibitive forum effectively bars consumers from this forum as well; consumers are thus left with no forum at all in which to resolve a dispute. In this regard, we note that this particular claim is not mentioned in the Hill decision, which upheld the clause as part of an enforceable contract.

While it is true that, under New York law, unconscionability is generally predicated on the presence of both the procedural and substantive elements, the substantive element alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the provision at issue unenforceable (see, Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, at 12; Matter of State of New York v Avco Fin. Servs., supra, at 389; State of New York v Wolowitz, 96 AD2d 47, 68). Excessive fees, such as those incurred under the ICC procedure, have been grounds for finding an arbitration provision unenforceable or commercially unreasonable (see, e.g., Matter of Teleserve Sys. [MCI Telecommunications Corp.], supra, at 593-594).

In the Filias case previously mentioned, the Federal District Court stated that it was “inclined to agree” with the argument that selection of the ICC rendered the clause unconscionable, but concluded that the issue was moot because Gateway had agreed to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and sought court appointment of the AAA pursuant to Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC) § 5. The court accordingly granted Gateway’s motion to compel arbitration and appointed the AAA in lieu of the ICC. Plaintiffs in that action (who are represented by counsel for appellants before us) contend that costs associated with the AAA process are also excessive, given *255the amount of the individual consumer’s damages, and their motion for reconsideration of the court’s decision has not yet been decided. While the AAA rules and costs are not part of the record before us, the parties agree that there is a minimum, nonrefundable filing fee of $500, and appellants claim each consumer could spend in excess of $1,000 to arbitrate in this forum.

Gateway’s agreement to the substitution of the AAA is not limited to the Filias plaintiffs. Gateway’s brief includes the text of a new arbitration agreement that it claims has been extended to all customers, past, present and future (apparently through publication in a quarterly magazine sent to anyone who has ever purchased a Gateway product). The new arbitration agreement provides for the consumer’s choice of the AAA or the ICC as the arbitral body and the designation of any location for the arbitration by agreement of the parties, which “shall not be unreasonably withheld.” It also provides telephone numbers at which the AAA and the ICC may be reached for information regarding the “organizations and their procedures.”

As noted, however, appellants complain that the AAA fees are also excessive and thus in no way have they accepted defendant’s offer (see, UCC 2-209); because they make the same claim as to the AAA as they did with respect to the ICC, the issue of unconscionability is not rendered moot, as defendant suggests. We cannot determine on this record whether the AAA process and costs would be so “egregiously oppressive” that they, too, would be unconscionable (Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 14, appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 841). Thus, we modify the order on appeal to the extent of finding that portion of the arbitration provision requiring arbitration before the ICC to be unconscionable and remand to Supreme Court so that the parties have the opportunity to seek appropriate substitution of an arbitrator pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 1 et seq.), which provides for such court designation of an arbitrator upon application of either party, where, for whatever reason, one is not otherwise designated (9 USC § 5).

Appellants make the final argument that the arbitration clause does not apply to the cause of action for false advertising (with respect to the promised round-the-clock service) under various sections of the General Business Law on the ground that there is no mention of arbitration in the technical service contract itself. Although they raise this claim for the first time on this appeal, we find the promise of technical sup*256port to be within the scope of arbitration as it is clearly a “dispute or controversy arising out or relating to [the] Agreement or its interpretation.” Put another way, the service contract does not apply to some separate product that could be retained while the computer products—and the accompanying agreement—could be returned.

Accordingly, the order of Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered October 21, 1997, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as to appellants on the ground that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between tbe parties, should be modified, on the law and the facts, to the extent of vacating that portion of the arbitration agreement as requires arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, with leave to the parties to seek appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to 9 USC § 5 and remanding the matter for that purpose, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Nardelli, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ., concur.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered October 21, 1997, modified, on the law and the facts, to the extent of vacating that portion of the arbitration agreement as requires arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, with leave to the parties to seek appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to 9 USC § 5 and remanding the matter for that purpose, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

4.1.4 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 4.1.4 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION et ux.

No. 09-893.

Argued November 9, 2010 —

Decided April 27, 2011

*334& alia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Auto, JJ., joined. Thomas, J, filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 352. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 357.

Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kenneth S. Getter, Evan M. Tager, *335Archis A. Parasharami, Kevin Ranlett, Donald M. Falk, and Neal Berinhout.

Deepak Gupta argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Scott L. Nelson, Gregory A. Beck, Kirk B. Hulett, Craig M. Nicholas, and Alex M. Tomasevic *

*

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of South Carolina et al. by Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina, James Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah; for the American Bankers Association et al. by Alan S. Kaplinsky, Jeremy T. Rosenblum, and Mark J. Levin; for the Center for Class Action Fairness by Brian P. Brooks; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for CTIA — The Wireless Association by Paul D. Clement and Michael F. Altschul; for DIRECTV, Inc., et al. by Jeffrey S. Davidson; for Distinguished Law Professors by Andrew G. McBride; for DRI — The Voice of the Defense Bar by Kevin C. Newsom and John R. Kouris; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T. Vann; for the New England Legal Foundation by Benjamin G. Robbins and Martin J. Newhouse; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Deborah J. La Fetra.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Note, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Peter J. Nickles of the District of Columbia, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Steve Bullock of Montana, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, and William H. Sorrell of Vermont; for the American Antitrust Institute by Richard M. Brunell and Albert A. Foer; for the American Association for Justice by Andre M. Mura and John Vail; for Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors by William B. Rubenstein, Theodore Eisenberg, John Leubsdorf, Arthur R. Miller, and Judith Resnik; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Douglas T. Kendall and Elizabeth B. Wydra; for Contracts Professors by Peter K. Stris; for Federal Jurisdiction Professors by Stephen I. Vladeck and Michael J. Quirk; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Sarah Crawford, Terisa E. Chaw, Catherine Ruckelshaus, Rebecca Hamburg, and Sharyn A Tejani; for the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia et al. by Bonnie I. RobinVergeer, Michael D. Donovan, and James C. Sturdevant; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by John Payton, Debo P. Adegbile, and Joshua Civin; for the National Academy of Arbitrators by James *336A. Feldman; for the National Workrights Institute by Theodore J. St. Antoine and Lewis Maltby; for Marygrace Coneff et al. by Leslie A. Bailey, Arthur H. Bryant, F. Paul Bland, Jr., and Matthew Wessler; and for Jonathan C. Kaltwasser by Joseph N. Kravec, Jr.

Biro N. Aragaki filed a brief for Arbitration Professors as amici curiae.

*336Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes agreements to arbitrate “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. We consider whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.

I

In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC (AT&T).1 The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties’ “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.2 The agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions. The version at issue in this case reflects revisions made in December 2006, which the parties agree are controlling.

The revised agreement provides that customers may initiate dispute proceedings by completing a one-page Notice of Dispute form available on AT&T’s Web site. AT&T may *337then offer to settle the claim; if it does not, or if the dispute is not resolved within 30 days, the customer may invoke arbitration by filing a separate Demand for Arbitration, also available on AT&T’s Web site. In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifies that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages. The agreement, moreover, denies AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer, requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.3

The Concepcions purchased AT&T service, which was advertised as including the provision of free phones; they were not charged for the phones, but they were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phones’ retail value. In March 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The complaint was later consolidated with a putative class action alleging, among other things, that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free.

In March 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with the Concepcions. The Concepcions opposed the motion, contending that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory *338under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The District Court denied AT&T’s motion. It described AT&T’s arbitration agreement favorably, noting, for example, that the informal dispute-resolution process was “quick, easy to use,” and likely to “promp[t] full or . .. even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate”; that the $7,500 premium functioned as “a substantial inducement for the consumer to pursue the claim in arbitration” if a dispute was not resolved informally; and that consumers who were members of a class would likely be worse off. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, *11-*12 (SD Cal., Aug. 11,2008). Nevertheless, relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), the court found that the arbitration provision was unconscionable because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, *14.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, also finding the provision unconscionable under California law as announced in Discover Bank. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 P. 3d 849, 855 (2009). It also held that the Discover Bank rule was not pre-empted by the PAA because that rule was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.” 584 F. 3d, at 857 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response to AT&T’s argument that the Concepcions’ interpretation of California law discriminated against arbitration, the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that “ ‘class proceedings will reduce the efficiency and expeditiousness of arbitration’” and noted that ‘“Discover Bank placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration.’ ” Id., at 858 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F. 3d 976, 990 (CA9 2007)).

We granted certiorari, 560 U. S. 923 (2010).

*339h-i HH

The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576, 581 (2008). Section 2, the “primary substantive provision of the Act,” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983), provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S. C. §2.

We have described this provision as reflecting both a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” Moses H. Cone, supra, at 24, and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 67 (2010). In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 443 (2006), and enforce them according to their terms, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (1989).

The final phrase of § 2, however, permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconseionability,” but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 492-493, n. 9 (1987). *340The question in this case is whether § 2 pre-empts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. We refer to this rule as the Discover Bank rule.

Under California law, courts may refuse to enforce any contract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,” or may “limit the application of any unconscionable clause.” Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1670.5(a) (West 1985). A finding of unconscionability requires “a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114, 6 P. 3d 669, 690 (2000); accord, Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th, at 159-161, 113 P. 3d, at 1108.

In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court applied this framework to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held as follows:

“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” Id., at 162-163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1668).

California courts have frequently applied this rule to find arbitration agreements unconscionable. See, e. g., Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451-1453, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 819-821 (2006); Klussman v. Cross Country *341Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1297, 36 Cal Rptr. 3d 728, 738-739 (2005); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 556-557, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237-239 (2005).

Ill

A

The Concepcions argue that the Discover Bank rule, given its origins in California’s unconscionability doctrine and California’s policy against exculpation, is a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” under FAA §2. Moreover, they argue that even if we construe the Discover Bank rule as a prohibition on collective-action waivers rather than simply an application of unconscionability, the rule would still be applicable to all dispute-resolution contracts, since California prohibits waivers of class litigation as well. See America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17-18, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 711-713 (2001).

When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353 (2008). But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration. In Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987), for example, we noted that the FAA’s pre-emptive effect might extend even to grounds traditionally thought to exist “‘at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” Id., at 492, n. 9 (emphasis deleted). We said that a court may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what .. . the state legislature cannot.” Id., at 493, n. 9.

An obvious illustration of this point would be a ease finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy *342consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery. The rationalizations for such a holding are neither difficult to imagine nor different in kind from those articulated in Discover Bank. A court might reason that no consumer would knowingly waive his right to full discovery, as this would enable companies to hide their wrongdoing. Or the court might simply say that such agreements are exculpatory — restricting discovery would be of greater benefit to the company than the consumer, since the former is more likely to be sued than to sue. See Discover Bank, supra, at 161, 113 P. 3d, at 1108-1109 (arguing that class waivers are similarly one sided). And, the reasoning would continue, because such a rule applies the general principle of unconscionability or public-policy disapproval of exculpatory agreements, it is applicable to “any” contract and thus preserved by §2 of the FAA. In practice, of course, the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; but it would presumably apply to contracts purporting to restrict discovery in litigation as well.

Other examples are easy to imagine. The same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps termed “a panel of twelve lay arbitrators” to help avoid pre-emption). Such examples are not fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA had manifested itself in “a great variety” of “devices and formulas” declaring arbitration against public policy. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 406 (CA2 1959). And although these statistics are not definitive, it is worth noting that California’s courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 Hastings Bus. L. J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, Judicial *343Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buffalo L. Rev. 185,186-187 (2004).

The Concepcions suggest that all this is just a parade of horribles, and no genuine worry. “Rules aimed at destroying arbitration” or “demanding procedures incompatible with arbitration,” they concede, “would be preempted by the FA A because they cannot sensibly be reconciled with Section 2.” Brief for Respondents 32. The “grounds” available under § 2’s saving clause, they admit, “should not be construed to include a State’s mere preference for procedures that are incompatible with arbitration and ‘would wholly eviscerate arbitration agreements.’” Id., at 33 (quoting Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 237 Ill. 2d 30, 50, 927 N. E. 2d 1207, 1220 (2010)).4

We largely agree. Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. Cf. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 872 (2000); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372-373 (2000). As we have said, a federal statute’s saving clause “ ‘cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.’” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227-228 (1998) (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)).

*344We differ with the Concepcions only in the application of this analysis to the matter before us. We do not agree that rules requiring judicially monitored discovery or adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence are “a far cry from this case.” Brief for Respondents 32. The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.

B

The “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Volt, 489 U. S., at 478; see also Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 681-682 (2010). This purpose is readily apparent from the FAA’s text. Section 2 makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” as written (subject, of course, to the saving clause); § 3 requires courts to stay litigation of arbitral claims pending arbitration of those claims “in accordance with the terms of the agreement”; and §4 requires courts to compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement” upon the motion of either party to the agreement (assuming that the “making of the arbitration agreement or the failure ... to perform the same” is not at issue). In light of these provisions, we have held that parties may agree to limit the issues subject to arbitration, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985), to arbitrate according to specific rules, Volt, supra, at 479, and to limit with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes, Stolt-Nielsen, supra, at 683.

The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be speci*345fled, for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to protect trade secrets. And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247, 269 (2009); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628.

The dissent quotes Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219 (1985), as ‘“rejecting] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.’” Post, at 360 (opinion of Breyer, J.). That is greatly misleading. After saying (accurately enough) that “the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was [not] to promote the expeditious resolution of claims,” but to “ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate,” 470 U. S., at 219, Dean Witter went on to explain: “This is not to say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it . . . .” Id., at 220. It then quotes a House Report saying that “the costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration.” Ibid, (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)). The concluding paragraph of this part of its discussion begins as follows:

“We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between two goals of the Arbitration Act — enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution — must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters.” 470 U. S., at 221.

In the present case, of course, those “two goals” do not conflict — and it is the dissent’s view that would frustrate both of them.

Contrary to the dissent’s view, our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration. *346They have repeatedly described the Act as “embod[ying] [a] national policy favoring arbitration,” Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U. S., at 443, and “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 24; see also Hall Street Assocs., 552 U. S., at 581. Thus, in Preston v. Ferrer, holding pre-empted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before arbitration, we said: “A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve 'streamlined proceedings and expeditious results/ ” which objective would be “frustrated” by requiring a dispute to be heard by an agency first. 552 U. S., at 357-358. That rule, we said, would, “at the least, hinder speedy resolution of the controversy.” Id., at 358.5

California’s Discover Bank rule similarly interferes with arbitration. Although the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post. The rule is limited to adhesion contracts, Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th, at 162-163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110, but the times in which consumer contracts were anything *347other than adhesive are long past.6 Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F. 3d 903, 906 (CA7 2004); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1147, 1149 (CA7 1997). The rule also requires that damages be predictably small, and that the consumer allege a scheme to cheat consumers. Discover Bank, supra, at 162-163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110. The former requirement, however, is toothless and malleable (the Ninth Circuit has held that damages of $4,000 are sufficiently small, see Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Fed. Appx. 489, 492 (2009) (unpublished)), and the latter has no limiting effect, as all that is required is an allegation. Consumers remain free to bring and resolve their disputes on a bilateral basis under Discover Bank, and some may well do so; but there is little incentive for lawyers to arbitrate on behalf of individuals when they may do so for a class and reap far higher fees in the process. And faced with inevitable class arbitration, companies would have less incentive to continue resolving potentially duplicative claims on an individual basis.

Although we have had little occasion to examine classwide arbitration, our decision in Stolt-Nielsen is instructive. In that case we held that an arbitration panel exceeded its power under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA by imposing class procedures based on policy judgments rather than the arbitration agreement itself or some background principle of contract law that would affect its interpretation. 559 U. S., at 684-687. We then held that the agreement at issue, which was silent on the question of class procedures, could not be interpreted to allow them because the “changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” are “fundamental.” Id., at 686. This is obvious as a *348structural matter: Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.

First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration — its informality — and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment. “In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.” 559 U. S., at 685. But before an arbitrator may decide the merits of a claim in classwide procedures, he must first decide, for example, whether the class itself may be certified, whether the named parties are sufficiently representative and typical, and how discovery for the class should be conducted. A cursory comparison of bilateral and class arbitration illustrates the difference. According to the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the average consumer arbitration between January and August 2007 resulted in a disposition on the merits in six months, four months if the arbitration was conducted by documents only. AAA, Analysis of the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload, online at http://www.adr.org/si.asp7idr: 5027 (all Internet materials as visited Apr. 25, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). As of September 2009, the AAA had opened 283 class arbitrations. Of those, 121 remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, *349or dismissed. Not a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits. Brief for AAA as Amicus Curiae in Stolt-Nielsen, O. T. 2009, No. 08-1198, pp. 22-24. For those cases that were no longer active, the median time from filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal — not judgment on the merits — was 583 days, and the mean was 630 days. Id., at 24.7

Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. The AAAs rules governing class arbitrations mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class litigation. Compare AAA, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (effective Oct. 8, 2003), online at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936, with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23. And while parties can alter those procedures by contract, an alternative is not obvious. If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be bound by the arbitration. For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 811-812 (1985). At least this amount of process would presumably be required for absent parties to be bound by the results of arbitration.

We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator. Indeed, class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925; as the California Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank, class arbitration is a “relatively recent development.” 36 Cal. 4th, at 163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110. And it is at the very *350least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due process rights are satisfied.

Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts. But when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims. Other courts have noted the risk of “in terrorem” settlements that class actions entail, see, e. g., Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Management Co. LLC, 571 F. 3d 672, 677-678 (CA7 2009), and class arbitration would be no different.

Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an interlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final judgment as well. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact for clear error. In contrast, 9 U. S. C. § 10 allows a court to vacate an arbitral award only where the award “was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; “there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing ... or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy^] or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; or if the “arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award ... was not made.” The AAA rules do authorize judicial review of certification decisions, but this review is unlikely to have much effect given these limitations; review under § 10 focuses on misconduct *351rather than mistake. And parties may not contractually expand the grounds or nature of judicial review. Hall Street Assocs., 552 U. S., at 578. We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.8

The Concepcions contend that because parties may and sometimes do agree to aggregation, class procedures are not necessarily incompatible with arbitration. But the same could be said about procedures that the Concepcions admit States may not superimpose on arbitration: Parties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations. Rent-A-Center, West, 561 U. S., at 67-69. But what the parties in the aforementioned examples would have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state law.

The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system. See post, at 365. But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons. Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go unresolved. As noted earlier, the arbitration agreement provides that AT&T will *352pay claimants a minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer. The District Court found this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be “essentially guarantee^]” to be made whole, 584 F. 3d, at 856, n. 9. Indeed, the District Court concluded that the Concepcions were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class action, which “could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.” Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, *12.

* * *

Because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941), California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the FAA. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1

The Concepcions’ original contract was with Cingular Wireless. AT&T acquired Cingular in 2005 and renamed the company AT&T Mobility in 2007. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F. 3d 849, 852, n. 1 (CA9 2009).

2

That provision further states that “the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.

3

The guaranteed minimum recovery was increased in 2009 to $10,000. Brief for Petitioner 7.

4

The dissent seeks to fight off even this eminently reasonable concession. It says that to its knowledge "we have not. . . applied the Act to strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative proceedings,” post, at 366 (opinion of Breyer, J.), and that “we should think more than twice before invalidating a state law that ... puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing,’ ” post, at 361.

5

Relying upon nothing more indicative of congressional understanding than statements of witnesses in committee hearings and a press release of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, the dissent suggests that Congress “thought that arbitration would be used primarily where merchants sought to resolve disputes of fact. . . [and] possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power.” Post, at 362. Such a limitation appears nowhere in the text of the FAA and has been explicitly rejected by our eases. “Relationships between securities dealers and investors, for example, may involve unequal bargaining power, but we [have] nevertheless held ... that agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 33 (1991); see also id., at 32-33 (allowing arbitration of claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 despite allegations of unequal bargaining power between employers and employees). Of course the dissent’s disquisition on legislative history fails to note that it contains nothing — not even the testimony of a stray witness in committee hearings — that contemplates the existence of class arbitration.

6

Of course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion — for example, requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhesive agreements to be highlighted. Such steps cannot, however, conflict with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.

7

The dissent claims that class arbitration should be compared to class litigation, not bilateral arbitration. Post, at 363. Whether arbitrating a class is more desirable than litigating one, however, is not relevant. A State cannot defend a rule requiring arbitration-by-jui'y by saying that parties will still prefer it to trial-by-jury.

8

The dissent cites three large arbitration awards (none of which stems from elasswide arbitration) as evidence that parties are willing to submit large claims before an arbitrator. Post, at 364. Those examples might be in point if it could be established that the size of the arbitral dispute was predictable when the arbitration agreement was entered. Otherwise, all the eases prove is that arbitrators can give huge awards — which we have never doubted. The point is that in class-action arbitration huge awards (with limited judicial review) will be entirely predictable, thus rendering arbitration unattractive. It is not reasonably deniable that requiring consumer disputes to be arbitrated on a elasswide basis will have a substantial deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an arbitration provision “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. § 2. The question here is whether California’s Discover Bank rule, see Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), is a “groun[d]... for the revocation of any contract.”

It would be absurd to suggest that § 2 requires only that a defense apply to “any contract.” If §2 means anything, it *353is that courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agreements because of a state public policy against arbitration, even if the policy nominally applies to “any contract.” There must be some additional limit on the contract defenses permitted by § 2. Cf. ante, at 351 (opinion of the Court) (state law may not require procedures that are “not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA” and “lac[k] its benefits”); post, at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (state law may require only procedures that are “consistent with the use of arbitration”).

I write separately to explain how I would find that limit in the FAA’s text. As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress. 9 U. S. C. §§ 2, 4. Under this reading, I would reverse the Court of Appeals because a district court cannot follow both the FAA and the Discover Bank rule, which does not relate to defects in the making of an agreement.

This reading of the text, however, has not been fully developed by any party, cf. Brief for Petitioner 41, n. 12, and could benefit from briefing and argument in an appropriate case. Moreover, I think that the Court’s test will often lead to the same outcome as my textual interpretation and that, when possible, it is important in interpreting statutes to give lower courts guidance from a majority of the Court. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U. S. 391, 411 (2002) (O'Con-nor, J., concurring). Therefore, although I adhere to my views on purposes-and-objectives pre-emption, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 582 (2009) (opinion concurring in judgment), I reluctantly join the Court’s opinion.

I

The FAA generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written. Section 2 provides that “[a] written provision in ... a contract ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract. . . shall *354be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Significantly, the statute does not parallel the words “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” by referencing the grounds as exist for the “invalidation, revocation, or non-enforcement” of any contract. Nor does the statute use a different word or phrase entirely that might arguably encompass validity, revocability, and enforceability. The use of only “revocation” and the conspicuous omission of “invalidation” and “nonenforcement” suggest that the exception does not include all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Coneededly, the difference between revocability, on the one hand, and validity and enforceability, on the other, is not obvious. The statute does not define the terms, and their ordinary meanings arguably overlap. Indeed, this Court and others have referred to the concepts of revocability, validity, and enforceability interchangeably. But this ambiguity alone cannot justify ignoring Congress’ clear decision in §2 to repeat only one of the three concepts.

To clarify the meaning of §2, it would be natural to look to other portions of the FAA. Statutory interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997). “A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme ... because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988).

Examining the broader statutory scheme, § 4 can be read to clarify the scope of § 2’s exception to the enforcement of *355arbitration agreements. When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court, §4 requires that “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,” the court must order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”

Reading §§ 2 and 4 harmoniously, the “grounds ... for the revocation” preserved in § 2 would mean grounds related to the making of the agreement. This would require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1967) (interpreting § 4 to permit federal courts to adjudicate claims of “fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself” because such claims “g[o] to the 'making’ of the agreement to arbitrate”). Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement — such as public policy — could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.*

*356II

Under this reading, the question here would be whether California’s Discover Bank rule relates to the making of an agreement. I think it does not.

In Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 113 P. 3d 1100, the California Supreme Court held that “class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully exculpatory.” Id., at 165, 113 P. 3d, at 1112; see also id., at 161, 113 P. 3d, at 1108 (“[C]lass action waivers [may be] substantively unconscionable inasmuch as they may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy”). The court concluded that where a class-action waiver is found in an arbitration agreement in certain consumer contracts of adhesion, such waivers “should not be enforced.” Id., at 163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110. In practice, the court explained, such agreements “operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be imposed under California law.” Id., at 161, 113 P. 3d, at 1109. The court did not conclude that a customer would sign such an agreement only if under the influence of fraud, duress, or delusion.

The court’s analysis and conclusion that the arbitration agreement was exculpatory reveals that the Discover Bank rule does not concern the making of the arbitration agreement. Exculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic example of contracts that will not be enforced because of public policy. *35715 G. Giesel, Corbin on Contracts §§85.1, 85.17, 85.18 (rev. ed. 2003). Indeed, the court explained that it would not enforce the agreements because they are “‘against the policy of the law.’” 36 Cal. 4th, at 161, 113 P. 3d, at 1108 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1668 (West 1985)); see also 36 Cal. 4th, at 166, 113 P. 3d, at 1112 (“Agreements to arbitrate may not be used to harbor terms, conditions and practices that undermine public policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Refusal to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made.

Accordingly, the Discover Bank rule is not a “groun[d]... for the revocation of any contract” as I would read § 2 of the FA A in light of § 4. Under this reading, the FA A dictates that the arbitration agreement here be enforced and the Discover Bank rule is pre-empted.

*

The interpretation I suggest would be consistent with our precedent. Contract formation is based on the consent of the parties, and we have emphasized that “[ajrbitration under the Act is a matter of consent.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989).

The statement in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987), suggesting that §2 preserves all state-law defenses that “arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,” id., at 493, n. 9, is dicta. This statement is found in a footnote concerning a claim that the Court “decline[d] to address.” Id., at 492, n. 9. Similarly, to the extent that statements in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 69, n. 1 (2010), can be read to suggest anything about the scope of state-law defenses under § 2, those statements are dicta, as well. This Court has néver addressed the question whether the state-law “grounds” referred to in §2 are narrower than those applicable to any contract.

Moreover, every specific contract defense that the Court has acknowledged is applicable under §2 relates to contract formation. In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996), this Court said *356that fraud, duress, and unconscionability “may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.” All three defenses historically concern the making of an agreement. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U. S. 527, 547 (2008) (describing fraud and duress as “traditional grounds for the abrogation of [a] contract” that speak to “unfair dealing at the contract formation stage”); Hume v. United States, 132 U. S. 406, 411, 414 (1889) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make” and suggesting that there may be “contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise the presumption of fraud in their inception” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.

The Federal Arbitration Act says that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added). California law sets forth certain circumstances in which “class action waivers” in any contract are unenforceable. In my view, this rule of state law is consistent with the federal Act’s language and primary objective. It does not “stan[d] as an obstacle” to the Act’s “accomplishment and execution.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). And the Court is wrong to hold that the federal Act pre-empts the rule of state law.

I

The California law in question consists of an authoritative state-court interpretation of two provisions of the California Civil Code. The first provision makes unlawful all contracts “which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own .. . violation of law.” *358Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1668 (West 1985). The second provision authorizes courts to “limit the application of any unconscionable clause” in a contract so “as to avoid any unconscionable result.” § 1670.5(a).

The specific rule of state law in question consists of the California Supreme Court’s application of these principles to hold that “some” (but not “all”) “class action waivers” in consumer contracts are exculpatory and unconscionable under California “law.” Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 160, 162, 113 P. 3d 1100, 1108, 1110 (2005). In particular, in Discover Bank the California Supreme Court stated that, when a class-action waiver

“is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ ” Id., at 162-163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110.

In such a circumstance, the “waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” Id., at 163, 113 R 3d, at 1110.

The Discover Bank rule does not create a “blanket policy in California against class action waivers in the consumer context.” Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (CD Cal. 2006). Instead, it represents the “application of a more general [unconscionability] principle.” Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457, 165 P. 3d 556,564 (2007). Courts applying California law have enforced class-action waivers where they satisfy general unconscionability standards. See, e. g., Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Diamond Foods, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 634, 647-650, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d *359449, 459-462 (2010); Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 4th 825, 843-845, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 305-307 (2010); Smith v. Americredit Financial Servs., Inc., No. 09cv1076, 2009 WL 4895280 (SD Cal., Dec. 11, 2009); cf. Provencher, supra, at 1201 (considering Discover Bank in choice-of-law inquiry). And even when they fail, the parties remain free to devise other dispute mechanisms, including informal mechanisms, that, in context, will not prove unconscionable. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989).

II

A

The Discover Bank rule is consistent with the federal Act’s language. It “applies equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in .contracts with such agreements.” 36 Cal. 4th, at 165-166, 113 P. 3d, at 1112. Linguistically speaking, it falls directly within the scope of the Act’s exception permitting courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements on grounds that exist “for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added). The majority agrees. Ante, at 343.

B

The Discover Bank rule is also consistent with the basic “purpose behind” the Act. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219 (1985). We have described that purpose as one of “ensuring] judicial enforcement” of arbitration agreements. Ibid.; see also Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, 274, n. 2 (1932) (“ ‘The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration’ ” (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong, 1st Sess., 1 (1924); emphasis added)); 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in *360admiralty contracts”). As is well known, prior to the federal Act, many courts expressed hostility to arbitration, for example, by refusing to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate. See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924). The Act sought to eliminate that hostility by placing agreements to arbitrate “ ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, at 2; emphasis added).

Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide procedural and cost advantages. The House Report emphasized the “appropriate[ness]” of making arbitration agreements enforceable “at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation.” Id., at 2. And this Court has acknowledged that parties may enter into arbitration agreements in order to expedite the resolution of disputes. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 357 (2008) (discussing “prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate”). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985).

But we have also cautioned against thinking that Congress’ primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural advantages. Rather, that primary objective was to secure the “enforcement” of agreements to arbitrate. Dean Witter, 470 U. S., at 221. See also id., at 219 (we “reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims”); id., at 219, 217 (“[T]he intent of Congress” requires us to apply the terms of the Act without regard to whether the result would be “possibly inefficient”); cf. id., at 220 (acknowledging that “expedited resolution of disputes” might lead parties to prefer arbitration). The relevant Senate Report points to the Act’s basic purpose when it says that “[t]he purpose of the [Act] is clearly set forth in section 2,” S. Rep. No. 536, at 2 (emphasis added), namely, the section that says that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, ir*361revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” 9U.S. C. §2.

Thus, insofar as we seek to implement Congress’ intent, we should think more than twice before invalidating a state law that does just what §2 requires, namely, puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate “upon the same footing.”

Ill

The majority’s contrary view (that Discover Bank stands as an “obstacle” to the accomplishment of the federal law’s objective, ante, at 344-352) rests primarily upon its claims that the Discover Bank rule increases the complexity of arbitration procedures, thereby discouraging parties from entering into arbitration agreements, and to that extent discriminating in practice against arbitration. These claims are not well founded.

For one thing, a state rule of law that would sometimes set aside as unconscionable a contract term that forbids class arbitration is not (as the majority claims) like a rule that would require “ultimate disposition by a jury” or “judicially monitored discovery” or use of “the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Ante, at 342, 344. Unlike the majority’s examples, class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration. It is a form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed elsewhere. See, e. g., Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (App. 1980) (officially depublished); American Arbitration Association (AAA), Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (2003), http://www.adr.org/ sp.asp?id=21936 (as visited Apr. 25, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); JAMS, The Resolution Experts, Class Action Procedures (2009). Indeed, the AAA has told us that it has found class arbitration to be “a fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class disputes.” Brief for AAA as Amicus Curiae in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Animal-Feeds Int’l Corp., O. T. 2009, No. 08-1198, p. 25 (hereinafter *362AAA Amicus Brief). And unlike the majority’s examples, the Discover Bank rule imposes equivalent limitations on litigation; hence it cannot fairly be characterized as a targeted attack on arbitration.

Where does the majority get its contrary idea — that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a “fundamental attribute]” of arbitration? Ante, at 344. The majority does not explain. And it is unlikely to be able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.

When Congress enacted the Act, arbitration procedures had not yet been fully developed. Insofar as Congress considered detailed forms of arbitration at all, it may well have thought that arbitration would be used primarily where merchants sought to resolve disputes of fact, not law, under the customs of their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power. See Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H. R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1924); Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9-10 (1923); Dept, of Commerce, Secretary Hoover Favors Arbitration — Press Release (Dec. 28, 1925), Herbert Hoover Papers, Articles, Addresses, and Public Statements File, No. 536, p. 2 (Herbert Hoover Presidential Library); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 281 (1926); AAA, Year Book on Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1927). This last mentioned feature of the history — roughly equivalent bargaining power — suggests, if anything, that California’s statute is consistent with, and indeed may help to further, the objectives that Congress had in mind.

Regardless, if neither the history nor present practice suggests that class arbitration is fundamentally incompatible with arbitration itself, then on what basis can the majority hold California’s law pre-empted?

*363For another thing, the majority’s argument that the Discover Bank rule will discourage arbitration rests critically upon the wrong comparison. The majority compares the complexity of class arbitration with that of bilateral arbitration. See ante, at 348-349. And it finds the former more complex. See ibid. But, if incentives are at issue, the relevant comparison is not “arbitration with arbitration” but a comparison between class arbitration and judicial class actions. After all, in respect to the relevant set of contracts, the Discover Bank rule similarly and equally sets aside clauses that forbid class procedures — whether arbitration procedures or ordinary judicial procedures are at issue.

Why would a typical defendant (say, a business) prefer a judicial class action to class arbitration? AAA statistics “suggest that class arbitration proceedings take more time than the average commercial arbitration, but may take less time than the average class action in court.” AAA Amicus Brief 24 (emphasis added). Data from California courts confirm that class arbitrations can take considerably less time than in-court proceedings in which class certification is sought. Compare ante, at 348-349 (providing statistics for class arbitration), with Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, Class Certification in California: Second Interim Report From the Study of California Class Action Litigation 18 (2010) (providing statistics for class-action litigation in California courts). And a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy resolution of disputes were all that mattered, then the Discover Bank rule would reinforce, not obstruct, that objective of the Act.

The majority’s related claim that the Discover Bank rule will discourage the use of arbitration because “ [arbitration is poorly suited to ... higher stakes” lacks empirical support. Ante, at 350. Indeed, the majority provides no convincing reason to believe that parties are unwilling to submit high-*364stake disputes to arbitration. And there are numerous counterexamples. Loftus, Rivals Resolve Dispute Over Drug, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 16, 2011, p. B2 (discussing $500 million settlement in dispute submitted to arbitration); Ziobro, Kraft Seeks Arbitration in Fight With Starbucks Over Distribution, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 2010, p. B10 (describing initiation of an arbitration in which the payout “could be higher” than $1.5 billion); Markoff, Software Arbitration Ruling Gives I.B.M. $833 Million From Fujitsu, N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, p. A1 (describing both companies as “pleased with the ruling” resolving a licensing dispute).

Further, even though contract defenses, e. g., duress and unconscionability, slow down the dispute resolution process, federal arbitration law normally leaves such matters to the States. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 68 (2010) (arbitration agreements '“may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses’” (quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996))). A provision in a contract of adhesion (for example, requiring a consumer to decide very quickly whether to pursue a claim) might increase the speed and efficiency of arbitrating a dispute, but the State can forbid it. See, e. g., Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122 Ohio St. 3d 63, 67, 2009-0hio-2054, ¶ 19, 908 N. E. 2d 408, 412 (“Unconscionability is a ground for revocation of an arbitration agreement”); In re Poly-America, L. P, 262 S. W. 3d 337, 348 (Tex. 2008) (“Unconscionable contracts, however — whether relating to arbitration or not — are unenforceable under Texas law”). The Discover Bank rule amounts to a variation on this theme. California is free to define unconscionability as it sees fit, and its common law is of no federal concern so long as the State does not adopt a special rule that disfavors arbitration. Cf. Doctor’s Associates, supra, at 687. See also ante, at 355-356, n. (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that, under certain circumstances, California might remain free to apply its unconscionability doctrine).

*365Because California applies the same legal principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the unconscionability of any other contractual provision, the merits of class proceedings should not factor into our decision. If California had applied its law of duress to void an arbitration agreement, would it matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement were efficient?

Regardless, the majority highlights the disadvantages of class arbitrations, as it sees them. See ante, at 350 (referring to the “greatly increase[d] risks to defendants”; the “chance of a devastating loss” pressuring defendants “into settling questionable claims”). But class proceedings have countervailing advantages. In general agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate. I suspect that it is true even here, for as the Court of Appeals recognized, AT&T can avoid the $7,500 payout (the payout that supposedly makes the Concepcions’ arbitration worthwhile) simply by paying the claim’s face value, such that “the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.” Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F. 3d 849, 855, 856 (CA9 2009).

What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim? See, e. g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F. 3d 656, 661 (CA7 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”). In California’s perfectly rational view, nonclass arbitration over such sums will also sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims (say, for example, where claiming the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms that require technical legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on hold). Discover Bank sets forth circumstances in which the California courts believe that the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated to *366insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds by “deliberately cheating] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.” 36 Cal. 4th, at 162-163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110. Why is this kind of decision— weighing the pros and cons of all class proceedings alike— not California’s to make?

Finally, the majority can find no meaningful support for its views in this Court’s precedent. The federal Act has been in force for nearly a century. We have decided dozens of cases about its requirements. We have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures. E. g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U. S., at 629 (antitrust claims arising in international transaction are arbitrable). We have upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slow down arbitration proceedings. E. g., Volt Information Sciences, 489 U. S., at 477-479 (California law staying arbitration proceedings until completion of related litigation is not pre-empted). But we have not, to my knowledge, applied the Act to strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative proceedings. Cf. Preston, 552 U. S., at 355-356 (Act pre-empts state law that vests primary jurisdiction in state administrative board).

At the same time, we have repeatedly referred to the Act’s basic objective as ensuring that courts treat arbitration agreements “like all other contracts.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 447 (2006). See also, e. g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, 64 (2009); Doctor’s Associates, supra, at 687; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 281 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 483-484 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 492-493, n. 9 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 627. And we have recognized that “[t]o immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge” on grounds applicable to all other contracts “would be to elevate it over other forms of contract.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. *367395, 404, n. 12 (1967); see also Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 299, 169 N. E. 386, 391 (1929) (Cardozo, C. J.) (“Courts are not at liberty to shirk the process of [contractual] construction under the empire of a belief that arbitration is beneficent any more than they may shirk it if their belief happens to be the contrary”); Cohen & Dayton, 12 Va. L. Rev., at 276 (the Act “is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws”).

These cases do not concern the merits and demerits of class actions; they concern equal treatment of arbitration contracts and other contracts. Since it is the latter question that is at issue here, I am not surprised that the majority can find no meaningful precedent supporting its decision.

IV

By using the words “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” Congress retained for the States an important role incident to agreements to arbitrate. 9 U. S. C. § 2. Through those words Congress reiterated a basic federal idea that has long informed the nature of this Nation’s laws. We have often expressed this idea in opinions that set forth presumptions. See, e. g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action”). But federalism is as much a question of deeds as words. It often takes the form of a concrete decision by this Court that respects the legitimacy of a State’s action in an individual case. Here, recognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold California’s law, not to strike it down. We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.

With respect, I dissent.

4.2 Fraud 4.2 Fraud

4.2.1 Halpert v. Rosenthal 4.2.1 Halpert v. Rosenthal

267 A.2d 730.

Ruth S. Halpert vs. Martin G. Rosenthal.

JULY 20, 1970.

Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.

*408Kelleher, J.

This is a civil action wherein the plaintiff vendor seeks damages for the breach by the defendant ven*409dee of a contract for the sale of real estate. The defendant filed a counter-claim in which he sought the return of his deposit. A jury trial was held in the Superior Court. The jury found for the defendant and judgment followed. The case is before us on the plaintiff’s appeal.

On February 21, 1967, the parties hereto entered into a real estate agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to convey a one-family house located in Providence on the southeasterly corner of Way land and Upton Avenues to defendant for the sum of $54,000. The defendant paid a deposit' of $2,000 to plaintiff. The agreement provided for the delivery of the deed and the payment of the balance of the purchase price by June 30, 1967.

On May 17, 1967, a termite inspection was made of the premises, and it was discovered that the house was inhabited by termites. The defendant then notified plaintiff that, because of the termite infestation, he was not going to purchase the property. The defendant did not appear for the title closing which plaintiff had scheduled for June 30, 1967.

The plaintiff immediately commenced this suit. Her complaint prayed for specific performance or monetary damages.. When the case came on for trial, the property had been sold to another buyer for the sum of $35,000. The plaintiff then sought to recover from defendant the $19,000 difference between the selling price called for in the sales agreement and the actual selling price. The defendant in his answer alleged that plaintiff and her agent had, during the preagreement negotiation, intentionally misrepresented the house as being free of termites. The defendant’s counterclaim sought the return of the $2,000 deposit.

At the conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence, plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. The trial *410justice reserved decision on the motion and submitted the case to the jury. After the jury’s verdict, he denied the motion.

This case is unique in that plaintiff made no motion for a new trial. Her appeal is based for the most part on the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict in her favor on the counterclaim. She has also alleged that the trial justice erred in certain portions of his charge to the jury and in failing to adopt some 15 requests to charge submitted by plaintiff.

The absence of a motion for a new trial narrows the scope of an inquiry on appeal. Instead of being concerned with the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence as we would be were we reviewing the usual motion for a new trial, we apply the standards applicable to a motion for a directed verdict. In doing so, it is our duty to consider all of the evidence and reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to defendant. Cofone v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, Inc., 103 R. I. 345, 237 A.2d 717; Gramolini v. Marsalkowski, 102 R. I. 85, 228 A.2d 537.

Since we consider only the evidence favorable to defendant, we shall set forth defendant’s version of three different occasions in 1967 when the alleged misrepresentations relative to absence of any termites were made.

1. In early February, defendant and his wife inspected the Halpert home. They asked the agent about termites and he told them that there was no termite problem and that he had never experienced any termite problem with any of the houses he sold in the East Side section of Providence.

2. Later on in February, defendant, his wife, his sister-in-law and his brother-in-law met plaintiff. The brother-in-law inquired about the presence of termites; plaintiff said that there were no termites in the house.

*4113. When defendant was about to sign the purchase and sales agreement, he asked plaintiff's real estate agent whether it might not be advisable if the home be inspected for termites before the agreement was signed. The agent told defendant that such a step was unnecessary because there were no termite problems in the house.

The plaintiff contends that any statements or representations attributed to her or her agent were qualified in that when asked about the termites, they replied that to the best of their knowledge or experience the Wayland Avenue property was termite free. What she overlooks is that in our consideration of the correctness of the denial of her motion for a direction, we can consider only that evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom which favor defendant. We do not weigh the evidence to determine whether her or her agent's representations were qualified or unqualified. ■

In contending that she was entitled to a directed verdict, plaintiff contends that to sustain the charge of fraudulent misrepresentation, some evidence had to be produced showing that either, she or her agent knew at the time they said there were no termites in the house, that such a statement was untrue. Since the representations made to defendant were made in good faith, she argues that, as a matter of law, defendant could not prevail on his counterclaim:

The defendant concedes that there was no evidence which shows that plaintiff or her agent knowingly made false statements as to the existence of the termites but he •maintains that an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact is grounds for rescission of a contract where, as here, a party relies to his detriment on the misrepresentation.

We affirm the denial of the motion for a directed verdict.

The plaintiff, when she made her motion for a directed verdict, stated that her motion was restricted to the issue *412of “fraud.” The word “fraud” is a generic term which embraces a great variety of actionable wrongs. LaCourse v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877. It is a word of many meanings and defies any one all-inclusive definition. Fraud may become important either for the purpose of giving thé defrauded person the right to sue for damages in an action for deceit or to enable him to rescind the contract. 12 Williston, Contracts §1487 at 322 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1970). In this jurisdiction a party who has been induced by fraud to enter into a contract may pursue either one of two remedies. He may elect to rescind the contract to recover what he has paid under it, or he may affirm the contract and sue for damages in an action for deceit. Goodwin v. Silverman, 71 R. I. 163, 43 A.2d 50; Robinson v. Standard Stores, Inc., 52 R. I. 271, 160 A. 471; Moran v. Tucker, 40 R. I. 485, 101 A. 327.

The distinction between a claim for damages for intentional deceit and a claim for rescission is well defined. Deceit is a tort action, and it requires some degree of culpability on the misrepresenter’s part. Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.) §100. An individual who sues in an action of deceit based on fraud has the burden of proving that the defendant in making the statements knew they were false and intended to deceive him. Cliftex Clothing Co. v. DiSanto, 88 R. I. 338, 148 A.2d 273; Conti v. Walter Winters, Inc., 86 R. I. 456, 136 A.2d 622. On the other hand, a suit to rescind an agreement induced by fraud sounds in contract. It is this latter aspect of fraud that we are concerned with in this case, and the pivotal issue before us is whether an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact warrants the granting of a claim for rescission. We believe that it does.

When he denied plaintiff’s motion, the trial justice indicated that a false, though innocent, misrepresentation of a fact made as though of one’s knowledge may be the basis for the rescission of a contract. While this issue is one of *413first impression in this state, it is clear that the trial judge’s action finds support in the overwhelming weight of decisional and textual authority which has established the rule that where one induces another to enter into a contract by means of a material misrepresentation, the latter may rescind the contract. It does not matter if the representation was “innocent” or fraudulent.

In 12 Williston, supra, §1500 at 400-01, Professor Jaeger states:

“It is not necessary, in order that a contract may be rescinded for fraud or misrepresentation, that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false. Innocent misrepresentation is sufficient, for though the representation may have been made innocently, it would be unjust and inequitable to permit a person who has made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.”

This statement of law is in accord with Restatement of Contracts, §476 at 908 which states:

“Where a party is induced to enter into a transaction with another party that he was under no duty to enter into by means of the latter’s fraud or material misrepresentation, the transaction is voidable as against the latter * *

Misrepresentation is defined as

“* * any manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts.” Restatement of Contracts, §470 at 890-91.

The comment following this section explains that a misrepresentation may be innocent, negligent or known to be false. A misrepresentation becomes material when it becomes likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with another person. Restatement of Contracts, §470 (2) at 891. Section 28 of Restatement of Restitution is also in accord with this proposition of law that a transaction can be rescinded for innocent mis*414representation of a material fact. In addition, many courts have also adopted this rule including the following: Lehnhardt v. City, 105 Ariz. 142, 460 P.2d 637; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Anaya, 78 N. M. 101, 428 P.2d 640; Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398; Hudspeth v. Zorn, (Mo.) 292 S.W.2d 271; Keeton Packing Co. v. State, (Tex.) 437 S.W.2d 20; Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGrath, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245; Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912; Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 168 N.W.2d 201; Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700; Berger v. Pittsburgh Auto Equipment Co., 387 Pa. 61, 127 A.2d 334.

In Watkins v. Grady County Soil & Water Conservation District, (Okla.) 438 P.2d 491, 495, the court ordered cancellation of an easement agreement that was procured by a material misrepresentation honestly made with no intent to deceive. The court reasoned that the question is “* * * not whether the representation is knowingly false, but whether the other party believed it to be true and thus was misled by such misrepresentations into making the contract.”

In Williams v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141 N.W.2d 650, the court indicated that relief would be available if there was in fact a misrepresentation, though made innocently, and if its deceptive influence was effective, the consequences to the plaintiff being as serious as though it proceeded from a vicious purpose. Citing Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109, the court said that in determining whether relief is appropriate, courts must look to the effect of the untrue statement upon the person to whom it is made, rather than to the motive of the one making the representation.

In Ham v. Hart, 58 N. M. 550, 273 P.2d 748, the court in holding that the honesty and good faith of the person making misrepresentations is immaterial, quoted the fol*415lowing excerpt from 1 Story Equity Jurisprudence §272 (14 ed.):

“ 'Whether the party thus misrepresenting a material fact knew it to be false, or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or false, is wholly immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally in morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a material fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive; for it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the other party.’ ” 58 N. M. at 552, 273 P.2d at 749.

It is true that some courts require proof of knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation before a contract may be invalidated. Wilkinson v. Appleton, 28 Ill. 2d 184, 190 N.E.2d 727; Classic Bowl, Inc. v. AMF Pinspotters, Inc., 403 F.2d 463; Southern Roofing & Petroleum Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 725. However, the weight of authority follows the view that the misrepresenter’s good faith is immaterial. We believe this view the better one.

A misrepresentation, even though innocently made, may be actionable, if made and relied on as a positive statement of fact. The question to be resolved in determining whether a wrong committed as the result of an innocent misrepresentation may be rectified is succinctly stated in 12 Willis-ton, supra, §1510 at 462 as follows:

“When a defendant has induced another to act by representations false in fact although not dishonestly made, and damage has directly resulted from the action taken, who should bear the loss?”

The question we submit is rhetorical. The answer is obvious. Simple justice demands that the speaker be held responsible. Accordingly, we hold that here defendant vendee could maintain his counterclaim.

The plaintiff’s second contention is to the effect that even if an innocent misrepresentation without knowledge *416of, its falsity may under certain circumstances entitle the misrepresentee to relief by way of rescission, defendant cannot maintain his action because the sales agreement contains a merger clause. This provision immediately precedes the testimoniujn clause and provides that the contract * * contains the entire agreement between the parties, and that it is subject to no understandings, conditions or representations other than those expressly stated herein.” The plaintiff argues that in order to enable a purchaser to rescind a contract containing a merger clause because of a misrepresentation, proof of a fraudulent misrepresentation must be shown. We find no merit in this argument.

If, as plaintiff concedes, a merger clause, such as is found within the sales contract now before us, will not prevent a rescission based on a fraudulent misrepresentation,1 there is no valid reason to say that it will prevent a rescission of an agreement which is the result of a false though innocent misrepresentation where both innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations render a contract voidable. See Restatement of Contracts, §476. As we observed before, the availability of the remedy of rescission is motivated by the obvious inequity of allowing a person who has made the innocent misrepresentation to retain the fruits of the bargain induced thereby. If we are to permit a party to rescind a contract which is the result of an innocent misrepresentation, the “boiler plate” found in the merger clause shall not bar the use of this remedy.

The plaintiff also makes much ado about the difference between what the vendee alleged in his counterclaim and what he proved at trial. She directs our attention to the *417undisputed fact that defendant pleaded an intentional misrepresentation of fact, whereas at trial he adduced evidence which would show that the contract was signed because of the innocent misrepresentation about the termites.

While the difference between defendant’s “allegata” and his “probata” might have had some significance in the days prior to the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure in the Superior Court, we observed in Cofone v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, Inc., supra, that the common-law requirement that the proof conform to the pleadings is no longer the law in this jurisdiction. It has been negated, we said, by that portion of Rule 15 (b) which provides that where an issue is tried in a cause by the expressed or implied consent of the parties, it shall be treated in all respects as if it had been pleaded even in the absence of amendment. An examination of the record shows that at no time during the Superior Court trial did plaintiff make objection to the trial justice that defendant’s evidence was at variance with his plea. The only objection lodged by plaintiff to defendant’s evidence relative to the alleged misrepresentations was that it violated the provisions of the contract’s merger clause. Later in the trial, plaintiff stated that she would show that defendant’s failure to purchase her home was due to reasons other than the presence of the termites. We therefore hold that plaintiff’s complaint of a variance between the pleading and the proof comes too late in this litigation to warrant any consideration.

Before leaving this phase of plaintiff’s appeal, we think it appropriate that we allude to the tendency of many courts to equate an innocent misrepresentation with some species of fraud. Usually the word “fraud” connotes a conscious dishonest conduct on the part of the misrepresenter. Fraud, however, is not present if the speaker actually believes that what he states as the truth is the truth. *418We believe that it’ would be better if an innocent misrepresentation was not described as some specie of fraud. Unqualified statements imply certainty. Reliance is more likely to be placed on a positive statement of fact than a mere expression of opinion or a qualified statement. The speaker who uses the unqualified statement does so at his peril. The risk of falsity is his. If he is to be liable for what he states, the liability is imposed because he is to be held strictly accountable for his words. Responsibility for an innocent misrepresentation should be recognized for what it is&emdash;an example of absolute liability rather than as many courts have said, an example of constructive fraud. See 12 Williston, supra, §1510; 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts §7.7.

When we consider plaintiff’s allegations as to the errors committed by the trial justice in charging or in failing to charge the jury, we note that in most instances she has failed to comply with that portion of Rule 51 of Super. R. Civ. P. which states that a person objecting to the giving of or failure to give certain instructions shall specifically state the grounds for his objection. This provision is designed to give the trial justice an opportunity to correct any error in his charge. While plaintiff has lodged numerous objections to the charge as given and to the court’s failure to charge, she has in most instances given no reason for any of the objections made. We shall not consider any of the objections taken to the trial justice’s failure to give the requested instructions, and we shall consider only those objections to the charge where there has been some attempt at compliance with the rule or where the reason for the objection is obvious. See Paquin v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 106 R. I. 267, 259 A.2d 115.

The plaintiff first contends that the trial justice failed to instruct the jury that the burden of proof as to the issue of misrepresentation was upon defendant. This argument *419is without merit. At one point in his instructions the trial justice made this statement:

“The defendant cannot avoid his contract unless you find, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that a misrepresentation of fact was made to him by the plaintiff or her agent and that such a misrepresentation was material to the action here disputed.”

While this portion of the charge did not specifically state that it was defendant’s burden of proof to show that a misrepresentation had been made, in our opinion it adequately conveyed to the jury the obligation which this concept placed on the proponent of an issue. In addition, the trial justice earlier in his instructions had explained to the jury the phrase “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the instructions are somewhat cryptic, the jury’s verdict is proof positive that defendant had convinced the jury that the representations attributed to plaintiff had been made.

The plaintiff states that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that misrepresentations had to be proved by “clear and convincing evidence” and not by a “preponderance of the evidence” as they were charged. Wé disagree. Long ago in Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 39 E. I. 146, 98 A. 1, we stated in clear and express language that fraud must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no reason why we should require a higher degree of proof when the good faith of the misrepresenter is unquestioned. •

The plaintiff complains that the trial justice erred when he told the jury that 'defendant could recover even though he might have been “negligent” in signing the sales agree-*420merit2 The thrust of this objection is plaintiff’s contention that either defendant’s neglect to include in the contract, a clause which would have protected his interest in the event termites were found on the property or his failure to have the premises inspected for termites prevents his recovery of the deposit. Such an argument is really aimed at the question of whether or not defendant was justified in relying on the representations made by plaintiff and her agent. We can see nothing patently absurd or ridiculous in the statements attributed to them which would warrant us in saying that defendant should be denied relief because of his failure to do what plaintiff now says he should have done. On the record before us, defendant was amply justified in believing that the home he was purchasing was free of termites.

The plaintiff’s final objection on her appeal is directed toward the refusal of the trial justice to allow her in two instances to attempt to impeach the credibility of defendant by using his answers to interrogatories as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Rule 33 (b) provides that answers to interrogatories may be used at trial to the same extent as provided in Rule 26 (d) for use of the deposition of a party. This means, in effect, that answers to interrogatories can be used by an adverse party for any purpose, including impeaching the credibility of a party as a witness, subject, however, to the evidentiary rules of admissibility.

On cross-examination plaintiff attempted to impeach the credibility of defendant in accordance with the rules stated *421above by showing that in answering interrogatories propounded to him, defendant stated that misrepresentations as to termites were made to his mother-in-law during the negotiation period. We note, however, that in direct examination, defendant made no reference • whatsoever as to what was said or not said to his mother-in-law regarding termites. Whether cross-examination should be permitted beyond those matters testified to by a witness on direct examination is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his exercise thereof will not be disturbed except upon a clear showing of an abuse of such discretion. State v. Campbell, 95 R. I. 370, 187 A.2d 543. The question propounded by plaintiff was not in cross-examination of anything testified to by defendant in direct examination. On the record before us we can see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Vingi v. Trillo, 77 R. I. 55, 73 A.2d 43.

Thereafter, later in the trial, plaintiff called defendant to the stand under the adverse party rule, G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-17-14, and attempted a second time to introduce the interrogatories for impeachment purposes. Again, the trial justice prohibited this line of questioning. Without making a determination as to the validity of this procedure under the adverse party rule, we find that there was no error. In Urbani v. Razza, 103 R. I. 445, 449, 238 A.2d 383, 386, we held that an exclusion of evidence, even if wrongful, will not suffice for a reversal unless the evidence excluded “* * * was relevant and material to a crucial issue and if it can with reason be said that such evidence, if admitted, would properly have influenced the verdict or had a controlling influence on a material aspect of the case.”

As we have noted above, the record clearly discloses considerable evidence pertinent to the misrepresentation issue. Even if we were to assume that the exclusion of the in*422terrogatories was improper, we are unable to say that it would have had such a substantial influence on the jury, if admitted, as to cause it to return a contrary verdict to that which it did. See Romanelli v. A. B. C., Inc., 104 R. I. 689, 248 A.2d 598.

Alfred M. Silverstein, for plaintiff.

Leonard Decof, for defendant.

The appeal of the plaintiff is denied and dismissed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment thereon.

Motion for reargument denied.

4.2.2 Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank 4.2.2 Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank

Opinion

QUA, Justice.
The declaration alleges that on or about September 12, 1938, the defendant sold the plaintiff a house in Newton to be occupied by the plaintiff and his family as a dwelling; that at the time of the sale the house ‘was infested with termites, an insect that is most dangerous and destructive to buildings'; that the defendant knew *678 the house was so infested; that the plaintiff could not readily observe this condition upon inspection; that ‘knowing the internal destruction that these insects were creating in said house’, the defendant falsely and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff its true condition; that the plaintiff at the time of his purchase had no knowledge of the termites, exercised due care thereafter, and learned of them about August 30, 1940; and that, because of the destruction that was being done and the dangerous condition that was being created by the termites, the plaintiff was put to great expense for repairs and for the installation of termite control in order to prevent the loss and destruction of said house.
1There is no allegation of any false statement or representation, or of the uttering of a half truth which may be tantamount to a falsehood. There is no intimation that the defendant by any means prevented the plaintiff from acquiring information as to the condition of the house. There is nothing to show any fiduciary relation between the parties, or that the plaintiff stood in a position of confidence toward or dependence upon the defendant. So far as appears the parties made a business deal at arm's length. The charge is concealment and nothing more; and it is concealment in the simple sense of mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any peculiar duty to speak. The characterization of the concealment as false and fraudulent of course adds nothing in the absence of further allegations of fact. Province Securities Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 269 Mass. 75, 92, 168 S.E. 252.
2If this defendant is liable on this declaration every seller is liable who fails to disclose any nonapparent defect known to him in the subject of the sale which materially reduces its value and which the buyer fails to discover. Similarly it would seem that every buyer would be liable who fails to disclose any nonapparent virtue known to him in the subject of the purchase which materially enhances its value and of which the seller is ignorant. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659. The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature *679 a standard so**809 idealistic as this. That the particular case here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense is scarcely to be denied. Probably the reason is to be found in the facts that the infestation of buildings by termites has not been common in Massachusetts and constitutes a concealed risk against which buyers are off their guard. But the law cannot provide special rules for termites and can hardly attempt to determine liability according to the varying probabilities of the existence and discovery of different possible defects in the subjects of trade. The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated and followed by this court in Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 52, 53; Potts v. Chapin, 133 Mass. 276;Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N.E. 705, 26 L.R.A. 430, 44 Am.St.Rep. 373; Phinney v. Friedman, 224 Mass. 531, 533, 113 N.E. 285;Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 126, 131 N.E. 454, 17 A.L.R. 669; Wellington v. Rugg, 243 Mass. 30, 35, 36, 136 N.E. 831, and Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 561, 165 N.E. 873. It is adopted in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, § 551. See Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., §§ 1497, 1498, 1499.
3The order sustaining the demurrer is affirmed, and judgment is to be entered for the defendant. Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53, 55–63, 20 N.E.2d 465.
So ordered.

4.2.3 Weintraub v. Krobatsch 4.2.3 Weintraub v. Krobatsch

NATALIE WEINTRAUB, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DONALD P. KROBATSCH AND ESTELLA KROBATSCH, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND THE SERAFIN AGENCY, INC., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued November 20, 1973

Decided March 19, 1974.

*446Mr. Charles J. Farley, Jr. argued the cause for the defendants-appellants (Messrs. Farley & Farley, attorneys).

Mr. Dean A. Gaver argued the cause for the plaintiff-respondent (Messrs. Hannoch, Weisman, 8'lern & Besser, attorneys).

Mr. Roger K. Bentley, II argued the cause for the defendant-respondent (Messrs. Zlothin & Bentley, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Jacobs, J.

The judgment entered in the Law Division, as modified in an unreported opinion of the Appellate Division, directed that the appellants Donald P. Krobatsch and Estella Krobatsch, his wife, pay the sum of $4,250 to the plaintiff Natalie Weintraub and the sum of $2,550 to the defendant The Serafín Agency, Inc. We granted certification on the application of the appellants. 63 N. J. 498 (1973).

The procedural steps below need not be dealt with at this point, other than to note that oral testimony was never taken and the matter was disposed of by summary judgment on the basis of meagre pleadings and conclusory affidavits. Eor present purposes we must resolve doubts in favor of the appellants • and must accept their factual allegations, along with the- inferences most favorable to- them. See Ruvolo v. *447American Cas. Co., 39 N. J. 490, 499 (1963); Frank Rizzo, Inc. v. Alatsas, 27 N. J. 400, 405 (1958); Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, Inc., 12 N. J. Super. 490, 495 (App. Div. 1951). -On that approach the following appears:

Mrs. Weintraub owned and occupied a six-year-old English-town home which she placed in the hands of a real estate broker (The Serafín Agency, Inc.) for sale. The Krobatsches were interested in purchasing the home, examined it while it was illuminated and found it suitable. On June 30, 1971 Mrs. Weintraub, as seller, and the Krobatsehes, as purchasers, entered into a contract for the sale of the property for $42,500. The contract provided that the purchasers had inspected the property and were fully satisfied with its physical condition, that no representations had been made and that no responsibility was assumed by the seller as to the present or future condition of the premises. A deposit of $4,250 was sent by the purchasers to the broker to be held in escrow pending the closing of the transaction. The purchasers requested that the seller have the house fumigated and that was done. A fire after the signing of the contract caused damage but the purchasers indicated readiness that there be adjustment at closing.

During the evening of August 25, 1971, prior to closing, the purchasers entered the house, then unoccupied, and as they turned the lights on they were, as described in their petition for certification, “astonished to see roaches literally running in all directions, up the walls, drapes, etc.” On the following day their attorney wrote a letter to Mrs. Weintraub, care of her New York law firm, advising that on the previous day “it was discovered that the house is infested with vermin despite the fact that an exterminator has only recently serviced the house” and asserting that “the presence of vermin in such great quantities, particularly after the exterminator was done, rendered the house as unfit for human habitation at this time and therefore, the contract is rescinded.” On September 2, 1971 an exterminator wrote to Mr. Krobatseh advising that he had examined the premises *448and that “cockroaches were found to have infested the entire house.” He said he could eliminate them for a relatively modest charge by two treatments with a twenty-one day interval but that it would be necessary to remove the carpeting “to properly treat all the infested areas.”

Mrs. Weintraub rejected the rescission by the purchasers and filed an action in the Law Division joining them and the broker as defendants. Though she originally sought specific performance she later confined her claim to damages in the sum of $4,250, representing the deposit held in escrow by the broker. The broker filed an answer and counterclaim seeking payment of its commission in the sum of $2,550. There were opposing motions for summary judgment by the purchasers and Mrs. Weintraub, along with a motion for summary judgment by the broker for its commission. At the argument on the motions it was evident that the purchasers were claiming fraudulent concealment or nondisclosure by the seller as the basis for th’eir rescission. Thus at one point their attorney said: “Your honor, I would point out, and it is in my clients’ affidavit, every time that they inspected this house prior to this time every light in the place was illuminated. Now, these insects are nocturnal by nature and that is not a point I think I have to prove through someone. I think Webster’s dictionary is sufficient. By keeping the lights on it keeps them out of sight. These sellers had to know they had this problem. You could not live in a house this infested without knowing about it.”

The Law Division denied the motion by the purchasers for summary judgment but granted Mrs. Weintraub’s motion and directed that the purchasers pay her the sum of $4,250. It further directed that the deposit monies held in escrow by the broker be paid to Mrs. Weintraub in satisfaction of her judgment against the purchasers. See Oliver v. Lawson, 92 N. J. Super. 331, 333 (App. Div. 1966), cerlif. denied, 48 N. J. 574 (1967). It denied the broker’s summary judgment motion for its commission but held that matter for trial. On *449appeal, the Appellate División sustained the summary judgment in Mrs. Weintraub’s favor but disagreed with the Law Division’s holding that the broker’s claim must await trial. It considered that since the purchasers were summarily held to have been in default in rescinding rather than in proceeding with the closing, they were responsible for the commission. See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N. J. 528, 558-62 (1967). Accordingly, it modified the Law Division’s judgment to the end that the purchasers were directed to pay not only the sum of $4,250 to Mrs. Weintraub but also the sum of $2,550 to the broker.

Before us the purchasers contend that they were entitled to a trial on the issue of whether there was fraudulent concealment or nondisclosure entitling them to rescind; if there was then clearly they were under no liability to either the seller or the broker and would be entitled to the return of their deposit held by the broker in escrow. See Keen v. James, 39 N. J. Eq. 527, 540 (E. & A. 1885), where Justice Dixon, speaking for the then Court of last resort, pointed out that “silence may be fraudulent” and that relief may be granted to one contractual party where the other suppresses facts which he, “ hinder the circumstances, is bound in conscience and duty to disclose to the other party, and in respect to which he cannot, innocently, be silent.’ ” 39 N. J. Eq. at 540-41. See also Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 119 N. J. Super. 411, 420 (Essex Co. Ct. 1972); Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, Inc., supra, 12 N. J. Super, at 495-97; 12 Williston, Contracts § 1498 (3d ed. 1970); Prosser, Torts 695-99 (4th ed. 1971); Keeton, “Fraud — Concealment and Non-Disclosure,” 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1936); Goldfarb, “Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation,” 8 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 5 (1956).

Mrs. Weintraub asserts that she was unaware of the infestation and the Krobatsches acknowledge that, if that was so, then there was no fraudulent concealment or nondisclosure on her part and their claim must fall. But the purchasers allege that she was in fact aware of the infestation and at *450this stage of the proceedings we must assume that to be true. S'he contends, however, that even if she were fully aware she would have been under no duty to speak and that consequently no complaint by the purchasers may legally be grounded on her silence. She relies primarily on cases such as Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N. E. 2d 808, 141 A. L. R. 965 (1942), and Taylor v. Heisinger, 39 Misc. 2d 955, 242 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Taylor is not really pertinent since there the court found that the seller had “no demonstrated nor- inferable knowledge of the condition complained of.” 242 N. Y. S. 2d at 286. Sivinton is pertinent but, as Dean Prosser has noted (Prosser, supra at 696), it is one of a line of “singularly unappetizing cases” which are surely out of tune with our times.

In Swinion the plaintiff purchased a house from the defendant and after he occupied it he found it to be infested with termites. The defendant had made no verbal or written representations but the plaintiff, asserting that the defendant knew of the termites and was under a duty to speak, filed a complaint for damages grounded on fraudulent concealment. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained a demurrer to the complaint and entered judgment for the defendant. In the course of its opinion the court acknowledged that “the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense” but concluded that the law has not “reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this.” 42 N. E. 2d at 808-809. That was written several decades ago and we are far from certain that it represents views held by the current members of the Massachusetts court. See Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 247 N. E. 2d 708, 711 (1969). In any event we are certain that it does not represent our sense of justice or fair dealing and it has understandably been rejected in persuasive opinions elsewhere. See Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P. 2d 672 (1960); Loghry v. Capel, 257 Iowa 285, 132 N. W. 2d 417 (1965); Williams v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141 N. W. 2d 650 (1966); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash. App. 220, *451491 P. 2d 1312 (1971); Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of S. C., 259 S. C. 477, 193 S. E. 2d 124 (1972); cf. Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P. 2d 661 (1941); Simmons v. Evans, 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S. W. 2d 295 (1947); Piazzini v. Jessup, 153 Cal. App. 2d 58, 314 P. 2d 196 (1957); Rich v. Rankl, 6 Conn. Cir. 185, 269 A. 2d 84, 88 (1969); Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1971). See also Restatement 2d, Torts § 551 (Tent. Draft No. 12 (1966)); Keeton, “Rights of Disappointed Purchasers,” 32 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1953); cf. Bixby, “Let the. Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purdhase of a Defective Home,” 49 J. Urban Law 533 (1971); Haskell, “The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-, erty,” 53 Geo. L. J. 633 (1965); Note, “Implied Warranties, in Sales of Real Estate ■— The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor,” 22 DePaul L. Rev. 510 (1972).

In Obde v. Schlemeyer, supra, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P. 2d 672, the defendants sold an apartment house to the plaintiffs. The house was termite infested but that-fact was not disclosed by the sellers to the purchasers who later sued for damages alleging fraudulent concealment. The sellers contended that they were under no obligation whatever to speak out and they relied heavily on the decision of the Massachusetts court in Swinton (311 Mass. 677, 42 N. E. 2d 808, 141 A. L. R. 965). The Supreme Court of Washington flatly rejected their contention, holding that though the parties had dealt at arms length the sellers were under “a duty to inform the plaintiffs of the termite condition” of which they were fully aware. 353 P. 2d at 674; cf. Hughes v. Stusser, 68 Wash. 2d 707, 415 P. 2d 89, 92 (1966). In the course of its opinion the court quoted approvingly from Dean Keeton’s article supra, in 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1. There the author first expressed his thought that when Lord Cairns suggested in Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377 (1873), that there was no duty to disclose facts, no matter how “morally censurable” (at 403), he was expressing nineteenth century law as shaped by an individualistic philosophy based on freedom. *452of contracts and unconcerned with morals. He then made the following comments which fairly embody a. currently acceptable principle on which the holding in OI de may be said to be grounded:

In the present stage of the law, the decisions show a drawing away from this idea, and there can be seen an attempt by many courts to reach a just result in so far as possible, but yet maintaining the degree of certainty which the law must have. The statement may often be found that if either party to a contract of sale conceals or suppresses a material fact which he is in good faith bound to disclose then his silence is fraudulent.
The attitude of the courts toward nondisclosure is undergoing a change and contrary to Lord Cairns’ famous remark it would seem that the object of the law in these cases should be to impose on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever justice, equity, and fair dealing demand it. This statement is made only with reference to instances where the party to be charged is an actor in the transaction. This duty to speak does not result from an implied representation by silence, but exists because a refusal to speak constitutes unfair conduct. 15 Tex. L. Rev. at 31.

In Sorrell v. Young, supra, the Court of Appeals of Washington reeently applied the holding in Obde v. Schlemeyer, supra, to a ease where the sellers sold a residential lot to the buyers without disclosing that the lot had been filled. The buyers’ evidence indicated the following: when the sellers originally acquired the lot it was below street grade and had been partially filled. They completed the filling and kept the lot until they considered it salable. At the time of the sale the fact that the land had been filled was not apparent. The sellers did not mention it at all and the buyers made no inquiry. The buyers sought a building permit and were told that expensive soil tests would be required, that piling would be necessary and that there was no assurance that a house could be built even if piling was installed. The court held that the buyers’ evidence, if accepted, would support a right to rescind. In the course of its opinion it had this to say:

... by the turn of the century, Washington had recognized that “the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather *453than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., 54 Wash. 124, 127, 102 P. 1054, 1056 (1909). And, “[a]s would be expected when change in the law is taking place, there is no unanimity” in the decisions of other jurisdictions. Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1953). However, there is an “amorphous tendency” on the part of most courts to grant relief to a purchaser for nondisclosure of facts which would probably affect the purchaser’s decision to purchase. W. Prosser, Torts § 101 (3d. ed. 1964). And consistent with Restatement of Torts § 551, comment 6 (1938), relief by way of rescission is more readily granted than damages. W. Prosser, Torts § 105 (3d ed. 1964). 491 P. 2d at 1314.

In Loghry v. Capel, supra, the plaintiffs purchased a duplex from the defendants. They examined the house briefly on two occasions and signed a document stating that they accepted the property in its “present condition.” 132 N. W. 2cü at 419. They made no inquiry about the subsoil and were not told that the house had been constructed on filled ground. They filed an action for damages charging that the sellers had fraudulently failed to disclose that the duplex was constructed on improperly compacted filled ground. The jury found in their favor and the verdict was sustained on appeal in an opinion which pointed out that “fraud may consist of concealment of a material fact.” 132 N. W. 2d at 419. The purchasers’ stipulation that they accepted the property in its present condition could not be invoked to bar their claim. See Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 35 N. W. 2d 98 (1948), where the court pointed out that the purchase of property “as is” does not bar rescission grounded on fraudulent conduct of the seller. 35 N. W. 2d at 103.

In Simmons v. Evans, supra, the defendants owned a home which was serviced by a local water company. The company supplied water during the daytime but not at night. The defendants sold their home to the plaintiffs but made no mention of the limitation on the water service. The plaintiffs filed an action to rescind their purchase but the lower court dismissed it on the ground that the defendants had not made anjr written or verbal representations and the plaintiffs had “inspected the property, knew the source of the water sup*454ply, and could have made specific inquiry of these defendants or ascertained from other sources the true situation and, therefore, are estopped.” 206 8. W. 2d at 296. The dismissal was reversed on appeal in an opinion which took note of the general rule that “ ‘one may be guilty of fraud by his silence, as where it is expressly incumbent upon him to speak concerning material matters that are entirely within his own knowledge.’” 206 8. W. 2d at 296. With respect to the plaintiffs’ failure to ascertain the water situation before their purchase the court stated that the plaintiffs were surely not required “to make a night inspection in order to ascertain whether the water situation with reference to this residence was different from what it was during the day.” 206 8. W. 2d at 297.

In Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963), the plaintiffs sought to rescind their purchase of a house on the ground that they were defrauded by the seller’s real estate agent or broker, “by reason of the concealment and nondisclosure that said house contained an extensive termite and fungus infestation, and by certain representations that said house was not so infested.” A summary judgment against the plaintiffs was granted by the trial judge but was reversed on appeal in an opinion which set forth the following which we consider of particular pertinence to the present stage of litigation in the matter before us:

The principles controlling the conduct of a real estate agent or broker in the sale of real estate are well established in this state. He is not only liable to a buyer for his affirmative and intentional misrepresentations to a buyer, but he is also liable for mere nondisclosure to the buyer of defects known to him and unknown and unobservable by the buyer. (Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201; Crawford v. Nastos, 182 Cal. App. 2d 659, 665, 6 Cal. Rptr. 425; Rothstein v. Janss Investment Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 73, 113 P. 2d 465; Rogers v. Warden, 20 Cal. 2d 286, 289, 125 P. 2d 7.) The underlying settled rule is that every person connected with a fraud is liable for the full amount of the damages and the wrongdoers, if any, are jointly and severally liable. (Crawford v. Nastos, supra, 182 Cal. App. 2d p. 665, 6 Cal. Rptr. p. 429; *455Swasey v. deL’Etanche, 17 Cal. App. 2d 713, 718, 62 P. 2d 753; Ross v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 174 Cal. App. 2d 135, 141-142, 344 P. 2d 368). Whether a matter not disclosed by a real estate broker or agent is of sufficient materiality to affect the desirability or value of the property sold, and thus make him liable for fraudulent nondisclosure, depends upon the facts of each case. (Lingsch v. Savage, supra, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. p. 205.) In the case at bench we have allegations which present triable issues of fact tendered not only on the basis of positive misstatements and misrepresentations of fact allegedly made by Dolman, but also the alleged suppression and nondisclosure of facts known to him and unknown and unobservable by plaintiffs. 33 Cal. Rptr. at 667.

As in Suporta, supra, the purchasers here were entitled to withstand the seller’s motion for summary judgment. They should have been permitted to proceed with their efforts to establish by testimony that they were equitably entitled to rescind because the house was extensively infested in the manner described by them, the seller was well aware of the infestation, and the seller deliberately concealed or failed to disclose the condition because of the likelihood that it would defeat the transaction. The seller may of course defend factually as well as legally and since the matter is primarily equitable in nature the factual as well as legal disputes will be for the trial judge alone. See Hubbard v. International Mercantile Agency, 68 N. J. Eq. 434, 436 (Ch. 1904); Keuper v. Pyramid Bond & Mortgage Corp., 117 N. J. Eq. 110, 114-115 (E. & A. 1934); cf. Steiner v. Stein, 2 N. J. 367 (1949); Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N. J. 184, 198-199 (1963).

If the trial judge finds such deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of the latent infestation not observable by the purchasers on their inspection, he will still be called upon to determine whether, in the light of the full presentation before him, the concealment or nondisclosure was of such significant nature as to justify rescission. Minor conditions which ordinary sellers and purchasers would reasonably disregard as of little or no materiality in the transaction would clearly not call for judicial intervention. While the described condition may not have been quite as major as in the termite *456cases which were concerned with structural impairments, to the purchasers here it apparently was of such magnitude and was so repulsive as to cause them to rescind immediately though they had earlier indicated readiness that there he adjustment at closing for damage resulting from a fire which occurred after the contract was signed. We are not prepared at his time to say that on their showing they acted either unreasonably or without equitable justification.

Our courts have come a long way since the days when the judicial emphasis was on formal rules and ancient precedents rather than on modern concepts of justice and fair dealing. While admittedly our law has progressed more slowly in the real property field than in other fields, there have been notable stirrings even there. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N. J. 70 (1965); Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper, 53 N. J. 444 (1969); cf. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N. J. 130 (1970); Totten v. Gruzen, et al., 52 N. J. 202 (1968). In Schipper we elevated the duties of the builder-vendor in the sale of its homes and in the course of our opinion we repeatedly stressed that our law should be based on current notions of what is “right and just.” 44 N. J. at 90. In Reste we expressed similar thoughts in connection with the lease of real property. We there noted that despite the lessee’s acceptance of the premises in their “present condition” (a stipulation comparable to that of the purchasers in their contract here), the landlord was under a duty to disclose a material latent condition, known to him but unobservable by the tenant; we pointed out that in the circumstances “it would be a wholly inequitable application of caveat emptor to charge her with knowledge of it.” 53 N. J. at 453-454. Both Schipper and Reste were departures from earlier decisions which are nonetheless still relied on by the seller here. No purpose would now be served by pursuing any discussion of those earlier decisions since we are satisfied that current principles grounded on justice and fair dealing, embraced throughout this opinion, clearly call for a full trial below; *457to that end the judgment entered in the Appellate Division is:

Reversed and remanded.

For reversal and remandment — Acting Chief Justice Jacobs, Justices Hall, Sullivan, Pashman and Clivvokd and Judge Convoke—6.

For affirmance—Hone.

4.3 Against Public Policy 4.3 Against Public Policy

4.3.1 Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp. 4.3.1 Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp.

GREGORY D. HANKS v. POWDER RIDGE RESTAURANT CORPORATION ET AL.

(SC 17327)

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.1

*315Argued April 18

officially released November 29, 2005

*316William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was David McCarry, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Laura Pascóle Zaino, with whom, on the brief, were John B. Farley and Kevin M. Roche, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This appeal2 arises out of a complaint filed by the plaintiff, Gregory D. Hanks, against the defendants, Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation and White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., doing business as Powder Ridge Ski Resort, seeking compensatory damages for injuries the plaintiff sustained while snowtubing at the defendants’ facility. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that this court’s decision in Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., 265 Conn. 636, 829 A.2d 827 (2003), precluded the plaintiffs negligence claim as a matter of law. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following factual and procedural history. The defendants operate a facility in Middlefield, known as Powder Ridge, at which the public, in exchange for a fee, is invited to ski, snowboard and snowtube. On February 16, 2003, the plaintiff brought his three children and another child to Powder Ridge to snowtube. Neither the plaintiff nor the four children had ever snowtubed at Powder Ridge, but the snowtub*317ing ran was open to the public generally, regardless of prior snowtubing experience, with the restriction that only persons at least six years old or forty-four inches tall were eligible to participate. Further, in order to snowtube at Powder Ridge, patrons were required to sign a “Waiver, Defense, Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement, and Release of Liability” (agreement). The plaintiff read and signed the agreement on behalf of himself and the four children. While snowtubing, the plaintiffs right foot became caught between his snow-tube and the man-made bank of the snowtubing ran, resulting in serious injuries that required multiple surgeries to repair.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present negligence action against the defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants negligently caused his injuries by: (1) permitting the plaintiff “to ride in a snow tube that was not of sufficient size to ensure his safety while on the snow tubing run”; (2) “fail[ing] to properly train, supervise, control or otherwise instruct the operators of the snow tubing ran in the proper way to ran the snow tubing course to ensure the safety of the patrons, such as the plaintiff’; (3) “fail[ing] to properly groom the snow tubing ran so as to direct patrons . . . such as the plaintiff away from the sidewalls of [the] ran”; (4) “placing] carpet at the end of the snow tubing run which had the tendency to cause the snow tubes to come to an abrupt halt, spin or otherwise change direction”; (5) “failing] to properly landscape the snow tubing run so as to provide an adequate up slope at the end of the run to properly and safely slow snow tubing patrons such as the plaintiff’; (6) “fail[ing] to place warning signs on said snow tubing ran to warn patrons such as the plaintiff of the danger of colliding with the side wall of [the] snow tubing ran”; and (7) “fail[ing] to place hay bales or other similar materials on the sides of the snow tubing ran in order to direct patrons *318such as the plaintiff away from the sidewalls of [the] run.”

The defendants, in their answer to the complaint, denied the plaintiffs allegations of negligence and asserted two special defenses. Specifically, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by his own negligence and that the agreement relieved the defendants of liability, “even if the accident was due to the negligence of the defendants.” Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the agreement barred the plaintiffs negligence claim as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the trial court determined, pursuant to our decision in Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 640-44, that the plaintiff, by signing the agreement, unambiguously had released the defendants from liability for their allegedly negligent conduct. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to reargue the motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion and this appeal followed.

The plaintiff raises two claims on appeal. First, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the agreement clearly and expressly releases the defendants from liability for negligence. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that a person of ordinary intelligence reasonably would not have believed that, by signing the agreement, he or she was releasing the defendants from liability for personal injuries caused by negligence and, therefore, pursuant to Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 643, the agreement does not bar the plaintiffs negligence claim. Second, the plaintiff claims that the agreement is unenforceable because it violates public policy. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that a recreational operator cannot, consistent with public *319policy, release itself from liability for its own negligent conduct where, as in the present case, the operator offers its services to the public generally, for a fee, and requires patrons to sign a standardized exculpatory agreement as a condition of participation. We disagree with the plaintiffs first claim, but agree with his second claim.

Before reaching the substance of the plaintiffs claims on appeal, we review this court’s decision in Hyson. The plaintiff in Hyson was injured while snowtubing at Powder Ridge and, thereafter, filed a complaint against the defendant, White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., alleging that the defendant’s negligence proximately had caused her injuries.3 Id., 637-39. Prior to snowtubing at Powder Ridge, the plaintiff had signed an exculpatory agreement entitled “RELEASE FROM LIABILITY.” Id., 638 and n.3. The issue presented in Hyson was whether the exculpatory agreement released the defendant from liability for its negligent conduct and, consequently, barred the plaintiffs negligence claims as a matter of law. Id., 640. We concluded that it did not. Id.

In arriving at this conclusion, we noted that there exists “widespread support in other jurisdictions for a rule requiring that any agreement intended to exculpate a party for its own negligence state so expressly”; id., 641-42; and that this court previously had acknowledged “the well established principle . . . that ‘[t]he law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence ....’” Id., 643. Accordingly, we determined that “the better rule is that a party cannot be released from liability for injuries resulting from its future negligence in the absence of *320language that expressly so provides.” Id. This rule “prevents individuals from inadvertently relinquishing valuable legal rights” and “does not impose . . . significant cost[s]” on entities seeking to exculpate themselves from liability for future negligence. Id. Examining the exculpatory agreement at issue in Hyson, we observed that “the release signed by the plaintiff [did] not specifically refer to possible negligence by the defendant” but, instead, only referred to “inherent and other risks involved in [snowtubing] . . . .”4 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 640. Thus, “[a] person of ordinary intelligence reasonably could believe that, by signing this release, he or she was releasing the defendant only from liability for damages caused by dangers inherent in the activity of snowtubing.” Id., 643. Accordingly, we concluded that the exculpatory agreement did not *321expressly release the defendants from liability for future negligence and, therefore, did not bar the plaintiffs claims. Consequently, we declined to decide whether a well drafted exculpatory agreement expressly releasing a defendant from prospective liability for future negligence could be enforced consistent with public policy. See id., 640 (“we do not reach the issue of whether a well drafted agreement purporting to have such an effect would be enforceable”); id., 643 n.ll (“we do not decide today whether a contract having such express language would be enforceable to release a party from liability for its negligence”).

As an initial matter, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. “[T]he standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summaiy judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 619, 872 A.2d 408 (2005).

I

We first address the plaintiffs claim that the agreement does not expressly release the defendants from liability for personal injuries incurred as a result of their own negligence as required by Hyson. Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence would not understand that, by signing the agreement, he or she was releasing the defendants from liability for future negligence. We disagree.

“]T]he law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence . . . Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., *322supra, 265 Conn. 643. “[T]he law’s reluctance to enforce exculpatory provisions of this nature has resulted in the development of an exacting standard by which courts measure their validity. So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts .... Put another way, it must appear plainly and precisely that the limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility ....

“Not only does this stringent standard require that the drafter of such an agreement make its terms unambiguous, but it mandates that the terms be understandable as well. Thus, a provision that would exempt its drafter from any liability occasioned by his fault should not compel resort to a magnifying glass and lexicon. ... Of course, this does not imply that only simple or monosyllabic language can be used in such clauses. Rather, what the law demands is that such provisions be clear and coherent . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell, 73 Conn. App. 66, 72, 807 A.2d 1001 (2002), quoting Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 107-108, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979); see also Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 643 (“a party cannot be released from liability for injuries resulting from its future negligence in the absence of language that expressly so provides”). “Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a question of fact . . . [w]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldberg v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 550, 559-60, 849 A.2d 368 (2004).

*323The agreement5 at issue in the present case provides in relevant part: “I understand that there are inherent risks involved in snowtubing, including the risk of seri*324ous physical injury or death and I fully assume all risks associated with [s]nowtubing, even if due to the NEGLIGENCE of [the defendants] . . . including but not limited to: variations in the snow conditions; steepness and terrain; the presence of ice, moguls, bare spots and objects beneath the snowtubing surface such as rocks, debris and tree stumps; collisions with objects both on and off the snowtubing chutes such as hay bales, trees, rocks, snowmaking equipment, barriers, lift cables and equipment, lift towers, lift attendants, employees, volunteers, other patrons and spectators or their property; equipment or lift condition or failure; lack of safety devices or inadequate safety devices; lack of warnings or inadequate warnings; lack of instructions or inadequate instructions; use of any lift; and the like. . . . I . . . agree I will defend, indemnify and hold harmless [the defendants] . . . from any and all claims, suits or demands by anyone arising from my use of the Powder Ridge snowtubing facilities and equipment including claims of NEGLIGENCE on the part of [the defendants] . . . . I . . . hereby release, and agree that I will not sue [the defendants] . . . for money damages for personal injury or property damage sustained by me while using the snowtubing facilities and equipment even if due to the NEGLIGENCE of [the defendants] . . . (Emphasis in original.)

We conclude that the agreement expressly and unambiguously purports to release the defendants from prospective liability for negligence. The agreement explicitly provides that the snowtuber “fully assume[s] all risks associated with [s]nowtubing, even if due to the NEGLIGENCE” of the defendants. (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the agreement refers to the negligence of the defendants three times and uses capital letters to emphasize the term “negligence.” Accordingly, we conclude that an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence would understand that, by signing the *325agreement, he or she was releasing the defendants from liability for their future negligence.6

The plaintiff claims, however, that the agreement does not expressly release the defendants from liability for their prospective negligence because the agreement “define[s] the word ‘negligence’ solely by reference to inherent [risks] of the activity.” We disagree. The agreement states that the snowtuber “fully assume[s] all risks associated with [s]nowtubing, even if due to the NEGLIGENCE of [the defendants]” and provides a nonexhaustive list of such risks. (Emphasis in original.) We acknowledge that some of the risks listed arguably can be characterized as inherent risks because they are innate to the activity, “are beyond the control of the *326[recreational] area operator and cannot be minimized by the operator’s exercise of reasonable care.” Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 692, 849 A.2d 813 (2004). Other risks listed in the agreement, for example, “lack of safety devices or inadequate safety devices; lack of warnings or inadequate warnings; lack of instructions or inadequate instructions” are not inherent risks. The recreational operator has control over safety devices, warnings and instructions, and can ensure their adequacy through the exercise of reasonable care. Thus, a snowtuber who, by virtue of signing the present agreement, assumes the risk of inadequate safety devices, warnings or instructions, necessarily assumes the risk of the recreational operator’s negligence.

We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the agreement in the present matter expressly purports to release the defendants from liability for their future negligence and, accordingly, satisfies the standard set forth by this court in Hyson.

II

We next address the issue we explicitly left unresolved in Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 640, namely, whether the enforcement of a well drafted exculpatory agreement purporting to release a snowtube operator from prospective liability for personal injuries sustained as a result of the operator’s negligent conduct violates public policy. We conclude that it does and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Although it is well established “that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Gibson v. Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 730, 699 A.2d 68 (1997); it is equally well established “that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable.” Solomon v. Gilmore, 248 Conn. 769, *327774, 731 A.2d 280 (1999). “[T]he question [of] whether a contract is against public policy is [a] question of law dependent on the circumstances of the particular case, over which an appellate court has unlimited review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parente v. Pirozzoli, 87 Conn. App. 235, 245, 866 A.2d 629 (2005), citing 17A Am. Jur. 2d 312, Contracts § 327 (2004).

As previously noted, “[t]he law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 643. This is because exculpatory provisions undermine the policy considerations governing our tort system. “[T]he fundamental policy purposes of the tort compensation system [are] compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct .... It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law . . . [but it] is perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when compensation [is] required. . . . An equally compelling function of the tort system is the prophylactic factor of preventing future harm .... The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 578-79, 717 A.2d 215 (1998). Thus, it is consistent with public policy “to posit the risk of negligence upon the actor” and, if this policy is to be abandoned, “it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift to another party better or equally able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer.” Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).

*328Although this court previously has not addressed the enforceability of a release of liability for future negligence, the issue has been addressed by many of our sister states. A frequently cited standard for determining whether exculpatory agreements violate public policy was set forth by the Supreme Court of California in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 98-101. In Tunkl, the court concluded that exculpatory agreements violate public policy if they affect the public interest adversely; id., 96-98; and identified six factors (Tunkl factors) relevant to this determination: “[1] [The agreement] concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” Id., 98-101. The court clarified that an exculpatory agreement may affect the public interest adversely even if some of the Tunkl factors are not satisfied.7 Id., 101.

*329Various states have adopted the Tunkl factors to determine whether exculpatory agreements affect the public interest adversely and, thus, violate public policy. See, e.g., Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1986); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977); Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 110 Wash. 2d 845, 851-52, 758 P.2d 968 (1988). Other states have developed their own variations of the Tunkl factors; see, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (“[i]n determining whether an exculpatory agreement is valid, there are four factors which a court must consider: [1] the existence of a duty to the public; [2] the nature of the service performed; [3] whether the contract was fairly entered into; and [4] whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language”); Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499-500, 465 P.2d 107 (1970) (“express agreements exempting one of the parties for negligence are to be sustained except where: [1] one party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power; [2] a public duty is involved [public utility companies, common carriers]”); while still others have adopted a totality of the circumstances approach. See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 535, 644 A.2d 522 (1994) (expressly declining to adopt Tunkl factors because “[t]he ultimate determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations”); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 333-34, 670 A.2d 795 (1995) (same). The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has determined that all exculpatory agreements purporting to release tortfeasors *330from future liability for personal injuries are unenforceable because “[t]o hold that it was competent for one party to put the other parties to the contract at the mercy of its own misconduct . . . can never be lawfully done where an enlightened system of jurisprudence prevails. Public policy forbids it . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Assn., 244 Va. 191, 194, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992).

Having reviewed the various methods for determining whether exculpatory agreements violate public policy, we conclude, as the Tunkl court itself acknowledged, that “[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four comers of a formula.” Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 98. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Courts of Maryland and Vermont that “[t]he ultimate determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.” Wolf v. Ford, supra, 335 Md. 535; Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., supra, 164 Vt. 333-34. Thus, our analysis is guided, but not limited, by the Tunkl factors, and is informed by any other factors that may be relevant given the factual circumstances of the case and current societal expectations.

We now turn to the merits of the plaintiffs claim. The defendants are in the business of providing snowtubing services to the public generally, regardless of prior snowtubing experience, with the minimal restriction that only persons at least six years old or forty-four inches tall are eligible to participate. Given the virtually unrestricted access of the public to Powder Ridge, a reasonable person would presume that the defendants were offering a recreational activity that the whole family could enjoy safely. Indeed, this presumption is borne out by the plaintiffs own testimony. Specifically, the plaintiff testified that he “trusted that [the defendants] *331would, within their good conscience, operate a safe ride.”

The societal expectation that family oriented recreational activities will be reasonably safe is even more important where, as in the present matter, patrons are under the care and control of the recreational operator as a result of an economic transaction. The plaintiff, in exchange for a fee, was permitted access to the defendants’ snowtubing runs and was provided with snowtubing gear. As a result of this transaction, the plaintiff was under the care and control of the defendants and, thus, was subject to the risk of the defendants’ carelessness. Specifically, the defendants designed and maintained the snowtubing run and, therefore, controlled the steepness of the incline, the condition of the snow and the method of slowing down or stopping patrons. Further, the defendants provided the plaintiff with the requisite snowtubing supplies and, therefore, controlled the size and quality of the snow-tube as well as the provision of any necessary protective gear. Accordingly, the plaintiff voluntarily relinquished control to the defendants with the reasonable expectation of an exciting, but reasonably safe, snowtubing experience.

Moreover, the plaintiff lacked the knowledge, experience and authority to discern whether, much less ensure that, the defendants’ snowtubing runs were maintained in a reasonably safe condition. As the Vermont Supreme Court observed, in the context of the sport of skiing, it is consistent with public policy “to place responsibility for maintenance of the land on those who own or control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents to the minimum level possible. [The] [defendants, not recreational skiers, have the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can properly maintain and inspect their *332premises, and train their employees in risk management. They alone can insure against risks and effectively spread the costs of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, on the other hand, are not in a position to discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against the ski area’s negligence.

“If the defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive for ski areas to manage risk would be removed, with the public bearing the cost of the resulting injuries. ... It is illogical, in these circumstances, to undermine the public policy underlying business invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to control.”8 (Citations omitted.) Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., supra, 164 Vt. 335. The concerns expressed by the court in Dalury are equally applicable to the context of snowtubing, and we agree that it is illogical to permit snowtubers, and the public generally, to bear the costs of risks that they have no ability or right to control.9

*333Further, the agreement at issue was a standardized adhesion contract offered to the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it” basis. The “most salient feature [of adhesion contracts] is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn. 409, 416, 538 A.2d 219 (1988); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) (defining adhesion contract as “[a] standard form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who has little choice about the terms”). Not only was the plaintiff unable to negotiate the terms of the agreement, but the defendants also did not offer him the option of procuring protection against negligence at an additional reasonable cost. See Restatement (Third), Torts, Apportionment of Liability § 2, comment (e), p. 21 (2000) (factor relevant to enforcement of contractual limit on liability is “whether the party seeking exculpation was willing to provide greater protection against *334tortious conduct for a reasonable, additional fee”). Moreover, the defendants did not inform prospective snowtubers prior to their arrival at Powder Ridge that they would have to waive important common-law rights as a condition of participation. Thus, the plaintiff, who traveled to Powder Ridge in anticipation of snowtubing that day, was faced with the dilemma of either signing the defendants’ proffered waiver of prospective liability or forgoing completely the opportunity to snowtube at Powder Ridge. Under the present factual circumstances, it would ignore reality to conclude that, the plaintiff wielded the same bargaining power as the defendants.

The defendants contend, nevertheless, that they did not have superior bargaining power because, unlike an essential public service, “[s]nowtubing is a voluntary activity and the plaintiff could have just as easily decided not to participate.”10 We acknowledge that snowtubing is a voluntary activity, but we do not agree that there can never be a disparity of bargaining power in the context of voluntary or elective activities.11 See *335Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., supra, 164 Vt. 335 (“[w]hile interference with an essential public service surely affects the public interest, those services do not represent the universe of activities that implicate public concerns”). Voluntary recreational activities, such as snowtubing, skiing, basketball, soccer, football, racquetball, karate, ice skating, swimming, volleyball or yoga, are pursued by the vast majority of the population and constitute an important and healthy part of everyday life. Indeed, this court has previously recognized the public policy interest of promoting vigorous participation in such activities. See, e.g., Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 702 (important public policy interest in encouraging vigorous participation in skiing); Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 409, 696 A.2d 332 (1997) (important public policy interest in promoting vigorous participation in soccer). In the present case, the defendants held themselves out as a provider of a healthy, fun, family activity. After the plaintiff and his family arrived at Powder Ridge eager to participate in the activity, however, the defendants informed the plaintiff that, not only would they be immune from claims arising from the inherent risks of the activity, but they would not be responsible for injuries resulting from their own carelessness and negligence in the operation of the snowtubing facility. We recognize that the plaintiff had the option of walking away. We cannot say, however, that the defendants had no bargaining advantage under these circumstances.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the agreement in the present matter affects the public interest adversely and, therefore, is unenforceable because *336it violates public policy.12 Accordingly, the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The defendants and the dissent point out that our conclusion represents the “distinct minority view” and is inconsistent with the majority of sister state authority upholding exculpatory agreements in similar recreational settings. We acknowledge that most states uphold adhesion contracts releasing recreational operators from prospective liability for personal injuries caused by their own negligent conduct. Put simply, we disagree with these decisions for the reasons already explained in this opinion. Moreover, we find it significant that many states uphold exculpatory agreements in the context of simple negligence, but refuse to enforce such agreements in the context of gross negligence. See, e.g., Farina v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 66 F.3d 233, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (Oregon law); Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Sup. 730, 736 (D. Haw. 1993), superseded in part by Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-1.54 (1997) (recreational providers liable for simple negligence in addition to gross negligence); McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 750, 758, 603 S.E.2d 7 (2004), cert. denied, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 69 (January 10, 2005); Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 543, 514 A.2d 485 (1986); Zavras v. Capeway Rovers Motorcycle Club, Inc., 44 *337Mass. App. 17, 18-19, 687 N.E.2d 1263 (1997); Schmidt v. United States, 912 P.2d 871, 874 (Okla. 1996); Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 75-76 (Tenn. 1985); Conradt v. Four Star Promotions, Inc., 45 Wash. App. 847, 852, 728 P.2d 617 (1986); see also New Light Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 247 Neb. 57, 62-65, 525 N.W.2d 25 (1994); 8 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. 1998) § 19:23, pp. 291-97 (“[a]n attempted exemption from liability for a future intentional tort or crime or for a future willful or grossly negligent act is generally held void, although a release exculpating a party from liability for negligence may also cover gross negligence where the jurisdiction has abolished the distinction between degrees of negligence and treats all negligence alike”). Connecticut does not recognize degrees of negligence and, consequently, does not recognize the tort of gross negligence as a separate basis of liability. See, e.g., Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 833 and n. 10, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). Accordingly, although in some states recreational operators cannot, consistent with public policy, release themselves from prospective liability for conduct that is more egregious than simple negligence, in this state, were we to adopt the position advocated by the defendants, recreational operators would be able to release their liability for such conduct unless it rose to the level of recklessness. Id., 832 (recklessness is “a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent” [internal quotation marks omitted]). As a result, recreational operators would lack the incentive to exercise even slight care, with the public bearing the costs of the resulting injuries. See 57A Am. Jur. 2d 296, Negligence § 227 (2004) *338(“ ‘gross negligence’ is commonly defined as very great or excessive negligence, or as the want of, or failure to exercise, even slight or scant care or ‘slight diligence’ ”). Such a result would be inconsistent with the public policy of this state.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., concurred.

NORCOTT, J.,

with whom BORDEN and PALMER, Js., join, dissenting. Although I concur in part I of the majority opinion, I disagree with its conclusion in part II, namely, that the prospective release of liability for negligence executed by the plaintiff, Gregory D. Hanks, in this case is unenforceable as against public policy. I would follow the overwhelming majority of our sister states and would conclude that prospective releases from liability for negligence are permissible in the context of recreational activities. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to take a road that is, for many persuasive reasons, far less traveled.

I begin by noting that “[i]t is established well beyond the need for citation that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree. This freedom includes the right to contract for the assumption of known or unknown hazards and risks that may arise as a consequence of the execution of the contract. Accordingly, in private disputes, a court must enforce the contract as drafted by the parties and may not relieve a contracting party from anticipated or actual difficulties undertaken pursuant to the contract . . . .” Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, 226 Conn. 748, 755-56, 628 A.2d 1298 (1993). Nevertheless, contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable. See, e.g., Solomon v. Gilmore, 248 Conn. 769, 774, 731 A.2d 280 (1999).

*339In determining whether prospective releases of liability violate public policy, the majority adopts the Vermont Supreme Court’s totality of the circumstances approach.1 See Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 334, 670 A.2d 795 (1995). Although it also purports to consider the widely accepted test articulated by the California Supreme Court in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the majority actually accords the test only nominal consideration. Because I consider the Tunkl factors to be dispositive, I address them at length.

“[T]he attempted but invalid [release agreement] involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. [1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and *340makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” Id., 98-101.

“[N]ot all of the Tunkl factors need be satisfied in order for an exculpatory clause to be deemed to affect the public interest. The [Tunkl court] conceded that ‘[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four comers of a formula’ and stated that the transaction must only ‘exhibit some or all’ of the identified characteristics. . . . Thus, the ultimate test is whether the exculpatory clause affects the public interest, not whether all of the characteristics that help reach that conclusion are satisfied.” (Citations omitted.) Health Net of California, Inc. v. Dept. of Health Services, 113 Cal. App. 4th 224, 237-38, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235 (2003), review denied, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 2043 (March 3, 2004).

Notwithstanding the statutory origins of the Tunkl factors,2 numerous other states have adopted them to determine whether a prospective release violates public policy under their common law. See, e.g., Morgan v. *341South Central Bell Telephone Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 117 (Ala. 1985); Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1986); La Frenz v. Lake County Fair Board, 172 Ind. App. 389, 395, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977); Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 558-59, 627 P.2d 1247 (1981); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977); Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 110 Wash. 2d 845, 852, 758 P.2d 968 (1988); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 1986).3

Applying the six Tunkl factors to the sport of snow-tubing, I note that the first, second, fourth and sixth factors support the defendants, Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation and White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., doing business as Powder Ridge Ski Resort, which operate the Powder Ridge facility, while the third and fifth factors support the plaintiff. Accordingly, I now turn to a detailed examination of each factor as it applies to this case.

The first of the Tunkl factors, that the business is of a type thought suitable for regulation, cuts squarely in favor of upholding the release. Snowtubing runs generally are not subject to extensive public regulation. Indeed, the plaintiff points to no statutes or regulations that affect snowtubing, and I have located only one statutory reference to it. This sole reference, contained in No. 05-78, § 2, of the 2005 Public Acts, explicitly *342exempts snowtubing from the scope of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 29-212, which applies to liability for injuries sustained by skiers.4 Thus, while the legislature has chosen to regulate, to some extent, the sport of skiing, it conspicuously has left snowtubing untouched.

The second Tunkl factor also works in the defendants’ favor. Snowtubing is not an important public service. Courts employing the Tunkl factors have found *343this second element satisfied in the contexts of hospital admission and treatment, residential rental agreements, banking, child care services, telecommunications and public education, including interscholastic sports. See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1978) (residential rental agreements); Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 92 (hospitals); Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 4th 662, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168 (2003) (child care); Vilner v. Crocker National Bank, 89 Cal. App. 3d 732, 152 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1979) (banking); Morgan v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., supra, 466 So. 2d 107 (telephone companies); Anchorage v. Locker, supra, 723 P.2d 1261 (telephone companies); Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, supra, 110 Wash. 2d 845 (public schools and interscholastic sports). The public nature of these industries is undeniable and each plays an important and indispensable role in everyday life. Snowtubing, by contrast, is purely a recreational activity.

The fourth Tunkl factor also counsels against the plaintiffs position that snowtubing affects the public interest because snowtubing is not an essential activity. The plaintiffs only incentive for snowtubing was recreation, not some other important personal interest such as, for example, health care, banking or insurance. The plaintiff would not have suffered any harm by opting not to snowtube at Powder Ridge, because snowtubing is not so significant a service that a person in his position would feel compelled to agree to any terms offered rather than forsake the opportunity to participate. Furthermore, “[ujnlike other activities that require the provision of a certain facility, snowtubing occurs regularly at locations all across the state, including parks, backyards and golf courses.” Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., 265 Conn. 636, 650 n.4, 829 A.2d 827 (2003) (Norcott, J., dissenting). Thus, *344the plaintiff had ample opportunity to snowtube in an environment of his choosing, which he could have selected based on whatever safety considerations he felt were relevant. In the absence of a compelling personal need and a limited choice of facilities, I cannot conclude that the defendants enjoyed a significant bargaining advantage over the plaintiff.

Finally, the sixth Tunkl factor weighs against a determination that the release implicates the public interest. The plaintiff did not place his person or property under the defendants’ control. Unlike the patient who lies unconscious on the operating table or the child who is placed in the custody of a day care service, the Powder Ridge patron snowtubes on his own, without entrusting his person or property to the defendants’ care. In fact, the attraction of snowtubing and other recreational activities often is the lack of control associated with participating.

In contrast, the third and fifth Tunkl factors support the plaintiffs position. With respect to the third factor, although the defendants restricted access to the snow-tubing run to persons at least six years old or forty-four inches tall, this minimal restriction does not diminish the fact that only a small class of the general public is excluded from participation. See Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 102 (research hospital that only accepted certain patients nevertheless met third prong of Tunkl because it accepted anyone who exhibited medical condition that was being researched at hospital). Such a small exclusion does not diminish the invitation to the public at large to partake in snowtubing at the defendants’ facility, because the snowtubing run is open to any person who fits within certain easily satisfied parameters. See id., 99-101.

Finally, I examine the fifth Tunkl factor, namely, whether the release agreement is an “adhesion contract *345. . . .” Id., 100. “[The] most salient feature [of adhesion contracts] is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn. 409, 416, 538 A.2d 219 (1988). Although the plaintiff made no attempt to bargain as to the terms of the release, it defies logic to presume that he could have done so successfully. As the majority correctly notes, the defendants presented patrons with a “take it or leave it” situation, conditioning access to the snowtubing run on signing the release agreement. Accordingly, the fifth Tunkl factor indicates that the agreement does affect the public interest.

In sum, I conclude that, under the Tunkl factors, the defendants’ release at issue in this case does not violate public policy with respect to the sport of snowtubing. This conclusion is consistent with the vast majority of sister state authority, which upholds releases of liability in a variety of recreational or athletic settings that are akin to snowtubing as not violative of public policy. See, e.g., Barnes v. Birmingham International Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929, 933 (Ala. 1989) (automobile racing); Valley National Bank v. National Assn. for Stock Car Auto Racing, 153 Ariz. 374, 378, 736 P.2d 1186 (App. 1987) (spectator in pit area at automobile race); Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 494-96, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001) (same); Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 602, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1988) (scuba diving), review denied, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 1511 (October 13, 1988); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) (horseback riding); Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. App. 1990) (automobile racing), review denied, 581 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1991); Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms Ltd., 215 Ill. App. 3d 337, 341, 574 N.E.2d 1311 (horseback riding), appeal denied, 142 Ill. 2d 651, 584 N.E.2d 126 (1991); Clanton v. United Skates of America, 686 N.E.2d 896, 899-900 *346(Ind. App. 1997) (roller skating); Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 551, 514 A.2d 485 (1986) (skydiving); Lee v. Allied Sports Associates, Inc., 349 Mass. 544, 551, 209 N.E.2d 329 (1965) (spectator at automobile race); Lloyd v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 833 A.2d 1, 4 (Me. 2003) (mountain biking); Gara v. Woodbridge Tavern, 224 Mich. App. 63, 66-68, 568 N.W.2d 138 (1997) (recreational sumo wrestling); Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn. 1982) (weightlifting at fitness center); Mayer v. Howard, 220 Neb. 328, 336, 370 N.W.2d 93 (1985) (motorcycle racing); Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Assn., Inc., 128 N.H. 102, 108, 509 A.2d 151 (1986) (go-cart racing); Kondrad v. Bismarck Park District, 655 N.W.2d 411, 414 (N.D. 2003) (bicycling); Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Center, 9 Ohio App. 3d 27, 28, 457 N.E.2d 1185 (1983) (skydiving); Manning v. Brannon, 956 P.2d 156, 159 (Okla. App. 1997) (skydiving); Mann v. Wetter, 100 Or. App. 184, 187-88, 785 P.2d 1064 (1990) (scuba diving); Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp., 412 Pa. Super. 442, 448, 603 A.2d 663 (1992) (ski racing); Huckaby v. Confederate Motor Speedway, Inc., 276 S.C. 629, 631, 281 S.E.2d 223 (1981) (automobile racing); Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 787, 798 (S.D. 2000) (automobile racing); Kellar v. Lloyd, 180 Wis. 2d 162, 183, 509 N.W.2d 87 (App. 1993) (flagperson at automobile race); Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Wyo. 1988) (ski race during decathlon).5

This near unanimity among the courts of the various states reflects the fact that “[m]ost, if not all, recreational activities are voluntary acts. Individuals participate in them for a variety of reasons, including to exercise, to experience a rush of adrenaline, and to *347engage their competitive nature. These activities, while surely increasing one’s enjoyment of life, cannot be considered so essential as to override the ability of two parties to contract about the allocation of the risks involved in the provision of such activity. When deciding to engage in a recreational activity, participants have the ability to weigh their desire to participate against their willingness to sign a contract containing an exculpatory clause.” Hyson v. While Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 649 (Norcott, J., dissenting). It also is consistent with the view of the American Law Institute, as embodied in 2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981),6 and Restatement (Third) of Torts, Apportionment of Liability § 2 (2000).7

*348Notwithstanding the foregoing authority, the majority adopts the Vermont Supreme Court’s holding in Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., supra, 164 Vt. 334, and concludes that the release agreement in the present case violates public policy. In Dalury, the plaintiff “sustained serious injuries when he collided with a metal pole that formed part of the control maze for a ski lift line. Before the season started, [the plaintiff] had purchased a midweek season pass and signed a form releasing the ski area from liability.” Id., 330. The release signed by the plaintiff in Dalury clearly disclaimed liability for negligence. Id. Citing the Tunkl factors, but fashioning an alternative test based on the totality of the circumstances, the Dalury court held the release invalid as against public policy. Id., 333-35. The Dalury court, like the majority in the present case, concluded that a recreational activity affected the public interest because of the considerable public participation. Id., 334.1 find the Vermont court’s opinion unpersuasive.

Although the number of tickets sold to the public is instructive in determining whether an agreement affects the public interest, it is by no means dispositive. Private, nonessential industries, while often very popular, wield no indomitable influence over the public. The average person is capable of reading a release agreement and deciding not to snowtube because of the risks that he or she is asked to assume.8 By contrast, in those fields *349implicating the public interest, the patron is at a substantial bargaining disadvantage. Few people are in a position to quibble over contractual obligations when seeking, for example, insurance, medical treatment or child care. A general characteristic of fields entangled with the public interest is their indispensability; snow-tubing hardly is indispensable. Under the majority’s reasoning, nearly any release affects the public interest, no matter how unnecessary or inherently dangerous the underlying activity may be.9 That position remains the distinct minority view, followed only by the courts of Vermont and Virginia.10 See Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Assn., 244 Va. 191, 194, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992) (“[t]o hold that it was competent for one party to put the other parties to the contract at the mercy of its own misconduct . . . can never be lawfully done where an enlightened system of jurisprudence prevails”).

*350The majority also contends that, because of the status of Connecticut negligence law, my conclusion would have broader public policy implications than the decisions of other courts upholding releases. Specifically, the majority contends that because the law of Connecticut does not recognize differing degrees of negligence, my position allows snowtube operators to insulate themselves from liability even for grossly negligent acts. This is a contrast from states that do recognize a separate claim for gross negligence. Thus, the majority avers, in this state, it would be possible to insulate oneself from liability for all acts not rising to the level of recklessness, whereas elsewhere only simple negligence may be disclaimed.

Although the majority’s theory initially appears compelling, closer examination reveals that the line it draws is a distinction without a difference because many states that prohibit prospective releases of liability for gross negligence define gross negligence in a way that mirrors Connecticut recklessness law.11 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407 (7) (a) (2005) (governmental immunity statute defining gross negligence as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results”); see also Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 259, 934 P.2d 1349 (1997) (“[WJanton misconduct is aggravated negligence. . . . *351[W]illful, wanton, and reckless conduct have commonly been grouped together as an aggravated form of negligence.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Cullison v. Peoria, 120 Ariz. 165, 169, 584 P.2d 1156 (1978) (“[W]anton [or gross] negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms. It is in the air, so to speak. It is flagrant and evinces a lawless and destructive spirit.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Ziarko v. Soo Line R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 274-75, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (“[U]nlilce intentionally tortious behavior, conduct characterized as willful and wanton may be proven where the acts have been less than intentional—i.e., where there has been a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent the danger, or a failure to discover the danger through . . . carelessness when it could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care. . . . Our case law has sometimes used interchangeably the terms willful and wanton negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. . . . This court has previously observed that there is a thin line between simple negligence and willful and wanton acts . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 375, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (“gross negligence . . . has been defined in motor vehicle tort cases as a wanton or reckless disregard for human life in the operation of a motor vehicle” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, 686 N.W.2d 545, 552-53 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the *352want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present legal duty, and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), review granted, 2004 Minn. LEXIS 752 (November 23, 2004), quoting State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 159, 21 N.W.2d 480 (1946); State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 478-79 (Minn. 1999) (person is grossly negligent when he acts “without even scant care but not with such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong” [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting State v. Bolsinger, supra, 159; Bennett v. Labenz, 265 Neb. 750, 755, 659 N.W.2d 339 (2003) (“[g]ross negligence is great or excessive negligence, which indicates the absence of even slight care in the performance of a duty”); New Light Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 247 Neb. 57, 64, 525 N.W.2d 25 (1994) (relying on New York law characterizing gross negligence as “conduct that evinces a reckless indifference to the rights of others”); Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540, 554, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1992) (“Gross negligence, when invoked to pierce an agreed-upon limitation of liability in a commercial contract, must smack of intentional wrongdoing. ... It is conduct that evinces a reckless indifference to the rights of others.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 403 (N.D. 1996) (“[Where] [g]ross negligence is defined [by statute] as the want of slight care and diligence. . . . This court has construed gross negligence to mean no care at all, or the omission of such care which even the most inattentive and thoughtless seldom fail to make their concern, evincing a reckless temperament and lack of care, practically willful in its nature.” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); *353Harsh v. Lorain County Speedway, Inc., 111 Ohio App. 3d 113, 118-19, 675 N.E.2d 885 (1996) (upholding release for negligence but not “willful and wanton conduct”);12 Bogue v. McKibben, 278 Or. 483, 486, 564 P.2d 1031 (1977) (“ [g]ross negligence refers to negligence which is materially greater than the mere absence of reasonable care under the circumstances, and which is characterized by conscious indifference to or reckless disregard of the rights of others” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Albright v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 548 Pa. 268, 278, 696 A.2d 1159 (1997) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved a trial court’s characterization of gross negligence for purposes of governmental immunity statute as “a form of negligence where the facts support substantially more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.”); Jinks v. Richland County, 355 S.C. 341, 345, 585 S.E.2d 281 (2003) (For the purposes of a governmental immunity statute, gross negligence is defined as “the intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. . . . It is the failure to exercise slight care. . . . Gross negligence has also been defined as a relative term and means the absence of care that is necessaiy under the circumstances.” [Citations omitted.]).13

*354Furthermore, at least one other court has concluded that releases similar to the one in question are valid notwithstanding the absence of a gross negligence doctrine. New Hampshire, like Connecticut, does not recognize differing degrees of negligence, yet its highest court has upheld a release of liability for negligence, stating: “The plaintiff cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions that hold on public policy grounds that an exculpatory agreement does not release defendants from liability for gross negligence. These cases are inapposite because New Hampshire law does not distinguish causes of action based on ordinary and gross negligence. . . . The plaintiff advances no reasons for abandoning this rule and we decline to create an exception to allow him to pursue his claims of gross negligence.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Assn., Inc., supra, 128 N.H. 108-109; but see Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 705 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2000) (declining to reach issue of whether agreement that released liability for gross negligence would violate public policy where agreement in question stated only “negligence”); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18-19, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (recognizing potential problems that Wisconsin’s abolition of gross negligence might raise in area of exculpatory clauses).

*355The great weight of these numerous and highly persuasive authorities compels my conclusion that the release at issue herein does not violate public policy as it pertains to the sport of snowtubing. Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor and I would affirm that judgment. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

4.3.2 Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber 4.3.2 Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber

982 P.2d 1277

VALLEY MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, an Arizona professional corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven S. FARBER, D.O. and Susan H. Farber, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellees.

No. CV-97-0488-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

June 18, 1999.

Lane Campbell & Nach, P.C. By: Richard N. Brandes and Renaud Cook & Drury By: LeslieAnn Haacke and Bell & O’Connor, P.C., Phoenix By: John Daniel Campbell III and David A. Joffe, Scottsdale, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Snell & Wilmer By: Lonnie J. Williams, Jr. and Bryan Cave, L.L.P. By: Mark I. Harrison, Rodney W. Ott, Phoenix, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

FELDMAN, Justice.

We granted review to determine whether the restrictive covenant between Dr. Steven Farber and Valley Medical Specialists is enforceable. We hold that it is not. Public policy concerns in this case outweigh Valley Medical’s protectable interests in enforcing the agreement. We thus vacate the court of appeals’ opinion, affirm the trial court’s judgment, and remand to the court of appeals to resolve any remaining issues. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution article VI, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1985, Valley Medical Specialists (“VMS”), a professional corporation, hired Steven S. Farber, D.O., an internist and pulmonologist who, among other things, treated AIDS and HIV-positive patients and performed brachytherapy — a procedure that radiates the inside of the lung in lung cancer patients. Brachytherapy can only be performed at certain hospitals that have the necessary equipment. A few years after joining VMS, Dr. Farber became a shareholder and subsequently a minority officer and director. In 1991, the three directors, including Dr. Farber, entered into new stock and employment agreements. The employment agreement contained a restrictive covenant, the scope of which was amended over time.

In 1994, Dr. Farber left VMS and began practicing within the area defined by the restrictive covenant, which at that time read as follows:

The parties recognize that the duties to be rendered under the terms of this Agreement by the Employee are special, unique and of an extraordinary character. The Employee, in consideration of the compensation to be paid to him pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, expressly agrees to the following restrictive covenants:
(a) The Employee shall not, directly or indirectly:
(i) Request any present or future patients of the Employer to curtail or cancel their professional affiliation with the Employer;
(ii) Either separately, jointly, or in association with others, establish, engage in, or become interested in, as an employee, owner, partner, shareholder or otherwise, or furnish any information to, work for, or assist in any manner, anyone competing with, or who may compete with the Employer in the practice of medicine.
(in) Disclose the identity of any past, present or future patients of the Employer to any other person, firm or corporation engaged in a medical practice the same as, similar to or in general competition with the medical services provided by the Employer.
(iv) Either separately, jointly or in association with others provide medical care or medical assistance for any person or persons who were patients or [sic] Employer during the period that Employee was in the hire of Employer.
(d) The restrictive covenants set forth herein shall continue during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination, for any reason, of this Agreement. The restrictive covenants set forth herein shall be binding upon the Employee in that geographical area encompassed within the boundaries measured by a five (5) mile radius of any office maintained or utilized by Employer at the time of execution of the Agreement or at any time thereafter.
(e) The Employee agrees that a violation on his part of any covenant set forth in this Paragraph 17 will cause such damage to the Employer as will be irreparable and for that reason, that Employee further agrees that the Employer shall be entitled, as a matter of right, and upon notice as provided in Paragraph 20 hereof, to an injunction from any court of competent jurisdiction, restraining any further violation of said covenants by Employee, his corporation, employees, partners or agents. Such right to injunctive remedies shall be in addition to and cumulative with any other rights and remedies the Employer may have pursuant to this Agreement or law, including, specifically with regard to the covenants set forth in subparagraph 17(a) above, the recovery of liquidated damages equal to forty percent (40%) of the gross receipts received for medical services provided by the Employee, or any employee, associate, partner, or corporation of the Employee during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination, for any reason, of this Agreement. The Employee expressly acknowledges and agrees that the covenants and agreement contained in this Paragraph 17 are minimum and reasonable in scope and are necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the Employer and its goodwill.

(Emphasis added.)

VMS filed a complaint against Dr. Farber seeking (1) preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Dr. Farber from violating the restrictive covenant, (2) liquidated damages for breach of the employment agreement, and (3) damages for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion of patient files and confidential information, and intentional interference with contractual and/or business relations.

Following six days of testimony and argument, the trial court denied VMS’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the restrictive covenant violated public policy or, alternatively, was unenforceable because it was too broad. Specifically, the court found that: any covenant over six months would be unreasonable; the five-mile radius from each of the three VMS offices was unreasonable because it covered a total of 235 square miles; and the restriction was unreasonable because it did not provide an exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.

The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a modified covenant was reasonable. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 190 Ariz. 563, 950 P.2d 1184 (App.1997). The court noted that there were eight hospitals outside the restricted area where Dr. Farber could practice. Id. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188. Although the covenant made no exceptions for emergency medicine, the court held that the severability clause permitted the trial court to modify the covenant so Dr. Farber could provide emergency services within the restricted area. Id. (citing Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs (“Peairs”), 164 Ariz. 54, 61, 790 P.2d 752, 759 (App.1989)). Moreover, VMS was allowed to stipulate that Dr. Farber could perform brachytherapy and treat AIDS and HIV patients within the restricted area, again even though the covenant contained no such exceptions. Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188.

The court of appeals found the restriction, when so modified, reasonable as to time and place. Although non-emergency patients might be required to travel further to see Dr. Farber, they could continue to see him if they were willing to drive that far. Id. at 567-68, 950 P.2d at 1188-89. Three years was reasonable because the record contained testimony that it might take Dr. Farber’s replacement three to five years to develop his pulmonary practice referral sources to the level they were when Dr. Farber resigned. Id.

The court found that the restrictive covenant did not violate public policy, believing that courts must not unnecessarily restrict the freedom of contract. Id. at 568, 950 P.2d at 1189. Moreover, the record was void of any evidence that the availability of pulmonologists in the restricted area would be inadequate without Dr. Farber. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

There is some dispute over what standard of review should be applied to the trial court’s decision. Dr. Farber contends the court of appeals usurped the trial court’s discretion by applying a de novo standard. Granting or denying a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Financial Assocs., Inc. v. Hub Properties, Inc., 143 Ariz. 543, 545, 694 P.2d 831, 833 (App.1984). The trial judge’s factual findings are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. See Rule 52(a), Ariz.R.Civ.P.

VMS contends, however, that the court of appeals correctly applied a de novo standard. Mixed findings of fact and law are reviewed de novo. Indeed, some courts have held that the determination of whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable is a question of law. See, e.g., Gann v. Morris, 122 Ariz. 517, 518, 596 P.2d 43, 44 (App.1979); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind.1983).

It is true that the ultimate question of reasonableness is a question of law. But reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on weighing the totality of the circumstances. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (App.1989) (“Each ease hinges on its own particular facts.”); Olliver/Pilcher Ins. v. Daniels, 148 Ariz. 530, 532, 715 P.2d 1218, 1220 (1986). Thus, we will give substantial deference both to the trial court’s findings of fact and its application of law to fact, reviewing the former on a clearly erroneous standard and the latter for abuse of discretion.

B. History of restrictive covenants

A brief reference to basic principles is appropriate. Historically, covenants not to compete were viewed as restraints of trade and were invalid at common law. Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 72 Ohio App.3d 446, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1991); see generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1960); Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 Am. Bus. L J. 31, 33 (1993). Eventually, ancillary restraints, such as those incident to employment or partnership agreements, were enforced under the rule of reason. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (hereinafter “Restatement”). Given the public interest in doctor-patient relationships, the validity of restrictive covenants between physicians was carefully examined long ago in Mandeville v. Harman:

The rule is not that a limited restraint is good, but that it may be good. It is valid when the restraint is reasonable; and the restraint is reasonable when it imposes no shackle upon the one party which is not beneficial to the other.
The authorities are uniform that such contracts are valid when the restraint they impose is reasonable, and the test to be applied, ... is this: To consider whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party can be of no benefit to either; it can only be oppressive, and, if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable and void, on the ground of public policy, as being injurious to the interests of the public.

42 N.J. Eq. 185, 7 A. 37, 38-39 (1886) (citations omitted); see also Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161, 1165 (1978). To be enforced, the restriction must do more than simply prohibit fair competition by the employee. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 216, 772 P.2d at 39. In other words, a covenant not to compete is invalid unless it protects some legitimate interest beyond the employer’s desire to protect itself from competition. Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 518, 724 P.2d 596, 604 (App.1986). The legitimate purpose of post-employment restraints is “to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment.” Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 647. Despite the freedom to contract, the law does not favor restrictive covenants. Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1031. This disfavor is particularly strong concerning such covenants among physicians because the practice of medicine affects the public to a much greater extent. Id. In fact, “[f]or the past 60 years, the American Medical Association (AMA) has consistently taken the position that noncompetition agreements between physicians impact negatively on patient care.” Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants not to Compete Between Physicians: Protecting Doctors’ Interests at Patients’ Expense, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992).

C. Level of scrutiny — public policy considerations

We first address the level of scrutiny that should be afforded to this restrictive covenant. Dr. Farber argues that this contract is simply an employer-employee agreement and thus the restrictive covenant should be strictly construed against the employer. See Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600 (noting employer-employee restrictive covenants are disfavored and strictly construed against the employer). This was the approach taken by the trial court. VMS contends that this is more akin to the sale of a business; thus, the noncompete provision should not be strictly construed against it. See id. (courts more lenient in enforcing restrictive covenants connected to sale of business because of need to effectively transfer goodwill). Finding the agreement here not on all fours with either approach, the court of appeals applied a standard “somewhere between” the two. Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 566, 950 P.2d at 1187.

Although this agreement is between partners, it is more analogous to an employer-employee agreement than a sale of a business. See Restatement § 188 cmt. h (“A rule similar to that applicable to an employee or agent applies to a partner who makes a promise not to compete that is ancillary to the partnership agreement or to an agreement by which he disposes of his partnership interest.”). Many of the concerns present in the sale of a business are not present or are reduced where, as here, a physician leaves a medical group, even when that physician is a partner. When a business is sold, the value of that business’s goodwill usually figures significantly into the purchase price. The buyer therefore deserves some protection from competition from the former owner.' See Kafker, supra, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. at 33. A restraint accompanying the sale of a business is necessary for the buyer to get the full goodwill value for which it has paid. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 647.

It is true that in this case, unlike typical employer-employee agreements, Dr. Farber may not have been at a bargaining disadvantage, which is one of the reasons such restrictive covenants are strictly construed. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assocs., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170, 172-73 (1984). Unequal bargaining power may be a factor to consider when examining the hardship on the departing employee. But in cases involving the professions, public policy concerns may outweigh any protectable interest the remaining firm members may have. Thus, this ease does not turn on the hardship to Dr. Farber.

By restricting a physician’s practice of medicine, this covenant involves strong public policy implications and must be closely scrutinized. See Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 60, 790 P.2d at 758; Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1032 (restrictive covenant in medical context “strictly construed in favor of professional mobility and access to medical care and facilities”). Although stopping short of banning restrictive covenants between physicians, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) “discourages” such covenants, finding they are not in the public interest.

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs discourages any agreement between physicians which restricts the right of a physician to practice medicine for a specified period of time or in a specified area upon termination of employment or a partnership or a corporate agreement. Such restrictive agreements are not in the public interest.

1989 Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Section 9.02 (hereinafter “AMA Opinions”). In addition, the AMA recognizes that free choice of doctors is the right of every patient, and free competition among physicians is a prerequisite of optimal care and ethical practice. See AMA Opinions, Section 9.06; Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1030.

For similar reasons, restrictive covenants are prohibited between attorneys. See Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J.Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 137 N.J.Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App.Div.1975); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410-11 (1989). In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted a code of professional conduct that contained a disciplinary rule prohibiting restrictive covenants between attorneys. See Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 37. The ethical rules adopted by this court provide:

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyers right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.

Ethical Rule (“ER”) 5.6, Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 42, Ariz.R.Sup. Ct.

Restrictive covenants between lawyers limit not only their professional autonomy but also the client’s freedom to choose a lawyer. See ER 5.6 cmt. We do not, of course, enact ethical rules for the medical profession, but given the view of the AMA to which we have previously alluded, we believe the principle behind prohibiting restrictive covenants in the legal profession is relevant.

Commercial standards may not be used to evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public policy considerations preclude their applicability. In that sense lawyer restrictions are injurious to the public interest. A client is always entitled to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. The attorney-client relationship is consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he may do nothing which restricts the right of the client to repose confidence in any counsel of his choice. No concept of the practice of law is more deeply rooted.

Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500.

We therefore conclude that the doctor-patient relationship is special and entitled to unique protection. It cannot be easily or accurately compared to relationships in the commercial context. In light of the great public policy interest involved in covenants not to compete between physicians, each agreement will be strictly construed for reasonableness.1

D. Reasonableness of covenant

Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40 (“Each case hinges on its own particular facts.”); Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 532, 715 P.2d at 1220. A restriction is unreasonable and thus will not be enforced: (1) if the restraint is greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest; or (2) if that interest is outweighed by the hardship to the employee and the likely injury to the public. See Restatement § 188 cmt. a.; see also Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 648-49; Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Partnership Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 970, 984 (1975). Thus, in the present case, the reasonableness inquiry requires us to examine the interests of the employer, employee, patients, and public in general. See 62 A.L.R.3d at 976; see also Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 57, 790 P.2d at 755; Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600 (accommodating right to work, right to contract, and public’s right to competition); see generally Blake, supra. Balancing these competing interests is no easy task and no exact formula can be used. See Restatement § 188 cmt. a.

In holding this restrictive covenant enforceable, the court of appeals relied heavily on Peairs, noting the restriction here was “very similar to the one in Peairs, which restricted a doctor from practicing orthopedic medicine and surgery within a five-mile radius of each of three offices for three years.” Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188. As noted, however, each case must be decided on its own unique facts. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. Here, the facts are sufficiently distinguishable from Peairs to warrant different treatment. For instance, in Peairs the three offices were “clustered,” and the total restricted area was thus much smaller. 164 Ariz. at 60, 790 P.2d at 758. The Peairs restrictive covenant prevented the practice of “orthopedic medicine and surgery.” Id. at 56, 790 P.2d at 754. Here, however, the covenant prohibited Dr. Farber from providing any and all forms of “medical care,” including not only pulmonology, but emergency medicine, brachytherapy treatment, and HIV-positive and AIDS patient care. Finally, the trial court in Peairs granted the preliminary injunction, while the trial court here denied it. Because we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s ruling after hearing the evidence in both cases is another factor that distinguishes the two cases.

E. VMS’s protectable interest

VMS contends, and the court of appeals agreed, that it has a protectable interest in its patients and referral sources. In the commercial context, it is clear that employers have a legitimate interest in retaining their customer base. See, e.g., Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. “The employer’s point of view is that the company’s clientele is an asset of value which has been acquired by virtue of effort and expenditures over a period of time, and which should be protected as a form of property.” Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 654. In the medical context, however, the personal relationship between doctor and patient, as well as the patient’s freedom to see a particular doctor, affects the extent of the employer’s interest. See Ohio Urology Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1031-32. “The practice of a physician is a thing so purely personal, depending so absolutely on the confidence reposed in his personal skill and ability, that when he ceases to exist it necessarily ceases also____” Mandeville, 7 A. at 40-41 (holding medical practice’s patient base is not protectable interest); see also Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 17.

Even in the commercial context, the employer’s interest in its customer base is balanced with the employee’s right to the customers. Where the employee took an active role and brought customers with him or her to the job, courts are more reluctant to enforce restrictive covenants. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 664, 667. Dr. Farber was a pulmonologist. He did not learn his skills from VMS. Restrictive covenants are designed to protect an employer’s customer base by preventing “a skilled employee from leaving an employer and, based on his skill acquired from that employment, luring away the employer’s clients or business while the employer is vulnerable — that is — before the employer has had a chance to replace the employee with someone qualified to do the job.” Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. These facts support the trial judge’s conclusion that VMS’s interest in protecting its patient base was outweighed by other factors.

We agree with VMS, however, that it has a protectable interest in its referral sources. See Medical Specialists, Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517, 523 (Ind.App.1995) (“Clearly, the continued success of [a specialty] practice, which is dependent upon patient referrals, is a legitimate interest worthy of protection.”); Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Mo.App.1991).

F. Scope of the restrictive covenant

The restriction cannot be greater than necessary to protect VMS’s legitimate interests. A restraint’s scope is defined by its duration and geographic area. The frequency of contact between doctors and their patients affects the permissible length of the restraint. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 659. The idea is to give the employer a reasonable amount of time to overcome the former employee’s loss, usually by hiring a replacement and giving that replacement time to establish a working relationship. Id. Even in the commercial context, “[w]hen the restraint is for the purpose of protecting customer relationships, its duration is reasonable only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to put a new man on the job and for the new employee to have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness to the customers.” Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 518, 724 P.2d at 604 (quoting Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 677).

In this case, the trial judge found that the three-year period was an unreasonable duration because

all of the experts agree that the practice of pulmonology entails treating patients with chronic conditions which require more hospital care than office care and which requires regular contact with the treating physician at least once within each six-month period so that any provision over six months is onerous and unnecessary to protect VMS’s economic interests where virtually all of Dr. Farber’s VMS patients had an opportunity by late 1994 or early 1995 (Farber left September 12, 1994) to decide which pulmonologist ... they would consult for their ongoing treatment[.]

On this record, we cannot say this factual finding was clearly erroneous. The three-year duration is unreasonable.

The activity prohibited by the restraint also defines the covenant’s scope. The restraint must be limited to the particular speciality of the present employment. See Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 676. On its face, the restriction here is not limited to internal medicine or even pulmonology. It precludes any type of practice, even in fields that do not compete with VMS. Thus, we agree with the trial judge that this restriction is too broad. Compare Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 56, 790 P.2d at 754 (upholding injunction that enforced restrictive covenant preventing doctor from practicing only orthopaedic medicine and orthopaedic surgery).

G. Public policy

The court of appeals held that the restrictive covenant does not violate public policy, pointing out that the record contains nothing to suggest there will be a lack of pulmonologists in the restricted area if Dr. Farber is precluded from practicing there. Even if we assume other pulmonologists will be available to cover Dr. Farber’s patients, we disagree with this view. It ignores the significant interests of individual patients within the restricted area. Kafker, supra, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. at 39-40. A court must evaluate the extent to which enforcing the covenant would foreclose patients from seeing the departing physician if they desire to do so. See Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1170; see also AMA Opinions, Section 9.06.

Concluding that patients’ right to see the doctor of their choice is entitled to substantial protection, VMS’s protectable interests here are comparatively minimal. See Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 15-36. The geographic scope of this covenant encompasses approximately 235 square miles, making it very difficult for Dr. Farber’s existing patients to continue treatment with him if they so desire. After six days of testimony, the trial judge concluded that this restrictive covenant was unreasonably broad and against public policy. Specifically, the judge found:

(1) the three year duration was unreasonable because pulmonology patients typically require contact with the treating physician once every six months. Thus, a restriction over six months is unnecessary to protect VMS’s economic interests. Patients would have had opportunity within approximately six months to decide which doctor to see for continuing treatment;
(2) the five mile radius was unreasonable because with the three offices, the restriction covered more than 235 square miles;
(3) the restriction was unreasonable because it did not expressly provide for an exception for emergency medical treatment;
(4) the restriction was overly broad because it is not limited to pulmonology;
(5) the covenant violates public policy because of the sensitive and personal nature of the doctor-patient relationship.

Given the facts and the principles discussed, that finding is well supported factually and legally.

H. Severance — the blue pencil rule

This contract contains a severance clause.2 The court of appeals accepted a stipulation by VMS that the restriction would not prohibit Dr. Farber from treating HIV-positive and AIDS patients or from performing brachytherapy. On its face, however, the restriction is broader than that, restricting him from providing “medical care or medical assistance for any person or persons who were patients or [sic] Employer during the period that Employee was in the hire of Employer.” Arizona courts will “blue pencil” restrictive covenants, eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions. See Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600; Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 533, 715 P.2d at 1221 (“If it is clear from its terms that a contract was intended to be severable, the court can enforce the lawful part and ignore the unlawful part.”). Here, however, the modifications go further than cutting grammatically severable portions. The court of appeals, in essence, rewrote the agreement in an attempt to make it enforceable. This goes too far. “Where the severability of the agreement is not evident from the contract itself, the court cannot create a new agreement for the parties to uphold the contract.” Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 533, 715 P.2d at 1221.

Even the blue pencil rule has its critics. For every agreement that makes its way to court, many more do not. Thus, the words of the covenant have an in terrorem effect on departing employees. See Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 682-83. Employers may therefore create ominous covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it enforceable. Id. Although we will tolerate ignoring severable portions of a covenant to make it more reasonable, we will not permit courts to add terms or rewrite provisions.

In modifying the agreement, the court of appeals cited Peairs, which indeed allowed the trial court to alter the restrictive covenant in a contract “between medical professionals whose services are necessary for the welfare of the public.” 164 Ariz. at 61, 790 P.2d at 759. We disapprove of the portion of Peairs that permits courts to rewrite and create a restrictive covenant significantly different from that created by the parties.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the restrictive covenant between Dr. Farber and VMS cannot be enforced. Valley Medical Specialists’ interest in enforcing the restriction is outweighed by the likely injury to patients and the public in general. See Restatement § 188. In so holding, we need not reach the question of the hardship imposed on Dr. Farber. The public policy implications here are enough to invalidate this particular agreement. We stop short of holding that restrictive covenants between physicians will never be enforced, but caution that such restrictions will be strictly construed. The burden is on the party wishing to enforce the covenant to demonstrate that the restraint is no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest, and that such interest is not outweighed by the hardship to the employee and the likely injury to the public. Here VMS has not met that burden. The restriction fails because its public policy implications outweigh the legitimate interests of VMS.

Dr. Farber listed in his petition for review several issues “presented to, but not decided by, the court of appeals.” Valley Medical Specialists’ response also contained “additional issues if the court accepts review.” None of the issues were briefed in this court. We thus remand to the court of appeals for a determination of those issues that are capable of decision and still need to be decided.

THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Chief Justice, and CHARLES E. JONES, Vice Chief Justice, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, Justice, and RUTH V. McGREGOR, Justice, concur.

1

. Dr. Farber asks us to hold restrictive covenants in the medical profession void per se as against public policy. Finding the present covenant unreasonable and thus unenforceable by injunction, we need not and do not address that contention.

2

. Since it is the agreement and desire of the parties hereto that the provisions of this Paragraph 17 be enforced to the fullest extent possible under the laws and public policies applied in each jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought, should any particular provision of this Paragraph 17 be deemed invalid or unenforceable, the same shall be deemed reformed and amended to delete herefrom that portion thus adjudicated invalid, and the deletion shall apply only with respect to the operation of said provision and, to the extent a provision of this Paragraph 17 would be deemed unenforceable by virtue of its scope, but may be made unenforceable by limitation thereof, each party agrees that this Agreement shall be reformed and amended so that the same shall be enforceable to the fullest extent permissible under the laws and public policies applied in the jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought, the parties hereto acknowledging that the covenants contained in this Paragraph 17 are an indispensable part of the transactions contemplated herein.

4.4 Statute of Frauds 4.4 Statute of Frauds

4.4.1 Radke v. Brenon 4.4.1 Radke v. Brenon

LLOYD RADKE v. PRESTON BRENON AND ANOTHER.

134 N. W. (2d) 887.

April 15, 1965

No. 39,166.

Harry N. Ray, for appellants.

Jerome A. Gotlieb, for respondent.

Rogosheske, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment of the district court decreeing specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate.

The judgment was entered upon findings made after trial that “subsequent to the Defendant acquiring” the property in question they “did offer to sell the property to the Plaintiff for the sum of Two Hundred Sixty-two ($262.00) Dollars, which offer the Plaintiff did accept”; and that “at all times relevant, the Plaintiff has been ready, willing and able to complete the agreement for the sale of Defendants’ property but the Defendants have refused to do so.” The court concluded that defendants “have wrongfully and improperly failed and refused” to deliver a deed of the property to plaintiff.

Resolving the conflicts in the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, as we must, these appear to be the facts. Plaintiff and defendants are neigh*36bors owning adjoining lots in Wakefield Park addition in Ramsey County. At the times each acquired ownership, their lots and eight neighboring lots did not extend to the west shoreline of Wakefield Lake, located nearby. The strip of land between the shoreline of the lake and the east boundary of the platted lots was owned by Dr. Gulden, the developer of the addition, and his brother. They had been hopeful of selling the entire strip to the county for use as a park, but when the county finally declined the offer in 1956, Dr. Gulden attempted to sell to the several owners separated from the lake. These attempts were unsuccessful until December 1, 1959, when defendants acquired ownership of the entire strip'. Preston Brenon, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was a licensed real estate agent. Following his purchase, he had the property surveyed, and on June 28, 1960, he sent an identical letter to plaintiff and the eight other neighbors offering to sell them the irregular parcels that separated their lots from the lake. In the letter he explained that since he was interested only in that part of the strip adjoining his property, he had no desire to retain the remainder. He stated he had “no desire to make any profit on this transaction if everyone owning adjoining property is willing to buy their portion” and divide the cost “equally among all 10 including [himjself.” He itemized the total cost at $2,120 and offered to sell each lot for $212 on any terms agreeable. This letter was not signed by defendant but his name was typewritten thereon, he having authorized this and considered such to be tantamount to his signature. Previous to the receipt of this letter, plaintiff and defendant had discussed the latter’s intent of acquiring the property for the neighborhood on at least two occasions. About 2 weeks after plaintiff received this offer, he orally accepted it. Sometime later, plaintiff learned from a neighbor that two neighbors declined to purchase, and thus the divided cost of each lot was increased to $262. Although he was agreeable to pay the increase, he did not immediately so inform defendant. Despite defendant’s progress in completing sales to other interested neighbors, plaintiff, for reasons not explained except that he believed he was waiting for defendant to furnish him a copy of the survey and an abstract, delayed making a request for the abstract until *37May 7, 1961. On cross-examination, he admitted that the survey was received by him with the June 28 letter. In any event, it is clear that plaintiff accepted defendant’s offer on May 7, at which time plaintiff knew of the price increase. Defendant testified:

“Q. * * * And did he agree to buy that time?

“A. At that time he did.”

Later in May, defendant delivered to plaintiff a stub abstract covering entries from July 2, 1947, to May 9, 1961. At that time plaintiff offered “some money” but was told by defendant to “wait till it’s all settled.” There was a further delay before a title opinion could be given, made necessary when plaintiffs attorney insisted on procuring a complete abstract. On August 14, plaintiff delivered to his attorney a check for $262 payable to defendants for the purpose of completing the sale. On August 16, plaintiff’s attorney wrote defendant informing him that he held the check for payment of the sale price to be delivered on receipt of a deed. Sometime after August 16, plaintiff received a letter from defendant dated August 16 informing him that the offer to sell was revoked.

From the time plaintiff bought his home in 1953, he occupied the parcel of land in dispute with consent of the owners. During the period it was owned by the Guldens, he cleaned, filled, graded, and planted grass upon it. However, after defendant purchased it, he did no more than continue to maintain the grass, fill in some “low spots that kind of wash away,” and plant “a few trees.”

The question is whether these facts establish a valid and enforceable contract for the sale of land. Defendants contend they do not.

As admitted by defendant, an oral contract to sell the land was made, and the trial court was clearly justified in so finding. There being no formal, integrated, written contract, however, the problem is whether the oral contract is unenforceable because it comes within Minn. St. 513.051 of the statute of frauds. Briefly, that pro*38vision decrees void any contract for the sale of lands unless the contract or some memorandum of the contract is in writing. The precise issue in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the letter written by defendant offering the land to plaintiff is a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

The statute expresses a public policy of preventing the enforcement by means of fraud and perjury of contracts that were never in fact made. To inhibit perversion of this policy by those who would deny an oral contract actually made, the statute itself permits enforcement of an oral contract if there exists a note or memorandum as evidence of the contract. To the courts, then, is left promotion of the policy of the statute, either by denying enforcement urged by defrauders or by granting enforcement against wrongful repudiators. As an aid in this objective, the statute itself lists some requisites of a memorandum and this court has added others, so that we have some indication of what content a memorandum normally must have in order to be sufficient evidence of the contract.

The statute requires that the writing express the consideration and that it be subscribed by the party by whom the sale is to be made or by his lawful agent authorized in writing. This court has stated that the memorandum is sufficient when, in addition to the above requirements, it states expressly or by necessary implication the parties to the contract, the lands involved, and the general terms and conditions upon which the sale will be made.2

These latter elements are clearly present in the letter written by defendant. Plaintiff’s name is included in the inside address heading the letter, and Brenon’s name is typewritten at the bottom. The land to be sold is positively delineated. The letter offers “their portion” to “everyone owning adjoining property,” and the survey map accom-*39partying the letter depicts each tract. Considering the conversation both before and after the letter was sent, it is inconceivable that the parties could be uncertain concerning the land to be sold. As to other terms of the contract, such as manner of payment, Brenon merely held himself ready “to work out any kind of terms” with the purchasers.

The elements expressly required by statute are not so obvious. First, the consideration of $212 stated in the letter is not the same as the $262 tendered in accord with the oral understanding. Despite this discrepancy, we think that the letter sufficiently expresses the consideration because the $212 represented an equal share of the cost divided by all ten interested parties. As Brenon said in the letter, “I feel the only fair way to share the cost is to divide equally among all 10 including myself.” There is no dispute that the price was changed from that stated in the letter when two property owners declined to buy. The consideration then was simply a mathematical computation according to the formula specified in the letter.3 We do not believe this variation in the dollar amount renders the letter’s expression of the consideration insufficient, especially since plaintiff paid more under the admitted agreement than he would have paid according to the letter.

The necessity of a subscription presents the final problem. A “subscription” is the same as a “signing,”4 and it is clear that Brenon’s typewritten name, which according to his testimony was typed with the intent that it be tantamount to a written signature, is a sufficient subscription.5 A problem here is that his wife, who owned the property *40with him in joint tenancy, apparently neither signed the letter nor authorized him in writing to sell her share. But this deficiency was at no time claimed or asserted before the trial court or in defendants’ brief to this court. It was suggested for the first time upon oral argument. If it is a fact, it was not a part of the theory upon which the case was tried and submitted. We must therefore adhere to our well-settled rule that an unlitigated issue may not be asserted for the first time on appeal.6

We by no means intend to hold that Brenon’s letter would be a sufficient memorandum in every case. We will overlook technical requirements only if proof of the oral contract is clear and uncontradicted as in this case where defendant admitted that a contract had been made. But those technical requirements are only aids to discern where the truth lies in a given case, and we will not blindly apply those technicalities if they lead to a conclusion repugnant to commonsense. As Professor Williston has said:

“In brief, the Statute ‘was intended to guard against the perils of perjury and error in the spoken word.’ Therefore, if after a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the pertinent facts and all the evidence in a particular case, the court concludes that enforcement of the agreement will not subject the defendant to fraudulent claims, the purpose of the Statute will best be served by holding the note or memorandum sufficient even though it be ambiguous or incomplete.”7

Most persuasive is defendant’s admission during trial that a contract was in fact made between plaintiff and himself. Although we have followed the majority rule that admission of the contract does not preclude assertion of the statute of frauds,8 an admission that a con*41tract was made certainly cannot be ignored when all other evidence submitted supports the same conclusion. Even though it may be argued that the formal requirements contemplated by the statute are lacking, when all the evidence is taken into account we are of the opinion that the letter should be held a sufficient memorandum in this case.9 The policy of the statute of frauds would be perverted if the admitted contract were not enforced. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

4.4.2 McIntosh v. Murphy 4.4.2 McIntosh v. Murphy

DICK McINTOSH AND MARTHA McINTOSH v. GEORGE MURPHY AND MURPHY MOTORS, LIMITED, A HAWAII CORPORATION.

No. 4828.

May 11, 1970.

Richardson, C.J., Marumoto, Abe, Levinson AND KOBAYASHI, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY

LEVINSON, J.

This case involves an oral employment contract which allegedly violates the provision of the Statute of Frauds requiring “any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof” to be in writing in order to be enforceable. HRS § 656-1 (5). In this action the plaintiff-employee Dick McIntosh seeks to recover damages from his employer, George Murphy and Murphy Motors, Ltd., for the breach of an alleged one-year oral employment contract.

While the facts are in sharp conflict, it appears that defendant George Murphy was in southern California during March, 1964 interviewing prospective management personnel for his Chevrolet-Oldsmobile dealerships in Hawaii. He interviewed the plaintiff twice during that time. *30The position of sales manager for one of the dealerships was fully discussed but no contract was entered into. In April, 1964 the plaintiff received a call from the general manager of Murphy Motors informing him of possible employment within thirty days if he was still available. The plaintiff indicated his continued interest and informed the manager that he would be available. Later in April, the plaintiff sent Murphy a telegram to the effect that he would arrive in Honolulu .on Sunday, April 26, 1964. Murphy then telephoned McIntosh on Saturday, April 25, 1964 to notify him that the job of assistant salés manager was open and work would begin on the following Monday, April 27, 1964. At that time McIntosh expressed surprise at the change in job title from sales manager to. assistant sales manager but reconfirmed the fáct that he was arriving in Honolulu the next day, Sunday. McIntosh arrived on Sunday, April 26,1964 and began work oh the following day, Monday, April 27, 1964.

As a consequence of his decision to work for Miirphy, McIntosh moved some of his belongings from the mainland to Hawaii, sold other possessions, leased ah apartment in Honolulu and obviously forwent any other employment opportunities. In short, the plaintiff did all those things which were incidental to changing one’s residence perma: nently. from. Los Angeles to Honolulu, a distance of approximately 2200 miles. McIntosh continued working for Murphy until July 16, 1964, approximately two and one-half months, at which time he was discharged on the grounds that he was unable to close deals with prospective customers and could not train the salesmen.

At the conclusion of the trial, the defense moved for a directed verdict arguing that the oral employment agreement was in violation of the Statute of Frauds, there being no written memorandum or note thereof. The trial court ruled that as a matter of law the contract did not come *31within the Statute, reasoning that Murphy bargained for acceptance by the actual commencement of performance by McIntosh, so that McIntosh was not bound by a contract until he came to work on Monday, April 27, 1964. Therefore, assuming that the contract was for a year’s employment, it was performablé within a year exactly to the day and no writing was required for it to be enforceable. Alternatively, the court ruled that if the agreement was made final by the telephone call between the parties on Saturday, April 25, 1964, then that part of the weekend 'which remained would not be counted in cal: culating the year, thus taking the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. With commendable candor the trial judge gave as the motivating force for the decision his desire to avoid a mechanical and unjust application of the Statute.1

The case went to the jury on the following questions: (1) whether the contract was for a year’s duration or was performable on a trial basis, thus making it terminable at the will of either party; (2) whether the plaintiff was discharged for just cause; and (3) if he was not discharged for just cause, what damages were due the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of |12,103.40. The defendants appeal to this court on four principal grounds, three of which we find to be without merit. The remaining ground of appeal is whether the plaintiff can maintain an action on the alleged oral employment contract in light of the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds making unenforceable an oral contract that is not to be performed within one year.

*32L. TIME OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

The defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction to the jury that if the employment agreement was made more than one day before the plaintiff began performance, there could be no recovery by the plaintiff. The reason given was that a contract not to be performed within one year from its making is unenforceable if not in writing.

The defendants are correct in their argument that the time of acceptance of an offer is a question of fact for the jury to decide. But the trial court alternatively decided that even if the offer was accepted on the Saturday prior to the commencement of performance, the intervening Sunday and part of Saturday would not be counted in computing the year for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The judge stated that Sunday was a non-working day and only a fraction of Saturday was left which he would not count. In any event, there is no need to discuss the relative merits of either ruling since we base our decision in this case on the doctrine of equitable estoppel which was properly briefed and argued by both parties before this court, although not presented to the trial court.

II. ENFORCEMENT BY VIRTUE OF ACTION IN RELIANCE ON THE ORAL CONTRACT

In determining whether a rule of law can be fashioned and applied to a situation where an oral contract admittedly violates a strict interpretation of the Statute of Frauds, it is necessary to review the Statute itself together with its historical and modern functions. The Statute of Frauds, which requires that certain contracts be in writing in order to be legally enforceable, had its inception in the days of Charles II of England. Hawaii’s *33version of the Statute is found in HRS § 656-1 and is substantially the same as the original English Statute of Frauds.

The first English Statute was enacted almost 300 years ago to prevent “many fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury”. 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677) . Certainly, there were compelling reasons in those days for such a law. At the time of enactment in England, the jury system was quite unreliable, rules of evidence were few, and the complaining party was disqualified as a witness so he could neither testify on direct-examination nor, more importantly, be cross-examined. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 440, 441 (1931). The aforementioned structural and evidentiary limitations on our system of justice no longer exist.

Retention of the Statute today has nevertheless been justified on at least three grounds: (1) the Statute still serves an evidentiary function thereby lessening the danger of perjured testimony (the original rationale); (2) the requirement of a writing has a cautionary effect which causes reflection by the parties on the importance of the agreement; and (3) the writing is an easy way to distinguish enforceable contracts from those which are not, thus channelling certain transactions into written form.2

In spite of whatever utility the Statute of Frauds may still have, its applicability has been drastically limited by judicial construction over the years in order to mitigate the harshness of a mechanical application.3 Furthermore, *34learned writers continue to disparage the Statute regarding it as “a statute for promoting fraud” and a “legal anachronism”.4

. Another method of judicial circumvention of the Statute of Frauds has grown oat of the exercise of the equity powers of the courts. Such judicially imposed limitations or exceptions involved the traditional dispensing power of the equity courts to mitigate the “harsh” rule of law. When courts have enforced an oral contract in spite of the Statute, they have utilized the legal labels of “part performance” or “equitable estoppel” in granting relief. Both doctrines are said to he based on the concept of estoppel, which operates to avoid unconscionable injury. 3 Williston, Contracts § 533A at 791 (Jaeger ed. 1960), Summers, supra at 443-49; Monarco v. LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (Traynor, J.).

Part performance has long been recognized in Hawaii as an equitable doctrine justifying the enforcement of an oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in land where there has been substantial reliance by the party seeking to enforce the contract. Perreira v. Perreira, 50 Haw. 641, 447 P.2d 667 (1968) (agreement to grants life estate); Vierra v. Shipman, 26 Haw. 369 (1922) (agreement to devise land); Yee Hop v. Young Sak Cho, 25 Haw. 494 (1920) (oral lease of real property). Other courts have enforced oral contracts (including employment contracts) which failed to satisfy the section of the *35Statute making unenforceable an agreement not to be performed within a year of its making. This has occurred where the conduct of the parties gave rise to an estoppel to assert the Statute. Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th cir. 1965) (equitable estoppel); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th cir. 1954) (“promissory estoppel”); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88. (1909) (equitable estoppel).

It.is appropriate for modem courts to cast aside the raiments, of conceptualism which cloak the true policies underlying the reasoning behind the many decisions, enforcing contracts that violate the Statute of Frauds. There is certainly no need to resort to legal rubrics or meticulous legal formulas when better explanations are available. The policy behind enforcing an oral agreement which violated the Statute of Frauds,- as a policy of avoiding unconscionable, injury, was well set out by the California Supreme Court. In Monarco v. LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623, 220 P.2d 737, 739 (1950), a case which involved an action to enforce an oral contract for the conveyance of land on the grounds of 20 years performance by the promisee, the court said:

The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that , would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract ....

See also Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909) (an employment contract enforced).

In seeking to frame a workable test which is flexible enough to cover diverse factual situations and also provide some reviewable standards, we find very persuasive section *36217A of the Second Restatement of Contracts.5 That section specifically covers those situations where there has been reliance on an oral contract which falls within the Statute of Frauds. Section 217A states:

(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and restitution; (b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought; (c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence; (d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; (e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was forseeable by the promisor.

We think that the approach taken in the Restatement, is the proper method of giving the trial court the necessary latitude to relieve a party of the hardships of the Statute of Frauds. Other courts have used similar approaches in dealing with oral employment contracts upon which an employee had seriously relied. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th cir. 1954); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). This *37is to be preferred over having the trial court bend over backwards to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. In the present case the trial court admitted just this inclination and forthrightly followed it.

L. Richard Fried, Jr. and Ted Gamble Clause {Pratt, Moore, Bortz &Oase of counsel) for defendants-appellants.

Katsugo Miho {Fong, Miho, Ohoy & Robinson of counsel) for plaintiffs-appellees.

There is no dispute that the action of the plaintiff in moving 2200 miles from Los Angeles to Hawaii was foreseeable by the defendant. In fact, it was required to perform his duties. Injustice can only be avoided by the enforcement of the contract and the granting of money damages. No other remedy is adequate. The plaintiff found himself residing in Hawaii without a job.

It is also clear that a contract of some kind did exist. The plaintiff performed the contract for two and one-half months receiving $3,484.60 for his services. The exact length of the contract, whether terminable at will as urged by the defendant, or for a year from the time when the plaintiff started working, was up to the jury to decide.

In sum, the trial court might have found that enforcement of the contract was warranted by virtue of the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s promise. Naturally, each case turns on its own facts. Certainly there is considerable discretion for a court to implement the true policy behind the Statute of Frauds, which is to prevent fraud or any other type of unconscionable injury. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff’s reliance was such that injustice could only be avoided by enforcement of the contract.

Affirmed.

*38DISSENTING OPINION OF

ABE, J.,

WITH WHOM KOBAYASHI, J., JOINS.

Tbe majority of tbe court bas affirmed the judgment of the trial court; however, I respectfully dissent.

I.

Whether alleged contract of employment came within the Statute of Frauds:

As acknowledged by this court, the trial judge erred when as a matter of law he ruled that the alleged employment contract did not come within the Statute of Frauds; however, I cannot agree that this error was. not prejudicial as this court, intimates.

On this issue, the date that the alleged contract was entered into was all important and the date of acceptance of an offer by the plaintiff was a question of fact for the jury to decide. In other words, it. was for the. jury to determine, when. the. alleged one-year employment contract was entered into and if the jury had found that the plaintiff had accepted the offer1 more than one day. before plaintiff was to report, to work, the. contract would have come within the Statute of Frauds. and would have been unenforceable. Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 31 Ill. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964); Chase v. Hinkley, 126 Wis. 75, 105 N.W. 230 (1905).

II.

This court holds that though the alleged one-year employment contract came within the Statute.of Frauds, nevertheless the judgment, of the trial court is affirmed “on the ground that the plaintiff’s reliance was such that injustice could .only be avoided by. enforcement of the contract.”

I believe this court is begging the issue by its holding because to reach that conclusion, this court is ruling that *39the defendant agreed to hire the plaintiff under a one-year employment contract. The defendant has denied that the plaintiff was hired for a period of one year and has introduced into evidence testimony of . witnesses that all hiring by the defendant in the past has been on a trial basis. The defendant also testified that he had hired the plaintiff on a trial basis.

Here on one hand the plaintiff claimed that he had a one-year employment contract; on the other hand, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had not been hired for one year but on a trial basis for so long as his services were satisfactory. I believe the Statute of Frauds was enacted to avoid the consequences this court is forcing upon the defendant. In my opinion, the legislature enacted the Statute of Frauds to negate claims such as has been made by the plaintiff in this case. But this court holds that because the plaintiff in reliance of the one-year employment contract (alleged to have been entered into by the. plaintiff, but denied by . the defendant) has changed his position, “injustice could only be avoided by enforcement of the contract.” Where is the sense of justice?

Now assuming that the defendant had agreed, to hire the plaintiff under a one-year employment contract and the contract came within the Statute of Frauds, I cannot agree,, as intimated by this court, that we should circumvent the Statute of Frauds by the exercise of the equity powers of courts. As to statutory law, the sole function of the judiciary is to interpret the statute and the judiciary should not usurp legislative power and enter into the legislative field. A. C. Chock, Ltd. v. Kaneshiro, 51 Haw. 87, 93, 451 P.2d 809 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 41 Ohio Op. 233, 83 N.E.2d 254 (Ct. C.P. 1948). Thus, if the Statute of Frauds is too harsh as intimated by this court, and it brings about undue hardship, it is for the legislature to amend or repeal the statute and not for this court to legislate.