MR. JUSTICE ANDERSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from an order appointing the administrator of an estate.

The deceased, Shun T. Takahashi, was a Japanese alien who died in Flathead county, Montana, on July 23, 1941. The public administrator, James Jorgensen, Jr., applied for letters of administration. The application was opposed by Vivian Takahashi, a white woman, claiming as surviving widow of the deceased, and asking for the appointment of Claude C. Britell as her nominee. The two petitions were heard together, each contesting the other. There was no will, and the deceased left prop*493erty within the jurisdiction of the court — a proper case for the appointment of an administrator — and the only question over which there was controversy was as to which of the two applicants was entitled to letters.

The public administrator in his petition refers to Vivian Takahashi, living at Havre, Montana, as the wife of the deceased, but alleges that she is a white woman and therefore was not his lawful wife and cannot claim any right of administration as his surviving widow. He alleges further that the only next of kin of the deceased is his father, Minomatsu Takahashi, residing in Japan, and that therefore, as public administrator he is entitled to letters.

Vivian Takahashi in her petition alleges that she is the surviving widow of the deceased, and that as such she is entitled to letters of administration, and, waiving such right, her nominee is entitled to letters. If she is the surviving widow she should prevail, and the controversy narrows down to the question of the validity of the marriage between her and the deceased.

Upon the hearing the court made an order granting the petition of the public administrator and ordering letters of administration to issue to him. The order did not specifically deny the petition of Vivian Takahashi but that was its effect. From the order so made, Vivian Takahashi and Claude C. Britell, her nominee, have appealed.

To sustain her case, Vivian Takahashi showed that she and the deceased were married in Spokane, Washington, on May 18, 1915. In addition to her testimony to that effect there was a written stipulation that they were duly married under the laws of Washington at Spokane on May 18, 1915, that marriage between a white person and a Japanese was not prohibited by the laws of that state, and that the marriage was there legal and valid. The only question left for determination is whether that marriage may be held valid in Montana.

Marriage between a Japanese and a white person is prohibited in this state. Section 5702, Revised Codes 1935, declares such marriage “utterly null and void” and official solemnization is *494prohibited with penalty of fine and imprisonment. (Sec. 5704, Id.) The ban applies not only to marriages contracted within the state but is extended to apply to marriage of residents of the state contracted elsewhere, section 5703 providing that “every such marriage * * * hereafter contracted or solemnized without the state of Montana by any person who has, prior to the time of contracting or solemnizing said marriage, been a resident of the state of Montana, shall be null and void within the state of Montana.” This law was enacted in 1909. and has remained unchanged ever since.

The phrase “prior to the time of contracting or solemnizing said marriage,” as here used, can refer only to the time immediately preceding the marriage. Given its widest meaning it would include any time previous to the marriage, even in the remote past and separated by intervening years of residence elsewhere. This would lead to questionable results, and would carry the reach of the legislation beyond the scope apparently intended by the legislature. In its application to foreign marriages, residence within the state is the condition of the law being applied. It is clear that it was not intended to apply generally to non-residents, and there is no reason to believe that the legislature intended to single out non-residents who had formerly resided in the state as being controlled by the law. The more reasonable view is that the language employed in speaking of prior residence in the state was intended to have the more restricted meaning as applying to the prior time immediately preceding the marriage.

In construing statutes, words employed should be given such meaning as is required by the context, and as is necessary to give effect to the purpose of the statute; and it is the duty of the court to restrict the meaning of general words whenever it is found necessary to do so in order to carry out the legislative intention. (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont. 608, 214 Pac. 596; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, 20 L. Ed. 566; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 12 S. Ct. 517, 36 L. Ed. 340; 25 R. C. L., Statutes, sec. 223.)

*495The only prior residence that can be material to the purpose of this law is that which transpires immediately preceding the event in case of marriage outside the state, this being taken as the criterion in determining the residence of the parties at the time the marriage takes place. So construed, we have a law which prohibits marriage in this state between Japanese and whites and which extends the ban to such marriage of its residents solemnized elsewhere as invalid within the state.

There is no contention that the state may not prohibit such marriages within its own borders, but question is raised as to the application of the law to marriages solemnized elsewhere. Appellants rely on the general rule that a marriage valid where made will be held valid everywhere, and to show that this rule is the law in Montana they cite section 5707 of the Revised Codes of 1935, which provides that “all marriages contracted without the state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this state.” We find exceptions thereto, also by statute, among them, as provided by sections 5702 and 5703, Revised Codes, those which prohibit such marriages as here considered and by which they are declared to be absolutely null and void. Such marriages are thereby taken out of the general rule and are not governed by section 5707/ (38 C. J. 1277.)

It is the policy of our law that there shall be no marriage between white presons and Japanese. To make that policy effective such marriage within the state is forbidden; and our own residents are not permitted to circumvent the law by marriage outside the state. Such marriage our law declares to be null and void and of no avail within the state.

A number of states have similar legislation prohibiting marriage between certain races, and such laws have been sustained by the courts. (Kinney v. Commomvealth, 30 Grat., Va., 858, 32 Am. Rep. 690; State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (n. s.), 800; Eggers v. Olson, 104 Old. 297, 231 Pac. 483. See, also, 38 C. J. 1217; 35 Am. Jur., Marriage, sees. 167, 173, 174.)

*496The control and regulation of marriage is a matter of do-mestie concern within each state. In the adoption of policies in respect thereto, which in its judgment are promotive of the welfare of its society and of the individual members thereof, the state is sovereign and not subject to the control of the Federal Government nor of the laws of any other state. (35 Am. Jur., Marriage, secs. 11, 167; 38 C. J. 1275; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 132; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1; Toler v. Oakwood, etc., Corporation, 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. (2d) 364, 127 A. L. R. 430; Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154,191 N. E. 673, 93 A. L. R. 701; Ex parte Soucek, 7 Cir., 101 Fed. (2d) 405; Murphy v. Murphy, 249 Mass. 552, 144 N. E. 394.)

The rule of comity does not require that a state shall sanction within its borders that which is repugnant to its own law. The question has frequently arisen in connection with the regulation of marriage, and the complete sovereignty of each state in the determination of what marriages of its own residents it will sanction is the universal rule. (Toler v. Oakwood, etc., Corporation, supra.)

The case of Cross v. Cross, 110 Mont. 300, 102 Pac. (2d) 829 cited by appellants, is not in point. The marriage there under consideration was not void but only voidable. It was not a marriage prohibited by the laws of this state.

The general rule as to recognition of foreign marriage valid in the state where contracted is referred to and applied in a number of other decisions of this court. In none of those cases, however, was the marriage in question obnoxious to the laws of this state. In the case of In re Huston’s Estate, 48 Mont. 524, 139 Pac. 458, there was no impediment to the marriage of the parties under our law, and a marriage between them in the state of Washington, legal and valid under the laws of that state, was sustained as valid in Montana. In the case of Welch v. All Persons, 78 Mont. 370, 254 Pac. 179, the reference to the rule there was in connection with a claimed marriage in the state of Wisconsin between parties who could have married in Montana. *497None of those eases were within the exception to the rule where the.marriage sought to be sustained is such as is forbidden by our law.

There should be no difficulty in understanding the legislative intent in referring to the residence of persons within the state as determinative of the application of the law. The word “resident” is generally understood as referring to a person in connection with the place where he lives. Webster’s Dictionary defines the word as meaning “one who resides in a place; one who dwells in a place for a period of more or less duration.” Our state Code defines “residence” as “the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.” (Sec. 33, Rev. Codes). It also says that “the residence can be changed only by union of act and intent.”

While the word “residence” has been involved in many controversies as will be seen from the reported cases, it will be found that it is not the word itself that has been difficult of understanding. It has been in the construction of language expressive of the effect of residence, and of the rights arising therefrom and based on the fact of residence. In each such case the word becomes a part of a concept larger than itself, such as residence necessary to the right to vote, residence in establishing a domicile, residence necessary to citizenship, etc. In each such case the context in connection with which the word is used must be considered, and the word, together with the context, then gives the meaning sought to be conveyed. There is thereby no change made in the simple, clear meaning of the word itself. (In re Coppock’s Estate, 72 Mont. 431, 234 Pac. 258, 39 A. L. R. 1152; Archer v. Archer, 106 Mont. 116, 75 Pac. (2d) 783; State ex rel. Duckworth v. District Court, 107 Mont. 97, 80 Pac. (2d) 367.) The fact of residence, of course, must .be determined in each case from the evidence adduced, and by the application thereto of ordinary rules of evidence.

•In the instant case we have to determine the simple fact of “residence.” The statute does not speak of any length of *498residence, nor is there any other qualification specified. We need not be concerned with the residence of Vivian Takahashi prior to the time of the marriage. If Shun T. Takahashi was then a resident of Montana, the question of the validity of the marriage as it here arises is governed by the Montana law.

Shun T. Takahashi came to Troy, Montana, in 1912, where he was then employed by the Great Northern Railway Company as call boy and errand boy and later as laborer in the roundhouse. He continued in that employment there until 1927 when he was transferred to Whitefish, Montana, but still in the employ of the railway company, working in the roundhouse. He worked for the railway company in such employment continuously from 1912 until the time of his death in 1941. For a time he also had a restaurant in Troy, from 1922 until 1927 or 1928. Vivian Takahashi became acquainted with him in 1915 •at Bonners Ferry, Idaho, where she was then working. The two towns were not a great distance apart, and after their acquaintance they visited back and forth. She was with Takahashi at Troy when they went to Spokane and were married.' After that they lived together at Troy as husband and wife and were well known there. There was no evidence of either of them having been anywhere else than in Montana since the time of their marriage, except some trips made to Seattle, Washington, but ■always returning to Montana where Takahashi all the time was •employed and part of the time was also running a restaurant, and where they lived and made their home. The history of their residence in the state is complete for more than a quarter of a century, including the time of their marriage. While it is the residence immediately prior to and at the time of the marriage that is of importance here, the long-continued residence thereafter in the same place is material as proving the permanent nature of the residence there already at the time of the marriage. (28 C. J. S., Domicile, sec. 17; 9 R. G. L. 557.)

In an attempt to show that Takahashi was not a resident of Montana at the time of the marriage, Vivian Takahashi testified •several times that he had always told her his home was in Seattle, *499but each time the testimony was stricken as hearsay; she then, still on direct examination, testified three times that she did not know where Takahashi’s home was at the time of their marriage; asked again “Did he tell you where his home was?” she replied : ‘ ‘ His home was in Seattle. ’ ’ The answer was objected to as hearsay and not ruled upon by the court, but it is apparent from the circumstances that she was testifying as to his own statement of his residence. The only other possible evidence of his residence other than in Montana was the certified copy of the marriage license showing that in making the application he stated that his residence was Seattle, Washington.

There was no evidence of Takahashi ever having lived in Seattle. His declarations alone, unsupported by any evidence of actual residence there, are of little, if any, value as evidence. (28 C. J. S., Domicile, sec. 18.) Actions speak lounder than words, and the conduct of the parties in this case leaves their statements and declarations in conflict therewith wholly without merit as evidence. (In re Harkness’ Estate, 176 Cal. 537, 542, 169 Pac. 78, 80; In re Thornton’s Estate, Cal. Sup., 19 Pac. (2d) 778.) Even though there had been substantial evidence of a former residence in the state of Washington, the conduct of both parties shows abandonment of such residence. Any floating intention they may have had of returning there could not have the effect of maintaining the residence there under the circumstances here shown. (17 Am. Jur., Domicile, sec. 31; In re Thornton’s Estate, supra.) Vivian Takahashi further testified that Takahashi during all the time was also working for the Oriental Trading Company which had headquarters in Seattle, and that he went where he was ordered to go by such company. Upon his death, among his personal effects found, was a check on the Oriental Trading Company payable to him. What such work consisted of or what the check was for does not appear. This was no proof of residence. There was no substantial evidence to show that Takahashi was not a resident of Montana.

It is clear that the evidence as a whole does not preponderate *500.against the district court’s finding, necessarily implied by the •order appealed from, that at the time of the marriage Takahashi was a resident of Montana. Certainly we cannot hold that the •court erred in that respect.

Appellants further contend that, regardless of the invalidity of the marriage at the time it was contracted, the relation having continued for twenty-six years and until Takahashi’s death, it is too late for the public administrator to attack the .marriage; that a marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, or by .a stranger, but can be set aside only by a party during the lifetime of the parties. The answer to this contention is that marriage between these two parties was absolutely prohibited. Neither time nor circumstance could remove the legal objection ■and obstacle thereto; nor could the marriage status afterward result from such cohabitation as followed. The marriage was void and ineffectual for any lawful purpose in this state. It is open to collateral attack in any proceeding wherein the question of its validity may be raised, whether before or after the •death of either or both of the parties. (35 Am. Jur., Marriage, ■ sec. 58; In re Gregorson’s Estate, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60, L. R. A. 1916 C, 697, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1124.) The marriage was wholly non-existent, and there was no occasion ever for any pro■•ceeding to have it annulled. The public administrator was in no way concerned until after the death of Takahashi, and it was ■entirely proper that he should show then that there had been no valid marriage between these parties.

Vivian Takahashi’s claim of right of administration rests entirely upon her claim of marriage with the deceased. Inasmuch as that marriage was entirely null and void and must be -■treated as wholly non-existent in this state, she is without any •claim of right of administration. There were no children of the marriage, and the evidence showed that the only next of kin ■was a surviving brother of the deceased, living in Japan, the father referred to in the petition having died. The public ad-ministrator is, therefore, entitled to letters of administration.

The order of the lower court is affirmed.

*501Mr. Chief Justice Johnson and Associate Justice Erickson .concur.

Mr. Justice Angstman takes no part in the foregoing decision.

Mr. Justice Morris:

I dissent. The general rule relative to residence is provided for by section 33, Revised Codes, which, so far as pertinent here, provides:

“Every person has, in law, a residence. In determining the place of residence the following rules are to be observed:

“1. It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.

‘ ‘ 2. There can only be one residence.

“3. A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. * * *

“7. The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent.”

The residence or domicile of the marriage contracting parties —the vital question to be determined in this action — on the date of their marriage, May 18, 1915, at Spokane, Washington, must •control our conclusions as to their residence. Where they lived subsequent to marriage has no bearing on the merits of this action.

It is shown by both the application for marriage license and by the certificate of marriage that both the contracting .parties ■claimed residence in other states: the man in the state of Washington and the woman in the state of Oregon. This written evidence, combined with the testimony of Mrs. Takahashi, is the best and practically the only evidence in the record as to the domicile or residence of the parties.

“The general rule is that domicile is changed from one place to another, or one state to another, only by abandonment by a person of his first place of domicile with intention not to return, and ;by taking up his residence in another place with the Intention of permanently residing in that place. In other words, *502to effect a change of residence or domicile, there must be an actual abandonment of the first domicile, coupled with intention not to return to it, and there must be a new domicile acquired by actual residence in another place or jurisdiction, with the intention of making the last acquired residence a permanent home.” (9 E. C. L. 542.)

The evidence in the record before us is ample to establish the actual residence of the parties in Montana for some two or three years prior to their marriage, but the record is entirely and absolutely void of any showing that either party intended to abandon his or her former residence in Washington and Oregon. Our statute, quoted above, says that residence can be changed “only by the union of act and intent.” The case of United States v. Knight, 9 Cir., 299 Fed. 571, 573. a Montana case, was a suit brought by the United States against Sidney E. Knight to cancel his certificate of citizenship. Knight was an Englishman and was admitted to citizenship in the United States in Lewis and Clark county, state of Montana, November 5, 1900. Within five years thereafter he went to South Africa in the employ of an American corporation, remaining in that country and in such employment for more than twenty years, and it appears that he took part in political affairs in South Africa and voted there but always maintained that he was an American citizen and registered with the American consul general at Capetown, South Africa, as an American citizen. The action brought against him was for the purpose of cancelling his certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraudulent representation. The federal district court held that it was not shown that the defendant had taken permanent residence in South Africa and dismissed the action; on appeal to the circuit court, the district court’s decision was affirmed. In the course of the opinion of the circuit court it was said:

“An American cttizen does not become a permanent resident of a foreign country by simply taking employment there with an American firm, however long his employment may continue. ’ ’

It appears that Takahashi was connected with the Oriental *503Trading Company of Seattle, Washington, and obviously continued in the employment of that concern at least to some extent during all the time down to the time of his death, as a check recently issued by that company to him, apparently for wages, was in his possession and was listed among the assets in the inventory of his property. He had an absolute right to maintain his residence in the state of Washington for any length of time that he might desire, and there is no evidence in the record to show that he ever intended to relinquish his legal residence in that state.

In order to keep within the statute, there must be shown not only that he resided in Montana during the time alleged, but that it was his intention to abandon his residence in the state of Washington. When it comes to the matter of his marrying, the only evidence that we have as to his intention in regard to his residence is the information given to the Washington officials at Spokane when he obtained his marriage license, and at that time he gave his place of residence as Seattle, Washington. It is so well established that one may maintain a legal residence separate and apart from his actual place of abode that I do not deem it necessary to present authorities on that point. Personally, the writer left Havre, Montana, nine years ago and took up his abode in the city of Helena, yet has maintained legal residence at Havre and voted there. We all know that our senators and congressmen and numerous other persons <.employed in the federal service maintain their residences at places other than the places where they actually live while in the service of the federal government. The right that such people have to maintain a legal residence in one place while actually living in another is a right that any other person may exercise as well as public officials.

Our statute prohibits marriage between a white person and a Japanese, as stated by the majority, but there is no such law in the state of Washington, and Takahashi and his wife were legally married in the state of Washington and their civil contract would .be sustained in every particular under the statutes *504of that state. And their marriage in the state of Washington and return to Montana, is not, in my opinion, a violation of section 5703, which provides that if a marriage contract is solemnized without the state of Montana by any person who has, prior to the time of contracting such marriage been a resident of this state, shall be void in this state. The residence referred to in section 5703 is a legal residence of the party, not the particular place where he may be employed or where he earns his living. Section 5707 provides: “All marriages contracted without the state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this state.” The parties complied with every lawful requirement of the state of Washington when they entered into their contractual marriage relation, and under our statute we have no power to deny to Mrs. Takahashi all the rights, privileges and immunities of that relation.

The fact that the two parties lived in Troy and went to Spokane to be married has no significance and was a perfectly natural act. Troy is located in the west part of the state and is much nearer to Spokane than any city of importance in Montana, and it was a perfectly natural act for the parties to go there to be married. There is nothing whatever in the record to show that either of them was cognizant of the fact that their marriage was prohibited under the laws of Montana, and while the rule is that all persons are presumed to know the law, this presumption cannot properly be applied as the basis for charging one with fraudulent intent unless it is shown that the parties so charged did have actual knowledge of the law, and even if they did know they could not legally enter into a marriage contract in Montana, such fact would not vitiate their marriage contract in the state of Washington.

The order of the trial court should be reversed and the petition of Yivian Takahashi for the appointment of her nominee as administrator should be granted, in the absence of any other ground than that mentioned which could be advanced in opposition to his appointment.

Buchanan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the court below holding the marriage between the appellant and the appellee to be void under § 20-54 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, which is part of “An ACT to preserve racial integrity,” enacted by the General Assembly and approved March 20, 1924 (Acts 1924, ch. 371).

The material facts are not in dispute. The suit was brought by the appellee, who is a white person, duly domiciled in Virginia. The appellant is a Chinese and was a non-resident of the State at the time of the institution of the suit. On June 26, 1952, they left Virginia to be married in North Carolina. They were married in that State and immediately returned to Norfolk, Virginia, where they lived together as husband and wife. It is conceded that they left Virginia to be married in North Carolina for the purpose of evading the Virginia law which forbade their marriage.

The Virginia statute, § 20-54, in effect at the time of the marriage, is as follows:

“It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘white person’ shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter.”

Virginia statutes regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons in effect at the date of the marriage, and now in effect, provide that all marriages between a white person and a colored *82person shall be absolutely void (§ 20-57); that if a white person and a colored person go out of the State for the purpose of being married and with the intention of returning, and after being married return and reside here, and cohabit as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. Section 20-59 provides that they shall be guilty of a felony and confined in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.*

As stated in appellant’s brief, the only question at issue is whether the marriage of the appellant and appellee could be annulled on the ground of their racial ineligibility to marry one another.

The first assignment of error charges that the trial court was constitutionally without the power to annul the marriage on the basis of race; in other words, that the court did not have requisite potential jurisdiction. This argument seems to be in anticipation of a contention that was not made by the Commonwealth, which appears amicus curiae, the appellee not appearing on this appeal. We said in Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524, 548-9, 14 S. E. (2d) 381, 387, that “annulment rests within the inherent power of equity;” but of course if the Federal Constitutions forbids the enforcement of the statute under which the court acted, it likewise forbids the enforcement of the same prohibition by independent judicial action. “A State acts by its legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way.” Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347, 25 L. ed. 676, 679. “The judicial act of the highest court of the state, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the state.” Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 15, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842-3, 92 L. ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441.

We need not linger over this first assignment because the remaining assignment of error presents the real issue — whether the statute in question is beyond the power of the State to enact under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Marriage, the appellant concedes, is subject to the control of the States. Nearly seventy years ago the Supreme Court said, and it *83has said nothing to the contrary since: “Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the Legislature.” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 657, 8 S. Ct. 723. And nine years before that: “Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244, 250. That case was written by Chief Justice Waite, who said, in upholding a conviction of bigamy against a defense on the ground of the religious practice of polygamy authorized by the defendant’s church, “it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life.”

In the same year, 1878, it was written by this court, in Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 862:

“There can be no doubt as to the power of every country to make laws regulating the marriage of its own subjects; to declare who may marry, how they may marry, and what shall be the legal consequences of their marrying. The right to regulate the institution of marriage; to classify the parties and persons who may lawfully marry; to dissolve the relation by divorce; and to impose such restraints upon the relation as the laws of God, and the laws of propriety, morality and social order demand, has been exercised by all civilized governments in all ages of the world.” See also Ex Parte Kinney, 3 Hughes 1, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, 3 Va. Law J. 370.

More recently, in Wood v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 963, 965, 166 S. E. 477, this court said “that the preservation of racial integrity is the unquestioned policy of this State, and that it is sound and wholesome, cannot be gainsaid.” And in Toler v. Oakwood &c. Corp., 173 Va. 425, 434, 4 S. E. (2d) 364, 368: “There can be no question of the public policy of Virginia with reference to miscegenation.”

In State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42, a statute prohibiting the intermarriage of negroes and white persons was held not to violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights laws. In the course of a well-reasoned and well-supported *84discussion of the powers retained by and inherent in the States under the Constitution, the court said:

“# * jn tj1js State marriage is treated as a civil contract, but it is more than a mere civil contract. It is a public institution established by God himself, is recognized in all Christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the peace, happiness, and well-being of society. * * The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit any interference therewith. If the federal government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to its power. **" 36 Ind. at 402-3.

It was said in that case that the question was one of difference between the races, not of superiority or inferiority, and that the natural law which forbids their intermarriage and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them different natures.

In Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 739, the question was whether the State could make the marriage of a white person with a person of the colored race a punishable offense. The court held that the State had and retained that power; that while marriage was a contract, it was one of a peculiar character and subject to peculiar principles, the most interesting and important in its nature of any in society, and not embraced in the constitutional interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of contracts. Manifestly, said the court, it is for the peace and happiness of the colored race, as well as of the white, that laws prohibiting intermarriage of the races should exist, and “How, then, can it be maintained that the States of this Union, in adopting amendments which make no allusion to such intermarriages, intended to deprive themselves of the important power of regulating matters of so great consequence and delicacy within their own borders for themselves, as it always was their undoubted right to do.” 29 Am. Rep. at 743.

In 36 Am. Jur., Miscegenation, § 3, p. 452, it is said:

“In accordance with the power of every country to make laws regulating the marriage of its own subjects, to declare who may marry, how they may marry, and what shall be the legal consequences of their marrying, it is considered as well settled that although miscegenation statutes have been persistently attacked on the ground that they are violative of the United States Constitution, *85they nevertheless constitute a proper exercise of the power of each state to control its own citizens.

More than half of the States of the Union have miscegenation statutes. With only one exception they have been upheld in an unbroken line of decisions in every State in which it has been charged that they violate the Fourteenth Amendment: State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. (2d) 882; Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S. W. 977; Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. (2d) 240; Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 50 Am. Rep. 499; State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251, 22 Am. Rep. 683; In Re Shun T. Takahashi’s Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. (2d) 217; In Re Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 P. 911; Lonas v. State, 3 Heiskell (50 Tenn.) 287; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263, 30 Am. Rep. 131.

The exception is California, where a divided court held to the contrary with three of the seven judges dissenting, in Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711, 198 P. (2d) 17 (sub nom. Perez v. Lippold). In one of the two concurring opinions it was pointed out that since California recognized a marriage performed in another State between persons of the white and colored races, such marriage could not be considered vitally detrimental to public health and morals, and that the California statutes forbidding miscegenetic marriages were distinguished from such statutes in other States in that they were entirely declaratory, while all the others carried with them punishments for violations, indicating an attitude of comparative indifference on the part of the California legislature and the absence of any clearly expressed sentiment or policy. However that may be, the holding is contrary to the otherwise uninterrupted course of judicial decision, both State and Federal, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, with which we agree.

Stevens v. United States, 10 Cir., 146 F. (2d) 120, involved the validity of an Oklahoma statute which forbade the marriage of a person of African descent to any person not of such descent, or the marriage of any person not of African descent to a person of such descent, violation of which was punishable as a felony and the marriage declared in effect to be a nullity. The statute was challenged by the party of African descent on the ground that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held:

“* * Marriage is a consentient covenant. It is a contract in the sense that it is entered into by agreement of the parties. But it is more than a civil contract between them, subject to their will and *86pleasure in respect of effects, continuance, or dissolution. It is a domestic relation having to do with the morals and civilization of a people. It is an essential institution in every well organized society. It affects in a vital manner public welfare, and its control and regulation is a matter of domestic concern within each state. A state has power to prescribe by law the age at which persons may enter into marriage, the procedure essential to constitute a valid marriage, the duties and obligations which it creates, and its effects upon the property rights of both parties. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654. And within the range of permissible adoption of policies deemed to be promotive of the welfare of society as well as the individual members thereof, a state is empowered to forbid marriages between persons of African descent and persons of other races or descents. Such a statute does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. * 146 F. (2d) at 123.

From the Slaughter-House Cases, (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394, to Brown v. Board of Education, (1954), 347 U. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. ed. 873, 38 A. L. R. (2d) 1180, and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 74 S. Ct. 693, 98 L. ed. 884, the Supreme Court has made no decision at variance with the holding in the Stevens case. It has on numerous occasions invoked the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate State legislation and decision with respect to political and civil rights, but it has not denied to the States the right to deal with their social and domestic problems and to legislate in regard to the marriage relation. On the contrary, it has been at pains to exclude that relation from the effects of its holdings.

In Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583, 1 S. Ct. 637, 27 L. ed. 207, an Alabama statute provided that if a white person and a negro intermarried or lived in adultery or fornication with each other, they should be imprisoned in the penitentiary. Another statute provided smaller punishment for any man and woman who lived together in adultery or fornication. A white woman and Pace, a negro, were convicted under the first-mentioned statute and Pace appealed, claiming that the statute was in conflict with the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In affirming the conviction the court said: “Equality of protection under the laws implies not only accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on the same terms with others, to the courts of the country for the security of his person and property, but that in the administration of criminal *87justice he shall not be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater' or different punishment.” It was held that there was no discrimination against either race in the statute; that “Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same.”

In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. ed. 256, 259, the court said:

“Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police power of the state. * *.”

Again in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 19, 20, 62 L. ed. 149, in speaking of the Civil Rights statutes enacted under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the court stated: “These enactments did not deal with the social rights of men, but with those fundamental rights in property which it was intended to secure upon the same terms to citizens of every race and color.” And further: “The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit the amalgamation of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person.”

Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, likewise recognized the distinction between social legislation and the rights intended to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in these words:

“The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations of race or color. * *.” 68 S. Ct. at 847.

Brown v. Board of Education, supra, reached its conclusion that segregation in the public schools was contrary to the Equal Protection clause on the basis that education is perhaps the most important function of State and local governments, “the very foundation of good citizenship,” and that the opportunity to acquire it, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms,”

*88No such claim for the intermarriage of the races could be'supported; by.no sort of valid reasoning could it be found to be a foundation of good citizenship or a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. In the opinion of the legislatures of more than half the States it is harmful to good citizenship.

In the same tenor Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, pointed out that as long ago as 1896 the court declared the principle that the Constitution forbids, “so far as civil and political rights are concerned,” discrimination against any citizen because of his race. In respect to the question of due process of law, the court said that “Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.”

It is the considered opinion of the people of more than half of the States of the Union that the prohibition against miscegenetic marriages is a proper governmental objective, and all the courts which so far have dealt with the question, with the one exception noted, have held that that is so.

As recently as November 22, 1954, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Alabama in the case of Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. (2d) 114, in which certiorari had likewise been denied by the Supreme Court of Alabama. 260 Ala. 698, 72 So. (2d) 116, 348 U. S. 888, 75 S. Ct. 210. In that case the appellant had been convicted under the Alabama miscegenation statute which made it a felony for any white person and any negro or the descendant of any negro to intermarry or live in adultery or fornication with each other. The conviction was affirmed against the contentions that the statute denied to the appellant, a negro, “her constitutional right and privilege of intermarrying with a white male person,” and that it violated the Privileges and Immunities, the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

If the prevention of miscegenetic marriages is a proper governmental objective, and within the competency of the State to effect, which we hold it to be, then § 20-54 of the Code, supra, under attack, is a valid enactment unless the classification made by the statute is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to the purpose intended to be effected. As was said in Purity Extract &c. Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 S. Ct. 44, 46, 47, 57 L. ed. 184: “It is also well established that, when a State exerting its recognized au~ *89thority, undertakes to suppress what it is free to regard as a public evil, it may adopt such measures having reasonable relation to that end as it may deem necessary in order to make its action effective.” And again: “The inquiry must be whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.”

The only way by which the statute could be made effective was by classification of the races. If preservation of racial integrity is legal, then racial classification to effect that end is not presumed to be arbitrary.

It does not appear from this record that the appellant questioned the reasonableness of the classification in the trial court. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the classification made by the statute is unreasonable or that it is not reasonably related to the purpose intended to be accomplished. In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, the presumption of reasonableness is very strong.

“* * When the classification made by the legislature is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the action is arbitrary. * Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 55 S. Ct. 187, 192, 79 L. ed. 281.

Such is the established rule in this Commonwealth as well as in all other jurisdictions. Martin's Ex’rs v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603, 102 S. E. 77; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141; Joy, et al. v. Green, 194 Va. 1003, 76 S. E. (2d) 178; Bray v. County Board, 195 Va. 31, 77 S. E. (2d) 479; 12 Am. Tur., Constitutional Law, § 521, p. 214; 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 99, p. 250.

The institution of marriage has from time immemorial been considered a proper subject for State regulation in the interest of the public health, morals and welfare, to the end that family life, a relation basic and vital to the permanence of the State, may be maintained in accordance with established tradition and culture and in furtherance of the physical, moral and spiritual well-being of its citizens.

We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the *90Constitution, or in any other provision of that great document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or which denies the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship. Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races have better advanced in human progress when they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture and developed their own peculiar genius.

Regulation of the marriage relation is, we think, distinctly one of the rights guaranteed to the States and safeguarded by that bastion of States’ rights, somewhat battered perhaps but still a sturdy fortress in our fundamental law, the tenth section of the Bill of Rights, which declares: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”

The decree appealed from is

Affirmed.

*268ARCHBALD, J., pro tem.

Solvador Roldan applied to the county clerk of Los Angeles County for a license to wed a woman of Caucasian descent and was refused such license. On a hearing of his application before the superior court for a writ to compel the issuance thereof he was found to be a “Filipino”, viz., “an Illocano, 'born in the Philippine Islands of Filipino progenitors in whose blood was co-mingled a strain of Spanish”, and not a Mongolian. From a judgment making the alternative writ of mandate permanent the defendants have appealed.

Section 69 of the Civil Code, relating to marriage licenses, was amended in 1880 (Code Amendments, 1880, p. 3) to prohibit the issuance of a license authorizing the marriage of a white person “with a . . . Mongolian”. Section 60 of the Civil Code was amended in 1905 (Stats. 1905, p. 554) by adding “Mongolians” to the classes whose marriage with a “white” was made “illegal and void”. The sole question involved in this appeal is whether or not the legislature in 1880 and 1905 meant to include Filipinos in its use of the word “Mongolian”.

We find no dissent to the statement that the Filipino is included among the Malays, although since the time of Huxley, at least, there has been some question among ethnologists as to whether the five grand subdivisions of the races of mankind, as classified by Blumenbach, is the proper classification or whether the Malays are to be included among the “Mongoloid” group and as a branch of the Mongolian family. We are not, however, interested in what the best scientific thought of the day was, but in what was the common use of the word “Mongolian” in California at the time of the enactment of the legislation above mentioned.

The case of Ah Yup, Fed. Cas. No. 104, decided by Judge Sawyer of the United States Circuit Court, District of California, in 1878, contains this information: “In speaking of the various classifications of races, Webster in his dictionary says [italics ours] : ‘The common classification is that of Blumenbach, who makes five: (1) the Caucasian, or white race, ... (2) the Mongolian, or yellow race, occupying Tartary, China, Japan, etc., (3) the Ethiopian or negro (black) race, ... (4) the American, or red race, . . . and (5) the Malay, or brown race, occupying the Indian Archi*269pelago’.” The 1891 edition of Webster’s comprising the earlier editions of 1864, 1879 and 1884, under the heading “Race”, says: “Naturalists and ethnographers divide mankind into several distinct varieties, or races . . . One of the common classifications is that of Blumenbach, who makes five races,” describing them the same as the quotation of Judge Sawyer from the earlier Webster’s and adding that “many recent writers classify the Malay and American races as branches of the Mongolian”. Practically the same wording is found in the 1903 edition of Webster’s.

The Standard Dictionary of 1911 gives the following definition of a Mongolian: “(1) A Mongol. (2) By extension a Chinaman: In Blumenbach’s system any one of the yellow peoples of China.”

The New American Cyclopaedia (1863) defines “Mongolian Race” as “one of the great ethnological divisions of mankind”, and the article thereon continues: “Dr. Pickering, in 'The Races of Men', includes the American Indians among the Mongolians . . . By most writers, however, the American Indians are held to be a distinct race, and the term Mongolian is restricted chiefly to the following nations: the Mongols proper, the Mantchoos, Coreans, Chinese, Thibetans, Anamites, Burmese, Siamese, Japanese, Samoyeds, Koriaks, Curáis, Ostiaks, Kamchatdales, Finns, Laplanders, Esquimaux and the various tribes inhabiting Toorkistan or Independent Tartary, who are commonly called Tartars by Europeans.”

Ogilvie’s Imperial Dictionary of the English Language (1884), under “Mongol, Mongolian”, says: “An epithet sometimes employed to the whole class of Turanian tongues, sometimes restricted to that group spoken by the Kalmucks and other tribes from Thibet to China.—Mongolian race, the second in Blumenbach’s classification of the races of mankind. It corresponded very closely with the modern Turanian division.” This dictionary also defines “Malay” as “belonging or relating to the Malays or to their country.—Malay race, one of the five principal divisions of mankind according to Blumenbach.”

In the “Reports of the Immigration Commission” of the United States (1911), vol. 5, “Dictionary of Races or Peoples”, p. 94, under “Malay, Malaysian or Brown Race”, appears the following, the italics being ours: “One of the *270five grand divisions of mankind as commonly classified since the time of Blumenbach, - hut the most disputable - one in the view of recent ethnologists. Many consider it to be a branch of the Mongolian race, but such admit, at least, that it is the most divergent great branch of the latter.” And on page 97 of the same volume, under “Mongolian, etc.”, we read: “Many ethnologists so define ‘Mongolian’ as to include the entire American and Malay races.”

We think we have quoted enough to show that, regardless of the fine points of the argument from the ethnologist’s standpoint, the early classification of Blumenbach left its impression on the writers from his day to 1905, at least, so that his classification is spoken of as the one “commonly” used; and we venture to think that in the recollection of those whose early schooling was anywhere in the period from 1850 to 1905 his classification of the races into the five divisions, the white, black, yellow, red and brown, still persists.

From 1862 to 1885 the history of California is replete with legislation to curb the so-called “Chinese invasion”, and as we read we are impressed with the fact that the terms “Asiatics”, “Coolies” and “Mongolians” meant “Chinese” to the people who discussed and legislated on the problem, or at most that they only extended in their thought to natives of China and the inhabitants of adjacent countries having the same characteristics. It appears from the report in 1878 to the state senate of its “Special Committee on Chinese Immigration” that the mass of the immigration complained of came from the “port of Hong Kong” (p. 64), and that of the Chinese then here “you would not find one in a thousand—probably one in five thousand—but that came from Kwang-Tung, the province of which Canton is capital” (p. 70). In the same volume (p. 265) is an article by H. W. Clement, a member of the San Francisco bar, entitled “Caucasian vs. Mongolian”, in which he speaks of the Americans as the sons of Japheth in possession of America; that “seized with an insane desire to revisit the old homestead”, and finding it surrounded by the “Chinese Wall”, they battered it down, “but from out the breach swarmed one hundred fifty thousand of the three hundred millions of overcrowded humanity within, who threaten to overrun us. ... We find by our twenty-five *271years of acquaintance with them . . . that the . . . changeless life of ‘Shem’ and his descendants from Asia has shaped their character . . . and determined their race, and we call them Mongolians. . . . The conflicting rights, prejudices and interests of those two races in California constitutes the Chinese problem.”

In the “Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California” (1878-79), speaking on the report of the “Committee on Chinese” relative to articles proposed affecting those nationals, Mr. John F. Miller says: “They [certain church people opposing restrictions] would Mongolize this land in a vain attempt to bring the Chinese to a knowledge ...” (vol. 1, p. 633). Mr. Charles C. O’Donnell (p. 647): “If you expect to wipe out crime you must wipe out the presence of the Mongolian in our midst.” We could quote an infinite number of similar statements, all of which point to the fact that the speakers were using the term “Mongolian” in the sense of the problem that they wore discussing, viz., the Chinese problem, and that it only applied to that people, including possibly the inhabitants of contiguous countries of the same characteristics. Mr. Burt, not liking the designations “Mongolian race” and “persons not eligible to become citizens”, in some of the proposed articles, said (p. 652) : “We mean Chinese, and why not come out squarely and say so.” The report of the committee, instead of using the words “Chinese or Mongolian” now appearing in section 2, article XIX of the Constitution, used the words “foreigners who are not eligible for citizenship”, and Mr. N. G. Wyatt, a member from Monterey County, moved to amend the section by inserting in place of such words the words “Chinese or Mongolian”, because of the uncertainty of the original language. Some courts apparently having admitted Chinese to citizenship while some denied them that privilege, Mr. Wyatt said (vol. 2, p. 681) : “I want it amended so as to apply, eo nomine> to the class it is intended to affect.” Mr. Barnes made a similar objection to the language used by the committee, saying (p. 687) : “If we mean Chinamen, why not say Chinamen or Mongolian?”

Mr. John S. Hager, who moved to amend section 5 of the proposed article by prohibiting any resident or foreigner *272ineligible to citizenship from owning property in the state after 1880, said (vol. 3, p. 1429) : “That applies to all classes of foreigners who are ineligible to become citizens. It also gives them sufficient notice.” Mr. C. Y. Stuart then inquired: “Will that apply to any but Chinese in fact?” Mr. Hager replied: “I think there are some others.” The lone voice in the convention that objected to the use of the word “Mongolian” was that of James J. Ayers, who said (vol. 2, p. 717) : “The term Mongolian does not apply exclusively to the Chinese. It is a generic type of the human family, and seme of the leading authorities on ethnology have divided the species into three classes: Mongolian, Caucasian and Negro. Some of them claim that the word Mongol embraces the American Indian.” He then added: “We all know that we mean Chinamen, and why not say Chinamen?” That the Malay race was not in the thoughts of any in the convention as being included in the designations used is clearly shown from the speech of Mr. James M. Shatter against the proposed amendment prohibiting the employment of Chinese by public officers and making a candidate for office ineligible who employed or had employed them within three months previously. After stating that such provision was the equivalent to debarring Chinese from employment (vol. 2, p. 676), he declared: “I have had in my employment natives of most European countries, of tire isles of the sea, including the Cannibal Islands of the south Pacific. Why do you not exclude the Kanakas, the Fiji, the Malay or the criminal from Australia? No reason against the Chinaman but presses with greater force against these people.” Apparently no one challenged this statement, which implied that the Malay, at least, was not included in the designation “Mongolian”; and we can draw but one conclusion from the debates, and that is that such an idea was not present in the minds of the members of the convention.

Much more could be shown but we think we have set down sufficient to indicate that in 1880, in a group that would compare very favorably with the average legislature, there was no thought of applying the name Mongolian to a Malay; that the word was used to designate the class of residents whose presence caused the problem at which all the legislation was directed, viz., the Chinese, and possibly *273contiguous peoples of like characteristics; that the common classification of the races was Blumenbach’s, which made the “Malay” one of the five grand subdivisions, i. e., the “brown race”, and that such classification persisted until after section 60 of the Civil Code was amended in 1905 to make it consistent with section 69 of the same code. As counsel for appellants have well pointed out, this is not a social question before ns, as that was decided by the legislature at the time the code was amended; and if the common thought of to-day is different from what it was at such time, the matter is one that addresses itself to the legislature and not to the courts.

Judgment affirmed.

Works, P. J., and Craig, J., concurred.

A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 27, 1933.

Seawell, J., Preston, J., and Thompson, J., dissented.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 For reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.

In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court *3of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:

“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”

After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state- officials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.

The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation statutes and, after *4modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions.2 The Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U. S. 986.

The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the Virginia Code:

“Leaving State to evade law. — If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.”

Section 20-59, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:

“Punishment for marriage. — If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.”

Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between “a white person and a colored person” without any judicial proceeding,3 and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, *5respectively, define “white persons” and “colored persons and Indians” for purposes of the statutory prohibitions.4 The Lovings have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a “colored person” or that Mr. Loving is a “white person” within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.

*6Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications.5 Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period.6 The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a “white person” marrying other than another “white person,” 7 a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that *7the applicants’ statements as to their race are correct,8 certificates of “racial composition” to be kept by both local and state registrars,9 and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial’ intermarriage.10

I.

In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its 1955 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S. E. 2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the State’s legitimate purposes were “to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,” and to prevent “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of racial pride,” obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Id., at 90, 87 S. E. 2d, at 756. The court also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.

While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State’s police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are un--limited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element *8as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.

Because we reject the notion that the mere “equal application” of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State’s contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does not mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949), or an exemption in Ohio’s ad valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of Ohio, *9Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.

The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that although these historical sources “cast some light” they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; “[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons bom or naturalized in the United States.’ Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 489 (1954). See also Strauder *10v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310 (1880). We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964).

The State finds support for its “equal application'’ theory in the decision of the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583 (1883). In that case, the Court upheld a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct by members of the same race. The Court reasoned that the statute could not be said to discriminate against Negroes because the punishment for each participant in the offense was the same. However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning of that case, we stated “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.” McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 188. As we there demonstrated, the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).

*11There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated “[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry” as being “odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny,” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already stated that they “cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.” McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 198 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).

There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.11 We have consistently denied *12the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.

II.

These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.

These convictions must be reversed.

]It is so ordered.

*13Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

I have previously expressed the belief that “it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.” McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that belief, I concur in the judgment of the Court.