1 Early Asian immigration and anti-Chinese sentiment 1 Early Asian immigration and anti-Chinese sentiment
1.1 People v. Hall 1.1 People v. Hall
People v. Hall (1854) People v. Hall (1854)
As early as 1852, Chinese community leaders in California mining regions, where a large number of Chinese immigrants had settled in the wake of the discovery of gold at Sutter's mill, had begun to send communication back to their countrymen in China urging them not to come to California because of the anti-Chinese hostility in the state.
This hostility quickly began to manifest itself in legislation. The Foreign Miners' License Tax was first enacted in 1850 and reenacted in May 1852. The tax was selectively enforced against Chinese and Latino miners. A "commutation tax" was also passed shortly thereafter; both taxes had the effect of burdening the Chinese miners who were already in the state and discouraging continued immigration.
The decision in People v. Hall represents how the racist attitudes against Chinese immigrants in nineteenth-century America had taken root in the judiciary. Consider how powerless a group becomes when they are unable to provide testimony in a civil or criminal matter.
*THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE W. HALL, Appellant.
Witness — Beesons Incompetent. — Section 394 of the Civil Practice Act provides: “ No Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify as a witness in any action in which a white person is a party.”
1 Idem. -Section 14 of the Criminal Act provides: “No Black, or Mulatto person, or Indian shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a White man.” Held, that the words, Indian, Negro, Black and White, are generic terms, designating race. That, therefore, Chinese and all other peoples not white, are included in the prohibition from being witnesses against Whites.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Mr. J. Heydeneeldt concurred.
The appellant, a free white citizen of this State, was convicted of murder upon the testimony of Chinese witnesses.
The point involved in this case, is the admissibility of such evidence.
The 394th section of the Act Concerning Civil Cases, provides that no Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify as a witness in any action or proceeding in which a White person is a party.
The 14th section of the Act of April 16th, 1850, regulating Criminal Proceedings, provides that “No Black or Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man.”
The true point at which we are anxious to arrive is, the legal signification of the words, “ Black, Mulatto, Indian and White person,” and whether the Legislature adopted them as generic terms, or intended to limit their application to specific types of the human species.
Before considering this question, it is proper to remark the difference between the two sections of our statute, already *400quoted, tbe latter being more broad and comprehensive in its exclusion, by use of the word “Black,” instead of Negro.
[400] * Conceding, however, for the present, that the word “Black,” as used in the 14th section, and “ Negro,” in 394th, are convertible terms, and that the former was intended to include the latter, let us proceed to inquire who are excluded from testifying as witnesses under the term “Indian.”
When Columbus first landed upon the shores of this continent, in his attempt to discover a western passage to the Indies, he imagined that he had accomplished the object of his expedition, and that the Island of San Salvador was one of those Islands of the Chinese Sea, lying near the extremity of India, which had been described by navigators.
Acting upon this hypothesis, and also perhaps from the similarity of features and physical conformation, he gave to the Islanders the name of Indians, which appellation was universally adopted, and extended to the aboriginals of the New World, as well as of Asia.
From that time, down to a very recent period, the American Indians and the Mongolian, or Asiatic, were regarded as the same type of the human species.
In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the intention of our Legislature, it will be necessary to go back to the early history of legislation on this subject, our statute being only a transcript of those of older States.
At the period from which this legislation dates, those portions of Asia which include India proper, the Eastern Archipelago, and the countries washed by the Chinese waters, as far as then known, were denominated the Indies, from which the inhabitants had derived the generic name of Indians.
Ethnology, at that time, was unknown as a distinct science, or if known, had not reached that high point of perfection which it has since attained by the scientific inquiries and discoveries of the master minds of the last half century. New speculations had been made with regard to the moral or physical differences between the different races of mankind. These were general in their character, and *401limited to those visible and palpable variations which could not escape the attention of the most common observer.
The general, or perhaps universal opinion of that day was, * that there were but three distinct types of [401] the human species, which, in their turn, were subdivided into varieties of tribes. This opinion is still held by many scientific writers, and is supported by Cuvier, one .of the most eminent naturalists of modern times.
Many ingenious speculations have been resorted to for the purpose of sustaining this opinion. It has been supposed, and not without plausibility, that this continent was first peopled by Asiatics, who crossed Behring’s Straits, and from thence found their way down to the more fruitful climates of Mexico and South America. Almost every tribe has some tradition of coming from the North, and many of them, that their ancestors came from some remote country beyond the ocean.
Prom the eastern portions of Kamtschatka, the Aleutian Islands form a long and continuous group, extending eastward to that portion of the North American Continent inhabited by the Esquimaux. They appear to be a continuation of the lofty volcanic ranges which traverse the two continents, and are inhabited by a race who resemble, in’ a remarkable degree, in language and appearance, both the inhabitants of Kamtsehatka (who are admitted to be of the Mongolian type), and the Esquimaux, who again, in turn, resemble other tribes of American Indians. The similarity of the skull and pelvis, and the general configuration of the two races; the remarkable resemblance in eyes, beard, hair, and other peculiarities, together with the contiguity of the two continents, might well have led to the belief that this country was first peopled by the Asiatics, and that the difference between the different tribes and the parent stock was such as would necessarily arise from the circumstances of climate, pursuits, and other physical causes, and was no greater than that existing between the Arab and the European, both of whom were supposed to belong to the Caucasian race.
Although the discoveries of eminent archeologists, and *402the researches of modern geologists, have given to this continent an antiquity of thousands of years anterior to the evidence of man’s existence, and the light df modern science may have shown conclusively that it was not [402 peopled by the inhabitants * of Asia, but that the Aborigines are a distinct type, and as such claim a distinct origin, still, this would not in'any degree, alter the meaning of the term, and render that specific which was before generic.
We have adverted to these speculations for the purpose of showing that the name of Indian, from the time of Columbus to the present day, has been used to designate, not alone the North American Indian, but the whole of the Mongolian race, and that the name, though first applied probably through mistake, was afterwards continued as appropriate on account of the supposed common origin.
That this was the common opinion in the early history of American legislation, cannot be disputed, and, therefore, all legislation upon the subject must have borne relation to that opinion.
Can, then, the use of the word “Indian,” because at the present day it may be sometimes regarded as a specific, and not as a generic term, alter this conclusion ? We think not; because at the origin of the legislation we are considering, it was used and admitted in its common and ordinary acceptation, as a generic term, distinguishing the great Mongolian race, and as such, its meaning then became fixed by law, and in construing statutes the legal meaning of words must be preserved.
Again: the words of the Act must be construed in pari materia. It will not be disputed that “White” and “Negro” are generic terms, and refer to two of the great types of mankind. If these, as well as the word “Indian,” are not to be regarded as generic terms, including the two great races which they were intended to designate, but only specific, and applying to those whites and Negroes who were inhabitants of this continent at the time of the passage of the Act, the most anomalous consequences would ensue. The European white man who comes here would not be *403shielded from the testimony of the degraded and ■ demoralized caste, while the Negro, fresh from the coast of Africa, or the Indian of Patagonia, the Kanaka,' South Sea Islander, or New Hollander, would be admitted, upon their arrival, to testify against white citizens in our courts of law.
* To argue such a proposition would be an insult [403] to the good sense of the Legislature.
The evident intention of the Act was to throw around the citizen a protection for life and property, which could only be secured by removing him above the corrupting influences of degraded castes.
It can hardly be supposed that any Legislature would attempt this by excluding domestic negroes and Indians, who not unfrequently have correct notions of their obligations to society, and turning loose upon the community the more degraded tribes of the same species, who have nothing in common with us, in language, country or laws, ,.
We have, thus far, considered this subject on the hypothesis that the 14th section of the Act Regulating Criminal Proceedings and the 394th section of the Practice Act, were the same.
As before remarked, there is a wide difference between the two. The word * ‘ black ” may include all negroes, but the term “negro” does not’include all black persons.
By the use of this term in this connection, we understand it to mean the opposite of “white,” and that it should be taken as contradistinguished from all white persons.
In using the words ‘ ‘ no black or mulatto person, or Indian shall be allowed to give evidence for or against a white person,” the Legislature, if any intention can be ascribed to it, adopted the most comprehensive terms to embrace every known class or shade of color, as the apparent design was to protect the white person from the influence of all testimony other than that of persons of the same caste. The use of these terms must, by every sound rule of construction, exclude every one who is not of white blood.
The Act of Congress, in defining what description of aliens may become naturalized citizens, provides that every “free white citizen,” etc., etc. In speaking of this subject, *404Chancellor Kent says that “the Act confines the description to ‘white’ citizens, and that it is a matter of doubt, whether, under this provision, any of the tawny races of Asia can be admitted to citizenship.” (2 Kent’s Com. 72.)
We are not disposed to leave this question in any [404] doubt. The word “white” has a distinct signification, which ex vi termini, excludes black, yellow, and all other colors. It will be observed, by reference to the first section of the second Article of the Constitution of this State, that none but white males can become electors, except in the case of Indians, who may be admitted, by special Act of the Legislature. On examination of the constitutional debates, it will be found that not a little difficulty existed in selecting these precise words, which were finally agreed upon as the most comprehensive that could be suggested to exclude all inferior races.
If the term “white,” as used in the Constitution, was not understood in its generic sense as including the Caucasian race, and necessarily excluding all others, where was the necessity of providing for the admission of Indians to the privilege of voting, by special legislation?
We are of the opinion that the words “white,” “negro,” “mullatto,” “Indian,” and “black person,” wherever they occur in our Constitution and laws, must be taken in their generic sense, and that, even admitting the Indian of this continent is not of the Mongolian type, that the words “black person,” in the 14th section, must be taken as contradistinguished from white, and necessarily excludes all races other than the Caucasian.
We have carefully considered all the consequences resulting from a different rule of construction, and are satisfied that even in a doubtful case, we would be impelled to this decision on grounds of public policy.
The same rule which would admit them to testify, would admit them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon see them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls.
*405This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-heated imagination of the patriot and statesman, but it is an actual and present danger.
The anomalous spectacle of a distinct people, living in our community, recognizing no laws of this State, except through necessity, bringing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open violation of law; * whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of [405] people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown; differing in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable difference, is now presented, and for them is claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen, but the further privilege of participating with us in administering the affairs of our Government.
These facts were before the Legislature that framed this Act, and have been known as matters of public history to every subsequent Legislature.
There can be no doubt as to the intention of the Legislature, and that if it had ever been anticipated that this class of people were not embraced in the prohibition, then such specific words would have been employed as would have put the matter beyond any possible controversy.
For these reasons, tve are of opinion that the testimony was inadmissible.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Mr. Justice Wells dissented, as follows;
From the opinion of the Chief Justice, I most respectfully dissent.
1.1.1 Reflection and Discussion (People v. Hall) 1.1.1 Reflection and Discussion (People v. Hall)
1. In search of equality. Although much of the legislation targeting the Chinese community in California served as a threat to their ability to earn a living, the decision handed down by the California Supreme Court in People v. Hall was a direct threat to life and limb. As the number of crimes committed against Chinese residents in mining districts rose, it became clear that perpetrators were emboldened by the powerlessness of their victims to be heard in court.
Of all the wrongs visited upon the Chinese in the period from 1850 to 1870, the ban on their testimony in state courts–not surprisingly, given its fateful implications–ranked the most deeply, and the removal of this disability was consistently the chief item on the agenda of community leadership . . . the testimony ban was a 'rock of offense' and the 'greatest stumbling block' preventing them from fully enjoying California's prosperity.
Charles J. McClain, In search of equality: The Chinese struggle against discrimination in nineteenth-century America (1994).
2. Examining the reasoning. In the Hall opinion, Chief Justice Murray does not address the defendant's failure to object on the ground that the statute made the testimony of the Chinese witnesses inadmissible and fails to cite any case law. He neither relies on material tested by cross-examination nor considers a counter-argument to challenge his "reasoning." So, what "researches" and "discoveries" does Justice Murray use to attempt to justify his decision?
What "canons of statutory construction," "ethnography," and "public policy consideration" straw man arguments are made?
Consider how the strong convictions and determination within the Chinese community clashed with the racist ideology at the time, leading to the riots and massacres discussed in the next section.
3. Silver lining? Is there any silver lining to be found in the Hall case? What about the fact that in order for there to have been an appeal, a number of things must have gone right before the system failed the victim?
- Authorities investigated the killing of Ling Sing (a/k/a Lyn Chain)
- The prosecutor found the Chinese witnesses to be credible and chose to prosecute George Hall
- A trial was held, and the jury convicted George Hall (though they acquitted two others who were allegedly involved)
- The trial judge rejected the request for a new trial, stating "the clear and positive proof the Chinese witnesses, corroborated by American testimony, together with the strong circumstantial evidence attending the whole affair, would not have permitted the most incredulous to form any other conclusion" than that Hall was guilty
- The trial judge sentenced Hall to death (though we may not all approve of the death penalty)
- The prosecution continued to fight during the appeal
1.2 Mobs, Riots, and Massacres 1.2 Mobs, Riots, and Massacres
This section includes some of the mobs, riots, and massacres targeting Chinese communities in the late 1800s. Unfortunately, organized public violence directed at Chinese communities was all too common at the time.
1.2.1 1871 LA Massacre 1.2.1 1871 LA Massacre
1.2.1.1 Introduction to the 1871 LA Massacre 1.2.1.1 Introduction to the 1871 LA Massacre
The 1871 L.A. Massacre was one of the first mass-attacks on a Chinese American community. Please review the following resources for more information about the attack:
L.A. groups commemorate 1871 massacre that killed 10% of city's Chinese community
Forgotten Los Angeles History: The Chinese Massacre of 1871
The Chinese Massacre: One of Los Angeles' Worst Atrocities (video)
1.2.1.2 Wing Chung v. Mayor of Los Angeles (1874) 1.2.1.2 Wing Chung v. Mayor of Los Angeles (1874)
[No. 3,434.]
FONG YUEN LING, SAM YUEN, YIN TUCK, and AH YUNG, Merchants and Partners trading under THE FIRM NAME OF WING CHUNG v. THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES.
Liability of City fob Damage done by a Mob.—Persons whose goods are destroyed by a mob, in n riot in a city, are not entitled to recover from the city the value of the goods destroyed, unless such persons, if they had knowledge of the impending danger, use reasonable diligence to notify the mayor or sheriff of the threatened riot and the apprehended danger to their property; nor are they entitled to recover if they instigate or participate in the riot.
Cbedibility of Witnesses.—It is the province of the jury to decide on the credibility of witnesses.
*532Ruling out Testimony.—If the proffered testimony of a witness upon a matter is ruled out by the Court, on the objection of the opposite party, and two other witnesses are allowed, without objection, to testify to the same matter, the party who offers the testimony is not injured.
Idem.—If, in an action against a city to recover damage for property destroyed by a mob, the Court rules out testimony that, during the riot, the plaintiff could not have gone on to the street to notify the Mayor, the error, if any, is immaterial, provided that, before the riot commenced, the plaintiff knew of the impending danger, and had ample opportunity to notify the Mayor,
Appeal from the District Court, Seventeenth Judicial District, County of Los Angeles.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Olassel, Chapman & Smith, for the Appellants.
The firing upon the officers in the Wing Chung store and the alleged participancy of Sam Yuen, occurring about 5 o’clock, can, under no view of the law, be held to be a justification of the outrages of the mob committed five hours afterwards. (Cal. Stat. 1867-8, p. 418; Moody v. Co. of Niagara, 46 Barb. 659; Ely v. Same (S. C.) 36 N. Y. 297.)
F. H. Hoioard, City Attorney, and 0. Melveny & Hazard, for the Despondent.
The plaintiffs sue as copartners to recover from the city of Los Angeles the value of money and merchandise belonging to the copartnership, alleged to have been destroyed by the mob during a riot which occurred in that city in October, 1871. The action is founded on the Act of March 27, 1868 (Statutes 1867-8, p. 418), prescribing the conditions on which a city shall be liable for property destroyed in a riot.
The verdict and judgment were for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal.
There was evidence tending to show that immediately preceding the riot there were in the city of Los Angeles two *533rival companies of Chinese, at the head of one of which was Sam Yuen, one of the plaintiffs; that on the day of the riot two Chinamen were arranged before a Justice of the Peace, on the charge of having shot at Yo Hing, the chief of the rival company; that Sam Yuen offered his firm as bail for the accused; that about 5 o’clock in the afternoon six or seven Chinamen were found in the street, near the plaintiffs’ store, shooting at each other; that one of them was fatally wounded, before the arrival of the police; that one of the policemen entered the “corral,” an inclosed space in the rear of the plaintiffs’ store, for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, but found it filled with armed Chinamen, Avho immediately fired upon him, compelling him to retreat; that another policeman, on going to the front of the store, saw a Chinaman there with a pistol in his hand, and followed him into the store, which he found filled Avith armed Chinamen, who immediately closed the door and commenced firing upon him; that during the melee he was wounded with a pistol-shot in the arm, and with great difficulty escaped from the building, after numerous shots were fired at him; that one Thompson then approached the door, but was fired upon from Avithin, and was fatally wounded; after which those within the building continued to fire upon those in the street. That another policeman entered the store and found Sam Yuen there, who immediately leveled his pistol and fired at the officer, as did also several other Chinamen; that Sam Yuen knew the officer to be a policeman; that shortly afterward a large crowd collected in front of the store, and in the course of the afternoon and evening prior to 10 o’clock, assaulted the building, broke in the door and roof, and committed the damage Avhich is complained of.
The defenses are: First, that the plaintiffs, or at least one of them (Sam Yuen), instigated and brought about the riot by his unlawful conduct; second, that the plaintiffs made no attempt to notify the Mayor or Sheriff of the threatened riot, as required by the third section of the Act. That section provides that, in actions of this character, the plaintiff shall not recover if it appears that the damage “was occasioned, or in any manner aided, sanctioned, or permitted *534by the carelessness or negligence of such person or corporation, nor * * * * unless such party shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage, and shall have used all reasonable diligence to notify the Mayor of such city, or Sheriff of such county, of any threat or attempt to commit such injury to his property by any mob, and of the facts brought to his knowledge.” There was no evidence tending in the slightest degree to show that either of the plaintiffs made any effort whatever to notify the Mayor or any other officer of the threatened riot, or “ used all reasonable diligence to prevent ” the damage to their property. On the contrary, it appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the policeman, that when the shooting first commenced in the street, the plaintiffs’ store and the "corral ” in the rear of it were filled with armed Chinamen, who immediately fired on the. officers when attempting to preserve the peace. It is in the highest degree improbable that this large body of armed men could have assembled in the plaintiffs’ store, and in a sheltered place in the rear of it, without their knowledge and privity. The leader of the rival company or faction had been shot at the day before, and plaintiffs offered themselves as bail for his assailants. The arming and assembling of Sam Yuen’s clan doubtless had reference to an impending conflict between the two companies. If the plaintiffs had been anxious to prevent a riot, it is clear, from the proof, that they had ample opporunity to notify the Mayor, and to summon the police before the shooting commenced. But instead of requesting aid to prevent violence and bloodshed, it appears from the. testimony of one of the officers that Sam Yuen resisted the interference of the police, and himself fired at the officer. Another officer was wounded in the store, and a citizen, in attempting to quell the riot, was shot down ' at the door. On these facts the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover: 1st, because they made no effort to notify the Mayor; and, 2d, because at least one of them instigated and participated in the riot, whilst the circumstances raise a strong presumption that the others were cognizant of the impending conflict between the two companies and took no steps to *535prevent it. It is not probable that so large an armed force could have assembled in and around their store, pending the quarrel between the two companies, except with their knowledge of its purpose.
There was evidence tending to show that when the firing commenced in the street, and soon after in the store, Sam Yuen was at his private residence and not at the store. But the policeman (Sanchez) testifies positively that Sam Yuen fired at him in the store, and it was for the jury to decide upon the credibility of the witnesses.
During the examination of the witness Lopez, the plaintiffs asked him whether, after the firing commenced at the Coronel building, it was possible for a Chinaman to have gone on the street in that vicinity without being killed? The question being objected to, was ruled out by the Court, and this ruling is assigned as error. It is claimed to have been material, as tending to show that after the firing commenced it was impracticable for the plaintiffs to have notified the Mayor. But two other witnesses for the plaintiffs (Card and Harris) testified without objection “that during the progress of the riot it was unsafe for a Chinaman to be seen on the street,”, and there was no rebutting testimony on that point. The plaintiffs, therefore, had the benefit of that fact before the jury; and if the question to Lopez had been admitted, it could not have strengthened their case. But it was immaterial, for the reason that before the firing commenced, the plaintiffs must have had knowledge, as we have seen, of the impending danger, and had ample opportunity to notify the Mayor. So far from doing it, one of them actively participated in the riot, and resisted, with violence, the efforts of the police to quell it.
We do not understand the instructions or any of them, to assume, as claimed by counsel, that the plaintiffs, or one of them, did in fact instigate the riot; nor do we discover any error in the giving or refusal of instructions prejudicial to the plaintiffs,
Judgment affirmed. Remittitur forthwith.
1.2.1.3 Reflection (Wing Chung v. Mayor of Los Angeles) 1.2.1.3 Reflection (Wing Chung v. Mayor of Los Angeles)
1. Financial hostility. In his book, In Search of Equality, Charles McClain describes the heart of the prejudice against Asian Americans at the time as a belief that the group "worked too hard, saved too much, and spent too little." With this in mind, how does a decision to deny assistance to Chinese business owners to repair their storefronts after a riot further embody that sentiment?
Much like how the Foreign Miners' License Tax and "commutation tax" had the effect of either making the Chinese experience in California mining regions increasingly difficult or discouraging immigration, is the decision in Wing Chung further evidence of hostility to Chinese immigrants and their businesses?
Does the court provide or can you rationalize any reasoning for why diligently notifying the city of a riot should be required before a business owner can recover for their losses after a riot? Or is this simply nothing more than another straw man argument masking judicial prejudice?
1.2.1.4. How Los Angeles Covered Up the Massacre of 17 Chinese (March 10, 2011)
Johnson, John, LA Weekly
How Los Angeles Covered Up the Massacre of 17 Chinese - LA Weekly
1.2.1.5 Reflection (How Los Angeles Covered Up the Massacre of 17 Chinese) 1.2.1.5 Reflection (How Los Angeles Covered Up the Massacre of 17 Chinese)
Consider the tone of the prior article, How Los Angeles Covered Up the Massacre of 17 Chinese.
Does it treat the subject matter and the victims with adequate respect? Is the tone merely a byproduct of the modern true crime era? Had you noticed the tone on your first reading of the piece?
1.2.2 1885 Rock Springs Massacre 1.2.2 1885 Rock Springs Massacre
1.2.2.1. Chinese miners are massacred in Wyoming Territory
HISTORY
On September 2, 1885, 150 white miners in Rock Springs, Wyoming, brutally attack their Chinese coworkers, killing 28, wounding 15 others, and driving several hundred more out of town.
Follow this link for more about the Chinese miners massacred in Wyoming Territory .
1.2.3 1885 Tacoma Chinese Expulsion 1.2.3 1885 Tacoma Chinese Expulsion
1.2.3.1 1885 Tacoma Chinese Expulsion 1.2.3.1 1885 Tacoma Chinese Expulsion
On November 3, 1885 at 9:30AM, 500 white citizens of Tacoma gathered and marched through Tacoma’s Chinatown. They stopped at every Chinese residence and business and instructed the occupants to get on wagons or march down to a train headed to Portland, Oregon that day. The mob also visited homes and businesses of white citizens to intimidate the supporters of the Chinese community. Several days later, what remained of the once prominent Chinese community was burned to the ground. The mob was methodical in its approach to removing the Chinese populace from Tacoma. This incident became known as the 1885 Chinese Expulsion of Tacoma and it resulted from the culmination of national and regional anti-Chinese sentiment, a culture within the city of Tacoma that propagated anti-Chinese movements, as well as several tragic anti-Chinese events near Tacoma. As a subsequent national and international outcry was raised, several members of the mob were put on trial, but were never convicted. The Chinese community of the American West faced considerable persecution in the late-nineteenth century, and this event in Tacoma was heralded as a way to take action against Chinese communities and became known as the "Tacoma Method."
1.2.3.2. Tacoma Chinese Garden and Reconciliation Park
Tacoma Chinese Reconciliation Park
Follow this link to learn more About the Tacoma Chinese Garden and Reconciliation Park.
1.2.4 1886 Seattle Chinese Expulsion 1.2.4 1886 Seattle Chinese Expulsion
1.2.4.1 1886 Seattle Chinese Expulsion 1.2.4.1 1886 Seattle Chinese Expulsion
On February 7, 1886, violence breaks out in Seattle as a mob starts to forcibly expel most of the city's Chinese population. The next day one man dies and four are injured when they attack Home Guards protecting Chinese residents. Martial law is declared and will last for two weeks. President Grover Cleveland (1837-1908) will order United States troops to Seattle, where they will remain until summer. Though most of Seattle will rebound quickly from the crisis, it will take the city's Chinese community 20 years to recover.
Mobs forcibly expel most of Seattle's Chinese residents beginning on February 7, 1886
1.2.4.2. Chinese Americans march in remembrance of immigrants' expulsion
Chinese Americans march in remembrance of immigrants' expulsion
1.2.5 1887 Hells Canyon Massacre 1.2.5 1887 Hells Canyon Massacre
1.2.5.1. Ambushed, The Hells Canyon Massacre of 1887 (2007)
Michael J. Nove, Oregon State Bar Bulletin, November 2007
One hundred and twenty years ago, in May of 1887, a band of horse thieves entered Hells Canyon bent on evil. There were six men in the band, and with a lust for gold and a hatred of the Chinese, they systematically gunned down no less than 10 miners. By some accounts as many as 34 Chinese were murdered, making this crime one of the worst in Oregon’s history.
1.3 Economic Restrictions 1.3 Economic Restrictions
1.3.1 Soon Hing v. Crowley (1885) 1.3.1 Soon Hing v. Crowley (1885)
SOON HING v. CROWLEY.
IN ERROR TO THE, CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Submitted December 16, 1884. —
Decided March 16, 1885.
The decision in Barbier v. Connelly, ante, 27 — that a municipal ordinance prohibiting from washing and ironing in public laundries and wash-houses within defined territorial limits, from ten o’clock at night to six in the morning, is a police regulation within the competency of a municipality possessed of ordinary powers — affirmed.
It is no objection to a municipal ordinance prohibiting one kind of business within certain hours, that it permits other and different kinds of business to be done within those hours.
Municipal restrictions imposed upon one class of persons engaged in a particular business, which are not imposed upon others engaged in the same business and under like conditions, impair the equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.
When the general security and welfare require that a particulai kind of work should be done at certain times or hours, and an ordinance is made to that effect, a person engaged in performing that sort of work has no inherent right to pursue his occupation during the prohibited time.
*704This court cannot inquire into the motives of legislators in enacting laws, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or be inferrible from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation.
The petitioner in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, was arrested by the defendant, who' is chief of police of th¿ city and county of San Francisco, for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of that municipality, approved on the 18th of June, 1883; and while in custody of the officer applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, in order to obtain his discharge. The Circuit Court refused to issue- the writ; the judges of the court being divided in opinion, and that of the presiding judge controlling.
The ordinance was adopted to regulate the establishment and maintenance of public laundries and wash-houses within certain limits of the city and county of San Francisco. It recited that the indiscriminate establishment of such laundries and wash-houses, where clothes and other articles were cleansed for hire, endangered the public health and public safety, prejudiced the well-being and comfort of the community, and depreciated the value of property in them neighborhood. It then ordained, pursuánt to the authority vested in the board, that after its passage it should be unlawful for any person to establish, maintain, or carry on the business of a public laundry or a public wash-house within certain designated limits of the city'and county, without having first obtained a certificate of the health officer of the municipality that the premises were properly and Sufficiently drainéd, and that all proper arrange-- ■ ments were made to carry on the business without injury to the sanitary condition of the neighborhood ; and also a certificate of the Board of Fire Wardens of the municipality that the stoves, washing and drying apparatus, and the appliances for heating smoothing-irons were in good condition, and that their use was not dangerous to surrounding property from fire, and that all proper precautions were taken to comply with the provisions of the ordinance defining the fire limits of the city and county, and making regulations' concerning the erection and *705use of buildings therein. The ordinance requires the health officer and the Board of Wardens, upon the application of ány one desirous to open or conduct the business of a public laundry, to inspect the premises in which it is proposed to carry on the business, in order to ascertain whether they are provided with proper drainage and sanitary appliances, and whether the provisions of the fire ordinance have been complied with; and if found satisfactory in all respects, to issue to the applicant the required certificates, without charge for the services rendered.
Its fourth section declares that no person owning or employed in a public laundry or a public wash-house within the prescribed limits shall wash or iron clothes between the hours of ten in the evening and six in the morning, or upon any portion- of Sunday; and its fifth section declares that no person engaged in the laundry business within those limits shall permit anyone suffering from an infectious or contagious disease to lodge, sleep, or remain upon the premises! The violation of any of these provisions is declared to be a misdemeanor, and penalties are prescribed according to the nature of the offence. The establishing, maintaining or carrying on the' business without obtaining the certificate is punishable by a fine of not more that $1,000, or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both. Carrying on the business outside of the,hours prescribed, or permitting persons with contagious diseases on. the premises, is punishable by a fine of not less than $5 or more than $50, or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The petitioner was arrested by the chief of police upon a warrant of a police judge of the municipality, issued upon a complaint' under oath, that the petitioner had washed and ironed clothes in a public laundry within the prescribed limits between the hours of ten o’clock in the evening of the 25th of February, 1884, and six o’clock in the morning of the following day, thereby violating the provisions of section four of the ordinance.
The .petition for the writ of habeas corpus presented to the judges of the Circuit Court set forth the arrest and detention *706of the petitioner by the chief of police, the ordinance under which the arrest was made, the complaint before the police judge, and the issue of the warrant under which he was taken into custody. It then proceeded to state that the petitioner' had for several years been engaged in working for hire in a public laundry in the city and county of San Francisco, and had in all respects complied with the laws of the United States' and of California, and the ordinances of the city and county, except in washing at the hours mentioned; that the business of ■ carrying on a laundry was a lawful one in which a large number of the subjects of the Emperor of China had been and were engaged in the said city and county within the limits prescribed by the ordinance; that there had been for several years great antipathy and hatred on the part of the residents of that city and county against the subjects of China residing and doing business there; that siich antipathy and hatred had manifested themselves in various ways and under various forms for the purpose of compelling the subjects of China to quit and abandon their business and residence in the city and county and State; that owing to that feeling, and not otherwise, and not' for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose, but in order to force those subjects engaged in carrying on. the business of a laundry in- the city and county of San Francisco to abandon' the exercise of their lawful vocation, and their only means of livelihood, the supervisors passed the ordinance in question; that the petitioner had been and was earning his living-exclusively by working at washing and ironing for hire, and in order to gain a livelihood was obliged to work late in the night, and had no other lawful vocation; that on the first of January, 1884, his employer paid the license collector of the city and county six dollars, the amount required by the ordinance to obtain a license to carry on the business of a laundry, and obtained from him a license to carry on the business at a designated place • within the prescribed limits. The petition also averred that section four of the ordinance was in'contravention of the provisions-of the Burlingame Treaty, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprived them of the equal protection of the laws.
*707On the hearing of the application for the writ certain questions arose, upon which the judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion. They were as follows:
1. Whether section four .of the ordinance mentioned is void on the ground that it is not Tyithin the police power of the Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco.
2. Whether said section is void on the groundCthat it discriminates between those engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other classes of business.
3. Whether said section is void on the ground that it discriminates between the different classes of persons engaged in the laundry business.
4. Whether said section is void on the ground that it deprives a man of the right to labor at all times.
5. Whether said section is void on the groifndi that it is unreasonable in its requirements, in restraint of trade,- or upon any other ground apparent upon the face of the ordinance, or appearing in the petition.
The opinion of the presiding judge being that the said section was valid and constitutional, the application for the ■ writ was denied; and the judgment entered upon the denial was brought to this court for review.
Mr. David McClure and Mr. Thomas D. Riordcm for plaintiff in error.
No appearance for defendant in error.
after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The ordinance- of the Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco, the legislative authority of that municipality, approved on the 25th of June, 1883, is similar in its main features to the ordinance under consideration at this term in Barbier v. Connolly, ante, page 27. It differs in the designation of the limits of the district of the city and- county within which its provisions are to be enforced, but not otherwise in any essential particular. The fourth section is identical in both. The *708prohibition against labor on Sunday in this section is; not involved here, as it was not in that case; and the provision for the cessation of labor in the laundries within certain prescribed limits of the city and county during certain hours of the night is purely a police regulation, which is, as we there said, within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies. Besides, the Constitution of California declares that “ any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” Art. XI., § 11. And it is of the utmost consequence in a city subject, as San Francisco is, the greater part of the year, to high winds, and composed principally within the limits designated of wooden buildings, that regulations of a strict character should be adopted to prevent the possibility of fires. That occupations in which continuous fires are necessary should cease at certain hours of the night would seem to be, under such circumstances, a reasonable regulation as a measure of precaution. At any rate, of its necessity for the purpose designated the municipal ¿uthorities are the appropriate judges. Their regulations in this matter are riot subject to any interference by the federal tribunals unless they are made the occasion for invading the substantial rights of persons, and no such invasion is caused by the regulation in question. As we said in Barbier v. .Connolly, “the same municipal authority which directs the cessation of labor must necessarily prescribe the limits within which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits in a city within which wooden buildings cannot be constructed.” No invidious discrimination is made against any one by the measures adopted. All persons engaged in the same business within the prescribed limits are treated alike and subject to similar restrictions.
There is no force in the objection that an unwarrantable discrimination is made against persons engaged in the laundry business, because persons in other kinds of business are not required to cease from their labors during the same hours at night. There may be no risks attending the business of others, certainly not as great as where fires are constantly required to carry them on. The specific regulations for one kind of busi*709ness, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is .only then that the discrimination can be said to impair, that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.
But counsel in the court below not only objected to the fourth section of the ordinance as discriminating between those engaged in the laundry business, and those engaged in other business, but also as discriminating between different classes engaged in the laundry business itself. This latter ground of objection becomes intelligible only by reference to his brief, in which we are informed that the laundry business, besides the washing and ironing of clothes, involves the fluting, polishing, blueing, and wringing of them; and that these are all different branches, requiring separate and skilled workmen, who are not prohibited from working ,during the hours of night. This fluting, polishing, blueing, and w.mging of clothes, it seems to us, are incidents of the general business, and are embraced within its prohibition. But if not incidents, and they are outside of the prohibition, it is because thére is not the danger from them that would arise from the continuous fires required in washing; and it is not discriminating legislation in any invidious sense that branches of the same business from which danger is apprehended are prohibited during certain hours of the night, whilst other branches involving no such danger are permitted.
The objection that the fourth section is void on the ground that it deprives a man of the. right to work at all times is equally without force. However broad the right of every one to follow such calling and employ his time as he may judge most conducive to his interests, it must be exercised subject to such general rules as are adopted by society for the common welfare. All sorts of restrictions , are imposed upon the actions of men notwithstanding the liberty which is guaranteed to each. It is liberty regulated by just and impartial laws. Bar-*710ties, for example, are free to make any contracts they choose for a lawful purpose, but society says what contracts shall be in writing and what may be verbally made, and on' what days they may be executed, and how long they may be enforced if their terms are not complied with. So, too, with the hours of labor. On few subjects has there been more regulation. How . many hours shall constitute a day’s work in the absence of contract, at what time shops in our cities shall close at night, are constant subjects of legislation. Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor. Such laws have always been deemed beneficent and merciful laws, especially to the poor and dependent, to the laborers in 1 our factories and workshops and in the heated rooms of our cities; and their validity has been sustained by the highest courts of the States.
The principal objection, however, of the petitioner to the ordinance in question is founded upon the supposed hostile motives of the supervisors in passing it. The petition alleges that it was adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in the city and county of San Francisco against the subjects of the Emperor of China resident therein, and for the purpose of compelling those engaged in the laundry business to abandon their lawful vocation, and residence there, and not for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose. There is nothing, however, in the language of the ordinance, or in the record of its enactment, which in any respect tends to sustain this allegation. And the rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives of the legislators, considered as the purposes they had in view, will always be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable effect of their enactments. Their *711motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth,' precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile. And in the present case, even if the motives of the supervisors were as alleged, the ordinance would not be thereby changed from a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate only against the class mentioned; and of this there is no pretence.
It follow's that the several questions certified must be answered in the negative and the judgment be affirmed;
And it is so ordered.
1.3.2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 1.3.2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)
Due to the various restrictions imposed on Chinese labor, particular areas of industry became concentrated with Chinese labor. Chinese workers made up 97 percent of all persons working in cigar-making in the San Francisco area, 84 percent of the boot and shoemakers, 88 percent of the garment manufacturers and 89 percent of the laundry workers.
San Francisco subsequently passed a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of a laundry located in a wooden building without the consent of the Board of Supervisors. Laundries in brick or stone buildings needed no comparable approval. At first glance, the law seemed a reasonable exercise of the state's police power, because the wooden buildings were more vulnerable to fire, a problem that plagued San Francisco and other nineteenth-century cities. However, at the time the ordinance was enacted, over 95 percent of the 320 laundries in the city were located in wooden buildings, and two-thirds of those had Chinese owners.
The Board of Supervisors granted permission to operate laundries in wooden buildings to none of the 200 Chinese applicants, including Yick Wo, who had operated a laundry in the city for many years before being refused a permit. When he continued to run the business, he was arrested and convicted for violating the ordinance.
YICK WO v. HOPKINS, SHERIFF. WO LEE v. HOPKINS, SHERIFF.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Submitted April 14, 1886. —
Decided May 10, 1886.
In a suit brought to this court from a State court which involves the constitutionality of ordinances made hy a municipal corporation in the State, this court will, when necessary, put its own independent construction upon the ordinances.
A municipal ordinance to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of the municipality violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, if it confers upon the municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without regard to discretion in the legal sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the competency of the persons-applying, or the propriety of the place selected, for the carrying on of the business.
An administration of a municipal ordinance for the carrying on of a lawful business within the corporate limits violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, if it makes arbitrary and unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race, between persons otherwise in similar circumstances.
The guarantees of protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution extend to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
Thosé subjects of the Emperor of China who have the right to temporarily or permanently reside within the United States, are entitled to enjoy the protection guaranteed by the Constitution and afforded by the laws.
These two cases were argued as one and depended upon precisely the same state of facts; tbe first coming here upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of California, the second on appeal from tbe Circuit Court of the United States for that district.
The plaintiff in error, Yick Wo, on August 24, 1885, petitioned tbe Supreme Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that be was illegally deprived of his personal liberty by the defendant as sheriff of the city and county of San Francisco.
The sheriff made return to the writ that he held the petitioner in custody by virtue of a sentence of the Police Judges Court, No. 2, of the city and county of San Francisco, whereby he was found guilty of a violation of certain ordinances of the board of supervisors of that county, and adjudged to pay a fine of $10, and, in default of payment, be imprisoned in the county jail at the rate of one day for each dollar of fine until said fine should be satisfied, and a commitment in consequence of non-payment of said fine.
The ordinances for the violation of which he had been found guilty were set out as follows:
Order No. 1569, passed May 26, 1880, prescribing the kind of buildings in which laundries may be- located.
“ The people of the city and county of San Francisco do ordain as follows:
“ Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.
“ Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, build, or maintain, or cause to be erected, built, or maintained, over or. upon the roof of any building now erected or which may hereafter be erected within the limits of said city and county, any scaffolding, without first obtaining the written permission of the board of supervisors, which permit shall state fully for what purpose said scaffolding is to be erected and used, and such scaffolding shall not be used for any other purpose than that designated in such permit.
“ Sec. 3. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this order shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
Order No. 1587, passed July 28,1880, the following section: “ Sec. 68. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.”
The following facts were also admitted on the record: That petitioner is a native of China and came to California in 1861, and is still a subject of the Emperor of China; that he has been engaged in the laundry business in the same premises and building for twenty-two years last past; that he had a license from the board of fire wardens, dated March 3, 1884, from which it appeared “that the above described premises have been inspected by the board of fire wardens, and upon such inspection said board found all proper arrangements for carrying on the business; that the stoves, washing and drying apparatus, and the appliances for heating smoothing irons are in good condition, and that their use is not dangerous to the surrounding property from fire, and that all proper precautions have been taken to comply with the provisions of order No. 1617, defining ‘ the fire limits of the city and county of San Francisco and making regulations concerning the erection and use of buildings in said city and county,’ and of order No. 1670, ‘prohibiting the kindling, maintenance, and use of open fires in houses; ’ that' he had a certificate from the health officer that the same premises had been inspected by him, and that he found that they were properly and sufficiently drained, and that all proper arrangements for carrying on the business of a laundry, without injury to the sanitary condition of the neighborhood, had been complied with; that the city license of the petitioner was in force and expired October 1st, 1885; and that the petitioner applied to the board of supervisors, June 1st, 1885, for consent of said board to maintain and carry on his laundry, but that said board, on July 1st, 1885, refuged said consent.” It is also admitted to be true, as alleged in the petition, that, on February 24, 1880, “ there were about 320 laundries in the city and county of San Francisco, of which about 240' were owned and conducted by subjects of China, and of the whole number, viz., 320, about 310 were constructed of wood, the same material that constitutes nine-tenths of the houses in the city of San Francisco.'- The capital thus invested by the subjects of China was not less than two hundred thousand dollars, and they paid annually for rent, license, taxes, gas, and water about one hundred and eighty thousand dollars.”
It was alleged in the petition, that “ your petitioner and more than one hundred and fifty of his countrymen have been arrested upon the charge of carrying on business without having such special consent, while those who are not subjects of China, and who are conducting, eighty odd laundries under similar conditions, are left unmolested and free to enjoy the enhanced trade and profits arising from this hurtful and unfair discrimination. The business of your petitioner, and of those of his countrymen similarly .situated, is greatly impaired, and in many cases practically ruined by this system of oppression to one kind of men and favoritism to all others.”
The statement therein contained as to the arrest, &c., was admitted to be true, with the qualification only, that the eighty odd laundries referred to are in wooden buildings without scaffolds on the roofs. \ '
It was also admitted “ that petitioner and 200 of his countrymen similarly situated petitipne'd the board of supervisors for permission to continue their business in the various houses which they had been occupying and using for laundries for more than twenty years, and such petitions -were denied, and all the petitions of those who were not Chinese, with one exception of Mrs. Mary Meagles, were granted.”
By section 2 of article XI of the Constitution of California it is provided that “ any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”
By section 14 of the Act of April 19,1856, usually known as the consolidation act, the board of supervisors is empowered, among other things, “ to provide by regulation for the prevention and summary removal of nuisances to public health, the prevention of contagious diseases; . .- . to prohibit the erection of wooden buildings within any fixed limits where the streets shall have been established and graded; ... to regulate the sale, storage, and use of gunpowder or other explosive or combustible materials and substances, and make all needful regulations for protection against fire; to make such regulations concerning the erection and use of buildings as may be necessary for the safety of the inhabitants.”
The Supreme Court of California, in the opinion pronouncing the judgment in this case, said: “ The board of supervisors, under the several statutes conferring authority upon them, has the power to prohibit or regulate all occupations which are against good morals, contrary to public order and decency, or dangerous to the public safety. Clothes washing is certainly not opposed to good morals or subversive of public order or decency, but when conducted in given localities it may be highly dangerous to the public safety. Of this fact the supervisors are made the judges, and, having taken action in the premises, we do not find that they have prohibited the establishment of laundries, but that they have, as they well might do, regulated the places at which they should be established, the character of .the buildings in which they are to be maintained, etc. The process of washing is not prohibited by thus regulating the places at which and the surroundings by which it must be exercised. The order .No. 1569 and section 68 of order No. 1587 are not in contravention of common right or unjust, unequal, partial, or oppressive, in such sense as authorizes us in this proceeding to pronounce them invalid.”
• After answering the position taken in behalf of the petitioner, that the ordinances in question had been repealed, the court added : “We have not deemed it necessary to discuss the question in the light of supposed infringement of petitioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, for the reason that we think the principles upon Avhich contention on that head can be based have in effect- been set at rest by the cases of Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703.” The writ was accordingly discharged and the prisoner remanded.
In the other case the appellant, Wo Lee, petitioned for his discharge from an alleged illegal imprisonment, upon a state of facts shown upon the record, precisely similar to that in the case of Tick Wo. In disposing-of the application, the learned Circuit Judge, Sawyer, in his opinion, 26 Fed. Rep. 471, after quoting the ordinance in question, proceeded at length as follows:
“ Thus, in a territory some ten miles wide by fifteen or more miles long, much of it still occupied as mere farming and pasturage lands, and much of it unoccupied sand banks, in many places without a building within a quarter or half a mile of each other, including the isolated and almost wholly unoccupied Goat Island, the right to carry on this, when properly guarded, harmless and necessary occupation, in a wooden building, is not made to depend upon any prescribed conditions giving a right to anybody complying with them, but upon the consent or arbitrary will of the board of supervisors. In three-fourths of the territory covered by the ordinance there is no more need of prohibiting or regulating laundries than if they were located in any portion of the farming regions of the State. Hitherto the regulation of laundries has been limited to the thickly settled portions of the city. . Why this unnecessary extension of the limits affected, if not designed to prevent the establishment of laundries, after a compulsory removal from their present locations, within practicable reach of the customers or their proprietors? And the uncontradicted petition shows that all Chinese applications are, in fact, denied, and 'those of Caucasians granted — thus, in fact, making the discriminations, in the administration of the ordinance, which its terms permit. The fact that the right to give consent is reserved in the ordinance shows that carrying on the laundry business in wooden buildings is not deemed of itself necessarily dangerous. It must be apparent to every well-informed mind that a fire, properly guarded, for laundry purposes, in a wooden building, is just as necessary, and no more dangerous, than a fire for cooking purposes or for warming a house. If the ordinance under consideration is valid, then the board of supervisors can pass a valid ordinance preventing the maintenance, in a wooden building, of a cooking stove, heating apparatus, or a restaurant, within the boundaries of the city and county of San Francisco, without the consent of that body, arbitrarily given or withheld, as their prejudices or other motives may dictate. If it is competent for the board of supervisors to pass a valid ordinance prohibiting the inhabitants of San Francisco from following any ordinary, proper, and necessary calling within the limits of the city and county, except at its arbitrary and unregulated discretion and special consent, and it can do so if this ordinance is valid, then it seems to us that there has been a wide departure from the principles that have heretofore been supposed to guard and protect the rights, property, and liberties of the American people. And if, by an ordinance, general in its terms and form, like the one in question, by reserving an arbitrary discretion in the enacting^ body to grant or deny permission to engage in a proper and necessary calling, a discrimination against any class can be made in its execution, thereby evading and, in effect, nullifying the provisions of the National Constitution, then the insertion of provisions to guard the rights of every cláss and person in that instrument was a vain and futile act. The effect of the execution of this ordinance in the manner indicated in the record would seem to be necessarily to close up the many Chinese laundries now existing, or compel their owners to pull down their present buildings and reconstruct of brick or stone, or to drive them outside the city and county of San Francisco, to the adjoining counties, beyond the convenient reach of customers, either of which results would be little short of absolute confiscation of the large amount of property shown to be now, and to have been for a long time, invested in these occupations. If this would not be depriving such parties of their property without due process of law, it would be difficult to say what would effect that prohibited result. The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance, and of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of business all the numerous small laundries, especially those owned by Chinese, and give a monopoly of the business to the large institutions established and carried on by means of large associated Caucasian capital. If the facts appearing on the face of the ordinance, on the petition and return, and admitted in the case, and shown by the notorious public and municipal history of the times, indicate a purpose to drive out the Chinese laundrymen, and not merely to regulate the business for the public safety, does it not disclose a case of violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the National Constitution, and of the treaty between the United States and China, in more than one particular ? . . .If this means prohibition of the occupation, and destruction of the business and property of the Chinese laundrymen in San Francisco — and it seems to us this must be the effect of executing the ordinance — and not merely the proper regulation of the business, then there is discrimination and a violation of other highly important rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and the treaty. That it does mean prohibition, as to the Chinese, it seems to us must be apparent to every citizen of San Francisco who has been here long enough to be familiar with the cause of an active and aggressive branch of public opinion and of public notorious events. Can a court be blind to what must be necessarily known- to every intelligent person in the State? See Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawyer, 552, 560: Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall, 97, 104; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 42.”
But, in deference to the decision of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Tick'Wo, and contrary to his own .opinion as thus expressed, the circuit judge discharged the writ and remanded the prisoner.
Mr. Hall McAllister, Mr. L. H. Van Schaick, and Mr. D. L. Smoot for plaintiffs in errorv
Mr. Alfred OlcwTce and Mr. M. G. Sieberst for defendant in error.
We claim that the city has power to adopt the section we are examining under article XI, section 11 of the Constitution “ to make and enforce all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” The police power of the State does extend to the regulation of this business by excluding it from certain limits, as shown by In re McClain, 61 Cal. 436; In re Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78; In re Ah Sing, 59 Cal. 404; The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62, et seq.; Ailstock v. Paige, 77 Va. 386; In re Lester, 77 Va. 663; Commonwealth v. Merriam, 136 Mass. 433; Muller v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 171; State v. Mayor, 15 Vroom (44 N. J. Law), 114; State v. Fay, 15 Vroom (44 N. J. Law), 474; Commonwealth v. Whelan, 134 Mass. 206; In re Liquor Locations, 13 R. I. 733; State v. Tarver, 11 Lea, 658.
Under our State constitution, the legislature is prohibited by art. IY., sec. 25, sub. 2, from exercising the local police power; but the power which is denied to the legislature is vested by art. XI., sec. 11, in the municipal corporations throughout the State. In re Stewart, 61 Cal. 374; In re Moynier, 65 Cal. 33; In re Soon Hing, March 13, 1884, by Supreme Court in bank, not reported; In re Walters, 65 Cal. 269; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703.
The police power is indestructible and inalienable, and being (so far as the regulation of local matters) denied to the legislature, it must reside in the municipalities. The sovereign people have located this power in the municipalities, and it is now too late to question its existence. See observations by Taney, C. J., in Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 428.
In addition to the cases heretofore cited, we refer to the following as recent illustrations of the extent of the police power: Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the laundry of petitioner was not a fully developed common-law nuisance, we say the State has power to regulate it, as was shown in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. The washing of Mr. Barbier was not a nuisance, but it was regulated. See also, In re Delaney, 43 Cal. 478.
It has been held that “ the State may construe her own laws.” Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 504, 515. This is what the State has done. And because some other State (Maryland for instance, in Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Maryland, 217) has taken a different view, it does not follow that the construction by the California Courts of their laws should be reversed. We do not question the right of Maryland to make or administer her laws. This decision was presented to the Supreme Court of California in Yick Wo, the case at bar, and our court declined to follow the Supreme Court of Maryland, and adhered to the contrary rule which had long been in force in our State. Ought we to disregard the Supreme Court of California, and follow the Supreme Court of Maryland ? Can this court reverse the Supreme Court of California because it refuses to follow the Supreme Court of Maryland and adheres to its own decisions? In re Frazer, 54 Cal. 94; In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 263.
No disguise will conceal the fact that there is a conflict of authority upon the question we are examining, as will be seen on inspection of a few of the decisions which treat the question at bar.
Decisions restraining the police power of the State. — (1878). Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Maryland, 217; (1882). July, In re Quong Wo, 7 Sawyer, 526, 531.
Decisions asserting the police power of the State. — (1871), In re Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250; (1871), Whitten v. Covington, 43. Geo. 421; (1872), State v. Court, etc., 7 Vroom (36 N. J. Law), 72; (1873), Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; (1873), State v. Ludington, 33 Wis. 107; (1875), Rohrbacker v. Jackson, 51 Mississippi, 735; (1876), Kansas Pacific Railroad Co. v. Riley, 16 Kansas, 573; (1879), Eureka v. Davis, 21 Kansas, 578; (1881), Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; (1883), State v. Brown, 19 Fla. 563.
The Fourteenth Amendment bécame a part of the Constitution July 28, 1868, and yet we find thé States from that time to this asserting and exercising this power.
Mr. Justice Matthews
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the case of the petitioner, brought here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of California, our jurisdiction is limited to the question, whether the plaintiff in error has been denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The question whether his imprisonment is illegal, under the constitution and laws of the State, is not open to us. And although that question might have been considered in the Circuit Court in the application made to it, and by this court on appeal from its order, yet judicial propriety is best consulted by accepting the judgment of the State court upon the points involved in that inquiry.
That, however, does not preclude this court from putting upon the ordinances of the supervisors of the county and city of San Francisco an independent construction; for the determination of the question whether the proceedings under these ordinances and in enforcement of them are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, necessarily involves the meaning of the ordinances, which, for that purpose, we are required to ascertain and adjudge.
We are consequently constrained, at the outset, to differ from the Supreme Court of California upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question. That court considered these ordinances as vesting in the board of supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or withholding their assent to the use of wooden buildings as laundries, to be exercised in reference to the circumstances of each case, with a view to the protection of the public against the dangers of fire. We are not able to concur in that interpretation of the power conferred upon the supervisors. There is nothing in the ordinances which points to such a regulation of the business of keeping and conducting laundries. They seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons. So that, if an applicant for such consent, being in every way a competent and qualified person, and having complied with every reasonable condition demanded by any public ^interest, should, failing to obtain the requisite consent of the supervisors to the prosecution of his business, apply for redress by the judicial process of mandamus, to require the supervisors to consider and act upon his case, it would be a sufficient answer for them to say that the law had conferred upon them authority to withhold their assent, without reason and without responsibility. The power given to them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint.
This erroneous view of the ordinances in question led the Supreme Court of California into the further error of holding that they were justified by the decisions of this court in the cases of Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703. In both of these cases the ordinance involved was simply a prohibition to carry on the washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and washhouses, within certain prescribed limits of the city and county of San Francisco, from ten o’clock at night until six o’clock in the morning of the following day. This provision was held to be purely a police regulation, within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies ; a necessary measure of precaution in a city composed largely of wooden buildings like San Francisco, in the application of which there was no invidious discrimination against any one within the prescribed limits, all- persons engaged in the same business being treated alike, and subject to the same restrictions, and entitled to the same privileges, under similar conditions.
For these reasons, that ordinance was adjudged not to be within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, it was said, in the first case cited, “undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits .of any one, except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offences.” “ Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.”
The ordinance drawn in question in the present case is of a very different character'. It does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the regulation of the use of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform. It allows without restriction the use for such purposes of buildings of .brick or stone; but, as to wooden, buildings, constituting nearly all those in previous use, it divides the owners or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their .personal character and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure. And both classes are alike only in this, that they are tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means of living. The ordinance, therefore, also differs from the not unusual case, where discretion is lodged by law in public officers or bodies to grant or withhold licenses to keep taverns, or places for the sale of spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit person for the exercise of the privilege, because in such cases the fact of fitness is submitted to the judgment of the officer, and calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature.
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not less, because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China. By the third article of the treaty between this Government and that of China, concluded November 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 827, it is stipulated: “ If Chinese laborers, or Chinese of any other class, now either permanently or temporarily residing in the territory of the United States, meet with ill treatment at the hands of any other persons, the Government of the United States will exert all its powers to devise measures for their protection, and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty.”
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says : “ Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. It is accordingly enacted by § 1977 of the Kevised Statutes, that “ all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings .for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights .of every citizen of the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
It is contended on the part of the petitioners, that the ordinances for violations of which they are severally sentenced to imprisonment, are void on their face, as being within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in the alternative, if not so, that they are void by reason of their administration, operating unequally, so as to punish in the present petitioners what is permitted to others as lawful, without any distinction of circumstances — an unjust and illegal discrimination, it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by the ordinances is made possible by them.
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are sup.posed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely'political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the commonwealth “may be a government of laws and not of men.” For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
There are many illustrations that might be given of this truth, which would make manifest that it was self-evident in the light of our system of jurisprudence. The case of the political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.
In reference to that right, it was declared by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 489, in the words of Chief Justice Shaw, “that in all cases where the constitution has conferred a political right or privilege, and where the constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which that right is to be exercised, it is clearly within the just and constitutional limits of the legislative power, to adopt any reasonable and uniform regulations, in regard to the time and mode of exercising that right, which are designed to secure and, facilitate the exercise of such right, in a prompt, orderly, and convenient manner; ” nevertheless, “ such a construction would afford no warrant for such an exercise of legislative power, as, under the pretence and color of regulating, should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself.” It has accordingly been held generally in the States, that, whether the particular provisions of an act of legislation, establishing means for ascertaining the qualifications of those entitled to vote, and making previous registration in lists of such, a condition precedent to the exercise of the right, were or were not reasonable regulations, and accordingly valid or void, was always open to inquiry, as a judicial question. See Daggett v. Hudson, 1 Western Reporter, 789, decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, where many of the cases are collected; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665.
The same principle has beeh more freely extended to the quasi-legislative acts of inferior municipal bodies, in respect to which it is an ancient jurisdiction of judicial tribunals to pronounce upon the reasonableness and consequent validity of their by-laws. In respect to these, it was the doctrine, that every by-law must be reasonajffe, not inconsistent with the charter of the corporation, nor with any statute of Parliament, nor with the general principles of the common law of the land, particularly those having relation to the liberty of the subject or the rights of private property. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., § 319, and cases cited in notes. Accordingly, in the case of The State of Ohio ex rel. &c. v. The Cincinnati Gas-Light and Coke Company, 18 Ohio St. 262, 300, an ordinance of the city council purporting to fix the price to be charged for gas, under an authority of law giving discretionary power to do so, was held to be bad, if passed in bad faith, fixing an unreasonable price, for the fraudulent purpose of compelling the gas company to submit to an unfair appraisement of their works. And a similar question, very pertinent to the one in the present cases, was decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the case of the City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Maryland, 217. In that case the defendant had erected and used a steam engine, in the prosecution of his business as a carpenter and box-maker in the city of Baltimore, under a permit from the mayor and city council, which contained a condition that the engine was “to be removed after six months’ notice to that effect from the mayor.” After such notice and refusal to conform to it, a suit was instituted to recover the penalty provided by the ordinance, to restrain the prosecution of which a bill in equity was filed. The court holding the opinion that “ there may be a case in which an ordinance, passed under grants of power like those we have cited, is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive, or partial, as to raise the presumption that the legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a' plain abuse of authority,” it proceeds to speak, with regard to the ordinance in question, in relation to the use of steam engines, as follows: “It does not profess to prescribe regulations for their construction, location, or use, nor require such precautions and safeguards to be provided by those who own and use them as are best calculated to render them less dangerous to life and propei’ty, nor does it restrain their use in box factories and other similar establishments within certain defined limits, nor in any other wray attempt to promote their safety and security without destroying their usefulness. But it commits to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to notify every person who now employs a steam engine in the prosecution of any business in the city of Baltimore, to cease to do so, and, by providing compulsory fines for every day’s disobedience of such notice and order of removal, renders his power over the use of steam in that city practically absolute, so that he may prohibit its use altogether. But if he should not choose to do this, but only to act in particular cases, there is nothing in the ordinance to guide or control his action. It lays down no mies by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented. It is clear that giving and enforcing these notices may, and quite likely will, bring ruin to the business of those, against whom they are directed, while others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action or non-action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being brought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment’s consideration. In- fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void.”
This conclusion, and the reasoning on which it is based, are deductions from the face of the ordinance, as to its necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation. In the present cases we are not obliged to reason from the probable to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration. For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class1 of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself, wfth a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by this court in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703.
The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in the record, are within this class. It appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite, deemed by the law or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution against injury to the public health. No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similiar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged. To this end,
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Yick Wo, and that of the Girouit Court of the United States for the District of Odlifornia ini the case of Wo Lee, . are severally reversed, and the cases remanded, each to the pi'oper court, with directions to discharge the petitioners from custody cmd imprisonment.
1.3.3 Reflection and Discussion (Yick Wo & Soon Hing) 1.3.3 Reflection and Discussion (Yick Wo & Soon Hing)
1. Equal Protection. Yick Wo was the first case to rely on the "equal protection" clause of the 14th Amendment, which prohibits states from denying any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. This unanimous decision effectively established that laws with discriminatory intent were unconstitutional.
In his opinion, Justice Matthews argues that the California Supreme Court got the interpretation of Barbier v. Connolly wrong and that the legislation at issue in that case was distinguishable because it was a police regulation not covered by the 14th Amendment. What is the reason that police regulations are not subject to 14th Amendment scrutiny? If, then, the legislation here is not a police regulation like that in Barbier as the California Supreme Court would have believed it to be, what is it, and why is it instead subject to the 14th?
The Supreme Court in Yick Wo declares the legislation at issue to be unconstitutional as applied because it affected different groups unequally, as opposed to being facially unconstitutional.
Yick Wo has acquired its place in constitutional history for its early endorsement of the principle that racially discriminatory enforcement of the law offended the constitutional mandate of equal protection just as much did a law that discriminated in its terms. But . . . the decision is more than simply an indictment of a neutral law unfairly applied.
Notwithstanding the references to laws 'fair on their face and impartial in their appearance,' the Court clearly thought it had before it a very flawed piece of legislation. Indeed a good two-thirds of Justice Matthews's opinion is given over to an analysis of just how bad a law the San Francisco ordinance was. A law that vests total and seemingly unconstrained discretion over access to the laundering trade in a municipal legislative body is, he makes abundantly clear, inherently suspect. But it would be wrong to stint the decision's race relations jurisprudence.
Charles J. McClain, In search of equality: The Chinese struggle against discrimination in nineteenth-century America (1994).
2. Comparing Soon Hing and Yick Wo. Soon Hing was decided a year before Yick Wo, and the cases are strikingly similar. The law in Yick Wo purported to be concerned with the materials making up the structure of the laundries, while the law in Soon Hing took aim at limiting the operating hours of such businesses and the sanitary conditions. These laws were defended as addressing important government concerns–the fires that frequently tore through the San Francisco area at the time. However, the petitioner in Yick Wo created a record of the disparate impact that the regulation had on Chinese laundries.
In the light of the fact that 89% of laundry workers were Chinese, could a different record have convinced the U.S. Supreme Court that the safety and sanitary concerns expressed by the city are more straw man arguments that have continuously been put up to justify the hostility toward the Chinese expressed through legislation?
When a city or state sees a pattern of hostility toward a certain group of citizens, does that inherently make any law disproportionately affecting that group suspect? Can you think of examples of laws that unequally burden one group but are defensible because of a compelling or otherwise important government interest?
1.4 Additional Resources 1.4 Additional Resources
The additional resources in this section are optional readings; they have been compiled because of their historical importance, relationship to other readings, or because they are otherwise noteworthy.
1.4.1. Asians & Pacific Islanders and the Civil War
Follow this link for an incredible history of Asians & Pacific Islanders who fought in the U.S. Civil War: Asians & Pacific Islanders and the Civil War.