1 Introduction 1 Introduction

1.1 Acknowledgments and Credits 1.1 Acknowledgments and Credits

Thanks to Josh Cape, Marion Delaney, and Kayla Kaufman for assistance in uploading and formatting this casebook.

Case excerpts and notes are reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press. Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

Quotations from Restatements of Tort Law are reproduced with permission, not as part of a Creative Commons license, from The American Law Institute.

1.2 Principles and Institutions 1.2 Principles and Institutions

          Tort law is the common law of civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  Torts books often start with a definition because tort law, unlike other mainstays of the first year in the American law school curriculum, can seem strange and unfamiliar to the new law student.  Terms like “contracts,” “procedure,” “property,” and “criminal law,” are relatively familiar to students long before they arrive for the first day of classes.  “Constitutional law” will resonate with the law student who has even a passing interest in politics or public policy.  Alone among first year subjects, “torts” has not made much headway into lay usage.  Indeed, the situation is even worse than this suggests, for to the extent the term has made its way into popular usage, the results have often been terrible misuse and misunderstanding.  

          So let’s start with a definition: Tort law is the common law of civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  Let’s now take that definition piece by piece.

          We call tort law a common law field because it arises out of the body of legal norms and institutions inherited by the United States from England more than two centuries ago, when the United States won independence from the British Empire.  In England, the common law was the law of the King’s courts in the centuries after the Norman Conquest in 1066.  (The common law was the law common to those courts, as opposed to the church courts, borough courts, and the courts of the local nobility, each of which had its own law through the medieval and early modern periods.)  Today, to say that a body of law is made up of common law principles is to say that it is mostly judge-made law, though not necessarily exclusively so.  State legislatures and the U.S. Congress increasingly alter the common law of torts.  The Federal Constitution and its state-level counterparts largely (but not entirely) give the Congress and state legislatures power to make such alterations, though as we shall see constitutional constraints touch tort law in several different ways.  Nonetheless, it is still fair to call torts a common law field.  And as a common law field, torts is made up predominantly of state law, rather than federal law, though federal law has always played a role, especially in the past century, and even more so in the last two decades.  To the extent that torts remains a subject of state law, its basic norms will vary from state to state, though usually with a wide area of consensus at its core. 

          Tort law deals with civil wrongs as opposed to violations of the criminal law.  This means that tort law’s norms and institutions exhibit a cluster of features characteristic of civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings.  Private parties, not public prosecutors, typically initiate tort litigation (though the government may be a claimant in tort cases when certain harms befall government property).  The array of procedural protections for criminal defendants (many of them constitutionally required) typically does not apply to defendants in torts cases.  There is no privilege not to testify on the grounds that you might concede liability, for example.  There are no Miranda warnings in torts.  And there is no constitutionally protected right to confront witnesses.  The Federal Constitution does not require states to offer jury trials in tort cases, though most states do anyway.  The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence” rather than the high threshold of  “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Parties without lawyers are not usually offered free court-appointed counsel.  Most importantly, perhaps, the fact that tort law is the law of civil wrongs means that, with one exception, tort law does not aim to punish.  Punishment is a principal function of the criminal justice system.  The remedies in a torts case aim not to punish the defendant, but to compensate the plaintiff, almost always through a monetary award, aimed at making up for losses, and sometimes (though much less often) through an order by a court requiring that a defendant cease some ongoing course of conduct.  The exception to this rule is the doctrine of punitive damages, which consist of monetary sums awarded by a judge or jury for the purpose of punishing tort defendants, and which are awardable in torts cases involving some especially outrageous or reckless conduct.  As we shall see, even though punitive damages are rare, they have attracted considerable attention because of concerns that they punish without the institutional protections offered to criminal defendants.  The United States Supreme Court has significantly constrained the size of possible punitive damages awards in recent years.  

          Tort law is a field not merely of civil law: it is a field of civil law wrongs.  The term “tort” comes from the Latin meaning bend or twist.  (It shares the same root as the word “torture.”)  For centuries, tort law has thus been connected indelibly to the moral concept of wrongfulness.  Most areas of tort doctrine thus ask about the wrongfulness of the parties’ conduct.  Some domains of tort law purport to do away with the concept of wrongfulness.  Since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, important areas of the law (urged on by prominent jurists and commentators) have embraced so-called strict or no-fault liability doctrines that ostensibly allocate accident costs without regard to questions of wrongfulness.  In the field of product-related injuries, for example, which we will spend considerable time discussing later in this book, doctrine has moved toward eliminating fault or wrongdoing from the analysis.  Such “no fault” approaches remain the exception to the rule.  

          Last, tort law is a common law field of civil wrongs not arising out of contract.  This means that, as a conceptual matter, the obligations that tort law recognizes exist independent of any agreement between the parties.  For a person to have a legal obligation to another arising out of tort law, they need not have promised the other person anything.  The law of torts itself, not the terms of any agreement, specifies the contours of the obligations it enforces.  

          Yet this final piece of our definition, like each element of the definition that has preceded it, comes with caveats and exceptions, two of which are worth noting here.  First, many and perhaps even most torts cases do arise out of the interactions of parties who are in contractual relationships with one another, or at least in relationships akin to contracts.  Consumers of products contract with sellers to buy those products, but if they sue for product-related injuries, they often sue in tort law.  Patients of doctors enter into contracts to purchase medical services, but if they sue when those services go awry, they usually sue in tort law.  And even when there is no formal contract, there are often relationships or social roles that could be construed as setting the terms of the parties’ interactions.  Social settings such as classrooms or playgrounds, as we shall soon see, typically come with informal conventions and codes of conduct.  Such conventions and agreements are crucially important in modern tort law.  They require that we decide whether and when tort law should defer to private agreements and when it should override them, especially when they purport to abolish tort obligations altogether.  

          Second, and just as significant, contracts are vital for the resolution of tort claims because in the real world virtually every successful tort claim is resolved by a special kind of contract called settlement. Contracts of settlement discharge the underlying tort obligation and render it a contractual obligation to pay some or all of the damages the plaintiff sought.  In the everyday practice of tort law, such settlement contracts are pervasive.  No one really knows what percentage of tort claims settle, but the percentage is thought to be stunningly high, probably well above ninety-five percent of those tort claims that lead to monetary transfers.  Settlement is thus at the heart of how American tort law works.  And it offers us a segue to a central theme in this book.  For settlement is one of the wide array of social practices and institutions that constitute American tort law and that make it more than merely a formal legal definition or a dry and dusty concept in the doctrinal analysis of the law.  Tort law in the United States is a vast and highly distinctive socio-regulatory system.    

* * * 

          Tort law in the United States consists of a sprawling set of social institutions and practices.  One way to see this is to observe that formal definitions of tort law do not differ much from one legal order to another. But the institutions and sociology of tort law differ radically from legal system to legal system.  In this book, we will attend to formal definitions and doctrines.  But we will keep an especially close eye on three features of American tort law that breathe life into the field and give it a distinctive twenty-first-century character.  

          First, tort law’s doctrines and principles embody the law’s basic norms of interpersonal obligation.  The principles underlying those norms are subject to fierce debate, of course.  Tort jurists have argued for many decades about these principles, about what they are and what they ought to be.  For example, some see tort law as an opportunity for utilitarianism in action.  In this view, tort law aims to maximize the aggregate welfare of the relevant society.  Others see in tort law a commitment to the moral philosophy of corrective justice or civil recourse; in this view, tort law recognizes the obligation of a wrongdoer to repair wrongful losses.  Still others understand tort law’s motivating principle to be constructing and maintaining the basic norms of a community, or shoring up the dignity and social standing of people whose injuries might otherwise degrade them in the eyes of fellow community members.  Ideas about the principles underlying tort law are as varied as ideas about how society should be organized.  This book will introduce you to, but will not adjudicate for you, the basic controversies over tort law’s commitments.  These controversies represent live debates in practical moral philosophy.  They also help us decide the hardest cutting-edge cases in the field, cases in which there is no obvious existing answer in the doctrine and for which lawyers, judges, and juries will need to rely on the law’s underlying principles.  

          Second, tort law in the United States is the starting point for a vast and far-flung set of exceedingly important social practices, ranging from contingency fee representations and highway billboard advertising, to class action litigation and claims adjustment, to contracting and risk assessment.  We can barely even begin to evaluate the law of torts and its virtues and defects without taking these social practices into account.  We will aim to take account of the tort system by referring to statistics and numbers and through the leading sociological, game-theoretical, and historical accounts.  Indeed, to understand the distinctive features of tort law in the United States as opposed to in other legal systems, where tort law operates quite differently, these perspectives will be decisive for illuminating the real stakes in long-running controversies.

          Third, American tort law shapes and is shaped by an important array of institutions, among them insurance companies, the administrative state, state-subsidized and state-provided social welfare programs, the jury, social customs, cost-benefit analysis, the plaintiff’s bar, and more.  These institutions, along with the practices noted above, powerfully influence the law of torts in the United States.  We cannot understand the law without them.  Indeed, we cannot understand contemporary American law more generally without placing these institutions front and center, and once we see tort law this way, the field serves as an ideal introduction to the central features of our vast and multifarious legal system. 

          Here, then, is the theory of this book: understanding the characteristic features of American tort law requires exploring the field’s principles, practices, and institutions.  The benefit of approaching tort law this way is not only that we understand torts better, though that would be no small thing.  The further payoff is that this approach allows us to turn the study of tort law into more than an obligatory first-year purgatory of fusty and old-fashioned common law rules.  Instead, we take up the law of civil wrongs as an introduction to some of the most important problems faced by twenty-first-century American lawyers and lawmakers more generally.  Thankfully, we can begin to think in these ways by exploring one of the field’s simplest and best-known cases, a case that began as a classroom interaction between two boys in nineteenth-century Wisconsin.   

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

1.3 Vosburg v. Putney 1.3 Vosburg v. Putney

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Vosburg v. Putney

50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891)

 

          The action was brought to recover damages for an assault and battery, alleged to have been committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20, 1889. . . . At the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff was a little more than 14 years of age, and the defendant a little less than 12 years of age.  The injury complained of was caused by a kick inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.  The transaction occurred in a school-room in Waukesha, during school hours, both parties being pupils in the school.  A former trial of the cause resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,800.  The defendant appealed from such judgment to this court, and the same was reversed for error, and a new trial awarded.

[The opinion of the court in the initial appeal provides the following additional facts:

          “The plaintiff was about 14 years of age, and the defendant about 11 years of age.  On the 20th day of February, 1889, they were sitting opposite to each other across an aisle in the high school of the village of Waukesha.  The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot, and hit with his toe the shin of the right leg of the plaintiff.  The touch was slight.  The plaintiff did not feel it, either on account of its being so slight or of loss of sensation produced by the shock.  In a few moments he felt a violent pain in that place, which caused him to cry out loudly.  The next day he was sick, and had to be helped to school.  On the fourth day he was vomiting, and Dr. Bacon was sent for, but could not come, and he sent medicine to stop the vomiting, and came to see him the next day, on the 25th.  There was a slight discoloration of the skin entirely over the inner surface of the tibia an inch below the bend of the knee.  The doctor applied fomentations, and gave him anodynes to quiet the pain.  This treatment was continued, and the swelling so increased by the 5th day of March that counsel was called, and on the 8th of March an operation was performed on the limb by making an incision, and a moderate amount of pus escaped.  A drainage tube was inserted, and an iodoform dressing put on.  On the sixth day after this, another incision was made to the bone, and it was found that destruction was going on in the bone, and so it has continued exfoliating pieces of bone.  He will never recover the use of his limb.  There were black and blue spots on the shin bone, indicating that there had been a blow.  On the 1st day of January before, the plaintiff received an injury just above the knee of the same leg by coasting, which appeared to be healing up and drying down at the time of the last injury.  The theory of at least one of the medical witnesses was that the limb was in a diseased condition when this touch or kick was given, caused by microbes entering in through the wound above the knee, and which were revivified by the touch, and that the touch was the exciting or remote cause of the destruction of the bone, or of the plaintiff’s injury.  It does not appear that there was any visible mark made or left by this touch or kick of the defendant’s foot, or any appearance of injury until the black and blue spots were discovered by the physician several days afterwards, and then there were more spots than one.  There was no proof of any other hurt, and the medical testimony seems to have been agreed that this touch or kick was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff.  The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff of $2,800.  The learned circuit judge said to the jury: ‘It is a peculiar case, an unfortunate case, a case, I think I am at liberty to say that ought not to have come into court.  The parents of these children ought, in some way, if possible, to have adjusted it between themselves.’ We have much of the same feeling about the case.”]

          The case has been again tried in the circuit court, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $2,500. . . . On the last trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows: “(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus?  Answer.  Yes.  (2) Had such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the injury?  A. Yes.  (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the result of such injury?  A. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff’s right leg become inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the defendant?  A. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s leg?  A. Kick.  (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend to do him any harm?  A. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the plaintiff?  A. Twenty-five hundred dollars.”  The defendant moved for judgment in his favor on the verdict, and also for a new trial.  The plaintiff moved for judgment on the verdict in his favor.  The motions of defendant were overruled, and that of the plaintiff granted.  Thereupon judgment for plaintiff, for $2,500 damages and costs of suit, was duly entered.  The defendant appeals from the judgment.

LYON, J.

 . . .

          The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that defendant’s motion for judgment on the special verdict should have been granted.  In support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule that “the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault.”  Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere assaults.  But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery.  In such case the rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault.  If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful.  Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also unlawful.

          Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held liable in this action.  Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play-grounds.  But it appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced.  Under these circumstances, no implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful.  Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and verdict, the action may be sustained.

 . . .

          Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff.  The court refused to submit such questions to the jury.  The ruling was correct.  The rule of damages in actions for torts [is] that the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him.  [The court explained that in a cause of action “ex contractu” and not “ex delicto, a different rule of damages would be applicable in which unforeseeable damages would not be recoverable.]

          [Despite upholding the plaintiff’s verdict in these two critical respects, the court nonetheless ruled in a separate part of its opinion that the trial court had erroneously overruled the defendant’s objection to one of plaintiff’s counsel’s questions.  Accordingly, the court sent the case back to the trial court for another new trial.]

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

1.4 Anatomy of a Torts Case 1.4 Anatomy of a Torts Case

          Vosburg v. Putney was a simple case.  By now, it is an old case.  But getting to the bottom of it reveals much about the complexities of American tort law right up to the present day. 

          At an elementary level, the case presents two kinds of questions that will run through the rest of this book and that are omnipresent in legal analysis: questions of fact and questions of law.  There are, for example, questions of fact about causation.  What caused the injuries to the leg?  Would those injuries have come about anyway if Putney had not made contact with Vosburg on the 20th of February?  There are also questions of fact about Putney’s intent: what did he mean to accomplish when he reached out and kicked his classmate? 

          The questions of law are different.  They ask not what happened, but rather what the law is—or what it ought to be.  For example, what kind of mental state does the law require for holding Putney liable?  Is it sufficient that he intended to make a certain kind of contact with Vosburg?  Or does Vosburg need to show that Putney further intended to harm him?  Questions of law about Putney’s causal relationship to Vosburg’s leg injury would ask whether it is sufficient for Vosburg to show that Putney’s kick increased the likelihood of leg damage that was already in motion, or that Putney’s kick accelerated that damage.  

          Once we bring in some of the context for the court’s opinion, this little case from long-ago Wisconsin also serves as a remarkable introduction to the sociology, economics, and functions of tort law.  Andrew Vosburg was a slight boy whose father, Seth (a Civil War veteran), worked as a teamster at a local lumber company.  According to Professor Zigurds Zile of the University of Wisconsin Law School,

Vosburg was frequently bedridden with a succession of childhood illnesses.  He caught scarlet fever at the age of eight and had two or three bouts with the measles.  Yet he was raised as an ordinary country boy, obliged to do the customary chores around the homestead, endure discomfort and face the usual hazards associated with rural life.  Bumps, bruises and lacerations were part of his workaday experience.  Accidents just happened to Andrew; or perhaps they happened to him more often because he lacked the strength and dexterity the rigors of his environment demanded . . . . 

Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 877, 879.

          George Putney, by contrast, was the only son of a prominent and prosperous local family.  Zile reports that George Putney was described by a contemporary as “a sucker of a boy” with “a bad temper.”  Id. at 882.  In fact, George had a minor altercation with Andrew a couple weeks prior to the incident at the center of the litigation when George inexplicably prevented Andrew from retrieving his textbook before an exam.

          The Vosburg family also initiated a criminal case against Putney.  Passions, it seems, ran high in 1889 in Waukesha.  Andrew’s father went to the town justice of the peace to file a criminal complaint against George on October 19, 1889.  The justice of the peace issued a warrant to apprehend George, and a trial ensued.  (This was the era before special criminal procedures for juveniles.)  After witness testimony and cross-examination, the court found George guilty as charged in the complaint.  He was ordered to pay a fine of $10, plus costs, amounting to a total of $28.19.  The conviction was later overturned on appeal.

          The civil and criminal cases arising out of the schoolboy’s kick soon involved substantial time and expenses.  During the first jury trial in the civil suit, witnesses included Andrew, George, the boys’ teacher, and Andrew’s doctors.  When the case was retried in the December term of 1890, the plaintiff subpoenaed eight witnesses and the defendant subpoenaed eleven.  The third trial for Andrew’s case seemed imminent until September 1893, when the circuit court dismissed the case for the plaintiff’s failure to pay overdue court costs.  In still another proceeding, Andrew’s father brought a claim against George Putney for the loss of his son’s services.  A jury awarded Seth $1200 in damages against George, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court later affirmed.  But even then, it does not seem that the Vosburgs ever collected any damages from the Putneys, perhaps because parents are not liable for the torts of their children.  At the end of this long litigation process, there is no evidence that the parties ever exchanged any money.

          All told, the dispute between these families lasted for four and a half years and never produced even a dollar in actual damages changing hands.  The litigation was expensive, too.  Zile estimated that the Vosburgs “would have incurred costs in the amount of $263 in order to get nothing.”  Their lawyers probably spent considerably more in time and money in hopes of recovering a portion, usually a third, of the winnings.  The Putneys probably paid at least $560 in lawyers’ fees and incurred additional costs summing to a further $677.  Zile, supra, at 977. 

          The outsized expenses of the Vosburg case are not unusual in American tort law, at least not in the narrow slice of cases that go forward to trial.  Observers estimate the administrative costs of the tort system—lawyers’ fees, expert witness fees, court costs, etc.—amount to between fifty and seventy cents for every dollar transferred from defendants to plaintiffs.  The Vosburg case’s costs were almost exactly in this range: the parties together incurred some $1500 in costs in a dispute over two claims that juries seemed to value at around $3700 (a $2500 claim for Andrew plus the $1200 claim for Seth).  The Vosburgs’ lawyers would have eaten up another one-third of whatever money the Putneys paid, for a total of around $2700 in costs on $3700 worth of tort claims.  The Vosburgs would only have recovered $2500 after subtracting their lawyers’ fees.  This is equivalent to a costs-to-value ratio of more than 1, a figure that is vastly higher than the administrative cost ratios that attach to, say, disability claims in the Social Security system, where costs are typically closer to ten percent of the value of the claim.  Tort administrative costs are vastly higher than first-party insurance administrative costs, too: victims of injuries can much more cheaply process claims for covered injuries from their own insurance companies than they can prosecute tort claims through the courts.

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

1.5 The Pervasiveness of Settlement 1.5 The Pervasiveness of Settlement

          Given how counter-productive the litigation was, one great mystery in Vosburg is why the families did not reach a settlement.  The initial trial judge seems to have thought the matter ought to have been resolved before trial.  The original appeals panel agreed.  And there were settlement negotiations.  By the early fall of 1889, the Vosburgs had already incurred substantial medical costs and were facing another year and a half of care, eventually costing at least $475.  After the Vosburg family retained a lawyer, 

Seth and Janet Vosburg and one of their attorneys called on Henry Putney [George’s father] at his store, and the incident “was talked over amongst [them].”  The Putneys offered to pay Dr. Bacon’s bills [about $125 accrued to date] and an additional amount of $125 towards medical and other needs in return for releasing George from any liability arising out of the February 20 incident.  The Vosburgs, however, were not willing to settle for less than $700, which to them was a paltry sum, barely sufficient to meet the financial obligations already accrued, to set aside a reserve against outlays associated with Andrew’s convalescence and potential complications, like the amputation of Andrew’s diseased leg, and to pay the lawyers for negotiating the settlement.  To the Putneys, by contrast, particularly if they looked at George’s role as peripheral, the sum of $250 might have seemed a generous price for the nuisance value of a threatened lawsuit.

Zile, supra, at 894.  

          The startling thing is that in hindsight any one of the proposals by either defendant or plaintiff would have been in the interest of the parties.  Simply dropping the litigation in return for nothing would have been better than proceeding.  Given the array of choices before them, litigating the claims to judgment seems to have been the worst choice available to the parties, and yet each of them chose to litigate rather than to accept settlement offers from the other side that (again, in hindsight) were vastly better than the alternative of trial. 

          So why didn’t the Vosburgs and Putneys settle if it was in their interest to do so?  The mystery deepens when we see that virtually all cases end in settlement.  One of the most important institutional features of American tort law is that it is almost entirely party-driven.  The parties to a lawsuit have virtually complete autonomy in deciding whether to bring claims, how to manage those claims, and whether to withdraw from prosecuting them.  The result is that almost all parties settle their disputes before trial.  

          Settlement has been widespread in American tort law for as long as modern tort law has existed, for more than a century and a half, and there is reason to think settlement is growing even more common in the past fifty years.  In 2003, the American Bar Association Litigation Section held a symposium titled The Vanishing Trial, which concluded that the “portion of federal civil cases resolved by federal trial fell from 11.5 percent [of all filings] in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.”  Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004).  Between 2008 and 2012, a mere “0.56 percent or slightly more than one-half of one percent of all terminations” occurred by civil jury trials.  Charles S. Coody, Vanishing Trial Skills, A.B.A. (May 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/QE5C-LPNS.  

[Click link below to see the a chart (p. 3), compiled by Marc Galanter, who led the ABA study, and his co-author, showing the stark picture of settlement in civil litigation generally].

LINK: PERCENTAGE OF CIVIL TERMINATION DURING OR AFTER TRIAL, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1962-2010 

Source: Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of Civil Trials in American Courts, POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST. 1, 3 (2011), https://perma.cc/9NFE-AP2M.

          Parties settle because, as the Vosburgs and Putneys learned, litigation is expensive and time-consuming.  Many parties are risk-averse; they have a preference for the certainty that settlement offers.  Moreover, there is reason to think that on the plaintiffs’ side, lawyers paid on a contingency basis, as a percentage of any settlement or award, will have an interest in avoiding long drawn-out proceedings.  Settlement minimizes their workload, allows them to take on additional claims, and often allows them to maximize their imputed hourly wage.  

          Given the incentives for the parties and for the plaintiffs’ lawyers, why is it then that some parties like the Vosburgs and Putneys don’t settle?  Looked at this way, the question is not why there are so few trials.  The question is why there are any trials at all!  Why doesn’t everyone settle?  

          One especially influential view is that where a case proceeds to judgment, at least one of the two parties, and perhaps both, must have incorrectly estimated the likely value of the claim.  In this account, which was first offered by George Priest and Benjamin Klein, trials are errors.  See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).  Consistent with this view, some observers suggest that the trend toward settlement since the middle of the twentieth century, at least in the federal courts, has been driven by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1938, which authorized pre-trial discovery and deposition procedures that allow each side to learn virtually everything about the facts of the case in advance of the trial itself.  Lawyers are thus able to develop quite accurate estimates of the value of the claim—much better estimates than pre-FRCP lawyers were able to form—which in turn allow the parties to settle their cases before trial.

          Another view is that parties do not settle because there is something other than dollars and cents at stake in tort disputes.  Parties persist, in this view, as a matter of principle.  And many argue that we should encourage them to do so.  In this latter view, articulated memorably by scholars like Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik, trials are not errors.  They are the public forums in which we work out our social commitments and hold our ideals up for testing.  See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101 (2006).  Of course, if trials are intrinsically valuable as public fora, then settlement rates are startlingly high.  For it appears that something about the tort system—and indeed, civil litigation generally—produces vast numbers of settlements and very few judgments.  

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License

1.6 The Size of the Torts System 1.6 The Size of the Torts System

          One way to glimpse the tort system in the aggregate is to look at the total amount of money passing through the American tort system each year.  It is here that little cases like Vosburg connect up to the heated political controversies over tort law in the past several decades. 

          Insurers estimate that the money transferred in the tort system amounts to more than $260 billion per year.  This is a huge amount of money, comparable to the amount the United States spends annually on old age pensions in the Social Security system.  Moreover, if we look at the amount of money flowing through the tort system, we can see that it has increased sharply over the past sixty years, though that growth has slowed (and by some measures has been reversed) since the middle of the 1990s.       

UNITED STATES TORT COSTS

Year U.S. Population (millions) Adjusted Tort Costs (billions) (2010) Tort Costs as a Percentage of GDP
1950 152 16 0.62%
1960 181 40 1.03%
1970 205 78 1.34%
1980 228 113 1.53%
1990 249 217 2.24%
2000 281 227 1.80%
2010 309 265 1.82%

Source: Towers-Watson, 2011 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends, https://perma.cc/4EGK-VXBY.  

Even with the slower growth of recent years, the figures for transfers and administrative costs in tort law are far higher in the United States than in any comparable legal system or economy.  

COMPARATIVE TORT COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN 2000

Country Tort Costs as a Percentage of National GDP (2000)
United States 2.2%
Italy 1.7%
Germany 1.1%
Spain 1.0%
Belgium 1.0%
Japan 0.8%
Switzerland 0.8%
United Kingdom 0.7%
France 0.7%
Denmark 0.6%
Poland 0.6%

Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs and Cross-Border Perspectives: 2005 
Update.

          There is at least one country where tort costs as a percentage of GDP are near zero: New Zealand simply abolished tort law for virtually all injuries forty years ago, replacing it with a system of social insurance.  

          One of the things we will want to be able to make sense of by the end of this book is why the tort system is so much bigger in the United States than it is in other countries.  The answer, it turns out, is not about the substantive doctrines of American tort law, which more or less resemble the substantive tort doctrines of other developed legal systems.  The real difference in American tort law lies in its institutions and procedures: jury trials, discovery, a plaintiffs’ bar whose fees are contingent percentages of the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery, and relatively restrictive programs of social provision.  One recent study of 24 countries, for example, finds a strong negative relationship between the generosity of  government social programs, on the one hand, and tort liability, on the other, after controlling for income, accident rates, and other factors.  See Dana A. Kerr, Yu-Luen Ma, & Joan T. Schmit, A Cross-National Study of Government Social Insurance as an Alternative to Tort Liability Compensation, 76 J. RISK & INSURANCE 367 (2009).

          It is worth noting that the data cited above, regarding torts costs in the U.S., is hotly controversial: it comes from a consultant to the insurance industry now named Towers-Watson, formerly Tillinghast or Towers-Perrin.  Critics contend that the Towers-Watson data is misleading and tendentious and that the insurance industry aims to use it to promote legislation that would reduce tort costs and thus serve the interests of insurers and the tort defendants they insure.  See, e.g., Lawrence Chimerine & Ross Eisenbrey, The Frivolous Case for Tort Law Change, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 16, 2005), https://perma.cc/6BRJ-UYP5.   The critics complain both that certain elements of the cost calculation, such as insurance executive compensation, ought to be excluded, and that Towers-Watson and its predecessors misstate the concept of costs in the tort system.  Both critiques have some force.  The latter critique in particular has obvious merit.  Why, after all, call the monetary transfers in the tort system the “costs” of tort law?  The costs might much better be described as the underlying injuries plus avoidance costs plus the costs of administering claims when injuries happen.  Is it a “cost” when tort law transfers money from wrongdoer to victim?  Or is it a “cost” when a wrongdoer injured the victim in the first place?  For a general theory of the sum of accident costs, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).

          Despite the criticisms, however, there is also a good reason to use the insurers’ data as a basic measure of the tort system.  For the startling thing about tort law in the United States is that insurers’ private information is the only way we can even possibly begin to grasp the full size and scope of the tort system.  This is worth emphasizing again: the biggest insurers and only the biggest insurers are in a position to see the macro trends in the field.  The reason is that the pervasiveness of private settlement ensures that there is no public repository of information about the fate of most tort claims, sometimes virtually all tort claims.  Nothing in the law of torts or in the law of settlement contracts even requires that a claim be filed with a court before it is contractually extinguished in a settlement agreement.  To the contrary, the parties can save money on the cost of drafting and filing a complaint and share those savings between them if they settle before filing the claim in a courthouse.  There is thus often not even a single trace in the public record of a tort claim, even one that produces a substantial settlement.  Indeed, many plaintiffs receive higher settlement awards precisely in return for their promise to keep the terms of the settlement and even the fact of their claim confidential—promises that are enforceable under current law, despite the protests of many well-positioned observers.  

          In short, the only institutions that could possibly know the overall size of the American tort system are the insurers.  And that tells us a lot about the system we are studying.  It is party-driven, highly opaque, radically decentralized, and vast.  Taken together, these features present the tort lawyer with an important challenge: What goals or moral projects could possibly be so important as to make U.S. tort law worth its stunningly high costs?  

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License

1.7 Accident Rates and the Deterrence Goal 1.7 Accident Rates and the Deterrence Goal

          One goal tort jurists often advance is the deterrence of unreasonably dangerous conduct.  The logic here is simple and intuitively attractive.  Tort law raises the price of injurious behavior.  As a result, the logic goes, the prospect of tort liability should decrease the amount of injurious behavior in the world.  Deterrence theory has further implications and wrinkles.  We will return to these at a number of junctures later in the book.  But the important point for now is that the risk of tort damages ought to lead rational parties to take into account the costs of their behavior in a way they might not, absent tort liability.  

          Of course, tort law is one of many regulatory mechanisms that aim to accomplish the goal of improving safety standards.  Consider, for example, state inspection regimes for everything from housing code compliance to factory employment standards.  The federal Food and Drug Administration seeks to guarantee the safety of pharmaceuticals and food products.  The Federal Highway Administration’s Office of Safety issues regulations and guidelines with an eye toward automobile accidents.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission does the same for consumer goods.  Even aside from regulators, the market itself creates many incentives for safety on the part of market actors seeking to attract buyers, passengers, or clients. 

          Does tort law add to the deterrence function played by these other regulatory institutions?  Formal evidence is considerably more difficult to come by, in no small part because of the difficulties described above in obtaining good information about the size and significance of tort costs.  Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the United States tort law does shape behavior around risk and safety.  We routinely read news stories about firms that claim to have made some decision—often an unpopular one—on the basis of the risk of litigation.  

          Consider the big picture trends in accidental and violent injuries over time.  For the past half-century and more—precisely the time during which tort costs have soared—rates of accidental death have declined substantially.  This is not to say that tort law has caused that decline.  It might be the case that causation runs in the other direction: improvements in safety may have generated higher expectations of safety and thus led to heightened standards in tort law.  Either way, the trend is striking.  Since 1960, accidental deaths in the United States have fallen by nearly half. 

Year Heart
disease
Cancer Cerebro-
vascular
diseases
Chronic
lower
respiratory
diseases
Diabetes
mellitus
Influenza
and pneumonia
Chronic
liver
disease and
cirrhosis
Accidents Suicide Homicide
1960 559.0 193.9 177.9 12.5 22.5 53.7 13.3 63.1 12.5 5.2
1961 545.3 193.4 173.1 12.6 22.1 43.4 13.3 60.6 12.2 5.2
1962 556.9 193.3 174.0 14.2 22.6 47.1 13.8 62.9 12.8 5.4
1963 563.4 194.7 173.9 16.5 23.1 55.6 14.0 64.0 13.0 5.4
1964 543.3 193.6 167.0 16.3 22.5 45.4 14.2 64.1 12.7 5.7
1965 542.5 195.6 166.4 18.3 22.9 46.8 14.9 65.8 13.0 6.1
1966 541.2 196.5 165.8 19.2 23.6 47.9 15.9 67.6 12.7 6.5
1967 524.7 197.3 159.3 19.2 23.4 42.2 16.3 66.2 12.5 7.5
1968 531.0 198.8 162.5 20.7 25.3 52.8 16.9 65.6 12.4 8.1
1969 516.8 198.5 155.4 20.9 25.1 47.9 17.1 64.9 12.7 8.3
1970 492.7 198.6 147.7 21.3 24.3 41.7 17.8 62.2 13.1 9.0
1971 492.9 199.3 147.6 21.8 23.9 38.4 17.8 60.3 13.1 9.8
1972 490.2 200.3 147.3 22.8 23.7 41.3 18.0 60.2 13.3 10.0
1973 482.0 200.0 145.2 23.6 23.0 41.2 18.1 59.3 13.1 10.2
1974 458.8 201.5 136.8 23.2 22.1 35.5 17.9 52.7 13.2 10.5
1975 431.2 200.1 123.5 23.7 20.3 34.9 16.7 50.8 13.6 10.2
1976 426.9 202.5 117.4 24.9 19.5 36.8 16.4 48.7 13.2 9.2
1977 413.7 203.5 110.4 24.7 18.2 31.0 15.8 48.8 13.7 9.2
1978 409.9 204.9 103.7 26.3 18.3 34.5 15.2 48.9 12.9 9.2
1979 401.6 204.0 97.1 25.5 17.5 26.1 14.8 46.5 12.6 9.9
1980 412.1 207.9 96.4 28.3 18.1 31.4 15.1 46.4 12.2 10.5
1981 397.0 206.4 89.5 29.0 17.6 30.0 14.2 43.4 12.3 10.1
1982 389.0 208.3 84.2 2.1 17.2 26.5 13.2 40.1 12.5 9.4
1983 388.9 209.1 81.2 31.6 17.6 29.8 12.8 39.1 12.4 8.4
1984 378.8 210.8 78.7 32.4 17.2 30.6 12.7 39.8 12.6 8.1
1985 375.0 211.3 76.6 34.5 17.4 34.5 12.3 38.5 12.5 8.0
1986 365.1 211.5 73.1 34.8 17.2 34.8 11.8 38.6 13.0 8.6
1987 355.9 211.7 71.6 35.0 17.4 33.8 11.7 38.2 12.8 8.3
1988 352.5 212.5 70.6 36.5 18.0 37.3 11.6 38.9 12.5 8.5
1989 332.0 214.2 66.9 36.6 20.5 35.9 11.6 37.7 12.3 8.8
1990 321.8 216.0 65.5 37.2 20.7 36.8 11.1 36.3 12.5 9.5
1991 313.8 215.8 63.2 38.0 20.7 34.9 10.7 34.9 12.3 10.1
1992 306.1 214.3 62.0 37.9 20.8 33.1 10.5 33.4 12.1 9.6
1993 309.9 214.6 63.1 40.9 22.0 35.2 10.3 34.5 12.2 9.8
1994 299.7 213.1 63.1 40.6 22.7 33.9 10.2 34.6 12.1 9.4
1995 296.3 211.7 63.9 40.5 23.4 33.8 10.0 34.9 12.0 8.6
1996 288.3 208.7 63.2 41.0 24.0 33.2 9.8 34.9 11.7 7.8
1997 280.4 205.7 61.8 41.5 24.0 33.6 9.6 34.8 11.4 7.3
1998 272.4 202.4 59.6 42.0 24.2 34.6 9.5 35.0 11.3 6.7
1999 267.8 202.7 61.8 45.8 25.2 23.6 9.7 35.9 10.7 6.2
2000 257.6 199.6 60.9 44.2 25.0 23.7 9.5 34.9 10.4 5.9
2001 247.8 196.0 57.9 43.7 25.3 22.0 9.5 35.7 10.7 7.1
2002 240.4 194.0 56.3 43.7 25.4 22.7 9.3 35.3 10.6 5.9
2003 232.3 190.1 53.5 43.3 25.3 22.0 9.3 37.3 10.8 6.0
2004 217.5 184.6 50.0 41.8 24.4 20.4 8.8 36.6 10.7 5.6
2005 220.0 188.7 48.4 37.8 25.3 21.3 9.3 39.7 11.0 5.6
2006 261.2 180.7 43.6 40.5 23.3 17.8 8.8 39.8 10.9 6.2
2007 190.7 177.5 41.6 41.2 22.4 16.3 8.9 37.8 10.8 5.8
2009 179.8 173.6 38.9 42.2 20.9 16.2 9.2 37.0 11.7 5.5
2011 173.7 168.6 37.9 42.7 21.5 15.7 9.7 38.0 12.0 5.2

Source: Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. (2014).

          Much of this change continues a trend that began long before 1960.  Excluding motor vehicle accidents, accidental deaths fell from around a hundred per 100,000 people in the population annually to less than thirty by 1975. 

Even motor vehicle accidental death rates have dropped during the past sixty years. 

  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
Total Unintentional Injuries
(per 100,000)
78.0 62.3 60.1 46.4 36.3 34.9 38.0 48.0
Motor Vehicle Related Injuries 24.6 23.1 27.6 22.3 18.5 15.4 11.3 11.7
Percetage of Total Unintentional Injuries 31.5% 37.1% 45.9% 48.1% 50.1% 44.1% 29.7% 24.4%

Source: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, https://perma.cc/V87X-9W64.

If we adjust motor vehicle accidental death rates by miles traveled, the drop in motor vehicle traffic fatalities has been even more pronounced.

Source: Center for Disease Control and Prevention (link)

          Yet if our goal in tort law is to deter unreasonably dangerous actions, as many observers argue it is or at least ought to be, the connections between deterrence and a case like Vosburg are not at all clear.  Is it reasonable to think that the prospect of tort damages payments—or even the prospect of interminable tort litigation—will alter the behavior of children in a classroom?  In this domain, at least, using tort law to induce appropriately safe behavior by children seems a fool’s errand, at least so long as we are trying to alter the behavior of children with monetary sanctions aimed at the children themselves.  (Monetary awards against the school or the teachers might be far more effective, even if controversial for other reasons.) 

          Many scholars believe that the notion of tort damages shaping behavior is unlikely even in other domains where it might seem more plausible than in the middle-school classroom.  We will return to this problem repeatedly in this book.  For now, it is sufficient to observe that the critics point to a myriad of factors that they say get in the way of translating prospective tort damages into a safer behavior.  Some parties are not susceptible to being incentivized in the relevant respect by cash.  Others act irrationally.  Still others act rationally and are responsive to monetary incentives, but are protected from tort damages by third parties who will pay the damages, such as liability insurers or employers.  Some may be sheltered from the threat of paying tort damages because they have time horizons shorter than the 4-plus years that it took Vosburg to conclude. 

          This is not to say that deterrence is an impossible goal, or that deterrence ought not be thought of as an important function of tort law.  We will see considerable support for the idea that tort damages do shape behavior in many contexts.  Nonetheless, the effort to shape behavior and induce safety offers at best a partial justification for tort law. 

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

1.8 Expressing Moral Judgments and Correcting Injustice 1.8 Expressing Moral Judgments and Correcting Injustice

          Another way we could defend tort law in light of its high costs would be to describe it as expressing our moral judgments about wrongful behavior and calling wrongdoers to account.  Judgments of liability signify that a defendant has wronged a plaintiff—and, further, that the community sees and acknowledges that wrong.  They also call upon the defendant to repair the damage done.  

          If we understand tort law this way, we might care much less about the behavioral effects of particular legal rules or judgments, because deterrence would not be the most important goal.  Stating that a particular course of conduct crossed the line has a value that is separable from discouraging the conduct in the first instance.  We also might think differently about cost: it might be worth a lot to pursue the questions of right and wrong that torts cases commonly raise, both for the actors involved and for society.  And it might not be surprising that inquiries into such questions are considerably more complex (and costly) than the kinds of inquiries Social Security claims administrators or insurance claims adjusters need to make.  

          As with the deterrence goal, we will continue to discuss expressive values and corrective justice throughout this book.  For now it is important to observe that these ideas may play an especially powerful role in accounting for the distinctive features of intentional torts.  These are often distinctively wrongful acts, arising out of conduct that has little or no social value.  Our law of intentional torts helps mark out such acts as wrongful, reinforcing our moral commitments while providing wronged parties recognition and repair.

          Later in the book, we will often find ourselves wondering what, if anything, makes an actor’s conduct wrongful.  Where that line is unclear, ideas about expressing moral judgment and correcting injustice are less helpful, for they come with no internal metric for distinguishing wrongful conduct from conduct that is justified.  In this discussion of battery, however, we face no such conundrum.  Here, wrongfulness arises out of the relationship between the defendant’s intentionality and the plaintiff’s injury.  A plaintiff in an intentional tort suit is essentially saying, “The defendant meant to hurt me!”  That meaning—that intent—makes the conduct wrongful.

          The next case and the following notes take up intent with more specificity.  What does it mean to act intentionally in the world of tort law?

___

Reprinted from John Fabian Witt & Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions, Fifth Edition, Published by CALI eLangdell Press.  Available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.