Peters, C. J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution1 prohibits the police from conducting warrant-less searches and seizures of garbage placed at the curb for collection. The state charged the defendant, Paul DeFusco, by substitute information with possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a),2 and the trial court accepted his conditional plea of nolo contendere.3 The defendant *629appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. DeFusco, 27 Conn. App. 248, 606 A.2d 1 (1992). We subsequently granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.4 State v. DeFusco, 222 Conn. 910, 608 A.2d 692 (1992). We affirm.

The relevant facts are as follows. On October 12, 1990, the Hamden police department executed a search warrant for 19 Building Brook Road, the defendant’s residence. The warrant had been issued on the basis of an affidavit signed by two Hamden police officers experienced in narcotics investigations. The affidavit recited information provided by a confidential informant and described items obtained during several September, 1990 “garbage pulls” by Hamden police officers from garbage placed for collection at the curb in front of the defendant’s house.5 In the course of their *630search of the defendant’s home, the police seized narcotics, drug paraphernalia, weapons and cash. The police arrested the defendant and charged him with various narcotics offenses.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home during the search.6 He argued that the warrantless garbage pulls violated article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and, therefore, that the items taken from the garbage should not have been relied on in the warrant affidavit. Without reference to the items taken from the garbage, the defendant claimed, the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. He also claimed, in the alternative, that the information contained in the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause even if the items obtained in the garbage pulls were properly considered. Relying on the defendant’s diminished expectation of privacy in the garbage that he had voluntarily placed curbside, the trial court determined that the garbage pulls had been constitutionally valid. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the affidavit had properly included reference to items obtained in those garbage pulls and had established probable cause. Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court subsequently accepted the defendant’s plea of nolo contendere, and sentenced him to an eight year term of imprisonment, execution suspended after two years and probation for three years.

. The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court; State v. DeFusco, supra, 27 Conn. App. 248; claiming that the trial court had improperly determined that (1) the garbage searches and seizures had not violated article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and (2) the affidavit, which properly included reference *631to the items seized in the garbage searches, had established probable cause. The Appellate Court affirmed.

In this appeal, the defendant reiterates the claims that he raised in the Appellate Court. Specifically, he argues that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s determinations that (1) the search and seizure of the defendant’s garbage had been permissible under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and (2) the affidavit, containing information obtained in the garbage searches, had established probable cause.

I

The defendant’s principal claim is that the Hamden police department’s warrantless searches and seizures of his garbage violated article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.7 We disagree.

Although the United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the fourth amendment to the federal constitution8 does not protect against warrantless police searches and seizures of garbage placed at the curb for collection; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. *63235, 37, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988); we may find greater protection of individual rights under our state constitution than that provided by the federal constitution. “It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 649, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992). Moreover, we have held that “[i]n the area of fundamental civil liberties—which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last resort .... In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut citizens have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 160, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). Recognizing that our state constitution “is an instrument of progress ... is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Oquendo, supra, 649; we have concluded in several cases that the state constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution. See, e.g., id., 652; State v. Marsala, supra, 171; State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 112, 547 A.2d 10 (1988), and cases cited therein.

*633In this case, we must decide whether article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution affords greater protection than does federal law against warrantless searches of garbage placed at the curb for collection. For present purposes, we assume that our determination of whether garbage placed at the curb for collection falls within the protection of article first, § 7, is governed by the two-part standard that is used under the federal constitution and many other states’ constitutions: (1) has the owner or custodian of the garbage manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to it?; and (2) is that expectation one that society would consider reasonable? Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Californian. Greenwood, supra, 39; Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 660, 555 N.E.2d 559 (1990); but see State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 198, 576 A.2d 793 (1990). Although we have never addressed the proper standard for determining the applicability of article first, § 7, neither party contests the appropriateness of using the Katz test in this case. Rather, the parties’ primary disagreement concerns the second part of the standard, namely, whether an expectation of privacy in garbage placed at the curb for collection is one that Connecticut citizens would recognize as reasonable.9

Because the focus of our inquiry, therefore, is the objective reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy in garbage placed curbside for collection,10 it *634is useful, at the outset, to identify several other issues, addressed by the parties, that are unnecessary to our decision. First, whether the defendant effected a property law abandonment of his garbage by placing it at the curb for collection is not determinative of the defendant’s state constitutional claim. As we have recently held, property law abandonment and constitutional abandonment are independent concepts. See State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 106-107, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991).11

Second, our respect for the sanctity of the home is not a factor in the circumstances of this case because article first, § 7, covers not only a person’s home but also his “papers” and “possessions.” Whether or not the garbage was located on the defendant’s property when searched; see footnote 5, supra; therefore, is not dispositive of the constitutional protection afforded by § 7. Accordingly, the state’s citation to several of our previous cases in which we emphasized that § 7 affords the highest protection against state invasion into the home; e.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 687-90, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); is unavailing insofar as the language of § 7 dispels the notion that § 7 protects only the home.

Third, our decision does not rely on the textual difference between the fourth amendment and article first, § 7. At oral argument before this court, the state argued that, because the fourth amendment protects, inter alia, “effects,” whereas § 7 protects, inter alia, the narrower category of “possessions,” the state constitution cannot be interpreted to provide more pro*635tection than does the federal constitution. Because this particular issue was neither briefed by the parties nor raised below, we decline to determine in this case the significance of the use of different words by the two provisions.

Finally, our decision in this case does not rely on the arguable lack of a historical foundation for the claim that article first, § 7, was intended to protect against warrantless searches of garbage placed at the curb for collection. Although we have, on occasion, employed a historical analysis of state constitutional provisions to aid in our determination of their content; see, e.g., Stater. Oquendo, supra, 650-52 (“seizure” under article first, §§ 7 and 9); State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 538 n.4, 594 A.2d 917 (1991) (“probable cause” under article first, § 7); see also, e.g., State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 217-19, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 614 A.2d 170 (1992) (warrant requirement under article first, § 7); the arguments of both the defendant and the state emphasized the discussion of what Connecticut citizens would consider reasonable in the present day. Indeed, the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is peculiarly focused on current conditions and requires a factual inquiry into all the relevant circumstances of the search. See State v. Pittman, 209 Conn. 596, 601, 553 A.2d 155 (1989). In this case, therefore, we confine our inquiry to contemporary considerations without reliance on the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, § 7.

We now address the primary issue on which the defendant’s state constitutional argument turns: whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy in garbage placed at the curb for collection was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Because we conclude that such an expectation was not reasonable, we are persuaded that article first, § 7, did not prohibit the garbage pulls conducted by the Hamden police.

*636When the defendant placed his garbage at the curb in front of his house for collection by the garbage collector, a myriad of intruders, purposeful or errant, could legally have sorted through his garbage. For instance, garbage collectors in Connecticut have a statutory duty to assist municipal authorities in identifying recycling violators.12 See General Statutes § 22a-220c (a). This required assistance necessarily entails the authority to inspect the contents of garbage placed for collection.13 Moreover, the owner or operator of a solid waste facility14 or a resources recovery facility15 has the statutory obligation to conduct periodic unannounced inspections of loads delivered to the facility to assist municipalities and the commissioner of environmental protection in assessing recycling compliance.16 See General Statutes § 22a-220c (b). It is also *637a matter of common knowledge that garbage placed at the curb is subject to intrusion by a variety of people, with a variety of purposes, including bottle and coupon collecting, antique hunting, food searching and snooping. See also California v. Greenwood, supra, 40. Finally, we regard it to be common knowledge among citizens of this state that dogs, raccoons, or other creatures may intrude upon and expose the contents of garbage that has been placed for collection in an accessible area.17

In light of our recognition of these potential intrusions on garbage placed at the curb for collection, the defendant’s argument for state constitutional protection against police searches of his garbage devolves into an argument that a person may harbor different expectations of privacy, all of which are reasonable, as to different classes of intruders. We cannot countenance such a rule. A person’s reasonable expectations as to a particular object cannot be compartmentalized so as to restrain the police from acting as others in society are permitted or suffered to act. We have impliedly rejected such illogical linedrawing, and our Appellate Court has expressly done so. See State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 357, 503 A.2d 566 (1986); State v. Liptak, 21 Conn. App. 248, 255, 573 A.2d 323, cert. denied, *638215 Conn. 809, 576 A.2d 540 (1990). Most federal and state courts agree. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14, 214 n.2, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986); State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Iowa 1988); State v. Trahan, 229 Neb. 683, 688-89, 428 N.W.2d 619 (1988); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 224, 228, 542 A.2d 276 (1988).18 A person either has an *639objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or does not; what is objectively reasonable cannot, logically, depend on the source of the intrusion on his or her privacy.

We conclude, therefore, that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he placed at the curb for collection. Accordingly, its search and seizure by the police did not violate article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.19

II

We now turn to the defendant’s claim that, even if the affidavit in support of the search and seizure warrant properly included reference to the items obtained during the garbage pulls, the information contained in the affidavit was not sufficiently specific or informative to establish probable cause. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. The affidavit stated that, on August 15, 1990, a “known and reliable” informant, whom the Hamden police had utilized numerous times in narcotics cases, *640had told Hamden police investigator Charles Grady that the defendant was selling one ounce quantities of cocaine from his Hamden residence. The affidavit further stated that the informant had told Grady that the defendant, a construction or carpentry foreman who supplemented his income by selling cocaine, sold approximately one half kilo of cocaine every two weeks.

According to the affidavit, the affiants obtained from the informant a description of the defendant’s vehicles, a description and name of the person from whom the defendant received his cocaine supply and a description of that person’s vehicle and town of residence. The affiants were also given information regarding the persons from whom the defendant’s supplier obtained cocaine. The affiants related that they had confirmed the information regarding both the defendant’s cars and the defendant’s supplier’s cars and residence. The affidavit further stated that the informant had told the Hamden police that the defendant had a longtime heroin addiction and used heroin daily.

Moreover, the affidavit related that, during September, 1990, Hamden police officers had conducted several “garbage pulls” from garbage at the defendant’s residence. As a result of a garbage pull on September 5, 1990, Grady found two prescription bottles bearing the defendant’s name and three small glassine baggies that were the type used to package cocaine and heroin. One baggie was labeled “Bad Med.” The affidavit also stated that, as a result of a garbage pull on September 26,1990, Grady had recovered a prescription bottle bearing the defendant’s name, several short cut straws, and two glassine baggies that were the type used to package cocaine and heroin.20 Finally, the affidavit stated that, in 1988, the Hamden police had *641received an anonymous complaint that the defendant was selling one ounce quantities of cocaine from the same residence.

Our determination of whether the affidavit established probable cause pursuant to article first, § 7, of the state constitution is governed by the “totality of the circumstances” test enunciated in State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 544, 594 A.2d 917 (1991).21 See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983). This test requires the issuing judge to make “a practical, nontechnical decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the warrant affidavit, including the veracity and the basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 223 Conn. 127, 135, 613 A.2d 211 (1992).

“When an affidavit indicates that the police have relied on information from a confidential informant, the magistrate should examine the affidavit to determine whether it adequately describes both the factual basis of the informant’s knowledge and the basis on which the police have determined that the information is reliable. If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why the police believe the information to be trustworthy, however, the magistrate can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists. In making this deter*642mination, the magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557, 563, 594 A.2d 933 (1991).

In our review of the defendant’s claim, we will uphold "the validity of [the] warrant ... [if] the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 215, 613 A.2d 224 (1992). "In a doubtful or marginal case . . . our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause leads us to afford deference to the magistrate’s determination.” State v. Johnson, supra, 565. With these principles in mind, we now consider whether there was a substantial factual basis for the issuing judge’s conclusion that the affidavit established probable cause.

A

We consider first the information provided by the informant. “Although, under [the totality of the circumstances] standard, we no longer rigidly apply the two-pronged . . . test [pursuant to State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 298 (1985)], the determination of an informant’s veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge remains highly relevant. ...” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duntz, supra, 216-17; see also State v. Barton, supra, 552. The affidavit in this case did not expressly state the informant’s basis of knowledge.22 Moreover, there was no indication whether the informant had personally observed the defendant’s drug use and sales or had learned the information from another source. Indeed, nothing in the affidavit would have entitled the issuing judge reasonably to infer that the informant was reporting information *643of which he had any basis of knowledge. See also State v. Duntz, supra, 217-18. This deficiency in the informant’s basis of knowledge does not necessarily require us to disregard the informant’s information, however, because the deficiency in the informant’s basis of knowledge “may be overcome by a strong showing of the informant’s reliability.” State v. Rodriguez, supra, 141; see also Illinois v. Gates, supra, 233; State v. Duntz, supra, 218.

Accordingly, we turn to the informant’s reliability. The affiants’ assertion that the informant was reliable does not itself give the issuing judge a basis upon which to infer reliability.23 See State v. Telesca, 199 Conn. 591, 603, 508 A.2d 1367 (1986); State v. Tulli, 14 Conn. App. 356, 358, 541 A.2d 515, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 809, 545 A.2d 1105 (1988). We note also that the informant’s association with criminal activity, evidenced by his reportedly numerous proffers of information to the police, detracts from his reliability. See State v. Telesca, supra (reliability of informant who regularly supplies information to police is suspect because he is likely to be involved in criminal activity or to associate with criminals); cf. State v. Rodriguez, supra, 141 and n.11 (police not obligated to establish reliability of citizen informants).

Despite these indicia of unreliability, the issuing judge nevertheless was entitled to determine that the informant was reliable. First, the affiants stated that the informant had been used “numerous times in the past for various narcotic[s] cases.” The issuing judge could reasonably have inferred from this statement that the informant had given trustworthy information in the past and, therefore, was reliable. Although this inference would have been better supported by an affirma*644tive statement by the affiants that this informant’s information had, in the past, led to arrests and convictions; see, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, supra, 136 (affidavit stated that informant has “also given information in prior cases that . . . led to arrests arid convictions”) (emphasis added); we do not require affiants to invoke “formulaic phrases” in a search warrant affidavit. State v. Barton, supra, 549. In addition, the issuing judge reasonably could have concluded that the glassine baggies and short cut straws recovered during the garbage pulls corroborated the informant’s allegations that the defendant was selling one ounce quantities of cocaine from his home and was a heroin user. Such corroboration would be a proper ground on which to base an inference of reliability. State v. Rodriguez, supra, 136-37. Finally, the issuing judge could properly have inferred the informant’s reliability from the fact that “the informant was not anonymous, but known [by the police,] and therefore risked both loss of credibility with the police and possible prosecution for falsely reporting an incident under General Statutes § 53a-180 had his information proved to be fabricated.” State v. Johnson, supra, 564. Taken together, under the totality of the circumstances, this information amounted to a sufficiently strong showing of the informant’s reliability and, therefore, compensated for a lack of information regarding his basis of knowledge.24

B

Second, we consider the information contained in the affidavit that derived from the garbage pulls, which we *645have held were valid under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The relevant items gathered from the defendant’s garbage were five glassine baggies and several short cut straws, which the affiants, who were experienced narcotics investigators, identified as drug paraphernalia. It was reasonable for the issuing judge to conclude, in light of the information provided, that the baggies and straws were, in fact, indicia of drug activity.

C

We have defined probable cause as a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, supra, 135. In light of the information provided by the informant, which the issuing judge could reasonably have credited as reliable, and the items gathered by police investigation, which the issuing judge could reasonably have concluded were indicia of drug activity, we hold that the issuing judge had a substantial factual basis upon which to conclude that probable cause existed.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion Callahan and Norcott, Js., concurred.

Katz, J.,

with whom Berdon, J., joins, dissenting. Today the majority concludes that the citizens of Connecticut have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage when that garbage has been placed in *646sealed, opaque bags at the curb. They hold that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution affords no protection against systematic police searches of those bags. The majority does not exclusively rely upon California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988) (fourth amendment to the federal constitution does not protect garbage placed at curb for collection against warrantless police searches and seizures),1 but instead relies upon statutes as well as the existence of unwelcome intruders to hold that it is not reasonable for Connecticut citizens to have an expectation of privacy in their garbage.

Both the majority and this dissent address only the second prong2 of the two-part standard that has traditionally been used under the federal constitution to assess whether a warrantless search and seizure of property has violated a person’s constitutional rights. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The issue is whether, in Connecticut, the owners or custodians of garbage placed at the curb have an expectation of privacy that the citizens of Connecticut would consider reasonable. I believe they do.

*647The determination that a particular place3 is shielded by the Connecticut constitution requires that the place be one that society is prepared to give deference to because of “its code of values and its notions of custom and civility . . . .” United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying this test where fourth amendment is under consideration). Whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate under the Connecticut constitution depends on whether it is one recognized and permitted by the citizens of Connecticut. A constitutional expectation of privacy does not require an “untrammeled power to admit and exclude”; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990); and it does not require that the area involved be hidden from the public eye. State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 110-11, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991). That the area involved was public is a relevant consideration, but does not mechanistically close the door upon the inquiry. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1476 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting).

The tension between the immediate reaction to the word garbage and the reality of what we place in our opaque, sealed trash bag is not easily resolved. I believe that although the defendant’s property may have been abandoned, his reasonable expectation of privacy therein was not. Nearly “ ‘every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste products. . . .’Asingle bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search of the bed*648room, can relate intimate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target’s financial and professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic interests.” California v. Greenwood, supra, 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the contents of a sealed, opaque trash bag may be more private, and thus should deserve as much protection, as many other containers whose contents have been protected. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 n.9, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979) (“comparatively small, unlocked suitcase”); State v. Mooney, supra, 89 (duffel bag and cardboard box).

Even the majority recognizes that an examination of garbage may reveal highly personal information. It then lists categories of such material that “we think it reasonable for Connecticut residents to wish to maintain as confidential.” See majority opinion, footnote 19. The majority suggests, however, that it is also reasonable for society to expect citizens to take affirmative steps—such as shredding or destroying—to hide garbage that they wish to keep private. How many of us, as Connecticut residents, feel the need to shred or destroy personal information before discarding it in order to protect its confidentiality?4 The very fact that Connecticut residents customarily discard highly personal and typically confidential information into their garbage without first shredding or destroying it, is a strong indication that they expect these items to remain private. Although the majority believes that much of *649what we discard is highly personal and that it is reasonable for people to want to maintain a privacy interest in such material, the majority, nevertheless, has concluded that our expectation of such privacy is unreasonable. This is where the majority and this dissent part company.

The majority first reasons that because we can assume that garbage left at the curb is readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other similar intruders, we lose an expectation of privacy in such garbage from the intentional and deliberate canvassing by the police. It further rejects totally that a person’s expectation of privacy can differ with regard to different classes of people. The problem with these positions is that they allow garbage-pickers to dictate how we as a society choose to live and what values we choose to protect. The accessibility of garbage to outsiders is not dispositive unless we choose to condone, endorse and ratify such conduct.5 Additionally, the mere fact that we recognize the possibility that an unwelcome scavenger may rummage through our garbage, is not the same as wholesale acceptance of detailed, systematic inspection by law enforcement. Merely because we are aware that leaving garbage for disposal may involve risks to our privacy interests does not mean that we need to add constitutionally to those risks through unrestrained scrutiny by police.6 A. *650Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,” 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 406-407 (1974). It is more reasonable to expect that those who are authorized to remove garbage will do so in the manner provided by private contract or through municipal ordinance than to expect that the garbage collector, into whose care it has been deposited, or some scavenger will rifle through it.7 See State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. App. 1980) (Anstead, J., dissenting). The possibility that an unwelcome intruder may scavenge *651through our garbage is not the foundation upon which this court should test what is reasonable.8

The public has characterized this conduct as “ ‘a disgusting invasion of personal privacy,’ Flieger, Investigative Trash, U.S. News & World Report, July 28, 1975, p. 72 (editor’s page); ‘indefensible ... as civilized behavior,’ Washington Post, July 10, 1975, p. A18, col. 1 (editorial); and contrary to ‘the way decent people behave in relation to each other,’ ibid”; California v. Greenwood, supra, 52 (Brennan, J., dissenting); when it was done by a tabloid reporter to expose the details of Henry Kissinger’s “intimate activit[ies] associated with the ‘sanctity of [his] home and the privacies of [his] life. . . .’” (Citation omitted.) Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984). Moreover, this unsavory and perhaps even revolting conduct is often illegal, particularly in our urban areas.9

In evaluating the reasonableness of a person’s expectation that his sealed, opaque container will not be part of a systematic examination by police, we look to “understandings that are recognized and permitted by *652society . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 100. It must be acknowledged that the state has the authority to regulate the disposal of garbage. “Were it not for such regulations, people who want to maintain the privacy of their garbage could either bury it in their backyards or burn it. They would need not then fear that the garbage might be disturbed by animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public ... or by unreasonable police searches. . . . [I]f pursuant to that authority it compels people to alter their conduct, it may not then contend that that conduct no longer deserves constitutional protection.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 212, 576 A.2d 793 (1990). General social norms help define what expectations of privacy will be tolerated. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1981). The social norm is to place garbage in opaque bags at curbside locations as in this case. If the defendant’s privacy has been compromised, it is as a result of a law that controls the method by which he disposes of his personal effects in a manner that offers no protection from government scrutiny. See Hamden Town Code of Ordinances §§ 94.39 (A) and 94.22 (A) (1990).

The majority relies heavily on the recycling statutes for the position that because garbage collectors have a statutory duty to assist municipal authorities in identifying recycling violators, which duty must necessarily entail the authority to inspect the contents of garbage placed for collection; see, e.g., General Statutes § 22a-220c; the citizens of Connecticut, therefore, have a greatly diminished expectation of privacy. There are several reasons why such legislation is not a legitimate basis upon which to determine a constitutional right. The first is the existence of other legislation that could be relied upon to demonstrate that we do pre*653sume that the protections of article first, § 7, apply to garbage. Many local ordinances prohibit garbage picking at the curb. See footnote 9 of this dissent. While these regulations may have been enacted to protect the exclusive right of a city or its authorized agent to collect trash or to promote sanitation and cleanliness, they may also have been based upon the recognition that people do have an expectation of privacy in their trash that we want to respect and protect. If we also assume people know of these regulations, then their perception that their garbage will not be violated by outsiders becomes reasonable. State v. Hempele, supra, 208-209.

More importantly, the majority violates the most basic tenets of jurisprudence when it holds that our constitutional right to privacy is circumscribed by recycling legislation. The landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803), established: “The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? . . . It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.

“Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

¡i« * *

“If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? *654... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . .

“So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”

Government regulations become relevant only after it has been determined that constitutional protections apply. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989). Although the majority insists that it is not directly relying on the recycling statutes to determine that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his garbage, it in fact relies on these statutes to inform Connecticut residents what to expect. The court is saying, in effect, to Connecticut citizens, that since these statutes exist, you can reasonably infer from them that your garbage is not private and, therefore, any expectation of privacy is unreasonable. How is this not reliance by the majority? I cannot condone the majority’s use of state statutes to define the contours of our right to privacy under the Connecticut constitution.

Another reason that the recycling statutes should not be relied upon in the context of the case before us comes from the legislation itself. These recycling statutes were enacted based upon environmental considerations. See 33 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1990 Sess., pp. 6098-99. Thus, the legislation that permits recycling collectors to examine an individual’s garbage to determine compliance with the recycling laws does not ultimately determine a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy. “A deter*655mination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires ‘balancing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 [103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110] (1983); Camara v. Municipal Court, [387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)].” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1987). In O’Connor v. Ortega, supra, 719-20, the court held that in the case of a search by a public employer, the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy must be balanced against the government’s need for supervision and efficiency. The court stated that in order for the search to be reasonable, it must be work related. Id., 725-26. If it is not work related or if the search is for evidence of criminal misconduct, a warrant is required. See id., 721. Any compromise to our legitimate expectations of privacy can only be to advance the ultimate goal to which the search could contribute. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 357-58, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). Therefore, even if we assume the constitutionality of General Statutes § 22a-220c, which is not before us today, such legislation allows only for a very limited search by a refuse collector to determine if recyclable items are contained within an individual’s garbage and did not contemplate a wholesale, systematic exploration by the police.10 Additionally, the statute provides for *656inspection based solely upon “reason.” General Statutes § 22a-220c (a). Even if “reason” means only “reasonable articulable suspicion,” it connotes at least a limited privacy right.

In this case, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his trash bags and should be able to claim the protection of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. Without the reference to the items seized in the search of the defendant’s trash, the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to allow the defendant to withdraw his conditional plea.

I respectfully dissent.

PALMER, J.

**82The issue presented by this appeal is whether article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution1 prohibits the police from conducting a warrantless canine sniff of the front door of a condominium in a multiunit condominium complex, and the common hallway adjacent thereto, for the purpose of detecting marijuana inside the condominium. The state appeals2 from the judgment of the trial court, which suppressed *5evidence seized from the condominium of the defendant, Dennis Kono, following such a canine sniff. The trial court concluded that the canine sniff constituted a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and, therefore, required a warrant predicated on probable cause. We conclude that the canine sniff violated article first, § 7, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.3 **83I

THE FACTS

The record reveals the following undisputed facts. In May, 2012, the Berlin Police Department received an anonymous tip that the defendant was boasting about growing marijuana at a condominium complex on Main Street in the town of Berlin. The case was assigned to Detective Shaun Solek, who determined that the condominium complex in question was a former factory located at 10 Main Street. Solek also discovered that the defendant lived in unit 204. Because the complex was still under construction, Solek contacted the developer, Corporation for Independent Living (developer), to request permission to enter the building. The developer referred Solek to the property manager, Connecticut Real Estate Management, whose owner, Alyssa Pillion, signed a consent form allowing Solek and Officer Eric Chase, a canine handler with the Berlin Police Department, to conduct a canine examination of the common areas of the building.

On the afternoon of May 29, 2012, Solek and Chase went to the condominium complex and were admitted into the building by Stephen Martino, the developer's property manager. As the trial court found, "[t]he first two floors contained thirty-four residential units, only a portion of which [was] completed and occupied. The outside doors to the multiunit building are normally **84locked, and access is gained through a keypad. Chase, who is a trained canine handler, was accompanied by his German Shepherd dog, Zeusz. Zeusz had been trained to detect eight substances including marijuana, hash [ish], crack cocaine, cocaine, ecstasy, and methamphetamine. Prior to the search of the complex, Chase was not informed ... which condominium unit was under investigation.

"Chase first had Zeusz conduct a presearch of the first floor common hallway. During the presearch, Zeusz is allowed to walk throughout the hallway without direction from his handler. After the presearch, Chase conducted a directed search in which Zeusz was commanded to sniff at the bottom of the front door of each condominium [unit] on the first floor. The same presearch and directed search procedures were also conducted on the second floor. When Zeusz performed his sniff at the bottom of the door to unit 204, the dog sat *6down in front of the door, which constituted a passive alert that [Zeusz] had detected contraband. Chase directed Zeusz to perform a second directed search on the second floor and Zeusz again gave a passive alert for drugs at unit 204. Chase knocked on the door but received no response. Chase remained at the door to [e]nsure that no one entered the premises, and Solek left to prepare a search warrant for [the] unit .... Approximately four hours later, Solek returned with a signed search warrant. Upon executing the warrant, the police discovered an indoor greenhouse containing marijuana plants, as well as seeds, lighting equipment and various firearms." The defendant was arrested and charged with several drug offenses and illegal possession of an assault weapon.

II

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION

The defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his condominium on **85the ground that a canine sniff of the threshold of his home, for the purpose of investigating the home's contents, constituted a search under both the fourth amendment and article first, § 7, of the state constitution. Specifically, the defendant argued that his front door and the hallway adjacent thereto were within the constitutionally protected curtilage of his condominium unit such that the entry of a dog into that area for the purpose of conducting a drug sniff constituted a trespass. The defendant further argued that a sniff by a well trained narcotics dog for the purpose of detecting drugs inside his home violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). See id., at 351, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507 (inquiry for fourth amendment purposes is whether individual "seeks to preserve [something] as private" and whether that subjective expectation of privacy is objectively "justifiabl[e]" under circumstances); see also id., at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring) (application of fourth amendment depends on whether individual has "exhibited an actual [subjective] expectation of privacy" and whether that subjective expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' "). The trial court agreed that the canine sniff violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment and granted the defendant's motion to suppress. In light of its determination that the police had violated the federal constitution, the court did not reach the defendant's claim under the state constitution. The trial court did note, however, that this court "has to date [declined to rule] on whether a canine sniff is ... a search under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution ...." (Citations omitted.) State v. Kono , Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. H15N-CR-12-0264061-S, 2014 WL 7462049 (November 18, 2014) ; see, e.g., State v. Waz , 240 Conn. 365, 371, 692 A.2d 1217 (1997) (declining to decide whether canine sniff of parcel **86constituted search under article first, § 7, because, "even if it did, the state constitution requires no more than a showing that the investigating officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the parcel contained contraband").4

In reaching its determination, the trial court relied on *7United States v. Thomas , 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fisher v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Wheelings v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 67, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Rice v. United States , 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986), in which the Second Circuit held that a canine sniff of a person's front door in a multiunit apartment building, for the purpose of detecting drugs inside the apartment, constituted a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The trial court also relied on Florida v. Jardines , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1417-18, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013), and Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 34-35, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a canine sniff conducted within the curtilage of a single-family residence (Jardines ) and the thermal imaging of a single-family residence (Kyllo ), for purposes of detecting marijuana therein, violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. Describing the holding in Thomas as "prescient," the trial court noted that, although the Second Circuit's view was once considered an outlier, Kyllo and Jardines had vindicated the Second Circuit's determination that a canine sniff of the exterior of a person's home, even one located in a **87multiunit apartment building, violates the fourth amendment if the purpose of the canine sniff is to detect drugs inside the home.

The trial court also rejected the state's contention that the search did not require a warrant supported by probable cause "because a dog sniff can ... determine [only] whether a home contains contraband, and no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband." In support of this contention, the state relied on United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 698, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), and Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 410, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), which held, respectively, that a canine sniff of luggage at a public airport and a canine sniff of a motor vehicle are not searches for fourth amendment purposes because a subjective expectation of privacy in contraband is not recognized as reasonable, and a canine sniff for illegal drugs reveals only the existence of that contraband and nothing more.5 The trial court explained that, although "it is true that a canine sniff is not a search when used to detect drugs in luggage at an airport; United States v. Place , supra, [at 707], 103 S.Ct. 2637; or in a motor vehicle; Illinois v. Caballes , supra, [at 409], 125 S.Ct. 834 ; Jardines teaches us that the use of a drug detection dog is a search when [the dog] is used to investigate the contents of someone's home. We also know from **88Kyllo that the contraband distinction stops at the front door of a home because, in the home ... all details are intimate details .... Kyllo v. [United States ], supra, 533 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *8Finally, the trial court rejected the state's contention that a warrant was not required because "the police were lawfully present in the common hallway outside the defendant's front door," an area where, in the state's view, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy or any property interest sufficient to protect against the officers' warrantless intrusion. In the trial court's view, it was immaterial that the police were lawfully present in the hallway, or that the defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in the common areas of his condominium complex, because the privacy interest at stake did not relate to those areas but, rather, to the inside of the defendant's home. The trial court also expressed concern that allowing the police to conduct warrantless canine sniffs of the front doors of apartments and condominium units but not of single-family homes-the practice found to violate the fourth amendment in Jardines -would impermissibly apportion constitutional rights on the basis of economic class.

Specifically, the trial court stated: "The use of a drug detection dog situated in a common hallway outside the front door to a condominium [unit] is no less an intrusion into the privacy of one's home than the [use of a] drug detection dog ... on the front porch of the single-family residence in Jardines . To rule otherwise would afford residents of this state who reside in multifamily apartments less a measure of privacy protected by the fourth amendment than their more well-off neighbors." The trial court stated further: "It would also allow law enforcement to troll through the hallways of apartment buildings, including public housing projects, with drug sniffing dogs to search for contraband within individual apartments .... Such arbitrary and unfettered **89discretion is assuredly repugnant to the fourth amendment." (Citation omitted.) Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that none of the state's evidence would be admissible at a trial.

III

ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE FIRST, § 7, OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION

On appeal, the state reasserts its contention that the canine sniff of the defendant's front door and the hallway adjacent thereto was not a search under article first, § 7, because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or in the contraband inside his home. We are not persuaded by the state's argument.

It is well established that this court, in determining whether the police conducted a search under article first, § 7, "employ[s] the same analytical framework that would be used under the federal constitution .... Specifically, we ask whether the defendant has established that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or thing searched."6 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

*9State v. Davis , 283 Conn. 280, 310, 929 A.2d 278 (2007). In the absence of "such **90an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications .... The determination of whether such an expectation exists is to be made on a [case-by-case] basis ... and requires a [two part] inquiry: first, whether the individual has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and, second, whether that expectation is one society recognizes as reasonable .... Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy in a particular place is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances ....

"The determination that a particular place is protected under [article first, § 7] requires that it be one in which society is prepared, because of its code of values and its notions of custom and civility, to give deference to a manifested expectation of privacy .... It must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable .... Legitimate expectations of privacy derive from concepts of real or personal property law or [from] understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others ... and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude .... Of course, one need not have an untrammeled power to admit and exclude in order to claim the protection of [article first, § 7, as] long as the place involved is one affording an expectation of privacy that society regards as reasonable."7 (Citations omitted; internal quotation **91marks omitted.) State v. Mooney , 218 Conn. 85, 94-96, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919, 112 S.Ct. 330, 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991).

Additional principles guide our analysis of the state's claim, chief among *10them the bedrock principle that "[p]rivacy expectations are ... highest and are accorded the strongest constitutional protection in the case of a private home and the area immediately surrounding it." State v. Brown , 198 Conn. 348, 356-57, 503 A.2d 566 (1986) ; see also Bozrah v. Chmurynski , 303 Conn. 676, 690, 36 A.3d 210 (2012) ("[n]owhere are expectations of privacy greater than in the home" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). It is also axiomatic "that a search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is presumptively unreasonable. Our constitutional preference for warrants is overcome only in specific and limited circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Waz , supra, 240 Conn. at 374 n.16, 692 A.2d 1217 ; see also **92State v. Miller , 227 Conn. 363, 382, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) ("[t]his court's precedents involving the state constitution's warrant requirement express a strong policy in favor of warrants").

Finally, "[i]n determining the contours of the protections provided by our state constitution, we employ a multifactor approach that we first adopted in [State v. Geisler , 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) ]. The factors that we consider are (1) the text of the relevant constitutional provisions; (2) related Connecticut precedents; (3) persuasive federal precedents; (4) persuasive precedents of other state courts; (5) historical insights into the intent of [the] constitutional [framers]; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms [otherwise described as public policies] .... We have noted, however, that these factors may be inextricably interwoven, and not every [such] factor is relevant in all cases." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skok , 318 Conn. 699, 708, 122 A.3d 608 (2015). In the present case, "our adjudication of the defendant's state constitutional claim is informed principally by those federal and sister state cases involving the use of a trained narcotics detection dog."8 State v. Waz , supra, 240 Conn. at 374, 692 A.2d 1217. We also consider whether the distinction that the state would have us draw under article first, § 7, between the front door of a single-family residence and that of a home located in a multiunit building finds support in our own case law or public policies of this state. With these principles in mind, we turn to the relevant federal precedent.

**93On balance, we believe that federal precedent provides support for the defendant's claim of a state constitutional violation. As we previously noted, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided more than thirty years ago that a canine sniff of the common hallway of a multiunit apartment building, for the purpose of detecting drugs inside one of the apartments, constitutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at 1367. Thomas not only remains good law in the Second Circuit; see United States v. Hayes , 551 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Thomas but reaffirming that canine sniff of apartment door in multiunit apartment building is subject to constraints of fourth amendment); but it has been strengthened by recent federal precedent. See United States v. Whitaker , 820 F.3d 849, 852-54 (7th Cir. 2016) (reasonable expectation of *11privacy in home prohibits canine sniff of apartment door in multiunit building); and presumptively carries particular weight with this court.9 **94Although the United States Supreme Court has never resolved the issue decided in Thomas ,10 we agree with the trial court that Kyllo and Jardines tend to favor the defendant's position. In Kyllo , federal agents suspected that the petitioner, Danny Kyllo, was growing marijuana inside his home in a three-family residence. Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 29, 121 S.Ct. 2038. During their investigation, the agents "used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the [three-family residence] .... The scan ... showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of [Kyllo's unit] were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the [three-family residence]." Id., at 29-30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. On the basis of this information and certain other facts, the agents obtained a warrant to search Kyllo's unit and there discovered more than 100 marijuana plants growing under grow lights. Id., at 30, 121 S.Ct. 2038.

After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Kyllo's motion to suppress; see id., at 30-31, 121 S.Ct. 2038 ; the United States Supreme Court granted Kyllo's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed. Id., at 31, 41, 121 S.Ct. 2038. In doing so, the court began its discussion of the government's claim by noting that, "[a]t the very core of the [f]ourth [a]mendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion .... With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless **95search of a home is reasonable and [thus] constitutional must be answered no." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038. It then explained that "[t]he ... case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than [naked eye] surveillance of a *12home. [The court has] previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much. [Although the court had] upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical [Co. v. United States , 476 U.S. 227, 234-35, 239, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ] ... [the court] found it important that [the searched area was] not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened ...." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038. "[O]btaining by [sense enhancing] technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area ... constitutes a search-at least [when, as in Kyllo ] the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the [f]ourth [a]mendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager ... was the product of a search." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 34-35, 121 S.Ct. 2038.

In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the government's contention that the thermal imaging was not a search because it did not reveal "private activities occurring in private areas ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038. As the court explained, "[t]he [f]ourth [a]mendment's protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained .... In the **96home ... all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes." (Emphasis in original.) Id. After observing that the thermal imager could detect lawful activity, even intimate details such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath"; id., at 38, 121 S.Ct. 2038 ; the court concluded: "[T]he [f]ourth [a]mendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house .... That line ... must be not only firm but also bright-which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant. [Although] it is certainly possible to conclude from the ... thermal imaging [scan] ... that no significant compromise of the homeowner's privacy ha[d] occurred, [the court] must take the long view ... from the original meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment forward." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038. When, as in Kyllo , "the [g]overnment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

More recently, in Jardines , the court was asked to decide "whether using a [drug sniffing] dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a search within the meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1413. In that case, the police received a tip that the respondent, Joelis Jardines, was growing marijuana inside his single-family residence. Id. On the basis of that information, a police drug detection dog and his handler were dispatched to Jardines' home to conduct a sniff test of the exterior of the residence. Id. As the court explained, "[t]he dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of **97any of these substances through particular behavioral *13changes recognizable by his handler." Id."As the dog approached Jardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor." Id."After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior [that the dog exhibits when he discovers] the odor's strongest point." Id. On the basis of the dog's reaction, the police obtained a warrant to search Jardines' residence, where they found several marijuana plants. Id.

Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis and later moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home on the ground that the officers' use of a dog to detect drugs inside the home violated the fourth amendment. See id. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. See id. That judgment, however, was reversed by the Florida District Court of Appeal, whose judgment, in turn, was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court. See id. The United States Supreme Court then granted Florida's petition for a writ of certiorari; see id., at 1414 ; "limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment." Id. The court concluded that it was. Id., at 1417-18.

In doing so, however, the court did not apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test recognized in Katz , as it did in Kyllo , but opted instead to view the matter through a common-law property lens. See id., at 1414. The court explained: "The [fourth] [a]mendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When the [g]overnment obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has undoubtedly occurred." (Internal **98quotation marks omitted.) Id."That principle renders this case a straightforward one. The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house-in the curtilage of the house, which [the court has] held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner." Id.

Having determined that the officers intruded on constitutionally protected curtilage, the court next considered whether Jardines "had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so." Id., at 1415. The court concluded that he had not, stating in relevant part: "[The court has] ... recognized that the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds .... This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the [n]ation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than any private citizen might do ....

"But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker. To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome);

*14to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound **99into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to ... call the police. The scope of a license-express or implied-is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose .... Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at1415-16.11

In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan explained that she "could just as happily have decided [the case] by looking to Jardines' privacy interests." Id., at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). Such a decision, she asserted, would have looked very much like the majority opinion. See id., at 1418-19 (Kagan, J., concurring) "It would have talked about the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion .... It would have insisted on maintaining the practical value of that right by preventing police officers from standing in an adjacent space and trawl[ing] for evidence with impunity .... It would have explained that privacy expectations are most heightened in the home and the surrounding area .... And it would have determined that police officers invade those shared expectations when they use trained canine assistants to reveal within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise have found there." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

**100Justice Kagan also explained that "the sentiment 'my home is my own,' while originating in property law, now also denotes a common understanding-extending even beyond that law's formal protections-about an especially private sphere. Jardines' home was his property; it was also his most intimate and familiar space. The analysis proceeding from each of those facts ... runs mostly along the same path.

"I can think of only one divergence: If [the court] had decided this case on privacy grounds, [it] would have realized that Kyllo ... already resolved it. The [court in] Kyllo ... held that police officers conducted a search when they used a [thermal imaging] device to detect heat emanating from a private home, even though they committed no trespass. Highlighting [the court's] intention to draw both a 'firm' and a 'bright' line at 'the entrance to the house' ... [it] announced the following rule:

" 'Where, as here, the [g]overnment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.' ...

"That 'firm' and 'bright' rule governs this case: The police officers ... conducted a search because they used a 'device ... not in general public use' (a trained [drug detection] dog) to 'explore details of the home' (the presence of certain substances) that they would not otherwise have discovered without entering the premises." (Citations omitted; footnote *15omitted.) Id., at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring). At the very least, therefore, Jardines makes clear that warrantless canine sniffs of the home are frequently unconstitutional. Justice Kagan's concurrence suggests that they are, in fact, **101never constitutional-at least in the absence of exigent circumstances.

Since Jardines , only one federal circuit court of appeals has considered whether a canine sniff of an apartment door in a multiunit apartment building, for the purpose of detecting drugs inside of the apartment, constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. See United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 850. In that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it was a search. Id., at 854. The facts of Whitaker are no different from the facts in the present case: "Acting on information that drugs were being sold from a certain apartment in Madison, Wisconsin, law enforcement obtained the permission of the apartment property manager [to bring] a [narcotics detecting] dog to the locked, shared hallway of the apartment building. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs at a nearby apartment door and then went to the targeted apartment where [the defendant, Lonnie] Whitaker, was residing. After the officers obtained a search warrant, Whitaker was arrested and charged with drug and firearm crimes based on evidence found in the apartment." Id., at 850.

Whitaker moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment, arguing, inter alia, that the use of the dog to detect contraband inside his home was a search under the fourth amendment and Jardines . Id., at 851 ; see id., at 850, 852. After the trial court denied his motion, Whitaker entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal from the trial court's ruling. Id., at 850. On appeal, "Whitaker argue[d] that Jardines should be extended to the hallway outside his apartment door because ... law enforcement took the dog to his door for the purpose of gathering incriminating forensic evidence." Id., at 852. Recognizing, however, "that Jardines was premised on trespass to property, he also argue[d] that this use of a [drug detection] dog violated his privacy interests under Kyllo ... and Katz ...." (Citations **102omitted.) Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the latter contention, stating in relevant part: "The use of a [drug sniffing] dog ... clearly invaded reasonable privacy expectations, as ... Justice [Kagan explained in her] concurring opinion in Jardines . The police in Jardines could reasonably and lawfully walk up to the front door of the house in that case to knock on the door and ask to speak to the residents. The police were not entitled, however, to bring a '[super sensitive] instrument' to detect objects and activities that they could not perceive without its help .... The police could not stand on the front porch and look inside with binoculars or put a stethoscope to the door to listen. Similarly, they could not bring the [super sensitive] dog to detect objects or activities inside the home. As Justice Kagan explained, viewed through a privacy lens, Jardines was controlled by Kyllo , which held that police officers conducted a search by using a [thermal imaging] device to detect heat emanating from within the home, even without trespassing on the property." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 852-53. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[a] dog [sniff] conducted from an apartment hallway comes within this rule's ambit." Id., at 853.

The Seventh Circuit noted, moreover, just as the Second Circuit did in Thomas , that "the fact that this was a search of a home distinguishes this case from dog sniffs in public places in United States v. Place , [supra, 462 U.S. at 698, 103 S.Ct. 2637 ] (luggage at airport), and *16Illinois v. Caballes , [supra, 543 U.S. at 406, 125 S.Ct. 834 ] (traffic stop). Neither case implicated the [f]ourth [a]mendment's core concern of protecting the privacy of the home. It is true that Whitaker did not have a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in his apartment hallway .... [But] Whitaker's lack of a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in the hallway does not also mean that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy against persons in the hallway snooping into his apartment using sensitive **103devices not available to the general public." (Citation omitted.) United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 853.

Even more recently, in United States v. Hopkins , 824 F.3d 726, 729, 731-33 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 522, 196 L.Ed.2d 425 (85 U.S.L.W. 3260, November 28, 2016 ), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the closely related question of whether a canine sniff of the front door of a two-story townhouse violated the fourth amendment as interpreted in Jardines and Kyllo . In Hopkins , the townhouse in question shared a common walkway and front stoop with the unit next door. See id., at 729-30. Unlike the court in Whitaker , which applied Katz ' reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Eighth Circuit followed the trespass to property approach utilized in Jardines . See id., at 731-33. In doing so, the court explained that, under Jardines , "the front porch area [is] a classic exemplar of curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home .... Although ... officers [have] an implicit license to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave, they [have] no invitation to introduc[e] a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 731. The court then explained that a determination of "whether a particular area is part of the curtilage of an individual's residence requires consideration of [four] factors that bear [on] whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Those factors, which are set forth in United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), include "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the **104area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Hopkins , supra, at 731.

Citing the canine handler's testimony that the dog had come within "six to eight inches" of the door and "actually sniffed the creases of the door"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 732 ; and noting that "[t]he area within [one] foot of the only door to the [townhouse] would be used every day by its residents as they came and went"; id. ; the court concluded that the first and third Dunn factors were met and, therefore, that the area in question was curtilage. See id. The court did determine that the second and fourth Dunn factors were not met, but it noted that the same was true in Jardines , and the United States Supreme Court still determined that the front porch in that case was curtilage. See id.

Because we address the state's claim under the state constitution, we need not decide whether a canine sniff of an apartment door inside a multiunit building violates the fourth amendment. In the absence of significant precedent to the contrary of which we are unaware, however, and despite conflicting court decisions, *17we agree with the defendant that the better reasoned federal case law concerning the propriety of residential canine sniffs under the fourth amendment supports the defendant's position in this case. This is true whether the defendant's claim is reviewed under the Katz line of privacy based decisions or under the principles of curtilage on which the court in Jardines relied and that the Eighth Circuit applied in Hopkins .

The state cites several federal cases for the proposition that the canine sniff of the defendant's front door was not a search because "there 'exists no generalized expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment **105building,' which [include] a 'common hallway.' "12 "This jurisprudence," the state argues, "is consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions that have accorded apartments the status of 'homes' for fourth amendment purposes, but not the 'adjoining common hallways.' United States v. Holland , 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, [105 S.Ct. 2657, 86 L.Ed.2d 274] (1985)." **106We agree with the trial court that the state's reliance on these cases, most of which predate both Jardines and Kyllo , is misplaced because all of them involve searches of the common areas themselves, or arrests made in those areas, rather than searches of apartments using the common areas as a place from which to launch a search. See, e.g., United States v. Holland , supra, 755 F.2d at 255-57 (defendant's arrest in common vestibule of apartment building was lawful because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that area); United States v. Kelly , 551 F.2d 760, 763 (8th Cir.) (evidence found under common stairwell of apartment *18building was admissible at trial because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that area), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2981, 53 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1977), and cert. denied sub nom. Powell v. United States , 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2981, 53 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1977).13 The issue the courts were required to determine in these cases was simply whether the defendant's expectation of privacy in the common areas was sufficient to require that the police obtain a warrant prior to entering or conducting a search of those areas. Holland , a Second Circuit case cited throughout the state's brief, illustrates why the state's reliance on these cases is unwarranted. **107In Holland , a police officer rang the doorbell for the apartment occupied by the defendant, Mose Holland, from "the ground floor entranceway" to the building's common hallway, and, when Holland arrived in the vestibule and opened the door, the police officer drew his gun and arrested him. United States v. Holland , supra, 755 F.2d at 254. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined "to treat this as a 'threshold' case"; instead, the court assumed that the arrest "took place in the vestibule or hallway ...." Id., at 255. In concluding that the arrest was lawful, the court relied on the "[commonsense] distinction between places of abode, such as apartments, and common hallways," which "are not within an individual tenant's zone of privacy ...." Id. That the state relies on Holland is curious in light of the Second Circuit's nearly simultaneous ruling in United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at 1367, that a canine sniff of a person's front door in a multiunit apartment building is indeed a search because of the heightened expectation of privacy in the home. Therefore, the Second Circuit's jurisprudence distinguishes between the invasion of a common area itself and the use of a common area to invade an adjacent private area. As that court aptly recognized, a person may lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building without sacrificing the privacy interest inherent in his home. See id.

The state also cites three federal district court cases that conclude that a canine sniff of the hallway adjacent to an apartment in a multiunit apartment building is not a search, in part because the resident lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building. See United States v. Mathews , United States District Court, Docket No. 13-79 (ADM/AJB) (D. Minn. October 25, 2013) ("[b]ecause they are shared by multiple tenants, no reasonable expectation of privacy arises in such common areas"), aff'd on other grounds, **108784 F.3d 1232 (8th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Penaloza-Romero , United States District Court, Docket No. 13-36 (RHK/TNL), 2013 WL 5472283 (D. Minn. September 30, 2013) *19("[T]he dog sniff occurred in a common hallway of an apartment building. Without an expectation of privacy in the hallway, it cannot have the same constitutional protections as the curtilage around a house."); United States v. Broadway , 580 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1193 (D. Colo. 2008) ("[The] [d]efendant argues [that the apartment building groundskeeper] did not have the authority to allow [the police detective] into the secure hallway .... '[A] tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.' "). For a number of reasons, these cases are unpersuasive. First, two of them are from the Eighth Circuit, which has explicitly reserved judgment on the application of Jardines to apartments in multiunit buildings. See United States v. Mathews , 784 F.3d 1232, 1235 (8th Cir.) (declining to reach question of whether Jardines "cast [s] doubt on ... earlier cases [in the Eighth Circuit] sanctioning the use of a drug dog to sniff around the door of an apartment in the common hallway of an apartment building ... because it was objectively reasonable at the time for police to rely on binding circuit precedent permitting such drug dog sniffs," and, under Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 [2011], "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied sub nom. Matthews v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 376, 193 L.Ed.2d 303 (2015). Furthermore, insofar as the court in Broadway addressed the issue, that court determined simply that a tenant could not reasonably expect police officers not to be present in the common hallway in question. See United States v. Broadway , supra, at 1194 ("[i]f actual authority is established, the person whose **109property is searched is unjustified in claiming an expectation of privacy in the property because that person cannot reasonably believe that the joint user will not, under certain circumstances, allow a search in her own right" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In Broadway , a detective was admitted into an apartment complex by a groundskeeper who had at least apparent authority to do so, and the court determined that the groundskeeper's consent vitiated any expectation of privacy on the part of the defendant. See id. ; see also United States v. Brock , 417 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[c]ritical to our holding that the dog sniff in this case was not a [f]ourth [a]mendment search is the fact that [the] police were lawfully present inside the common areas of the residence with the consent of [the defendant's] roommate"). As we observed previously, however, the question of lawful physical presence is distinct from the question of whether a canine sniff of the exterior of a person's home impermissibly invades reasonable expectations of privacy in the home.

The state also argues that the canine sniff was not a search under the state constitution because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in any contraband inside his condominium. Relying on the reasoning of United States v. Place , supra, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, and Illi n o is v. Caballes , supra, 543 U.S. at 408-409, 125 S.Ct. 834, that the canine sniffs at issue in those cases were not searches for purposes of the fourth amendment because a canine sniff reveals only contraband in which an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy, the state maintains that this logic applies equally to the present case. The state also observes that Place and Caballes are in no way inconsistent with or undermined by Kyllo , for, as the court itself explained in Caballes , "[c]ritical to [this court's] decision [in Kyllo ] was the fact that the [thermal imaging] device was capable of *20detecting lawful activity"; id. ; and "[t]he legitimate expectation **110that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from [an individual's] hopes or expectations concerning the non-detection of contraband in the trunk of his car." Id., at 410, 125 S.Ct. 834.14 According to the state, because a canine sniff reveals only contraband, it is not a search, even if it is directed at the home.

Although we ultimately disagree with the state's contention that the present case is controlled by Place and Caballes , we acknowledge that the state's fourth amendment analysis does find support in a number of federal and sister state cases. These cases hold that, whatever the extent of privacy rights otherwise pertaining to common hallways in multitenant buildings, a canine sniff of an apartment building or other residence is not a search because it discloses only the existence of contraband.15 See, e.g., United States v. Scott , 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1160, 131 S.Ct. 964, 178 L.Ed.2d 794 (2011) ; United States v. Brock , supra, 417 F.3d at 696 ; United States v. Anthony , United States District Court, Docket No. 11-68, 2012 WL 959448 (JBS) (D.N.J. March 20, 2012) ; United States v. Broadway , supra, 580 F.Supp.2d at 1190 ; State v. Nguyen , 841 N.W.2d 676, 681 (N.D. 2013), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2888, 192 L.Ed.2d 924 (2015). Although the continued vitality of the reasoning of the Seventh and Eighth Circuit cases has been called into question by subsequent decisions of those courts; see United States v. Hopkins , supra, 824 F.3d at 731-33 **111Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals); United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 852-54 (Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals); several other cases generally support the state's argument. For example, as the court in Anthony explained: "The legal premise that governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest ... is not, on its face, a [fact specific] judgment with respect to cars or luggage-or really even a judgment about privacy expectations; it is a judgment about the legitimacy of hiding contraband. From this perspective, there is no reason why governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband in a house should be different from governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband in the trunk of a car, because the reason for not affording contraband [f]ourth [a]mendment privacy protection has nothing to do with expectations of what will remain private, and everything to do with what society is prepared to accept as legitimate privacy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Anthony , supra. Consistent with this reasoning, the court concluded that a canine sniff of an apartment from the hallway of a multifamily residence, at least when "nothing in the record calls into question the factual premise that nothing is revealed other than possession of contraband by a dog sniff," is not a search under the fourth amendment. Id. ; see also United States v. Broadway , supra, at 1191 ("as long as the canine unit is lawfully *21present when the sniff occurs, the canine sniff is not a search within the meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

We acknowledge that, in Place and, more recently, in Caballes , the United States Supreme Court employed reasoning that supports the conclusion that a canine sniff is not a search under the fourth amendment because that investigative technique reveals only the **112existence of contraband, and one's subjective expectation of privacy in contraband is not objectively reasonable. See Illinois v. Caballes , supra, 543 U.S. at 408-10, 125 S.Ct. 834 (canine sniff of motor vehicle does not implicate fourth amendment because there can be no expectation of privacy in contraband that society deems reasonable); United States v. Place , supra, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (canine sniff of luggage at public airport is not search within meaning of fourth amendment, in part because it discloses only presence or absence of contraband). Nevertheless, we believe that Place and Caballes are distinguishable from the present case because a canine sniff of a residence is entitled to significantly more protection than a canine sniff of an automobile or a piece of luggage at a public airport. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have drawn a bright line around the home. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held "over and over again ... that people's expectations of privacy are much lower in their cars than in their homes"; Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1419 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring); and, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Thomas , "[a] practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person's home." United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at 1366. This is because "[t]he very fact that a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to have privacy, and if that inference is borne out by his actions, society is prepared to respect his privacy." Id., quoting United States v. Taborda , 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980). Indeed, this respect for the sanctity of the home is at the "very core" of the fourth amendment; (internal quotation marks omitted) Florida v. Jardines , supra, at 1414 ; and is "well established ... in our [state's] jurisprudence." State v. Geisler , supra, 222 Conn. at 687, 610 A.2d 1225 ; see also State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63, 75, 717 A.2d 652 (1998) ("the right to be secure in one's home is central **113to the prohibition of article first, § 7, of the state constitution, against unreasonable intrusions by the state"); State v. Brown , supra, 198 Conn. at 356-57, 503 A.2d 566 ("[p]rivacy expectations are normally highest and are accorded the strongest constitutional protection in the case of a private home and the area immediately surrounding it").

Furthermore, this distinction between searches of the home and searches of locations outside the home is consistent with the established priorities of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. As we noted in State v. Miller , supra, 227 Conn. at 363, 630 A.2d 1315, Connecticut has long had a "strong policy in favor of warrants" under article first, § 7, a policy that has been held to "[provide] broader protection than the fourth amendment" in certain contexts. Id., at 382, 630 A.2d 1315. Indeed, "[u]nder the state constitution, all warrantless searches, [regardless of] whether ... the police have probable cause to believe that a crime was committed, are per se unreasonable, unless they fall within one of a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Joyce , 229 Conn. 10, 24-25, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994). In Joyce , we explained that the few *22"recognized exceptions" arise out of "acknowledged interests in protecting the safety of the police and the public and in preserving evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 26, 639 A.2d 1007. Suffice it to say that the use of a canine sniff for drugs in response to an anonymous tip will rarely, if ever, rise to the level of urgency required by these precedents.

Thus, we agree with the Seventh and Second Circuits that a resident's legitimate expectation of privacy in the home is capacious enough to preclude certain uses of the common areas immediately adjacent to the home. As the Seventh Circuit explained, the defendant's "lack of a right to exclude did not mean [that] he had no right to expect certain norms of behavior in his apartment hallway. [To be sure], other residents and their guests **114and even their dogs) can pass through the hallway. They are not entitled, though, to set up chairs and have a party in the hallway right outside the door. Similarly, the fact that a police officer might lawfully walk by and hear loud voices from inside an apartment does not mean [that] he could put a stethoscope to the door to listen to all that is happening inside." United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 853.

In other words, a defendant's "lack of a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in the hallway does not also mean that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy against persons in the hallway snooping into his apartment using sensitive devices not available to the general public." Id. ; see also United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at 1367 (finding "a legitimate expectation that the contents of [a] closed apartment would remain private, that they could not be 'sensed' from outside [the] door"). This is consonant with the United States Supreme Court's observation that the right to retreat into one's home "would be of little practical value if the [s]tate's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity" or "if the police could enter a man's property to observe his repose from just outside the front window." Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1414.

Indeed, even if a canine sniff were to reveal nothing about the interior of the home, we believe that the underlying prohibition against unreasonable intrusions into the sanctity of the home cannot abide the public spectacle of a warrantless canine investigation of the perimeters of any home. It may well be that a canine sniff itself is "discriminating and unoffensive" when compared to other physical intrusions of the premises of a home. United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at 1367. Even so, such searches are highly visible and readily identifiable. They also hold a resident up to public scrutiny in his own home. As the Florida **115Supreme Court observed, "[s]uch a public spectacle unfolding in a residential neighborhood will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident, for such dramatic government activity in the eyes of many-neighbors, passers-by, and the public at large-will be viewed as an official accusation of crime." Jardines v. State , 73 So.3d 34, 36 (Fla. 2011), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013).16 We also share that court's concern that, if police officers are permitted to conduct warrantless canine searches of people's homes, "there is nothing to prevent [them] from applying the procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or based on whim *23and fancy, at the home of any citizen," and that "[s]uch an open-ended policy invites overbearing and harassing conduct." Id.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with those federal courts that have distinguished canine sniffs of the home from canine sniffs of movable property. While we have previously suggested that the "heightened privacy interests that pertain to one's house" might demand a more rigorous assessment of canine sniffs than the privacy interests in movable property; see State v. Waz , supra, 240 Conn. at 381, 692 A.2d 1217 ; we believe that Justice Kagan's concurrence in Jardines properly applies this principle to the "[super sensitive] instrument" of a dog's nose. Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). As Justice Kagan observed, the sanctity of the home is not measured by the presence or absence of contraband, or even by the relative "intimacies" of the facts that may be discovered there. Id. Rather, it is measured by the " 'firm' " and " 'bright' " line at the entrance to the house. Id., at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring). Considered in this light, cases such as Caballes are not simply cases about canine sniffs; they are cases about **116canine sniffs directed at motor vehicles . See Illinois v. Caballes , supra, 543 U.S. at 417, 125 S.Ct. 834 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that majority in Caballes did "not go so far as to say explicitly that sniff searches by dogs trained to sense contraband always get a free pass under the [f]ourth [a]mendment, since it reserve[d] judgment on the constitutional significance of sniffs assumed to be more intrusive than a dog's walk around a stopped car"). Significantly, this interpretation of Caballes has been adopted by the only federal circuit court of appeals to have considered the issue of canine sniffs in a common hallway after Jardines . See United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 853 ; see also United States v. Davis , 760 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 2014) (questioning continuing validity of earlier circuit precedent to contrary following Jardines ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 996, 190 L.Ed. 2d 872 (2015).

Turning to precedent from other state courts, we note that only seven states appear to have addressed the issue of whether a canine sniff of an apartment door in a multiunit building is a search with constitutional implications. Five have concluded, either under the federal constitution or their respective state constitutions, that it is a search and that it requires either a reasonable, articulable suspicion or a warrant supported by probable cause. See People v. Burns , 401 Ill.Dec. 468, 50 N.E.3d 610, 613-14, 622 (2016) (under Jardines , canine sniff of apartment door in multiunit apartment building is search under fourth amendment requiring warrant supported by probable cause); State v. Davis , 732 N.W.2d 173, 181 (Minn. 2007) (under Minnesota constitution, "the police needed a reasonable, articulable suspicion to walk a [narcotics detection] dog down the common hallway outside [the defendant's] apartment"); State v. Ortiz , 257 Neb. 784, 787, 600 N.W.2d 805 (1999) (under federal and Nebraska constitutions, "[a]lthough a canine may be deployed to test for illegal drugs in some cases, **117doing so at the threshold of [any] dwelling on less than reasonable, articulable suspicion is improper"); People v. Dunn , 77 N.Y.2d 19, 25, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990) (New York constitution requires reasonable, articulable suspicion before police may employ canine sniff of apartment door in multiunit apartment building), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1219, 111 S.Ct. 2830, 115 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1991) ; State v. Rendon , 477 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (under Jardines , "the officers' conduct in bringing a trained [drug detection] dog up to the threshold or *24area immediately outside of [the defendant's apartment] door for the purpose of conducting a [canine narcotics] sniff was an 'unlicensed physical intrusion' onto the curtilage of his home that constituted a search in violation of the [f]ourth [a]mendment").

In addition, the Florida Supreme Court and Washington Court of Appeals both have concluded that a canine sniff of the front door of a single-family home violates the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and therefore requires a warrant supported by probable cause. See Jardines v. State , supra, 73 So.3d at 36, 49, 54 ; State v. Dearman , 92 Wash.App. 630, 631, 637, 962 P.2d 850 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1032, 980 P.2d 1286 (1999). Because these courts based their rulings on the reasonable expectation of privacy test recognized in Katz , their holdings logically would extend to all residences within their states. The Indiana Court of Appeals has similarly concluded that a canine sniff of a residence requires only a reasonable and articulable suspicion. See Hoop v. State , 909 N.E.2d 463, 468-71 (Ind. App. 2009), transfer denied, 929 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. 2010). Although "Indiana has explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or seizure"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 468 ; the court emphasized as central to its holding "the need to restrict arbitrary **118selection of persons to be searched ...." Id., at 470. If anything, such concerns are exacerbated by the presence of many dwellings in close proximity, as in an apartment complex. As a result, we suspect Indiana also would apply the reasonable suspicion requirement to residences within a multiunit building.

Finally, several state appellate courts have determined that even a canine sniff of a nonresidential property may be a search under their respective state constitutions and may require a reasonable, articulable suspicion. In Alaska, a canine sniff of a commercial warehouse requires a reasonable and articulable suspicion; McGahan v. State , 807 P.2d 506, 510-11 (Alaska App. 1991) ; as does the canine sniff of an individual storage locker from a public hallway located in a storage facility in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Johnston , 515 Pa. 454, 457-58, 465-66, 530 A.2d 74 (1987). A handful of states also extend this protection to private vehicles under their respective state constitutions. See State v. Tackitt , 315 Mont. 59, 69-70, 67 P.3d 295 (2003) ; State v. Pellicci , 133 N.H. 523, 533, 580 A.2d 710 (1990) ; Commonwealth v. Rogers , 578 Pa. 127, 134-37, 849 A.2d 1185 (2004). In light of the heightened privacy interests surrounding a person's home, it is safe to assume that, in these states, a canine sniff of a private residence would require at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion.

In the other column, we are aware of only two state appellate courts that have concluded that a canine sniff of an apartment door in a multiunit building is not a search for fourth amendment purposes.17 See **119Lindsey v. State , 226 Md.App. 253, 274, 127 A.3d 627 (2015) (because common area adjacent to apartment door is not curtilage and resident has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that common area, canine sniff conducted from common area is not search under fourth amendment), *25cert. dismissed, 447 Md. 299, 135 A.3d 417 (2016) ; State v. Nguyen , supra, 841 N.W.2d at 681 (canine sniff of common hallway adjacent to apartment door was not search because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband and common hallway is not curtilage). In Lindsey , the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that the common area outside of an apartment door, which is where the canine search was conducted, did not constitute curtilage because the defendant, Shaun D. Lindsey, could not maintain "some form of exclusive control" over the area.18 (Emphasis omitted.) Lindsey v. State , supra, at 280, 127 A.3d 627. Because Lindsey lacked exclusive control over who entered and used the common area, the court also concluded that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area. See id. We are not persuaded by Lindsey , however, because, even if we agreed with that court's conclusion that the common area is not curtilage, we disagree with **120the court's reasonable expectation of privacy analysis insofar as it is predicated on the officers' lawful presence in the common area rather than on the canine sniff of the apartment that was conducted from that common area.

In Nguyen , the North Dakota Supreme Court held, first, that the technical trespass of police officers in the common hallways of an apartment building "[was] of no consequence because [the defendant, Matthew D.] Nguyen, had no reasonable expectation that the common hallways of the apartment building would be free from any intrusion." State v. Nguyen , supra, 841 N.W.2d at 681. For essentially the same reason, the court further determined that the common hallway was not curtilage: "Having determined that, unlike the area immediately surrounding a home, a party does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the common hallways and shared spaces of an apartment building, [the court] conclude[s] [that] the common hallway is not an area within the curtilage of Nguyen's apartment." Id., at 682. Finally, with respect to Nguyen's expectation of privacy inside his apartment, the court, in reliance on Place and its progeny, held that any such expectation did not reasonably extend to the contraband to which the trained narcotics detection dog alerted. See id., at681-82.19 For the foregoing reasons, *26we believe that, because **121an individual's privacy interests are greatest in his or her home, the court in Nguyen incorrectly equated a nonconsensual governmental intrusion into the home with a similar intrusion into a motor vehicle or a piece of luggage at a public airport. In any event, it appears that the weight of sister state precedent supports the view that the canine sniff of the defendant's door in the present case was a search under our constitution.

Finally, we perceive no principled reason of public policy, and the state has identified none, why, in the context of canine sniffs, the firm and bright line that we draw at the entrance of the house should apply to single-family dwellings but not to dwellings in a multiunit building. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit observed in Whitaker , allowing police dogs to sniff the doors of apartments but not freestanding homes would be deeply "troubling because it would apportion [constitutional] protections on grounds that correlate with income, race, and ethnicity. For example, according to the [United States Census Bureau's] American Housing Survey for 2013, 67.8 [percent] of households composed solely of whites live in [one unit] detached houses. For households solely composed of blacks, that number dropped to 47.2 [percent]. And for Hispanic households, that number was 52.1 [percent]. The percentage of households that live in [single unit], detached houses consistently rises with income. At the low end, 40.9 [percent] of households that earned less than $10,000 lived in [single unit], detached houses, and, at the high end, 84 [percent] of households that earned more than $120,000 did so."20

**122United States v. Whitaker , supra, 820 F.3d at 854. For this important reason, we believe that public policy strongly favors the state constitutional interpretation advocated by the defendant in the present case.

Accordingly, we are unable to agree with the state that all canine sniffs are constitutionally innocuous. Rather, for the reasons previously discussed in this opinion, we conclude that a canine sniff directed toward a home-whether freestanding or part of a multitenant structure-is a search under article first, § 7, and, as such, requires a warrant issued upon a court's finding of probable cause.21 We *27therefore conclude that the defendant was entitled to the suppression of the evidence seized from his residence as the fruit of the unlawful canine sniff.

IV

RESPONSE TO THE CONCURRING JUSTICE

In his concurring opinion, Justice Zarella contends that we should have decided this case under the federal constitution rather than under the state constitution. In support of this contention, he states that, as a general matter, "the proper mode of analysis [in a case involving claims under both the federal and state constitutions] should be to address the federal claim first, turning to the state constitutional claim only after determining that the federal constitution does not provide a basis for relief or if the applicable federal rule is truly unsettled."

**123Because Justice Zarella concludes that the defendant in the present case prevails under settled fourth amendment principles, he asserts that we have no cause to consider the defendant's state constitutional claim. We agree with Justice Zarella that we turn first to the state constitutional claim when the issue is unsettled under the federal constitution or, if it is settled under the federal constitution, when the defendant is not entitled to relief thereunder. Cf. State v. Santiago , 318 Conn. 1, 13 n.11, 122 A.3d 1 (2015). Ordinarily, if the issue has been definitively resolved under the federal constitution, and settled law clearly supports the view advanced by the defendant, there is little reason to undertake the kind of searching and painstaking analysis that invariably will be necessary to resolve a state constitutional issue of first impression raised on appeal.22 On the other hand, if the federal constitution does not clearly and definitively resolve the issue in the defendant's favor, we turn first to the state constitution to ascertain whether its provisions entitle the defendant to relief.23 After all, as the ultimate arbiter of the state constitution, this court's interpretation of that constitution is final and conclusive, whereas we "can give only an informed guess of the meaning of the [f]ederal [c]onstitution."24

*28D.

**124Braithwaite, " An Analysis of the 'Divergence Factors': A Misguided Approach to Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the New Jersey Constitution," 33 Rutgers L.J. 1, 35 (2001-2002) ; see also, e.g., State v. Joyce , supra, 229 Conn. at 15-16 n.6, 639 A.2d 1007 (when issue is not settled under federal constitution, we turn to state constitution rather than speculating as to how issue would be resolved under provisions of federal constitution).25

We disagree, however, that federal case law definitively resolves the issue presented by this appeal. As we have indicated, only two federal appeals courts have determined that the use of a canine sniff at a home is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment, and the case on which Justice Zarella primarily relies, United States v. Thomas , supra, 757 F.2d at1367, has been criticized by a significant number of federal courts.26 See, **125e.g., United States v. Reed , 141 F.3d 644, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting reasoning of Thomas and explaining that Thomas has not been followed by other courts); United States v. Lingenfelter , 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to follow Thomas and observing that " Thomas has been rightfully criticized"); United States v. Colyer , 878 F.2d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (questioning reasoning of Thomas as incompatible with United States Supreme Court cases involving canine sniffs); United States v. Cota-Lopez , 358 F.Supp.2d 579, 592 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (rejecting Thomas as contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent), aff'd, 104 Fed.Appx. 931 (5th Cir. 2004) ; United States v. Hogan , 122 F.Supp.2d 358, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (" Thomas ... has been criticized by several other circuit courts. Those courts have pointed out that the rationale underlying the Thomas decision conflicts with the underpinnings of the [United States] Supreme Court's holding that the canine sniff in Place did not constitute a search .... Thomas thus appears to be at odds with [Supreme Court precedent] .... Although Thomas remains the law in [the Second] [C]ircuit, the foregoing discussion suggests that it should not be applied expansively." [Citations omitted.] ).27

As this criticism of Thomas reflects, the United States Supreme Court has never retreated from its reasoning in *29Place , namely, that a canine sniff of luggage at a public airport is not a search for fourth amendment purposes because that investigative technique reveals only contraband in which the subject of the investigation **126has no legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 124 n.24, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ("the reason [the Place canine sniff] did not intrude [on] any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items" [emphasis omitted] ). In fact, as we noted previously, in Illinois v. Caballes , supra, 543 U.S. at 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, the court relied on the very same reasoning that it had employed in Place , concluding that a canine sniff of a motor vehicle, like a canine sniff of luggage at a public airport, "does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement"; id., at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834 ; because "governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. Of course, the rationale that canine sniffs reveal only the existence of contraband is no less applicable to any canine sniff, including the sniff at issue in the present case. Until the United States Supreme Court decides whether the reasoning of Place and Caballes applies with equal force to a canine sniff of a home, it is impossible to say with confidence that the federal constitution bars the warrantless canine sniff that occurred in the present case. See, e.g., State v. Guillen , 222 Ariz. 81, 85, 213 P.3d 230 (App. 2009) (characterizing this issue as presenting "a vexingly close question"), vacated on other grounds, 223 Ariz. 314, 223 P.3d 658 (2010) ; see also State v. Guillen , 223 Ariz. 314, 319, 223 P.3d 658 (2010) (observing that "the case law on dog sniffs of the exterior of a residence accessible to the public is far from clear" and that "cases from other jurisdictions are split on whether dog sniffs of the exterior of a residence violate the [f]ourth [a]mendment or their respective state constitutions").28 Thus, contrary to Justice Zarella's contention, the fact that the Second **127Circuit Court of Appeals decided the federal constitutional issue in favor of the defendant some three decades ago in Thomas -many years before the seminal cases of Jardines , Caballes and Kyllo were decided-by no means suggests that the law is truly settled under the fourth amendment.29 **128*30This lack of clarity surrounding the propriety of the use of a warrantless canine sniff at the door of a residence under the federal constitution is further demonstrated by the positions taken by the current members of the United States Supreme Court on this precise issue in Jardines . As we discussed previously, the majority in Jardines , which was comprised of Justices Scalia (the authoring justice), and Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the canine sniff conducted at the base of Jardines' front door was a search under the fourth amendment because the sniff took place in the curtilage of the home. See Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1417-18. In a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, but not Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Kagan expressed the view that the canine sniff also violated Jardines' reasonable expectation of privacy, and, for that reason as well, the sniff constituted a search protected by the fourth amendment. See id., at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, dissented. Id., at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting). In concluding that the canine sniff at Jardines' front door was not a search for fourth amendment purposes, Justice Alito rejected both the majority's curtilage rationale and Justice Kagan's reasonable expectation of privacy rationale.30 Id., at 1424, 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting). **129To summarize, four current members of the court-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito-have concluded that a canine sniff at the front door of a home is not a search that implicates *31the fourth amendment because, inter alia, the sniff does not violate the home owner's reasonable expectation of privacy. Three members of the court-Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan-take a contrary view. Justice Thomas, the remaining member of the court who also participated in Jardines , took no position on whether the canine sniff violated Jardines' reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, four current members of the court would decide the present case against the defendant on federal constitutional grounds, three current members of the court would decide the present case in favor of the defendant on federal constitutional grounds, and one current member of the court has taken no express position on the issue. Even if we were to assume that Justice Thomas' decision not to join Justice Kagan's concurrence reveals nothing about his view on the matter, more current members of the court are on record as concluding that a canine sniff at the front door of a home is not a search and, consequently, does not violate the fourth amendment. Accordingly, we reject Justice Zarella's assertion that the defendant clearly prevails under the federal constitution because, in fact, we simply have no idea how a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court would decide the issue. Although we believe that the more persuasive lower court precedent weighs in favor of our conclusion in this case, it can hardly be said that the issue is a settled one.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and McDONALD, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

ZARELLA, J., concurring in the judgment.

**130I agree that the use of a dog sniff to detect contraband inside the condominium unit occupied by the defendant, Dennis Kono, violated his rights, but for reasons different from those given by the majority. The majority relies on our state constitution, but, in my view, looking to the state constitution is unnecessary when, as in the present case, existing federal constitutional doctrine favors the defendant. Instead, when a party raises a claim under both the federal and state constitutions, the proper mode of analysis should be to address the federal claim first, turning to the state constitutional claim only after determining that the federal constitution does not provide a basis for relief or if the applicable federal rule is truly unsettled. I therefore respectfully concur only in the judgment.

I

Turning to the federal constitutional question, I would first conclude that federal case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolves the federal constitutional claim before us. Three decades ago, in United States v. Thomas , 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fisher v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Wheelings v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 67, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Rice v. United States , 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986), the Second Circuit concluded that a warrantless dog sniff of the contents of a home violates the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the resident lives in an apartment and the dog is outside of his apartment door in a shared hallway. The holding in Thomas remains good law; see, e.g., United States v. Hayes , 551 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) ; and the facts **131of Thomas match the facts of the present case in every relevant respect. *32As the majority explains, even though decisions of the Second Circuit do not bind this court, we accord them great weight on questions of federal law, including federal constitutional law, when the United States Supreme Court has not expressly resolved the issue before us. See, e.g., Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , 301 Conn. 759, 783, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011) ("it is well settled that decisions of the Second Circuit, while not binding [on] this court, nevertheless carry particularly persuasive weight in the resolution of issues of federal law when the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the point" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Deferring to the Second Circuit's decisions on matters of federal law promotes principles of comity and consistency in the application of federal law in this state. See id., at 784, 23 A.3d 1192 (noting that it would be " 'bizarre' " for application of federal law to depend on whether case was brought in state or federal court); see also Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services , 275 Conn. 464, 475-76 n.11, 881 A.2d 259 (2005) (citing cases explaining reasons for our deference to Second Circuit).

I see no compelling reason to depart from the approach of the Second Circuit in the present case. Nothing has eroded the basis for its holding in Thomas since that case was decided. Although Thomas was decided more than thirty years ago and was originally met with criticism, the Second Circuit has more recently cited it with approval; United States v. Hayes , supra, 551 F.3d at 143-44 ; and more recent United States Supreme Court decisions issued after Thomas have, in fact, bolstered its reasoning.1 See, e.g., **132Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 34-35, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ; see also Florida v. Jardines , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1417-18, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ; Florida v. Jardines , supra, at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). And, as the majority explains, the only circuit court to have addressed the question after Kyllo and Jardines were decided reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit in Thomas . See United States v. Whitaker , 820 F.3d 849, 852-54 (7th Cir. 2016). To be sure, Justice Espinosa has raised significant distinctions between the issues decided by the United States Supreme Court in Kyllo and Jardines , and the precise issue raised in the present case.2 But, in my view, these distinctions do not justify a departure from Second Circuit precedent, at least if we are applying federal law.3 *33I thus would begin with the federal constitutional analysis, apply the Second Circuit's decision in Thomas , **133and conclude that the dog sniff of the defendant's condominium unit in the present case was a search under the fourth amendment. Deciding otherwise would have the bizarre consequence of granting our citizens less protection under federal law in state courts than that provided under federal law in federal courts.

II

Because we may resolve the present case in the defendant's favor under the federal constitution, I disagree with the majority's decision to sidestep the federal constitution and instead resolve this issue by creating new doctrine under the state constitution. Specifically, I disagree with the majority's assertion, which is made without citation to authority, that we should analyze a federal constitutional claim first only if we are "able to say with a high degree of confidence that the United States Supreme Court, if presented with the federal constitutional claim," would reach the same conclusion. Footnote 23 of the majority opinion. The ability to confidently forecast how the United States Supreme Court might decide a question has not, in prior decisions, been treated as a prerequisite to beginning with a federal constitutional analysis. See generally, e.g., Pham v. Starkowski , 300 Conn. 412, 428-62, 16 A.3d 635 (2011) ; State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209, 231-48, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). Indeed, we routinely decide federal constitutional questions without clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court when those federal claims are made without accompanying state constitutional claims. Consequently, in light of the Second Circuit's prior decision in Thomas , I do not view the relevant federal precedent to be so ambiguous as to require that we avoid a federal analysis in the first instance.

To be sure, if the federal rule were truly unsettled-perhaps if neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had addressed the question, and **134other federal courts were generally silent on the matter-I might agree with the majority's approach. In the present case, however, the Second Circuit has already spoken on the question before us, on at least two occasions, so its decision is already binding on federal law enforcement personnel and the federal district courts in this state .

In addition, resolving the case under the federal constitution is more consistent with the procedural history of this case. Throughout the proceedings, the parties have principally argued the case under the federal constitution. In the trial court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence at issue first under the federal constitution and only added a claim under the state constitution as an alternative. The trial court decided the motion to suppress in the defendant's favor under the federal constitution and therefore found it unnecessary to address the claim under the state constitution, leaving us without any lower court ruling on the state constitution to consider. And, because the trial court based its decision on the federal constitution *34alone, the parties in their appeal to this court again focused their arguments on the federal constitution, presenting the state constitutional claim as an alternative ground for affirmance. Reaching the state constitutional issue in the present appeal is unnecessary.

Perhaps the majority is concerned that the United States Supreme Court might disagree with its conclusion, and thus wants to insulate our decision from further review and possible reversal. This reasoning has its proponents; see, e.g., W. Horton, The Connecticut State Constitution (2d Ed. 2012) p. 36; but it seems to me to be an insufficient reason to avoid applying the federal constitution when it is otherwise dispositive. If the United States Supreme Court ever does overrule Thomas , in either this case or another case, we could revisit the question under our state constitution then , **135when there is actually a principled need for doing so, and with the added benefit of being able to consider the United States Supreme Court's rationale as we consider the parameters of our own constitution. Indeed, if the United States Supreme Court were to disagree with Thomas , the validity of the majority's state constitutional analysis will necessarily be called into question in any event, given that we consider federal law when interpreting our state constitution and our understanding of federal law would have been incorrect.4 State v. Geisler , 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) (federal precedent is used as persuasive tool when court construes state constitution); see also State v. Skok , 318 Conn. 699, 730-31, 122 A.3d 608 (2015) (Zarella , J. , concurring) (agreeing that federal precedent provides persuasive authority when court interprets provisions of state constitution, at least when such provisions are related to federal constitutional provisions).

III

The majority's decision to look first to the state constitution-a view grounded, in my view, on a faulty premise-highlights an inconsistency in our case law about whether we should first look to the federal or the state constitution when claims under both are properly raised.5

**136Our prior cases, including many search and seizure cases, do not reflect a principled approach to this question. For example, this court has, on a few occasions, relied solely on the state constitution without any explanation of why it did not conduct any analysis under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Joyce , 229 Conn. 10, 15, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994) (declining to reach federal constitutional claim because state constitution provided basis for relief). In one decision, we noted that we should *35always examine the state constitution first. State v. Chapman , 227 Conn. 616, 626 n.8, 632 A.2d 674 (1993), superseded, 229 Conn. 529, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994). But this court has hardly followed that advice in practice, and has often addressed federal claims first, turning to the state constitution only after concluding that the federal constitution did not provide a basis for relief. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins , supra, 298 Conn. at 231-32, 259-61, 3 A.3d 806 (addressing claim regarding allegedly illegal search under federal constitution before turning to state constitutional analysis); Contractor's Supply of Waterbury, LLC v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection , 283 Conn. 86, 92, 97-98, 925 A.2d 1071 (2007) (analyzing federal equal protection claim before turning to state constitutional claim); State v. Ledbetter , 275 Conn. 534, 559-60, 881 A.2d 290 (2005) (resolving federal constitutional claim concerning eyewitness identification before turning to claim under state constitution), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S.Ct. 1798, 164 L.Ed.2d 537 (2006) ; State v. Linares , 232 Conn. 345, 354, 376, 655 A.2d 737 (1995) (addressing first amendment claim before addressing claims under analogous state constitutional provisions).

This waffling between deciding claims variously under the state or federal constitution, especially in the area of search and seizure law, is not a practice that **137we should perpetuate-at the very least because it gives our constitutional jurisprudence the appearance of being unprincipled. I would take this opportunity to clarify our mode of analysis with respect to the order of our consideration of federal and state constitutional issues. In my view, when a party properly raises a claim under both a federal constitutional provision and a comparable state constitutional provision, the better practice is to first address the question under the federal constitution, turning to the state constitution only after concluding that the federal provision does not provide a basis for relief or if the interpretation of the federal provision is truly unsettled or ambiguous. Ultimately, the quality of our constitutional analysis is most critical in a given case, but there are several prudential reasons to prefer consideration of the federal constitution first.

A

For one thing, looking to the federal constitution first is more consistent with the reality of existing legal doctrine concerning individual rights and with our understanding of the role of our state constitution, which recognizes that the federal constitution sets a national minimum for the protection of individual rights but leaves states to interpret their constitutions to provide greater protection.

Some commentators and courts recommend looking to the state constitution first when confronted with a claim under both the federal and state constitution-an approach commonly referred to as the primacy model. Under this approach, the state court looks first to its own state constitution, looking to the federal constitution only if the state constitution fails to provide a basis for relief. See, e.g., W. Horton, supra, p. 37; J. Landau, " Some Thoughts About 'State Constitutional Interpretation," 115 Penn. St. L. Rev. 837, 845-46 (2011) ; cf.

**138H. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights," 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 387 (1980). Proponents argue that, in a federal system, the first referent of a state judge should be the state's own laws and constitution, not the laws of another government. See W. Horton, supra, p. 37.

But this approach is inconsistent with the plain reality that federal constitutional law now dominates the field of individual *36constitutional rights, even in state proceedings, at least since the United States Supreme Court had determined that most of the guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights apply to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-a process often referred to as incorporation. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting state governments from depriving "any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law").

Before incorporation, state courts had no need to look beyond their state constitution or to consider which constitution to apply in a given case, because the federal constitution did not apply to state proceedings. State and federal courts treated the federal constitution as applying only to the federal government, with limited exceptions for when the federal constitution explicitly restricted actions by a state government, such as the prohibition on passing an ex post facto law. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Thus, in Barron v. Mayor & City Council , 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), the court rejected a claim that the fifth amendment's takings clause applied to state legislation. Writing for the court, Chief Justice John Marshall explained: "The [federal] constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated." Id., at 247. Because **139the amendments in the Bill of Rights "contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments," the court concluded that it could not "so apply them." Id., at 250.

Under this view, courts accepted that rights granted by states might vary from those granted under the federal constitution. As the court explained in United States v. Cruikshank , 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875), "[w]e have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several [s]tates. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a [s]tate, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those he has under the other." Id., at 549.

Because the federal and state constitutions stood truly independent of one another, state courts looked to their own constitutions to determine the rights of individuals, and many states, including Connecticut, interpreted their state constitutions to provide less protection than the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Michael J ., 274 Conn. 321, 351, 875 A.2d 510 (2005) (noting that Connecticut constitution provided less protection against double jeopardy until United States Supreme Court applied fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy to states); State v. Magnano , 97 Conn. 543, 546, 117 A. 550 (1922) (declining to apply federal exclusionary rule in state proceeding because state constitution did not require exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, and federal constitution was not binding).

But this dichotomy between state and federal rights began to erode as the United States Supreme Court **140recognized that certain protections in the federal Bill of Rights might be considered an integral part of the due process guaranteed to state citizens by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court did not incorporate the entire Bill of Rights at once but gradually incorporated many of *37its provisions on a case-by-case basis over a period of several decades. The process began with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co . v. Chicago , 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897), in which the court concluded that "a judgment of a state court, even if it [is] authorized by statute, [pursuant to which] private property is taken for the [s]tate or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment of the [c]onstitution of the United States ...." Id., at 241, 17 S.Ct. 581. And, in Gitlow v. New York , 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925), the court concluded that certain first amendment protections also applied to state governments, explaining that, "freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the [f]irst [a]mendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment from impairment by the [s]tates." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 666, 45 S.Ct. 625.

The incorporation of constitutional rights through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment progressed slowly thereafter, until the Warren Court6 in the 1960s increased the pace substantially, particularly for amendments affecting the rights of the accused in a state criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (applying fifth amendment guarantee against **141double jeopardy to states); Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (states must apply sixth amendment right to jury trial to state criminal trials); Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (sixth amendment guarantee of compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses applies to states); Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967) (sixth amendment right to speedy trial applies to states); Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applies to states); Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (sixth amendment right of accused to confront witnesses applies to states); Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U.S. 108, 110, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (applying certain fourth amendment standards for obtaining warrant to states), overruled in part on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ; Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (sixth amendment right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants applies to states); Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660, 666-67, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (states bound by eighth amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (applying fourth amendment exclusionary rule to state prosecutions).

The rapid progress of incorporation in the 1960s arose principally from the court's concerns over the fairness of criminal proceedings when states did not guarantee their citizens the same protections in state proceedings that their citizens already enjoyed in federal court. For example, before the decision in Mapp , the federal exclusionary rule did not apply in state prosecutions. See *38Mapp v. Ohio , supra, 367 U.S. at 657-58, 81 S.Ct. 1684. As a result, **142although the federal constitution barred federal prosecutors from using illegally obtained evidence, state prosecutors were free to use that same evidence in state prosecutions. See id., at 658, 81 S.Ct. 1684. This dichotomy encouraged federal law enforcement officers to turn evidence obtained illegally under federal law over to state authorities for their use in a state prosecution, a practice commonly known as the " 'silver platter' " doctrine. Id., at 653, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; see id., at 658, 81 S.Ct. 1684. This practice substantially undermined the value of the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. See id., at 658, 81 S.Ct. 1684.

Concern for the undermining of federal constitutional protections led in significant part to the court's decision in Mapp to apply the fourth amendment exclusionary rule against the states, a decision that began the rapid acceleration of incorporation. In justifying its decision on practical grounds, the court observed that "a federal prosecutor [could] make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a [s]tate's attorney across the street could"; id., at 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; such that "federal officers, being human, were ... invited to and did ... step across the street to the [s]tate's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence." Id., at 658, 81 S.Ct. 1684. The court was concerned that, through this practice, "the [s]tate, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serve[d] to encourage disobedience to the [f]ederal [c]onstitution, which it is bound to uphold." Id., at 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; see also W. Brennan, " The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights," 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 541 (1986) ("[a] healthy federalism is not promoted by allowing state officers to seize evidence illegally or by permitting state courts to utilize such evidence" [emphasis omitted] ).

The solution to this problem, the court explained, was uniformity between the limitations on federal and state authorities in criminal proceedings. According to the court, "[f]ederal-state cooperation in the solution **143of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches. ... Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of working arrangements whose results are equally tainted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mapp v. Ohio , supra, 367 U.S. at 658, 81 S.Ct. 1684.

The incorporation surge of the 1960s forced state courts, for the first time, to consider the federal constitution in addition to any coordinate state constitutional provisions. Because many state constitutions had provided less protection than the federal constitution, litigants began to favor claims under the federal constitution, and the federal constitution took on a dominant role in the field of individual rights nationwide, especially the rights of criminal defendants. See, e.g., R. Range, note, "Reverse Silver Platter: Should Evidence That State Officials Obtained in Violation of a State Constitution Be Admissible in a Federal Criminal Trial?," 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1499, 1512 (1988) ("[b]ecause federal protection of individual rights greatly was expanding, state courts had little or no incentive independently to interpret state constitutions as providing greater protection than the federal constitution"). Instead of relying on a patchwork of state constitutions, state courts across the country were bound to apply much of the federal Bill of Rights in their proceedings, giving rise to a new, nationwide body of law. See W. Brennan, supra, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 540 ("[i]n the years between 1961 and *391969, the [United States] Supreme Court interpreted the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to nationalize civil rights, making the great guarantees of life, liberty, and property binding on all governments throughout the nation"). Prior decisions in Connecticut providing less protection under **144our state constitution were overruled. See, e.g., State v. DelVecchio , 149 Conn. 567, 572-73, 182 A.2d 402 (1962) (applying federal exclusionary rule after United States Supreme Court applied fourth amendment protections to states); see also State v. Michael J. , supra, 274 Conn. at 351-52, 875 A.2d 510 (noting that Connecticut constitution provided less protection against double jeopardy until United States Supreme Court applied fifth amendment protections to states). Litigants and courts have since continued to overwhelmingly favor claims under the federal constitution, raising a state constitutional claim, if at all, as an alternative in case the federal claim fails. See, e.g., R. Williams, " State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure Cases," 77 Miss. L.J. 225, 241 (2007) ; see also " Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1357 (1982). Law schools principally teach federal constitutional rights, and commentators, judges, and lawyers today are far more familiar with the federal constitutional protections than those of the state constitutions, which vary from state to state. The preference for the federal constitution demonstrated by the parties and the trial court in the present case illustrates the point.

To be sure, the rise of the federal constitution in state proceedings has not entirely sidelined state constitutions. During the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court adopted limitations and exceptions for many of the rights the court previously had expanded on and granted to state citizens in the 1960s. This curtailment led commentators and dissenting United States Supreme Court justices in the 1970s and 1980s to encourage state courts to reject that court's recent curtailments by finding greater protection for individual rights under state constitutions. See, e.g., R. Range, supra, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1512-13; see also W. Brennan, supra, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 548-50.

**145Although this call for action led to a reemergence of the state constitution as an independent source of rights; see R. Range, supra, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1511-13; as a practical matter, the opportunity for the state constitution to have a truly dispositive impact has substantially narrowed. "Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," supra, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1356 ("the preeminence and supremacy of federal constitutional interpretation narrow the field for state elaboration and shape the context in which state constitutional law must evolve"). The state constitution can now make a difference in the outcome of a case only if it provides greater protection than the federal constitution.7 Indeed, our own cases recognize this more limited role of our state constitution. This court repeatedly has emphasized that the federal constitution sets "a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights" that states must guarantee but permits states to provide "higher levels of protection for such rights" under state law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geisler , supra, 222 Conn. at 684, 610 A.2d 1225 ; see also *40Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135, 155-56, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ; State v. Ledbetter , supra, 275 Conn. at 560, 881 A.2d 290 ; State v. Linares , supra, 232 Conn. at 378-79, 655 A.2d 737 ; Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey , 229 Conn. 312, 316-17, 640 A.2d 101 (1994).

The primacy approach of putting the state constitution first stands in contrast to the primary position the federal constitution occupies in the field of individual rights, even in state proceedings, and thus assigns to the state constitution a role it no longer holds. See "Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," supra, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 **146"The failing of the primacy model is that this assumption no longer resembles reality. Nor does it reflect the fact that litigants typically present state constitutional issues only when they expect an unfavorable federal constitutional result. Federal assumption of the dominant role in the federal system-and particularly in the protection of individual rights-has rendered the primacy model obsolete." [Footnote omitted.] ). Instead, "[f]or state constitutional law to assume a realistic role, state courts must acknowledge the dominance of federal law and focus directly on the [gap filling] potential of state constitutions." Id.

B

Given the respective roles of the federal and state constitutions following incorporation, I believe the better approach is one that resolves claims under the federal constitution first, and that looks to the state constitution when the federal constitution fails to provide the protections sought. This method-commonly called an interstitial approach-recognizes that the federal constitution sets minimum protections and calls for application of the state constitution only when necessary to supplement the protections of the federal constitution if the state might provide greater protection. See, e.g., M. Kelman, "Foreword: Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights," 27 Wayne L. Rev. 413, 429-31 (1981); J. Landau, supra, 115 Penn. St. L. Rev. 846; "Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," supra, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1356-57.

Federal law marks a natural starting point for any claim made under both the federal and state constitutions. In most cases, the federal rule will be readily ascertainable. Because litigants have strongly favored federal claims, courts across the country apply the federal constitution and do so more often than we apply our **147own state constitution. This has created an "expansive body of federal law" far more developed than state constitutional law on an overlapping topic. "Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," supra, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (state constitutions are better served when performing gap filling role in light of extensive number of federal decisions already covering much of field).

Starting with the federal constitution better allows us to articulate differences between the federal and state constitutions when they exist. When the state constitution provides protection not afforded by the federal constitution, certainly, we have a duty to enforce the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Dukes , 209 Conn. 98, 112, 547 A.2d 10 (1988). But deciding a claim under the state constitution without first articulating the result under the federal constitution can leave ambiguity about whether and to what extent our constitution actually differs from the federal constitution. One commentator has explained that, "[w]hen state judges pass over a fairly arguable federal issue ... we do not know whether the decision upholding the claim of state constitutional rights is a genuinely differentiated act of state *41interpretation or a crypto-federal ruling." M. Kelman, supra, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 430. Instead, the better practice is to declare the scope of the federal constitution before embarking on a state constitutional analysis. Doing so clearly delineates the differences between the two constitutions. Indeed, "[b]y proceeding from a failed federal claim to the question [of] whether the state constitution grants broader rights in the circumstances of the case, the state court eliminates an ambiguity that otherwise might shroud its decision. It tells us distinctly, and obliges the court to think more carefully about, whether and why the state constitution differs from or retains the same meaning as the federally interpreted counterpart." Id., 429. It also helps to avoid the appearance that the **148state constitutional analysis is merely a result oriented rejection of the federal rule rather than truly an independent and principled interpretation of our state charter. See id., 430-31 ("[t]he more credible separation of the state from the federal interpretation is that which takes place in the first place by a clear cut disposition of the [federal] issue followed by the state constitutional pronouncement").

Moreover, analyzing a claim first under the federal constitution coincides with our mode of state constitutional interpretation, which requires us to consider federal law on the topic in any event. Federal constitutional jurisprudence, although not binding, provides persuasive authority for any interpretation or application of an analogous provision of our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Linares , supra, 232 Conn. at 378-79, 655 A.2d 737. Indeed, we use federal precedent as one of six interpretive tools when construing our constitution, at least when our state constitution has a federal analog. See, e.g., State v. Geisler , supra, 222 Conn. at 685, 610 A.2d 1225 ; see also State v. Skok , supra, 318 Conn. at 729-31, 122 A.3d 608 (Zarella , J. , concurring). If, after reviewing federal case law in the context of a state constitutional analysis, it becomes apparent that the federal constitution would provide relief, there is no practical need for continuing with a needless state constitutional disquisition.

Beginning with the federal constitution also helps to avoid unnecessary constitutional decision making. If the federal constitution provides relief in a given case, we have no need to consider the question separately under the state constitution. As a matter of judicial restraint, we commonly avoid addressing constitutional questions that are not necessary to our disposition. See, e.g., State v. Cofield , 220 Conn. 38, 49-50, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991) (declining to consider whether recent United States Supreme Court decision also applied under state constitution when existing federal constitutional law **149was dispositive). If the federal constitution affords relief, we should not conduct an unnecessary state constitutional analysis, especially when, as in the present case, doing so requires us to needlessly create new doctrine. See "Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights," supra, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1357-58 ("This interstitial role recognizes federal doctrine as a settled floor of rights and asks whether and how to criticize, amplify, or supplement this doctrine to yield more extensive constitutional protections. The state court's role is not to construct a complete system of fundamental rights from the ground up. " [Emphasis added; footnote omitted.] ); see also M. Kelman, supra, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 429 ("a separation of the state issue from the federal need not occur until the individual rights claim has been considered and rejected on its federal merits"). *42Finally, looking to the federal constitution first will help to avoid creating unnecessary or unintended differences between federal law and state law. We should favor uniformity between the two constitutions when federal law is adequate to protect the rights of a party in a given case. As the decision in Mapp v. Ohio , supra, 367 U.S. at 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, demonstrates, deviations between federal and state law can ultimately undermine our constitutional order, especially in the area of search and seizure jurisprudence. Divergent search and seizure principles encourage the criminal law equivalent of forum shopping, at least for crimes that might also be prosecuted under federal law.8 Because our state constitution does **150not bind federal authorities or federal courts; see, e.g., United States v. Pforzheimer , 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) ; we are powerless to prevent state authorities who have obtained evidence in violation of the state constitution from providing it to federal authorities for their use in a federal prosecution, undermining both the legitimacy and value of protections granted by our state constitution. See, e.g., R. Range, supra, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1499. Indeed, the Second Circuit has made clear that federal district courts may admit evidence even if seized in violation of a state constitution. United States v. Pforzheimer , supra, at 204. It was precisely this type of practice that led the United States Supreme Court to hasten its incorporation process in the 1960s as a means of creating uniformity between federal and state law. See R. Range, supra, 1500-1501; cf. Mapp v. Ohio , supra, at 657-58, 81 S.Ct. 1684. Resorting to the state constitution only when necessary to fill a gap left by the federal constitution will help reduce the opportunity for similar problems to arise from our state constitutional interpretation.

For the foregoing reasons, I would simplify our decision and decide it under the federal constitution, consistent with the Second Circuit's decision in Thomas . Because the majority has unnecessarily opted to resolve the case under our state constitution without first resolving the federal constitutional claim, I concur in the judgment only.

ESPINOSA, J., dissenting.

I disagree with the majority that the police conducted a search of the condominium unit in which the defendant, Dennis Kono, resided in violation of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution by using a police dog to sniff in the shared hallway **151of the condominium complex. In order for the majority's rationale to be persuasive-under either the federal or state constitutions-it must establish either one or both of the following propositions: (1) dogs are the equivalent of sophisticated sense enhancing technology, not available to the general public; see Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ; or (2) a shared hallway in a condominium complex constitutes the curtilage of an individual condominium unit. See *43Florida v. Jardines , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). The majority has not maintained that the officers entered the defendant's curtilage to conduct the canine investigation. Instead, it has rested its holding on the premise that a police dog is similar to sophisticated electronic surveillance technology, akin to the thermal imaging device that was at issue in Kyllo . See Kyllo v. United States , supra, at 29-30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. I disagree that dogs, regardless of how well trained they are, should be treated in the same manner as advanced technology for purposes of article first, § 7, of the state constitution and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. Because the defendant's alternative theory, that the shared hallway constitutes curtilage to his condominium unit, would provide an independent basis on which to conclude that the procedure violated article first, § 7, of the state constitution, I also consider that claim and reject it.

In the present case, the police officers acted on information that the defendant was growing marijuana in his condominium unit. On the basis of that information, and with the permission of the property manager of the condominium complex where the defendant lived, they brought a police dog into the common hallway of the building in order to conduct a canine examination of that area.1 The police never entered the defendant's **152condominium unit, confining their activities to the common areas of the condominium complex. Under these facts, I conclude that the police did not conduct a search of the defendant's condominium unit under either the federal or state constitutions.

The majority correctly observes that in determining whether the police have conducted a search under article first, § 7, of the state constitution, this court applies the same analytic framework that would be applied under the federal constitution. See State v. Davis , 283 Conn. 280, 310, 929 A.2d 278 (2007). Accordingly, like the majority's analysis, much of my discussion considers federal precedent.

Police dogs occupy a unique position in search and seizure jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff is "sui generis." United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). In rejecting claims that dog sniffs constituted searches, the court has examined whether the police conduct at issue "compromise[d] any legitimate interest in privacy ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). A person has a legitimate interest in privacy in an area or item if that person has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second ... the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Applying this test, the **153court has explained that it is "aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure." United States v. Place , supra, at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. A dog sniff does not *44yield detailed information and does not "expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view," it discloses only the presence or absence of contraband. Id. Because of the uniquely limited scope of a canine investigation, the court has held that dog sniffs of luggage at an airport and of a motor vehicle during a traffic stop do not constitute searches for purposes of the fourth amendment. See id. (canine sniff of luggage at airport did not constitute search); Illinois v. Caballes , supra, at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 (canine sniff of motor vehicle during traffic stop did not constitute search). The sole context in which the Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff constituted a search was when the officers had physically entered the defendant's property, within the curtilage of the home, in order to conduct the examination. See Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1415, 1417-18. Notably, in Jardines , the court expressly declined to rely on the reasonable expectation of privacy test and instead analyzed the defendant's challenge to the procedure under a property based theory of the fourth amendment. Id., at 1414, 1417. I will discuss Jardines in greater detail later in this dissent.

The majority relies on Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, to conclude that the dog sniff in the present case compromised the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy. In Kyllo , the United States Supreme Court applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to conclude that the use of a thermal imaging device to determine the amount of heat emanating from the defendant's home constituted a search for purposes of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. Id., at 34-35, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Because its focus was on the advance of technology, **154Kyllo did not affect the validity of prior cases that recognized the "sui generis" nature of the dog sniff. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes , supra, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 ; United States v. Place , supra, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. In fact, in sharp contrast to the manner in which it has regarded the use of dogs in police work, the United States Supreme Court has eyed advancing law enforcement surveillance technology with wariness for decades, leery of the threats that such advances pose to the protections afforded by the fourth amendment. Kyllo falls in a long line of cases in which the court has considered the fourth amendment implications of such advances. It is significant that in Jardines , the court could have extended Kyllo to apply to dog sniffs, bringing police canines within the same line of cases that has considered, inter alia, global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices, thermal imaging devices, helicopters, aerial mapping cameras, airplanes, electronic tracking devices, and wiretaps. See Grady v. North Carolina , 565 U.S. 400, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015) (GPS tracking device); United States v. Jones , --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (GPS tracking device); Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (thermal imaging device); Florida v. Riley , 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (helicopters); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States , 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (aerial mapping cameras); California v. Ciraolo , 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (airplanes); United States v. Karo , 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (electronic tracking devices); Katz v. United States , supra, 389 U.S. at 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (wiretaps). Presented with this opportunity to include police dogs within this category, the court declined to do so. That is because dogs are different from advanced technology. *45Advancements in technology trouble the court precisely because they are continually evolving, potentially **155eroding society's reasonable expectations of privacy. The court has had a dual response to technological developments. On the one hand, the court has attempted to craft rules that are flexible enough to anticipate more sophisticated means of surveillance and investigation that may become available to law enforcement. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 36, 121 S.Ct. 2038 ("[w]hile the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development"). At the same time, however, the court has recognized that advancements in technology have had an unavoidable and undeniable effect on search and seizure law because they have changed what we may reasonably expect to remain private. For instance, the court observed in Kyllo that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the [f]ourth [a]mendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology." Id., at 33-34, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Similarly, in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 955, in which the court concluded that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle constituted a search, Justice Sotomayor observed that "the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations."

An example of an area in which reasonable expectations of privacy have been reshaped by advances in technology is aerial surveillance. For example, in Florida v. Riley , supra, 488 U.S. at 448, 450, 109 S.Ct. 693, the court concluded that flying a police helicopter at a height of 400 feet over the defendant's backyard, to look through openings in the roof of the defendant's backyard greenhouse, did not constitute a search. The court acknowledged that the area was within the curtilage of the defendant's home, but key to its analysis was the fact **156that "private and commercial flight ... is routine ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 450, 109 S.Ct. 693. Accordingly, the court concluded, it was unreasonable for the defendant to expect that the contents of the greenhouse would not be visible from the air. Id. ; see also California v. Ciraolo , supra, 476 U.S. at 209, 215, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (because private and commercial flight is routine, no search where police chartered plane to fly 1000 feet over defendant's backyard to observe area completely enclosed within high fences).

There is nothing novel about drug sniffing dogs. Domesticated dogs have been a part of our society for centuries, and the power of the canine sense of smell is certainly no secret. Although this court, until now, had never weighed in on the question of when or whether a dog sniff constitutes a search, the court heard claims regarding dog sniffs more than twenty years ago. See State v. Torres , 230 Conn. 372, 380, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (declining to reach question of whether dog sniff during traffic stop constituted search because procedure was justified by articulable suspicion). The United States Supreme Court has heard claims challenging dog sniffs as far back as thirty-three years ago. See United States v. Place , supra, 462 U.S. at 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637. In other words, the police use of dogs as an investigative tool has been considered within our jurisprudence for many years.

Dogs, unlike technology, are not going to change. As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff is "sui generis." Id., at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. The nature of a dog's sense of smell *46has not changed over the years and there is no reason to believe that it will evolve in the way that technology does. Therefore, the scope of information yielded by a dog sniff, unlike the information yielded by technological devices, will remain sui generis-that information will always remain limited to indicating merely the presence or absence of contraband. Thus, there is no danger that a dog sniff will **157evolve to the point of alerting officers to a detail such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath ...." Kyllo v. United States , supra, 533 U.S. at 38, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Notwithstanding the court's characterization of the thermal imaging device in Kyllo as "crude" technology; id., at 36, 121 S.Ct. 2038 ; that device yielded much more detailed information than is conveyed by a canine investigation. The court explained that the Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager used by the police in that case converted "radiation into images based on relative warmth-black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images." Id., at 29-30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. In other words, the police were able to observe images of not only objects, but also of persons, moving about inside the home. There is simply no comparison between that type of device and a police dog.

Moreover, although drug sniffing dogs are highly trained, there is no claim in the present case, nor has the majority contended, that only the police are able to train dogs to respond to particular odors with particular behaviors. Thus, even if a dog is a "device" akin to a thermal imaging device, there has been no showing that it is a device that is somehow unavailable to the general public. I would conclude, therefore, that Kyllo is inapplicable to the present case.

The federal decisions on which the majority relies to arrive at the opposite conclusion-that dogs should be treated like advanced technology for purposes of determining whether a procedure constituted a search that compromised a legitimate expectation of privacy-ignore the unique character of a dog sniff, and either predate Jardines or gloss over the fact that in Jardines , the majority declined to extend Kyllo to dog sniffs. Most significantly, the majority relies heavily on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in **158United States v. Thomas , 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Fisher v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Wheelings v. United States , 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 67, 88 L.Ed.2d 54 (1985), and cert. denied sub nom. Rice v. United States , 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986), which concluded that a dog sniff of the defendant's apartment from a shared hallway compromised the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, primarily on the basis of the court's reasoning that a dog is like a technological device. Thomas , however, predated Jardines . As I have explained, the United States Supreme Court has never treated dogs in the same manner that it has treated technology for purposes of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and it declined to do so in Jardines . Similarly, in another decision relied on by the majority, United States v. Whitaker , 820 F.3d 849, 852-53 (7th Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relies solely on the concurring opinion of Justice Kagan in Jardines to conclude that Kyllo should be extended to dog sniffs, ignoring the majority decision in Jardines . I observe that most of the state court decisions relied on by the majority either predate Jardines or apply a curtilage analysis rather than the Katz reasonable expectation *47of privacy test. See, e.g., People v. Burns , 401 Ill.Dec. 468, 50 N.E.3d 610, 617-22 (2016) (applying Jardines curtilage inquiry to determine that dog sniff at entrance to defendant's apartment violated fourth amendment).

I further observe that no dog sniff may be analyzed in a vacuum. This dog sniff occurred in the shared hallway of a multiunit building, not a single-family home. That fact is relevant to the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, which is analyzed under a very fact centered and common sense inquiry. When one lives in a unit that shares walls, floors and ceilings with other units, and shares the same hallway as others **159in the building, it would be unreasonable to expect the same amount of privacy as that enjoyed in an independent dwelling place. This court has expressly recognized this principle: "Reasonable expectations of privacy are necessarily diminished in [multifamily] homes and [multiunit] buildings, by virtue of the presence in common areas of other tenants and their visitors ...." (Citations omitted.) State v. Brown , 198 Conn. 348, 357, 503 A.2d 566 (1986). The majority's statement, therefore, that the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy must be treated as though he lived in a single-family dwelling, is not supported by this court's precedent and cannot be reconciled with the facts of the case. The majority's claim is that its fiction is required because otherwise residents of multifamily buildings would enjoy lesser protection under article first, § 7, of the state constitution. That is simply not correct. Each person is protected against searches that compromise a reasonable expectation of privacy. The determination of what is reasonable is necessarily a fact intensive inquiry. Applying all of the relevant facts, including the facts that the procedure involved a dog rather than any advanced technology, and that it occurred in the common area of the condominium complex, I would hold that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors that emanated into a shared hallway from his condominium unit.

I next consider whether the area of the shared hallway immediately adjacent to the door to the defendant's condominium unit constituted the curtilage of the unit, rendering the dog sniff a search pursuant to Jardines . The question is whether the area in front of the defendant's unit is akin to the front porch in Jardines . In Jardines , the officers walked onto the defendant's front porch with a drug sniffing dog, which sat at the base of the defendant's front door, indicating that it had detected one of the odors to which it had been trained **160to respond. Florida v. Jardines , supra, 133 S.Ct. at 1413. Under those facts, the court was quite clear that its conclusion was grounded in the fourth amendment's roots in property rights, specifically the law of trespass, and therefore turned on the fact that the officers had physically intruded on the defendant's property in order to conduct the canine investigation. Id., at 1414. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that "[w]hen the [g]overnment obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has undoubtedly occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Understood properly, therefore, Jardines was not a case about a dog-it was a case about a front porch. The police officers exceeded the limited license enjoyed by the public to enter onto a front porch-the fact that the intrusion involved a dog was not significant. The majority explained that "[i]t is not the dog that is the problem, but the behavior that here involved use of the dog. We think a typical person would find it a cause for great alarm ... to find a stranger snooping about his front porch with or without a dog." (Citation *48omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., at 1416 n.3. The same conclusion would have been required, the majority added, if instead of using a drug sniffing dog, the police had peered into the windows of the home with binoculars. Id. Jardines stands only for the narrow proposition that when a police dog sniff occurs on a defendant's property, within the curtilage of the home, the sniff constitutes a search.

"The curtilage area immediately surrounding a private house has long been given protection as a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept." Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, supra, 476 U.S. at 235, 106 S.Ct. 1819. "[T]he [f]ourth [a]mendment protects the **161curtilage of a house and ... the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself. ... [T]he central component of this inquiry [is] whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that "curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. ... We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a 'correct' answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of [f]ourth [a]mendment protection." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134. The court also has noted, however, that "for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage-as the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends-is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). This court has further observed that application of the four Dunn factors involves "two principal questions, objective and subjective ... (1)

**162whether society would recognize the particular area claimed as within the curtilage of the home; and (2) whether the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in that area." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ryder , 301 Conn. 810, 823, 23 A.3d 694 (2011).

Applying these principles to the present case, I conclude that the area immediately outside the defendant's condominium unit did not constitute the curtilage of his unit. Nothing about the common hallway, even in the area outside his door, can be said to "[harbor] the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Dunn, supra, 480 U.S. at 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134. Privacy simply cannot be enjoyed in an area that is a shared space. The sole factor favoring the defendant is the proximity of the area to his home. Proximity alone, however, is not sufficient. If it were, then every public sidewalk that abuts the front of a home would constitute the curtilage of the home. Nothing in the record reveals that there was any enclosure separating *49this area from the remainder of the shared hallway. Nor is there any suggestion that the area was used for any other purpose than passing through, either by the defendant on the way into and out of his unit, or by other residents and their visitors accessing their respective units. Nor did the defendant ever claim that he took any steps whatsoever to protect the area from observation by people passing by, and indeed it is questionable that he would be able to, given that he did not enjoy exclusive control of that area. Compare United States v. Hopkins , 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016) (area outside front door of defendant's townhome constituted curtilage where door not accessed via common walkway and even his nearest neighbor would not pass near entrance to his unit), with State v. Luhm , 880 N.W.2d 606, 616-17 (Minn. App. 2016) (area immediately outside **163defendant's condominium unit did not constitute curtilage where access was by way of shared hallway, visible to all who walked by, and use of area governed by condominium association rules).

Under these facts, I conclude that the area in the shared hallway immediately outside the defendant's condominium unit did not constitute curtilage. Accordingly, Jardines is inapplicable to the present case, and the dog sniff did not constitute a search, either under the fourth amendment of the federal constitution or under article first, § 7, of the state constitution.

I respectfully dissent.

Arthur H. Healey, J.

The defendant, Germano Kimbro, was arrested without a warrant on Novem*220ber 8, 1982, for the crime of possessing a narcotic substance, i.e., cocaine, in violation of General Statutes § 19-481 (a). He filed a motion to suppress1 and a motion to dismiss,2 claiming in each that his rights were violated under both the United States and the Connecticut constitutions. In his motion to suppress, he sought the suppression of items seized from his person as having been taken without a warrant or without probable cause or pursuant to an unlawful arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted both motions.3 The state, with the permission of the trial court, has appealed. On appeal, the state claims that *221the trial court erred (1) in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress on its determination that the police lacked probable cause to arrest when they arrested the defendant, and (2) in granting the motion to dismiss.

At the outset, we turn to the state’s threshold claim that the issue of “probable cause” in this appeal is to be determined solely by the “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis set out in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983), rather than by the stricter two-prong analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli4 cases which predated Gates.5 In this case we do not agree.

The defendant specifically premised his trial court motions upon the Connecticut as well as the United States constitutions. The trial court, without stating the precise bases of its decision in granting suppression and dismissal, granted the defendant’s motions. We are therefore entitled to infer that the trial court acted in favor of all the defendant’s claims as they were asserted in his motions, especially when the trial court’s decision, which was explicated in terms of the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, had been based on the settled substantive law of this state before the Gates decision. See, e.g., State v. Grayton, 163 Conn. 104, 106, 302 A.2d 246, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S. Ct. 542, 34 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1972). On appeal, the state seeks to overturn the trial court’s decision and, in doing so, argues in its brief that “Gates in no way [has] altered an individual’s ultimate right not to be searched or seized in *222the absence of probable cause. United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment; Connecticut Constitution, article I § 7.” (Emphasis added.) In his brief, the defendant asserts the Connecticut constitution’s preference for searches pursuant to a warrant and also argues that his motions below were predicated on both the United States and Connecticut constitutions. We conclude that the probable cause issue is properly before us under both the United States and Connecticut constitutions. See State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 566-73, 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (Healey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985).

We note that in none of our three earlier decisions in which we referred to Gates did any of the defendants claim that the respective circumstances failed to constitute probable cause under the Connecticut constitution. See State v. Perry, 195 Conn. 505, 488 A.2d 1256 (1985); State v. Couture, supra; State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 480 A.2d 509 (1984). It is our view in this warrantless arrest and search case that the trial court’s decision was correct under either the Gates “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis or the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

Gates, of course, involved an application for a warrant, and it is crucial to underscore the fact that the Gates court reiterated that “after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.” Illinois v. Gates, supra, 236. Rather, a reviewing court should pay “great deference” to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Id., citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). In the same fashion, we do not attempt such de novo review where there has been a trial court determination that probable cause does not exist. In deciding whether probable cause does or does not exist, “[t]he trier of the facts *223determines with finality the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. ‘We cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” State v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 157-58, 384 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978). This axiom is significant because the trier of fact, which in such a suppression hearing is the trial court, first determines the facts; then the trial court ultimately determines whether those facts it found constitute probable cause.6 The former is obviously a fact-bound determination, while the latter is at the very least a mixed question of fact and law. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964).

It is clear that the constitutional validity of the search in this case is predicated upon the constitutional validity of the arrest, which was constitutionally valid only if at the time the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. See Beck v. Ohio, supra, 91; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 31, 94 L. Ed. 513 (1949). “The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating . . . often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” Brinegar v. United States, supra, 176.

Certain observations concerning Illinois v. Gates, supra, should properly be made here. The Gates deci*224sion dismantled and abandoned the stricter “two-pronged test” of Aguilar and Spinelli in that it held that the sufficiency of an affidavit that relies on a confidential informant depends on “the totality-of-the-circumstances” test. While the Gates court reiterated the preference for search warrants, it seems fairly probable that the Gates test may be applied in fourth amendment cases to warrantless searches and seizures. See 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1985 Sup.) § 3.1, p. 172. Despite the abandonment of the two-pronged test of AguilarSpinelli in fourth amendment cases, the Gates court said that it “intended neither a rigid compartmentalization of the inquiries into an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge,’ nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an informant’s tip”; it did emphasize that “[rjather, we required only that some facts bearing on two particular issues be provided to the magistrate.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 231 n.6. Thus, the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” issues are still viable though in the context of the less strict “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis for the existence of probable cause. The Gates court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court “that an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report” (emphasis added) but it did not agree “that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . .’’Id., 230. Rather, as the Gates court set out, “they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” Id. Under Gates, “the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the *225magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 238-39; see Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984). However, in rejecting the stricter test, the Gates court attempted to characterize its new approach as an “analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations.” Illinois v. Gates, supra, 238. In rejecting the “independent status” of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test, the informant’s “veracity” or “reliability” and his “basis of knowledge,” the Gates court said that they were “better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”7 Id., 233. According to the Gates court, the totality of the circumstances analysis was “far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip.” Id., 230-31. The probable cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical conception,” it deals with “probabilities,” and “ ‘[t]hese are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Id., 231, quoting Brinegar v. United States, supra, 175-76. Fur*226thermore, “ ‘the [probable cause] process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities’ ” and “probable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id., 231-32. The court stressed that “[o]ur decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.” Id., 241. The Gates court referred with approval to Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), where “[w]e [said] that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer ‘may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations,' so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.’ ” Gates v. Illinois, supra, 242, quoting Jones v. United States, supra, 269.

While the Gates court laid down the totality of circumstances analysis, it did express both the preference for warrants and the deference to be given by appellate courts to determinations of probable cause. De novo appellate probable cause determination was specifically eschewed, and these admonitions were repeated in Massachusetts v. Upton, supra. With this background, we consider whether the trial court correctly determined that the state had not demonstrated the existence of probable cause in this warrantless arrest case.

It would appear that on November 8, 1982, Officer Joseph Howard had been a New Haven police officer for nearly nine years. At that time, he had been working for about a year and one-half with a city street crime unit whose primary function was narcotics enforcement. He had known the defendant Kimbro for more *227than five years, had arrested him in the past,8 and knew him to be a convicted felon recently released from prison. Over “approximately” two weeks before November 8, 1982, Howard had observed the defendant on Dixwell Avenue near Lake Place in New Haven “at least half a dozen times,” and felt that it was unusual during periods of “inclement weather, cold weather” that he saw the defendant “loitering for extended periods of time” at that location. Howard said that “Dixwell [Avenue] and Lake Place is an area that we patrol . . . quite frequently . . . [and] we would drive through the area in search of wanted persons or illegal activity and during such travels I did note his presence there on those aforementioned occasions.” He said that he knew “one of the [defendant’s] home addresses,” which was about two to three miles away, and he also said that he was not aware that the defendant worked at a garage across the street from the corner on which the November 8,1982 arrest took place.

Howard testified that as the result of a telephone call9 from “a known reliable informant,” approximately five to ten minutes before the defendant’s actual arrest, he and two other officers10 proceeded to Dixwell Avenue and Lake Place. He believed that the informant, who had been a paid police informant, was reliable because information given in the past by him “had resulted in the apprehension of wanted felons . . . and one narcotics arrest,”11 although he was not aware of any con*228victions resulting from any of those instances. Howard had known this informant for several months.

With reference to what Howard testified the informant told him, the trial court in its oral decision said that “what impressed me also was the fact that Officer Howard couldn’t really tell exactly what the informant had told him and there were no details involved.” The court felt that it was important as to “what weight should [be given] to Officer Howard’s testimony as to the credibility or reliability of the informant. I have to find that the informant was credible or reliable.”

Such matters are for the trier of fact and not for appellate review. In cases involving constitutional safeguards, as this did, in passing upon the trial court’s determination on the issue of probable cause, it is best we remember that we do not sit “ ‘as in nisi prius,’ ” and, therefore, deference is due the trial court’s decision of that issue. State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 298 (R.I. 1984); State v. Roberts, 434 A.2d 257, 264 (R.I. 1981); see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961).

The trial court also stated that “there are no circumstances in this case corroborating the informant, except the fact that he [the defendant] was at this particular comer when the police arrived there.” This last circumstance the trial court did not consider “paramount,” because Howard had seen the defendant there a half dozen times recently; moreover, the defendant worked in that area. Noting the lack of evidence of any prior arrests or convictions involving narcotics of Kimbro, the court attached “no indication of anything” to the circumstance that the defendant merely “backed away” *229when Howard approached him. It concluded that there were “insufficient circumstances for the determination that the informant was credible or that his information was reliable.” The “reliability” necessary for the existence of probable cause to arrest applies as much to the information provided as to the informant who provides it. Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308, 313, 207 A.2d 300 (1965).

The transcript also discloses that Howard testified on direct that the informant told him that the defendant was on Dixwell Avenue near Lake Place and “was in possession of and offering for sale what the defendant purported to be cocaine.” While he did not recall the “exact verbiage [of the informant,] the conversation was that Mr. Kimbro was in possession of it, that he was offering it for sale on the street and that the informant had seen the package that was offered, that was purported to be cocaine.”

On cross-examination Howard admitted that the informant did not tell him that he (the informant) “had seen narcotics on the defendant” but “merely packages of what the defendant was purporting to be cocaine.” He also said at first that the informant did not tell him he had seen an actual sale. Asked how the informant “knew” that the defendant “was in fact purporting to have cocaine,” Howard replied that the informant overheard “the defendant purport that the package of substance was cocaine.” He was asked again if the informant told him whether he had seen an actual sale. After a colloquy the court said that “one of the problems with this hearing is that . . . if the officer would just say what he said instead of trying to paraphrase what he said.” (Emphasis added.) The court thereupon instructed the officer to do so. Howard then said the informant did not know it was cocaine except that he “overheard” and “observed the packages being displayed and the offer of the purported cocaine for *230sale.”12 He thereafter repeated that the informant had not told him that he had seen a drug sale. During this portion of the cross-examination the court itself asked the officer questions and indicated that the testimony was “confusing.” Howard was also asked, based on his “observation” of the defendant over the period of two weeks in the same area, whether he had ever observed the defendant in a drug transaction. He said that “I could have and never even known it” because “small objects” are involved in such a transaction. Upon arriving at the location where the defendant was standing, Howard, who had not observed any drug activity, first placed the defendant under arrest and then searched him pursuant to the arrest. That search disclosed several packages, a sample of which was later found to include cocaine.

We have already noted that this case, unlike Gates, involves a warrantless arrest and search.13 While we endorse the Gates majority’s preference for warrants, we must recognize that, while the state makes no such claim in this case, it is not always reasonably practicable to get a warrant. The state instead suggests that this is a conventional type of case with probable cause evident under Gates, thus justifying the warrantless arrest and the resulting search and seizure. Where, in warrantless arrests or searches, the police involved, in effect, act as their own magistrate in the determina*231tion of the existence of probable cause, obviously fourth amendment protections still apply. See 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 3.3, p. 185. That amendment “ ‘protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted.) Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). It is well to remember that, unlike some other constitutional rights, there is no realistic way that an innocent person can invoke advance protection from unconstitutional searches and seizures, but rather the choice is either to submit to whatever the governmental authority undertakes or to resist at a possibly greater risk. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 31, 94 L. Ed. 513 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

In this case, the informant himself was the source of the information upon which the police acted. The “veracity” or “reliability” of this informant was of great concern to the trial court. The paid informant’s track record has been set out; there were prior arrests of “wanted felons,” but the one and only prior narcotics arrest was a “dropsy” case. No convictions had resulted from any information he had conveyed. He gave no information of any prior conduct of the defendant involving narcotics, nor did the police, singly or collectively, know of or suspect any prior conduct of the defendant with narcotics.14 This is true although he had been the subject of police observation for at least two weeks at that area where he was arrested.

There is little doubt that the veracity of an informant is enhanced where he makes a statement under oath or where his information is corroborated by police *232observation, especially where the informant’s information is in some detail. This police corroboration, of course, is, as in the cases where there is a warrant, that which results from prior independent police investigation. See United States v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1975); see also State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 448, 294 A.2d 517, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S. Ct. 198, 34 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1972) (“[w]here information from different sources dovetails, corroboration exists”). In determining the reliability of information provided by an informant, we have relied upon the reputation or past criminal behavior of the suspect as a practical consideration. See State v. Ferguson, 185 Conn. 104, 115, 440 A.2d 841 (1981). There is no evidence in this record that this informant knew anything of the defendant’s reputation or past criminal behavior. Howard, of course, knew of the defendant’s release from prison, but an officer’s knowledge of the reputation of a suspect is not alone enough to constitute probable cause. See United States v. Canestri, supra, 272-73.

In this case, the informant indicated what he saw of this defendant’s conduct prior to informing the police. We, as an appellate court, should not evince a grudging attitude toward the trial court’s ultimate assessment of the evidence before it, when that assessment is reasonably supportable on the credible evidence. Practice Book § 3060D; see Solomon v. Aberman, 196 Conn. 359, 377-78, 493 A.2d 193 (1985). In the present case the trial court was not indulging in the hyper-technicality which Gates disapproves, but, rather, as was evident from the transcript, it was sifting and evaluating the oral evidence presented.

What may be called the “basis of knowledge” circumstance in the totality of circumstances discloses that there was no evidence that this informant bought or even saw the alleged narcotics. We say this aware that *233whatever a person knowingly exposes is not constitutionally protected from observation. United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 100 (10th Cir. 1980); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (White, J., concurring). In this case, given the complete lack of any independent police investigation or information tending to corroborate the informant’s information, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that probable cause was not demonstrated is supported in this record. Furthermore, although the trial court properly employed the Aguilar-Spinelli test, what we have pointed out clearly demonstrated that probable cause could not exist even under the Gates totality of the circumstances test.

In light of our conclusion that even under the Illinois v. Gates approach the motion to suppress was properly granted, we ordinarily need say no more. In this case, however, the defendant also asserted the protection of the Connecticut constitution in his motion to suppress. We thus address this claim separately in accordance with the decision of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). In turning to article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,15 we must decide whether that provision affords more substantive protection to citizens than does the fourth amendment to the federal constitution in the determination of probable cause. We conclude that it does.

Although we have not previously determined this particular question, we have invoked our constitution in the protection of individual rights. See, e.g., State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. *234denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985); Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984); State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 463 A.2d 573 (1983); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). We clearly have the power to construe the Connecticut constitution in accordance with our particular analysis of the specific right in issue.16 Only recently we have said that “[f]ederal law, whether based upon statute or constitution, establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual *235rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (Citations omitted.) Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984). In taking this position we recognize, as we must, the authority of the United States Supreme Court to act as the final arbiter of controversies arising under the United States constitution. This was established early in the history of our republic. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) (authority to review state criminal cases); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816) (authority to review state civil cases). We also recognize, and the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, that such authority is limited when the federal courts undertake to review state court decisions construing state law. In Michigan v. Long, supra, 1041, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, said: “If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.” In construing article first, § 7, of our constitution in this case, we recognize that protections under our constitution may be afforded in accordance with Michigan v. Long, supra. It appears settled that federal court decisions do not limit the rights of state courts to afford greater rights than under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975); see also Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).

The determination of “probable cause” under article first, § 7, is not to be made under the “fluid” concept of that term as set out in Gates, but rather, under *236the established principles developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985) (after remand); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). Citation is not necessary to demonstrate this court’s invocation over the years of the AguilarSpinelli test, which we submit has not been applied hypertechnically.

We eschew the amorphous standard of Gates17 in passing upon article first, § 7, interpretation and apply the more specific standards of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Upton, supra.18 See also State v. Jackson, supra.19 The Aguilar-Spinelli test, with its two prongs of “veracity” or “reliability” and “basis of knowledge,” offers a practical and independent test under our con*237stitution that predictably guides the conduct of all concerned, including magistrates and law enforcement officials, in the determination of probable cause. This test protects individual rights without disadvantaging law enforcement. It is salutary to recall, as Justice Brennan has said, that “one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.” Brennan, supra, 503.

The circumstances relevant to the issue of probable cause in this case have been set forth earlier in this opinion. As we have demonstrated above, the trial court made no piecemeal analysis of the testimony in applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test in this case. It concluded that there were “insufficient circumstances for the determination that the informant was credible or that his information was reliable.” The trial judge said that he did not have “any real evidence here about the reliability of this informant and the fact they made one narcotics arrest [the dropsy case] does not give me that evidence of reliability.” Additionally, the trial court pointed out that “there are no circumstances in this case corroborating the informant, except the fact that he [the defendant] was at this particular corner when the police arrived there.” Actually, the corroboration to which the court referred should have been corroboration existing prior to that time when the police decided to make the arrest and after an evaluation of the informant’s information with whatever independent police information known to them at that time. As pointed out, the police had absolutely no self-verifying detail in their collective knowledge to add to the informant’s information. Even though they had been observing him for about two weeks and knew he was recently released from prison, they had, on this record, no knowledge of any prior narcotics history of any sort of this defendant. The deference to be given a finding of probable cause should, even-handedly, not be diluted *238in evaluating a trial court’s finding of no probable cause. This includes the trial court’s careful evaluation of all the evidence.

While it is not crucial in this warrantless arrest and seizure case, we note the rationale of United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965), that “doubtful or marginal cases . . . should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” The real question is not “whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, reh. denied, 424 U.S. 979, 96 S. Ct. 1488, 47 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1976). “There is no more basic constitutional rule in the Fourth Amendment area than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except in a few ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Watson, supra, 427 (Powell, J., concurring). This clearly applies under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The common sense application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test in this case by the trial court in its determination that there was not probable cause was not clearly erroneous, and the result reached under that test was constitutionally mandated under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.

There is no error.

In this opinion Dannehy and Santaniello, Js., concurred.

Shea, J.,

dissenting. The majority opinion goes far out of its way in seizing upon this case as the occasion to reject the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test established by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. *239Ed. 2d 1453 (1983), as the touchstone for ascertaining probable cause to justify a search or seizure under the fourth amendment of our federal constitution. In two recent cases, State v. Perry, 195 Conn. 505, 508, 488 A.2d 1256 (1985), and State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 106, 480 A.2d 509 (1984), this court has given its endorsement to Gates, declaring that “ ‘[t]he determination of probable cause must be made from the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Gasparro, supra. As applied in Gates, this broader statement of the criterion for determining probable cause obviated the necessity for disclosure of the manner in which the informant had acquired the information he had conveyed to the police, the so-called “basis of knowledge” part of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Under that test “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were . . . .” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). In the case before us, the testimony was clear that the informant had personally observed the defendant offering packages he represented to contain cocaine for sale on the streets.1 Thus the “basis of knowledge” *240prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which might not have been satisfied in Gates, was easily surpassed here. The so-called “veracity prong” of Aguilar-Spinelli, whether the police have reasonable grounds for crediting the information concerning criminal activity furnished by the informant, remains essentially untouched by the Gates “totality-of-the-circumstances” formulation. It is therefore wholly unnecessary for our disposition of this case to decide what we may do if we should some day be confronted with a situation like Gates where the “basis of the informant’s knowledge” is left to be inferred entirely from the details contained in the information furnished, some of which may have been verified by other sources. There is nothing in the language or history of article first, § 7, of our state constitution, paralleling the fourth amendment of our federal constitution, that mandates any particular test for determining the ultimate constitutional requirement of the existence of probable cause prior to a search. No one questions the authority of this court to construe our state constitution to afford greater protection to individual rights than that afforded by our federal constitution; see Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); but it is wholly inappropriate to declare our position in a particular instance before we have a case presenting the issue. Accordingly, I would follow our customary practice of not crossing constitutional bridges until we come to *241them. Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 647, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985).

I also disagree with the majority’s resolution of this appeal under the standard two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. As previously noted, the basis for the informant’s report of criminal activity in progress, the first prong of the test, was his personal observation of the defendant’s activities at the location specified.2 Such a situation “presents few problems: since the report, although hearsay, purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers on the honesty of the informant . . . . ” Spinelli v. United States, supra, 425 (White, J., concurring). It is this remaining veracity prong that the trial court as well as the majority maintain is not satisfied by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.

The majority opinion sets forth a plethora of arguments to support the conclusion of the trial court that the police could not reasonably have relied on the information supplied by the informant in arresting and searching the defendant. Among them are: (1) the deference due the trial court’s determination; (2) the lack of a warrant for the arrest or search; (3) an insufficient “track record” of the reliability of previous tips given by the informant, none of which had thus far resulted in a conviction; (4) the fact that, because the defendant may have worked near the location where he was reported to be selling cocaine, Officer Howard’s several observations of him loitering there for extended periods of time and for no apparent reason were not actually corroborative of the reliability of the informant; and (5) the absence of any knowledge by the police or indication in the informant’s report concerning prior drug related activities of the defendant. None of these can withstand analysis.

*242First. With respect to our function in reviewing trial court decisions on probable cause, it is clear that upon disputed factual issues we are ordinarily bound by the finding of the judge who heard the evidence. We ought not, however, to defer to the legal conclusions drawn from those facts if in our judgment they are clearly erroneous. Practice Book § 3060D. We have heretofore treated probable cause as a question of law to be reviewed in the light of the subordinate facts found by the trial court or presented to us as undisputed. See State v. Daley, 189 Conn. 717, 458 A.2d 1147 (1983); State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 294 A.2d 517, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S. Ct. 198, 34 L. Ed 2d 121 (1972). In the present case the trial court made no finding that the information given to the police by the informant was not as indicated by Howard’s testimony. The court concluded simply that the information received was insufficient as a matter of law to justify a reasonable belief that the defendant had engaged in criminal activity. No more deference is due that determination than any other trial court decision on a question of law.

Second. It is utterly ridiculous to suggest that when the police receive a report of criminal activity presently occurring in a public street they must await issuance of a warrant before taking action. By the time the application for the warrant can be prepared and a judge found available the felon would be long gone. Effective law enforcement under such a requirement would be impossible. The report received by Howard five or ten minutes before the arrest was that the defendant was then engaged in selling narcotics. If Howard had reasonable grounds to credit that report, delaying action until a warrant could be obtained would have been a dereliction of his duty to prevent crime.

Third. The prior experience of Howard with this informant demonstrates an ample basis for his reli*243anee upon the truth of the report received. Three previous arrests had been made on the basis of information furnished by the same informant, “[o]ne narcotics arrest and . . . two wanted felons.” Howard had participated in the narcotics arrest and when the suspect was approached he discarded some items containing heroin. Because Howard had been acquainted with the informant only for several months, he was aware of no convictions that had resulted from this informant’s tips, because the cases were still pending in court. Convictions are not essential for an informant to have an acceptable reputation for reliability. 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 3.3, p. 510. “Courts have consistently held that an informant’s track record is sufficiently established by a showing (i) that on one or more previous occasions the informant indicated that a certain object, usually narcotics . . . are concealed at a certain place, and (ii) that this information was verified as true by a search which uncovered the specified items at the place indicated.” Id., p. 511. The circumstances of the prior narcotics arrest, resulting from this informant’s tip, in which Howard had participated make this principle applicable to establish adequately the reliability of the informant even without the successful experience of the police with the information concerning the two wanted felons.

Fourth. The fact that Howard had seen the defendant loitering for extended periods of time at Dixwell Avenue and Lake Place even during cold and inclement weather did tend to confirm in his view the accuracy of the information received from the informant. Although the defendant may have worked in the vicinity, the location of his employment was not known to Howard at the time of the arrest and has no bearing upon the reasonableness of his judgment at that time. The weight given by the trial court as well as the *244majority to this innocent though unsupported3 explanation of the defendant’s frequent presence at the location where he was arrested is misplaced for the same reason that the fruits of a search, such as the cocaine found upon the defendant, cannot be used to justify the search.

Fifth. It is highly novel to suggest, as the majority opinion does, that Howard’s acquaintance with the defendant, whom he had once arrested, as a convicted felon recently released from prison was wholly insignificant in the probable cause determination because he was unaware of any prior involvement of the defendant with drugs. Courts frequently rely upon felony convictions as evidence of character just as lay persons do without consideration of the nature of the particular felony involved. See General Statutes § 52-145 (b); State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 523-25, 447 A.2d 396 (1982).

The case before us provides a stronger basis for relying upon the information supplied by the informant than that approved by the United States Supreme *245Court in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959), where a paid informant, who had given other information of narcotics violations found to be reliable during the preceding period of about six months, notified the arresting officer that the defendant would be returning to Denver from Chicago by train on one of two successive days with three ounces of heroin in his possession. He also gave a detailed description of the defendant and the clothing he would be wearing. When the defendant alighted from the train garbed as predicted he was arrested. The court upheld the finding of probable cause despite the absence of: (1) any disclosure of the basis for the informant’s knowledge of the defendant’s activities other than inferences that could be drawn from the details of his description and the accuracy of his prediction; (2) any “track record” of prior convictions based on previous tips of the informant; and (3) any confirmation by police observation of anything but noncriminal conduct of the defendant. “The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, [supra,] provides a suitable benchmark.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).

In the present case, the informant had obtained the information he gave the police by personal observation and was willing to risk his reputation for reliability as well as his source of income by reporting a crime in progress. He must have realized his report would be subjected to immediate verification by police action, as it was. Under these circumstances I cannot affirm the conclusion of the majority as well as the trial court that it was unreasonable for Howard to rely upon the truth of the information he had received and to arrest the defendant.

Accordingly, I dissent.

*246Callahan, J.,

dissenting. I concur with Justice Shea’s dissenting opinion.

I find myself at a loss as to why the majority feels it necessary to determine gratuitously that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution requires the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli tests to a determination of probable cause.

I am in agreement with what was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983), that “the ‘two-pronged test’ has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants’ tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.” Id., 234-35.

“The strictures that inevitably accompany the ‘two-pronged test’ cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement . . . .” Id., 237.

“We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard [totality-of-the-circumstances] will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli.” Id., 239.

I feel that making Aguilar and Spinelli the test for determining probable cause under the state constitution is a step backward into that labyrinthine body of hypertechnical rules concerning the criminal law from which I thought we were gradually beginning to emerge.

Peters, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, contrary to our holding in State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985), article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution permits a court to determine the existence of probable cause on the basis of the “totality of the circumstances” when it reviews a search warrant application based on information provided to the police by a confidential informant. The state charged the defendant, Timothy Barton, with possession of over a kilogram of marihuana with intent to sell and with possession of marihuana, in violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 21a-279 (b)1 respectively, after police, acting under the authority of a warrant, had *532searched his home and had seized more than fifty-pounds of marihuana there. The defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion on the ground that the affidavit accompanying the search warrant application failed to state the informant’s “basis of knowledge.” The charges were subsequently dismissed with prejudice. With the permission of the trial court, the state appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed. State v. Barton, 22 Conn. App. 62, 576 A.2d 561 (1990). We granted certification to reconsider the state constitutional issue presented,2 and we reverse.

The opinion of the Appellate Court reports the relevant facts. On August 7,1988, officers of the Winsted police department, acting on the authority of a search and seizure warrant obtained that day on the basis of information provided by a confidential informant, searched the defendant’s apartment in Winsted. Although the defendant was not at home when the police arrived to execute the warrant, they obtained a key from the owner of the apartment. In the course of their search, the police found some fifty-two pounds of marihuana wrapped in clear plastic bags and kept in larger garbage bags in a bedroom. When the defendant returned home after midnight, the police arrested him. Id., 64.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, contending that the search and seizure violated his rights under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and the fourth *533amendment to the United States constitution. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court applied the two-pronged analysis mandated by this court’s decision in State v. Kimbro, supra, which requires a magistrate, in determining whether probable cause exists for a search or seizure, to evaluate both the “basis of knowledge” and the “veracity” or “reliability” of an informant upon whose information the police have relied. See id., 233-37; see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). In the circumstances of this case, both the trial court and the Appellate Court concluded that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not adequately set forth the unnamed informant’s basis of knowledge and therefore failed to establish probable cause. State v. Barton, supra, 70. Both courts accordingly agreed that the evidence seized in reliance upon the warrant had to be suppressed. Id.

In the present appeal, the state urges us to overrule our holding in State v. Kimbro, supra, and to adopt the “totality of the circumstances” standard for determining probable cause used in the federal courts pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983). The state argues that our decision in Kimbro (1) did not accurately reflect either the preconstitutional law of Connecticut or the case law of this court construing article first, § 7, prior to the time when the fourth amendment to the federal constitution was made applicable to the states, and (2) needlessly constitutionalized a standard for the use of hearsay in warrant affidavits that is susceptible to rigid and inconsistent application by lower courts and that impairs legitimate law enforcement efforts. The state argues, alternatively, that the trial court and the Appel*534late Court were mistaken in concluding, under any standard of review, that the affidavit in this case failed to establish probable cause. We agree with the state that application of the standards mandated by Kimbro has resulted at times in unduly technical readings of warrant affidavits, and we reject such an inappropriate methodology.

In deciding this question, we consider first the analysis that led the United States Supreme Court to reject the Aguilar-Spinelli test. We next examine the constitutional basis underlying Kimbro to distinguish the goals we sought to achieve in retaining the AguilarSpinelli test in that decision from the nonconstitutional encrustations that accompanied it. Finally, we review the warrant affidavit at issue in this case to determine whether it satisfies the requirements of article first, § 7. We conclude that it does.

I

A

In Illinois v. Gates, supra, 235, the United States Supreme Court rejected the “complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules” that had evolved from its earlier decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, supra, and Spinelli v. United States, supra. As commonly cited and applied, the “two-pronged” Aguilar-Spinelli test provides a method for evaluating the existence of probable cause consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment3 when a search warrant affidavit *535is based upon information supplied to the police by a confidential informant. The issuing judge must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the informant in concluding that the facts are as he claims they are, and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer seeking the warrant concluded (a) that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible, or (b) that the information was reliable. State v. Ruscoe, 212 Conn. 223, 228-29, 563 A.2d 267 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S. Ct. 1144, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1990); State v. Delmonaco, 194 Conn. 331, 338, 481 A.2d 40, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 511, 83 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1984). When the information supplied by the informant fails to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, probable cause may still be found if the warrant application affidavit sets forth other circumstances—typically independent police corroboration of certain details provided by the informant—that bolster the deficiencies. State v. Ruscoe, supra, 229.

The Gates court identified two principal flaws in the Aguilar-Spinelli test. First, because courts and commentators had generally regarded the two prongs of the test to be entirely independent of each other, courts had struggled to formulate rules regarding what types of information and what types of corroboration might satisfy each of the prongs. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 229 n.4; see also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed. 1987) § 3.3 (a), pp. 612-27. Specifically, some courts had concluded that independent police investigation might corroborate the “reliability” of the information, but could never satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong of the test, while ample “self-verifying details” might establish that the informant had personal knowledge of the alleged activity and thus could satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong, but could never compensate for a deficiency in the “veracity” or “reliability” prong. *536See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (1974); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959). The “elaborate set of legal rules” that had resulted from this emphasis on the independent character of the two prongs had led courts, in many cases, to dissect warrant applications in an excessively technical manner, “with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that [could not] sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.” Illinois v. Gates, supra, 229, 234-35. Such a result was inconsistent with the nature of a probable cause determination, which, as the Gates court noted, involves a “ ‘practical, nontechnical conception.’ ” Id., 231, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 31, 94 L. Ed. 513 (1949).

The second principal flaw in the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, according to the Gates court, was that the test had caused reviewing courts, both at suppression hearings and at appellate levels, to test the sufficiency of warrant affidavits by de novo review. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 236. Such de novo review, in the view of the Gates majority, was inconsistent with the constitution’s “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” A reviewing court should rather determine whether the magistrate issuing the warrant had a “substantial basis” for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of criminal activity. Id.

In rejecting the. complex structure of rules that had evolved from Aguilar and Spinelli, however, the Gates court did not reject out of hand the underlying concerns that had originally been expressed in Aguilar. In that case, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a search warrant supported by an affidavit that stated only that the “[ajffiants have received reliable information *537from a credible person,” without stating any of the underlying circumstances that would support a finding of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 109. The Aguilar court ruled that such a conclusory affidavit failed to state a factual basis on which a neutral and detached magistrate could determine the existence of probable cause. Id., 113-14. In Gates, the court reaffirmed that the “veracity” or “reliability” and the “basis of knowledge” inquiries formulated in Aguilar remain “highly relevant” in the determination of probable cause and should be regarded as “closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question” of the existence of probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 230. The Gates court abandoned only a “rigid compartmentalization” of the inquiries and denied that the court had ever intended them to be understood as “entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.” Id.

In the place of the “compartmentalized” AguilarSpinelli test, the Gates court directed lower courts to apply a “totality of the circumstances” analysis more consistent with traditional assessments of probable cause. While still employing the analytical frame of reference established in Aguilar, a “totality of the circumstances” analysis permits a judge issuing a warrant greater freedom to assess “the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.” Id., 234. Under the analysis approved in Gates, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” *538Id., 238. The task of a subsequent court reviewing the magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant is to determine whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. Id., 238-39.

The court’s decision in Gates emphasized the necessity of a case-by-case analysis of probable cause based on all of the facts presented to the judge issuing the warrant, not merely on those capable of categorization as indicating the “veracity” or “basis of knowledge” of a particular informant. Underlying the court’s emphasis on the factbound nature of the probable cause determination were two premises: first, that probable cause is a practical, commonsense determination, requiring “ ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity’ id., 235, quoting Spinelli v. United States, supra, 419; and second, that one of the principal safeguards of the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement is the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate who is charged with exercising discretion to arrive at an informed and independent decision as to whether probable cause exists. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 239-40. Because none of these underlying propositions are in apparent conflict with our prior decisions construing Connecticut’s probable cause requirement, we turn now to a reconsideration of our decision in State v. Kimbro, supra.

B

We note, at the outset, that our decision in Kimbro did not rely upon historical analysis to determine the standard by which probable cause should be measured.4 *539We relied, rather, upon our determination that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, “with its two prongs of ‘veracity' or ‘reliability' and ‘basis of knowledge,’ offers a practical and independent test under our constitution that predictably guides the conduct of all concerned, including magistrates and law enforcement officials, in the determination of probable cause.” State v. Kimbro, supra, 236-37. We regarded the Gates “totality of the circumstances” analysis as an “amorphous standard” that inadequately safeguarded the rights of indi*540viduals to be free from unjustified intrusions. State v. Kimbro, supra, 230-31, 237. Upon careful review of that determination, we agree with the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in Gates that the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are highly relevant evidentiary questions that a magistrate issuing the warrant must consider in deciding whether probable cause for a search or seizure exists, but that they are not wholly independent and dispositive constitutional tests for which de novo review exists at a suppression hearing. See Illinois v. Gates, supra, 230.

In reaching our present conclusion we return to first principles. Article first, § 7, of our constitution provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” This provision, like the fourth amendment to the federal constitution that it closely resembles,5 safeguards the privacy, the personal security, and the property of the individual against unjustified intrusions by agents of the government.6

One of the principal means by which the warrant requirement protects the privacy and property of the individual is by the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate7 who must judge independently *541the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant.8 Whether applying the fourth amendment or article first, § 7, of our own constitution,9 we have frequently recognized that a magistrate issuing a warrant cannot form an independent opinion as to the existence of probable cause unless the affidavit supporting the warrant application sets forth some of the facts upon which the police have relied in concluding that a search is justified. “ ‘Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.’ ” State v. Rose, 168 Conn. 623, 627, 362 A.2d 813 (1975), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965).

*542When a police officer seeking a search warrant relies on hearsay information supplied by confidential informants rather than on personal knowledge and observations, certain additional facts are necessary to ensure that the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant is informed and independent. The Aguilar test originated when the United States Supreme Court identified two additional factors that magistrates must consider in evaluating the existence of probable cause in such cases: (1) the reliability of the way in which the informant reached his conclusions about the alleged illegal activity; and (2) the circumstances from which the police concluded that the informant was credible or that the information itself was reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 114.

Although Aguilar spawned progeny that became noted for their technicality, the court’s analysis in Aguilar itself was pragmatic and commonsensieal. Its unstated premise was that confidential informants10 are themselves often “criminals, drug addicts, or even pathological liars” whose motives for providing information to the police may range from offers of immunity or sentence reduction, promises of money payments, or “such perverse motives as revenge or the hope of eliminating criminal competition.” M. Rebell, “The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth *543Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards,” 81 Yale L.J. 703, 712-13 (1972); see also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed. 1987) § 3.3, p. 611. Because such an informant’s reliance on rumors circulating on the street is not unlikely and the veracity of such an informant is questionable, a magistrate reviewing a search warrant application based on such an informant’s word can best assess the probable reliability of the information if she or he is informed of some of the predicate facts that indicate how the informant gained his information and why the police officer believes that the information is reliable in order to decide, independently, whether the police officer’s inferences from the informant’s statements are reasonable.

In Kimbro, we expressed concern that the “fluid” “totality of the circumstances” analysis approved in the fourth amendment context of Illinois v. Gates, supra, would inadequately inform magistrates and law enforcement officials of their obligation to scrutinize the information gathered from confidential police informants with appropriate caution. State v. Kimbro, supra, 233-38. In construing article first, § 7, of our constitution to require continued application of the AguilarSpinelli test, we sought to make clear certain benchmarks to guide the discretion of our judges in reviewing ex parte applications for search and seizure warrants based on confidential informants’ tips.

Nonetheless, over time, the case law applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test has come to be encrusted with an overlay of analytical rigidity that is inconsistent with the underlying proposition that it is the constitutional function of the magistrate issuing the warrant to exercise discretion in the determination of probable cause. That discretion must be controlled by constitutional principles and guided by the evidentiary standards developed in our prior cases, but it should not be so shackled by rigid analytical standards that it deprives *544the magistrate of the ability to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. To the extent that Kimbro stands for the proposition that the exercise of discretion by a magistrate is reviewable only according to fixed analytical standards, it is overruled.

Our adoption of a “totality of the circumstances” analysis does not mean, however, that a magistrate considering a search warrant application should automatically defer to the conclusion of the police that probable cause exists. Such deference would be an abdication of the magistrate’s constitutional responsibility to exercise an independent and detached judgment to protect the rights of privacy and personal security of the people of Connecticut.

In essence, our adoption of a “totality of the circumstances” analysis of the probable cause requirement of article first, § 7, of our constitution means simply this: When a search warrant affidavit is based on information provided to the police by confidential informants, the magistrate should examine the affidavit to determine whether it adequately describes both the factual basis of the informant’s knowledge and the basis on which the police have determined that the information is reliable. If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why the police believe the information to be trustworthy, however, the magistrate can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists. In making this determination, the magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. When a magistrate has determined that the warrant affidavit presents sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify a search and has issued a warrant, a court reviewing that warrant at a subsequent suppression hearing should defer *545to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate. Where the circumstances for finding probable cause are detailed, where a substantial basis for crediting the source of information is apparent, and when a magistrate has in fact found probable cause, the reviewing court should not invalidate the warrant by application of rigid analytical categories. See United States v. Ventresca, supra, 109.

In adopting the Gates “totality of the circumstances” analysis, as we have here construed it, as the standard of analysis applicable to article first, § 7, of our constitution, we do not intend to dilute the constitutional safeguards of the warrant requirement. This court has both the constitutional duty to construe article first, § 7, in a way that adequately protects the rights of individuals in Connecticut and also the supervisory responsibility, as the overseer of the judiciary in Connecticut, to ensure that the standards adopted here require law enforcement officers to provide magistrates with adequate information on which to base their decisions in an ex parte context. If a warrant affidavit does not provide a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause, then evidence or contraband seized in the execution of that warrant will be suppressed, even when the officer executing the warrant has relied in good faith on its authority. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 171, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). In rejecting a good faith exception to cure errors in warrants, we expressly focused on the importance attached in this state to providing reliable and probative information to Superior Court judges, who are the only persons authorized to issue warrants in this state. Id., 169-70.

Our adoption here of federal constitutional precedents that usefully illuminate the open textured provisions of our own organic document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution. State v. Lamme, *546216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). As we have observed in the past, federal constitutional and statutory law “establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (Emphasis added.) Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984). In particular circumstances, therefore, and with regard to particular provisions of our own constitution, we have concluded that our constitution provides more substantive protection of individual rights than does its federal counterpart. State v. Marsala, supra, 160. Respect for settled interpretations of the organic law of our own state, moreover, requires that we examine changes in the interpretation of federal constitutional provisions to determine whether they are consistent with the history and policy concerns of analogous Connecticut constitutional provisions before adopting such changes as a matter of state constitutional law. In this case we conclude, upon careful reconsideration, that the “totality of the circumstances” analysis adopted in Gates will continue to guarantee the people of Connecticut “the full panoply of rights” that they have come to expect as their due. Id.; Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 642, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). We accordingly depart from the more rigid analytical structure imposed in Kimbro in order to restore the proper constitutional authority of magistrates to weigh the sufficiency of the information presented to them in warrant affidavits and to balance the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers against the highly prized rights of privacy and personal security afforded by our constitution.

II

We now consider the affidavit presented in this case in light of the proper constitutional standards. The Winsted police presented the warrant application for ex parte judicial approval on August 7,1988. The affi*547davit attached to the application stated that the police had received the relevant information from an informant earlier on the same day. The affidavit consisted of five paragraphs,11 four of which have little significance for the determination of probable cause in this case. The first two paragraphs recite the training and experience of the affiants, two Winsted police officers. The fourth paragraph identifies the owners of the property that was the subject of the search, and the fifth paragraph requests that the court issue the warrant on the basis of the information provided. As both the trial court and the Appellate Court concluded, the third paragraph is the only basis upon which probable cause could have been established. State v. Barton, supra, 65-66.

That paragraph provides: “ ‘That the affiants state on Sunday, August 7, 1988 Sgt. Gerald O. Peters received information from a confidential informant at police headquarters pertaining to Tim Barton who resides at 232 Perch Rock Trail, Winsted, Connecticut, first floor that Barton has in his apartment a large quantity of marijuana in plastic garbage bags, which are kept in a closet. That the informant also provided Sergeant Peters of [sic] a sample of the marijuana that is in the bags. A field test of the marijuana substance that was provided to Sgt. Peters was field tested and the test results was [sic] positive for cannibas [sic] substance. The informant further stated that Tim Barton operates a Texas registered vehicle and after being away for approximately one week Barton returned home on Saturday, August 6,1988 and unloaded several large plastic bags in the evening hours. The informant further stated that shortly after that four to five people arrived at the Barton apartment and stayed a short while and then left with plastic garbage bags.’ ” Id., 66.

*548Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts “as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe” that criminal activity has occurred. Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 218, 230, 30 A. 611 (1837); see also State v. Middleton, 170 Conn. 601, 604, 368 A.2d 66 (1976). Probable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity; and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items named will be found in the place to be searched. State v. Shifflet, 199 Conn. 718, 745-46,-508 A.2d 748 (1986); State v. DeChamplain, 179 Conn. 522, 528-29, 427 A.2d 1338 (1980). Unless the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally or recklessly included a false statement in the warrant affidavit; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); a reviewing court can consider only the information that was actually in the warrant affidavit presented to a judge issuing a warrant at the time that he or she signed the warrant. State v. Shifflet, supra, 746; see Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 109 n.1.

Reviewing the allegations set forth in the third paragraph of the affidavit in this case, the Appellate Court concluded that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause because it was defective under the “basis of knowledge” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test mandated by Kimbro. The Appellate Court cited the following deficiencies: (1) the affidavit did not expressly indicate that the informant had ever been inside the defendant’s apartment; (2) the details regarding the truck and the carrying in and out of garbage bags were “innocuous”; (3) the affidavit did not indicate that the informant had said that he had purchased the marihuana from the defendant, or that he had observed the defendant “constantly in possession” of marihuana in *549the apartment; and (4) the informant did not give a detailed description of the apartment but merely alleged that the garbage bags were in a closet. State v. Barton, supra, 68-70. We agree that the affidavit does not expressly state that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts described. Legitimate law enforcement efforts, however, should not be unduly frustrated because a police officer, in the haste of a criminal investigation, fails to recite his information in particular formulaic phrases. Probable cause does not depend upon the incantation of certain magic words. Having reviewed the circumstances described by the informant, we conclude that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s inference that the informant was reporting events that he had personally observed.

This inference could reasonably be drawn from the following facts. First, the affidavit reported that the informant provided the police with a sample of marihuana that had come from the garbage bags. Although that fact alone might not support an inference that the informant had personally seen the bags, other details in the affidavit do provide a basis for such an inference. The informant said that the defendant had been out of town for about a week and had returned the previous night, in a truck with a Texas registration, with several large plastic garbage bags, and that shortly after the defendant’s arrival four or five other individuals had come to the defendant’s apartment and had left soon afterwards with plastic garbage bags. These details, if credited, support an inference that the informant was sufficiently acquainted with the defendant to have known of a week-long absence and to have been present to observe the defendant’s activities upon his return. When considered together with the detail that the garbage bags were kept in a closet and with the fact that the informant provided the police with a mar*550ihuana sample purportedly from the same bags, these ' details support a reasonable, commonsense inference that the informant had personally observed the events he reported and had secured the marihuana sample directly from the defendant at his apartment. The affidavit did not merely state that an informant had reason to believe that marihuana could be found at the defendant’s apartment; rather, it provided “some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were.” Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 114. Although the magistrate could have properly exercised his discretion to reject the warrant application or to require the affiants to supplement it or corroborate some of its details; see Illinois v. Gates, supra, 240; we conclude that the inference drawn by the magistrate that the informant had firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s activities was not unreasonable.

Because the Appellate Court invalidated the warrant for its failure to state expressly the basis of the informant’s knowledge, it did not proceed to consider the question of the informant’s “veracity” or “reliability.” State v. Barton, supra, 70. The trial court, however, concluded that the informant’s veracity was adequately established because the act of providing a sample of the marihuana to the police was a “declaration against his penal interest.” We agree that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s inference that the informant’s information was reliable.

The first circumstance supporting an inference of “veracity” or “reliability” is the fact that the informant was not anonymous. The affidavit states that the informant provided his statement in person at police headquarters. Because his identity was known to the police, the informant could expect adverse consequences if the information that he provided was erroneous. Those consequences might range from a loss of confidence or *551indulgence by the police to prosecution for the class A misdemeanor of falsely reporting an incident under General Statutes § 53a-180, had the information supplied proved to be a fabrication.

More significantly, however, the informant supplied the police with a sample of a substance that the police tested and confirmed to be marihuana. By entering the police station with the marihuana in his possession and by exhibiting the marihuana to the police, the informant rendered himself liable to arrest, conviction, and imprisonment under General Statutes § 21a-279. “People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971); State v. Daley, 189 Conn. 717, 721-24, 458 A.2d 1147 (1983). Although the informant’s motive may be no loftier than the hope of leniency on other charges or the promise of a payment, courts have thought “that one who knows the police are already in a position to charge him with a serious crime will not lightly undertake to divert the police down blind alleys.” 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed. 1987) § 3.3 (c), p. 649. In the present case, the informant did more than make an incriminating admission that might or might not support a subsequent conviction; here he actually provided the physical evidence of his illegal possession to the police. Although the warrant application would have unquestionably been stronger if the affiants had bolstered the reliability of the informant by independently corroborating some of the details he reported; see, e.g., State v. Ruscoe, supra, 229-31; State v. Daley, supra; we conclude that the affidavit sufficiently set forth “some of the underlying circumstances” from *552which the police could have concluded that the informant was credible or that his information was reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, supra.

As our discussion of this affidavit demonstrates, the determination of an informant’s “veracity” or “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” remains highly relevant under the constitutional standard announced in this decision. As a matter of state constitutional law under article first, § 7, the task of the magistrate issuing the warrant is to make a practical, nontechnical decision whether there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence of a crime in a particular place. In coming to that decision, the magistrate must consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the factual circumstances from which the “veracity” and the “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information can be determined. A reviewing court, in turn, must determine that the affidavit presented a substantial factual basis upon which the magistrate could conclude that probable cause existed. See Illinois v. Gates, supra, 238-39; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990) (discussing the continuing relevance of “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” inquiries when relying on informants’ tips). “Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” United States v. Ventresca, supra. This is a marginal case; the magistrate could reasonably have demanded more information. We will not invalidate a warrant, however, merely because we might, in the first instance, have reasonably declined to draw the inferences that were necessary here. Having reviewed all the circumstances presented to the magistrate in this affidavit, we conclude that the affi*553davit provided a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this opinion Shea, Callahan, Covello, Borden and Santaniello, Js., concurred.

Glass, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case because, unlike the majority, I conclude that the disputed warrant meets the established requirements of the time honored Aguilar-Spinelli test.1 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). Because I disagree with the majority’s decision to scrap the Aguilar-Spinelli test by overruling State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985), in arriving at that result, I write separately in dissent.

In Kimbro, this court held that adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli test is “constitutionally mandated under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,” a provision found to afford “more substantive protection” to the citizenry of this state “than does the fourth amendment to the federal constitution in the determination of probable cause.” State v. Kimbro, supra, 233, *554238.2 The majority has now seen fit to overrule Kimbro, thereby discarding the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of the Gates approach to warrant sufficiency,3 the approach rejected in Kimbro as far too fluid and lacking in precise, predictable guidelines to ensure that Connecticut citizens are “secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures . ” Conn. Const., art. I, § 7; see State v. Kimbro, supra, 235-36.

Dressed today in Connecticut constitutional finery, the Gates approach relegates the principles pertinent to the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test to the status of “relevant considerations” among the amorphous “totality of the circumstances.” The purported relevance of these “considerations,” however, is belied by the majority’s suggestion that “despite” “deficiencies” under both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a warrant may yet derive sufficient sustenance from the “totality of the circumstances” to satisfy the mandates of our constitution. The majority thus appears to have strayed even further beyond the strictures of Aguilar-Spinelli than the Gates majority, which proposed that “a deficiency in one [of the prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test] may *555be compensated for ... by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”4 Illinois v. Gates, supra, 233. Under the majority’s evident reading of Gates, a warrant deficient under both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, nevertheless, complies with Connecticut constitutional requirements where the “totality of the circumstances” permit.

In whatever form, I fail to see how the elusive Gates approach “will continue to guarantee the people of Connecticut ‘the full panoply of rights’ that they have come to expect as their due.” The rights guaranteed to our citizens under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution “ ‘belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, supra, 274-75, (Brennan, J., dissenting). After today’s toppling of the analytical framework of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the principles of which the majority deems procedural encrustations that unduly inhibit a magistrate’s “discretion in the determination of probable cause,” just what remains to control that discretion, or for that matter, to guide the conduct of the warrant seeking police? Such actors, unfettered by meaningful standards by which to discharge their respective functions in the war*556rant process, are now granted the unbridled play to accord weight to their subjective preferences in determining the “circumstances” whose “totality” permissibly adds up to probable cause. See Y. Kamisar, “Gates, ‘Probable Cause,’ ‘Good Faith,’ and Beyond,” 69 Iowa L. Rev. 551, 571 (1984).

“ [Consisting largely of an exhortation to use common sense,” the Gates approach thus “enhances the risk that probable cause determinations will be grounded more upon the predilections of the decision-maker and less upon established principles of law . . . . ” W. LaFave, “Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew),” 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1171, 1190 (1983). That risk is not perceptibly diminished by the “reasonably” established by “other objective indicia of reliability” standard that the majority would apply where a warrant proves deficient under both prongs of the remains of AguilarSpinelli. Absent ascertainable guidelines, what “other” “indicia” objectively display the requisite magnitude of reliability to “reasonably” establish probable cause depends on the eye of the beholder, whether a police officer, a magistrate or a reviewing court.5

For the above reasons, I consider the Gates approach to warrant sufficiency a poor substitute for the principled guidelines of the Aguilar-Spinelli test found in Kimbro to be rooted in the Connecticut constitution. The Aguilar-Spinelli test, in my opinion, allows ample room for the application of common sense and the evaluation of the unique facts presented by particular cases. I do not, therefore, share the majority’s desire to strip probable cause determinations of the “fixed, analyti*557cal standards” oí Aguilar-Spinelli that have served to protect the free men and women of Connecticut from unreasonable government intrusion in a way that the standardless Gates approach, I submit, will never do. As this court recognized in Kimbro, we, as the court of last resort in this sovereign state, are not bound to contract the contours of our state constitution to mirror the United States Supreme Court’s increasingly restrictive perception of the scope of the individual liberties guaranteed by the federal constitution. State v. Kimbro, supra, 234 n.16. We refused to do so in Kimbro.6 In my view, the Connecticut constitution is not a document so fragile that a swift stroke of the federal pen suffices, as is allowed today, to erode the substantive protections found not six years ago to be afforded thereunder to the citizens of this state.

Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but respectfully dissent in the majority’s overruling of Kimbro in the course of reaching that result.

Wilkins, J.

We consider the defendant’s State law challenges to the denial of his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. When this case was before us for the first time, we concluded that the search was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because there was no demonstrated probable cause to issue the search warrant. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 563 (1983). In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed our judgment, concluding that there was a proper showing of probable cause under the “totality of the circumstances” test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). The Supreme Court remanded the case to us for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 735.

The State law issues presented to us include the questions whether probable cause to issue a search warrant should be determined by a stricter standard in this Commonwealth than under the Fourth Amendment and whether evidence seized without probable cause may nevertheless be admitted against a defendant. The defendant argues both these questions on statutory and constitutional grounds. We conclude that (1) there is a statutory exclusionary rule requiring the exclusion of evidence seized without a showing of probable cause (unless there is some other basis for justifying the search), (2) the test for determining probable cause is stricter under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) the application for the search warrant in this case did not demonstrate probable cause.

1. The legal consequences of a lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth argues that evidence seized pursuant to a search *365warrant should be admissible, regardless of whether there was probable cause, because this court has never accepted the concept of an exclusionary rule under the State Constitution when a search violated the requirements of art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights. Although our decision in this case does not turn on the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional exclusionary rule, the Commonwealth has correctly characterized this court’s historical position.

During the Nineteenth Century, as a matter of common law and at least implicitly as a matter of State constitutional law, relevant evidence unlawfully obtained was admissible in evidence in this Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, 337 (1841); Commonwealth v. Certain Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369, 374 (1850); Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 4 Allen 593, 600 (1862); Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 521 (1893); Commonwealth v. Acton, 165 Mass. 11, 13 (1895); Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 376 (1896). The constitutional question was thought to have been settled by these and other authorities when the question was reconsidered in Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 359 (1923), subsequent to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-394 [1914]; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 [1886]), holding inadmissible in the Federal courts property seized in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. This court noted that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to State court proceedings and, viewing the fact of an unlawful seizure of evidence as disconnected from the trial, declined to follow the decisions under the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Wilkins, supra at 360-362. “We prefer to adhere to our rule, which makes the competency of evidence depend upon its inherent probative value rather than upon outside circumstances, and which leaves the redress of grievances for invasion of constitutional rights to the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal law.” Id. at 362-363.

We need not decide in this case whether, as a matter of State constitutional or common law, we should now take a dif*366ferent position on the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued without probable cause.1 We conclude instead that G. L. c. 276, § 2B, provides a statutory prohibition against the admission of such evidence.

General Laws c. 276, § 2B,2 governing the content of affidavits submitted in support of applications for search war*367rants, was enacted in 1964. St. 1964, c. 557, § 3. Two years later a case reached this court involving the question whether evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant would be admissible if the application for the warrant did not meet the requirements of G. L. c. 276, §§ 2A, 2B, and 2C, but sworn testimony before the magistrate, supplementing the application, provided probable cause to issue the warrant. Commonwealth v. Monosson, 351 Mass. 327 (1966). Recognizing that “[t]he principal issue for decision is whether, notwithstanding violation of the statute, the evidence is admissible,” id. at 329, the court concluded that, if the application itself failed to demonstrate probable cause,3 the evidence was inadmissible. Id. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 374Mass. 142,148-149 (1977); Commonwealth v. Causey, 356 Mass. 125, 127-128 (1969); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354 Mass. 337, 345 (1968).4

*368This court’s determination in the Monosson case was to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued under circumstances in which the statutorily prescribed form for establishing probable cause was not met but probable cause may have existed. We think that this same reasoning should also apply when probable cause itself, as required by the State Constitution, is lacking. An absence of probable cause is a particularly significant defect in the warrant process because, if there was no probable cause, a search warrant should not have been issued and (barring any other justification for the search) the search should not have been conducted. Such a violation of a defendant’s rights is, therefore, a direct cause of the seizure and the prejudice from the violation is substantial, *369particularly where the seized evidence is relevant in proving charges against a defendant.

2. The standard for the determination of probable cause. The defendant argues that G. L. c. 276, § 2B, mandates a determination of probable cause according to the standard established by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. UnitedStates, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Section 2B, as well as §§ 1, 2, 2A, and 2C, were added to G. L. c. 276 in substantially their current form by St. 1964, c. 557, which was signed by the Governor on June 16, 1964, the day after the opinion in the Aguilar case was released. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in a series of opinions issued shortly thereafter, this court treated the requirements of § 2B as synonymous with those established in the Aguilar case. See Commonwealth v. Dias, 349 Mass. 583, 584 (1965); Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 349 Mass. 626, 633 & n.6 (1965); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 350 Mass. 459, 462-464 & n.5 (1966); Commonwealth v. Cuddy, 353 Mass. 305, 308-309 (1967); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354 Mass. 337, 344 (1968). This court even stated in one opinion that “[t]he purpose of the Legislature [in enacting G. L. c. 276, §§ 1, 2, 2A, 2B, and 2C] was to incorporate as statutory requirements for affidavits those features which the court held in the Aguilar case to be constitutional requirements.” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 358 Mass. 416, 421 (1970).

The timing of the bill’s enactment forecloses such a view. The Legislature could not have known of the Aguilar opinion because it sent to the Governor the bill that became St. 1964, c. 557, five days before the Supreme Court issued its Aguilar opinion. 1964 Bulletin of Committee Work 582. Moreover, the language of § 2B does not support the view that it incorporates the two-prong test that came to be expressed in the Aguilar and Spinelli opinions. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 581 (1983) (Lynch, J., dissenting). It would be an unacceptable statutory construction to find incorporated in the meaning of a statute, general in its terms, specific constitutional requirements not articulated until after enactment of the statute.

*370We thus conclude that § 2B does not establish any standard for the determination of probable cause, although it does prescribe in general terms the form and content of applications for search warrants. Sections 1, 2A, and 2B of G. L. c. 276 do require that warrants be issued only if there is a showing of probable cause, and, as we noted earlier, § 2B requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant not based on probable cause.5

We must now consider what standard art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth prescribes for determining the existence of probable cause.6 We have equated the word “cause” in art. 14 with the words “probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, 336 (1841). In each case, the basic question for the magistrate is whether he has a substantial basis for concluding that any of the articles described in the warrant are probably in the place to be searched. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 358 Mass. 747, 749 (1971); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949). Strong reason to suspect is not adequate. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).7 Concerning search warrants for allegedly stolen property, we have said that the affidavit must “contain enough information for an *371issuing magistrate to determine that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be searched.” Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 328 (1980).

The Commonwealth argues that art. 14 requires no more than is required by the Fourth Amendment as construed and implemented by the Supreme Court of the United States in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). By this view, the question whether probable cause exists is to be determined according to the “totality of the circumstances.” See Illinois v. Gates, supra at 238. The defendant, on the other hand, urges us to express a stricter standard for the determination of probable cause, specifically arguing that under art. 14 we should require a showing similar to that required by the Supreme Court of the United States before its adoption of the “flexible” standard of the Gates case.

This court has understandably had little occasion to determine what art. 14 requires be shown to a magistrate in order to constitute probable cause. As our earlier discussion shows, Massachusetts has not had an exclusionary rule as part of its common law or under art. 14, and, consequently, there has been little incentive for defendants to challenge the existence of probable cause on State common law or constitutional grounds. When the Fourth Amendment became applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 [1961]), the battle over the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant came to be fought on Federal constitutional turf. Defendants simply raised the Federal issues to the substantial exclusion of arguments based on the State law.

As a practical matter, therefore, cases involving probable cause questions did not call for consideration of any State constitutional question. Nor did our earlier opinion in this case appear to call for such a consideration. There we erroneously concluded that the Federal constitutional principles expressed in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), required the exclusion *372of the seized evidence. We simply failed to perceive, unlike the dissenting Justices (see Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 578 [1983] [Lynch, J., dissenting]), that the Supreme Court could permit a test for probable cause as “ ‘flexible’ and ‘easily applied,’” Upton, 390 Mass. at 567, as the fluid Gates standard has turned out to be.8

The Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, portions of the Constitution of the United States are based on provisions in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and this has been thought to be particularly true of the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 158 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 144 n.11 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973 (1981). In particular situations, on similar facts, we have reached different results under the State Constitution from those that were reached by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Federal Constitution. On occasion, the differences can be explained because of different language in the two Constitutions. Compare Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 536-538 (1978), with Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-933 (1975) (right to restrict free speech in places dispensing alcoholic beverages), and Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 88-89 (1983) (right under art. 9 of the Declaration of Rights to seek signatures on private property in connection with ballot access), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no First Amendment right to picket in a privately owned shopping center). On the other hand, in deciding similar constitutional questions, the two courts have reached contrary results based on differences of opinion concerning the application of similar constitutional principles. Compare Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 645-650 (1981), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980) (funding *373of medically necessary abortions); District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 660-671 (1980), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (constitutionality of the death penalty); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) (use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race).

Although we have never afforded more substantive protection to criminal defendants under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights than prevails under the Constitution of the United States, on several occasions we have recognized the possibility of doing so. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 508 n.22 (1982), rev’d, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Commonwealth v. Podgurski, 386 Mass. 385, 391 n.11 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222 (1983); Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-two Dollars, 383 Mass. 764,768 (1981); District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 589 (1980); id. at 597 & n.1 (Liacos, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 358 (1978). As we noted earlier, we have had no appropriate occasion to consider what standard of probable cause is required by art. 14.

We conclude that art. 14 provides more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable cause. We rejected the “totality of the circumstances” test now espoused by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. That standard is flexible, but is also “unacceptably shapeless and permissive.” Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 574. The Federal test lacks the precision that we believe can and should be articulated in stating a test for determining probable cause. The “totality of the circumstances” test is used in deciding several constitutional questions, but it has been applied where no more definite, universal standard could reasonably be developed.9

*374In the area of probable cause to issue a search warrant, specific and worthwhile standards can be articulated, as opinions of the Supreme Court prior to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), have demonstrated. “Clear lines defining constitutionally permissible conduct are most desirable to guide the police, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges.” Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 573. We thus reject the “totality of the circumstances” test as the appropriate standard for determining that probable cause which must be shown under art. 14.

We conclude instead that the principles developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), if not applied hypertechnically, provide a more appropriate structure for probable cause inquiries under art. 14.10 Under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, if an *375affidavit is based on information from an unknown informant, the magistrate must “be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the contraband was where he claimed it was (the basis of knowledge test), and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’ (the veracity test). Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 114. If the informant’s tip does not satisfy each aspect of the Aguilar test, other allegations in the affidavit that corroborate the information could support a finding of probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, supra at 415.” Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 566.

Each prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test — the basis of knowledge and the veracity of the informant — presents an independ*376ently important consideration. We have said that independent police corroboration can make up for deficiencies in either or both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass.; at 568. We reiterate today, however, that each element of the test must be separately considered and satisfied or supplemented in some way.

The test we adopt has been followed successfully by the police in this Commonwealth for approximately twenty years. It is a test that aids lay people, such as the police and certain magistrates, in a way that the “totality of the circumstances” test never could. We believe it has encouraged and will continue to encourage more careful police work and thus will tend to reduce the number of unreasonable searches conducted in violation of art. 14. We reject the argument that the higher standard will cause police to avoid seeking search warrants. We have no sense, and certainly we have no factual support for the proposition, that in recent years police in this Commonwealth have risked conducting warrantless searches because of the unreasonable strictures of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

We also do not believe that the Aguilar-Spinelli test has interfered or will interfere with the deference that a reviewing court should show to the issuing magistrate’s determination. “Once a magistrate has determined that he has information before him that he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he has ample room to use his common sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this Commonwealth, we have always urged reviewing courts to “be slow to jettison” warrants which exhibit such a commonsense approach. See Commonwealth v. Von Utter, 355 Mass. 597, 600 (1969).

Finally, we note that the number of cases in which evidence has been suppressed because of a failure to follow the requirements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test has not been substantial in relation to the number of challenges made to the adequacy of applications for search warrants. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 950 n.11 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to *377Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 Am. B. Found. Research J. 611, 619. And, of course, there is no way to document the salutary circumstance that numerous unreasonable searches were never made because of the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. We conclude, therefore, that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, as modified by our earlier decision in this case, is the standard for determining probable cause under art. 14.11

3. Probable cause in this case. Pursuant to the appropriate standard, we must undertake an analysis of the affidavit presented in support of the warrant to search the motor home. The significant portions of that affidavit are set forth in our earlier opinion. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 564 n.2. We apply the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, with the modification we thought had been made in the Gates opinion. Upton, 390 Mass. at 568. We also acknowledge that our attitude is not and should not be a grudging or negative one and that we should give great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Id. at 568-569. We grant that the question is a close one.

Probable cause was not shown on the affidavit in this case. In our earlier opinion we concluded that the basis of the informant’s knowledge was narrowly established, even though the reason why she believed the stolen property to be in the motor home was not presented. The veracity of the informant, however, was not shown. Anyone who might conclude that the veracity of the informant was demonstrated would have to place substantial credence in the unknown informant’s uncorroborated statements as self-verifying. Id. at 572-573. To para*378phrase our earlier opinion, “[i]f the affidavit in the case before us were to be upheld, [art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights] would be weakened to the level of permitting the search of any person’s premises based on a telephone tip from an anonymous informer who told a story connecting those premises with the fact of a recent police search of a third person’s room on premises to which the public had access.” Id. at 573. The probability of a link between the search of the motel room and the motor home was not shown, as it could have been if other information known to the police had been set forth in the affidavit (particularly the fact that a wallet containing identification of Upton’s wife had been found in the motel room). Id. at 572 n.8.

4. Motor vehicle exception. The Commonwealth argues that, even if the warrant was invalid, the search was justified as a warrantless search under an automobile exception to the requirement of a search warrant.12 The motor home had wheels and could be moved. It was parked about one foot away from the Upton house and was enclosed by a stockade fence, two sections of which could be opened by swinging them apart. There was evidence that the fence was six feet high and that the defendant told a police officer that he had lived in the motor home for the previous two weeks but did not own it. Two *379officers who conducted the search said they did not notice if the vehicle was registered, and one said he did not notice if the motor home was connected to running water.

In the present posture of this case, the issue is whether under the law of the Commonwealth an exception to the warrant requirement applies to the motor home.13 The applicability to motor homes of the Federal automobile exception has been considered by United States Courts of Appeals with differing results. Compare United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984) (exception applies to motor home used only for transportation), with United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981) (exception inapplicable even to motor home traveling on city street). The question in one aspect is now before the Supreme Court of the United States on review of a decision of the Supreme Court of California that a motor home parked in a public parking lot was not subject to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597 (1983), cert. granted, 465 U.S. 1098 (1984).

We are aware of no court that has applied the Federal automobile exception to a warrantless search of the interior of a motor home used as a residence and parked on the private property of the occupant’s family. In this case, the defendant’s expectation of privacy was increased by the fact that the motor home was parked within a foot of the Upton house and was enclosed by a six-foot-high stockade fence. Further, in this case, to the extent that we would require some showing of exigency to justify such a warrantless search, there is no showing of any exigency, as we noted in our previous opinion. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 574-575. As a matter of Massachusetts constitutional law, we decline to admit the evidence seized from the defendant’s motor home under an *380exception to the warrant requirement of art. 14. We suspect the result would be the same under the Fourth Amendment but do not rest our decision on that ground.

5. Conclusion. In our earlier opinion, we noted that, apart from the evidence seized from the motor home, “there was other evidence to support the defendant’s conviction on at least some of the charges against him.” Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. at 575. The case, is, therefore, remanded to the Superior Court subject to the same orders that we previously entered. Id. at 577.

So ordered.

Lynch, J.

(dissenting, with whom Nolan, I., joins). For the reasons stated in my earlier dissent, Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 578 (1983), I believe probable cause existed here under the test of Illinois v. Gates. Furthermore, I find nothing in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or G. L. c. 276, § 2B, that mandates a stricter standard for determining whether probable cause exists than is found in the United States Constitution. Because I believe probable cause exists, I would not reach the issue whether G. L. c. 276, § 2B, provides a statutory prohibition against the admission of evidence seized under a warrant issued without probable cause. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Shea, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether evidence seized by police officers in violation of our state constitution may be admitted during a criminal trial, as part of the state’s case-in-chief, under a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. The question comes to us upon certification from a decision rendered by the Appellate Court; State v. Marsala, 19 Conn. App. 478, 563 A.2d 730 (1989); affirming the conviction of the defendant, Michael Joseph Marsala, for two violations of the state dependency producing drug law, General Statutes § 21a-278 (b).1 We conclude that a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule is incompatible with the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 7,2 and, therefore, that the decision of the Appellate Court, applying such an exception, must be reversed.

*152The facts underlying the defendant’s conviction are set forth in an opinion rendered by the Appellate Court after the defendant had appealed from that judgment. State v. Marsala, 15 Conn. App. 519, 520-22, 545 A.2d 1151, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 816, 550 A.2d 1087 (1988) (Marsala I). Incriminating evidence was seized from both the defendant’s person and his home, pursuant to a search warrant issued for the purpose of allowing police officers to search those two places. More pertinent to our decision today, however, are the legal conclusions reached by both the trial and Appellate courts on the basis of the facts set forth in Marsala I. After a hearing conducted for the purpose of ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized, the trial court granted the motion as to the evidence taken from the defendant’s home but denied the motion as to the evidence obtained from his person.

The trial court concluded that the affidavit, submitted in support of the search warrant application, contained no information from which the issuing judge could have determined the basis of knowledge of two informants whose observations had been relied on by the affiants. Further, the trial court concluded that information contained in the affidavit detailing a surveillance of the defendant conducted by police officers did nothing to corroborate, in regard to a search of the defendant’s home, the informants’ descriptions of the defendant’s activities. Marsala I, supra, 522; see State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 235-36, 496 A.2d 498 (1985).3 The trial court denied, however, the motion to *153suppress the evidence seized from the defendant’s person, reasoning that observations of the defendant’s activities, made by one of the affiants, had corroborated the details provided by the informants and that the combined information, therefore, constituted probable cause to arrest the defendant. Marsala I, supra.

Before the Appellate Court, the state conceded that the “warrant executed upon the person and residence of the defendant was fatally defective in that the underlying affidavit lacked the requisite indicia of reliability and basis of knowledge” of the two informants. Id., 523. The state argued, however, that the admission of the items seized from the defendant’s person could be justified under the investigative stop doctrine as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).The Appellate Court rejected this contention; Marsala I, supra, 523-24; but relying upon its prior decision in State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 543 A.2d 750, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 283 (1988), remanded the case to the trial court so that it could resolve certain factual matters and determine whether the admission of the seized items could be justified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). Marsala I, supra, 526.

On remand, the trial court issued a written decision in compliance with the directive of the Appellate Court *154to make four specific determinations. The trial court concluded: (1) “the affiants did not mislead the issuing judge”; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); (2) there was “no evidence that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role”; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979); (3) “the police officers did have a reasonable belief that the warrant was valid”; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); and (4) “the warrant was not so facially deficient in its lack of particularity, regarding the place to be searched or the articles to be seized, that the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid.” See United States v. Leon, supra, 923. In his appeal from this decision, the defendant did not contest the trial court’s first, second or fourth conclusions. State v. Marsala, 19 Conn. App. 478, 480, 563 A.2d 730 (1989) (Marsala II). Thus, the issue before the Appellate Court was “whether the trial court erred in concluding on remand that the officers executing the warrant acted in objectively determinable good faith and that, therefore, the ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule applied.” Id. The Appellate Court concluded, upon its own independent review of the record and transcripts, that the trial court had not erred and that the evidence seized from the defendant’s person was properly admitted at his trial. Id., 483.

We granted the defendant’s petition for certification; see Practice Book § 4126 et seq.; limited to the following issue: “Does a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule exist under Connecticut law; and if so, did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the good faith exception was applicable in this case?” State v. Marsala, 213 Conn. 805, 567 A.2d 836 (1989). We answer the first portion of this question in the negative and, therefore, need not consider the second portion.

*155I

The defendant claims that apart from any constitutional considerations, General Statutes § 54-33f4 mandates the exclusion of illegally seized evidence and that the statute’s operation is unimpeded by any good faith exception. See Practice Book § 822.5 The defendant relies principally on: (1) § 54-33f (c), which provides that if a suppression motion is granted, “the property shall *156be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial” (emphasis added); (2) Practice Book § 821, which provides that, upon motion of the defendant, “the judicial authority shall suppress potential testimony or other evidence if he finds that suppression is required under the constitution or laws of the United States or the state of Connecticut”; and (3) the fact that there have been two unsuccessful legislative attempts to amend § 54-33f, so as to include a good faith exception to the'exclusionary rule. See 1983 House Bill No. 5125;6 1985 House Bill No. 7011.

The defendant’s reliance upon Practice Book § 821 is without merit. That provision establishes no substantive standard for the suppression of illegally seized evidence, but, rather, depends upon the applicable interpretation of either the United States or Connecticut constitution to determine whether evidence should be suppressed. If the provisions of either constitution, as currently interpreted, require the suppression of any evidence seized, § 821 merely directs the judicial authority to carry forth that suppression. In that regard, it is the constitution either of the United States or the state of Connecticut that requires the suppression, not § 821. Accordingly, § 821 incorporates the existing standards of search and seizure jurisprudence, as set forth by this court, our Appellate Court and the United States Supreme Court, leaving to trial courts the task of determining whether suppression is required in a particular case. See State v. Brown, supra, 625-26.

*157Regarding the defendant’s claim that § 54-33f and the virtually identical provisions of § 822 preclude the adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we agree with the Appellate Court’s resolution of this issue in State v. Brown, supra, 623-26, holding that the statute and Practice Book provisions are procedural rather than substantive and, therefore, do not define the extent of the exclusionary rule under Connecticut law. We have previously noted that § 54-33f was enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961),7 and that prior to that decision there was “no [express] provision in our practice for a motion to suppress.” State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 89, 203 A.2d 305 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943, 85 S. Ct. 1025, 13 L. Ed. 2d 962 (1965).

Section 54-33f provides expressly that evidence may be suppressed on the ground that “[t]he property was seized without a warrant,” and that if the motion is granted, “the property . . . shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.” If we were to accept the defendant’s contention that § 54-33f provides substantive rights rather than a procedure for implementing motions to suppress evidence, numerous decisions of this court, upholding the introduction of evidence seized without a warrant, simply could not be justified, since the introduction would have been in direct violation of the statutory provision. See, e.g., State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 271, 528 A.2d 760 (1987) (exigent circumstances); State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 107, 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828, 106 S. Ct. 90, 88 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1985) (inventory searches); State v. Graham, 186 Conn. 437, 443-45, 441 A.2d 857 (1982) (plain view doctrine); State v. Shaw, 186 Conn. 45, 48-49, 438 A.2d 872 (1982) *158(search incident to a lawful custodial arrest); State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 155-57, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981) (automobile exception to warrant requirement).

The defendant also argues that the legislature’s failure to adopt two proposed amendments to § 54-33f, which would have included a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, “are powerful signals that (1) our legislators did not believe that we already had a statutory good faith exception, (2) nor were they convinced that we should adopt one.” We conclude that the legislature’s failure to adopt these proposed amendments, although possibly indicative of both of the “signals” advanced by the defendant, cannot transform a procedural statute or Practice Book provision into one that provides criminal defendants with substantive rights. In cases in which this court has considered the legal effect of failed attempts to amend existing law, we have viewed those failures as indicative of legislative approval of an existing interpretation of substantive law. “The legislature is presumed to be aware of the interpretation placed upon its legislation by the courts and the effect which its own nonaction thereafter may ha ye.” Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 56, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), appeal dismissed, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1961); McDonald v. Haynes Medical Laboratory, Inc., 192 Conn. 327,334 n.13, 471 A.2d 646 (1984); Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 63, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see generally 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1984) § 48.18; D. O’Con-nor," “The Use of Connecticut Legislative History in Statutory Construction,” 58 Conn. B.J. 422, 437-39 (1984). We discern, however, little or no inferential value in the failed amendments in this case, since § 54-33f has never been interpreted by this court as providing anything more than a procedural mechanism *159for the bringing of motions to suppress evidence. Thus, even if both of the defendant’s assumptions regarding “signals” from the legislature concerning a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule are correct, those “signals” are simply inapplicable when they concern substantive rights and the existing law is one of procedure.

II

The defendant’s principal claim, which we find persuasive, is that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is incompatible with article first, § 7, of our state constitution, which provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” This language has remained unchanged since it was first adopted as article first, § 8, of our 1818 constitution,8 and is quite similar to the protections afforded by the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.9

We have frequently relied upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the fourth *160amendment, as well as other amendments to the United States constitution, to define the contours of the protections provided in the various sections of the declaration of rights contained in our state constitution. We have also, however, determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 112, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 166, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 235-36, 496 A.2d 498 (1985). In so doing, we have recognized that “[i]n the area of fundamental civil liberties—which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut residents have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law.” Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 641-42, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon, supra, as adopted by the Appellate Court in State v. Brown, supra, and applied by that court in this case, upon “respectful consideration,” is to become the law of this state. In Leon, after “accepting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that probable cause [for issuance of a search warrant] was lacking under the *161prevailing legal standards”; United, States v. Leon, supra, 905; the United States Supreme Court held, nevertheless, “that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id., 922.

In arriving at this conclusion, the court began its analysis by noting that: (1) the fourth amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands”; id., 906; (2) “the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong’ ”; id., quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); (3) “[t]he wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or seizure itself”; United States v. Leon, supra, quoting United States v. Calandra, supra; and (4) “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v. Leon, supra, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). On these grounds, the court reiterated that the exclusionary “rule thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ” United States v. Leon, supra, quoting United States v. Calandra, supra, 348. Stating that the issue before it was “[wjhether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case,” and not “ ‘whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct’ ”; United States v. Leon, supra, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); the court concluded that the *162question “must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.” United States v. Leon, supra, 906-907.

According to the court in Leon, “[t]he substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.” Id., 907. Thus, according to the Leon court, “ ‘[o]ur cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1980). Despite noting that many researchers “have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial”; United States v. Leon, supra, 908 n.6; the court declared that “[a]n objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains.” Id., 907. The court justified this observation by noting that the relatively small percentage of cases resulting in nonprose-cution or nonconviction because of the exclusionary rule10 “mask a large absolute number of felons who are *163released because the cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures.” Id., 908 n.6.

The Leon court’s conclusion regarding the costs of the exclusionary rule has been criticized on numerous levels. First, there is the obvious inconsistency between the “substantial” costs of the exclusionary rule, as identified by the court, and the “insubstantial” impact of the rule, as found by the research on which the court relied. As one commentator has stated, “[t]o date, the most careful and balanced assessment of all available empirical data shows ‘that the general level of the rule’s effects on criminal prosecutions is marginal at most.’ ”11 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3 (c), p. 52, quoting, T. Davies, “A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the ‘Costs’ of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of ‘Lost’ Arrests,” 1983 Am. B. Found. Research J. 611, 622.

Second, the Leon court’s assessment of the costs of the exclusionary rule is based on the effect of the rule in all cases instead of on the effect it would have in those cases in which evidence was suppressed despite the objectively reasonable behavior of the police offi*164cers involved. As Justice Brennan noted, the Leon majority “ignores this distinction and mistakenly weighs the aggregated costs of exclusion in all cases, irrespective of the circumstance that led to exclusion . . . against the potential benefits associated with only those cases in which evidence is excluded because police reasonably but mistakenly believe that their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment .... When such faulty scales are used, it is little wonder that the balance tips in favor of restricting the application of the rule.” United States v. Leon, supra, 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting). “This is not an insignificant error, for had the Court’s ‘cost’ inquiry been properly focused it would have been apparent that the relevant costs are insubstantial.” 1 W. LaFave, supra, § 1.3 (c), p. 52.

Finally, the Leon court “consistently and repeatedly refers to the costs of the exclusionary rule as if they were somehow a matter quite distinct from the Fourth Amendment itself.” 1 W. LaFave, supra, § 1.3 (c), p. 53. In this regard, we agree with former Justice Stewart, who has noted that “[mjuch of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly directed at the fourth amendment itself. . . . The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of the Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals. That is not a political outcome impressed upon an unwilling citizenry by unbeknighted judges. It is the price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property against unrestrained governmental power.” P. Stewart, “The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Seareh-and-Seizure Cases,” 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1392-93 (1983).

*165Although we recognize that the exclusionary rule exacts a certain “cost” from society in the form of the suppression of relevant evidence in criminal trials, we conclude, nevertheless, that this “cost” is not sufficiently “substantial” to overcome the benefits to be gained by our disavowal of the Leon court’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We base this conclusion on both the criticism leveled against the Leon opinion itself and our willingness in other areas of the law to uphold the exclusion of concededly reliable and relevant evidence on the basis of some greater benefit that will be realized by its suppression. Thus, for example, an otherwise voluntary and reliable confession is excluded from a criminal trial on the basis of a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), an exclusionary rule that we have adopted as an interpretation of the due process clause contained in article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. See, e.g., State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987); State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47, 51 n.3, 505 A.2d 1225 (1986); State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 45 n.12, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). Similarly, numerous categories of reliable and relevant evidence are excluded from both civil and criminal trials on the basis of either a common law or statutorily created privilege against disclosure. See generally C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence § 12.5 (Attorney and Client), § 12.6 (Husband and Wife), § 12.7 (Minor and Advisor), § 12.8 (Physician and Patient), § 12.9 (Psychiatrist and Patient), § 12.10 (Psychologist and Patient), § 12.11 (Priest and Penitent), § 12.12 (Journalist and Source), § 12.13 (Identity of an Informer), § 12.14 (Management and Labor), § 12.15 (Deaf or Hearing-Impaired Persons), § 12.16 (Battered or Raped Victim and Counselor), and § 12.17 (Family Relations Officer).

In its own analysis of the “benefits” of the exclusionary rule, the Leon court first concluded that operation *166of the rule could have no deterrent effect upon the judicial authorities who actually issue search warrants. According to the Leon court, “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.” United States v. Leon, supra, 916; see S. Wasserstrom & W. Mertens, “The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?” 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 106 (1984).

Having concluded that the exclusionary rule could have no deterrent effect on those who issue search warrants, the Leon court next reasoned that “[i]f exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect ... it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments.” United States v. Leon, supra, 918. Responding to arguments that the exclusionary rule without a good faith exception would deter inadequate presentations by the police in the affidavits submitted in support of search warrant applications and would discourage “magistrate shopping,” the Leon court found “such arguments speculative and conclude[d] that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. Virtually foreclosing any exclusion when the police “officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable”; id., 919; the court *167concluded that “[i]n most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. . . . Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id., 920-21.

We simply cannot accept the conclusion reached by the Leon court as a result of its weighing of the relevant costs and benefits of excluding evidence obtained through police officers’ good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a detached and neutral judicial official. Initially, we note that the exclusionary rule, although primarily directed at police misconduct, is also appropriately directed at the warrant issuing process, and that “it is somewhat odd to suppose that the exclusionary rule was not designed to deter the issuance of invalid warrants.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mertens, supra, 106. Just as with the fourth amendment, when article first, § 7, of our state constitution was adopted, “its purpose plainly was to prohibit the issuance of warrants that did not satisfy its requirements of probable cause and particularity.”12 Id. The text of article first, § 7, is clear: “[N]o warrant . . . shall issue . . . without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” (Emphasis added.) While we might agree that the exclusionary rule was not designed “to punish the errors *168of judges and magistrates”; (emphasis added) United States v. Leon, supra, 916; we cannot agree that the rule as it stood before Leon was not a significant factor inducing judges to take seriously their obligation to ensure that the probable cause requirement of article first, § 7, had been met before issuing search warrants based on information contained in affidavits provided to them by police officers. We are confident that, at least in this state, search warrants failing to meet the probable cause requirement more often “result from carelessness than from intentional constitutional violations, and just as surely the exclusionary rule is logically directed to those more common violations.” 1W. LaFave, supra, § 1.3 (d), p. 55. In this sense, the issuing authority, when the determination of probable cause is overturned on appeal, is not being “punished” for a mistake, but is, rather, being informed that a constitutional violation has taken place and is also being instructed in how to avoid such violations in the future. “In other words, the longstanding applicability of the exclusionary rule in with-warrant cases has served not only to deter the occasional ill-spirited magistrate, but more importantly to influence judicial behavior more generally by . . . creating an ‘incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982). Thus, “[t]he more important issue ... is not the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the conduct of individual magistrates, but the extent to which *169the rule helps preserve the integrity of the warrant issuing process as a whole.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mer-tens, supra, 109.

We conclude that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would have several negative effects upon this constitutionally mandated warrant issuing process. First, under the good faith exception, “police need concern themselves only with getting a warrant and not with getting a warrant that will hold up on review.” Id. Thus, although we are confident that most police officers take very seriously their obligation to present a reviewing authority with a constitutionally adequate basis for the issuance of a warrant, the good faith exception would encourage some police officers to expend less effort in establishing the necessary probable cause to search and more effort in locating a judge who might be less exacting than some others when ruling on whether an affidavit has established the requisite level of probable cause. Second, the “exception for good faith reliance upon a warrant implicitly tells magistrates that they need not take much care in reviewing warrant applications, since their mistakes will from now on have virtually no consequence . . . .” United States v. Leon, supra, 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, despite the Leon court’s assertion that there “is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’ conduct manifested objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated”; id., 924, it is unlikely “that overburdened trial and appellate courts will take the time and effort to write advisory opinions on [search and seizure] law when they can just as easily admit the evidence under the good faith exception.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mer-tens, supra, 111; United States v. Leon, supra, 957 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If we were to adopt the good faith exception, our practice of declining to address *170doubtful constitutional issues unless they are essential to the disposition of a case13 would preclude our consideration of probable cause beyond reviewing whether an officer had an “objectively reasonable” belief in its existence. Absent a meaningful necessity to review probable cause determinations, we conclude that close cases will become “both the hardest to decide and the easiest to dispose of under the good faith exception; in such cases the officer’s objective good faith is clearest.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mertens, supra, 112.

We also disagree with the Leon court’s assertion that “when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope”; United States v. Leon, supra, 920; “[penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id., 921. As a threshold observation, we note again that the exclusionary rule is not designed to “punish” anyone. Id., 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is, however, designed to deter future police misconduct and ensure, as nearly as can be, institutional compliance with the warrant issuing requirements of article first, § 7, of our state constitution. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is not whether the officer should be punished for his past behavior, but, rather, whether the sanction of the exclusionary rule is appropriate in cases where the officer in question believed that he was doing everything correctly, but in fact had not supplied the issuing authority with information sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of probable cause. We conclude that the rule is appropriate in these situations. “[I]t is not as though we cannot expect the police to make *171accurate assessments of probable cause without the help of a magistrate, for we expect them to make such assessments whenever they search or seize without a warrant, something they do far more often than search or seize with warrant in hand.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mertens, supra, 113-14.

Further, “[i]f the overall educational effect of the exclusionary ride is considered, application of the rule to even those situations in which individual police officers have acted on the basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their conduct was authorized can still be expected to have a considerable long-term deterrent effect. If evidence is consistently excluded in these circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish probable cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that whatever document the magistrate has signed will necessarily comport with Fourth Amendment requirements.” United States v. Leon, supra, 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

In short, we are simply unable to sanction a practice in which the validity of search warrants might be determined under a standard of “close enough is good enough” instead of under the “probable cause” standard mandated by article first, § 7, of our state constitution. We hold, therefore, that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist under Connecticut law.14

*172The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

Peters, C. J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the state constitution prohibits a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause but conducted while the automobile is impounded at a police station. The defendant, Jonathan L. Miller, was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217.1 The trial court, *366 Damiani, J., rendered a judgment of conviction upon the defendant’s plea of nolo contendere; see General Statutes § 54-94a;2 which was conditional upon his right to appeal the denial by the trial court, Miano, J., of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest and the search and seizure of his automobile. On the defendant’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment on the ground that the search of the defendant’s automobile had violated article first, § 7,3 of the Connecticut constitution. State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 614 A.2d 1229 (1992). The Appellate Court rejected, however, the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to suppression of evidence that had allegedly been obtained through unconstitutionally extraterritorial conduct by the West Hartford police in Hartford. We subsequently granted the defendant’s and the state’s petitions for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, and we now affirm.4

*367The relevant facts are reported in the decision of the Appellate Court.5 State v. Miller, supra, 209-11. On March 17, 1990, three men allegedly robbed a supermarket in West Hartford. Id., 209. Witnesses observed two of the three alleged robbers flee the scene in a light gray Chrysler automobile with Connecticut license plate identification 428GFK. Id., 209-10. Shortly thereafter, the witnesses reported this information to the West Hartford police, who discovered that the automobile was registered to the defendant, whose address is 41 Arlington Street in Hartford. Id., 210. Police officers from West Hartford and Hartford then went to Arlington Street to apprehend the defendant, but neither he nor his automobile was present at that location. Id.

Three West Hartford police officers, including detective Jay St. Jacques, remained at Arlington Street in unmarked police cars parked at both ends of the street. At the request of St. Jacques, all other police cars left the area. Id.

About forty minutes later, a light gray Chrysler drove down Arlington Street. St. Jacques followed the automobile until it stopped. When the driver, who was the defendant, exited the automobile, St. Jacques shone his high beam lights on him, drew a weapon and identified himself as a police officer. Id. As the defendant attempted to reenter the automobile and start it, addi*368tional West Hartford police officers arrived. They removed the defendant from the automobile and patted him down, but discovered no incriminating evidence. Id., 210-11. After the officers had handcuffed the defendant and placed him in the back seat of one of the West Hartford police cars, St. Jacques retrieved the keys to the Chrysler from the defendant’s pocket. St. Jacques unlocked the defendant’s automobile and searched the passenger compartment, but discovered no incriminating evidence. Id., 211.

The witnesses subsequently positively identified the defendant as one of the alleged robbers, and the police transported him to the West Hartford police station. The defendant’s automobile was towed to the West Hartford police department garage, where the police secured it and conducted a warrantless search, which revealed a .357 Smith and Wesson revolver in the trunk. Id.

The state charged the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon, in violation of § 53a-217.6 The defendant moved to suppress evidence, including the gun recovered from his automobile’s trunk. In support of his motion, the defendant argued that the gun was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure of the automobile and of an illegal arrest. The trial court, Miano, J., denied the motion. The trial court, Damiani, J., subsequently rendered a judgment of conviction upon the defendant’s conditional plea of nolo contendere.

Pursuant to § 54-94a, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court claiming that (1) the West Hartford police had acted outside their territorial jurisdiction by performing an *369investigation, stakeout, Terry7 stop and warrantless seizure8 of the defendant’s automobile in Hartford, and (2) the warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile at the West Hartford police garage was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement and thereby violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.9 Although the Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s first claim, it reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution prohibits the warrantless search of an automobile that has been impounded at a police garage.

In this certified appeal, both the defendant and the state take issue with the decision of the Appellate Court. The defendant contends that article tenth, § 1, article first, § 7, and article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution prohibit municipal police from conducting an extraterritorial investigation, stakeout, Terry stop or warrantless seizure. The defendant asserts, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress on that ground. The state argues that the warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile, while it was impounded at the West Hartford police station, was valid under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The state contends, therefore, that the Appellate Court *370improperly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on that ground. We reject both of these claims.

I

The defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed the gun recovered by West Hartford police officers from his automobile because the officers acted in violation of article tenth, § 1, article first, § 7, and article first, § 9, when they conducted an investigation, stakeout, Terry stop and warrantless automobile seizure in Hartford. We disagree.

A

At the outset, we note that we need not decide whether the Terry stop of the defendant was invalid pursuant to the cited constitutional provisions. Even if the stop were unconstitutional, no evidence flowed from it10 and, therefore, the subsequent prosecution of the defendant was not tainted by it. See State v. Miller, supra, 216. Accordingly, any illegality in the stop would not require dismissal of the charges against the defendant or a reversal of his conviction. State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 262-63, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S. Ct. 1797, 90 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1986).

B

Because, however, the discovery by the West Hartford police of the gun that the defendant seeks to have suppressed flowed from the investigation, stakeout and warrantless seizure of his automobile in Hartford,11 we *371must address the validity of those activities. The defendant contends that the extraterritorial conduct of the West Hartford police violated three provisions of the state constitution. We will address these three arguments seriatim.

1

First, the defendant contends that the home rule provision of the state constitution, contained in article tenth, § 1, prohibits a municipality from exercising any authority that is not expressly permitted by statute. Specifically, the defendant asserts that, because the conduct of the West Hartford police in Hartford exceeded the legislature’s delegation of municipal authority, that conduct also violated article tenth, § 1. The defendant relies on General Statutes §§ 7-148, 7-276, 7-277a, 7-281, 29-7, 29-169, 29-176 and 54-lf12 *372as reflecting the relevant legislative limitations on municipal police officers’ authority to engage in extraterritorial police activity. The defendant does not claim, however, that the alleged statutory violations themselves necessitate suppression of the gun. Rather, he relies solely on the alleged constitutional violations to support his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. We are not persuaded.

“Municipalities, because they are creations of the state, have no inherent legislative authority.” Simons *373v. Canty, 195 Conn. 524, 529, 488 A.2d 1267 (1985). Rather, the legislative authority of municipalities derives solely from express legislative grants. Article tenth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution embodies this rule: “The general assembly shall by general law delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems appropriate to towns, cities and boroughs relative to the powers, organization, and form of government of such political subdivisions.” Thus, “the sole font of municipal authority is legislative delegation in the form of a general statute or a special act adopted prior to the effective date of article tenth.” Id., 530; see City Council v. Hall, 180 Conn. 243, 248, 429 A.2d 481 (1980).

*374The home rule provision, however, limits only the legislative powers of municipalities. Although we may have broadly described the home rule provision in prior cases as limiting a municipality’s general authority to conduct its affairs, home rule is a constraint only on municipalities’ legislative powers. The language of article tenth, § 1, clarifies this limited scope: “The general assembly shall . . . delegate such legislative authority .. . .’’(Emphasis added.) Moreover, the home rule provision’s focus is evident from the dual purposes of that provision: “[1] to relieve the General Assembly of the burdensome task of handling and enacting special legislation of local municipal concern and [2] to enable a municipality to draft and adopt a home rule charter or ordinance which shall constitute the organic law of the city . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 193 Conn. 506, 521, 479 A.2d 208 (1984). The home rule provision thus “prohibits the legislature from encroaching on the local authority to regulate matters of purely local concern.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 630, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985). Accordingly, it is beyond dispute that the home rule provision, contained in article tenth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, limits a municipality’s legislative powers, and has no application to the scope of a municipality’s other powers. Because the West Hartford police were not exercising legislative authority, the defendant’s home rule argument is unpersuasive.

The defendant contends, however, that even if the home rule provision by its terms concerns only the legislative authority of municipalities, we should invalidate the conduct of the West Hartford police in this case pursuant to the “penumbras” of article tenth, § 1. Specifically, the defendant claims that, because the conduct of the West Hartford police violated statutory constraints on municipal police officers’ authority to *375conduct extraterritorial investigatory activities, the “penumbras” of the home rule provision were violated. Lacking further explanation by the defendant of the nature of these alleged “penumbras,” however, and in light of home rule’s origin in the status of municipalities as statutory creations with no inherent legislative power, we reject the defendant’s proposed extension of article tenth, § 1.

2

Second, the defendant argues that the West Hartford police, by conducting the investigation, stakeout and warrantless automobile seizure in Hartford, violated article first, § 7, which, inter alia, proscribes unreasonable seizures.13 The defendant contends that, because the West Hartford police officers’ conduct violated statutory constraints on their territorial authority, that conduct was per se unreasonable under article first, § 7. The state argues, to the contrary, that a seizure may be constitutionally reasonable even if it is not specifically authorized by statute. We agree with the state.

Although statutes may, in some circumstances, help to define the contours of constitutional rights; see State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 180-81, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); cf. State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 468, 625 A.2d 791 (1993); we are not persuaded that the prohibition in article first, § 7, of unreasonable seizures encompasses the legislature’s territorial restrictions on police conduct. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 7-148, 7-276, 7-277a, 7-281, 29-7, 29-169, 29-176 and 54-lf set out in footnote 12. Legislative enactments are expressions of this state’s public policy and do not necessarily define the outer boundaries of constitutional protections. Indeed, the legislature has the power to prohibit, as a matter of policy, that which we have held to be constitutional. *376Compare State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 620 A.2d 746 (1993) (holding that warrantless police searches of curbside garbage containers are permissible under article first, § 7), with 1993 House Bill No. 7237, § 2 (seeking to prohibit such searches; no action was taken on the House floor regarding this bill). The defendant has pointed to nothing in the text, purpose or legislative history of the relevant statutes, however, to indicate that the legislature intended to equate the prohibited conduct with that which is constitutionally unreasonable pursuant to article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s argument. .

3

Finally, the defendant argues that article first, § 9, which provides that “[n]o person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law,” prohibits the extraterritorial investigation, stakeout, Terry stop and warrantless automobile seizure in which the West Hartford police engaged in Hartford. Because we need not resolve the validity of the West Hartford police officers’ detention of the defendant; State v. Fleming, supra; this claim requires us to decide only whether the investigation, stakeout and warrantless automobile seizure violated article first, § 9. We conclude that they did not.

Although article first, § 9, constitutes “one of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing due process of law”; State v. Lamme, supra, 177; our cases applying that provision have generally involved personal liberty. See, e.g., State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 646-53, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (determining whether a seizure of the defendant had occurred); State v. Lamme, supra, 180 (validity of detention that is not based on probable cause); State v. Carroll, 131 Conn. 224, 227-29, 38 A.2d 798 (1944) (validity of warrantless *377arrest). The defendant provides no argument that the prohibition in article first, § 9, of restraints on personal liberty, such as arrests, detentions and punishment, that are not “clearly warranted by law” also includes a prohibition on illegal investigations, stakeouts and warrantless automobile seizures. Indeed, the crux of the defendant’s argument is that, because the West Hartford police officers’ conduct violated statutory constraints on extraterritorial police activities, it thereby violated article first, § 9. Accordingly, we hold that the West Hartford police officers’ investigation, stakeout and warrantless automobile seizure did not violate article first, § 9.

We thus conclude that the investigatory conduct in Hartford by the West Hartford police did not violate article tenth, § 1, article first, § 7, or article first, § 9, of the state constitution. The Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s refusal to suppress the gun on those grounds.

II

The state contends that the West Hartford police officers’ warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile at the West Hartford police station was permissible under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on that ground. The state’s claim directly raises the question whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), which interpreted the fourth amendment to permit a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause and conducted while the automobile was impounded at a police station, is valid as a matter of state constitutional law. We are persuaded that it is not valid.14

*378We begin our analysis of this state constitutional question of first impression with a summary of the origin of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent expansion of that exception in Chambers. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment is not violated by a roadside warrantless search of an automobile if the police have probable cause to search the automobile and if obtaining a warrant would be impracticable because of the possibility that the automobile will be moved out of the jurisdiction. The rule announced in Carroll has come to be called the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Connecticut recognizes this exception as a matter of state constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 126, 547 A.2d 10 (1988).15

*379In Chambers v. Maroney, supra, the United States Supreme Court extended the automobile exception to validate a warrantless search of an automobile that had been impounded at a police station. In support of its decision, the court stated that “[flor constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id., 52. The present case requires that we determine whether article first, § 7, permits this expansion of the automobile exception.

We note, as a preliminary matter, that we are not bound in our state constitutional inquiry by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers. “[W]e may find greater protection of individual rights under our state constitution than that provided by the federal constitution. ‘It is well established that federal constitutional . . . law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . .’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, [supra, 649]. Moreover, we have held that ‘[i]n the area of fundamental civil liberties—which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last resort. ... In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut citizens have come to expect as *380their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law.’. . . State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 160, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). Recognizing that our state constitution ‘is an instrument of progress . . . is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally’ . . . State v. Oquendo, supra, 649; we have concluded in several cases that the state constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution. See, e.g., id., 652; State v. Marsala, supra, 171; State v. Dukes, [supra, 112], and cases cited therein.” State v. DeFusco, supra, 632.

In our independent determination of whether to follow the Chambers rule as a matter of state constitutional law, several factors may be useful: “(1) the textual approach; see, e.g., Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (‘Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.’); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49, 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, [supra, 184] (‘The adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate open textured provisions in our own organic *381document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution.’); (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach; see, e.g., State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 386-87, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, [192 Conn. 48, 58-59,469 A.2d 1201 (1984)]; (5) the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, supra, 178-80; Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 60-62; Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 126, 198 A. 265 (1938); and (6) economic/sociological considerations. See State v. Barton, [219 Conn. 529, 546, 594 A.2d 917 (1991)]; State v. Dukes, supra, 115; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. Margulies, ‘Connecticut’s Free Speech Clauses: A Framework and an Agenda,’ 65 Conn. B. J. 437 (1991) (an analytical framework for state constitutional analysis in the context of the free speech clauses); E. Peters, ‘State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition,’ 84 Mich. L. Rev. 583 (1986) (book review).” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

Applying these analytical tools, we note that neither the text nor the history of article first, § 7, provides any reason to depart from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution in this case.16 As we have previously held, the text of article first, § 7, is similar to the text of the fourth amendment. See State v. Marsala, supra, 159. Additionally, the history of article first, § 7, does not illuminate the appropriate scope of the automobile exception because the modern nature and function of the automobile, on which that exception is predicated, were unknown in *3821818. Cf. id., 167 n.12 (fourth amendment and article first, § 7, were both enacted to prohibit general warrants and writs of assistance). We turn, therefore, to the other analytical tools suggested in Geisler.

This court’s precedents involving the state constitution’s warrant requirement express a strong policy in favor of warrants that supports the Appellate Court’s conclusion that article first, § 7, provides broader protection than does the fourth amendment against warrantless searches of automobiles that have been impounded at police stations, even though probable cause exists. For example, in State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 544-47, 628 A.2d 567 (1993), we rejected the defendant’s claim that article first, § 7, requires de novo review of the probable cause determination made by a judge issuing a warrant, in part because of our concern that such review would discourage the police from seeking warrants. Additionally, in State v. Geisler, supra, 695-96, we held that, despite the validity of the emergency exception to the state constitution’s warrant requirement, the police must retreat from a house that they have entered pursuant to that exception as soon as the emergency ceases to exist. See also State v. DeFusco, supra, 642; State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 216, 613 A.2d 224 (1992); State v. Barton, supra, 552.

Our constitutional preference for warrants reflects a goal of protecting citizens from unjustified police intrusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the police and the object of the proposed search. See State v. Diaz, supra; cf. State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 444, 294 A.2d 517, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S. Ct. 198, 34 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1972) (purpose of fourth amendment is to require neutral and detached magistrate to make probable cause determination). Accordingly, a search is invalid if the police, without a justification rooted in a valid exception to the warrant requirement, have relied upon only their *383own probable cause evaluation, even if later found to be correct, before searching. We thus read the two clauses of article first, § 7, in conjunction—a warrant-less search is per se unreasonable, justified only by limited exceptions—rather than in disjunction—a search is valid if it is reasonable, and the presence of a warrant is just one factor in the determination of reasonableness. Cf., e.g., State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 423, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986) (construing fourth amendment to bar warrantless searches as per se unreasonable); see generally State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-69 (Utah 1990) (extensive discussion of the consequences of reading the two clauses of the fourth amendment in conjunction and in disjunction); R. Bloom, “Warrant Requirement—The Burger Court Approach,” 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 691 (1982).

Our constitutional preference for warrants is overcome only in specific and limited circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Geisler, supra, 691 (recognizing emergency exception as matter of state constitutional law); State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 266-67, 559 A.2d 164, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1989) (recognizing exception for search incident to arrest as matter of state constitutional law); State v. Dukes, supra, 126 (recognizing automobile exception on the highway as a matter of state constitutional law). These recognized exceptions derive primarily from acknowledged interests in protecting the safety of the police and the public and in preserving evidence.

In this case, the state offers two principal justifications for expanding the automobile exception to permit a warrantless automobile search that is conducted after the automobile has been impounded at a police station. First, the state asserts that it may be necessary, under certain circumstances, to delay a warrant-less automobile search until such time as the automobile *384is located in a safe, convenient place. This proffered justification primarily expresses a concern for the safety of the police while they are at the scene of an automobile seizure. We are not persuaded.

The state’s argument fails because it relies upon the fiction that the legitimate safety concern that may necessitate towing an automobile from the site of its seizure to the police station also provides justification for the warrantless search of that automobile at the station. We refused to accept a similar fiction in State v. Geisler, supra, 695-96, in which we held that the police must obtain a search warrant upon expiration of the emergency that initially justified the warrant-less entry into a suspect’s home. Moreover, in State v. Badgett, supra, 427, we refused to extend the fiction that the passenger compartment of an automobile is always within reach of the arrestee to circumstances in which the arrestee is no longer at the scene when the warrantless search is undertaken. These fictions are inconsistent with our constitutionally mandated preference for warrants. We therefore reject the state’s suggestion that the risks that lead police to tow an automobile to the police station also justify a warrantless search of the automobile after it has been impounded.

Second, the state contends that a person’s privacy interest in his or her automobile is invaded to the same extent whether a warrantless search of that automobile is conducted at the scene of its seizure or at the police station. The state argues, therefore, that a warrantless automobile search at the police station is constitutionally permissible whenever a warrantless on-the-scene search would be permissible. We disagree.

We tolerate the warrantless on-the-scene automobile search only because obtaining a warrant would be impracticable in light of the inherent mobility of automobiles and the latent exigency that that mobil*385ity creates.17 See Carroll v. United States, supra, 153. The balance between law enforcement interests and individuals’ privacy interests thus tips in favor of law enforcement in the context of an on-the-scene automobile search. If the impracticability of obtaining a warrant no longer exists, however, our state constitutional preference for warrants regains its dominant place in that balance, and a warrant is required.18

Our conclusion is supported by decisions of other courts that have limited the applicability of the automobile exception pursuant to their state constitutions. For example, in State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 33, 725 P.2d 1285 (1986), the Oregon Supreme Court held, pursuant to the Oregon constitution, that, although “[s]earehes of automobiles that have just been lawfully stopped by police may be searched without a warrant and without a demonstration of exigent circumstances when police have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or crime evidence . . . any search of an automobile that was parked, immobile and *386unoccupied at the time the police first encountered it . . . must be authorized by a warrant ... or, alternatively, the prosecutor must demonstrate that exigent circumstances other than the potential mobility of the automobile exist." (Emphasis added.) See also State v. Larocco, supra, 469-70 (warrantless automobile searches are permissible under the state constitution only if supported by probable cause and if necessary to protect the police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence).19

Finally, we note that our holding will require suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence only if the state fails to establish that the evidence would subsequently have been obtained pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Badgett, supra, 432-34. In this case, the Appellate Court has ordered the trial court to determine whether the inevitable discovery rule would justify the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun, despite the unconstitutionality of the search in which the gun was recovered. State v. Miller, supra, 236.

In light of our demonstrated constitutional preference for warrants and our concomitant obligation narrowly to circumscribe exceptions to the state constitutional warrant requirement, we conclude that a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause, but conducted after the automobile has been *387impounded at the police station, violates article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly upheld the defendant’s claim that the gun should have been suppressed on that ground.20

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion Borden, Berdon and Katz, Js., concurred.

Callahan, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with part I of the majority opinion. As to part II, however, I believe that the majority is reaching to expand the scope of the state constitution when such an expansion has scant support and serves no useful purpose. The majority concedes that neither textually nor historically is there any justification for the application of the state warrant requirement to this set of facts. It, nonetheless, discovers that Connecticut citizens are entitled to greater protection from searches and seizures, when there is probable cause to believe that their motor vehicles are the repositories of weapons or contraband, than that provided by the federal constitution. The majority concludes, consequently, contrary to a long line of cases commencing with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), that the police in this instance were required by the state constitution to obtain a warrant to search the defendant’s automobile, even though the search and resultant seizure of the holdup weapon, a .357 caliber revolver, would have been constitutional *388without a warrant under federal law, which we have followed up until this point. See State v. Johnson, 183 Conn. 148, 153, 438 A.2d 851 (1981); State v. Schoenbneelt, 171 Conn. 119, 123, 368 A.2d 117 (1976).

The state constitution, like its federal counterpart, proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 121, 547 A.2d 10 (1988). It seems to me that if it is reasonable, and a proper exception to the warrant requirement, for the police to search a motor vehicle on the street without a warrant if they have probable cause to do so, and the majority does not dispute that it is, then a search of that same vehicle with the same probable cause does not become unreasonable if the vehicle is moved to a location where the search can be conducted with greater care and safety. The majority opinion will force the police to conduct motor vehicle searches in dangerous places and before hostile crowds or risk having valuable evidence suppressed at trial, if they determine that it is imperative that they pursue their investigation with dispatch rather than wait for a warrant.

The police may be spared such dilemmas, however, because of the inventory exception to the warrant requirement which, at least for the moment, remains viable. That “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 107, 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828, 106 S. Ct. 90, 88 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1985); allows the police, if their department has an established inventory policy, to comb the interior of a motor vehicle in their possession in order to inventory the vehicle and its contents. Id., 108. The obvious justification is to guard the police and others against the possible presence of dangerous articles in the vehicle, and to protect against potential claims of theft, loss or damage. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983). An inventory may *389be done as a reasonable exception to the warrant requirement, without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains anything even remotely connected to a crime. The majority opinion may result in a dramatic rise in the number of such searches.

That last comment is made not to encourage subterfuge or disrespect for the law, but to point out the illogic of constitutionally allowing the police to conduct inventories at police headquarters without a warrant and without probable cause, but not allowing them constitutionally to search, without a warrant, a vehicle they have probable cause to believe contains weapons or evidence of criminal activity that is properly in their possession at that same police headquarters. I do not, incidentally, have a problem with the reasonableness of inventory searches. My point is that the majority opinion seems to create an irrational distinction between what constitutes a proper exception to the warrant requirement when the criteria for inventory searches and what the police did in this case are laid side by side. I think Chambers had it right, relocating a motor vehicle to be searched by the police, who have probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle, to a more secure site does not convert a reasonable warrantless search into an unreasonable one. The majority opinion appears to be simply a flexing of state constitutional muscle for its own sake.

I respectfully dissent.

Berdon, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the state constitution requires the police, while lawfully in custodial possession of a suspect’s clothing, to obtain a warrant before subjecting the clothing to a chemical analysis. The defendant, Wallace Joyce, was charged with two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll (a) (3) and (4), respectively.1 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress certain evidence, including the results of a chemical analysis of his clothing. Although the trial court granted the motion in part, the court refused to suppress the chemical analysis results. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one count of arson in the first *12degree in violation of § 53a-lll (a) (4) and acquitted of the charge under § 53a-lll (a) (3). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve years, suspended after four years, fined $5000 and placed on five years probation. On the defendant’s appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the conviction with one judge, Heiman, J., dissenting. State v. Joyce, 30 Conn. App. 164, 619 A.2d 872 (1993). We granted the defendant’s petition for certification.2 We conclude that the results of the chemical analysis should have been suppressed and therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following evidence and findings, taken from the suppression hearing except as otherwise indicated, are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On January 29, 1990, fire fighters and paramedics arrived at 125 Maple Street, East Haven, in response to a dispatch call reporting that there had been an explosion at that location. Emergency medical technician Charles Licata, en route to the scene, received a call to step up the priority because there was a patient in need of immediate medical treatment. When Licata arrived, the house at 125 Maple Street was on fire and the defendant was standing in a nearby river, waist deep in water. The defendant appeared to be severely burned. Licata helped the defendant out of the water and up onto an embankment. The defendant’s clothing was burned and smoldering and he had first, second and third degree burns over 42 percent of his body. His hands were degloved, meaning that the skin was intact but it was hanging off his hands. Licata cut all of the defendant’s clothing off in order to expose his injuries so that they could be cleaned and treated and placed the clothing *13on the ground by the side of the road. Licata cleaned the defendant’s bums, placed him on a gurney, covered him with a sterile burn dressing, administered oxygen, and periodically wet down his body with a sterile saline solution. He then took the defendant to Yale-New Haven Hospital. In Licata’s opinion, based on his training and experience with burn victims, the defendant might have died had he not received immediate medical treatment and transportation to the hospital.

Licata and detective Paul Hemingway rode in the ambulance with the defendant to the hospital. Licata told Hemingway that the defendant’s clothing had been left by the roadside. En route to the hospital, Licata asked the defendant what had happened and the defendant responded that he had gone to his parents’ house to check on something. He had opened the door, and there had been an explosion. He was not sure if he had been blown out of the house, or if he had run out of the house to the river.

In the emergency room, Hemingway also asked the defendant what had happened, and the defendant repeated what he had told Licata. Hemingway then asked the defendant if he had a car. The defendant stated that he had a pickup truck, parked some distance away from the scene of the fire, at the Professional Building on Foxon Road in East Haven. Hemingway asked the defendant why the car was parked elsewhere, and the defendant responded that he had experienced mechanical problems. The conversation lasted only a minute, ending because the defendant, due to his condition, was no longer able to answer questions. Hemingway also spoke with the defendant’s wife. He told her that the police had the defendant’s burned clothing and wallet, and that she could pick them up at the police station.

*14Detective Bruce Scobie took possession of the defendant’s clothing, which was lying in a pile on the street. Scobie and Hemingway took the wet items of clothing to the police department, and hung them up to dry. They also inventoried the contents of the defendant’s wallet. After the clothing had dried, it was tagged, placed in bags and stored at the police department. Scobie stated that his intention had been to return the clothing to its proper owner, and that he had been carrying out a customary procedure for safekeeping property, because “[i]f we left . . . [the items of clothing] lying in the street they [would] either be thrown out or stolen.” Both Scobie and Hemingway stated that the defendant had not been considered a suspect at these initial stages of the investigation. The trial court found that the police had taken custody of the defendant’s clothing pursuant to their community caretaking function. See State v. Tully, 166 Conn. 126, 136, 348 A.2d 603 (1974). Neither party challenges this finding on appeal.

Within a day, the defendant did become a suspect. On January 30, the day after the fire, Scobie gave the defendant’s clothing to fire marshall Frederick Brow. Brow immediately brought each item of clothing to the state forensic laboratory in Meriden for chemical testing, except for the defendant’s undershirt and dungarees, which he transported two days later. Brow did not obtain a warrant before ordering the chemical analysis of the clothing. The police did, however, apply for and obtain a warrant to seize the defendant’s pickup truck several days later.

Jack Hubball, the head of the chemistry section of the state forensic laboratory, employed gas chromatography analysis on each of the defendant’s items of clothing. At the defendant’s trial, Hubball testified concerning the nature of the test he had performed. In the first step of the procedure, Hubball heated the *15garments individually to vaporize any organic material present. In the second step of the procedure, he ran the vapors through a column designed to separate the mixture of chemical compounds inside the vapor according to the differing boiling points of each compound. The machine produced a printout of a pattern that represented the compounds present in the vapor. In the final step of the procedure, Hubball compared the pattern with a library of known signature patterns of organic substances. The pattern on the defendant’s shirt, shoes, socks and jeans matched the known pattern for gasoline.3

The defendant argues that the chemical analysis of his clothing was the product of an illegal search and seizure under both the fourth amendment to the United States constitution4 and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut5 and therefore should have been suppressed. Since we agree with the defendant that the warrantless chemical analysis of the clothing constituted an unconstitutional search under article first, § 7, we need not reach the claim under the federal constitution.6 “It is well established that federal *16constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection of such rights. . . . Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

The state argues, however, that we should not review the state constitutional issue because the defendant failed to provide a separate or distinct analysis under the state charter in the Appellate Court. We have made clear that under these circumstances we are not bound to review the state constitutional claim.7 See, e.g., State *17v. Birch, 219 Conn. 743, 746 n.4, 594 A.2d 972 (1991). We have never held, however, that we are precluded from doing so. Under appropriate circumstances, review of state constitutional claims may be undertaken despite the failure of a defendant to brief the state constitutional issue in a prior appeal. State v. Geisler, 25 Conn. App. 282, 283-84 n.2, 594 A.2d 985 (1991), aff'd, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). In the present case, the dissent in the Appellate Court was predicated in part on the state constitutional issue.8 We certified the issue for review under both the federal and state constitutions, and both parties accordingly briefed the state constitutional issue in this court. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, we may review the defendant’s article first, § 7 claim. See State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 445, 534 A.2d 219 (1987).9

*18In determining whether the results of the chemical test of the defendant’s clothing should have been suppressed under the state exclusionary rule,10 as the product of a search11 that violated the state constitution, we employ the same analytical framework that would be used under the federal constitution.12 We must *19determine (1) whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing, (2) whether the testing of the clothing at the state laboratory constituted a search, and (3) if so, whether the circumstances of this case fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. For purposes of our analysis, we assume that the police had probable cause at the time of the chemical test to believe that the defendant started the fire.

We note initially that our determination of the constitutionality of the chemical testing of the defendant’s clothing is not meaningfully assisted by the express language of article first, § 7, other than the fact that the defendant’s clothing was a “possession” and therefore falls within the literal reach of the constitutional language. See State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 635, 620 A.2d 746 (1993). Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, our determination would not be assisted by a historical analysis of article first, § 7. “[W]e have, on occasion, employed a historical analysis of state constitutional provisions to aid in our determination of their content; see, e.g., State v. Oquendo, [223 Conn. 635, 650-52, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992)] (‘seizure’ under article first, §§ 7 and 9); State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 538 n.4, 594 A.2d 917 (1991) (‘probable cause’ under article first, § 7) . . ." State v. DeFusco, supra, 635.

When interpreting the contours of our state charter of liberty, it is clear that we may look to federal prece*20dent. State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 685; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983) (recognizing that in interpreting a state constitution, a state court may “rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions”). We employ this precedent for guidance and analogy when the federal authorities are “logically persuasive and well-reasoned.” W. Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (“state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees”).

For the clothing to fall within the protection of article first, § 7, the defendant must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In order to meet this rule of standing; State v. Pittman, 209 Conn. 596, 600-601, 553 A.2d 155 (1989); a two-part subjective/objective test must be satisfied: (1) whether the owner or custodian of the clothing “manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to it”; and (2) whether “that expectation [is] one that society would consider reasonable. . . .” State v. DeFusco, supra, 224 Conn. 633. This determination is made on a case-by-case basis. State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 331, 541 A.2d 1209 (1988). “Whether a defendant’s actual expectation of privacy ... is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919, 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991).

*21Our analysis commences with the concession by the state that generally there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothes that one wears. The state does not claim that mere custody of the defendant’s property would entitle the police to search the property, and the law holds otherwise. State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 386-87, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); State v. Mooney, supra, 218 Conn. 100 (assuming that upon probable cause the police were entitled to seize belongings found under a bridge and preserve them while a proper search warrant was secured, we held that the warrantless search of the belongings violated the fourth amendment). Instead, the state argues that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy because his own conduct, in spilling gasoline on his clothing, manifested no intent to preserve a privacy interest in such incriminating evidence. The state cites no authority for this novel proposition. We simply note that article first, § 7, of the state constitution serves to protect the privacy rights of every citizen, not just those who are intentionally concealing evidence of crimes. Compare Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987) (holding that the mere act of moving a piece of stereo equipment to expose its serial number ‘‘produce [d] a[n] . . . invasion of respondent’s privacy” in violation of the fourth amendment without any suggestion that the defendant intentionally concealed the serial number from view). We conclude that the defendant adequately exhibited his subjective expectation of privacy, as he “merely left his property behind him, more or less of necessity, making no attempt, however, to discard it or disassociate it from himself.”13 State *22v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 855 (Me. 1981), on appeal after remand, 481 A.2d 488 (Me. 1984) (no abandonment found where injured defendant left his knapsack by side of road, hitchhiked to police station, and then told police that pack belonged to him).

The state also argues that because the gasoline spill resulted in the emission of a detectable odor, the defendant’s expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable. The state analogizes the gasoline spill to a coffee stain on clothing that comes within the plain view of the police. The state’s analogy is misplaced. The record contains no evidence that the defendant’s clothing did in fact emit any odor detectable by the human sense of smell.14

*23The dissent asserts, however, that the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished by the fact that the clothing was damaged by the fire. Although the items of clothing tested at the state laboratory were unusable as clothing and reduced to rags, they were still the defendant’s rags.15 Compare State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 238-40, 456 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 1014, 79 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1984) (under fourth amendment of United States constitution, and article first, § 7, of Connecticut constitution, defendant retained reasonable expectation of privacy in burned out and boarded up building containing damaged personal property). Under all the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the defendant’s expectation of privacy was a reasonable one under article first, § 7, of the state constitution.

The next issue to be decided under our state constitution is whether the testing of the clothing at the state laboratory constituted a search. In the first instance, the answer to the question of whether the chemical testing of the clothing constituted a search borders on the obvious. Furthermore, the question has largely been answered by our determination that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the invisible and odorless chemicals present in his clothing. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984) (“[w]e must first determine whether [official conduct] can be considered a 'search’ subject to the Fourth Amendment—did it infringe an *24expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable”). Moreover, as previously noted, the testimony of the expert witness Hubball indicates that government conduct invaded the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy through the use of a machine designed to detect the presence and identity of many organic compounds by heating clothing items and analyzing the resultant vapors. We conclude that this chemical test, capable of determining a multitude of private facts about an individual,16 constituted a search under article first, § 7, of the state constitution.17

The state finally claims that if there was a search, it was not unreasonable and therefore passes constitutional muster. Under the state constitution, all warrant-less searches, whether or not the police have probable cause to believe that a crime was committed, are per *25se unreasonable, unless they fall within one of a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 617, 626 A.2d 273 (1993).

In State v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. 363, we recently explained the reasoning underlying the warrant requirement. “Our [state] constitutional preference for warrants reflects a goal of protecting citizens from unjustified police intrusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the police and the object of the proposed search. See State v. Diaz, [226 Conn. 514, 628 A.2d 567 (1993)]; cf. State v. Jackson, 162 Conn. 440, 444, 294 A.2d 517, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870, 93 S. Ct. 198, 34 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1972) (purpose of fourth amendment is to require neutral and detached magistrate to make probable cause determination). Accordingly, a search is invalid if the police, without a justification rooted in a valid exception to the warrant requirement, have relied upon only their own probable cause evaluation, even if later found to be correct, before searching. We thus read the two clauses of article first, § 7, in conjunction—a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, justified only by limited exceptions—rather than in disjunction—a search is valid if it is reasonable, and the presence of a warrant is just one factor in the determination of reasonableness. Cf., e.g., State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 423, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986) (construing fourth amendment to bar warrantless searches as per se unreasonable); see generally State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-69 (Utah 1990) (extensive discussion of the consequences of reading the two clauses of the fourth amendment in conjunction and in disjunction); R. Bloom, ‘Warrant Requirement—The Burger Court Approach,’ 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 691 (1982).

*26“Our constitutional preference for warrants is overcome only in specific and limited circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Geisler, supra, [222 Conn.] 691 (recognizing emergency exception as matter of state constitutional law); State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 266-67, 559 A.2d 164, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1989) (recognizing exception for search incident to arrest as matter of state constitutional law); State v. Dukes, [209 Conn. 98, 126, 547 A.2d 10 (1988)] (recognizing automobile exception on the highway as a matter of state constitutional law). These recognized exceptions derive primarily from acknowledged interests in protecting the safety of the police and the public and in preserving evidence.” State v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. 382-83.

In Miller, as in the present case, the police had possession of the defendant’s property—that is, a car that had been towed and impounded following the arrest of the defendant—and the defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the method by which the police had gained possession of the car. Id., 368. The police searched the impounded car without obtaining a warrant, and found a .357 Smith and Wesson revolver in the trunk. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of a weapon upon this evidence. Id. Under our state constitution, we refused to expand the automobile exception18 to the warrant requirement to include a warrantless search at the police station while the automobile is in lawful custody. We held that “[i]n light of our demonstrated constitutional preference for warrants and our concomitant obligation narrowly to circumscribe exceptions to the state constitutional warrant requirement, we conclude *27that a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause, but conducted after the automobile has been impounded at the police station, violates article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.” Id., 386-87.

The circumstances of the search in the present case present an even more compelling case for requiring a warrant than those of State v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. 363. In Miller, the state argued for the expansion of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement under the state constitution, the automobile exception. In the present case, the state is unable to identify any exception to the warrant requirement that could encompass the warrantless search of the defendant’s clothes.19 Our concern for the right to personal privacy and our preference for the warrant to protect that privacy was recently underscored when we pointed out that even if the police act without a warrant under the emergency exception, once that emergency ceases to exist, the police must terminate their intrusive conduct. State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 695-96. Accordingly, we conclude that the chemical analysis of the defendant’s clothing should have been suppressed as the result of a warrantless search unsupported by exigent circumstances or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to *28reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for a new trial on the count of arson in the first degree.

In this opinion, Peters, C. J., Borden, Norcott and Katz, Js., concurred.

Callahan, J.,

with whom Santaniello, J., joins, dissenting.

I dissent from the majority opinion because I do not believe that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the burnt remnants of his clothing.

In order to claim the protection of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant must establish that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded property. State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919, 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991). “Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications.” Id., citing State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 355, 503 A.2d 566 (1986). In order to determine whether a defendant harbored such an expectation, we inquire into (1) whether the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether that expectation was one that society would consider reasonable. State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 633, 620 A.2d 746 (1993), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The determination of whether the defendant has established a reasonable expectation of privacy must be made on a case-by-case basis; State v. Mooney, supra, 94; and by undertaking a factual inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances. State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 331, 541 A.2d 1209 (1988).

In the present case, when the fire fighters arrived on the scene of the fire, the defendant was standing in a *29river with severe burns over most of the front of his body. The defendant’s clothes were cut off in order to allow treatment of his burns. State v. Joyce, 30 Conn. App. 164, 166, 619 A.2d 872 (1993). Á fire fighter described the defendant’s clothing as charred and “ ‘mostly burned off his body in all the areas where he had the third and second degree burns.’ ” Id. The burned clothing was deposited in a wet pile alongside a public road. Id., 166-67. The defendant concedes that the police could properly have made a decision, as they did, to take his burned clothing to the police station as part of their community caretaking function. Id., 169. Nothing in the record indicates that the defendant articulated or otherwise manifested any subjective expectation of privacy in the remnants of his clothing. Moreover, even if the defendant had somehow manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, I believe that such an expectation is one that society would not recognize as reasonable. The defendant contends, nevertheless, that an unreasonable search occurred when the police transferred the clothes from police headquarters to the forensic laboratory to be tested for traces of gasoline.

At the outset, any expectation of privacy that the defendant may have had in his clothing was diminished by virtue of their condition and their treatment. The trial court opined that the remnants were no longer usable as clothing. State v. Joyce, supra, 30 Conn. App. 167 n.6. While a reasonable expectation of privacy may attach to one’s clothing, that expectation necessarily diminishes when the clothing is reduced to burnt remnants placed by the roadside.

The majority relies on State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 240, 456 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 1014, 79 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1984), for the proposition that a person’s expectation of privacy in *30property does not disappear merely because the property is damaged. I agree.. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Zindros.

In Zindros, we concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a “burned out and boarded up building.” Id. That conclusion was based on evidence that the defendant “always secured the site upon leaving” because he stored merchandise there worth approximately $6750. Id. Thus, the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy, evidenced by his securing the building every time he left, was reasonable because the building was still able to be closed up and was being used as a depository for his personal property. In the present case, the defendant’s clothing was no longer usable as such and the defendant neither expressed nor exhibited any interest in the remnants until the test results were to be introduced into evidence.1 Any reasonable expectation of privacy that might attach to clothing in general was severely diminished as a result.

Furthermore, “an inadvertent leaving of effects in a public place, whether or not an abandonment in the true sense of the word, can amount to a loss of any justified expectation of privacy.” W. LaFave, Search & Seizure (Sup. 1994) § 2.6, p. 94; see Wagner v. Hedrick, 181 W. Va. 482, 383 S.E.2d 286 (1989) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal effects removed by hospital personnel and left in hospital emergency room freely accessible to law enforcement officers, medical personnel and public in general); Sullivan v. District Court of New Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 742, 429 N.E.2d 335 (1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in jacket inadvertently left in common area of hospi*31tal). In the present case, the remnants of the defendant’s clothing were left on the side of the road, readily accessible to the public and law enforcement personnel.

Nor did the defendant retain an expectation of privacy in his burnt clothing merely because a police officer, rather than a passerby, happened to retrieve the remnants from the roadside. We have refused to recognize that one’s expectation of privacy depends upon who comes into possession of the property in question. “A person either has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or does not; what is objectively reasonable cannot, logically, depend on the source of the intrusion on his or her privacy.” State v. DeFusco, supra, 224 Conn. 638-39. Finally, an expectation of privacy does not attach to property merely because it may constitute incriminating evidence. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979) (noting that while a defendant may have a subjective expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence, that expectation is not one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable).

I dissent.

Peters, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the provisions of article first, § 9,1 of the Connecticut constitution preclude the police from detaining a person for limited investigative purposes without having probable cause to arrest. The state charged the defendant, Richard Lamme, with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and with the operation of a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension, in violation of General *174Statutes §§ 14-227a (a) and 14-215 (a), respectively.2 The defendant unsuccessfully moved, prior to trial, for the suppression of evidence concerning his performance of field sobriety tests. The trial court rendered judgment against the defendant on a jury verdict finding him guilty as charged, and the Appellate Court affirmed that judgment in State v. Lamme, 19 Conn. App. 594, 563 A.2d 1372 (1989). This court granted certification to consider the merits of his novel state constitutional claim, and we now affirm.3

*175The opinion of the Appellate Court reports the relevant facts. During the evening of October 22,1987, the defendant consumed several alcoholic beverages at the bar of the Trumbull Marriott hotel. At the request of the hotel management, in the early hours of the following day, police officer Richard Applebaum of the Trumbull police department wakened the defendant who was asleep in a chair in the front lobby. State v. Lamme, supra, 595. Noticing a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, Applebaum offered to arrange a safe ride home for the defendant. Id. The defendant responded, however, that he would wait in his car for a friend to drive him home. Id., 595-96. Having watched the defendant walk to his car with an uncertain gait, Applebaum radioed police headquarters with a description of the defendant and his car. Id., 596.

Police Officer Thomas Savarese heard the police broadcast and drove down a public road in the vicinity of the Marriott, where he observed the defendant driving a car that matched the broadcast description and did not have its headlights illuminated. Because the failure to display lighted headlights while on a public highway at night is an infraction; see General Statutes § 14-96a (d);4 Savarese stopped the defendant’s car. Id. Savarese too noticed a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath and then asked the defendant to step out of his car to take roadside sobriety tests of his physical dexterity.5 Id. The defendant’s failure to *176pass these tests was the basis for his arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. After the defendant’s arrest, Savarese took him to police headquarters. Id.

On these facts, the trial court and the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence concerning his performance on the field sobriety tests. Both courts agreed that the police had legally stopped the defendant, in the first instance, for driving without illuminated headlights in the dark of night. Id., 599. Thereafter, the odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath furnished a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant might be involved in criminal activity and justified his further detention for the limited intrusion represented by sobriety testing at the place where he was being detained. As a matter of federal constitutional law under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, the police made a valid Terry stop, as such a detention has been defined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983); State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 398-402, 521 A.2d 555 (1987); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 611, 617-18, 458 A.2d 369 (1983).

In the present appeal, the defendant urges us to hold that our state constitution requires a different result by virtue of article first, § 9, which provides that “[n]o person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law.” The defendant maintains that this section forbids the police to detain any person, even on reasonable and articulable suspicion, unless and until the police have probable cause to make an arrest. Applied to the facts of this case, the defendant's theory would require exclusion of the *177results of his roadside sobriety tests because the police concededly did not have probable cause to arrest him for driving while under the influence until he failed to pass these tests. We are unpersuaded.

The defendant’s constitutional claim focuses on the phrase “except in cases clearly warranted by law.” Although this court has not specifically addressed the import of this language in the context of an investigative detention short of an arrest, we have generally characterized article first, § 9, as one of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing due process of law. See, e.g., State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 425, 489 A.2d 350 (1985); State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 420, 481 A.2d 56 (1984); Parks v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 270, 278 n.8, 477 A.2d 636 (1984).6 A due process perspective therefore informs our assessment of the defendant’s contention that, because warrants cannot be issued without a showing of probable cause, the phrase “clearly warranted by law” mandates a universal probable cause standard whenever the police restrain personal freedom to any degree.

In examining the text of article first, § 9, to determine the extent to which it supports the defendant’s claim, “we must assume that infinite care was employed to couch in scrupulously fitting language a proposal aimed at establishing or changing the organic law of the state. Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 19, 103 A.2d 818 [1954]; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 125. Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.” Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), *178appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981). In article first, § 9, the “except in cases clearly warranted by law” clause modifies, without apparent distinction, the rights of a person “arrested, detained or punished.” Although the validity of an arrest turns on proof of probable cause, that standard of proof has no bearing on the legality of punishment. Accordingly, on its face, § 9 does not impose a universal probable cause standard in all the circumstances that the section encompasses. Furthermore, § 9’s separate inclusion of arrests and detentions counsels against finding an intent to impose a constitutional requirement for a parity of treatment between the greater intrusion on personal freedom represented by an arrest and the lesser intrusion represented by a detention. Read in its entirety, the text indicates that the specific content appropriately to be assigned to the phrase “clearly warranted by law” depends on the particular liberty interest that is at stake. Such a construction is, of course, entirely consonant with the general contours of a constitutional safeguard rooted in flexible principles of due process. See, e.g., Asherman v. Meachum, 213 Conn. 38, 46, 49-53, 566 A.2d 663 (1989); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 324-25, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972).

The historical antecedents of article first, § 9, shed little light on the scope of the section’s mandate with regard to detentions. The precise language of the present section was originally adopted as article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution of 1818.7 Prior to 1818, Connecticut’s declaration of rights took the form of a statutory enactment dating back to the preamble to Ludlow’s Code of 1650. That preamble provided that *179“no mans life shall bee taken away . . . no mans person shall bee arrested, restrained, banished, dismembered nor any way punished . . . under colour of Law or countenance of Authority, unless it bee by the ver-tue or equity of some express Law of the Country warranting the same, established by a General Courte, and sufficiently published, or in case of the defect of a Law in any perticular case, by the word of God.” 1 Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut 509 (J.H. Trumbull Ed. 1850). This text survived with only minor changes until its last codification before the adoption of the constitution, in the 1808 Public Statute Laws of Connecticut. At that time, the final clause of the preamble read: “unless clearly warranted by the laws of this state.” Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut (1808), Title I, § 2.

For present purposes, the most significant aspect of the pre-1818 declaration of rights is that it had constitutional overtones even though it was statutory in form. “The Declaration and supplementary statutes relating to individual rights were grounded in the Connecticut common law and viewed as inviolate. Abridge-ments perpetrated by the government were considered void on their face and courts were to refuse to enforce them.” C. Collier, “The Connecticut Declaration of Rights Before the Constitution of 1818: A Victim of Revolutionary Redefinition,” 15 Conn. L. Rev. 87, 94 (1982); see also H. Cohn & W. Horton, Connecticut’s Four Constitutions (1989) p. 18. The historical roots of “except in cases clearly warranted by law” appear therefore to provide protection for personal freedom through a blend of statutory and constitutional rights that, like the text of the current article first, § 9, incorporates no single constitutional standard.

The Connecticut constitutional convention of 1818 enacted a constitutional declaration of rights as an integral part of its major agenda of replacing a *180parliamentary form of government based on legislative hegemony with a system of government embodying a division of power among three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. The adoption of a written declaration of rights reflected an important change in political attitudes. “[T]he old pre-Revolutionary leaders thought that republican government with legislative supremacy was the best safeguard of personal liberties. . . . By . . . 1818, the beliefs of the old revolutionaries were replaced by the thinking of the post-Revolutionary generation, who perceived the necessity of written guarantees . . . [for the protection of personal rights that might not] be safe with the legislature and the courts . . . .” C. Collier, supra, 98. The history of the convention, officially reported in the Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates (1873), does not, however, reveal why, in formulating the new declaration of rights, the drafters elected to modify the terms of its statutory antecedent by replacing “restrained” with “detained” and by replacing “clearly warranted by the laws of this state” with “clearly warranted by law.”

This constitutional history demonstrates an underlying concern for protection of personal freedom that does not readily translate into constitutional doubt about the legality of brief investigative detentions. The available case law, in the period immediately antedating the adoption of the constitution of 1818, suggests that the official investigation of potentially criminal behavior was not then viewed as constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Wrexford v. Smith, 2 Root 171 (1795); Knot v. Gay, 1 Root 66, 67 (1774); and see 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) 390-91. The only case decided reasonably contemporaneously with the adoption of the 1818 constitution followed the pre-constitutional pattern of construing “warranted by law” as having a statutory *181referent similar to that expressly contained in the pre-1818 statutory declaration of rights. In that case, Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 43 (1837), this court noted the “solicitude for personal liberty manifested in the constitution,” but attached no specific constitutional consequences to that constitutional solicitude. Faced with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of a slave brought to this state by her Georgia owner, the court framed the issue as “what was the state of our law upon this subject, at the time of the adoption of the constitution of this state: for it has not since been varied.” Id. The court resolved that issue, in favor of freedom, under the relevant “state of our law” as found in the provisions of pre-1818 statutes for the abolition of slavery in Connecticut. While the statutory resolution of the issue posed to the court may well have obviated the need to articulate a constitutional standard, Jackson v. Bulloch’s framing of a constitutional issue in statutory terms indicates that detentions under article first, § 9, near the time of its adoption, were not perceived as invoking special constitutional considerations apart from applicable statutory constraints.

In this century, the case law under article first, § 9, continued to emphasize the central role of statutory safeguards in implementing the constitutional right of personal liberty. In State v. Carroll, 131 Conn. 224, 227-29, 38 A.2d 798 (1944), this court held that a police officer could be charged with manslaughter for having used physical force to consummate a warrantless arrest under circumstances unauthorized by the applicable statute. Despite the broader reach of common law authority to arrest, and despite the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicions, this court characterized the officer’s attack on his victim as “a gross violation of his fundamental rights,” citing the text of article first, § 9. Id., 231; see footnote 7, supra. The basis for the con*182stitutional violation was, however, the mandate of the statute: “[T]he purpose of the close restriction upon arrests without warrants is to protect the liberty of the innocent. We cannot say that the legislature adopted a wrong policy when it weighed that liberty against the possibility that some guilty person might escape.” State v. Carroll, supra; see also Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 281-83, 161 A. 239 (1932).

Only in State v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 425 A.2d 916 (1979), has this court assigned independent substantive significance to article first, § 9. Federici, like State v. Carroll, dealt with the consequences of an arrest that, lacking probable cause, was illegal under the relevant statute; General Statutes § 54-lf; and article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We concluded, in State v. Federici, supra, 61-62, that when an arrest is tainted by its linkage to an unconstitutional search and seizure, the use of such illegally obtained evidence in a subsequent prosecution compromises the right to a fair trial and requires dismissal of the outstanding charges related thereto. See also State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 261-62, 502 A.2d 886 (1986).

Federici also addressed the validity of a detention short of an arrest. Because the defendant in that case had conceded the constitutionality of his initial detention; State v. Federici, supra, 51; we relied on Terry v. Ohio, supra, as well as article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9, to conclude that reasonably articulated suspicions justified the police in stopping the defendant’s car and in detaining him for routine questions and observations. State v. Federici, supra, 57. We held, further, that this justifiable stop, based on a police broadcast of the description of an escape vehicle and the lack of a displayed rear marker plate on the defendant’s car, permitted the police to “view” the contents of the car. Id. At the least, Federici suggests that this court did not *183then perceive any fundamental inconsistency between the legality of a detention under our state constitution and the principles of Terry v. Ohio.

In sum, the few available precedents, like the text of article first, § 9, counsel against the conclusion that only a detention supported by a showing of probable cause is “clearly warranted.” We have, however, never addressed this issue head on, and now must consider whether sound constitutional policy requires us to adopt a different view. “The Connecticut constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens.” State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 115, 547 A.2d 10 (1988). In searching for an appropriate contemporary interpretation of our constitution, furthermore, we may look to, but are not bound by, relevant precedents in the federal courts. “We have frequently relied upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting . . . the United States constitution, to define the contours of the protections provided in the various sections of the declaration of rights contained in our state constitution. We have also, however, determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 159-60, 579 A.2d 58 (1990); State v. Dukes, supra, 112; State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 166, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 707-708, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 1017, 98 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1988); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 234-35, 496 A.2d 498 (1985); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 641-42, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

*184Our appraisal of the due process contours of article first, § 9, leads us to conclude that the principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. We hold, therefore, that the principles underlying constitutionally permissible Terry stops, as further construed in cases such as United States v. Hensley, supra, 227, and Florida v. Royer, supra, 498, define when detentions are “clearly warranted by law” under article first, § 9. Balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,8 we are persuaded that the defendant’s brief detention did not violate his due process rights.

The adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate open textured provisions in our own organic document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution. We have previously held that “the warnings enunciated by Miranda v. Arizona, [384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)] ... are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.” State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987), and cases therein cited. We have likewise concluded that a claimed right to hybrid representation, unavailable under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, is equally unavailable, despite some textual distinctions, under article first, § 8. State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 382-88, 497 A.2d 408 (1985). *185Our decision to interpret article first, § 9, in light of Terry v. Ohio finds further support in the universal acceptance of its governing principles in state constitutional law cases around the country. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).

In conclusion, the text, the history, and the policy embodied in article first, § 9, all rebut the position of the defendant that an investigatory detention without probable cause cannot pass constitutional muster.9 The defendant’s conviction must stand.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

Berdon, J.

In this appeal, the issue we certified for review is whether “the Appellate Court [was] correct in reversing the trial court’s factual finding that the police reasonably believed that the defendant was in need of emergency assistance, thus rendering entry of the defendant’s home lawful under the emergency doctrine?” State v. Geisler, 220 Conn. 918, 597 A.2d 342 (1991). We conclude that the Appellate Court properly held, on the basis of the facts found by the trial court, that pursuant to the state constitution the warrantless entry was not justified under the emergency doctrine. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

In a three count substitute information, the defendant, Martin Geisler, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2),1 assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d2 and evading responsibility in violation of General Statutes *675§ 14-224 (a).3 The charges stemmed from a motor vehicle accident involving the defendant and Mark Brunstad, who was operating a motorcycle.

On January 27,1988, the trial court, Lewis, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s blood alcohol tests, the defendant’s statements made at his home and at the station house, and the videotape of the defendant’s arrest. The trial court found that the evidence had been properly obtained because exigent circumstances justified the police officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home, which subsequently resulted in his arrest. Thereafter, a jury convicted the defendant on all three counts.

The defendant did not appeal the judgment of his conviction for evading responsibility. The defendant appealed from the judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle. The Appellate Court, sitting en banc, with three judges dissenting, set aside the convictions, holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the warrantless entry. State v. Geisler, 22 Conn. App. 142, 148, 576 A.2d 1283 (1990) (Geisler I). The Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor4 and to conduct a new *676trial on the second degree assault charge. This court denied the state’s petition for certification. State v. Geisler, 215 Conn. 819, 576 A.2d 547 (1990).

Thereafter, the state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, raising two questions.5 The first question sought a determination that the Appellate Court had improperly applied the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement for a search of a private dwelling. In the second question, the state alternatively claimed that even if the entry into the private dwelling was illegal, suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained outside the home and at the police station was not required under New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1990). The court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari as to the second issue, vacated the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Appellate Court for further consideration in light of New York v. Harris, supra. Connecticut v. Geisler, 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S. Ct. 663, 112 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1991).

On remand, the Appellate Court, sitting en banc, with two judges dissenting, concluded that although under Harris the federal exclusionary rule would not require suppressing the evidence obtained by the police after they left the defendant’s home, the Connecticut constitution extends greater protection to citizens of our *677state. The Appellate Court again ruled the evidence inadmissible, but this time it based its holding on state constitutional grounds. State v. Geisler, 25 Conn. App. 282, 292, 594 A.2d 985 (1991) (Geisler II). We then granted the state’s petition for certification to review the certified issue.

In Geisler I, supra, 144-47, and in Geisler II, supra, 285, the Appellate Court detailed the facts found by the trial court at the suppression hearing. We will discuss only those facts pertinent to the issues raised here. At approximately 3 p.m. on July 24, 1986, Brunstad was driving a motorcycle westbound on Long Lots Road in Westport. At the intersection of Long Lots Road and Bayberry Lane, Brunstad and a car traveling east on Long Lots Road collided, resulting in injuries to Brunstad. As he lay injured, Brunstad watched the car turn north on Bayberry Lane. When the police arrived, Brunstad described the car as a red Peugeot station wagon, and the driver as an older man with gray hair and glasses. Brunstad also told the police that the driver had stopped, had looked back at him and then had driven away.

Officer Michael Barrett of the Westport police department arrived at the scene of the accident while emergency personnel were attending to Brunstad. Barrett observed glass debris, a piece of trim and the front grille of a Peugeot. Westport police Sergeant Leonard Rummo told Barrett that a red Peugeot station wagon had hit Brunstad and then had fled the scene. Barrett assisted with traffic control for approximately twenty minutes and then was sent to check driveways on Bayberry Lane to try to locate the red Peugeot.

Approximately one mile from the accident scene, Barrett saw a red Peugeot station wagon in a driveway. He ran a check on the vehicle’s registration and obtained the defendant’s name and Bayberry Lane *678address. Barrett observed that the Peugeot’s door was ajar with the keys in the ignition. Additionally, the left front fender was dented, the trim and the plastic front grill were missing, the left headlight was broken, and the front fender had hair fibers attached to it.

Shortly thereafter, Westport police officer Gordon Hiltz arrived at the Bayberry Lane home to assist Barrett. Hiltz noticed that the Peugeot’s radiator felt warm, as if the car had been recently operated. The officers circled the house and then approached the front door. The inner door was open, but the screen door was closed. The officers rang the doorbell, knocked on the door and shouted through the screen door, but received no response. They again walked around the perimeter of the house and knocked on windows, but received no response. The officers knocked on the front door again, yelled into the house and still received no response. At this time, the officers discussed the possibility that the operator of the Peugeot might have been injured in the accident and might need assistance. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that they had considered the following factors to be relevant in making that determination: the damage to the car; the victim’s description of the driver as “older”; their belief that the driver might have been rendered unconscious or might have suffered a heart attack; and their “collective experience” as police officers. The officers entered the defendant’s house without a warrant.

Once inside the house, the officers yelled “Anyone home?” into the kitchen, but received no response. From the kitchen the officers could see across a hallway into a bedroom. They saw someone lying on the bed and called out to the person. That person, the defendant, did not respond, and the officers entered the bedroom. The defendant lay fully clothed, either asleep or unconscious, and they smelled an odor of alcohol in the room.

*679The officers shook the defendant to awaken him and “to see if he was all right.” The defendant awoke, the officers asked if he was all right, and he replied that he was. The officers observed no visible injuries, the defendant complained of none, and the officers determined that the defendant was not injured.

While still in the bedroom, Barrett asked the defendant if he had been drinking, and he responded in the affirmative. In response to the officers’ questions, he admitted that the red Peugeot in the driveway belonged to him and that he had returned to his home an hour earlier.6 The officers asked the defendant to step outside where they questioned him further and then placed him under arrest.7 The defendant entered the patrol car and was read his Miranda rights.8

At the police station, the officers videotaped the defendant answering questions and participating in performance tests given to determine his sobriety. The police administered to the defendant, with his consent, two blood alcohol breathalyzer tests and photographed him.

On the basis of the above factual findings, the trial court determined that the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home was justified by exigent circumstances, namely the officers’ reasonable beliefs that the defendant’s life was endangered, that the defendant might attempt to flee, and that evidence might be *680destroyed.9 The trial court further held that even if exigent circumstances did not exist, the blood alcohol results, the videotape of the defendant at the station house and the statements to the police were not “fruits of an illegal arrest,” and, therefore, were admissible. The trial court then denied the motion to suppress.

In Geisler I, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that on the basis of the facts found by the trial court, the officers could not have reasonably believed that the defendant’s life was endangered and that, therefore, the warrantless entry violated the search and seizure clause of the United States constitution.10 The Appellate Court determined that the “emergency doctrine” type of exigency was applicable to analyze the warrant-less entry into the defendant’s home and that the trial court’s factual findings did not support the officers’ conclusions that the defendant had been injured in the accident. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress the evidence obtained subsequent to the illegal entry—that is, the defendant’s statements at his home, his statements outside his home including those at the police station, the videotape and the results of the blood tests. Id., 155-56. The Appellate Court reasoned in Geisler I that the taint resulting from the unlawful entry into the defendant’s home was not sufficiently attenuated when the evidence was obtained.

In Geisler II, after remand by the United States Supreme Court, the Appellate Court held that the evidence obtained at the police station would have to be suppressed under state constitutional law, even though under federal constitutional law the evidence would be *681admissible.11 In its appeal from Geisler II, the state argues that the Appellate Court improperly found facts by reversing the trial court’s determination that the police officers’ entry was justified.

I

Well known federal and state constitutional principles govern the exclusion of evidence derived from a warrantless entry into a home. The fourth amendment to the United States constitution12 provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Entry by the government into a person’s home, “ ‘is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). Payton *682violations—that is, warrantless searches and seizures inside ahorne, are “presumptively unreasonable”; id., 586; and the state bears the burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement exists. Id., 586 n.25; State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 237, 456 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 1014, 79 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1984). “[A]bsent consent to entry or exigent circumstances, a judicial determination of probable cause must stand in between the police and the door of a person’s home, whether the object of an entry is to search and seize or to arrest.” State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 193, 435 A.2d 3 (1980). To discourage unreasonable searches and seizures, the evidence obtained as a direct result of that illegal search or seizure, as well as the ‘‘fruits,” or evidence derived therefrom, are excluded from evidence, unless the connection between the “fruits” and the illegal search has been sufficiently attenuated to be purged of its primary taint. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-805, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984).

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Harris, supra, narrowed the exclusionary rule in illegal warrantless home arrest situations so that evidence obtained away from the home incident to the arrest need not be suppressed if the police officers had probable cause to make the warrantless arrest. Id., 18. The court held that “the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Pay-ton.” Id., 21. In its analysis, the court in Harris distinguished “fruit of the poisonous tree” cases, which are analyzed by determining whether the evidence obtained is sufficiently divorced from the underlying illegality. It held that “attenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that ‘the challenged evidence is in some sense the *683product of illegal governmental activity.’ ” Id., 19, quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). Because the arresting officers in Harris had probable cause to arrest the defendant and because the statement at issue had been made while the defendant was lawfully detained at the police station, the court held that the statement was “not the product of being in unlawful custody. Neither was it the fruit of having been arrested in the home rather than someplace else.” New York v. Harris, supra.

Accordingly, if we were to follow Harris in interpreting our state constitution, the videotape, the blood alcohol results and the statements made by the defendant at the police station would be admissible into evidence because they were obtained while the defendant was in lawful custody at the police station and would not constitute “fruits” of the illegal entry into the dwelling. This court has not previously addressed this important question of state constitutional law.

In Geisler II, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Appellate Court held that the federal exclusionary rule, as narrowed by Harris, does not protect Connecticut citizens to the extent that the state constitution requires because it does not sufficiently deter police from entering a home without a warrant. Geisler II, supra, 290. In rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s abandonment in Harris of the attenuation analysis, the Appellate Court reasoned that “such an analysis is appropriate in order to determine whether there is a temporal and causal connection between the entry into the home and the particular evidence later obtained outside the home. Here, the state has conceded that the time between the defendant’s arrest in the home and the defendant’s station house statements and consent to take the intoximeter texts was minimal. [Geisler I], supra, 156. Furthermore, *684there were no intervening circumstances to break the causal connection between the warrantless entry into the home and the evidence in question. Id., 157.” Geisler II, supra, 290.13

It is well established that “federal constitutional and statutory law ‘establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.’ . . . Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984).” State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 546, 594 A.2d 917 (1991). Justice Shea, when writing for an unanimous en banc court in State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 159-60, 579 A.2d 58 (1990), rejected the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and noted that “[w]e have frequently relied upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the fourth amendment, as well as other amendments to the United States constitution, to define the contours of the protections provided in the various sections of the declaration of rights contained in our state constitution. We have also, however, determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 112, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 166, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 235-36, 496 A.2d 498 (1985).”

In order to construe the contours of our state constitution and reach reasoned and principled results, the *685following tools of analysis should be considered to the extent applicable: (1) the textual approach; see, e.g., Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981) (“Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.”); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49, 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut’s equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (“The adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate open textured provisions in our own organic document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution.”); (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach; see, e.g., State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 386-87, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 58-59; (5) the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, supra, 178-80; Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 60-62; Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 126, 198 A. 265 (1938); and (6) economic!sociological considerations. See State v. Barton, supra, 546; State v. Dukes, supra, 115; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985); M. Margulies, “Connecticut’s Free Speech Clauses: A Framework and an Agenda,” 65 Conn. B. J. 437 (1991) (an analytical framework for state constitutional analysis in the context of the free speech clauses); *686E. Peters, “State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition,” 84 Mich. L. Rev. 583 (1986) (book review).

Article first, § 7 of the Connecticut constitution, which is similar, but not identical, to the fourth amendment, provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” In order to give meaning to the independent vitality of owe state search and seizure clause, we made clear in State v. Dukes, supra, 110, that the exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in violation of our state constitution. We recognized that the “exclusionary rule is now widely recognized as an effective remedy for enforcement of the constitutional protection against unconstitutional searches and seizures.” Id.

In determining that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to suppress evidence under the state constitution, we are mindful of the costs to society that result from excluding such evidence. Nonetheless, just as we rejected those costs as being insufficient to outweigh the constitutional necessity of excluding evidence in State v. Marsala, supra, 165, so we come to the same conclusion in the present case. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissent in Harris, points out the practical considerations that weigh heavily in favor of excluding evidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal entry into the home. “[T]he officer knows that if he breaks into the house without a warrant and drags the suspect outside, the suspect, shaken by the enormous invasion of privacy he has just undergone, may say something incriminating. Before today’s decision, the government would only be able to use that evidence if the Court found that the taint of the arrest had been *687attenuated; after the decision, the evidence will be admissible regardless of whether it was the product of the unconstitutional arrest. . . . The Court thus creates powerful incentives for police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment. In the context of our constitutional rights and the sanctity of our homes, we cannot afford to presume that officers will be entirely impervious to these incentives.” New York v. Harris, supra, 32. We do not believe that our state constitution allows us to overlook these consequences.

The sanctity of the home has a well established place in our jurisprudence. The English common law, upon which much of this country’s constitutional and common law is based, recognized that intrusion into the home constituted especially egregious conduct. “From earliest days, the common law drastically limited the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest. Such action invades the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle. As early as the 13th Yearbook of Edward IV (1461-1483), at folio 9, there is a recorded holding that it was unlawful for the sheriff to break the doors of a man’s house to arrest him in a civil suit in debt or trespass, for the arrest was then only for the private interest of a party. Remarks attributed to William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, on the occasion of debate in Parliament on the searches incident to the enforcement of an excise on cider, eloquently expressed the principle: ‘The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!’ ” Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-307, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958). In discussing burglary, defined as “nocturnal house-breaking,” Black*688stone wrote, “[a]nd the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it styles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity . . . .”4 Blackstone’s Commentaries (1822) p. 222.

The Connecticut constitution that was adopted in 1818 contained in article first, § 8 the search and seizure clause that is currently found in article first, § 7 of the 1965 state constitution. Before the fourth amendment’s search and seizure clause was made applicable to the states, much less the exclusionary rule, this court recognized the limits imposed on the government by the Connecticut search and seizure clause. “The common law was ready to supply a remedy for any unreasonable search or seizure, by an action of trespass against the individuals who made it. Our Declaration of Rights would be meaningless if it did not seek to do more than this. Its guaranties were designed to protect the citizen against the State . . . and to do so in a way that would repress the wrongful act most efficiently. ... If the constitutional guaranty now under consideration is to be liberally interpreted in favor of the citizen, it would be difficult to apply the principle of such decisions to criminal prosecutions, supported by proof of papers illegally seized for that purpose, in the defendant’s house, by public officers acting professedly as such, without seeming to allow the State to profit by its own wrong. . . . Whether its seizure would have been, under the circumstances, unreasonable . . . presents a question of the utmost gravity, in its bearing, on the one hand, upon the methods of detecting crime, and on the other, upon the liberty of the individual and the inviolability of home.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 310-11, 34 A. 1046 (1896) (Baldwin, J., concurring). Indeed, the adoption of the state’s search and seizure clause in our state constitution was made in the context that *689its federal counterpart’s main thrust was not only protection from the general warrant but also applied “ ‘to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees] of the sanctity of a [person’s] home and the privacies of life.’ ” Payton v. New York, supra, 585, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).

Although not rooted in state constitutional law, we recently demonstrated our concern for the privacy of the individual when we concluded that a homeless man has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his duffel bag and cardboard box because, inter alia, they were located in a place that he regarded as his home. State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 111, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991); see also French v. Amalgamated Local Union 376, 203 Conn. 624, 630, 526 A.2d 861 (1987) (acknowledging inherent conflict between sanctity of home and principle of freedom of speech implicated in legislation restricting residential picketing); State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 442, 465 A.2d 323 (1983) (privilege to resist unlawful warrantless intrusion into the home exists in some circumstances); State v. Santiago, 26 Conn. App. 481, 489-90, 602 A.2d 40, cert. granted, 221 Conn. 920, 608 A.2d 686 (1992) (“A porch is intrinsically associated with both the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life. . . . [It] is as sacrosanct as the home itself. . . .”). Only recently, when we extended to the overnight guest the common law privilege to resist an unlawful police entry into the bedroom he occupied, we emphasized the importance of the right of privacy in the home. We held that the right to be secure in one’s home, “unequivocally establishes the proposition that [a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Silverman v. United States, 365 *690U.S. 505, 511 [81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961)]. Payton v. New York, supra, 589-90. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . agrave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brosnan, 221 Conn. 788, 806-807, 608 A.2d 49 (1992).

Finally, the New York Court of Appeals, when Harris returned to that court on remand from the decision of the United States Supreme Court, also rejected that court’s analysis under the New York constitution. The Court of Appeals concluded in People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991), “that the Supreme Court’s [Harris] rule does not adequately protect the search and seizure rights of [the] citizens of New York.” Id., 437. The court held that under the New York constitution, “statements obtained from an accused following a Payton violation must be suppressed unless the taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated.” Id.

We, therefore, conclude that the Harris rationale falls short of the protection required under our state constitution. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court that the exclusionary rule under article first, § 7 requires that evidence derived from an unlawful warrantless entry into the home be excluded unless the taint of the illegal entry is attenuated by the passage of time or intervening circumstances.

II

We must next determine whether the Appellate Court correctly decided that the warrantless entry into the home was not justified by an exception. The emergency doctrine is one of the recognized exceptions to the federal constitutional requirement that searches *691and seizures be conducted pursuant to a warrant. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). “[T]he fourth amendment does not bar police officers, when responding to emergencies, from making warrantless entries into premises and warrantless searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. . . . The extent of the search is limited, involving 'a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises.’ . . . The police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of the search pursuant to the legitimate emergency activities. . . . Such a search is strictly circumscribed by the emergency which serves to justify it . . . and cannot be used to support a general exploratory search.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 266, 528 A.2d 760 (1987).

Just as the commands of the fourth amendment are not absolute, neither are those of article first, § 7 of the state constitution. We recognize, therefore, that exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as an emergency, is an exception to the state constitution as well as the federal constitution. Such an exception is well grounded in the common law. Blackstone recognized a similar exception to the “house is a castle” principle in criminal cases where “the public safety supersedes the private.” 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries (1822) p. 223.

Nevertheless, the emergency doctrine does not give the state an unrestricted invitation to enter the home. “[Gjiven the rationale for this very limited exception, the state actors making the search must have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion is reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat.” Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir. 1989).14 The police, in *692order to avail themselves of this exception, must “have valid reasons for the belief that an emergency exists, a belief that must be grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective feelings . . . .” People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 178, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S. Ct. 3178, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1191 (1976). It is an objective and not a subjective test. The test is not whether the officers actually believed that an emergency existed, but whether a reasonable officer would have believed that such an emergency existed. State v. Klauss, 19 Conn. App. 296, 302, 562 A.2d 558 (1989); see State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 453, 461 A.2d 963 (1983) (adopting objective test for warrantless felony arrest exigency analysis); see also United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 1989) (test for determining whether a warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances is an objective one).

Ill

In making our determination as to whether the warrantless search was justified under the emergency doctrine exception to our state search and seizure clause, a two-part analysis is required. First, we must determine the proper standard of review the appellate courts should apply when analyzing trial court decisions involving the emergency doctrine exception and, second, *693whether the trial court’s decision passes muster under that standard of review. Although the Appellate Court did not explicitly state the standard of review that it used in Geisler I or in Geisler II, we conclude that it correctly analyzed the issue of the applicability of the emergency doctrine by making a de novo review, based upon the subordinate facts found by the trial court, to determine whether an emergency existed that would justify the warrantless entry into the dwelling.

Facts found by the trial court will not be disturbed unless the finding is clearly erroneous. Practice Book § 4061; State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985). Conclusions drawn from those underlying facts must be legal and logical. State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 267, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). An appellate court reviews conclusions based upon subordinate facts found, even if labeled conclusions of fact, to the same extent that it reviews conclusions of law. Hadfield v. Tracy, 101 Conn. 118, 125, 125 A. 199 (1924). Because the issue of the warrantless entry into a person’s home involves his or her constitutional rights, a reviewing court must examine the record thoroughly to determine whether the subordinate facts justify the trial court’s conclusion that the officers’ belief that an emergency existed was reasonable. State v. Howard, 221 Conn. 447, 454, 604 A.2d 1294 (1992); see State v. Frazier, 185 Conn. 211, 219, 440 A.2d 916 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1112, 102 S. Ct. 3496, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1375 (1982). Thus, we must determine, whether on the facts found by the trial court, the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the officers’ conclusion that there was an emergency was unreasonable.

The state relies on State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 546 A.2d 839 (1988), in arguing that the clearly erroneous standard of review should apply both to the subordinate *694facts found by the trial court and to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that there was an emergency that justified the warrantless entry. In that case, the trial court, ruling on a motion to suppress, held that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the defendant’s wife had consented to the entry, even though the issue of consent had not been raised before the trial court at the suppression hearing. On certification, we stated that whether consent to a search is voluntary is “ ‘a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ” Id., 7-8, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). Our holding in Reagan, however, must be viewed in the context of the issue that was then before us. The Appellate Court therein had concluded that there was consent without the benefit of the trial court’s finding of subordinate facts. We made it clear that the facts underlying a finding of consent are subordinate facts. State v. Reagan, supra, 14. We did not discuss the standard of review in the context of a trial court’s conclusion of consent because the trial court had not made such a finding. Thus, we regard Reagan as inapposite to the appropriate standard of review.

We hold, therefore, that in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the emergency doctrine, subordinate factual findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous and the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding the applicability of the emergency doctrine in light of these facts will be reviewed de novo.15

*695Without disturbing the trial court’s undisputed factual findings, the Appellate Court held that the police officers’ belief that the defendant was in need of immediate aid was not reasonable, and reversed the trial court. Geisler I, supra, 154. We agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court’s factual findings do not support the conclusion that it was reasonable to believe that an emergency existed.

In the present case, the facts available to the police officers were the minor damage to the car, the key left in the ignition, the open car door and the lack of a response when the officers rang the doorbell, knocked on the door and windows and shouted through the screen. Those facts could not reasonably lead to the conclusion that the driver might have suffered the type of injury that would require emergency aid. See People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 897, 567 N.E.2d 717 (1991) (emergency doctrine cannot justify warrantless entry where trial court found that police knew that defendant had been involved in accident, that defendant was sleeping, and that defendant was "out of it” but fine); Lambert v. State, 745 P.2d 1185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (emergency doctrine did not justify warrant-less entry even where the trial court found the automobile of the defendant severely damaged, but the defendant walked to a nearby farmhouse in order to obtain a ride home, and at his home, in response to a police inquiry, he said he was all right).

Indeed, in the present case, even if the police had been justified initially in entering the defendant’s home, once they ascertained that he was physically well they should have withdrawn. Upon being awakened, the defendant responded to the police officer that he was *696all right, the officers observed no visible injuries and they determined that he was not injured. See State v. Magnano, supra; Lambert v. State, supra.

We conclude, therefore, that the Appellate Court applied the correct standard of review to the trial court’s decision on the motion to suppress and also correctly ruled that the facts did not justify a reasonable belief that an emergency existed. Accordingly, we hold that the Connecticut constitution requires the suppression of evidence obtained not only inside the defendant’s home but also the evidence obtained outside the home, including the blood alcohol results, the defendant’s statements at the station house and the videotape of the defendant at the station house.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.16

In this opinion Peters, C. J., Shea and Glass, Js., concurred.

Covello, J.,

dissenting. I believe that the outcome of this case should be governed by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1990). The cases are virtually indistinguishable. As here, in Harris, the police arrested the defendant in his home without a warrant. As here, the police had probable cause to do so. As here, Harris sought the suppression of evidence obtained at the police station following his arrest.

The United States Supreme Court concluded that the fourth amendment to the United States constitution did not require suppression of the subsequently obtained evidence. Since the police had probable cause to take the defendant into custody, the Supreme Court reasoned that the later acquired evidence was obtained *697while the accused was being legally detained and, therefore, the unwarranted entry into the defendant’s home did not require the suppression of this otherwise admissible evidence.

Wisely, the majority does not even attempt to distinguish either the facts of the two cases or the language of the controlling constitutional provisions.1 Further, there is no historical basis for construing this language differently. I submit, therefore, that the holding in Harris should control the outcome here.

Despite their compelling similarities, the majority, nevertheless, rejects this view and under the aegis of our state constitution, prevents those who are to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence from learning critical, relevant facts; in this instance, time sensitive evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol level and video tapes of his physical condition shortly following the accident.

“Although in interpreting the Connecticut constitution we have agreed with and followed the federal handling of consonant provisions of the federal constitution”; State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 113, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); I agree with the majority that “in a proper case ‘the law of the land’ may not, in state constitutional context, also be ‘the law of the state of Connecticut.’ ” Id., 113-14. In doing so, however, in the absence of textual distinctions, we have primarily relied *698upon our historical antecedents as the basis for arriving at a contrary result. See, e.g., State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 538 n.4, 594 A.2d 917 (1991); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 179, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 60-62, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984);Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 126, 198 A. 265 (1938).

“This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the intentions of its authors.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 62.

In examining the purported historical antecedents of article first, § 7 of the Connecticut constitution, the majority refers to the 13th Yearbook of Edward IV (1461-1483), at folio 9, “[rjemarks attributed to William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, on the occasion of debate in [the British] Parliament...” and comments found in 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries (1822), p. 222.1 submit that the assertions of our English forbearers are applicable equally to the entire body of American jurisprudence and serve no particular purpose in illuminating the unique antecedents of Connecticut’s constitution.

The conferring of greater rights upon the individual always carries greater costs to society, including the diminution of the powers of those in law enforcement which are aimed at promoting the public good by the prevention of crime. State v. Dukes, supra, 106. “I believe that due process fairness, under our state as well as our federal constitution, must take into account the ‘felt necessities of the time’; O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881) p. 1; one of which is the magnitude of our crime problem.” State v. Stoddard, 206 *699Conn. 157, 182, 537 A.2d 446 (1988) (Shea, J., dissenting). I would not, therefore, place this further restriction upon the admissibility of relevant evidence.

Accordingly, I dissent.

Glass, J.

After a trial to a jury, the defendant, Ferdinand Oquendo, was convicted of the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102 (a), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (4) and conspiracy to commit burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-102 (a).1 The defendant was acquitted of the charges of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a). The trial *638court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of imprisonment of fifty years. From this judgment of conviction, the defendant appealed pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b).

On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress certain evidence and the identification of him as the fruits of an illegal stop and seizure; (2) the trial court denied him his constitutional right to confrontation when a hearsay statement made by his brother was admitted into evidence, because his brother did not testify and, therefore, could not be cross-examined; (3) the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s election not to testify, in violation of the defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to remain silent; and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. We find merit in the defendant’s first *639claim and, therefore,'we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. In the early morning hours of August 25, 1988, the Wethersfield police department responded to a telephone call from the Almar Motel in Wethersfield. At the motel, police found a man, later identified as Domingo “Billy” Huertas, lying outside of room 107, bleeding from a wound in his chest. Huertas was taken to a local hospital and given emergency treatment, but he died shortly after his arrival.2 After securing aid for Huertas, the police followed a trail of blood to room 100. The doorjamb of room 100 had been broken and the lock plate was on the ground, indicating that the door had been forced open. Inside the room, the police observed more blood and the room in disarray. They found two firearms, a .38 caliber semi-automatic handgun and a .22 caliber handgun. Behind the motel the police found a green cloth bag on the ground. The registration card for room 100 indicated that it had been rented for one week on August 22, 1988, by Charles Morales.

On the evening of August 24, 1988, Jose Huertas, who was the victim’s brother, Morales, the victim and a man named “Edgar” were at Morales’ home in Hartford. Morales gave the victim a .38 caliber handgun and put a .22 caliber handgun into a small box along with a kilogram of cocaine. The four men then went to the Almar Motel, where they drank beer and smoked “crack” cocaine. After approximately one and one-half hours, Jose, Edgar and Morales left the motel. The victim remained in the motel room with the cocaine and the handguns. Additional facts will be detailed in connection with the consideration of specific issues.

*640I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress certain physical evidence and identification evidence. On August 29, 1988, four days after the homicide of Huertas, Wallingford police officer William Birney seized cocaine from a gym-type duffel bag he found in the woods off Center Street in Wallingford. Birney subsequently identified the defendant as the man whom he had seen toss the bag into the woods. The defendant sought to suppress the cocaine and Birney’s identification of him on the basis that they were the fruits of an illegal seizure, in violation of the defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution.3 The trial court denied the defendant’s motions to suppress. Relying on the provisions of our state constitution, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was improper.

The trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motions to suppress, at which Birney was the only witness. Birney, a patrolman with approximately two and one-half years of experience at the time relevant to this appeal, testified as follows. On August 29, 1988, at *641approximately 12:50 a.m., Birney was patrolling in the area of East Main Street and Center Street in Wallingford in a marked police cruiser. Birney was wearing a uniform and a badge and was armed with a nightstick and a firearm. Birney described the area as primarily residential, with a shopping plaza that contains several small businesses. At the time of the patrol, all of the businesses were closed. Birney was aware that there had recently been a series of burglaries on East Main Street.

As Birney drove east on East Center Street, he saw a man and woman walking toward him. He recognized the woman as Nanette Williams, whom he recognized as having recently been arrested on larceny and burglary charges. Although it was “very warm” out, Williams was wearing a “thick jacket.” Her male companion, later identified as the defendant, was wearing a zipped “winter” jacket and carrying a tan, “gym-type” duffel bag. As Birney drove past Williams and the defendant, they “kind of looked at each other” and appeared to quicken their pace. Birney was familiar with Wallingford’s “street people” and had never seen the defendant. Birney thought that it was “strange” that the defendant was wearing a winter jacket when it was “so warm out.” It was not raining at the time. Birney knew from experience that burglars often wear heavy clothing to protect themselves from injury when they break windows. He had a “hunch” that Williams and the defendant had recently committed or were about to commit a burglary.

Birney turned the cruiser around and drove back in the direction of Williams and the defendant. He stopped about seven yards away from them, exited the cruiser and stood by the driver’s side door. Birney asked Williams what she and the defendant were doing. She replied that they were coming from the Junction Cafe. Birney knew that they were, in fact, walking in the *642direction of the Junction Cafe and that the cafe had closed at 11 p.m., nearly two hours earlier. Birney then asked the defendant to identify himself and the defendant answered, “Freddy Velez.” Both Williams and the defendant appeared nervous and kept glancing at each other. Birney asked the defendant to approach the cruiser. The defendant handed the duffel bag to Williams and stepped toward Birney. Birney instructed the defendant to bring the bag with him. The defendant then “grabbed the bag away from [Williams], gave a quick look up and down, and ran away.” Birney yelled to the defendant to “stop” and pursued him on foot through a yard and into a wooded area. Birney saw the defendant throw down the duffel bag as he entered the wooded area. Birney retrieved the bag, which was open. Inside the duffel bag he saw two plastic bags containing white powder, which subsequently tested positive for cocaine.

The following morning, Birney and other Walling-ford police officers searched the wooded area. In the area where Birney had last seen the defendant, another officer found a wallet containing a Connecticut identification card bearing the defendant’s photograph and the name “Raphael Torres.” As a result of the evidence retrieved by Birney and other Wallingford police officers, along with other evidence, the defendant was later arrested and charged with various crimes related to the homicide of Huertas.

The trial court concluded that an investigatory stop had occurred at some point after Birney exited his cruiser and began to question the defendant and Williams. The trial court found that Birney had based his conduct on his knowledge of recent burglaries in the area, his recognition of Williams as having been arrested recently for burglary and larceny, his experience that burglars often wear heavy outer garments and Williams’ responses to his questions. The trial *643court found further that the defendant’s flight had provided Birney with additional grounds to stop the defendant. The trial court concluded that Birney had had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the defendant had been, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity and, therefore, his stop of the defendant had been justified. Finally, the trial court concluded that the defendant had retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the duffel bag once he had discarded it.4

*644In his appeal to this court, the defendant claims that Birney made an investigatory stop without a reasonable and articulable suspicion, in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution. The state argues that Birney did not effectuate a stop but, rather, engaged in a “consensual encounter” with the defendant. Alternatively, the state contends that even if a stop occurred, Birney had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant, based on the observations he had made before exiting his cruiser, together with Williams’ responses to his questions.

*645“On appeal, it is the function of this court to determine whether the decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. . . . The trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985).

Our threshold inquiry is at what point, if any, did the encounter between Birney and the defendant constitute an investigatory stop or seizure. If we conclude that there was such a seizure, we must then determine whether Birney possessed a reasonable and articula*646ble suspicion at the time the seizure occurred. We conclude that, pursuant to article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the state constitution, there was a seizure. We conclude, further, that the stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion and, therefore, that the contrary conclusion of the trial court was clearly erroneous.

A

The defendant appears to concede that under current fourth amendment analysis, Bimey’s actions would not constitute a seizure.5 Accordingly, we confine our analysis to the relevant provisions of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant argues that under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution, he was seized when Bimey asked him to come over to the cruiser with his bag.6 The state argues that no seizure took place and urges this court to adopt the holding of California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991); see footnote 6, supra; in interpreting the contours of a seizure under the state constitution.

In analyzing claims of illegal seizure under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution, we have previously adopted the standards created by the United States Supreme Court for the analysis of claims of illegal seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. *6471, 20-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, reh. denied, 448 U.S. 908, 100 S. Ct. 3051, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1138 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). We have thus defined a person as “seized” under our state constitution when “ ‘by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.’ ” State v. Ostroski, 186 Conn. 287, 291, 440 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S. Ct. 173, 74 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1982), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, supra. In determining whether a seizure has occurred, so as to invoke the protections of our state constitution, we have stated that a court is to consider whether “ ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” State v. Ostroski, supra, 292, quoting United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 554. “Whether there has been such a seizure in an individual case is a question of fact.” State v. Ostroski, supra.

The state urges us to abandon these well established standards for the test now employed by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether a seizure has occurred under the fourth amendment.7 See California v. Hodari D., supra. The state argues that Birney’s interaction with the defendant was a “consensual encounter,” or, at most, an “attempted seizure.”8 The state contends that in light of the United *648States Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Hodari D., supra, this court should hold that there was no seizure of the defendant under the state constitution and, therefore, that the search of the defendant’s bag did not violate his state constitutional rights.

In California v. Hodari D., supra, two police officers, wearing jackets with “police” embossed on both sides, were patrolling a high-crime area in an unmarked vehicle. A group of youths, including the defendant, fled at the approach of the police vehicle. One of the officers gave chase on foot. He observed the defendant toss away a small rock. After restraining the defendant, the officer recovered the rock, which later proved to be cocaine. The United States Supreme Court framed the question presented as “whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield.” Id., 1550. The state conceded that the officer did not have the “reasonable suspicion” required under Terry v. Ohio, supra, to stop the defendant. California v. Hodari D., supra, 1549 n.1. The court concluded, however, that the police officer’s chase of the defendant was not a “seizure” of the person within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a seizure 'for fourth amendment purposes is equivalent to an arrest at common law, which it defined as requiring “either physical force . . . or . . . submission to the assertion of authority.” (Emphasis omitted). Id., 1551. The court thus held that, even if it was assumed that the officer’s pursuit constituted a “show of authority” for fourth amendment purposes, because the defendant did not submit to that authority until after he had discarded the cocaine, the cocaine was properly admitted into evidence. Id., 1552.

*649The state urges this court to read the definition of a “seizure,” as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., supra, into article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution. The state argues that since Birney never applied physical force to the defendant’s person and the defendant did not submit to Birney’s assertion of authority when he ordered the defendant to stop, the defendant’s state constitutional rights were not implicated.

“It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). Although we have often relied upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the fourth amendment to define the protections provided by related provisions of our state constitution, we have at times determined that the state constitution affords greater protections to the citizens of Connecticut than does the federal constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Id.; see also State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10 (1988). We have stated, moreover, that “[t]he Connecticut constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens.” State v. Dukes, supra, 115. Thus, “ ‘the law of the land’ may not, in [the] state constitutional context, also be ‘the law of the state of Connecticut.’ ” Id., 114. In the present case, we must decide whether article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution afford greater protection to the citizens of this *650state than does the federal constitution in the determination of what constitutes a seizure. We conclude that they do.

The state claims that “[t]he restraints associated with a common law arrest or detention best exemplify the contours of what constitutes a seizure” under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution. The state contends that at common law, arrest contemplated “the physical touching of a suspect, or the employment of means that ensure[d] the effective control over or confinement of the suspect.” The state argues, therefore, that pursuant to the common law doctrine of arrest as it existed in Connecticut, our state constitutional standard is “coextensive” with the federal standard set forth in California v. Hodari D., supra. We disagree.

At common law in Connecticut, an arrest was defined as “the apprehending or restraining the person of another . . . .” 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 386 (System). While it is true that at common law “mere words” could not effect an arrest, an arrest could be made without touching the person if sufficient indicia were present that the person was not free to leave. 1 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of Connecticut (1822) p. 499 (Digest) (arrest occurs when peace officer enters a room, tells defendant he is arresting him and locks the door). Legal documents in existence prior to the adoption of the state constitution in 1818 demonstrate a profound concern with the right of personal liberty. In writing of this “sacred and inestimable right” in 1796, Zephaniah Swift, who served as Chief Justice of this court from 1815 to 1819, stated that “no man can be restrained of his liberty; be prevented from removing himself from place to place, as he chuses; be compelled to go to a place contrary to his inclination, or be in any way imprisoned, or confined, unless by virtue of the express *651laws of the land.” 1 Z. Swift, System, supra, p. 180. The only violation of the right of personal liberty was by false imprisonment, which consisted of “the detention of a person without any legal authority.” 2 Z. Swift, System, supra, p. 57. Moreover, every “detention” or “confinement” of the person “in any shape,” including the forcible detention of a person in the street, constituted an imprisonment. Id.; see also 1 Z. Swift, Digest, supra, p. 17.

In California v. Hodari D., supra, Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, purported to rely on the common law definition of arrest for the conclusion that a seizure under the fourth amendment requires either physical force or submission to the assertion of authority. In response to the dissenters’ contention that an attempted arrest was also unlawful at common law, Justice Scalia wrote: “[I]t is irrelevant that English law proscribed ‘an unlawful attempt to take a presumptively innocent person into custody.’ . . . [N]either usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. The common-law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 1550-51 n.2. We are persuaded that the distinction made by the United States Supreme Court between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law does not guide our determination of what constitutes a seizure under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution.9

*652The distinction between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law reflected the difference between battery and assault. California v. Hodari D., supra, 1553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed.) § 9.2. We have previously set forth the concept of the right of personal liberty and the scope of the intrusions on that right, as they existed at common law in this state. “Every confinement of a person in any shape” constituted an imprisonment, for which, if it were accomplished without legal authority, an action for false imprisonment would lie. (Emphasis added.) 1 Z. Swift, Digest, supra, p. 18. Among the specific intrusions on personal liberty that constituted an imprisonment at common law was the unlawful, forcible detention of a person in the street. On the basis of these common law antecedents of article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our constitution, we are persuaded that the dichotomy between an attempted arrest and an arrest “should not take on constitutional dimensions.” See California v. Hodari D., supra, 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we decline to adopt the restricted definition of a seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. and adhere to our precedents in determining what constitutes a seizure under the state constitution.10 See State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 193-94 n.4, 527 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S. Ct. 293, 98 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1987); State v. Ostroski, supra, 290-92.

We now apply these precedential standards to the facts of this case. Birney was on patrol in a marked *653police cruiser. He drove past the defendant and Williams, turned around and stopped approximately twenty feet away from them. Birney then stepped out of the cruiser and stood next to the driver’s door as the defendant and Williams walked toward him. Birney was dressed in full police uniform and visibly armed with a gun and a nightstick. After Birney asked Williams where she and the defendant were going, he asked the defendant his name. The defendant gave him the name “Freddy Velez.” Birney told the defendant to approach the cruiser. The defendant gave the bag to Williams and stepped toward Birney. Birney told the defendant to bring the bag with him.

The state characterizes this entire interaction as a consensual encounter. Under our state constitution what starts out as a consensual encounter becomes a seizure if, on the basis of a show of authority by the police officer, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave. State v. Ostroski, supra, 291-92. In view of all the circumstances, including the lateness of the hour, the fact that Birney was armed and the fact that there was no one other than the defendant and Williams in the vicinity, we are persuaded that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have believed that he was free to ignore Birney’s instructions and walk away. Accordingly, we conclude that a seizure took place within the meaning of article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution.

B

Having determined that a seizure of the defendant took place, we must next determine whether the trial court properly concluded that the seizure was based on a reasonable and articulable basis of suspicion. We conclude that the trial court’s determination was clearly erroneous.

*654Article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution permit a police officer “in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner” to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Mitchell, supra, 195; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). In determining whether the detention was justified in a given case, a court must consider if “ '[bjased upon the whole picture the detaining officers [had] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668, 674, 490 A.2d 984 (1985), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981). A court reviewing the legality of a stop must therefore examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom. See State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 689, 495 A.2d 273 (1985). These standards, which mirror those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, with regard to fourth amendment analysis, govern the legality of investigatory detentions under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution. State v. Lamme, supra; State v. Scully, supra, 674-75 n.12.

The defendant contends that the factors considered by Birney in asking the defendant to approach the cruiser with his duffel bag did not amount to a reasonable and articulable suspicion. The state counters that if this court concludes that Birney’s request that the defendant bring the bag over to the police car was a seizure, Birney at that point had reasonable and articulable suspicion based on his initial observations of the appearance and behavior of Williams and the defendant, coupled with Williams’ responses to Birney’s questions. We agree with the defendant.

*655Although burglaries had been reported in the general area of Birney’s patrol, Birney had not received any report that a burglary had been committed in that area on the evening of August 29, 1988, nor did he possess information linking the defendant or Williams to a particular burglary in the area. Moreover, although Birney testified that the manner of dress of the defendant and Williams fit the profile of burglars, he acknowledged that homeless people often dress in a similar manner and carry items with them. The fact that Williams was known to Birney as a recent arrestee for larceny and burglary could not supply Birney with reasonable suspicion about the defendant. In addition, the fact that Birney did not recognize the defendant from his familiarity with “street people” in Wallingford could not provide justifiable grounds for a stop. Finally, while Williams may have given false answers to Birney’s questions, her responses did not provide Birney with a reasonable suspicion regarding the defendant’s activities.

We are persuaded that Birney’s suspicion that the defendant had been or was about to be engaged in criminal activity was not constitutionally sound.11 We also reject the state’s argument, and the trial court’s conclusion, that the defendant’s flight, when viewed in conjunction with Birney’s other observations, provided Birney with the requisite level of suspicion to seize the defendant. While a suspect’s flight may, in certain cases, be considered in determining whether *656there existed a reasonable and articulable basis of suspicion; see State v. Rodriguez, 14 Conn. App. 574, 578, 542 A.2d 342 (1988); police conduct that provokes flight precludes the consideration of this factor. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 10 Conn. App. 532, 540, 524 A.2d 655, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 801, 525 A.2d 965 (1987). As the Appellate Court has warned: “Were it otherwise, the officer could use the suspicious conduct that he himself induced as evidence that the defendant was acting suspiciously.” Id.

We recognize that police on patrol perform a variety of functions.12 Thus, a police officer, in carrying out his duties, may stop and speak to an individual on the street without necessarily implicating the individual’s constitutional rights. See State v. Damon, 214 Conn. 146, 153, 570 A.2d 700, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819, 111 S. Ct. 65, 112 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1990); State v. Williamson, supra. We acknowledge, furthermore, that the police must enjoy a certain degree of latitude in making investigative stops. Nevertheless, the requirement of a reasonable and articulable factual basis for an investigative stop must be met. We have consistently stated that a police officer’s decision to detain an individual for investigatory purposes “must be predicated ‘on more than a mere hunch.’ ” State v. Scully, supra, 675; State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 691, 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

We are persuaded that the informational basis advanced by Birney to justify his stop of the defend*657ant, which Birney himself characterized as a “hunch,” was insufficient to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion. In a close case like the present one, the balance ought to be struck on the side of the freedom of the citizen from governmental intrusion. To conclude otherwise would be to elevate society’s interest in apprehending offenders above the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable stops. The record in the present case does not disclose circumstances which, viewed in their totality, yielded sufficient specific and articulable facts to make constitutionally reasonable Birney’s detention of the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant was illegally seized, in violation of article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution.

C

Our conclusion that the defendant was illegally seized does not end our inquiry. We must next determine whether the defendant’s discarding of the bag and Birney’s resulting seizure of the cocaine and identification of the defendant were the products of the illegal seizure. We conclude that they were.

After oral argument to this court, the parties submitted supplemental briefs on the question of whether there was a basis in fact and in law to sustain the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motions to suppress under the doctrine of abandonment.13 In his supplemental brief, the defendant argues that he did not voluntarily abandon the bag because his action was induced by an illegal seizure of his person and, thus, the trial court’s ruling cannot be upheld on a theory of abandonment. The state contends, in its brief, that the trial *658court’s ruling should be affirmed on the basis that the defendant retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag when he discarded it in the course of Birney’s pursuit of him.14 We are persuaded that the trial court’s ruling cannot be sustained on a theory of abandonment and, therefore, that the trial court’s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous.

In distinguishing abandonment for the purposes of search and seizure analysis from the concept of abandonment in property law, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated: “In the law of search and seizure . . . the question is whether the defendant has, in discarding the property, relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy so that its seizure and search is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. ... In essence, what is abandoned is not necessarily the defendant’s property, but his reasonable expectation of privacy therein.” St. Paul v. Vaughn, 306 Minn. 337, 346, 237 N.W.2d 365 (1975). The court went on to state that “[wjhere the presence of the police is lawful and the discard occurs in a public place where the defendant cannot reasonably have any continued expectancy of privacy in the discarded property, the property will be deemed abandoned for purposes of search and seizure.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 346-47; see also State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 106-107, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991). Conversely, “where a person has disposed of property in response to ... an illegal [seizure or search by police], courts have not hesitated to hold that property inadmissible.” (Emphasis added.) 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed.) § 2.6 (b); see, *659e.g., United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1979) (objects thrown out of car window after illegal stop properly excluded from evidence); State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 380-81, 568 A.2d 48 (1990) (drugs discarded by defendant fleeing police after illegal seizure inadmissible); but see State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331, 1335-36 (Fla. App. 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980) (“a person’s otherwise voluntary abandonment of property cannot be tainted or made involuntary by a prior illegal police stop of such person”); People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 404, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 418 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969, 100 S. Ct. 461, 62 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979) (defendant’s discarding of gun after illegal seizure was “abandonment” because it was not a “spontaneous reaction” to seizure but rather was “an independent act involving a calculated risk”). We are persuaded that the weight of authority counsels in favor of our conclusion that there was no abandonment in this case.15

In California v. Hodari D., supra, 1550, the United States Supreme Court intimated in dicta that even where there is an initial unlawful seizure, the defendant’s flight terminates the seizure so that items discarded in the course of flight are not evidence disclosed “during the course of an arrest.” We disagree. Article first, § 8 of our state constitution protects citizens against the admission of evidence at trial that is obtained as a result of the unlawful activities of the police. See State v. Dukes, supra, 108-10. The relevant inquiry is whether the unlawful conduct of the police *660 induced, the disposal of the incriminating items by the defendant. We reject the implication of the dicta in Hodari D., that the chain of causation is broken when a suspect escapes from an unlawful seizure, thereby allowing the admission in evidence of items subsequently discarded. We are persuaded that following this reasoning could encourage illegal stops by the police. See State v. Williamson, supra; 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed.) § 2.6 (b) n.62.

The trial court concluded that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the duffel bag that he discarded during Birney’s pursuit of him. This conclusion of the trial court was clearly erroneous. We conclude that the defendant did not abandon the duffel bag that he discarded during Birney’s unlawful pursuit of him. We conclude, however, that the defendant’s wallet and its contents were properly admitted into evidence under a theory of abandonment since the record does not disclose that the wallet was discarded in response to Birney’s pursuit.

D

We have concluded that the cocaine and the identification of the defendant as the person who discarded the duffel bag containing the cocaine were the fruits of an illegal seizure. Accordingly, the trial court should have excluded this evidence pursuant to article first, § 8 of the state constitution. State v. Dukes, supra. The state has the burden of proving that the admission of evidence in violation of our state constitution was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 221, 613 A.2d 224 (1992); State v. Janes, 215 Conn. 173, 184, 575 A.2d 216 (1990). “The test for harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duntz, *661supra. The state has advanced no argument that the admission of the cocaine and the identification of the defendant were harmless error and, therefore, has failed to meet its burden. We conclude that the admission of this evidence was harmful to the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

II

The defendant next claims that he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when a hearsay statement made by his brother was admitted into evidence, because his brother did not testify and, therefore, could not be cross-examined. Because we are reversing the judgment of conviction on the basis of the defendant’s first claim, we address this claim only insofar as it may arise on retrial.

Robert Cruncleton was arrested on September 20, 1988, on charges arising from the homicide of Huertas. Cruncleton had previously given a statement to the Wallingford police in which he identified the defendant as the person who shot Huertas. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested on an unrelated charge in San Jose, California, as a result of which he was extradited to Connecticut on the basis of an outstanding arrest warrant for the murder of Huertas.

Six days after the shooting at the Almar Motel, on August 31,1988, prior to the arrest of either Cruncleton or the defendant, the Wethersfield and Walling-ford police executed a search warrant at the Wallingford home of Edwin Oquendo, the defendant’s brother. The search warrant was issued for the purpose of locating and seizing the shotgun used in the shooting of Huertas, as well as shotgun shells and small, circular red plastic cap devices. The search warrant was executed shortly after 12 a.m. on August 31, 1988. The search of Edwin’s home did not yield the items that *662had been sought, but resulted in the seizure of narcotics material. The police asked Edwin if he had any knowledge of the shooting of Huertas, to which he replied affirmatively. Edwin then accompanied the police to the Wethersfield police station at approximately 12 a.m. on August 31, 1988, where he gave a written statement over the course of approximately one and one-half hours. In his statement, which was made under oath, Edwin described the activities of the defendant, Cruncleton and the defendant’s girlfriend, Maria Morales, on the early morning of August 25, 1988. Edwin stated that he had seen the defendant retrieve a shotgun from Maria’s car. He also stated that he had seen the defendant pry the lock off a tan colored metal box that Maria had removed from the car. Edwin further stated that the box contained a large, thick manila envelope and two plastic bags that appeared to contain cocaine. Edwin also related to the police certain inculpatory statements that he had overheard the defendant make with respect to the shooting at the Almar Hotel.16

At the trial of the defendant, Edwin refused to testify.17 The state sought to have Edwin’s statement admitted into evidence through the testimony of John Salvatore, the Wethersfield police detective to whom Edwin had made the statement. The state argued first that the statement was admissible under the principle of State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). Alternatively, the state argued that Edwin’s statement was admissible under the residual exception *663to the hearsay rule. The defendant objected to the admission of Edwin’s statement on the grounds that: (1) State v. Whelan, supra, was not applicable;18 (2) the statement did not fall into any recognized exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) admission of the statement would violate his rights to confrontation and cross-examination under the state and federal constitutions.

The trial court concluded that the portion of the statement relating to Edwin’s personal observations of the defendant, Cruncleton and Maria Morales on the morning of August 25, 1988 was admissible.19 In concluding that Edwin’s statement was admissible, the court found that the statement was reasonably necessary for the resolution of the case and that it bore sufficient indicia of reliability. See State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 662-66, 491 A.2d 345 (1985).20 After the trial court *664ruled that it would admit Edwin’s statement through Salvatore, it indicated to defense counsel that the defendant would have the opportunity to cross-examine Edwin regarding the statement. The defendant objected to the procedure proposed by the court. After Salvatore had testified regarding Edwin’s statement, Edwin was called to the stand and refused to answer any questions on cross-examination.

The defendant first claims that Edwin’s statement was improperly admitted because it did not come within any specific exception to the hearsay rule and did not qualify for admission under the residual exception because it was lacking in the requisite indicia of reliability. The state does not argue that Edwin’s statement fell into any of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule. Rather, it argues that the statement was properly admitted under the so-called “residual” exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.

“An out of court statement is hearsay when it is offered to establish the truth of the matters contained therein.” State v. Sharpe, supra, 661. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls under one of several well established exceptions. State v. Outlaw, 216 Conn. 492, 505, 582 A.2d 751 (1990). The purpose behind the hearsay rule is to effectuate “the policy of requiring that testimony be given in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.” 2 C. McCormick, Evidence (4th Ed.) § 253. The “residual,” or “catch-all,” exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is “a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,” and (2) the statement is “supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” State v. Sharpe, supra, 664; see also State v. Outlaw, supra, 499-50.

*665The state contends that the trial court properly concluded that Edwin’s statement met both requirements of the two-pronged test set forth in State v. Sharpe, supra. With respect to the first prong of the test, that there be a reasonable necessity for the statement’s admission, the state claims that the evidence: (1) was highly probative; (2) could not have been obtained from any other source, as Edwin was the only “neutral” party present to observe the defendant’s conduct on the morning of August 25, 1988; and (3) was the only evidence corroborating Cruncleton’s testimony regarding the defendant’s involvement in the Almar Motel incident.21 We have stated that “the necessity requirement is met when, unless the hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it contains may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable, or because the assertion is of such a nature that evidence of the same value cannot be obtained from the same or other sources.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Sharpe, supra, 665. In the present case, Edwin was “otherwise unavailable” since he refused to testify at the trial. See State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431, 441, 426 A.2d 799 (1980) (although witness present in court, testimony unavailable due to invocation of testimonial privilege); see also 2 C. McCormick, supra, § 253, pp. 131-32 (declarant is unavailable if he persists in refusing to testify despite court order to do so). Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the first prong of the Sharpe test had been met.

The state argues that the trial court also properly concluded that Edwin’s statement met the second prong of the Sharpe test. The state claims that the reliability and trustworthiness of the statement were evi*666denced by the following: (1) Edwin informed the police that he had knowledge of the shooting of Huertas before any contraband was discovered in his home; (2) Edwin’s statement was voluntarily given, within five days of the shooting; (3) the statement was based on Edwin’s personal observations and he was given time to make corrections before signing it; (4) the statement was made under oath, potentially subjecting Edwin to criminal penalties;22 (5) Edwin was not in custody when he gave the statement; (6) Edwin’s statement tended to inculpate his brother; and (7) the details of Edwin’s statement were independently corroborated by Cruncleton’s testimony, the testimony of Jose Huertas, the victim’s brother, and the defendant’s admission to the San Jose police that he had been present at the Almar Motel during the homicide.

The defendant claims that Edwin’s statement lacked the requisite indicia of reliability and trustworthiness due to the circumstances under which it was obtained and, therefore, failed to meet the second criteria of the Sharpe test. The defendant emphasizes the following circumstances as indicative of the statement’s lack of reliability: (1) the search warrant on Edwin’s home was executed late at night; (2) the police seized narcotics as a result of the search; (3) Edwin’s statement was given after 12 a.m. in a police station in another town; (4) Edwin was at the Wethersfield police station for approximately two and one-half hours; and (5) while at the police station, Edwin saw Cruncleton, who was Edwin’s close friend and housemate.23 The defendant argues that these factors, when viewed together, defeat the state’s claim that Edwin’s statement was made *667under circumstances guaranteeing reliability and trustworthiness. We are persuaded that Edwin’s statement did not meet the second prong of the test set forth in State v. Sharpe, supra, and, accordingly, was improperly admitted by the trial court under the residual hearsay exception.

In State v. Sharpe, supra, 665, we stated that “[t]he circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and reliability can be found in a variety of situations.” In that case, the defendant objected to the admission through a police witness of the out-of-court statement of the victim’s neighbor. After learning of the shooting of the victim, the declarant had reported to the police that in the early morning of the day the victim was shot, he had seen an unfamiliar car with two men in it parked near the victim’s house. The declarant had given the police the license plate number of the car. We concluded that the proffered hearsay statement was reliable on the basis that the declarant did not know the defendant or the owner of the car, and, therefore, “would have had no reason to offer the police a false statement.” Id. In upholding the trial court’s admission of the statement, we noted, moreover, that the declarant was a witness at the defendant’s trial and, thus, was available for cross-examination.

In contrast to the declarant’s statement in Sharpe, the circumstances surrounding the giving of Edwin’s statement to the Wethersfield police reveal that it “was not imbued with guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness sufficient to support its admission.” State v. Outlaw, supra, 499. First, we reject the state’s contention that Edwin “would not incriminate [his brother] *668unless the accusation were true.” In view of the facts that the police were seeking the murder weapon in Edwin’s house and that they had found narcotics as the result of their search, we cannot say that the circumstances surrounding Edwin’s statement “establish a ‘motivational basis for truth-telling’ equivalent to those associated with the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule . . . .” Id., 500. In addition, Edwin’s close friendship with Cruncleton tends to undermine the trustworthiness of his statement.

Second, unlike the declarant in Sharpe, Edwin refused to testify and, therefore, was not “ ‘a witness at the trial and available for cross-examination.’ ” State v. Outlaw, supra, 499, quoting State v. Sharpe, supra, 665. As we noted in State v. Outlaw, supra, cross-examination has appropriately been described as “ ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ ” See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev. 1974) § 1367, p. 32. We have consistently stated that “an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying.” State v. Arline, 223 Conn. 52, 60, 612 A.2d 755 (1992); see also State v. Lubesky, 195 Conn. 475, 482, 488 A.2d 1239 (1985). Given the incriminating nature of the evidence contained in Edwin’s statement to the police, the defendant’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine Edwin regarding his statement further diminished the reliability needed for its admission.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that Salvatore’s testimony regarding Edwin’s statement was hearsay that did not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule, and, therefore, should have been excluded. Because we conclude that this evidence was inadmissible on the basis that it did not fall within the residual hearsay exception, as set forth in State v. *669Sharpe, supra, we need not reach the defendant’s claim that its admission violated his state and federal constitutional rights.24

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion Peters, C. J., and Berdon, J., concurred.

Borden, J., with whom Callahan, J.,

joins, dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion because I conclude that (1) the police officer, William Birney, had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to make an investigative stop of the defendant, and (2) it is therefore unnecessary and imprudent to reach the question of whether the definition of a “seizure” under article first, § 7,1 of our state constitution should be determined by the analysis of the United States Supreme Court, under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). I would, therefore, reject the defendant’s first claim on appeal, and would address the remaining claims of trial court impropriety.

As a preliminary matter, I note that, despite the majority’s insistence that its threshold inquiry is “at *670what point, if any, did the encounter between Birney and the defendant constitute an investigatory stop or seizure,” the majority opinion fails to define that point with specificity. I infer, however, that in the defendant’s and the majority’s view the point of seizure was when, after “Birney asked2 the defendant to approach the cruiser” and “[t]he defendant handed the duffel bag to Williams and stepped toward Birney,” Birney “instructed the defendant to bring the bag with him.” See p. 642 of the majority opinion.

It is clear to me that under well established constitutional standards Birney had reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping the defendant and Williams at that point. “[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).3 In this case, those facts and inferences were as follows.

*671It was in the middle of a warm, late August night, on a specific street that had recently been the scene of a series of burglaries. All the businesses were closed. When Birney drove past the defendant and Williams in his marked police cruiser, they looked at each other and quickened their pace. Birney knew that Williams, the defendant’s companion, had recently been arrested on larceny and burglary charges. Despite the weather and time of year, both the defendant and Williams were inappropriately dressed in winter clothing that Birney knew was the kind of clothing worn by burglars to protect themselves from injury when they break windows. Birney knew that the defendant was not one of the town’s street people. When Birney asked them what they were doing, Williams, obviously answering for both of them, lied. They both appeared to be nervous and kept glancing at each other. When Birney asked the defendant to approach the cruiser, the defendant, instead of either walking away or complying with the request with bag in hand, gave the duffel bag to Williams before stepping towards Birney. If all of this is not reasonable and articulable suspicion, I do not know what is.

The majority’s analysis attempting to undermine this conclusion is flawed. It consists mainly of supplying a series of possible benign inferences that could have been drawn by Birney from what he saw and confronted at 12:50 a.m. on that warm August night.4 The problem *672with that analysis is that it ignores the equally (at the least) rational inferences that Birney did draw from what he saw and heard—inferences that gave him plainly reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Moreover, the fact that Birney characterized his state of mind as a “hunch” is irrelevant. It is axiomatic that the proper standard is objective—namely, what a reasonable police officer in that situation would have concluded—not subjective. See United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 516, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1977); 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.3 (b), p. 188.

There is nothing in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or any of our precedents following it, that requires that a police officer draw only the benign inferences in favor of the defendant and precludes that officer from drawing rational, incriminatory inferences. Indeed, we have held to the contrary. See State v. Cofield, 220 Conn. 38, 45, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991), citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 21; see also State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 148-49, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981). Any other scheme would eviscerate the Terry stop doctrine, since on any given set of facts amounting to reasonable and articulable suspicion there would inevitably be different inferences that could have been, but were not, drawn by the police officer.

*673The result of this analysis is that, even if we were to adopt the position of the defendant that there had been a seizure in this case, it would avail him nothing, since Birney’s activity was not illegal. Therefore, contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the defendant did not run away and discard the bag in response to any police illegality, and the evidence should be admissible.

This also means, moreover, that we should not undertake to decide on this record whether our state constitution requires a definition of “seizure” that is different from and more broad than that applicable under the fourth amendment to our federal constitution.5 Traditionally, and for sound jurisprudential reasons, we only decide constitutional questions when it is necessary to do so. State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 353, 599 A.2d 1 (1991). Indeed, in the difficult and delicate area of search and seizure our recent history indicates the wisdom of such state constitutional prudence. Compare State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 238-45, 46, 496 A.2d 498 (1985) (Shea and Callahan, Js., dissenting), with State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991) (overruling Kimbro). The majority opinion misapplies the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, and unwisely ignores this history.

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The issue raised in this certified appeal is whether a sobriety checkpoint established for the purpose of detecting violations of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227a (a)1 violates the provisions of article first, §§ 72 or 9,3 of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant, Christie Mikolinski, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a. Before her trial to the court commenced, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information and a motion *545to suppress, claiming that the checkpoint at which she was stopped violated her rights under the Connecticut constitution. The trial court denied those motions. Accordingly, the evidence gathered as a result of the stop of the defendant at the checkpoint was introduced against her at her ensuing trial. Following her conviction, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court; State v. Mikolinski, 56 Conn. App. 252, 262, 742 A.2d 1264 (1999); and, on the granting of certification,4 the defendant appealed to this court.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s determination that the sobriety checkpoint instituted by the town of Southington did not violate her rights under article first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts, as stated by the Appellate Court, are relevant to this appeal. “Between 11 p.m. on May 23, 1997, and 3 a.m. on May 24, 1997, the Southington police department conducted a sobriety checkpoint of eastbound and westbound traffic in the area of 1199 Meriden-Waterbury Turnpike. Signs were posted in each direction alerting motorists to the checkpoint, and routes exiting the turnpike were available to motorists in each direction who chose not to enter the checkpoint.

“On May 24, 1997, at approximately 1:35 a.m., the [defendant] entered the checkpoint and stopped her vehicle. While the [defendant] was stopped, a police officer asked her a number of questions. . . . After the defendant admitted that she had been drinking alcohol, *546the officer directed [her] to an adjacent parking lot where a second officer conducted a detailed investigation. Upon approaching the [defendant’s] vehicle, the second officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on the [defendant’s] breath and noticed that her eyes were red and glassy. He administered several sobriety tests, all of which the [defendant] failed. The second officer then placed her under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of [intoxicating] liquor in violation of ... § 14-227a.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 254. Additional facts will be set forth as required.

The state does not dispute the fact that the initial stop of the defendant at the checkpoint constituted a seizure.5 The state argues as a preliminary matter, however, that, because the defendant voluntarily entered the checkpoint, she cannot now claim that the seizure was unreasonable. Cf. State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 314-16, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 84, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). We need not decide whether the defendant voluntarily entered the checkpoint, however, because, even if we assume, arguendo, that this was not the case, she cannot prevail on her claim.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that Southington’s sobriety checkpoint violated her rights under article first, § 7.6 In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. *547 Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of highway sobriety checkpoints, such as the one at issue in this appeal, is not prohibited under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. See id., 455. We are not persuaded that article first, § 7, imposes greater restrictions upon the use of such checkpoints than that imposed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz.

“It is well settled that we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the contours of article first, [§ 7] . . . [and] that federal constitutional . . . law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 504, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). “Moreover, we have held that [i]n the area of fundamental civil liberties—which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last resort .... In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut citizens have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law. . . . [W]e have concluded in several cases that the state constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than does *548the federal constitution.”7 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 632, 620 A.2d 746 (1993).

In determining whether the protections secured by article first, § 7, extend beyond those secured by the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, we consider several factors: (1) the text of the constitutional provision; (2) holdings and dicta of Connecticut appellate courts; (3) federal precedent; (4) sister state decisions; (5) historical aspects, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; and (6) economic and sociological or policy considerations. E.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

Our review of the text and history of article first, § 7, reveals nothing to indicate that it forbids the use of sobriety checkpoints. “The declaration of rights adopted in 1818 appears to have its antecedents in the Mississippi constitution of 1817, which in turn derived from the federal bill of rights and the Virginia declaration of rights of 1776. . . . The search and seizure provision in our 1818 constitution, then article first, § 8, closely resembles the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. Although its enumeration was changed to article first, § 7, when the 1965 constitution incorporated article first, § 4, into article seventh, its language has not been altered since its original adoption.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 533, 628 A.2d 567 (1993). The language of article first, § 7, which was based upon the fourth amendment, was adopted with little debate. See Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 600, 660 A.2d 742 (1995). Thus, the circumstances sur*549rounding the adoption of article first, § 7, lend weight to the view that, in most cases, a practice permitted under the fourth amendment is permissible under article first, § 7.

We have stated that “[t]here can be no ready test for determining [the] reasonableness [of a search or seizure] other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails. . . . We judge the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s interests against its promotion of legitimate state governmental interests, and examine the intrusion to determine whether it is the minimum search necessary under the circumstances.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 503; see also State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 148-49, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981).

In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, the court used the similar balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976), to weigh “the state’s interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 449. The court held that the sobriety checkpoint in that case was consistent with the fourth amendment, reasoning that “the balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, [weigh] in favor of the state program.” Id., 455. We conclude that this balancing test, which *550is consistent with our precedent, provides the proper means by which to assess the validity of sobriety checkpoints under article first, § 7.

In applying this balancing test to the sobriety checkpoint at issue in the present appeal, the defendant does not dispute that the state has a significant interest in preventing motorists from driving while under the influence of alcohol. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Site, “[n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.” Id., 451.8

Against this interest, we balance the level of intrusion on the individual’s privacy caused by a checkpoint. Although sobriety checkpoints may cause motorists a slight inconvenience, we conclude that, when sobriety checkpoints are operated properly, the intrusion on an individual’s privacy is minimal. See id., 451 (“the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints ... is slight”).

The balancing test also requires an evaluation of “the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 454. We agree with the United States Supreme Court that this inquiry is “not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.” Id., 453. Rather, “the *551choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.” Id., 453-54. We conclude that sobriety checkpoints further the public interest in reducing the number of alcohol related automobile accidents and resulting injuries, fatalities, and costs associated therewith.

The defendant, relying on principles outlined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), argues that the officers operating the checkpoint were required to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity before they detained her at the checkpoint. We are not persuaded by this argument.

It is true that “ [applications of Terry principles in the context of motor vehicle stops are . . . embodied in our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382-83, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (reasonable articulable suspicion standard); State v. Lamme, [216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990)] (principles of Terry define when detention is clearly warranted by law under article first, § 9, of state constitution); State v. Dukes, [209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1988)] (state constitution permits police to require occupants to step out of lawfully stopped motor vehicle); State v. Anderson, [24 Conn. App. 438, 441, 589 A.2d 374, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 130 (1991)] (state and federal constitutions permit brief investigatory stops based on reasonable and articulable suspicion).” State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 508-509. None of the foregoing cases, however, involved stops made pursuant to neutral criteria. Rather, in each of the cases, the motorist was singled out by law enforcement officers based upon the officers’ reasonable and articulable suspicion. The Terry standard, which is jyredicated upon police discretion, simply is incompatible with a sobriety checkpoint at which an *552officer’s discretion as to which cars to stop is eliminated by requiring the officer to stop all cars, or stop cars pursuant to other neutral criteria. As the court remarked in Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. 47, “[a] central concern in balancing [the public interest in law enforcement with individual liberty] . . . has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id., 51. We conclude that, just as the Terry standard protects an individual’s freedom from arbitrary police conduct by requiring that a seizure “be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual”; id.; so does the requirement “that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Id.

The defendant argues that the checkpoint at issue in this case was not operated pursuant to a plan embodying neutral criteria that limited officers’ discretion as to how individual drivers were to be treated. On the contrary, we agree with the trial court that the plan9 *554implemented by Southington police embodied neutral criteria in that it restricted officers’ discretion as to which cars to stop and provided that all drivers were to be treated uniformly during the initial stop. The plan instructed officers to stop all cars and provided officers with three questions that they were to ask all drivers. If, after this initial encounter, an officer had reason to believe that the driver was driving while under the influence, the plan instructed the officer to direct the driver to a safe, off-street location, where another officer was to administer sobriety tests. The trial court found that the checkpoint was implemented “almost to the letter” of the operational plan.

Our conclusion that sobriety checkpoints operated pursuant to neutral criteria are permissible under article first, § 7, is in accord with the decisions of sister state courts upholding the implementation of sobriety checkpoints under their respective state constitutions. E.g., Hagood v. Town Creek, 628 So. 2d 1057, 1062 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark. 41, 47, 938 S.W.2d 801 (1997); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1325, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987); People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Colo. 1990); State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995); Little v. State, 300 Md. *555485, 504, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 632-33 (Mo. App. 1988); Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 378-79 (N.D. 1994); State v. Bauer, 99 Ohio App. 3d 505, 513-14, 651 N.E.2d 46 (1994); Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 173-74, 611 A.2d 1177 (1992); State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. 1997); Carte v. Cline, 194 W. Va. 233, 238, 460 S.E.2d 48 (1995).

II

The defendant next argues that the sobriety checkpoint violated her rights under article first, § 9. We disagree.

Article first, § 9, provides: “No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law.” “[W]e have generally characterized article first, § 9, as one of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing due process of law. See, e.g., State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 425, 489 A.2d 350 (1985); State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 420, 481 A.2d 56 (1984); Parks v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 270, 278 n.8, 477 A.2d 636 (1984).” State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 177, 579 A.2d 484 (1990).

In Lamme, the defendant challenged the administration of roadside sobriety tests after having been stopped for a motor vehicle infraction. See id., 174. The defendant argued that article first, § 9, prohibits a police officer from detaining an individual unless the officer has probable cause to make an arrest. Id., 176. We rejected this argument, concluding that “the specific content appropriately to be assigned to the phrase ‘clearly warranted by law’ depends on the particular liberty interest that is at stake.” Id., 178. We stated that “[t]he historical roots of ‘except in cases clearly warranted by law’ appear ... to provide protection for personal freedom through a blend of statutory and constitutional rights that, like the text of . . . article *556first, § 9, incorporates no single constitutional standard.” Id., 179. We held that “the principles underlying constitutionally permissible Terry stops . . . define when detentions are ‘clearly warranted by law’ under article first, § 9.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 184. We then “balanc[ed] the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 21. “[In] [balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, we [concluded] that the defendant’s brief detention [by police in order to administer the roadside sobriety tests] did not violate his due process rights.” State v. Lamme, supra, 216 Conn. 184.

Thus, in defining the contours of article first, § 9, our first task is to identify the particular liberty interest at stake. In the present case, as in Lamme, the protected liberty interest is the individual’s right to be free from unreasonable police detention while driving a car. Because of the similarity of the liberty interest in the present case with that in Lamme, we conclude that the balancing test that was applied in Lamme appropriately guides our analysis of the defendant’s claim. See id.

In the present case, the defendant does not dispute that “[t]he state has a vital interest in keeping intoxicated drivers off the roads and highways”; State v. Lamme, 19 Conn. App. 594, 599, 563 A.2d 1372 (1989), aff'd, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); and we have concluded in our discussion of article first, § 7; see part I of this opinion; that this vital interest outweighs the intrusiveness of the checkpoint.

The defendant claims that her right to due process under article first, § 9, was violated “because [a sobriety checkpoint] permitting ‘suspicionless’ seizures [is] not *557expressly authorized by any statutory or administrative scheme and is not police activity that was authorized under common law.” Nothing in the text or the history of article first, § 9, however, requires common-law, statutory or administrative authorization to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist. In State v. Lamme, supra, 216 Conn. 185, we concluded, as a matter of state constitutional law, that Terry stops, which are not authorized by any statute or regulation, are permissible under article first, § 9. We stated that “[o]ur appraisal of the due process contours of article first, § 9, leads us to conclude that the principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Id., 184. In light of the balance of interests in the present appeal, we are persuaded that a brief investigatory detention at a sobriety checkpoint that is planned and operated pursuant to neutral criteria is consistent with the due process provisions of article first, § 9.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.