House, C. J.

These appeals have been consolidated for presentation to this court because they present identical basic facts and identical questions of law. Pursuant to a stipulation approved by the *618trial court, it has been agreed that any judgments in the cases against the defendants shall be fully binding on their successors in office without the necessity for substitutions of parties defendant owing to a change in the personnel occupying those offices.

The cases were brought seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the system of financing public elementary and secondary education in this state, at least as it affects the town of Canton, violates the Connecticut and the United States constitutions; (2) an order in equity directing the defendants to cease implementing the present financing system, at least as it affects the town of Canton, except as necessary to provide an orderly transition to a constitutional system for financing public schools; (3) an order that the court retain jurisdiction to assure a transition with all deliberate speed to a constitutional system of financing public education; and (4) any other equitable relief the court should deem proper.

In essence, each action sought by declaratory judgment a judicial determination as to whether the Connecticut educational finance system, at least as it existed at the time of trial (1974), violates constitutional equal rights and equal protection guarantees and is constitutionally mandated “appropriate legislation”; Conn. Const. Art. VIII § 1; to provide free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The questions presented are not only of great importance but of considerable complexity, and it is of small comfort to note that members of the judiciary throughout the country are also being faced with the same or similar complex questions.1 *619It is not inappropriate at the start of our consideration of the appeals to express a word of appreciation and commendation for the carefully prepared and helpful briefs submitted by counsel for the parties and by the amici curiae, and for the thorough and exhaustive record submitted by the trial court.

In order to facilitate an understanding of the plaintiffs’ claims, it is virtually essential to have at hand the sections of the relevant statutes and provisions of the state and federal constitutions on which the plaintiffs rely. They are set out in footnotes 2-9.

*620When the present actions were brought in 1974, the plaintiff Horton was enrolled in kindergarten in the Canton Elementary School, the plaintiff Barnhart in the sixth grade of the Canton Middle School, and the plaintiff G-race in the seventh grade in the Canton High School. The defendants included the governor, the treasurer and the comptroller of *621the state, the state commissioner of education, and the members of the state board of education, of the Canton board of education, and of the Canton board of finance.

The portions of the judgments of the Superior Court material to these appeals declared that the present system of financing public education in Connecticut, principally embodied in §§ 10-240 and 10-241 of the G-eneral Statutes, insofar as the system purports to delegate to the town of Canton the duty of raising taxes to operate free public elementary and secondary schools and insofar as it purports to delegate to Canton the duty of operating and maintaining free public elementary and secondary schools violates the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1; declared that the present system of financing public education in Connecticut does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States; held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not a valid defense to this action; and withheld any ruling on the plaintiffs’ ancillary claims for relief and retained jurisdiction until further orders.

The defendant state officials, hereinafter the defendants, appealed from the judgments and the plaintiffs cross appealed from the judgments insofar as they declared that the present system of financing public education in the state does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

On their appeal, the defendants have pressed five assignments of error that relate to the trial court’s findings, conclusions, and rulings on claims of law. The first two assignments of error pertain to the trial court’s findings concerning the quality of edu*622cation in Canton and the relation between expenditures and the quality of education. They also pertain to the court’s findings relevant to the effect of the existing system of financing education in the state, which system relies heavily on local property taxes and leads to a difference in revenue available to different towns for support of the public schools.

The third assignment of error is addressed to the conclusions which were reached by the court as a result of its findings of fact and which led to the ultimate conclusion expressed in its judgment— “that the present system of financing public education in Connecticut, principally embodied in §§ 10-240 and 10-241 of the General Statutes, insofar as the system purports to delegate to Canton the duty of raising taxes to operate free public elementary and secondary schools and insofar as it purports to delegate to Canton the duty of operating and maintaining free public elementary and secondary schools violates article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut Constitution.”

The defendants’ fourth assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that only two statutory sections, namely §§ 10-240 and 10-241, which provide the system for financing education, are unconstitutional. The fifth assignment claims that the trial court erred in overruling the defendants’ claims of law which are substantially similar in subject but opposite in result to the conclusions of law claimed as error in the third assignment.

Before turning to a consideration of the assignments of error addressed to the merits of the *623appeal, we turn first to the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court to act in these cases. This issue was raised by the defendants’ pleas of sovereign immunity which the trial court concluded were not valid defenses to these actions.

In Connecticut, we have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot he sued without its consent and that since the state can act only through its officers and agents a suit against a state officer is in effect one against the sovereign state. Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 339, 355 A.2d 307; Fidelity Bank v. State, 166 Conn. 251, 253, 348 A.2d 633; Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 298, 294 A.2d 290; State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 11, 69 A. 1028. This rule had its origin in the ancient common law, predicated on the principle that the king, being the fountainhead of justice, could not he sued in his own courts. 1 Pollack & Maitland, History of English Law (2d Ed.) pp. 514-18. While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has, nevertheless, been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler hut rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws. The source of the sovereign power of the state is now the constitution which created it, and it is now recognized that, as Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, hut on the logical and practical ground that there can he no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Kawa *624 nanakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S. Ct. 526, 51 L. Ed. 834; see Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 285, 130 A.2d 293.

The practical and logical basis of the doctrine is today recognized to rest on this principle and on the hazard “that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.” Block, “Suits against Gl-overnment Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,” 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060, 1061. As the author of that article makes clear, adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not mean that all suits against government officers, since they are in effect suits against the government, must be barred. As he suggests (p. 1080): “In those cases in which it is alleged that the defendant officer is proceeding under an unconstitutional statute or in excess of his statutory authority, the interest in the protection of the plaintiff’s right to be free from the consequences of such action outweighs the interest served by the sovereign immunity doctrine. Moreover, the government cannot justifiably claim interference with its functions when the acts complained of are unconstitutional or unauthorized by statute. On the other hand, where no substantial claim is made that the defendant officer is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his statutory authority, the purpose of the sovereign immunity doctrine requires dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.” This court expressly approved this principle in Simmons v. Parizek, 158 Conn. 304, 307, 259 A.2d 642, which was an action against a state commission which was alleged to have taken prop*625erty without constitutional or statutory authority. While noting (p. 306) that “this suit is clearly one against the state,” the court held that it was not barred by the defense of sovereign immunity, stating (p. 307): “It does not necessarily follow, however, that every action in which state officials or members of state agencies are named defendants and designated by official titles should be treated as an action against the state such as to clothe the defendants with immunity from suit. Sovereign immunity does not protect state officials from suits to recover property taken or held in violation of the constitution or without statutory authority, even though the property is held in the name of the state of Connecticut. . . . State officials cannot therefore shield themselves with sovereign immunity if a party alleges and proves that they took or retained his real property in a manner which was either unconstitutional or unauthorized by statute.”

Recognizing the distinction between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from liability; see Bergner v. State, supra; and the judicial duty under a constitutional government such as ours to decide a justiciable controversy as to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 27, 355 A.2d 49; Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177-78, 2 L. Ed. 60; we have many times in the past considered the merits of appeals from judgments in declaratory judgment actions when state officials have been parties. See Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (concerning the constitutionality of the no fault automobile insurance act); Lublin v. Brown, 168 Conn. 212, 362 A2d 769 (concerning the constitutionality of the occupational tax levied on attorneys); Thibeault v. White, 168 Conn. *626112, 358 A.2d 358 (concerning the interpretation of a public assistance statute); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 355 A.2d 307 (concerning the constitutional taking of property); Bridgeport v. Agostinelli, 163 Conn. 537, 316 A.2d 371 (concerning the rights of cities and towns to proportionate shares of legislative appropriations for educational purposes) ; Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 291 A.2d 721 (concerning the respective powers of two state regulatory commissions); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (concerning the constitutionality of an act providing for the administration of the Probate Court system); Knights of Columbus Council No. 3884 v. Mulcahy, 154 Conn. 583, 227 A.2d 413 (concerning the constitutionality of a statute regarding the playing of bingo); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 217 A.2d 698 (concerning the constitutionality of an act regarding the establishment of rates of insurance); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (concerning the validity and construction of the 1935 corporation business tax); Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 702 (concerning the constitutionality of a bonus to veterans).

The declaratory judgment procedure in Connecticut as provided by § 52-29 of the General Statutes and §§ 307—313 of the Practice Book is peculiarly well adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights and, as in these cases, the constitutionality of state legislative or executive action. As we have observed, “[t]he statute authorizing the Superior Court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made.” Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891. It antedated the Uniform Declaratory *627Judgments Act, it is broader in scope than that act and the statutes in most, if not all, other jurisdictions; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, supra; and “[w]e have consistently construed our statute and the rules under it in a liberal spirit, in the belief that they serve a sound social purpose.” Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403, 409, 51 A.2d 907. While the declaratory judgment procedure may not be utilized merely to secure advice on the law; Tellier v. Zarnowski, 157 Conn. 370, 373, 254 A.2d 568; or to establish abstract principles of law; Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 272, 83 A.2d 482; or to secure the construction of a statute if the effect of that construction will not affect a plaintiff’s personal rights; Gannon v. Sanders, 157 Conn. 1, 9, 244 A.2d 397; it may be employed in a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof. Practice Book § 309. The procedure has the distinct advantage of affording to the court in granting any relief consequential to its determination of rights the opportunity of tailoring that relief to the particular circumstances. In a case such as the present one, this circumstance is of special importance because the court, mindful of the proper limitations on judicial intervention, the problems inherent in the complexities of school financing and the presumption that the other departments of our government will accede to this court’s interpretation of the state constitution, may prop*628erly delay specific direction, affording time for corrective action and avoiding any “serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.” Block, “Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,” 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060, 1061.

We conclude that the trial court was not in error in holding that sovereign immunity was not an available defense to the present actions. A holding to the contrary would foreclose proper judicial determination of a significant and substantial constitutional question the determination of which is manifestly in the public interest.

We turn now to the assignments of error addressed to the court’s finding of facts. The finding consists of a total of 169 paragraphs of which 142 paragraphs are findings of fact. In addition, 37 exhibits are expressly incorporated into and made part of the finding. Although the defendants have assigned error in the court’s refusal to find certain facts and in its finding certain others without evidence to support them, the plaintiffs’ meticulously briefed support for the finding discloses that it is not subject to any material correction.

Without attempting to recite in detail the lengthy finding of facts, we note certain findings which are of special significance. The public schools in Canton, like those of all other towns in the state, are financed primarily by two means: funds raised by the town by assessment on property within the town and funds distributed by the state pursuant to legislation providing for a flat grant depending on the average number of pupils attending school daily. This grant is usually referred to as the ADM (average daily membership) grant. General Stat*629utes § 10-262. The ADM grant paid during 1973-74 was $215 per pupil and has since been increased to $250 per pupil. It has been the principal source of the state’s contribution to local public school education for about three decades though, by statute, the state provides for various other grant payments to each town or district for public and nonpublic school programs and activities. These include grants for exceptional and handicapped students, General Statutes § 10-76a—10-76g; for school construction, § 10-286; and for student transportation, §§ 10-266, 10-273a and 10-277.

In Connecticut, the percentage contribution of the local, state, and federal governments has been approximately 70 percent local, 20 to 25 percent state, and 5 percent or less federal. This contrasts with the average figures nationally of 51 percent local, 41 percent state, and 8 percent federal. Financing Connecticut’s Schools, Final Report of the Commission to Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity, p. 1. Funds raised by local governments for local public school education come principally from one source—the local property tax. For the year 1972-73, 80.1 percent of the state aid for local public school operating expenses was distributed as a flat grant that was not based upon the ability of the towns to finance education, 12.6 percent came from the reimbursement grant for special education, and 7.3 percent came from twelve miscellaneous grants, none of which was distributed on the basis of a town’s ability to finance education.

The total average statewide per pupil expenditure as reported by the state board of education for the year 1972-73 was $1091. The comparable figure reported by the Connecticut Public Expendi*630ture Council was $1054.70. The discrepancy is attributable to the inclusion of tuition paid to nonpublic schools for children requiring special education and the transportation payments by the state board of education.

Because local property taxes are the principal source of revenue for local public schools, a significant measure of the ability of the various towns to finance local education is the dollar amount of taxable property per pupil in each town which can be figured by dividing, the grand list of a town by the number of pupils.10 For the 1972-73 school year, wide disparities existed in the effective yield per pupil ranging from approximately $20,000 per pupil to approximately $170,000 per pupil. During that year, the state average was $53,639. In Canton, it was $38,415.

*631The general tax effort of a town may be measured by determining the net mill rate. Sample net mill rates for the school year 1972-73 were: Cornwall, 10.8 mills; Greenwich, 15.5 mills; Darien, 20.5 mills; Weston, 23.4 mills; West Hartford, 28.0 mills; Canton, 30.0 mills; Chaplin, 49.2 mills. The state average was 25.7 mills. For the 1972-73 school year, the average percentage of the local property tax spent on education by all towns was 57 percent; the percentage spent by Canton was 73 percent.

The tax effort of a town to finance education may be measured by determining the net school mill rate which is that part of the net mill rate which a town spends on education. Sample net school mill rates for the school year 1972-73 were: Greenwich, 7.0 mills; Cornwall, 7.8 mills; Darien, 14.6 mills; West Hartford, 16.2 mills; Weston, 19.4 mills; Canton, 21.9 mills; Chaplin, 37.4 mills. The state average was 14.6 mills. A comparison between property-rich and property-poor towns, ranking all towns in Connecticut by yields per pupil and dividing the towns into deciles, shows the following relationship between yield per pupil, per pupil operation expenditures, and net school mill rate for the 1972-73 school year:

*632Of these relationships, a few are key: although the average per pupil operating expenditures of eighth-decile towns are 30 percent less than the average per pupil operating expenditures of firstdecile towns, the average net school mill rate of eighth-decile towns is almost twice that of firstdecile towns; although the average per pupil operating expenditures of tenth-decile towns are 35 percent less than the average per pupil operating expenditures of first-decile towns, the average net school mill rate of tenth-decile towns is almost two and one-half times that of first decile towns. The net school mill rate of Canton is higher than the net school mill rate of Darien, Greenwich, West Hartford, and Weston, but the per pupil operating expenditures of Canton are substantially lower. Greenwich’s net school mill rate is less than 33 percent of Canton’s, but Greenwich’s per pupil operating expenditures are slightly more than 50 percent higher than Canton’s.

In sum, taxpayers in property-poor towns such as Canton pay higher tax rates for education than taxpayers in property-rich towns. The higher tax rates generate tax revenues in comparatively small amounts and property-poor towns cannot afford to spend for the education of their pupils, on a per pupil basis, the same amounts that property-rich towns do. These facts were affirmed by a conclusion of the governor’s commission on tax reform: “In short, many towns can tax far less and spend much more; and those less fortunate towns can never catch up in school expenditure because taxes are already as high as homeowners can toler*633ate. . . . This dual inequity—a family can pay more and get less for its children—is the fundamental issue of school finance.” 2 Governor’s Commission on Tax Reform, Local Government—Schools and Property, pp. 53-54.

The wide disparities that exist in the amount spent on education by the various towns result primarily from the wide disparities that exist in the taxable wealth of the various towns; the present system of financing education in Connecticut ensures that, regardless of the educational needs or wants of children, more educational dollars will be allotted to children who live in property-rich towns than to children who live in property-poor towns.

In the 1972-73 school year, the per pupil operating expenses of sample towns were as follows: Darien, $1570.47; West Hartford, $1443.10; Greenwich, $1428.99; Weston, $1332.79; Canton, $945.15; Lisbon, $669.94. The state average was $1054.70. Property-rich towns were and still are able, through higher per pupil expenditures, to provide a substantially wider range and higher quality of educational services than Canton in the areas of course offerings, special education, learning disability teachers and facilities, library resources, television teaching, and in numerous other areas, including higher ratios of classroom teachers to students, specialist teachers to students, guidance counselors to students, and other similar relationships. Because of the two-thirds reimbursement provision of the state aid statute for special education, towns that spend more on special education *634receive more state aid than towns that spend less. This is illustrated by the following chart:

High education-spending towns, such as Darien, were and are able to obtain more special education funds from the state because they are better able to afford the one-third portion of the expense, better equipped to identify special education problems and better staffed to apply for funds.

An important factor in determining what school system a teacher chooses to teach in is the school’s salary scale. Although over 80 percent of Canton’s educational budget goes to teachers’ salaries, in 1973-74, Canton’s average teacher salary was $10,830 compared with $14,175 in West Hartford. Top salary comparisons were $14,990 and $19,140, respectively. Towns with fewer tax resources such as Canton tend to have a higher percentage of inexperienced teachers, especially teachers with only one year of experience or less.

The criteria for evaluating the “quality of education” in a town include the following: (a) size of classes; (b) training, experience and background of teaching staff; (c) materials, books and supplies; (d) school philosophy and objectives; (e) type of local control; (f) test scores as measured against ability; (g) degree of motivation and application of the students; (h) course offerings and extracurricular activities. In most cases, the optimal version of these criteria is achieved by higher per *635pnpil operating expenditures, and because many of the elements of a quality education require higher per pupil operating expenditures, there is a direct relationship between per pupil school expenditures and the breadth and quality of educational programs.

Further findings by the trial court were addressed to consideration of possible means of achieving equality of educational opportunities with further consideration given to the variations in types of education and other variables that may affect the educational program and its cost. It found that equalizing the ability of the various towns to finance education would provide all towns, property-poor and property-rich, with the opportunity to exercise a meaningful choice as to educational services to be offered to students. It found that at the time of trial Connecticut ranked fiftieth among the states in its efforts to distribute aid in such a way as to equalize the abilities of the various towns to finance education, ranked forty-seventh in the percent of educational funding coming from the state and second in the percent of education funding coming from local governments, and that of all the existing forms of distributing state funds used throughout the country, the flat grant has the least equalizing effect on local financial abilities.

It further found that substantial progress can be made toward equalizing the financial abilities of the local districts by redistributing the flat grant funds according to a different formula, which can be accomplished without the need for additional state taxes; that equalizing the ability of the various towns to finance education would not require that all towns spend the same amount for the education of each pupil since towns can be left free to choose the *636level of expenditures appropriate for their circumstances ; and that there is no reason why local control needs to he diminished in any degree merely because some financing system other than the present one is adopted.

In its finding and by supplemental judgments dated August 8, 1975, the court took cognizance of legislation passed by the 1975 session of the General Assembly which increased the state’s flat grant from $215 per pupil to $250 per pupil and provided for “Special Instant Lottery Games” the net proceeds of which were to be used “solely for educational equalization grants to towns”; Public Acts 1975, No. 75-344; and distributed in accordance with Public Acts 1975, No. 75-341, “An Act Establishing a Guaranteed Tax Base Program to Finance Public Elementary and Secondary Education.”11 The court *637found that the $35 per pupil increase in the flat grant has little, if any, effect on equalizing the ability of the various towns to finance education, and that although the instant lottery legislation would provide an additional grant of $12.50 per pupil per year to those towns which fall in the bottom eighty-fifth percentile of all Connecticut towns ranked according to property-taxable wealth and median family income, the effect of the additional lottery fund grant on equalizing the ability of Canton and other property-poor towns to finance education “will be miniscule and not significant.”

Two further findings of the trial court were the following: “The State Board of Education has consultants available who concern themselves with assisting local boards of education in maintaining the statutorily-mandated minimum quality of education,” and “Canton is providing the basic elementary and secondary education required by statute.”

It was on the basis of the foregoing finding of facts that the trial court reached the conclusions which are the subject of the defendants’ third assignment of error. These conclusions were (in addition to the conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not a defense to this action, which ruling we have already discussed) that education is a fundamental right under the Connecticut constitution; that the state system of financing education is an interference with the “fundamental right” to education and therefore requires “strict judicial scrutiny”; that §§ 10-240 and 10-241 of the General Statutes are violative of the equal rights and equal protection of the laws provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 1 and 20, and of article eighth, § 1, and they are not appro*638priate legislation within the purview of article eighth, § 1; that variations in money available to different towns produce variations in quality of instruction; that the financing system discriminates against pupils in Canton because the breadth and quality of the education they receive is to a substantial degree narrower and lower than that which pupils receive in comparable towns with larger tax bases and a greater ability to finance education; that that narrower breadth and lower quality of education is a result of the state’s delegation of its responsibilities without regard to Canton’s financial capabilities; that the present financing system is not appropriate legislation to discharge the state’s constitutional duty to educate its students and, therefore, the system, beyond a reasonable doubt, violates the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1; that although local control of public schools is a legitimate state objective, since local control of education need not he diminished if the ability of towns to finance education is equalized, the local control objective is not a rational basis for retention of the present financing system; that the state has not selected the less drastic means for effectuating the local control objective and, therefore, the system, beyond a reasonable doubt, violates the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 1 and 20; that Canton’s reliance on real property taxes as the principal source of its funds for providing public school education has not been diminished in any legally significant degree by Public Acts 1975, No. 75-341; that Public Acts 1975, No.'75-341 provided no basis for modifying the court’s earlier announced decision that 10-240 and 10-241 of the General Statutes are violative of the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1.

*639The conclusions of the trial court are tested by the finding. Roby v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 166 Conn. 395, 397, 349 A.2d 838; Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 293, 268 A.2d 645. “A finding is to be read to uphold the judgment. Every reasonable presumption will be indulged in to support it.” Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 135. The conclusions reached by the trial court must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76, 80, 347 A.2d 58; Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 79, 239 A.2d 500; Craig v. Dunleavy, 154 Conn. 100,105, 221 A.2d 855.

Since many of the conclusions of the court are interdependent, it is unnecessary to consider them seriatim. Obviously the most significant ones are those dealing with constitutional interpretation, and the tests applicable to that interpretation, generally, and to the equal rights and equal protection provisions, specifically.

This court has many times noted that the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have a like meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations. State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310; Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 485, 313 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S. Ct. 911, 34 L. Ed. 2d 678; Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 381,161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515, 52 A.2d 702; State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 195, 132 A. 561. In State v. Rao, supra, we reiterated (p. 602) the controlling principles of law as enunciated by the United States *640Supreme Court: “Equal protection analysis must commence with a determination of whether a legislative classification . . . impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right ... it must he struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 342, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274. Where the statute does not involve fundamental rights . . . the legislation will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” See Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 124, 365 A.2d 109; Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A.2d 1063. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its application of the two standards of judicial review under the equal protection clause of the federal constitution: (1) the strict scrutiny test, where, once unequal treatment is demonstrated, the state must show a compelling state interest for the unequal treatment; and (2) the rational basis test, where, once unequal treatment is demonstrated, the complaining party must show that the legislation in question does not have a rational basis.

In the Rodriguez case, the United States Supreme Court adopted what appears to be a special test for determining whether education is a fundamental constitutional right: “[T]he key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the *641Constitution.” Sam Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 33. The court concluded that no such right was guaranteed by the federal constitution and, accordingly, declined to apply a strict scrutiny test.

Parenthetically, it is pertinent to note some of the criticism of the application of the test of fundamentality as determined by the existence of an explicit or implicit constitutional guarantee. See the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 300; Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 292, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219; Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 767, 557 P.2d 929 (Serrano II); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 804, 537 P.2d 635.

The Rodriguez case is very relevant to the appeal before us. The equal protection clauses of both the United States and Connecticut constitutions having a like meaning, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining federal constitutional rights are, at the least, persuasive authority, although we fully recognize the primary independent vitality of the provisions of our own constitution. Paraphrasing the language of the California Supreme Court in People v. Longwill, 3.4 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753: In the area of fundamental civil liberties —which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution-—we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connect*642icut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut residents have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law.

In the Rodriguez case, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to review the financing system for education used in Texas, which system had been attacked as violating the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Although there are significant differences between the Texas system and the Connecticut system, they are alike in that a substantial quantum of educational support is supplied by local districts with disparities in financial resources for the furnishing of such support. The trial court in the present cases observed: “[T]hose differences do not, in the opinion of this court, make inapplicable to the Connecticut system the reasons why the Texas system was held not to violate the United States Constitution.” We agree with that conclusion.

The Rodriguez decision was a 5 to 4 decision, and although the majority holding was that the Texas education-financing system did not violate the equal protection provisions of the federal constitution, the language of the majority opinion and the strength of the dissenting opinions have had great impact on state education-financing systems.12 Not the least significant caveats expressed in the *643majority opinion were the observations (p. 40) that the appellees in that case “would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures,” the acknowledgement (p. 41) that the justices of that court “lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues,” and the court’s expressed concern (p. 44) for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system—“it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State.”

Two other observations in the Rodrigues majority opinion have also obviously had their effect on state action to provide more uniform educational opportunity. The first is the reaffirmation of the statements made in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873, that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments” and “[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” The other observation is the concluding paragraph of the majority opinion in Rodrigues in which the court stated (p. 58) as “a cautionary postscript”:

*644“The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that this Court’s action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.”

In our consideration of the merits of the present appeals, we have not found material aid in the many decisions from the courts of other jurisdictions since most of them depend upon the controlling and differing provisions of the constitutions in the particular jurisdictions.13 Nor have we found the Rodriguez *645test for the fundamentality of the right to an education of particular help—although under that test it cannot be questioned but that in the light of the Connecticut constitutional recognition of the right to education (article eighth, § 1) it is, in Connecticut, a “fundamental” right.

As other courts have recognized, educational equalization cases are “in significant aspects sui generis” and not subject to analysis by accepted conventional tests or the application of mechanical standards. The wealth discrimination found among school districts differs materially from the usual equal protection case where a fairly defined indigent class suffers discrimination to its peculiar disadvantage. The discrimination is relative rather than absolute. Further, the children living in towns with relatively low assessable property values are afforded public education but, as the trial court found, the education they receive is to a substantial degree narrower and lower in quality than that which pupils receive in comparable towns with a larger tax base and greater ability to finance education. True, the state has mandated local provision for a basic educational program with local option for a program of higher quality but, as the trial court’s finding indicates, that option to a town which lacks the resources to implement the higher quality educational program which it desires and which is available to property-richer towns is highly illusory. As Mr. Justice Marshall put it in his dissent in Rodrigues (p. 89): “[T]his Court has never suggested that because some ‘adequate’ level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable *646inequalities of state action. It mandates nothing less than that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall he treated alike.’ F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) [40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989].” With justification, the trial court found merit to the complaints of the plaintiffs about “the sheer irrationality” of the state’s system of financing education in the state on the basis of property values, noting that their argument “ ‘would be similar and no less tenable should the state make educational expenditures dependent upon some other irrelevant factor, such as the number of telephone poles in the district.’ Note . . . [“A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars,” 81 Yale L.J. 1303, 1307].”

We find our thinking to be substantially in accord with the decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, and the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 (Serrano II), and whether we apply the “fundamentality” test adopted by Rodriguez or the pre-Rodriguez test under our state constitution (as the California Supreme Court did in Serrano II) or the “arbitrary” test applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 492,14 we must conclude that in Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.

*647“Connecticut has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young.” State ex rel. Huntington v. Huntington School Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882. Education is so important that the state has made it compulsory through a requirement of attendance. General Statutes § 10-184. As early as 1650, the General Court (as the General Assembly was then called) adopted a provision that “euery Towneshipp within this Jurissdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty houshoulders, shall then forthwith appoint one within theire Towne to teach all such children as shall resorte to him, to write and read .... And it is further ordered, that where any Towne shall increase to the number of one hundred families or housholders, they shall sett vp a Grammer Schoole, the masters thereof being able to instruct youths so farr as they may bee fitted for the Vniversity.” 1 Col. Rec. 555. This same basic educational system has continued to this date, the state recognizing that providing for education is a state duty and function now codified in the constitution, article eighth, §1, with the obligation of overseeing education on the local level delegated to local school boards which serve as agents of the state. Murphy v. Berlin Board of Education, 167 Conn. 368, 372, 355 A.2d 265; West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526. The General Assembly has by word, if not by deed, recognized in the enactment of § 10-4a of the General Statutes (see footnote 9, supra) that it is the concern of the state that “each child shall have . . . equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educational experiences.” Indeed the concept of equality is expressly embodied in the constitutional *648provision for distribution of the school fund in the provision (article eighth, § 4) that the fund “shall be inviolably appropriated to the support and encouragement of the public schools throughout the state, and for the equal benefit of all the people thereof.”

The present-day problem arises from the circumstance that over the years there has arisen a great disparity in the ability of local communities to finance local education, which has given rise to a consequent significant disparity in the quality of education available to the youth of the state. It was well stated in the memorandum of decision of the trial court, which noted that the “present method [of financing education in the state] is the result of legislation in which the state delegates to municipalities of disparate financial capability the state’s duty of raising funds for operating public schools within that municipality. That legislation gives no consideration to the financial capability of the municipality to raise funds sufficient to discharge another duty delegated to the municipality by the state, that of educating the children within that municipality. The evidence in this case is that, as a result of this duty-delegating to Canton without regard to Canton’s financial capabilities, pupils in Canton receive an education that is in a substantial degree lower in both breadth and quality than that received by pupils in municipalities with a greater financial capability, even though there is no difference between the constitutional duty of the state to the children in Canton and the constitutional duty of the state to the children in other towns.”

We conclude that without doubt the trial court correctly held that, in Connecticut, elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right, that *649pupils in the public schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right, and that the state system of financing public elementary and secondary education as it presently exists and operates cannot pass the test of “strict judicial scrutiny” as to its constitutionality. These were the basic legal conclusions reached by the court. The remaining conclusions arise from the application of these legal principles to the facts which the court found. These we have already summarized and it is unnecessary to repeat them. It suffices to note that the exhaustive finding of facts amply supports the conclusions of the court that the present legislation enacted by the General Assembly to discharge the state’s constitutional duty to educate its children, depending, as it does, primarily on a local property tax base without regard to the disparity in the financial ability of the towns to finance an educational program and with no significant equalizing state support, is not “appropriate legislation” (article eighth, § 1) to implement the requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.

The cross appeal of the plaintiffs requires but brief mention. Their sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the state’s present system of financing public education violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. In fact, the trial court expressly concluded that it did not. In the light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Rodrigues case and the court’s finding in the present case, it is extremely doubtful that error could be found in the trial court’s conclusion. The United States *650Supreme Court provides the ultimate definitions of the United States Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5. It is, however, unnecessary to extend this opinion for a discussion of what is essentially an academic question. We have found no error in the court’s conclusion that the present legislative provisions for financing education in the state violate the provisions of the Connecticut constitution. That suffices.

In reaching our conclusion, we have not overlooked the precept that “[w'Jhen the constitutionality of legislation is in question, it is the duty of the court to sustain it unless its invalidity is beyond a reasonable doubt.” Amsel v. Brooks, 141 Conn. 288, 294, 106 A.2d 152, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 880, 75 S. Ct. 125, 99 L. Ed. 693; Lublin v. Brown, 168 Conn. 212, 220, 362 A.2d 769; Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 487, 313 A.2d 53. With full consideration of that presumption, we have, nevertheless, reached our conclusion that there was no error in the judgments of the trial court.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is not inappropriate to comment on the question of what relief may properly be afforded to the plaintiffs. As we have noted, the trial court limited its judgments, to declaratory ones while retaining jurisdiction for consideration of the granting of any consequential relief. In so doing, it quoted with approval from the portion of the Rodrigues decision which observed (p. 59) that “the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.” This observation is doubly appropriate. While “ [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”; United *651 States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039; the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function of the legislative department hut its expressly mandated duty under the provisions' of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1. The judicial department properly stays its hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to act. Various means of achieving substantial equality of opportunities for learning have been adopted and are in operation in many other states.15

While the development of an appropriate legislative plan is not without its complexities, the problem is not insoluble. Nor do we share the alarm expressed in the dissenting opinion at what it concludes are “the implications of the decision” as requiring total state financing of education, loss of local administrative control over educational decisions and the requirement that education in all towns “be brought up to the Darien standard” which, if it occurred, the trial court found would require an increase of $313,000,000 over the amounts being currently expended. To the contrary, as we have noted, the trial court expressly found that none of these consequences would of necessity follow the adoption by the state of a financing program designed to achieve a substantial degree of equality of educational opportunity and permit all towns to *652exercise a meaningful choice as to educational services to be offered to students, that the property tax is still a viable means of producing income for education, and that there is no reason why local control lieeds to be diminished in any degree merely because some system other than the one presently in effect is. adopted. We find no reason to reject the validity of these findings. Obviously, absolute equality or precisely equal advantages are not required and cannot be attained except in the most relative sense. Logically, the state may recognize differences in educational costs based on relevant economic and educational factors and on course offerings of special interest in diverse communities. None of the basic alternative plans to equalize the ability of various towns to finance education requires that all towns spend the same amount for the education of each pupil. The very uncertainty of the extent of the nexus between dollar input and quality of educational opportunity requires allowance for variances as do individual and group disadvantages and local conditions.

We also note that the General Assembly has not been unaware of the possible constitutional problems inherent in the operation of the present system. In 1973, it established a “Commission to Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity.” Special Acts 1973, No. 73-143. The commission was directed to “conduct a study of, and make recommendations regarding, an equitable system of producing revenue to finance the provision of an equal educational opportunity for all children of the state.” Its final report, “arrived at after months of study, analysis, and discussion to fulfill our commitment to provide equality of educational opportunity for all Connecticut children,” concluded (p. i) that *653the present system of school finance is “inherently inequitable” and that “Connecticut is not providing equal educational opportunity for all its children.” It recommended a specific program to correct the situation. It is not our province to discuss the merits of the proposed plan or its implementation, hut its very existence as a result of legislative action should serve to stay judicial intervention to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to take appropriate legislative action.

There is no error; however, the Superior Court having refrained from ruling on the plaintiffs’ ancillary claims for relief and having retained jurisdiction pending further order of this court, the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion Bogdanski, Lostgo and Barber, Js., concurred. Bogdahski, J., filed a concurring opinion and Loiselle, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Bogdanski, J.

(concurring). I am in complete agreement with the language of the majority opinion to the effect that Connecticut has for centuries recognized that it is her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young; that education is so important that the state has, since colonial days, required towns to maintain local schools and made attendance compulsory; and that this basic educational system has continued to this date with the state recognizing that providing for education is a state duty.

To that I would add that the history of the 1965 constitutional convention proceedings demonstrates that the constitutional provision concerning education, adopted by the convention, formalized free *654public education on the elementary and secondary levels as a fundamental right. A review of that history reveals the following:

On September 23, 1965, Simon Bernstein, a delegate from the first district, in addressing himself to the educational resolution stated: “[M]y remarks are really addressed to section 1 only, which calls for placing in the Constitution the very fundamental provision that we shall provide as a Constitutional right free public school education.” Conn. Const. Conv. Proc., 1965, pt. 1, p. 311.

Thereafter, on October 19, 1965, Bernstein again spoke concerning an amendment to the resolution: “[T]he statement of purpose of that resolution of mine was that our system of free public education have a tradition [al] acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same Constitutional sanctity.” Conn. Const. Conv. Proc., 1965, pt. 3, p. 1039.

The constitutional provision ultimately adopted by the convention reads as follows: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Conn. Const. Art. VIII § 1.

I would add further that the right of our children to an education is a matter of right not only because our state constitution declares it as such, but because education is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of society together. In a real sense, it is as necessary to a civilized society as food and shelter are to an individual. It is our fundamental legacy to the youth of our state to enable *655them to acquire knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for it is the ability to reason that separates man from all other forms of life.

Indeed, as far back as 1894, in the absence of any constitutional provision, this court recognized how essential and important education is when it stated that “[i]t is a duty . . . [that] has always been assumed by the State; not only because the education of youth is a matter of great public utility, but also and chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the State itself.” Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348.

Finally, it should be observed that the issues raised and pressed on this appeal are directed toward the right of the children of this state to a basic education, and the determination of whether certain statutes of this state unconstitutionally impinge upon that right. We are, therefore, limited to those issues.

The function of this court is to review the actions of the trial court and the conclusions reached by it. Such a review of this case leads to but one result: that the conclusions reached by the trial court are more than amply supported by the subordinate facts.

Loiseele, J.

(dissenting). Although education occupies a position of great importance in this state, and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873, recognizes that today “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments” the United States Supreme Court has concluded that social importance is not the criterion by which the funda*656mentality of a right for equal protection purposes is determined, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16; see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S. Ct. 862, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36.

Nor is the right rendered fundamental simply because it is mentioned in the Connecticut constitution. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491, 303 A.2d 273; Olsen v. Oregon, 276 Ore. 9, 554 P.2d 139.

As I review the history of education in Connecticut, it does not support the “fundamentality” of the right. Education was not required to be free until 1869. Public Acts 1869, c. 71; compare with Rev. 1866, tit. 16, c. 3, § 98. In 1894, this court spoke of education as “a privilege or advantage, rather than a right in the strict technical sense of the term.1 This privilege is granted, and is to be enjoyed upon such terms and under such reasonable conditions and restrictions, as the law-making power, within constitutional limits, may see fit to impose; and, within those limits, the question what terms, conditions, and restrictions will best subserve the end sought in the establishment and maintenance of public schools, is a question solely for the legislature and not for the courts.” Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348.

Over the years, the legislature has been troubled by the disparities in financial capability of the school districts, and has made compensatory grants to the poorer systems. See, e.g., Public Acts 1903, c. 102, *657p. 69; Public Acts 1917, c. 371, p. 2543. It can be expected that the legislature will continue to implement this concern in compensatory legislation, but such concern does not render education a fundamental right.

The history of the addition of the provision on education to our constitution in 1965 is, like most legislative history, ambiguous. Statements made at the constitutional convention could be interpreted either way depending upon which point of view is fostered. Taken as a whole, this history is indicative of what the majority opinion has stated, that the constitutional amendment regarding free education on the elementary and secondary level was merely a “codification” of the obligation assumed by the state in its statutory enactments. The constitutional provision would prevent the state from requiring students to pay for education or from denying free education to some while making it available to others, but I do not see that the provision renders education a “fundamental” right.

Furthermore, the amendment regarding education must be read not only with the equal protection clause of the constitution, but also with article tenth, which was, like the education provision, new in the 1965 constitution, and provides specifically that “[t]he general assembly shall by general law delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems appropriate to towns.” The legislative authority over education is total, and includes the authority to tax for the support of education. Article tenth specifically authorizes the legislature to do what it has done in regard to education: to delegate the responsibility of raising the large part of the funds for its support to the towns.

*658Nor does the system adopted by the legislature seem to me to be as irrational as “the number of telephone poles in the district.” Local control with local fiscal responsibility, even in a property-poor district, is a rational justification for the present statutory scheme. One commentator, noting the lack of interest in education in the days when the income from the sale of the western lands covered most governmental education expenditures, states: “History will show that advancement in education depends largely upon local interest and local initiative, and that both interest and initiative are stimulated by some system of local taxation, instead of by reliance upon an income from a school fund.” Ames, History of Education in Connecticut, in 5 Osborn, History of Connecticut, p. 189.

No one argues that the state’s financial system causes an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any child or that education received in elementary or secondary schools is not free, as mandated by the state constitution. After you have brushed the foam off the beer, the plaintiffs’ argument concerns only one item—money.

The trial court explicitly states, and the majority of this court implicitly holds, that the “appropriate legislation” (article eighth, § 1), by which our legislature is constitutionally required to implement the guarantee of free elementary and secondary education, must be legislation which makes available to all towns the same amount of money per school child. I do not agree. There is nothing in the constitution requiring such an equalized pot of money per town. As I see it, the constitution requires free education, and “appropriate legislation” is legislation which makes education free. I will con*659cede that when the constitution says free education it must he interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates. But there is no contention that such situations exist, or that education in Connecticut is not meaningful or does not measure up to standards accepted by knowledgeable leaders in the field of education. No doubt the property-poor towns are careful managers of the education dollar, and are likely to give the value of each program much closer scrutiny than is a wealthy town. I am not persuaded that expenditures for educational opportunities above the reasonable minimum mandated by the legislature have any substantial effect on the education of students over the long pull. The Coleman Report (United States Office of Education, Equality of Educational Opportunity), p. 325, suggests that any such thesis is open to serious question. Although the trial court did not make an express finding, it recognized in its memorandum that there is a lessening marginal utility for each successive increment of educational input.

I have difficulty determining on what basis the majority opinion rests, especially when it cites dissenting opinions, which cannot be viewed as authority. The majority opinion states: “We find our thinking to be substantially in accord with the decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, and the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 (Serrano II).” I assume that this means the court is in accord with the rationales and not just the results reached by those decisions. The rationale of Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (Serrano I), which relied upon federal authority, is the same rationale *660expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 {Serrano II), in no way states a new rationale; it merely adheres to the result of Serrano I on the basis that the educational system violated the state’s constitutional provisions, which a footnote in Serrano I had stated (p. 596 n.ll) meant the same as the federal equal protection clause. It did so even though the state legislature had made a substantial and significant effort to equalize education during the time between the two decisions. In New Jersey, where the state constitution requires that there be a “thorough and efficient system” of education for all, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the state system was not “visibly geared” to the constitutional mandate, and established no minimum standards, which is not true in Connecticut. And more importantly, in my view, the New Jersey court rejected the “fundamental right” analysis as neither useful nor required. Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 491.

Up until today, this court has always stated that the due process and equal protection guarantees of our state constitution have the same meaning as their counterparts in the federal constitution. Roundhouse Construction Corporation v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 168 Conn. 371, 374, 362 A.2d 778; Karp v. Zoning Board, 156 Conn. 287, 295, 240 A.2d 845. Rodriguez unequivocally has ruled that disparities in spending for education between property-rich and property-poor towns do not violate the federal constitution. I see no distinction between the two constitutions in this respect, other than the provision in the state constitution con*661cerning free education in elementary and secondary schools, and, as I have previously stated, I believe that that provision alone does not create a fundamental right so as to invoke close judicial scrutiny in the determination of whether there is a violation of the equal protection clause of the state constitution.

As I read the majority opinion, although it mentions the constitutional provision concerning education, the real ground for its conclusion that education is a “fundamental” right is its historic importance in this state. Other rights to state-provided services have historically been of equal or greater importance in Connecticut, notably the rights to police protection, fire protection and public health services. The state assumed the duty of police protection long before it assumed the duty of free education. Using the rationale of the majority, the rights to these services are as fundamental as the right to free education. If delegating the responsibility for raising funds for education to the towns is an unconstitutional method of carrying out the state’s educational function, then such delegation must be equally impermissible in respect to these other historically important functions.

We cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country. The issue is whether, because our state laws allow some towns to furnish a broader spectrum of choice than other towns desire to furnish or feel financially able to furnish, that the system has to tumble down. Both the trial court and my colleagues state that the system need *662only be changed to allow equal opportunity to each child in the state. The realities of the matter, as I see it, are that after this decision no system can survive judicial scrutiny so long as there is any inequality.

Our system of school financing, by local taxation and state aid, is one which has steadily extended education and improved its quality. The system has continued to be affirmative and when scrutinizing it under judicial principles we should be sensitive to the efforts the legislature has made.

As the United States Supreme Court in Rodrigues has noted, “ ‘[t]he history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children.’ ”2 Our system of school financing is responsive to these two forces. While assuring good basic education for all children, it allows and encourages local participation and control.

To paraphrase Rodrigues, although this state’s system of school financing results in unequal expenditures depending on the wealth of a town, the disparities are not so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. This state has persistently endeavored to narrow the differences in levels of expenditures without sacrificing the benefits of local participation. Our system of financing is not the product of purposeful discrimination. It is rooted *663in years of experience in this and other states and in major part is the product of responsible studies by qualified people. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 55.

Furthermore, it is troubling that the findings of the trial court, in ranking Connecticut towns on the basis of property-per-pupil, have made no mention of the core cities and the role they play in this drama. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court pointed out (p. 58) that research projects have concluded that any financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the urban centers, a result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing conditions in those areas. These practical considerations cannot determine constitutional questions but they serve to highlight the wisdom of abstaining from judicial interference in matters better left to the legislature.

Even more than the decision made by the court, the implications of the decision alarm me. I do not see any possibility that any system which falls short of total state financing of education, whether through state assumption of the property tax or through other means, will satisfy the demands of equal protection after this decision. If education is indeed a fundamental right in Connecticut, and after this opinion is published it will be so, the strict scrutiny test must be applied to any legislative scheme for financing education. I do not believe that the so-called power equalization system, in which the state awards funds to towns on the basis of the educational tax effort they make, as measured by their net school mill rates, can survive strict

*664scrutiny, for that system makes the educational expenditures vary in accordance with the willingness of townspeople to tax themselves for education, a factor which has no relation to the needs of the children. An equalization system in which property-rich towns were required to contribute to a state fund distributed to property-poor towns was, in November, 1976, declared unconstitutional in Wisconsin, as in violation of a state constitutional provision that “the rule of taxation be uniform,” construed to require that taxes be spent at the level at which they were raised. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141. Nor do I believe that merely redistributing the existing state contribution to education in a compensatory manner will suffice; the state contribution is so small in relation to total expenditures for education that the inequality between property-poor and property-rich towns will still be substantial. Indeed, the California Supreme Court in a case relied upon by the majority as authority for its decision, has already rejected a plan which narrowed,3 but did not close, the educational gap between property-poor and property-rich towns on the basis that such a narrow gap could not pass judicial scrutiny. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 (Serrano II). Whatever system the state uses, and the opinion states that there are various means open to the legislature, short of total state financing, if the property-poor towns are not brought all the way up the scale to the level of the top property-rich towns, there will be a disparity that will not survive strict judicial scrutiny, that is, if the court does its job. I cannot see any middle ground. If education is brought up *665to the Darien standard (and I doubt if any system devised will downgrade edncation in a town whieh wants the nltimate in edncation and can afford it), the trial conrt has fonnd that the state wonld have to increase its spending for edncation to over one billion dollars per year.

PETERS, C. J.

The public elementary and high school

students in Hartford suffer daily from the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty, have had on their education. Federal constitutional law provides no remedy for their plight. The principal issue in this appeal is whether, under the unique provisions of our state constitution, the state, which already plays an active role in managing public schools, must take further measures to relieve the severe handicaps that burden these children’s education. The issue is as controversial as the stakes are high. We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford have waited long enough. The constitutional imperatives contained in article eighth, § l,1 and article first, §§ 1 and 20,2 of our *4state constitution entitle the plaintiffs to relief. At the same time, the constitutional imperative of separation of powers persuades us to afford the legislature, with the assistance of the executive branch, the opportunity, in the first instance, to fashion the remedy that will most appropriately respond to the constitutional violations that we have identified. The judgment of the trial court must, accordingly, be reversed.

I

THE HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THIS LITIGATION

In their action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the eighteen plaintiffs3 filed a four count complaint in which they claimed that the defendants4 had a constitutional obligation, under article *5eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, to remedy alleged educational inequities in the Hartford public schools. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions to strike the complaint and for summary judgment. After an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that “state action exists under the facts and circumstances of this case,” and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.

A

The plaintiffs’ revised four count complaint alleges that students in the Hartford public schools are burdened by severe educational disadvantages arising out of their racial and ethnic isolation and their socioeconomic deprivation. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, each count of their complaint is grounded on the proposition that the defendants have failed to fulfill their state constitutional responsibility to remedy these severe educational disadvantages. Count one alleges that the defendants bear responsibility for the de facto racial and ethnic segregation between Hartford and the surrounding suburban public school districts and thus have deprived the plaintiffs of an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1. Count two alleges that the defendants have perpetuated the racial and ethnic segregation that exists between Hartford and the surrounding suburban public school districts, and thus have discriminated against the plaintiffs and have failed to provide them with an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and *620, and article eighth, § 1. Count three alleges that the defendants have failed to provide the plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because the defendants have maintained in Hartford a public school district that, by comparison with surrounding suburban public school districts: (1) is severely educationally disadvantaged; (2) fails to provide equal educational opportunities for Hartford schoolchildren; and (3) fails to provide a minimally adequate education for Hartford schoolchildren. Count four alleges that the defendants have failed to provide the plaintiffs with a substantially equal educational opportunity as required by Connecticut law, including General Statutes § 10-4a,5 in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights to due process under article first, §§ 8 and 10.6

The defendants not only denied the underlying factual and legal premises of the plaintiffs’ complaint, but also raised seven special defenses. These defenses alleged that the defendants were not liable because of: (1) sovereign immunity; (2) stare decisis; (3) separation of powers; (4) the lack of a justiciable controversy; (5) *7the plaintiffs’ failure to join necessary parties, including the city of Hartford; (6) the absence of state action; and (7) the unavailability of court-ordered remedies.

The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motions to strike and for summary judgment that were premised on these special defenses. After an evidentiary hearing, however, the court ruled in favor of the defendants on their sixth special defense. Relying heavily on principles drawn from federal constitutional law, the court determined that the plaintiffs could not prevail without establishing that state action was the “direct and sufficient cause of the conditions” alleged in their complaint, and concluded that they had failed to prove such causation. Finding no such state action, the court rendered judgment for the defendants without addressing the merits of the constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiffs.

B

Because of the importance of the novel and controversial questions of constitutional law raised in this litigation, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c), we transferred to this court the plaintiffs’ appeal from the judgment of the trial court. Noting that the plaintiffs’ complaint had been pending since 1989, we held a special hearing, shortly after the appeal had been filed, to order supplementation of the trial record. We directed the parties to prepare a joint stipulation of all relevant undisputed facts and to assist the trial court in making findings of fact on matters upon which the parties could not agree.7 Our resolution of this appeal has proceeded on the basis of this supple*8mented record, which the parties and the court promptly prepared in accordance with our order.

C

The stipulation of the parties and the trial court’s findings establish the following relevant facts. Statewide, in the 1991-92 school year, children from minority groups constituted 25.7 percent of the public school population. In the Hartford public school system in that same period, 92.4 percent of the students were members of minority groups, including, predominantly, students who were either African-American or Latino.8 Fourteen of Hartford’s twenty-five elementary schools had a white student enrollment of less than 2 percent. The Hartford public school system currently enrolls the highest percentage of minority students in the state. In the future, if current conditions continue, the percentage of minority students in the Hartford public school system is likely to increase rather than decrease. Since 1980, the percentage of African-Americans in the Hartford student population has decreased, while the percentage of Latinos has increased. Although enrollment of African-American students in the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns has increased by more than 60 percent from 1980 to 1992, only seven of these school districts had a minority student enrollment in excess of 10 percent in 1992. Because of the negative consequences of racial and ethnic isolation, a more integrated public school system would likely be beneficial to all schoolchildren.

A majority of the children who constitute the public school population in Hartford come from homes that are economically disadvantaged, that are headed by a single parent and in which a language other than English is spoken. The percentage of Hartford schoolchildren *9at the elementary level who return to the same school that they attended the previous year is the lowest such percentage in the state. Such socioeconomic factors impair a child’s orientation toward and skill in learning and adversely affect a child’s performance on standardized tests. The gap in the socioeconomic status between Hartford schoolchildren and schoolchildren from the surrounding twenty-one suburban towns has been increasing. The performance of Hartford schoolchildren on standardized tests falls significantly below that of schoolchildren from the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns.

Directly or indirectly, the state has always controlled public elementary and secondary education in Connecticut. The legislature directs many aspects of local school programs, including courses of study and curricula, standardized testing, bilingual education, graduation requirements and school attendance. Since 1941, as a result of a state statute; see General Statutes § 10-240;9 the public school district boundaries in Hartford have been coterminous with the boundaries of the city of Hartford. Since at least 1909, as a result of another state statute; see General Statutes § 10-184;10 schoolchildren *10have been assigned.to the public school district in which they reside.

The legislature provides substantial support to communities throughout the state to finance public school operations. State financial aid is distributed so that the neediest school districts receive the most aid. Accordingly, in the 1990-91 and 1991-92 school years, overall per pupil state expenditures in Hartford exceeded the average amount spent per pupil in the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns. The state reimburses Hartford for its school renovation projects at a rate that is considerably higher than the reimbursement rate for the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns.

The state has not intentionally segregated racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. Except for a brief period in 1868, no students in Connecticut have intentionally been assigned to a public school or to a public school district on the basis of race or ethnicity.11 There has never been any other manifestation of de jure segregation either at the state or the local level. In addition to various civil rights initiatives undertaken by the legislature from 1905 to 1961 to combat racial discrimination, the state board of education was reorganized, during the 1980s, to concentrate on the needs of urban schoolchildren and to promote diversity in the public schools. Since 1970, the state has supported and encouraged voluntary plans for increasing, interdistrict diversity.

The state has nonetheless played a significant role in the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. Although *11intended to improve the quality of education and not racially or ethnically motivated, the districting statute that the legislature enacted in 1909, now codified at § 10-240,12 is the single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. The districting statute and the resultant school district boundaries have remained virtually unchanged since 1909. The districting statute is of critical importance because it establishes town boundaries as the dividing line between all school districts in the state.

Nonetheless, according to the findings of the trial court, poverty, and not race or ethnicity, is the principal causal factor in the lower educational achievement of Hartford students. The court also found that the Hartford public school system provides its students with a minimally adequate education under article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because, regardless of the comparative levels of achievement between Hartford students and students from the twenty-one suburban towns, the education provided to Hartford students gives them a chance to lead successful lives. It further found that the Hartford public school system provides its students with an equal educational opportunity because they receive resources, educational programs and curricula similar to those received by students in other communities in the state. It then found that school district lines would have to be redrawn in order to remedy effectively the severe racial, ethnic and socioeconomic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school system. In addition to these findings addressed to the plaintiffs’ specific legal claims, the court also found that any form of mandatory intervention would have to rely on coercive measures that would not assure educationally desirable outcomes.

*12D

The plaintiffs’ appeal challenges the validity of many of the trial court’s findings of fact and all of its conclusions of law.13 The defendants ask us to affirm the judgment of the trial court, by reversing its conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint is justiciable or by upholding its conclusion that the complaint is barred by an absence of the requisite state action. If we reject these affirmative defenses, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their claims of law in light of the findings of the trial court. We are unpersuaded by the defendants’ affirmative defenses and, on the merits, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

II

THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The defendants renew two affirmative defenses that they raised at trial.14 They argue that the text of article eighth, § 1, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to consider whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief by way of an order to the legislature to provide a remedy for their impaired educational opportunities. They also argue that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs cannot recover because they have not alleged that their educational impairment results from intentional state misconduct. We are not persuaded by either of these affirmative defenses.

*13A

The defendants maintain that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint because the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable. Granting the plaintiffs the relief they seek would, according to the defendants, require this court to respond to a political question that our constitution has expressly and exclusively entrusted to the legislature. We disagree.

Existing precedents descxibe the uneasy line that distinguishes between cases that are justiciable and cases that are not. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, courts do not have jurisdiction to decide cases that involve matters that textually have been resexved to the legislature, such as the implementation of a constitutional spending cap; Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 9-10, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996); or the appointment of additional judges. Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 683, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984); see also Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 74, 652 A.2d 1013 (1995). In the absence of such a textual reservation, however, it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119, 132 (1839); see Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 2557 (1985); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 625, 649-50, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I); Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 145, 151 A. 518 (1930). “Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate inter*14preter of the Constitution.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); see Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 552, 663 A.2d 317 (1995); Nielsen v. Kezer, supra, 74-75; see also L. Henkin, “Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?,” 85 Yale L.J. 597, 599-600 (1976); M. Redish, “Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question,’” 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1031, 1051-60 (1984-85).

In the context of judicial enforcement of the right to a substantially equal educational opportunity arising under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, justiciability is not a matter of first impression for this court. In Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615, and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III), 15 we reviewed, in plenary fashion,16 the actions taken by the legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to public elementary and secondary schoolchildren. Judicial authority to render these decisions was expressly reaffirmed in Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. 9-10, and in Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 193 Conn. 683.

The defendants do not challenge the continued validity of Horton I and Horton III, but argue that their claim of nonjusticiability differs. That argument is unavailing. The plaintiff schoolchildren in the present case invoke the same constitutional provisions to challenge the constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff school*15children invoked in Horton I and Horton III. The text of article eighth, § 1, has not changed. Furthermore, although prudential cautions may shed light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies; see Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 184-85, 610 A.2d 153 (1992); such cautions do not deprive a court of jurisdiction.

In light of these precedents, we are persuaded that the phrase “appropriate legislation” in article eighth, § 1, does not deprive the courts of the authority to determine what is “appropriate.”17 Just as the legislature has a constitutional duty to fulfill its affirmative obligation to the children who attend the state’s public elementary and secondary schools, so the judiciary has a constitutional duty to review whether the legislature has fulfilled its obligation,18 Considerations of justiciability must be balanced against the principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hillcrest Associates, 233 Conn. 153, 163, 659 A.2d 138 *16(1995); Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 614, 646 A.2d 126 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 410, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); Tolly v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Conn. 13, 29, 621 A.2d 719 (1993); see also United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 459, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 118 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1992). In this case, our precedents compel the conclusion that the balance must be struck in favor of the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

B

The defendants maintain that even if the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable, the plaintiffs are not entitled to judicial relief because the educational disparities of which they complain do not result from the requisite state action. The plaintiffs claim that the state bears responsibility to correct the constitutional violations alleged in their complaint because of the state’s failure to “take corrective measures to [e]nsure that its Hartford public schoolchildren receive an equal educational opportunity.”19 That failure is actionable, according to the plaintiffs, because of the state’s knowledge of the racial and ethnic isolation in the Hartford schools, combined with the state’s extensive involvement in the operations of Connecticut’s public schools and the impact of state statutes mandating school attendance within statutorily defined school districts. General Statutes §§ 10-184 and 10-240.20 The defendants maintain, to the contrary, that the state’s constitutional duty to provide for the elementary and secondary education of Connecticut schoolchildren is triggered only by state action that is alleged to be intentional state misconduct. The trial court relied on the absence of such intentional state *17action in denying relief to the plaintiffs. We disagree with the trial court’s decision.

The defendants’ argument, derived largely from principles of federal constitutional law, founders on the fact that article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, impose on the legislature an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide schoolchildren throughout the state with a substantially equal educational opportunity. Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 648-49. It follows that, if the legislature fails, for whatever reason, to take action to remedy substantial inequalities in the educational opportunities that such children are being afforded, its actions and its omissions constitute state action.

The affirmative constitutional obligation that we recognized in Horton I and Horton III, and reaffirmed recently in Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595-96, 660 A.2d 742 (1995), was not premised on a showing that the legislature had played an active role in creating the inequalities that the constitution requires it to redress. In Horton I, we determined that the state’s educational financing scheme was unconstitutional even though it was facially nondiscriminatory and even though the disparities resulting therefrom had not been created intentionally by the legislature. These constitutionally unacceptable disparities developed, instead, “from the circumstance that over the years there [had] arisen a great disparity in the ability of local communities to finance local education,” and from the legislature’s failure to consider “the financial capability of [each] municipality . . . .” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 648. In declaring this statutory scheme unconstitutional in Horton I, and in requiring further remedial action in Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 38, 43-44, we necessarily determined that the state’s failure adequately to address school funding inequalities constituted the state action that is the constitutional prerequisite for affording judicial relief.

*18The claims now before us likewise implicate the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to all of the state’s schoolchildren. The plaintiffs document the existence of an extensive statutory system developed in response to the legislature’s plenary authority over state public elementary and secondary schools.21 As a general matter, the plaintiffs challenge the failure of the legislature to address continuing unconstitutional inequities resulting, de facto, from that scheme. In addition, and more specifically, they point to two statutes that directly impact on their claims of constitutional deprivation. State law sets the borders of school districts to coincide with town boundaries; General Statutes § 10-240;22 and requires all children to attend public school within the district in which they reside. General Statutes § 10-184.23 The trial court expressly found that the enforcement of these statutes constitutes the “single most important factor” creating the present racial and *19ethnic imbalance in the Hartford public school system.24 The failure adequately to address the racial and ethnic disparities that exist among the state’s public school districts is not different in kind from the legislature’s failure adequately to address the “great disparity in the ability of local communities to finance local education” that made the statutory scheme at issue in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 648, unconstitutional in its application.25

The defendants maintain, however, that the logic of this inference is undermined by certain other precedents of this court. The defendants rely particularly on Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990), in which we concluded that the state’s failure to provide emergency housing to recipients of federal welfare benefits did not constitute state action. Although we recognized that the absence of emergency housing might *20have a deleterious impact on the opportunity of children to attend school, we held that this secondary effect was not a sufficient basis for imposing constitutional liability upon the state. See id., 286-87. Savage, however, sheds no light on the state action requirement in this case because, as we explained in Savage; see id., 284-86; the state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to provide emergency housing, while it does have an affirmative constitutional obligation with respect to public elementary and secondary education.

The defendants also invoke two cases in which this court declined to find state action because the pertinent actors were private parties rather than the state itself. In Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 504-505, 375 A.2d 998 (1977), we concluded that private discrimination by the testator of a scholarship fund who had restricted its beneficiaries on the basis of religion did not constitute state action. In Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 64-66, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984), we concluded that the governmental regulation and public use of a private shopping mall did not transform the mall owners’ refusal to allow political speech within the mall into state action. Although this aspect of the state action doctrine arguably is related to the question before us; see Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79, 115 S. Ct. 961, 130 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1995); it cannot be controlling in a case in which action or inaction by the state is directly implicated.

In addition to these state cases, the defendants urge us to follow federal precedents that concededly require, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that claimants seeking judicial relief for educational disparities pursuant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution must prove intentional governmental discrimination against a suspect class. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1992) (“[o]nce *21the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors”); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434, 96 S. Ct. 2697, 49 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1976) (United States constitution is not violated in absence of segregative efforts by state); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47, 747 n.22, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (1974) (“[t]he suggestion . . . that schools which have a majority of [African-American] students are not ‘desegregated’ . . . however neutrally the district lines have been drawn and administered, finds no support in our prior cases”); cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976). According to the defendants, because the plaintiffs raise claims of unconstitutional disparities in educational opportunities on the basis of severe racial and ethnic imbalances among school districts, the plaintiffs, too, must prove intentional state action.26

For two reasons, we are not persuaded that we should adopt these precedents as a matter of state constitutional law. First and foremost, the federal cases start from the premise that there is no right to education under the United States constitution. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973). Our Connecticut constitution, by contrast, contains a fundamental right to education and a corresponding affirmative state obligation to implement and maintain that right. See Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 595-96; Broadley v. Board of *22Education, 229 Conn. 1, 6, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 645. Second, the federal cases are guided by principles of federalism as “a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which [a court] examines state action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 44; see generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 18-2, p. 1691. As the United States Supreme Court noted, “it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 44. Principles of federalism, however, do not restrict our constitutional authority to enforce the constitutional mandates contained in article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20.

Federal constitutional law, furthermore, has not invariably required intentional state action as a requisite foundation for constitutional remedies. In cases involving the fundamental right to vote, the United States Supreme Court has held state action to be implicated by the legislature’s failure to take the proper steps to implement its affirmative constitutional duty. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-63, 568, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964); see also Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692-93, 109 S. Ct. 1433, 103 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 227, 107 S. Ct. 544, 93 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1986); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185-86, 91 S. Ct. 1904, 29 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1971); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1969); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318-19, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).27 We can perceive no *23principled distinction between judicial intervention to require legislative action to protect the fundamental right to vote and judicial intervention to require legislative action to protect the fundamental right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.

In summary, under our law, which imposes an affirmative constitutional obligation on the legislature to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity for all public schoolchildren, the state action doctrine is not a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims of constitutional deprivation. The state had ample notice of ongoing trends toward racial and ethnic isolation in its public schools, and indeed undertook a number of laudable remedial efforts28 that unfortunately have not achieved their desired end. The fact that the legislature did not affirmatively create or intend to create the conditions that have led to the racial and ethnic isolation in the Hartford public school system does not, in and of itself, *24relieve the defendants of their affirmative obligation to provide the plaintiffs with a more effective remedy for their constitutional grievances.

Ill

THE PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

We turn now to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. No statute, no common law precedent, no federal constitutional principle provides this state’s schoolchildren with a right to a public education that is not burdened by de facto racial and ethnic segregation. The plaintiffs make no such claim. The issue that they raise is whether they have stated a case for relief under our state constitution, which was amended in 1965 to provide both a right to a free public elementary and secondary education; Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 1; and a right to protection from segregation. Conn. Const., art. I, § 20. This issue raises questions that are difficult; the answers that we give are controversial. We are, however, persuaded that a fair reading of the text and the history of these amendments demonstrates a deep and abiding constitutional commitment to a public school system that, in fact and in law, provides Connecticut schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity. A significant component of that substantially equal educational opportunity is access to a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation.

Our analysis of this issue has three parts. First, what are the constituent elements of the affirmative constitutional mandate to provide all public schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity in the context of alleged racial, ethnic and socioeconomic disparities? Second, does the plaintiffs’ complaint encompass these elements? Third, have the plaintiffs proven their claim?

*25A

Since Horton I, it is common ground that the state has an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all public schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity. Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 648-49; see also Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 461-62, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995); New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699, 707-708, 638 A.2d 589 (1994); Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 34-35. Any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized. Horton I, supra, 646.

The issue presented by this case is whether the state has fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has substantially equalized school funding and resources. The defendants urge us to adopt such a limited construction of our constitution. The plaintiffs, to the contrary, urge us to adopt a broader formulation. They argue that the combination of “racial segregation, the concentration of poor children in the schools, and disparities in educational resources . . . deprive [Hartford schoolchildren] of substantially equal educational opportunities.” We agree with the plaintiffs in part. We need not decide, in this case, the extent to which substantial socioeconomic disparities or disparities in educational resources would themselves be sufficient to require the state to intervene in order to equalize educational opportunities. For the purposes of the present litigation, we decide only that the scope of the constitutional obligation expressly imposed on the state by article eighth, § 1, is informed by the constitutional prohibition against segregation contained in article first, § 20. Reading these constitutional provisions conjointly, we conclude that the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportu*26nity and requires the state to take further remedial measures.

Two factors persuade us that it is appropriate to undertake a conjoint reading of these provisions of our state constitution. One is the special nature of the affirmative constitutional right embodied in article eighth, § 1. The other is the explicit prohibition of segregation contained in article first, § 20.

The affirmative constitutional obligation of the state to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity, which is embodied in article eighth, § 1, differs in kind from most constitutional obligations. Organic documents only rarely contain provisions that explicitly require the state to act rather than to refrain from acting. See Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 557. As we observed, however, in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 645, “educational equalization cases are ‘in significant aspects sui generis’ and not subject to analysis by accepted conventional tests or the application of mechanical standards. The wealth discrimination found among school districts differs materially from the usual equal protection case where a fairly defined indigent class suffers discrimination to its peculiar disadvantage. The discrimination is relative rather than absolute.” See also Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 35. Nothing in the description of the relevant legal landscape in any of our cases suggests that the constitutional right that we articulated in Horton I was limited to school financing.

For Connecticut schoolchildren, the scope of the state’s constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity is informed and amplified by the highly unusual29 provision in article *27first, § 20, that prohibits segregation not only indirectly, by forbidding discrimination, but directly, by the use of the term “segregation.” The section provides in relevant part: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination . . . because of . . . race [or] . . . ancestry . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The express inclusion of the term “segregation” in article first, § 20, has independent constitutional significance. The addition of this term to the text of our equal protection clause distinguishes this case from others in which we have found a substantial equivalence between our equal protection clause and that contained in the United States constitution.30 Broadley v. Board of Education, supra, 229 Conn. 8 n.15; Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591, 594 n.5, 560 A.2d 444 (1989); Keogh *28v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 66, 444 A.2d 225 (1982). Fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation require that “[e]ffect must be given to every part of and each word in our constitution . . . .” Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 21, 103 A.2d 818 (1954); State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 386, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981). In other cases, we have held that, insofar as article first, § 20, differs textually from its federal counterpart, its judicial construction must reflect such a textual distinction. See AFSCME, Council 4, Local 681, AFL-CIO v. West Haven, 234 Conn. 217, 221 n.6, 661 A.2d 587 (1995) (per curiam); Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 513, 624 A.2d 876 (1993).

The issue before us, therefore, is what specific meaning to attach to the protection against segregation contained in article first, § 20, in a case in which that protection is invoked as part of the plaintiff schoolchildren’s fundamental affirmative right to a substantially equal educational opportunity under article eighth, § 1. In concrete terms, this issue devolves into the question of whether the state has a constitutional duty to remedy the educational impairment that results from segregation in the Hartford public schools, even though the conditions of segregation that contribute to such impairment neither were caused nor are perpetuated by invidious intentional conduct on the part of the state.

Linguistically, the term “segregation” in article first, § 20, which denotes “separation,”31 is neutral about seg*29regative intent. The section prohibits segregation that occurs “because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability”; (emphasis added); without specifying the manner in which such a causal relationship must be established.

Whatever this language may portend in other contexts, we are persuaded that, in the context of public education, in which the state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and to equalize educational opportunity, the state’s awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation imposes upon the state the responsibility to remedy “segregation . . . because of race [or] . . . ancestry . . . .”32 We therefore hold *30that, textually, article eighth, § 1, as informed by article first, § 20, requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.

The history of the promulgation of article eighth, § 1, and article first, § 20, supports our conclusion that these constitutional provisions include protection from de facto segregation, at least in public schools. That history includes not only the contemporaneous addition, in 1965, of these two provisions to our constitution, but also the strong commitment to ending discrimination and segregation that is evident in the remarks of the delegates to the 1965 constitutional convention.

First, it is undisputed that the duty to provide a public education contained in article eighth, § 1, and the prohibition against segregation contained in article first, § 20, were proposed to and adopted by the voters of this state in response to the constitutional convention of 1965. When the convention delegates debated the desirability of both amendments to our state constitution, they recognized and endorsed the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), declaring the unconstitutionality of “separate but equal” public school education. See 2 Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention of 1965, p. 691, remarks of Chase G. Woodhouse.33 The primary motivation for the addition of article eighth, § 1, to the constitution in 1965 appears to have been the realization that Connecticut *31was the only state in the nation that did not provide any express right to public elementary and secondary education in its constitution. See 3 Proceedings, supra, pp. 1039-40, remarks of Simon J. Bernstein.34 The delegates’ expectation that the proposed amendments to the constitution would secure interrelated constitutional rights was underscored by Bernstein’s remark that article first, § 20, was intended to be applied in the context of the “rights of freedom in education.” 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 694.

Second, it is significant that the debate over the amendment of article first, § 20, manifested the intention of the convention delegates to extend broad protection to all persons from all forms of racial and ethnic discrimination and segregation. The debate over the express inclusion of the term “segregation” focused not on whether including such a term might reach too far, but rather on whether it might invite too narrow a construction of the prohibition against discrimination. It was for this reason that the rules committee felt that language regarding segregation was unnecessary. 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 692, remarks of Chief Justice Raymond E. Baldwin. The convention delegates’ decision nonetheless to retain the term “segregation”35 was *32premised on the acknowledged importance of unequivocal opposition to all that is encompassed by this invidious philosophy and practice. See 2 Proceedings, supra, pp. 690-92, remarks of Chase G. Woodhouse and James J. Kennelly.36 In effect, the convention delegates inserted into article first, § 20, constitutional language that was intended to prohibit not only discrimination, but also segregation on the basis of race or ethnicity.37

Finally, the convention delegates’ manifest intent that article first, § 20, by prohibiting segregation, should pro*33vide “total protection against discrimination”; 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 692, remarks of James J. Kennedy; supports our conclusion that they intended to encompass de facto segregation in the circumstances presented by the present case. If significant racial and ethnic isolation continues to occur within the public schools, for which the legislature has an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity, no special showing of an invidious segregative intent is required.

It would be illogical not to prohibit all such segregation in light of the legislature’s otherwise comprehensive assumption of responsibility for the education of Connecticut schoolchildren. The legislature has created the current school districts, has required students to attend school and has determined which students will attend a particular school district. General Statutes §§ 10-184 and 10-240. The state cannot now avoid its responsibilities by invoking constitutional restraints articulated for different purposes under different constitutional provisions.

Sound principles of public policy support our conclusion that the legislature’s affirmative constitutional responsibility for the education of all public schoolchildren encompasses responsibility for segregation to which the legislature has contributed, even unintentionally. The parties agree, as the trial court expressly found, that racial and ethnic segregation is harmful, and that integration would likely have positive benefits for all children and for society as a whole. PYrther, as the trial court also expressly found, the racial and ethnic isolation of children in the Hartford schools is likely to worsen in the future.

Racial and ethnic segregation has a pervasive and invidious impact on schools, whether the segregation *34results from intentional conduct or from unorchestrated demographic factors. “[S]chools are an important socializing institution, imparting those shared values through which social order and stability are maintained.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982). Schools bear central responsibility for “inculcating [the] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system . . . .” Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 60 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1979). When children attend racially and ethnically isolated schools, these “shared values” are jeopardized: “If children of different races and economic and social groups have no opportunity to know each other and to live together in school, they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual respect necessary for the cohesion of our society.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District, 58 N.J. 483, 498, 279 A.2d 619 (1971). “[T]he elimination of racial isolation in the schools promotes the attainment of equal educational opportunity and is beneficial to all students, both black and white.” Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Sup. 710, 714 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 402 U.S. 935, 91 S. Ct. 1618, 29 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1971). Our state constitution, as amended in 1965, imposes on the state an affirmative obligation to respond to such segregation.

B

Having concluded that the provisions of article eighth, § 1, as informed by article first, § 20, permit a state constitutional challenge to substantial disparities in educational opportunities resulting from racially and ethnically segregated public schools, we turn now to an examination of the plaintiffs’ pleadings to determine whether they fairly can be read to encompass such a challenge. Because the remedies sought by the plaintiffs in their complaint are not differentially tied to the vari*35ous substantive claims that they have alleged, the plaintiffs can succeed if any of their claims falls within the constitutional right as we have defined it. We are persuaded that the plaintiffs’ pleadings cross this threshold.

In the first count of their complaint, the plaintiffs relied on article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, for what they have characterized as a per se claim that they have suffered from unconstitutional segregation.38 In the second count, the plaintiffs alleged that disparities in the racial and ethnic composition of Hartford public schools as compared with schools in the surrounding school districts violated their constitutional rights under the same constitutional provisions.39 These two counts can reasonably be construed to state a constitutional claim of school segregation as we have defined it. Both counts allege a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ right to a substantially equal educational opportunity expressly predicated upon the severe racial and ethnic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school system. The constitutional implications raised by these allegations were fully argued before the trial court, and were fully briefed by the parties before this court. Under *36these circumstances, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ pleadings, with respect to counts one and two, state a claim for the deprivation of a substantially equal educational opportunity. We would be remiss in the exercise of our constitutional obligation to provide “remedy by due course of law . . . without . . . delay”; Conn. Const., art. I, § 10; if we were to deprive the plaintiffs of a remedy solely because, as a pleading matter, their claims were stated in two counts rather than combined in one.40

In the third count of the plaintiffs’ complaint, they invoked article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, for a different purpose. They alleged that the defendants have failed to provide schoolchildren in the Hartford public school system with the educational resources necessary to obtain a minimally adequate education. As pleaded in their complaint and as argued before the trial court, this claim was not expressly predicated upon the severe racial and ethnic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school system. Moreover, at oral argument, the plaintiffs conceded that they had never claimed, either at trial or in their appellate brief, that the opportunity to participate in a racially and ethnically diverse education is a constitutionally required component of a minimally adequate education. Accordingly, we conclude that the third count of the plaintiffs’ complaint does not implicate the constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity as defined in part III A. Because, however, the plaintiffs’ remedial claims do not depend upon the validity of the third *37count of their complaint, we need not reach the merits of this claim.41

C

The final issue before us is whether, in light of the findings of the trial court, some of which the plaintiffs deem erroneous, the plaintiffs have proven a violation of their fundamental right, under the state constitution, to a substantially equal educational opportunity that is free from substantial racial and ethnic isolation. We conclude that they have done so.

“[I]n Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 646; Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 35. Proper evaluation of the plaintiffs’ claims is best pursued in accordance with the methodology that we adopted and applied in Horton III, supra, 38-39. This methodology requires us to balance the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature’s recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.

The analysis that we adopted in Horton III to scrutinize legislation that allegedly infringes upon the fundamental right to education requires a three-step process: *38“First, the plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that the disparities . . . are more than de minimis in that the disparities continue to jeopardize the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education. If they make that showing, the burden then shifts to the state to justify these disparities as incident to the advancement of a legitimate state policy. If the state’s justification is acceptable, the state must further demonstrate that the continuing disparities are nevertheless not so great as to be unconstitutional.” Id., 38; see also id., 45, 45 n.25. Applying the parties’ stipulated facts and the trial court’s factual findings to this analytical framework, we are persuaded that the current school assignment scheme, principally embodied in §§ 10-184 and 10-240, violates the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.

The plaintiffs have shown, and the defendants do not contest, that the disparities in the racial and ethnic composition of public schools in Hartford and the surrounding communities are more than de minimis. While children from minority groups constituted 25.7 percent of the statewide public school population in the 1991-92 school year, 92.4 percent of the children in the Hartford public school system were members of minority groups, including, predominantly, students who were either African-American or Latino. The percentage of minority students enrolled in Hartford’s public schools has since increased. In the 1994-95 school year, 94.5 percent of the children in the Hartford public school system were members of minority groups.42 Moreover, the Hartford public school system currently enrolls the highest percentage of minority students in the state, and this per*39centage is likely to become even higher in the future, if current conditions continue. These disparities jeopardize the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education.

The defendants stress that the trial court also made extensive findings about the significant role that adverse socioeconomic conditions play in the difficulties encountered by Hartford schoolchildren. Although the findings of the trial court are supported by credible evidence, they do not undermine the plaintiffs’ claim. It is well established, under prevailing principles governing the law of equal protection, that poverty is not a suspect classification. Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980). The plaintiffs have not brought an equal protection claim challenging these principles.

The trial court’s findings simply demonstrate that Hartford’s schoolchildren labor under a dual burden: their poverty and their racial and ethnic isolation. These findings regarding the causal relationship between the poverty suffered by Hartford schoolchildren and their poor academic performance cannot be read in isolation. They do not diminish the significance of the stipulations and undisputed findings that the Hartford public school system suffers from severe and increasing racial and ethnic isolation, that such isolation is harmful to students of all races, and that the districting statute codified at § 10-240 is the single most important factor contributing to the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. The fact that, as pleaded, the plaintiffs’ complaint does not provide them a constitutional remedy for one of their afflictions, namely, their poverty, is not a ground for depriving them of a remedy for the other.

The uncontested evidence of the severe racial and ethnic isolation of Hartford’s schoolchildren demon*40strates that the state has failed to fulfill its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity. Much like the substantially unequal access to fiscal resources that we found constitutionally unacceptable in Horton I, the disparity in access to an unsegregated'educational environment in this case arises out of state action and inaction that, prima facie, violates the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, although that segregation has occurred de facto rather than de jure. Thus, because the plaintiffs have made the requisite prima facie showing that their fundamental right to a substantially equal educational opportunity has been jeopardized, the burden of justification shifts to the state.

We next consider whether the defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the disparities in the plaintiffs’ educational opportunities are “incident to the advancement of a legitimate state policy.” Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 38. The defendants emphasize the uncontested fact that, although the state has created and maintained the public elementary and secondary school system, including the districting and the attendance statutes; General Statutes §§ 10-184 and 10-240; the state bears no de jure responsibility for the racial and ethnic isolation that the plaintiffs have encountered.

The statutes enacted by the legislature and the educational strategies adopted by the state demonstrate that the state has acted to further policies that are both legitimate and facially neutral with respect to racial and ethnic isolation. The General Assembly has enacted no legislation that was intended to cause either de jure or de facto segregation. It enacted the districting statute, not to impose or to foster racial or ethnic isolation, but to improve educational quality for all Connecticut schoolchildren by increasing state involvement in all aspects of public elementary and secondary education. *41Moreover, the districting scheme presently furthers the legitimate nonracial interests of permitting considerable local control and accountability in educational matters. Furthermore, in recognition of its moral obligation to address the adverse consequences of racial and ethnic discrimination, the state reorganized the board of education, during the 1980s, to concentrate on the needs of urban schoolchildren and to promote diversity in the public schools. Under General Statutes § 10-226a et seq., which the legislature enacted to remedy racial imbalances within public school districts, all schools within a district must maintain, within specified tolerances, a student population that reflects the student population in the district as a whole. In addition, the state has supported and encouraged voluntary plans for increasing interdistrict diversity. It has provided financial support to interdistrict magnet programs and has enacted legislation to promote voluntary interdistrict solutions to racial and ethnic isolation. See General Statutes § 10-264a et seq. In all these respects, the state has furthered agendas that are legitimate. Accordingly, the defendants have sustained their initial burden of justifying the legitimacy of the state’s actions.

In light of the defendants’ affirmative showing, we now consider the third part of the Horton III test. Once the state’s justification for its official actions has been shown to be acceptable, “the state must further demonstrate that the continuing disparities are nevertheless not so great as to be unconstitutional.” Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 38. In the context of the present claims, the state must demonstrate that, in light of its recognized discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education, and taking into account the measures that it has taken to remedy racial and ethnic disparities in the public schools, the disparities are not so significant as to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. In our assessment of whether the state has *42met its burden, we again emphasize that, much like the substantially unequal fiscal resources that we found constitutionally unacceptable in Horton I and Horton III, the disparity in access to an unsegregated educational environment in this case arises out of discrimination that is de facto rather than de jure.

We conclude that the defendants have failed to satisfy their difficult burden. Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.

Our conclusion finds uncontested factual support in the stipulations of the parties, which provide dramatic documentation of the wide disparities in the racial and ethnic composition of the student populations in the public schools in Hartford and those in the twenty-one surrounding communities. Although we have discussed these statistics previously in this opinion, they bear repeating. The percentage of minorities who attend Hartford public schools is significantly higher than the percentage of minorities who attend schools in the surrounding school districts. In the 1991-92 school year, over 92 percent of the students in the Hartford public school system were members of minority groups. In stark contrast, in that same period, only seven of the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns had a student minority enrollment above 10 percent. We rely also on the findings made by the trial court, which have not been contested by any of the parties, that despite efforts by the state to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school system, “[s]tudents in the Hartford schools are racially isolated and are likely to become more isolated in the *43future”43 and that “[t]he single most important factor that contribute[s\ to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in Hartford [is] the town-school district system [codified at § 10-240] which has existed since 1909, when the legislature consolidated most of the school districts in the state so that thereafter town boundaries became the dividing lines between all school districts in the state.” (Emphasis added.) This record compels the conclusion that the present state regulation of public elementary and secondary education “emasculate[s] the goal of substantial equality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 38. We conclude, therefore, that the school districting scheme, as codified at §§ 10-184 and 10-240 and as enforced with regard to these plaintiffs, is unconstitutional.

It is crucial for a democratic society to provide all of its schoolchildren with fair access to an unsegregated education. As the United States Supreme Court has eloquently observed, a sound education “is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Brown v. Board of Education, supra, 347 U.S. 493. “The American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. . . . We have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a demo*44cratic system of government . . . and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests. . . . And these historic perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. . . . [Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive hves to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Plyler v. Doe, supra, 457 U.S. 221.

Although the constitutional basis for the plaintiffs’ claims is the deprivation that they themselves are suffering, that deprivation potentially has an impact on “the entire state and its economy — not only on its social and cultural fabric, but on its material well-being, on its jobs, industry, and business. Economists and business leaders say that our state’s economic well-being is dependent on more skilled workers, technically proficient workers, literate and well-educated citizens. And they point to the urban poor as an integral part of our future economic strength. . . . So it is not just that their future depends on the State, the state’s future depends on them.” Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 392, 575 A.2d 359 (1990). Finding a way to cross the racial and ethnic divide has never been more important than it is today.

IV

REMEDIES

Our decision to reverse the judgment of the trial court, and to direct that judgment be rendered on behalf of the plaintiffs on the merits of their constitutional *45claims in the first and second counts of their complaint, requires us to consider what relief may properly be afforded to the plaintiffs. We recognize that the fashioning of appropriate declaratory or injunctive relief requires careful consideration in order to weigh the benefits and costs of various remedial measures.

In their appeal to this court, the plaintiffs have not focused their attention on the remedial consequences of a substantive decision in their behalf. Their prayer for relief asks us to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case with direction to render a declaratory judgment and “for further equitable relief not inconsistent with [our] decision.” The defendants urge this court not to assume direct control of the educational system in Connecticut and to eschew “acting as a super-legislature and glorified [b]oard of [education.”

Because the parties have not had the opportunity to present evidence directed to the remedial consequences that follow from our decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint, we could remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings to address remedies. Alternatively, if no further evidentiary inquiries would be required, we could invite further briefing in this court and attempt to resolve the issues ourselves.

We have decided not to follow either of these avenues but to employ the methodology used in Horton I. In that case, the trial court, after having found for the plaintiffs, limited its judgment by granting only declaratory relief but retained jurisdiction to grant consequential relief, if needed, at some future time. Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 650. In light of the complexities of developing a legislative program that would respond to the constitutional deprivation that the plaintiffs had established, we concluded, in Horton I, that further judicial intervention should be stayed “to afford the *46General Assembly an opportunity to take appropriate legislative action.” Id., 653. Prudence and sensitivity to the constitutional authority of coordinate branches of government counsel the same caution in this case.

In staying our hand, we do not wish to be misunderstood about the urgency of finding an appropriate remedy for the plight of Hartford’s public schoolchildren. Eveiy passing day denies these children their constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Every passing day shortchanges these children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own well-being and to that of this state and nation. We direct the legislature and the executive branch to put the search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas. We are confident that with energy and good will, appropriate remedies can be found and implemented in time to make a difference before another generation of children suffers the consequences of a segregated public school education.

The defendants counsel us, however, to stay our hand entirely. They claim that no judicial mandate can properly take into account the daunting, if not intractable, difficulties of crafting a remedial solution to the problem of de facto racial and ethnic segregation in the public schools of Hartford. When a similar question was raised about judicial authority to mandate the reform of state electoral systems, the claim was given short shrift by the United States Supreme Court. The court stated, in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 566: “We are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a state legislature is a complex and many-faceted one. We are advised that States can rationally consider factors other than population in apportioning legislative representation. We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing views as to political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and *47mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.” (Emphasis added.) Our oath, our office and the constitutional rights of the schoolchildren of Hartford, require no less of us in this case.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render a declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs; the Superior Court is directed to retain jurisdiction in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

concurring. I join the Chief Justice in her well reasoned majority opinion that concludes that the racial and ethnic segregation that exists in our public school system deprives schoolchildren of their state constitutional right to a “substantially equal educational opportunity.”1 More specifically, I agree “that, textually, *48article eighth, § 1, [of the Connecticut constitution] as informed by article first, § 20, requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.” I write separately because, in my view and as the record reflects, a racially and ethnically segregated educational environment also deprives schoolchildren of an adequate education as required by the state constitution.2

*49In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), the Supreme Court of the United States noted that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. ... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him [or her] for later professional training, and in helping him [or her] to adjust normally to his [or her] environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he [or she] is denied [an equal educational opportunity].” Twenty-three years later, Justice Bogdanski, in his concurrence in Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 654-55, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), reaffirmed that thought: “[T]he right of our children to an education is a matter of right not only because our state constitution declares it as such, but because education is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of society together. In a real sense, it is as necessary to a civilized society as food and shelter are to an individual. It is our fundamental legacy to the youth of our state to enable them to acquire knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for it is the ability to reason that separates [men and women] from all other forms of life.”

*50Unlike the federal constitution, the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1, provides that education is a fundamental right of every child regardless of his or her race or ethnicity. Id., 648-49 (“in Connecticut, elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right, [and] pupils in the public schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right”). Accordingly, it logically follows that the education guaranteed in the state constitution must be, at the very least, within the context of its contemporary meaning, an adequate education. Even Justice Loiselle, in his dissent in Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 658-59, conceded that the provision of an adequate education was constitutionally required and, in discussing the need to interpret that requirement in a reasonable manner, stated “[a] town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.” Indeed, long before the formal incorporation of this right into our present constitution, this court recognized the state’s “duty to provide for the proper education of the young.” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Huntington v. Huntington School District, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882 (1909); see also Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348 (1894).3

The state has established the boundaries of school districts coextensively with town lines, thereby placing in certain school districts, such as Hartford, overwhelming percentages of minority students. Indeed, the trial court found that “[s]tudents in the Hartford schools are racially isolated and are likely to become more isolated in the future.” In the 1987-88 academic year, 90.5 per*51cent of Hartford’s schoolchildren were of minority races or ethnicities. Yet, Hartford, like many of Connecticut’s urban centers, is encircled by school districts whose student populations include only a small percentage of minority children.4 The trial court’s forecast that racial and ethnic isolation would increase has unfortunately proven to be accurate. Figures recently released for the 1994-95 academic year, reveal that 93.4 percent of Hartford’s students are from minority racial or ethnic groups.5

This segregation can have a devastating impact on a minority student’s education. The United States Supreme Court recognized that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority [within the students] as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Segregation of white and [African-American] children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon [the African-American] children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the [African-American], A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of *52[African-American] children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Board of Education, supra, 347 U.S. 494.

In order to provide an adequate or “proper” education, our children must be educated in a nonsegregated environment. The trial court found, “[education in its fullest sense for both white and minority school children involves interracial and multiethnic exposure to each other and interaction between them, because racial and ethnic isolation [have] negative effects on both groups.” Indeed, a study commissioned by the state department of education in 1989, concluded that “desegregation has had some positive effect on the reading skills of black youngsters. . . . [T]here is some evidence that desegregation may help to break what can be thought of as a generational cycle of segregation and racial isolation.” J. Schofield, “Review of Research on School Desegregation’s Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students,” Commissioned by the Connecticut Department of Education (1989) p. 35. The study further concluded that “there are indications that desegregated schooling can provide students with valuable behavioral experience which prepares them to function in a pluralistic society. . . . [T]here is some evidence that school desegregation may have long-term positive consequences on adult social relationships, housing patterns, and the like.” Id., p. 36.

The poor academic achievement of Hartford’s students is insightful into the devastating effects of racial isolation on the students’ education. For example, in 1991-92, 94 percent of the sixth graders in Hartford’s public schools failed to meet the state’s goal for mathematics; 80 percent failed to achieve the state’s goal for reading; and 97 percent failed to obtain the state’s goal for writing. Equally disturbing is the knowledge that, *53in that same year, 62 percent of Hartford’s sixth graders failed to achieve even the state’s remedial standards for reading.

Scholastic achievement scores, are but one effect of segregation on education. Children of every race and ethnic background suffer when an educational system is administered on a segregated basis. Education entails not only the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic, but today, in our multicultural world, it also includes the development of social understanding and racial tolerance. If the mission of education is to prepare our children to survive and succeed in today’s world, then they must be taught how to live together as one people. Anything less will surely result in a segregated society with one racial and ethnic community pitted against another. Instead of fostering social division, we must build an integrated society, commencing with educating our children in a nonsegregated environment.

Accordingly, I conclude that, in addition to the state’s failure to provide Hartford schoolchildren with a “substantially equal educational opportunity,” these children are also being deprived of an adequate education because of their racial and ethnic isolation. It matters little with respect to the quality of the education that the segregation was unintentional. The fact that segregation exists as a result of the school districting statute requires the state to take remedial action to eliminate the constitutional violation of not providing these schoolchildren with an adequate education.6

Time is precious, especially when we are confronted with a constitutional violation that impacts the lives of our children and the future of our society. Every day that goes by is one more day that the schoolchildren who reside in Hartford and other urban centers in Connecticut are deprived of an adequate education. The *54plaintiff Milo Sheff was ten years old and in fourth grade when this litigation commenced more than seven years ago. We cannot recover what has been lost for him and others, but for those children who are presently enrolled in our public schools and for those who will enter in the future, we must eliminate the current segregation that exists.

I agree, however, with the Chief Justice that the executive and legislative branches of the state government should be given an opportunity7 to remedy what is now *55a terrible wrong. Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 17, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996) (Berdon, J., concurring). Nevertheless, in the words of United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren, the state must act “with all deliberate speed.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955).

I join in the majority opinion.8

BORDEN, J., with whom CALLAHAN and PALMER, Js.,

join, dissenting. The majority has reached a result driven conclusion based on a theory of constitutional liability that was never presented to the trial court or to this court, is ungrounded in the text and history of Connecticut’s constitutional provisions regarding the rights to public education and equal protection of the laws and is wholly at odds with the factual record in this case. The majority’s conclusion, moreover, is contrary to the teaching of Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I), this court’s principal precedent interpreting those provisions. In its zeal to reach a result that, it envisions, will eliminate racial and ethnic concentration in the public school districts of this state, the majority has “[renounced] this Court’s historical commitment to a conception of the judiciaiy as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments *56. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991) (Marshall and Blackmun, Js., dissenting). In essence, “[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s [state constitutional] decisionmaking.” Id. I therefore dissent.1

More specifically, in reaching a result that is unprecedented in American jurisprudence the majority has created a constitutional theory of equal educational opportunity that: (1) in the long history of this case, has never been presented to the trial court or to this court, and is, therefore, a theory to which the defendants have never had an opportunity to respond; (2) misapplies our precedent on the meaning of an equal educational opportunity as expressed in Horton I, and is contrary to the voluminous factual findings of the trial court; (3) distorts the meaning of the term “segregation” in our state constitution; and (4) misrepresents the record regarding the question of a remedy for the constitutional violation that the majority has found.

In addition, the majority sends to the legislature and the executive branch a mandate to fashion a remedy for de facto racial and ethnic concentration in our public schools, a task that those branches of government will inevitably find to be extraordinarily difficult or perhaps even impossible, because the majority articulates no principle upon which to structure such a remedy. The necessary implication of the majority’s reasoning is that virtually every school district in the state is now either *57unconstitutional or constitutionally suspect. Without explicitly saying so, the majority has effectively struck down, not just for the greater Hartford area but for the entire state, the municipality based school system that has been in effect in this state since 1909.

It is significant, moreover, that the majority does not respond to the major substantive flaws in its analysis that this dissent identifies. Nor does it take issue with what I identify as the necessary implications of its decision.

I

INTRODUCTION

Before analyzing the majority’s reasoning and the constitutional claims that the plaintiffs did present in this case, I state the extent of my agreement with the majority. First, I agree that the case is justiciable, and that there is state action. Moreover, and most importantly, I agree with the majority on the desirability — as a matter of public and educational policy — of eliminating from our public schools the type of racial and ethnic concentration demonstrated by this record.

I also agree that racial and ethnic isolation in our public schools is harmful — both to those races and ethnic groups that are so isolated and to the other races and ethnic groups from whom they are isolated. I also agree with the majority’s statement, based upon the trial court’s finding, that the racial and ethnic isolation of Hartford’s schoolchildren is likely to worsen in the future. I agree, furthermore, that racial and ethnic integration of our public schools would be beneficial for all children and society in general. These points of agreement rest on the notions that, as the majority recognizes, schools are important socializing institutions that bear a central responsibility for imparting our shared democratic values to our children, and that *58the opportunity for children of different races, ethnic backgrounds, economic levels and social groups to get to know each other in school is important if they are to understand and respect each other. Finally, I agree with the majority that the health of the economy of our state requires an educated workforce, which includes “the urban poor as an integral part of our future economic strength.” Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 392, 575 A.2d 359 (1990). Thus, I agree with the majority on the importance in our state — indeed, in our nation — of finding a way to cross the racial divide.2

*59The majority, however, has transformed a laudable educational philosophy into a constitutional mandate. That philosophy is that racially and ethnically integrated schools are socially and educationally preferable to racially and ethnically concentrated schools, because they confer certain significant social benefits on their students that such concentrated schools cannot, and they avoid certain significant social burdens that such concentrated schools are likely to impose. That belief, however, is utterly without basis as a constitutional claim of deprivation of an equal educational opportunity. Neither the record in this case, the text or history of the Connecticut constitution, nor our case law supports such a claim. A similar example of judicial overreaching *60comes to mind. Ninety-one years ago the United States Supreme Court, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905), declared unconstitutional, as violative of the liberty of contract perceived to be implicit in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, New York’s labor law imposing a daily limit of ten hours of work in the bakery industry. Justice Holmes dissented, stating that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” and that “a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.” Id., 75. This decision ushered into our constitutional jurisprudence what came to be known as the “Lochner era,” during which the Supreme Court undertook to strike down legislation that did not comport with the particular economic theories held by a majority of the justices. See Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 409, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying the “superlegislative power the Court exercised during the Lochner era”); 2 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1992) § 15.4, pp. 403-404 (“independent review of legislation during [Lochner] era resulted in unprincipled control of social and economic legislation”); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 8-2.

The majority opinion in this case does much the same. Just as the justices of the United States Supreme Court “Lochneñzed” the federal due process clause by reading laissez faire economic theory into it, the majority of this court has “Loc/merized” our education and equal protection clauses by reading into them an educational theory that mandates racially and ethnically integrated schools. There is no more basis today in our constitution for judicial intervention to impose such a manda*61tory educational theory than there was in the Lochner era for the judiciary to impose laissez faire economics.

Thus, the majority has used this court’s power to interpret the constitution in order to mandate a vast and unprecedented social experiment, using the state’s schools and schoolchildren as test data, and thereby to construct what the majority perceives to be the necessary bridge over the racial divide.3 The majority has done so, however, without the bricks and mortar necessary to that construction — the facts, and sound constitutional principles. Indeed, had the factual findings by the trial court been those unsuccessfully sought by the plaintiffs, this case would have been very different on *62appeal. For example, had the trial court found, as the plaintiffs claimed, that racial and ethnic concentration, rather than poverty, results in different, educational outcomes and achievements, and that the measurements of those outcomes and achievements are valid for inter-district purposes, the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity, as they presented it, would have been powerful and might have legitimately prevailed.

As this record overwhelmingly demonstrates, however, the trial court found the facts, not in accordance with the plaintiffs’ version of the evidence on that claim, but in accordance with the defendants’ version of the evidence. The trial court found that it is poverty, not racial or ethnic concentration, that accounts for the differences in educational outcomes and achievements between the children of the Hartford schools and those of the surrounding districts. The trial court also found, contrary to the plaintiffs’ factual claims but in accordance with the defendants’ factual claims, that the measurements regarding those differences, although valid for certain intradistrict purposes, are not valid for measuring educational differences between different school districts.

Thus, there are no facts in the record to support what the majority asserts, in an opinion long on rhetoric and short on reasoning, are the “devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation . . . have had on [the plaintiffs’] education.” Indeed, the facts found by the trial court contradict that assertion.4 Under the facts found by the trial court, all of the adverse effects on the educa*63tion of the plaintiffs result, not from their racial or ethnic isolation — either in whole or in part — but from their poverty. The majority, nonetheless, compensates for these factual shortcomings and for the trial court’s factual findings that are squarely contrary to the result the majority seeks to achieve, by ignoring those discomforting facts, and constructing a hitherto unknown constitutional theory — hitherto unknown in the long history of this litigation, and hitherto unknown in our even longer state constitutional history — that disregards all facts but those that are undisputed.

Thus, the majority opinion is, like the characters in Pirandello’s play, a result in search of a rationale.5 This case was litigated in the trial court for six years. The trial court heard evidence for eleven weeks. After a remand by this court to the trial court for the purpose of supplementing the factual record, the parties stipulated to 256 facts that are undisputed. Moreover, pursuant to our remand, the parties presented to the trial court for resolution a total of 676 disputed issues of fact — 551 by the plaintiffs and 125 by the defendants. With respect to these disputed issues of fact, the parties had presented extensive and conflicting evidence during the eleven weeks of trial. As a result, the trial court made 161 factual findings, in addition to the 256 stipulated facts. Those 417 factual findings constitute the factual basis for the constitutional claims advanced by the plaintiffs in the trial court and renewed on appeal.

Those findings, however, particularly the 161 facts found by the trial court that had been disputed, are critically and fundamentally adverse to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, as those claims were presented both to the trial court and to this court. Precisely because of that critical and fundamental factual adversity, however, the majority has, in an exercise of judicial *64revisionism, recast the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims so that the trial court’s critical factual findings have become irrelevant. Moreover, the assertion of the majority to the contrary notwithstanding, it cannot be tenably maintained that the constitutional theory created by the majority was ever presented to the trial court or to this court. The defendants, therefore, have never had the opportunity to respond to that theory.

There is no question, therefore, that everyone involved in this case shares the same goal: the ehmination of racial and ethnic isolation in the public schools of this state.6 Every desirable or wise policy, even every noble goal, however, is not necessarily embodied in the constitution. The debate, therefore, is over whether that goal is constitutionally mandated under the facts of this case. The majority, by an act of judicial will, without fidelity to the facts of the case or the claims of the parties, has imposed a constitutional mandate and has usurped a policy function that legitimately belongs to the legislature.

II

THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AS DISCLOSED BY THE RECORD IN THIS CASE

The majority opinion7 conceals the constitutional claims presented by the plaintiffs and responded to by *65the defendants in the trial court, and on appeal in this court. In addition, the majority has cobbled together, from disparate parts of the plaintiffs’ claims, a constitutional theory that is wholly without support in the text, history and purpose of the constitutional provisions at issue in this case, or in the facts as found by the trial court. In order to appreciate these criticisms of the majority opinion, it is necessary to summarize the plaintiffs’ claims regarding a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity, as disclosed by this record rather than as expounded by the majority, and then to compare the majority’s analysis to the record. Only then is it possible to subject the facts found by the trial court and the constitutional provisions at issue to a reasoned and dispassionate analysis.

The plaintiffs presented three constitutional claims to the trial court: (1) the plaintiffs have been denied their constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity by virtue of their racial and ethnic concentration, and by the concentration of poverty in the Hartford school district, coupled with certain disparities in educational resources and outcomes as compared to the suburban districts; (2) the racial and ethnic concentration of the plaintiffs in the Hartford school district constitutes a per se violation of the education and equal protection clauses of the constitution, based solely on the undisputed demographic facts of that concentration; and (3) the inadequacy of certain educational resources in the Hartford school system constitute a denial to the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to a minimally adequate education.8

It is the plaintiffs’ first claim — that of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity — (hat concerns us *66here, because that is the claim that the majority sustains on the basis of the undisputed demographic facts. It is indisputable, however, that the plaintiffs’ claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity was based, not solely on the demographic facts of racial and ethnic isolation and concentration of poverty, but on those facts coupled with other facts claimed by the plaintiffs to demonstrate disparities, in terms of educational resources and outcomes, between the Hartford and suburban districts. The plaintiffs’ claim of the deprivation of an equal educational opportunity was premised on a factual showing that, because of — in a cause and effect sense — their racial and ethnic isolation, the concentration of poverty in which they live, and the disparities between the educational resources available in the Hartford schools and those available in the suburban schools, the quality of their education, as measured by educational outcomes, is significantly less than that of their suburban neighbors. Put another way, the plaintiffs undertook to persuade the trial court that, as a factual matter, all three of these factors — racial and ethnic isolation, concentration of poverty, and disparities in educational resources — have caused the quality of their education, as measured by the standards articulated by this court in Horton I, to be inferior to that of the surrounding suburban districts.

Thus, it was critical to the plaintiffs’ equal educational opportunity claim that they prove the following facts: (1) they are racially and ethnically concentrated — an undisputed fact; (2) they suffer from the effects of a concentration of poverty — also undisputed; (3) the educational resources of the Hartford district are less than those of the surrounding districts9- — a disputed fact; *67and (4) the combination of the first three cause lesser educational outcomes in Hartford when compared to the suburban districts — also a disputed fact. One cannot read this record — both the trial court record and the appellate record — any other way.

Thus, at a minimum, proof of lesser educational outcomes as a result of racial and ethnic isolation was essential to the plaintiffs’ case, because their constitutional theory of deprivation of an equal educational opportunity is based on the provisions of article first, § 20, of the state constitution, regarding race and ethnicity. In other words, without either race or ethnicity, or both, as a causative factor in lesser educational outcomes, the plaintiffs’ case under article first, § 20, would fall, because those are the two protected categories under that article that the plaintiffs invoke as the basis of their constitutional theory.10 Thus, it was essential for the plaintiffs to establish in the trial court that their racial and ethnic isolation, either alone or in combination with the concentration of poverty, caused diminished educational outcomes relative to those of the surrounding communities.

It is also clear that the plaintiffs, the defendants and the trial court considered these issues as questions of fact to be established by evidence — both documentary and by way of experts’ opinions — and not questions of *68law. It is equally clear that these are questions of fact and not of law. Moreover, the plaintiffs, the defendants and the trial court all understood that the plaintiffs were required to prove the existence of a diminished educational opportunity caused by the plaintiffs’ racial and ethnic isolation, in addition to the more generalized benefits of an integrated educational system and burdens imposed by a racially and ethnically isolated system.

In other words, the plaintiffs never claimed that the general social benefits of racial and ethnic integration and the burdens of racial and ethnic concentration were sufficient to establish the factual foundation of their equal educational opportunity claim. The plaintiffs, the defendants and the trial court all understood that the plaintiffs were required, in order to come within the reasoning of Horton I, to establish the specific facts of diminished educational outcomes, relative to the suburban districts, as a result of their racial and ethnic and concentration. To corroborate this summary of the plaintiffs’ claims, I now turn to a discussion of the factual background of this appeal.11

A

The Plaintiffs’ Claims as Presented to the Trial Court

The plaintiffs had presented their claims in a tripartite structure.12 Before presenting their evidence, the plain*69tiffs made an opening oral argument to the court explaining their claims and relating those claims to the specific counts of their complaint. The plaintiffs specifically drew a sharp distinction between the first and second counts of their complaint. As they explained their case to the trial court, the first count depended solely on the legal claim that the term “segregation” in article first, § 20, of the state constitution encompassed de facto as well as de jure segregation, and that no evidence or facts regarding the effects of that segregation was necessary to prove the allegations of that count.13 They explained that the second count was, *70unlike the first count, based on a combination of facts: racial isolation; concentration of poverty; and inadequate educational resources; all combining to cause a quality of education inferior to that of the surrounding suburban districts.14

In the posttrial proceedings — both by way of their briefs and their oral arguments — the plaintiffs reiter*71ated that their claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity was premised on a factual inquiry into the actual quality of the education provided to them, relative to that provided to the students of the suburban districts. They repeatedly emphasized that they had proven that their racial and ethnic isolation, coupled with their inadequate educational resources and their concentration of poverty, caused the quality of their education to be inferior to that provided to their suburban counterparts.15 In those proceedings, moreover, they repeatedly contrasted their equal educa*72tional opportunity claim with their claim that de facto segregation was per se unconstitutional, making clear that the per se segregation claim was not an equal educational opportunity claim.16

B

The Remand Proceedings in the Trial Court

Upon our remand, the parties entered into a stipulation of 256 facts. Each side also presented to the trial court those disputed facts that it claimed to have proven. From the plaintiffs’ proposed factual findings, it is clear that they sought to persuade the court to find facts that supported their claim that the quality of the education provided the Hartford schoolchildren was inferior to that of the suburban districts, and that this inferiority was caused by their racial and ethnic isolation combined with the concentration of poverty in the district.17 The defendants’ proposed findings, by con*73trast, reflected their view that the evidence proved that it was the plaintiffs’ poverty, and not their racial and ethnic concentration, that caused the educational deficiencies of which the plaintiffs complained.

C

The Findings of Fact Regarding Equal Educational Opportunity

Thereafter, the trial court issued its “Finding,” which constituted its factual determinations “on the disputed facts disclosed in the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties . . . .” These findings indicate that the trial court was persuaded by the defendants’ factual claims, and not by the those of the plaintiffs.

Many of the trial court’s findings of fact are directly pertinent to the plaintiffs’ claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity. The trial court found as follows. Historically, racial or ethnic minority group membership has been associated with being educationally disadvantaged because members of those groups have failed to succeed in schools at the same levels as most members of the majority group. The generally poorer academic performance of black and Hispanic youngsters is explained for the most part by the social and economic conditions under which they and their families live.18

*74The court found further as follows: “It is poverty and not race that is a principal causal factor in lower educational achievement.” The problems of the Hartford schools are compounded by the fact that minorities in the inner cities are disproportionately poor, and the “real correlation with academic achievement is socioeconomic class rather than race . . . .” The fact that the students come from poor families “in and of itself is a significant problem in the schools. . . . The reason that children who live in poverty do not do well in statewide academic testing is because they are poor and disadvantaged and not because they are an ethnic or facial minority, because poor minority children exhibit the same patterns as those of their poor white counterparts, and poverty is the strongest predictor of poor academic achievement.” Moreover, the concentration of poverty may adversely affect academic achievement over and above the effect of family poverty. The socioeconomic status of schoolchildren dictates their academic performance. Thus, the improvement in the socioeconomic status of blacks explains the reduction by almost one half of the achievement gap between black and white students nationally between 1970 and 1990. The trial court also specifically found that “[v]irtually all of the differences in performance between Hartford students and those in other towns, as well as differences in college attendance, can be explained by differences in socioeconomic status and the background factors that socioeconomic status represents.”

The trial court also found that a higher concentration of students “at risk” may affect the achievement level of students in a particular school district. Thus, given two groups of students equal in all respects except the incidence of students with “at risk” factors such as low *75birth weight and mothers on drugs at birth, the group with the higher incidence of those “at risk” factors will perform more poorly in school than the other group.

The trial court further found that the level of achievement that should be attained by the students in a particular district cannot be assessed without considering the conditions that exist in the district that hinder academic achievement. Examples of those conditions are: the “mobility” of the students, namely, the frequency of their moving from school to school during a school year or from one year to the next; limited English proficiency of certain students; and the students’ socioeconomic status. The court found that, in order to understand the quality or effectiveness of a particular educational program, it is necessary to separate the disadvantages that students bring to school with them from the effects of the program itself. Moreover, it is necessaiy to separate the effects of poverty from the effects of racial isolation. Based on expert testimony, the court found that there are ways in which the separate effects of racial isolation and poverty can be measured statistically. The plaintiffs’ experts did not employ these statistical techniques.

The trial court also made certain findings regarding the state mastery test scores. The court found that the scores serve two purposes: (1) to inform districts so that they can improve their programs, correct deficiencies and plan for the future; and (2) to provide a basis for funding to districts that perform below remedial standards. This testing program was not designed for interdistrict comparison, but to provide information about individual students and programs within particular districts, and to trigger remedial services to students in need of them. Moreover, the trial court found, it would be an abuse of the purposes of the testing program to use the scores as the basis for comparing the quality of the education between schools or school sys*76terns. The test results should not be seen as primarily caused by racial isolation in the schools because the results could be related to many other factors. Thus, it is inappropriate to use the mastery test data as a basis for drawing conclusions about the quality of education in Hartford without taking into account the effects of other important variables, such as socioeconomic status, early environmental deprivations, and diminished motivation to succeed academically. Other variables that contribute to depressed test scores of Hartford schoolchildren that must be considered are the number of students with limited English proficiency and the extraordinary mobility of the student population.

The trial court also found that Hartford students and those in the surrounding towns are scoring at the level to be expected if the dramatic differences between them in poverty levels are taken into account. The disparity in test scores does not indicate that Hartford is doing an inadequate job of educating its students or that its schools are failing, because the test scores, based on the relevant socioeconomic factors, are at the approximate projected level when adjustments are made for those factors. Teachers and administrators have no control over where their students live or the conditions under which they live. They are not in a position to remedy the disadvantages that their students bring with them when they enter the educational system. Thus, the court found that there are no educational strategies or initiatives that can fully deal with the complex social issues that produce inequality of performance and undermine education, because hunger, parental neglect, crowded and substandard housing, and inadequate employment opportunities disproportionately attack minority children in our state and divert them from educational opportunity.

This, then, is the factual record upon which this case was presented to and decided by the trial court, and *77upon which the appeal came to this court. I turn, next, to this appeal as presented to us by the plaintiffs.

D

The Plaintiffs’ Case as Presented to This Court on Appeal

In their initial and reply briefs in this court, the plaintiffs made crystal clear that the three constitutional claims that they were presenting to us for our adjudication coincided perfectly with the three claims that they had presented to the trial court. For ease of reference, and more importantly for fidelity to the plaintiffs’ own understanding and characterization of their claims, I refer to the three claims as: (1) an equal educational opportunity; (2) per se segregation; and (3) a minimally adequate education. The plaintiffs’ briefs make equally clear that the first and third of these claims, namely, an equal educational opportunity and a minimally adequate education, are based on factual claims regarding, not only the undisputed facts of the degree of racial and ethnic concentration in the Hartford schools but, critically and essentially, the plaintiffs’ version of the disputed facts regarding the differences in educational outcomes and achievements in the Hartford schools relative to the surrounding suburban school districts, and the causes of those differences. Thus, the plaintiffs’ equal educational opportunity claim is squarely based on a combination of factual matrixes: the facts that demonstrate the racial and ethnic isolation of the Hartford schools, combined with what the plaintiffs claim to have established in the trial court as the educational deficiencies that are caused by that isolation,19

*78The plaintiffs set out the nature of their claims definitively at the very beginning of their appellate brief: “Hartford children attend schools that are the most racially, ethnically, and economically isolated in the state. These schools have the least educational resources and suffer from the worst academic performance. The cumulative effects of these inequities deprive Hartford’s children of the preparation necessary to join the mainstream of society.” 20 (Emphasis added.)

With this introduction in mind, I turn now to the plaintiffs’ own more detailed explication of their claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity21 *79as presented in their two briefs in this court. This explication is derived directly from, and is identical to, that claim as ultimately presented to the trial court for adjudication. The plaintiffs correctly point out that the right to an equal educational opportunity was recognized by this court in Horton I. The plaintiffs then accurately pose the question under this claim: “As a legal matter, this case falls squarely under [Horton I], 22 and the question before this Court is whether the undisputed condition of racial and economic isolation of the public schools, coupled with the undisputed and extreme disparities in educational resources afforded Hartford's schoolchildren, violate plaintiffs’ constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity.” (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs then explain precisely why they maintain that their right to such an opportunity has been violated. Under the heading, “The Segregated, Economically Isolated and Unequal Conditions in Hartford Metropolitan Area Public Schools Violate Plaintiffs’ Right to an Equal Educational Opportunity”; (emphasis added); the plaintiffs, quoting from Horton I, state: “Equality of educational opportunity is ascertained by comparing the quality of education provided in the school districts. In Horton I, this court identified criteria for measuring the quality of education, including: ‘(a) size of classes; (b) training, experience and background of teaching staff; (c) materials, books and supplies; (d) school philosophy and objectives; (e) type of local control; (f) test scores as measured against ability; (g) degree of motivation and application of the students; (h) course offerings and extracurricular activities.’ Horton I, [supra, 172 Conn. 634].”

*80With this legal, and appropriate, standard in place for the evaluation of a claim of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity, the plaintiffs then attempt to persuade us that, as demonstrated by the evidence presented in the trial court, they should prevail on this claim. They attempt to do so, however, not by relying on the general harms associated with a racially and ethnically isolated school system or on the general benefits of an integrated school system, but by arguing that the trial court’s adverse factual findings were clearly erroneous.23

In their reply brief in this court, the plaintiffs reinforce this understanding of the basis of their equal educational opportunity claim.24 The plaintiffs then, in order *81that we not be confused about their claims, reiterated the three claims that they had presented in this case, and the doctrinal differences between them. “First, plaintiffs claim that the extreme levels of racial segregation and the concentration of poor children in the Hartford schools, along with well-documented deficiencies and disparities in educational resources and reflected by the vast gulf in outcomes, violates plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an equal educational opportunity. Second, plaintiffs claim that the extreme levels of racial segregation in the Hartford area constitute a per se violation of Connecticut’s constitution. Third, plaintiffs claim that the conditions in the Hartford schools violate plaintiffs’ right to a minimally adequate education, pursuant to Article Eighth, § 1 and plaintiffs’ due process rights.”

To summarize: the plaintiffs’ first claim is their claim of a deprivation of equal educational opportunity as articulated in Horton I. As a factual matter, this claim rests on a complex factual matrix: the undisputed facts regarding the racial and ethnic concentration, and the concentration of poverty, in the Hartford district; the disputed facts regarding the claimed inadequate educational resources in the Hartford district; and the disputed causal effect of that combination of factors on the educational outcomes claimed to be prevalent in the Llartford district.

The plaintiffs’ second claim is based entirely on the legal theory that the term “segregation” in article first, *82§ 20, means de facto segregation. As a factual matter, this claim rests on only the undisputed facts regarding the racial and ethnic concentration in the Hartford schools, to the exclusion of the disputed facts regarding the claimed disparities between the educational resources and outcomes of the Hartford school district, on one hand, and the resources and outcomes of the suburban school districts, on the other hand.

The plaintiffs’ third claim is their claim of a deprivation of a minimally adequate education under article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution as articulated in Horton I. This claim rests on disputed facts regarding certain claimed inadequacies in the Hartford school district.

Having summarized the plaintiffs’ claims as disclosed by this voluminous record, I will next analyze the majority opinion in light of the record in this case. I turn, therefore, to that task.

Ill

THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE MAJORITY OPINION

A

The Majority’s Adjudicative Process

The first flaw in the majority opinion involves the adjudicative process by which the opinion was created. As the record demonstrates, the constitutional theory conceived by the majority bears only a passing resemblance to the claims of the plaintiffs as disclosed by the record. The majority’s theory is a combination of the legal theories presented in the plaintiffs’ first and second claims, completely shorn of the facts that the trial court found after six years of litigation. The theory upon which the majority opinion is based, therefore, is brand new and was never advocated by the plaintiffs.

*83The majority asserts, nonetheless, that “[t]he constitutional implications raised by these allegations were fully argued before the trial court, and were fully briefed by the parties before this court.”25 This is like saying that water is the same thing as hydrogen and oxygen because water is the result when the two gases are combined in a certain proportion.

The majority’s theory of alack of an equal educational opportunity is a hybrid of two disparate parts of the plaintiffs’ case, as argued to and litigated in the trial court and as argued and briefed in this court. One part of the hybrid is the legal theory of the plaintiffs’ first claim, namely, that under Horton /, they have been deprived of an equal educational opportunity, but without the factual matrix that the plaintiffs themselves presented to support that theory. The second part of the hybrid is the theory of the plaintiffs’ second claim, namely, that “segregation” in article first, § 20, means de facto as well as de jure segregation when applied to education. That theory, however, does 'riot constitute an equal educational opportunity claim, as understood and presented by the plaintiffs throughout this case, as *84understood and responded to by the defendants throughout this case, and as briefed and argued in this court.

Moreover, I confess that, having read the briefs carefully and having participated in the oral argument with great concentration, the majority’s theory of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity was a complete surprise to me. I can only wonder about the reaction of the defendants, who for the past six years have been defending this case on the basis that the record demonstrates, rather than the basis on which the majority has decided the case. In fact, I suspect that even the plaintiffs are surprised that they have prevailed on a theory of a deprivation of an equal educational opportunity that they did not present, and that renders wholly immaterial the entire factual matrix that they did present, appropriately albeit unsuccessfully, under that doctrine as articulated in Horton I.

The newness of the majority’s constitutional theory is not only demonstrated by comparing the record to the majority opinion, it is demonstrated by certain language in the majority opinion itself. When the majority asks, at the beginning of its analysis, whether “the plaintiffs’ complaint encompass[es] [the constituent elements of the affirmative constitutional mandate to provide all public schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity]”, it asks a question that no one else has ever asked us to answer, namely, whether the plaintiff's’ complaint is legally sufficient.26 In elaborating on that question, moreover, the majority’s language is curiously but revealingly qualified: it refers to the plaintiffs’ claim “as we have defined it.” This question and qualification are necessitated solely by *85the fact that the majority’s, rather than the plaintiffs’, theory of the equal educational opportunity claim has now become dispositive, and that this theory was never in this case until the majority issued its opinion.

Although prior to trial the defendants challenged the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint, they lost that challenge and, except for the arguments regarding justiciability and state action, did not renew it on appeal. Moreover, at no time in this appeal was the question raised of whether the plaintiffs’ pleadings stated a cognizable claim. At no time in this appeal was the question raised whether the plaintiffs’ pleadings could be read to support their constitutional challenge. The sole reason that these questions and these qualifications became necessary is that the majority has recast the essential nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint, as presented by the plaintiffs at trial and on appeal, in order to fit the majority’s predetermined outcome.

This method of adjudication is fundamentally flawed for several reasons that call into question the integrity of the majority decision. First, it is egregiously unfair to the defendants. Having defended this case for six years in the trial court, and having responded to the plaintiffs’ appeal on the legal and factual bases presented by the plaintiffs, the defendants have not had the opportunity to respond to the new theory of equal educational opportunity fashioned by the majority either by evidence or argument in the trial court, or by briefs and oral argument in this court. Indeed, we will all have to wonder what evidence or arguments the defendants would have produced in the trial court and this court had they known that this hybrid theory was the basis of the equal educational opportunity claim to which they were required to respond.27

*86Second, the majority’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ pleadings in this case turns our traditional treatment of pleadings on its head, and adds to the unfairness to the defendants. It is true that, under our modem jurisprudence, we read pleadings “broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . . Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 587-88, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988); Fuessenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 150-51, 487 A.2d 514 (1985). As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient to allow recovery.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn. 486, 496, 646 A.2d 1289 (1994).

The application of that principle cannot, however, save what the majority has done here. That principle generally applies before trial to the construction of a complaint when it is challenged for legal sufficiency; see, e.g., D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 220-21, 520 A.2d 217 (1987); during trial, to a determination of whether certain evidence should be admitted as within, or excluded as beyond, the fair boundaries of the complaint; see, e.g., Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554, 557-58, 525 A.2d 954 (1987); and posttrial, where the parties have in fact litigated the case in a posture that includes the challenged theory, and there has been no prejudice or surprise. See, e.g., Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, supra, 230 Conn. 497-98. The principle does not apply in this case, however, where the majority has, after the trial and after appellate briefs and arguments, altered the theory of the complaint on which all of the parties *87have relied, and then, without notice to anyone, has determined that the complaint supports the altered theory. That process violates the fundamental principle that “the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party . . . .” Id., 496.

The third flaw in the process by which the majority reached its decision is that, having decided to consider a new theory of the case, the court has not afforded the parties the opportunity to file supplemental briefs or to present further oral argument. In recent years, we have engaged in the practice of requesting supplemental briefs when, after oral argument, we have determined that the parties have not sufficiently addressed an issue or potentially dispositive theory of the case that surfaced either in the oral argument or in the process of our deliberations. See, e.g., State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 286-87 n.4, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (continued viability of constancy of accusation doctrine); Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., 235 Conn. 778, 784, 670 A.2d 294 (1996) (definition of disability under General Statutes § 31-349), superseded, 237 Conn. 490, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996); Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 130, 629 A.2d 413 (1993) (appropriate standard in habeas proceeding by which to determine effect of prior failure to raise constitutional claim); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 657, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (whether denial of motion to suppress can be sustained under abandonment doctrine). Indeed, we have reversed the Appellate Court for disposing of an appeal on the basis of a plain error analysis that neither party had raised, without first giving the parties the opportunity to brief the perceived plain error claim. See, e.g., Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 230 Conn. 95, 98-99, 644 A.2d 325 (1994).

There are two reasons for this postargument appellate procedure: (1) fairness to the parties suggests that they be confronted with a potentially dispositive theory *88that they had not had the prior opportunity to discuss; and (2) we are more likely to be correct in our judgments if they follow adequate briefing. I acknowledge that we have not uniformly followed this procedure, and that there is no rule that requires that we do so. Indeed, there are cases in which, for various reasons, it is appropriate that we not do so.

This case, however, is the paradigm of when supplemental briefing and argument would have been appropriate. This case may be the most significant ruling of this court in this century. I can think of no other case decided by this court that will have more impact on the daily lives of our citizenry than this case. Having ordered supplemental briefing and argument in cases involving issues of the continued viability of an evidentiary doctrine, the proper construction of second injury fund terminology, preservation of an issue for habeas review and the relevance of abandonment to the reasonable expectation of privacy, we should have done so in this case, the enormous public importance of which demands the highest degree of both fairness to the parties and confidence in the correctness of the outcome.

The use of that prudent appellate procedure would have been particularly appropriate in this case. In a case in which we exercise the judicial power to interpret a statute or explicate the common law, if we are incorrect, the General Assembly is free to enact legislation correcting our error. In a case such as this, however, in which this court incorrectly interprets our constitution, the only remedy of the people is the painful process of constitutional amendment.

Although, in my view, these flaws in the majority’s process of decision-making seriously undermine the integrity of its opinion, the more fundamental question is whether, nonetheless, the reasoning of the majority *89opinion is sound. It is not. I turn next, therefore, to the substantive flaws in the majority opinion.

B

The Misapplication of Horton I

The first substantive flaw in the majority opinion is that it misapplies the principal precedent upon which the plaintiffs’ equal educational opportunity claim is based, namely, Horton I. It does so by disregarding the factual underpinning of Horton J, thereby rendering irrelevant the critical factual differences between this case and Horton I. Thus, the majority demonstrates its lack of fidelity to Horton I by severing the plaintiffs’ claim from its jurisprudential roots and by shedding its essential factual underpinnings.

In Horton I, this court held that the education clause; article eighth, § 1; and the equal protection clauses; article first, §§ 1 and 20; require “that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 649; see also Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 34-35, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III) (characterizing Horton I as resting on article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20). We also held that the system of funding public education then prevailing, under which each town raised its own funds for education via property taxes, supplemented by a flat grant from the state according to the average daily number of students attending school in the town; Horton I, supra, 628; violated that requirement. Id., 648-49.

These conclusions rested on two sets of factual findings of the trial court in that case, which we determined were supported by the evidence. Id., 649. The first set of findings was that the existing system of school financing resulted in significant disparities between the amounts spent on education by property-rich towns and the *90amounts spent by property-poor towns. Id., 633. The court stated: “[T]he present system of financing education in Connecticut ensures that, regardless of the educational needs or wants of children, more educational dollars will be allotted to children who live in property-rich towns than to children who live in property-poor towns.” Id.

The second set of findings concerned the effect of these financial disparities on the children. That set of findings established that the per pupil spending disparities resulted in a lower quality of education in the property-poor towns than in the property-rich towns. Id. The court stated: “The criteria for evaluating the ‘quality of education’ in a town include the following: (a) size of classes; (b) training, experience and background of teaching staff; (c) materials, books and supplies; (d) school philosophy and objectives; (e) type of local control; (f) test scores as measured against ability; (g) degree of motivation and application of the students; (h) course offerings and extracurricular activities. In most cases, the optimal version of these criteria is achieved by higher per pupil operating expenditures, and because many of the elements of a quality education require higher per pupil operating expenditures, there is a direct relationship between per pupil school expenditures and the breadth and quality of educational programs.” Id., 634-35.28 All of these factual assertions by this court were based on the factual findings of the trial *91court in Horton I, findings that had been vigorously contested by the state.29

The critical difference between Horton I and this case involves that second set of factual findings. In *92 Horton I, the trial court found that, because of — in a cause and effect sense — the disparities in educational funding between the property-poor towns and the property-rich towns, the quality of the educational opportunity available to students in the property-poor towns was not substantially equal to the quality of the educational opportunity available to students in the property-rich towns. Id., 637-38. In Horton I, the plaintiffs undertook to prove that factual assertion, the trial court found that they had proven it, and this court sustained the trial court’s finding as supported by the evidence. Id., 648-49. Based on that finding, we concluded that the state’s flat grant system of funding education violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Id., 649-50.

In this case, the plaintiffs’ equal educational opportunity claim precisely parallels the plaintiffs’ claim in Horton I. In this case, the plaintiffs claim that, because of — in a cause and effect sense — their racial and ethnic isolation, coupled with the concentration of poverty and lack of material resources in Hartford, the quality of the educational opportunity available to them, measured by the same standards articulated by this court in Horton I, was not substantially equal to the quality of educational opportunity available to their suburban counterparts.30 Put another way, the plaintiffs claim that *93their racial and ethnic isolation and the concentration of poverty in the city causes the quality of their education to be inferior, as measured by the Horton I standards, than that provided in the suburbs. As in Horton I, the plaintiffs undertook to prove that factual assertion in the trial court. Unlike Horton I, however, in this case, the plaintiffs failed to persuade the trial court of that factual assertion.

In this case, the trial court found that, contrary to the factual assertions of the plaintiffs, it is poverty, and not race or ethnicity, that accounts for any discrepancies between the quality of education provided to the plaintiffs and the quality of education provided to their suburban counterparts. In addition, the trial court found that the principal standard of measure that the plaintiffs sought to use to demonstrate that difference in quality of education, the statewide mastery test scores, is not a valid tool for measuring interdistrict differences in the quality of education. As I indicate later in this dissent, the trial court’s factual findings are fully supported by the evidence. Thus, the analogues in this case to the factual underpinnings that supported our conclusion in Horton I are not only missing here; the factual analogues in this case are squarely contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority.31

Consequently, the majority’s reliance on Horton I is unfounded. In Horton I, we did not conclude that the plaintiffs had been deprived of an equal educational opportunity solely because of the disparities in educational funding between property-poor and property-rich *94towns, unconnected to the educational effects of those disparities. The majority concludes, however, that the plaintiffs have been so deprived solely because of their racial and ethnic isolation. The majority reaches that conclusion, however, not only unconnected to but squarely contrary to those factual findings. Thus, the majority’s analysis is contrary to the analysis that we employed in Horton I.

Indeed, the only attempt by the majority to link the facts of this case to Horton I occurs when the majority states: “As we observed, however, in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 645, educational equalization cases are in significant aspects sui generis and not subject to analysis by accepted conventional tests or the application of mechanical standards. The wealth discrimination found among school districts differs materially from the usual equal protection case where a fairly defined indigent class suffers discrimination to its peculiar disadvantage. The discrimination is relative rather than absolute. See also Horton III, supra, 195 Conn. 35. Nothing in the description of the relevant legal landscape in any of our cases suggests that the constitutional right that we articulated in Horton I was limited to school financing.”32 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The first part of this brief analysis is nothing more than a truism. The second part merely sets up the proverbial straw man.

No one disputes that educational equalization cases, whether based on claims of funding or race, are sui *95generis. That truism is, however, the beginning of the inquiry, not the end.

Although the constitutional right articulated in Horton I may not have been limited to school financing, there was a factual basis in that case that is lacking here. Moreover, the argument that Horton I is limited to school financing is but one of several arguments offered by the defendants.33 They also argue that, assuming that Horton I is appropriately extended to race and ethnicity, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are deprived of an equal educational opportunity by reason of race or ethnicity because the factual findings of the trial court are to the contrary and are supported by the evidence. By pretending that the defendants’ only response to the extension of Horton I to race and ethnicity is that Horton I is confined to financing, the majority dismantles the straw man, answering the easy question posed by this appeal and ignoring the difficult ones.

C

The Meaning of “Segregation” in Article First, § 20

The next substantive flaw in the majority opinion is the meaning that the majority attributes to the term “segregation” in article first, § 20. The majority somehow concludes that “segregation” means de facto, as well as de jure, segregation, on the basis of the text of article first, § 20, and the history in the 1965 constitutional convention of the adoption of article eighth, § 1, *96and article first, § 20.34 The text provides no support for the majority’s conclusion, and the history of the 1965 convention squarely contradicts it.

1

The Text of Article First, § 20

The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 20, as amended by articles fifth and twenty-first of the amendments, provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.”35 It is axiomatic that we are limited in constitutional adjudication by the text of the particular constitutional provision at issue. Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 581, 660 A.2d 742 (1995); State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 380-81, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 77-78, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984). That text does not support the majority’s reading of it.

Critical to the majority’s analysis is its conclusion that the phrase “because of’ and the term “segregation” do not require a showing of an intent by the state to segregate or discriminate when those terms are applied to the right to public education guaranteed under article eighth, § 1. Thus, the major, albeit unstated, premise of the majority opinion is that, although “because of’ and “segregation” may require a showing of an intent by the state to segregate when applied to all other “civil *97or political rights” covered by article first, § 20, that same language does not require such an intent when applied to public education under article eighth, § 1.

It is true that the majority does not explicitly say that the terms, “segregation” and “because of,” do require a state intent to segregate when applied to other rights guaranteed by article first, § 20. Instead, the majority states: “Whatever this language may portend in other contexts, we are persuaded that, in the context of public education, in which the state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and equalize educational opportunity, the state’s awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation imposes upon the state the responsibility to remedy ‘segregation . . . because of race [or] . . . ancestry ....’”

Despite the majority’s futile attempt to avoid the necessary implications of its rationale, it is clear that one such necessary implication is that the language at issue either does or does not require a segregative intent when applied in other contexts. Thus, I can read this passage from the majority opinion in only two possible ways: (1) “because of’ and “segregation” do not require a state intent to segregate, irrespective of the particular legal context; or (2) “because of’ and “segregation” do require a state intent to segregate when applied to other legal contexts, but not when applied to public education.

The majority cannot mean that these terms do not require such an intent irrespective of the legal context. That would necessarily mean that, with respect to the exercise of all civil and political rights, the state would be required to take affirmative steps to assure that these rights are not exercised by racially or ethnically concentrated groups, regardless of any state intent to segregate. This would mean, in turn, that any electoral district that is religiously, racially or ethnically concentrated is *98unconstitutional and has been such since 1965, and that such was the intent of the delegates to that convention. It would also mean that presently existing public housing projects in Hartford and other cities whose tenants are racially or ethnically concentrated, not by design but as a result of demographic and economic factors over which the state has no control, are unconstitutional and have been such because the 1965 convention delegates meant them to be. It is not hyperbole to say that the delegates would be astonished to have such an intent attributed to them. Nor is it hyperbole to say that such an interpretation would be so bizarre and unworkable as to be ludicrous.

Although I disagree with the majority, I am not willing to attribute that meaning to it. It must be, therefore, that the majority means to say that, although segregative intent is required when “because of’ and “segregation” are applied to other civil and political rights, it is not required when applied to public education. This, of course also necessarily means that the same language has opposite meanings when applied to different rights — an interpretation that, in my view, is also utterly implausible. Under the majority’s view, therefore, the phrase “because of’ and the term “segregation” have one meaning when applied to public elementary and secondary education, namely, that racial concentration need not be intentional on the part of the state, and the opposite meaning when applied to all other political and civil rights, namely, that racial concentration must be intentional.

This tortures the text of article first, § 20, and turns the process of constitutional adjudication upside down. I acknowledge that it is an accepted, necessary and appropriate part of the judicial process to stretch the meaning of language in order to render a statutory scheme constitutional. See, e.g., State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 805, 640 A.2d 986 (1994); Ambroise v. Will *99 iam Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 705, 553 A.2d 596 (1989). That does not justify, however, as the majority would have it, breaking constitutional language in two so that the same words in the same sentence have two opposite meanings when applied to different sets of rights, in order to render a statutory scheme unconstitutional.

In my view, this position is untenable. First, there is nothing in the language, history or purpose of article first, § 20, to support such a bizarre interpretation. We do not ordinarily read the same word or phrase in the same sentence to have opposite meanings depending on the subject matter to which the word or phrase is applied. See Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 343, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992); Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 116, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991). There is no reason to do so here. Article first, § 20, was not drafted or approved by Lewis Carroll, whose character in Through the Looking-Glass, Humpty Dumpty, said, “when I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” L. Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (Messner Ed. 1982) p. 198. If the phrase “because of’ and the term “segregation” mean that there is no intent requirement in the context of public education, but that there is such a requirement in the context of all other political and civil rights, it is only because the majority, like Humpty Dumpty, says so.

Second, the majority’s rationale for saying so in this instance, namely, that the state has an obligation to monitor and equalize educational opportunity, both assumes the answer to the question posed by this case and proves too much. It assumes the answer because the question is whether the obligation to “equalize” extends to racial and ethnic concentration not intended *100by the state. It proves too much because the state also has a constitutional obligation to monitor and equalize the electoral districts of the General Assembly. See Conn. Const., art. Ill, §§ 5 and 6.36 Certainly, the right to vote, and to have one’s vote given its appropriate constitutional weight, is at least as fundamental under our constitution as the right to a public education. See Conn. Const., art. VI, § 1. Therefore, because the right to vote is, like the right to attend a free public elementary and secondary school, a fundamental right that the state has a continuing obligation to monitor and equalize, under the majority’s rationale every general assembly district that is not racially, ethnically and religiously integrated is now unconstitutional. It is impossible rationally to conclude that the language adopted in *101the 1965 convention was intended to have this result. In short, the language of article first, § 20, simply cannot be cabined as the majority seeks to do.

Moreover, the term “segregation” cannot, the suggestion of the majority to the contrary notwithstanding,37 be read to mean something different from “discrimination” in the context of article first, § 20. The nouns in this one sentence provision should not be read as having meanings that are mutually exclusive of, and unrelated to, the meanings of the other nouns that surround them. Consequently, the majority’s reliance on the general inteipretive guideline that ordinarily no word or phrase is to be regarded as superfluous is misplaced in this context. This broad, constitutional equal protection provision was not intended to be interpreted as if it were the Uniform Commercial Code, with each term having a neatly compartmentalized definition. Within the bounds of the language used, the terms are to be read as taking their meaning from and sharing their meaning with each other, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.

This approach to article first, § 20, is consistent with our precedents, which have generally treated both article first, § 1, and article first, § 20, as expressing the same principle, namely, equal protection of the law. See, e.g., Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 8-10, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); Mario v. Fairfield, 217 Conn. 164, 173-77, 585 A.2d 87 (1991); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 504-505, 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 638-39, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985); Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515, 52 A.2d *102702 (1947); New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 219, 21 A.2d 383 (1941). The majority’s interpretive method of insisting that “segregation” must include de facto segregation because otherwise it would be superfluous, is inconsistent with the general approach of these precedents. By that reasoning, article first, § 1, and article first, § 20, themselves must also have meanings independent of each other, otherwise one would be superfluous. We have never read these constitutional provisions in that fashion, and there is no justification for doing so now.

Thus, the reference in article first, § 20, to both “equal protection of the law” and “segregation” does not suggest that “segregation” has some broader meaning than “equal protection of the law.” They both express the same principle, as does the word “discrimination,” and the fact that the framers of this provision used, and the electorate approved, the term “segregation” does not support the conclusion that it was intended to include de facto, as opposed to de jure, racial and ethnic isolation. When interpreting a constitution, “ ‘the intent to be arrived at is that of the people [who ratified it], and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed.’ ” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 78.

Similarly, the reference to “the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights” further indicates that article first, § 20, is not meant to be read with the kind of categorical nicety that the majority employs. This phrase refers to a generally broad, inclusive category of rights, the particulars of which will have to be explicated on a case-by-case basis. The textual point is that there is no obvious, sharp distinction that leaps to *103mind when considering whether rights are “civil” or “political” or both.

The appropriateness of this textual approach is further demonstrated by the references to “religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.” Although arguably the reference to “religion” can be read to mean something different from the other listed categories, it cannot be disputed that the categories of race, color, ancestry and national origin blend into one another.38

Moreover, the use of the phrase “because of,” followed by the list of protected categories, strongly suggests a requirement of state intent to segregate or discriminate, or intentionally to maintain such segregation. This reading of the phrase would be consistent with our precedents that, except where our text clearly departs from that of the federal equal protection clause, the two clauses have the same meaning and limitations. See, e.g., State v. Leary, 217 Conn. 404, 409, 587 A.2d 85 (1991); Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 237, 530 A.2d 1056 (1987); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577, 512 A.2d 893 (1986).

Under federal precedent, only state created or intentionally maintained racial segregation is unconstitutional, and the state is not constitutionally obligated to remedy interdistrict racial division that is caused *104primarily by economic and geographical factors. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198, 93 S. Ct. 2686, 37 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1973); Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 61 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (1974). Indeed, the majority’s analysis implicitly concedes that “because of’ carries a requirement of intentionality when applied to all civil and political rights except the right to free public elementary and secondary schools.

Furthermore, that “segregation,” as used in article first, § 20, does not include de facto racial and ethnic concentration is demonstrated by simply reading the text as the simple sentence that it is, shorn of the majority’s fiction that the words have opposite meanings when applied to public education and all other rights. This constitutional provision is not an education provision. It does not mention education specifically at all. This provision relates to.education because the right to attend a public school comes within the phrase “in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights.”39

If, as the majority concludes, “segregation” includes racial and ethnic concentration resulting, not from intentional state conduct but from demographic factors over which the state has no control, and if we are not willing to indulge in the fiction that the same words, used in the same sentence, nonetheless have opposite meanings when applied to different rights, then other areas of public life that are covered by the phrase “in the exercise of . . . political or civil rights” must also be subject to the same proscription. Thus, for example, a local electoral district that, by virtue of the religious, *105racial or ethnic make-up of its constituents, is heavily Roman Catholic, African-American, Puerto Rican or Polish-American, is “segregated” under the majority’s understanding of that term, and all voters within that district are being “segregated] or discriminat[ed] in the exercise or enjoyment of [their] civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin,” in violation of article first, § 20. In short, under the majority’s reading of “segregation,” the 1965 constitutional amendments rendered all such electoral districts unconstitutional. It is not only implausible that this is what the language used in 1965 was intended to mean, it is impossible rationally to reach such a conclusion.

2

The Record of the 1965 Constitutional Convention

The history of the term “segregation” in article first, § 20, in the 1965 convention makes even clearer than its text that the members of the convention did not intend it to mean de facto racial or ethnic concentration. It is inconceivable — except that the majority conceives it — and it is untenable to hold — except that the majority holds it — that the delegates to the 1965 constitutional convention intended the term “segregation” in that article to include de facto racial and ethnic concentration in the public schools irrespective of any state intent to bring about or to perpetuate such concentration. This question is not even close.

I begin this part of my analysis with another factual finding of the trial court that the majority ignores. The trial court found that “the 1965 constitutional convention was a very conservative body that made only those changes that had to be made in order to comply with the legislative reapportionment mandates of the federal courts and it was extremely reluctant to change any*106thing that did not have to be changed.”40 Thus, the 1965 convention was not called for the purpose of a general overhaul of the 1818 constitution. It was called primarily for the purpose of bringing the Connecticut constitution into compliance with the then recently decided cases of Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S. Ct. 1472, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1964), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964), and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963), and the delegates acted accordingly. The principal agenda of a constitutional convention is a useful tool in construing its actions. See E. Peters, “State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition,” 84 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 586 (1986) (“courts must look to the agenda of the constitution as a whole in the context of the historical and sociological issues that occupied center stage at the time of ratification”).

One cannot square this unchallenged characterization of the 1965 convention with the notion that, when in the course of accomplishing its principal objective of legislative apportionment it also adopted article first, § 20, this “very conservative” convention also intended to accomplish results that would at that time have rendered unconstitutional — or, at the very least, would have called into serious constitutional question — many school districts and general assembly districts in the state. Yet, despite what the majority may say, these are the necessary implications of its decision and rationale.'

In attempting to divine the intent of the framers of article first, § 20, we are not faced with the difficult task of peering back through the mists of more than a *107century to a sparse historical record, in order to determine the intent of persons of whom we have limited knowledge, as is often the case when we attempt to inteipret the language used in the 1818 state constitution. The 1965 convention took place but thirty-one years ago. The names and careers of the delegates are well known to anyone reasonably cognizant of Connecticut government and politics and there is a complete printed record.

Among the delegates were former and future governors of this state,41 former and future United States Senators and Representatives,42 former and future state legislators,43 former members of this court, including two former chief justices,44 and many other delegates with distinguished pedigrees in government and politics. These were men and women with long and distinguished careers in public life, who had practiced the arts of government and politics and who, presumably, knew the limits of both. They also knew that their effort would be placed before the electorate in order for the constitution to be amended. They knew, furthermore, that throughout Connecticut there were local, intradistrict neighborhood school boundaries and schools that were, because of the housing patterns then prevalent, heavily concentrated by religion, race and ethnic background. They knew, moreover, that, because of housing patterns, there would be local general assembly districts throughout Connecticut, created by the General Assembly in accordance with the constitutionally required reapportionment provisions that they were *108fashioning, that would also be heavily concentrated by the same factors.

It is simply inconceivable that the convention delegates, with that knowledge, intended by the language they used in article first, § 20, to render unconstitutional or to call into serious constitutional question, every one of those school boundaries, schools and electoral districts. In order to reach such a conclusion, one must posit the following line of hypothetical reasoning, or something similar, to the delegates regarding the meaning of “segregation”: (1) “because of’ and “segregation” mean intentional or de jure, rather than de facto, segregation, because otherwise the General Assembly would be prevented from drawing mathematically equal but religiously, racially or ethnically concentrated districts; and, although districts must now be substantially equal in population, it would be a radical change also to require them to be integrated on the basis of religion, race and ethnicity, a change far beyond the principal charge in this convention;45 (2) in fact, intentional segregation is probably what the United States Supreme Court was addressing in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), when it outlawed the “separate but equal” doctrine, although that is not absolutely clear from the available federal decisions to date; (3) nonetheless, when the words “because of’ and “segregation” come to be applied to interdistrict, but maybe not intradistrict, elementary and secondary school lines under the right to a free public education — which, by the way, will not be adopted until five days from now and, of course, has never been interpreted — those words mean the oppo*109site, namely, de facto segregation; and (4) we entertain this dual intent without (a) clearly — or even unclearly—suggesting it by the language we use, and (b) disclosing it on the record of this convention or to the voters who will have to ratify our work. This scenario, I suggest, does no more than dramatize the reasoning behind the majority’s tortuous and selective reading of the record of the 1965 convention. In my view, to attribute such a thought process to the delegates is not only implausible, it would have been irresponsible on the part of the delegates to have engaged in such a process sub rosa, and it is untenable to suggest that they did.

My view of the intent of the convention delegates is buttressed by the fact that, as even the plaintiffs emphasized in their posttrial brief to the trial court and in their appellate brief to this court, “[t]he documentation of racial and economic isolation in Connecticut schools in the 1960s was thorough and comprehensive. In addition to the state’s own official annual documentation, the University of Connecticut Institute of Urban Research and the University’s Educational Resources and Development Center conducted a series of highly detailed reports on school segregation in Connecticut’s major cities.” In constitutionalizing the right of Connecticut’s children to a free public education, however, the politically seasoned delegates to the 1965 convention uttered not one word even suggesting that this well documented problem would be addressed by the constitutional amendments that they had gathered to draft. In fact, the idea that the new education clause would create any sort of fundamental change in the state’s education system was squarely rejected by Simon Bernstein, a delegate whom the majority ironically cites in support of its result. In reference to the proposed education clause, Bernstein stated, “[T]his again is not anything revolutionary, it is something *110which we have . ...” 3 Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention of 1965, p. 1039.

Moreover, just one year before the convention, the New Haven board of education had adopted a junior high school pairing plan for the purpose of reducing unintended racial imbalance in its school system and in the interest of promoting equality of educational opportunity. That plan, which generated considerable public controversy, was the subject of several public hearings at which it was vigorously defended and assailed, and resulted in an action for an injunction against the plan.46 On July 8,1965, while the convention was in session, the Superior Court decided in favor of the board. See Guida v. Board of Education, 26 Conn. Sup. 121, 213 A.2d 843 (1965).

There can be little doubt that, if the delegates intended the word “segregation” in article first, § 20, to mean de facto segregation when applied to public education, the statutory authority that the Superior Court concluded the board had in Guida would have been transformed into a constitutional obligation. It is fair to presume that the delegates who came from the *111New Haven area,47 men and women cognizant of the public affairs of their district, were aware of this controversial case, which was decided only two months earlier. Indeed, one of those delegates, former Chief Justice Patrick B. O’Sullivan, was one of the drafters of article first, and the chairman of the convention that adopted it, and another, Mary B. Griswold, spoke in favor of it. I cannot believe that, if it were the intent of the convention in adopting the word “segregation” to constitutionalize the New Haven board’s plan, not one of the fourteen delegates from the district that included New Haven would have even mentioned its potential effect on the New Haven case. The record of the convention, however, is bereft of any such mention.

That record, moreover, affirmatively demonstrates that the delegates did not intend “segregation,” as used in article first, § 20, to include de facto segregation. To the contrary, the history of the article and the debate over the term “segregation” in the 1965 convention compel the conclusion that the delegates intended the term specifically to preclude, under our state constitution, the doctrine of state-created “separate but equal” educational and other public facilities that the United States Supreme Court had expressly overruled, as a matter of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, in Brown v. Board of Education, supra, 347 U.S. 483.

In February, 1950, the commission on state government organization issued its report to the General Assembly and to then Governor Chester Bowles. Among *112its recommendations was a revision of the constitution, which included a new article first, our Declaration of Rights, including the following proposed article first, § 20: “No person shall be denied the enjoyment of, nor be discriminated against in, nor be segregated in, any right or employment, nor be so treated in the militia, or in the public schools or in any public place, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.” The commission’s recommendation to revise the constitution was not acted upon.

During the 1965 convention, on July 28, 1965, Chase Going Woodhouse introduced Resolution No. 168, which contained several recommendations for changes in our Declaration of Rights, article first. Among these were two proposals that are relevant to this case. First, the resolution proposed that article first, § l,48 be amended to add the provision that all men are “entitled to the equal protection of the laws.” Second, it proposed that article first, § 20,49 be amended exactly as had been proposed by the commission to the General Assembly and the governor in 1950.50 This resolution was referred to the Committee on Resolutions.

Ultimately, the committee reported to the floor of the convention its Rules Committee Substitute for Constitutional Convention Resolution No. 168 (committee resolution 168). This resolution proposed a number of changes in the provisions of article first. Included within committee resolution 168 was the proposal that both article first, § 1, and then article first, § 20; see footnote *11349; remain unchanged, and that there be a new article first, § 22,51 providing as follows: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law, nor the enjoyment of his civil or political rights, nor be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.” This draft of article first, § 22, therefore, incorporated the explicit references to equal protection of the law and discrimination that had been in original Resolution No. 168, but omitted the specific references to segregation, employment, the militia and the public schools that had also been in the original resolution.

This proposal prompted a letter to the convention by the Connecticut Council of Churches that committee resolution 168 was not specific enough. The council stated that “ ‘segregation constitutes such a core area of discrimination as it affects the pattern of relationship among persons and groups and needs thereby to be specifically guarded against through constitutional provision.’ ” J. Zaiman, “Anti-Separation Clause Urged for Bill of Rights,” The Hartford Courant, Oct. 14, 1965, pp. 1 and 11. The council also expressed the thoughts that, because “ ‘civil or political rights’ ” was not defined in the proposal, that language was “ ‘so broad as to be specifically excepted against in any controversial test of rights,’ ” and that “ ‘[o]ur history seems to show that platitudinous phrases have not helped many of our citizens to enjoy specific rights that could not be pointed to implicitly in constitutional authority.’ ” Id., p. 11.

In addition, according to a contemporary account in The Hartford Courant, certain civil rights groups also thought that the proposal was not specific enough, and suggested reinserting the “antisegregation” clause. Id., p. 1. This prompted caucuses by both the Democrats *114and Republicans, as a result of which there was bipartisan agreement on reinserting language referring to segregation.

Accordingly, on October 14, Woodhouse brought to the floor an amendment reinserting the reference to “segregation,” which resulted in the following language that ultimately became article first, § 20: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”

In proposing this amendment, Woodhouse reminded the convention that the word segregation had appeared in the original resolution, and that the only question was one of the appropriate wording to be used.52 2 Proceedings, supra, pp. 690-91. Former Chief Justice Baldwin, one of the drafters of committee resolution 168 that was being amended, and another delegate, James J. Kennelly, both rose to stress the symbolic, as opposed to substantive, nature of the amendment.53 Id., pp. 691-92.

*115The only reference to education in the entire debate over committee resolution 168 was by Bernstein, and that reference was made in the context of his delineating more specifically the “civil and political rights” to which the proposal referred. Bernstein stated: “I just want to comment that in this section which states that there will be enjoyment of civil and political rights, for the record, perhaps we might spell out a few of them so that courts and historians in the future may not fail to understand what we are talking about. These are rights which we have always assumed we have had anyway and these rights include rights of freedom from discrimination in travel, rights of freedom in education, public accommodations, and employment and housing.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 694.

O’Sullivan put the amendment to a voice vote, and ruled it adopted. O’Sullivan then ruled “that this *116 amendment is not a substantive change and therefore we can act upon the entire bill today.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 696.

Reading this record in an objective, dispassionate manner leads inescapably to the conclusions that the use of the term “segregation” in what ultimately became article first, § 20: (1) was intended to emphasize that the entire section prohibited intentional segregation in the “separate but equal” sense; (2) was not intended to add substance to the provision, but was intended only to make the general principles more specific; (3) was not intended to affect rights to education in a way different from other civil and political rights; and (4) cannot be read to mean one thing when applied to all such rights except education, but the opposite when applied to the right to public education under article eighth, § 1. Several reasons compel these conclusions.

First, the historical source of the term was the 1950 recommendation to the General Assembly and governor for a constitutional provision. In 1950, the term “segregation,” in the constitutional sense, referred to the widespread system of laws in other parts of the nation, mandating the separation of the races, the constitutionality of which was then maintained under the infamous “separate but equal” doctrine. There is no evidence, either in this case or historically in general, to suggest that in 1950 this term was understood to mean racial or ethnic concentration that was not the product of state intent. Moreover, this historical source was specifically noted as the source of original Resolution No. 168, introduced to the 1965 convention by Woodhouse.

Second, after committee resolution 168 was reported out without the term “segregation,” the principal motive to reinsert it was to respond to the concern of civil rights groups and the Council of Churches, which was, not that the new resolution was not broad enough, but *117that it was not specific enough. Certainly, in 1965, eleven years after Brown and while the civil rights movement was taking hold in the land and extending the principle of Brown to all areas of public life, the Council’s reference to segregation as a “core area of discrimination” could only have referred to segregation in its constitutional sense of legally mandated or sanctioned segregation, and cannot be plausibly read as referring to what we later have come to describe as de facto segregation.54

Third, Woodhouse’s remarks when she introduced the amendment, reinforced the conclusion that the substance of what she sought to have enacted was already embodied in the provision, and that the reinsertion of the term was only to make the equal protection principle more specific, not to add something of substance that was not already included therein. See footnote 52. Read in the context of 1965, her reference to the “philosophy and the practice of segregation” could only have meant that philosophy and practice as a legal concept. See 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 691. Indeed, one wonders what the reference to “philosophy” could have meant in the context of racial and ethnic concentration that occurs as a result of demographic factors without any planning, intent, idea or doctrine behind it. Woodhouse’s final remarks, namely, that the amendment “in no way limits the rights of anyone,” and that it “strengthens the wording” of committee resolution 168; id.; were an assurance to the Council of Churches and others that their concern for specificity was being met. Her assurance that the *118insertion of “segregation” makes the general more specific cannot be read, as the majority reads it, however, to make the general something else.

Fourth, the drafters of committee resolution 168, Baldwin, O’Sullivan and Bordon,55 three former members of this court, including two former Chief Justices, chose to exclude the term. One of them, Baldwin, acknowledged that they had discussed in the Committee on Resolutions the question of whether to include the term “segregation,” and had concluded that “it was unnecessary to put in there.” Id., p. 692. Baldwin, and presumably O’Sullivan and Bordon, the other distinguished members of the drafting subcommittee, was nonetheless agreeable to the amendment “if it will please people.” Id.

In addition, Baldwin disclosed that the subcommittee had canvassed the state’s legislation “protecting political and civil rights,” and had found that our state led the nation in that respect. Id., pp. 695-96. He expressed his pride in that legislative record, and noted that, if other states had legislation like ours, “we would not be having the trouble that we are having in some places today.” Id., p, 696. Among that legislation was General Statutes § 10-15c, which requires that public schools be open to all children without discrimination on account of race, creed or color, and which had been in effect since 1868.56 The most plausible inference from this *119statement is that he was referring, in part at least, to the still extant resistance, in other parts of the nation, to elimination of the separate but equal doctrine, in education as well as other areas.

Had there been any intent in reinserting the term “segregation” that it have one meaning when applied to education and an opposite meaning when applied to all the other political and civil rights, the drafting subcommittee, who obviously commanded the respect of their colleagues, would have said so and would not have misled the delegates by assuring them that there was no change in substance intended by reinsertion. This is particularly true because if, as the majority posits, there are dual and opposite meanings lurking in the language, (1) that duality is certainly not apparent on the face of article first, § 20, (2) it is inconceivable that the draftsmen of the article would have left that duality unexpressed, and (3) this unexpressed duality would have opened the entire article to an even more bizarre inteipretation, namely, that intention does not apply to, and is not required to constitute a violation of, any of the civil or political rights encompassed by the article. In sum, the majority’s interpretation of article first, § 20, cannot rationally or responsibly be attributed to the people who drafted it or to their colleagues with whom they discussed and adopted it.

Fifth, with one exception discussed immediately below, the debate on article first, § 20, is bereft of references to education. Thus, the majority’s attempt to link the two, and to establish that the reference to “segregation” in the section was intended to mean de facto segregation, but solely when applied to article eighth, § 1, has no support in this record. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine how the debate over “segregation” could indicate such an intent, because when the debate took place, consideration of article eighth, § 1, the education clause, was five days in the future.

*120The only reference to the subject of education in the entire debate on the amendment occurred in remarks by Bernstein. 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 694. Those remarks are significant for several reasons that have more to do with what they do not establish than what they do establish. As noted, Bernstein made his remarks five days before the convention considered the resolution that ultimately became the education provision, article eighth, § 1. Thus, they could have had no conceivable relevance to the interpretation of that provision. In addition, his reference to education was intended to do nothing more than to indicate that education was one of those “civil and political rights,” along with, in his view, travel, public accommodations, employment and housing, that would be covered by article first, § 20. Id. As discussed previously, when Bernstein did specifically address the reach of the education clause five days after the adoption of the segregation clause, he made clear that the education clause was intended only to constitutionalize the then existing system of free public education — a municipality based system that included well documented instances of racial isolation. 3 Proceedings, supra, p. 1039.

Thus, when the majority asserts that “[t]he delegates’ expectation that the proposed amendments to the constitution would secure interrelated constitutional rights was underscored by Bernstein’s remark that article first, § 20, was intended to be applied in the context of the ‘rights of freedom in education,’ ” the majority merely states the obvious. Of course article first, § 20, was intended to apply to education, as one of the “civil or political rights” referred to in that article. To the extent, however, that the majority suggests that Bernstein’s remarks imply some connection between that obvious application and a specific and different meaning of “segregation” in that article when applied to article eighth, § 1, the suggestion is utterly without basis.

*121Sixth, O’Sullivan, another member of the drafting subcommittee, presiding as the chairman of the convention ruled the amendment to be technical and not substantive. 2 Proceedings, supra, p. 696. Such a ruling cannot be squared with the notion that the amendment had the intended effect of transforming the resolution from a straightforward equal protection provision, which specifically incorporated into our constitution principles that had already been held to be there by the established interpretations of article first, § 1, into a provision that maintained those principles generally, but altered them radically with respect only to public education. If such a transformation is anything, it is certainly substantive and not technical, and O’Sullivan would have called that fact to his colleagues’ attention.

Seventh, although we have on occasion interpreted article first, § 20, to have a broader meaning than its federal counterpart, based on differing language between the two; see, e.g., Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 513, 624 A.2d 876 (1993) (protecting from discrimination those with physical and mental disabilities based on explicit language of article first, § 20); the record in this case demonstrates that the linguistic difference, namely, the specific reference to “segregation,” was not intended to have a meaning different from that of the federal equal protection clause. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, this record demonstrates that it was intended only to constitute a more specific application of the same principle of equal protection of the laws.

Eighth, even if one somehow were able to read the record as not clearly establishing the meaning of “segregation” to require intent, at the least it cannot be disputed that the record does not clearly indicate that “segregation” has no requirement of intent. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that reading the record as the majority reads it works a radical change in our constitu*122tional equal protection jurisprudence. We do not read our constitutional text to make radical changes without clear evidence of an intent to do so. Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 172-73, 610 A.2d 153 (1992). The majority’s approach violates this sound principle of constitutional interpretation.

Thus, there is no basis for the suggestion by the majority of relevance to the issues in this case that when both article eighth, § 1, and article first, § 20, were debated by the convention delegates, “they recognized and endorsed the landmark decision in Brown . . . declaring the unconstitutionality of ‘separate but equal’ public school education.” First, there is no mention whatsoever of Brown, or of the question of segregation of schools, in the debate over article eighth, § 1. The entire debate concerned the fact that Connecticut was one of few states that did not mention education in its constitution, and the desirability of doing so.57 3 Proceedings, supra, pp. 1038-41. If anything, the fact that the delegates obviously were aware of Brown contradicts the inference that the majority seeks to draw. The debate over article first, § 20, referred to the separate but equal doctrine declared invaJM. in Brown. That was a doctrine of state intended segregation, and there is no suggestion in this debate that the framers intended the references to segregation to include the notion of de facto concentration of races or ethnic groups.58

*123Finally, the available historical evidence does not end with the printed record of the convention. There are postconvention documents that shed light on the question involved in this case, principally by the absence of any suggestion that comports with the majority’s analysis. These documents are: (1) a resume by the secretary of the state of the proposals passed by the convention; (2) an annotated copy of the proposed revised constitution, with marginal notes, published by the convention itself “as a guide to the people of the state”; and (3) an account published in The Hartford Courant, December 5, 1965, p. 36, of an interview with Baldwin in which he explained the work of the convention. Each of these discusses article first, § 20, in brief and summary fashion. None of them, however, even suggests that it could have opposite meanings when applied to education and other rights. If the majority’s startling textual and historical conclusions are correct, it is curious that no one at the time understood what the convention had done, not even the delegates themselves.59

*124D

Remedy

The final fundamental flaw in the majority opinion involves its discussion of a remedy for the constitutional violation that it has found. In what must surely be one of the great understatements in this court’s history, the majority recognizes “that the fashioning of appropriate declaratory or injunctive relief requires careful consideration in order to weigh the benefits and costs of various remedial measures.” The majority considers remanding the case to the trial court for the fashioning of a remedy because, in its view of the record, “the parties have not had the opportunity to present evidence directed to the remedial consequences that follow from our decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint,” and because in this court the plaintiffs “have not focused their attention on the remedial consequences of a substantive decision in their behalf.” The majority eschews this course of action, as well as the notion of inviting further briefing in this court, however, in favor of “the methodology used in Horton I,” namely, staying further judicial intervention to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to take appropriate action. In what must surely be one of the most ironic statements in this court’s history, given the majority’s judicial overreaching in this case, the majority offers as its rationale for this methodology “[pjrudence and sensitivity to the constitutional authority of coordinate branches of government . . . .”

This flaw has two parts. First, it misrepresents the record in this case. Second, it imposes on the General Assembly a mandate to enact a remedial regime without an articulation of principle to guide it in its endeavors.

*1251

The Record Regarding Remedy

The majority’s assertion that “the parties have not had the opportunity to present evidence directed to the remedial consequences that follow from our decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint” is contrary to the record. The question of a potential remedy was extensively litigated and briefed in the trial court, which specifically noted that “this is not a bifurcated hearing.” The parties presented several witnesses on the subject of a remedy.60 In their posttrial brief, the plaintiffs spent twelve pages discussing the question of a remedy, and the defendants responded in kind, devoting thirty pages to the question.

In addition, on remand the trial court made numerous findings regarding a potential remedy. The plaintiffs do *126not challenge these findings in this appeal. The court found that no state in the country has a racial imbalance law that requires interdistrict balancing. Under the heading, “The Nature and Scope of the Remedy,” the court made seventeen additional specific findings. Among those findings were the following. The plaintiffs seek to have the court direct the Hartford school districts and the twenty-one suburban districts to address the claimed inequities jointly, to reconfigure district lines, and to take other steps sufficient to eliminate those inequities. The court also found that the “present racial, ethnic and socioeconomic concentration and isolation of the schoolchildren in the Hartford public school system on the basis of their residence is principally the result of social and demographic patterns of change that have occurred over the past thirty years in the Hartford metropolitan area.”

The trial court found further that the relief sought by the plaintiffs includes the integration of the public schools in the region for the purpose of eliminating economic, as well as racial and ethnic, isolation. The court noted that, although William Gordon, an expert witness for the plaintiffs, was of the opinion that the federal courts’ method of eliminating de jure segregation could be effectively applied to this case, the remedial planning in this case would be more complicated because the remedy sought by the plaintiffs includes interdistrict economic integration. The court also noted the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ opinions that problems of poverty can be appropriately addressed by the public schools. The court rejected these opinions, however, as inconsistent with the “general agreement that conventional educational approaches are inadequate to address the special problems of the urban poor,” and with the “unanimous and apparently undisputed finding of the governor’s commission on quality and integrated education that there [are] no educational strategies or *127initiatives that could fully deal with the larger issues of poverty, unemployment, housing, health, substance abuse, hunger, parental neglect, and crowded and substandard housing” that are associated with the concentration of poverty.

The trial court specifically found that there “are no existing standards or guidelines that educators, social scientists or desegregation planners can offer or recommend to achieve the proper racial, ethnic and socioeconomic balance in the school districts of the Hartford metropolitan area.” The court further found that “[mandatory student reassignment plans to achieve racial balance, whether intradistrict or interdistrict, are ineffective methods of achieving integration, whether they are mandated by racial imbalance laws or by court order.” In this connection, the court also found that “[proposed solutions to the problems of racial, ethnic and economic isolation which rely on coercion and which fail to offer choices and options either do not work or have unacceptable consequences.” Finally, the court found that “ [integration in its fullest and most meaningful sense can only be achieved by building affordable housing in suburban areas in order to break up the inner city ghettos, and by making urban schools more attractive for those who live outside the city.”

These facts, like the facts regarding the educational effects of poverty rather than of race or ethnicity, were drawn from the testimony of the witnesses whom the parties had presented at trial. The competing factual claims were vigorously litigated at trial and briefed in the trial court, and both sides had a full and fair opportunity to brief them in this court. If, as the majority suggests, that opportunity was not adequately afforded here, it can only be attributed to the fact that the majority precludes it by sending the case directly to the General Assembly and the executive branch. This brings *128me to the task that the majority has thrust upon those branches of government by its opinion.

2

The Lack of a Recognizable Principle or Standard

I confess that, if I were a member of either the executive or legislative branch of our government, I would have but the slightest glimmering of what kind of legislation would comport with the majority’s mandate, because the opinion articulates no principle or standard upon which to base such legislation. Confining my discussion here to the Hartford metropolitan area, I can find no principle or standard in the majority opinion by which to measure the level of racial and ethnic integration of the African-American and Hispanic schoolchildren that will be constitutional.

The closest thing to such a principle are three statements by the majority. The first is that “the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation” in the public schools violates the constitution. (Emphasis added.) The second is that if “significant racial and ethnic isolation continues to occur,” no intent to bring about or maintain that isolation is required in order to establish a constitutional violation. (Emphasis added.) The third is that a “significant component of [a] substantially equal educational opportunity is access to a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation.”

Assuming that these elliptical references constitute the majority’s guidance to the General Assembly, is the lack of significant isolation, or the presence of substantial impairment, the same as “substantial equality?” Does significant isolation or “substantially impaired” mean that, with respect to the Hartford metropolitan area, the legislature must start with the last census figures, and redraw the district lines so that each munic*129ipality has a substantially equal percentage of African-American and Hispanic schoolchildren? Or does the reference to “extreme racial and ethnic isolation” mean that, so long as the concentration is not massive — something less than the current 92 or 95 percent figure,61 for example — the constitution will not be violated? Or is the measure a statewide, rather than a district-wide figure? That is, must each municipality have a percentage of African-American and Hispanic schoolchildren substantially equal to the percentage of such children in the state? Education is, after all, a state responsibility that has only been delegated to the municipalities.

Further, why is the municipality the appropriate measuring unit, rather than the individual school? After all, if a student’s constitutional right to an integrated education is violated by being required to be educated in a racially or ethnically concentrated setting, thereby, according to the majority, missing out on the social benefits of an integrated education and incurring the social burdens of a segregated education upon which the majority’s analysis rests, then is it not appropriate that we look at the actual setting in which each child’s education takes place? After all, a student who attends a racially and ethnically concentrated school, albeit in a racially and ethnically integrated school district, will not have those benefits and will carry those burdens. If so, then it seems that each school must, constitutionally, have the appropriate racial and ethnic makeup. *130These are just some of the questions that are raised, but not addressed, by the majority opinion.

The task of the state will be complicated, moreover, by the findings of the trial court in this case regarding remedy. The majority does not address these findings, but my examination of the record discloses that they are based on sufficient evidence to withstand appellate scrutiny. Among those findings are the following.

The trial court found that there are no educational strategies or initiatives that could fully deal with the larger issues of poverty, unemployment, housing, health, substance abuse, parental neglect, and crowded and substandard housing that are associated with the concentration of poverty under which the plaintiffs suffer. Thus, it is these factors, not the plaintiffs’ racial and ethnic concentration, that account for the educational deficiencies of which the plaintiffs complain. Furthermore, the court found that there are no existing standards or guidelines that educators, social scientists or desegregation planners can offer or recommend to achieve the proper racial, ethnic and socioeconomic basis in the school districts of the Hartford metropolitan area. The majority’s mandate, therefore, will require the state to devise a strategy to compel integration that, the trial court found after six years of litigation, will not significantly ameliorate the underlying educational deficiencies of which the plaintiffs complain, and with respect to which educators, social scientists and desegregation planners could not offer standards or guidance. Thus, the majority thrusts on our state government the truly awesome task of devising a remedy for educational deficiencies in Hartford — a remedy that will necessarily require drastic statewide changes — without an intelligible guiding principle, and with no indication that the true source of Hartford’s educational deficiencies will be addressed thereby.

*131In this respect, also, this case differs markedly from Horton I. In that case, like this case, the question of the availability of an appropriate remedy or remedies had been litigated. In that case, however, unlike this case, the trial court had found, and we affirmed based on that finding, that there were feasible remedies available to achieve the substantial equality of educational opportunity that was not being afforded by the flat grant funding system. Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 635-36. Furthermore, in that case, unlike this case, there were successful methods in use in many other states for remedying the inequality of educational opportunity resulting from financial inequities. Id., 651. According to the trial court’s findings here, by contrast, there are no strategies available, or in successful use elsewhere, for remedying differences in educational opportunities that result from concentrations of poverty. In sum, whereas the remedy in Horton I involved moving dollars around and thereby ameliorating educational differences and deficiencies, the remedy here will involve moving schoolchildren around without ameliorating such differences or deficiencies.

IV

THE NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION

Despite the effort of the majority to cabin its conclusions, it is clear to me that the effort must fail and that, when the General Assembly attempts to enact legislation in order to meet the mandate of this case, there are several necessary — not possible, not probable but, in my view, necessary — implications of the majority opinion that it will be required to confront. I have already discussed what seems to me to be the most obvious implication, namely, that the majority’s rationale applies, not just to interdistrict racial and ethnic concentrations, but to intradistrict and interschool con*132centrations as well. There are, however, other less obvious but equally necessary implications.

These implications are compelled in part by the identity of the plaintiffs. Six of the eighteen plaintiffs are white students — four who reside in Hartford, and two who reside in West Hartford. Moreover, there is no showing that the two who live in West Hartford are burdened by a concentration of poverty. The majority opinion vindicates these white students’ constitutional right to attend unsegregated schools, as well as the constitutional right of the African-American and Hispanic plaintiffs. Furthermore, the racial and ethnic concentration involved in the Hartford school district is more ethnic than racial. That is, a greater percentage of the students in Hartford are Hispanic than are African-American, and Hispanics are the fastest growing segment of the school population. Thus, in terms of article first, § 20, this case is more about “ancestry” and “national origin” than it is about “race” or “color.”62

*133The first of the necessary implications of the majority opinion is that every school district in the state that is primarily white and that does not have an appropriate percentage of African-American and Hispanic students, is in violation of article first, § 20.63 This conclusion, it seems clear to me, flows inexorably from the facts that (1) in this case, it is not only the constitutional rights to an unsegregated education of the African-American and Hispanic students, taken together, that are being violated, but the same rights of the white plaintiffs who live in Hartford and West Hartford, and (2) this violation is based on the general social benefits attributable to an integrated education, and the general social burdens attendant upon a racially and ethnically concentrated education. Certainly, every predominantly white school district lacks the general social benefits of an integrated education, and suffers from the general social burdens of a segregated education. Just as certainly, the constitutional rights of white students in other parts of the state cannot be less than those in the Hartford metropolitan area, and a student’s constitutional right to attend school in an unsegregated public school district, or to attend an unsegregated school within such a district, cannot depend on where the student happens to live.

Indeed, the majority comes very close to making explicit this necessary implication of its decision. It states that the right of “Connecticut schoolchildren” to a substantially equal educational opportunity requires “access to a public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and ethnic isolation.” Thus, every rural and suburban school district, from Litchfield to Pomfret and from Greenwich to Granby, is now either clearly or probably unconstitutional; its boundaries, or *134the racial and ethnic makeup of its school population, or both, will have to be changed in order to remedy that unconstitutionality. This means the end of the traditional system of municipality based school districts.64

Second, because ethnicity is a specifically protected class under article first, § 20, and because the facts of this case rest more on ethnicity than on race, not only must every school district in this state have an appropriate percentage of African-American and Hispanic students, taken together, but also an appropriate ethnic makeup, irrespective of race. Furthermore, I cannot see how such a makeup can be properly confined to counting Hispanic students. Certainly, other ethnic groups have no lesser status than Hispanic students. Just as certainly, moreover, the general benefits of an integrated education and the general burdens of a segregated education apply to ethnic, as well as racial, segregation. Therefore, if ethnicity is a protected class under article first, § 20, if “segregation” does not require intent, and if segregation prohibits ethnic as well as racial segregation, then in order for a school district to be nonsegregated it will have to contain an appropriate percentage of the various major ethnic groups in the state.

Third, because “segregation” in article first, § 20, does not have an intentionality requirement, and because that article protects religion on a par with race and ethnicity, every school district, and probably every neighborhood school, that is heavily concentrated with students of one religion is segregated. Consequently, all of the students in that district or school are being subjected to segregation “because of religion.” There*135fore, the legislature will be required to address this necessary implication of the majority’s mandate, so that each district, or school, will have an appropriate percentage of Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish students.65

As a result of these implications, the legislature, if it is to take seriously its responsibilities under the majority’s mandate, will have few options, if any, other than a statewide realignment of school districts, accompanied by a statewide transportation system.66 Such a system will be necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of every schoolchild in the state are protected.67

*136V

THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT

This discussion brings me, finally, to a consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims as they were actually presented to us for adjudication, not as reconstructed by the majority. The plaintiffs make three claims that, in my view of the case, must be addressed.68 These are, in general terms, that: (1) the defendants violated article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, by failing to provide public schoolchildren in the Hartford metropolitan area an equal educational opportunity; (2) the defendants violated article first, §§ 1 and 20, by providing education in the Hartford metropolitan area that is segregated on the basis of race and ethnicity; and (3) the defendants violated article eighth, § 1, by failing to provide Hartford schoolchildren a minimally adequate education. Although much of my prior discussion disposes of most of these claims, some further discussion is appropriate. None of these claims is persuasive, moreover, because none is supported by the record. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.69

A

Equal Educational Opportunity

As I indicated previously, the plaintiffs’ equal educational opportunity claim is based on Horton I, and is *137premised on the factual assertion that the racial and ethnic concentration in the district, coupled with their concentration of poverty and their lesser educational resources, as compared to the resources of the suburban districts, has caused educational outcomes in the Hartford school district that are inferior to those in the suburban districts. The claim also depends in significant part on the premise that, with respect to the relative educational outcomes of Hartford and the suburbs, the state mastery test scores are a valid tool for measuring differences in educational outcomes between Hartford and the suburbs. Consequently, they argue, just as in Horton /, in which unequal funding caused an inferior quality of education in the property-poor towns and violated the constitution, in this case the combination of factors listed earlier has caused the quality of education in the Hartford district to be inferior to that provided in the surrounding suburban districts and violates the constitution. Similarly, the plaintiffs argue that the relative quality of educational opportunities must be measured by the same or similar factors that this court deemed relevant in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 634, namely: educational outcomes, as reflected by the state mastery test scores, state remedial goals, scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores and college attendance rates; plants and facilities; equipment, supplies, textbooks and libraries; course offerings and curriculum; teaching and professional staff; bilingual education programs; and special needs programs.

As I indicated previously, although this claim might well be persuasive if its factual underpinnings were sound, it founders on the factual findings of the trial court. It is not necessary to recount all of those findings in this regard. It is sufficient to repeat here several that are fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim.

*138The trial court’s findings are squarely contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim that Hartford suffers from diminished educational resources compared to its suburban neighbors. The court found that, since 1979, the state’s method for financing public schools has taken into account the needs of urban school districts by including in the aid formula the number of children from low income families and, since 1989, a weighting factor that takes into account the number of students who score below the remedial standard on the state’s mastery test scores. The court also found that the 1986 Educational Enhancement Act addressed cities’ financial needs by raising teachers’ salaries dramatically, so that Hartford, New Haven and Bridgeport have been able to recruit and retain teachers at salaries comparable to, if not higher than, the salary levels offered in the suburbs, and that this has permitted urban class sizes to be reduced. The court found, in addition, that the priority school district program provides that the poorer communities, like Hartford, receive the greatest financial benefit, that the state factors the mastery test scores into the aid formula as a measurement of a school district’s need, and that where students do not meet remedial standards additional funds are made available.

The trial court found, moreover, that Hartford’s teachers are as qualified as their suburban counterparts, and that they are very committed and dedicated to providing a quality education for their students. Hartford’s teacher training program is based on the “effective schools” concept, which is specifically directed to the needs of urban and minority children. Finally, the court found that Hartford is not a negative educational setting, that there is “outstanding education going on in its schools,” that some “of the best special education classes in the state can be found” there, and that the “Hartford public schools offer academic programs that are sufficient to meet the basic educational needs of *139all its students and also provide other programs that are required to meet the special needs of its economically disadvantaged students.”

As I indicated in great detail earlier, the trial court’s findings are also squarely contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim that there is a causal connection between their racial and ethnic concentration — whether considered alone or in conjunction with the concentration of poverty — and any educational deficiencies of which the plaintiffs complain. The gist of the trial court’s findings in this regard is that it is not the racial and ethnic isolation of the plaintiffs, but their socioeconomic status — their poverty, its concentration, and all of the social pathologies that are closely associated with poverty and its concentration — that is the causative factor of those deficiencies.70 These “disadvantaging characteristics” of poverty, which “poor children bring with them” from home and neighborhood to school, include “unemploy*140ment . . . substance abuse, hunger, parental neglect . . . crowded and substandard housing,” and such “at risk” factors as low birth weight and mothers on drugs at birth.

Finally, the trial court’s findings are squarely contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim that they have established valid differences in the educational outcomes between the Hartford school district and the suburban districts. To the extent that the plaintiffs rely on the state mastery scores to measure these differences, which as I read their brief is a considerable extent, the trial court found that such scores are not a valid means for measuring interdistrict achievements. Moreover, despite the plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, the court’s findings on this subject are not confined to the state mastery test scores.71

The plaintiffs contend, nonetheless, that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, that many of the facts upon which they rely were undisputed in the trial court, and that the court was required to accept certain of the experts’ opinions. Suffice it to say that neither the record nor the law bears out that contention. The court’s findings are fully supported by the evidence. None of the facts in question was undisputed; on the contrary, they were hotly disputed in the trial court, *141originally and on our remand. Finally, it is axiomatic that a trial court is not required to accept an expert’s opinion; Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 396, 662 A.2d 118 (1995); and that is particularly true in this case, where the court indicated that some of the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions were flawed methodologically, and where there were contrary expert opinions that the trial court did credit.

B

Per Se Segregation Under Article Eighth, § 1, and Article First, § 20

This claim of the plaintiffs bears little additional discussion. As I indicated previously, it rests entirely on the proposition that “segregation” as used in article first, § 20, and applied to education under article eighth, § 1, means de facto racial and ethnic concentration, without a requirement of state intention. As I also indicated previously, this claim is simply untenable, and such a conclusion cannot rationally be drawn from the language or history of those constitutional provisions.

C

A Minimally Adequate Education

The plaintiffs’ final claim is that they have established that they are being deprived of their right, under article eighth, § 1, to a minimally adequate education. This claim requires some additional discussion, because the majority did not discuss it and, therefore, it was not involved in my analysis of the majority opinion. I conclude, nonetheless, that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on this claim.

The plaintiffs argue, first, that, under both the majority opinion in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 649 (referring to state’s “constitutional duty to educate its children”), and the dissenting opinion therein; id., 659 (Loiselle, J., *142dissenting) (“[w]hen the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.”); article eighth, § 1, embodies a requirement of a minimally adequate education that the judiciary is empowered to enforce. The plaintiffs also point to precedents from other jurisdictions that, in then-view, have held accordingly. They next contend that the trial court employed an improper standard in defining a minimally adequate education and that, under the proper standard, the evidence established a violation thereof as a matter of law.

The defendants respond, first, that article eighth, § 1, does not embody any particular substantive level of education that the judiciary has power to enforce. They contend that, although they agree that the constitutional provision includes the right to an “adequate education”; id., 659; it “does not authorize the judiciary to establish specific educational programs and goals or levels of educational achievement as a constitutional requirement.” The defendants next argue that, assuming we do consider the issue, the trial court cannot be faulted for using a standard that the plaintiffs themselves proposed, that the standard now proposed by the plaintiffs is improper, and that, under any appropriate standard, the plaintiffs’ rights have not been violated.

In my view, it is not necessary in this case to decide whether article eighth, § 1, embodies a requirement that the state provide a minimally adequate education or, if it does, the extent to which such a requirement is subject to judicial review. Nor is it necessary to define the specific contours of such an education. Assuming that there is such a requirement that is subject to judicial review, I conclude that the standard proposed by the plaintiffs is improper and that, gauged by any appropriate standard, the plaintiffs have not been deprived of such a right.

*143Although it is difficult to ascertain precisely the standard that the plaintiffs propose, it appears to be geared in significant part to student achievement, as measured by certain performance goals set by the state, namely, the state mastery tests.72 Thus, they assert that the trial court improperly rejected as irrelevant to this claim their “evidence relating to whether Hartford children were succeeding in the goals set by the state . . . .” They contend that this standard is not met in Hartford, which in their view is a “school system whose children cannot read or write, even if provided with significant resources,” and that Hartford has not provided a minimally adequate education because it is not a system “that succeeds in teaching children to at least achieve a minimal level of reading, writing and arithmetic . ...” As the defendants correctly point out, the plaintiffs base these characterizations of the Hartford school district on the state masteiy test scores for Hartford.

I reject, as did the trial court, the plaintiffs’ proposed standard for a constitutionally required minimally adequate education. Performance or achievement of the student population, taken generally, cannot in my view be the principle upon which any such requirement is based. There is nothing in either the language or the history of article eighth, § 1, to support such a standard.

Not only the trial court’s findings in this case, but also common sense tells me that any appropriate standard by which to measure the state’s assumed obligation to provide a minimally adequate education must be based generally, not on what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system. *144Although schools are important socializing institutions in our democratic society, they cannot be constitutionally required to overcome every serious social and personal disadvantage that students bring with them to school, and that seriously hinder the academic achievement of those students. Thus, as the trial court found, achievement levels as measured by such tools as the state mastery tests are an inappropriate measurement of the quality of education. Those test scores do not take into account important variables that erect difficult barriers to achievement, such as socioeconomic status, early environmental deprivations, low birth weight, mothers on drugs at birth, diminished motivation to succeed academically, extraordinary mobility, limited English proficiency, and all of the other dismal factors associated with the concentration of poverty in the Hartford school district.

This is not to say that, as part of its assumed constitutional obligation to provide a minimally adequate education, the state has no obligation to attempt, by reasonable means, to ameliorate these problems. It may well have such an obligation. It is to say, however, that this record fully establishes that the state has, through the programs, policies and funding mechanisms already described, met that obligation.

VI

CONCLUSION

It is a bedrock principle of our system of government that the legislative branch is the source of the fundamental public policy of the state, and that the courts may invalidate such a policy only where it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that it violates a constitutional right. Morascini v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 236 Conn. 781, 789, 236 A.2d 1340 (1996). Not only does the majority fail even to give lip service to this principle, the majority violates it.

*145With no justification other than its own view of the wiser course for the state to follow, the majority strikes down a legislative public policy determination — in effect since 1909, more than half a century prior to the 1965 constitutional convention — in favor of municipality based public school districts, and substitutes its own policy choice for that legislative determination. With the same absence of legitimate justification, the majority strikes down the legislative policy determination that more can be accomplished toward the goal of diversity in our public school systems by voluntary and incremental means, supplemented by state funding and incentives, than by a mandate that requires the abandonment of municipality based school districts and the institution of a statewide system of transportation of schoolchildren. Instead, the majority substitutes its policy choice and opts for a mandate that will require such a statewide system of transportation based solely on racial, ethnic and religious factors.

Although the majority may disagree with the legislature’s choices and initiatives, it cannot be maintained that reasonable people may not differ regarding the best way to reach the goal of diversity in our public schools. Indeed, in states and communities across the nation people of goodwill of all races and ethnic groups are struggling to find acceptable and feasible ways to reach and maintain that goal and, at the same time, to reach the twin goal of improving the quality of their children’s education. This case, in which there are such disagreements and in which the defendants are engaged in a good faith effort to reach those goals, is the quintessential case for deference to the policy choice of the legislative branch.

The majority concludes its opinion with a rhetorical invocation of its oath of office as a justification for its decision. That same oath of office, however, embraces the concept of judicial respect for the legitimate policy *146choices of the legislative branch, even when judges disagree with those choices.

Only twelve years ago, we stated: “This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the intentions of its authors. The faith which democratic societies repose in the written document as a shield against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power would be illusory if those vested with the responsibility for construing and applying disputed provisions were free to stray from the purposes of the originators.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 62. In this case, that snow has now fallen, and the shield against the arbitrary exercise of power has been shattered.

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

It is by now well established that, under the constitution of Connecticut, the state must “ ‘provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools’ Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 649, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton 1); and that this court has a role in ensuring that our state’s public school students receive that fundamental guarantee. See Sheff v. O’Neill, *243238 Conn. 1, 45-46, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996). In this public interest appeal, we consider whether article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut1 also guarantees students in our state’s public schools the right to a particular minimum quality of education, namely, suitable educational opportunities. The plaintiffs, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc.,2 and numerous parents and their children, who are enrolled in public schools across the state,3 appeal, upon a grant of certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a,4 from the judgment *244of the trial court granting the motion of the defendants, various state officials and members of the state board of education,5 to strike counts one, two and four of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.6 Having determined that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable because they do not present a political question, we conclude that article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution guarantees Connecticut’s public school students educational standards and resources suitable to participate in democratic institutions, and to prepare them to attain *245productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state’s economy, or to progress on to higher education. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts, as alleged in the operative complaint and construed in the manner most favorable to the pleader; see, e.g., Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317-18, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); and procedural history. The individual plaintiffs’ children attend public schools in Bridgeport, Danbury, Windham, Hartford, New Haven, East Hartford, New London, Plainfield and New Britain. The plaintiffs allege that the state has failed to provide their children with “suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities” because of inadequate and unequal inputs, which “are essential components of a suitable educational opportunity,” namely: (1) high quality preschool; (2) appropriate class sizes; (3) programs and services for at-risk students; (4) highly qualified administrators and teachers; (5) modem and adequate libraries; (6) modem technology and appropriate instruction; (7) an adequate number of hours of instruction; (8) a rigorous curriculum with a wide breadth of courses; (9) modem and appropriate textbooks; (10) a school environment that is healthy, safe, well maintained and conducive to learning; (11) adequate special needs services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; (12) appropriate career and academic counseling; and (13) suitably ran extracurricular activities. These inputs have been recognized by the state board of education in various “[p]osition [statements” as “necessary components of a suitable educational opportunity.”

The availability and quality of these essential inputs vary significantly in schools across the state, as demonstrated by statistics from the 2003-2004 school year cited by the plaintiffs. For example, at the Lincoln Ele*246mentary School (Lincoln) in New Britain, 50 percent of the kindergarten students attended preschool, nursery school or Head Start, as compared to 76 percent statewide. None of the computers at Lincoln are high or moderate powered, in comparison to the statewide average of 63 percent. Lincoln’s library has ninety non-print materials, as compared to an average of 395 elsewhere in the state. At Lincoln, 68 percent of the teachers have a master’s degree, in comparison to 80 percent statewide. Finally, although numerous students at Lincoln perform poorly in mathematics, the school does not offer pull-out remedial instruction or in-class tutorials in that subject.7

At the Roosevelt School in Bridgeport, which includes grades kindergarten through eight, 61 percent of the kindergarten students have attended preschool or Head Start, as compared with 76 percent statewide. The average size for a kindergarten class is twenty-six students there, as compared with nineteen statewide. For a seventh grade class, the average size is thirty students, as compared with twenty-two statewide. The library has nine print volumes per student, in comparison to twenty volumes per student statewide, and thirty-seven nonprint materials, as compared to 324 statewide. The library does not subscribe to any periodicals, while the average kindergarten through eighth grade school subscribes to fifteen periodicals. Roosevelt School does not offer any computer education instruction, while other schools statewide provide an average of eighteen hours per year. Roosevelt School also does not provide any world language instruction, while 66 percent of the kindergarten through eighth grade schools statewide *247do provide such instruction. Finally, each counselor at the Roosevelt School works with 438 students, in comparison to the statewide average of 265.

At the high school level, for example, Plainfield High School does not offer pull-out remedial instruction, in-class tutorials, after school programs, or summer school in mathematics or language arts, despite the fact that numerous students performed poorly in those subjects. Students at Plainfield High School took advanced placement tests in five courses, in comparison to the statewide average of nearly ten such courses. Finally, several dedicated specialty areas of Plainfield High School are in poor physical condition, including the all-purpose room, cafeteria, outdoor athletic facilities, educational technology and office/administrative space.8

As evidence of the state’s failure to provide “suitable educational opportunities,” the plaintiffs further rely on educational “outputs” from the previously discussed schools, as measured by the “adequate yearly progress” on student achievement tests required under the federal No Child Left Behind Act; 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.; including the Connecticut Mastery Test and the Connecticut Academic Performance Test.9 Indeed, students in these schools failed to complete essential courses, such as chemistry and algebra I, at a rate exceeding *248the statewide average.10 The plaintiffs also emphasize the higher than statewide average rates of students at these schools who either are retained or advanced despite not being ready for promotion.11 Finally, the plaintiffs emphasize the higher than average cumulative dropout rate at these districts’ high schools when compared to the statewide average of 10 percent, most notably, Plainfield and Bridgeport’s dropout rates of 20 and 45 percent respectively.

The plaintiffs allege that these deficiencies are the product of a flawed educational funding system that has failed to provide and “effectively [manage]” the resources necessary to ensure suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities in the public schools, which are state agencies managed by local school districts. Specifically, schools are funded by two sources, namely, local property taxes and state grants to municipalities via the educational cost sharing system pursuant to General Statutes § 10-262Í et seq. Although the state board of education has taken the position that the state and municipalities should bear the costs of education equally, the educational cost sharing system grants have accounted for only 39 percent of school funding in Connecticut. The plaintiffs attribute this shortfall to: (1) the legislature’s failure to raise the “foundation” grant amount from $5891 since 1999; see *249General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 10-262f (9) (G);12 (2) the failure of that “foundation” amount to account for the “actual costs of providing special education students with suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities”; and (3) the failure of “the minimum base aid ratio”; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 10-262f (2);13 which addresses a municipality’s ability to pay and to calculate accurately a town’s ability to raise the necessary funds. The plaintiffs reside in communities that “do not have the ability to raise the funds needed to compensate for the monetary shortfalls that result from the state’s arbitrary and inadequate funding system.”

The plaintiffs claim further that the state’s failure to provide them with suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities has caused them irreparable *250harm by rendering them “unable to take full advantage of the country’s democratic processes and institutions, risking political and social marginalization.” The plaintiffs also claim that these deficiencies will preclude them from being “competitive in seeking meaningful employment” and will leave them “less able to reap both the tangible and intangible benefits, including the salary, health benefits, and self-realization that come with securing a dependable and adequately paying job.” The plaintiffs contend that the deficiencies will leave them “unable to continue their education” and “deprived of both the monetary and intellectual rewards that are associated with [higher] education.” In sum, the plaintiffs claim that they are being educated “in a system which sets them up for economic, social, and intellectual failure.”

Accordingly, in their four count complaint, the plaintiffs claim that the state has violated: (1) article eighth, § 1, and article first, § § 1 and 20, of the state constitution by “failing to maintain a public school system that provides [them] with suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities”; (2) article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution by “failing to maintain a public school system that provides [them] with suitable educational opportunities”; (3) article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the state constitution by “failing to maintain a public school system that provides [them] with substantially equal educational opportunities”; and (4) article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the state constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by acting under color of state law in “failing] to maintain a public school system that provides [them] with suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities,” which has disproportionately impacted African-American, Latino and other minority students. The plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that: (1) they “have a right to receive suitable and substantially equal educational opportuni*251ties as a matter of state constitutional law”; (2) “the state’s failure to provide suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities violates article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the [state] constitution”; and (3) the “existing school funding system is unconstitutional, void and without effect.” The plaintiffs also seek, inter alia, injunctions against the continued operation of the present funding system except in transition to a court-ordered and newly created constitutional funding system, as well as the appointment of a special master, and an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Thereafter, the defendants moved to strike the first, second and fourth counts of the complaint, arguing that article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the state constitution do not confer a right to “suitable” educational opportunities, and in particular, do not “guarantee equality or parity of educational achievement or results.”14 In addressing the defendants’ motion to strike, the trial court first concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable under Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, and Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615. The trial court, applying the well established state constitutional analysis of State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), concluded that the language of the state constitution did not support the plaintiffs’ claim to a right to a suitable public education, and that the decisions of this court, including Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 639 A.2d 502 (1994), have demonstrated its “reluctance to insert itself into educational policy decisions in the absence of clear constitutional or legislative authority to do so.” The trial court also concluded that federal precedents did not support the plaintiffs’ *252claim, and that those state courts that have found “some qualitative content in their state constitution’s educational clauses . . . have done so on the basis of language substantially different than Connecticut’s.”15 Accordingly, the trial court concluded that there is no “constitutional right to ‘suitable’ educational opportunities.”16 The trial court rendered judgment striking counts one, two and four of the complaint, and this appeal followed. See footnotes 4 and 6 of this opinion.

“We begin by setting out the well established standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike. Because amotion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court’s ruling on the [defendants’ motion] is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. ... It is fundamental that in *253determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, supra, 280 Conn. 317-18.

I

Because it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, we begin with the defendants’ contention that the trial court improperly concluded that this case is justiciable, and does not present a political question.17 The defendants argue that the trial court improperly relied on Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, and Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615, in concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable because those cases involved educational equality claims, while this case presents questions of educational policy that are distinctly committed to coordinate branches of government. The defendants further contend that, under the well established political question analysis of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); see, e.g., Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 573, 858 A.2d 709 (2004); the plaintiffs’ claims present questions that are textually committed to the legislative branch, not readily evaluated under “judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” and *254would require this court to act improperly as a “super legislature” to address educational policy in the first instance. In response, the plaintiffs contend that we rejected these same arguments in Sheff, and that their claims do not require the courts to mandate particular educational policies. They contend that their claims need only be evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances,” which would compare the facts as found to a variety of indicators and inputs, none of which needs to be constitutionalized individually. The plaintiffs also emphasize the standard for considering motions to dismiss or to strike, which requires their allegations to be viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader. The plaintiffs further rely on Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 482-84, 803 A.2d 318 (2002), in which we considered the plaintiffs’ claims justiciable because formulation of the appropriate remedy could be left to the legislative branch in the first instance. We agree with the plaintiffs, and conclude that their claims do not present a nonjusticiable political question.

“We first set forth the fundamental principles that underlie justiciability. Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. ... As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. . . . Finally, because an issue *255regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. 568-69.

“The political question doctrine itself is based on the principle of separation of powers ... as well as the notion that the judiciary should not involve itself in matters that have been committed to the executive and legislative branches of government. To conclude that an issue is within the political question doctrine is not an abdication of judicial responsibility; rather, it is a recognition that the tools with which a court can work, the data which it can fairly appraise, the conclusions which it can reach as a basis for entering judgments, have limits. . . . Whether a controversy so directly implicates the primary authority of the legislative or executive branch, such that a court is not the proper forum for its resolution, is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case inquiry.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 572-73.

Following Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 211, “[i]n considering whether a particular subject matter presents a noryusticiable political question, we have articulated [six] relevant factors, including: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there *256should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s presence. . . . Furthermore, simply because the case has a connection to the political sphere [is not] an independent basis for characterizing an issue as a political question . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. 573. Indeed, “the principle that a case should not be dismissed for nonjusticiability as a political question unless an unusual need for unquestioned adherence to that decision is inextricable from the case, means that courts should view such cases with a heavy thumb on the side of justiciability, and with the recognition that, simply because the case is connected to the political sphere, it does not necessarily follow that it is a political question.” Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 488.

We agree with the plaintiffs that our decision in Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, controls the justiciability issue in this appeal. In that case, the plaintiff schoolchildren had claimed, inter alia, that the state “defendants bear responsibility for the de facto racial and ethnic segregation between Hartford and the surrounding suburban public school districts and thus have deprived the plaintiffs of an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1.” Id., 5. The plaintiffs also alleged “that the defendants have failed to provide the plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because the defendants have maintained in Hartford a public school district that, by comparison with surrounding suburban public school districts: (1) is severely educationally disadvantaged; (2) fails to provide equal educational opportunities for Hartford schoolchildren; and (3) fails to provide a mini*257maily adequate education for Hartford schoolchildren.” Id., 6.

In Sheff, the state contended that the case was a nonjusticiable political question “expressly and exclusively entrusted to the legislature” by article eighth, § 1; id., 13; which directs the legislature “to implement this principle [of free public education] by appropriate legislation.” Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 1. Describing the distinction between cases that are justiciable and those that are not as an “uneasy line,” we emphasized that “courts do not have jurisdiction to decide cases that involve matters that textually have been reserved to the legislature, such as the implementation of a constitutional spending cap ... or the appointment of additional judges. ... In the absence of such a textual reservation, however, it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles. . . . Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the [constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this [c]ourt as ultimate interpreter of the [c]onstitution.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 13-14.

In Sheff, we emphasized that, in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615, “we reviewed, in plenary fashion, the actions taken by the legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to public elementary and secondary schoolchildren.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 14. We emphasized that the “plaintiff schoolchildren in the present case invoke the same constitutional provisions to challenge the constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff schoolchildren invoked in Horton [I].... The text of article eighth, § 1, has not changed. Further*258more, although prudential cautions may shed light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies . . . such cautions do not deprive a court of jurisdiction.

“In light of these precedents, we are persuaded that the phrase ‘appropriate legislation’ in article eighth, § 1, does not deprive the courts of the authority to determine what is ‘appropriate.’ Just as the legislature has a constitutional duty to fulfill its affirmative obligation to the children who attend the state’s public elementary and secondary schools, so the judiciary has a constitutional duty to review whether the legislature has fulfilled its obligation. Considerations of justiciability must be balanced against the principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of subject matter jurisdiction. ... In this case, our precedents compel the conclusion that the balance must be struck in favor of the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ complaint.”18 (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 14-16; see also Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. 574 (“[although the text of our state constitution confers impeachment authority on the legislature . . . that authority is not unbounded and legislative encroachment upon other constitutional principles may, in an appropriate case, be subject to judicial review” [citations omitted]).

*259In support of his argument that article eighth, § 1, textually commits issues of educational quality to the legislature, Justice Zarella in his dissenting opinion relies on Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996), which addressed the legislature’s responsibility to implement the constitutional spending cap, Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984) (plurality opinion), wherein the plaintiffs sought this court to direct the appointment of additional trial judges, and Simmons v. Budds, 165 Conn. 507, 338 A.2d 479 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 1943, 40 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1974), wherein a professor challenged grading regulations adopted by the University of Connecticut. In our view, Justice Zarella’s reliance on these cases is inapposite because the constitutional provisions at issue therein unambiguously confer full authority over the respective subject matter to the legislature, and do not contain qualifying terms such as “appropriate legislation” that imply a judicial role in disputes arising thereunder, particularly when coupled with the word “shall,” which itself implies a “constitutional duty” that is “mandatory and judicially enforceable.” See Nielsen v. State, supra, 9-10 (unlike “appropriate legislation” language of article eighth, § 1, language in article third, § 18 [b], requiring legislature to “by law define” terms for constitutional spending cap “by its plain and unambiguous terms, commits exclusively to the General Assembly the power to define the spending cap terms and nowhere intimates any role in this process for the judiciary” [emphasis added]); Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 681 (number of trial judges is textually committed to legislature by provision stating, without qualification that “ ‘[t]he judges of the . . . superior court shall, upon nomination by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed’ ”); Pellegrino v. O’Neill, *260supra, 688 (Healey, J., concurring) (same); Simmons v. Budds, supra, 514 (although article eighth, § 2, of state constitution contains qualitative “ ‘excellence’ ” standard, it also does not have “appropriate legislation” clause of article eighth, § l);19 see also R. Levy, “Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation,” 54 Kan. L. Rev. 1021, 1051-52 (2006) (“[o]rdinarily, when the term ‘shall’ is used in a legal document, it is construed as mandatory and judicially enforceable”). Accordingly, Justice Zarella’s restrictive view of the constitutional language notwithstanding, the drafters of article eighth, § 1, could have used more restrictive language, had they wished to avert completely the potential involvement of the judiciary in its enforcement and implementation, regardless of the propriety of those legislative acts. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-31, 113 S. Ct. 732, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993) (claim that Senate improperly delegated impeachment fact-finding to committee was political question because of constitutional language giving Senate “ ‘sole [p]ower to try all [i]mpeachments’ ” [emphasis added]).

Moreover, our subsequent decision in Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 475, demonstrates that at least one of the plaintiffs’ desired remedies supports the justiciability of their claims. In Seymour, the plaintiffs claimed that General Statutes *261§ 10-51 (b), which provides for the financing of regional school districts, unconstitutionally resulted in higher education costs for property poor towns. Id., 479. In concluding that this claim was justiciable, “we first addressjed] the specific forms of relief that the plaintiffs seek. If we were to construe the complaint as requesting only that a court, having determined that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are meritorious, order the [school] district to establish itself as a taxing district, and set the taxing powers and standards suggested by the plaintiffs, we would have grave doubts about the justiciability of the claim, as the defendant suggests. In that case, it is very likely that the claim would fall within one or more of the categories of nonjusticiability.

“We do not, however, view the plaintiffs’ prayer for relief so narrowly. Although the plaintiffs do seek, in part, such an order from the court, and although the text of the complaint presents such a remedy as the only way to vindicate the plaintiffs’ rights, a separate prayer for relief is simply ‘[t]hat judgment be entered declaring that ... § 10-51 (b) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied by [the board].’ When a complaint is challenged by a motion to dismiss, we view its allegations in the light favorable to the pleader. . . . We see no reason why the same principle should not apply to the prayer for relief. This latter prayer for relief is susceptible of an interpretation that would leave the formulation of the appropriate remedy to the legislative branch, rather than requiring the judicial branch to entangle itself in what probably would be the nonjudicial function of establishing a taxing district. Furthermore, there is precedent for this court, having determined that a particular legislative scheme is unconstitutional, to leave the remedy to the legislative branch, at least initially. . . . We, therefore, consider the question of justiciability on the premise that the plaintiffs seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality *262of § 10-51 (b), with the remedy that they propose to be considered by the legislative branch.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 483-84; accord M. Besso, “Sheff v. O’Neill: The Connecticut Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics,” 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 165, 210 (2003) (The author noted that the “existing” political question doctrine is “depend[ent] on a linkage between right and remedy,” that it “no longer comports with the reality of our constitution in practice,” and that “[w]e should expect that the judiciary will declare constitutional principles, when warranted, but should expect no more. We should expect that the court’s declaration will be stated with clarity, and with no compromise, because of concerns about complex remedies. And we should expect that realization will come through the operation of politics beyond the court, but always in the shadow of the court’s declaration.”); see also M. Besso, supra, 211-12 (noting distinction between declaration of right and ordering of remedy, and arguing in favor of “a new role for the court that is at once more active and more restrained”).

In the present case, as in Seymour, the complaint clearly requests a declaration of a constitutional violation, with the precise remedy being left to the defendants in the first instance. Specifically, the plaintiffs ask that the court “order [the] defendants to create and maintain a public education system that will provide suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities [for the] plaintiffs.”20 This type of relief would not *263turn a trial judge into a de facto education superintendent, and supports the plaintiffs’ argument that their claims are justiciable. See also Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 650-51 (This court noted that the trial court properly “limited its judgments to declaratory ones while retaining jurisdiction for consideration of the granting of any consequential relief’ because “the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function of the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty under the provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1. The judicial department properly stays its hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to act.”).

With respect to the other Baker factors, we first note that “[t]here are easily discoverable and manageable judicial standards for determining the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim[s].” Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 485. Although the plaintiffs’ claims present a question of first impression in *264Connecticut, similar issues with respect to the substantive content of education clauses have been considered by courts in many of our sister states, some of which have articulated standards for determining whether a state’s public schools satisfy minimum constitutional requirements. See part IIE of this opinion. Although our courts should remain cautious of separation of powers concerns in crafting remedies, should the plaintiffs ultimately succeed in establishing liability at trial, the plaintiffs’ claims at this stage present nothing more than a basic question of constitutional interpretation, a task for which this court is well suited.21 See Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 485; see also Office of the Governors. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. 574 (“[t]here are no special impediments to our ascertainment and application of the standards by which to resolve this challenge; indeed, the matter raises questions of constitutional interpretation that, for more than two centuries, regularly have been reserved for the judiciary”); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, 176 S.W.3d 746, 779 (Tex. 2005) (The court noted that dis*265agreements about the meaning of the constitutional language “are not unique to [the state’s education clause]; they persist as to the meanings and applications of due course of law, equal protection, and many other constitutional provisions. Indeed, those provisions have inspired far more litigation than [the state’s education clause] . . . .”).

Further, deciding the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims does not inextricably involve us “in making an initial policy determination of a clearly nonjudicial, discretionary nature. Whenever a court engages in the process of determining whether a statute violates the constitution, matters of policy admittedly enter into the analysis. That does not mean, however, that, in applying the appropriate constitutional standards in the present case, we would be required to make some initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 486; see also Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 13 (“it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles”). Put differently, deciding the plaintiffs’ claims does not put this court in the position of articulating in the first instance, for example, maximum class sizes or minimal technical specifications for classroom computers.22 See also *266 Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, supra, 176 S.W.3d 779 (“[t]he judiciary’s choice is not between complete abstinence from [education clause] issues, and being, in the [s]tate defendants’ words, ‘the arbiter of education and policy, overseeing such issues as curriculum and testing development, textbook approval, and teacher certification’ ”). The judicial role is limited to deciding whether certain public educational systems, as presently constituted and funded, satisfy an articulated constitutional standard.23

*267Indeed, “[w]e see nothing in the plaintiffs’ claim of unconstitutionality, moreover, that would, if we were to undertake to decide it or if it were found to be meritorious, involve the courts in expressing a lack of due respect for coordinate branches of government.” Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 486. We have recognized that, “deciding that a statute is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied, is a delicate task in any event, and one that the courts perform only if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the statute’s invalidity. . . . That alone does not mean, however, that, if such a result must be reached on the facts and the law, such a declaration expresses lack of due respect for the legislative branch. Performing such a task simply exemplifies the fundamental judicial burden of determining whether a statute meets constitutional standards.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

Whether there is a risk of “multifarious pronouncements by other governmental departments on the question presented by the complaint” is not an inextricable concern. Id., 482. “Simply because the legislature has passed a statute adopting a particular fiscal formula cannot mean that a court may not entertain a constitutional challenge to that formula.” Id., 487-88. Thus, “this matter does not present an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a preexisting political decision. As previously discussed, it is well within the province of the judiciary to determine whether a coordinate branch of government has conducted itself’ in accordance with “the authority conferred upon it by the constitution.”24 *269supra, 271 Conn. 576. Accordingly, we conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.25

II

We now turn to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, which are properly framed using the state constitutional *270analysis articulated by State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 672, and posit that the fundamental right to education under article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution encompasses a minimum qualitative standard that guarantees students the right to “suitable educational opportunities.” The plaintiffs define “suitable educational opportunities” as having three components: (1) “An educational experience that prepares them to function as responsible citizens and enables them to fully participate in democratic institutions”; (2) “a meaningful high school education that enables them to advance through institutions of higher learning, or that enables them to compete on equal footing to find productive employment and contribute to the state’s economy”; and (3) an opportunity to meet the educational standards as set by the political branches of the state. We conclude, consistent with the conclusions of other state courts that have considered similar constitutional guarantees, that article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution embodies a substantive component requiring that the public schools provide their students with an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state’s economy.

“It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . . Furthermore, although we often rely on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendments to the constitution of the *271United States to delineate the boundaries of the protections provided by the constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized that, in some instances, our state constitution provides protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. . . . The analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protection to our citizens than the federal constitutional minimum is well settled. In State v. Geisler, [supra, 222 Conn. 684-86], we enumerated the following six factors to be considered in determining that issue: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) the text of the operative constitutional provisions; (3) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other state courts; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise described, relevant public policies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 509-10, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007).

“The Geisler factors serve a dual purpose: they encourage the raising of state constitutional issues in a manner to which the opposing party — the state or the defendant — can respond; and they encourage a principled development of our state constitutional jurisprudence. Although in Geisler we compartmentalized the factors that should be considered in order to stress that a systematic analysis is required, we recognize that they may be inextricably interwoven. . . . Finally, not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases.”26 (Citation omit*272ted.) State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 716 n.10, 657 A.2d 585 (1995). Accordingly, we now turn to the parties’ specific arguments with respect to each factor.

A

The Operative Constitutional Text

As noted previously, the text of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Thus, the plaintiffs argue that the textual factor supports their claim because the use of the word “school” in article eighth, § 1, necessarily means institutions wherein “systematic” or “intellectual, moral and social” instruction is provided, and that not maintaining a minimum constitutional standard would eviscerate the legislature’s responsibilities thereunder. The defendants contend in response that § 2 of article eighth of the state constitution, which provides that the University of Connecticut shall be devoted to “excellence” in education, as well as the use of qualitative language in other states’ education clauses, indicates that the drafters acted intentionally to omit a particular qualitative standard from article eighth, § 1. The defendants rely, then, on Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595, 660 A.2d 742 (1995), for the proposition that “[w]e are especially hesitant to read into the constitution unenumerated affirmative *273governmental obligations. In general, the declaration of rights in our state constitution was implemented not to impose affirmative obligations on the government, but rather to secure individual liberties against direct infringement through state action. ” The defendants contend, therefore, that the plaintiffs’ adequacy claims are distinct from those considered in Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, which also involved constitutional provisions directly implicating equality and segregation. In our view, the text of article eighth, § 1, is ambiguous, which necessitates a complete Geisler analysis to determine its meaning with respect to a qualitative component.

“In dealing with constitutional provisions we must assume that infinite care was employed to couch in scrupulously fitting language a proposal aimed at establishing or changing the organic law of the state. . . . Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.” (Citations omitted.) Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981). Moreover, we do not supply constitutional language that the drafters intentionally may have chosen to omit. See State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 320, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005).

As noted previously, the text of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut, provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Article eighth, § 1, does not contain any qualitative language, in contrast to § 2 of article eighth of the constitution of Connecticut, which requires the state to “maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, *274which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education. The general assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment of the governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units or coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, this court previously has held that the qualitative standard of “excellence” under article eighth, § 2, “was not meant to be a wedge for penetration of the educational establishment by judicial intervention in policy decisions.” Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514; id. (rejecting professor’s challenge to actions of officials of university setting grading policies to apply in wake of student antiwar protests).

The language of certain other states’ education clauses also supports the defendants’ textual argument superficially. The majority of the states have constitutional language that requires their legislatures to establish and maintain schools that are “adequate,” “general,” “thorough” or “efficient,” which supports the defendants’ argument that the drafters of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut could have imposed similar qualitative standards. See, e.g., Ark. Const., art. 14, § 1 (“[intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education”); Colo. Const., art. IX, § 2 (“[t]he general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously”); Fla. Const., art. IX, § 1 (a) (“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It *275is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”); Ga. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia. Public education for the citizens prior to the college or postsecondaiy level shall be free and shall be provided for by taxation.”); N.J. Const., art. VIII, § 4 (1) (“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years”); Ohio Const., art. VI, § 2 (“ [t]he general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state”); Va. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“[t]he General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained”); Wyo. Const., art. 7, § 97-7-001 (“[t]he legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow, and such other *276institutions as may be necessary”).27 Thus, these other *277states’ educational provisions provide some indication that the drafters of article eighth, § 1, could have, but did not, act to enact a constitutional provision with a clearly articulated qualitative standard for its public schools.

*278We disagree, however, with the defendants’ contention that Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 580-81, is dispositive of the plaintiffs’ claims under the textual factor. In Moore, we rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the state constitution contains an “unenumerated . . . obligation of the state to provide subsistence benefits to all its citizens in need,” concluding “that the state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to provide minimal subsistence to its poor citizens.” Id., 580-81. We emphasized that “[t]he text of our constitution makes evident the fact that its drafters have been explicit when choosing to impose affirmative obligations on the state,” noting that, “the history of article eighth, § 1, is particularly instructive in the present case. This explicit textual provision, and its counterparts, article eighth, § 2 (system of higher education), and article eighth, § 4 (school fund), are the only constitutional provisions, recognized to date, that impose affirmative obligations on the part of the state to expend public funds to afford benefits to its citizenry. Other provisions, such as those in article first, protect individuals from state intrusion.”28 Id., 595-96. Moore is inapposite because, in the present case, we are called on to consider the extent of the state’s obligations under the already existing education clause, rather than to carve a new unenumerated right out of whole cloth.

*279Moreover, although the defendants’ textual arguments are plausible, the constitutional language nevertheless is ambiguous, and is not dispositive of this appeal. See State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 385-88, 497 A.2d 408 (1985) (recognizing that “superficially appealing” constitutional language may be rendered ambiguous in context of relevant case law in concluding that no right to hybrid representation in criminal case exists under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut). The commonly cited dictionary definitions of the relevant terms in article eighth, § 1, namely, “elementary,” “secondary” and “school,” have a qualitative connotation, as “elementary school” is defined as “a school usu[ally] the first four to the first eight grades and often a kindergarten,” and particularly, “secondary school” is defined as a “school intermediate between elementary school and college and usu[aily] offering general, technical, vocational, or college-preparatory courses.”29 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1998). Indeed, even Justice Loiselle’s dissenting opinion in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 658-59, in which he concluded that education was not a fundamental right under the state constitution, appears to contemplate that the education clause must have some substantive content in order to be meaningful, as he said that “when the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.” See also id., 661 (Loiselle, J., dissenting) (“[w]e cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country”). Accordingly, since the text of article eighth, § 1, is ambiguous, we necessarily must continue with our review of the other Geisler factors.

*280B

The Holdings and Dicta of This Court

This factor similarly is not dispositive of the plaintiffs’ appeal because this case presents a question of first impression, namely, the qualitative content of the education clause with respect to inadequacy without considerations of inequality.30 A review of this court’s31 education clause jurisprudence demonstrates, however, that the plaintiffs’ claims are in fact consistent with our precedents. The seminal32 case is Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 618, wherein the plaintiffs challenged the state’s educational finance system, claiming that its reliance on the property tax “ensure [d] that, regardless of the educational needs or wants of children, more educational dollars will be allotted to children who live *281in property-rich towns than to children who live in property-poor towns.” Id., 633.

This court first determined, with respect to the applicable level of scrutiny, that, “in Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.”33 Id., 646. In so concluding, the court emphasized the presence of a specific education clause in the state constitution, in contrast to the federal constitution, under which education is not a fundamental right. See id., 640-45 (distinguishing and discussing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973]). The court, therefore, concluded that “the present legislation enacted by the General Assembly to discharge the state’s constitutional duty to educate its children, depending, as it does, primarily on a local property tax base without regard to the disparity in the financial ability of the towns to finance an educational program and with no significant equalizing state support, is not ‘appropriate legislation’ (article eighth, § 1) to implement the requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. *282649. The court left the remedy to the legislature in the first instance, however, noting that “the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function of the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty under the provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § l.”34 Id., 651; see also id. (“[t]he judicial department properly stays its hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to act”).

*283The concurring and dissenting opinions in Horton I demonstrate that, as a basic fundamental point, the entire court agreed that article eighth, § 1, necessarily embodies some qualitative component. Concurring in the reasoning as well as the judgment of the court, Justice Bogdanski wrote separately to highlight the history of the education clause and the 1965 constitutional convention proceedings, which “formalized free public education on the elementary and secondary levels as a fundamental right.” Id., 653-54. Justice Bogdanski also emphasized that “the right of our children to an education is a matter of right not only because our state constitution declares it as such, but because education is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of society together. In a real sense, it is as necessary to a civilized society as food and shelter are to an individual. It is our fundamental legacy to the youth of our state to enable them to acquire knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for it is the ability to reason that separates man from all other forms of life.” Id., 654-55 (Bogdanski,, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Bogdanski noted specifically that the equality issues presented by Horton I “are directed toward the right of the children of this state to a basic education, and the determination of whether certain statutes of this state unconstitutionally impinge upon that right.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 655.

Justice Loiselle dissented from the majority’s holding that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution. Id., 655-56. He characterized the majority’s opinion as “requiring ... an equalized pot of money per town”; id., 658 (Loiselle, J., dissenting); and stated that “the constitution requires free education, and ‘appropriate legislation’ is legislation which makes education free. I will concede that when the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an *284 open field to hear lectures by illiterates. But there is no contention that such situations exist, or that education in Connecticut is not meaningful or does not measure up to standards accepted by knowledgeable leaders in the field of education.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 658-59. Finally, Justice Loiselle emphasized that “[w]e cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that-our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country. The issue is whether, because our state laws allow some towns to furnish a broader spectrum of choice than other towns desire to furnish or feel financially able to furnish, that the system has to tumble down.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 661. In our view, the various opinions in Horton I support the plaintiffs’ position that the fundamental right to an education is not an empty linguistic shell, but has at least some minimal substantive content. Indeed, Justice Loiselle’s emphasis on the lack of a claim that the plaintiffs in Horton I were not getting a basic education is a harbinger of the plaintiffs’ claims in this appeal.

Our most recent decision with respect to article eighth, § 1, is Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1. In Sheff, we considered claims that severe racial and ethnic isolation in Hartford, as well as the high concentration of poverty there, violated the rights of the plaintiff schoolchildren under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20,35 of the state constitution. Id., 3-5. The *285plaintiffs argued that the state bore responsibility for the de facto racial and ethnic segregation between Hartford and its surrounding suburban school districts; id., 5; and also that “the defendants have failed to provide the plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because the defendants have maintained in Hartford a public school district that, by comparison with surrounding suburban public school districts: (1) is severely educationally disadvantaged; (2) fails to provide equal educational opportunities for Hartford schoolchildren; and (3) fails to provide a minimally adequate education for Hartford schoolchildren.” Id., 6.

On the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, this court framed the issue as “whether the state has fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has substantially equalized school funding and resources.”36 Id., 25. We concluded that, notwithstanding the lack of any invidious intentional conduct on the part of the state in creating the conditions of segregation, “in the context of public education, in which the state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and to equalize educational opportunity, the state’s awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation imposes upon the state the responsibility to remedy segregation . . . because of race [or] . . . ancestry .... We therefore hold that, textually, article eighth, § 1, as informed by article first, § 20, *286requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.”37 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 29-30.

We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the “methodology requires us to balance the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature’s recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 37. Citing statistics with respect to the ethnic and racial composition of the schools’ population, we stated that “the disparities in the racial and ethnic composition of public schools in Hartford and the surrounding communities are more than de minimis . . . [and] jeopardize the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education.”38 Id., 38-39.

*287Thus, we concluded that “the state has failed to fulfill its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity. Much like the substantially unequal access to fiscal resources that we found constitutionally unacceptable in Horton I, the disparity in access to an unsegregated educational environment in this case arises out of state action and inaction that, prima facie, violates the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, although that segregation has occurred de facto rather than de jure.” Id., 40. Notwithstanding “the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.”39 Id., 42. Accordingly, we concluded that “the school districting scheme, as codified at [General Statutes] §§ 10-184 and 10-240 and as enforced with regard to these plaintiffs, is unconstitutional.” Id., 43. We then elected “to employ the methodology used in Horton and directed only the granting of declaratory relief while retaining jurisdiction to grant consequential relief if needed in the future, following action by the political branches. Id., 45-46; see id., 46 (“[p]rudence and sensitivity to the constitutional authority of coordinate branches of government counsel the same caution in this case”).

*288In our view, Sheff supports the plaintiffs in the present case. Although not decided as an educational adequacy case, our determination therein that the claim that the government’s failure to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities pursuant to article first, § 20, was justiciable; see footnotes 18 through 24 of this opinion and the accompanying text; as well as our willingness to consider and order judicial remedies for the effect of the segregated conditions in Hartford’s schools on the education of the children there, indicates that this court is willing to protect the state constitutional right to an education afforded under article eighth, § 1.

Indeed, as in Horton I, the separate opinions in Sheff provide even stronger support for the plaintiffs’ claims herein, as the plaintiffs in Sheff also raised an educational adequacy claim that was not addressed directly by the majority opinion. See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 48 (Berdon, J., concurring); id., 141 (Borden, J., dissenting). Justice Berdon, concurring in the reasoning and the judgment, concluded that “a racially and ethnically segregated educational environment also deprives schoolchildren of an adequate education as required by the state constitution." (Emphasis added.) Id., 48. Noting the fundamentality of the right to an education under article eighth, § 1; see id., 49-50; Justice Berdon stated that ethnic and racial segregation between school districts “can have a devastating impact on a minority student’s education”; id., 51; and concluded that, “[i]n order to provide an adequate or ‘proper’ education, our children must be educated in a nonsegregated environment.” Id., 51-52. Although Justice Berdon described Hartford’s comparatively low achievement test scores as “insightful into the devastating effects of racial isolation on the students’ education”; id., 52; he emphasized that the effects of de facto segregation are felt beyond Hartford: “Children of every race and ethnic background suffer when an educational system is adminis*289tered on a segregated basis. Education entails not only the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic, but today, in our multicultural world, it also includes the development of social understanding and racial tolerance. If the mission of education is to prepare our children to survive and succeed in today’s world, then they must be taught how to live together as one people.” Id., 53 (Berdon, J., concurring).

In contrast, Justice Borden rejected the plaintiffs’ educational adequacy claim in his dissenting opinion, although he concluded that “it is not necessary in this case to decide whether article eighth, § 1, embodies a requirement that the state provide a minimally adequate education or, if it does, the extent to which such a requirement is subject to judicial review . . . [or] to define the specific contours of such an education.” Id., 142. Justice Borden assumed that there was a constitutional right to an adequate education, but rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on state mastery test scores as a standard for determining whether that right had been violated, noting that, “[n]ot only the trial court’s findings in this case, but also common sense tells me that any appropriate standard by which to measure the state’s assumed obligation to provide a minimally adequate education must be based generally, not on what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 143. Describing students’ problems such as low birth weight, maternal drug use and other “early environmental deprivations”; id., 144; Justice Borden concluded that, “[although schools are important socializing institutions in our democratic society, they cannot be constitutionally required to overcome every serious social and personal disadvantage that students bring with them to school, and that seriously hinder the academic achievement of *290those students.” Id. Significantly, Justice Borden noted, however, that his conclusion was “not to say that, as part of its assumed constitutional obligation to provide a minimally adequate education, the state has no obligation to attempt, by reasonable means, to ameliorate these problems. It may well have such an obligation. It is to say, however, that this record fully establishes that the state has, through the programs, policies and funding mechanisms already described, met that obligation.” Id. Although Justice Borden’s dissenting opinion rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on the record in Sheff, his analysis explicitly left open the question of whether article eighth, § 1, embodies a particular minimum quality of education.

Other decisions from this court provide additional insight into the limits of the state’s responsibilities under the education clause, and consistent with Justice Borden’s dissenting opinion in Sheff, indicate that the state’s responsibilities under article eighth, § 1, are not unbounded, and do not require the state to take measures that will maximize the potential of specific students or mitigate the effect of every possible negative external factor for which the state bears no direct responsibility.40 For example, in Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 286, 571 A.2d 696 (1990), the plaintiffs claimed that “terminating emergency housing and offering as an alternative only group shelter housing distant from the New Haven area, where the children of these *291plaintiffs have been attending school, would violate their state constitutional right to education because of the harmful effect upon them of frequent school transfers.” Applying Horton I, this court concluded that “the burden imposed on the state by our decision in Horton [I] to ensure approximate equality in the public educational opportunities offered to children throughout this state . . . despite variations in funding by the towns, [does not include] any guaranty that children are entitled to receive their education at any particular school or that the state must provide housing accommodations for them and their families close to the schools they are presently attending. The undoubted hardship imposed upon the children of these plaintiffs from the lack of affordable housing near the schools where they now are being educated cannot be disputed. It results, however, from the difficult financial circumstances they face, not from anything the state has done to deprive them of the right to equal educational opportunity. When the plaintiffs were displaced from their former homes, the commissioner [of income maintenance] was not obligated to provide emergency housing for them located near their former homes so that their children could continue to attend the same schools.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 286-87.

Similarly, in Broadley v. Board of Education, supra, 229 Conn. 4, we considered the plaintiffs claim “that he has a state constitutional right to receive a program of education specially designed to meet his individual needs as a gifted child.” Relying on General Statutes § 10-76a et seq., the plaintiff in Broadley contended that “the legislature, by classifying gifted children as among those children who are unable to ‘progress effectively’ without special education, has created for those children the right to special education under article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution . . . .” Id., 5. He “concede [d], however, that, the Connecticut constitu*292tion does not, standing alone, afford gifted children the right to a program of special education,” and also “that gifted children have no state statutory right to special education, because the legislature has not mandated such a course of study for gifted pupils.” Id., 6. We “conclude[d] that the legislature did not intend to create a right to special education for gifted children. Although the language of § 10-76a (c) includes gifted children as among those exceptional children who do not ‘progress effectively’ without special education, [General Statutes] § 10-76d (b) and (c) manifest the unambiguous intent of the legislature that special education is mandatory only for children with disabilities and not for gifted students. Indeed, there is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative history of the special education statutes that the legislature, in establishing a program of special education, sought either to define the parameters of the state constitutional right to a free public education, or to constitutionalize any particular kind of educational program for exceptional children.” Id., 7. In our view, Broadley is another illustration of the limitations of the education clause, in its rejection of the plaintiffs claim that he was constitutionally entitled to a particular program of education aimed at his individual progress specifically; indeed, the plaintiff therein did not claim that his education was insufficient to provide him with the minimum knowledge and skill base necessary to seek higher education or meaningful employment.

C

Constitutional History

As noted by the parties and the brief of the amici curiae, Christopher Collier, the state historian emeritus, and Simon J. Bernstein, the principal draftsman and proponent of article eighth, § 1, at the 1965 constitutional convention, Connecticut’s deeply rooted commit*293ment to free public education is well documented. See State ex rel. Huntington v. Huntington School Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882 (1909) (“Connecticut has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young”); see also Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348 (1894) (describing education as duty “assumed by the [s]tate . . . chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the [s]tate itself’). Indeed, the Code of Laws for the Colony of Connecticut, promulgated in 1650 and commonly known as the Ludlow Code, recognized that “the good Education of Children is of singular behoofe and benefitt to any Common wealth,” and required families to educate their children “to read the [E]nglish tounge, and knowledge of the Capitall Lawes,” in the “grounds and principles of religion,” and “in some honest lawfull . . . labour or [e]mployment, either in husbandry, or some other trade proffitable for themselves and the Common wealth, if they will not nor cannott traine them [u]p in Learning to fitt them for higher [e]mployments.” Code of Laws, Children (1650), reprinted in 1 Col. Rec. 509, 520-21 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., 1850). To that end, the Ludlow Code made public education and school attendance mandatory, requiring “euery Towneshipp within this Jurissdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty houshoulders . . . [to] forthwith appoint one within theire Towne to teach all such children as shall resorte to him, to write and read,” and further, “where any Towne shall increase to the number of one hundred families or housholders, they shall sett [u]p a Grammer Schoole, the masters thereof being able to instruct youths so farr as they may bee fitted for the [U]niversity.” Code of Laws, Schooles (1650), reprinted in 1 Col. Rec., supra, 555.

Thus, Bernstein stated that he had introduced the resolution that ultimately was enacted as article eighth, *294§ 1, because “our system of free public education [has] a tradition acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same [constitutional sanctity. It was because our [cjonstitution had no reference to our school system that I submitted my resolution .... I became aware of this . . . when I served on a board of education and was surprised to find that Connecticut with its traditional good education had no reference to it in the [cjonstitution when I use the word ‘good education’ I am quoting . . . from the Connecticut code of 1650 which others I believe call the Ludlow Code. Quote ‘a good education of children is of singular of behoove and benefit to any [c]ommonweaith’ so we do have the tradition which goes back to our earliest days of free good public education and we have h[ad] good public schools so that this again is not anything revolutionary, it is something which we have, it is which is practically all [constitutions in the [s]tates of our nation and Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle.”41 Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Delegate Bernstein; see id., p. 1062, remarks of Delegate Chase G. Woodhouse (“I think it is extremely fitting that we should finally put into our [constitution a reference to our great public schools because Henry Barnard of Connecticut is perhaps one of the greatest historical figures in this development of public school education in this whole nation of ours”); *295see also Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 595-96 (discussing history of article eighth, § 1, in noting that our constitution’s drafters “have been explicit when choosing to impose affirmative obligations on the state”). Woodhouse noted that, in conjunction with § 2, which constitutionalized higher education, article eighth “covers everything that we might regard as essential now for a system of education that will be one of the best in the whole United States.”42 Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1063. Indeed, in introducing the provision, Bernstein noted specifically the importance of education with respect to the preservation of representative democratic institutions.43 See Proceedings of the Connecticut *296Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, p. 312, remarks of Delegate Bernstein (“[i]t goes without saying that [if] we are g[o]ing to have representative [g]ovemment elected by a public that the education of the public is the first and best way of promoting the best representatives [to] be elected to our various legislative bodies in the [c]ity and the [s]tate”).

Although the proponents of article eighth, § 1, did not articulate a substantive standard, they emphasized the historical importance of education to Connecticut in the context of its role in fostering meaningful civic participation in a representative democracy. Thus, in the absence of any contravening evidence in the historical record supporting the proposition that the education provision only is hortatory and lacks real substance,44 this historical factor informs our construction of article eighth, § 1.

D

Federal Precedents

Having reviewed those Geisler factors specific to Connecticut, we now turn to a review of those considerations that go beyond our borders. We note, however, that “not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases.” State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 716 n.10; see also

*297 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 157, 956 A.2d 1174 (2008) (same). Thus, the lack of a comparable provision in the United States constitution that assures a fundamental right to a free public education renders federal precedent, most significantly San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 1, largely inapposite, and this Geisler factor generally is irrelevant to our analysis herein.

We note briefly, however, that the defendants rely on passages from San Antonio Independent School District, 45 emphasizing, for example, that the case presented “the most persistent and difficult questions of *298educational policy, another area in which this [c]ourt’s lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels”; id., 42; and that, “[ejducation, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems.”46 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Their reliance is misplaced because of the distinct nature of education under the state and federal constitutions, particularly, because the Supreme Court specifically concluded in San Antonio Independent School District that the right to a public education is not fundamental under the federal constitution, and therefore the plaintiffs therein were not entitled to strict scrutiny review of their claims with respect to the constitutionality of the state’s educational finance system. Id., 37-39. Put differently, the prudential concerns that the Supreme Court discussed in San Antonio Independent School District may well have their place in the state constitutional context with respect to specific remedies, but failing to consider carefully the plaintiffs’ claims would amount to an evisceration of the central holding of Horton I, namely, that, under article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, “the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.”47 Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 646. Accord*299ingly, we conclude that federal precedent does not inform our analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims in this appeal.

E

Sister State Decisions

A review of the sister state decisions in this area is of paramount importance to this appeal, which presents a question of first impression in an area of constitutional law that uniquely has been the province of the states. Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“nothing in the [c]ourt’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions”). The linguistic diversity of the various states’ education clauses; see part II A of this opinion; requires a careful review of the sister state decisions to determine which cases are of greatest precedential significance. Put differently, our analysis must go beyond simply determining the “majority” and “minority” approaches to this issue, and must focus specifically on decisions from states whose constitutional clauses, like article eighth, § 1, do not *300use qualitative language to describe their respective rights to education.48

We begin, then, with New York case law, which, as explained by the amici curiae Campaign for Educational *301Equity et al., is particularly instructive, given the similarity between its broadly worded constitutional provision and ours. New York’s education clause provides simply that “[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y. Const., art. XI, § 1. In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a claim that the “[s]tate’s educational financing scheme fails to provide public school students in the [c]ity of New York ... an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education as required by the [s]tate [constitution.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995) (Campaign I). In the context of a motion to dismiss, an analogue to our motion to strike, the court concluded that New York’s education clause “requires the [s]tate to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education .... Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury. If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources made available under the present system are adequate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential skills, the [s]tate will have satisfied its constitutional obligation.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 316. The court further emphasized that “[t]he state must assure that some essentials are provided,” specifically, “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those *302subject areas.” Id., 317. The court did not, however, “attempt to definitively specify what the constitutional concept and mandate of a sound basic education entails” because of the early procedural posture of the case, which lacked a developed factual record.49 Id.

A subsequent decision rendered after the remand trial in Campaign I further developed this standard to provide that students have a right to a “meaningful high school education, one which prepares them to function productively as civic participants,” although not necessarily a high school diploma. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 908, 801 N.E.2d 326, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2003) (Campaign II). After concluding that, “whether measured by the outputs or the inputs, New York City schoolchildren are not receiving the constitutionally-mandated opportunity for a sound basic education”; id., 919; the court again remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, wherein “[t]he [s]tate need only ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound basic education in New York City. Reforms to the current system of financing school funding and managing schools should address the shortcomings of the current system by ensuring, as a part of that process, that every school in New York City would have the resources necessary for providing the opportunity for a sound basic education. Finally, the new scheme should ensure a system of accountability to measure whether the reforms actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic education.”50 Id., 930.

*303The New Hampshire Supreme Court has ascribed similar substantive meaning to its education clause, which provides in relevant part: “Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufac*304tures, and natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among the people . . . .” (Emphasis added.) N.H. Const., Pt. II, art. LXXXIH. In a decision concluding that the state’s system of financing public education, mostly via property taxation, was unconstitutional because the school property taxes were not “proportional and reasonable throughout the [sjtate” as was demanded by the state constitution’s taxation clause; Claremont School District v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997) (Claremont IT)-, the New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized that “[o]ur society places tremendous value on education. Education provides the key to individual opportunities for social and economic advancement and forms the foundation for our democratic institutions and our place in the global economy.”51 Id., 472. Thus, the court concluded that a “constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right”; id., 473; and emphasized that “[mjere competence in the basics — reading, writing and arithmetic — is insufficient”; id., 474; and that “[a] broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of today’s society is essential for our students to compete, contribute and flourish in the twenty-first century.” Id.

*305Although the New Hampshire court left the implementation of a constitutionally adequate educational policy, and the financing thereof, to the political branches in the first instance, it followed the criteria set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989),52 and articulated “general, aspirational guidelines for defining constitutional adequacy,” namely, that a public education would provide students with: “ ‘(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.’ ” Claremont II, supra, 142 N.H. 474-75, quoting Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., supra, 212; see also *306 Londonderry School District v. State, 154 N.H. 153, 161-62, 907 A.2d 988 (2006) (statute modeled after seven Rose criteria is insufficient articulation of “constitutionally adequate education” because they are general guidelines that political branches are to use in designating which state education rules, statutes and curriculum frameworks form “constitutionally adequate education”).

Similarly, South Carolina’s education clause provides broadly that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as may be desirable.” S.C. Const., art. XI, § 3. In Abbeville County School District v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999), the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that this provision “requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate education.” The court “defíne[d] this minimally adequate education required by our [constitution to include providing students adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2) a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills.” Id. Remanding the case for further proceedings, the court recognized separation of powers concerns, and “emphasize [d] that the constitutional duty to ensure the provision of a minimally adequate education to each student in South Carolina rests on the legislative branch of government. We do not intend by this opinion to suggest to any party that we will usurp the authority of that branch to determine the way in which educational opportunities are delivered to the children of our [s]tate. We do not intend the *307courts of this [s]tate to become super-legislatures or super-school boards.”53 Id., 69.

In Tennessee, the state education clause provides that “[t]he State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education and encourages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free public schools. The General Assembly may establish and support such post-secondary educational institutions, including public institutions of higher learning, as it determines.” Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 12. The Tennessee Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as requiring the legislature to “maintain and support a system of free public schools that provides, at least, the opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare students intellectually for a mature life.” Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993); id. (rejecting defendants’ claim that this rule is not “an enforceable standard for assessing the educational opportunities provided in the several districts throughout the state”).

Finally, in one of the earliest adequacy cases, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted its education clause, which provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty *308of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex”; Wash. Const., art. IX, § 1; and concluded that “the [s]tate’s constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas. . . . Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system’s survival. ... It must prepare them to exercise their [fjirst [a]mendment freedoms both as sources and receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding. The constitutional right to have the [s]tate ‘make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children’ would be hollow indeed if the possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our open political system, in the labor market, or in the marketplace of ideas.” (Citations omitted.) Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 517-18, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The court recognized that these standards are not “fully definitive of the [s]tate’s paramount duty,” but rather, “constitute broad guidelines and that the effective teaching and opportunities for learning these essential skills make up the minimum of the education that is constitutionally required.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 518; see also id., 519 (state not required to “furnish total education in the sense of all knowledge or the offering of all programs, subjects, or services which are attractive but only tangentially related to the central thrust of our guidelines” [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]).

These cases are illustrative, as our research has revealed that those state courts that have reached the *309merits of the issue54 overwhelmingly have held that there is a floor with respect to the adequacy of the education provided pursuant to their states’ education clauses; that education must be in some way “minimally adequate” or “soundly basic.”55 Furthermore, many of *310these decisions have articulated comprehensive standards that have defined the components of a constitutionally adequate education, which provide us with further guidance as we consider the merits of this appeal. See part III of this opinion.

F

Economic and Sociological Public Policy Considerations

Finally, we address the sixth Geisler factor, which requires consideration of the economic and sociological concerns presented by this appeal.56 The plaintiffs, sup*311ported by several of the amici, cite statistics linking higher education and productive employment, given the changing structure of Connecticut’s economy, and argue that an education suitable to prepare students for higher education is necessary because students without higher education are more likely to wind up unemployed. The plaintiffs also cite statistics demonstrating that citizens without high school diplomas or higher education are less likely to vote in elections. In response, the defendants do not dispute that education should be, and is a high social priority, as shown by the fact that education already is the second highest appropriation in the state budget. They do, however, cite standardized testing statistics from the United States Department of Education indicating that Connecticut’s students already have a “ ‘better-than-average chance for success at every stage’ of their educational trajectory,” and emphasize that our students already perform above the national average on standardized tests. Emphasizing that the trial court has left intact the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, they argue that it is unlikely that judicial intervention will remedy the imperfections that do exist in the system, and likely would result in its upheaval, which would “stifle educational innovation” by reducing local control. Finally, the defendants reiterate their argument that the “prudential concerns” with respect to the enforcement of a right to a suitable education, namely, the complications *312attendant to supplanting the legislature with the judiciary as the primary education policy making body, favor their restrictive interpretation of article eighth, § 1. Although we acknowledge the prudential concerns that will attend the crafting of a remedy for a constitutional violation that may well be found in this case, we nevertheless conclude that this sixth Geisler factor favors the plaintiffs.

In addressing the problems wrought by racial and ethnic school segregation, we previously have acknowledged the policy behind public education, quoting the United States Supreme Court and stating that “a sound education is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. . . . The American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. . . . We have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government . . . and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests. . . . And these historic perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. . . . [Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive Uves to the benefit of us aU. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our [n]ation *313when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 43-44, quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).

Moreover, although individual plaintiffs bear the brunt of constitutional educational deprivation, “that deprivation potentially has an impact on the entire state and its economy — not only on its social and cultural fabric, but on its material well-being, on its jobs, industry, and business. Economists and business leaders say that our state’s economic well-being is dependent on more skilled workers, technically proficient workers, literate and well-educated citizens. And they point to the urban poor as an integral part of our future economic strength. ... So it is not just that their future depends on the [s]tate, the state’s future depends on them.”57 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 44.

Thus, although “[pjradentia! and functional considerations are relevant to the classical enterprise of constitutional interpretation, especially where, as here, the constitutional provisions at issue are so remarkably open-textured”; Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 185, 610 A.2d 153 (1992); these concerns, which, as Justice Vertefeuille points out in her dissent, involve the potential for judicial over-*314management of the state’s education system and interference with the prerogatives of the political branches of government, are in our view better addressed in consideration of potential remedies for any constitutional violations that may be found at a subsequent trial on the merits, which might well require staying further judicial action pending legislative action. See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 45; Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 653; see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 27-28, 861 N.E.2d 50, 828 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2006) (Campaign III) (“[t]he role of the courts is not ... to determine the best way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education . . . but to determine whether the [s]tate’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational” because of “limited access of the [j]udiciary to the controlling economic and social facts, but also by our abiding respect for the separation of powers upon which our system of government is based” [internal quotation marks omitted]). Put differently, concerns over complications with respect to remedies for violations will not lead us to misinterpret substantive provisions of the constitution.

Ill

The wealth of information yielded by our Geisler analysis has served well to explain the ambiguous text of Connecticut’s education clause, article eighth, § 1, of our state constitution. Thus, we conclude that article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting. A constitutionally adequate education also will leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s *315economy.58 To satisfy this standard, the state, through the local school districts, must provide students with an objectively “meaningful opportunity” to receive the benefits of this constitutional right. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, supra, 176 S.W.3d 787 (“[t]he public education *316system need not operate perfectly; it is adequate if districts are reasonably able to provide their students the access and opportunity the district court described” [emphasis in original]); see also Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 143 (Borden, J., dissenting) (constitutional adequacy determined not by “what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system”). Moreover, we agree with the New York Court of Appeals’ explication of the “essential” components requisite to this constitutionally adequate education, namely: (1) “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn”; (2) “minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks”; (3) “minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies”; and (4) “sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.” Campaign I, supra, 86 N.Y.2d 317; see also, e.g., Abbeville County School District v. State, supra, 335 S.C. 68 (state constitution requires provision to students of “adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: [1] the ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; [2] a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes; and [3] academic and vocational skills”); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 706, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) (provision of constitutionally adequate education “implicitly]” requires “supportive services: [1] good physical facilities, instructional materials and personnel; [2] careful state and local supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency”).

*317We recognize that our explication of a constitutionally adequate education under article eighth, § 1, is crafted in broad terms. This breadth reflects, first and foremost, our recognition of the political branches’ constitutional responsibilities, and indeed, greater expertise, with respect to the implementation of specific educational policies pursuant to the education clause.59 *318See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 46. The broad constitutional standard also reflects our recognition of the fact that the specific educational inputs or instrumentalities suitable to achieve this minimum level of education may well change over time, as a “constitutionally adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving world.” Claremont II, supra, 142 N.H. 474; see also, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 89 Ohio St. 3d 1, 9-10, 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000) (“[w]hat was deemed thorough and efficient when the state’s [constitution was adopted certainly would not be considered thorough and efficient today”); Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995) (“[t]he definition of a proper education is not static and necessarily will change”). Finally, it bears mention that, like any other principle of constitutional law, this broad standard likely will be refined and developed further as it is applied to the facts eventually to be found at trial in this case.

We note that the failure of students to achieve the goals of a constitutionally mandated education may be the result of specific deficient educational inputs, or potentially, be caused by factors not attributable to, or capable of remediation by, state action or omission, a complicated question that is at this point beyond the procedural posture of this case.60 See Campaign I, *319supra, 86 N.Y.2d 318 (“[i]n order to succeed in the specific context of this case, plaintiffs will have to establish a causal link between the present funding system and any proven failure to provide a sound basic education to New York City school children”); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, supra, 176 S.W.3d 788 (“[w]hile the end-product of public education is related to the resources available for its use, the relationship is neither simple nor direct; public education can and often does improve with greater resources, just as it struggles when resources are withheld, but more money does not guarantee better schools or more educated students”); see also Savage v. Aronson, supra, 214 Conn. 287 (“The undoubted hardship imposed upon the children of these plaintiffs from the lack of affordable housing near the schools where they now are being educated cannot be disputed. It results, however, from the difficult financial circumstances they face, not from anything the state has done to deprive them of the right to equal educational opportunity.”); Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 143 (Borden, J., dissenting) (assuming existence of constitutional right to adequate education, and noting that “any appropriate standard by which to measure the state’s assumed obligation to provide a minimally adequate education must be based generally, not on what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system”); Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 144 (Borden, J., dissenting) (“[although schools are important socializing institutions in our democratic society, they cannot be constitutionally required to overcome every serious social and personal disadvantage that students bring with them to school, and that seriously hinder the academic achievement of those students”). Put differently, although we acknowledge the state’s signifi*320cant responsibilities under the constitution, we nevertheless recognize that the education clause is not a panacea for all of the social ills that contribute to many of the achievement deficiencies identified by the plaintiffs in their complaint; a constitutionally adequate education is not necessarily a perfect one. See Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, supra, 784 (The court stated that the education clause “does allow the [legislature, of necessity, much latitude in choosing among any number of alternatives that can reasonably be considered adequate, efficient, and suitable. These standards do not require perfection, but neither are they lax. They may be satisfied in many different ways, but they must be satisfied.”).

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to strike because further proceedings are required to determine as a question of fact whether the state’s educational resources and standards have in fact provided the public school students in this case with constitutionally suitable educational opportunities.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion KATZ and SCHALLER, Js., concurred.

PALMER, J.,

concurring in the judgment. I agree with the plaintiffs1 that their claims under article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution2 are justiciable. I also conclude that the right embodied in that provision is a *321substantive one that requires the state3 to provide an educational opportunity to the students of our free public elementary and secondary schools that, at the least, is minimally adequate by modem educational standards.4 Consequently, like the plurality, I also conclude that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. I am unable to join the plurality opinion, however, primarily because I take a different view from the plurality with respect to the scope of the right guaranteed by article eighth, § 1. In particular, I believe that the executive and legislative branches are entitled to considerable deference with respect to the determination of what it means, in practice, to provide for a minimally adequate, free public education. Thus, it is the prerogative of the legislature to determine, within reasonable limits, what a minimally adequate education entails. Consequently, in my view, the plaintiffs will not be able to prevail on their claims unless they are able to establish that what the state has done to discharge its obligations under article eighth, § 1, is so lacking as to be unreasonable by any fair or objective standard. As I explain more fully hereinafter, any other approach, including the approach that the plurality advocates, would permit the judicial branch to second-guess the reasoned judgment of the legislative and executive branches with respect to the education policy of this state, thereby depriving those *322branches of their “recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 37, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).

I

JUSTICIABILITY

The state contends that the plaintiffs’ claims under article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution give rise to a nonjusticiable political question. Although I agree with the plurality’s determination that the plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims are justiciable, I disagree with the plurality’s assertion that Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, “controls the justiciability issue in this appeal.” My disagreement with the plurality is twofold. First, Sheff involved a claim that the plaintiffs in that case had been denied the right to a substantially equal educational opportunity under article eighth, § 1, and under the equal protection provisions of article first, §§ l5 and 20,6 of the state constitution. Second, in retrospect, our justiciability analysis in Sheff was less than persuasive.

Before considering these two points, I turn first to this court’s relatively brief discussion of justiciability in Sheff, in which we first explained that the defendants in that case had asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable because “the relief [that the plaintiffs sought] would . . . require this court to respond to a *323political question that our constitution has expressly and exclusively entrusted to the legislature.” Id., 13. Although we acknowledged that “courts do not have jurisdiction to decide cases that involve matters that textually have been reserved to the legislature”; id.; we also explained that, “[i]n the absence of such a textual reservation ... it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles.” Id. We then observed that, “[i]n the context of [a claim seeking] judicial enforcement of the right to a substantially equal educational opportunity arising under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20, justiciability is not a matter of first impression for this court.” Id., 14. We explained, more specifically, that, “[i]n Horton [v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I)], and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III), we reviewed, in plenary fashion, the actions taken by the legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to public elementary and secondary schoolchildren. Judicial authority to render these decisions was expressly reaffirmed in Nielsen v. State, [236 Conn. 1, 9-10, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996)], and in Pellegrino v. O’Neill, [193 Conn. 670, 683, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984)].” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 14.

We then noted: “The defendants [in Sheff] do not challenge the continued validity of Horton I and Horton III . . . but argue that their claim of nonjusticiability differs. That argument is unavailing. The plaintiff schoolchildren . . . invoke the same constitutional provisions to challenge the constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff schoolchildren invoked in Horton I and Horton III. The text of article eighth, § 1, has not changed.” Id., 14-15. The court in Sheff concluded that, “[i]n light of these precedents . . . the phrase ‘appropriate legislation’ in article eighth, § 1, does not *324deprive the courts of the authority to determine what is ‘appropriate.’ ” Id., 15.

Thus, our justiciability determination in Sheff was predicated entirely on Horton I and Horton III, and two subsequent cases, Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. I, and Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 193 Conn. 670. In Horton I and Horton III, however, this court never considered the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ claims in those cases because the defendants did not appeal the trial court’s decision rejecting their contention that the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable. Although we adverted to that fact in a footnote in Sheff; 7 see Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 14 n.16; we nevertheless treated our plenary review of the plaintiffs’ claims in Horton I and Horton III as adequate support for our conclusion in Sheff Hast claims alleging a violation of the constitutionally protected right to an equal educational opportunity are justiciable. See id., 14-15. Therefore, because we never addressed the issue of justiciability *325in Horton I or Horton III, our reliance on those cases for purposes of resolving the defendants’ justiciability claim in Sheff was misplaced.8 Finally, in both of the cases that we cited in Sheff as “expressly reaffirming]” our justiciability determination in Horton I and Horton III, namely, Nielsen and Pellegrino; id., 14; we simply explained that we had exercised our authority in Horton I and Horton III to reach the merits of those cases; we made no mention of the fact that the issue of our authority to do so was not before this court in either Horton I or Horton III because no party to those cases had raised it on appeal. See generally Nielsen v. State, supra, 9-10; Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 683. In light of this history, I cannot see how our justiciability determination in Sheff is sufficient to warrant our reliance on that conclusion for purposes of the present case.

I also disagree with the plurality’s reliance on our justiciability determination in Sheff for a second reason, namely, because Sheff and the present case involve different rights under the state constitution that implicate materially different jurisprudential considerations. In Sheff the plaintiffs alleged that they had been deprived of their right to an equal educational opportunity under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20; see Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 236 Conn. 5; whereas the plaintiffs in the present case have claimed that they have been denied their right to a suitable or adequate education under article eighth, § 1. The two types of claims give rise to important differences with respect to the role of the judiciary; the former requires the *326adjudication of issues that relate primarily to the equality of education, whereas the latter requires the adjudication of issues that are more directly related to education policy. To the extent that education adequacy litigation involves the courts in matters of education policy to a greater degree than education equity litigation, it is reasonable to conclude that, as a general matter, adequacy claims are more likely to result in judicial intrusion into areas of core legislative interest and responsibility. See, e.g., R. Levy, “Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation,” 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1021, 1033-34 (2006) (“Defining levels of adequacy requires that courts become involved in determining educational policies — the goals and the methods of delivering education — in a way that equity litigation does not. Likewise, fashioning remedies for violations of adequacy requirements is more problematic because legislatures may be reluctant to provide sufficient funding and because judicial enforcement of remedies against the legislature presents practical difficulties and raises serious separation-of-powers concerns.”).

I nevertheless agree with the plaintiffs that their claims under article eighth, § 1, are justiciable. First, I am not persuaded that the language of article eighth, § 1, so clearly removes the issue of its implementation from judicial review as to preclude the judiciary from exercising the authority that it otherwise possesses to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. Although the “appropriate legislation” language of article eighth, § 1, affords the legislature considerable latitude in determining how best to meet the constitutional mandate of free public elementary and secondary school education; see part II of this opinion; there is nothing in the wording or history of that provision to indicate that its drafters intended to shield its implementation by the legislature from any and all measure of judicial *327interpretation or review. Moreover, although I believe that the other factors to be considered in determining the justiciability of a claim under the state constitution9 present a closer question than the plurality believes it does, I agree with the plurality and the plaintiffs that those considerations are not sufficiently compelling in this case to relieve this court of its constitutional responsibility to safeguard the constitutional rights of our citizenry.10 Mindful of the fact that we undertake *328our resolution of the state’s claim “with a heavy thumb on the side of justiciability, and with the recognition that, simply because the case is connected to the political sphere, it does not necessarily follow that it is a political question”; Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 488, 803 A.2d 318 (2002); I am not convinced that that doctrine bars us from entertaining the plaintiffs’ education adequacy claim under article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution. As I explain more fully hereinafter, however, I am persuaded that many of the factors that the state identifies in the present case as requiring complete judicial abstention under the political question doctrine militate strongly in favor of limiting the role of the judiciary by deferring to the reasoned determination of the political branches *329with respect to the precise parameters of the right established under article eighth, § 1. Thus, affording considerable deference to the political branches with respect to the approach that they deem appropriate to satisfy the mandate of article eighth, § 1, necessarily eases separation of powers concerns — concerns that otherwise might lead to a different resolution of the state’s claim of nonjusticiability.

II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

By its terms, article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution is not merely precatoiy or hortatory. On the contrary, it imposes an affirmative, mandatory obligation on the legislature to enact legislation appropriate to the task of maintaining a system of free public elementary and secondary schools. The issue, therefore, is whether article eighth, § 1, obligates the state to ensure that those free public schools provide to the students attending them an educational opportunity of a certain level or quality. I believe that it does.

For several reasons, I am unable to conclude that article eighth, § 1, is satisfied as long as the state maintains a system of public elementary and secondary schools no matter how fundamentally inadequate some or all of those schools may be. It is apparent that Simon Bernstein, one of the delegates at the state constitutional convention of 1965, and other delegates who supported the idea of constitutionalizing the right to free public schools were proud of Connecticut’s long-standing commitment to the education of its schoolchildren, and they urged their colleagues to support the proposed right as an expression of the state’s continued recognition of that responsibility. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, p. 312, remarks of Bernstein (“[w]e have a great history and tradition requiring that the public body supply our chil*330dren with free public education”); Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Bémstein (noting this state’s educational “tradition which goes back to our earliest days of a free good public education”); see also id., p. 1062, remarks of Chase Going Woodhouse (“it is extremely fitting that we should finally put into our [constitution a reference to our great public schools because Henry Barnard of Connecticut is perhaps one of the greatest historical figures in this development of public school education in this whole nation of ours”). To presume, therefore, that the legislature may, if it chooses, establish and maintain manifestly inferior or substandard public schools would be inconsistent with the purpose underlying article eighth, § 1, namely, to underscore the importance of free public schools by elevating that principle to constitutional status. See, e.g., id., p. 1039, remarks of Bernstein (“I submitted a resolution . . . which pertained to the subject of education . . . and the statement of purpose of that resolution . . . was that our system of free public education have a tradition [of] acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same [constitutional sanctity. It was because our [constitution had no reference to our school system that I submitted my resolution and of course others were aware of the same [omission] in our [constitution and other similar resolutions were submitted. . . . [W]e have [had] good public schools so that this again is not anything revolutionary, it is something which we have, it is which is [in] practically all [constitutions in the [s]tates of our nation and Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle.”). Moreover, a contrary determination would be incompatible with the requirement of article eighth, § 1, that the legislature shall implement a system of free public elementary and secondary schools by “appropriate” legislation, a mandate that suggests that *331the delegates contemplated the establishment of free public schools of at least some measure or level of quality. Indeed, it would do violence to the meaning of the term “school,”11 as a place where students go to learn, to conclude that the legislature is free to establish and maintain a system of public education that is not even minimally adequate to meet the needs of those students.

Finally, I agree with Justice Schaller that our determination in Horton I concerning the right to an equal educational opportunity informs our determination of whether that right also includes a qualitative component. As Justice Schaller explains in his concurring opinion: “To be sure, the court concluded in Horton I only that the plaintiffs [in that case] were entitled to receive an education that was substantially equal in quality to the education that was provided to other children, not that they were guaranteed an education meeting a minimum qualitative standard. ... It is not possible to infer generally from a requirement of equality a requirement of adequacy. On the other hand, the idea that it is the quality of education to which Connecticut children have an equal right, rather than merely equality in education financing, supports the general proposition that the interest that children have in the fundamental right to education guaranteed by [article eighth, § 1] is inextricably linked to the quality of the education provided. Put another way, our conclusion in Horton I that the plaintiffs [in that case] had a right to substantially equal educational funding is based on the right to an education of substantially equal quality. The notion that children have a right to an education of substantially equal quality presupposes that ‘quality’ is an essential component of [article eighth, § 1]. We *332cannot fairly separate the right to education from the right to a quality education.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Thus, implicit in the right to an equal educational opportunity in our free public elementary and secondary schools is the right to an education that, at the least, satisfies minimum qualitative standards.

Having determined that article eighth, § 1, contains a qualitative component, the following question remains: What is the nature and scope of the right guaranteed under that provision? For the reasons that follow, I conclude, first, that the right established under article eighth, § 1, requires only that the legislature establish and maintain a minimally adequate system of free public schools. I also conclude that the legislature is entitled to considerable deference with respect to both its conception of the scope of the right and its implementation of the right.

A number of considerations support the conclusion that the right under article eighth, § 1, places no greater an obligation on the legislature than to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity to this state’s public elementary and secondary school students. First, article eighth, § 1, contains no language that mandates any particular standard or otherwise purports to delineate expressly the parameters of the right to a minimally adequate education. At first blush, the framer’s omission of such language might appear to be neutral with respect to the issue of the scope of the right created under article eighth, § 1. As the plurality has observed, however, the analogous provisions of a majority of state constitutions require the legislatures in those states to establish and maintain schools of a certain caliber, level or quality. See, e.g., Ark. Const., art. 14, § 1 (state must maintain “a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools”); Colo. Const., art. IX, § 2 (legislature directed to provide for “a thorough and uniform system of free public schools”); Fla. Const., art. IX, § 1 (a) (state *333shall provide for “a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education”); Idaho Const., art. IX, § 1 (legislature shall provide for “a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools”); 111. Const., art. X, § 1 (“[t]he state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services”); Minn. Const., art. XIII, § 1 (legislature shall provide for “a thorough and efficient system of public schools”); Mont. Const., art. X, § 1, para. 3 (“[t]he legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools”); N.J. Const., art. VIII, § IV, para. 1 (“[t]he [legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools”); Ohio Const., art. VI, § 2 (Ohio General Assembly shall make provisions for “a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state”); Va. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“[t]he General Assembly . . . shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained”); W. Va. Const., art. XII, § 1 (legislature “shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free schools”); Wyo. Const., art. 7, § 1 (“[t]he [legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction”). In Connecticut, however, we have elected to establish the constitutional right to a free public education without reference to any substantive or qualitative requirement. Although I am not persuaded that the absence of such language in article eighth, § 1, reflects an intent by the framers that our public elementary and secondary schools need not meet any minimum or threshold qualitative standard, the fact that article eighth, § 1, contains no such language is nevertheless reason for this court to refrain from defining the right too broadly or expansively.

*334Furthermore, article eighth, § 2, of the Connecticut constitution, which, like article eighth, § 1, was adopted at the 1965 constitutional convention, requires that the state “maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education.” (Emphasis added.) The fact that this provision makes reference to a particular qualitative standard supports an inference that the framers intentionally drafted article eighth, § 1, in non-substantive terms and further counsels against an expansive interpretation of article eighth, § 1.

The history of article eighth, § 1, also indicates that the framers themselves did not believe that they were establishing a broad, new right. For example, the main sponsor of the proposed provision, Bernstein, urged its adoption because the other states already had seen fit to include similar provisions in their state constitutions. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention, supra, Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Bernstein. Indeed, Bernstein expressly stated that the principle embodied in his proposal was “not anything revolutionary.” Id.; see also id., p. 1040, remarks of Albert E. Waugh (explaining that because Connecticut was only state not to have constitutional provision establishing right to free public education, adoption of proposed amendment was “natural and proper thing to do”). Thus, the intent and purpose of the framers, as reflected in the proceedings of the 1965 constitutional convention, coupled with the language of article eighth, § 1, strongly suggest that a particularly demanding qualitative requirement was not a matter of paramount importance. These considerations, taken together, nevertheless support the conclusion that article eighth, § 1, contemplates free public elementary and secondary schools that, at the least, are minimally adequate.

I also believe that the proper scope of article eighth, § 1, cannot be determined without due regard for the *335principle, previously recognized by this court, that “prudential cautions may shed light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 15; see also Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 185, 610 A.2d 153 (1992) (“[p]rudential and functional considerations are relevant to the classical enterprise of constitutional interpretation, especially [when] . . . the constitutional provisions at issue are . . . open-textured”); cf. United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 459, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 118 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1992) (observing that issue before court regarding limits of Congress’ apportionment authority gave rise to special concerns not present in prior cases but concluding that those concerns “relate[d] to the merits of the controversy rather than to [the court’s] power to resolve it”). Several such prudential considerations militate strongly in favor of deferring to the reasoned judgment of the political branches with respect to the determination, in practice, of the parameters of the right.

The first such consideration is what this court has recognized as the legislature’s significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary school education. Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 37, 41. The judicial branch must accord the legislative branch great deference in this area because, among other reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with issues of educational policy; in other words, courts “lack [the] specialized knowledge and experience” to address the many “persistent and difficult questions of educational policy” that invariably arise in connection with the establishment and maintenance of a statewide system of education. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973). Thus, these issues are best addressed by our elected and appointed officials in the exercise of their *336informed judgment. See id. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “[e]ducation . . . presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems. . . . The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that, within the limits of rationality, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to respect. ... On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the major sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education .... Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public education. . . . The ultimate wisdom as to [the] . . . problems of education is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the [state] inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 42-43.

Special deference is warranted in the present case due to the fact that the framers reserved to the legislature the responsibility of implementing the mandate of a free public education under article eighth, § 1, by “appropriate legislation.” The ordinary meaning of these words vests the legislature with significant discretion. Indeed, because the framers provided no express guidance as to the nature or scope of the “appropriate” legislation required under article eighth, § 1, it is appar*337ent that they intended to leave that determination to the reasoned judgment of the legislature.

Another compelling reason for judicial restraint in matters relating to educational policy is the potential that exists for a costly and intrusive remedy if it is determined that the state’s system of public education has failed to meet the constitutional standard of quality. The recent experience of our neighbors in Massachusetts and New York is instructive. In both of those states, trial courts found that certain schools were constitutionally deficient and imposed remedies that ultimately were upheld on appeal, costing billions of dollars. See Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, 443 Mass. 428, 436-51, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (2005) (plurality opinion) (explaining history and cost of litigation in Massachusetts); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 20-27, 861 N.E.2d 50, 828 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2006) (explaining history and cost of litigation in New York). Despite these expenditures, and after years of good faith efforts by the political branches to ameliorate the constitutional violations, trial courts in both Massachusetts and New York concluded that the educational deficiencies persisted and ordered further remedial action. See Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, supra, 443 (plurality opinion); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, supra, 25-27. On appeal, however, both the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the New York Court of Appeals determined that further judicial involvement in budgeting and policy making decisions relating to education was unwarranted — the lingering educational inadequacies notwithstanding — in light of the substantial deference due the political branches in matters of education policy. See Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, supra, 460 (plurality opinion) (rejecting trial court’s remedial order because it was, inter alia, “rife with policy choices that are properly the [legislature’s *338domain” and because remedy “would not be a final [one], but a starting point for what inevitably must mean judicial directives concerning appropriations,” which was unacceptable result in light of then ongoing efforts by political branches to improve education statewide); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, supra, 28 (“[The court’s] deference to the [legislature’s education financing plans is justified not only by prudent and practical hesitation in light of the limited access of the [j]udiciary to the controlling economic and social facts, but also by our abiding respect for the separation of powers [on] which our system of government is based .... We cannot intrude [on] the policy-making and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative and executive branches . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

These examples and similar cases from other jurisdictions reflect what one commentary recently has characterized as a distinct trend in education adequacy litigation away from judicial intervention and toward deference to the legislature. J. Simon-Kerr & R. Sturm, “Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education,” 6 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 83 (2010) (discussing cases). Although I agree with the plaintiffs that the prospect of an expensive remedy, or one that is likely to inject the court into matters of education policy, or both, should not preclude an adjudication of the merits of their education adequacy claims, the significant separation of powers issues that any such remedy invariably would spawn must be given due consideration in determining the scope of the right established under article eighth, § l.12 The fact is that the plaintiffs seek *339a complete overhaul of the current system of public education, including a judgment declaring “that the existing school funding system is unconstitutional, void and without effect,”13 a permanent injunction barring the state “from operating the current public education system, except as necessary to provide an expedient and efficient transition to a constitutional public education system,” and the appointment of a special master “to hold hearings, make findings, and report recommendations to the [c]ourt with regard to the constitutionality of any new system of education proposed by [the state].” It is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive or thoroughgoing challenge to the legitimacy of the manner in which the legislature has elected to discharge its responsibilities under article eighth, § 1, than that *340reflected in the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the present case.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ funding claim, it is noteworthy that a report commissioned by the named plaintiff, Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc., contains an estimate indicating that, during the 2003-2004 school year, the state would have had to spend an additional $2.02 billion on elementary and secondary public school education to meet the constitutional standard advocated by the plaintiffs. See Augenblick, Palaich & Associates, Inc., Estimating the Cost of an Adequate Education in Connecticut (June, 2005) p. v, available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/ states/ct/CT-adequacystudy.pdf (last visited March 9, 2010). This “additional” annual amount is approximately 92 percent more than the amount that the state actually spent that year, i.e., approximately $2.2 billion, on those schools. See Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, Connecticut State Budget 2003-2005, p. 13. For present purposes, it is not important whether the $2.02 billion figure is, in fact, accurate; what is important is that, under the plaintiffs’ conception of the nature and scope of the right established under article eighth, § 1, the state would be required to spend, at a minimum, many hundreds of millions of additional dollars on the state's public elementary and secondary schools. I fully appreciate, of course, that, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, it would be unfair to use the report or its $2.02 billion estimate for anything other than a very rough indicator of the magnitude of the problem from the plaintiffs’ perspective. The potential cost of the remedy as estimated in the report, however, is sufficiently great that it cannot be ignored for purposes of determining the scope and parameters of article eighth, § 1.

*341The potential for long, protracted and expensive litigation is yet another factor favoring an approach that affords a substantial degree of deference to the legislature concerning the discharge of its responsibility under article eighth, § 1. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Zarella discusses a number of cases in which sister state courts “have become bogged down for years in [seemingly] endless litigation” over the nature and scope of the state constitutional right to a free public education and the appropriate remedies for violations of that right, including, most notably, the New Jersey courts, and I need not repeat that discussion here. The observations of the high courts of Nebraska and Rhode Island are worth noting, however, because they so graphically highlight the problems that can arise when the judiciary becomes embroiled in disputes over the precise contours of the state constitutional right to education.14 See Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 557, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (“The landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states’ school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp.”); Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (“[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for [decades], consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a [legislature.”). It is no doubt that these potential problems can be minimized or perhaps even eliminated by employing *342a mode of constitutional inteipretation that affords considerable deference to the legislature with respect to the manner in which the right to a minimally adequate free public education is conceived and implemented.

In accordance with the foregoing principles and considerations, I agree generally that the following “essentials,” as explicated by the New York Court of Appeals, are necessary to satisfy the requirement of a minimally adequate education for purposes of article eighth, § 1. “Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn.15 Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks.16 Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.”17 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, *34386 N.Y.2d 307, 317, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).

Although these basic, minimum requirements appear to be relatively straightforward, what level of resources or specific measures are necessary to satisfy them in practice is by no means self-evident. Undoubtedly, reasonable people with expertise in the field of education can and will disagree on whether one or more of these requirements has, in fact, been met with regard to a particular school or schools and, if the requirement has not been met, what more is necessary to satisfy it. In my view, the deference owed to the political branches in matters of education policy dictates that, unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the actions that the state has taken to satisfy the particular requirement in dispute cannot reasonably be defended as minimally adequate, the court must defer to the judgment of the political branches in the matter. Thus, if the state and the plaintiffs disagree as to whether the legislature has met its obligation under article eighth, § 1, with respect to any of the core or essential components of a minimally adequate education, to prevail on their claim of a constitutional violation, the plaintiffs must establish that the action that the legislature has taken to comply with article eighth, § 1, reasonably cannot be considered sufficient by any fair measure. Put differently, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief unless they can dem*344onstrate that the legislature’s formulation of the scope of the right to a minimally adequate public education and its efforts in implementing that formulation are unreasonably insufficient. Any less demanding standard would give insufficient voice to the reasoned judgment of the legislature.18

Ill

CONCLUSION

“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate [the court’s] recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). It reasonably cannot be disputed, however, that, even though “schools are important socializing *345institutions in our democratic society, they cannot be constitutionally required to overcome every serious social and personal disadvantage that students bring with them to school, and that seriously hinderfs] the academic achievement of those students.”19 Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 144 (Borden, J., dissenting); see also part III of the plurality opinion (“[T]he failure of students to achieve the goals of a constitutionally mandated education may be . . . caused by factors not attributable to, or capable of remediation by, state action .... [W]e [therefore] recognize that [article eighth, § 1] is not a panacea for all of the social ills that contribute to many of the achievement deficiencies identified by the plaintiffs in their complaint . . . .” [Citations omitted.]).

In light of our citizenry’s “abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society”; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 30; however, and because our free public elemen*346tary and secondary schools can serve as a beacon for those most in need, we reasonably may expect that the legislative and executive branches will strive to do much more than is constitutionally required for the benefit of those attending those schools. Article eighth, § 1, however, guarantees a minimally adequate education for those students, and the plaintiffs’ complaint, liberally construed, alleges a violation of that fundamental right.20 Consequently, the plaintiffs are entitled to proceed with their claims under that provision. I there*347fore agree with the plurality that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings.

SCHALLER, J.,

concurring. I agree with the plurality opinion’s conclusion that the education clause, article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut1 requires public schools in Connecticut to provide students with an education that is adequate to prepare them to be full participants in the democratic processes of our government, and to be productive members of society, that is, to compete in the job market either before or after acquiring higher education for that purpose.2 I write separately in order to clarify and, where necessary, expand on the constitutional principles that compel that conclusion. I also write separately to express some important prudential concerns regarding the future progress of this action. Those concerns pertain to the standards that the trial court should apply in the trial of this matter in order to determine whether the plaintiffs, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc., and numerous parents and their *348children, who are enrolled in public schools in this state, will have succeeded in establishing a violation of the constitutional right as we define it today, and to the authority of the trial court to order appropriate remedies in the event that a violation has occurred.

It has long been established, based on the express language of our constitution, that the education clause guarantees to citizens of this state an affirmative right to a free public education. See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595-96, 660 A.2d 742 (1995) (education clause imposes affirmative obligation on state to expend public funds to provide free public elementary and secondary education); Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 6, 639 A.2d 502 (1994) (“Connecticut schoolchildren have a state constitutional right to an education in our free public elementary and secondary schools”); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 645, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I) (recognition of education as fundamental right guaranteed by education clause). I am convinced, as is the plurality, that the education clause guarantees, in addition, that the education we provide must satisfy a minimum qualitative standard, namely, that children in Connecticut have a constitutional right to an adequate education. Although the various terms by which the minimum qualitative standard has been expressed in this and other state litigation— suitable, adequate, or sound basic — are essentially interchangeable, keeping in mind that we are dealing with an implied, not an express, right, I believe that the term “adequate” conveys best the concept of a minimum qualitative standard. I believe it necessary, first, to explain more fully why that minimum standard is constitutionally required and how it is that this court has the basis as well as the authority to define the standard in terms of practical application — that is, democratic participation and productive citizenship — and, second, to explain why an adequate education, in addi*349tion to serving democratic goals, must, as the plurality concludes, “leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.” I address each of these points in turn. Finally, I will address several prudential concerns that are of paramount importance as this case proceeds to trial. It is crucial to keep in mind at this point that we are at an early stage of what is likely to be a long journey through the court system and, depending on the result, through the other branches of government. We decide the present issues based solely on the allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint. No factual record exists. Neither the judicial branch nor the legislative branch has engaged in fact finding. Our main task is to determine the constitutional issue presented on appeal and, importantly, to guide the trial court and the parties as they undertake the complicated process of litigating this case in the Superior Court. As important as our constitutional decision is, it is no more than a threshold ruling. Because our obligation to instruct the trial court as to how to proceed within properjudicial boundaries is crucial, I will offer a preliminary template for the trial court’s role in this litigation.

I

In construing the contours of our state constitution, the plurality employs the analysis established in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). In view of the fact that our state constitution does not contain an explicit statement of the constitutional right at issue, I agree in principle with this approach. I do not believe, however, that once having undertaken a Geisler analysis, it is necessary to determine whether the text is ambiguous. The use of Geisler is based on a prior determination that the text does not contain explicit language concerning the right in question. Because my application of Geisler differs in some mate*350rial respects from that of the plurality, I will offer an alternative analysis. In the course of the analysis, I undertake to articulate and explain the most persuasive reasons for interpreting the education clause to require that the guaranteed free public education must be adequate. Geisler, as we know, is grounded on the well established principle that “federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 684. In cases such as the present one, in which the question presented requires us to determine the contours of our state constitution in the absence of a specific declaration of a minimum qualitative standard, we have employed “the following tools of analysis . . . to the extent applicable: (1) the textual approach . . . (2) holdings and dicta of this court ... (3) federal precedent ... (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach ... (5) the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers . . . and (6) economic/sociological considerations.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 685. As we know, the Geisler tools were never intended to create a rigid formula nor were they intended to produce, by their mere recitation, a self-evident result as if by some intuitive process. See State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 112, 675 A.2d 866 (1996) (Norcott, J., dissenting). We have acknowledged this principle, stating that the Geisler factors “encourage a principled development of our state constitutional jurisprudence. Although in Geisler we compartmentalized the factors that should be considered in order to stress that a systematic analysis is required, we recognize that they may be inextricably interwoven. . . . Finally, not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 716 n.10, 657 *351A.2d 585 (1995). The purpose of Geisler was to require our courts to assemble and to assess the relevant information concerning the factors that applied to the particular constitutional interpretation — and then to reach a conclusion by the process of reasoning. This approach explains why the most reasonable interpretation of our education clause is that it implicitly requires that the education provided must be adequate. The Geisler factors are meant to serve as a guide to a searching analysis in order to identify and explain the contours of our state constitution, and are a vital component of our constitutional jurisprudence. The quality of the Geisler analysis employed has direct bearing on the authoritativeness of the opinion that, in this case, may be called upon to sustain and support this litigation through a demanding, even arduous, process.

I undertake to examine the factors as helpful tools to inform and guide the constitutional analysis. One of the most basic ways to ensure that the factors function as sources of information and guidelines is to allow the question to shape the discussion, rather than routinely going through the list of factors. In other words, the Geisler analysis must adapt itself to each particular inquiry. Some factors that are extremely relevant and persuasive in one inquiry may yield little or no persuasive information in another inquiry. The structure, therefore, of any Geisler inquiry must derive from the subject matter. I begin, therefore, with the most basic guideline provided by Geisler, and apply the factors only to the extent that each applies. In the present case, I agree with the plurality that this basic approach will mean that relatively little weight should be accorded to federal precedent. Accordingly, I will first consider more pertinent factors, and will look to federal precedent briefly, for only the most general guidance. Similarly, although I find that sibling state precedent, two cases, in particular, provides some guidance, the use*352fulness of decisions from other states is greatly limited by the fact that very few states with constitutional language similar to our own have weighed in on the issue, and the decisions of those courts contain little helpful analysis. By contrast, the two factors that I find to be particularly helpful and persuasive are the text of the education clause and our own case precedent, in which we have interpreted the education clause in two seminal cases. See Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996); Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615. I see no need in this concurring opinion to discuss the history of the education clause or the economic and sociological factors. The plurality opinion thoroughly discusses those considerations and explains fully why each factor supports its conclusion. I agree with its analysis and conclusion that those factors favor interpreting the education clause to include a qualitative element.

In any case, our starting point, as always, should be with the applicable constitutional text. The education clause provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 1. Nothing in the express language of the education clause requires that our public schools are required to deliver an education that meets any specific qualitative standard. I rely on two fundamental concepts, however, to conclude that the mere absence of express qualitative language does not preclude us from interpreting the constitutional text to require that public schools provide a minimally adequate level of education. The first is the use of common sense and logic in understanding the ordinary meaning of the constitutional language. The second is the recognition that a Geisler analysis would be unnecessary in the presence of an express guarantee. The test, after all, was designed to provide us with guidelines for inferring the meaning of a text in the absence of an *353 explicit statement of the constitutional right or duty at issue.

As to the first concept, the education clause requires that there shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. It would defy common sense to conclude that the General Assembly could possibly satisfy its obligation by providing for bad — or unsuitable, inadequate, or unsound — public schools. That is precisely what we would have to assume if we were to suppose that the General Assembly could satisfy its obligation to provide such schools without any qualitative requirements. That interpretation, I submit, is unthinkable. As Justice Loiselle famously observed in his dissent in Horton I, “when the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 659. A “school” is a “place for instruction in any branch or branches of knowledge; an establishment for imparting education.” (Emphasis added.) Webster’s New International Dictionary (1916). “When [used] without qualification, school is now familiarly used of an institution for teaching children.” Id. A “school,” therefore, is defined by its function — to educate children. In other words, the goal of educating children is presupposed in the very idea of a “school.” The concept of education cannot be understood absent the incoiporation of qualitative principles. To “educate” is “[t]o develop and cultivate mentally or morally; to expand, strengthen and discipline, as the mind ... to form and regulate the principles and character of; to prepare and fit for any calling or business by systematic instruction; to cultivate; train; instruct.” Id. Education, by its very nature, is a process designed to achieve the goal of improving students through cultivation and development of their minds, and training students by systematic instruction.

*354Second, the absence of explicit language cannot be an absolute determinant, because, otherwise, a Geisler analysis would never be appropriate. That is, only when a constitutional right or guarantee at issue is not explicit or plain on the face of the text does a Geisler analysis become necessary. This does not mean, however, that we may lightly read guarantees into our state constitution. We must, instead, be mindful of the guidance offered in Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 581, in which, when confronted with a similar claim of an implicit constitutional guarantee, we stated: “In construing the contours of our state constitution, we must exercise our authority with great restraint in pursuit of reaching reasoned and principled results. . . . We must be convinced, therefore, on the basis of a complete review of the evidence, that the recognition of a constitutional right or duty is warranted.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

I agree with the plurality that it is significant, albeit not dispositive, that article eighth, § 2, of the state constitution, in contrast to § 1 of article eighth, the education clause, does contain express qualitative language, providing: “The state shall maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education. The general assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment of the governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units or coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 2. The education clause, of course, does not contain similar qualitative language. This difference, however, is not inconsistent with the plurality’s interpretation of the education clause to guarantee an adequate education to primary and secondary public school students. As I have discussed in this concurring opinion, the idea of a minimum qualitative standard is implicit in the defini*355tion of “school.” “Excellence,” however, goes well beyond any minimum qualitative standard. Although, of course, no one would quarrel with the proposition that, in an ideal world, all public schools would be excellent, we cannot say that the idea of “excellence” is necessarily implicit in the idea of a “school.” Our reading of the education clause to guarantee “adequacy” as opposed to the “excellence” guaranteed in article eighth, § 2, reflects the difference between a minimally adequate education that is consistent with the definition of a “school,” and an excellent one that is expressly guaranteed by the state constitution.

I believe that the most persuasive evidence in support of identifying a qualitative element in the education clause derives from the holdings and dicta of this court, to which I now turn. I agree generally with the plurality’s analysis of our previous holdings and dicta, and the bearing that those precedents have on the issue before the court. I offer a few highlights. As the plurality opinion notes, even prior to the addition of the education clause to our constitution following the 1965 constitutional convention, our case law has long recognized the state’s commitment to public education. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huntington v. Huntington School Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882 (1909) (“Connecticut has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young”); see also Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348 (1894) (describing education as duty “assumed by the [s]tate . . . chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the [s]tate itself’). Two of our landmark decisions in the area of education provide remarkably persuasive support for identifying an implicit qualitative standard in our education clause.3 See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1; Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 615.

*356Education finance litigation in Connecticut has followed the national trend of progressing in two “waves, ” beginning with what are known as “equity” claims, equal protection actions based on claimed disparities in education financing. The present action represents the second wave of cases, known as “adequacy” claims, which are premised not on any alleged unconstitutional disparities but, rather, on the assertion that the state constitution guarantees some minimum standard of education that the state is not delivering to the plaintiffs.4 Horton I was a classic equity case, presenting the issue of whether financial disparities between property rich and property poor towns rendered the system of public education financing at that time, which depended heavily on local property taxes, invalid under the equal protection clause of the state constitution. Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 618, 628. The case did not rely on a claim that students were guaranteed a minimally adequate level of education. The court, in fact, took great pains to clarify that “minimal sufficiency” was not at issue in the action. Id., 645-46 (“[t]he [e]qual [protection [c]lause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state *357action”). Although the question of whether the state constitution guaranteed a minimally adequate education was not before the court, it is telling that, in concluding that the plaintiffs had established a violation of their right to equal protection, the court relied heavily on the relation between education financing and education quality. Id., 648 (“[t]he present-day problem arises from the circumstance that over the years there has arisen a great disparity in the ability of local communities to finance local education, which has given rise to a consequent significant disparity in the quality of education available to the youth of the state”); id., 635 (“because many of the elements of a quality education require higher per pupil operating expenditures, there is a direct relationship between per pupil school expenditures and the breadth and quality of educational programs”). To be sure, the court concluded in Horton I only that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive an education that was substantially equal in quality to the education that was provided to other children, not that they were guaranteed an education meeting a minimum qualitative standard. Id., 648-49. It is not possible to infer generally from a requirement of equality a requirement of adequacy. On the other hand, the idea that it is the quality of education to which Connecticut children have an equal right, rather than merely equality in education financing, supports the general proposition that the interest that children have in the fundamental right to education guaranteed by our education clause is inextricably linked to the quality of the education provided. Put another way, our conclusion in Horton I that the plaintiffs had a right to substantially equal educational funding is based on the right to an education of substantially equal quality. The notion that children have a right to an education of substantially equal quality presupposes that “quality” is an essential component of the education clause. We cannot fairly separate the *358right to education from the right to a quality education. This is the very idea that I discussed previously in this concurrence in examining the text of the education clause. “School” and “education” are concepts that embody the idea of some minimal level of quality. The majority opinion in Horton I aptly illustrates this connection.5

Another landmark case, Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, provides further guidance. I first note that Sheff, like Horton I, does not address directly the question of whether the state constitution guarantees a minimally adequate education. In fact, the Sheff court expressly declined to resolve the merits of that issue, even though the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had failed to provide them with a minimally adequate education.6 Id., 36-37. Just as in Horton I, however, in which an equal protection claim based on financial disparities ultimately was grounded on an interest in quality education, Sheff, a case based on racial and ethnic segregation in public schools, ulti*359mately was grounded in the interest that the plaintiffs had in obtaining a quality education. In the course of explaining why article eighth, § 1, and article first, § 20,7 of the state constitution required the legislature to remedy the racial segregation in Hartford’s public schools, the court looked to the general purpose and importance of education in our society, noting that “[s]chools bear central responsibility for inculcating [the] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system .... When children attend racially and ethnically isolated schools, these shared values are jeopardized: If children of different races and economic and social groups have no opportunity to know each other and to live together in school, they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual respect necessary for the cohesion of our society.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 34. The court explained the importance of providing children access to an unsegregated education, stating: “As the United States Supreme Court has eloquently observed, a sound education is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. . . . The American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. . . . We *360have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government . . . and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests. . . . And these historic perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. . . . [Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 43-44. Although we did not directly conclude that the state constitution guarantees a minimally adequate education, our equal protection analysis was guided by the underlying assumption that the education clause does not merely guarantee to each child in the state “an education” without qualification. Implicit in our analysis is the idea that the fundamental right to education guaranteed by the education clause is one that includes a qualitative component that is inseparable from the fundamental right. In other words, the right vindicated by Sheff logically and implicitly, if not expressly, was not merely a right of equal access to any education, but equal access to a “sound” or “adequate” education.

Justice Berdon’s concurring opinion in Sheff goes even further, reasoning that, from the elevation of education to a fundamental right through the passage of the education clause, “it logically follows that the education guaranteed in the state constitution must be, at the very least, within the context of its contemporary meaning, an adequate education.” (Emphasis added.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 50. This understanding of the fundamental right to education was, according to Justice Berdon, simply a matter of interpreting the education clause in a “reasonable manner.” Id. I agree with *361Justice Berdon that the contemporary meaning of the language of the education clause must inform our interpretation of the scope of the fundamental right to education and that interpreting the education clause in a reasonable manner requires the conclusion that the state constitution guarantees Connecticut children the right to an adequate education.

The first four Geisler factors — that is, the text and our case precedent, which I have discussed, plus the historical background of article eighth and the economic and sociological considerations, both of which are effectively set forth by the plurality opinion — taken together, appear to me to be highly persuasive on the issue. They convince me that the only reasonable interpretation of our education clause is that it implicitly includes a qualitative standard. The remaining two factors, sibling state decisions and federal precedent, although of significantly less relevance and persuasive value, provide further support for that conclusion. I turn first to the decisions of our sibling states.

There is some persuasive force in the fact that most state courts that have addressed the substantive issue have concluded that their state constitution guarantees a minimally adequate level of education.8 Because the *362education clauses in most state constitutions differ materially from our own, an analysis of sibling state decisions must focus on those states that have clauses most closely resembling our own, that is, clauses that do not contain qualitative language in setting forth the right to education.9 There axe few of these, and even *363fewer that have been interpreted by the state courts resolving whether the clause implicitly includes a qualitative element, specifically, New York, North Carolina and South Carolina. Of those three states, I briefly discuss the decisions of New York and North Carolina because they are the most pertinent.10 The education *364clause in New York’s state constitution provides simply: “The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y. Const., art. XI, § 1. In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995) (Campaign I), the court considered the plaintiffs’ claim that the state system of public education financing violated the state constitution because it denied them a sound basic education, and noted that it already had, in dicta, construed the meaning of education to connote a “sound basic education.” Id., 316, citing Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138, 103 S. Ct. 775, 74 L. Ed. 2d 986 (1983). In Nyquist, the court relied on two sources to interpret the education clause, the text itself and the historical background of the clause. As to the historical background of the education clause, which was adopted in 1894, the court stated that “[w]hat appears to have been contemplated when the education article was adopted at the 1894 Constitutional Convention was a [s]tate-wide system assuring minimal acceptable facilities and services . . . .” Board of Education v. Nyquist, supra, 47. The court’s consideration of the text is somewhat more oblique, yet still helpful. The opinion simply refers to “ [interpreting the term education, as we do, to connote a sound basic education . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 48. Without directly saying so, the court was relying on the definition of the term *365 education in concluding that the word must include some qualitative element. This is precisely what I have done in reading the term “schools” in our education clause. The two terms cannot be understood without finding the concept of a minimum qualitative standard in the definition.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997), interpreted the state constitution’s two education clauses, which provide: “The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right”; N.C. Const., art. I, § 15; and “[t]he General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools . . . .” N.C. Const., art. IX, § 2 (1). The court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of the right to public education contains a qualitative element, and based its analysis primarily on the court’s prior precedent and the education statutes. Leandro v. State, supra, 346-47. The court also based its conclusion, however, on the general principle that “[a]n education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance . . . .’’(Emphasis added.) Id., 345. This is another way of stating the principle with which I began, in my textual analysis: the guarantee of quality is in the meaning of “school” and “education” themselves. Without some guarantee of a qualitative standard, the fundamental right to education guaranteed by our state constitution would be meaningless.

As I noted previously in this concurring opinion, I consider the factor of federal precedent last because it has the least relevance in this particular context, in which the language of our state constitution differs from the federal constitutional language. I observe merely that, although education is not a fundamental *366right under the federal constitution, federal precedent repeatedly has recognized the importance of education to our democratic society. Indeed, even in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized the unique significance of the right to education in our society, citing to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), for the proposition that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, at the same time that San Antonio Independent School District established that education is not a fundamental right under the federal constitution, the court left further resolution of the issue to the states, cautioning that its decision was “not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 58.

Finally, the General Assembly already has acknowledged statutorily the very same standard that we today hold is mandated constitutionally. Specifically, in General Statutes § 10-4a (1), the legislature identifies the educational interests of the state to include “the concern of the state that . . . each child shall have for the period prescribed in the general statutes equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educational experiences . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the duty that we now hold to be constitutionally required is one that the legislature already has recognized and undertaken of its own volition.

*367These tools of constitutional analysis lead me to the firm conclusion that the fundamental right to free education guaranteed by the education clause, article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution, would be stripped of its meaning and content if we were to interpret that guarantee as not embodying some minimum qualitative standard. A guarantee of education cannot stand without assurance that the guaranteed “schools,” and the education provided therein will meet a minimum qualitative standard.

n

Having concluded that our education clause implicitly includes a qualitative element, I next turn to the question of how we should define the contours of the right sufficiently to guide the trial court in determining the issues in the present action without intruding on the authority of the other branches of government, that is, within the scope of the justiciable issue in this case. The plurality opinion settles on the formula proposed by the plaintiffs, concluding that the education clause “guarantees Connecticut’s public school students educational standards and resources suitable to participate in democratic institutions, and to prepare them to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state’s economy, or to progress on to higher education. ” I suggest that it is important to explain more thoroughly the reasons for so defining the constitutional right. Otherwise, we run the risk of sacrificing the primary benefits of a Geisler analysis — enabling a principled development of our constitutional law and, by so doing, establishing and supporting the constitutional right with the authority of the court. Our sound reasoning comprises a crucial step in making a constitutional pronouncement with such far-reaching consequences. Regardless of the outcome of this litigation, this constitutional determination will continue to guide the legislative branch in carrying out its constitutional duty in *368future years. Well reasoned explanation also may serve to establish common ground for the parties to reach consensus, now or in the future, on various aspects of the issues. Without sound reasoning to support and explain the decision, the court relinquishes its principal claim to authority. See State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 716 n.10.

We must, accordingly, do more than merely conclude that our state constitution guarantees the right to an adequate education. That conclusion alone does not provide sufficient guidance to enable the trial court to determine whether the constitutional guarantee is being fulfilled or violated. It is essential to explain how we arrive at the stated goals that fully define the contours of the educational guarantee. Linguistic considerations alone support the conclusion that our task is not completed by stating that the education clause guarantees the right to an adequate education. That determination merely gives rise to the inevitable question as to adequacy “for what purposes?” Two general principles guide my inquiry as to the contours of the right. First, the question “for what purposes” suggests that the direction of the inquiry should be goal directed; that is, the inquiry seeks to determine the goals to be served by the adequate education. Second, in answering the question, it is necessary to examine why education has been elevated to the status of a fundamental right protected by our state constitution. In other words, only by understanding what we as a society so value in education, may we discern “for what purposes” such an education should be adequate. Accordingly, I examine in turn each of the purposes proposed by the plurality — in short, to prepare students to participate in democratic institutions and to become productive members of our society — to determine whether there is a sufficient basis in our law to conclude that each is an essential component of an adequate education.

*369“I know no safe depositary of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (1820), 12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson (P. Ford ed., 1905), p. 163. Education is not simply a duty owed to the individual student. Rather, the duty to provide an education to the young in our society also is viewed in very utilitarian terms. That is, we educate our young not only for their personal benefit, but also to benefit our democracy. See Bissell v. Davison, supra, 65 Conn. 191 (duty to provide education “has always been assumed by the [s]tate; not only because the education of youth is a matter of great public utility, but also and chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the [s]tate itself’). Certainly, an education that adequately prepares our children to participate effectively in our democracy is of critical importance to our society. Adequate education must prepare students fully for meaningful participation in the democratic process. I can envision that effective participation will involve, not only nominal performance of typical civic actions, such as voting and jury service, but well-informed and thoughtful contributions to the wide variety of activity and decision making that enables our democratic society to flourish. There is ample support for the conclusion that an adequate education should prepare students to become engaged in the democratic process. Evidence of this connection dates back to the Code of Laws for the Colony of Connecticut, commonly known as the Ludlow Code, which required that children receive “so much [1] earning as may inable them perfectly to read the [English] toungue, and knowledge of *370 the Capitall Lawes.” (Emphasis added.) Code of Laws, Children (1650), reprinted in 1 Col. Rec. 509, 521 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., 1850). Simon J. Bernstein, a delegate to the 1965 constitutional convention and proponent of amending the constitution to add the education clause, expressly relied on the Ludlow Code in describing the purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment during the 1965 constitutional convention. Additionally, he specifically acknowledged the importance of education in fostering and maintaining our democratic government: “It goes without saying that if we are going to have representative [g]ovemment elected by a public . . . the education of the public is the first and best way of promoting the best representatives to be elected . . . .” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, p. 312, remarks of Delegate Bernstein.

More recent legislation also supports the conclusion that a principal purpose of education is to prepare children to participate effectively in our democracy. For example, General Statutes § 10-18 (a) (1) requires schools to provide courses in history, government and citizenship: “All . . . schools . . . shall provide a program of United States history, including instruction in United States government at the local, state and national levels, and in the duties, responsibilities, and rights of United States citizenship. No student shall be graduated from any such school who has not been found to be familiar with said subjects.” In 2007 and 2008, that statute was amended by the enactment of No. 07-138 of the 2007 Public Acts and No. 08-153 of the 2008 Public Acts, to add a new subdivision requiring that “elementary schools shall include in their third, fourth or fifth grade curriculum a program on democracy in which students engage in a participatory manner in learning about all branches of government.” General Statutes § 10-18 (a) (2). In 2000, the legislature enacted *371No. 00-156 of the 2000 Public Acts, amending General Statutes § 10-22 la to add civics as a requirement for high school graduation.11 The Associate Commissioner of the State Department of Education at the time explained the impetus behind this amendment: “The civics requirement grows out of a concern that young citizens are disengaged from the democratic process. . . . Relevance to life is imperative for students to reconnect with democratic behaviors and institutions as citizens of the United States. It is this connection which must be explicitly made for students as a part of civics education.” Connecticut Department of Education Letter to School Superintendents, High School Principals and Social Studies Department Heads, September 27, 2000, p. 1, available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/ lib/sde/Word Docs/Curriculum/soccivic.doc (last visited March 9, 2010). All of these recent changes to the curriculum and graduation requirements reflect the General Assembly’s understanding of the critical role that education plays in preparing our children to become citizens in our democracy.

This court also has acknowledged, repeatedly, that a principal purpose of education is to prepare students to participate as citizens in our democracy. In his concurring opinion in Horton I, Justice Bogdanski eloquently described the function of education in our society: “[T]he right of our children to an education is a matter of right not only because our state constitution *372declares it as such, but because education is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of society together. In a real sense, it is as necessary to a civilized society as food and shelter are to an individual. It is our fundamental legacy to the youth of our state to enable them to acquire knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for it is the ability to reason that separates [men and women] from all other forms of life.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 654-55. Indeed, Justice Loiselle, in his dissenting opinion, stated: “We cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country.” Id., 661. These two statements also illustrate the principle that education simultaneously is intended to benefit individual members of society, by enabling them to exercise their rights as citizens, and society as a whole, by providing individuals with the means to exercise those rights intelligently.

We explained further in Sheff, in which the function of education in preparing students to participate as citizens in our society was central to our holding, that “[i]t is crucial for a democratic society to provide all of its schoolchildren with fair access to an unsegregated education. As the United States Supreme Court has eloquently observed, a sound education ‘is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’ Brown v. Board *373 of Education, supra, 347 U.S. 493. ‘The American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. . . . We have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government . . . and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests. . . . And these historic perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 43-44. One would have to look hard for a more compelling statement of the importance of a “sound” or “adequate” education to the preparation for good citizenship.

Marian Wright Edelman, the president and founder of the Children’s Defense Fund, and a leading scholar in the area of educational theory, has stated that “education is for improving the lives of others and for leaving your community and world better than you found it”12 and “education is a precondition to survival in America today.”13 Surely, enabling our children to become productive members of society, either directly following secondary school, or after completing a course of higher education, serves the general utilitarian purpose of benefiting the state as a whole. See Bissell v. Davison, supra, 65 Conn. 190-91. A statement made by President Barack Obama during an address to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce on March 10,2009, illustrates dramatically the importance of this purpose of education: “The source of America’s prosperity has never been merely how ably we accumulate wealth, but how well we edu*374cate our people. This has never been more true than it is today. In a [twenty-first] century world where jobs can be shipped wherever there’s an Internet connection, where a child bom in Dallas is now competing with a child in New Delhi, where your best job qualification is not what you do, but what you know — education is no longer just a pathway to opportunity and success, it’s a prerequisite for success.” Our law has long supported the conclusion that one of the primary purposes of education is to prepare children in this state to compete in the economic marketplace. The Ludlow Code understood this to be an essential goal of education, requiring that schoolmasters “bring [up] theire [c]hildren and [apprentices in some honest lawfull [calling] labour or [e]mployment . . . proffitable for themselves and the Common wealth . . . .” Code of Laws, Children (1650), reprinted in 1 Col. Rec., supra, 521.

This court also has acknowledged the vital role that education plays in enabling citizens of this state to compete in the economic marketplace: “[Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our [n]ation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheff v. O’Neil, supra, 238 Conn. 44. Indeed, the words of the Sheff majority, describing the racial and ethnic isolation claims asserted by the plaintiffs in that case, characterize the claims of the plaintiffs in the present case precisely: “Although the constitutional basis for the plaintiffs’ claims is the deprivation that they themselves are suffering, that deprivation potentially has an impact on the entire state and its economy — not only on its social and cultural fabric, but on its material well-being, on its jobs, industry, and *375business. Economists and business leaders say that our state’s economic well-being is dependent on more skilled workers, technically proficient workers, literate and well-educated citizens. And they point to the urban poor as an integral part of our future economic strength. . . . So it is not just that their future depends on the [sjtate, the state’s future depends on them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The purpose of preparing children to become productive members of society, then, like the purpose of preparing them to be good citizens in our democratic society, benefits both the individual and the state as a whole. Not only do democratically engaged and productive citizens, adequately prepared by their public educations, contribute to the well-being and progress of our society, but education also provides the means by which individuals improve their own social and economic circumstances, thereby enabling them and their successors to benefit from that education.

I conclude that these authorities sufficiently support the plaintiffs’ contention that the education guaranteed by the education clause, article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution, must be adequate to prepare students to participate and engage in the processes of our democracy and to become productive members of our society.

Ill

I write also to express prudential concerns regarding the next stage of this litigation and to offer suggestions in the form of a preliminary template based on what I anticipate may arise at trial. During the next stage, which is likely to consist of pleading, discovery, trial and decision making in the Superior Court, I can envision several issues, among many, that are likely to prove especially challenging. These issues will have to be addressed by the trial court and the parties as they litigate, in a sense as proxies for the people of the state, *376who surely have a compelling interest in the outcome, the troubling allegations of inadequacy, as well as inequity, for which the plaintiffs seek relief. The first issue is the challenge that the court will face in determining the appropriate method of measuring educational adequacy for the public school students of the state. The second is the challenge that the court will face in determining whether the plaintiffs ultimately have proved that some or all of the students are being deprived of an adequate education. Finally, in the event that the trial court determines that the state has failed to meet its constitutional duty of providing an adequate education, the trial court, and ultimately this court, in all likelihood, will face the challenge of determining the extent to which the court can design a specific remedy without intruding on the constitutional authority of the legislative branch, or whether the crafting of the remedy must be left in the first instance to the legislature. I discuss each of these issues in turn.

The New York Court of Appeals, in a decision that was rendered at a stage of litigation similar to the posture of the present case, succinctly articulated the task of the trial court in determining the appropriate measure of adequacy and whether it is being met. The court first determined, with somewhat more specificity than we do today, that the education article of the New York constitution “requires the [s]tate to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education. . . . Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.” (Citation omitted.) Campaign I, supra, 86 N.Y.2d 316. The court explained both the need to set forth a template to guide the trial court and the necessary limits of such a template, because of the early stage of the litigation process. “We do not attempt to definitively specify what the *377constitutional concept and mandate of a sound basic education entails. Given the procedural posture of this case, an exhaustive discussion and consideration of the meaning of a ‘sound basic education’ is premature. Only after discoveiy and the development of a factual record can this issue be fully evaluated and resolved. Rather, we articulate a template reflecting our judgment of what the trier of fact must consider in determining whether [the] defendants have met their constitutional obligation.” Id., 317-18. Given the preliminary contours that the court drew of a “sound basic education,” it described the task of the trial court, which would “have to evaluate whether the children . . . are in fact being provided the opportunity to acquire the basic literacy, calculating and verbal skills necessary to enable them” to achieve the goals of education; id., 318; which we have identified in this opinion as participating fully in the democratic process and becoming productive members of society. As I have noted, we have identified the goals of education in less specific terms than the New York Court of Appeals did in Campaign I. Accordingly, the trial court in the present case will have to evaluate whether the schools in the plaintiffs’ towns or districts are providing children with the skills necessary to enable the children to participate effectively in our democracy and to become productive members of our society. In other words, the court will have to determine whether the education provided is adequate to meet the goals that we have defined today.14 As it carries out *378that task, the trial court will have to flesh out the goals with appropriate specificity, based on the factual record.

In order to make that evaluation, the court first will have to determine the appropriate method for measuring adequacy. Measuring educational adequacy traditionally is accomplished by identifying input and/or output standards that serve as a measure of adequacy, then calculating the actual cost of attaining those inputs and/or outputs, a process referred to as “costing out.” S. Smith, “Education Adequacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research,” 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 107, 114 (2004). “There are four methodologies to identify adequate education funding: (1) the professional judgment model; (2) the evidence based or ‘best practices’ model; (3) the successful schools model; and (4) the advanced statistical model.” Id., 115. “[T]he professional judgment and evidence based/best practices models can be viewed as input models in which expert educators and researchers identify inputs that are required to produce an adequate education system. These inputs are then costed out to arrive at an adequate funding level. The successful schools and advanced statistical models can be viewed as outcome models in which an analysis compares schools and/or school districts with varying demographics and student performance to their corresponding funding levels in order to identify adequate funding levels.” Id. Basically these methods combine to allow the trier of fact to consider the state’s general and per pupil expenditures along with the level of performance of children of the state on standardized tests, matriculation rates, and other measures of performance. An alternative means of measuring adequacy is to rely on statistical modeling stud*379ies. These statistical methods are used “either to estimate (a) the quantities and qualities of educational resources associated with higher or improved educational outcomes or (b) the costs associated with achieving a specific set of outcomes, in different school districts, serving different student populations. The first of these methods is known as the education production function and the second of these methods is known as the education cost function.” R. Wood & B. Baker, “An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas,” 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 125, 147 (2004). The advantage of these two methods is that they both “require policymakers to establish explicit, measurable outcome goals.” Id. Moreover, both of these statistical methods may prove helpful in estimating the effect of the different particular needs of the various districts on values such as resources and costs. Id.

The North Carolina Supreme Court endorsed this general approach in Leandro v. State, supra, 346 N.C. 355. That court directed that the trial court on remand could consider “[educational goals and standards adopted by the legislature,” “the level of performance of the children of the state [of North Carolina] and its various districts on standard achievement tests,” and the “level of the state’s general educational expenditures and per-pupil expenditures.” Id. In Campaign I, the New York Court of Appeals listed the following relevant inputs, including: “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn . . . minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks . . . [and] minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by *380sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.” Campaign I, supra, 86 N.Y.2d 317. The court in Campaign I also mentioned performance on standardized tests as a relevant output. Id.

In my view, it is not sufficient for the state merely to offer an opportunity for education without regard to the circumstances of the children to whom it is offered. In other words, because an opportunity exists only when it takes into account the conditions — social, economic, and other — that realistically limit the opportunity, the educational offering must be tailored to meet the adequacy standard in the context of the social and economic conditions of the children to whom it is offered. Although no one could reasonably argue that the state is constitutionally bound to be a guarantor of educational, civic, or economic success, the state is bound to provide an education that is adequate given the circumstances of the children to whom it must be provided. Depending on the circumstances, an offering that would suffice in one district of the state may not suffice in another.

By way of illustration, some commentators argue that the most serious social disadvantage preventing a child from being able to learn is, of course, poverty. Relying on data obtained from the United States Census Bureau, the General Assembly’s Commission on Children reported in 2009 that one in ten Connecticut children under the age of eighteen in 2007 lived in a family with income below the federal poverty line — nearly 86,000 children. State of Connecticut General Assembly, Commission on Children, Fact Sheet on Child Poverty in Connecticut, 2009, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/ coc/PDFs/poverty/child poverty report 0109.pdf (last visited March 9, 2010). Not surprisingly, those children were not evenly distributed throughout the state’s 169 towns. The 2000 census revealed that, in thirty-eight towns, the child poverty rate was less than 2 percent, *381yet in seven towns that rate was 23 percent, led by Hartford, which had an extremely high child poverty rate of 47 percent. Id. Waterbury, Bridgeport and New Haven also had the high child poverty rates of 31.4 percent, 28.4 percent, and 28.7 percent, respectively. Id. The impact that poverty has on a child’s ability to learn is difficult to quantify, but it is unquestionably considerable. Poverty brings with it a host of other impediments to learning: limited or no access to health and dental care, poor or no prenatal care for the child’s mother, failure to identify conditions such as learning disabilities and autism that would require special education services, poor diet and inadequate housing in unsafe neighborhoods. See M. Rebell, “Poverty, ‘Meaningful’ Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts,” 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1467, 1472-73 (2007).15

As challenging as these issues are, the trial court and, likely, this court, may have to face the issue of remedies, depending on the outcome of the adequacy phase of the trial. In that event, it may well be that the appropriate option available to the courts, to avoid a conflict concerning the separation of powers, would be the *382route taken in Sheff and Horton I, that is, an order that would assign, at least initially, the responsibility of providing a specific remedy to the legislature and, as appropriate, to the parties to the litigation. Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 4 (“the constitutional imperative of separation of powers persuades us to afford the legislature, with the assistance of the executive branch, the opportunity, in the first instance, to fashion the remedy that will most appropriately respond to the constitutional violations that we have identified”); see also Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 650-51.16 The North Carolina Supreme Court explained the prudential concerns that support this approach. “[T]he legislative process provides a better forum than the courts for discussing and determining what educational programs and resources are most likely to ensure that each child of the state receives a sound basic education. The members of the General Assembly are popularly elected to represent the public for the purpose of making just such decisions. The legislature, unlike the courts, is not limited to addressing only cases and controversies brought before it by litigants. The legislature can properly conduct public hearings and committee meetings at which it can hear and consider the views of the general public as well as educational experts and permit the full expression of all points of view as to what curricula will best ensure that every child of the state has the opportunity to receive a sound basic education.” Leandro v. State, supra, 346 N.C. 354-55. Moreover, “ [e] ducational goals and standards adopted by the legislature are factors which may be considered on remand *383to the trial court for its determination as to whether any of the state’s children are being denied their right to a sound basic education.” Id., 355.

The standard of educational adequacy that is required by our constitution must be met with respect to all children in our state, including those who face serious obstacles to benefiting from it as well as those who are readily equipped to benefit. The public educational system does not operate in abstraction but, rather, in the full social and economic context of our diverse society. The children who have the greatest need for an adequate education are those who face the greatest obstacles to obtaining that education. For many of our children, public education is, perhaps ironically, the principal means by which they can surmount the obstacles that must be overcome, in the first place, in order to benefit from the education. While the state is not bound under the constitution to be a guarantor of educational, social or economic success in the long run, the state is bound to provide a public education that is well suited to enable all children to achieve that success.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.,

dissenting. I agree with the plurality’s conclusion that the claim by the plaintiffs, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc., and numerous parents and their public school children, that the defendants, Governor M. Jodi Rell and various state officials and members of the state board of education,1 have violated article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution by failing to provide the schoolchildren with suitable educational opportunities is justiciable. I also agree that this court’s decision in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), sets forth the factors to be considered in *384determining the scope of the right guaranteed by the constitutional provision. I disagree, however, with the plurality’s conclusion that the Geisler factors support the view that “article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting,” and that, to be constitutionally adequate, that education must “leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.” Instead, I would conclude that the constitutional requirement that “[t]here shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state”; Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 2; was intended to ensure the perpetuation of Connecticut’s statewide system of free public schools, and was not intended to guarantee a “suitable” education as interpreted by the majority. I therefore would conclude that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to strike counts one, two and four of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

The plurality stated that, “[i]n considering whether a particular subject matter presents a nonjusticiable political question, we have articulated [six] relevant factors, including: a textuaily demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques*385tion. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s presence. . . . Furthermore, simply because the case has a connection to the political sphere [is not] an independent basis for characterizing an issue as a political question . . . . Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, [271 Conn. 540, 573, 858 A.2d 709 (2004)]. Indeed, the principle that a case should not be dismissed for nonjusticiability as a political question unless an unusual need for unquestioned adherence to that decision is inextricable from the case, means that courts should view such cases with a heavy thumb on the side of justiciability, and with the recognition that, simply because the case is connected to the political sphere, it does not necessarily follow that it is a political question. Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, [261 Conn. 475, 488, 803 A.2d 318 (2002)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 14, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996), this court considered whether the plaintiffs’ claim that they were entitled to “a substantially equal educational opportunity arising under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20,” of the state constitution was justiciable. The defendants in Sheff had claimed that the case presented a nonjusticiable question because the constitution conferred exclusive power on the legislature to “implement [the principle that there shall always be free public schools in the state] by appropriate legislation.” Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 1; see Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 13. This court responded to this claim by observing that in Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 625, 649-50, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I), and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 35, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III), 2 we had “reviewed, in plenary fash*386ion, the actions taken by the legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to public elementary and secondary schoolchildren.”3 Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 14. The court then observed that “[t]he plaintiff schoolchildren in the present case invoke the same constitutional provisions to challenge the constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff schoolchildren invoked in Horton I and Horton III. The text of article eighth, § 1, has not changed. Furthermore, although prudential cautions may shed light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies; see Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 184—85, 610 A.2d 153 (1992); such cautions do not deprive a court of jurisdiction.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 14-15. In light of these precedents, we concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims in Sheff were justiciable. Id., 15-16.

The court then rejected the Sheff defendants’ claim that this court’s decision in Simmons v. Budds, 165 Conn. 507, 338 A.2d 479 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 1943, 40 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1974), supported their claim that the case was nonjusticiable. See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 15 n.17. In Simmons, the plaintiffs had claimed that the defendants, various University of Connecticut officials, had violated the constitutional mandate of article eighth, § 2, of the Connecticut constitution that the University of Connecticut “ ‘shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education.’ ” Simmons v. Budds, supra, 513. The court in Simmons concluded that, when article eighth, § 2, was adopted, “[i]t was intended that the board of trustees and the administrators were to be free to decide what is wise in educational policy. . . . Corrective action, if warranted, lies within the provinces of the board of trustees from whom the university senate’s authority is derived, the governor who appoints the *387trustees under § 10-118 of the General Statutes, and, ultimately, with the General Assembly to which the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 2, entrusts the responsibility of governing the University of Connecticut.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 514. The court concluded that “the constitutional [standard of ‘excellence’ was not meant to be a wedge for penetration of the educational establishment by judicial intervention in policy decisions.” Id. In Sheff, this court characterized its holding in Simmons as a decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, and stated that “[w]e did not hold that the claim was nonjusticiable.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 15 n.17. Accordingly, we concluded that Simmons did not support the defendants’ argument in Sheff that the plaintiffs’ claim was nonjusticiable. Id., 15 and n.17.

It is clear, therefore, that this court has recognized that there is considerable overlap between the “prudential cautions [that] may shed light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies”; Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 15; and the factors that inform our determination as to whether an issue constitutes a nonjusticiable political question.4 See Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 614-15, 660 A.2d 742 (1995) (“[t]he difficulty of defining the scope of [a state constitutional right to minimal subsistence for poor citizens], or of deciding what is the appropriate government response [to indigence]” supports conclusion that no such right exists); Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, supra, 222 Conn. 185 (“[p]rudential and functional considerations [as set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, *388217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962)] are relevant to the classical enterprise of constitutional interpretation, especially where, as here, the constitutional provisions at issue are so remarkably open-textured”); see also United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 459, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 118 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1992) (“[r]espect for a coordinate branch of [government raises special concerns . . . but those concerns relate to the merits of the controversy, rather than to our power to resolve it”). Thus, this court has been willing to treat factors such as respect for a coordinate branch of government and the difficulty of crafting appropriate equitable relief as prudential considerations relevant to the scope of a constitutional right, rather than as limits on the scope of the courts’ power to resolve constitutional questions. This approach is consistent with “the principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of subject matter jurisdiction.” Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 15.

Accordingly, although I recognize, as Justice Zarella argues in his dissenting opinion, that the claim that the plaintiffs have raised in the present case is not precisely the same as the claim raised by the plaintiffs in Sheff 5 the principles underlying this court’s holding in Sheff that the plaintiffs’ claim in that case was justiciable apply equally here. Accordingly, I would conclude that deference to the legislature and the difficulty of formulating appropriate equitable relief do not deprive this court of jurisdiction to determine the scope of the right but, instead, are factors to be considered in determining the scope of the right created by article eighth, § 1, as the trial court concluded.6

*389I turn, therefore, to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that, under article eighth, § 1, they have a right to receive suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities. To support this claim, the plaintiffs allege in counts one, two and four of their complaint, that various plaintiffs: (1) are in classes too large to learn effectively; (2) have had no opportunity to attend preschool; (3) lack access to remedial instruction or summer school; (4) attend schools with limited or poor quality technological resources; (5) are taught by teachers lacking subject matter expertise;7 and (6) attend schools with high concentrations of special education students, bilingual or non-English speaking students and students who are “at risk,” and schools that lack access to resources commensurate with their needs. In addition, the plaintiffs claim that these inadequacies are caused by a flawed educational funding system.

I agree with the plurality that this question may be resolved by application of the factors set forth in State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 684-86.8 Although Geisler ordinarily supplies “[t]he analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protection to our *390citizens than the federal constitutional nünimum”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 509, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007); I perceive no reason why this framework should not be equally useful in analyzing the scope of a right guaranteed by the state constitution that has no federal analog. See Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 581-82 (applying Geisler analysis to claim that state has constitutional obligation to provide minimal assistance to its poor citizens). Accordingly, I address each factor in turn.

With respect to federal precedent, I recognize that this factor has limited relevance in the present case because the federal constitution contains no analog to article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution. I disagree, however, with the plurality’s conclusion that the federal precedent is entirely irrelevant to our analysis. Rather, I believe the United States Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), supports the trial court’s conclusion that there are important prudential considerations that must be considered in determining the scope of the state constitutional right. In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems. . . . The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that, within the limits of rationality, the legislature’s efforts to tack the problems should be entitled to respect. ... On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided. . . . The ultimate wisdom as to [the] . . . problems of education is not likely to *391be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the [s]tates inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 42-43. The court in San Antonio Independent School District concluded that “[t]he consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various [s]tates . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 58. I would conclude that this reasoning strongly counsels against interpreting article eighth, § 1, to endow the plaintiffs with the right to a “suitable” education that is enforceable in our courts.

With respect to the text of article eighth, § 1, I disagree with the plurality’s conclusion that it is ambiguous as applied to the claims in this case.9 Article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. ...” As the plurality points out in footnote 29 of its opinion, the common understanding of the word “ ‘school’ ” is “ ‘an organization that provides instruction . . . .’ ” As the plurality also recognizes, article eighth, § 1, “does not contain any qualitative language, in contrast to § 2 of article eighth . . . which requires the state to ‘maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in *392higher education’ (emphasis in original); and in contrast to the education provisions of the constitutions of many of our sister states. In light of the language of article eighth, § 2, and inasmuch as this state was the last state to adopt a constitutional education provision; see Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 30; it is clear to me that the framers were well aware of their option to include a qualitative standard in article eighth, § 1, and deliberately chose not to include one. This deliberate choice weighs very heavily with me, and I therefore would conclude that the text of article eighth, § 1, reasonably cannot be read as mandating that the instruction in our public schools be “suitable” or effective for some specific end.10

With respect to the precedents of this court, I would conclude that our previous cases construing article eighth, § 1, provide no guidance in the present case because, as the plurality recognizes, they have involved claims of inequality, while this case presents for the first time a claim that that constitutional provision establishes a qualitative standard. There is ample precedent in our decisions, however, for the general proposition that prudential considerations such as an absence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the case and the difficulty in crafting equitable relief are relevant to our determination of the scope of a state constitutional right. See Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 15; Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 614-15; Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, supra, 222 Conn. 185; Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514. *393As Justice Zarella has demonstrated in part III B of his dissenting opinion in the present case, courts simply are not well suited to make the difficult policy determinations as to what constitutes a “suitable” education and how to achieve that end. In my view, these prudential considerations weigh heavily against an inteipretation that article eighth, § 1, includes an implicit qualitative standard.

With respect to the history of article eighth, § 1, I disagree with the plurality that this factor supports its conclusion that the provision contains an implicit qualitative requirement. Rather, I would conclude that the statements of the delegates to the constitutional convention support a conclusion that the framers merely intended to guarantee that the legislature would continue to provide the free public school system that it traditionally had provided. Simon J. Bernstein, a delegate to the 1965 constitutional convention and the principal supporter of the provision that became article eighth, § 1, stated during convention proceedings that “we do have the tradition which goes back to our earliest days of free good public education and we have [had] good public schools so that this again is not anything revolutionary, it is something which we have . . . which is [in] practically all [constitutions in the [sjtates of our nation and Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle.” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), IT. 3, p. 1039; see also Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, p. 312, remarks of Delegate Bernstein (“[w]e have a great history and tradition requiring that the public body supply our children with free public education”). Thus, Delegate Bernstein’s statements emphasize that the provision was intended merely to honor and perpetuate Connecticut’s tradition of providing free public schools for all of its school aged children. See Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 *394Conn. 596 (“the framers of the education provisions looked to the historical statutory tradition of free public education in this state to support its explicit inclusion in the state constitution”); J. Dinan, “The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the Constitutional Convention Debates,” 70 Alb. L. Rev. 927, 941 (2007) (including article eighth, § 1, among class of state constitutional education clauses that had “purpose of recognizing or confirming actions already taken by legislatures” and were intended to be merely hortatory); id., 943 (noting that Delegate Bernstein “was clear . . . that he did not mean for adoption of this clause to signal any change in the current school system”). There is no evidence that article eighth, § 1, was intended to create a new, judicially enforceable right to a suitable education.

With respect to the decisions of our sister states, I disagree with the plurality that they are “of paramount importance” in determining the scope of article eighth, § 1. The plurality relies on cases from New York, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee and Washington in support of its interpretation.11 See part II E of the plurality opinion. As the plurality acknowledges, however, courts in seven other states, several of which have constitutions containing education clauses with qualitative standards,12 have concluded that claims *395seeking to enforce those provisions are nonjusticiable. See footnotes 24 and 54 of the plurality opinion. In addition, a number of states have concluded that the education clauses of their respective constitutions do not contain judicially enforceable qualitative standards or funding requirements.13 Indeed, recent scholarship *396demonstrates that the trend in education adequacy litigation since 2005 has been “towards deference [to the legislature] and away from judicial intervention.” J. Simon-Kerr & R. Sturm, “Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education,” 6 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 85 (2010). The primary reasons for this trend are the fact that the courts that have waded into these waters have found themselves drowning in endless litigation and they have increasingly realized that they are institutionally unable to craft appropriate relief. See id., p. 88; id., p. 99 (proposed remedies are “ ‘rife with policy choices that are properly the [legislature’s domain’ ” and are “fundamentally political”), citing Hancock v. Driscoll, 443 Mass. 428, 460, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (2005); J. Simon-Kerr & R. Sturm, supra, p. 117 (“‘The landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states’ school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp.’ ”), *397citing Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heinman, 273 Neb. 531, 557, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007); see also part III B of Justice Zarella’s dissenting opinion. The plurality attempts to distinguish these cases on various grounds; see footnote 24 of plurality opinion; but I find persuasive the statement of the court in Lobato v. State, 216 P.3d 29, 36 (Colo. App 2008), rev’d, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009), that these disparate results are not based on any clearly discernible legal principles, but “revolve around policy choices and value determinations”; (internal quotation marks omitted); that courts are ill suited to make in the first instance. Finally, even if the plurality were correct that this factor tends to favor the plaintiffs, I would conclude that the text of article eighth, § 1, of our state constitution, the history of the provision, and our state and federal precedents establishing that prudential concerns, such as the lack of manageable judicial standards and the difficulty of crafting equitable relief, are relevant to the scope of a state constitutional provision, are of greater importance and substantially outweigh this factor.

With respect to economic and sociological concerns, the plurality concludes that the plaintiffs and the state itself have a vital interest in a school system that provides a sound basic education to every child in the state. I agree with this assessment. The majority also concludes that this interest trumps any prudential concerns, such as the absence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards and the inability of this court to craft appropriate relief, which “are in our view better addressed in consideration of potential remedies for any constitutional violations that may be found at a subsequent trial on the merits, which might well require staying further judicial action pending legislative action.” I disagree with this conclusion. Although this court has, on occasion, left the enforcement of a state *398constitutional right to the legislature in the first instance; see Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 45-46; Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 650; I believe that, in the present case, the absence of any qualitative standard in the text of our constitution, together with the dismaying experiences of other courts that have attempted to enforce such a standard, weigh heavily against interpreting article eighth, § 1, to contain an implicit qualitative standard, and in favor of leaving the crafting of a remedy to the legislature. In my view, the absence of a judicially enforceable remedy strongly implies the absence of a judicially enforceable right. See Dimmock v. New London, 157 Conn. 9, 16, 245 A.2d 569 (1968) (“for the vindication of every right there is a remedy” [internal quotation marks omitted]). The course taken by the plurality can only create unrealistic expectations and divert scarce public resources from supporting schools to defending endless litigation.

In summary, I would conclude that none of the Geisler factors supports the plurality's conclusions that: (1) “article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting”; and (2) the constitutionally adequate education provided by the public schools will “leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.” Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that the state has violated its constitutional obligation to provide “free public elementary and secondary schools in the state”; Conn. Const., art. VHI, § 1; and that it properly granted the defendants’ motion to strike counts one, two and four of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

*399ZARELLA, J., with whom McLACHLAN, J.,

joins, dissenting. This case presents this court with a rare opportunity to consider the experience of our sister states in deciding whether to become involved in the resolution of an issue that raises important philosophical and practical questions regarding the legitimate exercise of judicial power. Rather than examining and learning from this experience, however, a majority of this court has elected to ignore it, thus setting the court on a path that will lead to decades of confusion and produce a trail of wasteful litigation. James Madison warned in the Federalist Papers that judges must refrain from lawmaking: “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative . . . the judge would then be the legislator.” The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison). Yet that is what will come to pass as a result of the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’1 stricken claims are justiciable under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Judges will become legislators because courts will now be allowed, and very likely required, to define minimum educational “inputs” and “outputs” in order to determine whether the state has satisfied its purported constitutional mandate to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a “suitable” education, a task that involves educational policy making and demands specialized skills that courts do not possess. In concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims do not involve a political question, this court misinterprets our case law and dismisses the clear distinctions between the plaintiffs’ claims and the claims adjudicated by this court in Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996), and Seymour v. Region One Board of Educa *400 tion, 261 Conn. 475, 803 A.2d 318 (2002). More importantly, this court disregards the plain language of article eighth, § 1, which directs the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to implement the principle of “free public elementary and secondary” education by enacting “appropriate legislation.” The most immediate practical effect of the court’s decision is that it will take control of educational matters from local boards of education and vest it with the courts, a result that the framers of article eighth, § 1, could not have possibly envisioned. Moreover, it will require the legislature to appropriate at least $2 billion per year in additional funding to ensure that Connecticut schoolchildren will be provided with the resources allegedly required for a suitable education. See part III D of this opinion. Thus, by extending judicial authority into areas expressly reserved to the legislature, this court’s ruling in the present case sets a dangerous precedent that will create a quagmire of uncertainty with respect to future controversies regarding the boundaries of judicial and legislative power in matters concerning education. Because I cannot agree with this clear violation of the separation of powers, I respectfully dissent.2

*401I

THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

It is first necessary to understand exactly what the plaintiffs claim in order to fully appreciate the effect of this court’s decision on our state constitutional jurisprudence and the separation of powers. The plaintiffs do not claim that the current school funding system is in violation of the state constitution’s equal protection provisions because different towns are not receiving reasonably similar funding. Rather, they claim that Connecticut students are not receiving a “suitable” educational opportunity as measured by certain “outputs . . . .” Thus, irrespective of the relative equality of funding, the plaintiffs claim that, if certain performance based results or outcomes are not achieved, students will be deprived of a suitable educational opportunity.

The plaintiffs specifically allege in their complaint that their constitutional rights have been violated because the state has failed “to maintain an educational *402system that provides [them] with suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs further allege that the state has failed “to maintain a public school system that provides [them] with suitable educational opportunities . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs describe generally the “inputs” and “outputs” that are essential to a “suitable” educational experience, with the “inputs,” or “essential components of a suitable educational opportunity,” consisting of (1) high quality preschool, (2) appropriate class sizes, (3) programs and services for at-risk students, (4) highly qualified administrators and teachers, (5) modem and adequate libraries, (6) modem technology and appropriate instruction, (7) an adequate number of hours of instruction, (8) a rigorous curriculum with a wide breadth of courses, (9) modem and appropriate textbooks, (10) a school environment that is healthy, safe, well maintained and conducive to learning, (11) adequate special needs services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., (12) appropriate career and academic counseling, and (13) an adequate array of and suitably run extracurricular activities. The plaintiffs describe the even more crucial “outputs” as measures of, inter alia, performance on the student achievement tests required under the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq., school retention rates, and high school graduation rates. The plaintiffs thus do not seek to create programs and allocate resources on an equal funding basis but in a manner designed to ensure that all students graduate at a constitutionally guaranteed minimum level of competence. With this understanding in mind, I briefly recapitulate the governing law on justiciability.

n

LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY

“The principles that underlie justiciability are well established. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an *403actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. . . . The third requirement for justiciability, the political question doctrine, is based on the principle of separation of powers. . . . The characterization of [an issue] as political is a convenient shorthand for declaring that some other branch of government has constitutional authority over the subject matter superior to that of the courts. . . . The fundamental characteristic of a political question, therefore, is that its adjudication would place the court in conflict with a coequal branch of government in violation of the primary authority of that coordinate branch. . . .

“Whether a controversy so directly implicates the primary authority of the legislative or executive branch, such that a court is not the proper forum for its resolution, is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case [basis]. . . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioned] adherence to apolitical decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for *404nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s presence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 6-8, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996), quoting Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 217. In the present case, all six Baker factors are implicated by the plaintiffs’ stricken claims, and, accordingly, the controversy is nonjusticiable.

Ill

APPLICATION OF THE BAKER FACTORS

A

Textually Demonstrable Commitment to the Legislature

I begin by noting that article eighth, § 1, does not refer to a “suitable” education or to an “adequate” education, nor does any other constitutional provision suggest that the state is obligated to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a suitable or minimum standard of education. Even the plurality ultimately concedes in its discussion of the first Geisler factor that the defendants’3 inteipretation of the constitutional text to mean that it does not confer a right to suitable educational opportunities is reasonable in the absence of an affirmative provision regarding a minimum educational standard. Consequently, I would initially conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable because there is no explicit basis in the constitution for the right to a suitable education.

The lack of such a provision is consistent with the purpose of article eighth, § 1. As this court noted in Sheff, “[t]he primary motivation for the addition of arti-

*405cle eighth, § 1, to the constitution in 1965 appears to have been the realization that Connecticut was the only state in the nation that did not provide an express right to public elementary and secondary education in its constitution. See [Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3] pp. 1039-40, remarks of [Simon Bernstein].” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 30-31. Bernstein, a delegate to the constitutional convention and the proponent of article eighth, § 1, explained during a debate on the matter that he had submitted a similar resolution earlier in the proceedings and that the purpose of the resolution was to ensure “that our system of free public education have a tradition [of] acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same [constitutional sanctity.4 It was because our [c]onstitution had no reference to our school system that I submitted my resolution and of course others were aware of the same [omission] in our [c]onstitution and other similar resolutions were submitted. . . . Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle. ... I can’t possibly see any dispute over the principle involved, [as] it is such a basic principle that it should be in the [constitution.” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, pp. 1039-40. The only other delegate to speak on the proposed provision explained that he supported it because Connecticut was the only state in the nation in which the constitution made no reference to elementary and secondary education, and, therefore, adopting the amendment seemed like the “natural and proper thing to do.” Id., p. 1040, *406remarks of Albert E. Waugh. Thus, the delegates gave no thought to the question of educational quality, their intent simply being to elevate the general principle of a free public elementary and secondary education to the status of a constitutional right, as every other jurisdiction in the nation had done.5 Indeed, if it had been the intent and purpose of the delegates to adopt a constitutional provision that would guarantee students a minimum standard of education or level of educational achievement, one would have expected such a controversial concept to have been mentioned and fiercely debated. An examination of the proceedings, however, indicates that the very brief discussion that occurred when Bernstein introduced the provision that became article eighth, § 1, was entirely about constitutionalizing the right to a free public education, not the right to a minimum standard of education or level of educational achievement. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, pp. 310-13; Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, pp. 1038-41. To that end, Bernstein repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the proposed provi*407sion was to secure nothing more than the right to a “free public education,” adding that the principle ought to be honored because it was “not anything revolutionary . . . .” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039; see also Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 120 (Borden, J., dissenting) (“[Bernstein] made clear that [article eighth, § 1] was intended only to constitutionalize the then existing system of free public education” [emphasis added]). Accordingly, in the absence of an affirmative statement of a governmental obligation to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a minimum standard of education, there is no textual basis or historical support for the judicial enforcement of such a right. See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595, 660 A.2d 742 (1995) (“We are especially hesitant to read into the constitution unenumerated affirmative governmental obligations. In general, the declaration of rights in our state constitution was implemented not to impose affirmative obligations on the government . . . but rather to secure individual liberties against direct infringement through state action.”).

I also conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable because article eighth, § 1, unequivocally delegates to the legislature the task of enacting “appropriate legislation” to ensure that Connecticut schoolchildren will be provided with a free public education. By implication, “appropriate legislation” includes whatever qualitative standards, if any, the legislature deems necessary to achieve its mandate.6

*408The directive in article eighth, § 1, that the General Assembly “shall implement” the principle of a free education by enacting “appropriate legislation” is no different from the language used in other constitutional provisions that impose affirmative obligations on the legislature and that have been deemed nonjusticiable. See Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. 9-10 (article third, § 18); Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 681-82, 480 A.2d 476 (article fifth, § 2), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984); Simmons v. Budds, 165 Conn. 507, 514, 338 A.2d 479 (1973) (article eighth, § 2), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 1943, 40 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1974). For example, article fifth, § 2, which concerns the number and appointment of judges, provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he judges of the . . . superior court shall, upon nomination by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, article third, § 18 (b),7 which imposes a cap on general budget expenditures, provides in relevant part that “[t]he general assembly shall by law define ‘increase in personal income’, ‘increase in inflation’ and ‘general budget expenditures’ for the purposes of this section . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, article eighth, § 2, which requires the state to “maintain a system of higher education, including The University of *409Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education,” provides in relevant part that [t]he general assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment of the governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units or coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.” (Emphasis added.)

We concluded in Nielsen, Pellegrino and Simmons that claims brought under each of the foregoing provisions were nonjusticiable because they could not be resolved without interfering with a clearly articulated duty of the legislature. See Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. 10; Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 193 Conn. 682; Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514. We specifically observed in Pellegrino that “[w]e must resist the temptation which this case affords to enhance our own constitutional authority by trespassing [on] an area clearly reserved as the prerogative of a coordinate branch of government.” Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 681. We likewise noted in Nielsen that article third, § 18, “by its plain and unambiguous terms, commits exclusively to the General Assembly the power to define the spending cap terms and nowhere intimates any role in this process for the judiciary. . . . Nothing elsewhere in our constitution contradicts this textual commitment to the General Assembly.” (Citation omitted.) Nielsen v. State, supra, 9. In Simmons, we also explained that the plaintiffs claim in that case was nonjusticiable because the language in article eighth, § 2, referring to the General Assembly’s affirmative duty to appoint the university’s governing boards and constituent bodies, indicated a clear intention that “the board of trustees and the administrators were to be free to decide what is wise in educational policy. . . . Corrective action, if warranted, lies within the provinces of the board of trustees from [which] the university senate’s *410authority is derived, the governor who appoints the trustees under [General Statutes] § 10-118 . . . and, ultimately, with the General Assembly to which the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 2, entrusts the responsibility of governing the University of Connecticut. We find no error in the conclusion of the trial court that the constitutional [standard of ‘excellence’ was not meant to be a wedge for penetration of the educational establishment by judicial intervention in policy decisions.” (Citations omitted.) Simmons v. Budds, supra, 514.

The language of article eighth, § 1, is similar to the language in the preceding provisions — all of which impose an affirmative duty on the legislature — because it plainly and unambiguously provides that the “general assembly shall implement [the] principle [of a free public elementary and secondary school education by enacting] appropriate legislation." (Emphasis added.) There is no suggestion in this or in any other constitutional provision that the judicial branch has a role in the process, nor has the court referred to any Connecticut case permitting judicial intervention when the claim involves a constitutional provision that imposes an affirmative duty on the legislature. Moreover, it is counterintuitive to conclude, in light of Simmons, that, when a level of quality is mandated by the constitution, there is no justiciable issue because matters concerning educational quality fall within the legislative domain but that when no level of quality is mandated, there is. Thus, even if a “free” education could be construed to mean a suitable education, Simmons dictates that questions concerning educational quality are nonjusticiable.

Our decisions in Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I), and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III), are distinguishable because the constitutional challenge in *411those cases was brought under both article eighth, § 1, and the equal protection provisions of the state constitution, namely, article first, §§ 1 and 20. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 621. The right to equal protection, as with most other rights guaranteed by the state constitution, differs from the right to education because it is a “negative” right, that is, a right granted to the individual on which the government may not infringe. State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 894, 179 P.3d 366 (2008). The judiciary almost always can protect a negative constitutional right by ordering the government to cease the infringement, either by striking the offending statute or by prohibiting the offending act. Id. In contrast, a person alleging that the legislature has failed to perform an affirmative duty must seek a judicial remedy that mandates the performance of that duty. Id. Our precedent, however, particularly in Simmons, in which this court declined to intervene even though the constitution specifically declared that the University of Connecticut shall be dedicated to excellence; see Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514; compels this court to refrain from interfering in the present dispute because the duty to implement the principle of a free public education is clearly committed to the legislature.

The plurality’s conclusion that Nielsen did not consider the “appropriate legislation” language of article eighth, § 1, to be a textual commitment to the General Assembly like the “plain and unambiguous” spending cap language in article third, § 18; Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. 9; reflects an improper understanding of that case. What the court indicated in Nielsen was that the “appropriate legislation” language at issue in Horton I was broader than the spending cap language only in the context of the equal protection claim in Horton I. See id., 10 (“In construing [article eighth, § 1], we expressly held [in Horton I] that the then-existing *412financing scheme for the state’s public schools [was] not appropriate legislation ... to implement the requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools. ... It was in light of the textual distinction between these different constitutional provisions that, in Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, [193 Conn.] 683, we described Horton I as clearly [a case in which] a judicial remedy could have been applied . . . .” [Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Consequently, in Nielsen, we did not view the “appropriate legislation” language of article eighth, § 1, as opening the door to judicial intervention in all matters pertaining to education but, rather, as a tool that the court in Horton I had used in conjunction with the equal protection provisions of the state constitution to evaluate whether the then existing system of funding public education was providing children with substantially equal educational opportunities. See Nielsen v. State, supra, 10.

The plaintiffs in the present case appear to be asking this court to do something that the court in Nielsen could not have imagined, that is, to use the equal protection provisions of the state constitution as a vehicle to establish a substantive floor for educational achievement as a constitutional right. See, e.g., B. Neubome, “State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights,” 20 Rutgers L.J. 881, 887 (1989) (in absence of independent textual basis for substantive federal constitutional rights in education, health and housing, lawyers have sought to use federal constitution to protect poor by invoking equal protection and due process clauses “to bootstrap judges into a position [of] trump [ing] government refusals to spend money on critical services [that are] desperately needed by the poor”). This court, however, should do everything in its power to avoid using the equal protection provisions in this manner *413because the concept of substantive equal protection has not been recognized in this state, and there is no textual support in the constitution for judicial intervention in substantive educational matters. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980) (“[t]he guarantee of equal protection . . . is not a source of substantive rights or liberties, but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity”).

In addition to the fact that the text of article eighth, § 1, specifically commits the function of providing a free public education to the legislature, this court has recognized on numerous occasions that providing Connecticut schoolchildren with an education is a function of the state that is properly exercised by the legislature. See, e.g., New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699, 703, 638 A.2d 589 (1994) (article eighth, § 1, “places the ultimate responsibility for the education of the children of Connecticut on the state,” which distributes responsibility through statutory framework granting state board of education “the broad and general power to supervise and control the educational interests of the state” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 598, 603, 402 A.2d 763 (1978) (state function and duty of providing education is manifest from extensive legislation relating to furnishing of education for general public under article eighth, §§ 1 and 2, the legislative branch having responsibility for determining general education policy). Indeed, the legislature has committed significant financial resources and developed an extensive statutory framework to carry out this duty. For example, the General Assembly’s office of fiscal analysis has estimated that the annual appropriation for elementary and secondary education for the budget years 2009 through 2011 will be approximately $3.3 billion, or 17 percent *414of the state budget, the second highest expenditure after human services. Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, Connecticut State Budget 2009-2011, p. 12.

The funds appropriated for education are administered pursuant to an extensive and detailed statutory scheme incorporated in title 10 of the General Statutes, which vests ultimate power and authority for general supervision and control of the state’s educational interests in the state board of education. See General Statutes § 10-4.8 The legislature has further delegated responsibility for implementing the principle of a free *415public education to local boards of education. E.g., Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 257-58, 438 A.2d 88 (1980); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); see also State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 418-19, 52 A.2d 636 (1947) (“Under the statutes, provision is made for the education of the inhabitants of each town through its town board of education. Accordingly ... [a] town board of education is an agency of the state in charge of education in the town; to that end it is granted broad powers by the legislature . . . .” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). This court has expressly acknowledged the link between the constitutional mandate and the duty of local boards by describing the boards as agencies of the state that “carry out the constitutional guarantee of free public education contained in article eighth, § 1 . . . .” Local 1186, AFSCME v. Board of Education, 182 Conn. 93, 100, 438 A.2d 12 (1980); see also Murphy v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 368, 372-73, 355 A.2d 265 (1974) (“[T]he furnishing of education for the general public, required by article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, is by its very nature a state function and duty. . . . The local boards have of necessity been delegated this responsibility. . . . Clearly, then, town boards of education ... act as agents of the state under the authority of our state constitution and the enactments of our legislature.” [Citations omitted.]).

To guide and assist the local boards in carrying out this duty, General Statutes § 10-220 (a) provides that “[e]ach local or regional board of education shall maintain good public elementary and secondary schools, implement the educational interests of the state as defined in section 10-4a and provide such other educational activities as in its judgment will best serve the *416interests of the school district . . . .” (Emphasis added.) This includes providing an “appropriate learning environment” through “(1) adequate instructional books, supplies, materials, equipment, staffing, facilities and technology, (2) equitable allocation of resources among its schools, (3) proper maintenance of facilities, and (4) a safe school setting . . . .” General Statutes § 10-220 (a). Local boards of education also “shall prescribe rules for the management, studies, classification and discipline of the public schools and, subject to the control of the State Board of Education, the textbooks to be used; shall make rules for the control, within their respective jurisdictions, of school library media centers and approve the selection of books and other educational media therefor, and shall approve plans for public school buildings and superintend any high or graded school in the manner specified in this title.” General Statutes § 10-221 (a). General Statutes § 10-222 (a) further requires each local board to “prepare an itemized estimate of the cost of maintenance of public schools for the ensuing year . . . .” Thus, it is the local boards of education that decide, in their discretion, how education funds shall be budgeted and expended. Local 1186, AFSCME v. Board of Education, supra, 182 Conn. 100.

The effect of the court’s decision to permit — indeed, require — judicial involvement in educational matters will be to wrest control of education from the local boards and place it in the hands of the court. It is clear that this will happen because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the state’s failure to provide “suitable” educational opportunities is caused by inadequate and unequal educational “inputs,” which the complaint defines as “the resources and conditions, such as staff, programs, and environment, that constitute an educational system.” Such “resources and conditions,” however, are exactly what the legislature has directed local *417boards to provide under §§ 10-4a and 10-220 to ensure that each child will have a “suitable program of educational experiences”; General Statutes § 10-4a (1); and “an appropriate learning environment . . . .” General Statutes § 10-220 (a). Court intervention to establish a minimum standard of education or level of educational achievement thus will conflict with legislative directives to local boards, whose discretion to determine what constitutes a “suitable program” and “an appropriate learning environment” for children in their respective districts will not only be severely curtailed, but very likely eliminated, because the court will become the ultimate arbiter of whether Connecticut schoolchildren are receiving the proper educational resources to satisfy the newly defined constitutional mandate of a suitable education.

The plurality asserts that its ruling is “not intended to supplant local control over education,” explaining that the purpose of court intervention is merely “to articulate the broad parameters of [the] constitutional right, and to leave their implementation to the expertise of those who work in the political branches of state and local government, informed by the wishes of their constituents. [As] long as those authorities prescribe and implement a program of instruction rationally calculated to enforce the constitutional right to a minimally adequate education . . . then the judiciary should stay its hand.” Footnote 59 of the plurality opinion. As New Jersey, Kansas and other jurisdictions have discovered, however, such a view is unrealistic. See part III B of this opinion. The court will not be able to limit its involvement in educational matters to vague declarations of principle but will be required to adjudicate constitutional challenges to the adequacy of specific state and local programs of instruction, which will place the court in a position to override decisions made by state and local authorities regarding the level and distri*418button of limited financial resources for education in their respective jurisdictions.

This could not be what the proponents of article eighth, § 1, intended. If it were, they surely would not have described the provision as “not anything revolutionary.” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Bernstein. That the framers never would have contemplated this change of course also is evident from other parts of the convention records, in which delegates described the proposed provision on education as embodying nothing more than Connecticut’s long history and tradition of providing children with a free public education. See, e.g., Convention Resolution No. 109 (July 27,1965), reprinted in 1965 Connecticut Constitutional Convention Bulletins, Calendars, Resolutions, Files, Appendix (1965). Proponents of article eighth, § 1, demonstrated no interest in supplanting legislative or local control of education but, rather, stated that their intent was to correct an omission in the constitution and thus achieve consistency with the constitutions of other states. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, pp. 1039-40, remarks of Bernstein. In fact, there is nothing in the recorded history of the 1965 convention to suggest that the framers wanted to end the tradition of local control of education by granting the courts authority to determine how the principle of a free public education should be implemented. If that had been the framers’ intent, they would not have used specific language delegating such authority to the legislature. Indeed, cases interpreting the power of the state and local boards of education following adoption of article eighth, § 1, never have questioned the constitutionality of the statutory scheme or the authority of the legislature or the boards to determine the content of a suitable educational opportunity or an appropriate learning environment. I thus fail to compre*419hend how a majority of this court can peruse our case law, the statutory framework and the history of the constitutional convention without concluding that the legislature and local boards have been delegated exclusive authority to implement the constitutional mandate of providing children with a free public education.

Nevertheless, the plurality, after failing to find any textual support in the constitution, claims that the principle articulated in Sheff that courts may enforce the constitutional right to substantially equal education opportunities also governs in the present case because our holding in Sheff “does not refer specifically to the [state] constitution’s equal protection provisions, and relies expressly on the ‘appropriate legislation’ clause from article eighth, § 1, to justify judicial examination of [education] statutes.” Footnote 18 of the plurality opinion. The plurality, however, adopts an extraordinarily broad interpretation of Sheff and ignores the fact that the court’s holding in Sheff was intended to resolve the claim, raised in the state’s affirmative defense, that “the text of article eighth, § 1, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to consider whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief by way of an order to the legislature to provide a remedy for their impaired educational opportunities”; Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 12; the impairment being that the state did not satisfy the constitutional mandate of providing “substantially equal educational opportunities] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 14. Thus, the plurality ignores the court’s observation in Sheff that the claim of nonjusticiability had been raised “[i]n the context of judicial enforcement of the right to a substantially equal educational opportunity arising under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 19 and 2010 . . . .’’Id. The court explained that *420it had reviewed similar claims involving inequities in educational opportunities in Horton I and Horton III, and that the defendants in Sheff had not challenged the continued vitality of those two cases but had argued that their claim of nonjusticiability was distinguishable. Id. The court disagreed with the defendants, however, stating that the plaintiffs had “invoke[d] the same constitutional provisions [concerning equality and education] to challenge the constitutionality of state action that the plaintiff schoolchildren [had] invoked in Horton I and Horton III"; 11 (emphasis added) id., 14 — 15; and that our decisions in Horton I and Horton III had been reaffirmed in Nielsen v. State, supra, 236 Conn. 9-10, and Pellegrino v. O’Neill, supra, 193 Conn. 683. Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 14. Only then did the court state that the phrase “appropriate legislation” in article eighth, § 1, did not preclude it from determining what was “appropriate” in that case, plainly referring to the court’s constitutional duty to review whether the legislature had fulfilled its obligation to provide children who attend the state’s public schools with substantially equal educational opportunities. Id., 15. The court concluded with the observation that “our precedents compel the conclusion that the balance must be struck in favor of the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ complaint.”12 (Emphasis added.) Id., 16.

*421The language in Sheff thus demonstrates, without question, that the court did not reject the defendants’ affirmative defense on the ground that article eighth, § 1, permits the judicial branch to consider whether the General Assembly has enacted “appropriate legislation” in all cases arising under that provision, as the plurality declares. 57¿effmerely determined that the “appropriate legislation” language in article eighth, § 1, does not prevent the courts from adjudicating claims involving inequities in educational opportunities similar to the claims that the court addressed in Horton I and Horton III. Indeed, the only logical explanation for the court’s repeated references to the Horton decisions is that it wished to reaffirm their continued precedential value in similar cases involving claims alleging unequal educational opportunities.

The plurality asserts that, because Sheff did not refer specifically to the constitution’s equal protection provisions in its holding on article eighth, § 1, it intended to endorse judicial review of issues relating to public education generally that do not implicate equal protection concerns. The Sheff holding, however, merely repeated language used in the defendants’ affirmative defense, in which they argued that the “text of article eighth, § 1,” deprived the court of jurisdiction to consider the relief that the plaintiffs requested under both the equal protection and education provisions of our state constitution. Id., 12. Moreover, the court interpreted the provision only after specifying that it was doing so “[i]n light of these precedents” involving inequalities in educational opportunities. Id., 15. In relying on Sheff to permit judicial review of education adequacy claims, the plurality expands the principles articulated in Sheff far beyond their stated meaning.

*422The arguments made by the parties in Sheff further illustrate this point. In their brief to this court, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable under article eighth, § 1, because the “appropriate legislation” language committed the issues that the plaintiffs raised to the legislature. Sheff v. O’Neill, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, September Term, 1995, Pt. 4B, Defendants’ Brief p. 75. The plaintiffs countered that the defendants’ characterization of their claims as resting on “article eighth, § 1, in isolation” was incorrect because the complaint had “conjoin[ed] the guarantee of free public elementary and secondary schools with article first, §§ 1 and 20, which promise ‘equal rights’ to public benefits and privileges and which condemn ‘segregation and discrimination.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Sheff v. O’Neill, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, September Term, 1995, Pt. 4C, Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief p. 18. The plaintiffs further explained that article eighth, § 1, must be read “in pari materia” with article first, §§ 1 and 20, to establish “a ‘basic and fundamental right’ ... to a ‘substantially equal educational opportunity.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. The plaintiffs in Sheff thus took great pains to clarify that they viewed the “appropriate legislation” language of article eighth, § 1, in the context of their right to equal protection enumerated in article first, §§ 1 and 20, as this court did in the opinion that followed. Consequently, the plurality’s construction of Sheff to mean that all claims arising under article eighth, § 1, are justiciable represents a significant and unwarranted departure from Sheff that the court in that case could not have contemplated.

The plurality attempts to bolster its strained reading of Sheff to mean that educational issues arising under article eighth, § 1, are not textually committed to the legislature by resorting to a footnote in that opinion in which the court states that other jurisdictions “over*423whelmingly” have determined that “the judiciary has a constitutional duty to review whether the legislature has fulfilled its obligation.” Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 15 and n.18. The court, however, could not have intended to establish a principle of general reviewability of all education claims arising under article eighth, § 1, when it cited cases from our sister states because the claim before our court was the far narrower one of whether the plaintiffs had been deprived of “substantially equal educational opportunit[ies] . . . .” Id., 6. The plurality thus takes that footnote out of context13 and applies its reasoning to an entirely different factual and legal scenario. In other words, rather than interpret the statement in the footnote in the context of the claims made in Sheff, the plurality elects to untether the comment and make it a statement of general applicability. Moreover, it is absurd to attribute such a major change in our interpretation of article eighth, § 1, to a comment in a footnote referring to cases from other jurisdictions, especially when the footnote does not make it absolutely clear that that was the court’s intent. Accordingly, although the plurality relies on footnote 18 in Sheff, which, in any event, is nothing more than dictum, I submit that the footnote sheds no light on the meaning of article eighth, § 1. The only conclusion that can be *424drawn from the footnote is that the court in Sheff simply was recognizing that other courts also have determined that constitutional claims involving education are justiciable when the provision or provisions implicated, like the “conjoin[ed]” equal protection and education provisions in Sheff; Sheff v. O’Neill, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, September Term, 1995, Pt. 4C, Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief p. 18; or the equal protection provision in the Wyoming constitution, permit judicial review.

The plurality subsequently concludes that certain cases that the defendants cite, in which other jurisdictions have deemed education adequacy claims nonjusticiable, are inapplicable in the present case because they do not involve constitutional language similar to the “appropriate legislation” language contained in article eighth, § 1. See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 405 (Fla. 1996) ("[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require” [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Fla. Const., art. IX, § 1; Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 535, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge . . . being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the means of instruction,” and “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Neb. Const., art. I, § 4, and art. VII, § 1; and Oklahoma Education Assn. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1062 nn.6 and 8 (Okla. 2007) (“[provisions shall be made for the *425establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control; and said schools shall always be conducted in English: Provided, that nothing herein shall preclude the teaching of other languages in said public schools,” and “[t]he Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated” [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Okla. Const., art. I, § 5, and art. XIII, § 1. A review of the constitutional provisions of such states nevertheless suggests that the Connecticut constitutional provision, which contains no qualitative language, is textually closer to those of states that do not permit judicial review of such matters than to those of states that do.

In sum, the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the first Baker factor because there is no enumerated constitutional right to a suitable or a minimum standard of education, and there is a textually demonstrable commitment of issues concerning education to the General Assembly as part of its express obligation under the constitution to enact legislation to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a free public education. This court has stated that, “[i]n dealing with constitutional provisions we must assume that infinite care was employed to couch in scrupulously fitting language a proposal aimed at establishing or changing the organic law of the state. . . . Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.” (Citations omitted.) Stolberg v. Caldwell, supra, 175 Conn. 597-98. The delegates to the 1965 constitutional convention established the right to a free public education and, in unambiguous language, assigned its implementation to the legislature, not the courts.

*426B

Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

I also disagree with the plurality that the second Baker factor poses no obstacle to judicial review because “[t]here are easily discoverable and manageable judicial standards for determining the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim[s].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As I previously discussed, the constitution provides no qualitative or substantive standards regarding the type of public education to be provided to Connecticut schoolchildren, and there is nothing in the historical record indicating that the delegates to the 1965 constitutional convention considered such standards. The majority nonetheless concludes that Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 261 Conn. 475, and Horton I govern our resolution of this question because the plaintiffs merely request a declaration of a constitutional violation,14 “with the precise remedy being left to the defendants in the first instance.” Part I of the plurality opinion; see Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, supra, 484; Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 650-51. Consequently, the plurality asserts that the requested remedies will not “turn a trial judge into a de facto education superintendent . . . .” The complaints in Seymour and Horton I, however, are distinguishable.

The principal issue before the court in Seymour and Horton I was the constitutionality of school financing legislation under one or more of the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. See Seymour v. Region One Board of *427 Education, supra, 261 Conn. 479-80 (involving claim that statutory formula set forth in General Statutes § 10-51 [b] for financing public education in regional school districts deprived plaintiff taxpayers of state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection because tax burden per student fell more heavily on taxpayers in some communities than similarly situated taxpayers in surrounding communities); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 618, 649 (involving claim that state system of public education financing violated equal protection provisions of state constitution and was not constitutionally mandated “appropriate legislation,” under article eighth, § 1, to implement requirement that state provide substantially equal educational opportunity to students in free public elementary and secondary schools). In contrast, the principal issue in the present case is whether Connecticut schoolchildren have a right to a suitable education, which does not implicate the state constitution’s equal protection provisions.15 This distinction is significant because the nature of a claim determines the difficulty of developing the judicial standards required to resolve it.

Courts are uniquely qualified to determine issues of equality and particularly unqualified to determine minimum educational standards. In Baker, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that “[¡Judicial standards under the [ejqual [pjrotection [cjlause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the [f] ourteenth [ajmendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”16 Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 226. *428Thus, equity claims in school funding cases are often decided under the rational basis test. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973); Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 60 (R.I. 1995); see also R. Levy, “Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation,” 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1021, 1052 (2006); cf. Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 362-63 (Colo. 2009) (combining elements of traditional equal protection and adequacy analysis, and concluding that challenge to “the adequacy of [the state’s] public school funding system” is justiciable and that courts are responsible for reviewing funding scheme to determine if it is rationally related to legislature’s constitutional mandate to provide “ ‘a thorough and uniform’ ” system of public education in accordance with legislature’s own pronouncements).

In Connecticut, educational financing legislation is strictly scrutinized under the equal protection clause pursuant to a three part test designed to evaluate whether the financing plan, as a whole, supports the policy of “providing significant equalizing state support to local education.”17 Horton v. Meskill, supra, 195 Conn. 38. The claim that Connecticut schoolchildren have a right to a “suitable” education, however, does not implicate the equal protection provisions of our state constitution and will require the court to articulate *429qualitative standards defining a minimum quality of education. This is a complicated task heavily laden with policy implications that courts are ill equipped to handle, a conclusion shared by many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, supra, 680 So. 2d 406-408 (“While the courts are competent to decide whether or not the [legislature's distribution of state funds to complement local education expenditures results in the required uniform system, the courts cannot decide whether the [legislature’s appropriation of funds is adequate in the abstract, divorced from the required uniformity. To decide such an abstract question of adequate funding, the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the [legislature's value judgments as to the spending priorities to be assigned to the state’s many needs, education being one among them. . . . The judiciary must defer to the wisdom of those who have carefully evaluated and studied the social, economic, and political ramifications of this complex issue — the legislature. . . . [T]here are no judicially manageable standards available to determine adequacy. . . . [T]he phrase uniform has manageable standards because by definition this word means a lack of substantial variation. By contrast . . . [the term] adequacy simply does not have such straightforward content.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 209, 710 N.E.2d 798 (1999) (“No matter how the question is framed, recognition of the plaintiffs’ cause of action under the education article would require the judiciary to ascertain from the constitution alone the content of an ‘adequate’ education. The courts would be called [on] to define what minimal standards of education are required by the constitution, under what conditions a classroom, school, or district falls below these minimums so as to constitute a ‘virtual absence of educa*430tion,’ and what remedy should be imposed. . . . [T]hese determinations are for the legislature, not the courts, to decide.”); Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, supra, 273 Neb. 553 (“It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary’s field of expertise .... Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion. To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals .... In contrast, an open and robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the [s]tate and their elected representatives.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also J. Elson, “Suing to Make Schools Effective, or How to Make a Bad Situation Worse: A Response to Ratner,” 63 Tex. L. Rev. 889, 904-905 (1985) (“Ordering schools to become more effective poses unique problems because no one knows how to force educators to make students learn. . . . The methods for making ineffective schools effective . . . are neither direct nor objective, because they must affect students’ minds through the medium of educator behavior. Before a successful remedy can be constructed, certain now-mysterious causal relations must be understood: how teacher behavior affects learning, how school administration affects teacher behavior, and how the implementation of school reforms affects school administration and teacher behavior.”).

*431Moreover, some jurisdictions that have assumed the challenge have become bogged down for years in endless litigation because there are no easily identifiable judicial standards by which to measure whether children are receiving a suitable education. Among the most compelling examples of what may happen in the absence of judicial standards is the state of New Jersey. After the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the state’s education funding system in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515-20, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (Robinson I), because it failed to comply with the constitutional mandate of providing students with a “thorough and efficient”18 education; id., 520; the court found itself embroiled in the controversy for years thereafter as it tried to avoid imposing judicial standards and as the legislature struggled to develop a means of eliminating disparities in education expenditures among districts with vastly different resources.19 In Robinson I, the court first interpreted the “thorough and efficient” clause; see footnote 18 of this opinion; to mean the *432“educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.” Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 62 N.J. 515. The court then decided that the legislature had not provided all students with a “thorough and efficient” education solely on the basis of the gross disparities in expenditures between wealthier and poorer districts because it had “been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate.” Id., 515-16. Lacking any standards to shape a proper judicial remedy, the court ordered the legislature to do so and then postponed issuance of the order for nearly eighteen months to give the legislature a reasonable opportunity to comply with the constitutional directive. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 198, 306 A.2d 65, cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 292, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973). When the legislature failed to act, the court extended the deadline. See Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 36-37, 335 A.2d 6 (1975). In the continuing absence of legislative action, the court finally issued an order to redistribute $300 million in state funds to achieve greater conformity with the constitutional mandate, but, still hoping to avoid imposing a judicial solution, the court delayed the order’s effective date approximately four months to give the legislature additional time to enact remedial legislation. See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 144 n.4, 146-50, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913, 96 S. Ct. 217, 46 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975). The legislature finally responded with the Public School Education Act of 1975 (act), c. 212, 1975 N.J. Laws 871, which was intended to reduce gross disparities in education expenditures among the districts and which the court found “constitutional on its face . . . assuming it [was] fully funded.” Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). When the act was not fully funded, the court enjoined state *433and local officials from distributing any funds, with a few limited exceptions, beginning July 1, 1976, if the legislature did not provide full funding for the act by that date. See Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 159-61, 358 A.2d 457, modified, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976). The legislature finally passed legislation imposing the state’s first income tax to provide the required funding, and the court dissolved the injunction. See Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).

After the Robinson cases, in which the court repeatedly gave the legislature additional time to act because it was reluctant to develop its own constitutionally based standards, there followed another line of cases in a still ongoing controversy challenging the constitutionality of the school funding formula and its ability to provide a “thorough and efficient education” for disadvantaged students living in “property-poor school districts” with special needs. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 279, 495 A.2d 376 (1985); see also Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 117 N.J. 51, 563 A.2d 818 (1989); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575 (1994); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 163 N.J. 95, 748 A.2d 82 (2000); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 84, 751 A.2d 1032 (2000); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 170 N.J. 537, 790 A.2d 842 (2002); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 172 N.J. 294, 798 A.2d 602 (2002); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 177 N.J. 578, 832 A.2d 891 (2003), modified, 182 N.J. 153, 862 A.2d 538 (2004); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 177 N.J. 596, 832 A.2d 906 (2003); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke 185 N.J. 612, 889 A.2d 1063 (2005); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 187 N.J. 191, 901 A.2d 299 (2006); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 193 N.J. 34, 935 A.2d 1152 (2007); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 451, 956 A.2d 923 (2008); *434 Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544, 960 A.2d 360 (2008); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140, 971 A.2d 989 (2009). In these cases, the court considered various definitions of a “thorough and efficient” education as applied to students in the state’s poorer districts, constantly revising and redefining the concept. See J. Lichtenstein, note, “Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey’s Constitutional Commitment to Equal Educational Opportunity,” 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 429, 473-75 (1991). The court ultimately moved away from its original definition in Robinson I, pursuant to which the goal had been to reduce significant disparities in state funding among the districts; Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 62 N.J. 515-16; and gravitated toward a broader definition that considered educational outputs and resulted in greater funding for poorer districts with large numbers of disadvantaged students who “must be given a chance to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students.” Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, supra, 119 N.J. 313; see also J. Lichtenstein, supra, 474. The Abbott litigation is still in progress as a special master considers on remand whether the “special needs of disadvantaged students can be met sufficiently” through the application of the state’s most recent funding formula. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, supra, 199 N.J. 190.

Reacting with alarm to the proceedings in New Jersey, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted in Pawtucket v. Sundlun, supra, 662 A.2d 40, that, in attempting to define what constitutes the “thorough and efficient” education specified in the New Jersey constitution, “the New Jersey Supreme Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a [legislature.” Id., 59. Hoping *435to avoid a “morass comparable to the decades-long struggle [in New Jersey]”; id.; the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to adopt the lower court’s holding that the Rhode Island constitution required an “equal, adequate and meaningful education . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 55, 58.

When the Kansas Supreme Court chose to follow the path taken by New Jersey, it found itself facing similar problems for the exact same reason, namely, the lack of objective, quantifiable judicial standards. What later was described as a “constitutional confrontation”; R. Levy, supra, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1021; began in earnest when the Kansas Supreme Court ruled in Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 771, 773, 102 P.3d 306 (2005), that the state’s school financing system was unconstitutional because it violated the mandate in the Kansas constitution that “[t]he legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools”; Kan. Const., art. 6, § 1; and by making “suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state. . . .” Id., art. 6, § 6 (b). Rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the then existing school funding scheme raised equal protection concerns, the court in Montoy concluded that an equitable and fair distribution of funding was required to provide an opportunity for every student to obtain the constitutionally mandated suitable education to which he or she was entitled. Montoy v. State, supra, 773. Just as the New Jersey court had done in the Robinson case, however, the Kansas court declined to develop its own standards and relied instead on the legislature, which commissioned an independent study “to define the level of performance for which funding must be provided.” R. Levy, supra, 1052. As a consequence of that decision, the legislature enacted school finance legislation that appropriated approximately $142 million of additional *436funding for education and changed the funding formula. Id., 1022. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the new legislation did not remedy the constitutional violation, however, and, relying on the independent study, the court ordered the legislature to implement a minimum increase of $285 million above the funding level for the 2004-2005 school year, which included the $142 million of additional funding already contemplated in the existing legislation. Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 840, 845, 112 P.3d 923 (2005). As a result of that order, the legislature was called back into a “very contentious special session”; R. Levy, supra, 1022; during which unsuccessful efforts were made to amend the constitution or to reject Montoy v. State, supra, 279 Kan. 817. R. Levy, supra, 1023. Ultimately, the legislature enacted a multiyear plan that increased school funding by approximately $466 million. Id., 1023-24. In Montoy v. State, 282 Kan. 9, 138 P.3d 755 (2006), the court subsequently held that the latest school finance legislation substantially complied with its prior orders, noting that the legislature will have provided annual increased funding by the 2008-2009 school year of $755.6 million over that provided in the 2004-2005 school year; id., 19, 22; and that the funds had been allocated in a manner that satisfied the court’s concerns regarding at-risk students, special education students and medium and large school districts. Id., 21-22.

The difficulty of developing standards in the present case is brought into stark relief by the plaintiffs’ complaint, which, as I previously noted, describes the “essential components of a suitable educational opportunity” in vague generalities, such as “appropriate” class sizes, “highly qualified” administrators and teachers, an “adequate” number of horns of instruction and a “rigorous” curriculum with a “wide breadth” of courses,20 and proposes to measure whether a suitable *437education has been attained by evaluating student achievement, a concept that is far removed from the plain meaning of article eighth, § 1, and is devoid of any substantive content. I would suggest that the court is not equipped to evaluate these “inputs” and “outputs” or to provide them with the content now lacking to determine whether Connecticut schoolchildren are being provided with an adequate education. The plurality nevertheless dismisses such concerns, stating that the plaintiffs’ complaint is similar to the complaints in Seymour and Horton I because it seeks, among other remedies, declaratory relief, “with the precise remedy being left to the defendants in the first instance.” The plurality also observes that “the plaintiffs’ claims at this stage [of the proceedings] present nothing more than a basic question of constitutional interpretation”; part I of the plurality opinion; and that it “will not let premature, and perhaps unfounded, concerns about the crafting of a remedy deprive the plaintiffs of their day in *438court.” Footnote 22 of the plurality opinion. The plurality further suggests that, even if this court ultimately must adjudicate the substantive content of an adequate education, similar adequacy claims have been considered by our sister states, some of which have articulated standards that could serve as guideposts for Connecticut courts in determining when public schools have satisfied the constitutional mandate of a suitable education.

I find the plurality’s assertion that it will not allow concerns about the crafting of a remedy to “deprive the plaintiffs of their day in court” remarkable in light of the fact that it is the existence of judicial standards, or lack thereof, that determines the court’s ability to adjudicate a matter, including the crafting of an effective remedy. This goes to the heart of the doctrine of justiciability- The plurality’s rationale effectively concedes that this court will be required at some point in the proceedings to define what a “suitable” education actually means if the defendants are unable to do so “in the first instance.” This court, however, will not be able to declare, even “in the first instance,” that the present system does not provide the plaintiffs with “suitable educational opportunities” without first adding substantive content to this presently vague and open-ended concept. We thus are asking the trial court to do what the plurality refuses to do, which is to define the constitutional parameters. Furthermore, educational standards cannot necessarily be borrowed from other states with different public needs and perceptions as to what a minimum quality of education entails because policy judgments regarding educational goals and methods and how to resolve competing claims for limited state resources are typically based on unique local factors that may not be relevant in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, there are no easily discoverable judicial standards available to guide this court in *439determining whether Connecticut schoolchildren have been provided with a suitable education that guarantees certain predetermined outputs.

C

Nonjudicial Policy Determination

For many of the same reasons that I conclude that there is a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to the legislature and a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, I also conclude that the third Baker factor is implicated by the plaintiffs’ claims, namely, the impossibility of resolving them without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly intended for nonjudicial discretion. See Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 217. The plurality declares that deciding the plaintiffs’ claims would not require the court to become involved in policy determinations regarding issues such as maximum class sizes or minimal technical specifications for classroom computers but that the judicial role would be limited to deciding whether selected public education systems, as presently constituted and funded, satisfy an articulated constitutional standard. The plurality, however, fails to provide even the faintest clue as to what that constitutional standard might be, just as it fails to recognize that, in order to determine whether a particular system is properly constituted and funded, the courts will be required to develop baseline criteria to make such comparisons possible, a task that most certainly will involve policy making because it will require decisions regarding the distribution of limited state resources and the balancing of competing political interests.

D

Lack of Respect for a Coordinate Branch of Government

The prudential considerations embodied in the final three Baker factors, which limit the challenges that a *440court may hear, also counsel against justiciability in this case. Judicial intervention to resolve an issue with potentially vast financial consequences demonstrates a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government because the court is treading on a constitutional prerogative of the legislature regarding education and the legislature’s exclusive authority to appropriate funds.21 As I previously noted, jurisdictions that have considered constitutional claims alleging that the state has failed to provide a suitable education have required the legislature to enact drastic increases in education funding to satisfy the constitutional mandate. For example, the Kansas legislature adopted a multiyear plan that increased the annual appropriation for education by several hundred million dollars over a period of four years to ensure that adequate funding would be available. See Montoy v. State, supra, 282 Kan. 19, 22. Similarly, the New Jersey legislature was compelled to institute the state’s first income tax to provide increased school funding before the court would lift an injunction precluding state and local officials from distributing any funds for education until sufficient funding had been provided. See Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 70 N.J. 159-61. Court decisions that affect basic legislative functions such as funding thus pose challenges that have serious practical as well as philosophical implications for the separation of powers. As the Florida Supreme Court wisely observed, “[w]hile the courts are competent to decide whether or not the [legislature's distribution of state funds to complement local education expenditures results in the required uniform sys*441tem, the courts cannot decide whether the [¡legislature's appropriation of funds is adequate in the abstract, divorced from the required uniformity. To decide such an abstract question of adequate funding, the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the [legislature's value judgments as to the spending priorities to be assigned to the state’s many needs, education being one among them. In short, the [c]ourt would have to usurp and oversee the appropriations power, either directly or indirectly, in order to grant the relief sought by [the] [pjlaintiffs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, supra, 680 So. 2d 406-407.

In the present case, the named plaintiff, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc., commissioned a report published in 2005 estimating that $2.02 billion in additional funding, an annual increase of nearly 92 percent over actual school funding,22 would have been required in the 2003-2004 school year to ensure that all school districts across the state had a reasonable chance of meeting the standards that the report deemed necessary to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a suitable public education.23 See *442Augenblick, Palaich & Associates, Inc., Estimating the Cost of an Adequate Education in Connecticut (June, 2005) p. v (report), available at http://www.schooIfunding.info/states/ct/CT-adequacystudy.pdf (last visited March 9,2010). Even this astounding estimate may have been low, however, because it focused exclusively on operating rather than capital expenses and did not include the cost of enforcing similar standards in public institutions such as magnet and vocational schools, which also educate students. Id., p. ii. Moreover, the report notes that its figures will require adjustment for inflation to calculate costs in future years. Id., p. iii. Thus, the inescapable fact that emerges from the report is that the plaintiffs are asking this court to order the legislature to rearrange its spending priorities by increasing the annual appropriation for public elementary and secondary education by nearly 92 percent over the present level of funding in order to satisfy the constitutional mandate of providing Connecticut schoolchildren with a suitable education. This represents a significant reallocation of limited state resources, a function that normally rests with the legislature rather than the courts.

The situation in the present case is further complicated by the fact that none of the defendants has the power or authority to increase state funding for education.24 The complaint does not name any members of *443the legislature as defendants. Also omitted from the list of defendants are the individual towns that potentially would be affected if the court deems their discretionary funds necessary for redistribution to satisfy the purported constitutional mandate of providing children with a suitable education. Accordingly, it is not clear how the court could order a funding increase as the complaint is presently structured.

E

Risk of Multifarious Pronouncements and Unquestioning Adherence to a Political Decision

In addition, judicial intervention would raise the possibility of “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements” on educational matters as the courts and the legislature struggle to define and carry out their respective responsibilities. Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 217. There is also an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to apolitical decision already made”; id.; namely, the constitutional delegation of authority to the legislature to implement the principle of a free public education, for the obvious reason that to do otherwise would constitute a violation of the separation of powers and might even have the unfortunate effect of creating an adversarial relationship between the judicial and legislative branches. When the Kansas Supreme Court accepted a similar challenge, what subsequently occurred was described as “[a] dramatic and suspenseful showdown between two governmental heavyweights . . . [that] kept many Kansans gripping the edges of their seats as each new episode unfolded . . . [and that] set in motion a series of actions and reactions [the] repercussions [of which] have not yet been fully *444realized.” R. Levy, supra, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1021. This court should leam from what has happened in other jurisdictions and decline to shoulder a burden that clearly does not fall within the judicial domain and that, upon delegation to the courts, will turn judges into legislators.

Accordingly, because I conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable, I respectfully dissent.