Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether attorney’s fees incurred by a plaintiff subsequent to an offer of settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 must be paid by the defendant under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, when the plaintiff recovers a judgment less than the offer.

I

Petitioners, three police officers, in answering a call on a domestic disturbance, shot and killed respondent’s adult son. Respondent, in his own behalf and as administrator of his son’s estate, filed suit against the officers in the United States District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and state tort law.

Prior to trial, petitioners made a timely offer of settlement “for a sum, including costs now accrued and attorney’s fees, *4of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000) DOLLARS.” Respondent did not accept the offer. The case went to trial and respondent was awarded $5,000 on the state-law “wrongful death” claim, $52,000 for the § 1988 violation, and $3,000 in punitive damages.

Respondent filed a request for $171,692.47 in costs, including attorney’s fees. This amount included costs incurred after the settlement offer. Petitioners opposed the claim for postoffer costs, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which shifts to the plaintiff all “costs” incurred subsequent to an offer of judgment not exceeded by the ultimate recovery at trial. Petitioners argued that attorney’s fees are part of the “costs” covered by Rule 68. The District Court agreed with petitioners and declined to award respondent “costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred after the offer of judgment.” 547 F. Supp. 542, 547 (ND Ill. 1982). The parties subsequently agreed that $32,000 fairly represented the allowable costs, including attorney’s fees, accrued prior to petitioners’ offer of settlement.1 Respondent appealed the denial of postoffer costs.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 720 F. 2d 474 (CA71983). The court rejected what it termed the “rather mechanical linking up of Rule 68 and section 1988.” Id., at 478. It stated that the District Court’s reading of Rule 68 and § 1988, while “in a sense logical,” would put civil rights plaintiffs and counsel in a “predicament” that “cuts against the grain of section 1988.” Id., at 478, 479. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, the court reasoned, would be forced to “think very hard” before rejecting even an inadequate offer, and would be deterred from bringing good-faith actions because of the prospect of losing the right to attorney’s fees if a settlement offer more favorable than the ultimate recovery were rejected. Id., at 478-479. The court concluded that “[t]he legislators who enacted section 1988 would not have wanted its effective*5ness blunted because of a little known rule of court.” Id., at 479.

We granted certiorari, 466 U. S. 949 (1984). We reverse.

rH ► — I

Rule 68 provides that if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and “the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. ” (Emphasis added.) The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation. Advisory Committee Note on Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F. R. D. 433, 483, n. 1 (1946), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 637; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346, 352 (1981). The Rule prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits. This case requires us to decide whether the offer in this case was a proper one under Rule 68, and whether the term “costs” as used in Rule 68 includes attorney’s fees awardable under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.

A

The first question we address is whether petitioners’ offer was valid under Rule 68. Respondent contends that the offer was invalid because it lumped petitioners’ proposal for damages with their proposal for costs. Respondent argues that Rule 68 requires that an offer must separately recite the amount that the defendant is offering in settlement of the substantive claim and the amount he is offering to cover accrued costs. Only if the offer is bifurcated, he contends, so that it is clear how much the defendant is offering for the substantive claim, can a plaintiff possibly assess whether it would be wise to accept the offer. He apparently bases this argument on the language of the Rule providing that the defendant “may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property *6or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued” (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals rejected respondent’s claim, holding that “an offer of the money or property or to the specified effect is, by force of the rule itself, ‘with’ — that is, plus 'costs then accrued,’ whatever the amount of those costs is.” 720 F. 2d, at 476. We, too, reject respondent’s argument. We do not read Rule 68 to require that a defendant’s offer itemize the respective amounts being tendered for settlement of the underlying substantive claim and for costs.

The critical feature of this portion of the Rule is that the offer be one that allows judgment to be taken against the defendant for both the damages caused by the challenged conduct and the costs then accrued. In other words, the drafters’ concern was not so much with the particular components of offers, but with the judgments to be allowed against defendants. If an offer recites that costs are included or specifies an amount for costs, and the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will necessarily include costs; if the offer does not state that costs are included and an amount for costs is not specified, the court will be obliged by the terms of the Rule to include in its judgment an additional amount which in its discretion, see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 362, 365 (Powell, J., concurring), it determines to be sufficient to cover the costs. In either case, however, the offer has allowed judgment to be entered against the defendant both for damages caused by the challenged conduct and for costs. Accordingly, it is immaterial whether the offer recites that costs are included, whether it specifies the amount the defendant is allowing for costs, or, for that matter, whether it refers to costs at all. As long as the offer does not implicitly or explicitly provide that the judgment not include costs, a timely offer will be valid.

This construction of the Rule best furthers the objective of the Rule, which is to encourage settlements. If defendants are not allowed to make lump-sum offers that would, if accepted, represent their total liability, they would under*7standably be reluctant to make settlement offers. As the Court of Appeals observed, “many a defendant would be unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it exposed to liability for attorney’s fees in whatever amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff.” 720 F. 2d, at 477.

Contrary to respondent’s suggestion, reading the Rule in this way does not frustrate plaintiffs’ efforts to determine whether defendants’ offers are adequate. At the time an offer is made, the plaintiff knows the amount in damages caused by the challenged conduct. The plaintiff also knows, or can ascertain, the costs then accrued. A reasonable determination whether to accept the offer can be made by simply adding these two figures and comparing the sum to the amount offered. Respondent is troubled that a plaintiff will not know whether the offer on the substantive claim would be exceeded at trial, but this is so whenever an offer of settlement is made. In any event, requiring itemization of damages separate from costs would not in any way help plaintiffs know in advance whether the judgment at trial will exceed a defendant’s offer.

Curiously, respondent also maintains that petitioners’ settlement offer did not exceed the judgment obtained by respondent. In this regard, respondent notes that the $100,000 offer is not as great as the sum of the $60,000 in damages, $32,000 in preoffer costs, and $139,692.47 in claimed postoffer costs. This argument assumes, however, that postoffer costs should be included in the comparison. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that postoffer costs merely offset part of the expense of continuing the litigation to trial, and should not be included in the calculus. Id,., at 476.

B

The second question we address is whether the term “costs” in Rule 68 includes attorney’s fees awardable under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. By the time the Federal Rules of Civil *8Procedure were adopted in 1938, federal statutes had authorized and defined awards of costs to prevailing parties for more than 85 years. See Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161; see generally Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975). Unlike in England, such “costs” generally had not included attorney’s fees; under the “American Rule,” each party had been required to bear its own attorney’s fees. The “American Rule” as applied in federal courts, however, had become subject to certain exceptions by the late 1930’s. Some of these exceptions had evolved as a product of the “inherent power in the courts to allow attorney’s fees in particular situations.” Alyeska, supra, at 259. But most of the exceptions were found in federal statutes that directed courts to award attorney’s fees as part of costs in particular cases. 421 U. S., at 260-262.

Section 407 of the Communications Act of 1934, for example, provided in relevant part that, “[i]f the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.” 47 U. S. C. §407. There was identical language in § 3(p) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153(p) (1934 ed.). Section 40 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C. §40 (1934 ed.), allowed a court to “award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” And other statutes contained similar provisions that included attorney’s fees as part of awardable “costs.” See, e. g., the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1934 ed.); the Securities Act of 1933,15 U. S. C. §77k(e) (1934 ed.); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§78i(e), 78r(a) (1934 ed.).

The authors of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 were fully aware of these exceptions to the American Rule. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 54(d), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 621, contains an extensive list of the federal statutes which allowed for costs in particular cases; of the 35 “statutes as to costs” set forth in the final paragraph of the Note, no fewer than 11 allowed for attorney’s fees as part of costs. Against this background of varying definitions of “costs,” the drafters *9of Rule 68 did not define the term; nor is there any explanation whatever as to its intended meaning in the history of the Rule.

In this setting, given the importance of “costs” to the Rule, it is very unlikely that this omission was mere oversight; on the contrary, the most reasonable inference is that the term “costs” in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority. In other words, all costs properly awardable in an action are to be considered within the scope of Rule 68 “costs.” Thus, absent congressional expressions to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines “costs” to include attorney’s fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68. See, e. g., Fulps v. Springfield, Tenn., 715 F. 2d 1088, 1091-1095 (CA6 1983); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110, 113-117 (ND Cal. 1979); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259-1260 (Colo. 1978). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S., at 362-363 (Powell, J., concurring).

Here, respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, a prevailing party in a § 1983 action may be awarded attorney’s fees “as part of the costs.” Since Congress expressly included attorney’s fees as “costs” available to a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit, such fees are subject to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68. This “plain meaning” interpretation of the interplay between Rule 68 and § 1988 is the only construction that gives meaning to each word in both Rule 68 and § 1988.2

*10Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not believe that this “plain meaning” construction of the statute and the Rule will frustrate Congress’ objective in § 1988 of ensuring that civil rights plaintiffs obtain “‘effective access to the judicial process.’” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Merely subjecting civil rights plaintiffs to the settlement provision of Rule 68 does not curtail their access to the courts, or significantly deter them from bringing suit. Application of Rule 68 will serve as a disincentive for the plaintiff’s attorney to continue litigation after the defendant makes a settlement offer. There is no evidence, however, that Congress, in considering § 1988, had any thought that civil rights claims were to be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is concerned. Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not be penalized for “helping to lessen docket congestion” by settling their cases out of court. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra, at 7.

Moreover, Rule 68’s policy of encouraging settlements is neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants; it expresses a clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits. Civil rights plaintiffs — along with other plaintiffs — who reject an offer more favorable than what is thereafter recovered at trial will not recover attorney’s fees for services performed after the offer is rejected. But, since the Rule is neutral, many civil rights plaintiffs will benefit from the offers of settlement encouraged by Rule 68. Some plaintiffs will receive compensation in settlement where, on trial, they might not have recovered, or would have recovered less than what was offered. And, even for those who would prevail at trial, settlement will provide them with compensation at an earlier date without the burdens, stress, and time of litigation. In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants.

*11To be sure, application of Rule 68 will require plaintiffs to “think very hard” about whether continued litigation is worthwhile; that is precisely what Rule 68 contemplates. This effect of Rule 68, however, is in no sense inconsistent with the congressional policies underlying § 1983 and § 1988. Section 1988 authorizes courts to award only “reasonable” attorney’s fees to prevailing parties. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, we held that “the most critical factor” in determining a reasonable fee “is the degree of success obtained.” Id., at 436. We specifically noted that prevailing at trial “may say little about whether the expenditure of counsel’s time was reasonable in relation to the success achieved.” Ibid. In a case where a rejected settlement offer exceeds the ultimate recovery, the plaintiff — although technically the prevailing party — has not received any monetary benefits from the postoffer services of his attorney. This case presents a good example: the $139,692 in postoffer legal services resulted in a recovery $8,000 less than petitioners’ settlement offer. Given Congress’ focus on the success achieved, we are not persuaded that shifting the postoffer costs to respondent in these circumstances would in any sense thwart its intent under § 1988.

Rather than “cutting against the grain” of § 1988, as the Court of Appeals held, we are convinced that applying Rule 68 in the context of a § 1983 action is consistent with the policies and objectives of § 1988. Section 1988 encourages plaintiffs to bring meritorious civil rights suits; Rule 68 simply encourages settlements. There is nothing incompatible in these two objectives.

Ill

Congress, of course, was well aware of Rule 68 when it enacted § 1988, and included attorney’s fees as part of recoverable costs. The plain language of Rule 68 and § 1988 subjects such fees to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68. Nothing revealed in our review of the policies underlying § 1988 constitutes “the necessary clear expression of congres*12sional intent” required “to exempt. . . [the] statute from the operation of” Rule 68. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 700 (1979). We hold that petitioners are not liable for costs of $139,692 incurred by respondent after petitioners’ offer of settlement.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Powell,

concurring.

In Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346 (1981), the offer under Rule 68 stated that it was “in the amount of $150, which shall include attorney’s fees, together with costs accrued to date.” Id., at 365. In a brief concurring opinion, I expressed the view that this offer did not comport with the Rule’s requirements. It seemed to me that an offer of judgment should consist of two identified components: (i) the substantive relief proposed, and (ii) costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. The amount of the fee ultimately should be within the discretion of the court if the offer is accepted. In questioning the form of the offer in Delta, I was influenced in part by the fact that it was a Title VII case. I concluded that the “‘costs’ component of a Rule 68 offer of judgment in a Title VII case must include reasonable attorney’s fees accrued to the date of the offer.” Id., at 363. My view, however, as to the specificity of the “substantive relief” component of the offer did not depend solely on the fact that Delta was a Title VII case.

No other Justice joined my Delta concurrence. The Court’s decision was upon a different ground. Although I think it the better practice for the offer of judgment expressly to identify the components, it is important to have a Court for a clear interpretation of Rule 68. I noted in Delta that “parties to litigation and the public as a whole have an interest — often an overriding one — in settlement rather than exhaustion of protracted court proceedings.” Ibid. The purpose of Rule 68 is to “facilitate] the early resolution of marginal suits in which the defendant perceives the claim to *13be without merit, and the plaintiff recognizes its speculative nature.” Ibid. See also id., at 363, n. 1. We have now agreed as to what specifically is required by Rule 68.

Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

In Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346 (1981), I expressed in dissent the view that the term “costs” in Rule 68 did not include attorney’s fees. Further examination of the question has convinced me that this view was wrong, and I therefore join the opinion of The Chief Justice. Cf. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 176 (1950) (Jackson, J. concurring).

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.

The question presented by this case is whether the term “costs” as it is used in Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 and elsewhere throughout the Rules refers sim*14ply to those taxable costs defined in 28 U. S. C. § 1920 and traditionally understood as “costs” — court fees, printing expenses, and the like2 — or instead includes attorney’s fees when an underlying fees-award statute happens to refer to fees “as part of” the awardable costs. Relying on what it recurrently emphasizes is the “plain language” of one such statute, 42 U. S. C. §1988,3 the Court today holds that a prevailing civil rights litigant entitled to fees under that statute is per se barred by Rule 68 from recovering any fees for work performed after rejecting a settlement offer where he ultimately recovers less than the proffered amount in settlement.

I dissent. The Court’s reasoning is wholly inconsistent with the history and structure of the Federal Rules, and its application to the over 100 attorney’s fees statutes enacted by Congress will produce absurd variations in Rule 68’s op*15eration based on nothing more than picayune differences in statutory phraseology. Neither Congress nor the drafters of the Rules could possibly have intended such inexplicable variations in settlement incentives. Moreover, the Court’s interpretation will “seriously undermine the purposes behind the attorney’s fees provisions” of the civil rights laws, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346, 378 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) — provisions imposed by Congress pursuant to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Today’s decision therefore violates the most basic limitations on our rulemaking authority as set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and as summarized in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975). Finally, both Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States have been engaged for years in considering possible amendments to Rule 68 that would bring attorney’s fees within the operation of the Rule. That process strongly suggests that Rule 68 has not previously been viewed as governing fee awards, and it illustrates the wisdom of deferring to other avenues of amending Rule 68 rather than ourselves engaging in “standardless judicial lawmaking.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 378 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

I

The Court’s “plain language” analysis, ante, at 11, goes as follows: Section 1988 provides that a “prevailing party” may recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Rule 68 in turn provides that, where an offeree obtains a judgment for less than the amount of a previous settlement offer, “the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.” Because “attorney’s fees” are “costs,” the Court concludes, the “plain meaning” of Rule 68 per se prohibits a prevailing civil rights plaintiff from recovering fees *16incurred after he rejected the proposed out-of-court settlement. Ante, at 9.

The Court’s “plain language” approach is, as Judge Pos-ner’s opinion for the court below noted, “in a sense logical.” 720 F. 2d 474, 478 (CA7 1983). However, while the starting point in interpreting statutes and rules is always the plain words themselves, “[t]he particular inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be understood or what understanding they convey when used in the particular act.”5 We previously have been confronted with “superficially appealing argument[s]” strikingly similar to those adopted by the Court today, and we have found that they “cannot survive careful consideration.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 758 (1980). So it is here.

In Roadway Express, the petitioner argued that under 28 U. S. C. § 1927 (1976 ed.) (which at that time allowed for the imposition of “excess costs” on an attorney who “unreasonably and vexatiously” delayed court proceedings),6 “costs” *17should be interpreted to include attorney’s fees when the underlying fees-award statute provided for fees “as part of the costs.” We rejected that argument, concluding that “costs” as it was used in § 1927 had a well-settled meaning limited to the traditional taxable items of costs set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 1920. 447 U. S., at 759-761. We found that Congress has consistently “sought to standardize the treatment of costs in federal courts, to ‘make them uniform — make the law explicit and definite,’ ” and that the petitioner’s interpretation “could result in virtually random application of § 1927 on the basis of other laws that do not address the problem of controlling abuses of judicial processes.” Id., at 761-762. Specifically, allowing the definition of “costs” to vary depending on the phraseology of the underlying fees-award statute

“would create a two-tier system of attorney sanctions. . . . Under Roadway’s, view of § 1927, lawyers in cases brought under those statutes [authorizing fees as part of the costs] would face stiffer penalties for prolonging litigation than would other attorneys. There is no persuasive justification for subjecting lawyers in different areas of practice to differing sanctions for dilatory conduct. A court’s processes may be as abused in a commercial case as in a civil rights action. Without an express indication of congressional intent, we must hesitate to reach the imaginative outcome urged by Roadway, particularly when a more plausible construction flows from [viewing ‘costs’ uniformly as limited to those items set forth in §1920].” Id., at 762-763.

The Court today restricts its discussion of Roadway to a single footnote, urging that that case “is not relevant to our decision” because “§1927 came with its own statutory definition of costs” whereas “Rule 68 does not come with a definition of costs.” Ante, at 9-10, n. 2. But this purported “distinction” merely begs the question. As in Roadway, the question we face is whether a cost-shifting provision “come[s] with a definition of costs” — that set forth in § 1920 in an effort *18“to standardize the treatment of costs in federal courts,” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, at 761 — or instead may vary widely in meaning depending on the phraseology of the underlying fees-award statute.7 The parties’ arguments in this case and in Roadway are virtually interchangeable, and our analysis is not much advanced simply by the conclu-sory statement that the cases are different.

For a number of reasons, “costs” as that term is used in the Federal Rules should be interpreted uniformly in accordance ■with the definition of costs set forth in § 1920:

First. The limited history of the costs provisions in the Federal Rules suggests that the drafters intended “costs” to mean only taxable costs traditionally allowed under the common law or pursuant to the statutory predecessor of § 1920.8 *19Nowhere was it suggested that the meaning of taxable “costs” might vary from case to case depending on the language of the substantive statute involved — a practice that would have cut against the drafters’ intent to create uniform procedures applicable to “every action” in federal court. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. I.9

Second. The Rules provide that “costs” may automatically be taxed by the clerk of the court on one day’s notice, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d) — strongly suggesting that “costs” were intended to refer only to those routine, readily determinable charges that could appropriately be left to a clerk, and as to which a single day’s notice of settlement would be appropriate. Attorney’s fees, which are awardable only by the court *20and which frequently entail lengthy disputes and hearings,10 obviously do not fall within that category.

Third. When particular provisions of the Federal Rules are intended to encompass attorney’s fees, they do so explicitly. Eleven different provisions of the Rules authorize a court to award attorney’s fees as “expenses” in particular circumstances, demonstrating that the drafters knew the difference, and intended a difference, between “costs,” “expenses,” and “attorney’s fees.”11

Fourth. With the exception of one recent Court of Appeals opinion and two recent District Court opinions, the Court can point to no authority suggesting that courts or attorneys have ever viewed the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 as including attorney’s fees.12 Yet Rule 68 has been in effect for 47 years, and potentially could have been applied to numerous fee statutes during this time. “The fact that the defense *21bar did not develop a practice of seeking” to shift or reduce fees under Rule 68 “is persuasive evidence that trial lawyers have interpreted the Rule in accordance with” the definition of costs in § 1920. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S., at 360.

Fifth. We previously have held that words and phrases in the Federal Rules must be given a consistent usage and be read in pari materia, reasoning that to do otherwise would “attribute a schizophrenic intent to the drafters.” Id., at 353. Applying the Court’s “plain language” approach consistently throughout the Rules, however, would produce absurd results that would turn statutes like §1988 on their heads and plainly violate the restraints imposed on judicial rulemaking by the Rules Enabling Act. For example, Rule 54(d) provides that “costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”13 Similarly, the plain language of Rule 68 provides that a plaintiff covered by the Rule “must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer” — language requiring the plaintiff to bear both his postoffer costs and the defendant’s postoffer costs.14 If “costs” as used in these provisions were interpreted to include attorney’s fees by virtue of the wording of § 1988, losing civil rights plaintiffs would be required by the “plain language” of Rule 54(d) to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees, and prevailing plaintiffs falling within Rule 68 would be required to bear the defendant’s postoffer attorney’s fees.

*22Had it addressed this troubling consequence of its “plain language” approach, perhaps the Court would have acknowledged that such a reading would conflict directly with § 1988, which allows an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only where “the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant,”15 and that the substantive standard set forth in § 1988 therefore overrides the otherwise “plain meaning” of Rules 54(d) and 68. But that is precisely the point, and the Court cannot have it both ways. Unless we are to engage in “schizophrenic” construction, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 360, the word “costs” as it is used in the Federal Rules either does or does not allow the inclusion of attorney’s fees. If the word “costs” does subsume attorney’s fees, this “would alter fundamentally the nature of” civil-rights attorney’s fee legislation. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S., at 762. To avoid this extreme result while still interpreting Rule 68 to include fees in some circumstances, however, the Court would have to “select on an ad hoc basis those features of § 1988 . . . that should be read into” Rule 68 — a process of construction that would constitute nothing short of “stand-ardless judicial lawmaking.” Ibid.16

*23Sixth. As with all of the Federal Rules, the drafters intended Rule 68 to have a uniform, consistent application in all proceedings in federal court. See supra, at 19, and n. 9. In accordance with this intent, Rule 68 should be interpreted to provide uniform, consistent incentives “to encourage the settlement of litigation.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 352. Yet today’s decision will lead to dramatically different settlement incentives depending on minor variations in the phraseology of the underlying fees-award statutes — distinctions that would appear to be nothing short of irrational and for which the Court has no plausible explanation.

Congress has enacted well over 100 attorney’s fees statutes, many of which would appear to be affected by today’s decision. As the Appendix to this dissent illustrates, Congress has employed a variety of slightly different wordings in these statutes. It sometimes has referred to the awarding of “attorney’s fees as part of the costs,” to “costs including attorney’s fees,” and to “attorney’s fees and other litigation costs.” Under the “plain language” approach of today’s decision, Rule 68 will operate to include the potential loss of otherwise recoverable attorney’s fees as an incentive to settlement in litigation under these statutes. But Congress frequently has referred in other statutes to the awarding of “costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee,” of “costs together with a reasonable attorney’s fee,” or simply of “attorney’s fees” without reference to costs. Under the Court’s “plain language” analysis, Rule 68 obviously will not include the potential loss of otherwise recoverable attorney’s fees as a settlement incentive in litigation under these statutes because they do not refer to fees “as” costs.17

*24The result is to sanction a senseless patchwork of fee shifting that flies in the face of the fundamental purpose of the Federal Rules —the provision of uniform and consistent procedure in federal courts. Such a construction will “introduce into [Rule 68] distinctions unrelated to its goal. . . and [will] result in virtually random application of the Rule.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, at 761-762. For example, two consumer safety statutes, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act18 and the Consumer Product Safety Act,19 were enacted in the same congressional session and are similar in purpose and structure — they both authorize the promulgation of safety standards, provide for private rights of action for violations of their requirements, and authorize awards of attorney’s fees. The Motor Vehicle Act, however, authorizes the award of fees and costs,20 while the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizes costs including fees.21 Under today’s decision a successful plaintiff will, where the requirements of Rule 68 are otherwise met, be barred from recovering otherwise reasonable attorney’s fees for a defective toaster (under the Consumer Product Safety Act) but not for a defective bumper (under the Motor Vehicle Act). Yet nothing in the history of either Act, or in the history of Rule 68, supports such a bizarre differentiation.

The untenable character of such distinctions is further illustrated by reference to the various civil rights laws. For example, suits involving alleged discrimination in housing are *25frequently brought under both the Fair Housing Act of 196822 and 42 U. S. C. § 1982,23 and suits involving alleged gender discrimination are often brought under both the Equal Pay Act of 196324 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 Yet because of the variations in wording of the attorney’s fee provisions of these statutes, today’s decision will require that fees be excluded from Rule 68 for purposes of the Fair Housing Act26 but included for purposes of § 1982,27 and that fees be excluded for purposes of the Equal Pay Act28 but included for purposes of Title VII.29 It will be difficult enough to apply Rule 68 to the numerous cases seeking relief under both “fees as costs” and “fees and costs” statutes.30 More im*26portantly, there is absolutely no reason to believe that either Congress or the drafters of the Rules were more eager to induce settlement of § 1982 fair-housing litigation than Fair Housing Act litigation,31 or that they intended sterner settlement incentives in Title VII gender-discrimination cases than in Equal Pay Act gender-discrimination cases.32

Moreover, many statutes contain several fees-award provisions governing actions arising under different subsections, and the phraseology of these provisions sometimes differs slightly from section to section. It is simply preposterous to think that Congress or the drafters of the Rules intended to sanction differing applications of Rule 68 depending on which particular subsection of, inter alia, the Privacy Act of 1974,33 the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933,34 the Outer Continental *27Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,35 or the Interstate Commerce Act36 the plaintiff happened to invoke.

In sum, there is nothing in the history and structure of the Rules or in the history of any of the underlying attorney’s fee statutes to justify such incomprehensible distinctions based simply on fine linguistic variations among the underlying fees-award statutes — particularly where, as in Roadway Express, the cost provision can be read as embodying a uniform definition derived from § 1920. As partners with Congress, we have a responsibility not to carry “plain language” constructions to the point of producing “untenable distinctions and unreasonable results.” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 71 (1982). See also n. 5, supra. As Justice Rehnquist, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, cogently reasoned in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S., at 378 (dissenting opinion), interpreting Rule 68 to allow a “two-tier system of cost-shifting” would attribute “woode[n] and pervers[e]” motives to Congress and to the drafters of the Rules; “[n]o persuasive justification exists for subjecting these plaintiffs to differing penalties for failure to accept a Rule 68 offer and no persuasive justification can be offered as to how such a reading of Rule 68 would in any way further the intent of the Rule which is to encourage settlement” on a uniform basis.37

*28HH

A

Although the Court s opinion fails to discuss any of the problems reviewed above, it does devote some space to arguing that its interpretation of Rule 68 “is in no sense inconsistent with the congressional policies underlying § 1983 and §1988.” Ante, at 11. The Court goes so far as to assert that its interpretation fits in smoothly with § 1988 as interpreted by Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). Ante, at 11.

The Court is wrong. Congress has instructed that attorney’s fee entitlement under § 1988 be governed by a reasonableness standard.38 Until today the Court always has recognized that this standard precludes reliance on any mechanical “bright-line” rules automatically denying a portion of fees, acknowledging that such “mathematical approach[es]” provide “little aid in determining what is a reasonable fee in light of all the relevant factors.” 461 U. S., at 435-436, n. 11. Although the starting point is always “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation,” this “does not end the inquiry”: a number of considerations set forth in the legislative history of § 1988 “may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward.” Id., at 433-434 (emphasis added).39 We also have emphasized that *29the district court “necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment” because of its “superior understanding of the litigation.” Id., at 437. Section 1988’s reasonableness standard is, in sum, “acutely sensitive to the merits of an action and to antidiscrimination policy.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S., at 762.

Rule 68, on the other hand, is not “sensitive” at all to the merits of an action and to antidiscrimination policy. It is a mechanical per se provision automatically shifting “costs” incurred after an offer is rejected, and it deprives a district court of all discretion with respect to the matter by using “the strongest verb of its type known to the English language — ‘must.’” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 369. The potential for conflict between § 1988 and Rule 68 could not be more apparent.40

Of course, a civil rights plaintiff who unreasonably fails to accept a settlement offer, and who thereafter recovers less than the proffered amount in settlement, is barred under § 1988 itself from recovering fees for unproductive work performed in the wake of the rejection. This is because “the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees,” 461 U. S., at 440 (emphasis added); hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” must be excluded from that calculus, id., at 434. To this extent, the results might sometimes be the same under either § 1988’s reasonableness inquiry or the Court’s wooden application of Rule 68. Had the *30Court allowed the Seventh Circuit’s remand in the instant case to stand, for example, the District Court after conducting the appropriate inquiry might well have determined that much or even all of the respondent’s postoffer fees were unreasonably incurred and therefore not properly awardable.

But the results under § 1988 and Rule 68 will not always be congruent, because § 1988 mandates the careful consideration of a broad range of other factors and accords appropriate leeway to the district court’s informed discretion. Contrary to the Court’s protestations, it is not at all clear that “[t]his case presents a good example” of the smooth interplay of § 1988 and Rule 68, ante, at 11, because there has never been an evidentiary consideration of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the respondent’s fee request. It is clear, however, that under the Court’s interpretation of Rule 68 a plaintiff who ultimately recovers only slightly less than the proffered amount in settlement will per se be barred from recovering trial fees even if he otherwise “has obtained excellent results” in litigation that will have far-reaching benefit to the public interest. Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, at 435. Today’s decision necessarily will require the disallowance of some fees that otherwise would have passed muster under §1988’s reasonableness standard,41 and there is nothing in § 1988’s legislative history even vaguely suggesting that Congress intended such a result.42

*31The Court argues, however, that its interpretation of Rule 68 “is neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants.” Ante, at 10. This contention is also plainly wrong. As the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has noted twice in recent years, Rule 68 “is a ‘one-way street,’ available only to those defending against claims and not to claimants.”43 Interpreting Rule 68 in its current version to include attorney’s fees will lead to a number of skewed settlement incentives that squarely conflict with Congress’ intent. To discuss but one example, Rule 68 allows an offer to be made any time after the complaint is filed and gives the plaintiff only 10 days to accept or reject. The Court’s decision inevitably will encourage defendants who know they have violated the law to make “low-ball” offers immediately after suit is filed and before plaintiffs have been able to obtain the information they are entitled to by way of discovery to assess the strength of their claims and the reasonableness of the offers. The result will put severe pressure on plaintiffs to settle on the basis of inadequate information in order to avoid the risk of bearing all of their fees even if reasonable discovery might reveal that the defendants were subject to far greater liability. Indeed, because Rule 68 offers may be made recurrently without limitation, defendants will be well advised to make ever-slightly larger offers throughout the discovery process and before plaintiffs have conducted all reasonably necessary discovery.

This sort of so-called “incentive” is fundamentally incompatible with Congress’ goals. Congress intended for “private citizens ... to be able to assert their civil rights” and for “those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws” not to be *32able “to proceed with impunity.”44 Accordingly, civil rights plaintiffs “‘appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest’”; to promote the “vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights legislation,” Congress has directed that such “private attorneys general” shall not “be deterred from bringing good faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved.”45 Yet requiring plaintiffs to make wholly uninformed decisions on settlement offers, at the risk of automatically losing all of their postoffer fees no matter what the circumstances and notwithstanding the “excellent”46 results they might achieve after the full picture emerges, will work just such a deterrent effect.47

Other difficulties will follow from the Court’s decision. For example, if a plaintiff recovers less money than was offered before trial but obtains potentially far-reaching injunc-tive or declaratory relief, it is altogether unclear how the Court intends judges to go about quantifying the “value” of the plaintiff’s success.48 And the Court’s decision raises *33additional problems concerning representation and conflicts of interest in the context of civil rights class actions.49 These are difficult policy questions, and I do not mean to suggest *34that stronger settlement incentives would necessarily conflict with the effective enforcement of the civil rights laws. But contrary to the Court’s 4-paragraph discussion, the policy considerations do not all point in one direction, and the question of whether and to what extent attorney’s fees should be included within Rule 68 has provoked sharp debate in Congress, in the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, and among commentators.50 The Court has offered some inter*35esting arguments based on an economic analysis of settlement incentives and aggregate results. Ante, at 10. But I believe Judge Posner had the better of this argument in concluding that the incentives created by interpreting Rule 68 in its current form to include attorney’s fees would “cu[t] against the grain of section 1988,” and that in any event a modification of Rule 68 to encompass fees is for Congress, not the courts. 720 F. 2d, at 479.

B

Indeed, the judgment of the Court of Appeals below turned on its determination that an interpretation of Rule 68 to include attorney’s fees is beyond the pale of the judiciary’s rulemaking authority. Ibid. Congress has delegated its authority to this Court “to prescribe by general rules . . . the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions.” 28 U. S. C. §2072.51 This grant is limited, however, by the condition that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Ibid. The right to attorney’s fees is “substantive” under any reasonable definition of that term. Section 1988 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the House and Senate Reports recurrently emphasized that “fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain . . . compliance” with the *36civil rights laws and to redress violations.52 Statutory attorney’s fees remedies such as that set forth in § 1988 “are far more like new causes of action tied to specific rights than like background procedural rules governing any and all litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 443, n. 2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also 720 F. 2d, at 479 (§ 1988 “does not make the litigation process more accurate and efficient for both parties; even more clearly than the statute of limitations [at issue in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530 (1949)], it is designed instead to achieve a substantive objective— compliance with the civil rights laws”).53

As construed by the Court today, Rule 68 surely will operate to “abridge” and to “modify” this statutory right to reasonable attorney’s fees. “The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,— the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them,” or instead operates to abridge a substantive right “in the guise of regulating procedure.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 10, 14 (1941) (emphasis added); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 464-465 (1965). Unlike those provisions of the Federal Rules that explicitly authorize an award of attorney’s fees, Rule 68 is not addressed to bad-faith or unreasonable litigation conduct. The courts always have had inherent authority to assess fees against parties who act “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, *37or for oppressive reasons,” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 258-259, and the assessment of fees against parties whose unreasonable conduct has violated the rules of litigation falls comfortably into the courts’ authority to administer “remedy and redress for disregard or infraction” of those rules, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra, at 14.

Rule 68, on the other hand, contains no reasonableness component. See supra, at 29. As interpreted by the Court, it will operate to divest a prevailing plaintiff of fees to which he otherwise might be entitled under the reasonableness standard simply because he guessed wrong, or because he did not have all information reasonably necessary to evaluate the offer, or because of unforeseen changes in the law or evidence after the offer. The Court’s interpretation of Rule 68 therefore clearly collides with the congressionally prescribed substantive standards of § 1988, and the Rules Enabling Act requires that the Court’s interpretation give way.

If it had addressed this central issue, perhaps the Court would have reasoned that Rule 68 as interpreted to include attorney’s fees is merely a procedural device designed to further the important policy of encouraging efficient and prompt resolution of disputes. With all respect, such refashioning of settlement incentives is squarely foreclosed by the Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, which held that it is “inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation.” 421 U. S., at 247. Beyond a handful of “limited circumstances” that do not encompass today’s decision,54 “it is *38apparent that the circumstances under which attorney’s fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making these awards are matters for Congress to determine,” id., at 257, 262 (emphasis added), and that “courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance” or disallowance of attorney’s fees, id., at 269. By permitting a mechanical per se rule to supplant the congres-sionally prescribed reasonableness standard of § 1988, and by divesting courts of the discretion Congress intended them to exercise, the Court has assumed a forbidden “roving authority” to “make major inroads on a policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself.” Id., at 260, 269. It matters not whether such “roving authority” is exercised on a case-by-case basis or, as here, in interpreting a Federal Rule promulgated pursuant to Congress’ delegation of rulemaking authority: in either event, the result is to “abridge” and to “modify” the substance of § 1988 “in the guise of regulating procedure.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra, at 10.55

h-H

For several years now both the Judicial Conference and Congress have been engaged in an extensive reexamination of Rule 68 and have considered numerous proposals to amend the Rule to include attorney’s fees. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules initially proposed an amendment to Rule 68 in August 1983 that would have applied equally to plaintiffs and defendants and that would have left application of the Rule’s fee provisions in the courts’ informed discret*39ion.56 The proposal received extensive criticism57 and subsequently was replaced with a revised version in September 1984. The attorney’s fee provisions of that proposal would *40apply only if a court determined that “an offer was rejected unreasonably,” and the proposal sets forth detailed factors for assessing the reasonableness of the rejection.58 Public *41hearings on this proposed amendment were held only several months ago.59

In the meantime, numerous revisions of § 1988 have been proposed in Congress in recent years. A 1981 proposal would have imposed a rule similar to that adopted by the Court today,60 but it drew sharp opposition during legislative hearings61 and never was voted out of Subcommittee. Subsequent proposals to the same effect have had a similar fate.62 In 1984, legislation was introduced that would have adopted the same rule but subject to the qualification that the failure to accept a settlement offer “was not reasonable at the time *42such failure occurred.”63 Hearings were held on this legislation,64 but it too never was voted out of Subcommittee.

This activity is relevant in two respects. First, it rather strongly suggests that neither the Advisory Committee nor Congress has viewed Rule 68 as currently governing attorney’s fees, else the proposals to amend Rule 68 to include attorney’s fees would largely be unnecessary. Second, the Committee and Congress have given close consideration to a broad range of troubling issues that would be raised by application of Rule 68 to attorney’s fees, such as (1) whether to import a reasonableness standard into Rule 68, (2) whether and to what extent district courts should have discretion in applying the Rule, (3) the need to revise Rule 68 so as to ensure that offerees have had sufficient time and discovery to evaluate the strength of their cases and the reasonableness of settlement offers, (4) application of the Rule to suits for nonpecuniary relief, (5) application of the Rule to class-action litigation, (6) conflicts of interest between attorneys and clients that the Rule might create, and (7) the precise nature and scope of the sanction. Many of the proposals discussed above have been carefully crafted to address these problems. See nn. 56, 58, and 63, supra.

Congress and the Judicial Conference are far more institutionally competent than the Court to resolve this matter. *43Because the issue before us at the very least is ambiguous, and because the “plain language” approach leads to so many inexplicable inconsistencies in the operation of the Rules and the substantive fees-award statutes, the Court should have stayed its hand and allowed these other avenues for amending Rule 68 to be pursued. Under these circumstances, the Court’s decision to the contrary constitutes poor judicial administration as well as poor law, and it renders even more imperative the need for Congress and the Judicial Conference to resolve this problem with dispatch.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF

BRENNAN, J.,

DISSENTING

Congress has enacted well over 100 fee-shifting statutes, which typically fall into three broad categories:

(A) Statutes that refer to attorney’s fees “as part of the costs.” Variations include “attorney’s fees to be taxed and collected as part of the costs,” “costs including attorney’s fees,” and “attorney’s fees and other litigation costs.” Under the Court’s “plain language” approach, these various formulations all “defin[e] ‘costs’ to include attorney’s fees.” Ante, at 9. Thus where an action otherwise is governed by Rule 68, attorney’s fees that are potentially awardable under these statutes “are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68.” Ibid.

(B) Statutes that do not refer to attorney’s fees as part of the costs. Many other fee statutes do not describe fees “as” costs, but instead as an item separate from costs. Typical formulations include “costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee,” “costs together with a reasonable attorney’s fee,” and “costs, expenses, and a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Some statutes simply authorize awards of fees without any reference to costs. Under the Court’s “plain language” approach, none of these formulations “defin[e] ‘costs’ to include attorney’s fees.” Ibid. Thus where an action otherwise is governed by Rule 68, attorney’s fees that are potentially awardable under these statutes are not subject to Rule 68 and instead *44are to be evaluated solely under the reasonableness standard as summarized in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).

(C) Statutes that may or may not refer to attorney’s fees as part of the costs. A number of statutes authorize the award of “costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees.” It is altogether uncertain how such statutes should be categorized under the Court’s “plain language” approach to Rule 68. On the one hand, if the phrase “including attorney’s fees” is read as modifying the word “costs” at least in part, attorney’s fees that are potentially awardable under these statutes arguably are subject to Rule 68. On the other hand, if “including attorney’s fees” is read as modifying only the word “expenses” (which seems to be the more plausible “plain meaning”), fees under these statutes are not subject to Rule 68 and instead are governed solely by the reasonableness standard as summarized in Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra.

The following is a summary of the statutes enacted by Congress authorizing courts to award attorney’s fees, broken down into the three categories discussed above.65 The Court has not explained why it is that either Congress or the drafters of the Federal Rules might have intended to create such disparate settlement incentives based on minor variations in the phraseology of attorney’s fee statutes.

A. Attorney’s Fees Referred to as “Costs”

1. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E) and (F).

2. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), 552a(g)(4)(B).

3. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552b(i).

*454. Commodity Exchange Act, 88 Stat. 1394, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §§ 18(d) and (e).

5. Packers and Stockyard Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 166, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 210(f).

6. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 534, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 499g(b).

7. Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, 82 Stat. 95, 7 U. S. C. §§ 2305(a) and (c).

8. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(q)(3).

9. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1767, 12 U. S. C. § 1975.

10. Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15(a) and (b).

11. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1394, 1396, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15c(a)(2), 26.

12. Unfair Competition Act of 19Í6, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U. S. C. §72.

13. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77k(e).

14. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1171, 1176, 15 U. S. C. §§77ooo(e), 77www(a).

15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 890, 898, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§78i(e), 78r(a).

16. Jewelers Hall-Mark Act, 34 Stat. 262, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 298(b)-(d).

17. Consumer Product Safety Act, 86 Stat. 1218, 1226, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2060(c) and (f), 2072(a), 2073.

18. Hobby Protection Act, 87 Stat. 686,15 U. S. C. §2102.

19. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1243, 15 U. S. C. §§ 4016(b)(1) and (4).

20. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1817,15 U. S. C. §§ 4304(a) and (b) (1982 ed., Supp. III).

21. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 3002, 16 U. S. C. §470w-4.

*4622. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 897, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4).

23. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3129, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2632(a) and (b).

24. Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2586,17 U. S. C. § 505.

25. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 3353, 17 U. S. C. § 911(f) (1982 ed., Supp. III).

26. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c).

27. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §2520.

28. Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, 28 U. S. C. § 1875(d)(2).

29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U. S. C. § 794a(b).

30. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 503, 30 U. S. C. § 1270(d).

31. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 94 Stat. 573, 30 U. S. C. § 1427(c).

32. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 2458, 30 U. S. C. § 1734(a)(4).

33. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 888, 33 U. S. C. § 1365(d).

34. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1057, 33 U. S. C. § 1415(g)(4).

35. Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2141, 33 U. S. C. § 1515(d).

36. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 94 Stat. 2302, 33 U. S. C. § 1910(d).

37. Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1690-1691, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300j — 8(d), 300j-9(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

38. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 445, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Z(e).

39. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988.

*4740. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 350-351, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1997a(b), 1997c(d).

41. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3(b).

42. Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 246, 42 U. S. C. § 2000b-l.

43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k).

44. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1880, 42 U. S. C. §2000aa-6(f).

45. Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1244, 42 U. S. C. § 4911(d).

46. Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 1555, 42 U. S. C. § 6104(e)(1).

47. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 89 Stat. 930, 42 U. S. C. § 6305(d).

48. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2826, 42 U. S. C. § 6972(e).

49. Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1686, 1706-1707, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7413(b), 7604(d), 7607(f).

50. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 784, 42 U. S. C. § 7622(e)(2).

51. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3335, 42 U. S. C. § 8435(d).

52. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 990, 42 U. S. C. § 9124(d).

53. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 657, 43 U. S. C. § 1349(a)(5).

54. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 153(p).

55. Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 737, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §829.

56. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1227.

57. Shipping Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 3132, 46 U. S. C. App. § 1710(h)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III).

*4858. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1072, 1095, 47 U. S. C. §§206, 407.

59. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2779, 47 U. S. C. §§553(c)(2), 605(d)(3)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III).

60. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 90 Stat. 2076, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1686(e).

61. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1015, 49 U. S. C. App. § 2014(e).

62. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 11705(d)(3), § 11710(b).

63. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1796, 50 U. S. C. § 1810(c).

B. Attorney’s Fees Not Referred to as “Costs”

1. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4)B.

2. Plant Variety Act, 84 Stat. 1556, 7 U. S. C. §2565.

3. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, as amended, 11 U. S. C. §§303(i), 362(h), 363(n), 523(d).

4. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(d)(8)(A).

5. National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1260, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1730(m)(3).

6. Federal Credit Union Act, 84 Stat. 1010, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1786(p).

7. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 64 Stat. 879, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818(n).

8. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1728, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 2607(d)(2)(b).

9. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3708, 3789, 12 U. S. C. §§ 3417(a)(4), 3418.

10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §78u(h)(8).

11. Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 439, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1117.

*4912. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 724, 15 U. S. C. § 1400(b).

13. Truth-in-Lending Act, 82 Stat. 157, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1640(a).

14. Consumer Leasing Act, 90 Stat. 259, 15 U. S. C. § 1667b(a).

15. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 84 Stat. 1134, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1681n(3), 1681o(2).

16. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 88 Stat. 1524, 15 U. S. C. § 1691e(d).

17. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 91 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 1692k(a).

18. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 92 Stat. 3737, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1693m(a) and (f).

19. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 82 Stat. 595, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1709(c).

20. Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 86 Stat. 955, 963, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a)(2).

21. Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat. 2039, 2041-2042, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2), 2020(b)(4)(C).

22. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 92 Stat. 331, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2805(d)(1) and (3).

23. Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1677, 1679, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3608(d), 3611(d).

24. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2426, 16 U. S. C. § 3117(a).

25. Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Amendments Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 934, 25 U. S. C. §640d-27(b).

26. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1665, 26 U. S. C. § 6110(f)(2).

27. Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1927.

28. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2412(b).

29. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U. S. C. § 107.

*5030. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 216(b).

31. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U. S. C. § 431(c).

32. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 604, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 626(b).

33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 891, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(g).

34. Multiple Mineral Development Act, 68 Stat. 710, 30 U. S. C. § 526(e).

35. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 919, as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 6721(c).

36. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1438, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 928(a).

37. Patent Infringement Act, 66 Stat. 813, 35 U. S. C. §285.

38. Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act, 72 Stat. 1165, 38 U. S. C. § 784(g).

39. Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 406(b).

40. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 946, 42 U. S. C. §2184.

41. Legal Services Corporation Act, 88 Stat. 381, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2996e(f).

42. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c).

43. Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act, 88 Stat. 706, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5412(b).

44. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2792, 42 U. S. C. § 9612(c)(3).

45. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 658, 682, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1349(b)(2), 1818(c)(1)(C).

46. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2430, 43 U. S. C. § 1631(c).

*5147. Act of Mar. 2, 1897, 29 Stat. 619, 48 U. S. C. § 1506.

48. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 11708(c).

49. Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2016, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 11711(d) and (e).

C. “Costs and Expenses, Including Attorney’s Fees”

1. Magnuson-Moss Warranty — Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88 Stat. 2189, 15 U. S. C. § 2310(d)(2).

2. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1263, 29 U. S. C. § 1451(e).

3. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1303, 92 Stat. 183, 30 U. S. C. §§ 815(c)(3), 938(c).

4. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 511, 520, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1275(e), 1293(c).

5. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 84 Stat. 1906, 42 U. S. C. §§ 4654(a) and (c).

6. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appropriations Authorization of 1978, 92 Stat. 2953, 42 U. S. C. § 5851(e)(2).

7. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 122, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 854(g).

*519Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. § 505, provides in relevant part that in any copyright infringement action “the court may . .. award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”1 The question presented in this case is what standards should inform a court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement action — a question that has produced conflicting views in the Courts of Appeals.

Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who, in the late 1960’s, was the. lead singer and songwriter of a popular music group known as “Creedence Clearwater Revival.”2 In 1970, he wrote a song entitled “Run Through the Jungle” and sold the exclusive publishing rights to predeeessors-ininterest of respondent Fantasy, Inc., who later obtained the copyright by assignment. The music group disbanded in 1972 and Fogerty subsequently published under another recording label. In 1985, he published and registered a copyright to a song entitled “The Old Man Down the Road,” which was released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers Records, Inc. Respondent Fantasy, Inc., *520sued Fogerty, Warner Brothers, and affiliated companies3 in District Court, alleging that “The Old Man Down the Road” was merely “Run Through the Jungle” with new words.4 The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Fogerty.

After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U. S. C. § 505. The District Court denied the motion, finding that Fantasy’s infringement suit was not brought frivolously or in bad faith as required by Circuit precedent for an award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant.5 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 984 F. 2d 1524 (CA9 1993), and declined to abandon the existing Ninth Circuit standard for awarding attorney’s fees which treats successful plaintiffs and successful defendants differently. Under'that standard, commonly termed the “dual” standard, prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous *521or brought in bad faith.6 In contrast, some Courts of Appeals follow the so-called “evenhanded” approach in which no distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that “we do not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant of prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded approach.” Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d 151, 156 (1986).

We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 903 (1993), to address an important area of federal law and to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s “dual” standard for awarding attorney’s fees under §505, and the so-called “evenhanded” approach exemplified by the Third Circuit.8 We reverse.

*522Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, it contends that the language of § 505, when read in the light of our decisions construing similar fee-shifting language, supports the rule. Second, it asserts that treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently comports with the “objectives” and “equitable considerations” underlying the Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the legislative history of §505 indicates that Congress ratified the dual standard which it claims was “uniformly” followed by the lower courts under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We address each of these arguments in turn.

The statutory language — “the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs” — gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defendants. But respondent contends that our decision in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), in which we construed virtually identical language, supports a differentiation in treatment between plaintiffs and defendants.

Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs____” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the cognate provision of Title II of that Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000a-3(b), that a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily *523recover an attorney’s fee unless some special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968). This decision was based on what we found to be the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes, and the intent of Congress to achieve such objectives through the use of plaintiffs as “‘private attorney[s] general.’” Ibid. In Christians-burg, supra, we determined that the same policy considerations were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil rights defendant. We noted that a Title VII plaintiff, like a Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is “the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’ ” 434 U. S., at 418. We also relied on the admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that different standards were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful defendants.

Respondent points to our language in Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989), that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” But here we think this normal indication is overborne by the factors relied upon in our Christiansburg opinion that are absent in the case of the Copyright Act.9 The legislative history of §505 provides no support for treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery of attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees provision of § 505 of the 1976 Act was carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discussion.10 The relevant House Report provides simply:

“Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney’s fees are left to the court’s discretion, and the section also makes clear that neither costs nor attorney’s fees *524can be awarded to or against ‘the United States or an officer thereof.’” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 163 (1976).11

See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 145 (1975) (same). Other courts and commentators have noted the paucity of legislative history of § 505. See, e. g., Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 621 (ED Va. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788 F. 2d 247 (CA4 1986). See also Jaszi, 505 And All That — The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 107, 107-108, and nn. 1, 2 (1992).

The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not completely similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context, impecunious “private attorney general” plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources. Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and to provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms of the award of attorney’s fees. The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. See infra, at 527. In the copyright context, it has been noted that “[entities which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists; the same is true of prospective copyright infringement defendants.” Cohen, supra, at 622-623.

*525We thus conclude that respondent’s argument based on our fee-shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail.12

Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of § 505 and of the Copyright Act in general are best served by the “dual approach” to the award of attorney’s fees.13 The most common reason advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright infringement. See, e. g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (CA9 1987) (“Because section 505 is intended in part to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter infringement, and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally awarded to a prevailing plaintiff”) (citations omitted); Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA2 *5261984) (same). Indeed, respondent relies heavily on this argument. We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by no means the only goal of that Act. In the first place, it is by no means always the case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as exemplified in the case at hand. See Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d, at 155 (noting that “in many cases the defendants are the [copyright] holders”).

More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution grants to Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984). For example, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975), we discussed the policies underlying the 1909 Copyright Act as follows:

“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly... reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by *527this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” (Footnotes omitted.)

We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 349-350 (1991), where we said:

“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” (Citations omitted.)

Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement. In the case before us, the successful defense of “The Old Man Down the Road” increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright.

Respondent finally urges that the legislative history supports the dual standard, relying on the principle of ratification. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute-and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change . . .”). Respondent surveys the great number of lower court cases interpreting the identical provision in the 1909 Act, 17 *528U. S. C. § 116 (1976 ed.), and asserts that “it was firmly established” that prevailing defendants should be awarded attorney’s fees only where the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous or brought with a vexatious purpose. Brief for Respondent 40-45. Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress was aware of this construction of former §116 because of two copyright studies submitted to Congress when it was studying revisions to the Act. W. Strauss, Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, Study No. 22 (hereinafter Strauss Study), and R. Brown, Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Study No. 23 (hereinafter Brown Study), Studies Prepared for Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960).

Before turning to the import of the two studies and the cases decided under the 1909 Act, we summarize briefly the factual background of Lorillard, whence comes the statement upon which respondent relies. There the question was whether there was a right to jury trial in an action for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In enacting that statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that the provisions of the ADEA were to be “enforced in accordance with the ‘powers, remedies and procedures’ ” of specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 81 Stat. 604, 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). Lorillard, 434 U. S., at 580. In the three decided cases which had treated the right to jury trial under the FLSA, each court had decided that there was such a right. In enacting the ADEA, “Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation.” Id., at 581.

Here, by contrast, the Strauss and Brown Studies deal only briefly with the provision for the award of attorney’s fees. In the Strauss Study, the limited discussion begins with a quote to A. Weil, American Copyright Law 530-531 *529(1917), for an explanation of the “discretionary awarding of attorney’s fees”:

“ ‘The amount of money frequently involved in copyright letigation [sic], especially on the part of the defendant is trifling. The expense of any letigation [sic] is considerable. Unless, therefore, some provision is made for financial protection to a litigant, if successful, it may not pay a party to defend rights, even if valid, a situation opposed to justice .... It is increasingly recognized that the person who forces another to engage counsel to vindicate, or defend, a right should bear the expense of such engagement and not his successful opponent....’” Strauss Study 31.

The study then notes that the pending bills contemplate no change in the attorney’s fees provision and concludes with the simple statement “[t]he cases indicate that this discretion has been judiciously exercised by the courts.” Ibid.14 This *530limited discussion of attorney’s fees surely does not constitute an endorsement of a dual standard.

The Brown Study was intended as a supplement to the Strauss Study and, inter alia, provides information from a survey distributed to practitioners about the practical work*531ings of the 1909 Copyright Act.15 It also does not endorse a standard of treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently. At one point, the study notes that “courts do not usually make an allowance- at all if an unsuccessful plaintiff’s claim was not ‘synthetic, capricious or otherwise unreasonable,’ or if the losing defendant raised real issues of fact or law.” Brown Study 85.16

Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to conclude that there was no settled “dual standard” interpretation of former § 116 about which Congress could have been aware. We note initially that at least one reported case stated no reason in awarding attorney’s fees to successful defendants. See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F. 2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925) (noting that the Copyright Act gave courts “absolute discretion,” the court awarded attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit). More importantly, while it appears that the majority of lower courts exercised their discretion in awarding attorney’s fees *532to prevailing defendants based on a finding of frivolousness or bad faith, not all courts expressly described the test in those terms.17 In fact, only one pre-1976 case expressly endorsed a dual standard. Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623 (SDNY 1967).18 This is hardly the sort of uniform construction that Congress might have endorsed.

*533In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress, nor the cases referred to by the studies, support respondent’s view that there was a settled construction in favor of the “dual standard” under § 116 of the 1909 Copyright Act.

We thus reject each of respondent’s three arguments in support of the dual standard. We now turn to petitioner’s argument that §505 was intended to adopt the “British Rule.” Petitioner argues that, consistent with the neutral language of §505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument for the British Rule.

First, just as the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the British Rule. The statute says that “the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The word “may” clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion.

Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247-262 (1975) (tracing the origins and development of the American Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S., at 758. While § 505 is one situation in which *534Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney’s fees in the court’s discretion, we find it impossible to believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British Rule. Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative comment. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the common law... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident”). Not surprisingly, no court has held that § 505 (or its predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule.

Thus we reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the Courts of Appeals and petitioner’s claim that § 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,” but instead equitable discretion should be exercised “in light of the considerations we have identified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 436-437 (1983).19 Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than that applicable to a prevailing *535plaintiff, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring in the judgment.

In my view, the Court’s opinion is flatly inconsistent with our statutory analysis in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978). Because I disagree with that analysis, however, and because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language at issue in this case, I concur in the judgment.

In Christiansburg, the Court interpreted the attorney’s fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III). In this case, the Court construes the attorney’s fee provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U. S. C. § 505. As the Court observes, the two provisions contain “virtually identical language.” Ante, at 522. After today’s decision, however, they will have vastly different meanings.

Under the Title VII provision, a prevailing plaintiff “ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances,” Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 417, whereas a prevailing defendant is to be awarded fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” id., at 421. By contrast, under the Court’s decision today, prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the copyright context “are to be treated alike,” and “attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion.” Ante, at 534.

Interestingly, the Court does not mention, let alone discuss, Christiansburg’s statutory analysis. We began that *536analysis by considering the Christiansburg petitioner’s argument:

“Relying on what it terms ‘the plain meaning of the statute,’ [petitioner] argues that the language of [the attorney’s fee provision] admits of only one interpretation: ‘A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.’” 434 U. S., at 418.

We summarily rejected this contention, stating that “the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let-alone require, such a mechanical construction.” Ibid. We opined that the language “provide[s] no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to attorney’s fees.” Ibid, (emphasis deleted). Turning to the “equitable considerations” embodied in the statute’s policy objectives and legislative history, id., at 418-420, we stated that those considerations counseled against petitioner’s position — a position we concluded was “untenable,” id., at 419.

Today, confronting a provision “virtually identical” to that at issue in Christiansburg, the Court adopts precisely the interpretation that Christiansburg rejected as “mechanical” and “untenable.” The Court states that “the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim for disapproving the dual standard,” ante, at 533, and that the language “gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defendants,” ante, at 522. Thus, the Court replaces the “dual” standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit with an “evenhanded” approach, under which district courts will apply the same standard to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants when deciding whether to award fees. Ante, at 534-535, and n. 19.

It is difficult to see how the Court, when faced with “virtually identical” language in two provisions, can hold that a given interpretation is required by the “plain language” in *537one instance, but reject that same interpretation as “mechanical” and “untenable” in the other. After today’s decision, Congress could employ the same terminology in two different attorney’s fee statutes, but be quite uncertain as to whether the Court would adopt a “dual” standard (that is, reject the “mechanical” construction) or apply an “evenhanded” rule (that is, adopt the “plain meaning”).

Such an inconsistent approach to statutory interpretation robs the law of “the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, we repeatedly have sought to avoid this sort of inconsistency in our fee award decisions. See, e. g., Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) (“case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all” fee-shifting statutes using the term); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 691 (1983) (“similar attorney’s fee provisions should be interpreted pari passu”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983) (the standards “set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party’ ”). See also Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989) (“fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is ‘a strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike”); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (“[Similarity of language ... is, of course, a strong indication that . . . two [attorney’s fee] statutes should be interpreted pari passu”).

The Court recognizes the general principle that similar fee provisions are to be interpreted alike, ante, at 523, but states that the principle does not govern this case because the factors that guided our interpretation in Christiansburg — the policy objectives and legislative history of the statute — do not support the adoption of a “dual” standard in this context. See ante, at 522-525. The Court’s analysis, however, rests on the mistaken premise — a premise implicit in Christians-*538burg — that whether we construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning depends upon the statute’s policy objectives and legislative history. Although attorney’s fee provisions may be interpreted “in light of the competing equities that Congress normally takes into account,” Zipes, supra, at 761, those “equities” cannot dictate a result that is contrary to the statutory language. “Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U. S. 120, 126 (1989). When the text of the statute is clear, our interpretive inquiry ends. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). The Court goes astray, in my view, by attempting to reconcile this case with Christiansburg. Rather, it should acknowledge that Christiansburg mistakenly cast aside the statutory language to give effect to equitable considerations.

I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language in this case. As the Court observes, the language of 17 U. S. C. § 505 gives no indication that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are to be treated differently. See ante, at 522, 533. In addition, as the Court states, the use of the word “may” suggests that the determination of whether an attorney’s fee award is appropriate is to be left to the discretion of the district courts. Ante, at 533. This conclusion finds further support in the full text of § 505, which provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs .... [T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” (Emphasis added.)

Because considerations of stare decisis have “special force” in the area of statutory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989), I might be hesitant to overrule Christiansburg and other cases in which we have construed similar attorney’s fee provisions to impose a “dual” standard of recovery. See, e. g., Hensley, supra, at *539429, and n. 2 (42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed., Supp. III)); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U. S. 711, 713, n. 1 (1987) (42 U. S. C. § 7604(d)). But while stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a dubious precedent, “it does not demand that such a precedent be expanded to its outer limits.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore decline to extend Christiansburg’s analysis to other contexts. Because the Court — at least in result, if not in rationale — refuses to make such an extension, I concur in the judgment.

*546Justice Alito

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the calculation of an attorney’s fee, under federal fee-shifting statutes, based on the “lodestar,” i. e., the number of hours worked multiplied by the prevailing hourly rates, may be increased due to superior performance and results.1 We have stated in previous cases that such an increase is permitted in extraordinary circumstances, and we reaffirm that rule. But as we have also said in prior cases, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient; factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation cannot be used as a ground for increasing an award above the lodestar; and a party seeking fees has the burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar does not adequately take into account and proving with specificity that an enhanced fee is justified. Because the District Court did not apply these standards, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*547I

A

Respondents (plaintiffs below) are children in the Georgia foster-care system and their next friends. They filed this class action on behalf of 3,000 children in foster care and named as defendants the Governor of Georgia and various state officials (petitioners in this case). Claiming that deficiencies in the foster-care system in two counties near Atlanta violated their federal and state constitutional and statutory rights, respondents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorney’s fees and expenses.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia eventually referred the case to mediation, where the parties entered into a consent decree, which the District Court approved. The consent decree resolved all pending issues other than the fees that respondents’ attorneys were entitled to receive under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.2

B

Respondents submitted a request for more than $14 million in attorney’s fees. Half of that amount was based on their calculation of the lodestar — roughly 30,000 hours multiplied by hourly rates of $200 to $495 for attorneys and $75 to $150 for nonattorneys. In support of their fee request, respondents submitted affidavits asserting that these rates were within the range of prevailing market rates for legal services in the relevant market.

*548The other half of the amount that respondents sought represented a fee enhancement for superior work and results. Affidavits submitted in support of this request claimed that the lodestar amount “would be generally insufficient to induce lawyers of comparable skill, judgment, professional representation and experience” to litigate this case. See, e. g., App. 80. Petitioners objected to the fee request, contending that some of the proposed hourly rates were too high, that the hours claimed were excessive, and that the enhancement would duplicate factors that were reflected in the lodestar amount.

The District Court awarded fees of approximately $10.5 million. See 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260,1296 (ND Ga. 2006). The District Court found that the hourly rates proposed by respondents were “fair and reasonable,” id., at 1285, but that some of the entries on counsel’s billing records were vague and that the hours claimed for many of the billing categories were excessive. The court therefore cut the nontravel hours by 15% and halved the hourly rate for travel hours. This resulted in a lodestar calculation of approximately $6 million.

The court then enhanced this award by 75%, concluding that the lodestar calculation did not take into account “(1) the fact that class counsel were required to advance case expenses of $1.7 million over a three-year period with no on[-]going reimbursement, (2) the fact that class counsel were not paid on an on-going basis as the work was being performed, and (3) the fact that class counsel’s ability to recover a fee and expense reimbursement were completely contingent on the outcome of the case.” Id., at 1288. The court stated that respondents’ attorneys had exhibited “a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism ... than the Court has seen displayed by the attorneys in any other case during its 27 years on the bench.” Id., at 1289. The court also commented that the results obtained were “ ‘extraordinary’ ” and added that “[ajfter 58 *549years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable result on such a comprehensive scale.” Id., at 1290. The enhancement resulted in an additional $4.5 million fee award.

Relying on prior Circuit precedent, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 532 F. 3d 1209 (2008). The panel held that the District Court had not abused its discretion by failing to make a larger reduction in the number of hours for which respondents’ attorneys sought reimbursement, but the panel commented that it “would have cut the billable hours more if we were deciding the matter in the first instance” and added that the hourly rates approved by the District Court also “appeared] to be on the generous side.” Id., at 1220, and n. 2. On the question of the enhancement, however, the panel splintered, with each judge writing a separate opinion.

Judge Carnes concluded that binding Eleventh Circuit precedent required that the decision of the District Court be affirmed, but he opined that the reasoning in our opinions suggested that no enhancement should be allowed in this case. He concluded that the quality of the attorneys’ performance was “adequately accounted for 'either in determining the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation or in setting the reasonable hourly rates.’ ” Id., at 1225 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546, 565-566 (1986) (Delaware Valley I)). He found that an enhancement could not be justified based on delay in the recovery of attorney’s fees and reimbursable expenses because such delay is a routine feature of cases brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. And he reasoned that the District Court had contravened our holding in Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557 (1992), when it relied on “ ‘the fact that class counsel’s compensation was totally contingent upon prevailing in this action.’” 532 F. 3d, at 1226, 1228 (quoting affidavit in support of fee request).

*550Judge Wilson concurred in the judgment but disagreed with Judge Carnes’ view that Eleventh Circuit precedent is inconsistent with our decisions. Judge Hill also concurred in the judgment but expressed no view about the correctness of the prior Circuit precedent.

The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc over the dissent of three judges. See 547 F. 3d 1319 (2008). Judge Wilson filed an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing; Judge Carnes, joined by Judges Tjoflat and Dubina, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing; and Judge Tjoflat filed a separate dissent, contending, among other things, that the District Court, by basing the enhancement in large part on a comparison of the performance of respondents’ attorneys with all of the unnamed attorneys whose work he had observed during his professional career, had improperly rendered a decision that was effectively unreviewable on appeal and had essentially served as a witness in support of the enhancement. Id., at 1326-1327.

We granted certiorari. 556 U. S. 1165 (2009).

II

The general rule in our legal system is that each party must pay its own attorney’s fees and expenses, see Hensley v. Eckerkart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983), but Congress enacted 42 U. S. C. § 1988 in order to ensure that federal rights are adequately enforced. Section 1988 provides that a prevailing party in certain civil rights actions may recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”3 Unfortunately, the statute does not explain what Congress meant by a “reasonable” fee, and therefore the task of identifying an appropriate methodology for determining a “reasonable” fee was left for the courts.

One possible method was set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 717-719 (CA5 1974), *551which listed 12 factors that a court should consider in determining a reasonable fee.4 This method, however, “gave very little actual guidance to district courts. Setting attorney’s fees by reference to a series of sometimes subjective factors placed unlimited discretion in trial judges and produced disparate results.” Delaware Valley I, supra, at 563.

An alternative, the lodestar approach, was pioneered by the Third Circuit in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F. 2d 161 (1973), appeal after remand, 540 F. 2d 102 (1976), and “achieved dominance in the federal courts” after our decision in Hensley. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U. S. 789, 801 (2002). “Since that time, ‘[t]he “lodestar” figure has, as its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Dague, supra, at 562).

Although the lodestar method is not perfect, it has several important virtues. First, in accordance with our understanding of the aim of fee-shifting statutes, the lodestar looks to “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 895 (1984). Developed after the practice of hourly billing had become widespread, see Gisbrecht, supra, at 801, the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case. Second, the lodestar method is readily administrable, see Dague, supra, at 566; see also *552Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 582 U. S. 598, 609 (2001); and unlike the Johnson approach, the lodestar calculation is “objective,” Hensley, supra, at 433, and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results.

III

Our prior decisions concerning the federal fee-shifting statutes have established six important rules that lead to our decision in this case.

First, a “reasonable” fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U. S., at 565 (“[I]f plaintiffs . .. find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance that he will be paid a ‘reasonable fee/ the purpose behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied”); Blum, supra, at 897 (“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys” (ellipsis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 1988’s aim is to enforce the covered civil rights statutes, not to provide “a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys.” Delaware Valley I, supra, at 565.

Second, the lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective. See Dague, 505 U. S., at 562; Delaware Valley I, supra, at 565; Blum, supra, at 897; see also Gisbrecht, supra, at 801-802. Indeed, we have said that the presumption is a “strong” one. Dague, supra, at 562; Delaware Valley I, supra, at 565.

Third, although we have never sustained an enhancement of a lodestar amount for performance, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12, 17, we have repeatedly said that enhancements may be awarded in “ ‘rare’ ” and “ ‘exceptional’” circumstances. Delaware Valley I, supra, at 565; Blum, supra, at 897; Hensley, supra, at 435.

*553Fourth, we have noted that “the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee,” Delaware Valley I, supra, at 566, and have held that an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that is subsumed in the lodestar calculation, see Dague, supra, at 562-563; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U. S. 711, 726-727 (1987) (Delaware Valley II) (plurality opinion); Blum, 465 U. S., at 898. We have thus held that the novelty and complexity of a case generally may not be used as a ground for an enhancement because these factors “presumably [are] fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel.” Ibid. We have also held that the quality of an attorney’s performance generally should not be used to adjust the lodestar “[b]ecause considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate.” Delaware Valley I, supra, at 566.

Fifth, the burden of proving that an enhancement is necessary must be borne by the fee applicant. Dague, supra, at 561; Blum, 465 U. S., at 901-902.

Finally, a fee applicant seeking an enhancement must produce “specific evidence” that supports the award. Id., at 899, 901 (An enhancement must be based on “evidence that enhancement was necessary to provide fair and reasonable compensation”). This requirement is essential if the lodestar method is to realize one of its chief virtues, i. e., providing a calculation that is objective and capable of being reviewed on appeal.

IV

A

In light of what we have said in prior cases, we reject any contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. The lodestar method was never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances. In*554stead, there is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.

B

In this case, we are asked to decide whether either the quality of an attorney’s performance or the results obtained are factors that may properly provide a basis for an enhancement. We treat these two factors as one. When a plaintiff’s attorney achieves results that are more favorable than would have been predicted based on the governing law and the available evidence, the outcome may be attributable to superior performance and commitment of resources by plaintiff’s counsel. Or the outcome may result from inferior performance by defense counsel, unanticipated defense concessions, unexpectedly favorable rulings by the court, an unexpectedly sympathetic jury, or simple luck. Since none of these latter causes can justify an enhanced award, superior results are relevant only to the extent it can be shown that they are the result of superior attorney performance. Thus, we need only consider whether superior attorney performance can justify an enhancement. And in light of the principles derived from our prior cases, we inquire whether there are circumstances in which superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account in the lodestar calculation. We conclude that there are a few such circumstances but that these circumstances are indeed “rare” and “exceptional,” and require specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been “adequate to attract competent counsel,” Blum, supra, at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, an enhancement may be appropriate where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attor*555ney’s true market value, as demonstrated in part during the litigation.5 This may occur if the hourly rate is determined by a formula that takes into account only a single factor (such as years since admission to the bar)6 or perhaps only a few similar factors. In such a case, an enhancement may be appropriate so that an attorney is compensated at the rate that the attorney would receive in cases not governed by the federal fee-shifting statutes. But in order to provide a calculation that is objective and reviewable, the trial judge should adjust the attorney’s hourly rate in accordance with specific proof linking the attorney’s ability to a prevailing market rate.

Second, an enhancement may be appropriate if the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted. As Judge Carnes noted below, when an attorney agrees to represent a civil rights plaintiff who cannot afford to pay the attorney, the attorney presumably understands that no reimbursement is likely to be received until the successful resolution of the case, 532 F. 3d, at 1227, and therefore enhancements to compensate for delay in reimbursement for expenses must be reserved for unusual eases. In such exceptional cases, however, an enhancement may be allowed, but the amount of the enhancement must be calculated using a method that is reasonable, objective, and capable of being reviewed on appeal, such as by applying a standard rate of interest to the qualifying outlays of expenses.

*556Third, there may be extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees. An attorney who expects to be compensated under § 1988 presumably understands that payment of fees will generally not come until the end of the case, if at all. See ibid. Compensation for this delay is generally made “either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274, 282 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we do not rule out the possibility that an enhancement may be appropriate where an attorney assumes these costs in the face of unanticipated delay, particularly where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense. In such a case, however, the enhancement should be calculated by applying a method similar to that described above in connection with exceptional delay in obtaining reimbursement for expenses.

We reject the suggestion that it is appropriate to grant performance enhancements on the ground that departures from hourly billing are becoming more common. As we have noted, the lodestar was adopted in part because it provides a rough approximation of general billing practices, and accordingly, if hourly billing becomes unusual, an alternative to the lodestar method may have to be found. However, neither respondents nor their amici contend that that day has arrived. Nor have they shown that permitting the award of enhancements on top of the lodestar figure corresponds to prevailing practice in the general run of cases.

We are told that, under an increasingly popular arrangement, attorneys are paid at a reduced hourly rate but receive a bonus if certain specified results are obtained, and this practice is analogized to the award of an enhancement such as the one in this case. Brief for Respondents 55-57. The analogy, however, is flawed. An attorney who agrees, at the outset of the representation, to a reduced hourly rate in exchange for the opportunity to earn a performance bonus is *557in a position far different from an attorney in a § 1988 case who is compensated at the full prevailing rate and then seeks a performance enhancement in addition to the lodestar amount after the litigation has concluded. Reliance on these comparisons for the purposes of administering enhancements, therefore, is not appropriate.

V

In the present case, the District Court did not provide proper justification for the large enhancement that it awarded. The court increased the lodestar award by 75% but, as far as the court’s opinion reveals, this figure appears to have been essentially arbitrary. Why, for example, did the court grant a 75% enhancement instead of the 100% increase that respondents sought? And why 75% rather than 50% or 25% or 10%?

The District Court commented that the enhancement was the “minimum enhancement of the lodestar necessary to reasonably compensate [respondents’] counsel.” 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 1290. But the effect of the enhancement was to increase the top rate for the attorneys to more than $866 per hour,7 and the District Court did not point to anything in the record that shows that this is an appropriate figure for the relevant market.

The District Court pointed to the fact that respondents’ counsel had to make extraordinary outlays for expenses and *558had to wait for reimbursement, id., at 1288, but the court did not calculate the amount of the enhancement that is attributable to this factor. Similarly, the District Court noted that respondents’ counsel did not receive fees on an ongoing basis while the case was pending, but the court did not sufficiently link this factor to proof in the record that the delay here was outside the normal range expected by attorneys who rely on § 1988 for the payment of their fees or quantify the disparity. Nor did the court provide a calculation of the cost to counsel of any extraordinary and unwarranted delay. And the court’s reliance on the contingency of the outcome contravenes our holding in Dague. See 505 U. S., at 565.

Finally, insofar as the District Court relied on a comparison of the performance of counsel in this case with the performance of counsel in unnamed prior cases, the District Court did not employ a methodology that permitted meaningful appellate review. Needless to say, we do not question the sincerity of the District Court’s observations, and we are in no position to assess their accuracy. But when a trial judge awards an enhancement on an impressionistic basis, a major purpose of the lodestar method — providing an objective and reviewable basis for fees, see id., at 566 — is undermined.

Determining a “reasonable attorney’s fee” is a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge, see 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (permitting court, “in its discretion,” to award fees), but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited. It is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination, including any award of an enhancement. Unless such an explanation is given, adequate appellate review is not feasible, and without such review, widely disparate awards may be made, and awards may be influenced (or at least, may appear to be influenced) by a judge’s subjective opinion regarding particular attorneys or the importance of the case. In addition, in future cases, *559defendants contemplating the possibility of settlement will have no way to estimate the likelihood of having to pay a potentially huge enhancement. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 7 (1985) C“[M]any a defendant would be unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it exposed to liability for attorney’s fees in whatever amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff’”).

Section 1988 serves an important public purpose by making it possible for persons without means to bring suit to vindicate their rights. But unjustified enhancements that serve only to enrich attorneys are not consistent with the statute’s aim.8 In many cases, attorney’s fees awarded under § 1988 are not paid by the individuals responsible for the constitutional or statutory violations on which the judgment is based. Instead, the fees are paid in effect by state and local taxpayers, and because state and local governments have limited budgets, money that is used to pay attorney’s fees is money that cannot be used for programs that provide vital public services. Cf. Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. 433, 448 (2009) (payment of money pursuant to a federal-court order diverts funds from other state or local programs).

*560* * *

For all these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kennedy,

concurring.

If one were to ask an attorney or a judge to name the significant cases of his or her career, it would be unsurprising to find the list includes a case then being argued or just decided. When immersed in a case, lawyers and judges find within it a fascination, an intricacy, an importance that transcends what the detached observer sees. So the pending or just completed case will often seem extraordinary to its participants. That is the dynamic of the adversary system, the system that so well serves the law.

It is proper for the Court today to reject the proposition that all enhancements are barred; still, it must be understood that extraordinary cases are presented only in the rarest circumstances.

With these comments, I join in full the opinion of the Court.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

Nearly 30 years ago, a group of attorneys sought a fee award under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 after “achiev[ing] only limited success” litigating their clients’ constitutional claims. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 431 (1983). This Court’s opinion resolving their claim for fees observed that “in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award” of attorney’s fees under § 1988 “may be justified.” Id., at 435 (emphasis added). That observation plainly was dictum, but one year later this Court relied on it to reject the “argument that an ‘upward adjustment’ ” to the lodestar calculation “is never permissible.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 897 (1984). Yet “we have never sustained an enhancement of a *561a lodestar amount for performance,” ante, at 552, and our jurisprudence since Blum has charted “a decisional arc that bends decidedly against enhancements,” 532 F. 3d 1209, 1221 (CA11 2008) (Carnes, J.). See also ante, at 552-553.

Today the Court holds, consistent with Hensley and Blum, that a lodestar fee award under § 1988 may be enhanced for attorney performance in a “few” circumstances that “are indeed ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional.’” Ante, at 554. But careful readers will observe the precise limitations that the Court imposes on the availability of such enhancements. See ante, at 554-557; see also ante, at 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t must be understood that extraordinary cases are presented only in the rarest circumstances”). These limitations preserve our prior cases and advance our attorney’s fees jurisprudence further along the decisional arc that Judge Carnes described. I agree with the Court’s approach and its conclusion because, as the Court emphasizes, see ante, at 553, the lodestar calculation will in virtually every case already reflect all indicia of attorney performance relevant to a fee award.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider “whether the calculation of an attorney’s fee” that is “based on the ‘lodestar,’” ante, at 546 (opinion of the Court), can “ever be enhanced based solely on [the] quality of [the lawyers’] performance and [the] results obtained,” Pet. for Cert. i (emphasis added). The Court answers that question in the affirmative. See ante, at 546 (“We have stated in previous cases that such an increase is permitted in extraordinary circumstances, and we reaffirm that rule”); see also ante, p. 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As our prior precedents make clear, the lodestar calculation “does not end the [fee] inquiry” because there “remain other considerations that may lead *562the district court to adjust the fee upward.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 434 (1983). For that reason, “[t]he lodestar method was never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances.” Ante, at 553. Instead, as the Court today reaffirms, when “superior attorney performance,” ante, at 554, leads to “exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified,” Hensley, supra, at 435; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546, 565 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 896-900 (1984). I agree with that conclusion.

Where the majority and I part ways is with respect to a question that is not presented, but that the Court obliquely, and in my view inappropriately, appears to consider nonetheless — namely, whether the lower courts correctly determined in this case that exceptional circumstances justify a lodestar enhancement. See Parts IV-V, ante; see also ante, p. 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I would not reach that issue, which lies beyond the narrow question that we agreed to consider. See 556 U. S. 1165 (2009) (limiting review to the first question presented); Pet. for Cert. i (stating question); see also Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 205 (2001) (“As a general rule ... we do not decide issues outside the questions presented... ”). Nor do I believe that this Court, which is twice removed from the litigation underlying the fee determination, is properly suited to resolve the fact-intensive inquiry that 42 U. S. C. § 1988 demands. But even were I to engage in that inquiry, I would hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding an enhancement. And I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As the Court explains, the basic question that must be resolved when considering an enhancement to the lodestar is whether the lodestar calculation “adequately measured] ” an attorney’s “value,” as “demonstrated” by his performance “during the litigation.” Ante, at 554-555. While I understand the need for answering that question through the appli*563cation of standards, I also believe that the answer inevitably involves an element of judgment. Moreover, when reviewing a district court’s answer to that question, an appellate court must inevitably give weight to the fact that a district court is better situated to provide that answer. For it is the district judge, and only the district judge, who will have read all of the motions filed in the case, witnessed the proceedings, and been able to evaluate the attorneys’ overall performance in light of the objectives, context, legal difficulty, and practical obstacles present in the case. In a word, the district judge will have observed the attorneys’ true “value, as demonstrated .. . during the litigation.” Ante, at 555 (emphasis added). By contrast, a court of appeals, faced with a cold and perhaps lengthy record, will inevitably have less time and opportunity to determine whether the lawyers have done an exceptionally fine job. And this Court is yet less suited to performing that inquiry. Accordingly, determining whether a fee enhancement is warranted in a given case “is a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge,” ante, at 558, and the function of appellate courts is to review that judge’s determination for an abuse of such discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 571 (1988); see also General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 143 (1997) (“[Deference ... is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review”).

This case well illustrates why our tiered and functionally specialized judicial system places the task of determining an attorney’s fee award primarily in the district court’s hands. The plaintiffs’ lawyers spent eight years investigating the underlying facts, developing the initial complaint, conducting court proceedings, and working out final relief. The District Court’s docket, with over 600 entries, consists of more than 18,000 pages. Transcripts of hearings and depositions, along with other documents, have produced a record that fills 20 large boxes. Neither we, nor an appellate panel, can easily read that entire record. Nor should we attempt to *564second-guess a district judge who is aware of the many intangible matters that the written page eannot reflect.

My own review of this expansive record cannot possibly be exhaustive. But those portions of the record I have reviewed lead me to conclude, like the Court of Appeals, that the District Judge did not abuse his discretion when awarding an enhanced fee. I reach this conclusion based on four considerations.

First, the record indicates that the lawyers’ objective in this case was unusually important and fully consistent with the central objectives of the basic federal civil-rights statute, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Moreover, the problem the attorneys faced demanded an exceptionally high degree of skill and effort. Specifically, these lawyers and their clients sought to have the State of Georgia reform its entire foster-care system — a system that much in the record describes as well below the level of minimal constitutional acceptability. The record contains investigative reports, mostly prepared by Georgia’s own Office of the Child Advocate, which show, for example, the following:

• The State’s foster-care system was unable to provide essential medical and mental health services; children consequently and unnecessarily suffered illness and lifelong medical disabilities, such as permanent hearing loss, due to failures on the part of the State to administer basic care and antibiotics. See, e. g., Doc. 3, Exh. 3C, pp. 11-13.

• Understaffing and improper staffing placed children in the care of individuals with dangerous criminal records; children were physically assaulted by the staff, locked outside of the shelters at night as punishment, and abused in other ways. See, e. g., Doc. 50, pp. 32-36, 55; Doc. 3, Exh. BA, pp. 2-6; Doc. 3, Exh. 2, pp. 4-5; Doc. 52, Exh. 1, pp. 6, 12-15, 34.

*565• The shelters themselves were “unsanitary and dilapidated,” “unclean,” infested with rats, “overcrowded,” unsafe, and “‘out of control.’” See, e. g., Doc. 3, Exh. 3A, at 1-2; Doc. 3, Exh. 3B, p. 2; Doc. 50, at 29.

• Due to improper supervision and other deficiencies at the shelters, 20% of the children abused drugs; some also became victims of child prostitution. See id., at 39; Doc. 3, Exh. 3A, at 3.

• Systemic failures also caused vulnerable children to suffer regular beatings and sexual abuse, including rape, at the hands of more aggressive shelter residents. See, e. g., Doc. 50, at 18-22, 54-55; Doc. 52, Exh. 1, at 7-10,26; Doc. 3, Exh. 3B, at 3 (“[A child] was beaten so badly by eight other [children] that he suffered severe internal bleeding”); id., at 4 (describing violent sexual assault and rape).

• Not surprisingly, many children — upwards of 5 per day and over 750 per year — tried to escape these conditions; others tried to commit suicide. See, e. g., Doc. 50, at 27-28, 54; Doc. 52, Exh. 18, p. 4 (under seal) (at least 25% of children run away from shelters); Doc. 52, Exh. 18E, pp. 1-11,18-19 (under seal) (daily logs); see also Doe. 50, Exh. 1, pp. 37,54 (describing suicide attempts) (all docket entries above and hereinafter refer to No. l:Q2-cv-1686 (ND Ga.) (case below)).

The State’s Office of the Child Advocate, whose reports provide much of the basis for the foregoing description, concluded that the system was “operating in crisis mode” and that any private operator who ran such a system “would never be licensed to care for children.” Office of the Child Advocate for the Protection of Children Annual Rep. 10,14 (2001), Record, Doe. 3, Exh. 3C (hereinafter OCA 2001 Rep.); accord, id., Exh. 3A, at 1. The advocate noted that neither her investigative reports nor national news publicity (including a television program that highlighted a 5-year-old foster *566child’s death from beatings) had prompted corrective action by the State. OCA 2001 Rep. 1,14.

The advocate further stated that litigation was necessary to force reform. Id., at 14-15. And she repeatedly asked the State to give her office the authority to conduct that litigation. See Office of the Child Advocate Advisory Committee, Annual Effectiveness Rep. 4 (2002), online at http://www. georgia.gov/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/7/22/84622967effective ness2003.pdf (all Internet materials as visited Apr. 16, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (“[F]or the Office to be truly effective, it must possess the authority to compel change [and] ... to initiate litigation on behalf of children. Such authority is widely considered by other states’ Child Advocates as crucial to effecting meaningful change for children”); Office of the Child Advocate Advisory Committee, Annual Effectiveness Rep. 13 (2003-2004), online at http://gachildadvocate.org/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/48/16/ 846247610CA_Effectiveness_Report2003_2004.doc (same); Office of the Child Advocate Advisory Committee, Annual Effectiveness Rep. 11 (2004-2005), online at http://www. georgia.gov/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/31/23/102387685OCA %20Effectiveness%20Report%202004-2005.doc (same). But the State did not grant the child advocate’s office the litigating authority she sought. See 2000 Ga. Laws p. 245, as codified, Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-173 (2008).

The upshot is that the plaintiffs’ attorneys did what the child advocate could not do: They initiated this lawsuit. They thereby assumed the role of “a ‘private attorney general’ ” by filling an enforcement void in the State’s own legal system, a function “that Congress considered of the highest priority,” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam), and “meant to promote in enacting § 1988,” Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782, 793 (1989).

Second, the course of the lawsuit was lengthy and arduous. The plaintiffs and their lawyers began with factual investiga*567tions beyond those which the child advocate had already conducted. See, e.g., Record, Docs. 50-52 (partially under seal). They then filed suit. And the State met the plaintiffs’ efforts with a host of complex procedural, as well as substantive, objections. The State, for example, argued that the law forbade the plaintiffs to investigate the shelters; on the eve of a state-court decision that might have approved the investigations, the State then removed the case to federal court; the State then sought protective orders preventing the attorneys from speaking to the shelters’ staff; and, after losing its motions, the State delayed to the point where the District Court “was forced to admonish [the] State Defendants for ‘relying on technical legal objections to discovery requests in order to delay and hinder the discovery process.’” 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1268 (ND Ga. 2006) (quoting Record, Doc. 145, p. 4). See also Record, Doc. 1; id., Doe. 3, pp. 9-10; id., Docs. 26, 28-29,44, 60.

In the meantime, the State moved for dismissal, basing the motion on complex legal doctrines such as Younger abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which the District Court found inapplicable. 218 F. R. D. 277, 284-290 (ND Ga. 2003). See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923); and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). The State also opposed the petitioners’ request to certify a class of the 3,000 children in foster care, but the District Court again rejected the State’s argument. 218 F. R. D., at 299-302. And, after that, the State filed a lengthy motion for summary judgment, Record, Docs. 243-245, which plaintiffs’ attorneys opposed in thorough briefing supported by comprehensive exhibits, see id., Docs. 254-258, 260. After losing that motion and eventually agreeing to mediation, the State forced protracted litigation as to who should be the mediator. See id., Docs. 363-364, 366, 369-370, 373, 376, 380. All told, in opposing the plaintiffs’ efforts to have the foster-care system reformed, the State spent $2.4 million on *568outside counsel (who, because they charge the State reduced rates, worked significantly more hours than that figure alone indicates) and tapped its own law department for an additional 5,200 hours of work. 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 1287.

Third, in the face of this opposition, the results obtained by the plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have been exceptional. The 47-page consent decree negotiated over the course of the mediation sets forth 31 specific steps that the State will take in order to address the specific deficiencies of the sort that I described above. See id., at 1289; see also App. 92-207 (consent decree). And it establishes a reporting and oversight mechanism that is backed up by the District Court’s enforcement authority. See 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 1289. As a result of the decree, the State agreed to comprehensive reforms of its foster-care system, to the benefit of children in many different communities. And informed observers have described the decree as having brought about significant positive results. See, e. g., Record, Doc. 632, p. 4 (most recent court-appointed overseers’ report) (“The State’s overall performance . . . continues the trend of steady improvement. . . ”); id., at 4-10 (detailing substantial health, safety, and welfare improvements); see also Office of the Child Advocate Ann. Report (2008), Letter from Tom C. Rawlings, Director, Office of Child Advocate, to Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia (Jan. 16, 2009), online at http://oca.georgia.gov/vgn/images/ portal/cit_1210/48/0/1314080080CA%202008%20Annual%20 Report.pdf (“[W]e are generally pleased with the direction of our state’s child welfare system . . . ”); cf. Weinstein & Weinstein, Before It’s Too Late: Neuropsychological Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 561, 590-591 (2000) (describing in general the broad social impact of dysfunctional child-welfare systems (quoting National Institutes of Health, Research on Child Neglect (1999), online at http:// grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-OD -99-006.html)). *569But see Record, Doc. 632, at 10-13 (noting areas in which Georgia’s system still needs improvement).

Fourth and finally, the District Judge, who supervised these proceedings, who saw the plaintiffs amass, process, compile, and convincingly present vast amounts of factual information, who witnessed their defeat of numerous state procedural and substantive motions, and who was in a position to evaluate the ultimate mediation effort, said:

1. The “mediation effort in this case went far beyond anything that this Court has seen in any previous case,” 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 1282;

2. “[Biased on its personal observation of plaintiffs’ counsel’s performance throughout this litigation, the Court finds that... counsel brought a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism to this litigation than the Court has seen displayed by the attorneys in any other case during its 27 years on the bench,” id., at 1288-1290;

3. The Consent Decree “provided extraordinary benefits to the plaintiff class____” Id., at 1282. “[T]he settlement achieved by plaintiffs’ counsel is comprehensive in its scope and detailed in its coverage. . . . After 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved sueh a favorable result on such a comprehensive scale,” id., at 1289-1290.

Based on these observations and on its assessment of the attorneys’ performance during the course of the litigation, the District Court concluded that “the evidence establishes that the quality of service rendered by class counsel... was far superior to what consumers of legal services in the legal marketplace . . . could reasonably expect to receive for the rates used in the lodestar calculation.” Id., at 1288.

On the basis of what I have read, I believe that assessment was correct. I recognize that the ordinary lodestar calcula*570tion yields a large fee award. But by my assessment, the lodestar calculation in this case translates to an average hourly fee per attorney of $249. See id., at 1287 (lodestar calculation and attorney hours). (The majority’s reference to an hourly fee of $866, ante, at 557, refers to the rate associated with the single highest paid of the 17 attorneys under the enhanced fee, not the average hourly rate under the lodestar. The lay reader should also bear in mind that a lawyer’s “fee” is substantially greater than his “profit,” given that attorneys must sometimes cover case-specific costs (which in this case exceeded $800,000, see 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 1291) and also must cover routine overhead expenses, which typically consume 40% of their fees, see Altman Weil Publications, Inc., Survey of Law Firm Economics 80 (2007 ed.).)

At $249 per hour, the lodestar would compensate this group of attorneys — whom the District Court described as extraordinary — at a rate lower than the average rate charged by attorneys practicing law in the State of Georgia, where the average hourly rate is $268. See id., at 89. Accordingly, even the majority would seem to acknowledge that some form of an enhancement is appropriate in this case. See ante, at 554-555 (“[A]n enhancement may be appropriate where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value, as demonstrated in part during the litigation”). Indeed, the fact that these exceptional results were achieved in a case where “much of the work,” ante, at 557, n. 7, was performed by relatively inexperienced attorneys (who, accordingly, would be compensated by the lodestar “below the market average,” ibid.) is all the more reason to think that their service rendered their outstanding performance worthy of an enhancement. By comparison, the District Court’s enhanced award — a special one-time adjustment unique to this exceptional case — would compensate these attorneys, on this one occasion, at an average hourly rate of $435, which is comparable to the rates *571charged by the Nation’s leading law firms on average on every occasion. See Firm-by-Firm Sampling of Billing Rates Nationwide, National Law Journal, Dec. 11,2006, p. S2 (listing 13 firms at which áverage hourly rate is between $400 and $510); Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. Corp. L. 95, 110, n. 58 (2007) (“These numbers are probably an underestimate given that many of the highest-billing national law firms decline to take part in the National Law Journal Survey”). Thus, it would appear that the enhanced award is wholly consistent with the purpose of §1988, which was enacted to ensure that “counsel for prevailing parties [are] paid as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 9 (1976) (“[C]ivil rights plaintiffs should not be singled out for different and less favorable treatment”); see also Blum, 465 U. S., at 893, 897.

In any event, the circumstances I have listed likely make this a “rare” or “exceptional” case warranting an enhanced fee award. And they certainly make clear that it was neither unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reach that conclusion. Indeed, if the facts and circumstances that I have described are even roughly correct, then it is fair to ask: If this is not an exceptional case, what is?

* * *

My disagreement with the Court is limited. As I stated at the outset, we are in complete agreement with respect to the answer to the question presented: “[A]n increase” to the lodestar “due to superior performance and results” “is permitted in extraordinary circumstances.” Ante, at 546. Unlike Justice Thomas, I do not read the Court’s opinion to “advance our attorney’s fees jurisprudence further along the decisional arc” toward a point where enhancements are “virtually” barred in all cases. Ante, at 561 (concurring opinion). Our prior cases make clear that enhancements are *572permitted in “‘exceptional’ cases,” Delaware Valley, 478 U. S., at 565, where the attorney achieves “exceptional success,” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 435; see also Blum, supra, at 896-901. By definition, such exceptional circumstances occur only rarely. See ante, p. 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I do not see how the Court could “advance” our fee enhancement jurisprudence so as to farther discourage lodestar enhancements without overruling the precedents I have just cited, which the Court has not done. To the contrary, today the Court “reafftrm[s]” those precedents, which allow enhancements for exceptional performance. Ante, at 546. And with respect to that central holding we are unanimous.

Nor is my disagreement with the Court absolute with respect to the proper resolution of the case before us, for the Court does not purport to prohibit the District Court from awarding an enhanced fee on remand if that court provides more detailed reasoning supporting its decision. Ante, at 557; cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47. But the majority and I do disagree in this respect: I would not disturb the judgment below. “A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 437. Nor should it lead to years of protracted appellate review. See id., at 455-456 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We did not grant certiorari in this case to consider the fact-intensive dispute over whether this is, in fact, an exceptional case that merits a lodestar enhancement. The District Court has already resolved that question, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment, having found no abuse of discretion. I would have been content to resolve no more than the question presented. But, even were I to follow the Court’s inclination to say more, I would hold that the principles upon which we agree — including the applicability of abuse-of-diseretion review to a District Court’s fee determination — require us to affirm the judgment below