JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

This case involves a unique question arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 That question is whether a charge filed pursuant to § 704(a) of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a)) prohibits an employer from discharging an *1000employee for having made false statements in a request for reconsideration of his case before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming racial discrimination against him and fellow Negro employees. The District Court, finding that the statement was not privileged, upheld the discharge and refused to grant relief to the discharged employee. We reverse. Appellant here, Peter Wrenn, a Negro, had been employed by Employer, American Cast Iron Pipe Co. of Birmingham, Alabama, for some 17 years at the time of his discharge in September 1967.' The Employer was willed in trust to the employees by its founder in 1924. The stock was left to a Board of Management and a Board of Operatives. Membership on the Board of Operatives and the Board of Management is limited to white male employees. Another board, called the Auxiliary Board, is limited to Negro male employees. The Auxiliary Board does not have a meaningful voice in matters of management but exists solely for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the Board of Operatives matters which affect Negro employees. Employer employs some 2700 employees, of whom 790 are Negro. None of the employees are represented by a labor organization. There are 12 members on the Auxiliary Board and 12 on the Board of Operatives. Each member serves for a 2-year term and 6 new members are elected each year. The race lines are preserved throughout. Only Negro employees vote for members of the Auxiliary Board and only white employees vote for members of the Board of Operatives. Wrenn, prior to his discharge, had been elected by his fellow Negro employees to serve 2 terms of 2 years each on the Auxiliary Board. He was serving his second 2-year term as a member of the Auxiliary Board and as chairman of that board at the time of his discharge.

The Company has been a contractor with the United States since the effective date of Executive Order No. 10925 signed by President Kennedy, and therefore has been under an obligation since 1961 to undertake an affirmative action program to eliminate discriminatory’employment based on race or to institute affirmative action programs to assure equal employment opportunities to minority groups.2 At least since 1963, Wrenn and other Negro employees have continuously and persistently sought relief from claimed racially discriminatory employment practices of Employer through various appeals to Federal agencies and officials. In November 1963— prior to the availability of Title VII— Wrenn sent a letter to the President of the United States alleging the continuance of serious racial discrimination by Employer. He received a reply from a Mr. Brimm, Chief Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, who came to Birmingham and investigated the charge and subsequently filed a no-eause finding. Wrenn and others continued to petition the President for relief. On March 30, 1965, the Committee For Equal Job Opportunity was organized by a majority of the Negro employees of Employer.

After the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 Wrenn, as Chairman of the Committee For Equal Job Opportunity, in addition to filing on his own behalf, assisted fellow Negro employees in the filing of numerous charges of employment discrimination. Several of those charges, including the one of Wrenn, formed the basis of Pettway 74 recently decided by an*1001other panel of this Court, During the pendency of Pettway I in the Court below, Wrenn was suspended from his job for two weeks because of an alleged altercation with a white employee. In September 1966, Wrenn filed a charge with EEOC alleging that he had been suspended because of his race. In May 1967, Wrenn was advised by EEOC that his charge had been dismissed, because EEOC after investigation had concluded that his suspension did not constitute a violation of Title VII. However, Wrenn was advised that he could submit additional information if he thought EEOC should reconsider its finding. It is the response to this invitation which is at the bottom of the present case. On July 13, 1967, Wrenn, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee For Equal Job Opportunity wrote a letter to Stephens Shulman, Chairman of EEOC stating his objections to the May 1967 no-cause finding, and requesting further investigation.5 EEOC, and later the *1002District Court, treated the letter as a timely filed petition for reconsideration. EEOC forwarded a copy of the letter to the Company in August 1967. On September 5, 1967, an official of Employer summoned Wrenn to his office, and upon ascertaining the authenticity of Wrenn’s signature on the letter, permanently discharged Wrenn for making false and malicious statements about Employer in the letter. On September 13, 1967, Wrenn filed another charge with EEOC alleging that his discharge of September 5 was an act of reprisal for Wrenn’s having previously filed charges of discrimination against Employer and that his discharge was based on discrimination because of his race.6 Wrenn filed a petition in the District Court for injunctive relief on September 15, 1967, as an ancillary matter to Pettway I (No. 24813, see note 4 supra). The District Court concluded that since it had earlier dismissed that ease for lack of jurisdiction, the case was not then pending so it did not have jurisdiction as an ancillary proceeding. However, the Court treated the motion as a new and independent action and after hearing, denied relief on the merits, ruling that the letter constituted serious, false charges and was not privileged.

We must first determine whether the District Court erred in refusing to treat Wrenn’s motion as ancillary to Pettway I. We find that it did. Wrenn’s motion for injunction pending appeal specifically invoked F.R.Civ.P. 62 (c). It plainly asserted that while Pettway I was pending in the District Court, Wrenn had been suspended by Employer for two weeks supposedly because of his involvement in an altercation with another employee, but that his later discharge actually resulted from charges filed with EEOC protesting that suspension, and that both the suspension and discharge were the result of Wrenn’s continuing efforts to seek relief under Title VII from racially discriminatory employment practices assailed in Pettway I. Wrenn sought reinstatement to maintain the status quo pending determination of the question whether, in fact, the Company was in violation of Title VII. Regardless of the District Court’s view concerning the necessity for conciliation efforts before suit could be filed,7 the District Court did have *1003jurisdiction of this motion for injunc-tive relief as ancillary to the case then pending on appeal.

That Pettway I was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, rather than on the intrinsic merits, is a matter of no consequence. Of course, the Trial Court could not, during the pendency of the appeal, take action with respect to the order then under review which would hinder or frustrate8 determination by the Court of Appeals. But the case was a “pending” one, at least in the sense that if, as actually happened, the Court of Appeals differed with the District Court, the case would go back as a viable one from the very date of its filing.9

Several cases10 give strong support to the conclusion that the Trial Court erred in failing to treat the petition as ancillary to Pettway I. Pettway II followed the traditional Title VII pleading seeking an injunction and reinstatement. Pettway II sought relief under F.R.Civ.P. 62(c). It is well settled that 62(c) is expressive of the power in the courts to preserve the status quo pending appeal.11 Once power to act is established, it is equally plain that there was a need for the Trial Court to maintain the status quo and thus avoid the

possibility that Pettway I might become moot as to Wrenn.12

We therefore find that the District Court should have considered the motion as ancillary to Pettway I. Considering that the denial of a preliminary injunction was for nearly all practical purposes the ultimate determination of Wrenn’s case on the merits — maybe as to both Pettway I as well as II — we look upon it in that light, uninsulated by the usual principle that tests a grant or denial of preliminary injunctions in terms of abuse of discretion. Here there were a number of reasons clearly calling for interim protection.

The question of charging party privilege is one of first impression under Title VII. The Employer’s position, as we understand it, is that Wrenn’s allegations contained in his July 13, 1967 letter to EEOC “constitutes a false and malicious accusation that [Employer] bribed or improperly influenced federal officers in the exercise of their official duties.” The Employer maintains that it was knowingly and maliciously libeled and discharged Wrenn for that reason.

Wrenn, on the other hand, makes a dual response. First, he maintains that the allegedly offensive portion of the letter *1004is a mere expression of personal opinion, conjecture, or arguing technique. Second, even if seriously libelous, the real cause for being fired was his prior activities in the civil rights movement within Employer’s operations, not the letter. Wrenn claims that these statements, even if false, are protected under section 704(a) of the Act (42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-3(a)), which clearly states that “it shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees * * * because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-chapter, or because he has made a charge * * * or participated * * * in an investigation, (or) proceeding * * * under the sub-chapter.” We can assume that the Court found the letter was false and inaccurate because there was no evidence to support the bribery charge. However, it is not at all clear that the Court found the letter motivated by malice. The District Court found that Wrenn was discharged for good and sufficient cause in no way motivated by an intention to retaliate for filing and prosecuting discriminatory employment charges, and that the discharge did not constitute an unlawful employment practice under § 704(a).13

It bears repeating, that EEOC, two months later, arrived at exactly the opposite conclusion. See note 6 supra. EEOC declared: “Charging party’s statements were made in the exercise of his right under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to complain to this Commission and to avail himself fully of our power to hear, decide, and attempt to conciliate charges of job discrimination that are within our jurisdiction. * * * Reasonable cause exists to believe that the Respondent discharged Charging Party as an act of reprisal in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as alleged.” 14 There *1005can be no doubt about the purpose of § 704(a). In unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action.

This is particularly required under the machinery set up by Title VII. Unlike so many Governmental structures in administrative law, EEOC is an administrative agency without the power of enforcement. While it can subpoena witnesses, hold hearings, and attempt conciliation, it has no authority to issue orders or compel enforcement. More than that, except for the pattern or practice situation, (§ 707(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(a)), in which the Attorney General may institute suit and intervention by him by leave of the court on the Attorney General’s certification that the ease is of general public importance, either on his own or in response to recommendation of EEOC, (§ 705(g) (6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(f) (6), Government does not enter the litigation. The suit is between private parties. The burden of enforcement rests on the individual through his suit in Federal District Court. But charges must first have been filed with EEOC. Consequently, the filing of charges and the giving of information by employees is essential to the Commission’s administration of Title VII, the carrying out of the congressional policy embodied in the Act and the invocation of the sole sanction of Court compulsion through employee instituted suit. “Whether in name or not, the suit is perforce a sort of class action for fellow employees similarly situated.” Jenkins, supra, 400 F.2d at 33. “When conciliation has failed— either outright or by reason of the expiration of the statutory timetable— that individual, often obscure, takes on the mantel of the sovereign.” Jenkins, supra, 400 F.2d at 32.15 This is often the only way that such issues can be raised — by an individual drafting his charge as best he can without expert legal advice.16 This activity, essential as it is, must be protected. What the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 1964, 379 U.S. 21, 23, 85 S.Ct. 171, 173, 13 L.Ed.2d 1, 4, is certainly true here in a situation in which a single poor, ignorant employee with a grievance, not a sling shot in his hand, faces a huge industrial employer in this modern day David and Goliath confrontation :

“A protected activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in good faith.”

Both EEOC and Employer claim to find support for their view in a close examination of § 8(a) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (a) (4) and § 15(a) (3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 215 (a) (3) as an aid in interpreting § 704 (a) of Title VII.17 While we find the *1006language of Title VII even broader18 than that contained in the NLRA or the FLSA and hold that the courts must protect an individual filing charges with EEOC, we should emphasize that reliance on the Labor Acts for interpretive guidance must necessarily be guarded because the differences between those Acts and Title VII may well outnumber the similarities.19 Notwithstanding these differences, abundant support can be found under such Acts for the conclusion here that protection must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes designed by Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters of employment.20

*1007Congress, in Title VII, as did the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, sought to evaluate and balance the competing interests. On the one hand is the protection of the employer from damage caused by maliciously libelous statements and on the other is protection of the employee from racial and other discrimination. In Title VII Congress sought to protect the employer’s interest by directing that EEOC proceedings be confidential and by imposing severe sanctions against unauthorized disclosure. Sections 706(a), 709(e), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5(a), 2000e-8(e). The balance is therefore struck in favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated protection from invidious discrimination, by protecting his right to file charges.

We hold that where, disregarding the malicious material contained in a charge (or petition for reconsideration, or other communication with EEOC sufficient for EEOC purposes, or in a proceeding before EEOC) the charge otherwise satisfies the liberal requirements of a charge,21 the charging party is exercising a protected right under the Act. He may not be discharged for such writing.22 The employer may not take it on itself to determine the correctness or consequences of it. Nor may the court either sustain any employer disciplinary action or deny relief because of the presence of such malicious material. We do not decide whether a writing purporting to be and to be used as a charge, which does not meet the requisites of a charge such as is required to set the EEOC machinery in operation is protected. We leave that for another day and another court.

This letter (note 5 supra) for reconsideration was a good charge. In Parts [1], [2], [4], and [5] Wrenn, as Chairman of the Committee For Equal Job Opportunity clearly criticizes the internal operations of EEOC. Part [3] is a categorical allegation that Employer is violating the Act and intends to continue to violate the Act. Wrenn, and especially this Committee, were clearly entitled to make these charges. The District Judge did not say that Wrenn could be discharged for making these charges. With Parts [1], [2], [4], and [5] constituting arguably good charges deserving of EEOC investigation and later employee-instituted suit, the price is too high to permit the presence of Part [6] (later claimed or proved to be false or malicious) to allow the Employer to discharge the employee, and worse, throw out all of the charges with the awesome finality of a common-law demurrer. The Employee is not stripped of his protection because he says too much. If he says enough the Employee can suffer no detriment by virtue of having filed charges with EEOC which also contain false or malicious statements. By utilizing EEOC machinery he is exercising a protected right.

Since the Employee was discharged because he filed the charge and his request for reconsideration with EEOC, his discharge was a violation of § 704(a) and he must be reinstated and afforded other appropriate relief including appropriate back pay and such further pro*1008tective orders or injunctions as may be needed.23

The Trial Court found that Wrenn was not discharged by reason of racial discrimination (findings 6 and 9, note 13 supra). The Judge expressly found that he was discharged for having made the false, malicious statement in the charge (findings 4 and 9, conclusion 3, note 13 supra). On the Employer’s own candid story, “when it received knowledge of the making by [Wrenn] of the false and malicious accusations of bribery against it, [Employer] instituted prompt disciplinary action and discharged [Wrenn] for this reason.” 24 That discharge violated § 704(a) of the Act.

The case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

*273Justice Souter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), forbids retaliation by employers against employees who report workplace race or gender discrimination. The question here is whether this protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation. We hold that it does.

I

In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District’s *274employee relations director, Gene Hughes.1 211 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (CA6 2006). When Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, asked petitioner Vicky Crawford, a 30-year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” on the part of Hughes, id., at 374-375, Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior: once, Hughes had answered her greeting, “‘Hey Dr. Hughes, [wjhat’s up?/ ” by grabbing his crotch and saying “ ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’ he had repeatedly “ ‘put his crotch up to [her] window’ and on one occasion he had entered her office and “ ‘grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch/ ” id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported being sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although Metro took no action against Hughes, it did fire Crawford and the two other accusers soon after finishing the investigation, saying in Crawford’s case that it was for embezzlement. Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her report of Hughes’s behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII violation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), followed by this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ibid.

The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). The one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and Crawford accused Metro of violating both.

*275The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro. It held that Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not “instigated or initiated any complaint,” but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else.” Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03-cv-0996 (MD Tenn., Jan. 6,2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. It concluded that her claim also failed under the participation clause, which Sixth Circuit precedent confined to protecting “'an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal investigation . . . where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge’ ” (not the case here). Id., at 15a (emphasis deleted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F. 3d 537, 543 (CA6 2003)).

The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, holding that the opposition clause “'demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant... protection against retaliation,’” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. Appx. 607, 610 (CA6 2004)), whereas Crawford did “not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the investigation, nor did she take any further action following the investigation and prior to her firing,” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. Again like the trial judge, the Court of Appeals understood that Crawford could show no violation of the participation clause because her “ ‘employer’s internal investigation’ ” was not conducted “‘pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.’” Ibid, (quoting Abbott, supra, at 543).

Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those of other Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause, see, e. g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F. 3d 256, 262 (CA7 1996), we granted Crawford’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1162 (2008). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

*276II

The opposition clause makes it “unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate against any... employe[e]... because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful ... by this subchapter.” §2000e-3(a). The term “oppose,” being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979): “[t]o resist or antagonize ...; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1957). Although these actions entail varying expenditures of energy, “resist frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE.” Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “oppose” as “to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion”).

The statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is thus covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee, an answer she says antagonized her employer to the point of sacking her on a false pretense. Crawford’s description of the louche goings-on would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as “resist[ant]” or “antagonistic]” to Hughes’s treatment, if for no other reason than the point argued by the Government and explained by an EEOC guideline: “When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communication” virtually always “constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§8-II-B(l), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399 (2008) (explaining that EEOC compliance manuals “reflect ‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998))). It is true that one can imagine exceptions, like an employee’s description of a supervisor’s racist joke as *277hilarious, but these will be eccentric cases, and this is not one of them.2

The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short of opposition, taking the view that the clause “ ‘demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant. . . protection against retaliation/” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell, supra, at 610), and that an employee must “instigat[e] or initiat[e]” a complaint to be covered, 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. But though these requirements obviously exemplify opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it.

“Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it “opposition” if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by “instigating” action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons. Cf. McDonnell, supra, at 262 (finding employee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where his employer retaliated against him for failing to prevent his subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires *278a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.

Metro and its amici support the Circuit panel’s insistence on “active” and “consistent” opposition by arguing that the lower the bar for retaliation claims, the less likely it is that employers will look into what may be happening outside the executive suite. As they see it, if retaliation is an easy charge when things go bad for an employee who responded to enquiries, employers will avoid the headache by refusing to raise questions about possible discrimination.

The argument is unconvincing, for we think it underestimates the incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998). Ellerth and Faragher hold “[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with ... authority over the employee.” Ellerth, supra, at 765; Faragher, supra, at 807. Although there is no affirmative defense if the hostile environment “culminates in a tangible employment action” against the employee, Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765, an employer does have a defense “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken” if it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any” discriminatory conduct and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” ibid. Employers are thus subject to a strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability. Ibid.; see also Brief for Petitioner 24-28, and nn. 31-35 (citing studies demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discrimi*279natory conduct). The possibility that an employer might someday want to fire someone who might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.

That aside, we find it hard to see why the Sixth Circuit’s rule would not itself largely undermine the Ellerth-Faragher scheme, along with the statute’s “‘primary objective’” of “avoiding] harm” to employees. Faragher, supra, at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417 (1975)). If it were clear law that an employee who reported discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.” Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n. 58 (compiling studies). The appeals court’s rule would thus create a real dilemma for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.” Ellerth, supra, at 765. Nothing in the statute’s text or our precedent supports this catch-22.3

*280Because Crawford’s conduct is covered by the opposition clause, we do not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit misread the participation clause as well. But that does not mean the end of this case, for Metro’s motion for summary judgment raised several defenses to the retaliation charge besides the scope of the two clauses; the District Court never reached these others owing to its ruling on the elements of retaliation, and they remain open on remand.

Ill

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito,

with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.

The question in this case is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), prohibits retaliation against an employee who testifies in an internal investigation of alleged sexual harass*281ment. I agree with the Court that the “opposition clause” of § 2000e-3(a) (2000 ed.) prohibits retaliation for such conduct. I also agree with the Court’s primary reasoning, which is based on “the point argued by the Government and explained by an [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)] guideline: When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in ... a form of employment discrimination, that communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.’” Ante, at 276. I write separately to emphasize my understanding that the Court’s holding does not and should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal investigations or engage in analogous purposive conduct.

As the Court concludes, the term “oppose” does not denote conduct that necessarily rises to the level required by the Sixth Circuit — i. e., conduct that is “ ‘consistent’ ” and “instigated or initiated” by the employee. 211 Fed. Appx. 373, 376 (2006). The primary definitions of the term “oppose” do, however, require conduct that is active and purposive. See Webster’s New International Dictionary 1709-1710 (2d ed. 1953); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1010 (1966) (hereinafter Random Diet.); 10 Oxford English Dictionary 866-867 (2d ed. 1989). For example, the first three definitions of the term in the dictionary upon which the Court principally relies are as follows:

“1. to act against or provide resistance to; combat. 2. to stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set as an opponent or adversary.” Random Diet. 1359 (2d ed. 1987).

In accordance with these definitions, petitioner contends that the statutory term “oppose” means “taking action (including making a statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct unlawful discrimination.” Brief for Petitioner 40.

In order to decide the question that is before us, we have no need to adopt a definition of the term “oppose” that is *282broader than the definition that petitioner advances. But in dicta, the Court notes that the fourth listed definition in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language goes further, defining “oppose” to mean “ ‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion” Ante, at 276 (emphasis added). Thus, this definition embraces silent opposition.

While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term “oppose,” the term is not always used in this sense, and it is questionable whether silent opposition is covered by the opposition clause of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). It is noteworthy that all of the other conduct protected by this provision— making a charge, testifying, or assisting or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing — requires active and purposive conduct. “ ‘That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.’” S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 378 (2006) (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371 (1994)).

An interpretation of the opposition clause that protects conduct that is not active and purposive would have important practical implications. It would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their employers. To be sure, in many cases, such employees would not be able to show that management was aware of their opposition and thus would not be able to show that their opposition caused the adverse actions at issue. But in other cases, such employees might well be able to create a genuine factual issue on the question of causation. Suppose, for example, that an employee alleges that he or she expressed opposition while informally chatting with a co-worker at the proverbial water cooler or in a workplace telephone conversation that was overheard by a co-worker. Or suppose that an employee alleges that such a conversation occurred after work at a restaurant or tavern frequented by co-workers or at a neighborhood picnic attended by a friend or relative of a supervisor.

*283Some courts hold that an employee asserting a retaliation claim can prove causation simply by showing that the adverse employment action occurred within a short time after the protected conduct. See, e. g., Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting that some cases “accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case”); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Cooperative Extension of Schenectady Cty., 252 F. 3d 545, 554 (CA2 2001); Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 121 F. 3d 1390, 1395 (CA10 1997); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Development Co., 28 F. 3d 1446, 1458 (CA7 1994). As a result, an employee claiming retaliation may be able to establish causation simply by showing that, within some time period prior to the adverse action, the employer, by some indirect means, became aware of the views that the employee had expressed. Where the protected conduct consisted of a private conversation, application of this rule would be especially problematic because of uncertainty regarding the point in time when the employer became aware of the employee’s private expressions of disapproval.

The number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has proliferated in recent years. See U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html; Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through FY 1996, http:// www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (as visited Jan. 16, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (showing that retaliation charges filed with the EEOC doubled between 1992 and 2007). An expansive interpretation of protected opposition conduct would likely cause this trend to accelerate.

The question whether the opposition clause shields employees who do not communicate their views to their employers through purposive conduct is not before us in this case; the answer to that question is far from clear; and I do not understand the Court’s holding to reach that issue here. *284For present purposes, it is enough to hold that the opposition clause does protect an employee, like petitioner, who testifies about unlawful conduct in an internal investigation.

*269Pee Curiam.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-3(a), it is unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” In 1997, respondent filed a §2000e-3(a) retaliation claim against petitioner Clark County School District. The claim as eventually amended alleged that petitioner had taken two separate adverse employment actions against her in response to two different protected activities in which she had engaged. The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, No. CV-S-97-365-DWH(RJJ) (D. Nev., Feb. 9, 1999), but a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed over the dissent of Judge Fernandez, No. 99-15522,2000 WL 991821 (July 19, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished), judgt. order reported at 232 F. 3d 893. We grant the writ of certio-rari and reverse.

On October 21, 1994, respondent’s male supervisor met with respondent and another male employee to review the psychological evaluation reports of four job applicants. The report for one of the applicants disclosed that the applicant had once commented to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.” Brief in Opposition 3. At the meeting respondent’s supervisor read the comment aloud, looked at respondent and stated, “I don’t know what that means.” Ibid. The other employee then said, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” and both men chuckled. Ibid. Respondent later complained about the comment to the offending employee, to Assistant Superintendent George Ann Rice, the employee’s supervisor, and to another assistant *270superintendent of petitioner. Her first claim of retaliation asserts that she was punished for these complaints.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied §2000e-3(a) to protect employee “opposition]” not just to practices that are actually “made... unlawful” by Title VII, but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were unlawful. 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (stating that respondent’s opposition was protected “if she had a reasonable, good faith belief that the incident involving the sexually explicit remark constituted unlawful sexual harassment”); Trent v. Valley Electric Assn. Inc., 41 F. 3d 524, 526 (CA9 1994). We have no occasion to rule on the propriety of this interpretation, because even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII.

Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Just three Terms ago, we reiterated, what was plain from our previous decisions, that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is “so ‘severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (Only harassing conduct that is “severe or pervasive” can produce a “constructive alteratio[n] in the terms or conditions of employment”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (Title VII “forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment”). Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, “whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive” must be judged “by ‘looking at all the circumstances,’ including the ‘frequency of the dis*271criminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."' Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 787-788 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1998)). Hence, “[a] recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.' ” Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII’s standard. The ordinary terms and conditions of respondent’s job required her to review the sexually explicit statement in the course of screening job applicants. Her co-workers who participated in the hiring process were subject to the same requirement, and indeed, in the District Court respondent “conceded that it did not bother or upset her” to read the statement in the file. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15 (District Court opinion). Her supervisor’s comment, made at a meeting to review the application, that he did not know what the statement meant; her co-worker’s responding comment; and the chuckling of both are at worst an “isolated inciden[t]” that cannot remotely be considered “extremely serious,” as our eases require, Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788. The holding of the Court of Appeals to the contrary must be reversed.

Besides claiming that she was punished for complaining to petitioner’s personnel about the alleged sexual harassment, respondent also claimed that she was punished for filing charges against petitioner with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing the present suit. Respondent filed her lawsuit on April 1,1997; on April 10,1997, respondent’s supervisor, Assistant Superintendent Rice, “mentioned *272to Allin Chandler, Executive Director of plaintiff’s union, that she was contemplating transferring plaintiff to the position of Director of Professional Development Education,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 11-12 (District Court opinion); and this transfer was “carried through” in May, Brief in Opposition 8. In order to show, as her defense against summary judgment required, the existence of a causal connection between her protected activities and the transfer, respondent “relie[d] wholly on the temporal proximity of the filing of her complaint on April 1,1997 and Rice’s statement to plaintiff’s union representative on April 10,1997 that she was considering transferring plaintiff to the [new] position.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-22 (District Court opinion). The District Court, however, found that respondent did not serve petitioner with the summons and complaint until April 11,1997, one day after Rice had made the statement, and Rice filed an affidavit stating that she did not become aware of the lawsuit until after April 11, a claim that respondent did not challenge. Hence, the court concluded, respondent “ha[d] not shown that any causal connection exists between her protected activities and the adverse employment decision.” Id., at 21.

The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on two facts: The EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter to respondent three months before Rice announced she was contemplating the transfer, and the actual transfer occurred one month after Rice learned of respondent’s suit. 2000 WL 991821, at *3. The latter fact is immaterial in light of the fact that petitioner coneededly was contemplating the transfer before it learned of the suit. Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.

As for the right-to-sue letter: Respondent did not rely on that letter in the District Court and did not mention it in *273her opening brief on appeal. Her demonstration of causality all along had rested upon the connection between the transfer and the filing of her lawsuit — to which connection the letter was irrelevant. When, however, petitioner’s answering brief in the Court of Appeals demonstrated conclusively the lack of causation between the filing of respondent’s lawsuit and Rice’s decision, respondent mentioned the letter for the first time in her reply brief, Reply Brief in No. 99-15522 (CA9) pp. 9-10. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion did not adopt respondent’s utterly implausible suggestion that the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter — an action in which the employee takes no part — is a protected activity of the employee, see 42 U. S. C. §2000e-3(a). Rather, the opinion suggests that the letter provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent’s charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference that the transfer proposal made three months later was petitioner’s reaction to the charge. See 2000 WL 991821, at *3. This will not do.

First, there is no indication that Rice even knew about the right-to-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent. And second, if one presumes she knew about it, one must also presume that she (or her predecessor) knew almost two years earlier about the protected action (filing of the EEOC complaint) that the letter supposedly disclosed. (The complaint had been filed on August 23, 1995, and both Title VII and its implementing regulations require that an employer be given notice within 10 days of filing, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (e)(1); 29 CFR §1601.14 (2000).) The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be “very close,” O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F. 3d 1248, 1253 (CA10 2001). See, e. g., Richmond v. Oneok, Inc., 120 F. 3d 205, 209 (CA10 1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F. 2d 1168, 1174-1175 (CA7 1992) *274(4-month period insufficient). Action taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.

In short, neither the grounds that respondent presented to the District Court, nor the ground she added on appeal, nor even the ground the Court of Appeals developed on its own, sufficed to establish a dispute substantial enough to withstand the motion for summary judgment. The District Court’s granting of that motion was correct. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

OPINION OF THE COURT

[562 U.S. 172]

Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Until 2003, both petitioner Eric Thompson and his fiance, Miriam Re-galado, were employees of respondent North American Stainless (NAS). In February 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS that Regalado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination. Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson.

Thompson then filed a charge with the EEOC. After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he sued NAS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., claiming that NAS had fired him in order to retaliate against Re-galado for filing her charge with the EEOC. The District Court granted summary judgment to NAS, concluding that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (ED Ky. 2006). After a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F.3d 804 (2009). The court reasoned that because Thompson did not “en-gag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,” he “is not included

[562 U.S. 173]

in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action.” Id., at 807-808.

We granted certiorari. 561 U.S. 1041, 130 S. Ct. 3542, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1121 (2010).

I

Title VII provides that “ [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The statute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer committed an unlawful employment practice, and, if the EEOC declines to sue the employer, it permits a civil action to “be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved ... by the alleged unlawful employment practice.” § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1).

It is undisputed that Regalado’s filing of a charge with the EEOC was protected conduct under Title VII. In the procedural posture of this case, we are also required to assume that NAS fired Thompson in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing a charge of discrimination. This case therefore presents two questions: First, did NAS’s firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation? And second, if it did, does Title VII grant Thompson a cause of action?

II

With regard to the first question, we have little difficulty concluding *699that if the facts alleged by Thompson are true, then NAS’s firing of Thompson violated Title VII. In Burlington N.& S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006), we held that Title VII’s antire-taliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct. We reached that conclusion by contrasting the text of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision with its substantive antidiscrimination provision. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin “ ‘with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

[562 U.S. 174]

of employment,’ ” and discriminatory practices that would “ ‘deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.’ ” Id., at 62, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); emphasis deleted). In contrast, Title VIPs antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from “ ‘discriminating] against any of his employees’ ” for engaging in protected conduct, without specifying the employer acts that are prohibited. 548 U.S., at 62, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (quoting § 2000e-3(a); emphasis deleted). Based on this textual distinction and our understanding of the antiretaliation provision’s purpose, we held that “the antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Id., at 64, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345. Rather, Title VIPs antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id., at 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiance would be fired. Indeed, NAS does not dispute that Thompson’s firing meets the standard set forth in Burlington. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. NAS raises the concern, however, that prohibiting reprisals against third parties will lead to difficult line-drawing problems concerning the types of relationships entitled to protection. Perhaps retaliating against an employee by firing his fiance would dissuade the employee from engaging in protected activity, but what about firing an employee’s girlfriend, close friend, or trusted coworker? Applying the Burlington standard to third-party reprisals, NAS argues, will place the employer at risk any time it fires any employee who happens to have a connection to a different employee who filed a charge with the EEOC.

Although we acknowledge the force of this point, we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that third-party reprisals

[562 U.S. 175]

do not violate Title VII. As explained above, we adopted a broad standard in Burlington because Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is worded broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and a preference for clear rules cannot justify departing from statutory text.

We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are unlawful. We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize. As we explained in Burlington, 548 U.S., at 69, 126 S. Ct. 2405, *700165 L. Ed. 2d 345, “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Given the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules. We emphasize, however, that “the provision’s standard forjudging harm must be objective,” so as to “avoi[d] the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiffs unusual subjective feelings.” Id., at 68-69, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345.

Ill

The more difficult question in this case is whether Thompson may sue NAS for its alleged violation of Title VII. The statute provides that “a civil action may be brought... by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Sixth Circuit concluded that this provision was merely a reiteration of the requirement that the plaintiff have Article III standing. 567 F.3d, at 808, n. 1. We do not understand how that can be. The provision unquestionably permits a person “claiming to be aggrieved” to bring “a civil action.” It is arguable that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more than the minimal Article III standing, which consists of injury in fact caused by the defendant

[562 U.S. 176]

and remediable by the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). But Thompson’s claim undoubtedly meets those requirements, so if that is indeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue.

We have suggested in dictum that the Title VII aggrievement requirement conferred a right to sue on all who satisfied Article III standing. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S. Ct. 364, 34 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1972), involved the “person aggrieved” provision of Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act) rather than Title VII. In deciding the case, however, we relied upon, and cited with approval, a Third Circuit opinion involving Title VII, which, we said, “concluded that the words used showed ‘a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’ ” Id., at 209, 93 S. Ct. 364, 34 L. Ed. 2d 415 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (1971)). We think that dictum regarding Title VII was too expansive. Indeed, the Ti'afficante opinion did not adhere to it in expressing its Title VIII holding that residents of an apartment complex could sue the owner for his racial discrimination against prospective tenants. The opinion said that the “person aggrieved” of Title VIII was coextensive with Article III “insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned,” 409 U.S., at 209, 93 S. Ct. 364, 34 L. Ed. 2d 415 (emphasis added). Later opinions, we must acknowledge, reiterate that the term “aggrieved” in Title VIII reaches as far as Article III permits, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165-166, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979), though the holdings of those cases are compatible with the “zone of interests” limitation that we discuss below. In any event, it is Title VII rather than Title VIII that is *701before us here, and as to that we are surely not bound by the Ti'afficante dictum.

We now find that this dictum was ill-considered, and we decline to follow it. If any person injured in the Article III sense by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd consequences

[562 U.S. 177]

would follow. For example, a shareholder would be able to sue a company for firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a consequence. At oral argument Thompson acknowledged that such a suit would not he, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. We agree, and therefore conclude that the term “aggrieved” must be construed more narrowly than the outer boundaries of Article III.

At the other extreme from the position that “person aggrieved” means anyone with Article III standing, NAS argues that it is a term of art that refers only to the employee who engaged in the protected activity. We know of no other context in which the words carry this artificially narrow meaning, and if that is what Congress intended it would more naturally have said “person claiming to have been discriminated against” rather than “person claiming to be aggrieved.” We see no basis in text or prior practice for limiting the latter phrase to the person who was the subject of unlawful retaliation. Moreover, such a reading contradicts the very holding of Ti'afficante, which was that residents of an apartment complex were “person [s] aggrieved” by discrimination against prospective tenants. We see no reason why the same phrase in Title VII should be given a narrower meaning.

In our view there is a common usage of the term “person aggrieved” that avoids the extremity of equating it with Article III and yet is fully consistent with our application of the term in T'afficante. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., authorizes suit to challenge a federal agency by any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute.” § 702. We have held that this language establishes a regime under which a plaintiff may not sue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695

[562 U.S. 178]

(1990). We have described the “zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 399-400, 107 S. Ct. 750, 93 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1987). We hold that the term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495, 118 S. Ct. 927, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), while excluding plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII.

Applying that test here, we conclude that Thompson falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII. Thompson was an employee of NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employ*702ers’ unlawful actions. Moreover, accepting the facts as alleged, Thompson is not an accidental victim of the retaliation—collateral damage, so to speak, of the employer’s unlawful act. To the contrary, injuring him was the employer’s intended means of harming Regalado. Hurting him was the unlawful act by which the employer punished her. In those circumstances, we think Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII. He is a person aggrieved with standing to sue.

The judgment of the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

SEPARATE OPINION

[562 U.S. 179]

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, and add a fortifying observation: Today’s decision accords with the longstanding views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that administers Title VII. In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC counsels that Title VII “prohibit[s] retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuing those rights.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-13 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-11(C)(3) (1998)). Such retaliation “can be challenged,” the Manual affirms, “by both the individual who engaged in protected activity and the relative, where both are employees.” Id., at 25-26 (quoting Compliance Manual § 8-II(B)(3)(c)). The EEOC’s statements in the Manual merit deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944). See Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399-400, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 170 L. Ed. 2d 10 (2008). The EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, I further note, is consistent with interpretations of analogous statutes by other federal agencies. See, e.g., NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088-1089 (CA7 1987) (adopting NLRB’s position that retaliation against a relative violates the National Labor Relations Act); Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-128 (CADC 2001) (same), cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11.